It’s Our History, We Should Tell It
Life After the Algerian War of Independence for Harkis and Pied Noirs
Alexandra Golabek
Abstract: This paper is aimed to understand further why the Harki and Pied Noir role in the Algerian War of Independence is muted as much as it is in history. The perceptions French citizens and government officials held of these two groups, as well as with women, contribute to this silence. Political opportunities for Frenchmen, cultural progress, and a refusal to have their story (which includes their lives and treatment before the war, during, and after) silenced any longer add to their history becoming more common knowledge.
Honor Code: I affirm that I have upheld the highest principles of honesty and integrity in my academic work and have not witnessed a violation of the Honor Code.
Alexandra Golabek Introduction
It is easy for the voice of the victor to be the most commonly accepted interpretation of a history. But, what if the loudest voice is not that of the victor? Who rightfully gets bestowed with the privilege of writing the history of an event, if the more powerful loses, and the more vulnerable, potentially less civilized, wins? In the case of Algeria, this African country won its independence struggle against French colonizers. However, the role of Algeria and its people within this war and their voice are rarely ever exaggerated as much so as that of the French voice. The native Algerians fought against disloyal Algerians and France to gain their independence, yet this struggle is still written about through the lens of the European losers.
It is only recently that the side of the silent voices in this struggle have appeared on the radar of historians and government officials. French colonization and the independence that followed left the people in Algeria with ties to both France and Algeria without a solid, definitive home or identity. These people include the Harkis, native Algerians whose allegiance was pledged alongside that of the French during the war, and the Pied Noirs, a mixture of French,
Spanish, Italian, Maltese and English migrants from the Mediterranean area who were settled in
Algeria for decades, who also were more allied alongside the French during the war. It is difficult to determine whether or not these groups were better or worse off as a result of French withdrawal from colonization. Scholars today, because Harkis and Pied Noirs are coming forth about their role in and after the war, are debating the issue. They appear to be interested in the reasons these minorities are able to come forth and voice their experiences with the war, with ante bellum Algeria, and with their post independence struggle in Algeria or France, respectively. With the increase in attention on these groups, perceptions about them are being examined under a microscope. I argue that the perception of the Harkis and the Pied Noirs
2 is changing because they are acknowledging that their current status and life in the aftermath of the war are poor, and they want their conditions to improve while at the same time receiving the recognition they believe they deserve by France for their roles in the war. Over fifty years have passed since independence was declared, so the French no longer believe imperative to continue the ostracization of these groups, but instead are able to approve of them in their society.
Each historian who writes on a particular historical topic brings his or her own subjectivity to the material. It is important to make note of not only who the author is in terms of their subject field and specialty to understand better their bias, but also when their piece was written and what sources they used to substantiate their own argument about the topic. In the case of the Algerian War of Independence, a conflict that took place between 1954 and 1962, many different historians have studied the people involved in the war and their treatment both during and after the armed struggle. Historians compare firsthand accounts of Pied Noirs,
Harkis, and Algerian Muslim women’s living situations and their own opinions on their statuses, using evidentiary works from these groups prior, during, and after the war. The status of their current social standings in both Algeria and France have peaked the curiosity of many historians.
There is the common theme throughout numerous authors’ writings on this subject that these people’s voices and histories were not created in their own, and therefore these minority groups are now establishing what they regard as their true stories on the historical radar.
Several authors have argued that the sudden resurgence in the information made available to them to create a comprehensive history of these aforementioned people is from either a political opportunity on behalf of the French to secure votes, or that these groups now in the modern day are able to better access their own voice in order to clear up questions and
3 misconceptions about a forgotten war and people that is in fact a crucial aspect of their life story.
Based on the evidence procured through my research, I believe that while these previously mentioned reasons for the reappearance of Harki and Pied Noirs testimony are accurate, I find that these historians are ignoring the interconnectivity of their reasons. Therefore, Harki and
Pied Noirs accounts of their experiences before, during, and after the Algerian War of
Independence are due in result to the cultural progress that is the current state of the world. It has been long enough, fifty-five years to be exact, that there are more outlets for expression, and more people are willing to share their stories with others who are desirous to hear the history of the Harki and Pied Noirs communities.
Background
It is imperative to start with a background of the Algerian War of Independence, and I will try to make this history as neutral as possible in terms of the French, Harki, and Pied Noirs actors and their contributions. In 1830, the French navy captured Algiers, the capital city of
Algeria, which began the 132 years of French colonialism in Algeria.1 At the time of this blockade, the Algerian population numbered 1.5 to 3 million Algerians. During the same period,
Algeria became the destination for hundreds of thousands of European immigrants to settle, who later became known as Pied Noirs, or the Black Feet.2 This identity was made up from French,
Spanish, Italian, Maltese, and English origins. The Pied Noirs can be comparable to the
Americans on Native American soil, with the Pied Noirs stealing the land of the indigenous
1 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Making of the Modern World) (Oxford: University Press, 2012), 8. 2 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 14.
4 Algerians. Throughout this colonization, Algerian Muslims remained a majority, and their desire for more political and economic opportunities led to the initial calls for independence.
The war actually broke out in 1954 on Toussaint Rouge, also known as Red, or Bloody,
Saints Day, where there were numerous attacks on French military and police by the National
Liberation Front, FLN, the nationalist party in Algeria who fought against the French in the war.3
The war was characterized by guerilla warfare and excessive use of torture from both sides.
Although there was an overarching nationalist war for independence, the Algerian War did not hesitate to spur on civil wars between the loyal Algerians and the traitor Algerians, otherwise known as the Harkis, native Algerians who chose to fight alongside the French. In 1960, French
President Charles de Gaulle opened discussions with the Algerians for their independence. With this maneuver, the Pied Noirs believed that de Gaulle would side with them, however after attacking French government offices in Algiers, de Gaulle’s only desire was to put an end to the bloody war as peacefully as possible.4
De Gaulle’s negotiations for independence led to the signing of the Évian Accords in
1962 with the FLN. This declared a ceasefire, the withdrawal of French troops from Algeria, recognition of full sovereignty and a right to self-determination for the Algerian nation, and rights for Pied Noirs. These rights included property rights, religious freedoms, and the choice of citizenship of French or Algerian after three years. A cordial relationship between the French and Algerians was supposed to present itself from this agreement, however that was not the case.5 Prior to this agreement though, the Organisation Armée Secrète, the French Secret Army
3 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 115. 4 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 319. Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem (New York W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1962), 147, 155. 5 Phillip C. Naylor, France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000.
