THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Conflicting Identities: Algerian Jewish Migration to France as a Result of the Algerian War, 1954-1962

ELINOR FARBER SPRING 2021

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for baccalaureate degrees in History, Economics, and French with honors in History

Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Tobias Brinkmann Malvin and Lea Bank Associate Professor of Jewish Studies and History Thesis Supervisor

Cathleen Cahill Associate Professor of History Honors Adviser

* Electronic approvals are on file. i

ABSTRACT

In 1954, the Algerian War of Independence from France began. Algeria’s Jewish population, which numbered around 140,000 at its height in 1954, had lived in Algeria for centuries and gained French citizenship in 1870 with the passing of the Crémieux Decree. Although as a collective Algeria’s Jews remained neutral throughout the Algerian War, they faced violence and negative economic consequences. Additionally, representatives from both sides of the war met with Algerian Jewish leaders to try to win their support. Algeria gained its independence in 1962, and around 90% of Algeria’s Jewish population immigrated to France as a result. Once in France, they faced housing and job shortages, as well as some discrimination from the French Jewish community. However, they were able to integrate into French society rather quickly and reinvigorate the French Jewish community. Throughout the war and their migration to France, they experienced conflicting ideas about their identities and place in society.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ...... iii

LIST OF TABLES ...... iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... v

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1 Jewish Life in Algeria Prior to the Algerian War ...... 6

French Colonization and the Crémieux Decree of 1870 ...... 8 World War II and the Holocaust ...... 14

Chapter 2 The Position of Jews During the Algerian War ...... 19

The Outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence ...... 21 Efforts by the FLN to Gain Jewish Support...... 24 Heightened Tensions and a New French Republic ...... 28 The De Gaulle Administration and Algeria’s Right to Self-Determination ...... 33 Preparations to Leave for France ...... 36 Backlash to the Evian Accords ...... 40

Chapter 3 Uneasy Adaptation in France ...... 46

Alternate Choices for Algerian Jews ...... 47 Arrival in France ...... 49 Integration into the French Jewish Community ...... 54 Interactions with Muslim Algerians in France...... 56

Conclusion ...... 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 62

ACADEMIC VITA ...... 67

iii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of Algeria ...... 5

Figure 2: American Troops Entering Algeria as Part of Operation Torch, 1942 ...... 18

Figure 3: "Week of Turmoil for France," Demonstration in Paris, May 1958 ...... 30

Figure 4: Maurice El Medioni performing with Lili Labassi, Canastel, Oran, 1956 ...... 44

Figure 5: Repatriates from Algeria on a Boat to France in 1962 ...... 49

Figure 6: Immigration to Israel ...... 60

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 ...... 45

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without support from my advisors, professors, family, and friends. First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Brinkmann, my thesis advisor, for his guidance, wisdom, and support throughout the thesis writing process. I would also like to thank Dr. Cahill, my honors advisor, for her constant encouragement and help throughout this year.

Furthermore, I would like to give a special thanks to Mr. Long, my high school history teacher, for inspiring my love of history. Additionally, I cannot thank my friends, co-captains, and roommates enough for their emotional support during this process and my collegiate career. Thank you for endless laughs and for listening to me talk about my thesis all the time. Lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my parents, sister, and family for their unending support throughout my time at Penn State. 1

Introduction

Before the outbreak of the Algerian War in 1954, the Jewish population in Algeria had a unique political and cultural identity that shaped the way that the war would affect them. Jews had lived in Algeria long before the French colonized it in 1830, but France viewed them differently than Muslim Algerians and granted the Jewish population citizenship in 1870 with the passing of the Crémieux Decree. The Crémieux Decree marked a turning point in the status of Jews in

Algeria, distinguishing them from their Muslim neighbors who they had lived beside for centuries.

France’s attempts to win over the support of Algerian Jews created a tense situation in which some

Jews felt more connected to France and others felt more connected to Algeria, while Algerian

Muslims grew more resentful that France had not offered them citizenship as well. Although the

Jewish population gained a better legal status, they were still subject to anti-Semitism from both

European settlers and Algerian Muslims. The Vichy regime, which came to power in 1940 and collaborated with Nazi Germany, imposed many of the same anti-Semitic racial laws in Algeria that they had established in France. Vichy repealed the Crémieux Decree as well, reminding

Algerian Jews that just as that they could be given citizenship, it could also be taken away. While it was reinstated in 1943, the relationship between Algerian Jews and France remained more complicated, especially as nationalists in Algeria began rallying for independence.

During the war of Algerian independence, the Jewish population in Algeria was caught between the two sides, France and the National Liberation Front (FLN). Although individuals may have supported one outcome, Algerian Jews never took a distinct side as a collective. Despite this, they experienced violence and negative economic consequences as a result of the war. Denis 2 Guénoun, an Algerian-Jewish teenager at the time of the war, recalled his father’s support for

Algerian independence, but his father also knew that independence would mean that they would have to immigrate to France and leave their home. Members of the FLN and French government also attempted to appeal to Algerian Jews in order to gain their backing, but this never resulted in a substantial statement of support for either side. As the war escalated and an independent Algeria became more inevitable, violence and anti-Semitism also increased by all sides, and Algerian Jews began leaving for France. A smaller fraction migrated to Israel. Maurice El Médioni, a Jewish musician in Oran, originally moved his family to Israel due to the violence they faced in Algeria, but after discovering the lack of economic opportunities in Israel, they relocated to Marseille.

Between 1959 and 1962, when the war ended, over 125,000 Algerian Jews migrated to France.

They made up around 90% of the Algerian Jewish population at their height. This migration also transformed and reinvigorated the Jewish community in France.1

The story of Algeria’s Jews is unique in the way they experienced the Algerian War and their subsequent migration to France. Jews had lived in Algeria for centuries prior to French colonization and been promised citizenship by Algerian nationalists. What prompted them to leave after Algeria gained its independence? Additionally, given that their migration coincided with a larger movement of European settlers to France, in what ways was their experience a result of their unique identity as Algerian Jews? Did their arrival in France create tensions in the French Jewish community, or did the migrants reinvigorate it?

Algeria’s Jewish population faced distinctive struggles during the war as a result of the colonial interests of France and the political interests of Algerian nationalists. Unlike European settlers, or pieds-noirs, who immigrated after French colonization in 1830, Jews had been living

1 “World Jewish Population,” American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. 56 and 61, American Jewish Committee Archives. 3 in Algeria for centuries and formed relationships within their community and with their Muslim neighbors. Algerian Jews encountered difficulties in gaining and keeping their French citizenship, while also resisting the push by France to become more assimilated with French culture. Due to the violence that they faced during the war, coupled with their tumultuous migration to France and integration into French society, Algerian Jews were victims of the Algerian War and France’s colonial intentions. Furthermore, they had a unique identity based on their collective history and culture, which differed from that of pieds-noirs, Algerian Muslims, and the Jewish community in

France, even though they shared some similarities with each of these groups. Their migration to

France in mass both caused and was caused by this distinct identity of Algerian Jews.

The thesis is organized into three chapters. Chapter 1 details the history of the Jewish population in Algeria before the Algerian War, starting with migrations to Algeria from Europe in the fourteenth century. It also describes the complicated relationship between France and the

Algerian Jewish population. Chapter 2 discusses the status of Algerian Jews during the Algerian

War and provides a glimpse into the different ways that Algerian Jews experienced the war.

Chapter 3 describes the arrival of Algerian Jews to France following the war and the process of integrating into French society.

Furthermore, this thesis draws upon primary sources mainly from the American Jewish

Committee archives, historical articles from The New York Times, a memoir by Denis Guénoun titled, A Semite: A Memoir of Algeria, and a memoir by Maurice El Médioni titled, A Memoir:

From Oran to Marseilles. The American Jewish Committee (AJC) is an international organization that advocates for Jews around the world, and they have offices in many different countries, including France and historically Algeria. They played an active role in documenting many of the experiences that Algerian Jews had during the Algerian War. Additionally, both Denis Guénoun 4 and Maurice El Médioni were Jewish, grew up in Algeria, and eventually migrated to France as a result of the war. However, they had some differences in the way that they viewed the war and their experiences immigrating out of Algeria. Ultimately, these sources provide a well-rounded glimpse into the experience of Algerian Jews.

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Figure 1: Map of Algeria Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collections, University of Texas Library.

6 Chapter 1

Jewish Life in Algeria Prior to the Algerian War

Due to massacres and forced conversions of Jews in Spain, a wave of mostly Catalan and

Majorcan Jews immigrated to Algeria in 1391.2 Prior to immigration, the Christian kings of Spain had appointed Jews to be ambassadors to Muslim courts, so their connections to North Africa eased the transition.3 For the most part, Muslim leaders accepted the new Jewish immigrants with open arms; however, local Jews living in Algeria did not.4 Differences in ritual, language, and customs created tension between the various groups. Sephardi Jews, who were generally wealthier and more educated, lived in separate quarters from the local Jews in cities.5 Additionally, they introduced new languages to the Algerian Jewish community that both revitalized it and caused tension. Before their migration, local Jews spoke the Berber language, but the Algerian Jewish community soon spoke Berber, Arabic, Spanish, Ladino, Italian, Judeo-Arabic, and Hebrew. The

Jewish community in Oran preserved the Spanish Ladino dialect until the nineteenth century.6

Although tensions arose between local and immigrant Jews in Algeria following the 1391 pogroms in Spain, the immigrant population succeeded in reinvigorating Algeria’s Jewish community.

2 “The Jews in the Levant and the Maghreb,” Musée d’Art et d’Histoire du Judaïsme, last modified April 17, 2020, https://www.mahj.org/fr/decouvrir-collections-parcours-permanent/9-les-juifs-au-levant-et-au-maghreb.; Daniel Schroeter, “Algeria,” In Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World, edited by Norman A. Stillman, Phillip I. Ackerman-Lieberman, Yaron Ayalon, Avigdor Levy, Vera B. Moreen, Meira Polliack, Angel Saenz-Badillos and, and Daniel Schroeter, accessed October 20, 2020, https://referenceworks.brillonline.com:443/entries/encyclopedia- of-jews-in-the-islamic-world%252Falgeria-COM_0001380. 3 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria,” In Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed., edited by Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, 645-652, Vol. 1. (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), Gale eBooks (accessed October 17, 2020), https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX2587500793/GVRL?u=psucic&sid=GVRL&xid=e1f4104f.; Schroeter, Daniel, “Algeria.” 4 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 5 Ibid. 6 “Algeria,” World Jewish Congress, last modified January 2018, https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/about/communities/DZ. 7 Algiers, Constantine, and Tlemcen became important centers for Jewish life in Algeria, although Jews were also living in the Berber and M’zab regions.7 The 1391 refugees stimulated trade, especially in these more remote areas. In particular, they exported ostrich feathers, African gold, burnooses, rugs, cereals, wool, and pelts to Europe.8 Jewish-Muslim relations were relatively peaceful following their immigration from Spain, and Muslims even offered refuge to Jews during periods of violence in Algeria.9 When Spain expelled the remaining Jews in 1492, the violence in

Algeria created unfavorable conditions for new migrants, so few Spanish Jews relocated to Algeria at that time.10

In the sixteenth century, the coastal regions of Algeria became part of the expanding

Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottoman Empire, Jews and Christians were subject to the Dhimma, which was a form of social contract. Because Jews and Christians were considered “people of the book,” they were granted relative autonomy but were required to pay special taxes. Economically, the Ottomans relied on the Jews and their connections to Europe to be traders within the

Mediterranean, particularly to Marseille and Livorno in Tuscany. Leading up to the French colonization of Algeria in 1830, Jews had established large communities primarily in the coastal regions and in cities, led mostly independently by their own Chief Rabbis in each different community.11

7 Daniel Schroeter, “Algeria.” 8 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 9 Ibid. 10 “The Jews in the Levant and the Maghreb,” Musée d’Art et d’Histoire du Judaïsme. 11 Ibid.; Daniel Schroeter, “Algeria.” 8 French Colonization and the Crémieux Decree of 1870

