Research Collection
Doctoral Thesis
Architecture of Counterrevolution: The French Army in Algeria, 1954–1962
Author(s): Henni, Samia
Publication Date: 2016
Permanent Link: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010794984
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ETH Library DISS. ETH NO. 23583
Architecture of Counterrevolution Th e French Army in Algeria, 1954–1962
Samia Henni
Institute for the History and Th eory of Architecture, gta D-ARCH, ETH Zurich 2016
DISS. ETH NO. 23583
Architecture of Counterrevolution Th e French Army in Algeria, 1954–1962
A thesis submitted to attain the degree of Doctor of Sciences of ETH Zurich (Dr. sc. ETH Zurich)
Presented by Samia Henni
Master in Architecture, Academy of Architecture, USI, Mendrisio, 2004 Advanced Master in Architecture and Urban Planning, Berlage Institute, Rotterdam, 2010 PhD Guest Researcher in Visual Culture, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2014
Born on 09.09.1980 in Algiers, Algeria
Citizen of Algeria, France and Switzerland
Accepted on the recommendation of Prof. Dr. Philip Ursprung, ETH Zurich, Switzerland and Prof. Dr. Tom Avermaete, TU Delft, Th e Netherlands Prof. Dr. Jean-Louis Cohen, Institute of Fine Arts, New York University, USA
2016 4 Architecture of Counterrevolution
Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht das Zusammenwirken von französischer Kolonialpolitik und militärischen Massnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Aufstände im Hinblick auf die Architektur während der Algerischen Revolution (1954–62). Im Zuge des blutigen und langwierigen bewaff neten Konfl ikts in Algerien, teilten die französischen Zivil- und Militärbehörden, das ländliche und städtische Territorium neu ein, veränderten die gebaute Umwelt von Grund auf, errichteten in kürzester Zeit neue Infrastruktur und verfolgten eine Baupolitik, mit deren Hilfe die französische Kolonialherrschaft in Algerien erhalten werden sollte. Nicht nur mit strategischen Zerstörungen, sondern gerade auch mit Neubauten verfolgte die Kolonialmacht das Ziel, die algerische Bevölkerung zu kontrollieren, und andererseits die europäischen Bewohner zu schützen. Die Dissertation richtet ihren Fokus auf drei mit einander in Verbindung stehende räumliche Massnahmen der Aufstandsbekämpfung: Die gross angelegte Zwangsumsiedlung algerischer Bauern; Grosssiedlungen für die algerische Bevölkerung als Teil von General Charles de Gaulles ‘Plan de Constantine’; eine befestigte Verwaltungsstadt, die zum Schutz der französischen Behörden während der letzten Monate der Algerischen Revolution entstand. Anliegen dieser Arbeit ist es, den Modus operandi dieser baulichen Massnahmen aufzuzeigen. Dargestellt werden ihre Ursprünge, Entwicklung und Ziele, die beteiligten Akteure, Protokolle, Auswirkungen und die zugrunde liegenden Entwurfsmechanismen.
Samia Henni Abstract 5
Abstract
Th is dissertation examines the intersection of French colonial policies and military counterinsurgency operations in architecture in Algeria during the Algerian Revolution (1954–1962). During this bloody and protracted armed confl ict, the French civil and military authorities profoundly reorganized Algeria’s vast urban and rural territory, drastically transformed its built environments, rapidly implanted new infrastructure, and strategically built new settlements in order to keep Algeria under French colonial rule. Th e colonial regime had designed and completed not only tactical destructions, but also new constructions to allow for the strict control of the Algerian population and the protection of the European communities of Algeria. Th is study focuses on three interrelated spatial counterrevolutionary measures: the massive forced resettlement of Algerian farmers; the mass-housing programs designed for the Algerian population as part of General Charles de Gaulle’s Plan de Constantine; and the fortifi ed administrative new town planned for the protection of the French authorities during the last months of the Algerian Revolution. Th e aim is to depict the modus operandi of these settlements, their roots, developments, scopes, actors, protocols, impacts, and design mechanisms.
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7
Contents
Acknowledgements 9
List of Abbreviations 13 List of Figures, Maps and Plans 17
Introduction 27
I. Camps Called Centres de Regroupement, 1954–1958 41 1. Discreet Violence 57 1.1 Th e Secret of Two Ethnologists 65 1.2 Pacifi cation or Counterrevolution? 82
2. Th e Bâtisseurs of the Camps 99 2.1 Propagandizing the Camps 109 2.2 Vichy’s Ghost in Constantine 122
II. Housing in General de Gaulle’s Plan, 1958–1961 147 3. On the Colonial Project 149 3.1 Transforming the Greatest Number 164 3.2 Toward Semi-Urban Housing 185
4. Between Offi cers and Technocrats 215 4.1 Opération Bidonville 218 4.2 Permanent Camps or Villages? 253 4.3 Mass Housing: More With Less 284
III. Th e New Capital City, 1961–1962 319 5. Rocher Noir 321 5.1 Building New French Headquarters 350 5.2 Abandoning Rocher Noir 384
Conclusion 399
Bibliography 405
Acknowledgements 9
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to all the individuals and institutions that have supported me in this process. Foremost, I wish to thank my estimable advisors Professors (in alphabetic order) Tom Avermaete, Jean-Louis Cohen, and Philip Ursprung for their careful guidance, constant encouragement, and incisive comments throughout the various stages of this project. I am greatly indebted to Philip for his tireless stimulation, admirable confi dence, earnest provision, cheerful humor, and for the opportunities he kindly facilitated. I want to thank Jean-Louis and Tom for the valuable conversations, the precision of their readings and observations, and for their incessant sustenance. My three advisors were exceptional and I owe to them more than I can express. I want to express my sincere gratitude to Irit Rogoff for the insightful inspirations and conversations; to Stefan Nowotny for the rewarding reading groups and philosophical discussions; and to the PhD fellows and guests of the doctoral research program Curatorial/ Knowledge at the Goldsmiths, University of London. I greatly appreciate the friendship, exchanges, and excellent collaborations with Doreen Mende, Carolina Rito, and Leire Vergara. I would like to equally thank the gta members of the doctoral program in the History and Th eory of Architecture: Ita Heinze-Greenberg, Nina Zschocke, Vittorio Magnano Lampugnani, Akòs Moravansky, Laurent Stalder, and Andreas Tönnessmann for their perceptive remarks, noteworthy advices, and for all the inspiring critiques and discussions that were held at the gta institute and elsewhere. I would also like to thank Julie Mogodin for being always able to fi nd a solution for any administrative matter. Over the years of this research, I have had the opportunity to present and discuss fragments and versions of this study with a number of remarkable characters. For their critiques and recommendations, I wish to thank Victor Buchli, Lieven De Cauter, Reinhold Martin, Werner Oechslin, Felicity D. Scott, Bernard Stielger, Daniel Weiss, and Eyal Weizman. Th is dissertation has also benefi ted from the echoes of many conversations with: Alex Bremner, Christophe Cornubert, Bruno de Meulder, Veronica Darius, Gregory Grämiger, Andri Gerber, Britta Hentschel, Karl R. Kegler, Torsten Lange, Alan Mabin, Bruno Maurer, Jenny Fatou Mbaye, Mary McLeod, Niklas Naehrig, Michelle Provoost,
May 2016 10 Architecture of Counterrevolution
Sascha Roesler, Kelly Shannon, Rainer Schützeichel, Emily Eliza Scott, Harald Robert Stühlinger, Markus Tubbesing, Ola Uduku, Alla Vronskaya, Jessica White, Mechtild Widrich, to whom I am enormously grateful. Archivists at various institutions have also been key to the production of this manuscript. Th ey have contributed in various ways, from searching of missing documents, facilitating the long French bureaucratic procedures, to being insistently questioned about the inventories of the archives. I owe a grand merci to Daniel Hick at the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence for his great guidance and knowledge; to Dominique Parcollet at the Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po in Paris for her valuable suggestions; to Bruno Berteau at the Service Historique de la Défense at the Château de Vincennes in Paris for his meticulous assistance in researching military aerial photographs; to Sophie Armand, Marie-Hélène Bernard-Ristorcelli, and Anne Goulet at the Archives Départementales de la Haute Garonne in Toulouse for having accepted to open the archives of Louis de Hoÿm de Marien; to Feline Wagner for her constant availability at the gta library and archives. I wish also to acknowledge the wonderful hospitality of all those who kindly accepted to be interviewed and who welcomed me in their private homes despite their age or health conditions. I wish to thank Claire Bachelot for the pleasing conversation and the delicious lunch; Gérard Bélorgey; Michel Cornaton for his inestimable generosity and for sharing his personal archives and library with me; Josette Daure for having off ered me the books of her fi rst husband Jean-Jacques Deluz and the album of the projects designed in Algeria by her second husband Alexis Daure; Maurice Faivre; Jean-Loup Marfaing; and René Mayer. I am immensely grateful to Saïd Almi, Tom Avermaete, Aïche Boussad, Kenza Boussora, Jean-Louis Cohen, Sheila Crane, Zeynep Çelik, Kahina Djiar, Djaff ar Lesbet who have generously off ered their papers to support the ephemeral online Algerian Pavilion; to Selma Hellal and Sofi an Hadjadj from the Barzakh Editions in Algiers for their constant support; and to Yasmina Reggad and Stephan Petermann for their appreciated encouragement.
Samia Henni Introduction 11
I have also benefi ted from the doctoral camaraderie of a number of individuals; in particular, I wish to thank Claudia Moll, Daniela Ortiz dos Santos, Sascha Delz, Andreas Kalpakci, and Lukas Zurfl uh for the insightful conversations and documents exchange, and Nicholas Stefan Drofi ak for his patient and passionate violin lessons. Finally, my greatest debt is to my mother for her permanent care, and to my partner Pascal Schwaighofer who has always tolerated my nerves and has provided the most beautiful emotional sustenance, which is most needed.
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Abbreviations 13
List of Abbreviations
ACCF Association des Combattants de la Communauté Française ADHG Archives Départementales de la Haute-Garonne, Toulouse ADIR Association Nationale des anciennes Déportées et Internées de la Résistance AEDAA Association pour l’Etude et le Développement de l’Agglomération Algéroise AFCDG Archives de la Fondation Charles de Gaulle, Paris AGEA Association Générale des Etudiants d’Algérie AI Aff aires Indigènes ALN Armée de la Libération Nationale ANFPFSS Archives Nationales de France, Pierrefi tte-sur-Seine, Paris ANOM Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence BCEOM Bureau Central d’Etudes pour les Equipements d’Outre-Mer BCPN Bâtiments Civils et Palais Nationaux BCRA Bureau Central de Renseignement et d’Actions BERU Bureau d’Etudes et de Réalisations Urbaines CADAT Caisse Algérienne d’Aménagement du Territoire CAEES Centre Algérien d’Expansion Economique et Social CAPER Caisse d’Accession à la Propriété et à l’Expansion Rurales CAS Cité Administrative Satellite CCAT Commission Centrale de l’Aménagement du Territoire CCMAN Commandement Civil et Militaire des Aurès-Nementchas CDEF Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces CDRA Commission de Réforme Agraire et d’Aménagement Rural CEA Cercle d’Etudes Architecturales CEDA Caisse d’Equipement pour le Développement de l’Algérie CFHU Confédération Française pour l’Habitation et l’Urbanisme CFLN Comité Français de Libération Nationale CGAT Commission Générale d’Aménagement du Territoire CGP Commissariat Général du Plan CHEM Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires CHSP Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po, Paris
May 2016 14 Architecture of Counterrevolution
CIA Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne CIAM Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne CICRC Commission Internationale Contre le Régime Concentrationnaire CILOF Compagnie Immobilière pour le Logement des Fonctionnaires Civils et Militaires COFROR Compagnie Française d’Organisation CNF Comité National Français CNRS Centre National de la Recherche Scientifi que CRHR Commissariat à la Reconstruction et à l’Habitat Rural CSTB Centre Scientifi que et Technique du Bâtiment DEL Dépenses d’Equipement Local DGER Direction Générale des Etudes et Recherches DGSS Direction Générale des Services Spéciaux DPLG Diplômé Par Le Gouvernement DTSG Direction des Travaux Spéciaux de Génie EAEC European Atomic Energy Community EC European Community ECPAD Etablissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense, Paris ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEC European Economic Community ENSBA Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts FAF Front pour l’Algérie Française FAN Front d’Action National FAS Fonds d’Action Social pour les travailleurs musulmans d’Algérie en Métropole et pour leurs familles FASILD Fonds d’Aide et de Soutien pour l’intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations FDH Fonds de Dotation de l’Habitat FLN Front de la Libération Nationale FN Front National FNAF Front National pour l’Algérie Française FNC Front National Combattant GEANARP Groupe d’Etude et d’Action pour les Nord-Africains de la Région
Samia Henni Abbreviations 15
Parisienne GPRA Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne GPRF Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française HBM Habitat à Bon Marché HLM Habitat à Loyer Modéré IAURP Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne ICPC Ingénieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ITEBA Institut Technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics en Algérie IGRP Inspection Générale des Regroupements de Population IGAME Inspecteur Général de l’Administration en Mission Extraordinaire INA Institut National de l’Audiovisuel IUUA Institut d’Urbanisme de l’Université d’Alger IUUP Institut d’Urbanisme de l’Université de Paris JMO Journaux de Marches et Opérations LEN Logement Economique de Première Nécessité LEPN Logement Economique de Première Nécessité LOGECO Logement Economique et Familial LOPOFA Logement Populaire et Familial MC Ministère de la Construction MRL Ministère de la Reconstruction et du Logement MRU Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l’Urbanisme NF Nouveaux Francs OAS Organisation Armée Secrète OCRS Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes OPA Organisation Politico-Administrative PFAT Personnel Féminin de l’Armée de Terre PAS Prestations d’Action Sociale RAF Rassemblement pour l’Algérie Française RPF Rassemblement du Peuple Français SAAE Service de l’Action Administrative et Economique SAM Salon des Arts Ménagers SAM Société des Architectes Modernes SAP Société Agricole de Prévoyance
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SAS Section Administrative Spécialisée SAT-FMA Service d’Assistance Technique aux Français Musulmans d’Algérie SAU Section Administrative Urbaine SCA Service Cinématographique des Armées SCAA Service de Coordination des Aff aires Algériennes SCAPCO Section Coopérative Agricole du Plan de Constantine SCET Société Centrale pour l’Equipement du Territoire SCIC Société Centrale Immobilière de la Caisse SCS Service des Centres Sociaux SCSE Service des Centres Sociaux Educatifs SDAURP Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région de Paris SEMA Société d’Economie et de Mathématique Appliquées SERA Société d’Equipement de la Région d’Alger SERB Société d’Equipement de la Région de Bône SEZID Société d’Equipement des Zones d’Industrialisation Décentralisées SHAT Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Ministère de la Défence, Château de Vincennes, Paris SONACOTRAL Société Nationale de Construction de Logements pour les Travailleurs Algériens SR Service de Renseignement UIA Union of International Architects UN United Nations UNAMAT Union Algérienne de l’Industrie et du Commerce des Matériaux de Construction UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization UNFOHLM Union National des Fédérations d’Organismes d’Habitat à Loyer Modéré ZAD Zone d’Aménagement Diff éré ZAC Zone d’Aménagement Concerté ZAC Zone d’Aménagement Coordonné ZEC Zone de l’Est Constantinois ZID Zone d’Industrialisation Décentralisée ZOPI Zone de Pré-Industrialisation ZOR Zone d’Organisation Rurale ZUP Zone à Urbaniser par Priorité
Samia Henni Figures, Maps and Plans 17
Figures, Maps and Plans
Chapter 1 Fig. 1.1 Newspaper article in L’Humanité of 18 April 1959 44 Figs. 1.2–1.6 Newspaper articles released between April and May 1959 45 Fig. 1.7 Expansion of the Algerian Revolution between 1954 and 1956 46 Fig. 1.8 a Forbidden zones and the Plan Challe prior to July 1959 48 Fig. 1.8 b Military operations of Plan Challe 49 Fig. 1.9 Camp de regroupement in northern Constantine 51 Fig. 1.10 Camp de regroupement in Cap Djenet 52 Fig. 1.11 Camp de regroupement in the department of Bône 52 Fig. 1.12 Camp de regroupement Marguerite 53 Fig. 1.13 Camp de regroupement Cheraia, region of Collo, department of Setif 53 Fig. 1.14 Camp de regroupement Oued Mebtouh, Sidi Bel Abbès 54 Fig. 1.15 Camp de regroupement 54 Fig. 1.16 Camp de regroupement in Th iers, Palestro in the region of Algiers 55 Fig. 1.17 Camp de regroupement Tahel El Achouet in the region of Constantine 56 Fig. 1.18 Camp de regroupement in Nelsonbourg, Si-Mahdjoub in 1957 56 Fig. 1.19 Paris Institute of Ethnology in 1929 58 Figs. 1.20–1.25 Settlements and everyday life scenes from the Aurès photographed by Th érèse Rivière 60 Fig. 1.26 Germaine Tillion in the Aurès in 1935 72 Fig. 1.27 Jacques Soustelle in the Aurès in 1955 72 Fig. 1.28 TIME Magazine Cover of August 1959: Jacques Soustelle 73 Figs. 1.29–1.32 Evacuation of the Algerian civilian population in the rural area of Catinat Ain Tevia 76 Fig. 1.33 Opération espérance, bombing of the village Bou Birek and its controlled evacuation in 1956 77 Figs. 1.34 Map of the camps de regroupement in Algeria in 1962 79 Figs. 1.35–1.36 Propaganda published by the Bureau psychologique 80 Figs. 1.37 French propaganda 81 Figs. 1.38–1.40 Guidelines for French offi cers, ABC du chef de noyau actif 85–86 Fig. 1.41 Phases of pacifi cation in Constantine in August 1957 87 Fig. 1.42 Camp de regroupement in Taliouine, Valley of Oued Isser 90 Fig. 1.43 Camp de regroupement in Telagh in 1958 90 Figs. 1.44–1.45 Development of the dispositif of pacifi cation 92 Fig. 1.46 Organization of a military sector of pacifi cation 95
May 2016 18 Architecture of Counterrevolution
Chapter 2 Figs. 2.1–2.2 Description of the SASs in Les Réalités “Dites la vérité même si elle est amère” 100 Figs. 2.3–2.7 Assignments of French offi cers released by the French army 102 Figs. 2.8 Number of SASs and construction sites by the French army 103 Fig. 2.9 SAS of Bou Snib in the municipality of Ouled Hababa in November 1958 104 Fig. 2.10 Camp de regroupement in Aïn Zouit 104 Fig. 2.11 SAS of Oued Mouger 106 Figs. 2.12, 2.13 Photographs by the SAS of Praxbourg 107 Fig. 2.14 Typical plans for housing units by CRHR 108 Figs. 2.15, 2.16 Reconstruction of Orléanville 110 Figs. 2.17, 2.18 Journal de marches et opèrations of the SAS of Bouinan 110 Fig. 2.19 Master plan for the reconstruction of Orléanville 111 Fig. 2.20 SAS of Mouger 111 Figs. 2.21, 2.22 Journal de marches et opèrations of the SAS of Bouinan 112 Fig. 2.23 Plan of Defense of the SAS of Oued El Alleg 115 Fig. 2.24 Plan of Defense of the SAS of Laperrine 116 Fig. 2.25 Stills from Képi Bleu (Service Cinématographique de l’Armée, 1957) 119 Fig. 2.26 Stills from Rih El-Awras (Dir. Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina, 1966) 121 Figs. 2.27–2.30 Robert Lacoste visits the construction of a camp de regroupement in the region of Constantine in June 1957 133 Figs. 2.31 Maurice Papon and Robert Lacoste, June 1957 134 Figs. 2.32 Robert Lacoste in a meeting in Constantine, June 1957 134 Fig. 2.33 Regrouping of the Algerian civilian population by the French army between January 1956 and July 1958 137 Fig. 2.34 Construction site protected by the French army between January 1956 and July 1958 137 Fig. 2.35 Regrouping of the Algerian civilian population by the French army between January 1956 and January 1959 138 Fig. 2.36 Construction site protected by the French army between January 1956 and January 1959 138 Fig. 2.37 Regrouping of the Algerian civilian population by the French army between January 1959 and June 1959 139 Fig. 2.38 Construction site protected by the French army between January 1959 and June 1959 139 Figs. 2.39–2.40 Construction of shelters in the camp de regroupement of Taher El Achouet in Constantine 142 Figs. 2.41 Distribution of the sectors of the Service d’assistance technique aux français musulmans d’Algérie (SAT-FMA) within the prefecture of Paris Police 143
Samia Henni Figures, Maps and Plans 19
Chapter 3 Fig. 3.1 Esplanade du Maréchal Fosch (Forum) in Algiers on 13 May 1958 152 Fig. 3.2 Demonstrations of European population in Algiers on 13 May 1958 152 Fig. 3.3, 3.4 De Gaulle’s pamphlets for French army offi cers 152 Fig. 3.5 Essais sur l’intégration drafted by the sopporters of the politics of Jacques Soustelle in the aftermath of the crisis of 13 May 1958 153 Fig. 3.6 Poster on the French exploitation of the Algerian Sahara 154 Fig. 3.7 Conference about the Plan de Constantine held by Jean Vibert (Director of the Plan) in July 1959 156 Fig. 3.8 Plan de Constantine poster 156 Fig. 3.7 Les réalités of September 1958 163 Fig. 3.8 Les réalités of June 1958 163 Fig. 3.9 Results of the Plan de Constantine according to the department by the fall of 1961 166 Figs. 3.10, 3.11 Results of the Plan de Constantine by the fall of 1961 169 Fig. 3.12 Members of the committee of Housing and Urbanism 171 Fig. 3.13 Covers of the reports of the eight conferences organized by the ITEBA in Algiers between October 1958 and June 1959 173 Fig. 3.14 List of housing projects promoted by the Société coopérative musulmane algérienne d’habitation et d’accession à la petite propriété of Oran 177 Fig. 3.15 Plans, housing at Place du Général Korte in Oran 180 Fig. 3.16 General plan, housing at Place du Général Korte in Oran 180 Fig. 3.17 Housing at Place du Général Korte in Oran 180 Fig. 3.18 Diar el Ourida 181 Fig. 3.19 Diar Sidi Yassine 181 Fig. 3.20 Carrière centrales in Casablanca 181 Fig. 3.21, Fig 3.22 Logeco Mer et soleil in Hussein-Dey (Algiers) 182 Fig. 3.23 Booklet of habitat semi-urbain 189 Fig. 3.23 Exposition d’Urbanisme et d’Architecture Moderne in Algiers, 1933 192 Fig. 3.24 La maison indigène du centenaire designed by Léon Claro 192 Fig. 3.25 Plan of indigenous habitations designed by François Bienvenu 194 Fig. 3.26 View of indigenous habitations designed by Bienvenu 194 Fig. 3.27 “Exposition de la cité moderne d’Alger” 195 Fig. 3.28 Master plan of lotissement indigène (indigenous housing), Clos Salembier, Algiers designed by Albert Seiler and Marcel Lathuillière 197 Fig. 3.29 View of Seiler and Lathuillière housing project designed for Algerian populations 197 Fig. 3.30 Semi-urban dwellings published in the brochure released by the Housing Service of the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria. 208 Figs. 3.31–3.33 Models of the semi-urban dwellings published in the brochure released by the
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Housing Service of the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria 209 Fig. 3.34 Four possible plans of the semi-urban dwellings 209 Fig. 3.35 Accession à la propriété, plan of the regrouping of the village of Beni Merouane in Dem- el-Begrat, 1959 212 Fig. 3.36 Plan of a new fortifi ed settlement for the regrouping in Aïn Babouche designed by the CRHR, 1958 212
Chapter 4 Fig. 4.1 Bidonvilles in Algiers region in 1954 217 Fig. 4.2 Number of inhabitants of Algiers’ bidonvilles in 1954 217 Fig. 4.3 Th e chart indicates that during the bloody infamous Bataille d’Alger the number of inhabitants of the bidonvilles doubled 219 Fig. 4.4 A scene from La Battaglia di Algeri (Dir. Gillo Pontecorvo, 1966) 219 Fig. 4.5 Information form for the inhabitants of the bidonvilles 220 Fig. 4.6 A scenario for the evacuation of the bidonville of Clos-Salembier 223 Fig. 4.7 Clearing of Algiers bidonvilles in 1959 224 Fig. 4.8 Five types of settlements documented by the SAS offi cer of Clos Salembier in 1959 225 Fig. 4.9 Model of Diar Es Schems 225 Fig. 4.10 Family budgets in habitat évolutifs and bidonvilles 227 Fig. 4.11 Salaries of bidonvilles’s inhabitants in 1959 227 Fig. 4.12 Excerpt of the grid of CIAM Algiers group, CIAM IX, La Charte de l’Habitat, Aix-en- Provence, 1953 231 Figs. 4.13–Fig. 4.15 La Concorde (1,200 housing units) in Birmandreis, Algiers 232 Fig. 4.16 Carrières Jaubert (Diar El Kef, phase II–IV); Frais Vallon (Taine A, Taine E, Taine F) 233 Fig. 4.17 Carrières Jaubert 233 Fig 4.18 Master plan for the reconstruction of Orléanville in the aftermath of the earthquake of September 1954 235 Figs. 4.19, 4.20 Albert Camus Center 235 Figs. 4.21, 4.22 CIA pamphlet 238 Figs. 4.23, 4.24 Settlements built by the CIA in Maison Carrée 238 Fig. 4.25 Map showing the distribution of housing projects under the authority of the CIA in Algeria between 1954 and 1959 238 Fig. 4.26 CIA brochure destined for future tenants or householders 238 Fig. 4.27 Les Eucalyptus, housing project “logement simplifi és” built by the CIA 240 Fig. 4.28 Nanterre bidonville in the outskirts of Paris 241 Fig. 4.29 Distribution of Algerian workers in the region of Paris in the 1960s 241
Samia Henni Figures, Maps and Plans 21
Fig. 4.30 Foyers in Nanterre and Genevilliers in the 1960s 242 Fig. 4.31 Organization chart of the Service d’Assistance Technique aux Français Musulmans of the Paris Police 243 Fig. 4.32 Spatial organization of Algiers’ bidonvilles, Algiers’ Casbah, and Algiers’ rue d’Isly 248 Figs. 4.33, 4.34 Plan and photographs documenting a bidonville in rue des près in Paris 248 Fig. 4.35 Article reporting on Delouvrier’s one thousand villages project 254 Fig. 4.36 Article reporting on the mille villages program in Timgad 254 Fig. 4.37 Paul Delouvrier’s call of 5 November 1959 used by the French army to recall French offi cers’ mission 255 Fig. 4.38 Article in Les Réalités “Dites la vérité même si elle est amère” no. 34 of June 1959 256 Fig. 4.39 Article in Les Réalités 257 Fig. 4.40 Article in Le Monde of 10 June 1959 264 Fig. 4.41 Anonymous article 264 Figs. 4.42–4.49 IGRP, Documentation photographique sur les centres de regroupement, 15 June 1960 271 Figs. 4.50–4.52 Notice technique pour la construction des nouveaux villages drafted by the Région Territoriale et Corps d’Armée of Algiers 272 Fig. 4.53 Master plan of Lachish, Israel 274 Fig. 4.54 (right) Master plan of Arborea, Sardinia 274 Fig. 4.55 Le Corbusier’s village-centre 275 Fig. 4.56 Possible distribution of villages 275 Figs. 4.57–4.58 Maximum distance between arrable lands according to Bugnicourt 276 Fig. 4.59 From Xavier de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois, Pl. 12. A. 280 Fig. 4.60 From Ibid., Pl. 2. A. 280 Fig. 4.61 From Ibid., Pl. 12. B. 280 Fig. 4.62 From Ibid., Pl. 2. B. 280 Fig. 4.63 From Ibid., Pl. 13. 281 Figs. 4.64–4.69 Housing Types designed by the CRHR 282 Figs. 4.70–4.73 Figures published in L’habitat algérien au terme de la troisième année du Plan de Constantine: Les perspectives pour 1962 285 Fig. 4.74 List of urbanists appointed for major cities in the northern departments of Algeria 287 Figs. 4.75–4.78 Description of the CADAT 290 Figs. 4.79–4.81 La Royale in Annaba designed by Badani and Roux-Dorlut 292 Fig. 4.84 Master plan for Les Annassers designed by the Agence du Plan d’Alger 294 Fig. 4.85 Model of the fi rst phase of Les Annassers 294 Fig. 4.86 Distribution of the functions and activities in Le Couteur plan 294 Fig. 4.87 Master of Les Annassers designed by Le Couteur 294 Fig. 4.88–4.89 Th e Cathedral of Sacré-Cœur in Algiers designed by Jean Le Couteur and Paul Herbé between 1955 and 1961 295
May 2016 22 Architecture of Counterrevolution
Fig. 4.90 Master plan for the regroupement of Bordj Méhiris 296 Fig. 4.91 Master plan for the regroupement of Sidi Salem in Constantine 296 Fig. 4.92 Th e camps de regroupements became incorporated into the rural reform of the Plan de Constantine 296 Figs. 4.93–4.94 New rural settlements in Randon, municipality of Bône 296 Fig. 4.95 Bulletin de la Caisse d’équipement pour le développement de l’Algérie 296 Figs. 4.96–4.99 Brochure of the Logment Million 298 Figs. 4.100–4.104 Housing settlements in the area of Frais Vallon (Algiers) designed by Daure and Béri, together with Courtot, Chauveau, and Magrou 302 Figs. 4.105–4.110 La Montagne designed by Daure, Béri, and Simounet 303 Fig. 4.111 Les dunes designed by Régeste and Bellissent 304 Fig. 4.112 Cité Nador designed by Maury-Gomiz 304 Fig. 4.113 Diar Es Schems (House of the Sun) designed by Challand 304 Figs. 4.114–4.117 El Bir Améziane in Constantine designed by Daure and Béri 304 Figs. 4.118–4.119 Les peupliers in Constantine designed by Daure and Béri 304 Figs. 4.120–4.122 Les palmiers in Bel Air designed by Daure and Béri 304 Fig. 4.121 Champ de manoeuvre in Setif designed by Daure and Béri 304 Fig. 4.122 Les oliviers in the outskirts of Algiers designed by Daure and Béri 304 Fig. 4.123 Distribution of residential zones across the three northern departments of Algeria 309 Fig. 4.124 Distribution of industrial zones in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine 309 Fig. 4.125 Location of Rouiba-Reghaia 314 Figs. 4.126–4.127 Industrialization of Algiers region and its corresponding residential area in CADAT brochure 314 Fig. 4.128 Les Iris in Reghaia Sud designed by Daure and Béri 314 Fig. 4.129 Residential areas in Reghaia Nord and Reghaia Sud 315
Chapter 5 Fig. 5.1 Rocher Noir prior to the construction of the new administrative city 326 Fig. 5.2 List of attendees of the meeting of 3 march 1961 328 Fig. 5.3 Th e building of the French General Government in Algiers 328 Fig. 5.4 Plan of the fi rst phase of Rocher Noir 332 Fig. 5.5 Plan of the fi rst and second phases of Rocher Noir as published in a newspaper article in Algiers 332 Fig. 5.6 Plan of the military zone of Rocher Noir and Reghaia in 1963 334 Figs. 5.7–5.8 Barricades in Algiers in early 1960 335 Figs. 5.9–5.10 Hammam in Constantine, Bernard Bachelot’s diploma project at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts in Paris in 1957 337
Samia Henni Figures, Maps and Plans 23
Figs. 5. 11–5.14 French military base of Reggane in Adrar Province in the Algerian Sahara for nuclear tests 338 Fig. 5.15 Sport facilities at Rocher Noir. Daure and Béri’s apartment building in the background 339 Figs. 5.16 Construction site of Rocher Noir 340 Figs. 5.17–5.20 First phase of Rocher Noir that was completed in 1961 340 Fig. 5.21 Organization chart of the construction of Rocher Noir 342 Figs. 5.22–5.24 Plans of apartment buildings designed by Daure and Béri in Rocher Noir 343 Figs. 5.25–5.27 Elevation and photographs of Daure and Béri dwellings in Rocher Noir 344 Fig. 5.28 Rocher Noir’s housing projects designed by Daure and Béri and Bize, Ducollet, and Vidal 344 Figs. 5.29–5.34 OAS slogans in Algeria 347 Fig. 5.36–5.41 Explosion in Rocher Noir photographed by de Hoÿm de Marien 349 Fig. 5.42 Plan for Rocher Noir designed by de Marien 351 Fig. 5.43 Distribution of functions and activities in Rocher Noir 352 Fig. 5.44 Master Plan for Rocher Noir designed by de Marien 352–353 Figs. 5.45–5.49 Military aerial photographs of Rocher Noir 357 Figs. 5.50–5.57 Th e construction of Rocher Noir photographed by de Marien 361 Figs. 5.58–5.63 Th e construction of Rocher Noir photographed by de Marien 368 Fig. 5.64 Boulevard de l’impératrice 368 Fig. 5.65 Djenan el-Hassan 368 Fig. 5.66 Housing units, Rocher Noir 368 Fig. 5.67 Résidence Peyrissac, Cherchell, Algeria 368 Fig. 5.68 Villa, Rocher Noir 368 Fig. 5.69 Rob and Roq housing, Cap-Martin, France 368 Fig. 5.70 Villa of the Delegate of the French Government, Rocher Noir 368 Fig. 5.71 Cité La Montagne designed by Simounet, Daure and Béri 371 Fig. 5.72 Rocher Noir 371 Fig. 5.73 Rocher Noir photographed by de Marien 371 Fig. 5.74–5.84 Video portraying Rocher Noir on 27 September 1961 374–375 Fig. 5.85 Algeria’s regroupement, scenario 1 and 2 380 Fig. 5.86 Algeria’s regroupement, scenario 3 and 4 380 Fig. 5.87 Algeria’s regroupement, scenario 5 381 Fig. 5.88 Algeria’s regroupement, scenario 6 381 Fig. 5.89 Hersant Plan 383 Fig. 5.90 Time magazine cover, Raoul Salan 385 Fig. 5.91 Burning of Algiers library 385 Fig. 5.92 Burning of Oran Port 385 Figs. 5.93–5.98 Stills from the movie of 25 March 1962 388
May 2016 24 Architecture of Counterrevolution
Figs. 5.99–5.101 Offi cial visit of the French prefects to Farès in Rocher Noir on 17 April 1962 389 Figs. 5.102–5.104 Inspection of 21 April 1962 of the armed forces that protected the population of Rocher Noir 389 Fig. 5.105 Th e raising of Algerian colors on 2 July 1962 391 Fig. 5.106 Women Soldiers of Land Forces at Rocher Noir in 1963 395 Fig. 5.107 A military celebration at Rocher Noir in 1964 395 Fig. 5.108 Commemoration of the capitulation (German Surrender) of 1945 and of Joan of Arc at Rocher Noir in 1964 395
Samia Henni
27
Introduction
Colonialism is not a positive force. On 23 February 2005, the French Fifth Republic (1958–present), under the presidency of Jacques Chirac (1932–2007), decreed law no. 2005-128 on the Reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés (Recognition of the Nation and the National Contributions of Repatriated French). Article 4 mandated that teachers must teach students about the “positive role” of French colonialism, particularly in North Africa (the French departments of Algeria, the French departments of the Algerian Sahara, and the French protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia), and to acknowledge the “sacrifi ces” of the French offi cers who served in these territories. Th e second sentence of Article 4 read: “school programs recognize in particular the positive role of the French presence overseas, notably in North Africa, and concede to history and to the sacrifi ces of the combatants of the French army in these territories the eminent position to which they have the right.”1 With Article 4, the French authorities dictated the contents of history lessons; brainwashed pupils studying in French schools; obligated teachers to shroud in silence a number of infamous colonial massacres; compelled teachers and pupils alike to praise French colonialism and imperialism; rejected the violence of colonialism; undermined the work of historians and their ongoing debates; off ended all those who had lived, or still live, under a colonial regime; overlooked the accountability and responsibility of the French colonial authorities; and celebrated the crimes that the French civil and military authorities committed, including the crimes of the French paramilitary terrorist group known as the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS, or the Organization of the Secret Army). Th ese are only a few of the consequences of this law. In the wake of the swift avalanche of national and international reactions, protests, debates, and condemnations—which were particularly centered on the Algerian Revolution, or the Algerian War of Independence (November 1954–July 1962)—the French authorities removed, with some diffi culty, the
1 Loi no. 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés—Article 4. Journal Offi ciel de la République Française.
May 2016 28 Architecture of Counterrevolution
aforementioned sentence of Article 4 from law no. 2005-128 on 16 February 2006, one year after its institution.2 But France’s intention—and that of other Western colonizers— to eulogize colonialism existed then and still exists today. In contrast to the imposed amnesia of Article 4, this dissertation examines a fragment of what the French authorities sought to hide. It illuminates a handful of the myriad of “non-positive” (to paraphrase the French legislators) characters and eff ects of French colonialism—including the key role the French army played—upon the territory and people of Algeria (France’s longest colonial presence in North Africa, which began in 1830) during the French war to keep Algeria under French rule. Th e term war was formally recognized thirty-seven years after the ceasefi re in 1962. Indeed, it was not until 18 October 1999, also under the presidency of Chirac, that the French authorities approved the use of the offi cial appellation La Guerre d’Algérie (“the Algerian War,” alternately translated as “the War for Algeria”) at French schools and in offi cial terminology.3 Before 1999, the French government euphemistically called the unnamed and undeclared war Les opérations de maintien de l’ordre (“enforcement of law and order”) or Les évènements d’Algérie (“Algeria’s events”).4 During this bloody and protracted armed confl ict, the French civil and military authorities profoundly reorganized Algeria’s vast urban and rural territory, drastically transformed its built environments, and rapidly implanted new infrastructure and settlements across the country. In addition to the destructions of war, the colonial regime decreed a number of laws, orders, and directives for the evacuation of certain areas and the construction of spaces to allow for the strict control of the Algerian population and the defense of the European population living in Algeria. Th e forced relocation and construction of settlements in rural and urban areas was a key factor in isolating the Algerian population from the infl uence of the liberation fi ghters, and in impeding the support and spread of the desire for independence (or of “contamination,” to use the
2 On the history of the debates and the numerous opinions on Article 4, see, for example, Marianne Ellingsen Kvig, “Le débat sur l’article 4 de la loi du 23 février 2005: La bataille des mémoires coloniales” (Master’s thesis, University of Oslo, 2007), https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/25752/MicrosoftxWordx-xOPPGAVE.pdf?sequence=1. 3 Law no. 99-882 of 18 October 1999. Journal Offi ciel of 22 October 1999, p. 15657.
Samia Henni Introduction 29
French army’s technical term). Th is dissertation focuses on these resulting constructions and seeks to portray the modus operandi of French colonial architecture during the Algerian Revolution, as well as that architecture’s roots, developments, scopes, actors, protocols, and design mechanisms. Th is study calls this multifaceted infrastructure the “architecture of counterrevolution.” Th e following chapters do not pretend to off er a comprehensive history of the ninety-four months of the French war’s destruction and construction in Algeria; nor do they claim to provide an exhaustive description and analysis of the buildings that the French colonial authorities constructed in Algeria during the Algerian Revolution. Rather, the dissertation seeks to probe the colonial practices of control and domination through juridical means, military operations, and housing units, and to highlight the roles that various offi cers, technocrats, architects, planners, and ethnologists played. It does so by delving into the practices of the Vichy regime and of the French colonial wars of the nineteenth century; it undoes the nexus of these two French systems and their links to the French war machine in colonial Algeria. Th e Algerian War of Independence was waged against the tumultuous backdrop of the Cold War. It was not only a war between French offi cers and the Algerian Armée de libération nationale (ALN, or National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Algerian Front de libération national [FLN], or National Liberation Front). It was also a war between the French civil and military authorities, among French army offi cers, between the French left and right wings, between French communists and leftists, between French Gaullists and right-wing parties, between the Eastern and Western blocs, and among Algerian elites. Since the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution, the United Nations General Assembly had debated the “Algerian Question” a number of times until December 1960, when the members of the United Nations recognized Algeria’s right to self-determination. Th e French colonial war of anti-Algerian independence is widely regarded as the precursor of modern civil-military counterinsurgency operations, and thereby of the rhetorical Global War on Terror of today. Its theories, known as the guerre moderne (modern warfare), were developed by French offi cers who had gained their practical experience during the Second World War (1939–1945) and during the Indochina War (1946–1954), which France lost. Th e offi cers secretly transferred these methods to North and South
May 2016 30 Architecture of Counterrevolution
America during the 1960s.5 Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, the United States and other Western powers have overtly expressed their interest in French military practices in Algeria—notably the infamous Battle of Algiers—and in the ways with which the French army created, learned, integrated, and enforced counterrevolutionary measures. Th e aforementioned architecture of counterrevolution dismantles the eff ects of these measures on the transformation of the Algerian territory and exposes the intrinsic relationships between military maneuvers, political ideologies, colonial doctrines, and architecture. It reveals the politico-socio-economic meanings of laws, maps, structures, infrastructures, shelters, and other buildings, and discloses how these groups (and their broad network of actors) embody what psychiatrist and author Frantz Fanon (1925–1961), best known for his 1961 book Th e Wretched of the Earth, called the psychology of colonialism in his rejected doctoral dissertation.6 Th e Algerian Revolution provoked the downfall of the Fourth French Republic (1946–1958). During the eight years of the war, a number of French chief executives attempted to deal with the Algerian question: Pierre Mendès France (1907–1982) and his Interior Minister François Mitterrand (1916–1996), between June 1954 and February 1955; Edgar Faure (1908–1988), from February 1955 to January 1956; Guy Mollet (1905–1975), between January 1956 and May 1957; Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (1914–1993), between June 1957 and September 1957; Felix Guillard (1919–1970), from November 1957 to April 1958; and Pierre Pfl imlin (1907–2000), for a few days after Algiers’ fi rst General’s Putsch and the subsequent French politico-military crisis of
13 May 1958 . Deserving of special mention is General Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), who not only served as Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Algerian Aff airs between June 1958 and January 1959, but also as the President of the French Fifth Republic (1958–present) for more than ten years, from January 1959 to April 1969.7 Th e French authorities appointed eight chief executives in turn to represent French
5 Th is legacy will be discussed in depth in Chapter 1. 6 Fanon’s rejected doctoral dissertation was published as a book in 1952 under the title Peau noire, masques blancs (Black Skin, White Masks) by Editions du Seuil. Fanon discusses the psychology of colonialism in the fi rst chapter. See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Markmann Charles Lam (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 8–27. 7 In addition to these Frenchmen, Georges Pompidou (1911–1974) played a major role in conducting secret negotiations with the Algerian FLN at the request of de Gaulle. Pompidou served as France’s prime minister between 1962 and 1968 and its president from 1969 until his death. He therefore infl uenced French policies toward Algeria and its inhabitants both during and after Algerian independence.
Samia Henni Introduction 31
interests in Algeria: the ethnologist Jacques Soustelle (1912–1990), between January 1955 and January 1956, as Governor General of Algeria; General Georges Catroux (1877– 1969), from January to February 1956, as Resident Minister in Algeria; the syndicalist and socialist Robert Lacoste (1898–1989), from February 1956 to May 1958, as Resident Minister in Algeria; the lawyer André Mutter (1901–1974) as the last Resident Minister in Algeria; General Raoul Salan (1899–1984), between June and December 1958, as Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria, as well as Commander in Chief of French Armed Forces in Algeria; the inspector of fi nances Paul Delouvrier (1914– 1995), from December 1958 to November 1960, as Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria; Jean Morin (1916–2008), between November 1960 and March 1962, as Delegate General in Algeria; and fi nally Christian Fouchet (1911–1974), as High Commissioner for the French Republic in Algeria between March and July 1962, when de Gaulle declared the independence of Algeria with the imposed cooperation of France. All of these French civil or military men, representing either left-wing or right-wing politics, fought for the same cause: to ensure that Algeria was dominated by France and to protect French economic interests in Algeria. Th e aim of this study is therefore to explore the singular spatial strategies that buttressed the French colonial cause. Th e dissertation is structured in three parts that discuss various times when politico-military operations and planning policies converged. Th e fi rst, “Camps Called Centres de Regroupement,” examines the ways in which the French army invaded the daily lives of Algerian civil society in rural and urban areas alike, forcibly relocated vast numbers of Algerians into militarily controlled camps, oversaw Algerians’ movements and activities, and transformed the people’s domestic space across the country. Th e second part, “Housing in General de Gaulle’s Plan,” investigates the premises with which de Gaulle launched a colossal socio-economic development plan called the “Plan de Constantine” (named for the eastern Algerian city) that included the construction of housing units for one million people. It also explores the intentions, typologies, actors, and eff ects of de Gaulle’s dwellings during the War of Independence. Th e fi nal part deals with the mechanisms involved in the construction of a new administrative city called Rocher noir (“Black Rock”), which was to be located roughly fi fty kilometers east of Algiers, near the Mediterranean Sea. Th e French stronghold was to be inhabited by the French government in Algeria and its civil servants; it was exclusively designed to protect these men and their families from the
May 2016 32 Architecture of Counterrevolution
bloody terrorism of the OAS. Part One includes two chapters, covering the period between November 1954, which marked the onset of the Algerian Revolution, and May 1958 that coincided with the fi rst Algiers General’s Putsch and the collapse of the Fourth Republic. Chapter One, “Discreet Violence,” examines the genesis of the camps de regroupement8 by investigating the missions of the French ethnologist Germaine Tillion (1907–2008) and the practices of the aforementioned ethnologist Jacques Soustelle in the Aurès Mountains of northeastern Algeria. Th e chapter also explores the roots of the colonial doctrine of guerre moderne, its theorists and practitioners, including David Galula (1919–1967), Charles Lacheroy (1906–2005), and Roger Trinquier (1908–1986). It probes the socio-spatial relationships between this type of warfare, the military policy of pacifi cation, and the positions of the forefathers of “modern war,” who include Marshals Th omas Bugeaud (1784–1849), Joseph Gallieni (1849–1916), and Louis Lyautey (1854–1934). Chapter Two, “Th e Bâtisseurs of the Camps,” is devoted to the offi cers of the sections administratives spécialisées (SAS, or specialized administrative sections), who supervised and partly built the camps, as well as to the policies and conditions in which the camps were built in a number of rural regions of Algeria. Th e second part of the chapter focuses on the development of the camps de regroupement in the Algerian Department of Constantine during the tenure of the former Vichy regime civil servant Maurice Papon (1910–2007). Papon was convicted in 1998 of crimes against humanity for his participation in the deportation of Jews in Bordeaux to concentration camps during the Second World War; this background did not stop him from serving both as General Inspector of Administration in the Extraordinary Mission (civil and military) in Eastern Algeria and as Prefect of the Department of Constantine between 1956 and 1958. Th e second part of the second chapter highlights the legacies between the French fascist regime and the French colonial regime. Part Two of the dissertation, “Housing in General de Gaulle’s Plan,” also includes two chapters. It explores the period between the return of General de Gaulle to power in May 1958 and the end of the mandate of Paul Delouvrier in November 1961 as General Delegate of the French Government in Algeria. Chapter Th ree, “On the Colonial Project,”
8 Th e term camps de regroupement is diffi cult to translate, but it essentially means “resettlement camps.” The question of the traslation of the camps de regroupment will be adressed in Chapter 1.
Samia Henni Introduction 33
chronicles General de Gaulle’s attempts to partly divert the scope of the armed confl ict and surveys Delouvrier’s assignments to transform the Algerian population. Th e chapter discusses the typologies of housing programs that the French technocrats planned for Algeria, as well as these programs’ affi liations with postwar housing programs in France. It also debates the controversy of an additional colonial typology called habitat semi-urban (semi-urban dwellings), which were specifi cally designed for Algerian people who were deemed neither urban nor rural. Chapter Four, “Between Offi cers and Technocrats,” examines three levels of profound spatial transformations during the War of Independence: army offi cers’ clearance of the bidonvilles (shantytowns) in urban areas, the transformation of permanent camps de regroupement into villages in rural Algeria through Delouvrier’s mille villages (one thousand villages) program, and French technocrats’ and architects’ regulation and construction of mass-housing projects in Algeria’s urban areas. Th e chapter looks at the role of certain protagonists in Algeria such as former minister of reconstruction and urbanism Eugène Claudius-Petit (1907–1989) and architect Marcel Lathuillière (1903–1984). It also seeks to trace the frictions and legacies between four infl uential French groups in Algeria: those who served at the French Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l’Urbanisme (MRU, or Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism), such as Pierre Dalloz (1899–1992); those who worked for Le Corbusier (1897–1965) in Paris, like Pierre-André Emery (1903–1982); those who collaborated with Fernand Pouillon (1912– 1986) in Algiers, like Alexis Daure (1921–2015); and those who graduated from or taught at the Institut d’urbanisme de l’université de Paris (IUUP, or Institute of Urbanism at Paris University) and/or the Institut d’urbanisme de l’université d’Alger (IUUA, or Institute of Urbanism at Algiers University). Th e fi nal part of the dissertation, “Th e New Capital,” covers the period between 1961 and 1964. It consists of Chapter Five, “Rocher Noir,” which examines the ways with which General de Gaulle and the French civil and military authorities attempted to protect French civil servants in Algiers from the violent terrorism of the OAS by building the aforementioned new fortifi ed city that was entirely designed for use by French offi cials. It explores the circumstances in which this fortifi ed colonial city was swiftly designed and built in 1961, temporarily occupied by civil servants of the French government in Algeria, and eventually abandoned in 1964. Th e fi ve chapters are treated as narratives that are guided and framed by a number
May 2016 34 Architecture of Counterrevolution
of protagonists and antagonists who represented the French institutions and government (both civil and military authorities) in Algeria under French colonial rule and during the Algerian Revolution. Each historical “frame” examines an aspect of the French architecture designed for a counterrevolution and suggests a reading of the psychology of French colonialism in Algeria. It is therefore not concerned with any one Algerian city, any one practice, or any one project. Th e dissertation relies on particular biographies and specifi c situations of military character that the French authorities created or faced in order to obstruct and dominate the Algerian Revolution. Not surprisingly, while the revolution and the war went unimpeded, the Algerian population suff ered from massive uprooting, and Algeria’s territory and built environment were transformed in profound ways. Th is dissertation, Architecture of Counterrevolution: Th e French Army in Algeria, 1954–1962, provides only a piece of the complex puzzle (yet to be composed) of the territorial infrastructure of anti-decolonization and the Algerian population’s control, domination, and assimilation. Th is institutionalized colonial violence was the product of the French form of republicanism that pretends to comprehend the values of its national slogan: liberté, égalité, fraternité. General Charles de Gaulle again inscribed this symbolic tripartite motto—the origins of which lie in the celebrated French Revolution—within the French constitution of his Fifth Republic in September 1958: that is, in the midst of the bloody French war to keep Algeria under French colonial rule.
Sources
Th e French archives of the Algerian War of Independence were partly opened to the public in 1992, thirty years after the 1962 ceasefi re. Th e word “partly” is used here because a number of fi les remain classifi ed, secret, and otherwise inaccessible to the world. Law no. 79–18 of 3 January 1979 denies access for a period of sixty years to all documents involving the private lives of individuals or of France’s national security and defense.9 Th is implies that some dossiers will be opened to scientifi c research only in 2022. Th is doctoral dissertation—as well as the entire written history of the French war in Algeria—is thus
9 Loi no. 79–18 du 3 janvier 1979 sur les archives. Journal Offi ciel de la République Française.
Samia Henni Introduction 35
based on the records that the French authorities have meticulously selected; of course, this selection represents only one side of the story.10 Th e extensive inventories of the French national archives related to Algeria under French rule and the Algerian War of Independence that were consulted for this research include, among others: • Introduction à l’étude des archives de l’Algérie (Introduction of the Study of the Archives of Algeria), published in 1992 by the Service historique de l’Armée de Terre (SHAT, or the Historic Service of Land Forces), in the Château de Vincennes in Paris, French Ministry of Defense. • Th e four volumes of the sous-série 1 H 1091–4881: Algérie 1945–1967, released by the SHAT between 1999 and 2001. • Etat des sources relatives à l’Algérie (Th e State of Sources on Algeria), released by the Service historique de l’Armée de l’Air (SHAA, or the Historic Service of the Air Forces), in the Château de Vincennes in Paris, French Ministry of Defense. • Inventaire des cartes d’Algérie (1830–1950), “Inventory of Algeria’s Maps,” SHAT. • Th e military photographs and fi lms of the archives of the établissement de communication et de production audiovisuelle de la défense (ECPAD), at the Fort of Ivry in Paris. • Th e database of the Archives nationales d’outre-mer (ANOM, or the National Archives of Overseas Territories) in Aix-en-Provence. Th e ANOM holds Algeria’s territorial records; the documents of the civil cabinet of the French General Governors in Algeria (CAB); archival documents of the ministry of state charged with Algerian Aff airs and the ministries of war, the interior, and French colonies; and the fi les of Algeria’s prefectures and those of the French government in Algeria, including série N, dedicated to public works. • Th e inventories of the French national archives that are held in Fontainebleau, Paris, and Pierrefi tte-sur-Seine. A number of fi les were consulted in Pierrefi tte-
10 On the paradoxes of the French archives of the Algerian War of Independence, see, for example, Th ierry Sarmant, “Les archives de la guerre d’Algérie: Le secret entre violence et mémoire,” in Archives « secrètes », secrets d’archives ? Historiens et archivistes face aux archives sensibles (Paris: CNRS Éd., coll. CNRS Histoire, 2003), 103–10.
May 2016 36 Architecture of Counterrevolution
sur-Seine, including the archives of the Plan du développement et social en Algérie, dit Plan de Constantine (1958–1964), the archives of Charles de Gaulle, and the archives of French prime ministers, the ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism, and the Ministry of Construction.
Th e personal archives of Paul Delouvrier and Charles de Gaulle complete the French national civil and military archives. Th e author consulted Delouvrier’s archives at the Service of the Archives of Contemporary History of the Center of History of Sciences Po in Paris, where the documents of his tenure as General Governor of the French Government in Algeria between 1958 and 1961 are available for consultation. Also in Paris, at the Foundation Charles de Gaulle in Rue Solférino (where de Gaulle had his offi ce between 1947 and 1958), the author assessed the archival records of General de Gaulle. In addition to these primary sources, a series of interviews between 2013 and 2015 with French people who had directly or indirectly participated in the War of Independence and/or its related architecture. Th is oral history includes conversations with the following fi gures: • Michel Cornaton (b. 1936), who was drafted into the French army in Algeria between 1959 and 1960; in 1967 Cornaton published Les regroupements de la décolonisation en Algérie,11 and in 2010 he published Pierre Bourdieu. Une vie dédoublée.12 Cornaton also generously opened his private archives to the author. • General Maurice Faivre (b. 1926), a French army offi cer who served in Constantine, Kabylia, and Reghaia between 1957 and 1962, and who was the author of Les 1000 villages de Delouvrier : protection des populations musulmanes contre le FLN13 (Delouvrier’s 1,000 Villages: Protection of the Muslim Population from the FLN);
11 Th e second edition of the book was released in 1998 under a diff erent title: Les camps de regroupement de la guerre d’Algérie. See Michel Cornaton, Les regroupements de la décolonisation en Algérie, fi rst edition (Paris: Editions Economie et Humanisme, 1967); Michel Cornaton, Les camps de regroupement de la Guerre d’Algérie, Histoire et perspectives méditerranéennes (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998). 12 Michel Cornaton, Pierre Bourdieu. Une vie dédoublée (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010). 13 Maurice Faivre, Les 1000 villages de Delouvrier. Protection des populations musulmanes contre le FLN (Sceaux: L’Esprit du livre éditions, 2009).
Samia Henni Introduction 37
• Gérard Bélorgey (1933–2015), who was a reserve offi cer in Algeria between 1955 and 1957 and who later served as the Head of Economic Aff airs in Mostaganem charged with the management of the budget of the camps de regroupement; • René Mayer (1925–2015), a civil engineer who was born in Constantine and who was the Head of the Service of Habitat at the Public Works Department of the French General Delegation in Algeria during the execution of the Plan de Constantine; he was entrusted with de Gaulle’s mass-housing programs; • Josette Daure, who was the wife of Swiss architect Jean-Jacques Deluz, and who later married French architect Alexis Daure, the latter of whom built a number of large-scale housing projects in Algeria between 1958 and 1964; and • Claire Bachelot, who was the spouse of Bernard Bachelot (1930–2011), the Algiers-based architect and manager of the construction site of Rocher Noir.
Th e research for this dissertation concentrated on a myriad of published sources when studying the various versions and accounts of the complex history of the Algerian War of Independence in English and in French.14 Th e majority of the literature focuses on the military, political, economic, anthropological, and social aspects and consequences of the war in Algeria, in France, and internationally. Th e literature on the spatial transformations, changes, policies, and impacts at various scales and in the diff erent regions of Algeria is dramatically scarce, however. Since the end of the war in 1962, very little research has been conducted on the destructions and constructions of the Algerian War of Independence— even less so by architects and architecture historians. In addition, these rare studies that do exist focus on Algiers and ignore the rest of the vast territory of Algeria. Notable among the few publications that do consider the spaces and built environments of the Algerian War is L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: Aperçu critique (Urbanism and Architecture of
14 Maurice Sarazin, who was a librarian at the National Library of Algiers until 1962, published an extensive bibliography that included the majority of published literature (in 2011) and unpublished dissertations (in 2012) on the Algerian War of Independence in the French language. See Maurice Sarazin, Bibliographie de la guerre d’Algérie (1954-1962): ouvrages en langue française parus de 1954 à 2009 (Paris: Dualpha, 2011); Maurice Sarazin, 666 thèses et mémoires en langue française sur la guerre d’Algérie, 1954-1962: Soutenus devant les universités françaises et étrangères de 1960 à 2011 (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2012).
May 2016 38 Architecture of Counterrevolution
Algiers: A Critical Overview), published in 1988 by Swiss architect Jean-Jacques Deluz (1930–2009), who had emigrated to Algiers in 1956 just after his graduation from the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne. Deluz analyzed Algiers between 1945 and 1962. In the introduction to his book, Deluz argues that “so far, few studies have been devoted to Algeria’s architecture and urbanism during the period of the liberation war. Th is is not very surprising. It is due either to a guilty conscience or hostility on the French side, or painful sensitivity or an obscurantist will on the Algerian side.”15 Deluz’s statement is still valid today. Other signifi cant works of scholarship—although they are not directly or exclusively centered on the war and its architectures—include Paul Rabinow’s French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (1989); David Prochaska’s Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870–1920 (1990); Xavier Malvetti’s Alger: méditerranée, soleil et modernité (1992); Zeynep Çelik’s Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule (1997), in which Çelik dedicates a few pages to the camps de regroupement; Saïd Almi, Urbanisme et colonisation, présence française en Algérie (2002); Jean-Louis Cohen, Nabila Oulebsir, and Youcef Kanoun’s book Djazaïr, une année de l’Algérie en France (2003); Nabila Oulebsir, Les usages du patrimoine: monuments musées et politiques coloniales en Algérie 1830–1930 (2004); and Zeynep Çelik, Julia Clancy-Smith, and Frances Terpak’s book Walls of Algiers: Narratives of the City through Text and Image (2009).16 Th is selected bibliography (in chronologic order) attests that authors have paid very little heed to the architecture and architects who served the politico-military purposes of the French war to keep Algeria under French rule. Th is dissertation therefore endeavors to fi ll this gap and to isolate historical questions that refl ect our contemporaneity: to learn why and how the politico-military objectives and territorial operations converged; to determine the factors that allowed architecture, colonial policies, and counterrevolutionary war strategies to intersect; and to examine the ways in which judicial measures and socio-economic conditions were created for building France’s architecture of counterrevolution in colonial Algeria.
15 Jean-Jacques Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique (Liège, Alger: Pierre Mardaga Editeur, Offi ce des publications universitaires, 1988), 5. [“Peu d’études ont été consacrées jusqu’à présent à l’architecture et à l’urbanisme en Algérie dans la période de la guerre de libération. Cela n’a rien de très surprenant. Soit mauvaise conscience ou hargne du côté français, soit sensibilité douloureuse ou volonté d’occultation du côté algérien.”] 16 Th is list is not complete. For more comprehensive references, see the bibliography of this manuscript.
Samia Henni Introduction 39
Personal Note
I was born in Algiers and spent the fi rst eighteen years of my life in Algeria. I lived in Hussein-Dey in eastern Algiers, a district that was radically transformed during the Algerian War of Independence. A vast number of mass-housing projects were built there, including Cité Amirouche, Bel Air, Brossette, Eucalyptus, La Montagne, Léveilley, and Maya, some of which are mentioned in this dissertation. Part of my large Algerian family lived in diff erent neighborhoods of Algiers, most of which were built in the 1950s and ’60s, during the War of Independence. Part of my childhood and adolescence coincided with the bloody violence of the Algerian Civil War (1991–2002)—known as the décennie noir (Black Decade)—during which I learned to live with constant fear and the threat of death. Bombs, shootings, military tanks, alarms, curfews, and everything else that an armed confl ict entails were part of my daily life and that of the lives of millions of my fellow Algerians. In 1998, by the completion of the fi rst year at the Ecole Polytechnique d’Architecture et d’Urbanisme in Algiers, I was generously awarded a scholarship by the association Amici dell’Accademia di Architettura di Mendrisio to study at the newly established Accademia di Architettura di Mendrisio (Switzerland), Università della Svizzera Italiana. Th e same year, Abdelaziz Boutefl ika (b. 1937), member of the FLN and former soldier in the ALN who served as Minister of Foreign Aff airs between 1963 and 1979 in the three governments of Houari Boumediènne (1927–1978) in independent Algeria, announced his intention to run for president in the anticipated elections of 1999. Although all other candidates withdrew from the lection prior to the vote denouncing fraud concerns, Boutefl ika was elected. He became active on national and international levels. Boutefl ika attempted to restore peace and security in Algeria with the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, and to rebuild the reputation of Algeria, which shifted from being the symbol of revolution during the Algerian War of Independence to the emblem of violence and injustice and terror during the Algerian Civil War. In the wake of the constitutional amendment of 2009 that allowed the President to run for a third term, Boutefl ika “won” again the presidential election for the third time, surpassing (in 2012) Houari Boumediènne as the longest-serving president of independent Algeria. While writing this dissertation, Boutefl ika—sitting in a wheelchair—audaciously
May 2016 40 Architecture of Counterrevolution
declared that he would run for a fourth term in spite of his ill health and his three terms in offi ce. Th is re-re-re-election spawned large protests across the country but they were immediately banned and brutally silenced. Maintaining Algeria under the constant authority of the FLN since the signing of the Evian Agreements in 1962 between the French government and the Algerian FLN is only contributing—among many other issues—to the prolongation of silence and the dissemination of an orchestrated history of certain chapters of the story of France and Algeria during the War of Independence. Notable among these episodes are the constructions that were initiated or built during this armed confl ict, in particular the camps de regroupement and de Gaulle’s Plan de Constantine, their completion, abandonment, or transformation after Algeria gained its independence. Th is study seeks instead to investigate these confl icting spaces, or spaces of confl ict, and explore the psychology of colonialism, its repercussions, reverberations, infl uences, aspirations, inspirations; hoping that it will stimulate further research.
Samia Henni 41
I. Camps Called Centres de Regroupement 1954–1958
May 2016
43
1. Discreet Violence
In 2003, Michel Rocard (b. 1930)—French politician and member of the Socialist Party, who served as Prime Minister from 1988 to 1991 under President François Mitterrand (1916–1996)—published a book titled Rapport sur les camps de regroupement et autres textes sur la Guerre d’Algérie (Report on the Regroupement Camps and Other Texts on the Algerian War). Rocard wrote this report in 1959 (forty-four years earlier), when he was Inspector of Finances in Algeria during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). On 17 February 1959, more than four years after the onset of the Algerian Revolution on 1 November 1954 (All Saints’ Day), he submitted the confi dential document to Paul Delouvrier, the newly appointed General Delegate of the French Government in Algeria. In this 1959 account, the twenty-eight-year-old Rocard denounced the outrageous conditions of the French colonial “regroupement camps in which a million villagers are parked, more than half of them children.”17 Th e report was immediately communicated to the media in France, which eventually revealed the existence of the militarily controlled camps de regroupement (roughly translated as “regrouping camps”) in Algeria that until then had been kept secret from general national and international public opinion. Among the reasons that incited Rocard to publish his 1959 report on the camps over four decades later was (as he said) the alarming invasion of Iraq. Th rough the fi ascos of the war in Algeria, Rocard attempted to demonstrate the impossibility of solving political problems by means of purely military measures, as had occurred in colonial Algeria.18 Th e 1959 media scandal resulted in the unprecedented publication of photographs, approximate fi gures, and descriptions that reported the forced resettlement of Algerian civilians on a massive scale. Various articles—simultaneously released in both left- and right-wing newspapers—in their very titles asserted the alarming number and precarious circumstances that the French army was imposing upon Algerians: “Dans les camps d’Algérie des milliers d’enfants meurent” (“In the Camps of Algeria, Th ousands of Children Die”); “Un
17 Michel Rocard, Rapport sur les camps de regroupement et autres textes sur la guerre d’Algérie, Edition critique (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2003), 13.[“Les camps de regroupement dans lesquels sont parqués plus d’un million de villageois, dont plus de la moitié d’enfants.”] 18 Ibid., 9.
May 2016 44 Architecture of Counterrevolution
million d’Algériens ‘regroupés’ par l’armée menacés de famine” (“One Million Algerians ‘Regrouped’ by the Army Th reatened with Famine”); “Un million d’Algériens dans les camps: c’est la guerre”
(“One Million Algerians in Camps: Such Is War”); “Un million d’Algériens parqués dans des camps de ‘regroupement’” (“One Million Algerians Parked in ‘Regroupement’ Camps”); “J’ai visité, près de Blida, les villages de regroupement” (“I Have Visited, Near Blida, the Regroupement Villages”), “Un million d’Algériens derrière les barbelés” (“One Million Algerians behind Barbed Wire”); “Algérie: un million de personnes déplacés” (“Algeria: One Million People Displaced”); and “Un million d’Algériens de l’Atlas ont été rassemblés dans mille villages” (“One Million Algerians from the Atlas Mountains Have Been 19 . Fig. 1.1 Newspaper article, Un million Gathered in a Th ousand Villages”) (Fig. 1.1–1.6) d’algériens “regroupés” par l’armée menacés de One million people; this unique and apparently famine in L’Humanité of 18 April 1959. SHAT 1 H 2485 D2. preconceived number announced by the French civil authorities was mere guesswork. Th e reality among the French army was rather diff erent. As the Inspection générale des regroupements de population (IGRP, or the General Inspection of the Population Regroupement) argued, it was clear that “by 1959 we had found ourselves facing a very serious situation: it had become impossible to quantify even approximately the volume of the displaced rural populations that had occurred since 1954.”20 Th e camps de regroupement were established for military purposes immediately following the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution. In order to respond to the Algerian
19 Archives of the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, (hereafter SHAT) SHAT 1 H 2485 D 2. Coupures de Presse concernant les réfugiés et les camps de regroupement, 1959. 20 SHAT 1 H 2030. Le Chef de Bataillon J. Florentin de l’Inspection Générale des Regroupements. Les regroupements des populations en Algérie. Alger le 11 Décembre 1960, p. 13. [“En 1959 on se trouve fi nalement devant une situation très grave: il était devenu impossible de chiff rer même approximativement le volume des populations rurales déplacées depuis 1954.”]
Samia Henni Discreet Violence 45
Figs. 1.2–1.6 Various newspaper articles released by the French left-wing neswspapers such as Le Monde, as well as right- wing press like Le Figaro between April and May 1959. SHAT 1 H 2485 D2.
May 2016 46 Architecture of Counterrevolution
Fig. 1.7 Expansion of the Algerian Revolution between 1954 and 1956. From Guy Pervillé, Atlas de la guerre d’Algérie: De la conquête à l’indépendance (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2011), 18. people’s demands for independence, the French army devastated a number of villages and demarcated certain rural areas as zones of insecurity, which later were termed the “forbidden zones.”21 Th ese vast regions were not only considered geographically isolated, but also—and most importantly—as epicenters of Algerian revolutionary activities. One of the most uncontrollable and infamous areas for the French authorities was the scattered settlements of the vast highlands of the Aurès Mountains in northeastern Algeria (Fig. 1.7). Th e Aurès served as a testing ground for various civil-military counterrevolutionary socio-spatial strategies. Th ese strategies were designed to achieve what was, in retrospect, an unfeasible restoration of security and an impossible assurance of French sovereignty over a colonized population who was seeking their independence from France. Th e Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN, or National Liberation Front) proclaimed
21 Michel Cornaton, Les camps de regroupement de la Guerre d’Algérie, Histoire et perspectives méditerranéennes (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998), 60–61.
Samia Henni Discreet Violence 47
the country’s independence in its very fi rst manifesto to the Algerian people and to the militants of the Algerian cause, arguing that their political program aimed for Algeria’s national independence by claiming “the restoration of a sovereign Algerian state.”22 In an attempt to legitimize the massive forced resettlement of the rural Algerian population, Jacques Soustelle (1912–1990), French ethnologist and Governor General of Algeria between 1955 and 1956, and his successor, Robert Lacoste (1898–1989), French politician and Resident Minister of Algeria between 1956 and 1958, both claimed that Algeria was hazardously underadministered and that its population was too large to maintain the 1848 territorial departmentalization.23 According to Lacoste, a new territorial reorganization needed to address the population’s urgent administrative necessities.24 He drew particular attention to the departments of the Hauts-Plateaux (where the Aurès was located), where, he argued, minor rural populations occupied vast underdeveloped areas. As a result of a planned enhancement of the underadministration and underdevelopment of Algeria under French colonial rule, the colonial government created new regions, departments, districts, and municipalities between 1955 and 1958. Th is administrative reorganization was coupled with a strategic choice of new regional centers in order to ensure pressing national-security issues and to facilitate the regional communication and enforcement of French regulations.25 Militarily speaking, from 1954 onward the entire territory of Algeria was gradually interpenetrated by adjustable infrastructures and hermetic cobwebs of checkpoints, watchtowers, military posts, border fortifi cations, minefi elds, and electric fences, all of which enabled constant counterrevolutionary military operations.26 Th e French army progressively allocated particular areas of the Algerian territory to one of three main military
22 Mohamed Harbi, Les archives de la révolution algérienne (Paris: Les éditions jeune Afrique, 1981), 102. [“La restauration de l’Etat Algérien souverain.”] Th e manifesto was issued on 31 October 1954. 23 In 1848, the Second Republic incorporated Algeria as three departments of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine to France (departmentalization). A colonial policy to populate Algeria began to take shape. 24 Decree no. 56-641 of 28 June 1956. Lacoste was fi rst Resident Minister in Algeria from 9 February 1956 to 13 June 1957 and then Minister of Algeria from 13 June 1957 to 14 May 1958. 25 Ibid. 26 See, for example, Jean-Charles Jauff ret and Maurice Vaïsse, eds., Militaires et guérillas dans la guerre d’Algérie. Actes du colloque de montpellier des 5 et 6 mai 2000, organisé par le Cente d’étude d’histoire de la Défense et l’UMR no. 5609, Idéologies, Défense, du CNRS. (Bruxelles: André Versaille Editeur, 2012); Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La défense en surface (1945-1962), Le contrôle territorial dans la pensée stratégique française d’aprés-guerre. (Paris: Service historique de la Défense, 2009); André-Roger Voisin, Algérie 1956-1962: la guerre des frontières sur les barrages électrifi és (Charenton: Presses de Valmy, 2002).
May 2016 48 Architecture of Counterrevolution
Fig. 1.8 a Forbidden zones and the Plan Challe prior to July 1959. From Guy Pervillé, Atlas de la guerre d’Algérie: de la conquête à l’indépendance (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2011), 36–37. categories: zones opérationnelles (“zones of operations”), zones de pacifi cation (“pacifi cation zones”), and the zones interdites (“forbidden zones,” Figs. 1. 8 a, b).27 Within the zones of operations, offi cers were ordered to utilize any possible means to restore national security. In the militarily controlled zones of pacifi cation, the army employed action psychologique (psychological actions) against civilians, who were forcefully administered, supervised, and indoctrinated, as well as being induced to collaborate with the army.28 And fi nally there were the forbidden zones, which consisted of free-fi re zones for both air and ground French military forces that needed to be cleared of any living being—including animals. Th e prohibited regions were frequently isolated places; they comprised not only immense woodlands and highlands but also vast, inhabited rural areas from which Algerian civilians were relocated en masse to ensure a national-security zone
27 In 1959 the zones interdites became zones de contrôle militaire renforcé. See Patrick Kessel, Guerre d’Algérie: Ecrits censurés, saisis, refusés 1956-1960-1961, Histoire et perspectives méditerranéennes (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002), 234–235. 28 Marie-Catherine Villatoux, Guerre et action psychologique en Algérie (Paris: Service historique de la Défense, 2007).
Samia Henni Discreet Violence 49
Fig. 1.8 b Military operations of Plan Challe between February 1959 and April 1961. From Guy Pervillé, Atlas de la guerre d’Algérie: De la conquête à l’indépendance (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2011), 38–39. for the French army.29 Th e various hypothesized territorial categories spawned frequent spatial misunderstandings and border confl icts between the civil and military authorities involved. Th e civilian administrative subdivisions consisted of departments, districts, and municipalities, while the systematic military quadrillage (grid system) was composed of zones, sectors, subsectors, quarters, and subquarters. Th e military zones were intended to be combined with one of the following military objectives: operations, pacifi cation,
29 See, for example, Ian Frederick William Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Th eir Opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001), 164; Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 46; Mouloud Feraoun, Journal, 1955-1962: Refl ections on the French-Algerian War (Lincoln NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), XX–XXI.
May 2016 50 Architecture of Counterrevolution
or enforcement of forbidden zones. Th e most unmistakable directive was to empty the forbidden zones, forcing civilians to leave their homes, villages, and arable lands. Th is military operation not only damaged countless traditional villages and uprooted numerous Algerian peasants, but also engendered the establishment of what the French army termed the centres de regroupement in Algeria under French colonial rule.30 Th e French appellation centre de regroupement not only poses translation problems— because it involves both the displacement and concentration of civilians, in extrajudicial detention, within an enclosed and surveyed space—but also entails precisely that which it is not. For obvious reasons, the terms concentration and camp were appositely circumvented in offi cial military nomenclature and, as a result, by the majority of the French media. In 1957, Maurice Papon, the General Inspector of Administration in the Extraordinary Mission in Eastern Algeria and the Prefect of the Department of Constantine—who was convicted in 1998 of crimes against humanity for his participation in the deportation of Jews in Bordeaux to concentration camps during the Second World War31—rigorously requested the immediate suppression of the word camp from all road signs in the Algerian department under his authority.32 In Constantine (in eastern Algeria), Papon was in charge of both the civil and military authorities; he banned any use of the term, ordering: “the term camp will have to disappear from the terminology.”33 For these reasons—and because the centre embodied the unequivocal characteristics of a camp (as will be discussed shortly)—the euphemistic French expression centre de regroupement will be used in this thesis with the intention of reporting the French voice verbatim. Th e term regroupement seems to have a purely military sense, however, in that it coincides with the meaning of concentration; according to one dictionary of the French language, regroupement is the action of regrouping, which means: “1. To group, to unite anew (what was dispersed): To regroup offi cers of an army.… 2. To group (dispersed elements), to gather. à To
30 Another consequence of the forbidden zones is the internal migration of the Algerian populations, those who were able to escape from the atrocities of the war in rural areas and managed to reach urban areas such as Algiers and Oran. As a result, the number of the bidonvilles (slums) had tremendously increased during the Algerian War of Independence (Chapter 3). 31 Richard Golsan, Th e Papon Aff air: Memory and Justice on Trial (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), 1. 32 Interview with Michel Cornaton on 18 May 2013. 33 Cited in Charles-Robert Ageron, “Une dimension de la guerre d’Algérie: les ‘regroupements’ de populations,” in Militaires et guérilla dans la Guerre d’Algérie, by Jean-Charles Jauff ret and Maurice Vaïsse (Bruxelles: André Versaille Editeur, 2012), 236. [“Le terme de camp devra disparaitre de la terminologie.”]
Samia Henni Discreet Violence 51
Fig. 1.9 Camp de regroupement in northern Constantine, photographed by Francis Lemaitre who served as sous- lieutenant in Algeria between 1959 and 1961. ECPAD D104-128. reassemble: To regroup the populations.”34 Concentration, logically enough, is the action of concentrating, which means, according to the same dictionary, “to gather in a center. Military: Th e concentration of troops in an area of the territory. à Grouping, roundup, regrouping. Special: Camps de concentration.”35 Although these camps had been intensively (and haphazardly) created since the onset of the Algerian Revolution, it was not until 1957,36 under the military command of General Raoul Salan (1899–1984), that offi cial military policies stamped “secret” or “secret-
34 “Regroupement, Regrouper,” Le Nouveau Petit Robert. Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1993), 2143. [“1. Grouper, unir de nouveau (ce qui était dispersé). Regrouper les hommes d’une armée. (…) 2. Grouper (des éléments dispersés), réunir => rassembler. Regrouper les populations.”] 35 “Concentration,” Le Nouveau Petit Robert. Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1993), 482. [“Action de concentre, de réunir en un centre. Milit. La concentration des troupes en un point du territoire. à Groupement, rassemblement, regroupement. Special: Camps de concentration ”] 36 Cornaton, Les camps de regroupement de la Guerre d’Algérie, 60–63.
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Fig. 1.10 (left) Camp de regroupement in Cap Djenet, department of Tizi Ouzou. SHAT 1 H 1119. Fig. 1.11 (rigtht) Camp de regroupement in the department of Bône . SHAT 1 H 1119. confi dential” or “top-secret” began to regulate the creation of the forbidden zones and to normalize the forced resettlement of the civilian populations; this was particularly the case with the construction and completion of the defensive perimeter known as the “Morice Line” that sealed off Algeria’s eastern and western borders with neighboring Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco in order to prevent human circulation and material exchanges.37 Th e Morice Line provoked a rapid and massive expansion of the camps. In addition, in 1958 the military’s Challe Plan fortifi ed the Morice Line with additional electrifi ed wire, minefi elds, barriers, and checkpoints; these systematic counterrevolutionary operations intensifi ed the imposed evacuation of civilians from the forbidden zones. Th e number of the camps thus continued to increase throughout the course of the Algerian War of Independence. It was in 1959 that planning “technicians,” as the military offi cers called them, became directly involved in transforming the permanent camps into what the army termed “villages,” as well as in designing new settlements for the forcefully relocated populations. Under the authority of General Charles de Gaulle, Delouvrier38 launched the emergency resettlement program dubbed the mille villages (“One Th ousand Villages,” Chapter 4)
37 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1977), 230. 38 After his experience in Algeria, Paul Delouvrier was appointed general delegate of the Metropolitan Region of Paris between 1961 and 1969, and then Prefect and Deputy Director of the Aménagement du territoire between 1966 and 1969. Delouvrier is considered the father of the villes nouvelles (new tows) in France, (Chapter 4).
Samia Henni Discreet Violence 53
Fig. 1.12 (left) Camp de regroupement Marguerite, department of Orléanville. SHAT 1 H 1119. Fig. 1.13 (rigtht) Camp de regroupement Cheraia, region of Collo, department of Setif. SHAT 1 H 1119. as a response to the aforementioned scandal over the camps de regroupement. Delouvrier ordered immediate improvements in the development of the camps’ economic conditions. To this end, he established mobile teams comprised of a military offi cer and two skilled professionals of rural planning, which he called équipes itinérantes d’aménagement rural (mobile rural planning teams).39 Th ese were expected to study (a) the future of the regrouping process; (b) the economic viability of the camps; (c) the legal status of the occupied lands; (d) the administrative needs of the education and health-care sectors; (e) the extent of immediate assistance that was required; and (f) the military concerns of protection and self-defense.40 Concentrating civilians in controlled camps and then in surveyed villages was a military counterrevolutionary tactic that the French army was familiar with. Although the geopolitical circumstances of the armed confl ict was dissimilar, during the First Indochina War (1946–1954) that had ended just before the beginning of the Algerian War, the French army (which had lost that war) evacuated certain remote areas in French Indochina
39 SHAT 1 H 2030 D 1. Paul Delouvrier, 24 Avril 1959, Directive no. 3.444 CC, Regroupement de Populations. 40 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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Fig. 1.14 (left) Camp de regroupement Oued Mebtouh, Sidi Bel Abbès. FR ANOM FM 81F/444. Fig. 1.15 (right) Camp de regroupement. FR ANOM FM 81F/444. and created a strategic network of villages fortifi és41 (Fortifi ed Villages) there, which had inspired the US army to plan the Agroville Program and the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam during the Vietnam War (1955–1975).42 Roger Trinquier (1908–1986), a colonel who served in both French Indochina and in French Algeria, argued in his book La Guerre moderne that “in modern warfare, the enemy is far more diffi cult to identify. No physical frontier separates the two camps. Th e line of demarcation between friend and foe passes through the very heart of the nation.”43 Accordingly, every individual was considered a suspect, and the battlefi eld was no longer defi ned. Everyone was regarded as both friend and foe, everywhere and at all times. Everybody appeared to be a potential menace to French law and order.