5 Organisation, used terroristic means of torture and bombings to discourage the independence proclamation from being signed. Their efforts, although temporarily persuasive because of the terror they instilled, fell mute. Following the French withdrawal from Algeria, the FLN captured, attacked, tortured, and murdered thousands of Harki and Pied Noirs individuals and families, with both groups attempting to flee in the thousands to France for protection.6 France made little to no acknowledgements of the agreements they were supposed to have kept according to the Évian Accords, and Harki and Pied Noirs refugees became unwanted, unwelcomed outcasts in French society immediately after the war.
It was not until 1999 that President Jacques Chirac began a dialogue for French acknowledgment of the role the Harkis and Pied Noirs played in the Algerian War of
Independence.7 Most history books breeze over this war of decolonization and independence, stopping before the conditions of the Pied Noirs and Harkis after the war are made available to the public. This background is aimed to create a generalized mental image of the war, yet continue deeper into the Harki and Pied Noirs life and conditions after the war and why these negative perceptions of them are changing in today’s world.
The Algeria to the French
To begin, it is imperative to understand the Algerian War of Independence and the role of the Harkis and Pied Noirs from the collective French perspective. Doing so will enhance the efforts made by the Harkis and Pied Noirs to have revisited the most commonly accepted portrayals of the war, and will aid in understanding their desire to alter the history of
6 Naylor, France and Algeria. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000. 7 “Hollande: ‘France turned its back on the harkis’,” The National World, September 26, 2016, http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/hollande-france-turned-its-back-on-the-harkis.
6 textbooks. “On November 1st, 1954, All Saints Day, [General Paul Aussaresses] was still on duty in Paris at the Action Service (Service Action) of the SDECE...That very day a few hundred
Algerians came down from the Aurès Mountains and organized scores of spectacular attacks to start the revolt of what it has been fashionable to refer to since then as the ‘Muslim people’”.8 This event is the most widely accepted start date of the war. Note the negative connotation of religion by General Aussaresses, a now retired French general who published his memoir The Battle of the Casbah, in 2001. A staunch supporter of torture throughout the
Algerian War, his entire memoir courses along the lines of the French justifications for the validity of their torturous actions taken during the war.
In hopes to save the French Union, Pierre Mendès France, a French politician and member of the National Assembly, who was also an unwavering opponent of French colonialism, regardless of his critical position of the repressive policies in Algeria “envisaged a remodeled French Union focused upon Africa”. This included creating “a new relationship with the African territories based on equality, cooperation, and decentralization, albeit one whose evolution was to be controlled by France”.9 He continued that French global power would then be maintained in the face of increasing Soviet, US, and pan-Arab nationalism. “Without a reformed Algeria and French Union France’s great-power status would be gone for ever...It is not only our prestige that is at stake, but also our national independence,” in relation to the control and prominence over North Africa, specifically Algeria.10 Although Mendès France did
8 Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 1. SDECE: Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service). France’s external intelligence agency, with its resources largely dedicated to the Algerian War. Was used to facilitate “the dirty war” against the enemies of the French Republic. Their main targets in Algeria were members of the FLN. 9 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 130. 10 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 130.
7 not agree fully with French colonialism, he remained a steadfast supporter of France’s interests in Algeria and an influential politician whose views affected and influenced others to want the continuation of French domination over colonial Algeria for the betterment of France as a whole.
Accounts portray Algeria in its determined siege of war for independence as violent, aggressive, and wild. When the National Liberation Front is introduced into the history of the war, they are revealed as “the authors of the violence”.11 On FLN pamphlets distributed throughout Algeria, their “Means of Struggle” section is outlined by stating “every means
[necessary] until the realization of our goal,” which is an Algeria in the hands of Algerians, religiously, democratically, and socially. 12 This statement characterizes the FLN as an aggressive, forceful entity who does not hold any regret for violent measures. However, further into the pamphlet, regardless of whether the FLN consciously decided to employ violent tactics throughout the war or not, they did explicitly state that “in return for [the French accepting and respecting their wishes], French cultural and economic interests will be respected, as well as persons and families, [and] all French citizens desiring to remain in Algeria will be allowed to opt for their original nationality, in which case they will be considered foreigners, or for Algerian nationality, in which case they will be considered as Algerians both in rights and duties”.13 The declaration concludes with an acknowledgment by the FLN that France and Algeria, if this is all respected, will be held on the same equal playing field, and mutual respect would be fostered between the two.14
There is a conscious decision on the part of the French or European authors who have written the history of this war to have chosen to create a generalized persona of Algerians as
11 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 114. 12 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 116. 13 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 116. 14 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 116.
8 violent, wild people. The overarching identity that France created for Algeria and the war itself aid in how difficult it was for those involved in the war to be accepted into France for safety at the ceasefire. Typified as savages, the French community after the war deemed it necessary to
“exercise vigilance over the harkis lest they be recruited into the FLN or OAS [the French Secret
Army Organisation]”.15 From this, one understands that these stereotypes continued into the refugee movement. Harkis and Pied Noirs were at a disadvantage to gain any recognition from the French for the role they played in the war due to this negative collective Algerian identity.
Although specifically the Pied Noirs were not necessarily considered Algerians before or during the war, they were not easily and readily welcomed into France after independence either because they were not “pure blood” French. Some had never set foot in France before, having been born in Algeria, yet still considered their national identity to be that of France. This issue of national identity and a refusal of the outsider created reason for the Harki and Pied Noirs role in the war and treatment to come to light in the present day.
The overarching depiction of the Algerian War of Independence, when written with most acknowledgement of France and the collective acknowledgement of Algeria, omits the inclusion the way of life that was left for the actors involved in the struggle that are not “French” and only
French. The losers in this battle have for decades been the only ones who were capable of writing a history of this war, which neglects aspects of post war conditions and treatment that are imperative to understanding the identity of the Harkis and the Pied Noirs. To further the distrust
France held toward the Harkis, history books that speak of “The Algerian Insurrection” make notice of a few instances where Harkis, targeted by the National Liberation Army, the FLN’s armed wing during the battle, “changed sides during the battle” to receive assistance given by the
15 Claire Eldridge, From Empire to Exile: History and Memory Within the Pied-Noir and Harki Communities, 1962-2012. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016, 73.
9 Muslim soldiers in the French forces”.16 This creates a negative, traitor-esque appearance of the
Harkis during battle, so it would make sense that these hostilities continued into the post war years.