Prior to their colonization of Algeria, the French government had accumulated debts to the Bacri and Busnach families of Algeria, who had been delivering grain to France since the end of the eighteenth century.12 A series of political events as a result of these debts led to a violent invasion and subsequent colonization of Algeria in 1830.13 At this point, around 30,000 Jews lived in

Algeria, and they were relatively independent and self-governing.14 The first attempts of a concerted effort to confer French citizenship to Algerian Jews occurred in 1833 when lawyer

Adolphe Crémieux wrote a letter to France’s minister of the interior addressing the new conquest of Algeria.15 French officials understood that they had a difficult task of stabilizing Algeria with a minority settler population in a Muslim majority country. Crémieux argued that Algerian Jews would be a key stabilizing force in French Algeria if given the right protections.16

On September 4, 1839, the central Jewish consistory in Paris asked the French minister of war to legally organize the Jews in Algeria, which exhibited the significance of the Algerian Jewish community in France’s eyes.17 By 1845, France had established consistories for the Jews in

Algiers, Oran, and Constantine.18 They functioned similar to those in France and provided the Jews of Algeria the same social, religious, and cultural programs that were available in France.19

Legally, Algerian Jews had Mosaic civil status, meaning that they had the right to be governed by

12 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 13 Todd Shepard, “Algerian Nationalism, Zionism, and French Laïcité: A History of Ethnoreligious Nationalisms and Decolonization,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 45, no. 3 (2013): 445-67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43303031. 14 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 15 Joshua Schreier, Arabs of the Jewish Faith: The Civilizing Mission in Colonial Algeria (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 45. 16 Sophie B. Roberts, Citizenship and Antisemitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870-1962 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 51. 17 Joshua Schreier, Arabs of the Jewish Faith, 45. 18 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 19 “The Jews in the Levant and the Maghreb,” Musée d’Art et d’Histoire du Judaïsme. 9 Mosaic law in civil affairs, whereas Muslims had Koranic civil status. Chief Rabbis from France led the consistories in Algeria with one of the main tasks of the consistories being to encourage the emancipation and cultural assimilation of the Jews. Because of this, tensions arose between those who wanted to assimilate and those who wanted to remain true to their traditional roots. To combat assimilation to French culture, Hebrew printing presses and Jewish religious schools were established throughout Algeria.20 However, France continued to encourage the assimilation of

Jews, and in 1858, French influence expanded once again with Jewish general counselors being selected for each province of Algeria.21

Jews who welcomed cultural assimilation continued to petition for more rights in the 1860s and invited Napoleon III of France to visit Algeria in 1865. On July 14, 1865, the French Senate declared that Jews, Muslims, and other non-French European immigrants could become naturalized French citizens through a complex administrative process. However, anyone who wished to participate was required to give up their personal status, including allegiance to religious law. From 1865 to 1914, 36,869 Algerians gained citizenship this way, many of whom were

European settlers from other countries besides France.22 However, many Jews did not want to receive citizenship through this declaration, and only 144 Algerians with Mosaic civil status voluntarily chose to become French citizens.23 France continued to recognize the political and strategic importance of attempting to assimilate Algerian Jews into French culture.

In 1863, a French newspaper, Le Siècle, published an article titled, “Variétes Algériennes,” where the author, Louis Noir, described different groups of people living in Algeria. In terms of

20 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 21 Ibid. 22 Sophie B. Roberts, Citizenship and Antisemitism, 53. 23 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 28-29. 10 Algerian Jews, he continued to acknowledge the importance of gaining their support for France, writing, “Leur sort s'est singulièrement amélioré depuis notre conquête, leur caractère aussi.

Quelques-uns cherchent bien encore à nous tromper à l'occasion, mais, en général, ils nous ont voué une vive reconnaissance […]. En résumé, la race juive nous a été et nous sera encore d'un puissant secours pour coloniser et civiliser l'Algérie.”24 In other words, he notes that Algerian Jews had improved their character since France’s conquest, and although some of them still reverted to their traditional culture, they would help to promote French culture in Algeria. Even if the Jews in

Algeria did not feel as though they had actually adopted parts of French culture, rhetoric such as this continued to be utilized in France to the advantage of those who wanted Algerian Jews to gain

French citizenship.

After decades of lobbying by French Jews, on October 24, 1870, the Crémieux Decree was signed and extended full citizenship to all Algerian Jews north of the Sahara Desert. Adolphe

Crémieux, who was the minister of justice in France and a leading figure in the Paris Jewish community, is widely recognized as the true author of the decree.25 Officially, it stated, “Le

Gouvernement de la défense nationatie Décrète: Les Israélites indigènes des départements de l'Algérie sont déclarés citoyens Français; en conséquence, leur statut réel et leur statut personnel seront, à compter de la promulgation du présent décret, réglés par la loi française, tous droits acquis jusqu'à ce jour restant inviolables.”26 It could be important to note the use of the word “Israélite,”

24 “Le Juif,” Le Siècle, January 4, 1863, https://www.retronews.fr/colonies/long-format/2018/05/17/le-decret-qui- rendit-francais-les-juifs-dalgerie; translation by Elinor Farber: “Their lot has improved significantly since our conquest, as has their character. A few still seek to deceive us on occasion, but, in general, they have given us great gratitude […]. In short, the Jewish race has been and will continue to be of great help to us in colonizing and civilizing Algeria.” 25 Sung-Eun Choi, Decolonization and the French of Algeria: Bringing the Settler Colony Home (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 22-24. 26 “Bulletin Officiel de la Délégation du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale,” Le Moniteur Universel, October 30, 1870, https://www.retronews.fr/colonies/long-format/2018/05/17/le-decret-qui-rendit-francais-les-juifs-dalgerie; translation by Elinor Farber: “The government of national defense decrees: The native Jews of the departments of 11 which was a French term to denote a Jew who was assimilated into French culture. Again, although

Algerian Jews may not have adopted many elements of French culture at this time, language was imperative to crafting the narrative that Algerian Jews would accept French culture and assist in maintaining control of Algeria. Additionally, French officials thought that Jews were more able to be “civilized” than Muslims, and an idea emerged that Jews just needed a country like France to help them succeed. Jacques-Isaac Altaras, a Jewish man who worked for the French government, argued that Algerian Jews were not practicing a “civilized, French Judaism,” so French citizenship was imperative to help them assimilate like the Jews in France had assimilated into French culture.27

After the implementation of the decree, all Algerian Jews, except those in the M’zab, were granted French citizenship and had to abandon their Mosaic civil status, which was one of the local law systems that France had allowed to exist following their colonization. Koranic civil status was also recognized, but France attempted to limit its local power as much as possible.28 The decree, although welcomed by some Jews, removed the element of choice that the 1865 statute had allowed. Some Jews in Constantine and Oran publicly objected to it, but the law continued to go into effect.29 Jews residing in the M’zab region of Algeria were not included in the Crémieux

Decree because they lived outside the French sphere of influence in Algeria. They only gained

French citizenship in 1961, at the end of the Algerian War.30

Algeria are declared French citizens; consequently, their real status and their personal status will be, from the promulgation of this decree, regulated by French law, all rights acquired up to this day remaining inviolable.” 27 Sung-Eun Choi, Decolonization and the French of Algeria, 22-24. 28 Todd Shepard, “Algerian Nationalism, Zionism, and French Laïcité: A History of Ethnoreligious Nationalisms and Decolonization.” 29 Joshua Schreier, Arabs of the Jewish Faith, 175. 30 Sung-Eun Choi, Decolonization and the French of Algeria, 15. 12 Despite the wishes of French officials, Algerian Jews were hesitant to adopt French culture.

Joshua Schreier argues that they accepted French citizenship quietly but did not accept the French influence over their personal lives, which the French thought was a necessary step to assimilation.31 In March of 1871, the Mokrani revolt occurred against the French government by over 250 Muslim tribes and was partially caused by the Crémieux Decree, but it was perceived in

France as a revolt out of jealousy of the Jews. Following the revolt, Le Petit Journal published an article with their view of the Muslims in Algeria, claiming, “On sait la haine séculaire qui anime les musulmans contre la race juive. Les musulmans en sont encore maintenant au point où en était la France au Moyen Âge. Un décret signé par M. Crémieux et conférant aux Israélites d'Alger le droit de former un bataillon spécial de tirailleurs, excita vivement la jalousie des Arabes.”32 They argued that the anti-Semitism of Muslims in Algeria was comparable to that of France in the

Middle Ages, and they go so far as to claim that the Crémieux Decree ignited the jealousy of the

Muslims and caused this revolt. This continued to perpetuate the French narrative that Algerian

Jews should become more integrated into French culture rather than Algerian culture. However, other instances of anti-Semitic violence occurred as a result of the Crémieux Decree. The perpetrators were often European settlers rather than local Muslims.33

Looting, murders, and the sacking of synagogues took place throughout the last few decades of the nineteenth century in Tlemcen, Algiers, and other cities throughout Algeria. The

Dreyfus Affair in France also triggered several anti-Semitic incidents in Algeria around the turn

31 Joshua Schreier, Arabs of the Jewish Faith, 175. 32 “Nouvelles d’Algerie,” Le Petit Journal, March 12, 1871, https://www.retronews.fr/colonies/long- format/2018/05/17/le-decret-qui-rendit-francais-les-juifs-dalgerie; translation by Elinor Farber: “We know the secular hatred that leads Muslims against the Jewish race. Muslims are still now at the point where France was in the Middle Ages. A decree signed by M. Crémieux and conferring on the Jews of Algiers the right to form a special battalion of skirmishers, greatly aroused the jealousy of the Arabs.” 33 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 13 of the century. Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish officer in the French army. He was falsely accused of treason. His treatment revealed that anti-Semitic stereotypes were widely shared by members of the French establishment and public, and by extension, in the colony of Algeria. In 1906, following an extensive investigation, Dreyfus was acquitted and reinstated. Yet during the repeated appeals the political rift between those who supported him and those who did not persisted. Anti-Semitic incidents occurred on a more frequent basis. In 1898 a pogrom in Algeria claimed the lives of several Jews.34 After Dreyfus was exonerated, anti-Semitism in France and Algeria largely decreased and remained at low levels until the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany in the 1930s.

On June 26, 1889, France passed the last major citizenship law that would affect the citizens of Algeria. According to the law, children born in Algeria to a non-French father who himself was born on French soil and children born in Algeria to a non-French father who was not born on French soil but who lived on French soil until age twenty-one would automatically be a naturalized citizen once they turned twenty-one.35 This helped to create a distinct pied-noir, or settler, community in Algeria. Generally, pieds-noirs were French white citizens who were born in Algeria. Few Algerians refused citizenship, even though it caused many people to question their new allegiances to France since it conflicted with their previous national identity.36 However, like the Crémieux Decree, the law failed to address the question of citizenship for Algerian Muslims.

Todd Shepard argues that the lack of citizenship discussions for Algerian Muslims was a result of a combination of ethnocentrism, Orientalism, racism, and Islamophobia that dramatically affected their opportunities for future success and growth.37 Although it was clear that French officials held

34 Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews (New York: BasicBooks, 1993), 15-16.

35 Sophie B. Roberts, Citizenship and Antisemitism, 53. 36 Ibid, 53. 37 Todd Shepard, “Algerian Nationalism, Zionism, and French Laïcité: A History of Ethnoreligious Nationalisms and Decolonization.” 14 prejudices against Algerian Muslims that affected their decisions, the French Third Republic claimed that the law was justified to not include Muslims due to their Koranic civil status, which would prevent them from gaining citizenship. They also argued that they wanted to respect their choice to keep being protected under “local law.” However, this was clearly not true as the

Crémieux Decree was passed with no regard for the choice Algerian Jews to remain protected under their local law.38 Ultimately, France used the vulnerability of Algerian Jews as part of their colonization of Algeria. While they were protected by the Crémieux Decree, the Jewish population in Algeria had an unstable relationship with France, which would be used against them during

World War II by the collaborative Vichy regime.