41 Villatoux, La défense en surface (1945-1962), Le contrôle territorial dans la pensée stratégique française d’aprés-guerre., 41–47. 42 On the Agroville Program and the Strategic Hamlet Program, see, for example, Joseph J. Zasloff , “Rural Resettlement in South Viet Nam: Th e Agroville Program,” Pacifi c Aff airs 35, no. 4 (1962): 327–40, doi:10.2307/2753142; Peter F. Leahy and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Why Did the Strategic Hamlet Program Fail? (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990). 43 Roger Trinquier, La Guerre Moderne: A French View on Counterinsurgency (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 26. Modern warfare will be discussed in the next Chapter Pacifi cation or Counterrevolution?
Samia Henni Discreet Violence 55
Farmers, both in the Aurès and elsewhere, were treated as potential terrorists,44 and thus were continuously controlled and watched. As a result, the centres de regroupement and later the mille villages were purposely designed and strategically located. Th e French colonial authorities frequently employed a strict gridiron plan in order to enable military surveillance and to facilitate the maintenance of law and order in the camps. Th e ideal site for a grid plan was undoubtedly the plains, well away from remote mountainous topography. A wide linear main street ran through the fl at land to permit immediate access to the camps. Fig. 1.16 Camp de regroupement in Th iers, Palestro in the region of Algiers in 1959. ECPAD ALG 59 378. Its central area accommodated a large square and military headquarters; the involuntarily relocated populations were distributed around the main entrance and the military posts (Figs. 1.9–1.18). Th e small, closely built shelters diff ered according to the availability of fi nancial resources and construction materials that were assigned, as well as the predicted duration of the camps (this last point will be discussed later). Th e housing varied from standardized boxes built of durable material (in the best cases) to simple barracks of tents placed in a quadrangular formation according to the grid. In an eff ort to address the counterrevolutionary operations’ military objectives, the thousands of camps scattered across the Algerian territory were monotonous. Th e camps de regroupement were often surrounded by barbed-wire fences and watchtowers housing armed guards ready to open
44 François Mitterrand, then Minister of the Interior, used this term in his speech during his offi cial visit to the Aurès in November 1954, a few days after the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution. See the transcript of his speech on < http:// fresques.ina.fr/independances/impression/fi che-media/Indepe00211/allocution-de-monsieur-mitterrand-et-interview- du-caid-de-m-chouneche-1.html> Accessed on 1 October 2014.
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Fig. 1.17 (left) Camp de regroupement Tahel El Achouet in the region of Constantine. ECPAD ALG 57 348. Fig. 1.18 (rigtht) Camp de regroupement in Nelsonbourg, Si-Mahdjoub in 1957. ECPAD ALG 57 249. fi re. 45 Whereas the keyword for the Algerian revolutionaries was dispersion, for the French counterrevolutionaries it was concentration. Nevertheless, given the undeniable precedent of the concentration camps during the Second World War in France and elsewhere, the French civil and military authorities were expected to operate diff erently. But was it in fact diff erent? By whose authority, and under which legal forms, were the Fourth and Fifth Republics able to concentrate, or “regroup,” civilians in Algeria under French rule between 1954 and 1962? Unlike torture, why and how were the French regroupement camps kept secret for so long? And what type of spatial confi gurations do these camps belong to?
45 As part the budget of the fi rst phase of the construction of the centre de regroupement, both watchtowers and barded-wire are often included. See 1 H 4394, ZEA and 27° DIA, Etat-Major, 5° Bureau. Notes à l’attention des Commandants de Secteur, Regroupement de populations. Tizi Ouzou, 17 June 1959, p. 4. In addition, published aerial photographs visibly show the watchtowers and barded-wire, see, for example, Xavier de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois: Atlas Blidéen, Chenoua, Mitidja Occientale, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines d’Alger (Paris: Publication Universitaires de France, 1961), 101.
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1.1 Th e Secret of Two Ethnologists
Th e inhabitants of the Aurès, the Algerian Berber-speaking Shawiya people, were a constant source of disquiet for the French authorities by reason of their enduring resistance to French colonization.46 According to a military survey that was produced and diff used by the French army during the Algerian War of Independence on the physical, economic, and human geographies of the Aurès’s vast rural region, the population of the Aurès rebelled against the French in 1849, from 1858 to 1859, in 1879, and again from 1916 to 1920. Th e army characterized this population by its disobedience to any foreign conqueror or exterior authority 47; it also proclaimed that the Aurès had always been the refuge of autonomous and seminomadic peasants who lived in dispersed and well- protected settlements. Th e tough climate and the rugged topography made the region almost impenetrable to the French authorities. As the military analysis stated, both the diffi cult communication systems and the territorial underadministration compelled the rural tribal populace to govern itself and to defend itself from any possible aggressor.48 Th is military text was not far off from prior civil colonial ethnographic studies of the Aurès that French ethnologists had undertaken during the interwar period (indeed, the text may have been inspired by these studies); specifi cally, these undertakings may be dated 1) to the institutionalization of the discipline of ethnology under the Th ird Republic, 2) through the establishment of the Institute of Ethnology in Paris in 1925, and 3) to the transformation on the occasion of the Universal Exposition in Paris in 1937 of the Museum of Ethnography at the Trocadéro into the Museum of Man (Fig. 1.19).49 Although the
46 On the history of the Shawia, or Chaoui people, see, for example, Ibn Khaldoun, Histoire des Berbères et des dynasties musulmanes de l’Afrique Septentrionale, trans. Baron de Slane (Alger: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1852), originally published in Arabic in 1375 and 1379; Germaine Tillion, Il était une fois l’éthnographie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1957). 47 SHAT 1H 2872 D2. Etudes sur l’économie, la démographie et la géographie des Aurès (1948-59). Présentation des Aurès, 1957 [date of the statistics]. 48 Ibid. 49 On the Museum of Man, see for example, Alice L. Conklin, “Civil Society, Science, and Empire in Late Republican France: Th e Foundation of Paris’s Museum of Man,” Osiris, 2nd Series Vol. 17, Science and Civil Society (2002): 255– 29; Eric Jolly, “Marcel Griaule, ethnologue : La construction d’une discipline (1925-1956),” Journal des africanistes tome 71, fascicule 1. Les empreintes du renard pâle (2001). On the 1937 Universal Exposition, called Exposition Internationale des Arts et Techniques dans la Vie Moderne, see for example, Bertrand Lemoine, Paris 1937: cinquantenaire de l’Exposition Internationale des Arts et des Techniques dans la Vie Moderne (Paris: Institut Français d’Architecture, 1987).
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ethnologist Paul Rivet (1876–1958) and sociologist Marcel Mauss (1872–1950), the fathers of these public institutions, educated a number of prominent French ethnologists,50 this study will limit itself to two central fi gures for their political roles and their explicit involvement in the forced displacement of Algerian civilians in the Aurès (and later across Algeria) during the course of the Algerian War of Independence. Th e two ethnologists in question—both of whom participated in the Resistance during the Vichy regime of the Second World War—are the former concentration-camp deportee Germaine Tillion and the former intelligence and propaganda agent Jacques Soustelle. At the end of November 1954, shortly after the outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence, François 51 Mitterrand (then Minister of the Interior in the government of Pierre Mendès France [1907–1982]) assigned Fig. 1.19 Paris Institute of Ethnology in 1929. From Germaine Tillion (who had graduated Fanny Colonna, Aurès/Algérie 1935-1936. Elle a passé tant d’heures… (Paris: Editions de la MSH, 1987), 132-133. from the Institute of Ethnology in 1932) a special mission in the Aurès. It was Louis
50 Among which Th érèse Riviere, who travelled to the Aurès with Germaine Tillion, and her brother Georges-Henri Rivière, who served as Deputy Director of the Museum of Man, and then as Director of the Musée des Arts et des Traditions Populaires, which also opened in 1937. 51 During the Algerian War of Independence, the socialist François Mitterrand served as the Minister of the Interior from June 1954 to February 1955, and then Minister of Justice from February 1956 to June 1957. In 1958, he opposed general Charles de Gaulle’s return to power. Mitterrand was France’s Prime Minister from 1981 to 1995. On Tillion’s mission, see Jean Lacouture, Le témoignage est un combat. Une biographie de Germaine Tillion (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000), 232–242.
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Massignon (1883–1962), her ethnology professor and a Catholic academic of Islam, who asked Mitterrand to kindly grant Tillion and him an urgent meeting. Massignon’s goal was “to make sure that we do not aff ect the civilian population”52 in Algeria. Th is choice was no coincidence. Tillion spoke the Shawi language, since she had sojourned in the Aurès between 1934 and 1940, when she (together with her colleague, Th érèse Rivière) was assigned to an ethnographic mission among the settled and seminomadic tribal populations of the Aurès.53 Th is purportedly academic assignment was commissioned fi rst by the Institute of Ethnology, with the fi nancial support of the London International Institute of African Languages and Cultures (today the International African Institute), and then by the Paris Centre national de la recherche scientifi que (CNRS, or the Paris National Center for Scientifi c Research). Her dissertation was entitled “Morphologie d’une république berbère: les Ah-Abder-rahman, transhumants de l’Aurès méridional”54 (“Morphology of the Berber Republic: the Ah-Abder-rahman, Transhumants of Southern Aurès”). Henri Labouret (1878–1959)—former military offi cer in French West Africa, colonial administrator, member of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, and an ethnologist who was faithful to “tradition of these governors-ethnologists,“55—argued that the objective of this wide-ranging sociological and ethnological enquiry consisted of:
Making an eff ective contribution to the methods of colonization; the knowledge of indigenous customs, beliefs, laws, and techniques; and enabling a more rational collaboration with the indigenous population on natural resources…. In addition, we intend to create a collection of systematically collected objects using photographs, sketches, and fi lms.56
52 Ibid., 234. [“Pour être sûre qu’on ne touchera pas à la population civile.”] 53 On the housing studies that resulted from Rivière’s expedition, see Th e Algerian House Defi ned by Ethnographers in Zeynep Çelic, Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 88–97. 54 Association Germaine Tillion, Chronology.
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Figs. 1.20–1.25 Settlements and everyday life scenes from the Aurès photographed by Th érèse Rivière. From Fanny Colonna, Aurès/Algérie 1935-1936. Elle a passé tant d’heures… (Paris: Editions de la MSH, 1987).
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Because the Institute of Ethnology depended on funding from the Ministry of Overseas France, it is perhaps not surprising that the institute expected direct results from the ethnographic survey in order to both enhance a colonial modus operandi of territorial exploitation and to enlarge the collection of the Museum of Ethnography.57 In other words, the Institute of Ethnology and its museum were both infl uenced and supervised by the Ministry of the Colonies: that is, the French colonial empire. In 1940, Tillion returned to Paris and became an active member of the Network of the Museum of Man—a movement of French resistance to the Vichy regime and Nazi occupation—until her imprisonment in Fresnes in August 1942 and her deportation to Compiègne and then to the Ravensbrück concentration camp for women in northern Germany in October 1943, where she survived.58 According to Tillion, the most signifi cant manuscripts and documents related to her long research on the Aurès were stored in a large blue suitcase, which vanished among the looted treasure of Ravensbrück a few days before the arrival of the Swedish Red Cross in April 1945.59 Despite the Vichy regime, German occupation, Tillion’s imprisonment, and Rivière’s disease, the Museum of Man inaugurated an exhibition called L’ Au rè s in May 1943 that (somewhat surprisingly) lasted until May 1946. Th e exhibition was organized by their ethnologist colleague, Jacques Faublée, who displayed an impressive number of artifacts and photographs that Tillion and Rivière had amassed during their fi eld research in the colonized mountains of the Aurès a few years earlier (Fig. 1.20–1.25).60 Nevertheless, while Labouret clearly stated the reasons for the ethnographic colonial expedition in the Aurès, the purpose of the L’ Au rè s exhibition remains obscure—although the catalogue of the exhibition did state that in 1934, Paul Rivet, Director of the Museum of Man, “found it useful to commission an ethnographic mission in the Aurès … whose inhabitants preserved elements of archaic civilization compared to the rest of Algeria.”61
57 Ibid. 58 Fabien Sacriste, Germaine Tillion, Jacques Berque, Jean Servier et Pierre Bourdieu. Des ethnologues dans la guerre d’indépendance algérienne (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011), 35–72. While writing this dissertation, Fabien Sacriste was writing his dissertation entitled: Les camps de “regroupement” : une histoire de l’État colonial et de la société rurale pendant la guerre d’indépendance algérienne (1954-1962) under the supervision of Guy Pervillé and Jacques Cantier. 59 Germaine Tillion, Il était une fois l’éthnographie (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000), 9–10. 60 During their mission in the Aurès, Th érèse Rivière brought 857 objects and Germaine Tillion 130 from Algeria to France. See Fonds d’archives privées Th érèse Rivière (1901–1970) at the Archives of the Musée du quai Branly in Paris. 61 Catalogue des collections de l’Aurès, Musée de l’Homme, 1943. [“Utile d’envoyer une mission ethnographique dans l’Aurès, (…) dont les habitants conservent des éléments de civilisation archaïque relativement au reste de l’Algérie.”].
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Following the liberation of France by the Army of Africa, Forces françaises libres (FFL, or the Free French Forces) under the Algiers-based General Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), and their allies, Tillion returned to Paris and dedicated several years to the investigation and denunciation of all systems of human concentration, based on her own atrocious experience. She argued that “the concentration camp in which [I] was deported was part of a consistent system whose main objectives were exploitation and extermination.” 62 She also became a member of the Commission internationale contre le régime concentrationnaire (CICRC, or International Commission on Concentration Camps), which investigated the gulags in the Soviet Union; an observer of the Association nationale des déportées et internées de la résistance (ADIR, or the Association of Women Deportees and Internees of the Resistance) during the trial of the Ravensbrück leaders; and a delegate to ADIR at the French National Commission on Concentration Regimes.63 As a result, when Tillion returned to the Aurès at the end of 1954—at the beginning of what would become a long and bloody colonial war—she was abundantly equipped with ethnographic knowledge on both the inhabitants of the Aurès and resistance against authoritarian regimes. While doing so, she became a scholar of diff erent systems of concentration and an outspoken opponent of concentration camps. When Minister of the Interior Mitterrand agreed to receive Louis Massignon and Germaine Tillion in his offi ce in Paris (on 24 November 1954), and to assign Tillion with a temporary mission in the Aurès, he emphasized the intentions of the military commander of the Department of Constantine (among the Aurès Mountains) to displace the civilian population.64 Th e day after the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution on 1 November 1954, however, an emergency meeting was held in the Aurès between civilian and military authorities; the meeting included Jacques Chevallier (1911–1971), Secretary of State for War in France and Mayor of Algiers,65 and General Paul Cherrière, Commander-in-Chief of French Algeria, French Tenth Military Region. Th ey agreed to mobilize any kind of
62 Cited in Sacriste, Germaine Tillion, Jacques Berque, Jean Servier et Pierre Bourdieu. Des ethnologues dans la guerre d’indépendance algérienne, 52. [“L’univers concentrationnaire qu’elle [a] connu faisait partie d’un système cohérent dont les seuls objectifs étaient l’exploitation et l’extermination.”] 63 For a complete chronology of the biography of Germaine Tillion, see www.germaine-tillion.org. 64 Lacouture, Le témoignage est un combat. Une biographie de Germaine Tillion, 235. 65 Jacques Chevallier served as Secretary of State for War between June 1954 and January 1955, and Mayor of Algiers between May 1953 and May 1958. He is also known for his Battle of the Bidonville in Algiers and the housing projects he commissioned to French Architect Fernand Pouillon and many others.
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human and material resources as a means to ending the unrest and to launch a plan in the Aurès that would include both off ensive and defensive elements.66 Speaking to the National Assembly on 12 November 1954, the aforementioned Mendès France—President of the Council of Ministers from June 1954 to February 1955 and signer of the Geneva Accords in July 1954 that withdrew French troops from Indochina—clearly declared that “there is no compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity, the integrity of the Republic. Th e departments of Algeria are part of the French Republic. Th ey have been irrevocably French for a long time.”67 Mitterrand—who had resigned from the previous government a year earlier following the arrest of Morocco’s King Hassan II and his father by the French authorities—continued with the same tone later that same day by confi rming that the French government had acted quickly and justly following All Saints’ Day (i.e., the outbreak of the revolution) two weeks before. He proclaimed:
In three days, everything was put in place. Someone asked: Is it to maintain order? Not only that, but to affi rm French power and to stress our drive. It was not only to repress and move on to military counteroff ensives in order to reclaim a territory that was not lost! It was to affi rm the worried population that at any time, at any moment, they would be defended.”68
In order to satisfy the European colons and to defend and maintain French interests in Algeria, the French government increased the number of military offi cers and multiplied the punitive expeditions in French Algeria. Th e colonial government also sent a special military unit to the Aurès called the 18° Régiment d’infanterie parachutiste de choc (18° RIPC, or the Eighteenth Shock Infantry Parachute Regiment), commanded by Colonel
66 Abderrahmane Bouchène et al., Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale (1830-1962) (Paris and Algiers: Editions La Découverte and Editions Barzakh, 2012), 512–513. 67 Pierre Mendès France, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Aff airs, 12 November 1954. < http://www. ph-ludwigsburg.de/html/2b-frnz-s-01/overmann/baf4/algerie/alg12.htm#1> Accessed on 18 September 2014. [“On ne transige pas lorsqu’il s’agit de défendre la paix intérieure de la nation, l’unité, l’intégrité de la République. Les départements d’Algérie constituent une partie de la République française. Ils sont français depuis longtemps et d’une manière irrévocable.”] 68 François Mitterrand, Minister of the Interior, 12 November 1954.
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Paul Ducourneau, who had recently returned from the war that France had lost in its other essential overseas colony, Indochina. While there, Colonel Ducourneau had learned from the military tactics of both the French combatants and their enemies, the Vietminh; thus, as the British historian Alistair Horne argues in A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962, “with Ducourneau the school of Indochina arrived in Algeria.”69 In November 1954, French military air forces dropped thousands of warning pamphlets on two main valleys in the Aurès, urging the inhabitants to evacuate the region within two days if they wanted to escape the upcoming bombardment. Th e fi rst aerial bombing—and thereby the fi rst forced displacement of the civilian population—took place on November 1954 in the Aurès.70 Th e Algiers-based French newspapers announced this involuntary displacement on 27 November 1954, reporting that “half of the population of fourteen villages in the north of the Aurès had left their homes.”71 During Mitterrand’s offi cial visit to Algeria (including the Aurès) from 27–30 November 1954, however, he publically declared in unambiguous terms that the French government had no intention of aff ecting nor attacking the civilian population. Th e interior minister announced that civilians should not suff er from the presence of terrorists among them; accordingly, they must help the French government lest they become the fi rst victims.72 He also proclaimed that while his government would avoid anything that might appear to be a state of war, the 73 government would relentlessly pursue any revolutionary elements in the name of justice. Th is publically stated—yet unwritten and unregulated—statement was hurriedly applied in the Aurès in December 1954, by which time Tillion had already arrived in the mountains. Th e military undertook a growing number of attacks, rakings, reprisals, repressions, controls, checks, and punishments of the civilian population, including the operations “Véronique” (“Speedwell” or “Veronica”), which included the bombing of
69 Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, 102–103. 70 Abderrahmane Bouchène et al., Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale (1830-1962) (Paris and Algiers: Editions La Découverte and Editions Barzakh, 2012), 480. On the very fi rst days of the Algerian War, see for example, Yves Courrière, La guerre d’Algérie (1954-1957). Les fi ls de la Toussaint. Le temps des léopards. (Paris: Editions Robert Laff ont, 1990), 259–317; Collette Jeanson and Francis Jeanson, L’Algérie hors la loi (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955), 181–214. 71 Bouchène et al., Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale (1830-1962), 513. [“La moitié de la population des quatorze douars du nord de l’Aurès a[vait] quitté sa résidence.”] 72 Mitterrand’s offi cial speech during his visit to Algeria, 01 December 1954. Offi ce National de Radiodiff usion Télévision Française
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caves,74 and “Orange Amère” (“Bitter Orange”) and “Violette” (“Violet”), which comprised food blockades and imposed resettlements, respectively.75 As a result, starting with the very earliest days of the French war against Algerian independence fi ghters, Algerian civilians had been chased away from their homes, villages, and lands, and without any legal consensus on the part of the authorities. If Algeria was indeed France, a French territory, as the Radical Mendès France and the Socialist Mitterrand (among many others) had claimed, these military operations were thus extrajuridical in nature. According to the Geneva Convention of 1949, an “armed confl ict not of an international character”76 should have been declared in the French colonized territory of Algeria, and therefore its respective signed provisions should have been enforced. If Algeria was not France, since it was a colonized territory, then a state of war should have been declared. Neither of these two cases were corroborated by the French authorities in Algeria under French rule, however; instead, the French government avoided the slightest reference to an armed confl ict. Th is state of non-war, including the resulting forced relocation of civilians (as will be shortly discussed), did not respect the norms of international law. In addition, between November 1954 and April 1955, the French government failed to issue either a written instruction or a legislative bill of any kind. Only in April 1955 did it formally declare an offi cial state of emergency (état d’urgence), thus allowing the institution of forbidden zones and prohibiting the free movement of civilians.77 Prior to this date, France’s actions were therefore implicated in the art of war without acknowledging the state of war, and hence these actions lacked any legal legitimacy. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, France only admitted to the existence of a “non-international armed confl ict” eighteen months after the beginning of the war, when the struggle had already been extended to a greater part of the Algerian territory.78 Only then should Article 3 of the Geneva Convention (which specifi es the minimum provisions of the two parties in this kind of confl ict) have been
74 Jeanson and Jeanson, L’Algérie hors la loi, 190. 75 Bouchène et al., Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale (1830-1962), 512–513. 76 Article 3, Confl icts not of an international character, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. < https://www.icrc.org/en> Accessed on 24 September 2014. 77 Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence. Th e Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 103. 78 Françoise Perret and François Bugnion, De Budapest à Saigon. Histoire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, 1956-1965 (Genève: Georg Editeur, Editions m+h, 2009), 187.
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applied.79 France unlawfully declined to declare a war on its colonized territory, most likely because this would have been deemed a civil war if Algeria were regarded as a French department. Instead, this unspoken war was euphemistically called, as mentioned in the introduction, either Les opérations de maintien de l’ordre (“the enforcement of law and order”) or Les évènements d’Algérie (“the Algerian events”). France was therefore waging an undeclared war. Ironically, because the war was indeed acknowledged in 1999 by the French National Assembly and formally called La guerre d’Algérie (“the Algerian War”), 80 the undeclared war may be retrospectively regarded as a French civil war. In her 1997 interview with the biographer and journalist Jean Lacouture, Germaine Tillion recounted her 1954 fi ndings on the extreme poverty and alarming socio-economic situation of the Shawiya population of the Aurès at the onset of the unspoken war.81 When Lacouture questioned her on why she had begun to publically report on the French activities in Algeria only in 1956—two years after her initial witnessing of the events—she told him that she had been unaware of what was actually occurring on the ground at the time, and that she had been informed by her Algerian friends of the existence of brutal interrogation techniques only in 1955. She explained that she had been very concerned with what she called the clochardisation (i.e., causing someone to become homeless) of the Algerian population, and therefore she had attempted to prevent this by establishing the centres sociaux (social centers) in Algiers in 1955. She also asserted that she had commenced her committed battle against the use of torture at the various detention camps in 1957, when the military assumed control of both the civil administrative and police forces.82 Tillion did not mention the extrajuridical forced relocation of civilians in the Aurès, however; nor did she report on the concentration of civilians in the Aurès or refer to the regroupement of Shawiya families who had been evacuated from the bombarded region where she
79 Article 3, Confl icts not of an international character, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. < https://www.icrc.org/en> Accessed on 24 September 2014. 80 Law no. 99-882 of 18 October 1999. Journal Offi ciel of 22 October 1999, p. 15657.
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had sojourned between December 1954 and February 1955.83 Although her ethnology professor had solicited her knowledge on the Aurès and her experience of concentration camps in order “to make sure that we do not aff ect the civilian population,”84 this very population was gravely aff ected before, during, and after Tillion’s mission in the Aurès. In 1967, fi ve years after the end of the Algerian War of Independence, Tillion wrote the foreword to author Michel Cornaton’s Les regroupements de la décolonisation en Algérie85 (Th e Regroupement of Decolonization in Algeria), in which she denounced not the establishment of the centres de regroupement by the French army in colonized Algeria at war but the centers’ persistence after Algerian independence; this was not Cornaton’s main argument. In 1998, while a bloody civil war was taking place among Algerians in Algeria, Cornaton published the second edition of his book. Without altering the contents, he changed the title to Les camps de regroupement de La Guerre d’Algèrie,86 and he inserted an additional preface called “Trente ans après” (“Th irty years later”) in which he reported decades later how Germaine Tillion had responded in 1967 when he had asked her to write the foreword to his fi rst edition. She argued at that time that the book was coming out at a bad moment, both too late and too early: too late, because it was released after the war, and too early, because the war would be silenced for twenty or thirty years, as she said had occurred with the Nazi concentration camps. She argued that it was “a law of history: silence lasts for one generation.”87 Although her argument can be debated, she and many others who engaged in the war and witnessed the camps in the Aurès (and elsewhere in Algeria) conformed to this common rule. What is surprising, however, is that this deliberate amnesia persisted for much more than one generation (both in France and in Algeria88): a situation that has engendered a fragile time bomb and a subject that has become an inevitable taboo.
83 In her writings, biographies, radio, television and published interviews, Tillion did not reveal the reasons of her long silence, although the question was clearly posed. Instead, she spoke about her fi ght against the use of torture in ALgeria during the war of independence. 84 Lacouture, Le témoignage est un combat. Une biographie de Germaine Tillion, 234. [“Pour être sûre qu’on ne touchera pas à la population civile.”] 85 5/4/16 2:37 PM 86 Cornaton, Les camps de regroupement de la Guerre d’Algérie. When I asked Michel Cornaton about the reasons why he changed the title, he replied that he took him so many years to admit that the centres de regroupements were the French camps of the Algerian War of Independence. Interview with Michel Cornaton, on 18 May 2013. 87 Ibid., I. [“C’est la loi de l’histoire. Le silence se fait le temps d’une génération.”] 88 Ibid., I–XIV.
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When the author of Le témoignage est un combat: une biographie de Germaine Tillion (Testimony Is a Fight: A Biography of Germaine Tillion) posed Tillion the question of whether one could think of her as having been both the eye and the pen of human consciousness in the Aurès, she replied, “I have never considered myself a witness ... a witness who would have protested in the press if I had observed any bullying of the civilian population.”89 Accordingly, for ambiguous reasons, a Frenchwoman ethnologist and antifascist resistant had chosen not to act to protect the civilian colonized population against the punitive consequences of an unspoken war. She had preferred to disregard the principles of human rights and the ethics of human justice. She had favored silence; she had the privilege to wield the power of silence. Tillion’s marginalization of the extrajuridical camps and forced displacement of civilians, despite her prior experiences and convictions, was not a unique case. With the exception of a few individuals,90 an impressive number of coexisting and succeeding French civilian and military representatives acted and reacted in a much more dreadful manner and with a pitiless approach.91 Some had opted not only to regard themselves as nonwitnesses, but also to design exceptionally oppressive policies that aimed to preserve Algeria under French rule and to secure French economic interests in Algeria. Th is was the case of the newly appointed Governor General of Algeria, Tillion’s colleague the ethnologist Jacques Soustelle. By the end of January 1955, just before the downfall of his government, Mendès France nominated Soustelle Governor General of Algeria. Like Tillion, Soustelle was a former student of the Institute of Ethnology in Paris. He was inspired and supported by the aforementioned Paul Rivet to investigate the pre-Columbian civilizations of Mexico,
89 Tillion and Lacouture, La Traversée du mal. Entretien avec Jean Lacouture, 93. [“Je ne me suis jamais considérée comme un témoin... Un témoin qui aurait protesté dans la presse s’il avait constaté des brimades subies par la population civile.] 90 Th ere were a few exceptions. A restricted number of authors alerted the public opinion about the atrocity of the war and dared to denounce torture during the very fi rst months of the war, such as Claude Bourdet “Votre Gestapo d’Algérie” published in France-Observateur on 13 January 1955, and François Mauriac “La Question” in L’Express on 15 January 1955. 91 Such as the ethnologist Jean Servier who manipulated historical tribal confl icts in the Aurès and armed one tribe in order to fi ght against the other. Th ese armed Algerians, called Harki, collaborated with the French army. See, for example, Nordine Boulhaïs, Des harkis berbères de l’Aurès au nord de la France (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2002); Sacriste, Germaine Tillion, Jacques Berque, Jean Servier et Pierre Bourdieu. Des ethnologues dans la guerre d’indépendance algérienne, 215–230.
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where he traveled in 1932 with his wife Georgette, who was also an ethnologist.92 He studied the language, habits, religion, and social organization of the Mayan Lacandon population in central Mexico, and in 1937 published a doctoral dissertation titled “La famille Otomi-Pame du Mexique central”93 (“Otomi-Pame Family from Central Mexico). Back in Paris, he was appointed Deputy Director of the Museum of Man in 1938, where he met Tillion when she had briefl y returned from the Aurès. Again spurred on by Rivet, he joined the Vigilance Committee of Antifascist Intellectuals and became one of its main leaders. On the eve of the Second World War, Soustelle returned to Mexico to fi ght what was starting to become a successful Nazi propaganda campaign; he was put in charge of intelligence and counterpropaganda. He and the British Minister of Information created the Inter-Allied Propaganda Committee.94 Opposed (like Tillion) to both the armistice of 22 June 1940 and the Vichy regime, he attempted to join the Free French Forces (commanded by General de Gaulle fi rst in London and then in Algiers), which claimed to be the legitimate government of France in exile. De Gaulle solicited him to form a committee of support among French and pro-French people in Mexico; soon after, he was off ered the position of Commissioner of Propaganda in Mexico. In December 1940, the leftist Soustelle met General de Gaulle in London, while the Resistance Network of the Museum of Man (which Tillion would soon be involved in) was about to be established in Paris. Following his successful achievements, he was again requested to continue his propaganda missions—not only in Mexico but throughout Central America. In Bogotá, Colombia, he met his ethnology professor, and former Director of the Museum of Man, Paul Rivet, who informed Soustelle about the foundation of the Network of the Museum of Man, of which he was a member.95 Soustelle partially fi nanced these large-scale political assignments thanks to his strange wins in the Mexican lottery.96 In 1942, his intelligence undertakings and propaganda capabilities in Mexico and
92 Bernard Ullmann, Jacques Soustelle, le mal aimé (Paris: Plon, 1995), 17–23. 93 Jacques Soustelle, La famille Otomo-Pame du Mexique central (Paris: Institut d’Ethnologie, 1937). 94 Stephen R. Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 315. 95 Denis Roland, “Jacques Soustelle, de l’ethnologie à la politique,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 43, no. 1 (1996): 147; Ullmann, Jacques Soustelle, le mal aimé, 67. 96 Ullmann, Jacques Soustelle, le mal aimé, 60–70.
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Central America converted the formerly leftist Soustelle into what Roland Denis calls “an ultra of Gaullism.”97 He joined the Comité national français (CNF, or the French National Committee) in London and was appointed director of its Information Services bureau; that is, the chief of the Free French Secret Service. His role included negotiations with the British government and the control of anti-Vichy publications and the news press, as well as radio broadcasts on the BBC, Radio Brazzaville, and Radio Beirut.98 In November 1943, the now-Gaullist Soustelle became the head of the Direction générale des services spéciaux (DGSS, or General Directorate of Special Services in Algiers), which resulted from the union of the Bureau central de renseignement et d’action (BCRA, or Central Offi ce of Intelligence and Action) with the Service de renseignement (SR, or Intelligence Service).99 Together with his allies, Soustelle was responsible for creating and diff using Resistance- related actions in Free France and within the African army; he was also expected to provide assistance to French Indochina, which was now occupied by Japan.100 In August 1944 Paris was liberated, at which point de Gaulle, Soustelle, and the DGSS settled in the Métropole (France). In October 1944, Soustelle replaced the letters “SS” (most likely due to SS connotation) of the DGSS with “EG,” thus constituting the new appellation DGER, or Direction générale des études et recherches (General Directorate for Studies and Research). Without changing its fundamental methods, Soustelle continued to lead intelligence and to direct the secret service at the new DGER until April 1945, when he was appointed (for a short time) Commissaire de la République (Prefect) of Bordeaux. As a result, the Gaullist ethnologist Jacques Soustelle as of 1944 was considered to be “one of the most powerful men of the soon-to-be established regime. And also one of the most mysterious.”101 After the end of the Second World War in 1945 and before the beginning of the Algerian War of Independence in 1954, Soustelle served fi rst as Minister of Information
97 Roland, “Jacques Soustelle, de l’ethnologie à la politique,” 149. 98 Jacques Soustelle, Vingt-huit ans de Gaullisme (Paris: Editions de la Table Ronde, 1968), 22–23. 99 Ibid., 25. 100 Claude Faure, “Bref historique des services de renseignement et de sécurité français contemporains,” Revue historique des armées 247 (2007): 70–81. 101 Ullmann, Jacques Soustelle, le mal aimé, 129. [“Le Jacques Soustelle qui débarque à Paris, le 28 août 1944, est l’un des hommes les plus puissants du nouveau régime qui s’instaure. Et aussi l’un des plus mystérieux.”] In 1960, Jacques Soustelle supported the French paramilitary organization called Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS, Organization of the Secret Army) to illegally fi ght against the independence of Algeria; that is, de Gaulle’s politics in Algeria. Soustelle became by then an anti-Gaullist.
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and then as Minister of the Colonies, where he was responsible for large French overseas colonial territories. Soustelle also continued to serve General de Gaulle as the fi rst Secretary General of the general’s political party, the Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF, French People’s Rally), which de Gaulle had founded in 1947 following his resignation from the presidency of the Provisional French Government and the proclamation of the Fourth Republic. By the end of January 1955, two months after the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution and a few days before the fall of Pierre Mendès France, Mitterrand met Soustelle and proposed, on behalf of the prime minister, that he be nominated Governor General of French Algeria—during an unspoken war. While Mitterrand revealed that the insecurity and rebellion in the Aurès was worrisome, he recalled that “Algeria is France,” and thus an urgent plan of reforms was necessary to keep Algeria under French rule. Soustelle informed General de Gaulle of this opportunity and then formally accepted Mitterrand’s off er; together they outlined a series of reform programs that were essentially based on the 1947 Statute of Algeria.102 Mitterrand privileged grand plans for Algerians’ voting rights, employment, education, infrastructure, public institutions in rural areas, and the integration of Algeria’s police forces into those of the Métropole.103 Upon his arrival in Algeria in February 1955, Soustelle undertook a strategic investigation trip to the Aurès as a way to personally inspect the situation on the ground. Undoubtedly, his ethnographic and propagandistic backgrounds led him to seek direct contact (with the assistance of an interpreter) with the Shawiya population. His promptly arrived-at observations were that terrorism was already deeply rooted in the region, that any possible informer would not dare collaborate, and that an effi cient intelligence system should therefore be restored immediately.104 He also realized that the protracted underadministration of the region, the alarming misery of the population, and the insuffi ciency and inadequacy of the French military forces in the mountains— forces that he felt to be inappropriately modern and sophisticated for the circumstances, which demanded more rugged armed forces—made the revolt far more serious than the government of France understood. For Soustelle, this situation resulted from the
102 Ibid., 185–188. [“L’Algérie, c’est la France.”] 103 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 131. 104 Jacques Soustelle, Aimée et souff rante Algérie (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956), 24.
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Fig. 1.26 Germaine Tillion in the Aurès in 1935. Association Germaine Tillion. Fig. 1.27 Jacques Soustelle in the Aurès in 1955. ECPAD F 55 148. accumulated French errors of the past, such as the suppression of the Bureaux arabes (Arab bureaus) and the cessation of the recruitment of remunerated administrators to the region.105 During this initial encounter with the Aurès and (as Soustelle put it) its “non-Arab populations, who remained attached to the most archaic customs,”106 he seems to have witnessed the existence of the fi rst extrajuridical French camps of the Algerian War of Independence. While describing his initial impressions and observations on the Aurès, he reported that “some villages, such as Ichmoul and particularly Yabous, were depopulated, and some inhabitants had gone to the mountains, but many had been evacuated to Arris and Touff ana, where they lived under harsh conditions despite the emergency food and health
105 Ibid., 26. Soustelle restored the Bureaux Arabes by creating what he called the Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS) in 1955, which were then used for a systematic psychological action upon the civilian regrouped population. Th e SAS will be discussed in Chapter 2. On the Bureaux Arabes see Xavier Yacono, Les bureaux arabes et l’évolution des genres de vie indigènes dans l’ouest du Tell Algérois (Paris: Editions Larose, 1953). 106 Soustelle, Aimée et souff rante Algérie, 26–27. [“Des population non-arabes demeurées très près des costumes les plus archaïques.”]. Th e term “archaic” had been used in the catalogue of the 1943 exhibition L’Aurès, as well as by Soustelle himself in 1956.
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assistance organized by the administration.”107 It is rather surprising that the French administration mishandled the overall colonial governance of the population in the Aurès while succeeding in supplying food to the displaced population and simultaneously imposing food blockades on certain populations in the same region. Nevertheless, even if the civilian population could aff ord food, the forced displacement of civilians occurred before the offi cial regulation and prior to the state of emergency; France thus behaved outside of any legal devices. Despite his own remarks on the clearance of hamlets and the evacuation of the Algerian population, in his fi rst speech in Algiers on 23 February 1955, shortly after his visit to the Aurès, Soustelle advocated that France had made its choice to stay, whatever happened in Algeria, Fig. 1.28 TIME Magazine Cover 108 of August 1959: Jacques Soustelle. and that this choice was called intégration (integration). Cover credit: Boris Chaliapin. From http://content.time.com/time/ In contrast to the French colonial doctrines of assimilation covers/0,16641,19590817,00.html. and association, Soustelle’s integration considered Algeria to be a French province. Th e integration policy included several elements: (a) the recognition of its original physiognomy and particular personality, in terms of culture, language, and religion; (b) the total fusion of Algeria’s economy, industry, and currency into that of the Métropole; and (c) the absolute political equality of rights and duties.109 Th is “choice,” although still colonial, appears to have been too drastic (and possibly too modern) for many French military offi cers and civil servants, who strongly believed in the French colonial mission civilisatrice (“civilizing mission”) in Africa; this system did not acknowledge non-French values but rather imposed French customs on the colonized population. In addition, it is widely accepted that “the majority
107 Ibid., 24. [“Certains douars, Ichmoul et Yabous notamment, étaient dépeuplés, une partie de leurs habitants ayant gagné la montagne et une autre, de beaucoup la plus nombreuse, ayant été évacuée sur Arris et Touff ana, où elle vivait dans des conditions diffi ciles malgré les secours alimentaires et sanitaires organisés par l’administration.”] 108 Jeanson and Jeanson, L’Algérie hors la loi, 193. 109 Jacques Soustelle, L’espérance Trahie (1958-1961) (Paris: Editions de l’Alma, 1962), 25.
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of the ‘pieds-noirs’ [“black feet”] are quite attached to Vichy conservatism.”110 As a result, Soustelle enjoyed little encouragement in his endeavors. Parallel to his political program, Soustelle counted on two key fi gures for assistance: Commander Vincent Monteil, Chief of the Military Cabinet (who would resign in June 1955 in protest of the use of torture by the police in Algeria111), and Tillion, who had just returned to Algiers from the Aurès in February 1955. Immediately after her return, Tillion demanded to meet Soustelle—the former Deputy Director of the Museum of Man and now Governor General of Algeria—since she sought to recount her ethnographic experience in the Aurès and to off er the “expertise” she had gained there. Tillion met Soustelle; the same day she was off ered a position on his cabinet, which she accepted.112 Despite the downfall of Mendès France, the new government of the Radical Edgar Faure (1908–1988), established on 23 February 1955, did not suspend Soustelle and the members of his cabinet (now including Tillion) from their recently assigned functions in Algeria under French colonial rule. Instead, the new leadership created a legal entity that from then on was incessantly adapted and upgraded throughout the course of the Algerian War of Independence. On 3 April 1955, the French National Assembly and the Council of the French Republic approved law no. 55-385, which instituted the état d’urgence.113 Th e state of emergency was to be decreed on all or parts of the metropolitan territory of France, French Algeria, or any other overseas French departments in case of imminent danger that resulted from serious breaches of public order or any events that could prove from their very nature and severity to be signs of public calamity.114 Th e territory of France and
110 Lacouture, Le témoignage est un combat. Une biographie de Germaine Tillion, 239. [“La majorité des “pieds- noirs” reste plutôt attachée au conservatisme de Vichy.”] Th e term “pieds-noirs” (black feet) refers to French, European and Jewish populations who settled in colonized French Algeria and then “immigrated” to France, or rather “were repatriated” to use the French authority’s vocabulary) after Algeria was granted its independence in 1962. Th e term began to be used shortly before the end of the Algerian War of Independence, however its origins are still widely debated. Some argue that it might refer to the coloration of the feet of winegrowers during the trading of the grapes, knowing that many colons lived on the production of wine. Others claim that the term alludes to the fi rst French military offi cers who arrived in Algeria at the very beginning of Algeria’s colonization in 1830; these wore black boots that seemingly ran on the skin of their feet. 111 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 139. 112 Lacouture, Le témoignage est un combat. Une biographie de Germaine Tillion, 240–241. 113 Th e state of emergency is not to be mistaken for the state of siege; that is, a state of war. Th e French government considered Algeria as French Departments and therefore any reference to the state of war was avoided. 114 Law no. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 instituting the state of emergency and declaring its application in French Algerian Departments for a period of six months. Th e law stated that in case of the dissolution of the government the state of emergency was unavailable. See www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
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colonized Algeria were treated alike; the same legislation was applicable both in colonial Algeria and in France. Th e territories in which the state of emergency was enforced only needed to be designated by an offi cial decree signed by the Council of Ministers, and only after consulting a report on the specifi c situation written by the Minister of the Interior. Th e fi rst territories to be declared to be in a state of emergency were neither located in metropolitan France nor in a French colony or protectorate, but rather in French colonial Algeria. On 6 April 1955, the arrondissements of Batna (i.e. the Aurès) and Tizi-Ouzou, as well as the Municipality of Tebessa, were declared to be in a state of emergency by decree no. 55-386. Th e law was readily followed by a few adjustments. On 23 April 1955, the Ministry of Justice listed all possible crimes and off enses that must be considered in the law of the state of emergency by decree no. 55-440. On 10 May 1955, decree no. 55-493 verbalized the composition of the competent members of the consultative and territorial commissions, who were authorized to consider the withdrawal of specifi c condemnations. On 19 May 1955, the numbers of territories that were in the state of emergence that had been announced on 6 April were extended by decree no. 55- 544 to include the Department of Constantine, the Arrondissement of Tizi-Ouzou, and the municipalities of Marina, Sebdou, Biskra, and El-Oued. On 7 August 1955, law no. 55-1080 extended again the state of emergency to six months and regulated the military jurisdiction in French Algeria. During the course of August 1955, three additional laws were signed in Paris. First, decree no. 55-1109 of 18 August 1955 established an exceptional fi nancial compensation to military offi cers who served (according to the text of the bill) in certain territories of French North Africa where the state of emergency had been declared. A second decree, no. 55-1120 of 20 August, founded a tribunal de cassation (court of appeals) for the French armed forces of the administrative districts that were in a state of emergency in French colonial Algeria. Finally, the state of emergency was extended and enforced across the entire territory of Algeria on 28 August 1955 by decree no. 55-1147.115 What was purported to be an exceptional and extraordinary situation had rapidly become a generalized rule. In addition to the colonial civil rules, French Algeria fell into the hands of the French army,
115 All decrees and laws mentioned are accessible on the online archive of the Journal Offi cial de la République Française. See www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
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Figs. 1.29–1.32 Evacuation of the Algerian civilian population in the rural area of Catinat Ain Tevia. Th e village of Bou Guetane became a forbbiden zone by decision of the commander of Constantine in April 1957. ECPAD 57 341.
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Fig. 1.33 Opération espérance, bombing of the village Bou Birek and its controlled evacuation in 1956. Th is military off ensive was followed by the regrouping the inhabitatnts. ECPAD ACT 5413. which had recently lost the Indochina War and was thus determined to use any means necessary not to be defeated in the unspoken war in Algeria. Article 5 of the law of the state of emergency of 3 April 1955 empowered the prefects of the departments in which the state of emergency had been validated to:
1) Prohibit the movement of people or vehicles in certain places and at specifi c times that will be set by decree; 2) to institute, by decree, the zones of protection or security in which the residence of persons will be regulated; and 3) to prohibit the sojourn, in part or the entirety of the department, of any persons who seek to hinder in any way whatsoever the actions of the public authorities.116
Article 6, meanwhile, authorized the Minister of the Interior (and in French Algeria the Governor General) to impose sentences of assignation à residence (house arrest) on anyone
116 Law no. 55-385 of 3 April 1955. [“1° D’interdire la circulation des personnes ou des véhicules dans les lieux et aux heures fi xés par arrêté; 2° D’instituer, par arrêté, des zones de protection ou de sécurité où le séjour des personnes est règlementé; 3° D’interdire le séjour dans tout ou partie du département à toute personnes cherchant à entraver, de quelque manière que ce soit, l’action des pouvoirs publics.”]
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who resided in a territorial limitation or a locality that was in a state of emergency whose activity might threaten public security and order. Article 6 also stated, however, that the administrative authority must take all necessary measures to ensure the subsistence of the persons who were subjected to home arrest, including their families; it also specifi ed that “under no circumstances will the home confi nement result in the creation of camps in which the persons referred to in the preceding paragraph would be under detention.”117 Whereas the Fourth Republic acquired a lawful form for regulating the residence and circulation of civilians and for controlling their activities (and for arresting certain persons), in the territories where states of emergency had been declared the creation and construction of detention camps was unquestionably banned. Sylvie Th énault, historian and author of Violence ordinaire dans l’Algérie colonial: camps, internements, assignations à résidence (Ordinary Violence in Colonial Algeria: Camps, Internments, and House Arrests), pointed out in 2012 that the decision for the categorical ban on the camps derived from two essential facts. Th e fi rst was the presence of certain elected members of the French Assembly who themselves had been victims of the enforcement of similar legislation by the Vichy regime in France during the Second World War. And second, a fresh round of polemics were provoked by the comparison between Nazi concentration camps and the Soviet Union’s gulags, including an article in the right-wing daily Le Figaro, written by a former deportee and founder of the aforementioned CICRC,118 of which Germaine Tillion was an active member. With the existence of Article 5 of the law of the state of emergency, the prefects of the French departments in Algeria were authorized to demarcate by decree two opposite types of zones: zones of security, in which every single movement was administered and controlled, and zones of insecurity, which later would be called zones interdites (forbidden zones), in which not a single movement was authorized or tolerated. In addition, without any decree the circulation of certain persons in the zones of security was also prevented. In contrast, Article 6 permitted the Minister of the Interior and the Governor General of Algeria to charge certain persons with house arrest, although, again, they were not
117 Article 6. Law no. 55-385 of 3 April 1955. [“En aucun cas, l’assignation à résidence ne pourra avoir pour eff et la création de camps où seraient détenues les personnes visées à l’alinéa précédent.”]. Other Articles of this law authorized the strict control and the censorship of the media, publications, cinemas, and theatres. 118 Sylvie Th énault, Violence ordinaire dans l’Algérie Coloniale. Camps, internements, assignations a residence (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2012), 276.
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Figs. 1.34 Map of the camps de regroupement in Algeria in 1962. Private Archives of Michel Cornaton. allowed to detain them in camps. Article 13 even provided punishment for violations of the provisions of articles 5 and 6 with imprisonment of eight days to two months and/or a fi ne of 5,000 to 200,000 ancient French francs. Contrary to what these articles would lead one to believe, however, a tragic number of camps proliferated all over French colonial Algeria, and, until the end of the Algerian Revolution, they multiplied on the pretext of pacifi cation, which consisted of a series of military operations (as will be discussed shortly). Although detention camps were decisively outlawed, the enforcement of the law of the state of emergency in the territory of Algeria under French colonial rule resulted in the creation of an alarming number of diff erent kinds of detention camps, which were all termed centers. Th e Algerian anticolonial fi ghters, or revolutionaries, who were subjected to house arrest—whom the authorities referred to as rebels, and who were distinct from the relocated populations—were forcibly transferred to one of the various centres de détention administrative (administrative detention centers). Th eir appellations varied according to their military functions: centre d’hébergement (accommodation centre), centre de rassemblement (rallying center), centre de tri et de transit (sorting and transit center),
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Figs. 1.35–1.36 Propaganda published by the French Bureau psychologique. SHAT 1 H 2461. centre d’interrogatoire (interrogation center), centre d’orientation (orientation center), centre d’éducation (education center), and centre de rééducation (rehabilitation center).119 In most of these camps, the aforementioned military brainwashing program called the action psychologique was systematically implemented; in others, cruel methods of torture and execution were practiced extensively. Th e number of detainees reached its peak in April 1959, with eleven thousand people held in the accommodation centers.120 In contrast, the people who were not charged with home confi nement, the nonrebels—the suspects who happened to live in the insecurity zone (and who later were called the “regrouped”) and who were forced to abandon the forbidden zone—were evacuated into militarily controlled camps, the centres de regroupement. One estimate for 1960 counted 2,157,000121 such forced regrouped persons. Another evaluation from 1961 considered that at least 2,350,000 people had been concentrated into camps, and that an
119 SHAT 1 H 2573 D 1. Centres d’hébergement, de rassemblement, de regroupement, de triage et transit, d’éducation et de rééducation; action psychologique dans ces centres et rapports d’inspection. On the diff erence between some of the mentioned camps, see, Ibid., 274–301. 120 Ibid., 284. 121 Bourdieu and Sayad, Le déracinement. La crise de l’agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie, 13.
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Figs. 1.37 French propaganda. SHAT 1 H 1117. additional 1,175,000 people had been forced to leave their original homes due to constant and violent military operations; altogether, over 3.5 million people were forcibly displaced in French Algeria.122 Another fi gure for 15 February 1962, just a few weeks before Algeria’s independence, reported that 3,740 camps de regroupement had been built in French Algeria since the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution in 1954.123 Even today, historians both Algerian and French, civilian and military, have never agreed on the exact numbers of the “regrouped” population, the devastated villages, and the camps that were constructed during that time.
122 Cornaton, Les camps de regroupement de la Guerre d’Algérie, 122–123. 123 Ibid., 121.
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1.2 Pacifi cation or Counterrevolution?
Across the vastness of the Aurès Mountains, the law of 3 April 1955 on the state of emergency was promptly enforced on 6 April. Six days later, the military cabinet of the Governor General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, diff used a memo titled La pacifi cation de l’Aurès (“Th e Aurès’s Pacifi cation”) specifying that “the recovery of the situation in the areas where the state of emergency is enforced will be achieved by means of the policy of pacifi cation.”124 Th e term pacifi cation (literally “peacemaking,” although the reality entails something else entirely) was not a new term in the glossary of the French army. Pacifi cation had been employed in the nineteenth century during the long years of the wars of the French colonization of Algeria, as well as of other territories in Africa and Southeast Asia (such as Tonkin and Madagascar); but the French monarchy had also used the same word pacifi cation during the sixteenth century, for instance during the European wars of religion.125 Although the expression remained largely unchanged, the policies, methods, and technologies of pacifi cation had been reorganized considerably and had been gradually upgraded to the provisions of the twentieth century, especially following the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the long Cold War. During the Algerian War of Independence, the Bureau psychologique (Psychological Bureau) of the Joint High Command released a military Guide pratique de pacifi cation (“Practical Guidelines for Pacifi cation”), which was addressed to French commanders of companies, batteries, squadrons, and subdistricts in French colonial Algeria, in order to instruct the offi cers under their authority. Th e script on diff erent methods for forging the instruments of pacifi cation reported that “it means making clear to every soldier that he must provide, in addition to a purely military action, a psychological action that is no less
124 SHAT 1H 1119 D1, Cabinet Militaire du Gouverneur Général en Algérie, Note Memento A/S de la pacifi cation de l’Aurès, Alger le 12 Avril 1955. [“Le redressement de la situation dans la zone où l’état d’urgence est appliqué sera le fait d’une politique de pacifi cation.”] 125 See, for example, Edict de pacifi cation, faict par le Roy pour mettre fi n aux troubles de son Royaume et faire désormais vivre tous ses subjets en bonne paix et concorde soubs son obéissanc. (Paris: F. Morel & J. Mettayer, 1577) < http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ ark:/12148/cb37306040j> Accessed on 25 November 2014. On the various colonial and military methods for Pacifi cations, see, for example, Samia El Mechat, Coloniser, pacifi er, administrer: XIXe-XXIe siècles (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2014).
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important and that is exerted by human contacts.”126 Th is recommendation conveyed that pacifi cation encompassed both military and sociopsychological actions upon the Algerian population, and that every soldier should become, according to the pacifi cation guidelines, “an agent of pacifi cation.” Another military document completed in 1957, the result of a meticulous study entitled Etude sur les problèmes et les méthodes de pacifi cation en Algérie (“A Survey on the Problems and Methods of Pacifi cation in Algeria”), asserted that pacifi cation should more actively promote three areas: direct contact with the population, the initiation of construction sites, and the dissemination of education.127 Th e military survey (which claimed to be a self-critical analysis whose aim was to perfect the methods of French pacifi cation in colonial Algeria) was based on an in-depth questionnaire fi lled out by French soldiers who were serving in French colonial Algeria and who directly experienced both the shortcomings and strengths of the methods of pacifi cation. But it was also with a few French offi cers who had served in three wars (the Second World War (1939–1945), the Indochina Colonial War (1946–1954), and the Algerian Colonial War), that the methods of pacifi cation had taken the perverse forms of civil-military operations. Th ese offi cers became notorious theorists and advocates of the doctrine of the Guerre moderne—also known as the Guerre révolutionnaire. Its counterpart, the Guerre contre-révolutionnaire (Counterinsurgency today) was France’s pacifi cation war waged in Algeria, which would later become known as “dirty war.”128 Among the leading theorists and practitioners of counterrevolutionary operations in colonial Algeria, some of whom were also well known for the bloody Battle of Algiers, were colonels Marcel Bigeard (1916–2010), David Galula, Yves Godard (1911–1975), Charles Lacheroy, and Roger
126 STAT 1H 1119 D1. Guide Pratique de Pacifi cation à l’usage des Commandants de Sous-Quartier. Diff usion Restreinte. Bureau Psychologique, X° Région Militaire, Commandement Supérieur Interarmées, 1958, p. 7. [“il s’agit de faire comprendre à chaque soldat qu’il doit fournir, outre l’action purement militaire, une action psychologique qui n’est pas moins importante et qui s’exerce par des CONTACTS humains.”] 127 SHAT 1H 1119 D1. Etude sur les problèmes et les méthodes de pacifi cation en Algérie. Confi dentiel. Bureau Psychologique, 10° Région Militaire. Janvier 1957. 128 On Revolutionary warfare, see, for example, John Shy and Th omas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 815–62. On Counterinsurgency and the role of the Algerian War, see, fo example, Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Bloomington-London: Indiana University Press, 1972); Ian Frederick William Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Th eir Opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001); Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency : Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); russell Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars : Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 174–189.
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Trinquier; and generals Paul Aussaresses (1918–2013), Jacques Massu (1908–2002), and Raoul Salan (1899–1984); Salan was at that time France’s most decorated soldier. In January 1961, Salan founded the paramilitary extremist group the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS, or the Organization of the Secret Army), which violently opposed Algerian independence. Th e French journalist Marie-Monique Robin masterfully interviewed those offi cers who were still alive in 2003; the interviews served for the writing of her book Les escadrons de la mort: l’école française (Th e Death Squads: Th e French School), and are available in her documentary fi lm bearing the same title. eTh fi lm and book describe both their war methods and the export of those methods to the Americas, notably to Argentina, Chile, and the United States.129 On 2 July 1957, Colonel Lacheroy, Chief of the Service of Psychological Action and Intelligence at the French Ministry of National Defense, delivered a lecture to an audience of two thousand offi cers at the auditorium of the Sorbonne in Paris entitled La guerre révolutionnaire et l’arme psychologique (“Revolutionary Warfare and Psychological Weaponry”). Th e colonel (who was later sent to Constantine and then Algiers) drew particular attention to the radically distinct character of this type of warfare, which consisted of total warfare. He argued that it was:
… total, because not only does it mobilize in this eff ort all of the industrial, commercial, and agricultural powers of a country, but it also takes up in the war eff ort all women and children and elderly men, all who think, all who live, all who breathe, with all their forces of love, all their forces of enthusiasm, all their forces of hate, and it throws them into war. Th is is the new reality. Total war, because it takes the souls as well as the bodies and it yields them to the obedience of the war eff ort.”130
129 Marie-Monique Robin, Escadrons de la mort, l’école française, Documentary (Ideale Audience, ARTE France, 2003); Marie-Monique Robin, Escadrons de la mort, l’école française (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2004). 130 SHAT 1118 D 3. . Conférence du Colonel Lacheroy, Chef du Service d’Action Psychologique et d’Information du Ministère de la Défense Nationale. Guerre révolutionnaire et l’arme psychologique. 2 Juillet 1957, p.4. “Totale parce que non seulement elle mobilise vers cet eff ort de guerre toutes les puissances industrielles, commerciales, agricoles d’un pays, mais aussi parce qu’elle prend et pousse dans l’eff ort de guerre tous les enfants, toutes les femmes, tous les vieillards, tout ce qui pense, tout ce qui vit, tout ce qui respire avec toutes leurs forces d’amour, toutes leurs forces d’enthousiasme, toutes leurs forces de haine et qu’elle les jette dans la guerre. C’est là le facteur nouveau. Guerre totale parce qu’elle est une guerre qui prend les âmes comme les corps et les plis à l’obéissance et à l’eff ort de guerre.”
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In the same line of thought, Colonel Trinquier, who both recommended and backed up the use of torture, claimed in his 1961 book La Guerre moderne that
… the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population. According to Mao Tse-tung, it is as essential to the combatant as water to the fi sh. Such support may be spontaneous, although that is quite rare and probably a temporary condition. If it doesn’t exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most eff ective of which is terrorism.131 (Italics are in the original.)
Colonel Galula is well known to English-speaking military strategists and readers, since he published two manuals in English (Counterinsurgency Warfare: Th eory and Practice in 1964 and Pacifi cation in Fig. 1.38 Guidelines for French offi cers, Algeria, 1956–1958 in 1963) when he was a ABC du chef de noyau actif released by the Région territoriale et corps d’armée d’Alger, research associate at Harvard University’s Center Etat-Major 3e Bureau. FR ANOM ALG SAS DOC 5. for International Aff airs (between 1962 and 1967). He noted that “pacifi cation would be achieved if we could gradually compromise the population in the eyes of the rebels.”132 Colonel Galula’s 1964 monograph on the theory and practice of counterrevolutionary warfare infl uenced the Department of the US Army, even in the writing of its 2006 fi eld manual FM 3–24, entitled Counterinsurgency, which was addressed to US soldiers fi ghting in Iraq and Afghanistan. As noted in its foreword, the manual was meant to fi ll a doctrinal gap of twenty years.133 Colonel Galula’s thinking was frequently cited in the manual’s second chapter, “Unity of Eff ort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” notably when he
131 Roger Trinquier, La Guerre Moderne: A French View on Counterinsurgency (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 8. First published in France in 1961 under the title La Guerre moderne by Editions de la Table Ronde. 132 David Galula, Pacifi cation in Algeria, 1956-1958 (RAND Corporation, 1963), 92. 133 David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, “Counterinsurgency,” Field Manual no. 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 15, 2006).
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Figs. 1.39–1.40 Guidelines for French offi cers, ABC du chef de noyau actif released by the Région territoriale et corps d’armée d’Alger, Etat-Major 3e Bureau. FR ANOM ALG SAS DOC 5. argued that in this type of war, “the soldier must be prepared to become… a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilians tasks to civilians.”134 In colonial Algeria the soldier was not replaced, as will be discussed shortly. In an attempt to wage a counterrevolutionary war in the Aurès, the French army conceived a set of systematic practices. As described in the 1955 military instruction La pacifi cation de l’Aurès, these undertakings were of a profoundly dissimilar character. Th ey included the organization of an extensive network of administrators and military offi cers who had previously operated in the Aff aires indigènes bureau (AI, or Indigenous Aff airs) in
134 Ibid., 2–9.
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Fig. 1.41 Phases of pacifi cation to be implemented in northern Constantine in August 1957. SHAT 1 H 3613. the French Protectorate of Morocco; the application of signifi cantly in-depth political and administrative actions; and the destruction, capture, or prevention of “rebel” groups from provoking any harm. Th is last military directive articulated the specifi c characteristics of pacifi cation by means of three distinguished, yet interrelated, operations:
(1) Action humaine: Th e use of population-based actions, by becoming acquainted with the people, supervising them, regaining their confi dence, and obtaining their profound support;
(2) Action constructive: Th e use of constructive actions that would consist of building new connecting roads, infrastructure, and additional administrative centers and military posts, and organizing better living conditions in the Aurès;
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(3) Action de protection: Th e use of protective actions that were meant to create a permanent environment of insecurity for the “rebels” by (a) the use of intelligence, human contacts, and ambush; (b) the presence and action of military forces and police controls based on intelligence and political actions; (c) the progressive arming of the population in order to enable its self-defense; (d) the distancing of “suspects;” and (e) the use of traditional armed fi ghting against the “rebels.”135
Th e term “rebels” in one sense alluded to revolutionaries; fi ghters for the liberation of a colonized population and territory; armed or non-armed individuals who claimed the independence of Algeria from France; and violent or nonviolent anticolonial militants. Th e word “suspects,” in contrast, indicated (as deliberately defi ned in the military directive) those people “who provide any personal, volunteer, and eff ective assistance to the rebels.”136 To this end, any person—a family member, neighbor, friend, colleague, or anyone else— who dared to feed, treat, dress, lodge, hide, or even speak with a revolutionary would systematically be considered a suspect and would immediately be “distanced” from the rest of the population. Th e same military directive, however, stated that during the éloignement (distancing) of suspects, “no collective sanctions of a deportation character are acceptable. Construction sites are to be specifi ed as soon as possible.”137 But since there was no apparent regulation to distinguish suspects from non-suspects, the entire Algerian population became a potential suspect: an enemy who should be converted to an unconditional non-suspect. According to Colonel Trinquier, “since it is the population that is at stake, the struggle will assume two aspects: political—direct action on the population; and military—the struggle against the armed forces of the aggressor.”138 Th is was a political aspect that was policed and monitored by an army upon the civilian population, which was equally advocated in a military directive of December 1959 entitled Instructions pour la pacifi cation en Algérie (“Instructions for Pacifi cation in Algeria”), fi ve years after the outbreak of the war and
135 SHAT 1 H 1119 D 1, Cabinet Militaire du Gouverneur Général en Algérie, Note Memento A/S de la pacifi cation de l’Aurès, Alger le 12 Avril 1955. pp. 2-3. Th e arming of a number of individuals resulted in the creation of what the French called the village d’auto-défense (Self- defence Village). 136 Ibid., p. 3. [“Défi nition du “suspect”: celui qui donne une aide personnelle, volontaire et eff ective aux rebelles.”] 137 Ibid., [“Pas de sanctions collectives à caractère de déportation. Chantiers de travail à préciser au plus tôt.”] 138 Trinquier, La Guerre Moderne: A French View on Counterinsurgency, 40.
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one and a half years after the return of General de Gaulle to power. Th e directive argued that “the population is the challenge of the adversary as well as of the law-enforcement offi cials. [Th e population] is the key to the problem, because success will belong to those who engage the population in their actions.”139 In the Aurès, the original duty of the French civil authorities was to provide their military counterparts with the mission of pacifi cation and to elaborate on general or particular political scopes. Th at situation changed when Soustelle decided on a drastic course of action in April 1955. With the intention of incorporating military operations into civil actions, Soustelle recommended “the creation of one single command for the entirety of South Constantine,”140 where the state of emergency was being enforced. Soustelle’s unequivocal demand was immediately endorsed. Th e sole exceptional power was thus to be exercised not by a civilian administrator, as assumed in a state of non-war, but rather by a military offi cer. Similarly to the state of emergency that was fi rst enforced in the Aurès and later throughout the entirety of Algeria, the intimate civil-military cooperation headed by a military offi cer was, according to Soustelle, fi rst “tested in the Aurès” and then gradually applied across large portions of Algeria between 1956 and 1958 under the banner of the Etat-Major mixte141 (Civil-Military General Staff ). Th e system reached its peak in May 1958, with General Salan serving as Commander of both the civil and military forces; as General Delegate of the Government in Algeria; Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces in Algeria; and Commander of the Tenth Military Region (i.e., Algeria under French colonial rule). By the end of April 1955, Edgar Faure had signed an interministerial agreement in which he appointed General Gaston Marie Georges Géraud Parlange (1897–1972) as Chief of the Commandement civil et militaire des Aurès-Nementchas (CCMAN, or Civil and Military Commander-in-Chief of the Aurès-Nementchas).142 Prior to his arrival in
139 SHAT 1 H 1268 D 1. Commandement en Chef des Forces en Algérie, Etat-Major Interarmées, Instructions pour la Pacifi cation en Algérie, approuvée par le Général d’Armée Aérienne M. Challe, Commandant en Chef les Forces en Algérie, le 10 décembre 1959, p. 9. [“La population est l’enjeu de l’adversaire comme des forces de l’ordre. Elle détient la clef du problème, car le succès appartiendra à celui des deux qui la fera s’engager dans son action.”] 140 Soustelle, Aimée et souff rante Algérie, 96. [“Je recommandai la création d’un commandement unique pour tout le Sud-Constantinois, ce qui fut décidé le 26 avril.”] 141 SHAT 1 H 2576 D 2, Etude sur l’état-major mixte dans l’Est algérien. 1957. 142 Claude Paillat, Deuxième dossier secret de l’Algérie, 1954-1958 (Paris: Les Presses de la Cité, 1962), 151. General Parlange was then appointed Prefect of Batna on 3 August 1956, and later General Inspector of the Regrouping of the Population by Paul Delouvrier in 1959.
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Fig. 1.42 (left) Camp de regroupement in Taliouine, Valley of Oued Isser in 1959. ECPAD 59 369. Fig. 1.43 (right) Camp de regroupement in Telagh in 1958. ECPAD 58 223.
Algeria, General Parlange had been in charge of the Indigenous Aff airs bureau within the Protectorate of Morocco; he was trained in the colonial doctrines and methods of Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854–1934).143 In August 1956 General Parlange became Prefect of Batna, and then in November 1959 the Head of the aforementioned Inspection Générale des Regroupements de Population (IGRP, or General Inspection of the Regrouping of the Population), a military institution whose mandate was to inspect the regroupement of the civilian population that the military offi cers were currently accomplishing. According to Soustelle, Parlange’s previous involvements in the pacifi cation of Morocco, his comprehensive knowledge of Berber language and society, his responsive authority, and his friendly character all made him the best candidate for the restoration of civil-military law and order in the Aurès.144 His twofold mission in particular included
143 Michel Rocard, Rapport sur les camps de regroupement et autres textes sur la guerre d’Algérie, Edition critique (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2003), 230. 144 Soustelle, Aimée et souff rante Algérie, 96.
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the direct participation of both military offi cers and civilian administrators, who served under his command in “the development of educational and social services, health-care assistance, and the launching of construction sites for public works in order to address unemployment, poverty, and underemployment.”145 Th is civil-military directive was offi cially endorsed with the signed covenant by Edgar Faure; Faure’s Minister of the Interior, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury;146 and Faure’s Minister of National Defense and Armed Forces, General Pierre Koenig. Such socio-economic missions, spatial commissions, and political assignments, seemingly nonmilitary in nature, had already been integrated into Marshal Lyautey’s military “colonial school” in the nineteenth century. In his fi rst infl uential article, “Du rôle social de l’offi cier dans le service miliaire universel” (“On the Social Role of the Offi cer in the Universal Military Service”), from 1891, Lyautey criticized the rigidity and inadequacy of the French military education. He claimed that the French military school should provide “a fruitful conception of the modern role of the offi cer in order to become the educator of the entire nation.”147 He also argued that it was necessary to transform the bad sides of the war into a good opportunity, and thereby to “display, during the course of military service, not only violent and sterile fatigue, but also the broader fi eld of the social action.”148 Marshal Lyautey’s renown has often centered on his published letters and military colonial techniques, as well as his spatial planning intentions and principles that he developed in Morocco together with the Beaux-Arts French architect and town planner Henri Prost (1874–1959) during Lyautey’s mandate as the fi rst resident general in the
145 Paillat, Deuxième dossier secret de l’Algérie, 1954-1958, 150. [“Une attention particulière sera apportée au développement de l’action scolaire et sociale, des services médicaux, et à l’ouverture de chantiers de travaux d’utilité publique permettant de lutter contre le chômage, la misère et sous-emploi.”] 146 Bourgès-Maunoury (1914- 1993) succeeded Mitterrand as the Minister of the Interior between 23 February 1955 and 1 December 1955. He served then as a Minister of Defense from 1 February 1956 to 13 June 1957 in Guy Mollet’s Government that succeeded Edgar Faure. From 14 May 1957 to 30 September 1957 he became France’s Prime Minister. Th en, between 6 November 1957 and 14 May 1958, Bourgès-Maunoury served again as the Minister of Interior in the Government of Félix Gaillard that succeeded Guy Mollet. In 1958 (like François Mitterrand) he opposed the return of general de Gaulle to power. 147 Hubert Lyautey, Le rôle social de l’offi cier: suivi de textes et de lettres autour de “Le rôle social de l’offi cier” (Paris: Christian de Bartillat, Editeur, 1994), 37. [“Mais donnez-leur cette conception féconde du rôle modern de l’offi cier devenu l’éducateur de la nation entière.”] Lyautey’s article was fi rst published in 1891 in the Revue des deux mondes, under the title Du rôle social de l’offi cier dans le service militaire universel. 148 Ibid., 38. [“En leur montrant dans le service obligatoire, non plus la corvée brutale et stérile, mais le plus vaste champ d’action sociale.”]
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Figs. 1.44–1.45 Development of the dispositif of pacifi cation. SHAT 1 H 1268.
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newly designated Protectorate of Morocco between 1912 and 1924.149 But Lyautey’s methods progressively developed prior to the French colonization of Morocco. His colonial mindset originated from his previous military experiences and was informed by a few infl uential French military offi cers and colonial administrators, including Marshal Joseph Simon Gallieni (1849–1916) in French colonial Indochina and Marshal Th omas Robert Bugeaud (1784–1849) in French colonial Algeria. Lyautey graduated from the Ecole spéciale militaire of Saint-Cyr in 1875; two years later he was promoted to lieutenant. Immediately after his promotion, he traveled to French colonial Algeria, where he spent his promotion’s holidays and wrote his unpublished Notes d’Algérie. Following a lottery drawing, he was allocated to join the cavalry in the Second Hussars Regiment, with which he returned to Algeria from 1880 to 1882. Th ere he learned the Arabic language and wrote his unpublished Lettres d’Algérie.150 His years in the French colonial departments of Algeria (the northern territory was annexed in 1848) educated him in the strong Algerian resistance that the French army faced, particularly in Marshal Bugeaud’s bloody battle against El-Emir Abd El-Kader and his forces, which led to Bugeaud becoming Governor General of Algeria. In 1941, Bugeaud established the Direction des aff aires arabes151 (Bureau of Arab Aff airs), which was directly subordinated to the military authority; the permanent role of this offi ce was “to ensure a lasting pacifi cation of tribes by means of a fair and regular administration, in order to pave the way for our colonization; to ensure our trade, through the enforcement of public security; and to ensure the protection of all legitimate interests and increases in the well-being of the indigenous.”152
149 See, for example, Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 104–125. 150 Th e notes and letters are held at the Fondation Lyautey et Association Nationale Maréshal Lyautey. See
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Following his fi rst colonial experiences in French colonial Algeria, Lyautey was promoted to captain and sent fi rst to Italy and then back to France. In 1894, at the age of forty, he was assigned to the general staff of French troops in Indochina, where he fought alongside Colonel Gallieni in the Tonkin. When Gallieni became Governor General of Madagascar in 1897, he asked Lyautey to follow him and aff orded him important positions in the pacifi cation and organization processes on the island; Lyautey was then promoted to lieutenant colonel. In his second key essay, “Du rôle colonial de l’armée” (“On the Colonial Role of the Army”)—which he wrote during his sabbatical year in Paris and published in 1900—the newly promoted Colonel Lyautey discussed his brand of the art of colonial warfare and military strategies of pacifi cation. According to Lyautey, the preeminent means for achieving pacifi cation—as his tutor Gallieni had claimed in 1898, now quoted in Lyautey’s article—was “to employ a combined action of power and politics.”153 Lyautey followed Gallieni’s causality: “Whenever incidents of war require one of our colonial offi cers to act against a village or an inhabited center, he should not lose sight of its primary attention once the subjugation of the inhabitants is obtained, which is to rebuild the village, create a market, and establish a school.”154 Th e French colonial school of warfare—developed by Bugeaud in French colonial Algeria, refi ned by Gallieni in the French Colony of Madagascar, disseminated by Lyautey in the French Protectorate of Morocco,155 readjusted by Soustelle in French colonial Algeria, applied by Parlange in the Aurès in 1955, extensively practiced and theorized by Trinquier and Galula (among many others), and exported to the rest of the world— promoted several sociospatial practices and psychopolitical functions of the military forces. Rebuilding a village that a defeated civilian population (France’s enemy) was destined for, after having destroyed the people’s original home, was also one of the duties of French offi cers in French colonial Algeria. . In one sense, the enemy in Algeria under French rule in 1954 comprised the totality of the population; at the same time, “modern warfare” (as
153 Gallieni quoted in Hubert Lyautey, Du rôle colonial de l’armée (Paris: Armand Colin Editeur, 1900), 16, http:// catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb34075148v. [“Est d’employer l’action combinée de la force et de la politique.”] 154 Ibid. [“Chaque fois que les incidents de guerre obligent l’un de nos offi ciers coloniaux à agir contre un village ou un centre habité, il ne doit pas perdre de vue que son premier soin, la soumission des habitants obtenue, sera de reconstruire le village, d’y créer un marché, d’y établir une école.”] 155 On the development of the “colonial school”, see, for example, Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: Th e Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 376–407.
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Fig. 1.46 Organization of a military sector of pacifi cation. SHAT 1 H 1268.
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coined by Trinquier) encompassed various political and psychological actions. To this end, he claimed that “the control of the masses through a tight organization, often through several parallel organizations, is the master weapon of modern warfare.”156 (Italics are in the original.) According to General Parlange, who was one of the fi rst builders of camps de regroupement in Algeria during the War of Independence—or of the spaces that were supposed to replace the destroyed villages as Lyautey claimed— the camps were refugee centers, as he argued in 1960 when he was Head of the aforementioned IGRP. Parlange wrote that it was in the Aurès that the revolution had begun, and it was there where it had to end; he therefore claimed that “due to a signifi cant lessening of troops, I was led to create the fi rst refugee center in 1955 in the mountains.”157 Camps now known as “centers” were created in French colonial Algeria in defi ance of the categorical ban on creating camps within the law of the state of emergency of 3 April 1955. In addition, these refugees were neither criminals (as the term was defi ned by the decree of 23 April 1955) nor rebels (as was mentioned in Soustelle’s military cabinet’s directive) nor Hors-La-Loi (HLL, or “outside the law”), as some in the French media at the time designated the members of the Armée de la Liberation Nationale (ALN, or National
Liberation Army). Th ese refugees—that is, France’s enemy—were precisely potential suspects: men, women, and children who happened to live in the villages that the French authorities designated as zones of insecurity and that later became forbidden zones. Th ese zones were systematically evacuated and their residents forcibly relocated into militarily controlled camps, the centres de regroupement. Th e French army called the civilians who were forced to live in the camps les regroupés (“the regrouped”). Th e IGRP argued that “the creation of the regroupement is the most eff ective means for removing the population from the infl uence of the rebels”158; it went on to claim that “the regroupement policy is one of
156 Trinquier, La Guerre Moderne: A French View on Counterinsurgency, 30. 157 Centre d’Histoire de Science Po (hereafter CHSP), Archives Paul Delouvrier et Jean Vaujour, 1 DV 17, Dr 4 & Dr 5. Général Parlange, Inspection Générale des Regroupements, à Monsieur le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Objet: Inspection dans le Département de l’Aurès. Alger, le 28 Juillet 1960. [“C’est, il faut le noter, dans l’Aurès et plus spécialement à Arris que la Rébellion a commencé et (…) c’est là qu’elle doit s’éteindre. C’est aussi dans ce département qu’à la suite d’une diminution sensible d’eff ectifs j’avais été amené en 1955 à créer les premiers centres de réfugiés des montagnes.”] 158 SHAT 1 H 2030 D 1, J. Florentin, Chef de Bataillon de l’Inspection Générale des Regroupements, Les regroupements de population en Algérie, Alger, le 11 Décembre 1960, p. 15. [“La création de regroupements comme étant le moyen le plus effi cace pour soustraire la population du bled à l’infl uence rebelle.”]
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the masterpieces of the pacifi cation maneuver.”159 During the Algerian War of Independence, Roland Barthes—French literary theorist, linguist, and semiotician—described the offi cial terminology the French representatives used during this armed confl ict in the chapter titled “Grammaire africaine” (“African Grammar”) in his 1957 book Mythologies. Barthes argued that the French authorities deliberately used a form of what he called écriture cosmétique (cosmetic writing). He emphasized that the scope of this cosmetic text was not to communicate, but rather to intimidate. Accordingly, one might suggest that the terms pacifi cation, centre, and regroupement are to be included in that same semantic category. He noted that this language was a mask that was designed to divert the nature of the war and cover the real facts with a “noise” of language. According to Barthes, this grammar was both ideologically burdened and politically loaded; in this context, he defi ned the term war in Grammaire africaine as follows:
War. Th e aim is to deny the thing. For there are two ways: either to name it as little as possible (the most common method), or to give it the meanings of its own antonym (a more devious method, which is the basis for almost all of the mystifi cations of bourgeois language). War is then used in the sense of peace and pacifi cation in the sense of war.160
159 Ibid. [“La politique des regroupements étant une des pièces maîtresse de la manœuvre de pacifi cation.”] 160 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1957), 157. [“Guerre. – Le but est de nier la chose. On dispose pour cela de deux moyens: ou bien la nommer le moins possible (procédé le plus fréquent); ou bien lui donner les sens de son propre contraire (procédé plus retors, qui est à la base de presque toutes les mystifi cations du langage bourgeois). Guerre est alors employé dans le sens de paix et pacifi cation dans le sens de guerre.”]