I have consciously chosen to end this section with a French depiction of the war that is extremely negative regarding France’s actions. Henri Alleg, a French-Algerian writer and communist, was living in Algeria at the time of the independence war.17 In June of 1957, Alleg was arrested by French paratroops for the pro independence articles he was writing. Undergoing one month of torture in El-Biar, Algeria, he first handedly experienced the brutality at the hands of the French that his fellow captured Algerians underwent. He was a European being
“interrogated”, as European accounts used in order to put his torture nicely, “by French military personnel using electric shock (including on his genitals), water torture, and beatings”.18 “You have no right to employ these methods,” Alleg continued after describing his torture, while the paratroopers laughed in his face.19 Refusing to succumb to the torture, when asked if Alleg was feeling any better from a drink of water, he replied, “Yes, you’ll soon be able to start on me again,” indicating that the abuse tactics were not stronger than the will for Algerian independence.20
Fifty years after the original publication of his book, Alleg remarked on his memoir and its status in France. “The French government would not allow any challenge to the doctrines justifying the policy it was pursuing in Algeria [during the war],” and Alleg’s book did just this.
16 Edgar O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962 (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967), 65. 17 Henri Alleg, The Question (United Kingdom: John Calder [Publishers] Ltd., 1958), xvi. Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 223. 18 Alleg, The Question, xvii. 19 Alleg, The Question, 43. 20 Alleg, The Question, 71.
10 Instead of glossing over the torture that the French army was known to use, Alleg published his story in order to serve a greater purpose. His book “was therefore a story of immense personal anguish and an attempt to make sure that the story of Algerians and others reached the general public”.21 The seizure and banning of this publication exemplifies how badly the French wanted to control what history was making its way into public knowledge. Alleg’s views of France eroded negatively because of his experience. The similarities between French torturers during the war and FLN assailants after the war indicates that national identity really played no role in the fate of one’s condition during and after this struggle. This is one of the only accounts of the war written by a European who condemns France’s actions.
Algeria Included In The History
Contrary to the depiction of the Algerian War of Independence focused more so on the
European aspect to the struggle and their subsequent withdrawal, Edgar O’Ballance’s history of the war looks closer at the role the Harkis possessed, and how their actions contributed to the negative perceptions French citizens held of the Harkis after the war. A British military journalist and defense commentator, O’Ballance seeks to clear up the “widespread misunderstanding of the nature of the long drawn-out and bitter struggle between the French and the Algerian nationalists”.22 He succeeds in doing so by delving into the lesser-known incidents of the war with regard to the Harkis, and gives a straightforward account of the progress of the insurrection.
With regard to the Harkis, O’Ballance begins with Pierre Messmer, Minister for the
French Armed Forces, who explains to the French Army the reasons for the ceasefire in 1962.
21 Alleg, The Question, xvii, 34. 22 O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962, Inside Cover.
11 He credits the FLN and the National Liberation Army, the ALN, as “a powerful diplomatic, political and sentimental influence that could not be ignored” by the French forces.23 Messmer insisted that “France would not abandon her children” in reference to Harkis deserting the French troops and killing their French officers from persuasion by other Muslim Algerians.24 First, this is interesting because when the history of the Algerian War is not centered fully on the French withdrawal, readers learn more of the actors involved in the armed struggle, creating a more comprehensive storyline. Second, from this account of the war, we learn that it may not have been the intention all along, if France were to lose the war, that France would alienate the Harkis from integrating into French society.
Similarly, Benjamin Stora, born in French Algeria and regarded as the leading expert on
Algerian history, combats the one sided articulation of the war and attempts to create a better- rounded history. Like O’Ballance, Stora directly uses the terms “Pied Noirs” and “Harkis” in his diction of the war’s history, but goes even further by advancing the history past the Évian
Accords. Stora explicitly expands upon the treatment of the Harkis and Pied Noirs after the war ended, explaining how there were profound upheavals marking massive displacements in Harki communities, impoverishment, and the withering of spirits. This “new psychological fragility born of social poverty and rootlessness” caused members of the FLN and France in general to exploit and abuse these Muslim Algerians.25 “The Algerian nationalists [the FLN] needed to denounce the existence of ‘collaborators’ to legitimate their conception of the unanimous nation;
[while] French officers needed harkis to show the loyalty of the now ‘pacified’ native populations. In either case, the [Harkis] found themselves transformed against their will into
23 O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962, 192. 24 O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962, 192. 25 Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 102.
12 ‘faithful servants of France’ or ‘absolute traitors’ to the Algerian homeland”.26 With the end of the war came tens of thousands of Harki massacres, while other Harki individuals or families
“encountered enormous difficulties in becoming integrated into French society, living as outcasts”.27 In either scenario, the Harkis were at a disadvantage in terms of their future.
In a telegram from the Minister of State, Louis Joxe, to France’s Special Administration
Section, SAS, they were ordered to stop transferring the Harkis who were threatened in Algeria to France, stating that “all individual initiatives tending to settle the Muslim French in the metropolis are strictly prohibited”.28 This first telegram was in May of 1962, and two months later another directive was issued stating that any “auxiliary troops landing in the metropolis in deviance from the general plan will be sent back to Algeria”.29 Stora’s use of these telegrams enhances the understanding the reader has that the relationship the Harkis had with the French was very one sided and finite. The inclusion of the Harki’s position and treatment in the immediate aftermath of the war would be reason enough for these Harkis or second generation
Harkis to want verbal compensation and acknowledgement for their role in the war and their disposal of by the French afterward.
As for the Pied Noirs in Stora’s work, he also gives them a more comprehensive history than any history book does that just glances over the war and generalizes. “The descendants of
European colons, or settlers, born in Algeria, with roots in France or the Mediterranean periphery, had no Algerian history to embrace”.30 Right off the bat Stora characterizes the Pied
26Stora, Algeria 1830-2000, 102. 27 Stora, Algeria 1830-2000, 102. 28 Stora, Algeria 1830-2000, 101. 29 Stora, Algeria 1830-2000, 101. Louis Joxe, telegram no. 125/IGAA to SAS Officers, July 15th, 1962, in Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2004), 101. Telegram was found through https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Joxe, reference note 3. 30 Stora, Algeria 1830-2000, xii.