World War II and the Holocaust

In May 1940, German troops invaded France. In June the French government capitulated. The northern part of France, including Paris, was occupied by the Germans. In the South, the unoccupied zone, the Germans installed a puppet regime that became known as Vichy Regime, because the small spa town served as the new government’s headquarter. The leader of the Vichy

Regime was Marshall Philippe Pétain, who was widely credited for saving France during the battle of Verdun during the First World War.39 On October 3, 1940 the Vichy government issued the first statut des juifs, just days after a similar statute was announced in the occupied zone. Following the German model, the Vichy statute broadened the definition of Jewish persons to include someone with two or more Jewish grandparents. The racial laws demonstrated that Vichy closely

38 Ibid. 39 Michael Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 55. 15 cooperated with the Nazi regime. The next day, a second law was published that allowed the government to intern, move to a specific residence, or send to a forced labor camp any foreign

Jew.40 As a result of the race statutes, which were also applied in Algeria, Jews were limited to a certain quota in public schools and in certain professions, such as lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, and other professionals.41 It is important to note that German troops never entered Algeria, and the

Vichy regime was responsible for instituting anti-Semitic policies in Algeria.

On October 7 of the same year, the Crémieux Decree was officially repealed, and around

115,000 Jews in Algeria lost their French citizenship.42 Jews who had fought in the French army during World War I and from 1939-40 and were decorated were able to retain their citizenship; however, Jews had to prove their service with official military documents, and any inconsistencies would disqualify them from receiving an exemption. Additionally, only veterans from World War

I and 1939-40 were able to receive exemptions; any other military service did not apply.43 The abolition of the Crémieux Decree solidified the fear that Algerian Jews had felt since its start and subjected them to the same state-mandated anti-Semitism as in the metropole.

The main governmental organization responsible for drafting and implementing the Vichy race laws that limited the political, economic, and social status of the Jews in France and Algeria was the Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives, headed by Xavier Vallat. In 1941, he visited

Algeria for the purpose of determining if any of the race laws needed to be adjusted or repealed.

Even after meeting with the Chief Rabbi Maurice Eisenbeth and Jewish military veterans, he did not repeal any of the laws. Algerian Jews remained subject to the same quotas for certain

40 Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 56. 41 “Algeria,” World Jewish Congress. 42 Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 57. 43 Michael Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century, 76-77. 16 professions and public schools.44 Additionally, Algerian Jews lost the right to own real estate. In terms of schooling, Algerian Jews mainly attended public schools before World War II, and the enrollment in schools run by the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), unlike Morocco and Tunisia, was a small percentage of all students. The AIU was founded in Paris in 1860 as a philanthropic organization “to devote itself to the defense of Jews and the promotion of human rights.” It established Jewish schools across North Africa but was closed down by the Germans in 1940.45

Jewish enrollment in institutions of higher learning was limited to 3%, and primary and secondary schools had a quota of 14%, which was decreased to 7% in 1942.46 However, a group of Jews were able to establish a network of Jewish schools with Jewish teachers that were able to accommodate students who had been expelled as a result of the quotas. By 1942, around 20,000 students were able to take advantage of these schools. The Vichy Regime made it difficult for them to operate like regular public schools. An estimated 2,000 Algerian Jews were sent to labor and concentration camps in Algeria. They faced harsh treatment from guards and terrible living conditions within the camps, and many died as a result.47 In 2018, the German government recognized Algerian Jews as

Holocaust survivors and provided them compensation.48

Despite the chaos caused by the racial laws and deportations to camps within Algeria,

Algerian Jews were still somewhat aware of anti-Semitic policies in Germany and the rest of

Europe through newspapers, radio, and refugees from Europe. Many of these refugees, mainly

German and some French Jews, were on their way to another country overseas, but nonetheless,

44 Ibid, 77. 45 “Alliance Israelite Universelle,” Alliance Israelite Universelle, accessed March 20, 2021, http://www.aiu.org/en/alliance-israelite-universelle. 46 Ibid, 78-79. 47 Sophie Silver Ochayon, “The Jews of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia,” Yad Vashem, accessed October 2020, https://www.yadvashem.org/articles/general/the-jews-of-algeria-morocco-and-tunisia.html. 48 “Jews in Islamic Countries: Algeria,” Jewish Virtual Library, accessed March 27, 2021, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jews-of-algeria. 17 they were welcomed with open arms in Algeria and other North African states. Various Jewish agencies were established in order to aid these refugees and assist with their relocation.49 Much of the media was cut off for them between 1941 to 1943, and movement of refugees had slowed due to stricter travel rules.50 Despite the oppression that they faced under the Vichy regime, Algerian

Jews were heavily involved in the Algerian resistance movement, which paved the way for the

Allies to liberate North Africa.

As early as October 1940 when the first racial laws were established, young Algerian Jews began organizing resistance to the Vichy regime. One specific group, the Géo-Gras, was named after a director at a gymnasium where the activists met and trained and led by brothers Raphaël and Stéphane Aboulker. Another group was formed specifically after a group of students from the

University of Algiers were expelled as a result of the higher education quotas. Other prominent resistance leaders included Doctor Henri Aboulker and his son José, as well as Roger Carcassonne, a young industrialist.51 The main focus of the resistance groups in Algeria was to create a plan to assist the Allies with their landings during Operation Torch to liberate North Africa. On November

8, 1942, around 400 local members of the resistance in Algiers seized buildings of strategic importance for the Allies. More than 250 of the participants were Jewish. That was one of the largest proportion of Jews in an armed resistance force during World War II. Susan Zuccotti points out that despite this fact, the Jews in Algeria were not given the recognition that they deserved in terms of policies after the liberation.52

49 Yablonka, Hanna, “Oriental Jewry and the Holocaust: A Tri-Generational Perspective,” Israel Studies 14, no. 1 (2009): 94-122, muse.jhu.edu/article/258037. 50 Ibid. 51 Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 276. 52 Ibid, 276. 18

Figure 2: American Troops Entering Algeria as Part of Operation Torch, 1942 “The Jews Will Have to Wait,” Oct. 9, 2017, Mosaic Magazine. After British and American forces defeated the local Vichy forces in 1943 in Algeria, Yves

Châtel was appointed as new governor of Algeria. Chief Rabbi Eisenbeth pleaded with the governor to abolish all of the anti-Jewish race laws, but the laws were not repealed for several more months. On March 18, 1943, Henri Giraud, Commander in Chief of the French troops in

Algeria, repealed the anti-Jewish laws. However, he specifically did not reinstate the Crémieux

Decree.53 Following condemnation of this decision in the American press and a note from

President Roosevelt, the Crémieux Decree was reinstated on October 23, 1943, almost one year after the Allies landed in Algiers.54

53 Ibid, 276. 54 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 19 Chapter 2

The Position of Jews During the Algerian War

After the Allied provisional government in Algeria was installed on March 7, 1944, an ordinance was published which guaranteed the different local civil statuses, including Koranic civil status, while also granting an elite group of 65,000 Algerian Muslim men full French political rights.55 Attitudes toward the French legal status of Algerians began to change following the war, which also represented a positive, more accepting shift in attitudes toward immigrants living in

France. On May 7, 1946, a law passed which stated that all other Algerians with local civil status were now French citizens, but the law was generally vague and did not give much information as to how this would be applied. As a result, nationalist groups rejected these new advancements and claimed that they were a front for “continued colonial domination.”56 Although nationalist groups were clearly opposed to continued French rule and the new citizenship guidelines, many French officials tried to deny outright the existence of Algerian nationalism and refrained from discussing it during parliamentary debates.57 Additionally, from 1947 to 1954, French intelligence services limited the use of the term “nation” and its derivations when they spied on nationalist groups in

Algeria, which further exhibits the French government’s critical view toward these groups in

Algeria.58

While tensions between the French government and Algerian nationalists were growing following the war, Jewish communities in Algeria, as well as in France, were working to reorganize themselves after the devastation of the Holocaust. Jewish communities in Algeria were organized

55 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France, 39. 56 Ibid, 39. 57 Todd Shepard, “Algerian Nationalism, Zionism, and French Laïcité: A History of Ethnoreligious Nationalisms and Decolonization.” 58 Ibid. 20 into three different consistories of Oran, Algiers, and Constantine, led by the Fédération des

Communautés Israélites d’Algérie, or the FCIA, which was established in 1947 to oversee Jewish activity in Algeria. The Grand Rabbi of Algeria, the Chief Rabbis of all three consistories, and the

Presidents of the consistories ran the FCIA.59 Other organizations formed to assist Jews as well, such as the École Rabbinique d’Algérie, and L’Information Juive, which was a newspaper published from 1948 to April of 1962 in Algiers. Although there was a sense of unity due to the many different organizations designed to help Algerian Jews, the community was not very connected, and each one mainly functioned autonomously, which is important to recognize to understand how they responded during the Algerian War.60

The presence of these organizations demonstrated that many Algerian Jews still saw a future for themselves in Algeria; however, the immigration of Jews from North Africa to Israel increased between 1948 and 1951 causing growing discontent from North African Muslims.61

Additionally, many Algerians considered the French government as an Israeli ally due to its backing of Israel’s independence and military support during the 1948 war. However, hostility decreased around 1951 because of new, restrictive Israeli migration laws and reports of bad conditions for immigrants in Israel.62 Despite tensions between Muslims and Jews in North Africa decreasing, Maud Mandel emphasizes the fact that Zionists and Zionist newspapers, such as La

Terre Retrouvée, tried to paint North African nationalism in a negative light and in a way that made it seem dangerous to Jews, most likely in an effort to convince them to move to Israel.63

Various sides would continue to try to appeal to Algerian Jews during the Algerian War, which

59 Daniel Schroeter, “Algeria.” 60 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 61 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 39. 62 Ibid. 63 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 39. 21 made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for them to remain in Algeria. The complicated status of Algerian Jews during the war and the violence that occurred as a result would ultimately lead to the mass migration of Algerian Jews to France at the end of the war.

The Outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence

On November 1, 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) of Algeria demanded the reestablishment of the sovereignty of the Algerian Nation. Founded in 1954 by a group of Algerian nationalist militants, the organization’s goal was to create a unified nationalist movement to revolt against France and liberate Algeria.64 A series of attacks throughout the country accompanied this statement, which gave this day the name, “le Toussaint rouge,” meaning “Bloody All-Saints.” The attacks, which included bomb blasts in major towns throughout Algeria, killed eight people and wounded four, and the FLN and its military arm, l’Armée de Libération National (ALN), claimed responsibility for the attacks.65 The violence was the first time since 1830 that major attacks had occurred all over Algeria, which was significant in that 1830 was the year France colonized

Algeria. Their desire to break away from colonial rule was evident, especially during a time when decolonization movements were gaining support across the globe. However, the initial onslaught of violence indicated that the FLN would use any tactics in order to reach its goal, including terrorism.66 Many attacks during the first year of the war were aimed toward civilians who they

64 “National Liberation Front,” Encyclopedia Britannica, March 22, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Liberation-Front-political-party-Algeria. 65 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France, 43. 66 Ibid, 43. 22 characterized as “traitors” or colonial agents; however, this expanded to anyone living in so-called

“colonial centers” in August of 1955.67

On August 20, 1955, the FLN killed seventy-one Europeans and 52 Algerians in

Philippeville, including a prominent Jewish family from Constantine. As a result, France sent troops to Algeria in large numbers, increasing their troops from 60,000 in November of 1954 to

400,000 troops in July of 1956.68 With the increase in French soldiers, attacks and violence surged across the country, and many Jews felt as though France was not doing enough to protect its citizens from violence. Throughout the war, Jews in general tried to remain out of politics, as they felt caught between the two sides due to their long history in Algeria and their connection to France through citizenship. Additionally, many Jewish leaders continued to see a future for the Jews in

Algeria, at least during the start of the war; in 1955, construction began on Algeria’s first rabbinical school.69 In 1956, however, the Algerian conflict entered the global stage as the FLN aligned themselves with Egyptian nationalists, which also intertwined them with the Arab-Israeli conflict.70

The growing tensions surrounding Algerian Jews culminated on May 12, 1956 with the first major attack on a group of Jews. In the afternoon, a group of Algerian nationalists threw a grenade into a Jewish café in Constantine, which wounded thirteen people, seven of them seriously.71 The attack was unprecedented for the war until this point because many Jews had assumed that their overall neutrality in the war would protect them from violence. A French

67 Ibid, 43. 68 Jessica Hammerman, “By Sentiment and By Status,” French Politics, Culture & Society 36, 1 (2018): 76-102, accessed Nov 2, 2020, https://doi.org/10.3167/fpcs.2018.360104. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Two Pieces of Correspondence Regarding Attacks on Algerian Jews. May 17, 1956. American Jewish Committee Archives. 23 correspondent from Algeria for the newspaper, Paris-Press-L’Intransigeant, noted this shift in the targets of attacks: “Until now the outlaws did not dare touch Constantine Jews. They had heard that the latter had organized two commando groups and were ready to respond with violent reprisals to any act of terrorism. However, an anti-Jewish campaign has been going on in Algeria lately, led by Arab nationalists and the communists. The (Algerian Army of Liberation) headquarters in Cairo, egged on by the Egyptian government, is said to have ordered the fellaghas to attack Jews from now on, it is asserted in Algiers. Moreover, during an interview given to an

American news agency, Ferhat Abbas72 said 'the Liberation Army considers Jews on the same plane as Frenchmen.’”73 The excerpt clearly places the responsibility of a rise of anti-Semitism on

Arab nationalists and communists, and it also begins to portray the narrative that Algerian Jews were being attacked because they were associated with the French pieds-noirs. Although the recent attacks were clearly perpetrated by Algerian nationalists, the article also represents the attack as part of a larger “anti-Jewish campaign,” which did not seem to be the case, as many members of the FLN repeatedly tried to gain support of Algerian Jews throughout the war.