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2. Th e Bâtisseurs of the Camps
Central to the French military doctrine of pacifi cation at wartime in colonial Algeria—and thereby to the construction of the camps de regroupement—were the sections administratives spécialisées (SAS, or specialized administrative sections). Th ese extraordinary army units were deployed in rural areas in order to complete both military and civilian assignments. In one sense, the SAS offi cers’ military missions entailed the gathering of intelligence, the diff usion of propagandistic information, the ensuring of law and order, and the direct control of the civilian population. In contrast, their civil functions were to provide social, economic, educational, sanitary, and medical facilities, as well as to organize and build the militarily controlled camps called the centres de regroupement. Similar divisions were subsequently implemented in urban areas in order to cope with the alarming numbers of bidonvilles (slums; literally “can-towns”) in addition to accomplishing most of the aforementioned civil-military responsibilities; these divisions were then named the sections administratives urbaines (SAU, or “urban administrative sections”). By the end of 1961, twenty SAUs coexisted in the urban neighborhoods inhabited by the Algerian population (including in the Casbah of Algiers), and more than seven hundred SASs were spread across the vastness of Algeria’s countryside and the immense Sahara. 161 On 22 July 1955, General Parlange reported the fi rst results of his pacifi cation eff orts in the Aurès in a state of emergency, conveying the news that “the materiel conquest must be accompanied by the conquest of souls.… To win the souls, it is fi rst and foremost necessary to increase the contacts with the population. It is necessary to speak a simple, stripped language; to speak the same language.”162 Following Parlange’s report and the application of the state of emergency to the entire territory of French colonial Algeria by the decree of 28 August 1955 following the Battle of Philippeville (today Skikda) on 20 August 1955, Soustelle founded the Service de l’action administrative et économique
161 Jacques Frémeaux, “Les SAS (sections administratives spécialisées),” Guerres mondiales et confl its contemporains 4, no. 208 (2002): 56. 162 Cited in Christophe Trombert, “Les sections administratives spécialisées et la fusion du social et du sécuritaire en matière de contrôle social,” 2012, 2,
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Figs. 2.1–2.2 Description of the SASs in Les Réalités “Dites la vérité même si elle est amère.” of May 1957. 1 H 1118/2.
(SAAE, or Service of Administrative and Economic Action) on 5 September 1955. Th e SAAE’s objectives were to promote the claims of “l’Algérie Française” (“French Algeria”): to study, restore, and enforce effi cient administrative and economic organizations of the territory and of the civilian population in the vast and remote areas of Algeria, which were considered to be fertile terrain for revolutionaries. At the same, the SAAE simultaneously elaborated on “programs that will tend to the pacifi cation and revitalization of certain zones and to control the execution of these programs.”163 One of these programs was the foundation on 26 September 1955 of another in a
163 Cited in Jauff ret and Vaïsse, Militaires et guérillas dans la guerre d’Algérie. Actes du colloque de montpellier des 5 et 6 mai 2000, organisé par le Cente d’étude d’histoire de la Défense et l’UMR n° 5609, Idéologies, Défense, du CNRS., 274. [“Afi n d’élaborer des programmes de pacifi cation et de remise en valeur des zones et de contrôler l’exécution de ces programmes.”]
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long line of French institutions, the Aff aires algériennes (AA, or Algerian Aff airs). Th e aim of the AA was to establish, organize, and coordinate the undertakings and missions of the SAS.
Th e AA was directly attached to and commanded by the Military Cabinet of the Governor General of Algeria, as were the SASs and later the SAUs. As a result, SAS military offi cers were legally authorized by decree no. 55-1271 to assume the powers usually entrusted to “administrators of civil services upon the individual decision of the Governor General of Algeria.”164 To this end (and in addition to policing the everyday lives of the civilian population), SAS offi cers now managed the evacuation of the Algerian population and
164 Journal Offi ciel de la République Française. Décret no 55-1274 du 30 Septembre 1955 relatif à l’exercice des fonctions des offi ciers spécialisés mis à la disposition du gouverneur général d’Algérie. Article 1 [“Les attributions dévolues par les textes législatifs et réglementaires en vigueur aux administrateurs des services civils peuvent être exercées, sur décision individuelle du gouverneur général de l’Algérie, par certains offi ciers spécialisées mis à sa disposition.”]
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Figs. 2.3–2.7 Assignments of French offi cers during the war for Algeria released by the French army. SHAT 1 H 2499.
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monitored the construction of the camps de regroupement despite their almost nonexistent technical knowledge. Offi cers who had been trained to wage war now found themselves administering construction sites with an almost total lack of social, economic, climatic, geologic, geographic, or architectonic acquaintance with the territories or the populations they were supposed to oversee (Figs. 2.1–2.7). In an attempt to supervise the majority of the population, every SAS extended its various operations over a maximum of ten to fi fteen thousand people, which was considered to correspond to the population of two to three Algerian villages. Th e chief of the SAS was expected to have the ability (or was trained to have the ability) to speak the local language of the geographic area in which he was appointed: either the Arabic or Berber languages. Figs. 2.8 Number of SASs In most of the SAS units, the team members included one to and construction sites under the authority of the French three suboffi cers, a secretary, an interpreter, a radio operator, one army. SHAT 1 H 1117/2. or two nurses, and often an auxiliary medical offi cer. All SASs possessed their own protection forces, called Meghzen, which comprised around thirty (and up to fi fty) Algerian men who in one way or another were compelled to serve in the French army.165 In order to gain an intimate knowledge of the Algerian people, SAS offi cers received special training in administrative, legislative, geographic, economic, agricultural, religious, traditional, historical, sociological, and public-health features of the Algerian Arabic and Berber populations. Th e sociological part of the teaching was chaired by Germaine Tillion (Chapter 1), who delivered two lectures, titled “Structure sociale algérienne” (“Algerian Social Structure”) and “Le prolétariat citadin et paysan—La femme algérienne”166 (“Urban and Rural Proletariat—Th e Algerian Woman”); regrettably, the transcripts of these lectures are untraceable within the archival records.167 In October 2005, fi fty years after the establishment of the SAS, the military Centre
165 Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (hereafter FR ANOM), FR ANOM SAS DOC 5. Les SAS, Sections Administratives Spécialisées, leur politique, leur role et leurs méthodes. Echos de la Wilaya 5 no. 1, 10 Mars 1958, p.8-9. 166 FR ANOM SAS DOC 3. Programme de stage du stage d’orientation des offi ciers des Aff aires Algériennes et des administrateurs des Services Civils contractuels. Stage du 5 au 24 décembre 1955. Alger le 1er décembre 1955, p.1. 167 Over the course of this research, it was not possible to consult the archives of Germanine Tillion.
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Fig. 2.9 (left) SAS of Bou Snib in the municipality of Ouled Hababa in November 1958. FR ANOM 8 SAS 102. Fig. 2.10 (right) Camp de regroupement in the municipality of Aïn Zouit. FR ANOM 8 SAS 102. de doctrine d’emploi des forces (CDEF, or Doctrine Center for Forces Employment) under the French Ministry of Defense released a thick study called “Les sections Administratives pécialisées en Algérie: un outil pour la stabilisation” (“Specialized Administrative Sections in Algeria: An Instrument for Stabilization”). Th e military survey was based on selected literature on the SAS and on a number of interviews with former SAS offi cers. It was intended to divulge French experiences in colonial Algeria during the War of Independence, and in particular to provide guidance for the “stabilization” of local populations that French troops who were “in charge of similar assignments in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and soon in Kosovo”168 would enforce. As asserted in these military guidelines, the SASs were the direct heirs of the nineteenth-century Bureaux arabes (Arab bureaus) in colonial Algeria, of the twentieth-century Aff aires indigènes (Indigenous Aff airs bureaus) in Morocco, and of the greatest of the French military colonial offi cers, notably Bugeaud and Lyautey. The
168 Ministère de la Défense, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces (CDEF), Division recherché retour d’expérience, Les Sections Administratives Spécialisées en Algérie: Un outil pour la stabilization, octobre 2005.
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manual made no mention of the camps de regroupement, however, nor of the special roles that SAS offi cers played in the politico-military policy of mass resettlement of the civilian population. Instead, it dedicated less than a page to the villages de regroupement, under the pretense that these were part of the economic activities of the SAS within the Plan de Constantine (Chapter 3) launched by General de Gaulle in October 1958.169 Contrary to this assessment, French military archival documents, as will shortly be discussed, provide evidence that the SAS offi cers actually were responsible not only for evacuating existing villages for military reasons, but also for supervising the construction of the camps de regroupement. Th e CDEF’s survey also praised (on the same page) the SAS offi cers’ construction work on their defensive bastions called bordj170 (which the populations were concentrated around) as well as other buildings, including strategically positioned military posts, schools, health-care centers, post offi ces, and dwellings intended for educators and military offi cers who served in the SAS. One piece of evidence may be found in the various factsheets on the camp de regroupement drafted in August 1958 by the SAS chiefs of the Department of Bône (today Annaba) in response to a telegram from the General Commander of the Zone of Eastern Constantine (ZEC) asking for accurate data on the camps. Th e majority of these archival records contain the name, the date of creation, and the geographic location of the “centre;“ the exact numbers of the populations who were forced to settle in the camps; the shelter conditions; the hygienic circumstances; the medical control of health care; the existing schooling facilities; the means of subsistence; the possibilities of employment of the labor force; the monthly needs of semolina, wheat, and barley; and clothing and food requirements such as oil, condensed milk, sugar, and coff ee.171 In this department, some of the camps were created every year, year-round since 1955, while others were being created at the moment of the preparation of the handout. Th e fi gures of the evacuated populations, as well as the eff ective conditions of the standing shelters, varied enormously from camp to camp and from SAS to SAS. For instance, in the SAS of Bordj-M’raou, which monitored the daily lives of 1,346 people in the regroupement of Bordj-M’raou,
169 Ibid., 51. 170 Th e term bordj refers to the ottoman military bastion during the Regency of Algiers (c. 1517–1830) that preceded French Algeria. 171 FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Arrondissement de Bône, SAS Sidi Aissa; SAS de Barral; SAS d’Ain-Zana, SAS d’Hammam-Zaid, SAS de Bordj El Hassane…
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Fig. 2.11 SAS of Oued Mouger. FR ANOM 8 SAS 102. the majority of the huts were made of straw, and merely had one main opening; only fi ve people, whom the SAS considered to be “traders,” were able to build houses of enduring materials with a thatched roof.172 According to another SAS (of Hammam Zaid), which administered fi fty-nine families—that is, 415 people, including seventy children under the age of fi ve and 138 teenagers between the ages of fi ve and fteen—thefi houses were very rudimentary. Only fi ve shacks were built en dur (of lasting construction materials) and covered with tiles; the other shelters were of a limited size (of roughly seven by four meters); these were meant to house families that were comprised of an average of seven people. Th e chief of this SAS stated that a much larger program of regroupement of around two thousand people was being studied, and that a rough approximation of fi gures could be gleaned by multiplying the number of this regroupement by a factor of fi ve, since the people led the same kind of lives and had similar family structures.173 Meanwhile, the housing and living conditions of the inhabitants of the ongoing regroupement under the SAS of Gounod in the Arrondissement of Guelma, according to its chief, were, as of 1
172 FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Arrondissement de Bône, Regroupement de Bordj-M’raou, SAS de Bordj-M’raou, 20 Août 1958. 173 FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Arrondissement de Bône, SAS d’Hamma-Zaid, 23 Août 1958.
Samia Henni Th e Bâtisseurs of the Camps 107
Figs. 2.12 (left), 2.13 (right) Photographs by the SAS of Praxbourg. FR ANOM 8 SAS 102.
September 1958, very precarious; most of the people were “piled into the ruins of damaged barracks or housed in tents—some families have been resettled in ‘improved huts,’ whose construction was carried out as long as the municipality provided the credits for it.”174 He requested an additional credit for the construction of a cité de regroupement (regrouping estate). In another, larger, camp de regroupement called Herbillon, which held three thousand people, families were distributed in either huts or tents. Fifty families were soon to be transferred to one of the fi fty newly built rural dwellings named (as the document stated) une cité d’habitat rural de 50 logements175 (“a rural housing settlement of fi fty dwellings”), and that an additional cité de regroupement of a hundred metal-framed dwellings had been initiated so that within the next two months, one hundred families would again be relocated. Contrary to this situation, as specifi ed in the survey on the
174 FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Arrondissement de Guelma, 1 Septembre 1958. “entassés dans les ruines de baraques sinistrées ou logés sous la tente - quelques familles ont pu être recasées dans les “gourbis améliorés” dont la construction a été poursuivie tant que la commune a disposé de crédits.” 175 FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Centre de Regroupement – Herbillon, 22 Août 1958.
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circumstances of the centres in the municipality of Mondovi, in the previous two years, although “many families were invited to leave their habitual place of residence in the mountains, nothing was planned or offi cially organized to receive them.”176 Th e survey described the disastrous hygienic conditions and the distress of certain families who were constrained to rent courtyard fl oors, as in the case of 132 people who were compelled to argue over 120 square meters. And to complete this wide range of states of aff airs of a handful of SASs in merely one department, a tiny part of the regroupement of Barral presented an exceptional situation: 145 families out of two thousand people were lodged in a series of dwellings that were purpose-built by the Commissariat à la reconstruction.177
Fig. 2.14 Typical plans for housing units by the Commissariat à la reconstruction et à l’habitat rural.FR ANOM 5 SAS 191.
176 FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Comune de Mondovi - Centres de Regroupement, 29 Août 1958. “De nombreuses familles ont été invitées à quitter leur lieu de résidence habituelle dans le djebel, rien n’a été prévu ni organisé offi ciellement pour le recueillir.” 177 FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Aff aires Algériennes, SAS de Barral, 22 Août 1958.
Samia Henni Th e Bâtisseurs of the Camps 109
2.1 Propagandizing the Camps
Th e Commissariat à la reconstruction et à l’habitat rural (CRHR, or Rural Housing and Reconstruction Commission), not to be mistaken with the reconstruction following the Second World War, was established in French colonial Algeria in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in the colonial town of Orléansville (today Chlef) on 9 September 1954. Th e original plan of Orléansville had been laid out in 1843 by Marshal Bugeaud as a defensive military camp.178 According to Louis Gas, Head of the CRHR, the earthquake of 1954 caused more than fi fteen hundred fatalities and six thousand injuries, and it ravaged sixty-fi ve thousand residences, including (in Gas’s words) twenty-fi ve thousand “normal” buildings and forty thousand “traditional” constructions. He clarifi ed that thanks to an adapted legislation and a special fund for reconstruction and planning, the Commissariat was well prepared for dealing with its broad duties, which were to oversee and ensure the resettlement of victims and the maintenance of public services; to clear away the debris from the earthquake; to take measures to protect and safeguard certain buildings; to rehabilitate commercial, industrial, agricultural, and artisanal worksites; to assess and grant assistance to those in need; and to simultaneously plan and build housing.179 In his press conference on 23 February 1959, Gas pointed out that it was in the wake of the earthquake in Orléansville that the commissariat was put in charge “of the policy of improvements to the traditional dwellings of the rural population in Algeria, and more generally of constructions in rural areas;” he continued that its jurisdiction now “extends equally to the regulation of war damages.”180 To this end, the French authorities treated as the same the consequences of an unpredictable natural disaster and of calculated destruction during an armed confl ict for independence. (As mentioned earlier, however,
178 On the history of Orléansville and its post-earthquake reconstruction, see, for example, Aleth Picard, “Orléansville, la reconstruction après 1954,” in Architectures françaises d’outre-mer (Liège, Paris: Mardaga, 1992), 65–75. 179 CHSP 1 DV 34. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Service de l’Information, Conférence de Presse de Monsieur Louis Gas, Commissaire à la Reconstruction et à l’Habitat rural. Alger, le 23 Février 1960, p. 4-6. 180 Ibid., p. 3. [“De la politique d’amélioration de l’habitat traditionnel des population rurales d’Algérie et plus généralement de la construction en zones rurales.] [“S’étend également au règlement des dommages de guerre, mais j’en fais mention que pour mémoire, le stade de liquidation défi nitive étant, dans ce domaine, sur le point d’être atteint.”]
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Figs. 2.15, 2.16 (top) Reconstruction of Orléanville. A settlement named after the head of the CRHR. ECPAD ALG 57 406. Figs. 2.17, 2.18 (bottom) Journal de marches et opèrations of the SAS of Bouinan. FR ANOM 2 SAS 98.
Samia Henni Th e Bâtisseurs of the Camps 111
Fig. 2.19 (left) Master plan for the reconstruction of Orléanville. From L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui no. 60 (June 1955), 18. Fig. 2.20 (rigt) SAS of Mouger. FR ANOM 8 SAS 102. the French authorities had never acknowledged the state of war.) A typical 1956 plan numbered HTP2-A6C of the habitat rural (“rural housing”) designed by the CRHR consisted of a one-fl oor unit composed of two identical spaces: one served for indoor activities, while the other (a courtyard) served outdoor practices, so essential to the daily lives of Algerian families. Th e dimensions of the courtyard were fi ve by just less than nine meters, resulting in an area of about twenty-nine square meters. Th e indoor entity was composed of a main room of less than fourteen square meters (4.9 by 2.9 meters); a smaller room, of around seven square meters (3 by 2.30 metres); a tiny kitchen; and a minuscule restroom. Th e kitchen (2 by 1.7 meters) comprised cooking equipment and a small washbasin, whereas the space for sanitation facilities did not include a sink, but merely a restroom that was also to be used as a shower. While the housing unit was juxtaposed with another identical one, the latter was shifted in such a way that the courtyard of the former was always surrounded by three indoor spaces (Fig. 2.14). Th is overall confi guration could result in an infi nite row of housing units, and its
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Figs. 2.21, 2.22 Journal de marches et opèrations of the SAS of Bouinan. FR ANOM 2 SAS 98. multiple iterations could comprise what the CRHR has called the cité d’habitat rural and some SASs simply as the cité rurale. Despite the considerable diff erences in climatic and socio-economic conditions, such dwellings, destined for the rural displaced populations, were analogously built in the countryside of the French colonial departments of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. A few SAS offi cers photographed the construction of the camps de regroupement, including this type of shelter, in order to document the SAS monographies (monographs); these were typewritten military records that meticulously described all of the geographies of the territory in which the SAS operated (Figs. 2.11–2.13, 2.20). In other cases, a few photographs are to be found in some SASs’ Journaux de marches et opérations (JMO, or “war diaries”), which were handwritten daily chronicles of the military operations and
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activities that occurred in the zone controlled by the SAS; one example is the case of the SAS of Bouinan that was created in the Arrondissement of Blida in the Department of Algiers (Figs. 2.15–2.16, 2.21–2.22). Some of the pictures do indicate, however, that for some reason the housing units had been built without taking into consideration the shifted positions of the courtyards (as the technical services of the CRHR had suggested); the privacy of the dislocated families was thus again invaded. Th e CRHR was not the unique builder of the camps de regroupement; nor was it the sole civilian collaborator of the French army, as was reported in a questionnaire fi lled out by SAS offi cers in 1959 for the purpose of the completion of a detailed census on the massive forced resettlement of the Algerian population. Th is survey served as one basis for an investigation into possible improvements of the camps’ conditions in the aftermath of pressure from a medical scandal in France that was initially brought about by the French left wing, as was discussed in the introduction to Part I.
In the second part of the survey, titled “Current Equipment,” a statistical chart titled Nature et nombre de logements (“Th e Number and Nature of Housing”) showed the estimated number of fi ve diff erent typologies of dwellings that were being built in the camps by the time and costs involved in the construction. Th e times corresponded to before and after the creation of the regroupement, since the date of the establishment of the camp was requested and indicated in the fi rst part of the survey, called “General Data.” eTh typologies of the housing units that were built, in contrast, presupposed gourbis (“shacks”; see discussion below); improved gourbis; dwellings that were built by the municipality or by the army, with the support of emergency credits or other means; dwellings that were built by the CRHR; and fi nally tents.181 While the French army meant shack when the soldiers used the term gourbi, in the Algerian Arabic language (and primarily in Algeria), a gourbi signifi ed a one-fl oor house made of a regional adobe and built by the inhabitant. Entire Algerian villages were composed of gourbis—lump-clay houses of diff erent sizes and various shapes—that harmoniously fi t into the surroundings and were often confounded with the landscape. According to the Petit Abécédaire de la Grande Guerre (Little Alphabet Book of the Great
181 FR ANOM 933/ 154. Centres des arrondissements de Bône, Clairefontaine, Guelma et Souk-Ahras (1959). Recensement des centres de regroupement, Questionnaire 1.
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War), the term gourbi in its original sense was fi rst used in the French language by military offi cers who had served in Algeria at the outset of its colonization between 1840 and 1845; it was then employed during the Crimean War in 1855 by French soldiers who came from French colonial Algeria. Its meaning was profoundly deformed by now, however, and was utilized to designate the abri de tranchées (a dugout or bunker).182 By the end of the twentieth century, various French colonial administrators, travelers, and novelists were pejoratively utilizing the term in order to portray the living conditions of certain rural Algerian populations who (they claimed) were miserable. Th is added feature was most likely the consequence of the French colonization of Algeria. During the Algerian War of Independence, the constructed negative connotation imposed on the Arabic term in the French language continued to be spread; and thus the word gourbi in the 1959 survey conveyed a miserable shack, while the “improved gourbi” indicated a slightly less miserable shelter. In addition to the CRHR, both municipalities and army offi cers contributed to the construction of the dwellings in the camp de regroupement. More surprisingly, however, numerous Algerians who had been forced to abandon their homes (or original gourbis) were constrained to build themselves their own new imposed gourbis (in the harmful French sense of the term) in unprecedented time. A subsequent military document provides a confi rmation of this point: a triannual report on the regroupement of the civilian population solicited in 1960 by the IGRP, in which the organization explicitly requested the fi gures for both temporary and permanent dwellings that had been purpose-built by the inhabitants.183 Th e geographic position of the SASs (and of most camps de regroupement under their direct and constant control) were strategically selected in terms of defense and security. In a secret correspondence dated 26 July 1956 that the Chief of the SAS of Aïn-Romana
(in the Arrondissement of Blida in the Department of Algiers) sent to the Mayor of the Municipality of Mouzaiaville, the chief argued that the bordj “must, however, have certain
182 Jean-Pierre Colignon, Petit abécédaire de la Grande Guerre: ces mots qui racontent l’histoire, Le Courrier du Livre (Paris, 2014), 110. 183 FR ANOM 933 154. Centres des arrondissements de Bône, Clairefontaine, Guelma et Souk-Ahras (1959). Canevas du Compte-rendu trimestriel A/s des Regroupements de populations (1ère partie - Rapport de synthèse). Th e missions of the IGRP will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Samia Henni Th e Bâtisseurs of the Camps 115
Fig. 2.23 Plan de Defense of the SAS of Oued El Alleg. FR ANOM 2 SAS 105.
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defensive characteristics that will allow it to resist adverse actions of a certain scale.”184 Th e chief then described in both texts and maps a meticulous plan de défense (Plan of Defense) in case a worrisome situation arose. Th e area around the SAS’s fortifi ed building included (as in any battlefi eld) guard towers, blockhouses, and zones for target practice (Fig. 2.23). Th e descriptive text of the Plan of Defense of the SAS of Laperrine (in the Arrondissement of Palestro in the Department of Tizi-Ouzou) was comprised of an elaborate account of the kinds of terrain, means of defense, command types, surveillance and security activities, methods of fi ghting Fig. 2.24 Plan of Defense of the SAS of Laperrine. FR ANOM under high alert, and (eventually) the 5 SAS 191. evacuation of the population, when that became necessary. Th e map of this Plan of Defense shows the central position of the camp de regroupement—although it is referred to as a village in the map and as village des réfugiés in the text—in relation to two blockhouses and one tower. Th e map correspondingly indicates that the entire geographic area comprising the camp was surrounded by barbed wire (Fig. 2.24).185 It is not clear, however, whether just this one camp was fenced in, or if every French camp de regroupement in colonial Algeria was systematically ringed by barbed wire and guard towers. While the photographic archival records consulted for this study do not allow for
184 FR ANOM 2 SAS 105. Section administrative spécialisée d’Oued-el-Alleug et antenne d’Aïn-Romana 1956/1962. Personnel: correspondance (1956/1961). [“Doit cependant posséder certaines données de défense qui lui permettent de tenir contre une action adverse d’une certaine envergure.”] 185 FR ANOM 5 SAS 191. Section administrative spécialisée de Laperrine 1956/1961.
Samia Henni Th e Bâtisseurs of the Camps 117
generalization, a 1960 memorandum on the fi nancing methods for the new settlements for the regroupement termed nouveaux villages (new villages) suggests that a specifi c fund was indeed reserved for the travaux de défense (defensive works). Th is special expense was allocated under the fi nancial category of the Budget de l’Algérie Chapitre 41-01 Art.1er (Algeria’s Budget Chapter 41-01, Art. 1) covering the exclusive costs of the “construction of towers—purchase of barbed wire, etc.”186 Code 41-01, Art. 1 was equally utilized to designate requested budgets or eff ectuated payments of two infrastructural works intended for the “new villages”: hydraulic plants and streets and pathways inside the “village.” In most cases it is thus diffi cult to determine whether or not the budget of 41-01, Art. 1 was utilized to fence and watch over the camp, or instead to build its infrastructure. In rare circumstances, the name of the fund travaux de défense is explicitly specifi ed, as in the case of the emergency expenses program requested by the subprefect of Bouira for Aïn Graoueh in the Department of Grande Kabylie.187 In the course of the Algerian Revolution, as well as in its aftermath, a sprinkling of orchestrated visual representations of the forced relocation of the Algerian population in the camps de regroupement—or as the French army labeled them the centres de regroupement or nouveaux villages—was overtly displayed and broadcasted, and even less so to illustrate armed offi cers in uniform, guard towers, and barbed wire that might recall the recently ended Second World War (and notably the French taboo of the Vichy regime). In addition, given the law of the state of emergency, as mentioned earlier, texts, images, fi lms, theater, and any information about the war was by law subject to censorship.188 In March 1957— in the midst of the blood-soaked Battle of Algiers, conducted by the most radical of French military commanders (Chapter 1)—the French Service cinématographique des armées (SCA, or Cinematographic Service of the Armed Forces) produced a propaganda fi lm bearing the title Képi Bleu (Blue Cap), which today is freely accessible in the online archives of the French Établissement de communication et de production audiovisuelle de la défense (ECPAD,
186 SHAT 1 H 4393. Note au sujet du fi nancement des opérations d’installation des “Nouveaux villages”. Alger, le 20 avril 1960, p. 3. [“Travaux de défense: construction de tours – achat de barbelés, etc…”] 187 SHAT 1H 4393. Programme des dépenses d’urgence intéressant le développement local à réaliser en 1961 au titre du Chapitre 41-01 – Article 1er – Travaux de défense. Bouira le 2 juin 1961. 188 This strict control did not prevent a few Algerian and French fi lmmakers from directing movies during and about the Algerian War of Independence. On propaganda fi lms and the Algerian war, see Sébastien Denis, Le cinéma et la guerre d’Algérie: la propagande à l’écran (1945-1962) (Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions, 2009).
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or Offi ce of Communication and Audio-Visual Productions of Defense).189 Th e Képi Bleu was a nickname apparently given to SAS offi cers because, unlike other offi cers, they wore blue hats. Th e propaganda fi lm (in full color) was extensively screened and watched by a huge audience, in both Algeria and France, and because it was translated into both Arabic and English,190 it is relevant for analyzing what had not been shown and said in the fi lm, and to question the kind of information that was exploited and widely transmitted. Th e SCA fi lm lauded the administrative socio-economic missions of the SAS offi cers in colonial Algeria, and was made from the perspective of an army in need of self-legitimization in the wake of its condemnation of torture during the Battle of Algiers. Th e narrator in the fi lm eulogizes the SAS’s undertakings, which, according to the ECPAD’s introductory text of the fi lm, epitomized “the benefi cent will of France to raise [or educate, depending on the translation of the term élever] Algeria to the rank of modern countries.”191 Th e text makes no mention of the prominent role that SAS offi cers played in the military strategy of the camps de regroupement; on the contrary, it deliberately supersedes this militarily organized procedure by some sort of purely civil-planning system of a “housing policy in response to slum clearing.”192 In fact, Képi Bleu shows an unarmed SAS offi cer with a blue cap welcoming and handing over the keys to a new dwelling to an Algerian family after he has blatantly set fi re to a shack, which is referred to in the fi lm as “the gourbi of the bidonville.” Th e fi lm also displays Algerian men at work at a construction site, building (as the narrator notes) their own new homes, which would then be assigned to them in accordance with their familial circumstances. Th e fi lm states that in exchange for a modest rent, one could become the landlord of a two-room apartment, including a kitchen and a courtyard. Th e housing typology exemplifi ed in the movie resembles neither the housing units built by the Commissariat à la reconstruction et à l’habitat rural described earlier, nor the shelters constructed by the inhabitants themselves,
189 Établissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense (hereafter ECPAD) ECPAD SCA 114. Alain Pol, Képi Bleu, 1957. Part 1
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Fig. 2.25 Stills from Képi Bleu (Service Cinématographique de l’Armée, 1957). ECPAD SCA 114.
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photographed by SAS offi cers and portrayed previously in this study (Fig. 2.25). Képi Bleu represented and communicated a diff erent reality: a reality that made no reference to the forced resettlement of the Algerian population, nor to the construction of the camps de regroupement. In 1966, four years after Algeria gained its independence, the Algerian militant fi lmmaker Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina (b. 1934) directed Rih El-Awras (Th e Wind from the Aurès), which was released the same year as the canonical Th e Battle of Algiers. Although Rih El-Awras won the award for Best First Work at the Cannes Film Festival in 1967, and it was an entry in the Fifth Moscow International Film Festival, it did not draw as much attention as Th e Battle of Algiers would in later years. Unlike Képi Bleu, the black and white fi lm Rih El-Awras depicted not only the activities of the SAS, the devastation of the villages, and the existence of the camps de regroupement but also the labor camps that had been created and supervised by the French army. Th rough the symbolic character of an Algerian Shawiya woman (Chapter 1)—a wife whose husband has just been killed by a French air raid; a mother who is in search of her son who was arrested by the French army—Lakhdar-Hamina told tragic stories of various Algerian farming families in the countryside during the long struggle to liberate Algeria from French colonial rule. From camp to camp, the mother incessantly marches to desperately look for her son, off ering to anyone who could help her (including French army offi cers) a live chicken. Unlike Képi Bleu, the fi lm Rih El-Awras depicts distress and the miserable living conditions of rural population; the spaces of the camps were quite dissimilar to those depicted in the French propaganda fi lm (Fig. 2.26). During a windy evening in the Aurès, when the mother eventually fi nds her son, she is not allowed to enter the detention camp. In an attempt to scream out her pain and despair, she approaches the barbed-wire fence that surrounds the camp. Th e symbolic fi gure of the mother is electrocuted in the final scene.
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Fig. 2.26 Stills from Rih El-Awras (Dir. Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina, 1966).
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2.2 Vichy’s Ghost in Constantine
Following the second downfall of the French government since the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution in November 1954, the Socialist Guy Mollet (1905–1975) succeeded the Radical Edgar Faure as Prime Minister of France on 1 February 1956. Among the ministers of the new government, François Mitterrand, former minister of the interior within Pierre Mendès France’s government, was appointed Minister of Justice; Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, former minister of the interior under Edgar Faure’s government, was nominated Minister of National Defense; and Mendès France, former prime minister, was designated minister without a specifi c portfolio. Shortly after, Jacques Soustelle was recalled and replaced by General Georges Albert Julien Catroux (1877–1969), former governor general of Algeria between 1943 and 1944; this caused violent protests by French colons in Algiers on 6 February 1956, which from then on was known as La Journée des tomates (the Day of Tomatoes). Catroux resigned. Th e newly appointed finance minister and Socialist Robert Lacoste was nominated in his place. Contrary to Soustelle, who served as Governor General of Algeria, Lacoste was assigned Resident Minister of Algeria from 9 February 1956 to 13 June 1957, and then Minister of Algeria in the succeeding two French governments prior to the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return of General de Gaulle to power (namely, in Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury’s government from 13 June 1957 to 6 November 1957 and afterward in Félix Gaillard’s government between 6 November 1957 and 13 May 1958). By the legal change from governor to minister, cabinet status was introduced to colonial Algeria. At the moment of his appointment in 1956, Lacoste was the Minister of Finance and Economic Aff airs in the newly appointed government. In the 1930s, he had been considered a prominent trade unionist. During the Vichy regime, he participated in the Resistance and signed the Manifeste des Douze, a declaration by twelve French trade unionists against the Vichy regime.193 In 1944, he became Minister of Industrial Production in the Provisional Government of General de Gaulle, and then Minister of Industry and Commerce from 1945 until 1950. In addition to his governmental positions, he was a
193 On Lacoste’s role in the Manifeste des Douze, see for example, Pierre Brana and Joëlle Dusseau, Robert Lacoste (1898-1989). De la Dordogne à l’Algérie: un socialiste devant l’histoire. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 93–97.
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Socialist Member of Parliament of the Dordogne between 1945 and 1958. Lacoste had very little knowledge of Algeria. Immediately after his nomination, he mixed perfunctory industrial reforms and territorial reorganizations with brutal repression. Offi cially, he appealed for “ambitious measures to promote economic expansion, social equality, and administrative reorganization,”194 while he was lawfully empowered to take “any measures he considered necessary to restore order.”195 Th ese measures included the devolvement of police powers to the army: not only in remote areas such as the Aurès (since it was already the case there with General Parlange, prior to Lacoste’s arrival), but also throughout Algeria. Th is culminated in the bloody Battle of Algiers, the fortifi cation of Algeria’s borders, the intensifi cation of the forbidden zones, and the proliferation of the camps de regroupement. In early May 1956, Maurice Papon was appointed Prefect of the Department of Constantine and Inspecteur Général de l’administration en mission extraordinaire (IGAME, or General Inspector of Administration in the Extraordinary Mission) for the entire
Region of Eastern Algeria. Papon was a French civil servant who was convicted of crimes against humanity on 2 April 1998 at the Assizes Court in Bordeaux for his complicity in the deportation of Jews while he was General Secretary of the Gironde Prefecture (Bordeaux Region) under the Vichy regime of 1940–1944 during the Second World War.196 In Constantine, Papon was in charge of both civil and military authorities, as will be discussed shortly. Following the liberation of France in 1944, Papon managed to escape the French épuration légale (“legal purge”) despite his previous activities as a Vichy civil servant by claiming to have participated in the Resistance.197 While avoiding justice for more than fi fty years, Papon enjoyed an “exemplary” career as a high-ranking French government offi cial in Algeria under French rule, in the Protectorate of Morocco, and in various governments in France, even at one point serving as Prefect of the Paris Police under
194 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 155. 195 Ibid. 196 On Papon trial, see for example, Catherine Erhel, Mathieu Aucher, and Renaud de La Baume, Le Procès de Maurice Papon: 8 octobre 1997- 8 janvier 1998, Editions Albin Michel, vol. 1 (Paris, 1998); Eric Conan, Le procès Papon : un journal d’audience (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1998); Richard Golsan, Th e Papon Aff air: Memory and Justice on Trial (New York and London: Routledge, 2000). On Papon’s years as Vichy civil servant, see, for example, Gérard Boulanger, Maurice Papon: un technocrate français dans la collaboration (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994). 197 On the way how Papon avoided the Purge, see, for example, Gérard Boulanger, Papon: un intrus dans la République (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997), 159–197.
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General de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic. Th is role resulted in the 1961 massacre of Algerian pro-independence protesters in Paris, followed by (also in Paris) the 1962 massacre of anti- OAS protesters who had been organized by the French Communist Party. (As discussed in the previous chapter, the OAS refers to the paramilitary extremist group the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète [Organization of the Secret Army], which was violently opposed to Algerian independence.) Papon’s mass-media-covered, widely discussed, and long-lasting trial not only provoked controversial debates about France’s memory, history, testimony, justice, and morality, but also facilitated establishing apparent links and parallels between les années noirs (“the dark years”) of the Vichy regime and la guerre sans nom (“the war without a name”), or the Algerian War of Independence. Although a number of historians and French bureaucrats object to tracing presumed or real historical parallels between these two still-questionable and disputed wars, Papon might at least be considered as an emblematic case, a symbol, or a catalyst of this probable legacy. To this end, Papon’s deeds in Algeria during the War of Independence deserve further review. Papon fi rst studied law and political economy, then psychology and sociology. Shortly after, he graduated from the Sciences Po, Institut d’études politiques in Paris (the Institute of Political Studies). In 1934, he enrolled in the Ligue d’action universitaire radicale et socialiste (LAURS, or the League of Radical Socialist University Action), then headed by Pierre Mendès France, and participated in the protests against the French extreme right wing, notably the riots of 6 February 1934 in Paris.198 Ironically, François Mitterrand had participated in the riots as a young student member of the Volontaires nationaux (National Volunteers), an organization related to the Croix de Feu, a French right-wing league led by Colonel François de La Rocque (1885–1946), who served in Algeria and then in Morocco under the authority of General Lyautey. At the time, Papon was, in his own words, “of the left. Without being leftist.”199 Prior to the Vichy regime, Papon held the position of attaché of cabinet at various French governments’ Ministries of the Th ird Republic, including the Ministry of Air, of the Interior, of Foreign Aff airs, and of the Secretary of State for the Presidency of the
198 Maurice Papon, La vérité n’intéressait personne. Entretiens avec Michel Bergès sur un procès contre la mémoire. (Paris: François-Xavier Guibert, 1999), 30–31. 199 Ibid., 30. [“Enfi n disons d’un mot que j’étais de gauche. Sans être gauchiste...”]
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Council. In 1944, he was appointed Prefect of the Landes in Southwestern France and Cabinet Director of the Commissioner of the Republic in Bordeaux. On 26 October 1945, he was in charge of the subcommission of Algeria at the French Ministry of the Interior, replacing the Commissaire d’état chargé des aff aires musulmanes (State Commissioner for Muslim Aff airs), General Cartoux. His nomination followed the tragic carnage of Algerian protesters against French colonial rule in Algeria in the towns of Sétif, Guelma, and Kherrata, located in northeastern Algeria in the Region of Constantine. Th ese protests took place on 8 May 1945, the same day of the surrender of Nazi Germany and the end of the Second World War in Europe, in which many Algerian soldiers had participated and died. On that symbolic independence day, the French authorities did not hesitate to repressively employ air power, destroy Algerian villages, and arbitrarily open fi re on Algerians in order to exterminate any desire for decolonization and eventual independence. As with the number of Algerians who were forcibly relocated to the camps de regroupement, the number of Algerian victims is still widely disputed. Th e number of casualties is estimated to range widely from fi fteen hundred to forty-fi ve thousand.200 Th is tragedy was one of the reasons for the foundation of the Comité révolutionnaire d’unité et d’action (CRUA, or Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action), which would later evolve into the Front de libération nationale (FLN, or National Liberation Front). In this context, Papon was expected to ensure the communication of decisions between the French governor general of Algeria and the French ministry of the interior in Paris regarding the juridical repercussions of May 1945 upon both the Algerian and French populations. Papon “participated in the elaboration of the project of the law of 1946 concerning the events in the Constantine region,”201 which technically introduced him to the realm of the colonial aff airs in Algeria under French rule. He also adamantly opposed the propositions of transferring the functions of his subcommission to the governor general of
200 On the massacre of 8 May 1945 and the numerous estimates of victims, see for example, Yves Benot, Massacres coloniaux : 1944-1950 : La IVe République et la mise au pas des colonies françaises (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1994), 9–35; Mehana Amrani, Le 8 mai 1945 en Algérie: les discours français sur les massacres de Sétif, Kherrata et Guelma (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 42–70; Henri Alleg, La Guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Temps actuels, 1981), 265–267. 201 Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, “Maurice Papon, administrateur colonial, 1945-1958,” in Les administrations coloniales XIXe-XXe siècles, Esquisse d’une histoire comparée (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009), 71.
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Algeria, as well as establishing a resident minister in Algeria instead of a governor general of Algeria, which arose in the aftermath of the resignation of General de Gaulle in January 1946. Papon’s opposition was fueled by the fact that “the institution of a minister resident quickly appeared as the establishment of a diarchy between Paris and Algiers and a taste of the end.”202 After serving as Chief of the Cabinet of the State Secretary under the French Minister of the Interior in 1946 and then as Prefect of Corsica in 1947, Papon was appointed Prefect of the Department of Constantine on 17 September 1949. At the time of his appointment, the Socialist Marcel-Edmond Naegelen (1892–1978) was General Governor of Algeria under French rule, who (retrospectively speaking) failed to supervise the 1948 French legislative elections for the Algerian Assembly. In his 1962 memoirs on his missions in colonial Algeria between 1948 and 1951, Naegelen portrayed Constantine as:
… the poorest of the three [Algerian departments], the one where the European population was least dense, the one which pan-Arab propaganda aff ected most directly, the one which had been the theatre of the horrors of May 1945 in the cities and regions of Sétif and Guelma, the one where the general rebellion would break out in the Aurès on 1 November 1954.203
Consequently, in the daunting Department of Constantine, Papon was expected (among other things) to thoroughly reorganize the administrative services of the prefecture in order to gather intelligence; to address the question of the territorial and social sous-administration [underadministration] as a way to impede the expansion of various nationalist movements; and to ensure the nonelection of Algerians in the Algerian Assembly during the legislative elections of June 1951 by means of a planned vote-rigging, as had occurred in April 1948. His most important task was to create suitable solutions to the legal status of the disparus (missing persons): those “disappeared” Algerians who had been murdered during
202 Ibid., 70. [“L’institution d’un ministre-résident apparut rapidement comme l’établissement d’une dyarchie entre Paris et Alger et un avant-gout de la fi n.”] 203 Cited in Vann Kelly, “Papon Transition After World War II. A Prefect’s Road from Bordeaux, through Algeria, and Beyond. August 1941–October 1961,” in Th e Papon Aff air, Memory and Justice in Trial, ed. Richard Golsan (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), 47–48.
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the French massacres of May 1945 and whose bodies had been burned.204 Following his colonial experiences in Constantine, Papon had become Secretary General of the Prefecture of the Paris Police by the end of 1951. His transfer from colonial Constantine to metropolitan Paris foreshadowed a similar situation in 1958, when Papon was again devolved from wartime-era Constantine to Paris: not as secretary general this time but as Prefect of the Paris Police. Th e legacies between the French police in France and the colonial policies in Algeria, along with their multifaceted characters, were not new to the French authorities; the intimate relationship could be traced back to Louis Jean-Baptiste Lépine (1846–1933), who served fi rst as Prefect of the Paris Police between 1893 and 1897, then as Governor General of Algeria from 1897 to 1899, and then again as Prefect of the Paris Police from 1899 to 1913.205 Th ese back-and-forth presences and exchanges between the experiences gained in Algeria under French colonial rule and France intensifi ed dramatically after the Second World War.206 Papon, however, unlike other fi gures, was also equipped with the practices of the Vichy regime; thus his presence in colonial Constantine during the Algerian War of Independence deserves further inquiry. In the summer of 1954, a few months prior to the outbreak of the Algerian War, Papon was appointed Secretary General of the French Protectorate of Morocco under the Government of Pierre Mendès France. Th ere, he was predominantly involved in planning colonial reforms that aimed to limit Morocco’s demands for independence, including the formulation of various socio-economic policies for urban and rural equipments (infrastructure or equipment).207 In January 1956, Papon became a member of the investigation committee of the Commissariat général du plan (CGP, or General Commissariat of the Plan, Chapter 3), a French institution established in 1946 by General de Gaulle whose aim was to elaborate the long-term economic planning of the reconstruction of France, particularly through fi ve-year plans such as the Monnet Plan
204 On the activities of Papon in Constantine between 1949 and 1951, see, for example, Peyroulou, “Maurice Papon, administrateur colonial, 1945-1958,” 71–75. 205 Ibid., 76. 206 See, for example, Emmanuel Blanchard, La police parisienne et les Algériens (1944-1962) (Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2011); Jim House and Neil MacMaster, “‘Une Journée Portée Disparue’. Th e Paris Massacre of 1961 and Memory,” in Crisis and Renewal in France, 1918-1962 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 267–90. 207 On Papon’s planning policies, see, for example, Maurice Papon, Pour Une Politique D’équipement Urbain et Rural : Exposé Devant La Section Française Du Conseil Du Gouvernement, Décembre 1954. On Papon’s intentions in Morocco, see, Jim House and Neil MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 41–48.
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and the Marshall Plan (Chapter 3). Papon’s position did not last for long. In February 1956 he was appointed Technical Advisor to the Cabinet of the French Minister of the Interior for Algerian Aff airs. Whereas Morocco gained its independence on 2 March 1956, and Tunisia on 20 March 1956, the newly appointed French Resident Minister of Algeria, Robert Lacoste, obtained the bill of the pouvoirs spéciaux (“exceptional powers”) from the French National Assembly in Paris to maintain law and order in the French departments of Algeria, to protect its people and goods, and to safeguard the territory of Algeria: that is, to maintain Algeria under French rule.208 Shortly after, new administrative reforms were announced, and Papon was appointed not only Prefect of the Department of Constantine (as he had previously served, between 1949 and 1951), but also at the same time the aforementioned IGAME for the Region of Eastern Algeria. Th e status of the IGAME was reactivated in 1948 by French Minister of the Interior Jules Salvador Moch (1893–1985) in the wake of the labor strikes of 1947 in France; he bore the responsibility for ensuring public order and security in the departments that covered France’s military regions.209 Th e IGAME was the direct successor of the inspecteurs régionaux (“regional inspectors”), which had been fi rst instituted in France by the Vichy regime.210 Th e regional inspectors were established by the law of 19 April 1941; they acted as a regional intermediate echelon between the government and the departments and were charged with the coordination of information and the implementation of Vichy-era laws. In their extraordinary missions, the regional prefects were then directly assisted by, as French historian Pierre Barral wrote, “two special collaborators: the intendant [a chief administrative offi cer] of the police and the intendant of economic airs.”aff 211 Ironically, the decrees of 1951 and 1953 did indeed expand the fi elds of profi ciency of the 1948 IGAME to cover administrative and economic matters. Th e IGAME also then became
208 Décret no. 56-274 du 17 mars relatif aux mesures exceptionnelles tendant au rétablissement de l’ordre, à la protection des personnes et des biens et à la sauvegarde du territoire de l’Algérie. Journal Offi ciel de la République Française du 19 mars 1959. 209 Annie Denizart and Hervé Passot, eds., La région avant la région: Fonds de la mission économique régionale du Nord-Pas de Calais, 1949- 1976 (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, n.d.), 66. 210 Emmanuel Vital-Durand, Les collectivités territoriales en France, 5e ed. (Paris: Hachette Livre, 2004), 20. 211 Pierre Barral, “Idéal et pratique du régionalisme dans le régime de Vichy,” Revue française de science politique 24e année, no. 5 (1974): 925, doi:10.3406/rfsp.1974.418741. [“Deux collaborateurs spéciaux intendant de police et intendant des aff aires économiques.”]
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involved in the development and management of long-term economic plans. With his 1956 IGAME position, Papon held “the higher control and the overall coordination of civil and military authorities in the departments included in the Region of Eastern Algeria.”212 Th e Region of Eastern Algeria was then considered to be composed of the departments of Constantine, Batna, Bône (today Annaba), and Sétif. Th is vast area corresponded with one of the three French military divisions of colonial Algeria.213 Th e regions of Constantine, Algiers, and Oran—stretching from the eastern border with Tunisia to the western boundary with Morocco—coincided with the Tenth Military Region of France. As a result of his dual infl uential function, Papon represented and administered the Department of Constantine while simultaneously heading the prefects of Constantine (by himself), Batna (with General Parlange, who became Prefect of Batna in August 1956), Bône, and Sétif.214 At the same time, he was in direct correspondence with the military commander-in-chief of the Constantine Army Corps, who operated in the territory that included the aforementioned departments. In this context, Papon was responsible (among other duties) for ensuring law and order; defi ning the forbidden zones; obliterating the Organisation politico-administrative (OPA, or Politico-Administration Organization) of the FLN; monitoring the forced relocation and regroupement of the civilian population; supervising the civil-military operations conducted by the SAS; and gathering intelligence incessantly. In a letter to Robert Lacoste dated 5 July 1956 on the administrative reforms, Papon avowed that “I think, for my part, that the implementation of new administrations requires a broad eff ort of adaptation to which we cannot escape, and original solutions, even if they seem exorbitant to the common law, are essential to give birth to new departments.”215
212 Cited in Peyroulou, “Maurice Papon, administrateur colonial, 1945-1958,” 77. FR ANOM 93/ 4400. Letter of 16 May 1956 defi ning the poweres of the IGAME. [“Contrôle supérieur et de la coordination générale des autorités civiles et militaires dans les départements compris dans les regions de l’Est algérien.”] 213 Jean-Louis Masson, Provinces, départements, régions : l’organisation administrative de la France d’hier à demain (Paris: Editions Fernand Lanore, 1984), 570. 214 Later, in 1958, a new Department of Bougie (in Kabylia) was created and incorporated to Constantine Military Army Corps. 215 FR ANOM 12 CAB 124. Inspecteur Général de l’Administration en Mission Extraordinaire pour les Départements de l’Est Algérien à Monsieur le Ministre Résidant en Algérie. Signé Maurice Papon. Constantine, le 5 juillet 1956. [“J’estime, pour ma part, que l’implantation de nouvelles administrations nécessite un large eff ort d’adaptation auquel on ne saurait échapper et que des solutions originales, même si elle paraissent exorbitantes du droit commun, sont indispensables pour donner vie au nouveaux départements.”]
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During his 1997-98 trial, as Papon was interrogated about the curriculum vitae of his long career, he was asked to list and describe his life before and after the Vichy regime. While portraying the second wave of his functions in the Algerian town of Constantine under French colonial rule between 1956 and 1958, Papon (now in his late eighties) asserted during his trail that “my mission was pacifi cation.”216 He was seemingly faithful to the general terminology dictated by the French Republic in colonial Algeria. But according to Jean-Luc Einaudi—French political activist and author of La Ferme Améziane: enquête sur un centre de torture pendant la Guerre d’Algérie (Th e Ameziane Farm: Enquiry On A Torture Center During the Algerian War) and La Bataille de Paris: 17 Octobre 1961 (Th e Battle of Paris: 17 October 1961)—Papon stimulated the expansion of a total war in eastern Algeria. During the course of a press conference in the Prefecture of Constantine, Papon unequivocally ordered “all civilians to behave as soldiers”; he then stressed that “there are no longer military offi cers and civilians. It is necessary to be merely soldiers.”217 Although his two books were published in 1991, prior to Papon’s conviction in 1998 by the French authorities, Einaudi had demonstrated that “under [Papon’s] authority [as prefect and IGAME of Constantine], extrajuridical executions and the use of torture [were] practiced by military offi cers and policemen. Torture became a habitual and normal means to gather intelligence.”218 Einaudi argued that Robert Lacoste buttressed the “interrogation centers” and praised the measures that Papon took in Constantine, declaring that Maurice Papon was “one of the best administrative leaders in Algeria.”219 Papon was so persuasive that he was designated to defend French policies in Algeria at the United Nations General Assembly in the autumn of 1957.220
216 Erhel, Aucher, and de La Baume, Le Procès de Maurice Papon: 8 octobre 1997- 8 janvier 1998, 1:190. [“J’avais comme mission la ‘pacifi cation’.”] 217 Jean-Luc Einaudi, La bataille de Paris: 17 octobre 1961 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991), 48. [“Je demande à tous les civils de se conduire en soldats (…). Il n’y a plus de militaires et de civils. Il ne doit plus y avoir que des soldats.”] 218 Ibid. [“Sous son autorité, les exécutions sommaires et l’usage de la torture sont pratiqués par des militaires et des policiers. La torture devient un moyen habituel, normal, pour obtenir des renseignements.”] One of the most infamous torture centers was the Ferme Ameziane. It was located in Constantine region and under the authority of Papon, see, for example, Jean-Luc Einaudi, La ferme Améziane: Enquête sur un centre de torture pendant la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1991); Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Torture: Cancer of Democracy, France and Algeria, 1954- 62. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963); Raphaëlle Branche, La torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie, 1954-1962 (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2001), 268–276. 219 Einaudi, La bataille de Paris: 17 octobre 1961, 51. [“Un de nos meilleurs chefs administratifs de l’Algérie.”] 220 Ibid., 52.
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Conversely, in the vast territory under Lacoste’s celebrated administrator, the number of the Algerian people who were compulsorily uprooted and regrouped nearly tripled, rising from 117,000 to 360,000 people between 1956 and 1958.221 Th is was partly infl uenced by the fortifi cation of the Algerian borders with the Morice Line. In addition, Papon fi rmly ordered the immediate suppression of the term camp from all road signs; he banned the use of the word: “Th e permanent regrouping centers will be established in various municipalities and endowed with interim special delegations. Th e term camp will have to disappear from the terminology.”222 On 17 September 1957, Papon scripted new directives entitled “Instructions relatives aux regroupements de populations” (“Instructions for the Regrouping of the Population”). He divided his long handbook into two main parts. Th e fi rst, called “Generalities,” dealt with the raison d’être of the regrouping and provided an in-depth examination of the methods for regrouping, while the second part, “Practical Measures,” addressed the classifi cation of the regroupings and the conditions in which the operations of new regroupings might be undertaken.223 Papon confi rmed that the purpose of the regroupement of the populations was twofold: “to remove the support provided by scattered populations to outlaws, and at the same time to detach these populations—because they are what is at stake in revolutionary warfare—from the infl uence of the rebels.”224 Papon emphasized that this technique was not new, given that identical methods had been employed elsewhere, and that their effi ciency had been validated during the course of the Greek Civil War, as well as in Korea, Malaysia, and Kenya. Papon also corroborated that the regroupement of the Algerian population was the corollary of the military policy of the forbidden zone, and that the ultimate challenge of revolutionary-style warfare was not the conquest of the land, but rather of the
221 Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, “Maurice Papon, administrateur colonial, 1945-1958,” in Les administrations coloniales XIXe-XXe siècles, Esquisse d’une histoire comparée (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009), 78. Th e number is indicative, given that the fi rst attempt to quantify the regroupement was achieved in 1959. 222 Ageron, “Une dimension de la guerre d’Algérie: les ‘regroupements’ de populations,” 236. [“Les centres de regroupement défi nitifs pourront être érigés en communes distinctes et pourvues de délégations spéciales provisoires. Le terme de camp devra disparaitre de la terminologie.”] Michel Cornaton, in an interview with the author on 18 May 2013, declared that due to Papon’s instruction, the term camp became invisible. 223 SHAT 1 H 2576 D 2. Inspecteur Général de l’Administration en Mission Extraordinaire, Préfet de Constantine. Instructions relatives aux regroupements de populations. 17 Septembre 1957. 224 Ibid., p. 2. [“Supprimer le support fourni aux hors la loi par une population dispersée en en même temps arracher cette population, enjeu de la guerre révolutionnaire, à l’emprise rebelle, telle est la double fi n.”]
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population itself. According to Papon, a successful subjugation of the population was to be accomplished by means of “a mandatory and dynamic participation of the population,” which he considered to be “the guiding thread of psychological action.”225 Once the physical ascendency over the population was assured, he continued, “the moral infl uence and propaganda may be applied, particularly during the daily and weekly meetings. Th ese would very likely obtain a higher result than is typically achieved in traditional centers.”226 Papon explained in the instructions to his offi cers—and to civilians, who, as he had ordered, had to behave like offi cers—that the Algerian populations who were subjected to the forced regroupement would become receptive of a direct psychological action only if they were immediately “immersed, from the beginning, in an environment of order, discipline, and hygiene, and ‘organized’ in parallel hierarchies representing the professions, diverse origins, settlements in the center, etc.”227 While it is not clear what Papon meant by “traditional centers” (possibly camps), he was unambiguous about the “exorbitant” psychological and disciplinary mechanisms that should be used to persuasively overpower civilians. Papon also asserted that the French authorities had decided to classify the regroupement of the populations into two distinct categories: temporary and permanent. Th is diff erence was predominantly conditioned by the economic viability of the regroupement. Th e temporary regroupements were considered to be, as Papon declared, “refugee camps in which it is necessary to ensure, during a certain time, in addition to security, the means of subsistence—namely, food and shelter in precarious conditions (tents or gourbis).”228 Th e permanent camps, meanwhile, must provide “the possibility for the inhabitants to subsist on their own labor, within a political and economic environment. Th is implies that arable lands, pastures, and construction sites are to be located in the immediate vicinity of these
225 Ibid., p. 4. [“Tel doit être le fi l conducteur de l’action psychologique à y exercer.”] 226 Ibid. p. 5. [“L’emprise morale et la propagande pourront s’exercer notamment à l’occasion des réunions quotidiennes et hebdomadaires. Elles seront même susceptibles d’obtenir un rendement supérieur à celui généralement atteint dans les centres traditionnels.”] 227 Ibid., p. 4. [“Les ‘regroupés’ plongés, dès le début, dans une ambiance d’ordre, de discipline, d’hygiène, ‘organisées’ en hiérarchies parallèles représentatives des professions, des diverses origines, des implantations dans le centre , etc... “] 228 Ibid., p. 6. [“Il s’agit en pratique de camps de réfugiés auxquels il est nécessaire d’assurer pendant un certain temps, avec la sécurité, de quoi subsister c’est à dire se nourrir, s’abriter dans des conditions précaires (tentes ou gourbis).”]
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Figs. 2.27–2.30 Robert Lacoste, the French Resident Minister in Algeria, visits the construction of a camp de regroupement in the region of Constantine, June 1957. ECPAD ALG 57 317.
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Fig. 2.31 (left) Maurice Papon and Robert Lacoste, June 1957. ECPAD ALG 57 317. Fig. 2.32 (right) Robert Lacoste in a meeting in Constantine, June 1957. ECPAD ALG 57 317. centers.”229 Not only did new regroupements need to belong to one of these two classes of camps; all existing camps also had to be immediately classifi ed and adapted to one of the two categories. First, the SAS offi cers were requested to complete a questionnaire about the regroupement; then, based on these descriptions, a special commission would classify the camps. In this context, Papon declared that “the decisions will be taken at the level of departmental mixed general staff , after consulting the related major civil services, who will conduct (in advance, if possible) rapid reconnaissance.”230 Lacoste further elaborated on the technical and economic diff erences between temporary and permanent regroupements in the directives of 12 November 1957 addressed to his IGAMEs and prefects. In an attempt to “standardize the viewpoints and specify the procedure to be applied in order to achieve prompt results and bestow the necessary
229 Ibid. “La possibilité pour les habitants de vivre de leur travail, dans un cadre économiquement et politiquement viable. Cela implique que des terres cultivables, des pacages, des chantiers se trouvent à proximité immediate de ces centres.” 230 Ibid., p. 7. [“Les décisions seront prises à l’échelon de l’Etat-Major Mixte départemental après consultation des grands services civils intéressés qui procèderont au préalable, dans toute la mesure du possible, à des reconnaissances rapides.”]
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means,”231 Lacoste defi ned every imaginable aspect of these two categories, including types of shelters, the competent decision makers to be put in place, the builders responsible, the technical characteristics, and the security concerns and fi nancing methods. In the temporary regroupements, the SASs were accountable for providing aid to the population, in kind and by labor, social assistance, and health care; the military authority was responsible for the security of transportation, construction sites, population displacement, and the camps de regroupement; the CRHR was accountable for the provision of any “covered metallic structures” and civil defense; and the services of the prefecture were expected to purchase and install temporary tents. In the permanent regroupements, the SASs, together with the services of the prefecture and the municipality, were to solve technical matters related to water conveyance, sanitation, and viability; the CRHR was responsible for the construction of houses; the services of the prefecture and municipality for the construction of new town halls; and the military authority (as with the temporary regroupements) was to ensure the security of transportation, construction sites, population displacement, and any nouveaux centres232 (“new centers”). According to an estimate of 1 April 1959, in the region of Constantine alone, 370,111 people were subjected to massive regroupements, 141,714 of whom were considered to be temporary and 228,397 permanent.233
Th e introduction of the prospective future of the regroupement in the form of a seemingly clear distinction between temporary and permanent camps remained theoretical, or at least only clear on paper. In fact, although the French media reported the disorderliness of the French army in terms of the politics of the regroupement and the outrageous conditions of the camps de regroupement in April 1959, the human and socio-economic circumstances of the regroupements continued to be exceedingly tragic. According to General Parlange (who in the meantime had become Inspecteur général des regroupements in charge of enforcing directives and regulations, visiting existing camps, and reporting on their status and conditions):
231 SHAT 1 H 2576 D 1. Le Ministre de l’Algérie, Robert Lacoste à Messieurs les Inspecteurs Généraux de l’Administration en Mission Extraordinaire, Messieurs les Préfets. Objet: Regroupements de Population. Instruction n° 388 – DGAP/Sp. Alger, le 12 Novembre 1957, p. 1. 232 Ibid. Annexe I and II. 233 SHAT 1 H 2576 D 1. Regroupements de Population. Situation au 1 Avril 1959.
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We must indeed recognize that the regroupement often coincides with “uprooting” and is associated with a “scorched earth” policy. Th e consequences are serious in terms of various human, economic, and social developments that, if we are not careful, will render an already diffi cult future even more uncertain.234 … It seems to me to be essential that a healthy discipline should be brought back, because lack of discipline is rampant.”235
In the matter of the construction sites, Papon mentioned in his instructions that the sites were projected to be located in close proximity to the “permanent” camps de regroupement, which were equally opened, managed, and protected by the French military offi cers. Th ese building sites included the rehabilitation, reconstruction, and construction of infrastructure, hydraulic facilities, public buildings, and other works of public interest. A 1958 report on the participation of the army in extramilitary pacifi cation tasks featured an introduction by General Raoul Salan, who at the time was representing both civil and military powers when the document was issued. (He was serving simultaneously as General Delegate of Government, Commander-in-Chief of Forces in Algeria, and Joint-Army Senior Commander for the Tenth Military Region.) Th e report argued that “the fi rst goal of the construction sites is to enable more intimate psychological contacts with the men from the hamlet.… Th is is also a way of saying that France is determined to remain in Algeria.”236 Th e French army estimated that as of 1 July 1958, there were 203 military construction sites (in which 11,734 workers were employed) and 440 civil construction sites237; these fi gures saw a rapid increase to (respectively) 407 military sites (with 25,560
234 SHAT 1 H 2574. Le Général Parlange, Conseiller Technique et Inspecteur Général du Regroupement à Monsieur le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Alger le 15 Février 1960. p. 2. [“Il faut bien reconnaitre, en eff et, que regroupement correspond souvent aussi à “déracinement” et s’apparente à une politique de “terre brulée” - les conséquences en sont graves sur les plans humain, économique et social et ne manqueront pas si nous n’y prenons garde de rendre plus incertain un avenir qui semblait déjà diffi cile.”] 235 Ibid., p. 4. [“Il me semble indispensable qu’une saine discipline soit remise en application car l’indiscipline est généralisée.”] 236 SHAT 1 H 1119. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement, Commandement en Chef des Forces en Algérie, Commandement Supérieur Interarmées pour la 10e Région Militaire, Etat-Major – 6e Bureau. Synthèse relative à la participation de l’Armée aux tâches extra-militaires de pacifi cation. 1er semestre 1958. Alger, le 1er Août 1958. p. 18. [“Le but premier du chantier est de permettre des contacts psychologiques plus nombreux et plus intimes avec les hommes de la mechta. (…) C’est aussi une façon de signifi er que la France est décidée à rester en Algérie.”] 237 Ibid., p. 30.
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Fig. 2.33 (left) Regrouping of the Algerian civilian population by the French army between January 1956 and July 1958. From Délégation Générale du Gouvernement, Commandement en Chef des Forces en Algérie, Commandement Supérieur Interarmées pour la 10e Région Militaire, Etat-Major – 6e Bureau, Synthèse relative à la participation de l’Armée aux tâches extra-militaires de pacifi cation. 1er semestre 1958, Alger, le 1er Août 1958, p. 23. SHAT 1 H 1119. Fig. 2.34 (right) Construction site protected by the French army between January 1956 and July 1958. From Ibid., p. 19. SHAT 1 H 1119. hired laborers) and 576 civilian sites by 31 December 1958.238 Army offi cers also spent time securing the protection of both the civil and military construction sites. Th e locality, status, and type of such sites, however, were not at all specifi ed, since the army’s main priority was to reach record numbers in order to legitimate the army’s achievements. According to General Salan, the year 1958 confi rmed that “the army’s contributions to
238 SHAT 1 H 1119. Commandement de la Xe Région Militaire et des Forces Terrestres en Algérie, Etat-Major – 6e Bureau. Synthèse relative à la participation de l’Armée aux tâches extra-militaires de pacifi cation. 2ème semestre 1958. Alger, le 1er Février 1959. p. 18.
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Fig. 2.35 (left) Regrouping of the Algerian civilian population by the French army between January 1956 and January 1959. From From Délégation Générale du Gouvernement, Commandement en Chef des Forces en Algérie, Commandement Supérieur Interarmées pour la 10e Région Militaire, Etat-Major – 6e Bureau, Synthèse relative à la participation de l’Armée aux tâches extra-militaires de pacifi cation. 2ème semestre 1958, Alger, le 1er Février 1959, p. 13. SHAT 1 H 1119. Fig. 2.36 (right) Construction site protected by the French army between January 1956 and January 1959. From Ibid., p. 12. SHAT 1 H 1119. extramilitary pacifi cation tasks were both complete and total.”239 Nonetheless, another 1958 document stated that these construction sites were a straightforward part of the army’s everyday tasks, and were not in fact “extramilitary.” Th is document was a rigorous report that served as preparation for a conference at the Centre des hautes études militaires (CHEM, or Center for Advanced Military Studies) in Paris, which trained higher-level offi cers. Instead, the sites were named chantiers de chômage et
239 SHAT 1 H 1119. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement, Commandement en Chef des Forces en Algérie, Commandement Supérieur Interarmées pour la 10e Région Militaire, Etat-Major – 6e Bureau. Synthèse relative à la participation de l’Armée aux tâches extra-militaires de pacifi cation. 1er semestre 1958. Alger, le 1er Août 1958, p. 3. [“La contribution de l’Armée aux tâches extra-militaires de pacifi cation n’a été aussi complète, aussi totale.”]
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Fig. 2.37 (left) Regrouping of the Algerian civilian population by the French army between January 1959 and June 1959. From From Délégation Générale du Gouvernement, Commandement en Chef des Forces en Algérie, Commandement Supérieur Interarmées pour la 10e Région Militaire, Etat-Major – 6e Bureau, Synthèse relative à la participation de l’Armée aux tâches extra-militaires de pacifi cation. 1er semestre 1959, Alger, le 18 Août 1959, p. 15. SHAT 1 H 1119. Fig. 2.38 (right) Construction site protected by the French army between January 1959 and June 1959. From Ibid., p. 14. SHAT 1 H 1119. de pacifi cation (“construction sites for unemployment and pacifi cation”).240 To this end— particularly in the context of counterrevolutionary strategies in colonial Algeria—offi cers were stimulated and educated with the expectation that they should “take immediate measures to restore confi dence and to face underemployment and unemployment.”241 In his press statement in a radio broadcast of 17 September 1957, Papon formally declared that “two thousand constructions sites have been launched, employing sixty-six
240 SHAT 1 H 2576. Commandement Supérieur Interarmées, 10ème Région Militaire. Etat-Major, 6e Bureau. Objet: Renseignement pour la préparation d’une conférence au CHEM, Alger, le 9 Avril 1958, p. 7. 241 Ibid. [“Il importe de prendre immédiatement des mesures propres à restaurer la confi ance et à lutter contre le sous-emploi et le chômage.”]
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thousand workers. Th e most important of these, undisputedly, is the one we’ve opened at the Tunisian border, where seven thousand volunteer workers are fi nishing the defensive works.”242 Papon’s fi gures do not coincide with those issued by the Sixth Bureau. Th e fi rst sentence sought to overestimate the number of both construction sites and working forces, while discussing undefi ned locations, unspecifi ed camp types, unspoken investments, and the undecided nature of the projects. Even if Papon considered the construction of the camps de regroupement as being part of the chantiers de chômage et de pacifi cation, the fi gures still were overstated. Papon’s intention appears to have been to impress the radio audience with colossal and propagandistic numbers on the French authorities’ initiatives in colonial Constantine and Algeria in general. In the second sentence, however, Papon stressed purely military enterprises, although he did not explicitly say this. Th e massive defensive works in question ran along the Algerian borders with Tunisia in the east and Morocco in the west; it consisted of imposing electrifi ed fences of barbed wire, watchtowers, and searchlights in the midst of large minefi elds. Th e long and wide military fortifi cation was called the Morice Line, named after French Minister of National Defense André Morice (1900–1990); the line was completed in September 1957.243 For obvious reasons, not only had the military barrier of the Morice Line not been built by volunteers, but it had also engendered further massive regroupements of the civilian population, since outsized forbidden zones were created along the borders of the line. Th e conscripted labor force was repressed under French rule and relentless control. Papon continued his announcement to the press, arguing that “the most common behavior for a population who is willing to escape the infl uence of the rebels is to regroup itself under the protections of our posts.… We are opening many building sites for rural housing projects, particularly where the regroupements will be permanent because of
242 FR ANOM 12 CAB 124. Déclaration faite à la radio le Mardi 17 Septembre 1957 par Monsieur Maurice Papon, Inspecteur Général de l’Administration en Mission Extraordinaire pour la Région de l’Est Algérien, p. 3. [“2’000 chantiers sont ouverts, employant 66’000 ouvriers. Le plus important d’entre eux est, sans conteste, celui ouvert à la frontière tunisienne où 7’000 ouvriers volontaires parachèvent les travaux de défense.”] 243 On the objectives and further developments of the Morice Line, see, for example, Guy Pervillé, Atlas de la Guerre d’Algérie: de la conquête à l’indépendance (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2011), 34–35; Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1977), 263–267.
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favorable economic conditions.”244 Papon’s words profoundly reversed both the military raison d’être of the regroupements and Locoste’s aforementioned instructions on the motivations of the permanent regroupement. Th is specifi c camoufl age episode was not an isolated case within Papon’s methods of distorting a given reality, suppressing the voice of intimidated civilians, and extolling his heroic role; it also has little to do (as one might think) with the propagandistic purposes or optimistic perspectives of his press declarations. Th e “Papon System,” as Jim House and Neil MacMaster, authors of Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror and Memory, called it, was grounded in the particular experiences he’d gained from the authoritarian Vichy regime, violent colonial policies, and subversive military counterrevolutionary operations in colonial Algeria. As the authors wrote of this last point, the:
… total system of counter-insurgency and repression were carefully concealed from the public: a high level of decentralization of operations, scattered across the huge space of colonial Algeria, combined with a deliberate kaleidoscope of constantly changing names and acronyms for sinister operations … made it diffi cult even for investigative journalists to form a clear picture.245
In the course of the Algerian War of National Liberation, the Papon System was not restricted to colonial Algerians, but continued unabated in Paris. Shortly before the fi rst French Generals’ Putsch in Algiers on 13 May 1958 (Chapter 3), Papon was promoted to the position of Prefect of the Paris Police in March 1958. In June of that same year General de Gaulle kept Papon in that post; under the new Fifth Republic (until January 1967), Papon became the longest-serving police chief since the time of Louis Lépine (1846– 1933) around the turn of the twentieth century (as Papon himself proudly proclaimed).246 Jean Chapel—another former Vichy civil servant in Bordeaux who had also escaped the purge—replaced Papon in Constantine.
244 FR ANOM 12 CAB 124. Déclaration faite à la radio le Mardi 17 Septembre 1957 par Monsieur Maurice Papon, Inspecteur Général de l’Administration en Mission Extraordinaire pour la Région de l’Est Algérien, p. 2. [“Le procède le plus courant des populations voulant échapper à l’emprise rebelle est de se regrouper sous la protection de nos postes. (…) Des chantiers d’habitat rural s’ouvrent, en particulier, là où les regroupements seront défi nitifs en raison de condition économique favorable.”] 245 House and MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, 59. 246 Erhel, Aucher, and de La Baume, Le Procès de Maurice Papon: 8 octobre 1997- 8 janvier 1998, 1:196.
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Figs. 2.39–2.40 Construction of shelters in the camp de regroupement of Taher El Achouet in Constantine. ECPAD ALG 57 348.
Vichy ghosts continued to inhabit and serve in colonial Algeria; echoes of the Vichy regime and the Second World War persisted in Algeria under French rule even after Papon’s departure from Constantine.247 While describing his various responsibilities as police prefect in Paris during his 1997–98 trial, Papon confi rmed that one of his roles was to fi ght “the assaults organized by the FLN, whose methods of action were founded in terrorism, as routinely occur today in all countries.”248 With the intention of primarily targeting the Algerian immigrant community in Paris and destabilizing their claims for independence, Papon maintained that he “had asked SAS offi cers, who had done wonders in their pacifi cation tasks, to come from Algeria. We were able to penetrate the FLN environments and, in the end, dominate this devastating phenomenon.”249 Papon deliberately transferred not only certain Vichy methods to colonial Algeria, but also specifi c actors and techniques that had been employed in colonial Algeria to the postwar
247 On the legacy between Vichy civil servant and colonial Algeria, see, for example, House and MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, 33–40. 248 Erhel, Aucher, and de La Baume, Le Procès de Maurice Papon: 8 octobre 1997- 8 janvier 1998, 1:196. [“Des attentats du FLN qui avait institué comme méthode d’action le terrorisme, comme on le voit de manière courante dans tous les pays.”] 249 Ibid., 1:197. [“À cet égard, j’avais fait venir d’Algérie des offi ciers SAS (Section Administrative Spécialisée) qui avaient fait merveille dans leurs tâches de pacifi cation. Nous avons pu pénétrer les milieux FLN et, à la fi n, dominer ce phénomène si dévastateur.”]
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Figs. 2.41 Distribution of the sectors of the Service d’assistance technique aux français musulmans d’Algérie (SAT-FMA) within the prefecture of Paris Police. From Cunibile, Roger, L’assistance technique aux français musulmans d’Algérie à la préfecture de police à Paris (1961), 129.
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Fifth Republic under General de Gaulle. Immediately after Papon’s nomination in Paris, three senior SAS and SAU offi cers “were secretly fl own in from Algeria on 13 August 1958”250 in order to fi rst create the Service d’assistance technique aux français musulmans d’Algérie (SAT-FMA, or the Offi ce of Technical Assistance to French Muslims of Algeria, Chapter 4), which was directly controlled by the newly established Service de coordination des aff aires algériennes (SCAA, or the Offi ce of Coordination of Algerian Aff airs) of the Paris Police Prefecture. Other SAS offi cers arrived from Algeria to strategically lead special-intelligence offi ces in Paris called the Bureau de renseignements spécialisés (BRS, or Specialized Intelligence Bureau). Papon invigorated the exchanges of information and strategies between the SAS in colonial Algeria and the SAT-FMA in Paris.251 In 1988 Papon published Les Chevaux du pouvoir: Le Préfet de police du général de Gaulle ouvre des dossiers, 1958–1967 (Th e Horses of Power: De Gaulle’s Police Prefect
Opens the Files, 1958–1967), in which he fi rmly denied the massacre of October 1961 and unceasingly eulogized his own role in smashing the FLN. According to Papon, his intention was “to settle SAS offi cers who spoke Arabic, knew the specifi c problems of migrant workers, and were sensitive to their diffi culties and misfortunes—even their distress—in those areas inhabited by the Muslim population, where we were almost absent.”252 Of course, Papon did not employ SAS offi cers and infi ltrate harki253 agents among Algerians in Paris to provide socio-economic supports, but rather to create comprehensive fi chiers (“card-index fi les”), conduct a full census of the Algerian community, identify FLN supporters, and eventually to diff use anti-FLN propaganda campaigns in the bidonvilles of Paris where Algerians lived. Because such measures did not completely satisfy Papon, he imposed a curfew upon all Algerians, or Français musulmans d’Algérie (French Algerians
250 House and MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, 70. 251 On Papon’s role in the legacy between colonial violent repression in Algeria and Paris, see, for example, Ibid., 67–80; Roger Cunibile, L’assistance technique aux français musulmans d’Algérie à la préfecture de police à Paris, 1961; Emmanuel Blanchard, “Encadrer des ‘citoyens diminués’. La police des Algériens en région parisienne (1944-1962).” (Th èse pour le doctorat d’histoire, Université de Bourgogne, 2008), 219–230. 252 Maurice Papon, Les chevaux du pouvoir: Le préfet de police du général de Gaulle ouvre des dossiers, 1958-1967 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1988), 103–104. [“D’installer dans ces zones à population musulmane d’où nous étions pratiquement absent des offi ciers SAS parlant l’arabe, connaissant les problèmesspécifi ques des travailleurs immigrés, sensibles à leurs diffi cultés, à leurs malheurs voire à leur détresse.”] 253 Th e term harki (from harka, movement) refers to Algerians who served in the French army during the Algerian War of Independence.
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from Algeria), between 8:30 p.m. and 5:30 a.m.; their cafés had to close at 7:00 p.m., and any travel by car must be controlled, or their vehicles would be temporarily impounded.254 Against this background, thousands of Algerians (including women and children) peacefully demonstrated in the streets of Paris. La Bataille de Paris (the Battle of Paris) culminated in the killing of hundreds of Algerians and the detention of thousands of others.255 Ironically, the arrested Algerians were detained in the same Vélodrome d’Hiver (Winter Velodrome) located in the Fifteenth Arrondissement that some twenty years earlier had served as the destination of the majority of the deported Jews during the Vichy regime. Th e Vichy methods had successfully traveled from Bordeaux to colonial Constantine; they were then brought back to the capital city of the democratic Fifth Republic of France, where they were used against colonized Algerians.
254 Note de service no. 149-61 du 5 octobre 1961, ordre du jour de Maurice Papon. Available in the Appendix in Einaudi, La bataille de Paris: 17 octobre 1961, 299. 255 Th e exact fi gures are still disputed today. Th e dead victims are estimated between 70 and 325. 11’000 people were arrested and others were herded by the police into the Seine River after being beaten.
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II. Housing in General de Gaulle’s Plan 1958–1961
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3. On the Colonial Project
Th e Algiers Generals’ Putsch of 13 May 1958 marked both the strained return of General Charles de Gaulle to power from his twelve-year offi cial political retirement and the collapse of the French Fourth Republic (1946–1958). Th e coup was led by the apostles of Algérie française (French Algeria), which included both civil servants and army offi cers. Th e latter included General Jacques Massu, commander-in-chief of the bloody Battle of Algiers, and General Raoul Salan (Chapter 1), the father of counterrevolutionary warfare who, in January 1961, had co-established the paramilitary underground group known as the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS, or Organization of the Secret Army, Chapter 5) that was opposed to the politics of de Gaulle in colonial Algeria. Th e May 1958 putsch and de Gaulle’s revival were fully supported by right-wing colons, known as the ultras, as well as by the one-time Gaullist ethnologist and former governor-general of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle (Chapter 1), who had fi rst served in de Gaulle’s government from 1959 to 1960 and then joined the OAS to fi rmly oppose the general.256 “May ’58” was a profound politico-military crisis—if not a revolution—for France. Th e civil and military authorities’ disobedience was a crucial event in the history of the French Republic and of colonialism in general; it was a critical turning point in the French War in Algeria. Although several publications have been dedicated to the various versions and interpretations of May ’58—including those written by the actors of the turmoil themselves—little has remained in the common memory of the West. In May 2008, the Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Politiques (Center for the History of Political Sciences) commemorated the fi ftieth anniversary of May ’58 in a colloquium. Th e director of the institution, Jean-François Sirinelli—author of the foreword of the resulting colloquium publication, titled Mai 1958, Le retour du général de Gaulle (May 1958, Th e Return of General de Gaulle), and specialist on the cultural and political history of France
256 On the actors and complex chronicles of May 1958, see for example, Alain de Sérigny, La révolution du 13 mai. Avec les témoignages inédits de ses principaux acteurs (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958); Bromberger Merry and Bromberger Serge, Les 13 complots du 13 mai ou la délivrance de Gulliver (Paris: Fayard, 1959); Jean-Paul Th omas, Gilles Le Béguec, and Bernard Lachaise, eds., Mai 1958. Le retour du général de Gaulle. Actes du colloque tenu au Centre d’histoire de Sciences Po, mardi 13 mai 2008. Direction éditoriale: Philippe Oulmont (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010); Maurice Vaïsse, Comment de Gaulle fi t échouer e putsch d’Alger (Bruxelles: André Versaille Editeur, 2011); Abramovici Pierre, Le Putsch des généraux : de Gaulle contre l’armée, 1958-1961 (Paris: Fayard, 2011).