13 Noirs as a lesser group to the French of France, which gives an initial insight into the issues that the Pied Noirs were to face at the close of war. Stora goes on to explain that with the wars that arose within the Algerian War of Independence, “the pied noirs knew that they were done for if
France abandoned them”.31 The status and well being of this group living in Algeria relied so heavily upon the aid and acceptance of the French, that without it they knew they stood no chance remaining in Algeria. But, if the nation the Pied Noirs held in such high esteem would at the drop of a hat deny all allegiance to them, the Pied Noirs situation in Algeria after the war must have truly been that devastating for them to run back to the nation who abandoned them.
When in France, Stora continues, the Pied Noirs “were preoccupied with finding their place in
French society and with seeking out the sites of the lost memory of French Algeria”.32 Not only were the Pied Noirs who relocated to France unsure of what their social position was, but they also brought with them an identity of Algeria that the French so desperately wished to not associate itself with, as clearly seen through Joxe’s telegrams. Stora’s depiction of the Algerian
War of Independence reads where the European identity and telling of the war is not where the story ended for Algeria and its inhabitants. This aids in creating a contrasting view of the war to previous accounts written by French citizens, while at the same time setting the stage for the negative perceptions of Pied Noirs and their reasons for desiring a rewrite of the Algerian War’s history.
In another medium, Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 movie Battle of Algiers works to give attention to Algeria and its people that were commonly portrayed as a defenseless, weakened population, who had not been given the recognition and attention they deserved from the war that was fought in their own backyard. Although this movie never makes direct mention of Harki or
31 Stora, Algeria 1830-2000, 77. 32 Stora, Algeria 1830-2000, 106.
14 Pied Noirs combatants explicitly, it is important to include this work in the analysis of these peoples for the role that the French played in Algeria in this movie. This movie is made to portray Algeria in a powerful light, which is done by casting a negative shadow upon all actions the French make. Nationalist Algerians and members of the FLN are depicted as fearless heroes, who believed in the sanctity and independence of their nation above all else.
In this semi-fictionalized dramatization of the war, the movie opens up with Colonel
Mathieu, a Frenchman, who insists that he is “helping” the Algerian man whom he had tortured for the last few days. This aspect of torture is a common theme throughout the movie, which makes its most pivotal appearance at a press conference when Colonel Mathieu is questioned about his uses of torture against the Algerian people. Mathieu attempts to dodge the question by stating that “the word ‘torture’ does not appear in our orders”.33 His rationale for obtaining information from captured FLN members stems from the FLN’s own capture tactics: do not speak for twenty-four hours, and within this time, any information that could have been rendered useful will instead be rendered useless for the French troops. Without stating it explicitly,
Mathieu acknowledges the French’s use of torture through capture, indicating that they will use any necessary means to acquire pertinent information because said information could be lost if the prisoner does not speak within the twenty-four hour time frame. But it is imperative to note here that Mathieu also calls torture a “vicious circle,” defending the uses of French torture as an eye-for-an-eye measure because the Algerians also used such methods.34
33 Gillo Pontecorvo, La Battaglia di Algeri, DVD. Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo (1967; USA; Cinemascope, 1967.), DVD. English translation found at http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Battle- of-Algiers,-The.html. 34 Pontecorvo, La Battaglia di Algeri, DVD. English translation found at http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Battle-of-Algiers,-The.html.
15 This press conference ends with Mathieu expressing what the real issue in the war was, that the FLN wanted the French to leave Algeria, while they wanted to remain. Throughout the movie, a narrator expresses that the FLN is intentionally there to protect Algerians against the
French. For the sake of my argument and the interpretation therefore of this movie, it can be argued that the FLN in this context was against anyone who sought allegiance not to Algeria, otherwise known as the French, Harkis, and Pied Noirs. Ben M’Hidi, one of the founding fathers of the FLN, handcuffed in front of news reporters, was asked “Don’t you think it is a bit cowardly to use your women’s baskets and handbags to carry explosive devices that kill so many innocent [French and Algerian] people,” in which he responded “Doesn’t it seem to you even more cowardly to drop napalm bombs on unarmed villages, so that there are a thousand times more innocent victims? Give us your bombers, and you can have our baskets”.35 This conversation ends with another reporter asking if M’Hidi believes that the FLN has any chance of beating the French army, to which he responds “In my opinion, the FLN has more chances of beating the French army than the French have to stop history”.36 This conversation, strategically scripted and directed by Pontecorvo, portrays Algeria in a positive light during the war that was not easily seen in any of the histories written by French or European authors. It also foreshadows the history of these groups that were to be silenced post war.
Harki and Pied Noir Views of the Algeria of their Past
In this section, compared to its predecessor, it is imperative to note the differences scholars and “regular people” saw in ante bellum Algeria. It is interesting to note that having
35 Pontecorvo, La Battaglia di Algeri, DVD. English translation found at http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Battle-of-Algiers,-The.html. 36 Pontecorvo, La Battaglia di Algeri, DVD. English translation found at http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Battle-of-Algiers,-The.html.
16 studied this topic in depth, not all Pied Noirs and Harkis who lived throughout the duration of the war held feelings reminiscent of a cheerful, better Algeria prior to 1954 than what was left of the country after the war. Wanting to create as true a depiction as possible of Harki and Pied Noirs views before the war, I cannot silence the voice of Gérard Faivre. A winegrower and the former president of MAFA, the French Farmers of Algeria coalition, Faivre sought to “destroy the pejorative image which has frequently been given of the colonists”.37 Faivre, a Pied Noirs himself, argued when the Pied Noirs settled in Algeria at the beginning of colonization, they did not steal the land from the natives. Instead, in order to sustain colonization in a capitalistic way, they seized the uncultivated, difficult to access land.38 Beginning in 1914, European workers worked this land, which meant that the indigenous Algerians were not exploited for their labor.
And although France was paying their wages, these Pied Noirs were not in any sense overly compensated for their work. Hundreds of Algerian families began to inhabit these large estates, and they were offered medical services, social welfare, and doctors, all paid for at the expense of the owner of the estate. 39
Faivre continues that they not only educated the European children, but they also insisted on the schooling of the indigenous children as well.40 The relationship between the Pied Noirs
37 Monique Ayoun and Jean-Pierre Stora, Mon Algérie (Paris: Acropole, 1989), 127. MAFA: French Farmers of Algeria-farmers coalition. “J'aimerais détruire l'image péjorative que l'on a fréquemment donnée du côlon.” Original French from Monique Ayoun and Jean-Pierre Stora’s Mon Algérie. 38 Ayoun and Stora, Mon Algérie, 127. 39 Ayoun and Stora, Mon Algérie, 129. “Il y avait sur place un service medical, une infirmerie. Le médecin du village venait visiter tout le monde aux frais du domaine, une fois par semaine, environ. Ainsi avions-nous un role d’aide sociale, et nous formions de plus en plus de personnes à l’exercice d’un métier agricole ou de caractère artisanal”. Original French from Monique Ayoun and Jean-Pierre Stora’s Mon Algérie. 40 Ayoun and Stora, Mon Algérie, 128. “Nous nous occupions, aussi, d’aider à la scolarisation des enfants, tant européens qu’indigènes”. Original French from Monique Ayoun and Jean- Pierre Stora’s Mon Algérie.