Nonetheless, the attack in Constantine prompted a counterattack by a group of Jews on

May 13, 1956.74 The group, connected to Israel’s secret service, Mossad, machine gunned an Arab café that was known to be a meeting point for Algerian nationalists, and killed six Arabs and wounded four others. Mossad continued to work in North Africa and created networks of Jews throughout Algeria in an effort to try to stop other attacks on Jews and protect them.75 Naturally, the rise in anti-Jewish attacks created disruptions in the Algerian Jewish community, and many

72 Ferhat Abbas was an Algerian nationalist leader who had recently fled to Cairo. 73 Two Pieces of Correspondence Regarding Attacks on Algerian Jews. 74 Ibid. 75 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 24 people began to express their feelings of insecurity as a result of the conflict. Alan M. Strook, the

Chairman of the American Jewish Congress’s foreign affairs committee at the time, claimed that the crisis put Jews “between pincers of extreme fanaticism” on the eve of the committee’s fifty- first annual meeting in April of 1958.76 He understood the dangerous situation of Jews in Algeria as a result of the war, and he noted that the danger stemmed from both sides. Later in his statement, he argued that the political unrest and lack of a strong central government in France would lead to an increase in anti-Semitism in Algeria and France if the situation did not improve, and he also contended that an ongoing conflict in Algeria would cause more Arabs to radicalize and align themselves with President Nassar of the United Arab Republic, which was hostile toward Israel.77

Strook rightly recognized the threat to the Jews from both sides, which contrasted claims from the

French media, like Paris-Press-L’Intransigeant, that the rise in anti-Jewish violence was one-sided on behalf of the FLN. He even went so far as to say that if the situation did not improve for the

Jews in Algeria, “only mass flight might offer a way out.”78 He did not specify to where, but his words exemplify the severity of the situation and foreshadowed what would eventually come for most of Algeria’s Jews.

Efforts by the FLN to Gain Jewish Support

From August 13 to 20 in 1956, the FLN held the Congress of Soummam, which was a major step forward to creating an independent Algerian state. At the conference, the FLN announced its plans to expand attacks to European settlers, which could include Jews, as a result of French violence

76 “Anxiety Is Voiced for Algeria’s Jews,” New York Times, April 24, 1958, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1958/04/24/89085122.html?pageNumber=6. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 25 against Muslims who they thought were associated with the FLN in Algeria.79 Throughout the war, however, the FLN killed around 16,300 Muslim civilians and only 2,700 European civilians, despite claiming that their attacks on civilians would focus on the French. Either way, the French media and government painted this violence as barbarism while suppressing any information that discussed their own use of torture tactics and violence against Algerian Muslims.80 In addition to this development announced at the Congress of Soummam, the FLN also announced their stance toward Algerian Jews. They claimed that Jewish Algerians were part of the Algerian nation in one of the first major efforts to try to appeal to them for their support.81

One specific example of their attempt to appeal to them occurred in the Tunisian newspaper, L’Action, a few months after the Congress of Soummam. On October 15, 1956, the newspaper published an article titled, “The Time Has Come for Algerian Jews to Choose,” urging

Algerian Jews to side with the FLN. The article distinguished between three different groups of

Algerian Jews: the economically poor, the bourgeoisie, and the rich bourgeoisie. Although each group had different preferences and needs, France had treated them as a homogenous group for their own political gain. The author also pointed to instances where French colonialists attacked

Jews. For instance, on February 6, 1956 a group of Europeans attacked Jewish students and called them anti-Semitic slurs.82 Throughout the article, the author made it clear that Algerian Jews should not side with France because France did not care about them, but they warned Jews could no longer be neutral in the war: “Today Algerian Jews have the opportunity to make their choice,

79 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France, 44. 80 Ibid, 44. 81 Todd Shepard, “Algerian Nationalism, Zionism, and French Laïcité: A History of Ethnoreligious Nationalisms and Decolonization.” 82 Correspondence from AJC Paris Office regarding the National Liberation Army in Algeria and its call for Algerian Jews to state support for the National Liberation Army, October 22, 1956, American Jewish Committee Archives. 26 or at least show their solidarity, by taking a, now and collective position. From this moment on, the Algerian Revolution has entered a new phase; the rallying around of political, religious and ethnic minorities.”83 Algerian nationalists undoubtedly viewed the Jews as an important group from which would provide political support, and be an ally in the struggle for independence. The

FLN’s strategic criticism of France, coupled with the narrative that the nationalist movement would now cater to minorities, characterized their efforts to gain the support of Algerian Jews, which would continue throughout the war.

However, despite their attempts, Jews as a whole in Algeria did not formally voice their support for one specific group. In November of 1956, the FLN criticized the Grand Rabbi of

Algeria for not taking a stronger stance against the French because of France’s torture of Algerian

Nationalists. In response, Jacques Lazarus, director of the World Jewish Congress, stated, “[The

Jews] intend to stay loyal to the vocation that has made them equally close to the two other religious communities, Muslim and Christian.... Their firm hope is to continue to live in friendship with both.”84 Even though they intended to stay neutral between the two groups, it did not protect them from violence from either side. In 1957, violence and bombings against Jews increased, and the nationalists’ appeals to the Jewish community became more backed by violence if they did not listen.85

The violence against Jews continued on February 18, 1958 when the FLN kidnapped and killed two emissaries of the Jewish agency.86 Later in the year, two representatives from the

American Jewish Committee met with a representative from the FLN, Abdelkader Chanderli, to

83 Ibid. 84 Jessica Hammerman, “By Sentiment and By Status.” 85 Ibid. 86 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 27 discuss the incident. During the meeting, Chanderli justified their actions by claiming that they should not have been traveling to Southern Algeria during the war, and he mainly discussed how they viewed Algerian Jews as their fellow citizens. He said that the FLN would grant them full citizenship and rights if they won the war in an attempt to appeal to the two representatives, but they maintained their stance that they cannot speak on behalf of all of the Jews in Algeria.

However, they did note that many Algerian Jews did support a peaceful solution to the conflict, which they claimed was a cause of rising anti-Semitism in France.87 The representatives continued to make it clear that Algerian Jews would not take a side, but it is interesting to note that they were very aware of the danger that the Algerian Jewish population was facing from both sides, which would only worsen throughout the war.

Although the Jewish community in Algeria as a whole never distinctly supported the

French or the FLN, individuals had their own opinions of the war and who they wanted to support.

In particular, Denis Guénoun, who was born in Oran in 1946, grew up during the war and the

Algerian nationalist movement. He chronicled his experiences as an Algerian Jew during this time, as well as his relationship with his father, René, in his memoir, A Semite. Throughout the memoir, he recalls his father’s outspoken support for Algerian independence, which stemmed from his sense of historic connection to the Arabs in Algeria. René described himself as a Semite, which he felt linked them with the Arabs: “That is what the word ‘Semite’ says, either Jew or Arab without distinction, what Jews and Arabs share, what they are together, undifferentiated, the South of the world if you like, the point of origin beside the waves, the arid earth and the great religions invented by men.”88 René’s outlook toward his place as a Jew in Algeria was not unique, especially since

87 Notes on meeting with Mr. Chanderli, April 29, 1958, American Jewish Committee Archives. 88 Denis Guénoun, A Semite: A Memoir of Algeria (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 19. 28 many Jews had lived in Algeria long before French colonization. His perspective demonstrates the complicated position that Algerian Jews faced during the war, even for those who knew which side they would support.

The situation became more complex as Denis and his father discussed his support for the independence movement and what they would do if they did receive their own state. Even before the war began, René was clear with Denis that if Algeria became an independent nation, they would have to leave the country: “The country belongs to [the Algerians] … [If they win] we go and live in France, in the land of trees, vales, chateaus, and theaters, the land of Rousseau,

Malherbe, and Jean Gabin.”89 He understood the distinct identity that Jews had in Algeria, separate from both the French settlers and Algerian Muslims. He also respected the nationalist sentiments of his neighbors and knew that his family would not have a place in an independent Algeria. His beliefs provide a contrast to many of the European settlers in Algeria, who wanted it to remain under French rule. He also had the perspective and understanding of the conflict to know that they would have to leave, even though he supported their fight. Although leaders of the FLN tried to gain support from Algerian Jews by promising them full citizenship if they won the war, even

René, who already supported them, knew that their political status would not matter in Algeria if they won because they would have to move to France regardless.

Heightened Tensions and a New French Republic

In 1958, both the FLN and France suffered immense losses. From a military standpoint, the FLN was struggling for many reasons, one of which being an effort by the French to block the FLN

89 Ibid, 21. 29 from their external army in Tunisia with 40,000 troops. General Maurice Challe, who had been successful in suppressing FLN rebellions in the past, was also appointed to be a commander at the end of the year, which further hurt the independence movement.90 However, France suffered diplomatically during 1958, which would prove to be a more devastating blow in the war.

On April 26, 1958, European colonists organized large-scale protests in Algiers to demand a new government as a result of the Fourth Republic’s failure to suppress the FLN.91 These protests and the war were not the sole reason for the political turmoil in France. The New York Times pointed out that France had been struggling for years due to the breakdown of its colonial empire in countries like Tunisia, Morocco, and Vietnam. Additionally, although France was winning the war overall, military success came with a high cost: “The Algerian War has tied down a French army of over 400,000, badly stripping France’s NATO forces; cost the lives of 5,000 French and

50,000 Algerians, and drained the French treasury at the rate of $5,000,000 daily. It has inflamed feelings within France, exacerbated France’s relations with its allies, and lent fuel to the Pan-Arab, anti-Western campaign of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic.”92 The volatility economically and socially within France, coupled with the instability of a parliamentary government with five different major parties, caused a situation in which the Fourth Republic could not continue as it was.93 Especially during a time of worldwide decolonization, French control in

90 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 325. 91 Roberts Sophie B, Citizenship and Anti-Semitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870-1962, 342. 92 “France in Crisis,” The New York Times, May 15, 1958, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1958/05/18/91388991.html?pageNumber=163. 93 Ibid. 30 Algeria was growing less popular among French voters and throughout the rest of the world, which made a change in France’s government and policies toward Algeria inevitable.