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in the twentieth century—questioned why the French media payed more attention to May ’68 than to the major event that had taken place a decade before. He compared the media coverage of the celebrations of two signifi cant revolutionary moments in France and investigated the reasons behind the diff ering media treatment: “Why does 13 May 1958—whose anniversary is a round number, fi fty years—arouse so little interest within French society? I do not have the answer to such a question.”257 Both his question and his answer are telling. Regardless of political ideologies, the majority of French society seemed to have opted to remember, as a 1979 book title put it, “Les Trente Glorieuses: Ou la revolution invisible de 1946 à 1975”258 (Th e Glorious Th irty: Or the Invisible Revolution from 1946 to 1975) without giving May ’58 a second thought. Th e events of May 1958 not only brought de Gaulle back to power, but also to Algeria: a déjà-vu. In May 1943, during the Vichy regime of the Second World War, de Gaulle had moved his headquarters from London to the French territory of Algiers. With the establishment of the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (CFLN, or French Committee of National Liberation) in June 1943, Algiers became the capital of Free France.259 In the second volume of his Mémoires de Guerre (War Memories), published between 1954 and 1959, de Gaulle wrote that when he arrived in Algiers, he declared in a radio broadcast to the French people from France that “their government was now functioning in Algiers while it waited to return to Paris.”260 Algiers and the armed forces of Algeria played a crucial role in “seducing” the British and American forces that arrived in Algiers in November 1942; keeping his rival, General Henri Giraud, at bay; fi ghting the French Vichy regime; and consequently constituting the French Fourth Republic in 1946. Nevertheless, de Gaulle and his allies neither prevented nor condemned the French forces’
257 Th omas, Le Béguec, and Lachaise, Mai 1958. Le retour du général de Gaulle. Actes du colloque tenu au Centre d’histoire de Sciences Po, mardi 13 mai 2008. Direction éditoriale: Philippe Oulmont, 9. [“Pourquoi dans cette société française, le 13 mai 1958- dont l’anniversaire est, de surcroît, un compte rond, un cinquantenaire- suscite relativement peu d’échos. Je n’ai pas la réponse à une telle question.”] 258 After Jean Fourastié, Les Trente Glorieuses, ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Paris: Fayard, 1979). 259 Maurice Vaïsse, ed., De Gaulle et l’Algérie, 1943-1969. Actes du colloque tenu à l’amphithéâtre Austerlitz, aux Invalides, les vendredi 9 et samedi 10 mars 2012 (Paris: Armand Colin et Ministère de la Défense et des Anciens Combattants, 2012), 29. 260 Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de Guerre. L’unité (1942-1944) (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956), 109.[“J’annonçais aux français de France que leur gouvernement fonctionnait maintenant à Alger en attendant de venir à Paris.”]
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violent massacres of May 1945 in the Algerian region of Constantine (Chapter 2).261 Between 1958 and 1962—the year of Algeria’s independence from France— General de Gaulle visited Algeria’s northern and southern departments eight times. Th e fact that he did this fi ve times between June and December 1958 alone262 confi rms the seriousness of Algeria and the war there. In his fi rst offi cial visit to Algiers on 3–7 June 1958, where he pronounced his legendary (and overinterpreted) “Je vous ai compris!” (“I have understood you!”) at the Forum of Algiers on 4 June (Figs. 3.1, 3.2), de Gaulle assured the huge crowd that he indeed knew their intentions, declaring: “I see that the road you have opened in Algeria is that of renovation and fraternity.”263 He clarifi ed that the renovation that they sought “begins from the beginning—that is, from our institutions— and that is why I am here.”264 De Gaulle gave himself the task and the right to remodel the French institutions: not only in Algeria under French colonial rule, but also in France itself (Figs. 3.3, 3.4). Th e day before his Algiers speech, he had guaranteed himself that what he was about to announce was formally achievable by means of the approval of law no. 58-520 of the pleins pouvoirs (full powers) given to his government for a period of six months.265 De Gaulle also confi rmed the disparities between the ten million inhabitants who lived in Algeria under French rule. At the time, this comprised diff erent Algerian populations whom the colonial authorities fi rst referred to as indigènes (indigenous) and then as Musulmans (Muslims); Jews who had been granted French citizenship in 1870; and French or European citizens (today known as pieds-noirs, or black-feet). Th e general declared: “I duly record in the name of France … that from today, France considers that, in all Algeria, there is only one unique category of inhabitants: there are only fully fl edged
261 Vaïsse, De Gaulle et l’Algérie, 1943-1969. Actes du colloque tenu à l’amphithéâtre Austerlitz, aux Invalides, les vendredi 9 et samedi 10 mars 2012, 38–48. 262 Voyage du Général de Gaulle: 1958-1970, Fondation du Général de Gaulle.
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Fig. 3.1 (top left) Esplanade du Maréchal Fosch (Forum) in Algiers on 13 May 1958. Th e Palais du Gouvernement général was designed by Jacques Guiauchain and built by the company Perret brothers. From the blog C’était “la-bas” l’Algérie... mon pays. Fig. 3.2 (top right) Demonstrations of European population in Algiers (Bugeaud’s monument) on 13 May 1958. From C’était “la-bas” l’Algérie... mon pays. Fig. 3.3, 3.4 (bottom) De Gaulle’s pamphlets for French army offi cers. SHAT 1 H 1117/2.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 153
Frenchmen [Français à part entière]—fully fl edged Frenchmen with the same rights and the same duties;”266 (Fig. 3.5). De Gaulle justifi ed his statement by juxtaposing a well-known colonial dichotomy and impossibly disentangling all concerns at once. He emphasized that it was necessary to open the ways and provide the means to those who had thus far lacked access to them, and that the dignity of these people must be recognized. De Gaulle also stressed that it was equally necessary to guarantee a homeland to all those who had doubted to possess one.267 His twofold position did not last long; it was subsequently redirected to defend other French interests in Algeria. As had happened in April 1944, when General de Gaulle’s provisional government based in Algiers extended the right to vote to Frenchwomen (which led them to vote for the fi rst time Fig. 3.5 Essais sur in April 1945 during the municipal elections in France, and again l’intégration drafted by the sopporters of the politics in October 1945 in the fi rst postwar national ballot), de Gaulle of Jacques Soustelle in the aftermath of the crisis of decreed Algerian women’s suff rage on 3 July 1958. He then revealed 13 May 1958. SHAT 1 H 1117/2. a referendum on 28 September 1958 that allowed men and women in France, the overseas territories, and (for the fi rst time) colonial Algeria to approve or disapprove the constitution of the French Fifth Republic—a constitution that is still in use today. It was on his last day of his second visit to Algeria, on 1–3 July 1958, that de Gaulle revealed his concrete intentions, pronouncing: “Tonight, I proclaim that France intends to carry out on this soil a vast renovation plan that will achieve goals in which all will have their part. First of all, this means that everyone makes a living by working. Many new construction sites will be opened starting today.”268 Th e “renovation” that he had announced
266 de Gaulle, Discours et messages. Avec le renouveau. Mai 1958 - Juillet 1962, 15–16. Allocution prononcée à Alger le 4 juin 1958. [“Je prends acte au nom de la France et je déclare, qu’à partir d’aujourd’hui, la France considère que, dans toute l’Algérie, il n’y a qu’une seule catégorie d’habitants: il n’y a que des Français à part entière-, des Français à part entière, avec les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs.”] 267 Ibid., 16. 268 Ibid., 22. Allocution prononcée à la radio d’Alger le 3 Juillet 1958. [“Ce soir, je proclame que la France entend mener à bien sur ce sol le vaste plan de rénovation qui permettra d’atteindre le but et dont tous auront leur part. Il s’agit d’abord que chacun gagne sa vie en travaillant. Dès aujourd’hui, de nouveaux chantiers vont s’ouvrir.”]
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in June had become a “vast renovation plan” a month later. He promised that before the end of that year he would promulgate new industrial grand ensembles (large-scale settlements) that would be built on the territory of Algeria; he pledged that “starting this year, the number of new housing units will be doubled.”269 Th e general vowed that additional fi nancial credit would be freed up immediately in order to meet France’s estimated 1958 budget dedicated to the équipement de l’Algérie (equipment for Algeria) and to achieve this action d’urgence (emergency action), as he argued. Referring to the “necessary resources” that the country would need, he stated that “[Algeria’s] ground and underground contain them.”270 De Gaulle’s vast renovation plan also discreetly aimed to exploit the rich underworld beneath the Algerian Sahara
Fig. 3.6 Poster on the (Fig. 3.6). To this end, he appointed Jacques Soustelle “Delegate French exploitation of the Algerian Sahara. SHAT 1 H Minister of Overseas Territories and Departments, the Sahara, 1117/2. and Atomic Energy,” which operated between February 1959 and February 1960 under de Gaulle’s prime minister, Michel Debré (1912–1996). In his L’espérance trahie (Betrayed Hope), published in 1962, Soustelle described his economic assignment in southern Algeria under French colonial rule: “I endeavored to carry out the work of a veritable economic integration in the Sahara, since oil, gas, and minerals were to be incorporated into the economy of the whole Métropole-Algeria.”271 De Gaulle became familiar with the various assets of the Algerian Sahara during a private visit to the oilfi elds and construction sites in March 1957, prior to his offi cial return to power in May 1958. Th e benefi ts that he foresaw there consisted not only in exploiting natural resources, but also in conducting nuclear tests in the Algerian desert. Th e French authorities detonated their fi rst atomic bomb, called Gerboise Bleue (Blue Jerboa, named for a tiny jumping desert rodent), in the Algerian Sahara on 3 February 1960; the second,
269 Ibid., 23.[“Dès cette année sera doublé le nombre d’habitations nouvelles.”] 270 Ibid. [“Les ressources nécessaires : son sol, son sous-sol les contiennent.”] 271 Jacques Soustelle, L’espérance trahie (1958-1961) (Paris: Editions de l’Alma, 1962), 96. [“Au Sahara, je m’eff orçais de mener à bien une œuvre de véritable intégration: économique, puisque pétrole, gaz, minerais devaient s’incorporer à l’économie de l’ensemble Métropole-Algérie.”]
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Gerboise Blanche (White Jerboa), on 1 April 1960; the third, Gerboise Rouge (Red Jerboa), on 27 December 1960; and the fourth, Gerboise Verte (Green Jerboa), on 25 April 1961; others continued even after Algerian independence in 1962 and until 1966. Following the referendum’s success vis-à-vis de Gaulle’s new constitution, which was facilitated by the propaganda of his Minister of Information—the experienced Soustelle, who served as such between July 1958 and January 1959—de Gaulle immediately fulfi lled his promise. While he was on his fourth offi cial visit to Algeria he announced at the Place de la Brèche (today the Place du 1er Novembre272) in the Algerian city of Constantine on 3 October 1958 the initiation of a colossal fi ve-year plan de développement économique et social (socio-economic development plan) for Algeria under French rule. Th e plan was therefore acknowledged as the Plan de Constantine (1959–1963) after the city in which it was publically proclaimed (Figs. 3.7 3.8). Renovation was not politically and economically suffi cient; de Gaulle opted for a more radical action, asserting, “it is this country, so vital and so courageous, but so diffi cult and so suff ering, that should be profoundly transformed.”273 He also strategically employed the launching of his plan to provoke a further protraction of the long-inequitable “rapport” between France and Algeria that had begun in 1830, stressing that “because that is the nature of things, the fate of Algeria will be grounded … in its personality and its intimate solidarity with the French Métropole.”274 What de Gaulle intended with the term solidarity was most likely France’s economic, military, and atomic exploitation of the soil of independent Algeria, which was meticulously negotiated in the Evian Agreements of March 1962. Th e grand fi ve-year reform plan that de Gaulle professed was addressed to Algériennes and Algériens275 (Algerian women and men) and encompassed every imaginable sector. Th e plan projected that during this five-year period, at least one tenth of young workers in France who would serve in the government, the administration, the judicial
272 Th e 1st of November coincides with the date of the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution. 273 de Gaulle, Discours et messages. Avec le renouveau. Mai 1958 - Juillet 1962, 48. Discours prononcé à Constantine le 3 octobre 1958. [Il s’agit que ce pays si vivant et si courageux, mais si diffi cile et souff rant, soit profondément transformé.] 274 Ibid., 50.[“De toute manière, parce que c’est la nature des choses, le destin de l’Algérie aura pour bases, tout à la fois, sa personnalité et une solidarité étroite avec la métropole française.”] 275 Ibid., 48. [“Pour l’Algérie, quel est l’avenir auquel la France l’appelle? Algériennes, Algériens, je suis venu vous l’annoncer.”]
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Fig. 3.7 (left) Conference about the Plan de Constantine held by Jean Vibert (Director of the Plan) in July 1959. SHAT 1 H 2499. Fig. 3.8 (right) Plan de Constantine poster. SHAT 1 H 2499.
services, the army, the education sector, and the civil services must be recruited from the Arab, Kabyle, or Mozabite communities; salaries and wages in Algeria would be raised to levels comparable to those in France; two thirds of girls and boys would be enrolled in schools, and during the three following years (1963–1966) complete schooling would be achieved; and 250,000 hectares of new land would be allotted to Muslim farmers. Before the end of the fi ve years, de Gaulle declared:
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 157
Th e fi rst phase of Algeria’s agricultural and industrial plan de mise en valeur [enhancement] will be brought to its completion. Th is phase particularly includes the delivery and distribution of Saharan oil and gas; the establishment of large metallurgical and chemical complexes; the construction of housing for one million people; the adequate development of sanitary equipment, ports, roads, and transmissions; and the regular employment of 400,000 new workers.276
Only the politics of the construction of new dwellings for one million people will be critically investigated in the following pages. De Gaulle stated that during these fi ve years, the “fraternal human contact” that the French army had initiated would be continued and multiplied: not only in Algeria, but also in Paris and the French provinces. In other words, the SAS duties that had been founded by Soustelle in 1955 and maintained by the Resident Minister of Algeria, Robert Lacoste, were to be expanded. To this end, Algerians were now not only under constant military control, but were also subjugated to rapid capitalist industrialization by the French authorities. Th e French Left condemned de Gaulle’s plan, labeling it neocolonialism.277 On 19 December 1958, de Gaulle separated certain military functions from the civil authorities. He recalled to Paris General Raoul Salan, who had served in Algeria since November 1956 and who had been appointed by de Gaulle himself in June 1958 as both commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Algeria and Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria. Salan was assigned the function of inspector general of defense in Paris, which did not please him.278 De Gaulle appointed two men in place of the all-powerful Salan in order to restore civil authority and to divide civil authorities from their military counterparts. He named air force General Maurice Challe (1905–1979) as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Algeria; General Challe had fi rst launched his extensive military “Plan Challe” and later partook in the second military putsch of April 1961 in Algiers along with general Salan and others. De Gaulle also appointed inspector
276 Ibid., 49. [“La première phase du plan de mise en valeur agricole et industrielle de l’Algérie, sera menée à son terme. Cette phase comporte notamment l’arrivée et l’utilisation du pétrole et gaz sahariens, l’établissement de vastes ensembles métallurgiques et chimiques, la construction de logements pour un million de personnes, le développement adéquat de l’équipement sanitaire, des ports, des routes, des transmissions, l’emploi régulier de 400’000 travailleurs nouveaux.”] 277 Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, 307. 278 Th is point is discussed in chapter 5.
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of fi nances Paul Delouvrier as Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria; Delouvrier was to concentrate his eff orts on making de Gaulle’s Plan de Constantine for Algeria succeed. Th e choice of Delouvrier was an important one. Delouvrier, although he is renowned in France today for his subsequent regional planning career in Paris (1961– 1969) that followed his Algerian experience, and for his role at the Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne (IAURP, or Institute for Regional and Town Planning for the Paris Region), had actively contributed to France’s national economic reconstruction after the Second World War. Delouvrier was a member of the preliminary study commission279 that elaborated on the fi rst fi ve-year Plan de Modernisation et d’Equipement (Equipment and Modernization Plan) for France, the Plan Monnet (Monnet Plan), named for its major instigator, Jean Monnet (1888–1979); today Monnet is widely regarded as the founding father of the European Union. Before the First World War, Monnet had represented his family’s Cognac business overseas, particularly in London United States, and Canada. He later became Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations in Geneva between 1920 and 1922 as he had been nominated by both the French and British Premiers upon the creation of the League in 1919. In the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Monnet became Vice Chairman of Transamerica Banking Corporation in San Francisco. In his Mémoires (Memories), Monnet wrote: “In San Francisco, I have gained then lost a lot of money. I had only capitalized experience.”280 In eff ect, his American Keynesian experiences and fi nancial relations were essential in creating his postwar plan for France and for guaranteeing funds from the United States’ Marshall Plan (offi cially the European Recovery Program), named for Secretary of State and former Chief of Staff of the US Army George Marshall (1880– 1959). During the Second World War, Monnet had become a major fi gure in the Allied military and economic eff orts against Nazi Germany and the Vichy regime. He was fi rst appointed Chairman of the Anglo-French Economic Coordinating Committee in
279 Philippe Mioche, Le plan Monnet. Genèse et élaboration, 1941-1947 (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 1987), 96–97. 280 Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1976), 129. [“A San Francisco, j’ai gagné, puis perdu beaucoup d’argent. Je n’ai capitalisé que de ‘expérience.”]
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London in 1939, which coordinated joint planning of the wartime economies; following the Armistice of 22 June 1940, he was requested to move to Washington, DC, to continue his functions as a member of the British Supply Council until 1942. Despite his non- British nationality, Monnet stressed that by then he knew “the mechanisms of decisions in the United States, the engine, the organs of transmission—and the brakes, too.”281 Finally, while working for the American Victory Program, in February 1943 Monnet joined his American, French, and British allies in Algiers; there he met the aforementioned General
Giraud while de Gaulle was still in London. De Gaulle joined all of the liberators in May 1943 in Algiers. Monnet fi rst contributed to the alleviation of various Giraud–de Gaulle tensions and then joined the new Comité Français de Libération National (French National Liberation Committee), in which he was responsible for armement and ravitaillement (armament and supply).282 Well equipped with fi nancial and negotiating skills, Monnet traveled back to Washington in November 1943; de Gaulle encouraged him not only to secure American support for Free France, but also to convince President Roosevelt that he should acknowledge de Gaulle’s new government.283 In 1945, under General de Gaulle, who became President of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française (GPRF, or Provisional Government of the French Republic), Monnet and his well-selected team took charge of the economic recovery of France. Among many other initiatives, Monnet advocated an immediate exploitation of the German coal and steel resources in the Ruhr region by abolishing the International Authority for the Ruhr and replacing it with a joint organization led by France and the new nation of West Germany.284 In January 1946, an institutional framework for the Monnet Plan called the Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP, or General Commissariat of the Plan) was offi cially founded; not surprisingly, it was headed by Monnet himself. Th e Commissariat was expected to make a complete inventory of France’s technical needs and capabilities, as well as to defi ne a fi ve-year plan for modernization and production in France. Delouvrier served as the Head of the Financial Offi ce at the CGP between
281 Ibid., 179. [“Je connaissais maintenant les mécanismes de la décision aux Etats-Unis, le moteur, les organes de transmission - les freins aussi.”] 282 Ibid., 241. 283 Ibid., 251. 284 Michael Sutton, France and the Construction of Europe, 1944-2007. Th e Geopoliticl Imperative (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 45.
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1946 and 1947. Monnet recalled the time when Delouvrier, former member of the French Resistance, joined his early team; he wrote that Delouvrier’s “intelligence and the generosity of his character completely fi t what our enterprise expected from a new generation of Frenchmen. He enthusiastically tackled the plan’s fi nancial problems and began a very successful career.”285 In 1950, Monnet drafted what would become the Schuman Plan, after French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman (1886–1963) . From this plan, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established (by the Treaty of Paris of 1951) and presided over by Monnet between 1951 and 1955. In 1957, two additional institutions were created: the European Economic Community (EEC) founded by the Treaty of Rome, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) created by the Euratom Treaty. Th e ECSC was later incorporated into the European Community (EC) in 1993 upon the creation of the European Union. In 1953, Delouvrier served as General Secretary of the French interministerial committee to discuss questions of European economic cooperation in order to coordinate the operations of the services of the state with the newly established ECSC, directed by Monnet.286 When Delouvrier became Governor General of Algeria in 1958, twelve years after his fi rst mission at the CGP, the French Republic and its president (again, General de Gaulle) sought to address additional fi nancial supranational agreements. Pierre Benjamin Daniel Massé (1898–1987), whom de Gaulle appointed as the Head of the Commissariat between 1959 and 1966 (while the Plan de Constantine was underway), stated that “originally, de Gaulle and Jean Monnet played modernization against decadence. In signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Fourth Republic played economic openness against withdrawal.”287 But the “play” of the Fifth Republic that General de Gaulle instituted was ambiguous in nature. Unlike the Plan de Constantine, the Monnet Plan, the Marshall Plan, and
285 Monnet, Mémoires, 287. [“Son intelligence et la générosité de son caractère répondaient tout à fait à ce que notre entreprise attendait d’une nouvelle génération de Français. Il s’attaqua avec enthousiasme aux problèmes fi nanciers du plan et commença une très belle carrière.”] 286 Roselyne Chenu, Paul Delouvrier ou la passion d’agir (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994), 126. 287 Bernard Cazes and Philippe Mioche, Modernisation ou décadence. Etudes, témoignages et documents sur la planifi cation française (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l’université de Provence, 1990), 153. [“A l’origine, de Gaulle et Jean Monnet avaient joué la modernisation contre la décadence. En signant le traité de Rome en 1957, la IVè République jouait l’ouverture économique contre le repliement.”]
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the Schuman Plan all praised the names of the forefathers who had designed and/or announced them; the Plan de Constantine was seemingly diff erent (an orphan compared the other plans). Although it was General de Gaulle who announced the plan’s objectives, and Delouvrier whom he requested to achieve them, the Plan de Constantine did not bear the name of a representative of France in Algeria under French colonial rule. No one aspired to engrave his name in the undeniable history of France in Algeria. Although it is diffi cult to assess the reasons for this deliberate nonpersonifi cation of the plan, one suspects that it is because it was an operation of camoufl age, or a continuation of the colonial, if not neocolonial, project; although it is awkward to assume so, it may have been because the plan was an unrealistic endeavor, or a predicted miscarriage. In addition, the plan’s offi cial subtitle was not, as in the Monnet Plan, Modernization and Equipment, but rather Th e Economic and Social Development of Algeria.288 Th e Plan de Constantine was thus expected to “develop,” instead of “modernize,” Algeria and its inhabitants, both socially and economically. Th e colonial term development and its antonym underdevelopment (in French sous- développement) were, and still are,289 widely used in order to diff erentiate those who are “developed” from those who are “underdeveloped”; thus the latter are automatically forced to be developed by those who think that they already have that status. Th e so-called developed gave themselves the right to defi ne and decide who is or who is not developed, as well as the right to intervene and impose a certain kind of French development. In Algeria under French colonial rule, along with implementing the Plan de Constantine, de Gaulle entrusted Delouvrier with a somewhat peculiar mission: to “pacify and administer, but at the same time, transform.”290 Th e socio-economic development plan for Algeria under French colonial rule was to be drafted by specialized “central and departmental commissions” that were comprised of representatives of public administrations, private economic sectors, trade unions, and a few professionals. Th e central commissions were divided into fi ve categories: the
288 CHSP. 1DV 32 D1, Plan de Constantine, Mise en place. Arrêté du 12 Février 1959 relatif à la préparation du plan de développement économique et social de l’Algérie. 289 Th e term development is particularly used by the United Nations. 290 CHSP. 1 DV 19. De Gaulle to Delouvrier in Rapport sur l’activité des services de la Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie au cours du premier semestre 1959, p. 1. [“Il vous faut pacifi er et administrer, mais en même temps, transformer.”]
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Central Commission of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Central Commission of Industrial Development, the Central Commission of Social Equipment, the Commission of Synthesis, and the General Commission of Aménagement du Territoire (Regional Planning).291 In May 1959, the latter was subdivided into four subcommissions: 1) Economic Interests; 2) Infrastructure; 3) Planning of Major Urban and Industrial Zones (also called Aménagement Urbain [Urban Planning]); and 4) Administrative Equipment, which served the French government in Algeria.292 Th e proposals that the commissions were to work on would be approved of by the Conseil supérieur du plan de l’Algérie (High Council of the Plan of Algeria). Th is council was composed of an honorary president, who was also Head of the Commissariat Général du Plan de Modernisation et d’Equipement, and a president, who was also Deputy General Secretary of Economic Aff airs at the General Delegation of Government in Algeria.293 Although the aims of the French modernization in France and the French development in Algeria were dissimilar, in both cases the supreme decision depended on the French head of the Commissariat, who was not only the honorary president but also the president of the Caisse d’Equipement pour le Développement de l’Algérie (CEDA, or Fund for the Equipment and Development of Algeria), which was created by decree on 17 March 1959 in order to fi nance the Plan de Constantine’s multifaceted operations. According to Pierre Massé, then head of the Commissariat, “the trajectory of the Caisse [CEDA] reproduced, behind the scenes, that of the Algerian tragedy.”294 Th e Plan de Constantine that de Gaulle launched was not devised on a tabula rasa; instead, it was widely inspired by previous longstanding (but unrealized) plans that had aimed to industrialize Algeria. Th ese included the 1955 report of the Commission Maspetiol on the fi nancial relations between Algeria and France under the General Governorate of Jacques Soustelle, which reutilized certain proposals of the 1944 Commission for Muslim Reforms, or the 1958 Decennial Perspectives of the Economic Development of Algeria
291 Archives Nationales de France Pierrefi tte-sur-Seine (hereafter ANFPFSS). F/60/4020. Commission Générale d’Aménagement du Territoire, Séance du 4 mai 1959. 292 CHSP. 1 DV 32 D1. Plan de Constantine, Mise en place. Décision du 2 mai 1959 signé par le Secrétaire Général Adjoint pour les Aff aires Economiques pour le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. 293 CHSP. 1 DV 32 D1. Plan de Constantine, Mise en place. Décision du 9 mars 1959 signé par le Secrétaire Général de l’Administration pour le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. 294 Cazes and Mioche, Modernisation ou décadence. Etudes, témoignages et documents sur la planifi cation française, 154. [“La trajectoire de la Caisse reproduisit dans l’ombre celle de la tragédie algérienne.”]
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under Lacoste.295 Th e very idea of the Plan, however, was instrumental in France and elsewhere for achieving (or pretending to achieve) auspicious economic and military programs for the whole nation. In his book Le plan ou l’Anti-hasard (Th e Plan or the Anti- Accident), published in 1965 while he was directing the CGP (and thereby the CEDA), Massé stated that “the development is not only the march to abundance, [but] most likely the construction of a society.”296 But what kind of society did the housing projects of the Plan de Constantine visualize? How would the plan create such a society? And who would benefi t from it?
Fig. 3.7 (left) Les réalités of September 1958. SHAT 1 H 1118/2. Fig. 3.8 (right) Les réalités of June 1958. SHAT 1 H 1118/2.
295 Fred Célimène and André Legris, De l’économie coloniale à l’économie mondialisée - Aspects multiples de la transition (XXe et XXIe siècles) (Paris: Editions Publibook, 2011), 262–264. 296 Pierre Massé, Le plan ou l’anti-hasard (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1965), 54. [“Le développement n’est pas seulement la marche vers l’abondance, c’est plus encore, sans doute, la construction d’une société.”]
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3.1 Transforming the Greatest Number
By announcing on 3 October 1958 the construction of housing for one million people over a period of fi ve years, de Gaulle simultaneously introduced a massive construction industry and a French housing market that was addressed predominantly to Algerians in Algeria under French colonial rule. De Gaulle regarded the projected construction of roughly 220,000 urban dwellings and 110,000 rural dwellings between 1959 and 1963,297 not only as an imperative economic action, but also as one of the most pressing political operations of the time. De Gaulle and his dictated policies led to further mass displacements of rural and urban Algerian populations, however, and fostered strict socio- economic controls over new landlords and renters alike. De Gaulle urged his Delegate General of Government in Algeria, Paul Delouvrier, to consider himself as the personifi cation of France in Algeria. In his letter of 18 December 1958, de Gaulle wrote to Delouvrier: “You are France in Algeria. France: that is, its purpose, its authority, its means.”298 Because de Gaulle admitted in his letter that the politico- economic duties that he had prescribed to Delouvrier would be continuously compromised by insecurity, he requested that Delouvrier collaborate closely with his military counterpart, the general commander-in-chief of Algeria, and in certain cases to delegate his civil powers to his military colleague without losing his superior responsibility.299 Like his predecessors, de Gaulle deliberately avoided the term war; he kept certain civil responsibilities, such as the maintien de l’ordre (enforcement of law and order), under military power, while other civil functions, such as those of the French subprefects in Algeria, were reinforced.300 In his communication to Delouvrier, de Gaulle wrote that “throughout the ordeals and despite the delays, the will of the government is that Algeria will gradually reveal itself in its deep reality thanks to the actions conducted by all of France. To this end, you need to pacify
297 CHSP. 1 DV 19. Rapport sur l’activité des services de la Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie au cours du premier semestre 1959, présenté par Paul Delouvrier, Délégué du Gouvernement sur la proposition de André Jacomet, Secrétaire Général de l’Administration, Juillet 1959, p. 112. 298 Chenu, Paul Delouvrier ou la passion d’agir, 384. Annex no.4, Letter of 18 December 1958 by General de Gaulle to Paul Delouvrier. [“Vous êtes la France en Algérie. La France, c’est à dire son but, son autorité, ses moyens.”] 299 Ibid., 285. Ibid. 300 On the civil and military powers under Delouvrier’s Governorate, see for example, Hervé Lemoine, “Paul Delouvrier et l’Algérie. Comment servir et représenter l’état dans une Guerre d’Indépendance?,” in Paul Delouvrier, un grand commis de l’état (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2005), 49–53.
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and administer, but at the same time, transform.”301 Delouvrier took de Gaulle’s appeal literally. Th e very same sentence—“you need to pacify and administer, but at the same time, transform”—was reported and incorporated in a detailed report on the activities of the General Delegation of Government in Algeria in the fi rst half of 1959; the report was drafted and presented by Delouvrier himself and his Secretary General of Administration in Algeria, André Jacomet (1917–1993). A response to de Gaulle’s order was plainly evaluated and accurately described within two of the report’s chapters.302 Th e fi rst, Pacifi er et administrer en s’adaptant aux exigences du présent (Pacifying and Administering by Being Compatible with the Requirements of the Present), comprised three sections, as follows.
1) Th e continuation and reinforcement of the oeuvre de pacifi cation by defi ning the army’s operational objectives within civil assignments of pacifi cation (Chapter 1), which the preceding government had begun, and to defi ne the eff orts on behalf of the centres de regroupements (regrouping centers) and Delouvrier’s new policy of the mille villages (“One thousand villages,” Chapter 4).
2) Th e restoration of political/professional administrative structures by divorcing civil authorities from their military counterparts and redistributing the various powers and responsibilities.
3) Th e adjustment of administrative faculties by fortifying the administrative structure; suppressing the sous-administration (under- administration, which Soustelle and Lacoste also were in favor of); strengthening the role of the Sections Administratives Spécialiséss (SAS, or Special Administrative Sections; Chapter 2); “harmonizing” (to use Delouvrier’s term) the Algerian and French legislations and structures; reorganizing the Delegation General of Government in Algeria by creating new coordinating services; reinforcing the role of the Secretary General of Administration; and establishing a Direction du plan (Direction of the
301 Chenu, Paul Delouvrier ou la passion d’agir, 284.. [“La volonté du Gouvernement est que l’Algérie, à travers les épreuves et malgré les retards, se révèle peu à peu dans sa réalité profonde grâce à l’action menée par toute la France. A ce titre, il vous faut pacifi er et administrer, mais en même temps, transformer.”] 302 CHSP. 1 DV 19. Rapport sur l’activité des services de la Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie au cours du premier semestre 1959, présenté par Paul Delouvrier, Délégué du Gouvernement sur la proposition de André Jacomet, Secrétaire Général de l’Administration, Juillet 1959. Sommaire.
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Plan), as well as a Fond de développement (Fund for Development).303
Th e second chapter of Delouvrier and Jacomet’s report, entitled Transformer pour préparer l’Algérie nouvelle (Transforming to Prepare a New Algeria), contained two parts, as follows.
1) Preparing for the future by elaborating on the Plan de Constantine’s economic objectives, including an expansion of the employment market, the acceleration of development of an already-expanding economy, human promotion (mainly in terms of education), the construction of a general economic model, the elaboration of the objectives for each sector, and the determination of regional programs.
Fig. 3.9 Results of the Plan de Constantine 2) Th e second part of the second chapter according to the department by the fall of 1961. sought to immediately undertake “the ANFPFSS F/60/4021. realization of these goals through a series of ‘interim actions’”304 that comprised several subelements, including:
a) the revision of fi nancial means through the transformation of the mode of presentation/execution of investment costs, the augmentation of resources, and the reorientation of the expenditures;
b) human promotion by means of basic schooling, education, and professional training of the youth; the promotion of Algerians in the public service; the education of civil servants; and the improvement of the status of women;
c) social promotion via a special plan of investment, health, and social
303 Ibid. 304 Ibid., p.2. [“Entreprendre dès à présent la réalisation de ces objectifs par une série d’”actions intérimaires”]
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 167
action; enhancement of the conditions of Algerian workers in France; wage increases; and housing improvements; and
d) economic development via industrialization, agricultural development, and improvements in the service sector.305
Th e fi rst part of the report, on pacifi cation and administration, revisited certain premises but confi rmed the continuation of enforcement and pre–de Gaulle civil-military operations, such as the SAS and the camps de regroupement; the second, on transformation and new Algeria, injected rather awkward and oblique weapons with educational, social, gender, spatial, psychological, and purely economic characters. De Gaulle and his recently inaugurated Fifth Republic waged not only a military war against Algerian pro- independence fi ghters, but also transformative socio-economic and spatial wars against the entire Algerian population; the “interim actions” that were in store for Algeria were intended to serve France’s interests in the long term. Under the banner of cooperation, the French authorities guaranteed, after Algeria’s independence, a prolonging of their presence in Algeria. Th e authorities negotiated and signed a treaty that stated the “principles of cooperation between the two independent and associated countries in economic, fi nancial, cultural, and technical terms, as well as in the enhancement of the Sahara. [Th ese principles] specify the methods for safeguarding France’s economic and strategic interests.”306 Th e mass-housing projects belonged in the category of “fi nancial and technical cooperation.” As a result, what was seemingly a “social action” that was intended for Algerians under French colonial rule during the Algerian War of Independence (also known as the Algerian Revolution) became a technical cooperation and an economic opportunity for the French in independent Algeria. Although the French authorities in Algeria built thousands of dwellings during the War of Independence, their exact number remains in doubt. Th e Conseil Supérieur de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Construction (High Council of Regional Planning
305 Ibid. 306 19770828/14. Ministère d’Etat Chargé des Aff aires Algériennes. Les Accords d’Evian, textes et commentaires. La Documentation Française, 1962. p. 5. [Les principes de la coopération entre les deux pays indépendants et associés, en matière économique, fi nancière, culturelle, technique, ainsi que dans la mise en valeur du Sahara. Elles précisent les modalités de sauvegarder des interêts économiques et stratégiques de la France.”]
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and Construction), which gathered a few months before Algeria’s independence in order to discuss the Plan de Constantine’s results, did report a few fi gures.307 Th e document reported on both incomplete and complete dwellings between 1959 and 1961, as well as the number of dwellings that were expected to be built the following year. Th e report, entitled L’habitat Algérien au terme de la troisième année du Plan de Constantine, les perspectives pour 1962 (“Housing in Algeria at the End of the Th ird Year of the Plan de Constantine: Perspectives for 1962”), was related by Jean Le Guillou, Construction Commissioner for Algeria.308 Th e record disjointedly calculated quantitative surveys of two housing categories: rural and urban dwellings. According to the fi gures, during the fi rst three years of the Plan, the objective was to build 45,000 rural dwellings and 85,000 urban dwellings; the actual numbers, however, included the construction of only 38,000 rural dwellings and 69,181 urban dwellings, while 26,415 urban dwellings were still under construction. Th at is, 114,181 dwellings were essentially complete by the end of 1961309 (Figs. 3.9–3.11). As with the camps de regroupement, it is far from easy to determine the exact numbers of dwellings that were constructed in Algeria via the Plan de Constantine. When consulting archival documents, it is common to discover other fi gures that contradict these numbers. Even the data that General de Gaulle announced in his speeches and press conferences was often contested; such speeches were meant to legitimize and praise his Plan and to confi rm the triumph of his policies in Algeria, both nationally and internationally (especially among the members of the United Nations). According to the author of Le Plan de Constantine et la république algérienne de demain (Th e Plan de Constantine and the Algerian Republic of Tomorrow), published in 1961, “handing General de Gaulle exaggerated fi gures prior to press conferences and speeches did not help his cause; instead, these fi gures have provoked criticism and distrust within well-informed
307 ANFPFSS. F/60/4021. Délégation Générale en Algérie, Conseil Supérieur de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Construction, Secrétariat Général. Ordre du Jour de la session des 22 et 23 janvier 1962. Première séance Lundi 22 à 10 heures. P. 1. 308 ANFPFSS. F/60/4021. Conseil Supérieur de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Construction, L’habitat Algérien au terme de la troisième année du Plan de Constantine, les perspectives pour 1962. 309 ANFPFSS. F/60/4021. Conseil Supérieur de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Construction, L’habitat Algérien au terme de la troisième année du Plan de Constantine, les perspectives pour 1962, pp. 9-12. Th e housing typologies and their geographic distributions will be discussed in the next two chapters.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 169
Figs. 3.10, 3.11 Results of the Plan de Constantine by the fall of 1961. ANFPFSS F/60/4021.
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circles.”310 It is beyond question that the French authorities had not only built thousands of dwellings during the last years of the War of Independence in Algeria’s rural and urban areas, but also overwhelmingly transformed Algerians’ daily lives. Two commissions at the High Counsel of Territorial Planning and Construction played a major role in designing and building dwellings that would “transform” Algerians and endorse a “new” Algeria: the Commission de l’Habitat et de l’Urbanisme (Commission of Housing and Urbanism; Fig. 3.12) and the Commission des Zones Rurales (Commission of Rural Zones).311 Th e former recommended overall housing programs (and their coordination with urbanization projects) and implemented the politics involved in constructing Algerian housing projects. Th e latter was expected to advise on “any question” regarding rural development, in particular on the choice, defi nition, and vocation of the rural renovation zones.312 Th e term any might implicitly imply that the camps de regroupement were part of the Commission of Rural Zones’ assignments. Surprisingly, only one architect, Marcel Lathuillière, President of the Regional Council of the Order of Architects in Algeria, was a member of the Commission of Housing and Urbanism; the Commission of Rural Zones had none. In an attempt to defi ne the programs, costs, and players involved in the Plan’s dwellings in the “new Algeria,” the French Institut Technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics d’Algérie (ITEBA, or Technical Institute of Building and Public Works in Algeria) undertook an Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie (A Survey on Housing in Algeria). Th e ITEBA’s survey was centered around eight debates and conferences that were held by diff erent invited speakers and were chaired by various professionals who represented the French public and private sectors. Th e talks were hosted by the University of Algiers and took place between October 1958 and June 1959.313 Th e survey also served as the basis for the
310 Georges Vaucher, Le Plan de Constantine et la république algérienne de demain: indépendance politique et indépendance économique (Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1961), 46. [“Les services de documentation du Général de Gaulle lui ont rendu un mauvais service, en lui remettant avant ses conférences de presse ou ses discours, des chiff res trop exagérés qui ont suscité la critique et la méfi ance dans les milieux bien informés.”] 311 Th e other commissions included the Commission Population et Emploi (Commission of Population and Employment), Commission des Zones Industrielles et Urbaine (Commission of Industrial and Urban Zones), and the Commission des Equipements Généraux (Commission of General Equipment). 312 F/60/4021. Rapport du Secrétariat général du Conseil supérieur de l’aménagement du territoire au Conseil supérieur de l’aménagement du territoire, p. 2. 313 Th e talks were successively published as supplements to the Annals of the ITEBA between February 1959 (Issue no. 134) and November 1959 (Issue no. 143). Th e eights booklets are available at the SHAT and the ANOM.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 171
Fig. 3.12 Members of the committee of Housing and Urbanism. ANFPFSS F/60/4021. preparation of booklets (released by the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria) that contained recommendations for the diff erent types of dwellings. The debates and conferences covered the following themes (Fig. 3.13).
I. 16 October 1958: Evolution de l’habitat en Algérie (Evolution of Housing in Algeria), by René Mayer (1925–2015), Head of the Housing Service in the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria; chaired by Jacques Saigot, Engineer in Chief of Ponts et Chaussées (civil engineering) and Director of Public Works and Transportation at the General Delegation of Government in Algeria;
II. 11 December 1958: Etude sur l’habitat musulman actuel (Study of
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Current Muslim Habitation), by Pierre Padovani, Deputy Director of the Société coopérative musulmane algérienne d’habitation et d’accession à la petite propriété (Algeria-based Muslim Cooperative Society of Housing and Access to Minor Property) and founder of the Union des coopératives de construction d’Oranie (Union of Construction Cooperatives in the Oran Region); chaired by Marcel Lathuillière mentioned earlier;
III. 8 January 1959: L’urbanisme en Algérie (Urbanism in Algeria), by Raymond Roux-Dufort, Planner in Chief and Head of the Urbanism Service at the General Delegation of Government in Algeria; chaired by Saigot;
IV. 12 March 1959: Les professions du bâtiment face aux perspectives quinquennales (Five-Year Perspectives for Building Professionals) by R. Besson, engineer of arts and manufactures; this was to be chaired by Longobardi, President of the ITEBA, but due to illness Longobardi was replaced by René Mayer;
V. 9 April 1959: Les matériaux de construction et le plan quinquennal (Construction Materials and the Five-Year Plan) by Jean Meley, industrialist and Honorary President of the Union Algérienne de l’Industrie et du Commerce des Matériaux de Construction (UNAMAT, or Algeria- based Union of Industry and Commerce of Construction Materials); chaired by A. Mascherpa, President of the UNAMAT;
VI. 14 May 1959: Architecture et productivité (Architecture and Productivity), by Marcel Lathuillière; chaired by his colleague François Bienvenu, architect DPLG and Honorary President of the Regional Council of the Order of Architects in Algeria;
VII. 28 May 1959: Le fi nancement de la construction des logements (Financing Housing Construction), by R. Leroy, Head of the Service of Credit at the General Delegation of Government in Algeria; chaired by L. Nunziato, General Inspector of Financial Services;
VIII. 25 June 1959: Conclusion: L’habitat dans le plan quinquennal de l’Algérie (Conclusion: Housing in Algeria’s Five-Year Plan), by Saigot; chaired by Paul Delouvrier.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 173
Fig. 3.13 Covers of the reports of the eight conferences organized by the Institut Technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics d’Algérie (ITEBA, or Technical Institute of Building and Public Works in Algeria) in Algiers between October 1958 and June 1959.
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Th e general tone was announced at the outset of the conferences in Mayer’s fi rst report, on 16 October 1958, only thirteen days after de Gaulle’s speech in Constantine.314 Mayer was engineer of the ponts et chaussées and the Head of the Housing Department at the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria; he later became General Secretary of the Plan de Constantine. Mayer proclaimed that “the fi rst general idea I would insist on—at the risk of scandalizing some of you—is that the problem of housing is above all a matter of quantity.”315 To address this problem, Mayer developed a series of successive programmatic principles and advocated the construction of dwellings for diff erent social classes according to spending power. He stated that the salaries in Algeria were one fi fth those in France, and concluded that it would be inconceivable to build housing that would cost one fi fth what it would in France; he stated that Algerians nevertheless would be willing to allocate more of their money for their apartments than the people of France would, despite their very low incomes.316 He argued that Algeria’s construction industry, along with its various domains of production and employment, should play a leading role in Algeria’s economic expansion. Mayer based his appeal on the popular French adage “quand le bâtiment va, tout va!’,” [“When the building trade is thriving, everything is thriving!”], emphasizing that the French authorities should give particular priority to the building trade, just as “the Russians [had done] in their fi ve-year plans with their ‘priority on heavy industry.’”317 Mayer argued that Algeria needed to address its shortage of architects and draughtsmen, whose numbers (outside of the capital city) had been drastically diminished in the last few years in Algeria; he also noted a worrying absence of young architects in the country. Mayer proposed that these problems could be addressed by reopening housing projects, renewing construction programs, and launching operations that would be reminiscent of those that had been built by the HLM departmental offi ce (habitat à loyer
314 Not to be mistaken for the Radical René Mayer (1895-1972) who served as a Deputy of Constantine between 1946 and 1955, defending the economic interests of the French colons. Although I had interviewed Engineer René Mayer (1925*), who seemed to be Radical too, at his apartment in Paris, I retain unnecessary to incorporate it in this manuscript because it is faithful, if not worse, to what he declared in 1958. 315 René Mayer, “Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie. I. Evolution de l’habitat en Algérie, conférence prononcée le 16 octobre 1958 par M. Mayer sous la présidence de M. Saigot,” Annales de l’Institut Technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics, no. 134 (Février 1959): 3. [“La première idée générale sur laquelle je voudrais insister - au risque de scandaliser certains d’entre vous...- est que le problème du logement est avant tout une affaire de quantité.”] 316 Ibid., 6. 317 Ibid., 9. [“Les Russes ont donné à leurs plans quinquennaux celui de: ‘Priorité à l’industrie lourde.’”]
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modéré, or “low-cost housing”) in Oran. According to Mayer, this offi ce had succeeded admirably in designing a formula that always reproduced “the same apartment blocks”318 on site.319 Mayer also stressed the need for industrializing the building industry, arguing that the modes of production of construction materials were particularly important, because such materials were entirely contingent on private initiatives; he thus recommended that the government should immediately provide various types of industrialization assistance in order to prevent the same disasters that had befallen France following the Second World War. He also stated that the insuffi cient number of skilled workers created an overly exclusive market, to such an extent that Algerians’ salaries would be higher than their counterparts in France; he proposed applying “Taylor’s principles” (based on the ideas of the infl uential US mechanical engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor) in the building industry in Algeria, stating that “If we split up every worker’s assignments, we would eventually end up with very complex outcome produced by unqualifi ed and unspecialized workers.”320 Finally, Mayer reassured the audience that the fi nancing of this vast program would be defi ned by the chief of credit services at the General Delegation of Algeria in a separate conference; he again insisted, however, that the French devoted too little money to their housing:
Th ank heaven, in Algeria it is diff erent; in particular within the Muslim population, people accept that they must pay a normal price to become owners or tenants of decent accommodations. In equal living standards, it is no exaggeration to say that the inhabitants of this country will accept that they must pay twice or three times what a metropolitan [i.e. someone in France] would accept to pay.321
318 . Ibid., 11. [‘Toujours les mêmes blocs d’immeubles’.] 319 Ibid. [[Toujours les mêmes blocs d’immeubles].] 320 Ibid. [“Lorsqu’on réussit à décomposer suffi samment le travail de chaque ouvrier, on arrive, en partant d’une chaîne de travailleurs sans grande qualifi cation ou spécialisation, à élaborer fi nalement un matériau très complexe.”] 321 Ibid., 12. [“Grâce au ciel, en Algérie nous n’en sommes pas là; et dans la population musulmane en particulier, on accepte de payer un prix normal pour devenir propriétaire ou locataire d’un logement décent. A niveau de vie égal, il n’est pas exagéré de dire que les habitants de ce pays accepteront de payer le double ou le triple de ce que l’on pourrait faire admettre à un métropolitain.”]
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Th e conditions and premises of French housing programs in Algeria under French rule during the War of Independence and in France were perceptibly dissimilar. Needless to say, Mayer’s speech and inconsistent resolutions remained faithful to the French colonial project in Algeria that used to impose paradoxical, if not violent, directives.
Shortly before his death, the psychiatrist and author Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) impeccably described in his fi nal book published in 1961, Les damnés de la terre (Th e Wretched of the Earth), the violence that inhabits and governs the colonial world. Th e French government censored the book at the time, which was published during the course of the Algerian War for national liberation. Fanon, who was born in Martinique, dedicated himself to the anticolonial cause, not only by being an FLN activist (Front de Libération Nationale, or National Liberation Front) and treating victims of war and torture as Head of Service at the Psychiatrist Hospital in Blida (about forty-fi ve kilometers southwest of Algiers) during the Algerian War, but also by meticulously deconstructing the colonial mind and doctrine. He depicted the colonizer/colonized dichotomy that was cemented in built environments, schools, and language, among other places. He wrote about two antagonistic spaces: the “native” colonized neighborhoods that included (as Fanon emphasized) the shantytowns and the Medina, contrasted with the “European” colonizer- designed and colonizer-built quarters. Fanon described this dichotomy as follows: “Th e two confront each other, but not in the service of a higher unity. Governed by a purely Aristotelian logic, they follow the dictates of mutual exclusion: Th ere is no conciliation possible, one of them is superfl uous.”322 To this end, the new dwellings of de Gaulle’s Plan were to eradicate this all too apparent superfl uity, or too-present surplus, or too-obvious excess. Th e exclusion of the colonized people was to become a blurred inclusion, yet still colonial in nature. Th e colonized space was to be designed by the colonizer; and in most cases, it was to be built by the colonized. Th e conciliation was to be achieved by a consideration of the colonized communities that hitherto had been rejected. Th e visible “compartmentalization,” to paraphrase Fanon, or segregation, was to become abruptly invisible. It was a sort of a precipitate inclusive exclusion that diff ered from previous French colonial policies in
322 Frantz Fanon, Th e Wretched of the Earth, trans. R. Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 4. Originally published in the French language by Maspero éditeur, Paris, France, under the title Les damnés de la terre in 1961.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 177
Algeria, as will be discussed shortly. Th e collective housing projects of the French Société coopérative musulmane algérienne d’habitation et d’accession à la petite propriété (Fig. 3.14) that Mayer recalled in the fi rst conference is a fl agrant piece of evidence of this neocolonial policy: inclusive exclusion. His Deputy President, Pierre Padovani (1921–2008), who was a professor of philosophy at Oran High School, offi cer of the Legion of Honor, founder and President of
Fig. 3.14 List of housing projects promoted by the Société coopérative musulmane algérienne d’habitation et d’accession à la petite propriété of Oran. FR ANOM 9336/14.
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the Union des coopératives de construction d’Oranie (Union of Construction Cooperatives in the Oran Region), and General Secretary of the HLM Offi ce of the City of Oran—and who was the speaker of the second conference, Etude sur l’habitat musulman actuel (Study of Current Muslim Housing)—stated that “I am indeed glad to stress that in many of our estates, in Kouba [in the Algiers Region], in Saint-Denis-du-Sig [in the Oran Region], and elsewhere, the population is about one third Europeans and two thirds Muslims, and they live fraternally side by side.”323 Lathuillière, who chaired this session and introduced its purposes to the audience, praised Padovani and his Housing Corporation’s eff ective accomplishments; he supported his thorough discontinuity in applying the common housing formula the colonized populations, or the “Muslims,” as they were termed. He stated that:
Muslim habitations have long been in search of a formula.… Some architects have denounced the errors they have witnessed and the dangers of seeking to revive the Medina; while the essential reasons for its existence have disappeared, they [these architects] have not always been listened to. Mr. Padovani has broken with the routine.324
According to Padovani, the formula that he was rejecting was based on the assumption that Algeria colonized populations were not able to evolve, and therefore they were incapable of living in European-type buildings. By opposing this common colonial sentiment, he sought a new solution for the “Muslim problem” that, in his opinion, still remained “outside the economic circuit.”325 Padovani began his fi rst “Muslim” economic enterprise through a strategic, as he emphasized, “catalyst,” which consisted of “aiding” the anciens combattants musulmans (Algerian veterans of the Second World War). He argued that a great number of socio-
323 Pierre Padovani, “Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie. II. Etude sur l’habitat musulman actuel, conférence prononcée le 11 décembre 1958 par M. Padovani sous la présidence de M. Lathuillière,” Annales de l’Institut Technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics, no. 135–36 (March 1959): 13. [“J’ai d’ailleurs la joie de souligner que dans bon nombre de nos cités, à Kouba, à Saint-Denis-du-Sig et ailleurs, on compte environ un tiers d’Européens pour deux tiers de Musulmans et ils vivent fraternellement côte à côte.”] 324 Ibid., 3. [“L’habitat Musulman est resté longtemps à la recherche d’une formule. (…) Certains architectes ont dénoncé les erreurs dont ils ont été témoins et les dangers de vouloir faire revivre la Medina, alors que les raisons essentielles de son existence avaient disparu; ils n’ont pas toujours été écoutés. Mr. Padovani a brisé avec la routine.”] 325 Ibid., 6.
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economic undertakings had been promised to these veterans, but quite often these remained unfulfi lled; this had resulted in severe poverty for the veterans and their families, who subsequently were humiliated and were forced to beg for a living. Because his initiative was encouraged by Massé, who at the time was Inspector of Finances at the French Ministry of Veterans and Victims of War, in 1955 the fi rst Société Coopérative Musulmane Oranaise d’Habitation et de Construction (Muslim Cooperative Society of Habitation and Construction in Oran) was established. Padovani and his initial team, which involved several Algerian veterans, commissioned the design of the fi rst housing settlement to:
… An architecture offi ce that had once cooperated with Le Corbusier. Th is is the ATBAT [Atelier des Bâtisseurs (Builders Workshop)] offi ce in Paris, which included [Vladimir] Bodiansky, who was represented in North Africa by [Bernard] Romé and his team. Romé, who headed the Private Offi ce of Family Housing, has taken the risk of accepting the role of technical adviser for our cooperative. He proposed plans to us that we were immediately taken with.326
Th e four-story Nid d’abeilles (“Beehive”) suburban housing building was immediately realized and inhabited in 1956 at the Place du Général Korte (today Place des Frères Messaoudi) in Oran (Figs 3.15–3.17). Other analogous buildings were constructed in other regions of Algeria, including Diar el Ourida in Blida (Fig 3.18) and Diar Sidi Yassine in Sidi-Bel-Abbès (Fig 3.19). Th e resulting housing blocks were not dissimilar to those designed and built in Casablanca a few years earlier by the French architects of ATBAT- Afrique, the branch of ATBAT based in Morocco327 (Fig 3.20). Although the constructed dwellings respected the “norms of Muslim Housing,” as Padovani had pointed out in his conference, he realized that the developers mistook the
326 Ibid., 10. [“Un bureau d’étude qui avait opéré jadis avec Le Corbusier. Il s’agit du bureau ATBAT de Paris où se trouvait M. Bodiansky, représenté en Afrique du Nord par M. Romé et le groupe qui l’entoure. M. Romé qui dirigeait l’Offi ce Privé du Logement Familial a pris le risque d’accepter de devenir le conseiller technique de notre coopérative. Il nous a proposé des plans et nous avons été séduits immédiatement.”] 327 On the history, members and projects of the ATBAT and ATBAT-Afrique who fi rst worked on the Unité d’Habitation in Marseille and then on the Carrières Centrales in Casablanca and other Nid d’Abeille settlements in Morocco, see, for example, Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, Casablanca - Colonial Myths and Architectural Ventures, Th e Monacelli Press (New York, 2002), 325–363; Tom Avermaete,Another Modern: Th e Post-War Architecture and Urbanism of Candilis-Josic-Woods (Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2005), 134–175.
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Fig. 3.15 (top left) Plans, housing at Place du Général Korte in Oran. From L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui, no. 60 (June 1955), 5.
Fig. 3.16 (top right) General plan, housing at Place du Général Korte in Oran. Architects: Mauri, Pons, together with ATBAT-Afrique (architects: Candilis, Woods; engineers: Piot and Bodiansky). Developer: Société coopérative musulmane algérienne d’habitation et d’accession à la petite propriété of Oran. From L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui, no. 60 (June 1955), 5.
Fig. 3.17 (bottom) Housing at Place du Général Korte in Oran built by Société coopérative musulmane algérienne d’habitation et d’accession à la petite propriété of Oran. From “Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie. II. Etude sur l’habitat musulman actuel“ in Annales de l’Institut Technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics, no. 135–36 (March 1959), 11.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 181
Fig. 3.18 (top left) Diar el Ourida. From Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie, 14.
Fig. 3.19 (top right) Diar Sidi Yassine. From Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie, 15
Fig. 3.20 (bottom) Carrière centrales in Casablanca.
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typology of the buildings, claiming that it was the inhabitants of the new housing blocks who fi rmly criticized certain spatial confi gurations and elements, such as the height of the walls of the private enclosed patios, the positions and dimensions of the windows, the open-air ovens, the lack of space for basic kitchen appliances, and the absence of parking lots, among other things. To this end, Padovani and his team decided to change their formula and “this time to try a type of dwelling that could suit both Europeans and Muslims, a type of dwelling that would roughly correspond to the Metropolitan ‘Logeco’ [from LOGement ECOnomique et Familial, or low-cost and family dwellings], where European workers and Muslim workers could live side by side”328 (Fig. 3.21, 3.22). Although the new Algerian landlords did not condemn the typology of the Nid d’abeille building, but rather the defi ciency or inadequacy of certain features of the dwellings, Padovani used their disapproval as an opportunity to insert another typology that turned out to be a more expensive investment for the members of the housing cooperative: a new economic burden for new Algerian property owners. While one could interpret this gesture as an attempt to treat Algerian colonized populations, the European working class in Algeria, and the French working class in France as one unique, analogous social class, the incomes, conditions, legal statuses, and family compositions (to mention only a few facets) of the three overwhelmingly diff erent classes were exceedingly disparate. Th eir
Fig. 3.21 (left), Fig 3.22 (right) Logeco Mer et soleil in Hussein-Dey (Algiers). From the booklet of the Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne. CHSP 1 DV 34.
328 Padovani, “Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie. II. Etude sur l’habitat musulman actuel, conférence prononcée le 11 décembre 1958 par M. Padovani sous la présidence de M. Lathuillière,” 12. [Nous avons voulu essayer cette fois un type d’habitat pouvant convenir à la fois aux Européens et aux Musulmans, habitat correspondant à peu près aux LOGECO métropolitains, où l’ouvrier européen et l’ouvrier musulman pourraient vivre côte à côte. Nous avons dons réalisé des cités de ce genre à Birkadem, au Nador, à Kouba, Koléa, enfi n dans une bonne partie de l’Algérie.”]
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 183
socio-economic disparities were in fact colossal. Padovani compared the fi nancial situations of the two formulas, explaining: “this [new] formula has a monthly reimbursement of seven to eight thousand francs, while in the previous formula it was enough to deposit 2,500 to 3,500 francs per month to become a landlord.”329 Th is turning point, which was a colonial protocol of inclusive exclusion, was enforced without distinction in countless regions of Algeria, not only with the initial catalyst—the veterans—but also with the inhabitants of the bidonvilles (shantytowns). Th e French authorities were so satisfi ed with these operations that they had even encouraged Padovani and his Housing Cooperative to launch similar housing programs in the city of Lyon in France, where about twenty-eight thousand “Muslims” were living in analogous conditions; he stated that “I have visited the slums of Lyon. For some time now, these slums have been provided, like those in Paris and elsewhere, with Specialized Administrative Sections [Urban SAS]; the slums are much worse off than those of Algeria, because there is no sun.”330 With the Société coopérative musulmane algérienne d’habitation et d’accession à la petite propriété, as well as with the housing programs of de Gaulle’s Plan in Algeria and the housing blocks designed for Algerians in France, the end of the French habitat Musulman was brusquely imposed, as Padovani stressed: “in reality, it is no longer about Muslim habitation: it is simply about housing, housing for the greatest number, because as we all know, a particular type of housing engenders segregation, which has long been condemned.”331 Quantitative aspects prevailed over other characteristics of the dwellings. Quantity did not only imply the numbers of dwellings that were built, but also the amount of invested and gained capital in which the French public authorities and private entrepreneurs were directly involved. It is important to stress, however, that any dwelling, building, or built environment might embody or engender segregation. Whether designed by the French authorities (or
329 Ibid. [“Dans cette formule, il s’agissait d’un remboursement mensuel de l’ordre de 7 à 8000f par mois, alors que dans la formule précédente il suffi sait de verser de 2500f à 3500f par mois pour devenir propriétaire.”] 330 Ibid., 14. [“J’ai visité les bidonvilles de Lyon. Ces derniers comme ceux de paris d’ailleurs, sont, depuis quelques temps, dotés de sections administratives spécialisées (SAS urbaines), ils sont bien pires que ceux d’Algérie parcequ’il n’y a pas de soleil.”] Th e SAS and the bidonvilles will be discussed in Chapter 4. 331 Ibid., 16. [Mais, à la vérité, il ne s’agit plus d’habitat musulman, il s’agit simplement d’habitat, et d’habitat pour le plus grand nombre car nous savons tous que l’habitat de type particulier est ségrégatif et condamné depuis longtemps.”] Here, the plus grand nombre is far from Candilis-Josic-Woods’ interpretation and projects.
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any other authority) for Frenchmen, Algerians, Moroccans, or any other community, any type of building might exemplify social, cultural, ethnic, religious, and, most particularly, economic segregation. Being able to aff ord a certain type of housing in specifi c parts of urban or rural areas depends on economic resources. Th e reasons that Padovani and his colleagues abandoned specifi c designs for the Algerian populations under the Plan de Constantine (who by defi nition were treated diff erently from others, most notably from their metropolitan counterparts) were not due to antisegregationist principles, but rather from a purely quantitative initiative that was deeply ensconced in economic colonial and neocolonial doctrines. In his conference “Architecture and Productivity,” Marcel Lathuillière recalled: “any real estate construction must include both investment and profi tability, regardless of the conditions of its realization. Sometimes we forget that there is a relationship between resources and living conditions.”332 Th is is a dilemma of a colonized country at war.
332 Marcel Lathuillière, “Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie. VI. Architecture et productivité, conférence prononcée le 14 mai 1959 par M. Lathuillière sous la présidence de M. Bienvenu,” Annales de l’Institut Technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics, no. 141 (September 1959): 4.[“Toute construction immobilière doit comporter à la fois un investissement et une rentabilité, quelles que soit les conditions de sa réalisation. On a parfois oublié qu’il y a une relation entre les ressources et les conditions d’habitation.”]
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 185
3.2 Toward Semi-Urban Housing
In October 1944, a few months after the liberation of France, the Provisional Government of the French Republic of General Charles de Gaulle created the French Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l’Urbanisme (MRU, or Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism), whose mandate was to reconstruire (reconstruct) the physical destruction and psychological damage caused by the Vichy regime and the Second World War; this involved France’s image, its unity, and its devastated built environments. Th e ministers of the MRU included Eugène Claudius-Petit, who served from September 1948 to January 1953; during the Algerian War of Independence, Claudius-Petit became the head of the newly established Société Nationale de Construction pour les Travailleurs Algériens in France (SONACOTRAL, or the National Society of Construction for Algerian Workers, Chapter 4). He and the other ministers were responsible for determining the parameters and standards for the design of new dwellings that would modernize the French people, particularly women, in France.333 French housing legislation and programs, which were gradually thought for the purposes of postwar reconstruction that included the construction industry, served to institute a national welfare state and to generate a larger working middle class: the consumer society.334 Th is was partly achieved by means of the didactic annual exhibitions in Paris of the Salon des Arts Ménagers (SAM, or Household Arts Show), which educated and introduced consumers to domestic appliances, furniture, and home designs. Th e MRU was supposed to thoroughly collaborate with the Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP, or General Commissariat of the Plan) in order to accommodate national politics and to enforce the economic policies of both the Monnet Plan and the Marshall Plan in France.335 In spite of the ineff ectiveness and protracted delays in constructing and delivering dwellings in France when compared to other Western countries such as
333 On the role of women, see for ecample, Nicole C. Rudolph, At Home in Postwar France: Modern Mass Housing and the Right to Comfort (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 87–113. 334 On the consumer society and the welfare state, see, for example, Jean Baudrillard, Th e Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (Washington D.C. and Covelo: SAGE, 1998); Mark Swenarton, Tom Avermaete, and Dirk van den Heuvel, Architecture and the Welfare State (London: Routledge, 2014). 335 Gwenaëlle Le Goullon, “La construction de cités nouvelles au tournant des années 1950. L’Etat et les municipalités de banlieue entre adhésions, confl its et compromis,” in Villes de banlieues: personnel communal, élus locaux et politiques urbaines en banlieue parisienne au xxe siècle (Grâne: Creaphis Editions, 2008), 130.
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Germany (now split into East and West), the United Kingdom, and Sweden,336 French national mass-housing congresses, laws, institutions, and programs had gained a great deal of importance, to the extent that the term housing was incorporated into the offi cial appellation of the MRU, which became the Ministère de la Reconstruction et du Logement (MRL, or Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing) in 1953. Emergency measures that were qualitatively inferior to the HLMs were desperately taken in the aftermath of the legendary radio appeal of the French Catholic Priest Abbé Pierre (1912–2007), known as l’insurrection de la bonté (Uprising of Kindness), during the abnormally cold month of February 1954 that killed numerous homeless people in the streets of France. Th e government launched a number of additional low-cost public housing programs, including the Logements économiques de première nécessité (LEPN, or Low-cost Housing of First Necessity), the Logements économique normalisés (LEN, or Standardized Low-cost Housing), and the Logements populaires et familiaux (LOPOFA, or Working-class and Family Housing), all of which would shortly become part of another national agenda: the Opération Million: to build housing units for one million French people within one year.337 Due to the slow implementation and delayed execution, however, the propagation of shantytowns continued, and France’s enormous housing shortage tragically remained. Upon his return to power, de Gaulle sought to “adjust” unsatisfactory postwar incentives. Th e designation of the MRL was immediately revised, and the terms reconstruction and logement were replaced by what was ultimately at stake in 1958: construction; that is, accurately orchestrated economic growth. Just as he had created the MRU in 1944, de Gaulle now founded the Ministère de la Construction (MC, of the Ministry of Construction) and appointed the young former resistance fi ghter Pierre Sudreau (1919–2002) as its fi rst minister. Sudreau had studied law and political science in his youth. Upon France’s liberation, he joined the interior minister, and in 1955 he became Commissioner of Construction and Urbanism of the Paris Region, charged with the coordination of the grands ensembles. His mandate in de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic was to construct and build (construire, or bâtir), in contrast to reconstruct, the economic expansion of the entirety of France. As Sudreau argued, this would entail “starting up
336 Benoît Pouvreau, Un politique en architecture: Eugène Claudius-Petit (1907-1989) (Paris: Le Moniteur, 2004), 111. 337 Jean-Claude Driant, Les politiques du logement en France (Paris: La documentation française, 2009), 100.
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a long-term policy that integrates the eff orts of the construction of housing within an overall conception of urbanism and aménagement du territoire [regional planning].”338 Like the MRU, the new ministry created a massive propaganda mechanism in order to expound state policies, promote large-scale government planning, endorse state-subsidized dwellings, and instruct the new dwellers. In Algeria, which was enmeshed in an undeclared war, the Ministry of Construction, the CGP, and the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria (headed by Delouvrier) actively engaged in constructing—or “pacifying” and “transforming,” as de Gaulle recommended—a “new” Algeria. Delouvrier claimed that “in an underdeveloped country like Algeria [which had been colonized since 1830], the building industry can be considered one of the cornerstones, because it allows for distributing wages that will be spent for the benefi t of various consumer industries.”339 In order to rapidly promote the building industry and to accelerate the mass production of the promised 220,000 urban housing units of Gaulle’s fi ve-year socio-economic development plan for Algeria, the French authorities rationalized the typologies of dwelling units, dividing them into four diff erent categories. Th e diff erence was essentially based on the per-unit cost of construction, which ranged from 7,000 to 70,000 new French francs (NF; i.e., between €10,500 and €105,000).340 Th e majority of these units—nearly 93 percent—were actually in the range of 7,000 to 22,000 NF (€10,500 to €33,000): a very low-cost standard indeed. Th e distribution of the four types included the following: • 7 percent “superior” or “normal” housing, whose construction costs would vary between 50,000 and 70,000 NF.
• 30 percent of the aforementioned Logeco housing and HLM (as noted above, low- cost dwellings), whose per-unit building costs were not to exceed 22,000 NF for a
338 Cited in Christiane Rimbaud, Pierre Sudreau: un homme libre (Paris: Le cherche midi, 2004), 130.. [“Mettre en route une politique à long terme qui intègre l’eff ort de construction de logements dans une conception d’ensemble de l’urbanisme et de l’aménagement du territoire.”] 339 Saigot, “Enquête sur l’habitat en Algérie. VIII. Conclusion: L’habitat dans le plan quinquennal de l’Algérie, conférence prononcée le 25 juin 1959 par M. Saigot sous la présidence de M. Delouvrier,” Annales de l’Institut Technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics, no. 143 (November 1959): 16. [“je crois que dans un pays sous- développé comme l’Algérie, le bâtiment peut être considéré comme une des pierres angulaires car il permet de distribuer des salaires qui seront dépensés au profi t d’industries de consummation.”] 340 Th e French New Franc (Nouveau Franc NF) was introduced in January 1960 due to devaluation in the 1940s and 1950s. 1 NF was equal to 100 former francs (Francs F). In 1963, the NF was called again Franc (F). In 1999 the Franc was replaced by the Euro whose conversion rate equalled 6,55957 F = 1 €.
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living area of roughly fi fty square meters.
• 33 percent habitat million, which consisted of small apartments of roughly four square meters that were expected to cost 13,000 NF each.
• 30 percent newly designed habitat semi-urban (neither urban nor rural), which involved an even smaller living area and cheaper expenses: roughly thirty square meters, costing a mere 7,000 NF each.341
Th e superior and normal (“fi rst class”) housing was identical to the HLM that had earlier been built in postwar France; such housing units primarily had been designed for European colonists, including bureaucrats who served in French public institutions. In contrast, the Logeco (“second class”) housing was designed for working-class Europeans and Algerians, and the Million (“third class”) and semi-urban (“fourth class”) habitations were exclusively intended for the urban Algerian population. As suggested by Padovani and others, these dwellings—which were based on predetermined plan-types (model plans)—were widely inspired by postwar housing units such as the Logecos and the Opération Million enforced by the MRL in France, but they had been drastically reduced and modifi ed to coincide with the Algerian colonial context, as will be discussed shortly. More importantly, an additional special category was designed only for Algerians under French colonial rule: the habitat semi-urban. Since the outset of the Plan de Constantine, the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria established several design commissions. Marcel Lathuillière, as well as the Swiss-born architect Pierre-André Emery, an early collaborator of Le Corbusier’s and a vocal supporter of his plans for Algiers (1931–42), were listed among the numerous members of the commission that drafted the guidelines for the architectural characteristics and technical aspects of the habitat semi-urban342 (Fig. 3.23). Since the 1930s, the two architects had practiced their profession in the colonial city of Algiers. Lathuillière became a prolifi c architect who worked for public authorities, whereas Emery was involved
341 FR ANOM 81F/433. L’Habitat dans la Plan de Constantine. As in other cases mentioned earlier, the appellation of the fi rst category often diff ered, it was sometimes called de luxe (luxurious), or semi-luxurious, or de standing plus élevé (higher standing), or the LOGECO and HLM classique were sometimes expected to range between 20,000 and 30,000 NF. Moreover, certain documents reported the costs in NF while others in old Francs. 342 CHSP.1 DV 34. Habitat million and Habitat semi-urbain.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 189
primarily in the private sector, as well as in the Algiers group of the Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM, or International Congresses of Modern Architecture). Despite their diverse backgrounds and disparate professional affi liations, they were both actively engaged in public debates about housing projects in Algiers: in particular, the lodgings designed for the Algerian population that were fi rst called habitation indigène (indigenous housing) and then habitat Musulman (Muslim housing). Th is alteration was rooted in the judicial status of Algerians, as will be discussed shortly. In the last few decades, historians and scholars have dealt with the specifi c infl uences , of various architects, writers and politicians Fig. 3.23 Booklet of habitat semi-urbain. CHSP 1 who have generated divergent architectural DV 34. styles and engendered a few diff erent housing types in the twentieth century. Th ey have discussed specifi c implications of these gures fi in the collocation of Algiers within the contexts of the Mediterranean, modern architecture in colonial North Africa, and the CIAM. Th e purpose of this section is to attempt to trace a possible itinerary through which Lathuillière—who was not by coincidence chosen to partake in the design of the categories of dwellings of the Plan de Constantine—had centered his architectural intentions and had altered and adapted his convictions about housing for Algerians since the 1930s. Tracing this itinerary will help to clarify the unusual strategy that the French Fifth Republic selected for the fi nal phase of the Algerian War of Independence in colonial Algeria; it will also help to review the role that the architecture of the dwellings produced by the various public French organizations played in conditioning the lives of the colonized Algerian population in Algiers and to investigate the motivations behind the creation of the “semi-urban.”
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Marcel Lathuillière permanently moved to Algiers in 1930 after coming in second place in the Foyer civique343 (Civic Foyer) design competition of 1927, launched by the municipality of Algiers, to which he had submitted a design project along with the Algiers- born-and-based architect Albert Seiller (1901–1938). Th e two architects became partners in 1928. Lathuillière graduated from the Ecole nationale supérieure des Beaux-Arts in Paris, where he attended the Atelier Emmanuel Pontremoli, a neo-classicist architect, winner of the Prix de Rome; he was likewise in contact with the Atelier du Palais de Bois,344 directed by Auguste Perret. Th e year 1932 saw the establishment of the Algiers Group of the Société des Architectes Modernes (SAM, or Society of Modern Architects), a French organization that had been created in 1922. Th e Algiers Group’s active members included Lathuillière, Seiller, and the winner of the aforementioned Civic Foyer competition, Léon Claro (1899–1991). Th e SAM requested all of its adherents “to build on the principles of modern aesthetics, excluding any pastiche and any reproduction of ancient styles, whenever they are not prevented by absolute necessity.”345 In Algiers, this “pastiche” most probably referred to the neo-Moresque style that dominated the French colonial architecture of the early twentieth century, encouraged by Charles-Celestin Auguste Jonnart (1857 –1927). Jonnart served as General Governor of Algeria in 1900, between 1903 and 1911, and then again from 1918 to 1919, and was partly inspired by the studies and opinions on the Arab kingdom of the Emperor of the French Second Empire: Napoleon III. 346 Frantz Jourdain, President of the Paris SAM, criticized the outdated educational system of the Beaux- Arts that had “poisoned the youth.” In an article entitled “Il faut être de son temps” (“It Is Necessary to Be Contemporary”) published in Chantiers, he lauded the Algiers-SAM’s accomplishments: “my colleagues [in Algiers], in a few years, have done more in favor of modern evolution than the French architects [in Paris], who are too indecisive, divided,
343 Th e winner was Léon Claro. 344 Boussad Aïche, “Figures de l’architecture algéroise des années 1930 : Paul Guion et Marcel Lathuillière,” in Architecture au Maghreb (XIXe-XXe siècles) (Tours: Presses Universitaires François-Rabelais, 2011), 273. 345 Article 2 of the constitutive statues of the SAM, cited by the General Delegate of SAM in Emmanuel de Th ubert, “Architecture moderne,” Chantiers, no. 3 (March 1933): 291–93. [“De construire selon les principes de l’esthétique moderne, à l’exclusion de tout pastiche et de toute reproduction de styles anciens, chaque fois qu’ils n’en seront pas empêchés par une nécessité absolue.”] 346 On the French neo-Moresque style in Algiers, see, for example, Nabila Oulebsir, “Les ambiguïtés du régionalisme: le style néomauresque,” in Alger: paysages urbain et architectures, 1800-2000 (Paris: Les Editions de l’imprimeur, 2003), 104–25.
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uncertain, confused, and torn in diff erent directions.”347 If Algiers-based French architects succeeded in imposing nonregional architectures, or modern architecture deprived of “pastiche,” it was because the French colons in Algeria virulently criticized and condemned the stylistic choice of the General Government, arguing that the neo-Moresque forms did not belong to them; they thus mainly promoted a style that fi tted into a recognizable European architecture in Algiers.348 Th e General Delegate of the Paris-SAM stated that the group encompassed many diverse personalities, naming some of them after construction materials: the “Friend of Iron” (Frantz Jourdain), the “Master of Cement” (Auguste Perret), and the “Protagonist of Steel” (Henri Sauvage). He also stressed that one of the most belle (beautiful) foundations of the SAM was the Algiers Group founded by Lathuillière and his friends, because it demonstrated that “on both sides of the Mediterranean reign the same spirits and beat the same heart, so that France is both in Algiers and in Paris.”349
Algiers hosted the fi rst Exposition d’Urbanisme et d’Architecture Moderne (Exhibition of Town Planning and Modern Architecture) in February 1933 (Fig. 3.23). Th is exposition had followed three years after the monumental celebrations of the hundredth anniversary of the French colonization of Algeria, known as Le Centenaire de l’Algérie Française (Centenary of French Algeria). Th ese celebrations were held primarily in Algiers, but were also held in other parts of Algeria during the fi rst six months of 1930 (Fig. 3.24). Th e exposition also came two years after the International Colonial Exhibition in the Bois de Vincennes in Paris in 1931, which displayed the immense resources from both the French colonial empire and the majority of great Western possessions. Lathuillière was the deputy president of the organization committee of the exhibition, Seiller was the general curator, and Emery was the general secretary. Th e exhibition was organized by the infl uential Association of Urbanism of the Amis d’Alger, the Algiers-SAM Group, and the
347 Frantz Jourdain, “Il faut être de son temps,” Chantiers, no. 3 (March 1933): 290.[“Mes confrères, en quelques années, ont plus fait en faveur de l’évolution moderne que les architectes français, trop indécis, divisés, incertains, désorientés et tiraillés dans des sens diff érents.”] 348 Oulebsir, “Les ambiguïtés du régionalisme: le style néomauresque,” 118. 349 de Th ubert, “Architecture moderne,” 292. [“De part et d’autre de la méditerranée, règne le même esprit, bat le même cœur, de sorte que la France est tout entière en Alger comme à Paris.”]
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Fig. 3.23 (left) Exposition d’Urbanisme et d’Architecture Moderne in Algiers, 1933. From Chantiers no. 3 (March 1933), 236.
Fig. 3.24 (right) La maison indigène du centenaire designed by Léon Claro. From L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui, no. 3 (March 1936), 26.
Trade Union Association of Architects Graduated and Admitted by the Government.350 Rudolphe Rey, the President of the Committee of the Exhibition and the President of the Amis d’Alger who invited Le Corbusier to Algiers, asserted in his article “Tous urbanistes!” (“All Town Planners!”) that “planners and architects in Algeria, closely united in the continuation of their generous eff ort, will not cease to guide public authorities in their great task of remodeling and developing our African cities.”351 In the special issue of Chantiers dedicated to the exhibition, the reports and projects were divided into two parts: fi rst, urbanism and the large-scale planning and development of cities in Algeria; and second, architecture and modern construction in Algeria. Lathuillière published the
350 Th e Algiers-based magazines Travaux Nord-Africains and Chantiers dedicated a special issue to the exhibition, see, Travaux Nord-africains no. 1136 of 18 February 933; Chantiers no. 3 of March 1933. In the fi rst part on Urbanism in Chantiers, the famous projects by Tony Soccard, Maurice Rotival and Le Corbusier for the Quartier de la Marine are included. 351 Rudolphe Rey, “Tous urbanistes!,” Chantiers, no. 3 (March 1933): 237. [“Les urbanistes et les architectes algériens, étroitement unis dans la continuation de leur généreux eff ort, ne cesseront de guider les Pouvoirs publics dans leur grande tâche de remodèlement et de développement de nos villes africaines.”]
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 193
article “L’architecture moderne et l’aménagement de l’habitation” (“Modern Architecture and the Confi guration of Housing”), whereas Seiller reported his ideas in the article “L’hygiène dans l’habitation” (“Housing Hygiene”). Both articles disregarded the question of housing designed for Algerians. Only one article dealt directly with this issue: “L’habitation indigène et les quartiers musulmans” (“Indigenous Housing and Muslim Neighborhoods”), written by architect François Bienvenu, who was born and based in Algiers and who worked for the French General Government. Bienvenu described the ongoing public debates on the types of housing in which Algerians—or, as they were called, the indigènes (indigenous, or native)—were expected to live. He described two opposing groups of thought, neither of which proposed a common compromise that would be acceptable to both. Th e debates were centered around a rhetorical question: Is it necessary to conceive and build dwellings that will satisfy the current lifestyle of the Algerian population, or rather to envisage the adaptation of Algerians’ modes of living to the French colonial lifestyle through European- type housing?352 Some French representatives believed that Algerians inhabiting European-style dwellings would generate new needs that would not be compatible with their salaries; this would be a menace to colonial agriculture and industry. Others thought that if the Algerian population lived in European-style housing, it would activate new commercial transactions that would in turn be benefi cial to the entire colony, and therefore to the European community.353 Both arguments were rooted in economic interests and were engraved in colonial practices. According to Bienvenu, who designed and built housing for Algerians in Algiers (Figs. 3.25, 3.26), “the problem of the resettlement of the indigenous population should be the priority, the key problem on which everything else depends: sanitation, circulation, development, and embellishment.”354 Until Algeria achieved independence in 1962, however, the French colonial administration failed to solve this question; it did not avert the crise du logement (housing crisis), which may well have provoked the propagation of shantytowns.