17 and the Algerians were good, confident, and humane. Faivre questioned then why the negative persona was stuck to the skin of the Pied Noirs, who in his mind only fostered positive relationships with the Algerians prior to the war.41 This account of Algeria at the onset of colonization yet prior to the war establishes a healthy relationship between the Algerian natives and the Pied Noirs. But, this was not always the case. As we shall see next, Marie Cardinal’s accounts of her remembrance of Algeria bring her more pain than joy.
In a contradictory sense, Marie Cardinal, a prominent French novelist born in French
Algeria who identifies as a Pied Noir, recounted her attempt of a visit back to Algeria, and the happy and painful memories this decision dredged up for her. Unable to physically return to the
Algeria where she lived with her family, she still acknowledges the “happy memories[, [her] true roots,] [that] were attached to the farm like garlands to a Christmas tree. Why? The farm was
Algeria, the city was France. [I preferred Algeria.]”42 Cardinal acknowledges the role Algeria before the war played for her in her youth which has led her into her adult life, however she finds it to be more of a burden than a nostalgic activity to relish in the good times of the past. “The past bores me, especially my past. I have a lot of memories, all the better. But I don’t want to roll around in them. [...] Only to meet places and confront memories. That seems unhealthy to me. That seems indecent to me.”43 Returning to her family’s farm in Algeria would simply be
41 Ayoun and Stora, Mon Algérie, 129. “Les relations entre les deux communautés étaient bonnes, confiantes, sur le plan humain. Alors, pourquoi cette legend collée à la peau du <
18 too painful of an excursion for her, however Cardinal ends her account of this memory very abruptly, almost indicating the pain of a wrong decision.
Contrary to Cardinal’s more negative views of returning to the Algeria of her childhood, the older generation of Pied Noirs who lingered in Algeria after the war before finally moving on to France for their own reasons were much more nostalgic for the place they had left. A youthful
Pied Noirs woman who remained in Algiers after the war returned in 1966 to what had once been her family’s home. “’Our servants cried when they saw me,’ and everyone knew that she had, too” states an article in The Washington Post.44 In this scenario, the return to her native homeland was one which brought happy memories and reminiscent times, which means that not all Pied Noirs, women in specific, had negative connotations of their old home.
Where Marie Cardinal does fit into the commonalities of perceptions the Pied Noirs hold of Algeria after the war is when she makes notice of the changes that have occurred in
Algeria. Amy Hubbell, who uses Cardinal’s novel Au Pays de Mes Racines to better pick apart the feelings Pied Noirs held after independence, acknowledges that Cardinal is critical of the changes that are occurring in post independence Algeria.45 “Common among Pieds-Noirs, some have a deep reaction to Algeria’s present struggles with independence and feel that the Algerian
Civil War is a manifestation of the country’s inability to exist without the colonial influence”.46
What follows more in depth in the next section will be prefaced now for having mentioned Marie Cardinal; the role and status women held after the independence war was waged. Following Cardinal’s story of her life after the war, she reacts to an article written by a
paraît malsain. Ça me paraît indécent.” Original French from Amy L. Hubbell’s Remembering French Algeria: Pieds-Noirs, Identity, and Exile. 44 Reuters, “Algeria Is Still Home To Lingering Europeans,” The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), Apr. 16, 1966. 45 Marie Cardinal, Au Pays de Mes Racines, (Paris: Gasset, 1980). 46 Hubbell, Remembering French Algeria, 181.
19 young Algerian woman, who in her mind believes that the blame must be put on the institution of colonialism for the oppression of women. Cardinal responds, “What luck to be able to still believe that the oppressor is the foreigner and that you only have to chase him out so that everything will go better for women! That made me wonder. Now almost eighteen years after the oppressors left and this brave lady is soon going to realize that this is the feminine condition”.47 Now part of this assertion is because she is a Pied Noir and not an indigenous
Algerian; Cardinal has a different life experience than this young woman, and therefore has a different mentality regarding the treatment of women postwar. However, Cardinal is still very much so acknowledging the advances in status and independence that women were not made privy to post war, and for this she holds her negative viewpoints of Algeria. She provides an effective contrast between what new ways of life women envisaged, and what was in fact their reality.
The Fate of Women
In this section, I will use the role women played in the war and the fate of their status post war to substantiate my claims that the perceptions of the minorities involved in the Algerian War of Independence were left worse off than what their position had been during French colonization of Algeria, and worse than they had expected when Algeria was granted independence.
47 Hubbell, Remembering French Algeria, 182. “Quelle chance de pouvoir encore croire que l’oppresseur c’est l’étranger et qu’il suffit de le chasser pour que ça aille mieux du cȏté des femmes! Ça m’a laissée rêveuse. Voilà bientȏt dix-huit ans que les oppresseurs sont partis et cette brave dame va bientȏt se rendre compte de ce que c’est que la condition féminine.” Original French from Amy L. Hubbell’s Remembering French Algeria: Pieds-Noirs, Identity, and Exile.
20 As previously mentioned, Gillo Pontecorvo’s Battle of Algiers explored the events of the
Battle of Algiers. Pontecorvo strategically illustrates the role women had in their beloved
Algeria against those supporting the French cause. Women seen in this movie have a role that revolves around their performance during the war amidst the fighting and violence. The women in this movie are seen as sly figures, comparable to the veiled women Franz Fanon characterizes in his work Algeria Unveiled.48 The most prominent series of events focused on women is where three Algerian women were chosen to alter their appearances to seem more French-like, in order to effortlessly float through the security gates installed by French paratroops across the city.
While Algerians needed personal ID badges and documentation papers to pass through these checkpoints, Pied Noirs and women were able to enter through without a pat down or a second glance by the French officers. These three women altered their appearance by removing their veils and dressing in European garb, to sneak bombs into the European quarters of Algeria.
Here, French troops and Europeans living in France (not explicitly called Pied Noirs, but it is implied because of the prior information known of the war) are the target of the explosions, in order to further the fire of war.