Figure 3: "Week of Turmoil for France," Demonstration in Paris, May 1958 New York Times. The chaos in Algeria provided an opportunity for French military officials to stage a coup on May 13, 1958 with the aim of keeping Algeria French. Fearing the possible consequences of the coup, the government in France appointed Charles de Gaulle as Premier on May 15, 1958. The

Fourth Republic of France fell, and the Fifth Republic, led by de Gaulle, took power.94 The republic’s new constitution differed from the past two republics in the sense that the President held

94 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 325. 31 significantly more power, which allowed de Gaulle to take charge with the war in Algeria.95 Less than a month later, from June 4 to 7, de Gaulle visited Algeria to assess the situation and meet with leaders. While there, he told the Algerians and French settlers two contradictory statements: “I have understood you,” and “Long live French Algeria,” respectively.96 Although these provided different views to how to handle the war, he was more willing than the previous administration to listen and negotiate to the FLN, which brought some stability to a situation that was increasingly growing out of control. During de Gaulle’s trip to Algeria, on June 6, Abraham Karlikov from the

American Jewish Committee wrote to his colleague, Eugene Hevesi, in New York about de Gaulle and the position of the Jews in Algeria. Karlikov argued that the overall status of Jews remained unchanged as of that moment because Jews did not have a unified opinion on de Gaulle, so they were not affected right away. However, he claims that “their position vis-à-vis the general was no different than that of any other Frenchmen,” which could have been an attempt by Karlikov to continue to portray the Jews living in Algeria as connected to France rather than Algeria.97 Another measure of the initial change in wellbeing of Algerian Jews was that pressure to immigrate had not increased, which seemed to be a positive sign that recent events had not created too much change.98 Throughout the letter, Karlikov was still cautious overall and noted that the situation could change in the future, and in that case, they should be ready.

Alan M. Stroock, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American Jewish

Committee, also weighed in on the recent political change with de Gaulle and how he predicted it would affect the Jews in Algeria and France. Like Karlikov, he was initially optimistic about de

95 “French Fifth Republic,” Oxford Reference, Accessed 20 Mar. 2021, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110810104916596. 96 Sophie B. Roberts, Citizenship and Anti-Semitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870-1962, 342. 97 “New Arab Nationality Law,” memorandum, June 3, 1958, American Jewish Committee Archives. 98 Ibid. 32 Gaulle and noted that he did not have any anti-Semitic tendencies, although French settlers in

Algeria had perpetuated acts of anti-Semitism in the past.99 Regarding the Jews in France and possible future immigrants to France, Stroock discussed the threat of anti-Semitism in far-right groups and some member of the Paris police force, who had recently been protesting due to their dissatisfaction with their salaries. However, the protests had an “anti-Semitic nature,” which

Stroock argues could be harmful to Jews if it is not handled by the new administration.100 Stroock and Karlikov were both cautiously optimistic about the new regime; however, they acknowledged that they needed to be prepared if the tide of the war were to change. They recognized the vulnerable position of Jews in Algeria and the possible need for them to migrate elsewhere, which did eventually occur toward the end of the war.

De Gaulle was officially elected President of the Fifth Republic on December 21, 1958.

The new constitution of France reaffirmed the previous citizenship law of 1944 that gave all

Algerians with “local civil status” French citizenship, and two specific articles, 3 and 75, clearly noted that Algeria was still a part of France.101 The new constitution and de Gaulle’s attitude toward Algeria was a step in the right direction for Algerian independence, but it was not until several months later that de Gaulle gave Algeria the right to self-determination, which changed the tide of the war.

99 AJC Minutes, Admin Board, Jan-June 1958, American Jewish Committee Archives. 100 AJC Press Release Regarding Potential Political Dangers Facing Algerian Jewry, April 1958, American Jewish Committee Archives. 101 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 325. 33 The De Gaulle Administration and Algeria’s Right to Self-Determination

On September 16, 1959, de Gaulle proposed three options for Algeria: integration with France and continued French control, complete independence from France, or independence with cooperation and aid from France, which France favored.102 This signified a major shift in the war because it opened the door for negotiations between the FLN and France, and it allowed Muslim Algerians the chance to begin planning their own future.103 However, de Gaulle was not necessarily clear with the status of Jews in this arrangement, as he had mentioned them as a group separate from the French living in Algeria, which worried the growing number Jews who wanted to retain their

French citizenship. De Gaulle’s assertion initiated a new wave of Jews living in Algeria who wanted to emphasize their connection to France.104 Although Algerian Jews had won citizenship with the Crémieux Decree, they remained apprehensive due to the sudden abrogation of the

Crémieux Decree during the Holocaust.

In order to begin presenting a more unified, “French” status to France and discuss their future in Algeria, the Comité Juif Algérien d’Études Sociales (CJAES) met in November, 1959 with the primary concern of retaining their French identities, even if it meant abandoning Algeria and their historic connection to it.105 Jewish leaders, including Jacques Lazarus, worried that in negotiations, de Gaulle would grant them “communauté minoritaire” status, which would separate them from the French and contradict the Crémieux Decree.106 As a result of their doubts, representatives from the CJAES met with Delegate Paul Délouvrier to affirm their equal status

102 Ibid, 327. 103 Sophie B. Roberts, Citizenship and Anti-Semitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870-1962, 342. 104 Sung-Eun Choi, Decolonization and the French of Algeria: Bringing the Settler Colony Home, 47. 105 Sophie B. Roberts, Citizenship and Anti-Semitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870-1962, 342. 106 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 328. 34 with other French citizens, stating that they had a “particular situation…[and] risk being defined by some as natives of this land, and as thus, ‘Algerians’ rather than French.”107 Their efforts to declare their French identity was mirrored by the growing number of Algerian Jews who felt the same way, even though some individuals had differing opinions.

Although more Algerian Jews were attempting to assert their French identity, the FLN continued its appeals to gain their support. On December 1, 1959, the FLN published a brochure titled, “Documents addressed to the French people, the Jews of Algeria in combat for national independence,” with the goal of presenting Algeria as a safe place for Jews. They claimed they would establish equality for all citizens without discrimination following independence from

France, while also criticizing France for its colonial history and past anti-Semitism.108 A month later, in January of 1960, the FLN published an “Appeal to the Jews of Algeria” in another effort to win the trust and support of Jews living in Algeria: “You are an integral part of the Algerian people, you are not asked to choose between France and Algeria, but to become effective citizens of your true country. Either you choose to function fully in this country where the future will inaugurate freedom and democratic principles to be enjoyed by all the nation’s children; or else you accept to live under the reign of contempt and to be content with a citizenship granted to you by your oppressors within a context which is in contradiction even with the most elementary human rights.”109 By calling Algeria the true country of the Jews, the FLN called upon the long history of Jews in Algeria to try to appeal to them as people with a common history, language, and culture. The FLN also notes that Algerian Jews, since the Holocaust, had questioned their legal

107 Sung-Eun Choi, Decolonization and the French of Algeria: Bringing the Settler Colony Home, 48. 108 Sophie B. Roberts, Citizenship and Anti-Semitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870-1962, 342. 109 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 329. 35 status as French citizens due to the repeal of the Crémieux Decree under Vichy rule, and it contrasts the FLN with France by arguing that Algerian Jews will always be equal with other citizens and enjoy the same democratic values. Additionally, by calling France their oppressors, it references

France’s anti-Semitism and position during the Holocaust, when the Vichy Regime collaborated with the Nazis and targeted foreign Jews who had recently immigrated to France.

Although the FLN knew many of the insecurities that Algerian Jews faced during the war and pinpointed them in their appeals, most Algerian Jews still viewed France as their most viable option now that independence was almost inevitable. The CJAES and Jacques Lazarus responded to many of these appeals without outwardly voicing support for either side but continuing to use language that asserted their French identity in order to protect their citizenship in France.110 As

Jews began to realize that many other people in their communities were also preparing to immigrate to France, nationalists began to notice as well, increasing anti-Semitism and violence.

On the eve of Yom Kippur in 1959, an unknown terrorist threw a grenade into the synagogue of

Bou Saada, which killed the Rabbi’s 6-year-old granddaughter and injured several others.111 In

December of 1960, de Gaulle visited Algeria, which incited more riots from both sides. Algerian

Nationalists attacked the Great Synagogue of the Algiers on December 12, 1960, destroying a

Torah scroll that had been brought to Algeria by Spanish Jews in 1391. They also raised the

Algerian Nationalist Flag in the synagogue and vandalized the walls with, “Death to the Jews” and

Swastikas.112 The increase in anti-Semitic violence caused the first wave of Jewish immigrants to leave for France or Israel. In 1960, the police in Constantine noted this when they noticed that many Jews were leaving their homes with no intention of returning, and from 1961, the Jewish

110 Ibid, 329. 111 Sophie B. Roberts, Citizenship and Anti-Semitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870-1962, 344. 112 Ibid, 344. 36 Agency started to assist Jews from Algeria who wanted to make Aliyah.113 Immigration of Jews out of Algeria continued throughout the final years of the war as violence remained constant, specifically toward Jews.

On January 8, 1961, de Gaulle held a referendum vote for self-determination in Algeria, and it passed with a majority.114 It was clearly popular among the citizens of France, but many

French generals in Algeria, including Maurice Challe, Raoul Salan, Edmond Jouhaud, and Marie-

André Zeller, strongly opposed de Gaulle and his policies. A year prior, this group had attempted a coup which failed; however, it paved the way for the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS), a group committed to keeping French control in Algeria by using any means necessary, including violence.115 The OAS was extremely anti-Semitic and attacked Jews on many occasions, but many

Jews who opposed Algerian independence were also involved with the organization.

Preparations to Leave for France

Throughout the course of the Algerian War, Algerian Jews had not officially backed either side, with many hoping for a compromise to solve the conflict, such as a partition plan or a dual nationality system.116 However, de Gaulle’s shift in attitudes toward Algerian self-determination cleared the path to Algerian independence. As a result, the legal status of Jews in Algeria was thrown into doubt. Because of their perceived connection to Israel, even if as individuals they were not Zionists, many Jews worried about reprisals from Algerian nationalists. A growing number of

113 Ibid, 344. 114 Ibid, 344. 115 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 328-29. 116 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 37 Algerian Jews began preparing to leave for France. Between 1959 and 1962, Algeria’s Jewish population significantly decreased from 135,000 to 10,000.

Although it was clear that Jews sensed that they would need to leave Algeria in the near future, the FLN continued to attempt to win their support so that they would stay in Algeria after independence.117 These attempts, however, differed from previous attempts due to their more threatening and aggressive nature. In one statement, the FLN explained that they had waited long enough for the Jews of Algeria to choose a side, which they believed should be their side: “For a long time, we have understood and even excused our Jewish friends, deceived by colonial maneuverings, for the difficulty of resolving this division, this 'internal tearing,' this uncertainty…Today, the Algerian people must know on what side its true children will fall.”118

The FLN continued to call the Jews their “friends” and the “true children” of Algeria, which demonstrated that they still wanted to appeal to their historic, cultural connections. Additionally, they remained firm in their belief that France was a colonial power who had deceived the Jews into believing that they were not Algerian. Chanderli was also persistent in his meetings with members of the American Jewish Committee to try to appeal to Algerian Jews, stating in a meeting in 1961 that Algerian Muslims were not anti-Semitic at all, and any attacks on the Jews during the war was due to overall hostility toward Europeans and were not specifically aimed toward Jews.119

Interestingly, this contradicts his previous urgings that the Jews in Algeria were more Algerian than French, and the Algerians, if granted their independence, would see them as such.

117 Sung-Eun Choi, Decolonization and the French of Algeria: Bringing the Settler Colony Home, 48. 118 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 51. 119 “Conference with Representative of Algerian F.L.N.,” memorandum recounting meeting between the F.L.N. and AJC, B'nai B'rith, and the Conference of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. March 27, 1961. American Jewish Committee Archives. 38 Nonetheless, attempts from the FLN and Chanderli to appeal to the Jews were not successful on a large scale, and Jews began preparing for their impending departure from Algeria.