352 François Bienvenu, “L’habitation indigène et les quartiers musulmans,” Chantiers, no. 3 (March 1933): 246. 353 Ibid. 354 Ibid. [“Le problème du recasement de la population indigène nous paraît être le premier à résoudre, le problème-clef dont tous les autres dépendent: assainissement, circulation, développement, embellissement.”] On Bienvenu, see, for example, Zeynep Çelik, Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 130–143.
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Fig. 3.25 (top) Plan of indigenous habitations designed by François Bienvenu. From Chantiers no. 3 (March 1933), 267
Fig. 3.26 (bottom) View of indigenous habitations designed by François Bienvenu. From Chantiers no. 3 (March 1933), 267
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Fig. 3.27 “Exposition de la cité moderne d’Alger,” article by Marcel Lathuillière in L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui no. 5 (May 1936), 82.
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Lathuillière curated the second edition of the Exhibition of Urbanism and Modern Architecture (this time called the Exposition de la Cité Moderne; Fig. 3.27), which took place in the uncompleted Civic Foyer in Algiers from 28 March to 19 April. Th e exhibition was comprised of four diff erent sections: Urbanism, Architecture, Housing, and Techniques of Construction. Seiller curated the Housing section, which displayed the interiors of dwellings, their layout, furniture, and decoration; Emery was again the general secretary of the exhibition.355 On this occasion, a special issue of the French magazine L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui—whose correspondent in Algeria was Lathuillière between 1935 and 1948—was devoted to France d’Outremer (Overseas France). Th is time, the exhibition featured the habitat indigène: not only in the French overseas colonies and protectorates, but also—and particularly—in Algeria. Positions were again divided. Th e president of the HBM (Habitat à Bon Marché, or Low Cost Housing) Offi ce of the Municipality of Algiers expressed his opinion in his article “L’habitat indigène en Algérie” (“Indigenous Dwellings in Algeria”), arguing that “indigenous dwellings must meet the requirements of customary mores, which demands the absolute privacy of the home.”356 He illustrated his text with the housing project designed by Bienvenu. Lathuillière, in contrast—who in the meantime had obtained authorization for public works to be built for the French General Government in Algeria—stressed in his article “Le problème de l’habitat indigène en Algérie” (“Th e Problem of Indigenous Housing in Algeria”) that “it would be an error to push respect for their [‘indigenous’] customs to the point of trying to recall, by form and disposition, ancient buildings.”357 Lathuillière paired the non-European populations who lived in Algeria—as he noted, the Arabs, Berbers, Turks, Mozabits, and others communities that had Islam as a common bond—and he designed a housing complex for non-Europeans in Algiers (Figs. 3.23, 3.29); he also expressed the breadth of his design agenda, recommending that “new constructions will have to be careful about satisfying old customs, and should guide some
355 Exposition de la cité moderne : urbanisme, architecture, habitation, Alger du 28 mars au 19 avril 1936 (Alger: Comité d’Organisation, 1936), 8–9. 356 Pasquier-Bronde, “L’habitat indigène en Algérie,” L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, no. 3 (March 1936): 20. [“Le logement indigène doit répondre aux exigences des mœurs coutumières, lesquelles réclament l’intimité absolue du foyer.”] 357 Marcel Lathuillière and Albert Seiller, “Le problème de l’habitat indigène en Algérie,” L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, no. 3 (March 1936): 22. [“Ce serait une erreur de pousser le respect de leurs coutumes jusqu’à chercher à rappeler, par la forme et la disposition, les anciennes constructions.”]
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Fig. 3.28 (top) Master plan of lotissement indigène (indigenous housing), Clos Salembier, Algiers designed by Albert Seiler and Marcel Lathuillière. From L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui no. 3 (March 1936), 24.
Fig. 3.29 (bottom) View of Seiler and Lathuillière housing project designed for Algerian populations. From L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui no. 3 (March 1936), 25.
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habits in order to pave the way for a gradual assimilation to Europeans mores.”358 During the Algerian War of Independence, Soustelle advocated an upgrading of the conventional and ancient colonial doctrine of assimilation and its substitution by his reformed policy of integration, arguing in his manuscript L’espérance trahie (Betrayed Hope) that assimilation is unrealistic, because it “assumes that all inhabitants of Algeria, and predominantly Muslim Arabs or Berbers, are to be transformed, by a sort of magic wand, into Frenchmen of the Métropole, particularly in terms of religion, customs, and language.”359 Th e French authorities, civil and military, have never ceased to believe in the power of an imposed assimilation, however, and have recurrently used aggressive means to compel colonized populations (called French subjects) to embrace French ideals. Henri Labouret, one of the most prominent French colonial administrator-ethnographers, wrote on the roots of the French colonial policy in a chapter in his seminal book Colonisation, colonialisme, décolonisation (Colonization, Colonialism, Decolonization) titled “L’assimilation” that “the Frenchman owes to his temperament, and to an education rooted for centuries in classical thought and the principles of Roman Law, an ideal assimilation that has long dominated our history, our political life, and our colonizing actions.”360 Th e exhibition La Cité Moderne exposed the African architecture of the traditional dwellings in the great French Empire. Th e article “L’habitation indigène dans les colonies françaises” (“Indigenous Housing in French Colonies”) illustrated some of the exhibits of the sections on habitation indigène in French North Africa, French West and Equatorial Africa, French Madagascar, French Indochina, and French Oceania.361 Unlike in the other French colonial possessions, traditional housing in French North Africa was divided into two categories: L’habitation rurale (rural dwellings) of both nomadic and settled populations, and La maison urbaine (the urban house), which consisted primarily of courtyard houses.
358 Ibid. [“Les réalisations nouvelles devront être prudentes de satisfaire aux vielles coutumes et diriger certaines habitudes de manière à préparer la voie à une assimilation progressive aux mœurs européennes.”] 359 Soustelle, L’espérance trahie (1958-1961), 284. [“Suppose que tous les habitants de l’Algérie, et au premier chef les Musulmans arabes ou berbères, soient transformés, par on ne sait trop quel coup de baguette magique, en Français de la métropole, en particulier quant à la religion, aux mœurs, au langage.”] Soustelle condemned assimilation in order to advocate intégration. 360 Henri Labouret, Colonisation, colonialisme, décolonisation (Paris: Larose, 1952), 85. [“Le Français doit à son tempérament et à une éducation fondée depuis des siècles sur la pensée classique et les principes du Droit Romain, un idéal assimilateur qui a dominé notre histoire, notre vie politique et notre action colonisatrice.”] 361 Marcel Persitz, “L’habitation indigène dans les colonies françaises,” L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, no. 3 (March 1936): 13–19.
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Th e author admired the great variety of the populations who lived in this immense and diverse territory; he assessed the accurate profi ciency of their habitations, which coincided with both human and natural environments. Th e author also argued that traditional housing settlements—that is, pre-French colonial dwellings—were adapted to regional geographic and climatic conditions, fulfi lled cultural values, and ensured various social customs, including family privacy and the separation of activities according to gender.362 Ironically, the term indigène referred not only to the dwellings designed by the French authorities for the colonized populations, but also to the regional and traditional architecture that had been built prior to French colonization. Th us, the expression habitation indigène was employed to signify interchangeable times and spaces: pre- French as well as French colonial housing settlements for non-European populations. Th is controversial twofold appellation emerged from the judicial status of the colonized populations, which was dictated by the French colonial legislation known as the Code de l’Indigénat (Code for the Indigenous), a set of discriminatory regulations that did not constitutionally, politically, or economically protect the populations that were subjected to it. In Algeria under French colonial rule, the colonized populations were considered citizens of neither Algeria nor France. Instead, they were designated indigènes sujets français (indigenous French subjects), or simply sujets français or indigènes. To this end, precolonial and colonial housing settlements alike that were inhabited by the indigènes were labeled habitation indigène. With the abolition of the Code de l’Indigénat in the aftermath of the Second World
War, the term indigène, since it was rooted in racial diff erences, needed to be changed. Algerian populations then became les français Musulmans d’Algérie (French Muslims from Algeria), although they did not have the benefi ts of full French citizenship. Reference to religion replaced that of race: a measure that again controversially treated Algerians unequally to other communities who lived in Algeria. While for Algerians the criteria were based on religious affi liations, for Frenchmen, including Jews and Europeans, they were based on juridical citizenship. Th e “non-Muslim” populations—which included Christians from France and other European countries, as well as Jews who had settled in Algeria long before French colonization—were called neither French Christians nor
362 Ibid., 14.
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French Jews; and for unknown reasons, Jews and Christians were perceived to be one cohesive group. Unlike in the French Protectorate of Morocco and Tunisia, the Jewish community in the French departments of Algeria had been incorporated into the French population in 1870, since they were granted French citizenship under the Crémieux Decree.363 Th e colonized Algerian population was thus the sole community to be offi cially singled out for its religious faith. As a result, the habitation indigène turned out to be called the habitat musulman or the cité musulmane (Muslim housing).364 Th is was another colonial appellation and design based on discriminatory principles, as will be discussed shortly. Assimilating the “indigenous” and then “Muslims” to French standards and dwellings in Algeria under French colonial rule spawned several thoughtful debates among colonial administrators, politicians, and architects. Such discussions occurred during the French 12th Congrès National d’Habitation et d’Urbanisme (National Congress of Housing and Town Planning) held in May 1952 in Algiers. Th e congress was organized by two infl uential French institutions: the Union Nationale des Fédérations d’Organismes d’HLM (UNFOHLM, or National Union of Federations of HLM Organizations) and the Confédération Française pour l’habitation et l’urbanisme (CFHU, or the French Confederation for Housing and Town Planning). A study trip devoted to the questions and problems of urban dwellings in Algiers was additionally organized by the Fédération Algérienne des Organismes de HBM (the Algeria-based Federation of Low Cost Housing Organizations).365 Eugène Claudius-Petit, French Minister of the MRU, and other representatives of various French housing legislations and assets attended the congress in Algiers in order to corroborate that France and Algeria indeed faced similar issues in terms
363 During the Vichy Regime, anti-semitic measures were taken and the 1870 decree was abolished, and then reintroduced. 364 Th is does not mean that the term Muslim was never used before 1945, on the contrary, Islam, and Muslim customs had been since the onset of French colonization a subject of study for the French administration and social scientists. Th e term Muslim was also used to designate a specifi c urban planning, such as in Georges Marçais “L’urbanisme musulman” in Algérie, mai 1936 p. 8-9. Other expressions were also used, such as the maison moresques, urbanisme nord- africain; however, except a few exceptions like René Lespes article L’évolution des idées sur l’urbanisme algérois de 1830 à nous jours, the appellation Algerian house was rarely employed. Algérois referred to the geographic region of Algiers and not to the inhabitants of Algiers. Because Algeria was deemed a French department, the terms Berber, Arab, gourbi, indigenous were often used to designate the settlements where the Algerian population lived. 365 Annie Fourcaut, “Alger-Paris : crise du logement et choix des grands ensembles. Autour du XIIe Congrès national d’habitation et d’urbanisme d’Alger (mai 1952),” in Alger, lumières sur la ville, actes du colloque de mai 2001 à Alger (Alger: Éditions Dalimen, 2004), 128.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 201
of housing and planning, and to indicate that Algeria was at the same time profoundly diff erent. One of these dissimilarities consisted in the socio-cultural characteristics of the inhabitants of Algeria: that is, that Algeria was not only populated by French citizens and European communities (Italian, Spanish, Greek, Maltese, German, and Austrian, among others, who could certainly become French citizens), but also by Algerian populations (the “Muslims”). To this end, the congress animatedly discussed the typologies of the housing units in which the two communities should dwell: French (including Jews) and Europeans vs. the Algerian “Muslims.” Th e divergent opinions about a purported type of housing for Algerians made it clear that the circumstances of Algeria under French colonial rule were indeed profoundly dissimilar from those of France, but also of the French protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia. Two opposing policies came from the debate.366 One position was developed by the French participants from the Métropole, who advocated an emblematic colonial planned segregation by designing three categories of housing settlements.
1) Low-cost and low-rise dwellings would be created for specifi c classes of the Algerian population—called the Musulmans non évolués (“non- developed Muslims”) and Musulmans peu évolués (“less-developed or underdeveloped Muslims”)—who lived in the shantytowns; this proposal was spatially and fi nancially comparable with the cités d’urgence (emergency settlements) that were built in post-war France;
2) Habitat à bon marché would be created, devoted to the European working-class populations and a small fraction of Algerians who were described as a “Muslim population that has already achieved a certain degree of development [or evolution].”367
3) Dwellings would be created for the European middle classes that could benefi t from public funds for private investments.
Th e second approach was promoted by French architects who practiced in Algiers, notably Marcel Lathuillière, who was by then architect-adviser to the General French Government
366 Ibid., 131. 367 Cited in Ibid. [“Population musulmane qui a déjà atteint un certain degré d’évolution.”]
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in Algeria, a member of the Council of the Order of Architects in Algeria, and the President of the North African Section (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) of the Union of International Architects (UIA).368 Th is position hoped for “a radical and assimilationist urban modernization,”369 a stance that condemned community-based designs, single- family housing, and low-rise dwelling units, instead encouraging multi-family collective high-rise buildings in which the two communities, Algerians (“Muslims”) and Europeans (including French people), would be required to learn to live together. Unlike Europeans, however, Algerians had no alternative but to assimilate the French colonial resolution and to adopt French models of domesticity. According to Lathuillière, “a dwelling has a great infl uence on the behavior of a family.… Collective dwellings impose disciplines that shape the civilized man. Th is is where the role of the architect is clearly apparent: a role that goes far beyond the boundaries of art and technology and gains a greater social signifi cance.”370 Th e assimilationist viewpoint was reinforced by a prominent colonial fi gure in Algiers: René Montaldo, doctor of medicine, general adviser for the municipality of Teniet-el-Haad, and president of three groups: the Commission of Housing at the General Council in Algiers, the Public HLM Offi ce in the Department of Algiers, and the Algerian Federation of HLM Organizations. Montaldo drafted a report on habitation that summarized the challenges and discussions of the Congrès des Présidents des Conseils Généraux de France (Congress of Presidents of the General Councils of France) that had taken place in June 1953. He argued that the recent completions and the upcoming construction sites of low-cost HLM settlements in the French departments of Algeria “are absolutely identical to similar realizations in the Métropole, in terms of design, implementation, and amortization, that obey the same law of 1922.”371 He emphasized that these initiatives were insuffi cient for coping with the rise and spread of the alarming housing shortage,
368 Marcel Lathuillière, “Algérie 1955,” UIA: Union Iternationale des Architectes, no. 7 (May 1955): 2. 369 Fourcaut, “Alger-Paris : crise du logement et choix des grands ensembles. Autour du XIIe Congrès national d’habitation et d’urbanisme d’Alger (mai 1952),” 131. [“Modernisation urbaine radicale et assimilationniste.”] 370 Rapport de Marcel Lathuillière “L’habitat des musulmans dans les villes d’Algérie” in Rapport du XIIe Congrès national d’habitation et d’urbanisme, Mai 1952, Alger, cited in Ibid., 132. [“Le logis exerce une grande infl uence dans le comportement familial (…) Le logis collectif impose des disciplines qui façonnent l’homme civilisé. C’est là que le rôle de l’Architecte apparaît nettement, le rôle qui dépasse largement les limites de l’art et de la technique et prend une signifi cation sociale d’une grande ampleur.”] 371 FR ANOM 81F/2204. René Montaldo, Rappor sur l’Habitat, Congrès des Présidents des Conseils Généraux de France. Juin 1953, p. 2. [“Ces réalisations ne diff èrent en rien des réalisations similaires de la Métropole, tant dans leur conception, leur réalisation, que leur amortissement qui obéissent à la même loi de 1922.”]
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however, and that specifi c solutions—not so much of a formal character, but rather in terms of cost eff ectiveness—should be implemented in Algeria without delay in order to clear “the slums, the shantytowns, the ‘negro villages’ that disfi gure our conurbations, and are a real paradox, as an accusation and a curse to such a great civilization that France has brought to this country.”372 One could also suggest that these tragic conditions might be the direct consequences of the French colonization of Algeria. In his article “L’habitat économique et social en Algérie” (“Low-Cost and Social Housing in Algeria”), published in a special 1953 issue of the French magazine Techniques & Architecture that was dedicated to Algeria (and edited by Pierre-André Emery, the magazine’s correspondent in North Africa), Dr. Montaldo, distinguished two major programs for housing estates that he envisaged for the Algerian population. Th e fi rst was in the process of being implemented by the Public Housing Organization that he directed; it consisted of “normal HLM” that was designed for the categorized Musulmans évolués. Th e foremost objective of this program was “to establish, through the dwelling, a policy of contact that would lead both elements of our population to better know each other, to further interact with each other, and to love each other.”373 As Montaldo emphasized, the second proposal aff ected the majority of the Muslim population that lived in rural regions, as well as in the “bidonvilles, villages nègres, and the Casbah” of urban areas. In the absence of other opportunities, many Algerian communities were constrained to inhabit one of these housing settlements and frequently had to build their own shelters for themselves. In urban areas, the bidonvilles, villages nègres (also called villages indigènes), and the Casbah were neighborhoods that were inhabited almost exclusively by Algerians. Montaldo solicited the French government to dedicate more eff ort (in particular further funding and credit) to rural municipalities, and ensured that thanks to the standardization of the gabarit de cellule uniforme (identical cell dimensions) and the industrialization of construction sites, “the production costs would be subjected
372 Ibid. [“Les taudis, les bidonvilles, les ‘villages nègres’, qui enlaidissent toutes nos agglomérations et sont, véritable paradoxe, comme une accusation et une malédiction à cette belle civilisation apporté par la FRANCE dans ce pays.”] France is written in capital letters in the original document. Th e “village nègre” was a settlement inhabited, as clearly embedded in the term, by non-white people, that is, by Algerians. 373 René Montaldo, “L’Habitat économique et social en Algérie,” Techniques & Architecture 12, no. 1–2 (1953): 46. [“établir par le logement cette politique de contact qui conduira les deux éléments de notre population à se mieux connaitre, à se pratiquer d’avantage, et à s’aimer.”]
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to positive repercussions.”374 He summarized his recent experiences at the Public Housing Offi ce in the Department of Algiers in four points that would constitute, as he claimed, a doctrine; these included:
1) building housing units that would be susceptible to transformation and expansion, later called habitat évolutif or cité musulmane évolutive, in order to better accomplish the development of rural families by means of continuously improved facilities (équipements);
2) creating exclusively collective dwellings and high-rise buildings in major cities, with the exception of the cité de recasement: low-rise houses in which families would live provisionally;
3) seeking a policy of contact everywhere between the diff erent ethnic groups, and encouraging “a formal rejection of the construction of ‘Medina Style’ settlements, which are too compartmentalized, as he argued”375; and
4) initiating a policy of rent compensation by obtaining from urban areas that had higher salaries a kind of surloyers (“over-rent”) that would compensate the necessarily insuffi cient “rents” (in the economic sense) of rural sectors with very low wages.376
With de Gaulle’s socio-economic development plan and his unexpected 1958 proclamation that Algeria was inhabited by only one category of people, called Français à part entière377 (fully fl edged Frenchmen), the Algerian population was considered French overnight. Th is new status had not only normalized the policy of contact, but had also legitimized the projected French dwellings for the French population (this time including Algerians) in Algeria under French colonial rule. Debates about community-based designs and culture-specifi c housing devoted for particular populations in Algeria thus eventually no longer had a raison d’être. With the exception of the semi-urban, the appellations of
374 Ibid. [“Les prix de revient pourront en subir des répercussions heureuses.” 375 Ibid. [“Rejet formel de l’élaboration de cités ‘Style Médina’, beaucoup trop cloisonnées.”] 376 Ibid. 377 de Gaulle, Discours et messages. Avec le renouveau. Mai 1958 - Juillet 1962, 15–16. Allocution prononcée à Alger le 4 juin 1958.
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the typologies of housing in Algeria echoed mass-housing projects and preapproved plan- type housing units that previously had been built by the MRL in France: the HLMs, the Logecos, and the small housing units of the emergency Operation Million, which were based on construction costs. While Sudreau was concerned with amending the authoritarian policies of his predecessors and enhancing national productions of modern housing in France,378 he endorsed the creation of a miserable category of housing in Algeria, the semi-urban, which did not exist in France. Th is was because even the lowest category of housing programs in France—that is, the habitat Million—was economically inaccessible to certain classes of the colonized population in Algeria under French rule. Th e logement semi-urbain was created by decree on 20 May 1959. Th e introduction to its technical brochure, which was a twenty-six-page document that specifi ed every characteristic of the envisaged housing units, was written by an extensive list of members of a special working group that included Lathuillière, Emery, and André Jacomet, the General Secretary of Administration in Algeria. Th e introduction explained that the semi- urban was a form of habitation that coincided with the social and technical conditions of the populations that lived both in the outskirts of cities and in rural towns. Th e semi- urban did not belong to the category of rural housing, which was regulated by another institution: the Commissariat of Reconstruction and Rural Habitat (Chapters 2 and 4.). Jacomet classifi ed the various categories of urban housing that were built in Algeria from lowest to highest, explaining that “the semi-urban lodging is situated in the range of the types currently being built in Algeria at the most modest level. Above it, we fi nd settlement of temporary assistance; above this, the modern housing types of ‘million,’ ‘Logeco,’ and ‘normal,’ similar to those found in the Métropole.’”379 Although he openly recognized the minimized characteristics of the semi-urban housing, he emphasized that these units were “a decisive step of social development for families that were torn from
378 On the Referendum Apartment of 1959, see for example, W. Brian Newsome, “Th e ‘Apartment Referendum’ of 1959: Toward Participatory Architectural and Urban Planning in Postwar France,” French Historical Studies 28, no. 2 (2005): 329–58. 379 CHSP. 1 DV 34. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Direction des Travaux Publics et de la Construction et des Transports, Service de l’Habitat, Logement Semi-Urbain, p.1. [“Le logement semi-urbain se situe dans la gamme des types actuellement construits en Algérie à un niveau des plus modestes. Au dessus, l’on trouve la cité d’assistance temporaire, au dessus, les logement modernes “million”, “Logéco” et “normaux”, analogues à ceux que l’on trouve en métropole.”]
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the gourbi [shacks] and the slum.”380 Was this development or assimilation? Whereas the most inferior category of urban public housing to benefi t from state fi nancial aid was the Million in France, in Algeria it was the semi-urban, a dwelling of reduced size and reduced cost (and therefore of reduced comfort) that was expected to house Algerian families whom the French authorities considered to be neither urban nor rural, but rather “not yet urban” or “in the process of becoming urban.” Semi-urban dwellings were devoted to Algerian employees in the agricultural sector; agents of local administrative services; salaried workers in the semi-public sectors, such as workers in the railroads, post offi ces, and telecommunication services; and artisans and shopkeepers of the tertiary sector.381 Th e wages of these Algerian workers were so low—about 250 NF per month—that they could barely aff ord the semi-urban lodgment, whose rent amounted to roughly thirty NF per month over a period of fi fteen years, or a bank credit of around 5,500 NF without interest. In addition, the French authorities assumed that these neither urban nor rural families were not prepared to move into modern high-rise buildings, since they were unaccustomed to higher standards; therefore a gradual “development“ was necessary. Although similar presumptions were adopted in France to describe the behavior of French working-class families who moved from slums into the public social housing of the aforementioned LENs or LOPOFAs that were designed for them, as Nicole C. Rudolph argues in her 2015 book At Home in Postwar France,382 Algerian families were provided with inferior comfort and lower standards in Algeria. As was the case in postwar France, women were taught the way to settle in and to adapt their new domestic space to modern requirements dictated by the government, as well as how to allocate their budgets for household expenditures. In colonial Algeria, the Algerian women who would inhabit the logement semi-urbain were presumed to demand and lead the modifi cations of the spatial confi guration of their domestic spaces, which the French authorities deemed to be inappropriate: “Th e Muslim woman … is the one who will require a house that is properly exposed, allowing good exposure to sunlight in winter, and also to open the windows to the outside. Th is woman will also very soon require the
380 Ibid. [“Une étape décisive de l’évolution sociale des familles arrachés au gourbi et au bidonville.”] On the term gourbi and its connotation, see Chapter 2. 381 Ibid., p. 5. 382 Rudolph, At Home in Postwar France: Modern Mass Housing and the Right to Comfort, 125.
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removal of any opaque walls that are not based on Koranic prescriptions, and she will quickly consider that her house and courtyard are too cellulaire [cellular] in form.”383 In reality, the prescriptions for semi-urban dwellings guided the design of the housing units to conceive cells of cellular forms, as long as the cellulaire (cellular) referred to the cellule (cell) of habitation that were developed by the MRL offi cials in postwar France. Due to strict fi nancial restrictions, however, the dimensions of the cells in Algeria were drastically reduced, and the fi nishing works were left uncompleted. Th e functional and technical instructions from 1959 mandated the design of low- rise buildings that comprised a cluster of twenty-fi ve to sixty individual “cells” that were arranged in either single-story blocks or two-story blocks (duplexes) that covered only one part of the dwelling (Fig. 3.30). Th e range of housing types included a “2 pièces principales,” a two-room unit with a living area of between twenty-four and twenty-seven square meters; a “3 pièces principales,” a three-room unit of thirty-one to thirty-four square meters; and a “4 pièces principales,” a four-room unit of thirty-eight to forty-one square meters. Th e minimum surface area of the main bedroom was to be nine square meters, whereas the second or third bedrooms had to be seven square meters. Th e living room and the incorporated kitchen had to fi t within a minimum space of eleven square meters. Th e salle d’eau (a room devoted to bathing and laundering) was to be a minimum of two square meters, while the restroom was to be located outside the living space and without any direct contact with the other rooms. Th e units were to comprise an internal courtyard of a minimum surface area of sixteen square meters, enclosed not by the walls of the rooms of the units, but by fences that were to be equivalent to reeds attached to wooden poles (Figs. 3.31–3.34). Water was to be supplied, while electricity and gas were to be supplied only if there was the possibility of connecting to a general public distribution network.384 Th e minuscule dimensions of the cells—which were smaller than both the modernist Existenzminimum dwelling debated at CIAM II in Frankfurt an Main in 1929 and the tiniest one-room dwelling (with an area of thirty-fi ve square meters) of the 1922 HBM in France—were
383 Ibid., p. 6. [“La femme musulman (...), c’est elle qui exigera une maison convenablement exposée permettant une bonne insolation l’hiver et aussi d’ouvrir les fenêtres vers l’extérieur. Cette femme exigera, aussi, très bientôt, la suppression des murs opaques qui ne sont fondés sur aucune prescriptions coraniques et qu’elle estimera très vite donner à sa maison et à sa courette une forme trop cellulaire.”] 384 Ibid., p. 15.
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Fig. 3.30 Semi-urban dwellings published in the brochure released by the Housing Service of the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria. CHSP 1 DV 34. justifi ed by the meager wages of the future Algerian property owners, as well as by the French determination to impede Algerian solidarity. Th e French authorities deemed this solidarity to be exaggerated, and therefore, they opposed Algerian family cohabitations. Th e instructions argued that “the rules of Muslim solidarity lead to a disproportionate extension of family relationships,” and that “this conception of community is a serious obstacle to the awakening and development of a family unit.”385 Th e working group that outlined the recommendations for the semi-urban housing also expressed its preference for building three-room units, and as many as possible, at the cost of delivering these
385 Ibid., p. 7. [“Les règles de solidarité musulmane aboutissent à une extension démesurée des liens familiaux.”] [“Cette conception communautaire est une grave obstacle à l’éveil et au développement de la cellule familiale.”]
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 209
Fig. 3.31 (top) Fig. 3.32 (center) Fig. 3.33 (bottom) Models of the semi-urban dwellings published in the brochure released by the Housing Service of the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria. CHSP 1 DV 34.
Fig. 3.34 (next page) Four possible plans of the semi-urban dwellings published in the brochure released by the Housing Service of the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria. CHSP 1 DV 34.
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Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 211
units without completing the fi nishing stages; the group argued that the new owners would automatically dedicate more of their savings for the interior workings of the new properties. Th e colonial semi-assimilationist dwelling—“semi” because it was deprived of elementary prerequisites such as electricity—contributed to the further impoverishment of the already economically penurious population (even though they were not unemployed) and to their abrupt incorporation into the French banking system through the credit of the cellule. Th e logement semi-urbain was also known as the accession à la propriété de catégorie très économique (accession to very economical property). Accession à la propriété implies having access to a property—or, in this context, being given access to a property. Th e housing units were subsidized by the government’s Fonds de Dotation de l’Habitat (FDH, or Funds for Housing Endowment). Th e FDH ensured public loans to public and private housing cooperatives for building one of the three categories of the semi-urban dwellings. Th e borrowed fi xed amounts were calculated according to four geographic zones (A, B, C, and D), as well as to the sizes of the housing units, ranging from a minimum of 4,200 NF for a two-room unit in Zone D to 6,960 NF in Zone A, reimbursable within fi fteen years without interest. In the department of colonial Bône (today Annaba) in northeastern Algeria, a vast construction program was launched in March 1959 of 2,500 semi-urban dwellings that were also known as logements à 500,000 F (5,000 NF). Th e engineer in chief, Head of the Department of Urbanism and Construction of Bône, explained the diff erent administrative and fi nancial procedures for creating, building, and delivering a semi-urban cellule to the municipalities under his department;386 (Figs. 3.35). He stressed that municipalities were to play a vital role in promoting and facilitating the enforcement of this Accession à la propriété, in that they were required to:
1) obtain the registration of possible candidates, and certify their morality, solvency, and livelihood; priority was to be given to the chef de famille (the heads of the household) who were employed in the municipality or
386 FR ANOM. 933/160. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Département de Bône, Service de l’Urbanisme et de la Construction, Habitat. Lancement d’un programme de construction de logement type semi-urbain. Présenté par l’Ingénieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées, Chef du Service départemental de l’Urbanisme et de la Construction. Bône le 6 Mars 1959.
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Fig. 3.35 (top) Accession à la propriété, plan of the regrouping of the village of Beni Merouane in Dem-el-Begrat, 1959. FR ANOM 933/160. Fig. 3.36 (bottom) Plan of a new fortifi ed settlement for the regrouping in Aïn Babouche designed by the CRHR, 1958. FR ANOM 933/160.
Samia Henni On the Colonial Project 213
elsewhere;
2) cover housing cooperatives in the case of ineff ective reimbursements, as the FDH required, before granting loans;
3) and to seek (and possibly acquire) the necessary lands as soon as the number of creditworthy applicants was considered adequate to justify the construction of twenty to sixty semi-urban dwellings, and eventually to provide these dwellings to the housing associations in order to progressively launch construction operations.387
Th e lists of candidates that municipalities gathered were to be sent to the Prefecture of Bône with letters of motivation, thus resulting in a competitive atmosphere. In the case of the municipality of Dem-El-Begrat, the president of a special delegation even suggested off ering the required land free of charge in order to build semi-urban dwellings to accommodate Algerian workers and their families. In his letter to the colonel commandant of Bône dated 13 March 1959, he wrote: “you know the attraction off ered today by decent housing, and there is no more eff ective fi ght against FLN propaganda than to provide a decent roof to a Muslim family.”388 Th is counterrevolutionary strategy was similarly applied for clearing shantytowns.
387 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 388 FR ANOM. 933/160. Département de Bône, Arrondissement de Bône, Commune de Dem-El-Begrat. Le Président de la Délégation Spéciale à Monsieur le Colonel Commandant le B.E.T.E.S., Bône. 13 Mars 1959. [“Vous savez l’attrait off ert de nos jours par un habitat décent et il n’est lutte plus effi cace contre la propagande du FLN que de donner un toit décent à une famille musulmane.”]
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4. Between Offi cers and Technocrats
On 2 October 1958, the day before de Gaulle’s legendary speech in Constantine, the civil cabinet of the prefecture of Algiers issued a directive entitled Aménagement des bidonvilles (Th e Planning of Shantytowns) to the presidents of the special delegations that had been established in March 1958 in the absence of elected municipalities. Th e two-page document was signed by General Jacques Massu, one of the architects of the infamous Battle of Algiers and commander of the Zone Nord Algérois of the 10th Parachute Division, as well as commander of the civil powers in the department of Algiers. Copies were sent to the general secretaries of the General Safety, the Plan and Economic Aff airs, the Bureau of the Plan, intelligence offi cers, and chief offi cers of the Section Administratives Spécialisées (SAS, or Specialized Administrative Sections) and the Section Administratives Urbaines (SAU, or Urban Administrative Section, Chapter 4). General Massu wrote: “Th e problem of housing plays an important role in the exceptional eff ort undertaken for the social and economic recovery of the workers; this has provoked the construction of many HLM and the extension of the policy of access to property.”389 He argued that this solution was unaff ordable to certain segments of the population due to the initial capital that they were requested to provide before they could become owners. Massu stressed that thanks to the successful policy of certain municipalities that had strategically donated the land, their initial fi nancial burden had been signifi cantly reduced. He revealed that the donation provided a number of indirect revenues, and the construction site created an active economic hub within the municipality. He noted that while waiting for the construction of proper dwellings for the inhabitants of the vast bidonvilles, it was “equally necessary to absorb the ‘bidonvilles’ as soon as possible by undertaking their ordered, well-ventilated reconstruction by the inhabitants themselves, under the control of a technician who can
389 FR ANOM. 2 SAS 167. Préfecture d’Alger, Cabinet Civil, N° 720/CAB/D. Le Général de Division Massu, Commandant la Zone Nord Algérois & la 10° DP exerçant les pouvoirs civils dans le Département d’Alger à Messieurs les Présidents des Délégations Spéciales. Aménagement des bidonvilles. Alger, le 2 octobre 1958. [“Dans l’eff ort exceptionnel entrepris pour le relèvement économique et sociales des populations laborieuses, le problème du logement occupe une place importante qui a provoqué la mise en chantier de nombreuses HLM et l’extension d’une politique d’accession à la propriété.”]
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easily be found locally.”390 To enforce this directive, Massu summoned the civil abilities and military competences of SAS offi cers who were, as he stressed, compatible with the planning program: “SAS chief offi cers adapted to your municipalities are qualifi ed to help you and relieve you of some of your tasks by facilitating the execution of any measures that you might need to take, and by obtaining any material support from the local military authorities….”391 With the directive of the Aménagement des bidonvilles, General Massu turned more than 160 bidonvilles in Algiers alone into authorized forced-labor sites, in which one-third of Algiers’ population (living in the bidonvilles) were constrained to build basic infrastructures and to slightly improve their own provisional shelters under the constant control of the French army, represented by offi cers of the SAU,392 who were familiar with the conditions of the bidonvilles and their inhabitants (Figs. 4.1, 4.2).
390 Ibid. [“Il importe également de résorber au plus tôt les ‘bidonvilles’ en faisant procéder à leur reconstruction ordonnée aérée, par leurs habitants même placés sous le contrôle d’un technicien qui peut facilement être trouvé localement.”] 391 Ibid., [“Les Offi ciers Chefs de SAS adaptés à vos communes sont qualifi és pour vous aider et vous décharger d’une partie de votre tâche en facilitant l’exécution des mesures que vous envisagerez de prendre et en vous procurant, de la part des autorités militaires locales, un soutien matériel qui s’avère indispensable dans la majorité des cas.”] 392 According to the authors of L’Algérie des bidonvilles: le tiers monde dans la cité (Algeria of Bidonvilles: the Th ird World in the City), by 1954 one-third of Algiers’ population, that is 86’500 inhabitants, were living in bidonvilles. Robert Descloitres, Jean-Claude Reverdy, and Claudine Descloitres, L’Algérie des bidonvilles: le tiers monde dans la cité (Paris: Monton & CO, 1961), 65.
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 217
Fig. 4.1 Bidonvilles in Algiers region in 1954. From Robert Descloitres, Jean-Claude Reverdy, and Claudine Descloitres, L’Algérie des bidonvilles: le tiers monde dans la cité (Paris: Monton & CO, 1961), 72-73.
Fig. 4.2 Number of inhabitants of Algiers’ bidonvilles in 1954. From Robert Descloitres, Jean-Claude Reverdy, and Claudine Descloitres, L’Algérie des bidonvilles: le tiers monde dans la cité (Paris: Monton & CO, 1961), 65.
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4.1 Opération Bidonville
Populated by Algerians, like Algiers’ famous densely populated Casbah, the bidonvilles formed a revolutionary stronghold that the French civil and military authorities found extremely diffi cult to infi ltrate—and therefore to control. Th e French army developed counterrevolutionary (today this would be called “counterinsurgency”, Chapter 1) operations that SAU offi cers imposed in Algiers’ vast bidonvilles, and later in those bidonvilles in the suburbs of Paris populated by Algerian migrants, most notably Nanterre.393 In addition to generating worries about hygiene, the residents of the bidonvilles were usually considered to be an “uncontrolled and unrecorded population, inevitably serving as a refuge for criminals and killers of the FLN.”394 During the violent Battle of Algiers that terrorized Algiers’ inhabitants between September 1956 and September 1957 (Figs. 4.3, 4.4), placing tens of thousands of people under house arrest and torturing, disappearing, or killing thousands of people, the Military Commandment of the Department of Algiers launched a military operation known as Opération Bidonville. Its aim was “to consent to inserting in all the bidonvilles a simple organization that would enable the easy control of all of the inhabitants and the detection of suspicious elements.”395 Offi cers were requested to follow a tested, systematic method that comprised a number of measures, as follows.
1) First, they would number the groups of houses of the bidonvilles: the group numbering (numérotage) included any huts or other structures that were built around the same courtyard. Th e assigned number was to be painted on the façade of the shelter; the number’s dimensions were to be
393 On the French counterrevolutionary policy in the bidonvilles, or anti-bidonville strategy, in Algiers and Paris, see, for example, Neil MacMaster, “Shantytown Republics: Algerian Migrants and the Culture of Space in the Bidonvilles,” in Transnational Spaces and Identities in the Francophone World (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 73–93. On Nanterre bidonville, see, for example, Isabelle Herpin and Serge Santelli, Cahiers d’architecture 1. Bidonville à Nanterre: étude architecturale, Unité Pédagogique d’Architecture 8 (Paris: Institut de l’environnement, 1971); Monique Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville : Nanterre en guerre d’Algérie, 1959-1962 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2001); Abelmalek Sayad and Eliane Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, terre de bidonvilles (Paris: Ed. Autrement, 1995). 394 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Comment j’ai résorbé les bidonvilles de Bône, p. 1. [“Population incontrôlée, non recensée, sert inévitablement de refuge aux malfaiteurs et aux tueurs du FLN.”] 395 FR ANOM. 1 K 1183. Commandant Militaire du Département d’Alger, Commandement du Grand Alger, EMM. Note de Service n° 685/C.EMM. Opération Bidonville. Alger, le 19 Février 1957. [“Permettre d’implanter dans tous les bidonvilles une organisation simple permettant un contrôle facile de tous les habitants et la détections des éléments suspects.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 219
roughly fi fty centimeters high by ten to fifty centimeters wide.
2) Next, they would establish detailed records for three hierarchies of assumed leaders: the head of the family and the head of the group of houses (both of whom were designated by the Algerian inhabitations), and the head of the cluster, who was appointed by the French military commander of the sector to which the bidonville belonged.
3) Th ey would then deliver new numbered identity cards by incorporating the letter of the military sector, the exact number of the bidonville, the assigned letter of the cluster, and the allotted number of the group of houses: for instance, “N 47 C 11.” Th ose who had no identity cards had to ask for one within eight days of their identity control.396
Frequent searches were to be carried out any time, day and night. According to the French military authorities, eff ective and permanent controls of the population who lived in the bidonvilles were eff ortlessly ensured thanks to the effi ciency of the numbering system for identifying every human being, referred to as a numéro minéralogique (“number plate”). Control was also assured by Fig. 4.3 (top) Th e chart indicates that during putting the appointed heads of the clusters, of the the bloody infamous Bataille d’Alger the number of inhabitants of the bidonvilles groups of houses, and of the families responsible doubled. SHAT 1 H 1213. for the people who were registered under the Fig. 4.4 (bottom) A scene from the famous movie La Battaglia di Algeri (Dir. Gillo authorities’ direct control.397 Th e inhabitants Pontecorvo, 1966).
396 Ibid., pp. 1-3. Additif à la note de service. Numérotage des cartes d’identité. Alger le 20 Février 1957. 397 Ibid.
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of the bidonvilles were essentially under siege; Algiers’ bidonvilles became military battlefi elds. Opération Bidonville echoed the doctrines of the subversive revolutionary warfare (Chapter 1) that was scripted and implemented by French military offi cers— militants of the Algérie Française (French Algeria)—who staged the coup d’état of May 1958 that provoked the return of General Charles de Gaulle to power. With de Gaulle’s socio-economic development plan, the SAU were not dismantled; on the contrary, their missions were extended to include additional civil and military tasks, including the clearance of the self-constructed settlements (bidonvilles) inhabited by the Algerian population. Th is operation was euphemistically called Fig. 4.5 Information form for the registration and control of the inhabitants of the bidonvilles located in Résorption des bidonvilles (“Clearance of military sectors. SHAT 1 H 1183. the Bidonvilles”). In documents entitled “Comment j’ai résorbé les bidonvilles” (“How I Cleared the Bidonvilles”), SAU chiefs were requested to report on the procedures and phases that they had used to accomplish their assigned missions; they were requested to historicize their shortcomings and successes. 398 For instance, the SAU chief in colonial Mostaganem, in the northwest of Algeria, stated that since the outset of the Algerian War of Independence—or to paraphrase him, the évènements (the events)—and more precisely since 1956, the number of new shantytowns and shelters in existing shantytowns that were recently built on the municipality’s lands had increased dramatically due to the constant military operations. He argued that in 1958 a number of public housing projects were being constructed, which resulted in raising false hopes, and that in 1959 the military
398 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Résorption des bidonvilles.
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 221
authorities acted against the backdrop of this distressing situation. He wrote that “this state of aff airs worries the military commander, who takes certain measures as part of the control of the population with the initial aim of containing the infl ux.”399 Th ere were eight shantytowns in Mostaganem in February 1959, hosting 6,163 inhabitants. Th e largest bidonville, called Sidi-Abdelkader, accommodated eighteen hundred people, but these fi gures would rapidly change. In order to impede the internal migration provoked by the bloody war, and thereby to prevent the construction of new shantytowns, the army requested potential newcomers to meet three unequivocal, yet unrealistic, conditions: 1) to provide authorization for their departure from other locations; 2) to have gainful employment; and 3) to have a dwelling made of permanent materials. According to the SAU chief, although these actions halted the proliferation of shantytowns, the actions were still unsatisfactory; he argued: “it is necessary to fi ght and destroy the bidonvilles.”400 Th e SAU took additional radical measures. First, it enforced a vast program of recasement (resettlement), not by supplying newly constructed housing units, but rather by the “individuating” (peculiar selection) of vacant dwellings and buildings by the bureaux de contrôle de populations (Population Control Bureaus) and then by the distribution of the bidonvilles’ inhabitants by SAU offi cers. As a result of this method, the total number of inhabitants dropped to 3,013 people by the end of 1959. Th e second policy meshed with de Gaulle’s Plan de Constantine: a parallel plan of public HLM launched by the civil authorities. Both the rental fees and the acquisition expenses of the residential units that had been built were understandably too exorbitant for the majority of the bidonvilles’ inhabitants. A few cités de recasement (resettlements estates) located in bidonvilles or elsewhere401 were realized to this end, but the necessary credit was defi cient soon after, and the program was abandoned. Th e total number of bidonville inhabitants dropped again, to 1,847. In April 1961, the SAU chief reported that “the demise of the control bureaus,
399 SHAT. 1 H 1213. SAU Mostaganem. Comment j’ai résorbé les bidonvilles. [“Le commandement militaire qui prend, dans le cadre du contrôle des populations certaines mesures en vue, dans un premier temps, d’endiguer les arrivages.”] 400 Ibid. [“Il faut combattre et détruire les bidonvilles”] 401 Th e cités de recasements, also called cité de transit, were to designed to temporarily house the inhabitants of the bidonvilles until the completion of permanent dwellings in apartment buildings. Th ese temporary settlements were located either in an area of the bidonville or in vacant spaces outside the city center. Among these cités de recasements was Djenan el Hassan designed by Roland Simounet.
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which constituted the basis of this work, has stopped the war on the bidonvilles.”402 Some of these policies were implemented by another SAU in the Bidonville de Boulilef in Mostaganem. Before introducing any program, however, the SAU chief resolved that he would fi rst impose himself, as he argued, on “this hostile neighborhood, and that is why we installed a mobile antenna.”403 Th e objective of the itinerant SAU branch—which at the outset visited the Bidonville de Boulilef three times a week and then settled there and lived among its residents in a prefabricated house—was “to make contact with this heterogeneous population,”404 as the chief put it. Th e military policy of making “human contact” was part of the overall French colonial doctrine of pacifi cation during wartime (Chapter 1). As in the camps de regroupements, the forced strategic communication between French offi cers and Algerian civilians—the former of whom ostensibly were there to protect the population, but simultaneously gathered intelligence and assimilated Algerians to French rule, including French domestic spaces and costs—was strongly endorsed in the bidonvilles. In colonial Bône (Annaba today), in northeastern Algeria, the propagation of self- constructed settlements had been visible since 1955 for the same reasons as in Mostaganem: the inevitable consequences of the war that had broken out in November 1954. By the end of 1956, the SAS undertook operations of résorption (resorption) of the two largest shantytowns, Pont-Blanc and Joannonville, which hosted ten thousand people between them, “for humanitarian reasons and for security imperatives.”405 As in the Bidonville de Boulilief, a team of offi cers from the Algerian Aff airs division of the SAS of Bou-Hamra settled in the shantytowns in question and requisitioned a large strip of land located fi ve kilometers from the city center. Soon after, the division created three building sites that included: 1) a chantier de montage (assembly site) on the former site of the bidonvilles, in which the departing inhabitants would be selected and any usable materials from their shacks would be recycled; 2) a chantier de chargement et de transport (loading and transport
402 Ibid. [“La disparition des bureaux de contrôle qui constituaient la base de tout ce travaille stoppe la guerre aux bidonvilles.”] 403 SHAT. 1 H 1213. SAU Mostaganem. Comment j’ai résorbé les bidonvilles de Boulilief. [“Dans ce quartier hostile et pour cela une antenne mobile fut installée.”] 404 Ibid. [“De prendre contact avec cette population hétéroclite.”] 405 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Comment j’ai résorbé les bidonvilles de Bône, p. 1. [“Aussi tant pour des raisons humanitaires que pour des impératifs de sécurité.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 223
site), which would care for the designated families; and 3) a chantier de reconstruction (a reconstruction site), in which, after leveling and staking out the terrain, the newcomers would be welcomed. Th e rules stressed, however, that “before setting up every family, the offi cers of this team will take care of identifying and taking a census of the members, and establishing a family record: the fi rst element of the coming system of control. Of course, this reception will be accompanied by an always-welcomed food assistance program.”406 Th e newly ordered and well-ventilated settlement, dubbed “Sidi-Salem,” hosted fourteen thousand inhabitants in roughly three thousand coquettes maisonnettes (coquette cottages), as claimed by the offi ver. Th e SAS chief insisted that Algerian families now become modern; he stated that “they can ultimately hope to one day access a ‘standard’ that is equivalent to ours; isn’t that the essential goal of the Muslim promotion?”407 Th is was part of both colonial attitude and militaty mindset. Captain Courbon, the SAU chief of the Bidonville de Clos-Salembier in Algiers, addressed this “Muslim promotion” diff erently. In his forty-three- page study Les bidonvilles et leur résorption: Perspectives de promotion humaine, l’expérience du Clos-Salembier (Th e Bidonvilles and Th eir Absorption: Perspectives of Human Promotion—Th e Experience of Cols- Salembier), Courbon contended that “to eliminate a bidonville is to act in the sense of improving the living quarters and intending—by way of modifying the lifestyles and economic behaviors that result from the Fig. 4.6 Opération tiroir, a scenario for the evacuation of the bidonville of Clos- new housing—to move toward the promotion of the Salembier. SHAT 1 H 1213.
406 Ibid., p. 2. [“Avant de mettre en place chaque famille, les offi ciers de cette équipe auront soin d’en identifi er et d’en recenser les membres et d’établir une fi che familiale, premier élément du futur système de contrôle. Bien entendu, cet accueil sera assorti d’un secours alimentaire toujours bienvenu.”] 407 Ibid., p. 3. [“Elles peuvent enfi n espérer accéder un jour à un ‘standing’ équivalent au notre et, n’est-ce pas là le but essentiel de la promotion musulmane.”]
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family”408 (Fig. 4.6). He assumed that the primary mission of the SAU chief, in addition to taking a census of the bidonvilles’ populations and limiting the expansion of the shantytowns, was “to organize and humanize the bidonvilles”409 He argued that it was equally important to progressively suppress the shantytowns, which were generally regarded as refuges for FLN revolutionaries, because actual “human promotion” was incapable of taking place in the bidonvilles. According to Courbon, the specifi c typology of housing designed for these populations should simultaneously meet the aforementioned goals and respect certain social traditions; all of these actions should help to reconcile individualist tendencies, community necessities, and customs with the realities of modern life. He bemoaned the incompetence of the design team, however, stressing that “the choice of the type of dwelling is solely left to the care of architects and technicians. Fig. 4.7 Th e clearing of the bidonville in Clos- Th is is a regrettable error, because the framework Salembier documented by the SAS in 1959. SHAT 1 H 1213. in which the individual lives represents the key factor of his behavior.”410 Courbon claimed that the formal responses to the question of the bidonvilles should primarily be centered around three types of housing, as follows (Figs. 4.7–4.9).
1) Habitat horizontal: transitory and temporary low-rise buildings of a semi-rural character (not to be confused with semi-urban dwellings,
408 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Capitaine Courbon, SAU du Clos-Salembier. Les bidonvilles et leur résorption : perspectives de promotion humaine, l’expérience du Clos–Salembier, p. 19. [“Résorber un bidonville c’est agir dans le sens de l’amélioration de l’habitat et vouloir par la modifi cation des modes de vie et des comportements économiques découlant du nouvel habitat, s’orienter dans le sens d’une promotion de la famille.”] 409 Ibid., p. 12. [“Organiser et humaniser les bidonvilles.”] 410 Ibid., p. 19. [“Le choix du type de l’habitat est laissé aux seuls bons soins des architectes et des techniciens. C’est là une regrettable erreur car le cadre dans lequel vit l’individu représente le facteur essentiel de son comportement.”]
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Fig. 4.8 Five types of settlements documented by the SAS offi cer of Clos Salembier in 1959. SHAT 1 H 1213.
Fig. 4.9 Model of Diar Es Schems. SHAT 1 H 1213.
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Chapter 3), which comprised courtyards that recalled the traditional dwelling—but also the bidonville. Courtyards that were large enough could be converted into tiny gardens, as in the case, he emphasized, of the laborers’ gardens developed by the Jesuit priest Father Felix Volpette in Saint Etienne in France in 1894. Courbon believed that although these types of houses would improve living conditions, they would also encourage individualistic tendencies; he concluded that this solution could not be enforced in urban areas due to the elevated land costs.
2) Habitat vertical: high-rise buildings with modern, standard infrastructure that would enable a collective lifestyle—an idea that was dear to Courbon. He stressed that the recently built collective housing had often been built on narrow streets with intense traffi c, and that the inhabitants therefore lived in noisy neighborhoods that lacked playgrounds for their children.
3) Grand ensemble (large housing settlements): although this type of housing had aroused a great deal of controversy in France, Courbon believed that this was the most propitious form of community life, because it integrated “all of the indispensable resources of modern life and the development of society. [Th e grand ensemble] can pave the way for both a new manner of dwelling and a new manner of living.”411
Captain Courbon assumed that private courtyards would simply be replaced by open and well-ventilated spaces devoted to common amenities such as child-care and health-care centers, sporting facilities, shops, and a mosque. Nevertheless, he avowed that the majority of the residents of the bidonvilles were below the criterion of solvency, which consisted of renting a one-room dwelling that cost 3,000 NF per month (Figs. 4.10, 4.11). To this end, he asserted that a number of bidonvilles améliorés (improved bidonvilles) in accordance with strict rules of urbanism and hygiene should be built; he argued that baraques très sommaires (basic barracks) should be installed in these places, and that the authorities should request lower rents of the inhabitants.412 In other words, Courbon recommended that every shelter—including those in the bidonvilles—should be charged rent.
411 Ibid., p. 20. [“Tous les moyens indispensables à la vie moderne et à l’évolution d’une société. Il peut ouvrir la voie non seulement à une nouvelle manière d’habiter mais aussi à une nouvelle manière de vivre.”] 412 Ibid., p. 21.
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Fig. 4.10 (top) Family budgets in habitat évolutifs and bidonvilles. SHAT 1 H 1213. Fig. 4.11 (bottom) Salaries of bidonvilles’s inhabitants in 1959. SHAT 1 H 1213.
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Courbon also took for granted that “human promotion” (or development)—and thereby the creation of new communities—could be achieved if the authorities provided appropriate tutelage. He claimed: “It is essential to organize and direct the fi rst steps. Tutelage also seems likely to be necessary in order to do things in an astute manner and to explain the virtues of the assets that the conditioning provides.”413 He contended that it was also the task of the SAU offi cers and tutors to orient the new renters about their new requirements, since they would tend to confound the superfl uous with the necessary. In an attempt to educate these new communities, Courbon went further by organizing an exhibition on French furniture and appliances (including price tags) in a standard apartment; a consultant advised potential customers on the use of the objects and ultimately registered orders (which benefi ted from payment by installments). Th is pilot experience was highly successful, according to the captain. With his paternalistic, assimilationist, and educational human promotion, Courbon and many others generated consumption demands and engendered additional fi nancial expenditures despite the very low income of the majority of Algerian families who lived in the bidonvilles, “improved” or not. He based his assumption on a self-perpetuating cycle; as he wrote, “Th e improvement of the living environment inevitably engenders new needs. Having electricity will call for having radio and television; a large room with angled walls will allow the installation of modern furniture; and a shower cubicle will contain a child’s bathtub.”414 Educating the populations who lived in the bidonvilles was simultaneously carried out by another French institution, the Service des Centres Sociaux (SCS, or Social Centers Service), which was offi cially founded on 27 October 1955 by the former deportee and ethnologist Germaine Tillion (Chapter 1); Tillion served under the authority of the ethnologist Jacques Soustelle, who in turn served as General Governor of Algeria between January 1955 and January 1956 (Chapter 1). Th e fi rst two pilot centers were established in the bidonvilles of Bel-Air (with seven thousand inhabitants) and Boubsilia-Birardi (with
413 Ibid., p. 23. [“Il est indispensable de l’organiser et de diriger les premiers pas. Aussi une tutelle parait devoir s’y ajouter afi n de faire jouer à bon escient et d’expliquer la vertu des atouts fournis par la mise en condition.”] 414 Ibid., p. 25. [“De l’amélioration du cadre de vie découlent inévitablement de nouveaux besoins. L’électricité appelle la radio et la télévision; une large pièce aux murs en équerre permet l’installation d’un mobilier moderne; la cabine de douche peut contenir une baignoire d’enfants.”]
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6,500 inhabitants), both located in Hussein-Dey in the eastern part of Algiers.415 Th eir aim was to provide basic French education and professional training to the Algerian bidonville inhabitants: an initiative that meshed with UNESCO’s “self-help” empowering policy among what were known at the time as the underdeveloped countries (today known as the developing countries).416 To this end, as Tillion refl ected in 1997, “I thought that what could save Algerian families from the extreme poverty they wallowed in was to provide them with tools that would allow them to survive with dignity in the city.”417 Under General de Gaulle and Paul Delouvrier, General Delegate of the French Government in Algeria, the Service des Centres Sociaux became the Service des Centres Sociaux Educatifs (SCSE, or Social and Educational Centers Service) by decree no. 59-896 of 30 July 1959. Th e SCSE fell under the authority of the Ministry of Education—specifi cally, under the direct lead of the French General Director of National Education in Algeria, who was also rector of the Academy of Algiers—and was converted to the policy of “Muslims’ promotion” envisaged by the Plan de Constantine’s socio-economic development strategy. In 1953, the conditions of Algiers’ bidonvilles alarmed not only the CIAM-Algiers Group, headed by Pierre-André Emery—who exhibited the group’s comprehensive surveys at the CIAM IX on La Charte de l’Habitat (Housing Charter) held in Aix-en-Provence418 (Fig. 4.12)—but also the newly elected Mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier, a Catholic “son of the French Empire.”419 Prior to this position, which lasted until 1958 (i.e., until de Gaulle’s return), Chevallier had served as Mayor of El Biar (a residential suburb of Algiers populated by Europeans) between 1941 and 1943; as a counterespionage agent in North America, at the request of Jacques Soustelle in 1944; as a liberal politician in the
415 Nelly Forget, “Le Service des Centres Sociaux en Algérie,” Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps. La guerre d’Algérie: les humiliés et les oubliés, no. 26 (1992): 37–47. 416 On the making of the UNESCO programs, see, for example, M. Ijlal (Muhammad Ijlal) Muzaff ar, “Th e Periphery Within: Modern Architecture and the Making of the Th ird World” (Th esis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/41719. 417 Germaine Tillion and Jean Lacouture, La Traversée du mal. Entretien avec Jean Lacouture (Paris: Arléa, 1997), 102–103. [“J’ai pensé que ce qui pouvait sauver les familles algériennes de l’extrême misère vers laquelle elles basculaient, c’était de leur fournir un bagage leur permettant de survivre dignement dans la ville.”] 418 On the CIAM-Alger and the bidonville Mahieddine, see, for example, Zeynep Çelik, “Learning From the Bidonville: CIAM Looks at Algiers,” Spring 2003.,” Harvard Design Magazine, no. 18 (2003): 70–74; Zeynep Celic, “Bidonvilles, CIAM et grands ensembles,” in Alger: paysages urbain et architectures, 1800-2000 (Paris: Les Editions de l’Imprimeur, 2003), 186–227; Jean-Lucien Bonillo, “Le CIAM-Alger, Albert Camus et Le Corbusier: modernité et identité,” in Le Corbusier, Visions d’Alger (Paris: Editions de la Villette, 2012), 218–37. 419 Jean-Louis Planche, “Jacques Chevallier, député-maire d’Alger,” in Alger 1940-1962: une ville en guerre (Paris: Les Editions Autrement, 1999), 160.
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Algerian Assembly; as a general adviser to the city of Algiers, between 1945 and 1956; and as Secretary of State for War between June 1954 and January 1955. Chevallier was thus particularly well acquainted with the politico-economic stakes of the Algerian Revolution and the multifaceted colonial conditions of the Algerian population, including those who lived in the bidonvilles—conditions that had dramatically deteriorated in the aftermath of the French Massacre of May 1945 (Chapter 2). He dedicated a great deal of eff ort to the regional planning of Algiers, in particular to the demolition of the bidonvilles and the construction of heavily advertised mass-housing projects for both European and Algerian communities. Chevallier also created the Association pour l’Etude et le Développement de l’Agglomération Algéroise (AEDAA, or the Association for the Study and Development of the Algiers Region); in 1955 the AEDAA became known as the Agence du Plan d’Alger (Plan Agency of Algiers), which later became a model for France.420 In his 1958 book, Nous Algériens … (We Algerians …), Chevallier wrote of “how together, Europeans and Muslims
420 On a detailed account of the Agence du Plan, see, for example, Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 63–100; Saïd Almi, Urbanisme et colonisation: présence française en Algérie (Sprimont: Pierre Mardaga Editeur, 2002), 110–113; Entretien avec Jean-Jacques Deluz, “La contribution de l’Agence du plan,” in Alger: paysages urbain et architectures, 1800-2000 (Paris: Les Editions de l’Imprimeur, n.d.), 228–51.
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Fig. 4.12 Excerpt of the grid of CIAM Algiers group, CIAM IX, La Charte de l’Habitat, Aix-en-Provence, 1953. Fondation Le Corbusier. reunited, we have together made the city of Algiers what it has become over the last fi ve years: a capital.”421 He believed in the axiom of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (1900–1944)— French aristocrat, aviator, writer, and author of one of the most translated and best-selling books in the world, Le Petit Prince (Th e Little Prince), whose main character is said to have been inspired by de Gaulle’s Minister of Construction, Pierre Sudreau—an axiom that presumed the hypothesis “Pour réunir les hommes: ‘faites-leur bâtir une tour.’”422 Th is may be translated as either “To reunite people, make them build a tower” or “To reunite people, build a tower for them.” In accordance with this aphorism, Chevallier wrote, “Th is is how we launched and delivered with enthusiasm the ‘housing battle,’ which earned the
421 Jacques Chevallier, Nous algériens... (Paris: Calmann-Levy Editeurs, 1958), 139. [“C’est ainsi qu’en commun, Européens et musulmans réunis, nous avons fait ensemble de la ville d’Alger ce qu’elle est devenue depuis cinq ans: une capitale.”] 422 Ibid. [“Pour réunir les hommes: ‘Faîtes-leur bâtir une tour.’”]
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Figs. 4.13 (top left), Fig. 4.14 (top right), Fig. 4.15 (bottom) La Concorde (1,200 housing units) in Birmandreis, Algiers. From Daure and Béri Album.
city of Algiers its nickname as the fi rst construction site of France.”423 Th ousands of housing units were designed and built during the course of the bloody War of Independence and the violent Battle of Algiers. Th ese included the well- known Diar-es-Saada (Housing of Happiness); Diar-el-Mahçoul (Housing of the Kept Promise); the Climat de France, Djenan-el-Hassan (Beautiful Gardens) that Chevallier cited in his book; but also lesser-known places such as the Eucalyptus, the Champ de Manoeuvre, La Concorde, and the Carrières Jaubert (Chapter 4); and the initiation of the construction of twenty-fi ve thousand dwellings in Bachdjarah (Figs. 4.13–4.17). Chevallier contended that the two communities, Europeans and Algerians, ought to live together in the same building blocks: as he argued, “so the men of this country will understand one another,
423 Ibid. [“C’est ainsi que fut déclenchée dans l’enthousiasme et livrée la “bataille du logement” qui devait mériter à la ville d’Alger son surnom de premier chantier de France.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 233
Fig. 4.16 (top) Carrières Jaubert (Diar El Kef, phase II–IV); Frais Vallon (Taine A, Taine E, Taine F). Th e fi gure also shows Pouillon’s Climat de France. From Daure and Béri Album. Fig. 4.17 (bottom) Carrières Jaubert. From Daure and Béri Album.
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the law of these settlements excludes any spirit of exclusion.”424 Both Algerians and French colons criticized Chevallier: the pro-Algérie Française disagreed with the construction of housing for Algerians, while the Algerian nationalists accused him of being neocolonialist. Chevallier and Jean de Maisonseul (1912–1999)—architect, painter, urbanist (Alumni of the Institut d’Urbanisme de l’Université de Paris, IUUP, and later member of the Institut d’Urbanisme de l’Université d’Alger, IUUA), former draughtsman for Pierre- André Emery, and then member of the Agence du Plan—were among the signatories of the “Appel pour une trêve civile pour l’Algérie” (“Appeal for a Civil Truce for Algeria”). Written and pronounced by the writer Albert Camus (1913–1960) on 22 January 1956 in Algiers, a few months before the onset of the Battle of Algiers, the appeal was a peaceful attempt to reconcile European communities with Algerians. Algeria’s liberals, including Chevallier, initiated and actively supported the appeal; these activities resulted in the imprisonment of de Maisonseul between 1956 and 1958.425 De Maisonseul directed the reconstruction plan of the town of Orléansville (Chlef today) after the devastating earthquake of September 1954 (Fig. 4.18), which included the construction of the Center Albert Camus, designed by Louis Miquel (1913–1986) and Roland Simounet (1927–1996) between 1955 and 1960. Another member of the Agence du Plan, Jean-Jacques Deluz, regarded the center, “despite the specifi city of its scenic conception, [to be] one of the best [examples of] modern architecture in colonial Algeria”426 (Figs. 4.19, 4.20.). Like Camus, Chevallier supported the colonial politics of association. During Chevallier’s tenure, and under the French general government of Roger Léonard in Algeria, the Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne (CIA, or the Algerian Real Estate Company) was established on 16 November 1953, one year before the outbreak of the war; it would be dissolved in 1980, twenty-eight years after Algeria’s independence. Th e CIA’s primary objective was “to provide the population of Algeria—as part of regional planning and the resorption of the bidonvilles and the taudis—the greatest number of
424 Ibid., 141. [“Pour que les hommes de ce pays se comprennent, la loi de ces cités exclut tout esprit de ségrégation.”] However the three housing settlements built by Fernand Pouillon did not exclude segregation, see, Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 59–62. 425 Th e text of the Appeal is published in Albert Camus, Actuelles III, Chroniques algériennes, Gallimard, 1958 426 Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 63. [“Malgré la spécifi cité de sa conception scénique, une des meilleurs architectures modernes de l’Algérie coloniale.”] Th e Centre was suggested by Camus. It was destroyed by another earthquake in 1980. On the centre, see, Louis Miquel and Roland Simounet, “Centre Albert Camus, El Asnam,” Techniques et Architecture 329 (1980): 62–63.
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 235
Fig 4.18 Master plan for the reconstruction of Orléanville in the aftermath of the earthquake of September 1954. From L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui no. 60 (June 1955), 17.
Next page: Fig. 4.19 (top) Albert Camus Center. From Techniques & Architecture no. 329 (February–March 1980), 62. Fig. 4.20 (bottom) Albert Camus Center. From Techniques & Architecture no. 329 (February–March 1980), 63.
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Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 237
healthy, sustainable, and economical dwellings.”427 Th e term taudis was broadely used in France, in particular after the Second World War.428 According to the Grand Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Larousse, the term taudis was derived from se tauder, that is, se mettre à l’abri (to shelter from); it signifi ed un logement misérable, sal et mal tenu (a wretched, dirty, and unkempt house). To eradicate both the taudis and the bidonvilles, the fi rst phase of the CIA consisted of the construction of six thousand low-cost dwellings intended for both the sale and rental markets. By June 1955, the CIA had acquired extensive lands in the suburbs of major Algerian cities, notably Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Bône, totaling 145 hectares.429 Two types of housing were built: logement économique simplifi é (simplifi ed, economic housing) and logement traditionnel horizontal (traditional, low-rise housing), the latter of which consisted of two-bedroom dwellings with courtyards, with a surface area of sixty square meters. Th e second stage involved a larger plan distributed over the entire territory of Algeria; this phase included the construction of three housing typologies: 1) the cités musulmanes (Muslim settlements) in low-rise buildings designed for the purpose of the resorption of the bidonvilles, which were comprised of two-room houses with courtyards; 2) the logements musulmans évolutifs (transformable Muslim dwellings), which were composed of habitat amélioré (improved housing) in low-rise buildings; these had the same disposition as the former type, but with a larger area; and 3) the aforementioned logements économiques simplifi és; these were created within collective buildings in order to contend with the taudis.430 By December 1955, the CIA owned 170 hectares, it had annexed a fourth category of low-cost housing called the logement économiques (Logeco, Chapter 3), and it had built 1,145 units: 581 in Algiers and 564 in Oran. In addition, 3,291 dwellings were under construction and 2,577 housing were being designed: this meant “a total of more than seven thousand units, 60 percent of which are for sale.”431 In
427 FR ANOM. 1 F 2212. Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne. 1 Juin 1955, p. 1. [“De mettre à la disposition des populations d’Algérie dans le cadre de l’aménagement du territoire et essentiellement pour la résorption des bidonvilles et des taudis, le maximum de logements sains, durables et économique.”] 428 Th e use of the term taudis in France includes Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe‘s Guerre au taudis. 429 Ibid., p. 2. 430 Ibid.; FR ANOM. 1 F 2212. Documents Algériens, Réalisations nouvelles dans le domaine de l’habitat musulman, La Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne, N° 48, 31 Décembre 1955. 431 FR ANOM. 1 F 2212. Documents Algériens, Réalisations nouvelles dans le domaine de l’habitat musulman, La Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne, N° 48, 31 Décembre 1955. [“Un total supérieur à 7000 logements, qui dans une proportion de 60% sont destinés à la vente.”]
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Fig. 4.21 (a), Fig. 4.22 (b) CIA pamphlet. CHSP 1 DV 34.
Fig. 4.23 (c), Fig. 4.24 (d) Settlements built by the CIA in Maison Carrée (Algiers). FR ANOM. 81 F 221.
Next page: Fig. 4.25 (top) Map showing the distribution of housing projects under the authority of the CIA in Algeria between 1954 and 1959. From CHSP. 1 DV 34
Fig. 4.26 CIA brochure destined for future tenants or householders. FROM FR ANOM. 81 F 2212.
a
b
d c
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 239
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Fig. 4.27 Les Eucalyptus, housing project “logement simplifi és” built by the CIA in the outskirts of Algiers. CHSP. 1 DV 34.
August 1956, during the Algerian War of Independence, the CIA was further charged with implementing special housing programs and projects that were to be designed for French civil servants of the Department of National Defense in major Algerian cities (Figs. 4.21–4.27);432 the CIA created another public institution called the Compagnie Immobilière pour le Logement des Fonctionnaires Civils et Militaires (CILOF, or Real Estate Company for Military and Civil Servants’ Housing). By December 1958, the CILOF had built 1,855 dwellings, 1,862 units were under construction, and an additional 1,583 were in the design process. August 1956 marked the foundation of the French Société Nationale de Construction pour les Travailleurs Algériens en France (SONACOTRAL, or National Construction Company for Algerian Workers in France, today known as Adoma433) by French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, a socialist. Eugène Claudius-Petit, the former Minister of Reconstruction, was appointed the fi rst chairman of SONACOTRAL, a role he would hold from 1956 to 1977. His offi cial assignment was to dismantle the vast bidonvilles that proliferated around the suburbs of Paris, such as in Nanterre434 (Fig. 4.28), and to
432 FR ANOM. 1 F 2212. Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne. Activités. Août 1956, p. 4. 433 After the independence of Algeria, the SONATRAL lost its L becoming the SONATRA: Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs. Today it is called ADOMA. On the foundation of the SONACOTRAL, see, for example, Marc Bernardot (1997), “Une politique de logement : la Sonacotra (1956-1992),” Th èse de doctorat en sociologie, Université Paris 1; Choukri Hmed (2006), “Loger les étrangers “isolés” en France. Socio-histoire d’une institution d’État, la Sonacotra (1956-2006),” Th èse de sciences politiques, Université Paris 1. 434 On Nanterre bidonville see, for example, Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville : Nanterre en guerre d’Algérie, 1959- 1962.
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Fig. 4.28 (left) Nanterre bidonville in the outskirts of Paris. From Roger Cunibile, L’assistance technique aux français musulmans d’Algérie à la préfecture de police à Paris (1961), 18. Fig. 4.29 (right) Distribution of Algerian workers in the region of Paris in the 1960s. From Isabelle Herpin and Serge Santelli, Cahiers d’architecture 1. Bidonville à Nanterre: étude architecturale, Unité Pédagogique d’Architecture 8 (Paris: Institut de l’environnement, 1971), 16. guarantee “the fi nancing, construction, and arrangement of locaux d’habitation [residential premises] intended for French Muslims from Algeria who came to work in France, as well as for their families”435 (Fig. 4.29). Claudius-Petit was assisted by the former director of General Safety in Algeria, Jean Vaujour (1914–2010), who in 1960 became director of the military and civil cabinets of the general delegate of the French government in Algeria, Paul Delouvrier. Vaujour was “convinced of the utility of the Company, and [was] familiar with Algeria and Algerians.”436 Th e Claudius-Petit / Vaujour pairing had been meticulously selected. While the president was skilled in large-scale urban development and public mass-housing projects and policies in postwar France, Vaujour was profi cient in ensuring public law and order
435 Cited in Marc Bernardot, “Chronique d’une institution : la ‘sonacotra’ (1956-1976),” Sociétés contemporaines, no. 33–34 (1999): 40. [“Le fi nancement, la construction, l’aménagement de locaux d’habitation destinés aux Français musulmans originaires d’Algérie venus travailler en métropole et à leurs familles.”] 436 Pouvreau, Un politique en architecture: Eugène Claudius-Petit (1907-1989), 170. [“Convaincu de l’utilité de la société, connaissant bien l’Algérie et les Algériens, Vaujour se révèle un collaborateur de confi ance.”]
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Fig. 4.30 Foyers in Nanterre and Genevilliers in the 1960s. From Les foyers de travailleurs migrants en France, 1945–1995 < https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/exhibit/les-foyers-de-travailleurs-migrants-en-france/ AQ80T2BY?position=0%2C-1>. and national security in colonial Algeria. As a result of this partnership, Claudius-Petit and Vaujour envisioned an off -the-record political mission: SONACOTRAL would contribute to sabotaging the growing infl uence of FLN members who lived in (or might come to live) in the bidonvilles. SONACOTRAL also provided beds, or locaux d’habitation, for Algerian workers in France, and undertook the supervision of Algerian inhabitants of the bidonvilles in France (Fig. 4.30). According to the census of 1954, the number of Algerian workers (i.e., economic migrants) in France was estimated to be 210,000 people (out of a population of 1,553,600 foreign workers) that included Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and various colonized populations from the French protectorates and colonies of Africa and Asia who belonged to the Second French Empire.437 Th e supervision of the Algerian population who lived in Parisian bidonvilles was reinforced with the appointment of Maurice Papon (Chapter 2) as Prefect of the Police in 1958 by the radical Félix Gaillard government. Prior to this position, Papon had served in Constantine as Inspecteur Général de l’Administration en Mission Extraordinaire (IGAME, or inspector general of extraordinary missions) between 1956 and 1958. Various colonial
437 Herpin and Santelli, Cahiers d’architecture 1. Bidonville à Nanterre: étude architecturale, 11–18. By 1962, there were 335,000 Algerian workers in France. Th ese numbers do not include political refugees and foreign students.
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Fig. 4.31 Organization chart of the Service d’Assistance Technique aux Français Musulmans of the Paris Police. From Roger Cunibile, L’assistance technique aux français musulmans d’Algérie à la préfecture de police à Paris (1961), 127.
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and military doctrines that had been enforced in Algeria were exported to France with the arrival in Paris of the former Vichy civil servant Papon who had been granted the French Resistance Card in 1958 (but was later charged with committing crimes against humanity in 1998). Papon founded the Service d’Assistance Technique aux Français Musulmans (SAT- FMA, or Technical Assistance Section for French Muslims from Algeria) in August 1958, the mandate of which was “to strengthen the action that has been undertaken in the Seine in order to protect the Muslim population from political infl uence and the material constraints of anti-national organizations”438 (Fig. 4.31). Experienced French SAU offi cers who had headed bidonvilles in Algiers were brought back to France in order to supervise Parisian bidonvilles inhabited by Algerians. For instance, Captain Montaner, who was chief of the SAU at the Bidonville de Clos-Salembier in Algiers, became chief of the SAT- FMA at the Bidonville de Nanterre in Paris. Th e French Groupe d’Etude et d’Action pour les Nord-Africains de la Région Parisienne (GEANARP, or Study and Action Group for North Africans in the Paris Region) described Montaner as follows.
Drawing on psychological methods, he immediately enjoyed infl uence because he spoke Arabic, knew the Koranic laws, and worked eff ectively with the administration. He has substantial funds, and the means he employs are similar to those used by any other social worker in a North African context…. He pursues a completely diff erent goal, however: with him, the spirit of 13 May and of the Algérie Française pervades Nanterre.”439
Th e fi rst bidonville operation enforced by Claudius-Petit, Vaujour, and the SONACOTRAL team took place in the Prefecture of the Seine, where 40 percent of Algerian laborers were located. Th e most urgent requirements of the lits de foyers (beds in hostels, or dormitories)
438 Cunibile, L’assistance technique aux français musulmans d’Algérie à la préfecture de police à Paris, 42. [“De renforcer l’action menée sur le territoire de la Seine dans le but de préserver la population musulmane de l’emprise politique et des contraintes matérielles des organisations anti-nationales.”] Th ere were other public and private institutions dealing with the so-called “North-Africans” such ad the Fonds d’Action Sociale FAS that was created in Decembre 1958. 439 Cited in Muriel Cohen, “Des familles invisibles : politiques publiques et trajectoires résidentielles de l’immigration algérienne (1945-1985)” (Université Panthéon-Sorbonne-Paris I, 2013), 214. [“S’inspirant des méthodes psychologiques, il exerce au début une certaine infl uence car il parle arabe, connaît la loi coranique et intervient avec effi cacité auprès de l’administration. Il dispose de crédits importants et les moyens qu’il emploie le rapprochent par certains côtés de ceux de toute équipe sociale en milieu nord-africain : colonie de vacances, aide aux familles, permanence sociale. Mais il poursuit un tout autre but : avec lui c’est l’esprit du 13 mai et de l’Algérie française qui souffl e sur Nanterre.”]
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were evaluated to be 16,900 beds for the fi rst phase and an additional six thousand beds for a second stage in the Region of Paris alone. In this context, SONACOTRAL created temporary shelters called foyer-hôtels (hotels) for single male workers and cités de transit (transitory estates) for married workers and their families; later it built grand ensembles, most notably Les Canibouts in Nanterre, designed by architect Marcel Roux,440 who collaborated with Claudius-Petit at the MRU.Although the two typologies were not expected to last (both the dormitories and the collective shelters were meant to be provisional), the resulting buildings were to be transformed into standard low-cost collective housing once the workers returned to their respective homelands. Every built unit accommodated approximately 250 beds; the multi-bed rooms housed ten beds, and the kitchens and bathrooms were shared. In order to facilitate surveillance, the newly hired managers of the dormitories had formerly served as policemen, veterans, or colonial administrators.441 In its fi rst ten years, SONACONTRAL built just over sixty foyers in France442—that is, fi fteen thousand beds—for Algerian workers who were ultimately constrained to remain in France, as well as other migrants from neighboring countries and from former colonies who contributed to the rapid French economic development of Les Trentes Glorieuses (the “Th e Glorious Thirty.”) One of the key shareholders to cofi nance and comanage both the CIA in Algeria under French colonial rule and SONACOTRAL in France was the French public fi nancial institution the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (Deposits and Consignments Funds), which King Louis XVIII had established in 1816. Th is centralized endowment was chaired by François Bloch-Lainé (1912–2002) between 1952 and 1967; he had previously served as Director of the Cabinet of French Foreign Minister Jean-Baptiste Nicolas Robert Schuman (Chapter 3). In 1954, Bloch-Lainé created the Société Centrale Immobilière de la Caisse (SCIC, or Central Real Estate Company of the Fund), which launched the construction of the grand ensembles of Sarcelles in France. One year later, Bloch-Lainé founded the Société Centrale pour l’Equipemet du Territoire (SCET, or Central Company for Territorial Equipment). He then appointed the engineer of ponts et chaussées (civil engineering),
440 Bernardot, “Chronique d’une institution : la ‘sonacotra’ (1956-1976),” 44. 441 Amelia H. Lyons, Th e Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization (Standford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 124. 442 Bernardot, “Chronique d’une institution : la ‘sonacotra’ (1956-1976),” 42.