Through their masquerading as French women in order to further the FLN nationalist cause, this movie exemplifies the impressive and important role women held during the war as freedom fighters. They were able to filter back into Algerian society unnoticed, as seen when
French officials watched surveillance footage of the checkpoints, and pointed only at Algerian men as the cause of violence versus women. Early in the film, women hid in their veils guns and contraband for Algerian nationalists. It is not until further into the war that the French troops caught on to men dressing as Algerian women in veils to smuggle guns for guerilla attacks. This
48 Frantz Fanon, ‘Algeria Unveiled,’ in Monthly Review Press, 1965.
21 film, released only four short years after independence was granted for Algeria and the French withdrew from the nation, is one of the only public accounts that cast an Algerian history, instead of an Algeria within the history of the French.
Using Pontecorvo’s Battle of Algiers as a jumping off point for her own analysis of gender and the role it played in decolonization, Philippa Levine seeks to explore the contributions women made for the sake of the decolonization struggles.49 Levine expands upon the violence and abuse women were subjected to during the war, where many female fighters were arrested, tortured, sexually abused, and interned in camps.50 However, it is important to note here that through Djamila Amrane’s accounts of her time spent as a prisoner in the war, we learn that not in every case were women treated as inferior to the male freedom fighters. In certain instances, French military generals tried to keep gender out of the abuse by ordering the military “not to neglect women, because the nationalist movement was actively recruiting them into the fold”.51 For clarification, the nationalist movement was the FLN, and to combat this persuasion through methods other than violence, in 1957 “the French instituted health clinics and improved educational opportunities for women. In 1958, Algerian women gained the vote and reforms to marriage and divorce laws gave them greater rights. The thinking behind this strategy was that Algerian women would find western modernization irresistible, and support the
French”.52 In other words, the French were attempting to coerce Algerian women to support the
French cause over that of the FLN. For those that did succumb to this coercion, they had become
Harkis.
49 Philippa Levine, “Gendering Decolonisation,” Politique, Culture, Société, No. 11 (2010), 14. 50 Levine, “Gendering Decolonisation,” 8-9. 51 Levine, “Gendering Decolonisation,” 8. 52 Levine, “Gendering Decolonisation,” 9.
22 Levine’s understanding of how women fated after the war is similar to the fate Harkis and Pied Noirs suffered during and after colonialism in a generalized way. “Newly-independent nation states regarded women’s rights as secondary to the task of rebuilding economies and infrastructures [in Algeria], rather than seeing these as mutually constituted necessities”.53 Harki and Pied Noirs safety was second to the safety and well being of French citizens, as we will see when analyzing the reception of these groups during France’s housing crisis. Algerian women faced suppression before the war, during the war, especially seen in Battle of Algiers when they were not permitted through the checkpoints easily, and after the war by a different colonizer,
Arab men.
The Migration Period and Receptions of Incoming Refugees from Algeria
It was clear to Harkis and Pied Noirs that Algeria was no longer a safe location to call their home. The option to “return” to France seemed like the logical decision; those who aided the French in the independence war would likely assume it appropriate to seek refuge in the country they pledged their allegiance to during the war. However, they were wildly mistaken.
I find it pertinent to begin the discussion of the migration period of Pied Noirs and Harkis from Algeria to France with the Algerian side. “The changeover from a territory run by and for the benefit of the French to an independent Arab state has been so drastic and all- encompassing”.54 The independent Algerian nation was to begin their existence with numerous handicaps, most importantly the deaths of “tens of thousands, [with] mass dislocations of
53 Levine, “Gendering Decolonisation,” 13. 54 Abbot Smith, Short-Term Outlook in Algeria (Washington, DC: Office of National Estimates, 1963), 1-2.
23 population, and [the disruption of] both rural and urban economies”.55 Not only was the reception of Harki and Pied Noirs into French society not positive, but also the country that they left behind held tones of resentment for their mass exodus. The leaving of ninety percent of
Europeans “left a serious shortage of technical and managerial personnel, which affected agricultural and industrial production and left administrative chaos in the cities”.56 This commentary on Algeria post war is from the United States Board of National Estimates, which comments on American national security. The threat to American security in this scenario is from the removal of French troops and the mass exodus, which left power in Algeria up for grabs, as well as Algeria being heavily reliant on outside aid to rebuild itself.
A second account from the CIA discusses the United State’s desire to help promote healthy relations between Algeria and France by means of negotiations of a ceasefire. Although this account was published in 1959, people were still seeking refuge in France from Algeria.
The report takes notice of the fact that thousands of Algerians were dying each month and thousands more were becoming refugees to France, so at this point in the war one can interpret
America’s intentions to be that of helping Algeria receive self-determination, while also protecting the refugees to France.57 This account specifically can be used to see the perception of Pied Noirs and Harkis on the world scale, where contrary to the French view, they were seen as players in an acknowledged war who needed help to stay safe, whether that be in Algeria or in
France.
55 Smith, Short-Term Outlook in Algeria, 2. 56 Smith, Short-Term Outlook in Algeria, 2-3. 57 George Houser, Members of United States Congress in a Joint Statement Issues in Washington, D.C., Express Their Concern Over the Situation in Algeria and Recognize the Right of the Algerian People to Independence (Washington, DC: The American Committee on Africa, Inc, 1959), 2.
24 Both CIA accounts acknowledge the strains in Franco-Algerian relations, and how with the immigration of Pied Noirs and Harkis into France, these strains were not a continent apart anymore. The “other” was directly in France, and the problems that this close contact caused were intensified because of the proximity. The issues that arose from this immigration were so large that they were seen on the world stage.
Now to the reception of Pied Noirs and Harkis entering into France; France was already in the middle of a housing crisis when they embarked on fighting against Algeria’s independence. “The housing shortage in France...has steadily worsened every year since the war” and is “the nation’s ‘Social Problem No. 1’”.58 French families, averaging just over four people per household, divided by the French population at the time, would mean that “roughly
10 million French people [were] living in unhealthy, temporary, overcrowded and depressing conditions” as it is, that it is not shocking that French citizens would argue to save their own before agreeing to assimilate into their societies that of Harki and Pied Noir families.59 In
Andrea Smith’s edited volume Europe’s Invisible Migrants, she compiled a table to indicate the numbers of “Europeans” and “non-Europeans” who migrated to Europe after decolonization, spanning from 1945 to the early 1990’s. The results of the table show that as many as 1,100
“Europeans” migrated “back” to Europe following the decolonization of Algeria, and as many as
300 “non-Europeans”.60 The word “back” is in quotation marks because Smith is acknowledging that the word “Europeans” would refer to the French and the Pied Noirs, some of whom were second generation, born in Algeria, and had never actually stepped foot on French soil prior to
58 Austryn Wainhouse, "French Housing Crisis is Fundamental," The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), Mar. 8, 1953. 59 Wainhouse, "French Housing Crisis is Fundamental". 60 Andrea Smith, Europe’s Invisible Migrants: Essays in Honor of Annette Michelson, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002), 32.