As the Jewish Agency, which was responsible for organizing immigration to Israel, arranged relocation plans for Jews living in Algeria, members of the FLN displayed varying degrees of support. In 1957, Ferhat Abbas stated that the Jews had the right to move to Israel since they would all have equal rights under the law in an independent Algerian state, most likely in an effort to gain support from Israel during the U.N. deliberations about the Algerian War. In 1958, members of the newly-formed political arm of the FLN, the Gouvernement provisoire de la république algérienne (GRPA), changed their stance and said that they would not allow Jews to immigrate to Israel after Algerian independence.120 Although only a small proportion of Jewish emigrants wanted to move to Israel, activity by the Jewish Agency bothered members of the FLN and Chanderli because they believed it made it seem as though the Jews were in danger to the international community.121 In a meeting with the American Jewish Committee in 1961, however,

Chanderli stated that Algeria would follow Tunisia’s example and ensure that Jews are able to emigrate as they please, which he felt would encourage more Jews to remain in Algeria if they felt safe. Conversely, he remained cautious about large-scale immigration efforts, specifically by the

Jewish Agency. According to Chanderli, he “seemed to feel (1) that the Jews should remain and integrate into the life of the community, and (2) that it would, perhaps, be an unfavorable reflection upon Algeria if there were to be a mass emigration after Algeria acquired its independence.”122

Although Chanderli presented his opinions in a manner that was supportive of Algerian Jews, his

120 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 52. 121 Ibid, 52. 122 “Conference with Representative of Algerian F.L.N.,” memorandum recounting meeting between the F.L.N. and AJC, B'nai B'rith, and the Conference of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. 39 opinion was swayed by how Algeria would be perceived by the international community if the majority of Jews emigrated after independence. Furthermore, members of the FLN began to think of emigration, to Israel or anywhere else, as a statement of support for the French cause rather than the Algerian nationalists.123

On the French side, Jewish leaders prepared for possible departures of Algerian Jews through negotiations with government officials. In January of 1961, a group of French-Jewish leaders met to discuss the position of Jews in the Evian negotiations, which were almost inevitable at this point.124 Initial negotiations between the GRPA of the FLN and the French government for independence began in the spring of 1961 at Evian, located near the Swiss border in France. In relation to the Evian negotiations, Jewish leaders argued that the security of the Crémieux Decree needed to be a priority, especially since De Gaulle had been instrumental in helping to reinstate the decree after it had been repealed by the Vichy Regime in 1940. Additionally, Jewish leaders began to warn Jewish communities that there may be a mass exodus of Algerian Jews to France, which could create social tensions in their communities in the metropole.125 Due to their perceived connection with Israel Algerian Jews felt less and less safe staying in Algeria toward the end of the war.

During the Evian negotiations, the FLN representatives stated that Jews would have the right of self-determination. The FLN viewed the Jewish population in Algeria as Algerian. France supported this position.126 As a result of these negotiations, however, a shift began to occur in which the French stopped referring to the Jews of Algeria as a separate group in official documents

123 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 52. 124 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 330. 125 Ibid, 330. 126 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 52. 40 and policy decisions and instead began grouping them together with the rest of the European settlers in Algeria.127 This made it generally easier to ensure their rights during the negotiations, but some Jewish leaders worried that the individual concerns of the Jews in Algeria would be forgotten. The initial struggles of the negotiations between France and the FLN in the summer of

1961, coupled with growing violence from all sides in Algeria, caused Jews to feel even more anxious about their place in an independent Algeria.128

Backlash to the Evian Accords

Many French citizens living in Algeria did not approve of the Evian negotiations and wanted

Algeria to remain under French control, and a small section of this group formed the Organisation de l’armée secrete (OAS) in February of 1961 with the goal of keeping Algeria French with the use of violence and terror tactics.129 Before 1961, the OAS was never a united organization, but it gained popular support across Algeria from pieds noirs as a result of the negotiations. Many Jews, whose support for the French government had grown throughout the war, also began to support the OAS, despite many of its members being openly anti-Semitic.130 Although historians debate why so many Jews supported the OAS and joined its ranks, many believe that the increasing anti-

Muslim sentiments in the European population caused them to join, as well as the hope that Algeria would remain French so that they would have more security.131 The American Jewish Committee noted their support and even stated that those who did not support the OAS still linked losses of

127 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France, 181. 128 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 54. 129 Ibid, 55. 130 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 331. 131 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 55. 41 the FLN to the OAS group, demonstrating the growing influence that it had in the conflict.132 The official stance toward the OAS taken by Jacques Lazarus was one of disapproval, especially of their terror tactics and violent measures, which often hurt Jews themselves.133 Nonetheless, many

Jews in Algeria continued to support the OAS, and the rise of the OAS commenced an even more violent part of the war, which amounted to terror from both sides.

The brutal clashes between the OAS and the FLN frequently affected Jews in Algerian cities because Jewish quarters in cities were usually located between the Arab and European quarters, meaning that they were often caught in the middle of clashes.134 Even though the OAS claimed that it cared about the interests of the Jews, they often facilitated bombings and boycotts of Jewish businesses, which caused many Jews to move to France, as their livelihoods were lost.

In 1961, the battles between the OAS and the FLN in Constantine caused one of the first wide- scale departures of Jews from Algeria due to the intense violence that made it immensely dangerous for the Jews to stay in the country.135 In Oran, violence against the Jews escalated in

September of 1961 on the morning of Rosh Hashanah when a man and his daughter coming out of a synagogue were killed.136 Jewish self-defense units retaliated, murdering many local Muslim residents. Maurice El Médioni, a Jewish pianist living in Oran at the time, wrote about the aftermath of the incident: “Amongst the Jews, a fierce anger was unleashed and they went on the hunt for Arabs, shooting or stabbing or bludgeoning any they found to death. From that day on, the Jews found themselves actively involved in the struggle, on the side of the OAS. Those who could see what lay ahead fled to the mainland, especially to Paris, rather than Israel, with the

132 Ibid, 56. 133 Sung-Eun Choi, Decolonization and the French of Algeria: Bringing the Settler Colony Home, 48. 134 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 135 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 332. 136 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 54. 42 exception of the small community of Oran’s Moroccan Jews.”137 Although the murder was most likely executed not by the FLN but by members of the OAS in order to provoke tensions between the two sides, it still contributed to the growing animosities between Jews and Muslims in Algeria.

The FLN warned Oran’s Muslims not to fight against the Jews, and the CJAES told the Jews of

Oran to stay calm.138 Despite these warnings, violence from all sides continued to escalate, which made it nearly impossible for Jews to stay in Algeria, prompting even more waves of emigration.

Because of the reign of terror, Algerian Jews were in a state of “bewilderment and chaos,” and they began to see emigration as a more desirable path.139 In September of 1961, most likely as a result of the attacks in Oran, departures for France doubled. European settlers were also deciding to emigrate, but Jews had unique reasons for emigrating that were different from the European settlers. In Oran, Denis Guénoun and his family had remained mostly neutral throughout the war, although his father secretly supported Algerian independence, even though he knew it would mean they would have to leave Algeria. They felt historically connected to Algeria, and his father had taught Denis about their similarities with the Algerian Muslims since he was a child. However, on

June 22, 1961, their house was bombed, and their situation in Oran became more and more chaotic:

“Bombs exploded every night. Murders became ordinary. An OAS tract claimed credit for the attack on our house, calling Mama a Muscovite viper. My little Mama, reserved and timid, who had never set foot in a Party meeting.”140 Denis’s father, René, did have ties with the Communist party, so it is likely that they were attacked due to this connection rather than their status as Jews.

However, the chaos that they experienced living in Oran with limited support from either side of

137 Maurice El Médioni, A Memoir: From Oran to Marseilles, ed. Max Reinhardt, trans. Jonathan Walton, (London: Repeater Books, 2017), 91. 138 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 55. 139 Ibid, 55. 140 Denis Guénoun, A Semite: A Memoir of Algeria, 116. 43 the war created a situation that forced them to move to France and one that was unique from other

Europeans because they had felt connected to the Algerian cause throughout the war, but they still had to leave due to the increasing amounts of violence from all sides.

Maurice El Médioni, who also lived in Oran during the war, remained neutral and often played piano concerts for both Arab and European venues before the war escalated to a point where he no longer was safe playing in public. His status was uncertain in Algeria, and he knew that the tensions between the OAS and the FLN were not safe, even though he himself was neutral: “Heavy casualties were suffered on both sides, and the same regime of terror that the FLN imposed on its people was reproduced on the French side, as French Algerian guerrillas killed several Europeans by way of an example. Terror had taken hold. I began to be fearful. Even as a neutral, I was afraid.”141 The violence created a situation in which he could no longer stay in Algeria, especially because he had no support from either side due to his neutrality. Unlike the Guénoun family,

Maurice decided to move his family to Israel, with the help of the Jewish Agency in January of

1961. However, by 1962, he relocated to Paris after realizing that there were more economic opportunities for him in France, and he also recognized that most of Algeria’s Jews had decided to immigrate to France instead of Israel. For both Denis and Maurice, the terror from all sides of the war made it impossible for them to remain in Algeria safely, and their connection to France, coupled with the opportunities and economic infrastructure available in France, made France the optimal place for them to start their new lives.

141 Maurice El Médioni, A Memoir: From Oran to Marseilles, 90. 44

Figure 4: Maurice El Medioni Performing with Lili Labassi, Canastel, Oran, 1956 www.lemez.net On March 19, 1962, the French government and FLN agreed upon a cease fire and peace document at Evian.142 Interestingly, it was not actually signed by either party because the French government did not officially recognize the FLN as a legitimate political organization. Ultimately, however, the OAS was unsuccessful in its attempts to terrorize the French government into retaining control of Algeria. On July 3, 1962, Algeria declared its independence.143 Throughout the final years of the war, a steady flow of immigrants had come to France, but the number escalated after Algeria became independent because Europeans and Jews were worried about how it would affect their legal status and safety.144 By July of 1961, around 70,000 Jews had left Algeria for France, and about 5,000 had left for Israel. By 1968, only about 3,000 of Algeria’s previous

142 Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, 333. 143 Ibid, 334. 144 David Corcos, Haim Saadoun, and Robert Attal, “Algeria.” 45 140,000 Jews remained in Algeria. More than eighty percent of Algeria’s Jews are estimated to have moved to France, which dramatically transformed the character of the French Jewish community and provided new opportunities for them to integrate into French culture.

Table 1 Jewish Population in Algeria and France, 1914-1982 American Jewish Yearbook, Volumes 20, 22, 48, 56, 61, 64, 67, 72, and 83. Year Jewish Jewish Total Total % of % of Population Population Population Population Population Population in Algeria in France in Algeria in France in Algeria in France 1914 70,271 - 5,563,828 - 1.263% - 1919 - 150,000 - 41,476,272 - 0.362% 1939 110,000 320,000 - - - - 1945 120,000 180,000 - - - - 1954 140,000 300,000 9,367,000 42,800,000 1.495% 0.701% 1959 135,000 350,000 10,265,000 44,500,000 1.315% 0.787% 1962 10,000 500,000 11,020,000 45,960,000 0.091% 1.088% 1965 3,000 520,000 10,788,000 48,417,000 0.028% 1.074% 1970 1,500 550,000 13,349,000 50,320,000 0.011% 1.093% 1982 300 530,000 19,911,000 54,219,000 0.002% 0.978% 46

Chapter 3

Uneasy Adaptation in France

By the end of 1960, the Jewish population in Algeria was estimated to number approximately 140,000. A vast majority of them were French-educated, French-speaking, and likely from large coastal cities, whereas a smaller proportion of Algerian Jews lived in the M’zab region in the Sahara Desert, spoke Arabic, and had closer ties to their Muslim neighbors.145 With the changing regimes following the Evian Accords, Jews who remained in Algeria faced a series of uncertainties, described eloquently by the American Jewish Committee in a report on Algeria:

“In charting their future course, Algeria's Jews are plagued by many difficult questions. Can they depend upon the new government to uphold the pledges and guarantees of the Evian Agreement?

Can they expect a calm to follow the storm of excesses that ushered in independence? If they stay in the Moslem nation, do they risk being caught in a trap, to find one day that they cannot leave?