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Léon-Paul Leroy, as director of both the SCIC and the SCET.443 Both Bloch-Lainé and Leroy represented the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations at the CIA in Algeria.444 When they traveled to Algeria in 1955, they advised and inspired the conception of the Algiers- based Société d’Equipement de la Région d’Alger (SERA, or the Equipment Company of the Algiers Region). Th e report on the city council meeting titled “Urbanism: Th e Municipality’s Participation with the Semi-Public Company ‘Société d’Equipement de la Région d’Alger’”—a meeting that was held on 4 December 1956 and was presided over by Jacques Chevallier—stated that the SERA was analogous to the SCET, and that the SCET, the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, and the CIA had contributed to the creation of the SERA in Algeria. SERA’s goal was “to achieve operations related to real estate and economic and 445 societal equipment in the region of Algiers.” Th e report also specifi ed that it was crucial to change the legal statutes of the SERA and to convert it into a semi-public institution (it was originally a fully public company), because it was necessary to take measures that would be in favor of administrative decentralization and deconcentration (Chapter 4). 446 Claudius-Petit was startled to observe the unprecedented property investments and the abundant property speculations—and their severe consequences—in both Algeria and France. In 1957, he denounced the inadequate principles that were based extensively, as he argued, on “economic return that can only be justifi ed in the context of capitalist effi ciency.”447 He went further, criticizing both the pitiable housing settlements that had been built and the legal choices and fi nancial standards of French urbanism that Leroy had defended in November 1957 at the Cercle d’Etudes Architecturales (CEA, or Circle of Architectural Studies). Th e CEA was an association created in 1951 by Pierre
Dalloz (1899–1992), future director of the Agence du Plan d’Alger, that gathered together architects, engineers, developers, and civil servants. Claudius-Petit argued:
443 W. Brian Newsome, French Urban Planning, 1940-1968: Th e Construction and Deconstruction of an Authoritarian System (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009), 108. 444 FR ANOM. 1 F 2212. Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne. 445 FR ANOM. 1 F 2212. Mairie de la Ville d’Alger, extrait du registre des délibérations du conseil municipal, Séance du 4 décembre 1956. Présidence de M. Jacques Chevallier, Maire, Ancien Ministre, p. 2. [“La Société a pour objet de réaliser, dans la région d’Alger, des opérations d’équipement foncier, économique et social.”] 446 Ibid. 447 Cited in Pouvreau, Un politique en architecture: Eugène Claudius-Petit (1907-1989), 172. [“ Pour un rendement qui ne peut se justifi er que dans le cadre d’un rendement capitaliste.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 247
Th e studies seem to envisage more fi nancial, quantitative, and productive aspects; and we never distinguish the human purpose of this, in which any regional planning policy runs the risk of becoming a dreadful machine…. My concern in particular derives from an ongoing observation: the impotence of the French administration to oppose the powers of money when these powers are suffi ciently coalesced.448
Alongside de Gaulle’s fi ve-year socio-economic development plan in Algeria under French colonial rule, other fi nancial programs, or “machines,” were designed for the Algerian populations who lived in the bidonvilles in both Algeria and France. In contrast to the “modern” (as it was termed) urban housing in Algeria, which included the habitat Million and the semi-urban (Chapter 4), the national plan projected an even lower category of housing called the habitat sommaire (basic housing), as if the habitat semi-urban had not already been reduced to elementary comfort requirements and the bare minimum surface area. Th e housing that should replace the bidonvilles in the suburbs of the vast majority of Algerian cities belonged to particular programs, as was predicted in the general report of the Plan de Constantine: “rural housing and the resorption of suburban bidonvilles are subject to special programs that will indeed progressively make room—besides housing of a properly rural type—for a semi-urban type adapted to the needs of a more developed portion of the rural population.”449 Th e report estimated that 110,000 housing units would be constructed over a period of fi ve years, either for rural housing or for the clearance of the bidonvilles. Th e report also stressed that this fi gure did not include the dwellings built by the French army and the SAS: both the temporary and permanent camps de regroupement, later called the mille villages (“One Th ousand Villages,” Chapter 4).
448 Cited in Ibid., 173. [“Les études semblent envisagées davantage sous l’angle fi nancier, comptable, productif, et qu’on ne distingue jamais la fi nalité humaine dans laquelle toute politique d’aménagement du territoire risque d’être une eff royable machine. (...) Mon inquiétude vient surtout d’une observation constante: l’impuissance de l’Administration française à s’opposer aux puissances d’argent lorsque celles-ci sont suffi samment coalisées.”] 449 CHSP. 1 DV 32 D 1. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Plan de Constantine, 1959-1963. Projet de rapport général. Deuxième partie, voies et moyens du développement (troisième fascicule), 13 juin 1960, p. 203. [L’habitat rural et la résorption des bidonvilles suburbains font l’objet de programmes particuliers qui d’ailleurs feront place progressivement, à côté de l’habitat de type proprement rural, à un type semi-urbain adapté aux besoins des fractions plus évolués de la population rurale.”]
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Fig. 4.32 Spatial organization of Algiers’ bidonvilles, Algiers’ Casbah, and Algiers’ rue d’Isly. From Isabelle Herpin and Serge Santelli, Cahiers d’architecture 1. Bidonville à Nanterre: étude architecturale, Unité Pédagogique d’Architecture 8 (Paris: Institut de l’environnement, 1971), 33.
Next page: Figs. 4.33, 4.34 Plan and photographs documenting a bidonville in rue des près in Paris. From Isabelle Herpin and Serge Santelli, Cahiers d’architecture 1. Bidonville à Nanterre: étude architecturale, Unité Pédagogique d’Architecture 8 (Paris: Institut de l’environnement, 1971), 87.
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 249
In the urban bidonvilles, SAU chiefs were entrusted with the task of solving “the problem of habitation.”450 Captain Berthault, chief of the SAU of Climat de France in Algiers, said that he was expected to “prepare with equity the list of benefi ciaries when a new estate is assigned to the resorption of a bidonville; in two years I was able to see one third of my bidonvilles disappear.”451 He argued that the physiognomy of the district of Climat de France had been profoundly transformed, and that the majority of “his” bidonvilles were hurriedly substituted with the
450 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Capitaine Berthault. Chef de la SAU du Climat de France, Alger, Août 1959- Septembre 1961. Le Chef de SAU et le problème de l’habitat. 451 Ibid., p. 2. [“d’établir avec équité la liste des attributaires lorsqu’une nouvelle cité est aff ectée à la résorption d’un bidonville et j’ai pu ainsi voir disparaitre en deux ans le tiers de mes bidonvilles.”]
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“monumental settlements” that the municipality built nearly everywhere. In addition to temporary settlements, or cités de transit such as the Beaucheraye and at the Boulevard Clémenceau—he listed the following realized housing units intended for the inhabitants of Algiers bidonvilles: the Cités HLM “Chevallier,” as he called it (1957–59), for ten thousand inhabitants; the Cité des anciens combattants, or veterans, for 1,500 people; the Cité de la régie foncière de la ville “Perez” (1954), for 2,500 dwellers; the Cité Taine (1959), for fi fteen hundred people; and “Diar-El-Kef” (1960–1961), for four thousand residents.452 Unlike in Algiers, the SAU of Mascara, in northwestern Algeria, suff ered from ineffi cient planning and construction processes. According to its chief, in only a few years the number of inhabitants of the neighborhood of Bad-Ali had increased from fi fteen thousand to twenty-fi ve thousand, and of Boulilef from four hundred to four thousand in years, due to military operations in the countryside. Even though the majority of the newcomers lived in bidonvilles that should have been cleared for hygiene and security reasons, the municipality failed in its attempts to house and relocate the inhabitants. Th e SAU chief argued that “the municipality’s bureau of urbanism was overwhelmed; constructions that were actually being built were rare.”453 In the case of the town of Sétif, in northeastern Algeria, the town was divided into two zones under the control of Algerian Aff airs (Chapter 2): one in charge of the SAU of Sétif and the other responsible for the SAS of Yahiaoui, which included several neighborhoods as well as the general rural area. In its report on the “housing problem,” the SAS stressed that given the density of the various populations under its control, and the extreme rapidity with which shelters were being built, its territory was very much the concern of urban planners.454 Th e SAS noted that it was thanks to the chief of the SAS’s initiative in taking oppressive measures against the proliferation of illegal settlements that were built without a master plan; the Prefect of Sétif issued a decree on 3 August 1960 that formally forbade the construction of new buildings within one hundred fi fty meters inside and fi ve hundred meters outside the barbed wire surrounding the city of Sétif.455 Th e SAS emphasized that its chief’s mission
452 Ibid. 453 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Le Chef de SAU et le problème de l’habitat. Mascara., p. 2. [“Le Service d’urbanisme de la ville était débordé. De rares constructions étaient en cours.”] 454 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Lieutenant Hauvuy. SAS de Yahiaoui. Le Chef de SAU et le problème de l’habitat. 455 Ibid., p. 3.
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 251
had two types. Th e fi rst was of a police character, since the SAS had to enforce the law; the second was of an administrative character, since it had to oversee the delivery of building permissions and to ensure that the civil Housing Service was allowed to deliver certifi cates of conformity only with the permission of the SAS chief. Th e SAS concluded that by means of these repressive measures it was possible to solve the anarchic “housing problem” and to avoid the “birth,“ to paraphrase him, of bidonvilles.456 Th is strict military control was not practicable in every Algerian town. In the case of the SAU of Mostaganem, in the northwest of Algeria, for example, the head of the SAS denounced the resistance of the municipality in circumventing his assistance, arguing that “on several occasions, [I] off ered support to the municipality for various problems, including that of housing, claiming a share of participation in the overall work. [I] was simply and purely evicted from this taboo and strictly reserved area.”457 Th ese examples imply the concentration of eff orts and resources in the colonial capital city, the alarming oversimplifi cation of the “housing problem,” and the incompetence of the French civil and military authorities to accommodate its colonized populations with dignity. In addition to these policies, de Gaulle set up, just a few weeks after launching the Plan de Constantine (as part of his war eff orts), in Algeria the Prestations d’action sociale (PAS, or Social Action Funds) and in France the Fonds d’Action Social pour les travailleurs musulmans d’Algérie en Métropole et pour leurs familles (FAS, or Social Action Fund for Muslim Workers from Algeria in the Métropole and their Families, today known as FASILD458). One of the four areas of action of the FAS was “ending the bidonville problem.”459 Its budget came from the mandatory “social” contributions of Algerian workers in France that were collected by their employers; the funds were then redistributed in France, but also transferred back to Algeria (given that Algeria was deemed a French department).
456 Ibid., p. 5. 457 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Le Chef de SAU et le problème de l’habitat. Mostaganem. [“A plusieurs reprises, il a off ert le concours à la municipalité pour diff érents problèmes dont celui de l’habitat réclamant une part de participation au travail d’ensemble. De ce domaine tabou et strictement réservé il a été purement et simplement évincé.”] 458 Fonds d’Aide et de Soutien pour l’Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations (Fund of Aid and Support for Integration and Struggle against Discriminations). It is a public institution that fi nances activities in favour of the “integration” of migrants within the French populations in France. 459 Lyons, Th e Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization, 149.
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Th e general report of the Plan de Constantine emphasized that the PAS and the FAS “must provide 7 million NF in 1959, which will increase to 60 million NF in 1963. In fi ve years, nearly 200 million NF will be released for the benefi t of construction.”460 Th e FAS subsidized a number of socio-cultural, educational, and housing construction projects that had been submitted by various French organizations and associations that operated explicitly in favor of the so-called French Muslims from Algeria, including SONACOTRAL. In addition to this special public fund that was derived from Algerians’ earnings, Claudius-Petit sought fi nancial support from the French general government in Algeria. In his letter to Paul Delouvrier dated 18 August 1960, Claudius-Petit stated that seventeen foyer-hôtels were being built in the region of Paris and its surrounding area, and that by the end of that year the number would increase to thirty; he said that 7,500 single Algerian workers would be “accommodated in good conditions of hygiene and comfort.”461 He further stated that twenty construction sites for the construction of low- cost dwellings were to be created in order to host the numerous “Muslim” families living in the bidonvilles. He needed additional resources to do this, arguing that “we take the liberty of asking if, because of the new tasks that SONACOTRAL has assumed, Algeria might consider joining in its action by providing a subsidy.”462 Delouvrier, the General Delegate of the French Government in Algeria, was thereby expected not only to face the “bidonville problem” in urban areas in both France and Algeria under French rule, but also to hurriedly solve the chaotic forced regroupement of the Algerian population in rural areas by the French army, which had caused a severe media scandal in France’s left-wing and right-wing newspapers alike. Th is situation had further endangered the international reputation of the French Republic in colonial Algeria.
460 CHSP. 1 DV 32 D 1. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Plan de Constantine, 1959-1963. Projet de rapport général. Deuxième partie, voies et moyens du développement (troisième fascicule), 13 juin 1960, p. 208. [“Doit procurer 7 millions de nouveaux francs en 1959 et passera à près de 60 millions en 1963. En 5 ans, c’est près de 200 millions de nouveaux francs qui auront été dégagés au profi t de la construction de logements.”] 461 CHSP. 1 DV 34 D 4. SONACONTRAL, Société Nationale de Construction de logements pour les travailleurs originaires d’Algérie. Direction Administrative et Financière. Paris, le 18 Août 1960. Signé par la Président Eugène Claudius-Petit, p. 1. [“Seront logés dans de bonnes conditions d’hygiène et de confort.”] 462 Ibid., p. 2. [“Nous nous permettons donc de vous demander si, en raison des tâches nouvelles assumées par la Sonacotral, l’Algérie peut envisager de s’associer à son action en lui accordant une subvention.”]
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4.2 Villages or Permanent Camps?
Th e media scandal over the existence of French camps de regroupement in Algeria that arose in April 1959 in France, a few months after the establishment of the constitution of the new Fifth Republic, triggered emergency policies for the forced resettlement of the Algerian population. Th ese suddenly became grounded in rural modernization reforms and were thereby quickly attached to General de Gaulle’s strategic Plan de Constantine. Th e scandal was initially provoked by two Frenchmen who were allowed to visit the camps. One was Monsignor Jean Rodhain (1900–1977), an affi rmed pétainiste (Pétain supporter) and general secretary of the French Secours Catholique (Caritas France), who had just returned from a visit to colonial Algeria and had launched an emergency appeal in the daily French Catholic newspaper La Croix of 11 April 1959 for humanitarian aid for the one million involuntary displaced Algerians. Th e other was Michel Rocard, the young inspector general of Finance, who leaked to the French media his report on the camps de regroupement, which he had submitted on 17 February 1959 to the newly appointed general delegate of the French government in Algeria, Paul Delouvrier. Th is resulted in two lengthy articles: one in the weekly left-wing French magazine France Observateur (on 16 April 1959) and one in the daily left-wing French newspaper Le Monde (on 17 April 1959). Immediately following the leaked report, the majority of French newspapers and magazines, including the right-wing Le Figaro, reported on the disgraceful conditions of the camps de regroupement and deplored the material and psychological situations of the forced-resettled Algerian families, which included a great number of children who suff ered from diseases and famine.463 In the wake of the discreditable media scandal and criticism, Delouvrier proclaimed that he would personally take care of the regroupement of Algerian populations and would put the matter under his direct control; he later announced a large rural renovation program that he called the mille villages (as noted earlier, the “One Th ousand Villages”). In parallel with the Plan de Constantine (Chapter 3), de Gaulle concurred with the methods and objectives of the Plan Challe, a series of brutal, systematic military
463 SHAT. 1 H 2485 D 2. Coupures de Presse concernant les réfugiés et les camps de regroupement, 1959.
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Fig. 4.35 (left) Article presenting Delouvrier’s one thousand villages project in Les Réalités “Dites la vérité même si elle est amère” no. 34 of June 1959. FR ANOM FM 81F/444. Fig. 4.36 (right) Article reporting on the mille villages program in Timgad released in Aurès-Nemencha no. 31 of June– July 1959. SHAT 1 H 1118/2. operations conducted throughout the entire territory of Algeria that took place between 1959 and 1961. Th e plan was named for Maurice Challe, General of the French Air Forces, who served as commander-in-chief of the French Armed Forces in Algeria between 1959 and 1960 and who deliberately resigned in 1961 from the French army and participated in the second Algiers Generals’ Putsch against General de Gaulle. Th e Plan Challe was expected to “asphyxiate” the rebellion and destroy the FLN on the ground. Th e military off ensive included further fortifi cation of the Algerian borders; this action resulted in the enlargement of the “forbidden zones” (Chapter 2), from which entire villages and fi elds were to be forcibly and immediately evacuated or destroyed. Th e Plan Challe protracted and expanded French military regrouping measures, dramatically amplifi ed the number of the forced-resettled populations, and contributed to the construction of thousands of temporary and permanent camps de regroupements. For General de Gaulle, the forced resettlement of the Algerian population was, in addition to its military facets, designed to “pacify” and control the population; this was a political project. Th e camps de regroupement were instrumental for the French civil authorities, who used the camps as a socio-economic alibi to enforce an abrupt rural renovation; they were also helpful for the French army to quietly wage a bloody war of pacifi cation. Th e concomitance of the Plan Challe with the Plan de Constantine did provoke tension, however, and engendered several misunderstandings between the civil and military authorities, including the Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS, or Specialized Administrative Sections, Chapter 2). Delouvrier, who was eventually entrusted with the
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 255
task of regulating the regrouping policies, struggled to solve these tribulations. On 31 March 1959, a few days prior to the aforementioned unwelcome attention of the French media, Delouvrier released directive no. 2.445 CC among the French military and civil authorities, arguing that he intended to decelerate and prevent the massive formation of the regroupements. He declared that “recent surveys [conducted by Michel Rocard and others] have attested that Fig. 4.37 Paul Delouvrier’s call of 5 November 1959 used by the French army to recall French offi cers’ these [regroupement] operations are currently mission. SHAT 1 H 2499. on the rise, to an extent that was not initially envisioned.”464 He warned that “the means at our disposal no longer allow us to meet the basic needs for assistance; the situation of new regroupements would create practically insoluble problems.”465 Due to the scarcity of economic means, Delouvrier argued for restricting the forced evacuation of Algerians and thereby interrupting the construction of additional camps de regroupement, ordering that “no regroupement will be operated without my agreement. I indicate my intention to allow only those regroupements that are either of absolute military necessity or that result from the will of the populations themselves.”466 Until the expiration of his mandate in Algeria under French colonial rule in November 1961, however—and even after, as will shortly be discussed—the numbers of people and the numbers of camps swelled dramatically. On 24 April 1959, in the wake of the media scandal, Delouvrier diff used directive no. 3.444 CC; he recalled his guidelines that had been announced the previous month
464 FR ANOM. 9336/14. Paul Delouvrier, Le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie à MM. Les Généraux Commandants de Corps d’Armée, exerçant les pouvoirs civils dans les groupes de départements d’Alger, de Constantine et d’Oran, et à MM. Les Secrétaires Généraux Régionaux. Directive n° 2.445 CC. Regroupement de populations. Alger, le 31 Mars 1959, p. 1. [“Des enquêtes récentes ont montré que ces opérations ont pris, actuellement, une ampleur qui n’était pas prévue au départ.”] 465 Ibid., p. 2. [“Les moyens dont nous disposons, ne permettant plus de faire face aux besoins essentiels d’assistance et d’équipement, la situation des nouveaux regroupés poserait des problèmes pratiquement insolubles.”] 466 Ibid. [“Aucun regroupement ne devra être opéré sans mon accord. J’indique mon intention de n’autoriser que les regroupements absolument nécessaires sur le plan militaire ou résultant de la volonté des populations elles-mêmes.”]
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Fig. 4.38 Article in Les Réalités “Dites la vérité même si elle est amère” no. 34 of June 1959. FR ANOM FM 81F/444. and added that if the regroupements were based on sane economic and property-based foundations, they might become foyers de promotion sociale (places of social promotion). As he stressed, however, “if the inhabitants do not fi nd opportunities for normal existence in their dictated places of settlement, the regroupement will become a place of impoverishment and discontent, in which the politico-administrative organization of the adversary will fi nd fertile ground for agitation.”467 In order to circumvent rebellion, Delouvrier endeavored to turn existing camps de regroupement into foyers de promotion sociale by enhancing the living conditions of the forced-resettled populations and by providing them with prospects for “normal existence,” to paraphrase Delouvrier, although the circumstances of war were far from “normal.“ According to Delouvrier, “the objective we seek is to render all regroupements economically viable; that is, to ensure every regrouped family the possibility of gaining
467 SHAT. 1 H 2030 D 1. Paul Delouvrier, Le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Directive n° 3.444 CC. Regroupement de populations. Alger, le 24 Avril 1959, p. 1 [“Si les habitants ne retrouvent pas, au lieu d’implantation choisi, des possibilités d’existence normales, le regroupement est une foyer de misère et de mécontentement dans lequel l’organisation politico-administrative de l’adversaire trouve un terrain d’agitation fécond.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 257
its means of subsistence from a productive job, which will mostly be farming.”468 Self-subsistence was to be diff erently applied and achieved, depending on the case; he described three plausible circumstances: two opposing and one intermediate situation, the latter of which he urged should be considered the priority. Th e fi rst circumstance consisted of regroupements that were located in territories without any access to arable lands and agricultural fi elds; he recommended submitting these cases to the general commanders of the zones in question, who would, in accordance with military obligations, again displace the populations to more advantageous locations. Th e second probable situation consisted of the forced-regrouped populations who had access to their original farming lands and would be allowed to maintain their own domains of subsistence; they thus did not require any urgent mediation. Fig. 4.39 Article in Les Réalités “Dites la vérité Finally, all those regroupements that belonged même si elle est amère” no. 34 of June 1959. FR ANOM FM 81F/444. to neither of these two groups necessitated an immediate intervention.469 Delouvrier’s appeal for the betterment of the camps de regroupement was not always upheld, due to the weighty French bureaucratic machine, the long and drawn-out freeing-up of appropriate funds, and the lack of determination of a number of military and SAS offi cers. In his circular no. 3.852 CC of 5 May 1959, Delouvrier informed the civil and military authorities that the general delegation of the French government in
468 Ibid., p. 2. [“L’objective recherché est de rendre viable, sur le plan économique, l’ensemble des regroupements, c’est-à-dire d’assurer à chaque famille regroupée la possibilité de tirer ses moyens de subsistance d’un travail productif, qui sera le plus souvent agricole.”] 469 Ibid.
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Algeria had signed an agreement with the French Red Cross, and that three appropriately equipped trucks were formally authorized to circulate throughout the regroupements and to procure food and medical aid. Th e fi rst Red Cross truck departed only on 25 June in the Region of Algiers, as Delouvrier announced in his circular no. 5.766 CC of 1 July 1959, in which he requested his men to engage in total collaboration, stating, “in these diffi cult circumstances that we face, and given the enormous need created by the centres de regroupement, I believe that we must welcome and facilitate, as much as possible, any off ers of help that we are likely to receive.”470 In addition to this humanitarian assistance—which undeniably displayed the inability of the French army to deal with the socio-economic problems that it had generated in the camps the regroupement—Delouvrier also promoted any sort of patronage and sponsorship of the camps, including off ers by a number of religious organizations. In an attempt to fi nance the transformation of the camps de regroupement, the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria augmented the price of gasoline consumed in colonial Algeria on 1 June 1959, as reported in La Dépêche Quotidienne, a French newspaper based in Algiers: “To fi nance the progress of pacifi cation and the installation of the centres de regroupement: Increase by 9 Fr. per liter of gasoline, starting from this night at midnight.”471 It was not until 17 December 1959, however—one year after Delouvrier’s nomination—that comprehensive fi nancial reform was instituted and specifi c funds, dubbed Dépenses d’Equipement Local (DEL, or Local Equipment Expenditures), eventually became available. According to Delouvrier, the public funding methods used thus far had been imperfect, due to heavy administrative procedures, a defi ciency of technical expertise of the prefecture for the correct management of credit, and an insuffi ciency of technical control for an appropriate usage of the credits of the municipality, which swelled to “an abusive use of certain subsidies, and their investment
470 SHAT. 1 H 2574. Paul Delouvrier, Le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Circulaire n° 5.766 CC. Regroupement de populations. Alger, le 1 Juillet 1959, p. 2 [“Dans les circonstances diffi ciles que nous traversons, et compte tenu des besoins énormes créés par les centres de regroupements, j’estime que nous devons accueillir et faciliter, dans toute la mesure du possible, les off res d’aide que nous sommes susceptibles de recevoir.”] 471 SHAT. 2485 D 2. Coupures de Presse. Dépêche Quotidienne, Pour fi nancer les progrès de la pacifi cation et l’installation des centres de regroupement: Augmentation de 9 f. par litre d’essence depuis cette nuit 0 heure, 1 Juin 1959.
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in works of questionable usefulness.”472 Against this backdrop, the public credits of DEL were to be directly coordinated by the chiefs of the department and the sub-prefects, whereas public technical services—such as the Ponts et Chaussées (Civil Engineering), Hydraulics, Rural Equipment, Agriculture Services, Soil Protection and Restoration, National Education, Public Health Care, and Rural Housing—were to assist the municipalities and administrative authorities in the preparation and execution of the investments funded by the DEL. In his explanations of the expected nature and characteristics of the DEL expenses, Delouvrier stressed that “the necessary expenditures for the transformation of the centres de regroupement into villages nouveaux equipped with collective facilities must be given the utmost priority.”473 One of the supposed simplifi cations of the modalities of utilization of the DEL credits that was promoted by the new fi nancial reform in order to transform “centers” into “villages” was to fund a number of diff erent French institutions and organizations, ranging from prefectures, municipalities, federations of municipalities, the Société agricole de prévoyance (SAP, or Wise Agriculture Society), the Caisse algérienne d’aménagement du territoire (CADAT, or the Algerian Fund for Regional Planning), the Caisse pour l’accession à la propriété et à l’exploitation rurale (CAPER, or Fund for Accession to Property and Rural Exploitation), and even private companies. Th e costs of 80 percent of the construction of new rural dwellings in the camps were entrusted exclusively to the Commissariat à la reconstruction et à l’habitat rural (CRHR, or Commissariat of Reconstruction and Rural Housing, Chapter 2), whereas the remaining 20 percent were covered by the DEL and were to be allocated to the CAPER. Th is fund was supposed to be used in one of the following three cases: 1) for the construction of habitations sommaires (basic dwellings) of a unit cost not exceeding 2,500 NF or 2) for the purchase of construction materials for the same type of housing; 3) the fund could likewise be assigned again to the CRHR.474 Th e eff ective construction of shelters was attributed to the labor of the forced-relocated populations, as
472 FR ANOM. SAS DOC 3. Paul Delouvrier, Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Circulaire no. 6.870 Cab/SG du 17 Décembre 1959. Caisse d’équipement de l’Algérie – Réforme du fi nancement des dépenses d’équipement local, p. 7. [“L’emploi abusif de certaines subventions, et leur investissement dans des ouvrages d’une utilité discutable.”] 473 Ibid., p. 8. [“Les dépenses nécessaires à la transformation des centres de regroupements en villages nouveaux dotés d’aménagements collectifs, doivent être inscrites en priorité.”] 474 Ibid., p. 13-14. Dispositions particulières concernant l’habitat rural. As a matter of confrontation the semi-urban housing costed 7,000 NF.
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described in the Modes of Works Execution: “For the construction of rural housing, the DEL credits must serve only to acquire construction materials, to supervise the labor work of the recipients [of rural housing], and to complete it in case it is insuffi cient. Th e labor supplied by the population must be required wherever possible.”475 In order to transform camps into villages and to construct new settlements, Delouvrier instituted the Groupes de Travail Itinérants (Itinerant Working Groups), whose assignments were “to go into the fi eld, establish programs in order to provide every regroupement with a healthy economic basis, and facilitate its implementation.”476 Th ese mobile teams were to be composed of one SAS offi cer and two rural development technicians who might be designated among existing public technical bodies, such as Agriculture Services, Wise Agriculture Societies, Peasantry, Hydraulics, Forestry and Water Commissions, or Soil Protection and Restoration. Th e teams were to be nominated and supervised by the Secrétaires Généraux Régionaux (Regional General Secretaries), who were likewise accountable for coordinating and overseeing the forced resettlement of the Algerian population. Th e secretaries had to appoint at least one mobile working group in every French department in Algeria, although Delouvrier recommended nominating more than one group in order to accelerate the long and drawn-out processes.477 Th e Itinerant Working Groups were predominantly expected to propose, study, and evaluate the following aspects: 1) the future of the regroupement and the proportion of the forced-relocated people who were likely to remain in the regroupement once peace was achieved; 2) the economic viability of the camps, or “centers”; the possibility of water supply by the Hydraulics Service; the accessibility and means of communication by the Civil Engineering Service; the habitability conditions by the Commissariat of Reconstruction and Rural Housing (CRHR); the means of existence of the population by the Agriculture, Peasantry, and Soil Protection and Restoration services; 3) the legal status of the lands where the camps/centers were located by the Service of Domains; 4)
475 Ibid., p. 13. [“Pour la construction de l’habitat rural, les crédits DEL, ne doivent servir qu’à l’achat des matériaux, à encadrer le travail des attributaires et le compléter dans le cas où celui-ci serait insuffi sant. Cet apport de travail des populations doit être exigé dans toute la mesure du possible.”] 476 SHAT. 1 H 2030 D 1. Paul Delouvrier, Le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Directive n° 3.444 CC. Regroupement de populations. Alger, le 24 Avril 1959, p. 2. [“Ils auront pour mission de se rendre sur le terrain, d’établir les programmes ayant pour but de donner à chaque regroupement des bases économique saines et d’en faciliter la mise en œuvre.”] 477 Ibid., p. 3.
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social and administrative facilities, such as the organization of community life, and the establishment of cooperatives, community houses, schools, and post offi ces, as well as the sanitary amenities of public health care and socio-medical centers; 5) the extent of immediate assistance to those who were in need and to those who were apt to work; and 6) the military operations of protection and self-defense in collaboration with the military commander of the sector on which the camp depended.478 Th e resulting projects were to be submitted to the prefect, who was the President of the Commission Départementale de Réforme Agraire (Departmental Commission of Agrarian Reform) and who would defi ne the priorities and eventually take all necessary measures to enforce the selected programs. In an attempt to enforce his directives and regulate the chaotic regroupements, Delouvrier created the Inspection Générale des Regroupements de Population (IGRP, or General Inspection of the Regrouping of the Population), which he attached directly to his cabinet. He appointed General Parlange, the forefather of the fi rst regroupements in the Aurès (Chapter 1), as a technical consultant and general inspector of the IGRP on 1 November 1959—fi ve years after the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution. In his fi rst report to Delouvrier about the dreadful conditions of the camps de regroupements, General Parlange stated that “my mission was to visit the centers, to establish contact with their leaders, to monitor the implementation of your directives, and to inform you about the problems that may arise; you made me ultimately responsible for studying, together with the Services, the projects that are likely to improve the fate of the regrouped populations.”479 While Parlange eulogized the military successes of the camps, he denounced their human, social, economic, and planning consequences. In a report to Delouvrier, Parlage stated that “on the level of urbanism, serious mistakes had been committed;”480 these mistakes included the inadequate locations and dangerous sites on which many shelters and camps were built, the absence of judicial rights to use the occupied lands, and the defi ciency of the water supply and other facilities of the camps, which he always
478 Ibid., p. 2-3. 479 SHAT. 1 H 2574. Le General Parlange, Conseiller Technique, Inspecteur Général des Regroupements à Monsieur le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Alger, le 15 Février 1960, p. 1. [“Vous m’avez nommé Inspecteur Général des regroupements et m’avez donné mission de visiter les centres, de prendre contact avec leurs responsables, d’y contrôler l’application de vos directives et de vous rendre compte des problèmes qu’elle peuvent soulever; vous m’avez chargé enfi n d’étudier avec les Service les projets susceptibles d’améliorer le sort des populations regroupées.”] 480 Ibid., p. 3. [“Sur le plan urbanistique des fautes graves ont été commises.”]
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called centers. He concluded his survey by stating that the situation was far from being immediately remediated, and that barely one-tenth of the existing “centers“ might be integrated into the program of the mille villages. He added that the offi cial terminology must change as soon as possible, arguing that “at the moment, where a number of very important permanent accomplishments have enabled us to silence those former attacks against the centres de regroupement, it would be psychologically interesting to change the offi cial appellations of these gatherings.”481 Parlange suggested four categories for the new designations of the camps, as follows.
1) Nouveaux villages (new villages) referred to any center that was built of enduring materials and were located in the administrative center of the municipality.
2) Nouveaux hameaux (new hamlets) referred to the satellites of the former municipality centers; these were composed of permanent agglomerations and were located in the vicinity of the “new villages.”
3) Nouveaux quartiers (new neighborhoods) were located in the immediate vicinity of an ancient village or town.
4) Groupes d’abris provisoires (groups of temporary shelters) referred to the regroupements of temporary character that had to either disappear or be transferred.482 To this end, Parlange intended not only to erase the word center from the vocabulary but also to obliterate the term regroupement, since both terms had been associated with the media scandal and the criticism of public opinion.
In the aftermath of Parlange’s recommendations, Delouvrier signed a new directive entitled Regroupements de populations—Mille villages (Population Regrouping—One Th ousand Villages) on 25 May 1960, stating that the recent “evolution of pacifi cation”483
481 Ibid., p. 9. [“Au moment où nombre de réalisations défi nitives assez importantes permettent de faire taire les attaques anciennes portées contre les Centres de Regroupement, il serait intéressant psychologiquement de changer les appellations offi cielles de ces rassemblements.”] 482 Ibid. 483 SHAT. 1 H 2574. Paul Delouvrier, Le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Cabinet du Délégué Général, Inspection Générale des Regroupements. Directive no. 4.625 CC. Regroupement de populations – Mille Villages. Alger, le 25 Mai 1960, p. 1.
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had led him to revise and issue new instructions. He reiterated that although certain temporary regroupements were imposed by operational necessities and that the military authorities considered the regroupements to be the most effi cient means against the rebels, any regroupements must be conceived in the context of a step toward the villages. In Delouvrier’s opinion, the village was “a viable sociological unit and the symbol of progress in the countryside.”484 He wrote that “a village is not a simple agglomeration of housing. It is useless to build houses if the people who inhabit them do not have the necessary resources to support their existence.”485 He again insisted in distinguishing between temporary regroupements that ought to progressively disappear, and permanent regroupements that were supported by the DEL credits and would henceforth bear the new titles of “new village, new hamlet, [or] new neighborhood, in accordance with the size of the population and their localization.”486 He declared that the creation of new centres de regroupement was to be based on the unity of action of both civil and military authorities acting in collaboration and combining their resources, and that new commissions mixtes (mixed commissions) at every region, department, and arrondissement would have to make any decision on the regroupements together.487 Th e conception of new centers was for the fi rst time subjected to an enquête préalable (preliminary enquiry) that had to be brought about by the équipe itinérante, which was then renamed the équipe itinérante d’aménagement rural (Itinerant Team for Rural Planning; Fig. 4.41). Th e new team was to include both civil and military representatives; it was to be composed of one SAS offi cer, several skilled civil technicians, and offi cers from military commandments. Furthermore, Delouvrier declared that he “would attach great value to the fact that [the Itinerant Team for Rural Planning] should equally include valid elements from the population to be regrouped, as it is important to get them interested in their own aff airs.”488 In parallel with these mixed teams, he announced his intention to establish at every echelon, region, and prefecture “des Bureaux d’Aménagement Rural
484 Ibid. [“Unité sociologique viable et symbole des progrès du bled.”] 485 Ibid., p. 1. [“Un village n’est pas une simple agglomération d’habitants. Il ne sert de rien de construire des maisons si les gens qui les occupent n’ont pas les ressources nécessaires à leur existence.”] 486 Ibid., p. 2. [“Nouveau village, nouveau hameau, nouveau quartier, selon l’importance de la population et leur localisation.”] 487 Ibid. 488 Ibid. [“J’attacherais du prix à ce qu’elle comprenne également quelques éléments valables de la population à regrouper qu’il importe d’intéresser à ses propres aff aires.”]
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Fig. 4.40 (left) Article in Le Monde of 10 June 1959. FR ANOM FM 81F/444. Fig. 4.41 (right) Anonymous article. FR ANOM FM 81F/444.
[Offi ces of Rural Planning] specifi cally charged with the regroupement and the program of 1,000 Villages.”489 Th e mille villages was a slogan that Delouvrier launched to designate “permanent” camps de regroupement, or as he termed them (and requested others to do the same) “new villages, new hamlets, new neighborhoods.” Th e catchword confused a number of both civil and military offi cers who were in charge of implementing Delouvrier’s new policies, because they interpreted the mille villages as a restriction of the number of the built “villages” to only one thousand, thus resulting in colossal mistakes in statistics and fi nancial mismanagement.490 To amend these problems, Delouvrier diff used a circular that aimed to point out (and again redefi ne) the diff erence between momentary and enduring regroupements, stressing that the “permanent centers” were characterized by their economic and sociologic viability, which were expected to ensure a solid future. He argued that “there are only two categories of new settlements and not three: temporary and permanent (Mille Villages).”491 Th e French press at the time did use the misunderstood slogan, however, as in the article “Zelamta: Premier des ‘Mille Villages’ est inauguré en Oranie” (“Zelamta: Th e First ‘Mille Villages’ Is Inaugurated in the Oran Region”) in Le Monde on 10 June 1959,
489 Ibid., p. 4. [“Soient créés des bureaux d’aménagement rural, chargés spécialement des regroupements et du programme des 1000 villages.”] 490 Cornaton, Les camps de regroupement de la Guerre d’Algérie, 70. 491 SHAT. 1 H 2574. Paul Delouvrier, Le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Circulaire n° 3.270 CC. Centre de regroupement – Mille villages. Alger, le 19 Avril 1960, p. 1 [“Il n’existe que deux catégories de nouvelles agglomérations et non trois: les provisoires et les défi nitifs (mille villages).”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 265
in which the author reported that the nouveau village (new village) of Zelamta was located precisely on the same site as a former camp de regroupement; it comprised two hundred new dwellings, but the water supply was still provided by wells while the inhabitants waited for the Hygiene Service to install proper pipes; and that forty similar villages were planned in the Oran Region.492 To this end, Delouvrier’s new terminology insinuated— and inevitably led the media to report the same—that the French authorities were merely planning and building “new villages” for Algerian farmers in the name of the rural reforms of the Plan de Constantine. General Parlange drafted an extensive document called Réfl exions sur la création des nouveaux villages (Refl ections on the Creation of New Villages) in which he listed the incentives that made the “new village” agree with the premises of the Plan de Constantine. He argued that the new village would: 1) enforce municipal reforms by means of formal administration, frequent and simplifi ed contact with the population, and the disentanglement of economic problems; 2) allow for envisaging ethnic and social promotions through the improvement of housing, and thereby for the intensifi cation of education of the local elite; 3) restrict the neglect of rural areas and partly absorb the proletariat; 4) facilitate the hygienic control and the actions of the Itinerary Teams, as well as hasten the promotion of women; and 5) enhance general cooperation.493 Parlange warned of the agrarian reform, however—“in the regions of great colonization, it is a necessity but it faces huge diffi culties”—he therefore felt that it was “essential to prevent the new villages from simply becoming a reservoir of staff employed by the colons.”494 While he criticized CAPER’s slow processes in purchasing and redistributing arable lands from colons to Algerians, he praised the effi ciency of the newly established Sections Coopératives Agricoles du Plan de Constantine (SCAPCO, or Cooperative Agricultural Sections of the Constantine Plan). In a document titled “La SAS devant le problème rural ou la création d’une SCAPCO” (“Th e SAS before the Rural Problem, or the Creation of a
492 SHAT. 1 H 2485 D 2. Le Monde, 10 Juin 1959, Zelamta: Premier des “Mille Villages” est inauguré en Oranie. 493 CHSP. 1 DV 17 D 4-5. Général Parlange. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie. Cabinet du Délégué Général. Inspection Générale des Regroupements. Réfl exions sur la création des nouveaux villages. Alger, le 9 mars 1960, pp. 1-2. 494 Ibid., p. 3. [“Dans les régions de grande colonisation, elle est une nécessité mais se heurte à d’énorme diffi cultés.”]; [“il est indispensable d’empêcher que les nouveaux villages soient simplement un réservoir du personnel employé par les colons.”]
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SCAPCO”), the chief of the SAS of Kouba in the Department of Algiers argued that the creation of a SCAPCO in the territory under his authority was fundamental to the success of the rural planned colonial renovation, and that “rural reform constitutes the Achilles heel of the economic revolution of this country.”495 In another record, called “L’expérience de rénovation rurale” (“Th e Experience of Rural Renovation”), the chief of the SAS of Righia in the Department of Bône said that the agrarian reforms had been introduced to remedy the situation in the centres de regroupement of Righia, claiming that “it was necessary to provide jobs and subsistence to more than three thousand people.”496 Parlange’s refl ections on the new villages most likely served to formulate and distribute a comprehensive guideline called “Les mille villages” on April 1960, in which he announced that six hundred nouveaux villages were under construction or under transformation. Both the conversion of camps into “villages” and the construction of new villages were meant to meet the politico-socio-economic purposes of the Plan de Constantine, including the immediate development of the countryside.497 Th e IGRP assumed that one of the fi rst steps of rural reforms should consist of:
Improving the class of the inhabitants, and thus increasing their resources; it is necessary to simultaneously maintain their previous resources and to fi nd new ones. Th e economy of the olden days will not eff ectively provide access to modern life; however, it is not a question of asking all the inhabitants to abandon their land and live by something other than farming.498
Farmers who were forced to live in the camps were expected not only to remain farmers, but also to operate for the French colonial development of Algeria’s countryside. Th e IGRP intended to improve the yield of the land, as well as to éduquer les exploitants (instruct
495 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Département d’Alger, Ville d’Alger, 8° Arrondissement, SAS de Kouba. La SAS devant le problème rural ou la création d’une SCAPCO, p. 1. [“La réforme agraire constitue le talon d’Achille de la révolution économique de ce pays.”] 496 SHAT. 1 H 1213. Capitaine Charles Vidonne, Chef de la SAS de Righia, Département de Bône. L’expérience de rénovation rurale, p. 1. [“Il a fallut faire travailler et vivre plus de trois mille personnes.”] 497 SHAT. 1 H 1119. Inspection Générale des Regroupements, Les Milles Villages, Avril 1960, p. 1. 498 Ibid., p. 3. [“En augmentant le standing des habitants, donc en augmentant leurs ressources; il faudra en même temps maintenir les anciennes ressources et en trouver de nouvelles. L’économie d’autrefois ne permettra pas en eff et d’accéder à la vie moderne - il ne peut être question non plus que l’ensemble des habitants quittent leurs terres pour vivre d’autre chose que de la culture.”]
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farmers), by introducing directors and monitors in the SCAPCO: rural engineers and technicians of rural housing who would be “capable of ‘engaging’ the inhabitants in the action toward a modern life, to frame them without authoritarianism, and to help them without formalism.”499 Rural housing was deemed essential to the transition from “farmers” to “modern farmers” that the colonial authorities had in mind for the forcibly resettled populations. Th e IGRP stressed that it was indispensable to “fi rst improve housing: a tangible evidence of progress, a sensitive matter not only to men, but more importantly, to women; we must therefore make everyone forget the houses that they had to leave and that they were sentimentally attached to.”500 In order to coordinate the design of rural dwellings and new villages or permanent camps, Delouvrier created the Bureau d’Aménagement Rural (Offi ce of Rural Planning), which operated under the direct authority of the general secretary of the prefecture. In his directive of 4 November 1960, a few days prior to the expiration of his mandate, Delouvrier emphasized that this institution was expected to again actively connect, coordinate, study, and impel various administrative and technical services, as well as “to provoke the unity of action of all those who contribute to the creation and equipment of the regroupements of the population.”501 Th e head of the offi ce was to be selected among existing French administrative or technical services, or high-level French military offi cers from Algerian Aff airs. Th e Bureau d’Aménagement Rural was to become the engine of the équipe itinérante d’aménagement rural. Th e establishment of this additional bureaucratic body suggests that the French civil and military authorities failed to cooperate; the confi dential policy coordination of the regroupements thus continued to be a fragile question. Th ese defi ciencies dramatically aff ected the displaced Algerian population and were not openly debated at the time. On the contrary, the authorities conducted national and international propaganda campaigns
499 Ibid., p. 5. [“Capable d’engager les habitants dans l’action vers la vie moderne, de les encadrer sans caporalisme et de les aider sans formalisme.”] 500 Ibid., p. 10. [“D’abord améliorer l’Habitat, preuve tangible du progrès, sensible non seulement aux hommes, mais, ce qui est capital, aux femmes; nous devrons pour cela faire oublier à tous les maisons qu’ils ont dû quitter et pour lesquelles ils ont gardé un attachement sentimental.”] 501 SHAT. 1 H 2574. Paul Delouvrier, Le Délégué Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Circulaire n° 9.2610 CC/ IGRP. Regroupement de population – Bureaux et Equipes Itinérante d’Aménagement Rural. Alger, le 4 Novembre 1960, p. 2. [“ De provoquer l’unité d’action de tous ceux qui concourent à la création et à l’équipement des regroupements de population.”]
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in order to defl ect attention from the cruel realities of the camps de regroupement and to sustain the belief that the Fifth Republic, unlike its antecedent, acted in favor of the development of the displaced Algerian populations, as dictated by the Plan de Constantine. In his Campagne d’information sur les regroupements et les nouveaux villages (Information Campaign on the Regroupements and New Villages) of 4 July 1960, General Parlange pointed out that the campaign must address and aff ect the Algerian population, the Métropole, the international community, and the United Nations prior to its coming General Assembly.502 In addition to general information training courses organized for French students from France in the camps de regroupement, the French authorities undertook various emblematic and intensive propaganda measures involving: 1) the press, by means of guided articles and by inviting French and foreign journalists to visit the camps; 2) the distribution of brochures based on illustrations and short comments; 3) short fi lms and documentaries (in Arabic and French) on the socio-economic benefi ts of the regroupements, produced by the French Service of Information and SAS offi cers (seven short French fi lms and one American fi lm were produced as part of this eff ort); 4) a series of postcards, greeting cards, and posters were to be proposed and divided into two parts: on the left side was to be “Jadis” (“Before”), representing isolated villages of deteriorated gourbis (shelters, Chapter 1) and emphasizing the promiscuité (cohabitation) of farmers and their animals; on the right side would be the slogan “Aujourd’hui: programmes des 1,000 villages” (“Today: A Program of 1,000 Villages”), portraying the alignment of buildings, the town hall, the infi rmary, and the school. Th e postcards were to be freely supplied to all military offi cers of the contingent, who would send them to their families and friends in France; the authorities even envisioned providing every postcard with “a number eligible for a lottery, whose winners would be off ered a free voyage to Algeria;”503 5) conferences showcasing recent photographs that were to be held before selected and varied audiences; 6) traveling truck-based exhibitions on the Plan de Constantine and the “nouveaux villages” that were to be organized in France; 7) reports and pamphlets in several languages that were to be
502 SHAT. 1 H 2574. General Parlange. Inspection Général des Regroupement des Populations. Campagne d’information sur les regroupements et les nouveaux villages. Alger, le 4 juillet 1960, pp. 1-2. 503 Ibid., p. 4. [“Un numéro ouvrant droit à une loterie dont les gagnants bénéfi cieraient d’un voyage gratuit en Algérie.”]
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periodically transmitted to the United Nations; and fi nally 8) visits to the regroupements that were to be organized for politicians and industrialists who would infl uence the public opinion of their respective countries.504 In preparing the illustrated brochures of the program of the mille villages that would reinforce the propaganda eff orts, the IGRP demanded that the French army and SAS offi cers deliver photographic documentation of the centres de regroupement under their respective authorities by the beginning of August 1960.505 Aerial photographs were employed to garnish the vast collection of the built settlements called “new villages” or “new neighborhoods.” By assembling the photographs and their legends, the IGRP composed an abundant catalogue of newly built rural settlements that portrayed both the settlements’ spatial organization and the daily lives of the displaced populations (Figs. 4.42–4.49). As a result of this survey, a booklet entitled Algérie: Naissance de mille villages (Algeria: Th e Birth of One Th ousand Villages) was ultimately published. Th e booklet attempted to demonstrate that it was inevitably France’s mission to “civilize“ Algerian famers, families, women, and children.506 Th e concluding colonial text on the achievements of the French authorities claimed that in December 1960, “1,024 new villages host one million regrouped people.
Th e creation of these villages was enabled by the construction of 84,000 permanent homes made of durable materials.”507 In order to instruct offi cers in the building of the new “villages“ and dwellings, the IGRP and the French army distributed a number of technical directives and guidelines, including the Guide pratique pour la création des nouveaux villages (Practical Guidebook for the Creation of New Villages; Figs. 4.50–4.52) and the Notice technique pour la construction des nouveaux villages (Technical Guidelines for the Construction of New Villages)—the latter of which was informed by the recent experiences of both SAS offi cers and the Commissariat de la Reconstruction et de l’ Habitat Rural508—or Comment faire le pisé? Ou la
504 Ibid., p. 5. 505 CHSP. 1 DV 18 D 2. Inspection Générale des Regroupements de Population au Général de Corps d’Armée Commandant en Chef des Forces en Algérie. Documentation photographique sur les Centres de Regroupement. 15 juin 1960. 506 FR ANOM. B.12.260. Algérie: Naissance de mille villages. 507 Ibid. [“En décembre 1960, 1’024 nouveaux villages abritent un million de personnes regroupées. La création de ces villages s’est traduite par la construction de 84’000 logements défi nitifs en dur.”] 508 SHAT. 1 H 2030. Région Territoriale et Corps d’Armée d’Alger, 3° Bureau. Notice technique pour la construction des nouveaux villages.
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Figs. 4.42–4.45 (previous page); Figs. 4.46–4.49 IGRP, Documentation photographique sur les centres de regroupement, 15 June 1960. CHSP. 1 DV 18 D 2.
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Figs. 4.50–4.52 Notice technique pour la construction des nouveaux villages drafted by the Région Territoriale et Corps d’Armée of Algiers. SHAT 1 H 2030 D1. construction traditionnelle à bon marché (How to Make Compressed Earth? Or Low-Cost Traditional Construction), a methodical documentation with sketches about methods for producing a local construction material formulated by Commander Guet from Algerian Aff airs.509 Despite these belated measures, as Jacques Bugnicourt (1930–2002)—a former national secretary of Socialist Students in France and a close friend of the aforementioned Michel Rocard—pointed out in his November 1960 manuscript Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: Problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages (New Rural Centers in Algeria: Planning Problems of Lands and Villages), “the overall impression is that we build anywhere, anyhow, and anything.”510 Bugnicourt, who was in Algeria to serve as a conscript after having completed his studies in political science and geography in France, was acquainted with the population regroupements and their policies and implementations, since he was not only an SAS offi cer responsible for the Commission for Rural Renovation in the Department of Orléanville from 1958 to 1961, but also a member of the Commission of
509 FR ANOM. 2 SAS 167. Inspection Générale des Regroupements. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie. Comment faire le pisé? Ou la construction traditionnelle à bon marché. Alger le 30 Juillet 1960. Documentation recueillie par le Commandant G. Guet, Offi cier supérieur des Affaires Algériennes. 510 Jacques Bugnicourt, Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages (Alger: Bringau, 1960), 11. Many thanks to Michel Cornaton who off ered the author Bugnicourt’s book.
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the Civil Cabinet of Delouvrier charged with the study and revision of the directives of the population regroupement.511 In his didactic survey, Bugnicourt endeavored to contend with civil and military authorities for the planning and construction of permanent camps, or “centers,” called “villages.” With the ambition of ridding “new villages” of the detritus of the camps de regroupement, he composed an operative framework drawn on established rural planning practices and theories to recall the basic standards of existing models of villages, farms, agriculture fi elds, and rural housing. He illustrated his comparative study with a wide range of maps, plans, and sketches of rural settlements in Europe, Israel, Russia, Algeria and elsewhere in Africa, and other parts of the world. Under the title Un village à insérer dans un contexte économique (A Village to Be Inserted in an Economic Context), Bugnicourt claimed a fourfold hierarchy of units, as follows.
1) Th e unité homogène (homogeneous unit) would be a zone characterized by similar geologic, climatic, agricultural, and social features.
2) Th e unité de vie collective (unit of collective life) would be a territorial ensemble comprising the circulations and exchanges between individuals that were to be coordinated by a bourg (a larger market village, or a market center); Bugnicourt recommended the ideal model of Israeli colonial planning in the region of Lachish in the occupied territory of Palestine (Fig. 4.53).
3) Th e village-centre (village center) would provide villages with public facilities such as town halls, schools, and shops, as well as social amenities that would serve collective life; Bugnicourt borrowed the term from French urbanist (alumni of the IUUP and one of the founders of the IUUA)512 Gaston Bardet (1907–1989), a progressive Catholic who investigated fascist town planning in his 1937 book Une nouvelle ère romaine sous le signe du Faisceau: La rome de Mussolini (A New Roman Era
511 CHSP. 1 DV 17 D 2. Cabinet Civil. Délégation Général du Gouvernement en Algérie. Note à l’attention de Monsieur Prévot Chargé de Mission au Cabinet du Délégué Général. Alger le 5 Mars 1959. 512 On the legacy between the IUUP and IUUA, see, for example, Jean-Pierre Frey, “Les valises du progrès urbanistique. Modèles, échanges et transferts de savoir entre la France et l’Algérie,” Les Cahiers d’EMAM. Études sur le Monde Arabe et la Méditerranée, no. 20 (July 1, 2010): 33–57.
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Fig. 4.53 (left) Master plan of Lachish, Israel. From Jacques Bugnicourt, Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages (Alger: Bringau, 1960), 73. Fig. 4.54 (right) Master plan of Arborea, Sardinia. From Jacques Bugnicourt, Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages (Alger: Bringau, 1960), 171.
under the Fascist Banner: Mussolini’s Rome).513 Bardet assumed, like Marcel Poëte (1866–1951), that towns are living organisms; he thus attacked the functionalist Athens Charter and Le Corbusier’s doctrines. Paradoxically (and ironically), in this section of his survey, Bugnicourt represented the plan of a village-centre d’après Le Corbusier (Village-Center According to Le Corbusier; Fig. 4.55).
4) Th e unité élémentaire (basic unit) would be a village comprising rural dwellings and agricultural and public buildings that could be organized in two ways: grouped or dispersed (Fig. 4.56).514
Based on French town planning theories—in particular Bardet’s treatises515—Bugnicourt’s survey endeavored to defi ne the number, distance, and size of “new villages” and to supply the resettled Algerian population with basic services and commodities, as had others before him (although they had done so more accurately), including the German geographer
513 Gaston Bardet, Une nouvelle Ere romaine sous le signe du Faisceau: la Rome de Mussolini (Paris: Ch. Massin, 1937); Jean-Louis Cohen, “Gaston Bardet et la ‘Rome de Mussolini,’” Zodiac, no. 17 (Mai 1997): 70–85. Frey, J.-P. 2001. « Gaston Bardet, théoricien de l’urbanisme ‘culturaliste’”, Urbanisme, no. 319, p. 32-36. 514 Bugnicourt, Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages, 63–126. 515 Gaston Bardet, Mission de l’urbanisme (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1949). In particular, Chapter VIII La nouvelle structure rurale, 395-448.
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Fig. 4.55 (left) Le Corbusier’s village-centre. From Jacques Bugnicourt, Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages (Alger: Bringau, 1960), 81.
Fig. 4.56 (right) Possible distribution of villages. From Jacques Bugnicourt, Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages (Alger: Bringau, 1960), 124.
Walter Christaller in his 1933 Central Places Th eory for Nazi Germany.516 Bugnicourt advocated that the optimum (and maximum) distance between planned villages was three kilometers; he argued that such a distance would minimize commuting times and would maximize the time spent in the fi elds and with the family. He also claimed that this criterion was generally adopted not only by the CAPER in Algeria, but also by a number of rural specialists in European countries, such as the Agrarian Reform in Spain and the Law Caziot of 9 March 1941 during the Vichy regime in France517: a law that encouraged the regrouping of lands at the expense of small family farms. Bugnicourt suggested that the signifi cance of a village theoretically depended on the number of cultivated units that could be constituted within that three-kilometer demarcation (Fig. 4.57, 4.58); the “basic
516 Walter Christaller, Central Places in Southern Germany (Englewood Cliff s, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966). 517 Bugnicourt, Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages, 132–133.
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Figs. 4.57–4.58 Maximum distance between arrable lands according to Bugnicourt. From Jacques Bugnicourt, Les nouveaux centres ruraux en Algérie: problèmes d’aménagement des terroirs et des villages (Alger: Bringau, 1960), 134–135; 137.
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unit,” however, should ideally include roughly sixty families and should never be allowed to dip below thirty or to exceed one hundred fi fty families. Bugnicourt again quoted Bardet’s 1949 La nouvelle structure rurale (Th e New Rural Structure) and listed a few existing exemplary villages that had been built in Israel, as well as several rural models created by the Spanish Offi ce National de Colonization (National Bureau of Colonization).518 He then argued that master plans of the functional, aesthetic, economic, and social aspects of new rural settlements should be designed by professionals, who were seemingly appropriately employed at the CAPER and the Commission de Réforme Agraire et d’Aménagement Rural (CDRA, or Committee of Agrarian Reform and Rural Planning); the respective missions of these bodies were extended to the centres de regroupement in June 1959. He divided preconceived plans into two main classic types: 1) radial organizations, or the spider’s web plan; and 2) the rectangular, gridiron, or checkerboard type. He assessed that the latter system regrettably lacked imagination when it was employed, which resulted in “imprisoning men between straight lines, without taking into account their aspirations, their tastes, their professions, or even the relief or the landscape.”519 In relation to rural housing, Bugnicourt argued that courtyards were quintessential spaces in rural Algeria, and that their omission, as often occurred, would entail a profound ignorance of traditional domestic life in the Mediterranean region. He also favored a low- cost habitat évolutif susceptible to extension, adjustment, and modernization for various domestic, economic, social, and psychological reasons. He then quoted a paragraph on the necessary basic amenities of colonial housing, or housing built by the colonial administration in the colonies for local populations,520 from the 1956 publication Tropical Architecture in the Humid Zone, by Maxwell Fry (1899–1987) and Jane Drew (1911–1996), English modernist architects and town planners who worked in the British colonies of West Africa. According to Bugnicourt, however, the habitable surface area of a rural dwelling for a family of fi ve was to be situated between thirty and thirty-fi ve square meters, and the minimum surface area of the rooms was to be eight square meters; that
518 Ibid., 140–142. 519 Ibid., 209. [“Emprisonner les hommes entre des lignes droites, sans tenir compte de leurs aspirations, de leurs goûts, de leur métier, ni même du relief ou du paysage.”] 520 Ibid., 284.
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was much lower than the dimensions enforced in France; as he argued, this was due to the less exacting criteria in Algeria.521 Th is may be called colonialism. In 1961, a year after Bugnicourt’s book, Xavier de Planhol (b. 1926), French professor of geography at the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Nancy in France who was in Algeria to do his national service, published Nouveaux Villages Algérois: Atlas Blidéen, Chenoua, Mitidja Occientale (New Villages in the Algiers Region), in which he documented the camps de regroupement (which he called nouveaux villages) that had been created by the French army in the Region of Algiers. As de Planhol mentioned in the foreword, the book was assisted and facilitated by “the indefatigable complacency that the military authorities of every rank have shown to me and the support they have brought to my inquiries.”522 According to the author of Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, de Planhol’s book “praised the achievements of the French development, which he claimed had enormously raised the overall quality of life for the rural Algerian population”523—particularly when compared with the outrageous conditions of the displaced populations who were forced to live in the temporary camps de regroupement, which the media had denounced in 1959. Similarly, General Maurice Faivre (b. 1926), who served as French military captain for fi ve years in Algeria during the war and who defended France’s interests there, praised both de Planhol’s study and Bugnicourt’s survey. Faivre incorporated a recapitulation of the contents of both books in a chapter entitled “Le progrès social en vue” (“Social Development in Perspective”) in his 2009 book Les 1’000 villages de Delouvrier: Protection des populations musulmanes contre le FLN (Delouvrier’s 1,000 Villages: Th e Protection of the Muslim Population against the FLN).524 Th e fi rst four chapters of de Planhol’s Nouveaux Villages Algérois are dedicated to the regroupement of the Algerian population in the diff erent geographic areas of the greater Algiers region; these are followed by two sections entitled “Des bidonvilles aux cités de recasement” (“From the Bidonvilles to
521 Ibid., 286. 522 de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois: Atlas Blidéen, Chenoua, Mitidja Occientale Avant-Propos. [“l’inlassable complaisance que les autorités militaires de tout rang de la région ont montrée à mon égard et l’assistance qu’elles ont apportés à mes enquêtes.”] 523 Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence. Th e Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 169. 524 Faivre, Les 1000 villages de Delouvrier. Protection des populations musulmanes contre le FLN, 161–173.
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Resettlement Estates”) and “Problèmes d’habitat et d’organisation” (Problems of Housing and Organization). De Planhol purposely included the politico-military project of the resorption of the bidonvilles into the operations of “nouveaux villages,” arguing that
… it constitutes the fi nal stage of the reorganization of peuplement [peopling, populating, or colonization, depending on the translation and interpretation], consisting less this time in displacement than in “urbanization” of these primary habitats, allowing both the social promotion of its inhabitants and the establishment of satisfactory safety, in geometrically laid-out and well-ventilated streets that have succeeded the maze of gourbis separated by inaccessible courtyards.525
Although it is diffi cult to grasp the meaning of “urbanization” in the aerial photographs that de Planhol included in his chapter on rural housing (Figs. 4.59–4.62), it is possible to recognize the purpose of the geometric arrangement of the camps and to observe the presence of control devices in certain camps, such as the walls that surrounded the shelters (Fig. 4.59) and the watchtowers (Fig. 4.63). In order to justify the compact gridiron layouts and similar repetitive appearances of the vast majority of the “new villages,” de Planhol pointed out that safety was crucial, arguing that in order to guarantee security they must “minimize the perimeter of defense;”526 the rural settlements that were built thus were essentially expected to act as fortresses, and to isolate the Algerian population from Algerian revolutionaries. Th e low-cost standardized houses predominantly designed by the CRHR were formulated to address issues of quantity, time, and costs of construction, rather than quality. Th e CRHR’s quest for statistics disregarded various socio-cultural practices, construction materials, and geographic and climatic conditions present on the ground of any regroupement, which resulted in undermining essential social structures and the community equilibrium of the rural Algerian population. According to de Planhol, “the house-type ‘rural habitation,’ now reproduced in thousands of copies, makes no
525 de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois: Atlas Blidéen, Chenoua, Mitidja Occientale, 80. [“Constitue la phase ultime de la réorganisation du peuplement, consistant moins cette fois en déplacement qu’en ‘urbanisation’ de ces habitats primaires, permettant à la fois la promotion sociale de leurs habitants et l’établissement d’une sécurité satisfaisante, dans des rues géométriques et aérées succédant au dédale des gourbis séparés par des cours intérieurs inaccessibles.] 526 Ibid., 89. Th e second relevant factor consisted in the cost of lands.
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Fig. 4.59 (top left) From Xavier de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1961), Pl. 12. A. Fig. 4.60 (top right) From Xavier de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1961), Pl. 2. A. Fig. 4.61 (bottom left) From Xavier de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1961), Pl. 12. B. Fig. 4.62 (bottom right) From Xavier de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1961), Pl. 2. B. concession to the needs of the exploitation of the soil. It is exclusively a question of shelter.”527 He described the low-rise shelters, or “rural habitat,” that had been built as being predominately composed of two tiny rooms. Whereas the depth was always equal to three meters, the width of the rooms varied according to two designed versions: the fi rst was two rooms of 2.95 meters (8.85 square meters per room) or one room of 3.5 meters (10.5 square meters), and the second was of 2.3 meters (6.9 square meters). To this end, the overall indoor living surface area was always either 17.7 or 17.4 square meters, as if
527 Ibid., 100. [“La maison type “habitat rural”, maintenant reproduite à des milliers d’exemplaires, ne fait aucune concession aux nécessités de l’exploitation du sol. Il s’agit exclusivement d’un abri.”]
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Fig. 4.63 From Xavier de Planhol, Nouveaux Villages Algérois (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1961), Pl. 13. this insignifi cant variation made a qualitative diff erence for its inhabitants. Th e area of the smallest room did not coincide with Bugnicourt’s planning guidelines, which predicated a minimum surface area of eight square meters (which already was too small). Th e kitchen was of two by 1.2 meters, and the surface of the restroom was not even mentioned. An outdoor space called the courette (tiny courtyard) was commonly included. In the best cases, the courette was of fi ve by six meters, and the kitchen and sanitary facilities had direct access to it (Figs. 4.64–4.69). Th e IGRP eventually criticized (in May 1960) these types of “rural housing” designed by the civil servants of the CRHR. In a letter to the prefects of the northern French colonial departments of Algeria entitled “Construction des habitations dans les nouveaux villages” (“Construction of Housing in the New Villages”), the IGRP warned that “if this type of housing seems to provide satisfaction in certain municipalities and has the approval of a few sub-prefects, it is nevertheless the subject of intense criticism
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Housing Types designed by the CRHR for the Algerian population in the aftermath of Orléanville’s earthquake of 1954, and used for the forced resettlement program.
Fig. 4.64–4.65 (top) Type no. 1. FR ANOM 933/155.
Fig. 4.66–4.67 (center) Type no. 2. FR ANOM 933/155.
Fig. 4.68–4.69 (bottom) Type no. 3. FR ANOM 933/155.
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from users and local administrative authorities.”528 Although the IGRP acknowledged the eff ectiveness of the design of the CRHR, which succeeded in minimizing the costs of construction that the French general government in Algeria had imposed, it did report that “the overly standardized type of these constructions is not always adapted to the local climate or to the taste and desires of the inhabitants of the new communities.”529 Th e new inhabitants condemned not only the use of inadequate construction materials (such as the twenty-centimeter cinder-blocks) as the predominant construction materials for the walls of new houses—since they undermined the impeccable isothermal characteristics of their formers houses—but also the virtually microscopic sizes and dimensions of the indoor and outdoor spaces, because they signifi cantly reduced their previous generous living spaces and authentic courtyards. Th e dissatisfaction was so serious that “certain regrouped [people] had categorically refused to move into the houses (built by the Commissariat à la Reconstruction et à l’Habitat Rural) that were allocated to them.”530 Th e IGRP’s circular engendered internal polemics; the head of the CRHR rejected the critiques and denied any responsibility on the part of his employees and services.531 But the problem of rural housing, or permanent camps, that was destined for the forced-resettled Algerian populations was ultimately not resolved.
528 CHSP. 1 DV 17 D4-D5. Inspection générale des regroupements, Cabinet du Délégué Général, Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie. Construction des habitations dans les nouveaux villages. Alger, le 30 main 1960, p. 1. [“Si ce type de construction semble donner satisfaction dans quelques communes et recevoir l’approbation de quelques sous-préfets, il ne manque pas en revanche d’être le plus souvent l’objet de vives critiques de la part des utilisateurs et des autorités administratives locales.”] 529 Ibid., p. 2. [“Le type trop ‘standard’ de ces constructions ne s’adapte pas toujours aux conditions climatiques locales et au goût et aux désirs des habitants des nouvelles collectivités.”] 530 Ibid., p. 3. [“Certains regroupés auraient nettement refusé de s’installer dans les habitations (construites par le Commissariat à la Reconstruction et à l’Habitat Rural) qui leur étaient attribuées.”] 531 On the polemics see, CHSP. 1 DV 17 D4-D5.
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4.3 Mass Housing: More with Less
Th e study of the distribution of the 220,000 urban housing units for one million people to be built over the course of fi ve years promised by General de Gaulle in October 1958 had mobilized a number of French civil servants and technocrats. By the autumn of 1961, the survey L’habitat algérien au terme de la troisième année du Plan de Constantine: Les perspectives pour 1962 (Algerian Housing in the Autumn of the Th ird Year of the Plan de Constantine: Perspective for 1962) reported that 22,153 housing units had been built in 1959 in urban areas; 27,502 dwellings in 1960; and an additional 19,526 housing were built during the fi rst three quarters of 1961. 532 In three years, only 69,181 standardized apartments, divided into the four categories of superior/normal, Logeco, Million, and semi-urban (Chapter 3), had been built in urban areas—that is, less than the half of the promised number (Figs. 4.70, 4.73). As in France immediately following the end of the Second World War, not much progress had been made in the eff ective production of urban housing in Algeria since the launching of the Plan de Constantine, but the norms, prototypes, surveys, and completed projects have marked the architectural, socio- economic, and political landscapes of Algeria and its inhabitants ever since—even after the independence of Algeria, when several housing projects were left uncompleted. Under the supervision of the Conseil Supérieur de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Construction (High Council of Territorial Planning and Construction), seventeen specialized committees acting at diff erent levels were charged with defi ning the necessary programs and elaborating regional plans for the economic development of urban regions in Algeria, including the designation of residential areas and the distribution of the categories of mass housing. Th ese comprised fi ve diff erent Commissions Centrales de l’Aménagement du Territoire (CCAT, or Central Committees for Regional Planning), which were regrouped under the Commission Générale d’Aménagement du Territoire (CGAT, or the General Committee for Regional Planning) as well as twelve commissions départementales, or commissions régionales (departmental or regional committees), representing the twelve
532 ANFPSS. F/60/4021. L’habitat Algérien au terme de la troisième année du Plan de Constantine, Les perspectives pour 1962, p. 9.
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Figs. 4.70–4.73 Figures published in L’habitat algérien au terme de la troisième année du Plan de Constantine: Les perspectives pour 1962 (Algerian Housing in the Autumn of the Th ird Year of the Plan de Constantine: Perspective for 1962). ANFPSS. F/60/4021. departments of Algeria.533 Th e central committees were responsible for the overall examination of economic questions, technical particularities, and large-scale projects at a national level, such as the study of dams; the planning of major cities and industrial areas; and the analysis of infrastructure, roads, commercial harbors, and routes for national- gas supply systems. Th e departmental committees, in contrast, were requested to analyze any possible aspect that could directly aff ect the living conditions of rural areas and small towns.534 All committees, however, were expected to work together according to
533 ANFPSS. F/60/4020. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Direction du Plan et des Etudes Economique. Note de directives pour la préparation des plans régionaux. 24 Février 1959. 534 Ibid., p. 4.
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the following clause: “Th e bulk of the plan [Plan de Constantine] is the actions of all kinds that will bring livelihoods to the people and will enable them to more eff ectively utilize their working capacity;”535 it continued, “the development plan is, at all levels, the orchestration of the life of the country.”536 Th e CGAT was composed of sixteen representatives of French administrations from Algeria and France; this included the French general government in Algeria; the Permanent Secretary of National Defense; the Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS, or the Common Organization of the Saharan Regions); the Ministry of Construction and Urbanism; the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation; the General Regional Secretaries of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine; nine “experts,” including civil engineers; twenty-nine representatives of diff erent economic branches in Algeria; and nine representatives of trade-union organizations. Th e CGAT was presided over by a French general inspector at the Ministry of Construction and Urbanism, Mr. Bonnome. In order to establish an inventory of existing and planned housing units and public buildings, as well as of “a rational equipment program that will enable the harmonious development of the agglomeration in the coming years,”537 the working teams of the CGAT were urged to collaborate with the French town planners who had been appointed for various cities in Algeria. Th e planners included the Head of CIAM-Algiers group Pierre-André Emery, who was designated for the cities of Mostaganem and Tizi-Ouzou; the notorious French urbanist Jean Royer (1903–1981) for Bougie; and the French urbanist alumni of the UUIP and co-founder of the IUUA Tony Socard (1901–1996) for Bône (Fig. 4.74.)538 Th e CGAT entrusted four specialized French bureau d’études (consultancy offi ces) with undertaking the quantitative surveys for the twelve departments of Algeria, appointing the Société d’Economie et de Mathématique Appliquées (SEMA, or the Company of Applied Economics and Mathematics) for Bône, Constantine, and Philippeville (today Skikda); the Bureau d’étude et réalisation urbaine (BERU, or the Offi ce of Urban Investigation
535 Ibid., p. 2. [”L’essentiel du plan ce sont les actions de toutes natures qui donneront des moyens de vie à la population et lui permettront d’employer plus effi cacement sa capacité de travail.”] 536 Ibid., [”Le plan de développement c’est, à tous les échelons, l’orchestration de la vie du pays.”] 537 Ibid., [”Etablir un programme rationnel d’équipement permettant, dans les années à venir, le développement harmonieux de l’agglomération.”] 538 Tony Soccard was active in Algiers since the 1930s where he worked for the Régie foncière of Algiers. Together with Jean Alazard, Gaston Bardet, François Bienvenu, and Jean de Maisonseul, he founded the IUUA in 1942.
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and Realization) together with the Compagnie Française d’Organisation (COFROR, or the French Organization Company) for the cities of Oran, Arzew, and Mostaganem; the Société Central pour l’Equipement du Territoire (SCET, or the Central Society for Territorial Equipment) for the Agglomeration of Algiers; and the Bureau Central d’Etudes pour les Equipements d’Outre-Mer (BCEOM, or the Central Offi ce of Studies for Overseas Equipment) for Orléanville, Médéa, Tizi-Ouzou, Sétif, and Batna. Most of these technocratic agencies were based in Paris and knew little about the peculiarities of Algeria’s Fig. 4.74 List of renowned urbanists appointed for major cities in peoples, climates, construction the northern departments of Algeria. ANFPSS F60/4020. materials, and resources.539 In a letter of 7 July 1959, André Laure, a chief civil engineer (ponts et chaussées), attaché at and member of the Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP, or the General Commissariat of the Plan) wrote to Jacques Saigot, director of Public Works and Transportation for the general French government in Algeria, that “the Subcommittee of Urban Planning, reduced to its sole Paris members, met in Paris on 24 June in order to hear the presentation by the appointed offi ces on the progress of their work.”540 He pointed out that the studies would be slowed down at the public French institutions due to the upcoming summer holidays, but that, contrary to some peoples’ expectations, the collaboration between the French bureaus and the appointed town planners in Algeria (who had not attended the meeting
539 Th e design and construction of the grand ensembles in France was also led by similar bureaux d’études. 540 ANFPSS. F/60/4020. Letter from A. Laure to Monsieur Saigot, Directeur des Travaux Publics et des Transports, Alger. 7 juillet 1959.
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in Paris) seemed to be acceptable.541 French architects and town planners who practiced in Algeria were requested to work with the French members of the subcommittees based in France, but were not directly members of these commissions—that is, they were neither invited nor authorized to participate in the decision-making and policy-making processes. Instead, they were requested to enforce the verdicts and protocols drafted by their French counterparts based in France, and not in Algeria. Only French civil servants who worked for the French general delegation in Algiers and elected politicians who governed the three IGAMIEs of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine were allowed to voice their preferences. In a meeting of the members of the CGAT attended by forty-fi ve technocrats— including the representatives of the COFROR, the SCET, the SMA, and the BCEOM— the question of housing typologies and their distributions was evoked but not resolved due to the ongoing surveys that were being conducted at the time. Bonnome stressed that “it is primarily a matter of managing an infl ux of people who would be confronted with half or lower salaries once they arrive, and thus it is about answering an important demand that is generally not solvable.”542 Based on statistical studies and examples in other Mediterranean countries, notably Italy, he recommended building as soon as possible not more than eighty thousand housing units per year in urban areas, and to accelerate their realization by introducing “initiatives from France, where the building industry is in a semi-recession due to the considerable increase in productivity.”543 Not only had the dictated fi gure never been reached—and therefore de Gaulle’s promise was not attained—but also a number of building techniques and construction companies from France had rapidly extended their markets to Algeria. In its fi rst extensive report of activities of February 1960, the CGAT stressed that it was not practicable to establish a precise census of housing needs or to indicate a distribution of the diff erent housing typologies that would correspond to the habits and fi nancial resources of the Algerian population. Th e report noted that “no studies are currently accurate enough (similarly to those that have been made in France) that
541 Ibid. 542 ANFPSS. F/60/4020. Réunion de la Commission Générale d’Aménagement du Territoire du 13 janvier 1960, 2ème séance, p. 7. [“Il s’agit surtout de faire face à une arrivée massive de gens qui ne trouveront sur place que des demi- salaires ou des salaires inférieurs et donc de répondre à une demande importante mais généralement non solvable.”] 543 Ibid., [“Il faudrait susciter des initiatives en provenance de France où les industries du bâtiment est en semi- recession du fait de l’augmentation considérable de la productivité.”]
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would allow for making such an assessment.”544 Th e report continued by saying that the information that the French urban consultancy companies provided on the major cities was still unclear, and that the fi rst hypothetical results would be delivered by the end of the fi rst quarter of 1960. Th us, the distribution of the typologies of the 69,181 housing units that were built during the fi rst three years of the Plan de Constantine were not based on eff ective surveys or defi ned demands: they were most likely based on the cost of construction and diff erent fi nancing modes. In a press conference on 16 February 1960, Saigot had no intention of referring to the absent accurate data for determining the type and distribution of housing across Algeria; he declared instead that “according to Delouvrier’s statement, housing is one of the cornerstones of the plan, because the building industry allows for distributing wages that will be spent for the benefi t of various consumer industries.”545 In an attempt to create jobs and consumers, as well as tenants and landlords, the Caisse algérienne d’aménagement du territoire (CADAT, or Algerian Fund for Regional Planning) was charged with purchasing hectares of lands in order to promote the construction of vast residential and industrial areas. Th e CADAT was created in 1956 and was dissolved in 1980, well after Algerian independence. Th e fund was eligible to autonomously—or at the request of the general governor, regional or municipal public administrations, or public housing organizations—acquire, plan (aménager), promote, and sell housing estates (Figs. 4.75, 4.78). A report of 29 April 1960 to Minister of Construction Pierre Sudreau titled “Le développement de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Construction en Algérie en cours de la période d’application du Plan de Constantine” (“Th e Progress of Regional Planning and Construction in Algeria over the Course of the Period of the Application of the Constantine Plan”) stated that “the current situation of Algeria may, in many respects, be compared to that of France ten years ago, at the beginning of the
544 ANFPSS. F/60/4020. Plan Quinquennal de développement économique et social d’Algérie. Commission Générale d’Aménagement du Territoire. Premier rapport, Février 1960, p. 5. [“Aucune étude suffi samment serrés, analogue à celles qui ont été faites en Métropole, n’existe actuellement pour procéder à une telle évaluation.”] 545 Algérie d’Aujourd’hui. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie. Service de l’Information. Conférence de presse de Monsieur Saigot, Directeur des Travaux Publics, p. 5. [“Selon l’expression même de M. Delouvrier, l’habitat est une des pierres angulaires du plan car le bâtiment permet de distribuer des salaires qui seront dépensés au profi t des industries de consommation.”]
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Fig. 4.75 (top right), Fig. 4.76 (bottom left), Fig. 4.77 (top left), Fig. 4.78 (bottom right) Description of the CADAT and its regional planning projects in Algeria published in Bulletin de la Caisse d’équipement pour le développement de l’Algérie no. 3 (February 1961), 17; 21; 24; 19. ANFPSS 19770830/1.
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second Plan of Modernization and Equipment.”546 One might conclude that this lateness is another trace of colonialism. Th e same report also argued that the CADAT played an essential role in obtaining lands at reasonable fees, which facilitated “a rational urban development, with all its extent to be planned.”547 It reported that the CADAT had acquired (or was about to acquire), as part of the projected twenty-seven operations, roughly one-third of the 4,500 hectares that the Plan de Constantine deemed necessary for the construction of new residential zones in nineteen major cities in Algeria. Notable among these large-scale mass-housing projects were La Royale, covering seven hundred hectares in the coastal city of Bône, which was carried out together with the Société d’Equipement de la Région de Bône (SERB, or Equipment Company for the Region of Bône); and the residential neighborhood called Les Annassers in Algiers over an area of roughly 350 hectares, which was entirely conducted by the Société d’Equipement de la Région d’Alger (SERA, or the Equipment Company for the Region of Algiers).548 La Royale was also called Hippone La Royale after Hippo Regius, a major city of the Roman Empire in Algeria that was destroyed by the Arabs and renamed Annaba (the city of jujubes). Th e new town of La Royale, composed of thirty thousand newly designed housing units, was a large southern extension of the city of Annaba, which had 150,000 inhabitants in 1959. Th e new town was designed by the French architects Daniel Badani (1914–2006) and Pierre Roux-Dorlut (1919–1995) (Figs. 4.79–4.81). Th e two architects met during the Second World War at the Atelier of the Ecole nationale supérieure des Beaux-Arts that Augène Beaudouin (1898–1983) had reconstituted in Marseille; together they established an architecture offi ce in Montpellier in 1946. Badani obtained the title of Architecte en chef des bâtiments civils et palais nationaux (Chief Architect of Civil Buildings and National Palaces) and was appointed architect at the Ministry of Overseas Territories. Between 1946 and the commission of La Royale in 1959, Badani and
546 ANFPSS. 19820108/22. Rapport au Ministre concernant le développement de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Construction en Algérie en cours de la période d’application de Plan de Constantine établi par Monsieur Hugues de Fraysseix, Inspecteur Général de la Construction. Paris, le 29 Avril 1960, p. 1. [“La situation actuelle de l’Algérie peut, à divers égards, être comparée à ce qu’était celle de la Métropole, il y a une dizaine d’années, au début de 2ème Plan de Modernisation et d’équipement.”] 547 Ibid., p. 4. [“Pour permettre un développement urbain rationnel avec toute l’ampleur à prévoir.”] 548 Ibid., p. 5.
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Fig. 4.79 (top left), Fig. 4.80 (right), Fig. 4.81 (bottom left) La Royale in Annaba with 30,000 housing units designed by Daniel Badani and Pierre Roux-Dorlut. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 58; 60; 58.