25 their exodus after the war. This migration was also seen through The New York Times as “an economic headache to the de Gaulle Government,” which is evidenced by the little aid they were given when fleeing into France.61
The issues that arose from this migration were many. First off, France was clearly dealing with its own economic and social problems at the time, however the author of the aforementioned housing newspaper article even went so far as suggesting that the outcome of
France could potentially be worse off if France were to have ignored the liberation efforts made by Algeria.62 France was not ready for the influx of refugees seeking citizenship and safety in their country, resulting in turmoil. For the case of the Harkis, it did not matter their reasons for pledging allegiance to the French side; they were still unwelcomed and even wholeheartedly shut down and turned away from relocating to France for the sake of their safety, and the French identity that they believed they possessed did not matter any.
However, there is an important paradox that presents itself when discussing this French housing crisis. From 1945 to 1975, France was in “Les Trente Glorieuses,” otherwise known as
“The Glorious Thirty” years. During this span, France had economic prosperity and high rates of productivity, as well as dramatically increased standards of living for the typical French family.63
How then was there a supposed housing crisis? Why did the French have such a difficult time accommodating the refugees into their country if they were thriving? This can be answered most simply with the fact that the French State imposed heavy restrictions on the Harkis. These restrictions resulted from “the French government [not anticipating] an arrival en masse of
61 Peter Braestrup, “New Dilemmas for the ‘Pieds Noirs’,” New York Times (New York), May 26, 1963. 62 Wainhouse, "French Housing Crisis is Fundamental". 63 James Angresano, "The Case of France: Il y a Une Éxception Française?" In French Welfare State Reform: Idealism versus Swedish, New Zealand and Dutch Pragmatism. London; New Work; Delhi: Anthem Press, 2007, 175-6.
26 harkis, [so] neither strategies nor structures were in place to provide for their accommodation”.64
While the French State may have been thriving for itself, it was not prepared to distribute its profits and products to the Harkis.65 To contain as much of the Harki population as possible, military disciplinarians monitored Harki activities, some including having the Harkis present for the raising of the flag in the morning, officials reading their mail, having set times for meals, and for a period of time some Harkis were unable to name their own newborns; French social workers did.66 These efforts were in part made to deter any new incoming Harkis to France.
Following the decrepit housing camps that Harkis were forced to live in, Clare
Hollingworth, one of the most active war correspondents of the twentieth century and also a dedicated ally to the FLN, wrote a piece in the Manchester Guardian titled “Harkis Start New
Life In France: Homes in Deserted Villages”. The article, written on November 19th, 1962, eight months after the most commonly accepted end date of the war, discussed the condition that the Muslim Algerian Harkis were now doomed to face if fleeing to France. “French authorities have shown increasing reluctance to enable the Harkis to cross the Mediterranean since independence. It is generally believed, too, although the Minister of Defence has denied this, that at the request of the Algerian Government the French forces remaining in Algeria have been instructed to refuse protection to those Harkis remaining in their native land”.67 These feelings toward the Harkis were prevalent for decades to come. “Few areas want[ed] to receive the
Harkis”, for uneasiness revolving around the differences in language and their physical
64 Eldridge, From Empire to Exile, 26. 65 Eldridge, From Empire to Exile, 75. 66 Eldridge, From Empire to Exile, 75. 67 Clare Hollingworth, “Harkis Start New Life in France,” The Guardian (Manchester, UK), Nov. 19, 1962.
27 appearances, most specifically their facial features and their dress code.68 However, potentially much to the French citizen’s dismay, “the Harkis [were] fast shedding their Arab clothes and they badly want[ed] to become assimilated” into French culture and lifestyles.69
The turmoil that ensued from Harkis migrating into France was not met with a positive reception. Just as we will see when we encounter Fatima Besnaci Lancou in the next section, who explained her living situation when she and her family arrived in France in 1962, the Harkis observed in this newspaper article met a similar fate; living in tents while reconstructing a deserted village for their own benefit, without the help of the country they believed would support them, regardless of their support for the French during the war.
Present Day Receptions
September 26th, 2016 marked a monumental day in the lives of Harkis and their descendants living in France. Francois Hollande, current president of France, “acknowledged the state’s culpability in abandoning Algerians who fought alongside French colonial forces in
Algeria’s war for independence-and were then massacred as traitors after the French retreat in
1962” by members of the FLN in Algeria.70 Many scholars have become fascinated with the reappearance of Harki sentiments, and many of the descendants of Harkis have been arguing that they are popping up on the radar to gain official recognition for the unfair and unjust treatment of the Harkis after the French withdrew from Algeria. In particular, Claire Eldridge, a lecturer in
French studies specializing in their relations with Algeria, has noticed the absence of direct Harki
68 Hollingworth, “Harkis Start New Life in France”. 69 Hollingworth, “Harkis Start New Life in France”. 70 “Hollande: ‘France turned its back on the harkis’,” The National World, September 26, 2016, http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/hollande-france-turned-its-back-on-the-harkis.
28 testimony of their experiences during the war. But, she notices it more recently being created, within the past ten to fifteen years, through second generation Harkis.
The historical trajectory of the Harkis was characterized by the “prominent protest slogan
‘After betrayal, abandonment; after abandonment, exile; after exile, oblivion,’” Eldridge notes.71
The fact that this slogan, fifty-five years after the Algerian nation was granted independence, is still characteristic of the treatment this group feels is crucial for understanding why they feel it necessary and are able to voice their history now. Many scholars highlight “the difficulties these men and women have had integrating into French society and the crisis of identity of a community torn between two countries and cultures,” yet their cries are only heard now because of the more modern world we are living in today.72 There is a greater opportunity for acceptance and retributions on behalf of the French now than there was even twenty years earlier, hence why the Harki group is confident in sharing their stories of the torture they and their ancestors endured and the neglect they faced by the French.