And if they leave, where and how will they rebuild their lives?”146 Based on the swift exodus of almost all of Algeria’s Jews during the spring and summer of 1962, it is clear that these questions were in the minds of many. By late summer 1962, approximately 130,000 of Algeria’s Jews had left for France. Jewish community life in Algeria dissolved.147 Jewish migration coincided with the migration of the pieds noirs. Therefore, it could be argued that Jews did not differ from the colonial settlers. However, their unique motivations for migrating and their experience once in

France differentiate Algerian Jewish migrants from the pied-noir migrants.

145 Thomas F. Brady, “Half of Jews in Algeria Reported to Have Fled,” New York Times, June 26, 1962. 146 “Algeria.” Reports on the Foreign Scene. July 1962. American Jewish Committee Archives. 147 Thomas F. Brady, “Half of Jews in Algeria Reported to Have Fled.” 47 Alternate Choices for Algerian Jews

After most Algerian Jews left for France less than 10,000 Jews remained in Algeria in the fall of

1962. In Algiers alone, the Jewish population shrank from 50,000 to less than 4,000. The living conditions of those who stayed deteriorated as well; many had to rely on aid from organizations like the American Joint Distribution Committee and free rations of flour, milk powder, and vegetable oil.148 Henri Gozlan, who served as the municipal veterinarian of Algiers in 1962 and inherited the chairmanship of Algiers’ ancient Jewish consistory, stated that “those who stayed had courage.”149 Another member of the consistory, Georges Moatti, owned a grocery store that was not hurt economically by independence, but he was not optimistic about his future in Algeria.

Only two of the previous twelve synagogues in Algiers still functioned after the war, and only four

Rabbis remained in the city as well. One, Rabbi Gilbert Seror, spoke to a reporter from The New

York Times about the status of Jews in Algeria in 1962: “I preach of encouragement and hope. But as you see…” The reporter wrote that following his statement, he spread his arms out hopelessly.150

Declining living conditions, dwindling community, and a lack of communication with other Jewish leaders in other Algerian cities led many Algerian Jews to follow their coreligionists to France. By the end of 1964, only 4,000 Jews remained in all of Algeria.151

Most Algerian Jews who decided to migrate chose France. Only around 10,000 settled in

Israel between 1948 and the early 1960s.152 Once the war grew more violent in 1961, Maurice El

Medioni initially decided to move to Israel before moving to France shortly after. While migrating

148 “Holiday Time Sad for Algeria Jews: Many Subsist on Charity - Community Life Weakened,” New York Times, Sept. 28, 1962. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Michael M. Laskier. North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century, 342. 152 Ibid, 334. 48 to Israel, he had to travel through Marseille, where his Uncle Elie told him that they should stay in

France: “He wanted us to stay in France, or even better in Marseille, but our decision to go to Israel had already been made. He said, ‘You'll be back, after you've wasted your time and money.’ Seven months later his words proved to be right, and we did indeed come back to France.”153 Despite his uncle’s warnings, Maurice and his family arrived in Haifa on May 10, 1961.

They settled in Ashdod, a town of only a thousand people, with just a few suitcases and moved into a half-furnished apartment. Maurice enrolled his children in kindergarten and attempted to look for work, although the job prospects were slim.154 Through a friend, he was able to find some low-paying work, and he also invested in a brasserie. However, he disliked life in

Israel due to their economic situation and did not have many friends or family close by.

Additionally, he realized that all of his friends from Algeria were moving to France: “Those who could see what lay ahead fled to the mainland, especially to Paris, rather than Israel, with the exception of the small community of Oran's Moroccan Jews. So I asked myself ‘Why do I have to be the trailblazing guinea pig?’ I wanted to settle in Israel to provide a good example to the community in Oran, but those wise guys were all going straight to Paris. By October, I had come to the same decision: I retrieved as much of my money as I could, left everything else there, and headed for France.”155 Soon after, they arrived back in Marseille, and Maurice moved to Paris in order to have more career opportunities as a pianist. His wife and children joined him after a few months, and they moved into a 200 square meter apartment in the 4th Arrondissement of Paris.156

Although Maurice initially chose to migrate to Israel, the lack of economic opportunity and

153 Maurice El Médioni, A Memoir: From Oran to Marseilles, 85. 154 Ibid, 85. 155 Ibid, 91. 156 Ibid, 91. 49 community that he felt in Israel was also the case for many other immigrants, and France continued to be the better choice for Jews looking to leave Algeria.

Figure 5: Repatriates from Algeria on a Boat to France in 1962 “History’s Forgotten Exodus,” Wall Street Journal.

Arrival in France

For the majority of Algerian Jews, France was their final destination during the spring and summer of 1962. Many decided to settle in Marseille and Paris, but cities such as Strasbourg, Lyons,

Montpellier, and Toulouse were also popular choices due to their proximity to the Mediterranean or the German border.157 For Algerian Jews, who experienced oppression during the Holocaust

157 Ethan Katz, The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 215. 50 from Vichy officials rather than Germans, Germany did not evoke the same trauma for them that it did for European Jews in the years following the Holocaust. Unsurprisingly, the sheer volume of immigrants overwhelmed municipal services in the summer of 1962. France had not experienced this mass influx of immigrants since the 1930s and after World War II, and during those periods, the migration was spread over several years, as opposed to just a few months in this case. In Marseille alone on June 25, 1962, seven boats brought nine thousand repatriates to the city.158 Housing quickly became scarce in cities like Marseille, so authorities were directed to send immigrants to any towns within fifty miles that had space for them.159 This posed issues, however, for Jewish immigrants, as some towns did not have synagogues, Hebrew schools, and Jewish centers, which made it difficult for them to continue their religious practices. Additionally, in some towns, men had to work on the Sabbath in order to keep their jobs against competition.160Across

France, but especially in Marseille, conditions for immigrants were not ideal due to shortages in housing, synagogues, and jobs.

Conversely, Annecy, a small town in Southeastern France, became one of the most popular destinations for North African Jewish immigrants due to the efforts of Rudolphe Moos. In the summer of 1961, three Jewish families lived in Annecy, including the Moos family, but by

December 1962, sixty families, totaling 220 people, resided in the town and had better economic, religious and social prospects than their counterparts in other cities: “Unlike thousands of their co- religionists who are struggling for existence in Paris, Marseilles, and other big cities, [the Jews of

Annecy] have found homes, jobs, and friends.”161 After hearing about an expected increase in

158 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 75. 159 Ibid, 75. 160 “Algeria.” Reports on the Foreign Scene. 161 George Duran, “Jewish Refugees Happy in France,” New York Times, Dec. 7, 1962. 51 migration from Algeria to France in 1961 as a result of the war, Moos began working tirelessly to prepare Annecy to accommodate numerous Jewish immigrant families. He secured jobs and housing for all of the refugees, as well as acquiring household essentials and anything he could gather by canvassing the neighborhoods for hand-me-downs. Although Annecy is predominantly

Catholic, he also arranged with the town fathers to secure a room in the city hall annex for worship, and he collaborated with educational authorities to use a room in the public school for weekly religious classes. Additionally, with the help of the American Joint Distribution Committee and

Jewish communities in Switzerland, he opened Annecy’s first synagogue in an old restaurant. His motivation to not only assist Jewish immigrants with practical resources like housing but also with their religious transition was clear: “To the Jewish immigrant from North Africa his religion is as essential to his life as his daily bread.”162 He even worked with the local butcher to encourage him to add a special kosher meat department to his shop so that Jewish immigrants could add meat back into their diets. Because of Moos’s efforts, Annecy became a refuge for North African Jews and provided them with more opportunities than larger cities across France.

In addition to receiving aid from the government and individuals like Moos, several large

Jewish organizations mobilized during the early 1960s to provide aid to migrants in France. At a meeting in 1962, leaders of Jewish welfare funds were told to give “top philanthropic priority” to

Jews seeking refuge in France and Israel in large numbers.163 Likewise, Alan Sagner of Newark, chairman of the United Jewish Appeal’s Young Leadership Cabinet, said that Jewish welfare agencies in France had been dealing “with the most severe Jewish welfare task since the early

162 Ibid. 163 Irving Spiegel, “Refugees' Needs Called Critical,” New York Times, Nov. 16, 1962. 52 postwar years.”164 The Joint Distribution Committee, the Fonds Social des Juifs Unifié (FSJU), and the Comité de Bienfaisance Israélite de Paris (CBIP) were the main organizations assisting with the mass immigration of Algerian Jews, although there were numerous other smaller organizations that assisted as well.

In April 1962, the FSJU held a conference where they outlined a plan for Jewish social workers to assist with welcoming the migrants, finding housing, and assisting the poorest families.

In September, they set up an emergency fund specifically for North African Jewish migrants, with the support of the French government and the European Jewish community. They spent $26.2 million dollars of this fund between 1962 and 1965, in addition to half of their annual budget, to help North African Jews settle in France and get on their feet.165 Another organization, the

American Council for Judaism Philanthropic Fund, contributed $68,000 to aid Jews from Algeria as well, and the president of the fund, Henry S. Moyer, noted the efforts being made by many of these similar organizations: “As for French Citizens, it is natural that they hope to build new lives in their mother country. The humanitarian tradition of France throughout modern history has been to open her doors to all refugees.”166 In his statement, he clearly notes the inherent connection of

Algerian Jews to France by calling them French citizens as opposed to “refugees” or “migrants.”

Additionally, he referenced the character of France in terms of welcoming refugees; however, it is important to note that some refugees, specifically Muslim Algerians, had a more difficult experience arriving and integrating in France, especially as the French government made it more difficult for them to gain citizenship and receive better benefits from the state.

164 Irving Spiegel, “Young Jews Urged to Assume Leadership in Aiding the Needy,” New York Times, Sept. 14, 1963. 165 Ethan Katz, The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France, 221. 166 “U.S. Group Gives $68,000 To Aid Jews From Algeria,” New York Times, October 7, 1962. 53 Perhaps one of the largest Jewish aid organizations that assisted Algerian Jews was the

American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), headed by Moses Leavitt. In a report he pointed out that “the very structure of the Jewish communities in North Africa and France underwent a radical change” as a result of migration.167 France became the fourth largest Jewish community in the world, behind the United States, Russia, and Israel, which Leavitt stated put pressure on the

French government and many organizations to act. In 1962, the JDC provided aid for over 277,000 men, women, and children in 29 countries with over $28,544,000 in funds raised mostly in part by the United Jewish Appeal.168 More specifically for Algerian migrants, they provided cash relief, medical care, subsistence for children and the elderly, support for schools, and the financing of cultural and religious programs. They also financed the Organization for Rehabilitation Through

Training, which provided vocational training for Algerian Jewish refugees in order to help them transition their skills to the French workforce.169 Of the impact of the JDC on Algerian Jewish migrants, Leavitt stated, “Their need was desperate. But they found the Joint Distribution

Committee waiting for them, working with French Jews to provide food and clothing and medicines and housing-and the reassurance that they were not alone.”170 Although the situation in

France for Jewish migrants seemed bleak at times, organizations like the FSJU or the JDC improved their lives and shortened the period of transition, which only truly lasted a few years for

Jewish migrants.