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Roux-Dorlut realized housing projects and public buildings in France and in the French colonies of the Ivory Coast, Niger, and Senegal.549 In 1959, parallel to the commission of La Royale, they were off ered the job of designing a university complex for the Algerian city of Constantine. Although in 1959 they had developed (with the collaboration of Jean Prouvé [1991–1984]) modular optimal lighting elements called “pyradomes” for the ceilings of the faculty in Constantine, the La Royale project was too similar to a typical postwar French grand ensembles built in France. Les Annassers included twenty-one thousand housing units over an area of 356 hectares. Th e feasibility studies were started by the Agence du Plan d’Alger in 1956, when the Mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier, had initiated an ambitious building campaign to address Algiers’ ongoing housing shortage (Figs. 4.84, 4.85).550 Whereas 5,500 dwellings of the neighborhoods numbered 1, 2, and 3 were designed by the Agence d’Urbanisme d’Alger, the remaining 15,500 units were coordinated by the French architect Jean Le Couteur (1916–2010; Figs. 4.86, 4.87). Le Couteur graduated from the Atelier Auguste Perret at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts and became associated with the French architect Paul Harbé (1903–1963). Together they worked for Bernard Zehrfuss (1911–1996) in Tunisia when Zehrfuss was the director of the architecture and public works services between 1943 and 1948,551 and later in Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal. In 1951, they became chief architects at the Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism. Prior to the project of Les Annassers, Le Couteur and Herbé designed and built the renowned Cathedral of Sacré-Cœur, with its hyperbolic roof, in Algiers between 1955 and 1961, in the midst of the bloody war to decolonize Algeria (Figs. 4.88, 4.89). Both large-scale housing estates were published in the French journal Urbanisme of 1961 in special issue no. 73, which was entirely dedicated to Algeria and the French aménagement du territoire, urbanism, construction, and housing projects that derived from the studies and realizations of de Gaulle’s Plan de Constantine over the course of the Algerian War of Independence. Th e special issue included four categories of investigations and interventions: (1) regional urban studies and perspectives, using the examples of the
549 On the biography of Badani and Roux-Dorlut, see for instance, Hubert Lampereur, Badani & Roux-Dorlut. Des orfèvres de la grande échelle in AMC, 224 (Mai 2013). 550 On the fi rst project of Les Annassers, see Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 151–166. 551 Zehrfuss designed and built a number of mass housing projets in Algiers until 1953.
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Fig. 4.84 (top left) Master plan for Les Annassers designed by the Agence du Plan d’Alger in 1958. From Jean-Jacques Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique (Liège, Alger: Pierre Mardaga Editeur, Offi ce des publications universitaires, 1988), 155.
Fig. 4.85 (top right) Model of the fi rst phase of Les Annassers designed by the Agence du Plan d’Alger. From Jean-Jacques Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique (Liège, Alger: Pierre Mardaga Editeur, Offi ce des publications universitaires, 1988), 155.
Fig. 4.86 (center) Distribution of the functions and activities in the master plan designed by Jean Le Couteur. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 55.
Fig. 4.87 (bottom ) Master of Les Annassers designed by Jean Le Couteur as part of the Plan de Constantine. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 54.
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cities of Algiers, Oran, and Arzew; (2) schematic urbanism plans of twenty cities, including Constantine and Bône; (3) large-scale programs that displayed Les Annassers and La Royale, as well as El-Bir, a mass-housing project built for fi ve thousand inhabitants on the outskirts of Constantine; and (4) rural areas, in which new villages and cités de regroupement were touted in order to demonstrate the impact of rural reforms and the politics of improvement of rural housing of the Plan de Constantine. Perhaps not surprisingly, the military-controlled camps de regroupement were not mentioned (Figs. 4.90–4.95). Th e message that the seemingly independent professional journal, directed by Jean Royer, transmitted seemed to coincide with the targeted message of the propagandistic brochures about the Plan de Constantine’s housing that were distributed by the Service of Information of the general delegation of the French government in Algeria and the French government in France. Both messages conveyed the spirit of the colonial civilizing mission. Besides generating jobs and consumers in Algeria, Fig. 4.88 (top), Fig. 4.89 (bottom) the Plan de Constantine’s production of urban mass housing, Th e Cathedral of Sacré-Cœur in often called l’habitat du secteur moderne (modern housing), the center of Algiers designed by Jean Le Couteur and Paul Herbé was expected to accelerate the pace of construction and between 1955 and 1961. From Techniques & Architecture, no. 329 to reduce the costs of construction—that is, to yield the (March 1980), 74. rapid industrialization of construction that was inspired by questionable French postwar building experiences in France. In the memorandum of the preparation for an offi cial visit by the Minister of Construction to Algeria, the French general delegation reported that a large number of French construction companies had expressed their interest in coming to work in Algeria, which had caused much concern to the six thousand building companies that were already working in Algeria; therefore, the Algeria-based companies’ “professional organizations
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Fig. 4.90 (a) Master plan for the regroupement of e Bordj Méhiris. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 71.
Fig. 4.91 (b) Master plan for the regroupement of Sidi Salem in Constantine. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 71.
Fig. 4.92 (c) Th e camps de regroupements became incorporated into the rural reform of the Plan de Constantine. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 64.
Fig. 4.93 (d), Fig. 4.94 (e) New rural settlements in Randon, municipality of Bône. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 69.
Fig. 4.95 (f) Bulletin de la Caisse d’équipement pour le développement de l’Algérie no. 11 (December 1961). ANFPSS 19770830/1. f
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552 would like to channel this [infl ux].” Th e memorandum argued, though, that the lack of a skilled labor force and the scarcity of construction materials might slow construction processes; it also stressed that the 297 architects who were offi cially registered with the Order of Architects in Algeria were insuffi cient, especially in the regions of Constantine, Oran, and Bône. Th e memorandum specifi ed that due to previously unpleasant experiences, “the intervention of architects who operate from France had led to often controversial results, except when there was a close association between them [the architects] and an offi ce based in Algeria.”553 Th e document also listed the types of housing that were recommended in Algeria—the semi-luxurious, the normal, the Logecos (or the HLM Abis), the Million (or the HLM AA), and the semi-urban—and argued that the technical characteristics of these categories were similar to those built in postwar France, except for the semi- urban (Chapter 3) and the Million, which encompassed particular prescriptions that were comparable to the Operation Million in France. Th e technical recommendations for the habitat Million in Algeria were devised by the French Centre algérien d’expansion économique et social (CAEES, or the Algerian Center of Economic and Social Expansion) and issued on 9 December 1958, when General Raoul Salan was in charge of both military and civil powers and a few days before the appointment of Paul Delouvrier as Delegate General of the French Government in Algeria (Figs. 4.96–4.99). As in the commission of the semi-urban housing, Lathuillière and Emery represented the Order of Architects in Algeria. Th e introduction to the brochure for the habitat Million announced: “To reduce costs, the working group will search for norms to reduce surfaces and heights. Obviously this will acutely raise the problem of family cohabitation. But this coexistence could be solved by multiplying the number of rooms, rather than by increasing their dimensions.”554 Th e team proposed three types of housing units: a two-room fl at of thirty-one to thirty-four square meters; a three-room apartment
552 ANFPSS. 19770830/1. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie. Voyage d’étude de Monsieur le Ministre de la Construction. Note d’Information Générale, p. 8. [“Leurs organisations professionnelles aimeraient pouvoir les canaliser.”] 553 Ibid., p, 6. [“L’intervention d’architectes opérant depuis la Métropole n’a conduit, par contre, qu’à des résultats souvent discutés, sauf lorsqu’il existe une association étroite entre eux et un cabinet installé en Algérie.”] 554 CHSP. 1 DV 34. Logement Million Algérie. Première Partie : L’Objet des recherches. [“Pour diminuer le prix du revient, le groupe de travail sera conduit à rechercher des normes de surface et de hauteur réduites. Ceci pose évidemment avec acuité le problème de la cohabitation familiale. Mais ce problème de coexistence pourrait être résolu par la multiplication du nombre de pièces plutôt que par l’augmentation de leurs dimensions.”]
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Fig. 4.96 (top left), Fig. 4.97 (top right), Fig. 4.98 (bottom left), Fig. 4.99 (bottom right) Brochure of the Logment Million. CHSP 1 DV 34. of thirty-nine to forty-three square meters; and a four-room dwelling of forty-seven to fi fty-three square meters. Th e minimum height of 2.5 meters was thought to accord with existing prefabricated construction elements that measured 2.75 meters high; this height was also allowed in order to build a six-story building without having to insert an elevator. Th e width of such buildings was set to a maximum of nine meters. Th e working team argued that “what matters is that, in terms of hygiene and sanitation equipment, the built dwellings have all of the elements deemed necessary by the conditions of modern
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life. Th e units will be small in size, but healthy.”555 Th is “hygienist” principle resulted not only in miniscule housing units for large families with virtually microscopic kitchens and bathrooms, but also in long, repetitive, prefabricated housing slabs lacking in technical and architectural qualities. To this end, a number of French architecture agencies became factories for the frenetic production of habitat Million and other low-cost mass-housing projects in Algeria. One of these bureaus was the offi ce of the French architects Alexis Daure and Henri Béri. After he graduated from the Ecole nationale supérieure des Beaux-Arts in Paris, Daure went to Algiers to work for Fernand Pouillon on the renowned mass-housing projects. According to Jean Jacques Deluz—who worked for Daure and Béri in Algiers in 1956 and then for the Agence du Plan d’Alger, headed by Pierre Dalloz and directed by Gérald Hanning (1919–1980), former collaborator of Le Corbusier, Marcel Lods and Wladimir Bodiansky—Daure was “certainly the one who translated with the most character the intentions of Hanning’s landscapes.”556 (Hanning was a collaborator of Le Corbusier who conducted studies on Le Modulor and the Unité d’habitation, as well as the cellule before the unité.557) Pouillon argued that Hanning was “the most brilliant and sensitive organizer of ordered landscapes.”558 Th e idea of systematic, if not paranoiac, order indeed prevailed in the architecture and urbanism of Daure and Béri in Algeria both before and after the Plan de Constantine. In 1955, during the tenure of Jacques Chevallier, and prior to the housing of the Plan de Constantine, Daure and Béri designed and realized thousands of housing units. Th ese included the vast estate of La Montagne in Hussein-Dey on the outskirts of Algiers, which was designed and built (together with the young Roland Simounet) for Algerian populations living in the bidonvilles and was promoted by the Compagnie Immobilière
555 Ibid., [“ce qui importe, c’est que, sur le plan de l’hygiène et de l’équipement sanitaire, les logements construits disposent de tous les éléments jugés indispensables par les conditions de vie moderne. Les logements seront de dimensions réduites, mais sain.”] 556 Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 80. [“C’est certainement lui qui a traduit avec le plus de caractère les intentions paysagistes de Hanning, et une sorte d’»expressionisme» qui surprend dans l’architecture d’Alger de cette époque.”] 557 In his doctoral dissertation Alex Gerber stated that Hanning working at Le Corbusier offi ce from 1938 and 1946, whereas la fondation Le Corbusier who released Le Corbusier : choix de lettres argued that Hanning collaborated between 1939 and 1944. Hanning directed the Agence du Plan d’Alger from 1954 and 1958. 558 Cited in Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 64. [“Le plus sensible organisateur de paysages ordonnés.”]
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Algérienne (CIA, or the Algerian Real Estate Company, Chapter 4). Another of Daure and Béri’s projects was the colossal housing operation of 1957 in the heights of Bab el Oued in Algiers, which was composed of the Carrières Jaubert citer earlier (Diar El Kef, steps II, III, and IV)—designed together with Simounet and the engineer Vladimir Bodiansky (1894–1966)—and the Frais Vallon (Taines A, E, and F), conceived and realized together with Courtot, Chauveau, and Magrou, the developer of which was the Régie Foncière d’Alger (Figs. 4.100–4.104).559 La Montagne was composed of two thousand logements économiques (low-cost housing), fi ve hundred logements évolutifs (evolving housing) in collective buildings, one thousand individual houses (Figs. 4.105–4.110), and collective facilities such as markets, shops, baths, and cafés maures (cafés for Algerian men, literally “Moorish cafes”). Th e typical courtyard unit for the one-fl oor individual houses was set out on 7.65 by 7.7 meter plots, which was approaching Michel Ecochard’s grid for the Carrières Centrales in Casablanca; the spatial organization of the horizontally grouped dwellings was dissimilar, however. Th e two-room (28.8 square meter) or three-room (38.7 square meter) units of La Montagne’s logements évolutifs comprised two loggias on the opposite sides of the building: one of 1.3 square meters and the other of 2.1 square meters. In contrast to these projects, the Carrières Jaubert’s housing units were conceived as temporary shelters (they are still standing today) destined for the Algerian inhabitants of the bidonvilles, called cité de recasement (resettlement housing) or cité de transit (transitory housing). Th eir units were not only smaller than any other housing estate, but were also deprived of private sanitary facilities. Th e living area dropped the minimum surface below that of prewar HBMs, and the absence of washing spaces and toilets replicated the desolation of the slums. Referring to Simounet’s Djenan El Hassan transitory housing, Deluz argued that “the pretty graphic spaces, the proportions and dimensions of the Modulor, are powerless to hide the misery and high density of occupation.”560 Deluz did praise the architects’ attempts in Diar El Kef to revive the stone challenges of Pouillon in Diar El Mahçoul, thus demonstrating
559 On the role of Simounet and a detailed description of these projects, see, Çelik, Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule, 157–173; Sheila Crane, “Mediterranean Dialogues: Le Corbusier, Fernand Pouillon, and Roland Simounet.,” Modern Architecture and the Mediterranean / Ed. by Jean-Franois Lejeune and Michelangelo Sabatino., 2010, 94–109. 560 Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 78. [“Les jolis espaces graphiques, les proportions et les dimensions du Modulor, sont impuissants à cacher la misère et la surdensité de l’occupation.”]
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the probable infl uence of Pouillon on Daure.561 Th e use of articulated spaces and stone disappeared with the housing units of the Plan de Constantine. After Chevallier’s tenure and with de Gaulle’s plan, the CIA commissioned Daure and Béri to take on a wide range of large-scale housing projects, including El Bir, Les Peupliers in Constantine, Diar El Afi a, Les Jasmins, and Les Palmiers in Algiers.562 Th e majority of the designed and completed housing complexes were composed of long, narrow slabs with similar prefabricated elements of either brise-soleil, loggias, or openings, which corresponded to the reduced size and cost requirements. Th e habitat Million diff ered from the other low-cost housing categories (normal and Logeco) in the heights of the constructions (which did not exceed six fl oors) and in the small living-space areas of the housing units. Th e spatial composition of most of Daure and Béri’s housing projects were rather similar to one another; analogous monotonous buildings rapidly mushroomed across the territory of Algeria. Deluz considered Daure and Béri’s mediocre industrialized architectural productions to be the fi nest examples of the quantitative rationality of the urban housing of the Plan de Constantine. Other architects—including Lathuillière in Les Asphodèles; Challand in Diar Eschems; Régeste and Bellissent in Les Dunes; Maury and Gomiz in Ben Omar and Nador; and Barthes in Les Annassers (to mention but a few built projects in Algiers only; Figs. 4.111–4.122)—had accepted the compromises of the French civil engineers (ponts et chaussées) and subscribed to the colonial and neocolonial premises of the socio-economic development plan. Whereas in France Sudreau had launched several initiatives, studies, and surveys to improve the everyday lives of the discontented inhabitants of the grand ensembles, in Algeria, lower-quality grand ensembles with smaller housing units for larger families had rapidly proliferated between 1959 and 1961, when the construction works of a new administrative city for the French government in Algeria had begun (Chapter 5). Th e construction of these housing units was conducted despite General de Gaulle’s speech pronounced at the Palais de l’Ellysée on 16 September 1959—the fi fth year of the war and the same day of the fourteenth session of the United Nations General
561 Ibid., 80. 562 Mrs. Josette Daure, the second wife of Alexis Daure, who was the fi rst wife of Jean Jacques Deluz, has donated to the author an album of all projects that Daure and Béri designed or realized in Algeria.
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Fig. 4.100 (a), Fig. 4.101 (b), Fig. 4.102 (c), Fig. 4.103 (d), Fig. 4.104 (e) Housing settlements in the area of Frais Vallon (Algiers) designed by Daure and Béri, together with Courtot, Chauveau, and Magrou prior to the Plan de Constantine. From Daure and Béri Album.
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c f Fig. 4.105 (a), Fig. 4.106 (b), Fig. 4.107 (c) La Montagne in Hussein-Dey (Algiers) designed by Daure, Béri, and Simounet. From Daure and Béri Album. Fig. 4.108 (d) La Montagne, plan of the shops. From Daure and Béri Album. Fig. 4.109 (e) La Montagne, plan of the “cellule” of the horizontal housing program. From Daure and Béri Album. Fig. 4.110 (f) La Montagne, plan of the housing unit of the apartment buildings. From Daure and Béri Album.
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Fig. 4.111 (top) Les dunes designed by Régeste and Bellissent in 1959. From Jean-Jacques Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique (Liège, Alger: Pierre Mardaga Editeur, Offi ce des publications universitaires, 1988), 104.
Fig. 4.112 (center) Cité Nador designed by Maury-Gomiz in 1958. From Jean-Jacques Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 105.
Fig. 4.113 (bottom) Diar Es Schems (House of the Sun) designed by Challand in 1958. From Jean-Jacques Deluz, L’urbanisme et l’architecture d’Alger: aperçu critique, 104.
Next page: Selcted housing projects designed by Daure and Béri in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, before and during the Plan de Constantine.
Fig. 4.114 (a), Fig. 4.115 (b), Fig. 4.116 (c), Fig. 4.117 (d) El Bir Améziane for 5,000 inhabitants in the outskirts of Constantine. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 60–61.
Fig. 4.118 (e), Fig. 4.119 (f) Les peupliers in Constantine built between November 1961 and February 1963 (after Algeria’s independence in July 1962) and promoted by the CIA. From Daure and Béri Album.
Fig. 4.120 (g), Fig. 4.122 (i) Les palmiers (800 housing units) in Bel Air, Hussein-Dey (Algiers) built between 1959 and 1961 and promoted by the CIA. From Daure and Béri Album.
Fig. 4.121 (h) Champ de manoeuvre (1,200 housing units) in Setif. From Daure and Béri Album.
Fig. 4.122 (i) Les oliviers (5,700 dwellings) in the outskirts of Algiers. Th e horizontal long structure may recall the curve of the Plan Obus. From Daure and Béri Album.
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Assembly—in which he proclaimed the possibility of Algeria’s independence, or self- determination. By fi rmly rejecting the policy of intégration (integration) that Soustelle advised (Chapter 1), de Gaulle announced three options for the fate of Algeria and its inhabitants—both Algerians and Europeans. Th e fi rst was called sécession (secession) and consisted of gaining full independence from France, which he considered to be a disastrous scenario that would result in “an appalling misery, an ugly political chaos, widespread slaughter, and soon in a bellicose communist dictatorship.”563 De Gaulle asserted that, whatever happened, all provisions would be made for the exploitation and transportation of the oil of the Algerian Sahara, which he deemed “the oeuvre of France that interests the entire West.”564 He termed the second possibility francisation complète (complete “francization”), which would guarantee, as de Gaulle argued, equal rights to the two communities and would govern the French territory from Dunkerque in northern
France to Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. Th e third alternative involved “an Algerian government by Algerians, supported by French aid and in close union with France, for the economy, education, defense, and international relations.”565 Th e French authorities had meticulously prepared the ground for the third option and had called it “independence” (Chapter 5). In Algeria, the possibility of independence provoked fury and rage among the French army and the colons, leading to Algiers’ semaine des barricades (Week of Barricades) between 24 January and 1 February 1960, the referendum on self-determination for Algeria on 8 January 1961 (approved of by 75 percent of voters), the creation of the French far- right paramilitary called the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS, or the Organization of the Secret Army) in February 1961, the Algiers Generals’ Putsch of April 1961, and the independence of Algeria from France and the end of the war on 19 March 1962 (Chapter 5).
563 de Gaulle, Discours et messages. Avec le renouveau. Mai 1958 - Juillet 1962, 121. [“Elle entrainerait une misère épouvantable, un aff reux chaos politique, l’égorgement généralisé et, bientôt, la dictature belliqueuse des communistes.”] 564 Ibid. [“Toutes les dispositions seront prises, pour que l’exploitation, l’acheminement, l’embarquement du pétrole saharien, qui sont l’œuvre de la France et intéressent tout l’Occident, soient assurés quoi qu’il arrive.”] 565 Ibid.[“Le Gouvernement des Algériens par les Algériens, appuyé sur l’aide de la France et en union avec elle, pour l’économie, l’enseignement, la défense, les relations extérieures.”]
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Despite this bloody turmoil and the declaration of the possibility of self- determination, the French authorities—represented in Algeria by Paul Delouvrier— enforced in 1960 a number of French laws and policies of urbanism and aménagement du territoire in Algeria: notably decree no. 58-1464 of the zones à urbaniser par priorité (ZUP, or high-priority zones to urbanize) of 31 December 1958. Th e authorities also drafted and implemented new decrees that created new special planning zones in Algeria in order to accelerate investment, industrialize construction, and facilitate the expropriation of lands. Notable among these zones were the zones d’aménagement coordonné (ZAC, or coordinated development zones), the zones d’industrialisation décentralisée (ZID, or decentralized industrialization zones), the zones de préindustrialisation (ZOPI, or pre-industrialization zones), and the zones d’organisation rurale (ZOR, or the rural organization zones). In a report of March 1962, the inspector general at the French Ministry of Construction conveyed that Algeria comprised eight ZACs—which included Rouiba-Reghaia566 and
Blida near Algiers; Sainte-Barbe-du-Tlélat, Arzew, and Mostaganem near Oran; and Philippeville, Bône, Duzerville, and Kroubs near Constantine—three ZIDs, including Bougie, Tizi-Ouzou, and Beni-Saf; and fourteen ZOPI, which had established small industries or artisanal regions.567 In an attempt to circumvent a disproportionate infl ux of people to Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, the ZACs were located near these major cities and were planned with the intention of creating a “couronne de protection”568 (a ring of protection) composed of secondary reinforced (or new) satellite towns that benefi ted from massive industrial implantations, thus boosting “the priority equipment that is of interest to public and semi-public services or private bodies.”569 Parallel to the ZACs, the ZIDs were generated in order to ensure a more balanced distribution of industrial activities across Algeria. Th e conditions of coordinated programs enforced in the ZACs were to be correspondingly implemented in the three ZIDs. Th ese polycentric planning guidelines were France’s fi rst
566 Rouiba Reghaia was also a place for a French military air base (Chapter 5). 567 FR ANOM. 81 F/ 1810. Ministère de la Construction. Mission d’inspection générale en Algérie. Aménagement du territoire et construction en Algérie. Résultats de 1961 et perspectives pour 1962-1963. Mars 1962. Signé par Hugues de Fraysseix, inspecteur général au Ministère de la Construction, p. 7. 568 Ibid. 569 Ibid., [“Une priorité dans les programmes d’équipement intéressant à la fois les services publics et des organismes semi-publics ou privés.”]
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implemented assessments of the décentralisation industrielle (industrial decentralization), a policy that monarchist Charles Mauras and the far-right Action Française had advocated in 1914; the geographer Jean-François Gravier later proclaimed this policy in his 1942 book Régions et nation (Regions and Nation), as well as in his legendary Paris et le désert français (Paris and the French Desert) in 1947. Th e policy was eff ectively instituted and implemented only in the 1980s, however, through governmental and territorial reforms that redefi ned the role of the state in the various regions of France. In his 1961 article “Lignes de force de l’aménagement général du territoire” (“Key Elements for General Regional Planning”) on the Plan de Constantine in Algeria, Jean Vibert—who had recently resigned from his position as Director of the Plan and Economic Studies due to de Gaulle’s second announcement on the Algérie algérienne in November 1960 and the possibility of Algeria’s independence—argued that the French policy of decentralization “is not only a loosening but a real decentralization that is needed [s’impose] in Algeria.”570 Vibert went further and stated that the unbalanced situation between Algiers and the other regions of Algeria was so acute that he was “tempted to paraphrase the title of the book by J. F. Gravier and write: Algiers and the Algerian Desert.”571 Ironically, the Algerian desert (the Sahara) was the foremost economic interest of the French authorities in Algeria, in particular during the War of Independence, because of the ongoing oil and gas extractions and the fi rst French nuclear tests that were conducted there. Th us, the industrial decentralization did not take place in the southern departments of the Sahara, but rather in the three northern departments of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine (Figs.
4.123, 4.124). Furthermore, while the colonial administrators of French Algeria had preferred to invest in the capital city from which they governed the entire territory, they had never ceased to explore both above and below the vast Algerian desert: the Sahara. Th e decentralized planning instructions resulted in the construction of a number of new towns in northern Algeria. Some of these guidelines could most likely be regarded as the backbone of what later became known as the French politique des villes nouvelles (1965–2000) in France: a policy that was seemingly initiated and advocated by Paul
570 Jean Vibert, “Lignes de force de l’aménagement général du territoire,” Urbanisme, no. 73 (1961): 7. [“Ce n’est pas seulement un desserrement mais une véritable décentralisation qui s’impose en Algérie.”] 571 Ibid., 6. [“On serait tenter de paraphraser le titre du livre de J. F. Gravier et d’écrire: Alger et le désert algérien.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 309
Fig. 4.123 (top) Distribution of residential zones across the three northern departments of Algeria. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 8. Fig. 4.124 (bottom) Distribution of industrial zones in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 8.
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Delouvrier in the Ile-de-France, when he was appointed Delegate General of the District of the Region of Paris between 1961 and 1969, and then was extended to the entire territory of France. Delouvrier, who today is known as the père des villes nouvelles (forefather of new towns) in France, contributed to the industrial decentralization of northern Algeria and was instrumental in the implementation of the planning policies of the ZACs, ZIDs, ZOPIs, and ZORs, as well as the construction of the new towns envisaged by the Plan de Constantine in Algeria. In the aftermath of his experience with the aménagement du territoire (i.e., not urbanism) in Algeria, Delouvrier and his team developed the Schéma directeur d’aménagement et d’urbanisme de la région de Paris (SDAURP, or the Development and Planning of the Region of Paris Program), which strengthened decentralization and promoted the construction of eight, then fi ve, new towns surrounding Paris in order to avoid the massive infl ux of populations to Paris, as it previously occurred in the Algerian cities of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, as mentioned earlier. Th e authorities supplied new judicial planning means, including the zones d’aménagement diff éré (ZAD, or diff erentiated development zones) and later the zones d’aménagement concerté (ZAC, or concerted development zones), which were more fl exible than the ZUP. Whereas in Algeria General de Gaulle had ordered Delouvrier to “pacify and administer, but at the same time, transform,”572 in Paris the general had requested the same man “to bring order to this mess.”573 In Algiers, however, the purposes of the Plan de Constantine were in dispute. A note to Delouvrier of 3 June 1960 reported two rival readings. Th e fi rst stated that “the Plan de Constantine aims to allow a further development of the Algerian economy at a suffi cient pace, with the aid from metropolitan France to be reduced in 1964,”574 and indicated that the fi gures that de Gaulle had announced in October 1958 must be achieved in order to enable the autonomous development of the Algerian economy in the following
572 Chenu, Paul Delouvrier ou la passion d’agir, 284.. [“Il vous faut pacifi er et administrer, mais en même temps, transformer.”] 573 Th ere are several versions of the original sentence uttered by de Gaulle who addressed Delouvrier while they were fl ying over Paris in a helicopter, “mettez-moi de l’ordre dans ce merdier”; “mettez-moi de l’ordre dans ce bordel,” or “mettez-moi de l’ordre dans ce désordre.” On these diff erent versions, see Loïc Vadelorge, “Mémoire et histoire dans les villes nouvelles françaises,” Annales de la Recherche urbaine, no. 98 (2005): 7–14. 574 CHSP. 1 DV 32 Dr 1. Note pour Monsieur le Délégué Général. Object : Le Plan de Constantine. 3 juin 1960, Conception A, p. 2. [“Le Plan de Constantine a pour but de permettre un développement ultérieur de l’économie algérienne à un rythme suffi sant, avec une aide de la France métropolitaine réduite à partir de 1964.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 311
fi ve years. In contrast, the second interpretation claimed that “the Plan de Constantine represents the economic and social aspects of France’s policy in Algeria. Its goal is to contribute to the execution of this policy, i.e., to its process—self-determination—and to its objective—coexistence; it will be achieved only if economic and social progress is a tangible reality for the entire population.”575 Th e second position stressed, however, that de Gaulle’s promised numbers had “resulted from an irrational transposition of the ‘ten- years perspectives’ and have no scientifi c value. Th ey do not mark a ‘speed of liberation’ for the Algerian economy.”576 Both attitudes expressed their dissatisfaction with the current economic development of Algeria, which might be considered the result of French colonial policies there. Whereas the fi rst position blindly supported de Gaulle’s Plan, the second conjectured the unfeasibility of his engagements and therefore mistrusted the Plan and its unrealistic fi gures. In an attempt to address this discord, the members of the Conseil Supérieur du Plan de Constantine, together with Delouvrier and Pierre Massé, gathered on 13 June 1960 in Paris and approved the ultimate objectives of the fi ve-year plan, which consisted of the “renaissance of the countryside, as well as the extension and modernization of ‘modern Algeria.’”577 Th e latter included the education of l’homme technician (“technical man”), the implementation of industrialization, and the construction of new towns. Th ey also recalled that the Plan de Constantine’s mission, as de Gaulle had argued in his speech of October 1958, was to provide all inhabitants of Algeria with “what modern civilization can and must bring to men: well-being and dignity.”578 Th is paternalistic attitude and romantic approach did not directly address the hesitancy of the executers and investors of the Plan de Constantine. On the contrary, it defi ned fi ve key guiding strategies over the course of fi ve years for a total investment of 2.5 trillion old francs. Th ese involved: 1) educating farmers in the countryside; 2) providing water and fertile lands; 3) educating
575 Ibid., Conception B, p. 5. [“Le Plan de Constantine constitue l’aspect économique et social de la politique de la France en Algérie. Son but est de contribuer à l’exécution de cette politique, c’est à dire de son processus-l ‘autodétermination- et de son objectif- la coexistence; il sera atteint si pour l’ensemble de la population le progrès économique et social est une réalité tangible.”] 576 Ibid., [“Résultent d’une transposition irrationnelle des «perspectives décennales» et n’ont aucune valeur scientifi que. Ils ne marquent pas une ‘vitesse de libération’ de l’économie algérienne.”] 577 CHSP. 1 DV 34 Dr 1. Région Economique d’Algérie. Plan de cinq ans. Exposé de Monsieur le Président. 13 Juin 1960 in Paris, p. 1. [“Renaissance du bled et extension et modernisation de l’Algérie moderne.’”] 578 Ibid., p. 2.
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technicians for the industrial sector; 4) creating major industries that would create both customers and laborers; and 5) building new towns in order to settle people in places with profi table businesses.579 A few days following the Paris meeting, Delouvrier attended the plenary assembly of the Région Economique d’Alger (Algiers Economic Region) on 29 June 1960, which was also attended by several European businessmen based in the capital city of French Algeria. Delouvrier reassured these gentlemen—in particular their President, Laurent Schiaffi no (1897–1978), French shipowner, politician, businessman, and one of the richest colons of Algeria under French rule—that despite the secret ceasefi re negotiations between the French government and the Algerian members of the FLN, the Plan de Constantine would still be conducted. After the end of the armed confl ict, he continued, the task would be “to convince all those who live on this earth that the fate of Algeria can be freely regulated in the dignity and freedom of the West only if this country [Algeria] remains in close and deep union with France.”580 Delouvrier demanded that the attendees control their nerves and requested them “to trust General de Gaulle. You know his diffi cult and infl exible nature once he has defi ned the conditions of France’s policy: nothing else matters to him but France and the conditions of its policy.”581 Delouvrier also insisted on the political role of the Plan de Constantine, again evoking the arguments of the freedom and dignity of men. Th is would generate “modern men”; the indispensable aid and participation of “France, Europeans from Algeria, and the Muslim population”582; and the necessary eff orts to achieve industrialization and decentralization. He claimed that “Regarding industrialization, I also must insist before you, Algerians [i.e., French and European industrialists based in Algiers], on one of our [i.e., the French government’s] major concerns, which is also yours: the importance of decentralization.”583 He stressed
579 Ibid. 580 CHSP. 1 DV 34 Dr 1. Allocution de M. Paul Delouvrier à la séance plénière du 29 juin 1960 de la Région Economique d’Alger, p. 8. [“A convaincre tous ceux qui habitent sur cette terre que le sort de l’Algérie ne peut se régler librement dans la dignité et la liberté occidentales, que si ce pays reste en union étroite, profonde avec la France.”] 581 Ibid., p. 8. [“Il faut faire confi ance au Général de GAULLE. Vous connaissez son caractère diffi cile, infl exible, quand il a défi ni les conditions de la politique de la France; rien ne compte pour lui que la France et les conditions de sa politique.”] 582 Ibid., p. 5. [“Il faut l’aide, la participation étroite de la Métropole, des Européens d’Algérie et de la population musulmane.”] 583 Ibid., p. 3. [“Je dois aussi, en matière d’industrialisation, insister beaucoup auprès de vous, Algériens, sur un de nos soucis majeurs qui est le vôtre également: l’importance de la décentralisation.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 313
the signifi cance of these measures, and therefore of the strategic Plan de Constantine, “if we seek to achieve a harmonious development and prevent the hastiness of population on the coast, and particularly in the cities.”584 In order to achieve this goal, in January 1960 the French government established a mixed-economy organization called the Société d’Equipement des Zones d’Industrialisation Décentralisées (SEZID, or the Company for Equipment and Zones of Decentralized Industrialization), which operated together with the CADAT. Th e role of the SEZID was to “facilitate the completion of various formalities for companies that wish to settle in Algeria or to extend their activities; they can also build factories for themselves, to be rented or sold.”585 Every industrial operation and every ZAC, ZID, ZOPI, and ZOR comprised new residential areas designed for managers and workers. For instance, in the ZAC of Rouiba-Reghaia, roughly twenty-fi ve kilometers east of Algiers, the CADAT purchased lands and created two large housing estates in Rouiba: Les Orangers, which was composed of low-rise buildings and villas, and Rouiba Center, which was composed of high-rise buildings. In Reghaia, the CADAT acquired 193 hectares and commissioned the French architects Daure and Béri to coordinate the area and to partly design and build large- scale housing projects. In the northern area called Reghaia Nord the units were meant for the middle class, while in the southern area of Reghaia Sud the dwellings were destined for the working class.586 Given the planning policies of the Plan de Constantine, which reinforced segregation, the inhabitants of Reghaia would increase from ten thousand to forty thousand in just a few years. In Reghaia Nord, Daure and Béri built 432 HLM dwellings of four rooms (seventy-three square meters) and fi ve rooms (eighty-four square meters) over an area of 5.2 hectares, as well as 462 housing units of habitat Million of three rooms (forty-two square meters) and four rooms (fi fty-four square meters) covering 4.5 hectares. In Reghaia Sud, the two architects built 411 housing units of three rooms (forty- two to forty-fi ve square meters) over 4.3 hectares in Les Iris, the construction of which was completed in March 1963: one year after Algeria’s independence from France (Figs.
584 Ibid., [“Si nous voulons aboutir à un développement harmonieux et éviter une précipitation de la population sur la côte et singulièrement dans les villes.”] 585 ANFPSS. F/60/4022. Ministère de la Construction, Aménagement du territoire et construction en Algérie, Avril 1960, p, 3. [“Faciliter l’accomplissement des diverses formalités incombant aux entreprises désireuses de s’installer en Algérie ou de s’y étendre; elle peut aussi construire à leur intention des bâtiments d’usine en location-vente.”] 586 Aménagement du territoire, CADAT, Industrialisation Région d’Alger, Zone de Rouiba-Reghaia.
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a
b
c
d
Fig. 4.125 (a) Location of Rouiba-Reghaia. From Daure and Béri Album. Fig. 4.126 (b), Fig. 4.127 (c) Industrialization of Algiers region and its corresponding residential area in CADAT brochure. ANFPSS F60 4020. Fig. 4.128 (d) Les Iris, residential area in Reghaia Sud, designed by Daure and Béri. From Daure and Béri Album.
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 315
Fig. 4.129 Residential areas in Reghaia Nord and Reghaia Sud. From Daure and Béri Album.
May 2016 316 Architecture of Counterrevolution
4.125–4.129).587 Th is was a success for the French building industry. Th e majority of the historians of the Algerian War of Independence who have investigated the premises, ambitions, and results of the Plan de Constantine in Algeria under colonial rule have assessed that the Plan was unsuccessful, because the French government failed to meet the Plan’s proclaimed quantitative aims. Th eir evaluation has been based on two decisive accounts released by the Caisse d’Equipement pour le Développement de l’Algérie on 30 June and 31 December 1961. In his article “Les réactions patronales au Plan de Constantine” (“Th e Employers’ Reactions to the Plan de Constantine”), Daniel Lefeuvre argued that although the Plan had encouraged industrial investments in Algeria, “at the time when three-fi fths of the Plan had been implemented, it recorded 271,343 million NF of eff ective investments: that is, only 13 percent of the fi nal goal against the 48 percent that was envisaged. Th is delay, which authorizes one to speak about failure, was compounded by two circumstances.”588 He demonstrated that the delay was not caused by the military conditions of the armed confl ict that was taking place at the time, but rather by the industrial primacies and economic priorities that the French political authorities aspired to. Th e Plan de Constantine did succeed in creating a long-term rapport between France and Algeria after its independence, however, which was benefi cial for the French government, economy, and businesses. Among these “post-colonial” (or neocolonial) legacies were the exploitation of oil and gas, the continuation of nuclear tests in the Algerian Sahara, and the completion of housing estates, grand ensembles, and new towns. Th e French policymakers called this irreversible relationship coopération and regulated it with the French-Algerian Accords d’Evian (Evian Agreements), a treaty signed on 18 March 1962 that ended the Algerian War of Independence and guaranteed France the use of certain Algerian territories, sites, air bases, and military installations for anther fi fteen years (Chapter 5). Th e authorities also used the decentralized planning policy as an alibi for the design and construction of a new administrative capital city called the Rocher Noir,
587 Album of projects by Daure and Béri in Algeria donated by Josette Daure to the author. 588 Daniel Lefeuvre, “Les réactions patronales au Plan de Constantine,” Revue historique, no. 276 (1986): 182. [“au trois cinquième de sa réalisation, le Plan enregistrait 271’343 millions de nouveaux francs d’investissements eff ectifs, soit seulement 13% de l’objectif fi nal contre 48% prévus. Ce retard, qui autorise à parler d’échec, était aggravé par deux circonstances.”]
Samia Henni Between Offi cers and Technocrats 317
located fi fty kilometers east of Algiers, that was exclusively designed and built for the French government in order to protect French civil servants from the violent attacks of the French paramilitary OAS, which, as noted, opposed the politics of General de Gaulle in Algeria. As will be discussed in the next chapter, unlike the case with the other new towns and grand ensembles in Algeria, a French Beaux-Arts architect who had won the prestigious Prix de Rome in 1951 was commissioned with the design of the Rocher Noir. Both the Plan de Constantine and the possibility for self-determination were highly strategic, both nationally and internationally. Whereas the fi rst guaranteed the prosperity of French industry during (and after) the war, the second reassured the international community that France was indeed willing to cede its preferred colony. It is not clear, however, what de Gaulle had in mind with the construction of the Rocher Noir after he had announced the possibility of Algeria’s independence.
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319
III. Th e New Capital City 1961–1962
May 2016
Rocher Noir 321
5. Rocher Noir
General Charles de Gaulle’s recognition of Algeria’s right to self-determination, sovereignty, and independence was triggered by the internationalization of the “Algerian question” and its inscription in the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations by the leaders of the Gouvernement provisoire de la république algérienne (GPRA, or the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic). Since the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution on 1 November 1954, the Algerian question was included in the UN agenda six times and was the object of four debates between 1957 and 1959.589 African and Asian countries, many of them future members of the “Non-Aligned Movement” that had discussed Algeria’s colonial conditions during the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung (Indonesia) in April 1955, had supported the legitimate aspiration of the Algerian people. Many of these nations had themselves recently gained independence and had been admitted as UN members. Th e United Nations recognized Algeria’s right to independence on 19 December 1960: more than six years after the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution. Th e United Nations’ recognition of Algeria’s right to independence was preceded by France’s release in September 1960 of the Déclaration sur le droit à l’insoumission dans la Guerre d’Algérie (Declaration of the Right to Revolt in the Algerian War), known as the Manifeste des 121 (“Manifesto of the 121”). Th e initiative for this public declaration to refuse to take arms against the Algerian people and to approve support for the Algerian people emerged from the 5 September 1960 trial of what was known as the “Jeanson network,” a group of left-wing militants led by the existential philosopher Francis Jeanson (1922–2009). Th e Jeanson network had hosted the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale, or National Liberation Front) in France, had facilitated its militant activities, and had fought for Algeria’s legitimate independence from France. Th e Manifesto of the 121 was signed by one hundred twenty-one prominent French personalities, including Arthur Adamov, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Blanchot, André Breton, Edouard Glissant, Henri
589 “Th e Internationalization of the Algerian Problem and Its Inscription on the Agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations from 1957–1959,” 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Dossier 37/01/10; Fond: GPRA, 1958–62; Archives Nationales d’Algérie, Alger. Translated from the French and transcribed by Pierre Asselin, with Paulina Kostrzewski.
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Lefebvre, André Masson, François Maspero, Alain Resnais, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet. Th ey declared:
We respect and deem to be justifi ed the refusal to take up arms against the Algerian people. We respect and deem to be justifi ed the conduct of those French people who consider it their duty to provide aid and protection to the Algerian people, who are oppressed in the name of the French people. Th e cause of the Algerian people, which will contribute decisively to the ruin of the colonial system, is the cause of all free men and women.590
Th e Manifeste des 121 provoked the rage of the French government, including the army, as well as of other French intellectuals. Whereas the French authorities seized the text, and banned and censored the Manifesto, right-wing French personalities fi rmly opposed it and in turn signed a counter-declaration called the Manifeste des intellectuels français pour la résistance à l’abandon (a rough translation of which is the Manifesto of French Intellectuals for the Resistance to the Abandonment), which was released in October 1960.591 As is the case with most dichotomies, colonial Algérie française (French Algeria) and anti-colonial Algérie algérienne (Algerian Algeria) are still disputed today. Between de Gaulle’s fi rst declaration on self-determination in September 1959, his speech on Algérie algérienne associated with France in September 1960, the United Nation’s recognition of Algeria’s right to self-determination in December 1960, the referendum on the Algerian people’s right to independence in January 1961, de Gaulle’s ongoing claims to the Algerian Sahara, the signing of the Evian Agreements that eventually called for a ceasefi re in Algeria in March 1962, the referendum on the Evian Agreements in France, the referendum on Algeria’s self-determination in Algeria on 1 July 1962, the acknowledgment of Algeria’s independence on 3 July, and Algeria’s proclamation of independence on 5 July 1962, an alarming number of violent protests and hostile attacks took place fi rst in
590 Th e French version is available at http://www.fabriquedesens.net/Declaration-sur-le-droit-a-l. [“Nous respectons et jugeons justifi é le refus de prendre les armes contre le peuple algérien. Nous respectons et jugeons justifi ée la conduite des Français qui estiment de leur devoir d’apporter aide et protection aux Algériens opprimés au nom du peuple français. La cause du peuple algérien, qui contribue de façon décisive à ruiner le système colonial, est la cause de tous les hommes libres.”] An English translation is published in André Breton and Franklin Rosemont, What Is Surrealism: Selected Writings, Book 2 (Atlanta: Pathfi nder Press, 1978), pp. 460–62. 591 On the history of these manifestos, see, for example, Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli, La Guerre d’Algérie et les intellectuels français (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1991).
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 323
Algeria and then in France. Th ese ruthless pro-Algérie française and anti-Algérie algérienne actions culminated in the establishment of a French paramilitary terrorist group called the Organization Armée Secrète (OAS, or the Secret Army Organization), which propagated an additional armed confl ict in Algeria as well as intense bombing campaigns in both Algeria and France, including various attempts to assassinate General de Gaulle. In addition to the OAS (which was founded in Franco-era Madrid in January 1961), other anti-Algerian-independence right-wing organizations and political parties existed at the time. Th ese included: • the Front pour l’Algérie française (FAF, or the Front for French Algeria), the ancestor of France’s Front National, still active today; • the Front national combattant (FNC, loosely translated as the Armed National Front), co-founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen (b. 1928), who served in both recently fought colonial wars, the Indochina War and the Algerian War; • the Front national pour l’Algérie française (FNAF, or the National Front for French Algeria), presided over by Le Pen; • the Rassemblement pour l’Algérie française (RAF, or the Rally for French Algeria); • the Comité d’entente des anciens combattants (the Common Committee for Veterans); • the Association des combattants de la communauté française (ACCF, or the Association of French Community Fighters); • the Front d’action nationale (FAN, or the National Action Front); • the Association générale des étudiants d’Algérie (AGEA, or the General Association of Students from Algeria); and • the Mouvement universitaire pour le maintien de la souveraineté française en Algérie (the University Movement for the Maintenance of French Sovereignty in Algeria). Numerous other ferocious defenders of French Algeria were active at the time, including former supporters of the Vichy regime.592
592 For an extensive list of pro–French Algeria organisations, see Arnaud Déroulède, OAS: Etude d’une organisation clandestine (Hélette: Editions Jean Curutchet, 1997), pp. 17–37.
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Th e OAS was composed of French civilians and military offi cers and was supported by French and European people—including some French Jews from Algeria593—who fi rmly disapproved of the Algerian policies of the Fifth Republic and its leader, General de Gaulle; the OAS carried out acts of lethal violence against civilians in order to prevent Algeria’s independence and fi ercely defended French colonial sovereignty over Algeria. Th ey asserted that they were confronted with what they called de Gaulle’s trahison (“betrayal”). Over the course of eighteen months (January 1961–July 1962), the OAS murdered fi fteen hundred people, injured fi ve thousand others, and attacked, robbed, and destroyed a large number of infrastructure and buildings. Perhaps the greatest loss of irreplaceable documentation was the burning of the Library of Algiers University— including an estimated four hundred thousand manuscripts—in June 1962, a few days before the offi cial declaration of Algeria’s independence.594 Notable among the OAS’s founders was the retired general Raoul Salan (Chapter 1), ranked among France’s most decorated soldiers, who formerly served as General Delegate of the French Government in Algeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Algeria. Salan served in the French army between 1917 and 1959 and was active during the First and Second World Wars, the Indochina War, and the Algerian War. He led the fi rst Algiers Generals’ Putsch of 13 May 1958 (Chapter 3), which brought General de Gaulle back to power, and co-organized the second Algiers Generals’ Putsch of 21–26 April 1961, together with generals Maurice Challe, Edmund Jouhaud (1905–1995), and André Zeller (1898–1979). More than any other OAS partisans, such as Jean-Jacques Susini (b. 1933), Pierre Lagaillarde (1931–2014), Colonel Yves Godard (1911–1975), the aforementioned Jouhaud, or Dr. Jean-Claude Perez (b. 1928), General Salan was particularly acquainted with the military doctrine of the guerre révolutionnaire (Chapter 1). Th is meant that he was acquainted with both insurgency and counterinsurgency operations and subversive warfare tactics and strategies while waging two irregular colonial wars.595 He readily
593 On the involvment of French Jews from Algeria in OAS operations, see Ethan B. Katz, Th e Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North African to France (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2015), 201–216; Sung-Eun Choi, Decolonization and the French of Algeria: Bringing the Settler Colony Home (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 45–51. 594 Th e exact numbers of OAS causalities are disputed. Th e two numbers cited here are from Déroulède, OAS: Etude d’une organisation clandestine, p. 243. 595 On Salan’s military career, see Alain Gandy, Salan (Paris: Perrin, 1990).
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adopted psychological warfare and terror methods both against Algerians and against his own French government and people. Salan was arrested in April 1962 in Algiers and condemned to life imprisonment. In July 1968—a mere six years later—he was granted amnesty. In November 1982 he was reinstated into the French army.596 In 1963, one year after the end of the bloody Algerian War, the German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt studied Salan in his Th eorie des partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum begriff des Politischen (Th eory of the Partisan: Commentary on the Concept of the Political), which has become a reference for authors on both the right and left wings today.597 Schmitt’s theory begins with the Spanish guerilla war (1808–1813) against Napoleon and ends with General Salan and the OAS against both the French Fifth Republic and the pro–Algerian independence advocates. In between these events, Schmitt analyzes Carl von Clausewitz, Vladimir Lenin, and Mao Zedong.598 Schmitt conveyed his admiration for Salan, portraying him as a brave and intelligent man who had yielded to a given logic and had voiced his alternative “answer.” As Schmitt argued, “Salan stood, in short, in his whole existence as a Frenchman and a soldier, before an étrange paradoxe [strange paradox], within an Irrsinnslogik [logic of unreason] that embittered a courageous and intelligent man and drove him to the search for a counter-measure.”599 Schmitt used Salan’s behavior, his juridical trial, and the illegality of the OAS not only to establish and validate his own theories, but also to commemorate his emblematic “tragic hero,” a man of great military and colonial power who crosses the threshold of legality. Schmitt explores this tragic hero’s passage from a legal state representative to an illegal partisan and back
596 Th is begs the question: Why was Maurice Papon (Chapter 2) condemned for crimes against humanity while Raoul Salan and others were not? 597 Carl Schmitt, Th eorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963). Hannah Arendt’s copy of Schmitt’s book is available in the online collection of Bard College. See http://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Schmitt-Partisanen.pdf. 598 Raymond Aron, author of La tragédie algérienne (1957), L’Algérie et la république (1958), and Paix et geurre entre les nations (1962) criticized Schmitt for comparing Salan to Clausewitz. For Aron, the head of the OAS could not be raised to the level of Prussian offi cers who had fought a national enemy, and not the nation itself. To Aron, Schmitt had committed a “conceptual error.” On this critique, see Joël Mouric, “‘Citizen Clausewitz’: Aron’s Clausewitz in Defense of Political Freedom,” in Th e Companion to Raymond Aron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 83–85. 599 Carl Schmitt, Th e Th eory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political, trans. A. C. Goodson (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), p. 47. Th e original text reads: “Kurz, Salan stand wirklich, mit seiner ganzen Existenz als Franzose und Soldat, vor einem étrange paradoxe, in einer Irrsinnlogik, die einem mutigen und intelligenten Mann erbittern und zum Versuch eines Gegenschlages treiben konnte”; from Schmitt, Th eorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen, p. 70.
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Fig. 5.1 Rocher Noir prior to the construction of the new administrative city. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 31.
again into the legal state’s regulated sphere. Because Salan believed that de Gaulle betrayed him and the colons, he assumed that he was entitled to break French law, despite his status as a retired general. Based on the principle that one must fi ght fi re with fi re when dealing with partisans, Schmitt claimed that Salan “acted accordingly, not only with the courage of the soldier but also with the precision of the general staff offi cer and the exacting attitude of the technocrat. Th e result was that he was transformed into a partisan himself, and that in the end, he declared civil war on his own commandant and regime.”600 Th is implies that Schmitt felt that General Salan, the OAS, the French government, and Algerian and non-Algerian pro-independence fi ghters (including French communists) were all waging similar wars, and that only the defi nitions of friends and enemies and the irregularity, and legality of their acts diff ered. Schmitt’s argument indicates that the use of violence may be justifi ed by those who consider themselves sovereign and can therefore transcend the rule of law in the name of the enforcement of law and order and the defense of national (or today international) security. Surprisingly, other legitimate justifi cation for the use of violence—such as anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-neocolonialism—are, however, rarely accepted. In the wake of Salan’s return to Algiers and the establishment of the OAS, which carried out massacres and bomb attacks in Algiers and elsewhere, the Council of French
600 Schmitt, Th eorie des Partisanen, 57. Schmitt’s original text reads: “Das hat er folgerichtig getan, nicht nur mit dem Mut des Soldaten, sondern auch mit der Präzision des Generalstabsoffi ziers und der Exaktheit des Technokraten. Das Ergebnis war, dass er selber sich in einen Partisanen verwandelte und schließlich seinem eigenen höchsten Befehlshaber und seine Regierung den Bürgerkrieg erklärte.” From Schmitt, Th eorie des Partisanen, p. 83.
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Ministers and the Committee of Algerian Aff airs gathered on 15 February 1961 and decided to move the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria away from the turmoil then roiling the center of the capital city.601 With the aim of safeguarding French civil servants based in Algiers and ensuring the continuation of their colonial services, the delegation settled on a strategic plan of action that consisted of the construction of a new administrative capital city called Rocher Noir (Black Rock), which was to be located fi fty kilometers east of Algiers on the Mediterranean Sea. Th is was included in the yearly provision for Algeria under fi nancial chapter no. 11-38 entitled Création d’une ville administrative nouvelle au Rocher Noir (“Creation of a New Satellite Administrative Town at Rocher Noir”).602 Th e fi rst section of the new city to be constructed was inaugurated in September 1961. Th e French authorities, represented by the Société centrale pour l’équipement du territoire (SCET, or the Central Company for the Equipment of the Territory; Chapter 4),603 designated the French Beaux-Arts architect Louis Gabriel de Hoÿm de Marien (1920–2007), winner of the fi rst Grand Prix de Rome, as the chief architect for Rocher Noir. De Marien attended the meeting of 27 February 1961 in Algiers. Together with eight representatives of the French Delegation in Algeria (Fig. 5.2), they debated plans to launch construction and possible methods to speed construction of the new town; the town was expected to accommodate the thirty-fi ve hundred civil servants working in the massive General Government building (GG; or the Palais du Gouvernement). Th e GG building had been designed by the Algiers-based French architect Jacques Guiauchain (1884–1960)604 and was built by the construction company Perret Frères between 1929 and 1934 (Fig. 5.3). During the Algerian War of Independence, this massive edifi ce became the symbol of the Algiers General’s Putsch of May 58, as well as of a legendary
601 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Délégation Générale en Algérie, Direction des Travaux Publics, de la Construction, et des Transports, Administration Générale, Service Général. Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le 27 Février 1961 à 15 heures, dans le bureau de Monsieur Giraud, Directeur des Travaux Publics, de la Construction et des Transport. Démarrage de l’opération—Rocher Noir. Alger le 3 Mars 1961, p. 2. 602 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. “Délibération. Article 1—Il est créé au programme d’équipement de l’Algérie pour 1961 un chapitre nouveau 11-38 intitulé Création d’une ville administrative nouvelle au Rocher Noir.” 603 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Caisse d’Equipement pour le Développement de l’Algérie. Département de l’Equipement Public. Rapport au comité directeur. Object: Construction d’une ville administrative satellite au Rocher Noir. Meeting of 15 March 1961, p. 3. 604 Jacques Guiauchain, the third generation of the Guiauchain dynastry in Algiers, was the son of the architect George Guiauchain (1840–1918) and the grandson of the architect Pierre Auguste Guiauchain (1806–1875), chief architect of the city of Algiers.
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Fig. 5.2 (left) List of attendees of the meeting of 3 march 1961. ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Fig. 5.3 (right) Th e building of the French General Government in Algiers. ECPAD ALG 59 72. speech by General de Gaulle (Chapter 3). During the meeting, the cabinet director of the new General Delegate in Algeria requested transformable offi ces, which would allow for subsequent redistribution among the managerial, individual, and collective offi ces. He also urged that “the parallelism of the programs for housing and offi ces must be absolute”605; that is, construction must simultaneously produce spaces for working and living. At this decisive turning point, General de Gaulle appointed Louis Joxe (1901– 1991), former general secretary of the Comité français de la libération nationale (French Committee for National Liberation), as Minister of State for Algerian Aff airs residing in Paris, and Jean Morin (1916–2008) as General Delegate in Algeria based in Algiers— replacing Paul Delouvrier after his resignation; Morin later moved to the adjacent administrative city at Rocher Noir. Morin was resistant. In the aftermath of the Vichy regime, he had been charged with purging the prefectures of the Fourth Republic.606 He also served as a deputy director of the cabinet of the president of the French Provisional
605 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Délégation Générale en Algérie, Direction des Travaux Publics, de la Construction, et des Transports, Administration Générale, Service Général. Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le 27 Février 1961 à 15 heures, dans le bureau de Monsieur Giraud, Directeur des Travaux Publics, de la Construction et des Transport. Object: Démarrage de l’opération—Rocher Noir. Alger le 3 Mars 1961, p. 2. [“le parallélisme des programmes de logements et de bureaux doit être absolu.”] 606 Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962, p. 424.
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 329
Government of the Republic, deputy director of Foreign Aff airs charged with German Aff airs—at the time he worked with Michel Debré who was secretary general of German Aff airs—,607 and prefect of La Manche and of Maine and Loire. Ironically, it seems that de Gaulle was planning to purge French Algeria of French colonial-far-right characters. Just before his appointment in Algeria, Morin served as Prefect of the Haute- Garonne (the aforementioned de Hoÿm de Marien’s home region) and Inspecteur général de l’administration en mission extraordinaire (IGAME, General Inspector of Administration in the Extraordinary Mission; Chapter 2) for Languedoc. At the age of forty-four, Morin was assigned a delicate mission in an unfamiliar environment, in which both French- Algerian and French-French wars were taking place. Debré, now de Gaulle’s Prime Minister, wrote in his memoirs: “the spring before, I had charged [Morin] with the study of a very special project: to create a new town surrounded by farms in his region in order to welcome the French people from Algeria who wished to resettle in France.”608 Th is project became a reality in Algeria, but the targeted inhabitant was the French government, rather than French people from Algeria, since the government’s fl ight from OAS terrorism and resettlement outside of Algiers. On 5 December 1960, de Gaulle drafted the Instructions pour la marche à suivre en Algérie (Instructions for the Procedure to Follow in Algeria), which he transmitted to Prime Minister Debré, who in turn transferred it to Joxe and Morin.609 De Gaulle defi ned the main points to pave the judicial, military, administrative, and economic way for the French politics of Algérie algérienne. In his third point (on administrative details), de Gaulle proclaimed that at the moment of organizing the Algerian public administration, the General Delegate would become a High Commissioner of the French Republic in Algeria and would “maintain in its direct attributions the aff airs of sovereignty—in particular, defense—as well as the local administration of aid in all of the domains provided to Algeria
607 Association des amis de Michel Debré, Michel Debré et l’Algérie: actes du colloque, Assemblée nationale, 27 et 28 avril 2006, Editions Champs Elysées (Paris, 2007), 30. 608 Michel Debré, Trois Républiques pour une France. Mémoires–III: Gouverner, 1958–1962 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), p. 263. [“Le printemps précédant, je l’avait chargé de réfl échir à un projet très particulier: Créer dans sa région une ville nouvelle entourée d’exploitations agricoles, afi n d’accueillir dans de bonnes conditions ceux des Français d’Algérie qui voudraient se réinstaller en métropole.”] 609 Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets. Juin 1958–Décembre 1960 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1985), p. 418.
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by France (notably the Plan de Constantine).”610 De Gaulle also entrusted the Minister of State for Algerian Aff airs with, as he stated, “in addition to the entire Algerian problem, the aff airs related to the common domains of Algeria and France (economy, currency, certain matters of fi nances, justice, education, telecommunications, ports, airports, etc.).”611 De Gaulle projected and dictated everything for Algeria and the nation’s “association” (to borrow his phrasing) with France after Algeria’s independence, including the strategic Plan de Constantine. In his instructions for Algeria’s future with France, de Gaulle made no mention of the new French administrative city of Rocher Noir. Th e architect of Rocher Noir, de Marien, is today renowned for Paris’s fi rst skyscraper, the 210-meter-high Tour Maine-Montparnasse (1958–1973), which he designed together with the French architects Eugène Beaudouin, Urbain Cassan (1890– 1979), Raymond Lopez (1904–1966), and Jean Saubot (1931–1999); the skyscraper was the subject of considerable controversy. De Marien was born in Toulouse (Haute-Garonne); he graduated from the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts in Paris and was a student of Charles Lemaresquier (1870–1972). In February 1951, at the age of thirty-one, he received his diploma as architect DPLG (Diplômé par le gouvernement), a state certifi cate that was an extra license for architects. In June of the same year he was awarded the fi rst Grand Prix de Rome for his project on the assigned subject, Un centre de conférences internationales et de congrès (A Center for International Conferences and Congresses). In December 1951 he registered at the Order of Architects of the Regional Counsel of the Seine with number 999. He was resident of the French Academy at the Villa Medicis in Rome between 1952 and 1955. De Marien was also a graduate of the Royal Institute of British Architects. In France, he was nominated as chief architect of the Bâtiments civils et palais nationaux (BCPN, or Civil Buildings and National Palaces), advisor architect at the Ministry of Construction, architect-in-chief of the company Toulouse-Equipement of the Haute-Garonne, and advisor-architect at the Atelier Municipale d’Urbanisme (Municipal
610 Ibid., p. 419. [“Gardant dans ses attributions directes les aff aires de souveraineté—en particulier la défense— ainsi que l’administration sur place de l’aide fournie en tous domaines à l’Algérie par la métropole (notamment Plan de Constantine).”] 611 Ibid. [“Outre l’ensemble du problème algérien, les aff aires relatives au domaines communs à l’Algérie et à la métropole (économie, monnaie, certains secteurs des fi nances, direction de la justice, direction de l’enseignement, télécommunications, ports, aérodromes, etc.).”]
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Urbanism Workshop) for the town of Toulouse.612 Prior to his work at Rocher Noir, de Marien collaborated with the aforementioned Eugène Beaudouin (who was a professor at the Beaux-Arts) on a number of projects, including Rotterdam School in Strasbourg in 1952; students’ housing in Antony and Clermont-Ferrand in 1954; and an apartment building designed for young workers in Cachan. For the French Ministry of Construction, de Marien studied and coordinated a number of plan d’aménagement (master plans), such as those of Laubadère, Fould, Saint- Anne, and Ormeaux in Tarbes; Carmaux; La Mandoune and Chambord in Mautauban; Juan Les Pins; and Empalot, Rangueil, Saint-Georges, Les Rocades, Les Crêtes, and Les Bords de la Garonne in Toulouse. Th e French SCET commissioned him with the design and management of large districts, including Empalot, Saint-Georges, and Rangueil in Toulouse and the neighborhood of Pontots in Bayonne. De Marien also designed and built a number of large-scale housing projects, whose commission was the result, most likely, of the two previous projects. He completed six hundred “HLM” housing units (habitat à loyer modéré, or “low-cost housing”) in Tarbes, twenty villas in Arpajan, and various other housing projects, including Empalot and Rangueil in Toulouse. De Marien received the offi cial authorization of practice (patenté) in January 1961, just a few months prior to the onset of the construction of the gigantic commission of Rocher Noir.613 Th e minutes of a meeting entitled Démarrage de l’opération—Rocher Noir (Launching of Operation Rocher Noir) reported that the construction of the new town destined for the French general government in Algeria was divided into three phases. Th e fi rst two were to be completed immediately, with the third to be realized at a later date. Th e short timescale for implementing the decisions and completing the new town was unprecedented, particularly compared with the construction of housing units for Algerians during the war and the construction of housing for French people in post-war France. Th e fi rst step included dwellings and offi ces for one hundred fi fty heads of public services and their direct staff , and was to be completed by the end of July. Th e second phase comprised the construction of offi ces and housing units for eight hundred civil servants, and was to be achieved by the fourth quarter of 1961 (Figs. 5.4–5.5). Th e parallel
612 Archives Départementales de la Haute-Garonne (hereafter “ADHG”), 156 J. Curriculum vitae of Louis Gabriel de Hoÿm de Marien. 613 Ibid.
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Fig. 5.4 Plan of the fi rst phase of Rocher Noir. FR ANOM 81F 452.
Fig. 5.5 Plan of the fi rst and second phases of Rocher Noir as published in a newspaper article in Algiers. AD HG 140 J 21.
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construction of these two parts was to begin immediately, on 21 March 1961, and was to be fi nanced by the Caisse d’équipement pour le développement de l’Algérie (CEDA, of Fund for the Equipment and Development of Algeria; Chapter 3). According to the attendees of this fi rst meeting, the extraordinary speed of design and realization (fi ve months for the fi rst step and seven months for the second) imposed unusual measures; they argued that “this requires the adoption of accelerated procedures (forward agreement contract, rapid approvals).”614 De Marien was most likely selected according to this extraordinary procedure. On 15 March 1961, six days before the planned onset of construction, the Department of Public Equipment of the CEDA, which was established to implement the Plan de Constantine, circulated a report entitled Construction d’une ville administrative satellite au Rocher Noir (Construction of a Satellite Administrative Town) and addressed to its directing committee. Th e CEDA stated that the document was based on a preliminary overall program (which had been defi ned on 27 February) and a sketch that envisaged the realization of the new city in three phases. Th e cost estimate amounted to 90,000,000 new French francs (NF) and was agreed upon during a meeting of 4 March 1961.615 Th is large sum was made instantly available by reducing or withdrawing a number of public- works projects in the region of Algiers to benefi t the construction of Rocher Noir. These cuts included the diminution of investments in civil constructions (including those for national education and the industrial sector), buildings for the Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS, or specialized administrative sections; Chapter 1), and various Beaux- Arts buildings.616 Other projects of public interest were abandoned overnight. Th ese included the construction of a museum of antiquity and Muslim art in Algiers, a crossroads near the government’s summer palace, an offi ce building for the public water and energy services, a number of constructions for the SAS and the camps de regroupement, and other
614 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Délégation Générale en Algérie, Direction des Travaux Publics, de la Construction, et des Transports, Administration Générale, Service Général. Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le 27 Février 1961 à 15 heures, dans le bureau de Monsieur Giraud, Directeur des Travaux Publics, de la Construction et des Transport. Object: Démarrage de l’opération—Rocher Noir. Alger le 3 Mars 1961, p. 2. 615 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Caisse d’Equipement pour le Développement de l’Algérie. Département de l’Equipement Public. Rapport au comité directeur. Object: Construction d’une ville administrative satellite au Rocher Noir. Séance du 15 Mars 1961, p. 1. 616 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Etat modifi ant le programme d’équipement de l’Algérie pour 1961.
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Fig. 5.6 Plan of the military zone of Rocher Noir and Reghaia in 1963. SHAT 1 H 1873 D 1. expenses related to administrative offi ces in Algiers.617 With the design of Rocher Noir—a town specifi cally designed for the representatives of French colonial power in Algeria—the French authorities suddenly overcame the bureaucratic machine. Rocher Noir was located in the Algerian municipalities of Corso and Bellefontaine. Bordered by the Oued (river) Merdès, the very small existing coastal agglomeration of Rocher Noir was served by two national highways (no. 24, which ran close to the Mediterranean Sea, and no. 5, which connected Algiers to Constantine, in eastern Algeria), a departmental road through the village of Bellefontaine, and a railway that connected Rocher Noir to Algiers. Th e selection of this fl at land was strategic not only because it had the advantage of being served by existing infrastructure, but also because it was relatively easy to connect the new town to basic services (water, electricity, and telecommunications) or to complete them if the infrastructure was not yet in place.618 What was not mentioned in the descriptive document on the construction of Rocher Noir was that the strategic site was close to Algiers’s airport, which was located in Maison Blanche (today Dar El Beida),
617 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Opérations retirées du programme d’équipement public au profi t du Rocher Noir. Alger, le 6 mars 1961. 618 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Le Rocher Noir: Construction d’une Cité Administrative Satellite.
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Figs. 5.7–5.8 Algiers “Week of Barricades” between 24 January and 1 February 1960. ECPAD ALG 60 40; ALG 60 49. and, more importantly, to the French Air Force base at Reghaia (a former US Air Force base).619 Th e air base had served as a refuge for French General Delegate of the French Government in Algeria Paul Delouvrier and Commander-in-Chief in Algeria General Maurice Challe during the Algiers insurrection known as the Semaine des barricades (the “Week of Barricades”) in Algiers between 24 January and 1 February 1960 (Figs. 5.7 –5.8). Th ree future members of the OAS, including the young Lagaillarde and Ortiz, had organized the insurrection in support of General Massu, who publically lashed out at de Gaulle in an interview with the Munich-based German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, which was published in January 1960. Th is outburst against the French president prompted Massu’s recall from Algeria. Like Salan, Lagaillarde and Ortiz were convicted but were granted amnesty in 1968.620 Th e meager and fragmented archival records on the genesis of Rocher Noir do not prove that the construction of a better-protected town for the French General Government in Algeria was discussed in the aftermath of the Week of the Barricades. According to Jean Morin, the fi rst attempt to isolate the General Delegation was undertaken by Delouvrier, but it failed.621 It is possible, however, to imagine that the life of French civil servants working in Algiers was threatened by the continuous violence of the French far-right
619 Robert A. Diamond, France under de Gaulle (New York: Facts on File, 1970), 30. 620 On the Week of Barricades, see Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962, pp. 349–372; Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, pp. 270–276. 621 Jean Morin, De Gaulle et l’Algérie: Mon témoignage, 1960–1962 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1999), p. 96.
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“ultras”—and not by Algerian liberation fi ghters—and that offi cials had considered fortifying Algiers or building a new fortifi ed city prior to the decision to launch the Rocher Noir operation. Claire Bachelot, wife of Bernard Bachelot (1930–2011), the Algiers-based French architect and collaborator of de Marien who served as the local architect for Rocher Noir, claimed that Rocher Noir was unceasingly and strictly surveyed by French military troops and that access to the town was guaranteed with a laissez-passer (a pass);622 that is, the town was guarded in a way that was similar to procedures at a fortifi ed military base. In his 1972 book Les sentiers de la paix: Algérie 1958–1962 (Th e Paths to Peace: Algeria 1958–1962), Bernard Tricot (1920–2000), one of the most infl uential advisors of General de Gaulle on Algerian aff airs (who had also settled in Rocher Noir in 1962), confi rmed the existence of fences and barbed wire around the new settlement. Tricot retrospectively described the new town as follows:
By the Mediterranean Sea was an ocher plateau where the wind whipped up dust, taken over by construction works, a few spots of greenery, building sites, and white constructions dominated by a water tower with geometrical forms, and an enclosure made of a double-high fence that ran between the watchtowers, which were illuminated at night; it was at once a new town, an administrative town, and a fortifi ed camp.623
Bachelot was born in Constantine. His relatives had settled in Algeria under French colonial rule in the 1850s. Like de Marien, he graduated from the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts in Paris in 1957, at the age of thirty-seven. His diploma project was entitled Hammam in Constantine (Figs. 5.9–5.10), with which he obtained some distinction. At the Beaux-Arts, Bachelot studied fi rst at the Atelier André Leconte and then at Atelier Eugène Beaudouin. Between 1952 and 1956, Bachelot collaborated with his professor at the Agence Eugène Beaudouin, where he met de Marien as he was working with Beaudouin
622 Claire Bachelot, interview with the author on 23 November 2015. Many thanks to Sophie Armand for organizing the meeting. 623 Bernard Tricot, Les sentiers de la paix. Algérie 1958–1962 (Paris: Plon, 1972), p. 310. [“Au bord de la Méditerranée, un plateau ocre où le vent faisait s’élever une lourde poussière du sol bouleversé par les travaux, quelques taches de verdures, des chantiers et des constructions blanches dominés par un château d’eau aux formes géométrique, une Enceinte faite d’un double et haut grillage qui courait entre les miradors et qui s’illuminait la nuit, à la fois ville nouvelle, cité administrative et camp retranché, tel était Rocher Noir, au printemps de 1962.”]
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Fig. 5.9–5.10 Hammam in Constantine, Bernard Bachelot’s diploma project at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux- Arts in Paris in 1957. AD HG 140 J.
the aforementioned student’s housing project.624 In April 1957, Bachelot was registered with the Order of Architects of the Circumscription of Algiers at number 420. Back in Algiers, which was suff ering in the midst of the bloody Battle of Algiers, the Nineteenth Regiment du Génie drafted Bachelot for eighteen months. He worked for the French military Direction des Travaux Spéciaux de Génie (DTSG, or Direction of Engineering and Special Works), which was charged with the design and construction of the site for nuclear tests at the military base of Reggane in Adrar Province in the Algerian Sahara (Fig. 5.11–5.14); the fi rst nuclear bomb was detonated on 13 February 1960. Bachelot worked for six months for the prolifi c architect Michel Luyckx (1903–1992), who had come to Algiers in 1934 for the construction of the Forum of the new GG building; he remained in Algeria until Algeria’s independence in 1962. While there, he built numerous projects, including Adrar’s Administrative and Health Center. Bachelot was also hired by the Agence du Plan d’Alger (Chapter 4). After his military service and before Rocher Noir, Bachelot was commissioned with the design of a number of housing projects in Algiers, including his fi rst built project, Le Bayard, with forty-fi ve apartments, and the villa of Pierre Chevallier, the son of Jacques Chevallier, which was directly commissioned by Jacques Chevallier— after having commissioned Fernand Pouillon to design his personal villa.625
624 Pascal Delétage, “Bernard Bachelot (Constantine, 1930–Toulouse): Parcours d’un architecte moderne” (Master 2 en Histoire de l’art, Université de Toulouse Le Mirail, 2007), pp. 25–37; Sophie Armand and Jean-Loup Marfaing, Bernard Bachelot. 1930–2011 (Toulouse: Conseil régional Midi-Pyrénées, 2013). Th e master’s thesis is accessible at the Archives of the Haute Garonne. 625 Ibid.
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Figs. 5. 11–5.14 French military base of Reggane in Adrar Province in the Algerian Sahara for nuclear tests.
With an area covering three hundred hectares, the future fortifi ed administrative city was expected to contain offi ces and seven thousand housing units for a population of thirty to thirty-fi ve thousand inhabitants. Th e fi rst two phases were supposed to accommodate four to fi ve thousand people (roughly one thousand families).626 Th e architecture projects for the fi rst twenty hectares—the fi rst step—included an offi ce building with a net usable area of four thousand square meters with a courtyard, a large parking area, and both individual and collective housing. Th e housing program was comprised of a large residence of nine hundred square meters for the General Delegate in Algeria, which included a private area and another area for receptions; three luxury residences of 380 square meters
626 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Le Rocher Noir: Construction d’une Cité Administrative Satellite, p. 1.
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each with the same concept; twelve residences of 160 square meters each, with six rooms for the directors; 130 villas for civil servants (78–130 square meters with four rooms, and 52–65 square meters with two rooms); fi nally, seventy “Logecos” (logements économiques et familiaux, or low-cost family housing units; Chapter 4) were to be built for personnel. A twenty-fi ve-room hotel of sixteen hundred square meters was also to be constructed for single people; all possible activities and services were envisaged for the hotel, including a cinema, a restaurant, shops, and a post offi ce. Th e area that was dedicated to offi ces also included space for Fig. 5.15 Sport facilities at Rocher Noir. leisure and sporting facilities, such as tennis, basketball, Daure and Béri’s apartment building in the background. ECPAD ALG 63 131. and, of course, the French game of pétanque (a bowling game similar to bocce; Fig. 5.15).627 Th e buildings for offi ces and dwellings were to be located on either side of a main avenue with a width of 10.5 meters. A major design principle was dictated by the very short timeframe for construction: “the very short deadline for the completion of the fi rst portion requires horizontal constructions—and thus also for housing and isolated or grouped villas—but according to a discontinuous order as a way to achieve as harmonious an ensemble as possible.”628 All of the building plans were also to use the same grid of 1.13 meters and its multiples, that is, 2.26, 3.39, and 4.52. Th ey were built of materials that were available on-site; the terraced ceilings included prefabricated materials. De Marien and Bachelot followed these strict guidelines accordingly, as we will discuss shortly (Figs. 5.16–5.20). Ironically, harmony was a characteristic that did not concern the French technocrats of the Plan de Constantine (Chapters 3 and 4). Th e objective of the second stage, which covered an area of sixteen to twenty hectares, was to build eight hundred offi ces and housing units, a health center and a
627 Ibid., p. 2. 628 Ibid. [“Le très court délai imparti pour la réalisation de la première tranche nécessite de réaliser des constructions à l’horizontal, donc pour les habitations notamment, des villas isolée ou groupés, mais suivant un ordre discontinu pour obtenir un ensemble aussi harmonieux que possible.”]
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Figs. 5.16 (top left) Construction site of Rocher Noir. AD HG 140 J 21. Fig. 5.17–5.20 First phase of Rocher Noir that was completed in 1961. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 26.
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conference room (both of four hundred square meters), a fi fteen-hundred-meter shopping center of fi fteen hundred square meters, and three types of schools; the schools included a socio-education center, an elementary school, and a middle school, with a maximum of forty classes in total for fi fteen hundred pupils. Th e fi rst classes were to begin in October 1961, at the start of the school year.629 Th e CEDA reported that the public contracting authorities for the offi ces and the housing of the fi rst step was the Direction des travaux publics, 2ème circonscription d’Alger (Public Works Department of the Second Circumscription of Algiers), while the authority in charge of the collective dwellings of the second phase was the Compagnie immobilière algérienne (CIA, or the Algerian Real Estate Company; Chapter 4). Th e architectural author of the project was the direct collaborator of SCET (as noted earlier, the Central Company for the Equipment of the Territory).630 A comprehensive organizational chart of the engineers, architects, professionals, and companies involved in the Rocher Noir project shows that de Marien was assisted by Bachelot, and Bachelot was in turn assisted by two other architects named Dufour and Gauthier (Fig. 5.21). Th e CEDA also asserted that the construction companies would be selected on the basis of “a market of mutual agreement on unoffi cial calls for off er from important fi rms of Algiers that are currently underemployed.”631 Th e design of half of the eight hundred housing units of the second phase of Rocher Noir was commissioned to a partner (an habitué) of the CIA: the French architects Alexis Daure and Henri Béri, who had demonstrated their capacities through their rapid production of mass-housing projects in Algeria with the Plan de Constantine (Chapter 4). At Tovher Noir, between May 1961 and February 1962, the two architects built ten housing buildings of two to four stories each, covering an area of 109,000 square meters (Fig. 5.22). Th e number of rooms of the housing units ranged from a minimum of three rooms (57 square meters) to a maximum of fi ve rooms (85 square meters; Fig. 5.23–
629 Ibid., p. 3. 630 ANFPFSS. F/60/4032. Caisse d’Equipement pour le Développement de l’Algérie. Département de l’Equipement Public. Rapport au comité directeur. Construction d’une ville administrative satellite au Rocher Noir. Séance du 15 Mars 1961, pp. 2–3. 631 Ibid., p. 3. [“Par marché de gré à gré sur appel d’off re offi cieux auprès des entreprises importantes d’Alger actuellement en sous-emploi.”] Th e underemploment was caused by the war, the OAS, and the allocation of existing construction funds for the benefi t of Rocher Noir, as mentioned earlier.
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Fig. 5.21 Organization chart of the construction of Rocher Noir. ADHG 140 J 21.
5.24) Th e architects argued that the L and U shapes of the buildings defi ned “free spaces sheltered from the wind; the overlap produces a large variety of perspectives.”632 Th is aesthetic component was rarely considered within the housing projects built for the Plan de Constantine. In addition, the discontinuity of the buildings at Rocher Noir, which was expected to add harmony to the new town, coincided with the formal requests by the French authorities. Th e second half of the collective-housing program was commissioned to Georges Bize, Jacques Ducollet, and Jacques Vidal (Fig. 5.28). Rocher Noir, the most rapidly built construction site in Algeria (and most
632 Album of projects by Daure and Béri in Algeria donated to the author by Josette Daure. [“Des espaces libres abrités du vent, dont l’imbrication ménage de grandes variétés de perspectives.”]
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Figs. 5.22–5.24 (left) Plans of apartment buildings designed by Daure and Béri in Rocher Noir. From Daure and Béri private album donated by Josette Daure to the author.
Figs. 5.25–5.27 (right) Elevation and photographs of Daure and Béri housing units in Rocher Noir. From Daure and Béri private album donated by Josette Daure to the author.
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Fig. 5.28 Rocher Noir’s housing projects designed by Daure and Béri (top) and Bize, Ducollet, and Vidal (bottom). FR ANOM 81 F 452. likely in France, as well), was inaugurated on 25 November 1961. In an undated and anonymous press article entitled “La nouvelle capitale administrative de l’Algérie” (“Th e New Administrative Capital of Algeria”), the journalist emphasized that after the general public had become familiar with the massive silhouette of the GG building by means of the frequent television news and press photographs, the French government had decided to change its main headquarters. Th e author of the article argued that because “this building had served as the main setting for the events that marked the political destiny of France, [the general public] had not always understood the reasons behind changing the location of the central [French] government in Algeria, a change that nevertheless refl ects a profound reform, both political and administrative.”633 Th e journalist attempted to search for Rocher Noir’s raison d’être in the offi cial speech by Jean Morin, the last General Delegate in Algeria, that he delivered during the inauguration of Rocher Noir.