On a similar note, Sung Choi’s article, written in 2011, opens with “On 6 December
2007, having just returned from a visit to Algeria, French president Nicolas Sarkozy delivered a speech at Élysée Palace to an audience of harkis. In the speech, Sarkozy recalled the abusive treatment, the long years of internment, neglect, and social exclusion the harkis had faced in
France since their arrival as refugees in 1962”.73 In this speech, Sarkozy made it a point to acknowledge his country’s “indebtedness” to the Harkis, and remarked that the Republic is
71 M. Hamoumou, with A. Moumen, “L’histoire des harkis et française musulmans: la fin d’un tabou?’, in La Guerre D’Algérie 1954-2004: la fin de l’amnésie, eds. M Harbi and B. Stora (Paris, 2004), 339. Claire Eldridge, “’We’ve Never Had a Voice’: Memory Construction and the Children of the Harkis (1962-1991),” French History 23, no. 1 (2009): 88-107. 72 Eldridge, “We’ve Never Had a Voice,” 90. 73 Sung Choi, “The Muslim Veteran in Postcolonial France: The Politics of the Integration of Harkis After 1962,” French Politics, Culture & Society 29, no. 1 (2011): 24.
29 obligated to now “’right its mistakes’ to help these veterans integrate into French society” once and for all.74 As with Eldridge’s analysis of Harki history becoming more mainstream, this is only possible because the two nations are more progressive today than they were during the war.
But, while Choi and Eldridge agree that time has moved this issue forward, Choi also argues that a major contributing factor to French government officials actually listening to the Harkis and making these verbal concessions is because the officials see the political gain they could have from having Harkis in their respective corner. Although this is potentially not the most genuine reason to acknowledge the Harki role in the war and apologize for the torture and neglect they were treated with after French withdrawal, it is a step forward for a truer history of the war and of this group in particular.
As previously mentioned, it was not until 1999 under President Jacques Chirac, that
France admitted officially “that the eight-year combat that ended 132 years of French rule in
Algeria was a war”.75 The inaugural year of 2012 for Hollande allowed the president to stress the improvement of relations with the countries of North Africa that the French had once colonially ruled, with a special interest in repairing relations with Algeria. But these explicit sentiments stemmed earlier than these president’s public appearances. Jean-Marc Pujol, deputy mayor of Perpignan, France, is a Pied Noirs. Using his position in French society and his identity as a Pied Noirs, he compared his condition after the war to the aftermath of the
Holocaust. In 2009 he said, “We [France] are a country, that took 50 years to say we bear responsibility for what happened to the Jews during World War II. One day I think we will have
74 Choi, “The Muslim Veteran in Postcolonial France,” 24. 75 “Hollande: ‘France turned its back on the harkis’,” The National World, September 26, 2016, http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/hollande-france-turned-its-back-on-the-harkis.
30 to take responsibility for what happened to the pieds noirs”.76 This statement addresses the fact that although recognized, the apology is lacking in all three instances of a French president trying to right the wrongs done onto the Pied Noirs and Harkis.
However, as previously expressed and as clearly seen through the immense impact these declarations had on French citizens and those who identified as Harki or Pied Noirs, the perceptions of these minority groups were regardless extremely negative in the immediate months, years, and even decades following Algerian independence. As mentioned earlier,
Fatima Besnaci Lancou, a Harki female interviewing at an Algerian newspaper in November of
2008, began her outreach for Harki acknowledgement by comparing and contrasting the living situation she and her family were and are currently in. “The apartment of [mine], not far from the Sorbonne University in Paris, is a far cry from the tent cities and low-cost apartment blocks
[myself and my] family had been confined to when [we] first arrived from Algeria in
1962”.77 The main issues raised from this statement regard the massive number of migrants from
Algeria to mainland France who sought refuge from the FLN and rampages in Algeria, yet were either rejected or given no aid to help better their situation by the country they previously risked their lives for in the preceding war. Lancou’s assertion of these issues seeks to have the public understand what situations the Harkis, who had just fled for their lives, were subjected to. Her statement serves as a catalyzing agent for the acknowledgement of the conditions circa 1962 in
France for Harkis, and how far they have assimilated into French society today. But, with
76 Michael Kimmelman, "Footprints of Pieds-Noirs Reach Deep into France." The New York Times, March 2009. 77 “France's non-sacred bond: The Harkis fought for France in Algeria, but were abandoned after independence,” Aljezeera, November 23, 2008, http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2008/11/20081123101015359151.html.
31 statements like these, there is always the undertone of what they still wish to accomplish in regard to assimilation.
Conclusion
Algeria’s wounds from their war for independence continue to rage on today. As one young Algerian soldier proclaimed in 1955, “[this] is not a revolt, it is a war. We will fight for a year, five years, ten years if necessary. If we fall, the young will replace us in the struggle”.78
Those involved in the war efforts put their full heart and souls into the struggle. For the
Algerians, they “won” by gaining independence, but their nation was in economic, social, and political disarray. The French, Pied Noirs, and Harkis all lost. France was subjected to a massive influx of Pied Noirs and Harki refugees, who were attempting to escape from the maniacal hands of the FLN. The Harkis and the Pied Noirs were targeted in both Algeria and
France, being the outcasts in both countries. And finally, the Pied Noirs and Harkis were not able to tell their own story of the war. But, the refusals of entry into France and other setbacks did not prevent these two groups from creating homes where they saw fit. Their identity was aligned with that of France, even though the French did not want to acknowledge this.
1991 marked a series of dialogues that were about to be opened in response to the silence that surrounded the Harki and Pied Noirs experience. “As the public became more engaged with the past, the [French] state [was] forced to take a more active interest and role in the evolution of the activism of the harki and pied-noir community”.79 It is apparent where the French history stops, which is after their withdrawal from Algeria. But, it is becoming ever more evident where the Algerian history ends, and that is that it hasn’t yet. The Pied Noirs and Harkis have not
78 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 142. 79 Eldridge, From Empire to Exile, 161.
32 gained full recognition for their role in the war, the fact that the war was an actual war versus an armed struggle, and the French being unwilling to welcome them into the nation they fought for when they needed a home the most. The perception of the Harkis and Pied Noirs is changing to one that is more accepting and positive in France, however there is still a long way to go before these groups feel they have been righted for the cover up of their history. The world is changing, more of the Harkis and Pied Noirs are finding their voices, and more people are desirous to listen to this history. For these reasons, the history of the Algerian War of Independence is changing in a more inclusive, truer way.
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