167 Irving Spiegel, “Joint Distribution Chief Calls Aid for Jewish Migrants Urgent,” New York Times, Aug. 4, 1963. 168 “277,000 Abroad Helped in 1962 by the Joint Distribution Agency.” New York Times, June 23, 1963. 169 Ibid. 170 Irving Spiegel, “Aid Abroad Given to 250,000 Jews,” New York Times, June 3, 1962. 54 Integration into the French Jewish Community

Despite the aid that they received from the government, individuals, and organizations, Algerian

Jews still faced the massive undertaking of integrating into the French Jewish community. One of the most important differences between French Jews and Algerian Jews, on average, is that

Algerian Jews were more religiously observant, which the American Jewish Committee noted in one of their meetings in 1962: “The fact that Algerian Jews are Orthodox, unlike native French

Jews, makes even more difficult the problems of education, communal development and community relations.”171 They were also more overtly religious, wearing more traditional clothing and strictly following religious practices. In contrast, French Jews were more assimilated into

French culture as a whole due to the culture of laïcité, or secularism, in France and efforts made by France in the past to integrate Jews into French culture. Additionally, Algerian Jews were less wealthy than French Jews and were a part of the working and middle classes. These differences posed challenges for integration with the established French Jewish community, although many

Algerian Jews did make an explicit attempt to integrate, while others sought to retain their culture and traditions.172

In Marseille, it was particularly difficult for the migrants to integrate into the French Jewish community, as it was already very fragmented with various ethnic groups in small clusters across the city. The main synagogue served the Ashkenazi population on Rue Breteuil in the center of

Marseille, and three smaller synagogues served the Turkish, Polish, and Constantine populations further away from the city center.173 With the influx of North African Jews, Marseille’s Jewish

171 “Minutes of the National Executive Board Meeting,” Nov. 9-11, 1962, American Jewish Committee Archives. 172 Ethan Katz, The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France, 219. 173 Maud Mandel. Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 75. 55 population grew by 400%, with North African Jews quickly becoming the majority ethnic group, which increased tensions between native French Jewish leaders in the community. One member of the Marseille Consistory argued that he did not want to work with Algerian Jews because they had “the mentality of Arabs.”174 Even though throughout the war the French government had appealed to their connection with France as a result of the Crémieux Decree, individual French people still saw Algerian Jews as foreigners, leaving many without a concrete connection to either country.

This experience was not unique to Marseille; tensions brewed across France. As a whole, however, most Jewish leaders recognized their mistakes of the 1930s when Eastern European Jews were immigrating in large numbers to France to escape persecution, and native French Jews, or

Israélites, rejected their attempt to integrate into the French Jewish community. Spiritually, leaders viewed this as an opportunity to reinvigorate their religious community and worked to include

Algerian Jews in their communities. Within a few years, adult immigrants had gained leadership positions, new Jewish communities popped up across France, and older ones were revived with the help of the refugees.175

A main concern of these newly composed communities, though, was a possible increase in anti-Semitism as a result of the wave of migration. The American Jewish Committee warned that the influx of Jews to France “is creating a highly charged, potentially anti-Semitic situation.”176

New competition for jobs and housing could have opened the door for far-right groups to be anti-

Semitic; however, a survey by the American Jewish Committee found that there was not a

174 Ibid, 76. 175 Ethan Katz, The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France, 220-222. 176 Irving Spiegel, “Group Cites Peril of Anti-Semitism,” New York Times, Nov. 11, 1962. 56 significant increase in anti-Semitism as result of the increase in Jewish immigrants.177 This could be due to the strong ability of Jewish organizations to provide aid for immigrants so that they could settle and find jobs quicker, or it could also be due to the demographic make-up of this wave of migration, which included Jews, Europeans, and Muslim Algerians.

Interactions with Muslim Algerians in France

In addition to the wave of migration of Jewish immigrants, the Algerian War also caused the largest increase of Algerian Muslim migration to France. By 1958, 350,000 Algerian Muslims already were living in France, but many held the belief that they would be able to return to Algeria following the war. For most, this did not end up happening, and they faced difficulties in France gaining citizenship as the De Gaulle administration increased the requirements to apply.178 140,000

Muslim immigrants were harkis, who had served as auxiliaries in the French army and their families. Due to their involvement with the French in the war, they were often viewed as traitors and faced reprisals.179 French officials accepted the harkis only reluctantly and sent them to isolated camps. There was concern about potential conflicts between the harkis and other Algerian

Muslims.180 In contrast to Jewish migrants, harkis and other Algerian Muslims received little assistance with their relocation. For instance, when they arrived in France, many did not have an organization to welcome them. One migrant recalled his arrival at Orly Airport in Paris in 1962:

“[I]n a quarter of the airport, someone installs a small counter with stools. The seats are cramped and the signs touch each other. ‘Catholic Relief Services,’ ‘Jewish Social Services [FSJU],’

177 “Current Anti-Semitic Activities Abroad, a Survey,” 1963, American Jewish Committee Archives. 178 Ethan Katz, The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France, 216-219. 179 Maud Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France: History of a Conflict, 76. 180 Ibid, 77. 57 ‘Students,’ ‘Algerian Gas and Electric,’ and others with more mysterious signs. Each comes to find his own. Only the Arabs have no right to any sign in particular. Having disengaged, they are part of our past, and as such we abandon them to the good heart of the Red Cross.”181 The lack of support for Muslim immigrants is just one example of the stark contrast between how immigrants of different backgrounds were treated when they moved to France, which has had socioeconomic and cultural consequences that are still present today.

In Algeria Muslims and Jews lived happily side by side for centuries. In France their paths diverged and the two groups had limited interaction. To determine this, a study from 1966-67 of

500 Jews found that only a small proportion of respondents had close Muslim friends after leaving

North Africa.182 Historian Ethan Katz attributes this to two main factors. First, Algerian Jews might have wanted to distance themselves from the trauma that came with uprooting their lives quickly and leaving their culture that they had known for generations. Additionally, they may have wanted to limit interactions with other Algerian immigrants in order to ease the transition into the French

Jewish community. Algerian Jews were already viewed as foreigners by the French, and associating themselves with Algerian Muslims would have amplified this view, so they distanced themselves, even if it meant losing a connection that they had for generations and unethically abandoning their former neighbors in their time of need.183

Despite their efforts, however, it took some time for Algerian Jews to integrate into French

Jewish life. After immigrating, one Algerian Jewish woman had realized her neighbor in France was also Jewish, but she found out that her neighbor’s husband had told her, “Watch out, it seems that they are Algerians…Be careful, close the door and don't open it, because Algerians, they play

181 Ibid, 76. 182 Ethan Katz, The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France, 223. 183 Ibid, 223. 58 with knives.”184 This experience exemplifies the identity struggles Algerian Jews faced after coming to France. Throughout the war, they had been told that they were considered French citizens and a part of French culture, but when they arrived, what did this truly mean?

184 Ethan Katz, The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France, 224. 59

Conclusion

The Algerian War completely transformed both Algeria’s and France’s Jewish communities. An estimated 10,000 Jews remained in Algeria. The FLN did not honor the promises it made during the war. Only Algerians with a Muslim paternal father or grandfather were granted citizenship. Jews experienced anti-Semitism and persecution, especially when Houari Boumediene became President after a military coup. In 1967-68, in the wake of Israel’s defeat of several Arab countries in the Six-Day War, the Algerian government turned all but one of the country’s synagogues into mosques.185 The status of Algerian Jews in postwar Algeria caused many more of them to migrate to France. In 1970 only about 1,500 Jews remained in Algeria. By 1982, the estimated number had declined to 300.186

More recently, the Algerian government has made efforts to improve religious freedom in

Algeria. In 2003, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced to reopen synagogues and Jewish burial sites in collaboration with the French government.187 The Minister of Religious Affairs,

Mohamed Aissa, declared in 2014 that he wanted to reopen 25 synagogues that had previously closed; however, he backed away from this position when Algerian Jews did not fully support it.188

Although the Jewish population in Algeria is virtually nonexistent, tensions still exist in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even if the Jews living in Algeria are not outwardly Zionist. The

185 “Algeria,” World Jewish Congress. 186 “World Jewish Population,” World Jewish Yearbook, American Jewish Committee Archives. 187 “Algeria,” World Jewish Congress. 188 “Home for Algeria’s Jews Is Elsewhere,” Open Global Rights, accessed March 27, 2021, https://www.openglobalrights.org/home-for-algerias-jews-is-elsewhere/. 60 true number of Jews in Algeria today is unknown, but historians estimate that there are only a handful of them left, and they practice their religion in secret.189

In France today, rising anti-Semitism has led to increased migration to Israel, a shift from just decades ago when France was the most desirable location for North African migrants. Anti-

Semitism has been linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the populist “yellow-vest” protests in recent years. When speaking with a Holocaust survivor in Paris in 2019 on the subject of modern anti-Semitism in France, I distinctly remember her saying that she felt as if she were back in the 1930s, which demonstrates the severity of the rising anti-Semitism in France and across the world today. In 2015 alone, around 8,000 French Jews immigrated to Israel, which was the most of any Western country.190 Many of these immigrants are North African Jews, who had to once again relocate as a result of violence and anti-Semitism.

Figure 6: Immigration to Israel Sources: The Jewish Agency; Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de L’homme; Günther Jikeli, Indiana University Bloomington.

189 “Algeria,” World Jewish Congress. 190 Schwartz, Yardena, “‘Things have only gotten worse’: French Jews are fleeing their country,” National Geographic, Nov. 20, 2019. 61 It is clear that a considerable amount of the violence and anti-Semitism that Algerian Jews faced before, during, and after the war was a direct result of France’s colonialism. France’s efforts to gain the support of Algerian Jews and grant them citizenship exacerbated tensions between Jews and Muslims in Algeria, and many Algerian nationalists resented the fact that Jews never took a definitive side in the war against France. While France’s colonial interests were one of the main causes of the migration of Algerian Jews to France, it is also important to note that they were not embraced with open arms by French Jews and French society. Algeria’s Jews had a unique and distinct identity, which isolated them both Algeria and France.

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ACADEMIC VITA

EDUCATION The Pennsylvania State University | The Schreyer Honors College University Park, PA College of the Liberal Arts Class of 2021 Economics, B.S.; French, B.S.; History, B.A.; Jewish Studies, minor University of Minnesota in Montpellier, France Montpellier, France Study Abroad Program January 2020 – May 2020 London Theatre Study London, United Kingdom Study Abroad Program May 2018

LEADERSHIP & COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT Penn State Dance Marathon (THON) University Park, PA Supply Logistics Captain April 2020 – Present • Plan and facilitate the Gift Card Initiative, which is an effort to receive gift card donations from businesses and volunteers which THON uses to buy items for events and lower internal costs • Organize data tracking for the Gift Card Initiative’s inventory of over $25,000 in gift cards and approve gift card requests to obtain supplies for events throughout the year, including the THON 5K and THON Weekend • Build relationships with in-kind donors for paper and office supplies in order to minimize THON’s internal costs Oriana Singers and Glee Club Benefitting the Penn State Dance Marathon University Park, PA Primary Chair April 2020 – Present • Oversee a six-person executive board, create meeting agendas, create and manage a budget, and run weekly general and executive board meetings • Coordinate several fundraising events per semester, donation campaigns, recruitment, and social events • Raised $10,615.34 as an organization to benefit THON’s overall fundraising total, which raised $11,696,943.38 overall in 2020 to benefit families affected by pediatric cancer at Penn State Children’s Hospital The GLOBE Honors Special Living Option University Park, PA President April 2018 – April 2019 • Organized and executed events to foster a global perspective for floor residents, including global issues discussions, guest professor lectures, globally-themed dinners, and a mingling event with Humphrey Fellows • Developed a marketing campaign, alongside Schreyer Honors College staff, which increased applications by 30% • Created detailed budget to manage $2,500 for our events throughout the year

WORK EXPERIENCE Penn State Economics Department University Park, PA Undergraduate Teaching Assistant August 2018 – December 2020 • Assisted students’ learning in a 400-level growth and development economics course by facilitating class discussions, answering questions about course material, and creating quiz questions based on relevant articles and readings • Collaborated with the professor to ensure fair grading and adequate comprehension of the topics covered United States Department of State (Virtual Student Federal Service) Online Office of the Historian Intern September 2019 – December 2019 • Researched and analyzed primary source foreign relation documents regarding China’s influence in Sub-Saharan Africa during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations • Communicated with my supervisor to complete any additional projects as necessary Harpers Ferry National Historical Park Harpers Ferry, WV Visitor Services Intern May 2019 – August 2019 • Developed and presented to the public an interpretive program detailing women’s history of Harpers Ferry • Staffed information desks and assist visitors with questions and concerns about the park • Analyzed primary- and secondary-source material to gain an understanding of the park’s history and develop informal programs around the park and at the historic Lockwood House The Children’s Garden Shiremanstown, PA Preschool Assistant Teacher June 2018 – August 2018 • Ensured the safety and well-being of 14 preschool students in a classroom setting • Assisted in planning lessons and activities to foster positive early childhood development