633 FR ANOM. 81 F 452. La nouvelle capitale administrative de l’Algérie. [“Ce bâtiment a servi de cadre principal à des évènements qui ont marqué le destin politique de la France, [le public] n’a pas toujours compris les raisons de ce changement d’implantation des administrations centrales de l’Algérie, changement qui traduit pourtant une réforme profonde, à la fois politique et administrative.”]
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 345
Morin had argued that with the institution of the new capital of the French government in Algeria, the government was relieved of any kind of pressure; he stressed that politically, “the resolution of France was well declared: if it was to break with a long history and pursue the path of political development, it was ultimately necessary to restore the balance between the Algiers region and its peers, Constantine and Oran.”634 Morin added that administratively speaking, “our policy of devolution [déconcentration] and decentralization equally imposed a profound transformation of the General Delegation and its transfer out of Algiers.”635 Both the simulated alibi of the regional development that the Plan de Constantine promoted and the unspoken security issues that the skillful French murderers of the OAS had provoked in Algiers incited the French government to design and build Rocher Noir. Th is was a sign that France was still determined to remain in Algeria, even at the cost of decelerating the already-launched (and very optimistic) industrialization projects. Morin and the general public were aware of de Gaulle’s declarations about Algeria’s self- determination. And, in the wake of the failure of the French-Algerian negotiations of 1960, de Gaulle and a handful of carefully selected members of his government engaged in secret meetings with the aforementioned GPRA (the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) in Switzerland in February 1961—while the administrative city of Rocher Noir was being designed. To this end, Rocher Noir secured the French continuation of the colonial project and hosted the committee that was mandated with the transition to Algerian independence. Rocher Noir served as the offi cial headquarters for this turning point, as Article 9 of the Evian Agreements stated: “Th e headquarters of the commission of the ceasefi re will be set at Rocher Noir,”636 as will be discussed shortly. Th e safety of the construction site of Rocher Noir was ensured by military troops who patrolled the boundaries of Rocher Noir by night—since it was part of the systematic protection system of the military sector of Ain-Taya Maison Blanche—but they provided
634 Jean Morin, cited in ibid. [“Il était encore nécessaire que, par l’institution de cette cité, la résolution de la France fut bien affi rmé de rompre avec un long passé et de poursuivre dans la voie de l’évolution politique, il était enfi n nécessaire que l’équilibre fût rétabli entre la région d’Alger et ses égales, les régions de Constantine et d’Oran.”] 635 Ibid. [“Notre politique de déconcentration et de décentralisation imposait tout autant la transformation profonde de la Délégation Générale que son transfert hors de la ville.”] 636 FR ANOM. 19770828/14. Les Accords d’Evian. Textes et Commentaires. La documentation française, 1962, p. 6. [“Le siège de la commission mixte du cessez-le-feu sera fi xé Rocher-Noir.”]
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no protection during the day.637 In a letter of 12 June 1961 on the protection des chantiers du Rocher Noir (“the protection of the construction sites of Rocher Noir”), the engineer- in-chief of the department of civil engineering responsible for the Rocher Noir, urged the general director of Public Works, Hydraulics, and Construction to undertake the internal protection of the construction site, since the army offi cers did not guarantee the site’s safety. He recalled that during the meeting of 17 April 1961 at Rocher Noir, the attendees agreed that the civil services would build an illuminated barbed-wire fence, while the military authorities would guard the site outside the fortifi ed barrier. He confi rmed that “the barbed-wire fence was immediately undertaken. Night lighting for the perimeter defi ned by the line of the barbed wire should be achieved soon, with the likely engineering support.”638 Th e engineer-in-chief argued that these defense measures were insuffi cient, and that continual internal surveillance of the construction site was urgently required. He offi cially requested a permanent police presence on-site on several occasions, but he regretted to report that “nothing has been done so far. We can now expect incidents or attacks, especially since the building site is fully operational.”639 Th e OAS’s sophisticated intelligence, powerful killing machinery, and growing numbers of supporters facilitated the attacks that it carried out against France’s new fortifi ed city, as well as against Algerian and French people in Algeria and France. According to one OAS advocate, the OAS was “a state of mind”640 instead of a political party; he was eager to relate his version of OAS terrors in a book published as early as 1962. He asserted that multiple sabotage attempts and bombs were planned at Rocher Noir, and that a few had already succeeded, including those that targeted the post offi ce and the villa of Jean Morin, and a few others had failed. He argued that the OAS’s primary goals were to obliterate Rocher Noir and to murder de Gaulle (Figs. 5.29 –5.34).641
637 FR ANOM. 15 CAB 91. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Cabinet Militaire. Note pour Monsieur Rodier, Chef du Cabinet Civil. Object: Protection du chantier du Rocher-Noir. Alger, le 20 juin 1961. 638 FR ANOM. 15 CAB 91. Pont et Chaussées, Département d’Alger, 2ème circonscription, M. Pierre Boilot, ingénieur en chef à Monsieur le Directeur Général des Travaux Publics, de l’Hydraulique et de la Construction. Objet: Protection des chantiers du Rocher Noir, Alger, le 12 juin 1961. [“La clôture en barbelé a été réalisée immédiatement. L’éclairage nocturne du périmètre défi ni par la ligne du fi l de fer barbelé doit être réalisé prochainement avec l’aide probable du génie.”] 639 Ibid. [“Rien n’a été fait, jusqu’à présent. On peut craindre maintenant des incidents ou des attentats, d’autant plus que le chantier est en pleine activité.”] 640 Axel Nicol, La Bataille de L’OAS (Paris: Editions des Sept Couleurs, 1962), p. 8. [“L’OAS est un état d’âme.”] 641 Ibid., p. 199.
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Figs. 5.29–5.34 OAS slogans in Algeria.
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In a fi ve-page document titled Rapport sur les dégâts causés à la villa K par l’explosion du 29 juillet 1961 (“Report on the Damages to Villa K Caused by the Explosion of 29 July 1961”), de Marien inventoried the destruction within the underground section and the ground fl oor of the recently built house (Fig. 5.35). He wrote that the explosion had “degraded the works without dispersing them,”642 and listed the immediate interventions that he deemed necessary to repair the damage to the walls, fl oors, ceilings, and other structural elements. De Marien forbade access to the insecure building site, however, and ordered that the structure be shored up before starting the cleanup and demolition from the top (Figs. 5.36–5.41).643 Due to the multiplicity of its supporters, the OAS also managed to detonate another bomb at the fortifi ed Rocher Noir on the night of 14 November 1961. In the description of the “Aff aire du ‘plastiquage’ du ‘Rocher Noir’” (Th e Rocher Noir bombing aff air”) that was part of documents to assess French police activities against the OAS of early 1962, the three authors of this violent explosion were identifi ed. One of the three Frenchmen, who was also the chief of this sabotage operation, was the site manager of the metals construction company Arendt, which was operating at Rocher Noir.644 Arendt’s employee was assisted by a Rocher Noir guard.645 As a result of these off ensives, the French authorities were compelled to consider the French and European populations, including those involved in designing and building Rocher Noir, as potential suspects. Ironically, the same dynamic had occurred with the Algerian population at the onset of the Algerian Revolution and throughout the course of the war for Algeria (Chapter 1).
642 ADHG. 140 J 21. CAS Rocher Noir. Rapport sur les dégâts causés à la villa K par l’explosion du 29 juillet 1961. Alger, le 31 juillet 1961. Po L. de Marien, p. 1. 643 Ibid., p. 4. 644 Archives de la Fondation Charles de Gaulle (hereafter “AFCDG”). F 45 3. Mission C, Decembre 1961–1962. Lutte contre l’OAS. Bilan de l’activité de la police dans la lutte contre l’OAS du 1er au 11 janvier 1962. Annexe 1, l’Aff aire Aff aire du “plastiquage” du “Rocher Noir.” Th e three men were Hans Krull, born in 1933 in Germany; Maurice Chapellon (who worked for Arendt), born in 1934 in France; and Lucien Aquilina, born in 1918 in Algeria. 645 Ibid.
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Fig. 5.36–5.41 Explosion in Rocher Noir photographed by architect Louis de Hoÿm de Marien. AD HG 156 J.
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5.1 Building a New French Headquarters
Th e survivings plans for Rocher Noir that were preserved by Louis Gabriel de Hoÿm de Marien indicate that the architect had designed two versions of the master plan for the fortifi ed city.646 Th e fi rst plan for the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria was inspired by the French tradition of town and garden planning. Th e plan recalled the Beaux-Arts symmetry and geometry of the gardens of the château of Versailles, designed by André Le Nôtre (1613–1700) for Louis XIV. Th e straight and wide avenues, the impressive length of the view from the monumental point de vue (outlook), and the central axes are symbols of these kinds of imperial planning patterns. De Marien replaced the plants with a series of buildings that were positioned within large squares, which might have evoked the Super Quadras of Lucio Costa’s (1902–1998) plan for Brasilia (constructed 1956–1960), the new federal capital of Brazil. Th is plan was not adopted, however (Fig. 5.42). Th e second plan for Rocher Noir aimed to fulfi ll various functional characteristics dictated by the representatives of the French authorities in Algeria. Organized along one main axis and emerging in green spaces, the various city sectors were fi xed from the start and were designed to accommodate one specifi c activity, such as administration, housing, education, leisure, health care, commerce, or parking (Fig. 5.43). Contrary to the fi rst plan (and indeed to most capital cities), the resulting blueprint was a less monumental plan that lacked a particular vision; it was instead a collage of necessary facilities that were contained in diff erent structures designed either by de Marien himself or by other French architects who were already active in Algiers. In a coordination meeting on the planning and organization of the administrative satellite city, the French representatives of various organizations: Commissariat of the Plan, Civil Engineering, Service of Architecture, Civil Cabinet of the General Delegate, Service of Equipment, and the SCET—in the presence of de Marien and Bachelot—deliberated on a list of necessary public buildings and appointed architects for their immediate design. Th e memorandum of the meeting indicates that before examining the nature of these
646 Th e plans can be consulted at the Archives départementales de la Haute Garonne in Toulouse.
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Fig. 5.42 Plan for Rocher Noir designed by Louis de Hoÿm de Marien. AD HG 156 J. administrative facilities, the attendees decided to create what they had called the trames d’acceuil (“sites and services”; literally, reception roster) for the Algerian populations. As they argued, “the presence of the CAS [cité administrative satellite, or administrative satellite city] will inevitably result in the establishment of a bidonville [shantytown]. It is preferable to plan the location of this shantytown now in order to channel the people who will move near the new town.”647 To monitor this community, de Marien proposed locating the future cité d’accueil (a reception neighborhood) outside of Rocher Noir, on the other side of the river; such a neighborhood was designed accordingly. Th e French
647 AD HG. 140 J 21. Création d’une ville administrative sattelite au Rocher noir, Memorandum, p. 1. [“La présence de la CAS entraînera inévitablement la naissance d’un bidonville. Il est préférable de prévoir dès maintenant, l’emplacement de ce bidonville, afi n d’y canaliser les populations qui viendront s’installer vers la Nouvelle Ville.”] According to the French authorities, these people would most likely come from the Kabylia region.
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Fig. 5.43 Distribution of functions and activities in Rocher Noir. AD HG 156 J.
Pages 354–355:: Fig. 5.44 Master Plan for Rocher Noir designed by de Marien. AD HG 156 J.
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authorities had requested that they place the headquarters of the Groupes mobiles de sécurité (GMS, or mobile security groups), a reserve of the French army specifi cally created during the Algerian War of Independence, in the immediate vicinity of the cité d’accueil (Fig. 5.44). Ironically, de Marien’s design for the cité d’accueil recalls both semi-urban housing (Chapter 3) and the permanent camps de regroupement (Chapter 4). Th e list of required buildings included a large array of structures, including:
• a commercial center, health center, and poste de garde (control room) at the entrance of the fortifi ed city; • a conference center, sports club, and various green and leisure spaces, which were to be designed by de Marien; • the headquarters of the Compagnies républicaines de sécurité (CRS, or Republican Security Companies)—riot-control forces, a reserve of the French National Police—was commissioned to the French architects Marcel Lathuillière (Chapter 3) and Nicola di Martino; • the thousand-square-meter police headquarters, which was also to be completed by Lathuillière; • a high school, which was to be co-designed by Bachelot and de Marien; and • a prefabricated elementary school, which was to be completed by the Service of Architecture of the General Delegation.
Although the budgets for the city hall, the telephone exchange, and the post offi ce had still not been allotted, the rest of the plan for these various functions was achieved accordingly.648 Th e systematic plan indicates that in addition to these facilities, the French authorities also envisioned dedicating a large area to religious and cultural activities: not only for the Catholic and Jewish communities, but also for the Muslim population, including a Muslim graveyard (Fig. 5.44). On 21 October 1961, the engineer-in-chief of the civil engineering department of the General Delegation defi ned the areas that were supposed to be devoted to the various faiths in a letter to the director of the SCET. He
648 Ibid.
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proposed providing fi ve thousand square meters to the Catholics, fi ve thousand square meters to the Muslims, three thousand square meters to the Jewish community, and two thousand square meters to the Protestants.649 Th is symbolic, yet unprecedented, juxtaposition of the religions that coexisted in Algeria under French rule was never implemented. Th is was also the case for other projected public buildings, such as those designed by Lathuillière. Th e completed buildings of Rocher Noir are clearly visible in the aerial photographs of the French military reconnaissance operation of April 1963, less than a year after Algeria’s independence. Th e photographs reveal that not only was the plan ultimately adopted faithfully to de Marien’s second master plan, but also that the third phase was never completed (Figs. 5.45–5.49). In addition to this evidence, de Marien photographed the construction site and the realization of his fi rst colossal city-planning project. Unlike other related documents, de Marien preserved visual records that, in addition to recording his architecture, expose a few aspects of the conditions in which this rushed politico- military city was built (Figs. 5.50–5.63). Some of these photographs indicate that during
649 AD HG. 140 J 21. L’ingénieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées à Monsieur le Directeur de la SCET. Objet: Ville administrative du Rocher Noir: Exercice des cultes. Alger, le 21 octobre 1961.
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Military aerial photographs of Rocher Noir. Figs. 5.45–5.47 (top) SHAT MO164 of 23 April 1963.
Next page: Figs. 5.48,5.49 (bottom) . SHAT AV136 of 8 April 1963.
one of his fi rst trips to the site of the future city, de Marien visited the housing projects designed by Pouillon in Algiers. Th is visit suggests that de Marien was attracted either by Pouillon’s architecture or by his fast and effi cient construction methods; de Marien’s design for Rocher Noir, however, was not infl uenced by Pouillon’s work. Unlike de Marien, Bachelot did not keep any photographs he might have taken during the implementation of de Marien’s plans. During this process of construction of France’s hastiest city-planning project, French architecture magazines showed little interest in publishing the plans of Rocher Noir. In 1961, a handful of photographs were published in a special issue of Urbanisme dedicated to the Plan de Constantine and the large planning and housing projects in Algeria. In his article Lignes de force de l’aménagement général du territoire (“Guidelines of General Spatial Planning”) published in Urbanisme, Jean Vibert, former director of the Plan in Algeria and general secretary of the Conseil supérieur du plan (High Council of the Plan), stated that the new town of Rocher Noir was planned in order to enforce the policy of decentralization and to relieve Algiers from a massive population infl ux. He also mentioned the legacy between Rocher Noir and the new large industrial area of Reghaia- Rouiba (Chapter 4), and their immediate proximity to the highway, railway, harbor, the
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school of agriculture, the military base, farmland, and the aerodrome. Vibert argued, or justifi ed, that:
Th e central organizations will be based at Rocher Noir, fi fty kilometers from Algiers, which will leave the center of the city to those activities that cannot move away from the port. Th e choice of the location of the administrative city might have engendered criticism—the plan has located it to the west rather than to the east of the city—and its principle might have provoked suspicion of ulterior political motives, but the fact remains that under the threat of city congestion, it is necessary to fi rst move the services or activities away that do not absolutely need to occupy the central areas and the environs of the harbor.650
In contrast to this appeal, the Swiss-born architect Jean-Jacques Deluz, who was in Algiers at the time of the decision-making, criticism, debates, and construction of Rocher Noir, provided a diff erent interpretation. In the last part of his 1980 article titled “Alger 1962: L’héritage” (“Algiers 1962: Heritage”), Deluz criticized the authoritarian planning and mediocre architecture of the “technocrats of de Gaulle’s regime,” as he labeled them, and of the Plan de Constantine. He precisely summarized and denounced with full knowledge of the facts the particularities of Rocher Noir, the French “ville fantôme” (ghost city), arguing:
Th e most surprising operation, which concludes this last period of French colonization, is that of Rocher Noir (today Bou Merdès), a rare case of a deliberately ephemeral town. Th e technocrats of power, demonstrating here a cynicism and a lucidity that one could almost admire, decided to build a “capital” whose life will be that of the troubled period that is expected during the transfer of power. By 1961, all credits were channeled to this false city; all operations were frozen to its advantage. De Marien, architect Prix de Rome, but insignifi cant, was appointed; they chose a site in eastern Algiers, accessible from the airport but without contact with Algiers. And,
650 Vibert, “Lignes de force de l’aménagement général du territoire,” p. 7. [“Les organismes centraux vont s’installer au Rocher Noir, à 50 kilometres d’Alger, et laisser le centre de la ville aux activités qui ne peuvent s’éloigner du port. Le choix de l’emplacement de cette cité administrative a pu susciter des critiques—le plan l’aurait placé à l’ouest plutôt qu’à l’est de la ville—et son principe a pu faire suspecter des arrières pensées politiques, mais il demeure que dans une ville menacée d’engorgement il faut d’abord extirper les services ou activités qui n’ont pas un besoin impérieux d’occuper les quartiers centraux et les abords du port.”]
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Figs. 5.50–5.57 Th e construction of Rocher Noir photographed by de Marien. AD HG 156 J.
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while the metropolitan area was living amid the turmoil of the putsch, assassinations, and repressions; the growing rumor of the Muslim people rising from the ghettos; and the carcasses of abandoned buildings marking out the entire suburban landscape, Rocher Noir lived day and night in the fever of a delirious construction site, which was eff ectively completed within the allotted deadlines… Th en this city became that which it was planned to be: a ghost town abandoned in a grandiose landscape, but without poetry, without architecture, without history.651
Th is long but signifi cant and comprehensive quotation refl ects not only the politico- military complexities of the situation in which Rocher Noir had been hurriedly built— after and despite all other projects—but also the mediocrity of its master plan and its architecture, which later became a ruin. In the same issue of Urbanisme, another Swiss-born architect, Pierre-André Emery, the leader of the Algiers-CIAM (Congrès internationaux d’architecture moderne) group, published his article “L’architecture moderne en Algérie: 1930–1962.” Emery mentioned the construction of Rocher Noir without commenting on its architectural characteristics or planning specifi cities, asserting instead that “the ultimate attempt of the General Delegation of the government in Algeria was the creation of a satellite administrative town, the ‘Rocher Noir,’ fi fty kilometers east of Algiers. It was hardly completed at the time of the declaration of independence.”652 During the hurried design and construction of Rocher Noir, various Algiers-based French newspapers reported the evolution of the government’s endeavor and questioned the role of such a capital. In an early article of 13 February 1961 titled “Le Rocher Noir,
651 Jean-Jacques Deluz, “Alger 1962: L’héritage,” Techniques & Architecture, no. 329 (March 1980), p. 46. [“L’opération la plus surprenante, qui conclut cette dernière époque de la colonisation française, c’est celle du Rocher Noir (actuel Bou Merdès), cas rare de ville éphémère délibérée. Les technocrates du pouvoir, faisant preuve ici d’un cynisme et d’une lucidité, qu’on admirerait presque, décident de construire une ‘capitale’ dont la vie sera celle de la période troublée que l’on prévoit pour la passation des pouvoirs. Dès 1961, tous les crédits sont canalisés vers cette fausse ville, toutes les opérations sont gelées à son profi t. On fi t appel à De Marien, architecte prix de Rome sans envergure, on choisit un site à l’est d’Alger, accessible de l’aérodrome sans contact avec Alger. Et, alors que l’agglomération vivait dans les soubresauts des putsch, des assassinats et des répressions, que la rumeur croissante du peuple musulman s’élevait des ghettos, que les carcasses des immeubles abandonnés jalonnaient tout le paysage suburbain, Rocher Noir vivait jour et nuit dans la fi èvre d’un chantier délirant, qui fut eff ectivement terminé dans le temps imparti: le gouvernement provisoire y siégea quelques semaines... Puis cette ville fut ce qu’il était prévu qu’elle soit, une ville fantôme abandonnée dans un paysage grandiose—mais sans poésie, sans architecture, sans histoire.”] 652 Pierre-André Emery, “L’architecture moderne en Algérie: 1930–1962,” Techniques & Architecture, no. 329 (March 1980): 57. [“La dernière tentative de la Délégation générale du Gouvernement en Algérie a été la création d’une cité administrative satellite, le ‘Rocher Noir,’ à une cinquante de kilomètres à l’est d’Alger. Elle était à peine terminée au moment de la déclaration de l’indépendance.”]
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deviendra-t-il une capital” (“Will Rocher Noir Become a Capital?”) in the Dépèche Quotidienne d’Algérie, the writer stated that the only offi cial information about Rocher Noir’s rumors was that the name Algéria had been given to the future capital of the French government in Algeria. Th is name was, luckily, never adopted.653 Th e titles of other articles had announced (or denounced) one or another of the multifaceted aspects of the new city, such as: • “Opération Rocher Noir: d’abord cité administrative, ensuite: ville nouvelle de 30,000 habitants” (“Operation Rocher Noir: First an Administrative City, then a New City for 30,000 Inhabitants”); • “Pour être prêt le 31 août on travaille à trois postes sur certains chantiers de villas” (“To Be Ready on 31 August, Th ree Shifts Are Operating in Certain Villas’ Building Sites”); • “Un hôtel de 25 chambres et un restaurant de 200 couverts permettront d’accueillir tous ceux qui auront à faire dans la nouvelles cité administrative du Rocher Noir” (“A Hotel of Twenty-Five Rooms and a Restaurant Seating Two Hundred Will Welcome All Th ose Who Have to Deal with the New Administrative City of Rocher Noir”); • “Le réservoir de 2,000 m3 ‘monte’ de 90 cm par jour” (“Th e 2,000-Cubic- Meter Water Tank ‘Goes Up’ 90 Centimeter per Day”); or • “800 Logements en 8 mois au Rocher Noir” (“Eight Hundred Dwellings in Eight Months at Rocher Noir”).654
Th e future ghost city was estimated to cost 90,000,000 NF, as mentioned earlier; this included the expenses related to the design and construction works and the acquisition of land. Th e total honorarium for de Marien alone was more than 1,000,000 NF. Th e SCET paid the fi rst installment of 95,000 NF in 1960,655 the second of 552,179 NF in 1961,656 and the fi nal payment of 404,713 NF in 1962. In addition, the General Treasury of Algiers made two further payments in 1962, the fi rst of 128,322 NF to pay for the city’s
653 FR ANOM. 9113 3 F 1. Le Rocher Noir, deviendra-t-il une capital? 654 AD HG. 140 J 21. Newspaper articles collected by Bachelot. 655 AD HG. 156 J. Louis de Hoÿm de Marien. Relevé des honoraires pour 1960. 656 AD HG. 156 J. Société Central pour l’Equipement du Territoire. Attestation. Alger, le 24 Janvier 1963.
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offi cers and a second one of 38,092 NF for a twenty-four-classroom school.657 De Marien travelled twice a month to Algiers on average, and attended the coordination meetings at Rocher Noir’s construction site every fi fteen days. He was also permanently represented on-site by one to two employees who went back to Paris once a month.658 Bachelot instead attended the weekly meetings at Rocher Noir. His monthly fee was approximately 5,000 NF, which de Marien paid him with monthly checks between April 1961 and April 1962,659 at a time when Bachelot was no longer authorized to access the construction site of Rocher Noir and had to leave Algeria immediately.660 In one year, Bachelot’s fee amounted to 60,000 NF—very little compared to de Marien’s excessive remuneration. De Marien and Bachelot had agreed upon this sum in May 1961. De Marien confi rmed the fl at rate in a letter of 9 May 1961 to Bachelot, in which he also listed Bachelot’s tasks. Th ese included acting as the liaison with the French administration in Algiers, the SCET, and the construction companies; attending the site meetings; and directing works for the fi rst and second phases, which were comprised of fty-twofi dwellings of two rooms, seventy dwellings of three rooms, seventy-eight units of four rooms, three L-type villas, twelve K-type villas, the residence of the General Delegate, a hotel, a restaurant, the fi rst stage of the offi ce building for one hundred fifty employees, and the second phase of the offi ce buildings for eight hundred employees.661 A few months after their agreement, Bachelot was overwhelmed by unforeseen tasks. In a letter to de Marien of 26 February 1962, Bachelot explained that due to political exigencies, he had been compelled to be at the Rocher Noir construction site four times in the past two weeks; he therefore asked de Marien to reconsider his pay, due to the change of programs and to the additional workload that no longer corresponded to their mutual initial agreement. Bachelot wrote: “the last few days augur new working conditions. I think at this moment that it is impossible for me, with a remuneration of 5,000 NF, to carry out the completion of the health center, the construction of the shopping mall, and
657 AD HG. 156 J. Louis de Hoÿm de Marien. 1962—Recettes. 658 AD HG. 156 J. Declaration of taxes for 1961. A letter explaing the high expenses of the architecture offi ce of de Marien due to Rocher Noir and the trips to Algiers. Paris, 25 June 1962. Mrs. Claire Bachelot also remembered de Marien coming to Algiers every two weeks. 659 AD HG. 140 J 4. Livre journal des dépôts et des dépenses 1959–1962 de Bernard Bachelot. 660 Interview with Claire Bachelot. Most likely because Bachelot also became a suspect. 661 AD HG. 140 J 21. Letter from de Marien to Bachelor. Paris, 9 May 1961.
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the construction of the two aforementioned works [second and third phases of the offi ce- building projects].”662 Bachelot proposed that de Marien increase his monthly fee by an additional 2,000 NF until the completion of the works in June or July of 1962. De Marien rejected Bachelot’s request, arguing in his letter to Bachelot of 26 March 1962: “I have already told you, my dear Bachelot, that since the beginning, I was afraid that the building site would be more interesting to me from the study and realization viewpoints than from a fi nancial viewpoint, and the year-end accounts have confi rmed that fear.”663 De Marien continued that it was impossible for him to satisfy Bachelot’s demands, because “the advances that I am providing at this moment for the design of the third phase of the offi ce building and the high school are too important for me to add not only an increase, but also an extension of the duration of your payments, especially since I still have no insurance on the implementation of these two programs.”664 De Marien indicated that he would contact the SCET and ask them to hire Bachelot directly for the surveillance of the construction of other possible future buildings at Rocher Noir. Th e twenty-fi ve hundred Algerian workers who built Rocher Noir and who worked for one of the twenty French construction companies (including Perret Frères, who built the GG headquarters in the center of Algiers665) were confronted with extremely precarious conditions. On 1 July 1961, workers had protested against their unacceptable working environment, which the military authorities had reported on. Th e report revealed that the workers’ fees were substandard, the site lacked potable water, and that the workers were not being provided with a lunch allowance. Th e offi cer who wrote the report stated that “I discovered the living conditions in the camps: dirt, tents without beds, no garbage
662 AD HG. 140 J 21. Letter from Bachelot to de Marien. Algiers, 26 February 1962. [“Les derniers jours passés laissent augurer des conditions nouvelles de travail. Je pense, maintenant, qu’il me sera impossible de m’acquitter, pour la rémunération de 5000 NF de: la fi nition du dispensaire, la construction de la salle de conférence, la réception du centre commercial, la réception des deux autres ouvrages précédemment cités.”] 663 AD HG. 140 J 21. Letter from de Marien to Bachelot. Algiers, 26 March 1962. [“Je t’ai déjà dit, Mon Cher Bachelot, combien depuis le début je craignais que le chantier soit pour moi plus intéressant du point de vue étude et réalisation que du point de vue pécuniaire et les comptes de fi n d’année viennent malheureusement confi rmer cette crainte.”] 664 Ibid. [“Car les avances que je fournis en ce moment pour les études des bureaux 3ème stade et du lycée sont trop importantes pour que je puisse y ajouter non seulement une augmentation mais un prolongement de la cadence de tes versements, d’autant plus que je n’ai aucune assurance, ce jour, sur la réalisation de ces deux programmes.”] 665 AD HG. 140 J 21. Opéartion Rocher Noir. Réunicion de chantier. In an attempt to accelerate the construction of Rocher Noir, companies were requested to collaborate. Th e entreprises included ENAC, Nord-France, Laurent, Houdry, Perret, Omnium, Socolon, Segan, Ballot, Badaracchi, and Sotrafom.
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collection, etc.”666 He continued to denounce the presence of combines (schemes or rackets) in what he called camps that some of the building-site chiefs were involved in. He revealed that the chiefs compelled workers to pay a fee in exchange for being hired. Th e French civil authorities, unsurprisingly, denied these facts. A report from 29 July 1961 on a survey that the Health, Safety, and Labor Inspection of the General Delegation in Algeria conducted claimed that “although hygiene and safety may be poor, we cannot affi rm that they are alarming or that they could cause serious disorders, as the military authorities have suggested.”667 Th e principal inspector of labor (the author of the document) argued that the workers’ remuneration depended on their skills, as well as the wage category of the area of the building site. Th eir salaries varied between 1.06 NF per hour for unskilled laborers and 3 NF per hour for those who were better skilled. He asserted that the laborers did indeed have access to a canteen, and that the price of one meal was 5 NF—equivalent to fi ve hours of hard work under the Algerian sun for those who were deemed insuffi ciently skilled.668 Th e inspector reported that “following the intervention of an SAS offi cer who pointed out to [the workers] that they were in the third wage area, they have resumed work.”669 Th e presence of an SAS offi cer on the construction site of Rocher Noir suggests that Algerian workers were most likely hired on from the camps de regroupement (Chapters 1 and 2), which were located in eastern Algiers. Th e right to one-day-a-week breaks was also suspended, and workers were requested to work seven days a week. Th is suddenly became possible by enforcing the existing Article no. 49 of the labor code, which had been implemented in France in September 1939 (at the beginning of the Second World War), which decreed that “in state establishments, as well as in those where construction works are carried out on behalf of the state, and in the interest of national defense, weekly rest breaks may be temporarily suspended by the
666 FR ANOM. 1K 1183. Le Capitaine Maltre, Commandant la 2e Batterie et le Sous-Quartier de Bellefontaine à Monsieur le Chef d’Escadron, Commandant le 1/405° RAA et le Quartier Alma-Menerville. Object: Compte rendu concernant le Rocher Noir. [“J’ai pu me rendre compte des conditions de vie régnant dans les camps, tentes sans lit piset, saleté, pas de ramassage d’ordures, etc...”] 667 Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer. 1 K 1183. Délégation générale en Algérie, Inspection du travail et de la main- d’œuvre d’Alger et Titteri, Objet: Conditions de travail sur les chantiers du Rocher Noir. Alger, le 29 juillet 1961. [“Si les conditions d’hygiène et de sécurité laissent à désirer, on ne peut pas affi rmer qu’elles sont alarmantes et susceptibles de provoquer des troubles graves comme semble l’indiquer l’autorité militaire.”] 668 Ibid. 669 Ibid. [“A la suite de l’intervention d’un offi cier SAS qui leur a fait remarquer qu’ils travaillaient en troisième zone de salaire, les intéressés ont repris le travail.”]
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 367
relevant authorities.”670 To this end, Rocher Noir was a city erected for the purpose of national defense, a city built for and during a colonial war, a “war city.”. Among the buildings that Algerian workers had built were the villas for French civil servants and for Jean Morin. Th e photographs of these low-rise housing units indicate that de Marien used the same prefabricated elements—as recommended by the French authorities, as mentioned earlier—to defi ne and shape the various modular units. He treated the construction of the villa for the General Delegation, the villas for the directors and general secretaries of public services at the General Delegation, and the dwellings for the civil servants and hotel and restaurant workers alike. Th e structural vaulted roofs, which suited the prerequisite of accelerating the construction of these buildings, characterized de Marien’s architecture for Rocher Noir. Th e repetitive and identical vaults referred to the existing French architecture in Algeria, which referred, in turn, to the vaults of the architecture in the broader Mediterranean region. In Algiers under French rule, vaulted arches (either as a structural or prefabricated element) defi ned the spatial rhythm of a number of projects, including the military fortifi cation of the seafront of the Boulevard de l’Impératrice (later the Boulevard de la République; today Avenue Ernesto Che Guevara) that connected Algiers Harbor and the Place du Gouvernement (today Place des Martyrs, or Martyrdom Square) in the 1850s, a century before the Algerian War of Independence (Fig. 5.64). Another project was Roland Simounet’s design for the dwellings of the cité de transit (temporary transitional housing complex) called Djenan el-Hassan in 1956–1958, which was expected to accommodate the inhabitants of Algiers’s slums (Chapter 4; Fig. 5.65). Numerous scholars have noted the formal relationships between Simounet’s project and Le Corbusier’s vaulted Maison Monol (1919), the Résidence Peyrissac in a rural area of Cherchell in Algeria (1942; Fig. 5.67), and his Rob and Roq housing in Roquebrune in Cap-Martin in France (1949; Fig. 5.69). Th e fl at land of Rocher Noir and the one-story housing units—but not their density—might also evoke the completed project of the Cité La Montagne, on the outskirts of Algiers, designed by Simounet, Daure, and Béri and promoted by the aforementioned
670 Archives Nationales Outre-Mer. 15 CAB 91. Délégation générale du gouvernement en Algérie, Direction générale de l’action sociale, Sous-direction du travail. Objet: Suspension du repos hebdomadaire pour le personnel des entreprises chargées de la construction des bâtiments administratives du Rocher Noir. [“Dans les établissements de l’état ainsi que dans ceux où sont exécutés des travaux pour le compte de l’état et dans l’intérêt de la défense nationale, le repos hebdomadaire pourra être temporairement suspendu par les ministres intéressés.”]
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Figs. 5.58–5.63 Th e construction of Rocher Noir photographed by de Marien. AD HG 156 J.
Next page: Fig. 5.64 (a) Boulevard de l’impératrice Fig. 5.65 (b) Djenan el-Hassan Fig. 5.66 (c) Housing units, Rocher Noir. Fig. 5.67 (d) Résidence Peyrissac, Cherchell, Algeria. Fig. 5.68 (e) Villa, Rocher Noir. Fig. 5.69 (f) Rob and Roq housing, Cap-Martin, France. Fig. 5.70 (g) Villa of the Delegate of the French Government, Rocher Noir.
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 369
a b
d c
e f
g
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CIA (Chapter 4, Fig. 5.71). Th e living areas, construction materials, domestic appliances, and interior designs of the large villas and dwellings cannot be compared to the housing projects discussed earlier that were destined for the Algerian population. Th e French authorities had assigned a large budget to the daily living and working comforts of its civil servants. In the case of the nine-hundred-square-meter villa of the Delegate General, de Marien visited and examined the interior details with Mrs. Morin and took her desires and those of her husband into consideration. In a letter to Mrs. Morin of 26 December 1961, after the relocation of the General Delegation from Algiers to Rocher Noir, de Marien listed his endeavors to satisfy the Morins’ desires. Th ese included the operation of the fountain located in the courtyard; Saint-Laurent furniture; the arrival of an imported table for the Morins’ dining room in the petit séjour (small living-room); a modern tapestry; and the design of radiator covers.671 Although de Marien used identical elements for the individual houses, he initially envisaged distinguishing two diff erent categories according to luxury characteristics, as follows: 1) A zone of individual residential housing with green spaces, close to the seaside, whose average density of housing was ten dwellings per hectare; one hundred fi fty houses were distributed over fi fteen hectares, and each house was on one thousand square meters of land.672 2) A zone of individual normal housing with green spaces, to be located between the collective housing and the area of existing rural habitations, whose density was to be twenty dwellings per hectare (double that of the former zone); one hundred houses with a per-unit land area of fi ve hundred square meters.673
In addition to individual houses, Rocher Noir was planned to accommodate collective housing as part of the projected general housing sector. Th is vast sector was composed of three diff erent zones. In the fi rst and the second zones, the housing density
671 AD HG. 140 J 21. Letter from de Marien to Mrs. Morin. Paris, 25 December 1961. 672 AD HG. 140 J 21. Cité Administraive Sattellite: Opératon Rocher Noir. Programme d’aménagement. Louis de Marien, p. 4. 673 Ibid.
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Fig. 5.71 Cité La Montagne designed by Simounet, Daure and Béri.
Fig. 5.72 Rocher Noir. From Urbanisme no. 73 (1961), 26.
Fig. 5.73 Rocher Noir photographed by de Marien. AD HG 156 J.
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was of fi fty units per hectare; whereas the fi rst included twenty-fi ve hundred housing units contained in buildings of a maximum of four fl oors per housing unit, the second was intended to involve one thousand dwellings along with a shopping area. Th e third zone consisted of high-rise buildings whose height was to be between eight and sixteen fl oors, for twenty-two hundred dwellings; this zone was expected to have one hundred dwellings per hectare. Th e towers and the later collective-housing complexes with shops were never built.674 In order to resettle a few hundred French civil servants and their families fi fty kilometers from Algiers, Morin founded on 18 June 1961 “a committee charged with studying the problems posed by the transfer of the General Delegation to Rocher Noir.”675 Th e committee was composed of the General Inspector of Administration, the General Inspector and Director of Public Works, the Director of the Civil Cabinet of the General Delegate, the Director of the Military Cabinet of the General Delegate, the Project Manager at the Cabinet of the General Secretary of Administration, and a representative of the Chief Architect of Rocher Noir, de Hoÿm de Marien.676 Th e working group drafted a series of hypotheses designating the people and teams who were entitled (or required, as the case may be) to move to Rocher Noir fi rst. Th e committee prepared extensive lists of government workers and their positions, affi liations, and family compositions. Th ey selected the location and division of the allotted offi ces, as well as the types of dwellings for the employees and their families. In a letter of 26 June 1961 to the Director of the Civil Cabinet of the General Delegate, de Marien emphasized that because the construction of the offi ce building was progressing rather rapidly, the exact confi guration of the necessary offi ces of this fi rst phase was required as soon as possible. De Marien argued that “if the information corresponding to the real needs of the Administration is not provided, and to avoid delays in the delivery of the building, we would be obliged to apply a theoretical allocation made during the attribution and of
674 Ibid., p. 5. 675 FR ANOM. 15 CAB 91. Le Délégué Général en Algérie. Alger, 18 juin 1961. [“Une commission chargée d’étudier les problèmes posés par le transfert de la Délégaion Générale au Rocher Noir.”] 676 Ibid.
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which I am not sure that this will meet the needs of the services.”677 Th e resettlement of the fi rst group of the Civil Cabinet of the General Delegation of the French Government in Algeria began in early September 1961 (Figs. 5.74–5.84). Th is move took place a few days after the relocation of the Military Cabinet of the General Delegation to the military air force base of Reghaia, roughly ten kilometers from Rocher Noir. In his memoirs entitled De Gaulle et l’Algérie: Mon témoignage, 1960–1962 (De Gaulle and Algeria: My Testimony, 1960–1962), Jean Morin described the beauty of the site and the strategic characteristics of France’s new headquarters in Algeria. In the subchapter “Mettre le pouvoir à l’abri des tumultes” (“Protecting Power from Strife”), Morin emphasized that “thanks to its natural advantages, Rocher Noir off ers the administrative city… the advantage of being easy to defend.”678 He also argued that “Rocher Noir is not only an administrative city, but a real city that must be able to fully meet its own needs. By the fall of 1962, one thousand civil servants with their families were to be settled there: four thousand inhabitants. In short, a small Algerian Washington.”679 In addition to the planned self-suffi ciency of the French “Washington, DC” in Algeria under colonial rule, the French authorities meticulously studied possible plans of evacuation of the employees of Rocher Noir in case of emergency. In a document entitled “Protection des personnalités de la Délégation Générale du Rocher Noir en cas de coup de force” (“Protection of the General Delegation of Rocher Noir in Case of Uprisings”), the Military Cabinet proposed two evacuation scenarios.680 Th e fi rst supposed that the armed uprising might take place in Oran, which would provide suffi cient time to evacuate Rocher Noir via the helicopters permanently stationed at the new city and additional ones that would be sent to help with the evacuation eff ort. Th e second solution was envisaged in case of “an important and impromptu attack on Rocher Noir by dissidents of the
677 FR ANOM. 15 CAB 91. Letter from de Marien to Mosnieur Vieillescazes, Directeur du Cabinet du Délégé Général. Cité Administrative Sattellite Bureaux 1er stade. Paris, 26 June 1961. [“Si ce renseignement correspondant aux besoins réels de l’Administration ne nous était pas donné, et afi n d’éviter tout dépassement de délais dans la livraison du bâtiment, nous serions dans l’obbligation d’appliquer la répartition théorique retenue lors de l’adjudication et dont je ne suis pas sûr qu’elle satisfasse les besoins des services.”] 678 Morin, De Gaulle et l’Algérie: Mon témoignage, 1960–1962, 96. [“De part les seuls éléments naturels, le Rocher Noir off re à la cité administrative qui doit s’y installer l’avantage d’être facile à défendre.”] 679 Ibid. [“Le Rocher-Noir n’est pas seulement une cité administrative, mais une véritable ville, qui doit être capable de subvenir entièrement à ses besoins. Il s’agit d’y installer pour le deuxième trimèstre 1962 un millier de fonctionnaires, l’équivalent avec leur famille de 4,000 habitants. En somme un petit Washington algérien.”] 680 AFCDG. F 45 4. Délégation Générale en Algérie, Cabinet Militaire. Protection des personnalités de la Délégation Générale du Rocher Noir en cas de coup de force. Alger, le 19 Octobre 1961.
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Fig. 5.74–5.78 & next page Figs. 5.79–5.84 Video portraying Rocher Noir on 27 September 1961. INA
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 375
May 2016 376 Architecture of Counterrevolution
army or the OAS.”681 Th is second possible evacuation eff ort was expected to take place via helicopters and the Mediterranean Sea.682 Th e theories about possible revolts and the evacuation plans for Rocher Noir were even submitted to the French Prime Minister on 22 October 1961.683 Th e relocation of the French General Delegation from Algiers to Rocher Noir was coupled with a measure dubbed déconcentration (devolution), which the government decreed in March 1960 and January 1961.684 Th is measure was implemented together with the decentralization policies of the Plan de Constantine (Chapter 4). Déconcentration consisted of reducing the number of civil servants working for the General Delegation in Algiers. In a note signed by the General Secretary of Administration in Algeria, the secretary requested a “list of the excessive personnel who, following the devolution measures, must leave the central administration; they will be assigned to an external service or reassigned to the director of human resources.”685 Each department dutifully provided a description of its services and assignments, its employees who were indispensable for the achievement of the department’s goals and objectives, and the workers who could be considered redundant. A few diagrams bearing the subtitles Après déconcentration (“After devolution”) or Après réorganisation (“After reorganization”) were also outlined. Th e tactical measure of déconcentration enabled the French authorities not only to reorganize their own costly colonial administration, but also to remove a number of French institutions that had emerged from the Algerian War of Independence—a war that was about to end. Notable among these institutions was the Inspection Générale des Regroupements des Populations (IGRP, or General Inspection of the Population Regrouping; Chapter 4), which Paul Delouvrier had created to coordinate the chaotic establishment of
681 Ibid., p. 1. [“Attaque importante et impromptue par des moyens dissidents de l’Armée ou de l’OAS, de la cité Rocher Noir.”] 682 Ibid., p. 2. 683 AFCDG. F 45 4. Letter to the Prime Minister. 22 October 1961. 684 See decree no. 61-77 of 20 January 1961 on the administrative déconcentration in Algerian departments and decree no. 60-251 of 23 March 1960 on the déconcentration in the management of the personnel who served in Algeria. 685 FR ANOM. 15 CAB 91. Délégation Générale en Algérie. Cabinet du Secrétaire Générale. Note pour les Directeurs Généraux, Directeurs et Chefs de Service. Objet: Mesure de déconcentration. Alger, le 17 juillet 1961. [“La liste des personnels en surnombre qui, à la suite des mesures de décentralisation, doivent quitter l’Administration centrale pour être aff ectés dans un service extérieur, ou qui sont remis à la disposition de la Sous-Direction du Personnel.”]
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the camps de regroupement.686 To this end, the construction of Rocher Noir and the transfer of the new headquarters of French power in Algeria served not only to protect French civil servants from OAS assaults and to reorganize France’s own colonial administration, but also to pave the way for the transition planned in the French-Algeria conventions. Th ese transitions were enforced during the last months of colonial rule and after the independence of Algeria, which the country gained a few months after the inauguration of Rocher Noir. Rocher Noir was neither a capital city of a nation state, such as Algiers was for independent Algeria, nor a capital city of a colony, as Algiers was for the French colonial government in Algeria. Rocher Noir was a fortifi ed enclave that was built by and for the colonizer on colonized territory during the very last phase of a colonial war. Although it was called an administrative city, the plan was that Rocher Noir would serve as the capital city of the French government in Algeria and would accommodate the government’s headquarters. In his paper Seven Types of Capital City, Peter Hall distinguishes seven categories of capital cities: multi-function capitals (London, Paris, Stockholm, Moscow, and Tokyo); global cities (London, Tokyo); political capitals (Th e Hague, Bonn, Ottawa, Canberra, Brasilia, Washington, DC); former capitals (Berlin [from 1945 to 1994], Saint Petersburg, Philadelphia, Rio de Janeiro); ex-imperial capitals (London, Madrid, Lisbon, Vienna); provincial capitals (Milan, Turin, Stuttgart, Munich); and super capitals (Brussels, Strasbourg, Geneva, Rome, New York).687 One is tempted to add two further categories: former colonial capitals (Accra, Algiers, Dakar, New Delhi, and many others) and neocolonial military capitals (Rocher Noir). According to Morin, de Gaulle had never mentioned the words intégration and partition. Morin argued that the only plausible policy that de Gaulle would have enforced in the case of a total failure of negotiations was the policy of “regroupement, which … would have represented in [de Gaulle’s] mind a mere preliminary step before the withdrawal from Algeria.”688 Morin explained that the regroupement consisted of gathering the European
686 FR ANOM. 15 CAB 91. Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Cabinet du Délégué Général. [“L’inspection Générale des Regroupements a disparu en tant que telle au Cabinet du Délégué Général. Par suite des mesures de déconcentration, cette Inspection Générale a éclaté entre les trois régions.”] 687 Peter Hall, Seven Types of Capital City (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 8–9. 688 Morin, De Gaulle et l’Algérie: Mon témoignage, 1960–1962, p. 195. [“Celle du regroupement qui, selon moi, elle ne représentait dans son esprit que l’étape préalable au départ de l’Algérie.”]
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and French populations (as well as any Algerians who embraced the policy) within the same territory in Algeria, which implied a systematic division of the Algerian territory. Morin explained that regroupement was “a kind of zoning, which those who uphold this this theory call ‘sharing by regrouping.’”689 Ironically, de Gaulle and others used the same term regroupement that the French army had employed to designate the colonial policy of regroupement (i.e., forced resettlement) of the Algerian population (Chapter 2). Prime Minister Michel Debré compared the “sharing by regrouping” to the State of Israel, which is arguably far from sharing. Debré stressed that this strategy would “create a new State of Israel in North Africa, the eradication of which would be the target of all Arab countries, if not all Muslims around the world, to whom we would give a reason to maintain or worsen their coalition against us.”690 Although the negotiations of 1962 resulted in a ceasefi re that was implemented with some diffi culty—due to the ongoing OAS attacks—a project to regroup Europeans and to divide the Algerian territory was undertaken. In contrast to Morin’s argument, de Gaulle had considered partitioning Algeria between the European and Algerian populations by creating French exclaves within Algeria’s territory and assigning the Sahara to the French section. Th e author of this colonial project was the Gaullist politician and scholar Alain Peyrefi tte (1925–1999), who claimed that de Gaulle asked him “to fl oat the idea by writing newspaper articles and a short book proposing a kind of ‘French Israel’ in the coastal region in which the European population would be the majority.”691 Peyrefi tte obeyed. His articles in Le Monde of September 1961 coincided with the relocation of the French General Delegation to Rocher Noir. In his 1962 book titled Faut-il partager l’Algérie? (Shall We Share Algeria?692), Peyrefi tte rendered the multiple incompatibilities and contradictory statements claimed by a number of antagonists about what they believed to be their “rights” in Algeria. He exposed the failures and defects of the French colonial doctrine of assimilation and used these shortcomings to justify the necessity of splitting the Algerian territory; he proposed
689 Ibid. [“Une sorte de zonage, ce que les tenants de cette théorie appelaient ‘partage par regroupement.’”] 690 Debré, Trois Républiques pour une France. Mémoires–III: Gouverner, 1958–1962, p. 293. [“Nous allons créer en Afrique du Nord un nouvel Etat d’Israël, dont la disparition sera désormais l’objectif de tous les pays arabes sinon des musulmans du monde entier à qui nous donnerons une raison de maintenir, voire d’aggraver leur coalition contre nous.”] 691 Wall, Irwin M., France, the United States, and the Algerian War (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001), p. 246. 692 Alain Peyrefi tte, Faut-il partager l’Algérie? (Paris: Plon, 1962).
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new maps for the Algerian country (or countries). Peyrefi tte outlined the probable development of diff erent scenarios in a divided Algeria and analyzed the constitution of the State of Israel and the partition of Palestine, the Swiss Confederation, the French- British colonies that eventually formed Canada, and the partitions of Pakistan and India, Greek and Turkish Cyprus, and East and West Berlin. He disregarded Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish exclaves within Moroccan territory that resulted from Spain’s colonization of Morocco, which today are highly controlled, walled fortresses of the European Union within Africa. (Somewhat ironically, just across the Strait of Gibraltar from Ceuta and Melilla lies the British exclave of Gibraltar, at the southern tip of the Iberian Peninsula.) Peyrefi tte recommended six potential regroupement scenarios (Figs. 5.85–5.88). In every map, he defi ned the exact route of the oil and gas pipelines that would connect the source of exploitation in the Algerian Sahara to the northern parts of Algeria. Th e principles of the partition were based on the defense of the territory, the unity of the communities, and access to oil and gas. In the six maps Peyrefi tte proposed, Algiers and Oran belonged to the French exclaves. As Peyrefi tte argued, “What is worthy of France is not to create a French Israel, but a multiracial society in the image of Lebanon, a country in which people would freely choose to live together and to link their fate with that of a great country.”693 Th is ungrounded scenario overlooked the fact that for one hundred and thirty-two years the French colonial regime had had no intention of enforcing France’s national symbolic tripartite motto of liberté, égalité, fraternité, and that it was therefore a pipe dream to believe that this situation would change overnight. In addition, Peyrefi tte glorifi ed only France, calling it “a great country,” neglecting the Arab, Berber, and other great civilizations living in Algeria before French rule—an attitude that was faithful to the French colonial tradition. Prior to Peyrefi tte’s partition plan for Algeria, in 1957, Robert Hersant (1920– 1996), a French right-wing newspaper magnate, had also advocated the partition of Algeria as a solution to the Algerian War of Independence (before de Gaulle’s return to power). Politically, Hersant was initially involved with the Socialist youth movement in 1935, but he later founded the right-wing party Jeune Front in 1940. In 1941 he became
693 Ibid., 77. [“Ce qui est digne de la France, ce n’est pas de créer un Israël français, mais une société multiraciale à l’image du Liban, un pays dans lequel les hommes auront librement choisi de vivre ensemble et de lier leur sort à celui d’un grand pays.”]
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Fig. 5.85 Algeria’s regroupement, scenario 1 and 2. From Alain Peyrefi tte, Faut-il partager l’Algérie? (Paris: Plon, 1962), 145.
Fig. 5.86 Algeria’s regroupement, scenario 3 and 4. From Alain Peyrefi tte, Faut-il partager l’Algérie? (Paris: Plon, 1962), 147.
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Fig. 5.87 Algeria’s regroupement, scenario 5. From Alain Peyrefi tte, Faut-il partager l’Algérie? (Paris: Plon, 1962), 149.
Fig. 5.88 Algeria’s regroupement, scenario 6. From Alain Peyrefi tte, Faut-il partager l’Algérie? (Paris: Plon, 1962), 151.
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a member of the General Secretariat of the Youth of the Vichy regime and learned various methods of indoctrinating people. In the immediate postwar period, Hersant succeeded in escaping the épuration légale (postwar legal purge), but in 1947 he was tried and sentenced to ten years of what some have described as “national indignity.” In 1952, he benefi ted from the general amnesty. Th e “Hersant Plan” (Fig. 5.89) was vividly debated and rapidly abandoned. Even the deputies of the Radical party (who were colleagues of Hersant’s) did not support the plan: not only because they were not informed about it, but also because it was incompatible with their position. As Peyrefi tte argued:
In the Hersant Plan, the partition was a goal in itself. In mine, it is neither the goal nor the means: the goal is association, the means is the federation, the sharing is merely the risk to take in this process. In short, the Hersant Plan, which some might have qualifi ed as “imperialist” and “colonialist,” was rejected by the right, who called the authors “traitors of the national cause.” Today, the project, whose inspiration is, objectively, much more liberal, is disqualifi ed almost as if it were the expression of the ideology of the OAS.694
A number of historians have noted that Algeria’s 1961 partition project was de Gaulle’s strategic way of discouraging FLN fi ghters and accelerating the peace negotiations. One could also suggest that it was a strategic way of nurturing the expectations of the partisans of Algérie française, including those serving in the French Fifth Republic. During the last bloody days of the war, the OAS had indeed alleged that the partition of Algeria was a possible solution to their claims.695
694 Ibid., p. 353. [“Dans le plan Hersant, la partition était un but en soi. Dans le mien, elle n’est ni un but ni un moyen: le but est l’association, le moyen est la fédération, le partage n’étant que le risque à courir dans ce processus. Bref, le plan Hersant, que d’aucuns auraient pu qualifi er ‘impérialiste’ et de ‘colonialiste,’ fut rejeté par une droite qui en qualifi a les auteurs de ‘traitres à la cause nationale.’ Aujourd’hui, un projet dont l’inspiration est, objectivement, beaucoup plus libérale, est disqualifi é comme s’il était, ou à peu prés, l’expression de l’idéologie de l’OAS.”] 695 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, p. 316.
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Fig. 5.89 Hersant Plan. From Alain Peyrefi tte, Faut-il partager l’Algérie? (Paris: Plon, 1962), 193.
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5.2 Abandoning Rocher Noir
In the wake of the unsuccessful peace negotiations of 1960 and 1961 in Melun, Switzerland, and Rousses and Evian-les-Bains (France), the French authorities and the members of the GPRA agreed to meet again and to discuss the conditions of the ceasefi re and the interests of France in Algeria at Evian-les-Bains on 7 March 1962.696 Th e two powers signed what came to be known as the Evian Agreements on 18 March. Although the ceasefi re was announced the day after the signing of the accords, the OAS sabotaged the ceasefi re by multiplying its brutal killings and merciless assaults; Algerian and French blood thus continued to be shed. Th e ninety-three-page Evian Agreements defi ned the forthcoming nancial,fi economic, military, technical, and cultural legacies to be shared between France and the not-yet-independent Algeria, which was summarized with the word coopération. Th rough this contract of cooperation, France preserved its presence in Algeria. Th e section “Déclaration de principes sur la coopération pour la mise en valeur des richesses du sous- sol du Sahara”697 (“Declaration of Principles on the Cooperation for the Enhancement of the Underground Resources of the Sahara”) privileged France’s exploitation of oil and gas fi elds in the Algerian Sahara. France also protected the economic and technical interests (cooperation) of the Plan de Constantine in Algeria; maintained a number of military bases and installations in Algeria, including the strategic Mers el-Kebir naval base; and retained the right to detonate atomic bombs in the testing grounds of the Algerian desert. More than ninety percent of French voters approved the terms of the Evian accords in a referendum of 8 April 1962, which was held in France (but not in Algeria). Th e successful referendum and the agreements resulted in pitiless reprisals carried out by the OAS, including attacks, gunfi re, ambushes, bombings, and massacres. According to the terms of the accords, an interim period was to be run by a Franco-Algerian Provisional Executive, whose missions involved organizing a referendum on Algeria’s self-determination, upholding the ceasefi re and security of Algerians and
696 On the history of the Evian Accords, see Benyoucef Ben Khedda, Les accords d’Evian (Publisud-Opu, 1986); Jérôme Hélie, Les accords d’évian: Histoire de la paix ratée en Algérie (Paris: Orban, 1992); Olivier Long, Le dossier secret des Accords d’Evian: Une mission suisse pour la paix en Algérie (Lausanne: Ed. 24 heures, 1988). 697 FR ANOM. 19770828/14. Les Accords d’Evian. Textes et Commentaires. La documentation française, 1962.
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Europeans, and overseeing the release of prisoners. On 6 April 1962, de Gaulle, Debré, Joxe, and the French Minister of the Sahara and his Secretary of State of the Sahara signed a decree in Paris that nominated the twelve members of the Provisional Executive.698 De Gaulle and the civil servants in France and in Algeria considered Algeria a French territory until the proclamation of independence, and therefore they felt entitled to appoint the members of the Executive. Debrè argued that it was “the government of the Republic that designates the members of this executive, and does so unconditionally.”699 Th e committee included three Frenchmen from Algeria and eight Algerians, of which fi ve were FLN members. Th e French authorities nominated the Algerian lawyer Abderrahmane Farès (1911–1991), who had just been liberated from prison, as President of the Provisional Executive, and the Frenchman Roger Roth, Mayor of Philippville, Algeria (Skikda today), as Deputy President. Th e Provisional Executive settled in the unfi nished French bastion at Rocher Noir. In order to preserve French legacies and interests in Algeria, de Gaulle replaced Jean Morin with the French diplomat Christian Fouchet (1911–1974). Fouchet was appointed High Commissioner of the French Republic to Algeria, a capacity he served for the period between 19 March 1962 and 3 July 1962 (the day of de Gaulle’s proclamation of independence). Following Debré’s resignation 14 April 1962, de Gaulle appointed George Pompidou (1911–1974) as Prime Minister; Pompidou later served as President of France from 1969 until his death in 1974, Fig. 5.90 (top) Time magazine cover, Raoul Salan. Fig. 5.91 (center) Burning of Algiers library. INA. Fig. 5.92 (bottom) Burning of Oran Port.
698 Journal Offi ciel de la République Française, 7 April 1962. Ministère d’état chargé des Affaires Algériennes. Décret du 6 avril 1962 portant nomination des membres de l’Exécutif provisoire en Algérie. Accessed on 1 March 2016: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?numJO=0&dateJO=19620101&numTexte= &pageDebut=03644&pageFin=. 699 Debré, Trois Républiques pour une France. Mémoires–III: Gouverner, 1958–1962, p. 291. [“C’est donc au gouvernement de la République de désigner les membres de cet exécutif et sans condition.”]
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two years before the end of his mandate. Pompidou was extremely familiar with the various Franco-Algerian questions and France’s interests in Algeria, since he had played a crucial role in the peace negotiations with the Algerian members of the FLN, the result of which was the Evian Accords. Th e preparations for the independence of Algeria provoked the outrage of the OAS in Algeria, particularly in Algiers and Oran. Th e OAS intensifi ed its arbitrary violence and continued to proclaim the existence of Algérie française. Although the aforementioned General Raoul Salan was captured on 21 April 1962 in an apartment in Algiers, the OAS kept terrorizing Algeria’s inhabitants. Th e violence was particularly tragic, since the OAS enforced the politique de la terre brulée (scorched-earth policy). As with the Provisional Executive, Fouchet’s headquarters was located at Rocher Noir. A French television news program of 25 March 1962 depicted Fouchet’s arrival, and the vastness of the uncompleted buildings and infrastructure of Rocher Noir (Figs. 5.93– 5.98).700 Th e black-and-white fi lm shows the presence of cranes in the administrative town that had been built for the French government in Algeria, and which suddenly became the center of operations of the Franco-Algerian Provisional Executive. From the recording, it is somewhat diffi cult to affi rm whether or not the town in which Fouchet had just landed via helicopter was under construction, was abandoned, or was being reconstructed after wartime damage or a natural disaster of some kind. What is visible is the presence not only of a number of cranes, but also of military watchtowers at the entrance of the town and near the long slab-like shape of the offi ce building. It was also at Rocher Noir that the widely reported offi cial handover of power from Morin to Fouchet took place. Th e French public buildings and housing projects of Rocher Noir appeared in other French news programs, for instance in the video that reported the offi cial visits of the French prefects to Farès (Algeria) on 17 April 1962 (Figs. 5.99–5.101),701 or during the inspection of 21 April 1962 of the armed forces who protected the population of Rocher Noir (Figs. 5.102–5.104),702 or in an interview with Fouchet of 4 March 1962, in which the journalist
700 Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (hereafter INA). Allocution Fouchet et passation des pouvoirs, 25 March 1962.
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 387
reports on the ongoing crimes of the OAS.703 In the referendum of 1 July 1962, the Algerian and European populations of Algeria were called to respond “yes” or “no” to the question: “Voulez-vous que l’Algérie devienne un Etat indépendant coopérant avec la France dans les conditions défi nies par la déclaration du 19 mars 1962?” (“Should Algeria become an independent state, cooperating with France under the conditions defi ned by the declaration of 19 March 1962?”). Over nine-tenths (91 percent) of the participants voted “yes.”704 Although it is most likely that the voters approved of the fi rst part of the question, referring to the independence of Algeria from France, it is not clear how many of them had read the conditions of cooperation that were mandated in the Evian Accords before the referendum (or even after it). In his declaration of 3 July 1962705 on the reconnaissance de l’indépendance de l’Algérie (“Recognition of Algerian Independence”), de Gaulle summarized the juridical steps that had led France to grant Algeria its independence: the referendum of 8 January 1961 in France, which acknowledged the right of the Algerian population to self-determination, and the referendum of 8 April 1962, which approved the Evian Agreements of 19 March 1962 and enforced the law of 14 January 1961 on the Algerian independent state, cooperating with France. He then declared that “with the election of self-determination of 1 July 1962, the Algerian people voted for the independence of Algeria in cooperation with France.”706 Th is imposed legacy between France and Algeria and the planned attachment of Algeria to France inaugurated still another French colonial era in Algeria. While the forms and means of colonialism were diff erent from those of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ends were similar. On 2 July 1962, in the presence of a number of Algerian and French personalities and journalists, the President of the Provisional Executive conducted the levée des couleurs algériennes (“the raising of the Algerian colors”). Th e French national colors of bleu,
703 INA. Christian Fouchet : interview en liberté, 4 March 1962.
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Figs. 5.93–5.98 Stills from the movie of 25 March 1962 reporting on Foucher arrival at Rocher Noit. INA.
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 389
Figs. 5.99–5.101 (left) Offi cial visit of the French prefects to Farès in Rocher Noir on 17 April 1962. INA
Figs. 5.102–5.104 (right) Inspection of 21 April 1962 of the armed forces that protected the population of Rocher Noir. INA
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blanc, and rouge were fi nally replaced by the Algerian colors of vert, blanc, and rouge; Fig. 5.105). Th e black-and-white photograph portrays twelve gentlemen standing before the Algerian fl ag being raised at the unfi nished Rocher Noir. Symbolically, a woman and an Algerian offi cer were requested to hold the rope of the Algerian fl ag. Th e verticality of the fl agpole competes with the imposing construction site’s crane and the uncompleted pillars. Allegorically, the historical moment of Algerian independence in cooperation with France was immortalized not in Algiers, but rather in an unfi nished town that seemed to be abandoned, or at best under construction. Th e uncompleted status of Rocher Noir suggests, as de Gaulle had intended via the Plan de Constantine, that France should and would stay in Algeria in order to conclude the oeuvre it had begun. While the photograph draws our attention from the war’s destruction to the benefi ts of construction, it is still the case that this construction was put in place during a war of independence. In the immediate aftermath of the declaration of Algerian independence from France on 3 July 1962, the French economist Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (1910–2010) was appointed as the fi rst French Ambassador and High Commissioner to Algeria. He was primarily charged with the implementation of the Evian Agreements, including the accords of cooperation and the Plan de Constantine. Prior to his mission, Jeanneney had served as Minister of Industry in Debré’s government between 1959 and 1962, where he became familiar with de Gaulle’s political and economic politics in Algeria. In his instructions to Jeanneney of 9 August 1962, the secretary of state for Algerian aff airs ordered: “it is in the name of cooperation that the Ambassador of France will address his Algerian interlocutors. While the cooperation should not serve as a pretext for political intervention, it does enable the maintenance of our clear infl uence and might pave the way for a broader development.”707 Jeanneney and his team of representatives from the French government in independent Algeria (cooperating with France) settled in Rocher Noir in the vacant offi ces of the former French General Delegation of the French Government in colonial Algeria. One of Jeanneney’s coworkers later recalled that in July 1962, “We had settled
707 Instructions pour l’ambassadeur de France à Alger, published in Anne Liskenne, L’Algérie indépendente: L’ambassade de Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (juillet 1962–janvier 1963) (Paris: Armand Colin, 2015), p. 93. [“C’est au nom de la coopération de l’ambassade de France s’adressera à ses interlocuteurs algériens. La coopération ne doit pas servir de prétexte à l’intervention politique, mais elle permet de maintenir le plus clair de notre infl uence et peut ouvrir la voie au plus large développement.”]
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Fig. 5.105 Levée des couleurs algériennes (the raising of Algerian colors) on 2 July 1962. ECPAD ALG 62 128
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into the spaces that were freed up by the General Delegation; we established ourselves in the diff erent bungalows; everyone lived in a fully equipped bungalow.”708 Unlike other buildings and infrastructure that were constructed by the French authorities in Algeria during the colonial era, Rocher Noir was not transferred to the Algerian government. It remained French propriety on Algerian soil, and was formally designated as such before Algeria gained its independence from France.709 Th e Evian Agreements regulated the juridical status of Rocher Noir. Article 19 of the section on the “Garanties des droits acquis et des engagements antérieurs” (“Guarantees of Acquired Rights and Previous Commitments”) mandated that “the [French] state-owned properties in Algeria will be transferred to the Algerian state, except, with the agreement of the Algerian authorities, the buildings deemed necessary for the normal functioning of temporary or permanent French facilities.”710 Th e buildings of the fortifi ed complex of Rocher Noir belonged to this latter category. Th e question of the property of Rocher Noir was disputed after the ambassador and his team moved to Algiers in the autumn of 1962. Jeanneney had requested to move into the Villa des Oliviers in the center of Algiers, which had been the residence of General de Gaulle during the Second World War, when Algiers served as the capital of the Free French Forces between June 1943 and August 1944 (Chapter 3). With the nomination of the President of the GPRA, Ferhat Abbas (1899–1985), as President of the Assemblée nationales constituante de la république algérienne démocratique et populaire (National Assembly of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria), and the election of the former prisoner Ahmed Ben Bella (1916–2012) as President of the Conseil des ministres (Counsel of Algerian Ministers) in September 1962, the Provisional Executive ceased to exist. Th is turning point led to the establishment of the République algérienne démocratique et populaire (People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria) and the election of Ben Bella as the fi rst President of the Algerian Republic in September 1963, which provoked tensions and ongoing battles for power among various FLN rivals, including the
708 Cited in Ibid., p. 40. [“Nous nous sommes installés dans les locaux laissés vides de la Délégation générale, nous nous sommes répartis dans les diff érents bungalows, chacun un bungalow parfaitement équipé pour y vivre.”] 709 Ibid. 710 Ben Khedda, Les accords d’Evian, p. 95. [“Le domaine immobilier de l’Etat en Algérie sera transféré à l’Etat algérien, sous déduction, avec l’accord des autorités algériennes, des immeubles jugés nécessaires au fonctionnement normal des service français temporaires ou permanents.”]
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coup d’état of June 1965. Th is coup was carefully orchestrated by the Algerian army offi cer Houari Boumedienne, who seized power to become Algeria’s second president until his unexpected death in 1978. Th e inhabitants of Rocher Noir had changed once more. In his telegram of 20 October 1962 to the French Foreign Aff airs bureau, Jeanneney wrote that he had informed the President of the Provisional Executive before its dissolution that he would “consign the facilities, administrative offi ces, and residences [the Provisional Executive] had occupied to elements of the French forces starting on 2 October.”711 He argued that this transfer had been triggered by the Algerian authorities’ demand that a number of buildings located in the center of Algiers that were being used by the French army be vacated. Although the Algerian authorities had considered occupying Rocher Noir at the outset of the negotiations over the future of Rocher Noir, they eventually agreed to remove the French offi cers from Algiers. Rocher Noir thus became a French military base within independent Algeria. Th e protracted talks between the Algerian and French authorities over several properties, in which the two sides reassessed French ownership of Rocher Noir and several other prominent buildings in Algiers (such as Algiers Cathedral, built on an ancient mosque, and the radio and television headquarters), now took on a political tone. Whereas the Algerian authorities based their claims on the right to independence and sovereignty over their territory, the French authorities took recourse to the aforementioned Article 19 of the Evian Accords, the interpretation of which they rigorously debated.712 In a telegram to Joxe, Jeanneney pointed out that “the thesis of the literal interpretation of Article 19 has by the same token become diffi cult to defend as the starting point of negotiations that started more than three months after the establishment of independence.”713 Th e French ambassador also warned that the juridical text did not specifi cally refer to the private sector; he claimed that the ambiguity of the text entitled France to argue in the
711 ANFPFSS. AG/5(1)/1809. Questions relatives à l’avenir de Rocher Noir. Télégramme. Alger le 20 octobre 1962. [“Elle remettrait les installations, locaux administratifs et résidences qu’elle occupait à des élements des focres françaises à partir du 2 octobre.”] 712 ANFPFSS. AG/5(1)/1809. Questions relatives à l’avenir de Rocher Noir. Télégramme signé par Jenneaney. Alger le 24 octobre 1962, pp. 4–5. 713 Ibid., p. 5. [“La thèse de l’interpretation litterale de l’article 19 est devenue du même coup diffi cile à défendre comme point de départ d’une négociation qui s’ouvre plus de trois mois aprés l’accession à l’indépendence.”]
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extreme case: for instance, that the rivers and seashores were still owned by the French state. For fear of further severe politico-military confl icts with his Algerian counterpart, who in the meantime occupied the radio and television buildings without a formal pre- arrangement with the French authorities,714 Jeanneney recommended that “it will most likely be reasonable to indicate that we do not attach major importance to a quarrel over principles, and that we wish to treat the case on a pragmatic level.”715 As a response to Jeanneney’s call for pragmatism, Joxe, who had signed the Evian Agreements, insisted on the juridical and political aspects of Article 19. Joxe replied: “Article 19 should be used in good faith: without waiting for the conclusion of an agreement on French state properties, we have given to the Algerian state the enjoyment of many buildings; Algeria, in turn, should not challenge our securities on the buildings we keep.”716 Joxe recommended that the only solution to this impasse was to open broader negotiations on the topic on 15 November (after Algeria’s celebration of the anniversary of the Algerian Revolution on 1 November); such negotiations would allow the French government to draft the list of buildings that it deemed to be necessary to its ongoing operations. Joxe asked Jeanneney to notify Ben Bella that if the negotiations failed, then the French authorities would be “forced to immediately end the fi nancial arrangements that have allowed Algeria to survive.”717 Th is blackmailing attitude had characterized the Franco-Algerian “cooperation” in the aftermath of the Algerian War of Independence. In 1963, Rocher Noir became the headquarters for the French Personnel féminin de l’armée de terre (PFAT, or Women Soldiers of the Land Forces). Female French army offi cers were moved into the recently constructed buildings, where they used the facilities that Louis Gabriel de Hoÿm de Marien had designed for French civil servants in Algeria (Figs. 5.106–5.108).
714 CHSP, fonds Jeanneaney, carton 9. Compte rendu de l’entretien que Jeanneney a eu le samedi 27 octobre de 16h à 17h10 abec Ben Bella. Published in Liskenne, L’Algérie indépendente: L’ambassade de Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (juillet 1962–janvier 1963), pp. 157–168. 715 ANFPFSS. AG/5(1)/1809. Questions relatives à l’avenir de Rocher Noir. Télégramme signé par Jenneaney. Alger le 24 octobre 1962, p. 6. [“Il serait peut être raisonnable d’indiquer que nous n’attachons pas une importance majeure à la querelle de principes et que nous souhaitons traiter l’aff aire sur un plan pragmatique.”] 716 ANFPFSS. AG/5(1)/1809. Questions relatives à l’avenir de Rocher Noir. Télégramme signé par Joxe. Alger le 26 octobre 1962, p. 2. [“L’article 19 doit être appliqué de bonne foi: sans attendre la conclusion d’un accord domanial, nous avons remis à l’Etat algérien la jouissance de nombreux immeubles; l’Algérie, de son côté, ne doit pas contester nos titres sur les immeubles que nous gardons.”] 717 Ibid., p. 3. [“Nous serons contraints de mettre un terme immédiat aux facilités fi nancières qui ont seuls permis à l’Algérie de subsister.”]
Samia Henni Rocher Noir 395
Fig. 5.106 (top left) Personnel féminin de l’armée de terre (PFAT, Women Soldiers of Land Forces) at Rocher Noir in 1963. ECPAD 63 131.
Fig. 5.107 (top right) A military celebration at Rocher Noir in 1964. ECPAD 64 4.
Fig. 5.108 (bottom) Commemoration of the capitulation (German Surrender) of 1945 and of Joan of Arc at Rocher Noir in 1964. ECPAD 64 22.
May 2016 396 Architecture of Counterrevolution
In April 1964, the French bastion of Rocher Noir was permanently evacuated. Th e French authorities had defi nitively abandoned the newly buit fortifi ed town. e Th lights of Rocher Noir’s watchtowers were switched off forever, but other French military bases continued to exist in Algeria after the end of the war of independence, including those where French nuclear weapons of mass destruction were repeatedly tested. French nuclear bombs continued to be detonated in the Algerian Sahara after Algeria’s independence.
Samia Henni
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Conclusion
Th e architectural and territorial consequences of the French war to keep Algeria under French rule indicate that the French military and civil authorities did not play a “positive” (to paraphrase the 2005 French law discussed in the introduction) role in Algeria. But because the French National Assembly passed such law in the twenty-fi rst century advocating the “positive” character of colonialism in North Africa, the history of French colonialism and its multifaceted aspects and characters are overshadowed. Th us, a critical historical examination of the interrelated themes of colonialism; war-related theories and practices; counterinsurgency operations; Vichy-regime policies; territorial and spatial transformations; forced displacement; and emigration should today be deemed more important than ever. Th is study has sought to demonstrate that during the Algerian War of Independence Algeria’s territory served not only as a counterrevolutionary warfare theater but also as a breeding ground for new buildings and infrastructure that had been designed to control, oversee, administer, dominate, and assimilate Algerians to French rule, as well as to protect French civil servants from the terrorism of de Gaulle’s French military and civil opponents. Th e practices of architects, engineers, planners, ethnologists, technocrats, and offi cers in Algeria’s confl ict zone (similarly to many countries today) bore an undeniable witness to the extrajudicial spaces of the camps de regroupement; the transformation of militarily controlled camps into planned villages; the politico-military and economic characters of the Plan de Constantine; the colonial aspects of the semi-urban housing projects; the military purpose of the clearance of the bidonvilles and their substitution with habitat million and logécos718 that diff ered from those that were built in postwar France; the alibi of the French policies of decentralization and the constructions of mass-housing programs; and the design of the construction of a French fortress in Algeria. Th ese built environments were complicit with the very aims of French colonial power in Algeria. In contrast to architectural research that is conducted in peace zones, architectural research conducted in war zones and zones of confl ict predominately implies inquiries
718 Logécos refers to Logement Economique et Familial (Chapter 3).
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into the ethics, politics, and psychology of such designed spaces, buildings, territories, mechanisms, and their architects—in the sense of originator, creator, instigator, and inventor. Th us, investigating the biographies of these individuals and deconstructing the histories of the formation of governmental legislative and bureaucratic devices— which enabled these spaces to be planned and built in the fi rst place—play a key role in this type of architectural research. It is not surprising that the fragmented declassifi ed military archives do not provide access to the maps or plans that may have served for the destruction, construction, or defense of a given area; nor do these orchestrated sources off er any visual records that might represent the nature and persecutions of military spatial counterinsurgency operations. Instead, the majority of the surveys, photographs and fi lms were commissioned to produce meticulous propaganda images and were put in place to ease the escalating national and international criticism against the French civil and military policies in Algeria. Th erefore, this research has also delved into the vast collection of French military aerial photographs that resulted from various reconnaissance missions during the war: military observations of a region in order to locate the enemy or ascertain military strategies. Th is architectural research has revealed that the spaces and buildings that the French Fourth and Fifth Republics designed and built during the Algerian Revolution (or, as portrayed in the introduction, as the architecture of counterrevolution) epitomize not only the violent paroxysm of French colonialism and its spatial impacts, but also the failure of French colonial policies of assimilation, association, integration, and francization. At the moment when de Gaulle publically proclaimed the Algérie algérienne (Algerian Algeria)— which was the beginning of the end of Algérie française (French Algeria)—de Gaulle seemingly abolished classic French colonial policy and acknowledged that France had been unsuccessful in achieving its goal of making Algeria French. Th is does not exclude the irreversible territorial and socio-economic eff ects of the hundred thirty-two years of French colonial presence in Algeria. As demonstrated in the fi nal chapter of this study, from that very moment, de Gaulle and his men—including Georges Pompidou, who after Algeria’s independence became fi rst Prime Minister and then President of France— operated with the deceptive intention of obliterating the policy of assimilation; in reality, they had replaced assimilation with cooperation.
Samia Henni Conclusion 401
De Gaulle’s socio-economic development Plan de Constantine, announced in 1958, and the Franco-Algerian Evian Agreements, signed in 1962, extended France’s presence in Algeria and ensured that France would maintain its multifaceted legacies with Algeria after Algeria’s proclaimed independence. Although France did not succeed in making Algeria French, it did persist in defending its economic interests in Algeria, even after the independence of Algeria. Notable among these interests were the prolonged presence of French construction companies, oil and gas extraction businesses, experimental nuclear tests centers, and a number of military bases in independent Algeria. Th is was the strategic onset of an Algérie algérienne facilitated by the majority of heads of state of independent Algeria, who were either military ALN offi cers or members of the FLN—signatory of the Evian Agreements. France’s colonialism—and that of other Western countries—is ubiquitous. We may not only observe it in the ghettoization of European urban areas, residential segregation, and job positions, but also within daily discourses, newspapers, images, fi lms, laws, ideas, and ideologies. Th e rise of extremism and far-right political parties and movements in France719 (and elsewhere in Europe and around the globe) confi rms that the history of wars, colonialism, imperialism, and fascism may be both rapidly forgotten and strategically manipulated. Th e founder of the French Front National (FN, or National Front) is an ardent exponent of Algérie française, for example, and therefore of colonialism itself. Among the members of this political party—whose current president (the daughter of the founder) has announced her intention to run for the French presidency in the 2017 election—are a number of former members of French paramilitary terrorist group the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS, or the Organization of the Secret Army). In the aftermath of the FN’s signifi cant victories in the municipal elections of 2014 in France, a number of French municipalities—particularly in the southern regions, where former colonizers cohabitate with former colonized people from Algeria and elsewhere—became represented by FN-aligned mayors. In 2015 (during the redaction of this dissertation), the newly elected mayor of Béziers, who declared that he was not an FN member but who was supported by the FN, commemorated French colonialism in Algeria
719 On the history of the extreme right wing in France, see, for example, James G. Shields, Th e Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen (London: Routledge, 2007).
May 2016 402 Architecture of Counterrevolution
and the violence of the Algerian War of Independence by renaming a street in the town under his authority. He replaced the existing street name sign, “Rue du 19 mars 1962”— which marked the signing of the Evian Accords, the ceasefi re, and the end of the Algerian War of Independence—with “Rue du Commandant Denoix de Saint Marc (1922–2013) Héros Français,” denoting instead a French army offi cer who had served in Algeria: an advocate of Algérie française who participated in the General’s Putsch of April 1961 against de Gaulle, the very idea of Algérie algérienne, and the independence of Algeria. Th e current Socialist President of the Fifth Republic—whose constitution was drafted in 1958, during the bloody Algerian War of Independence—allowed this emblematic change to take place. With this renaming, an anti-republican Frenchman was deemed a national hero. To this end, the nostalgia for colonialism and the eagerness to praise France’s colonial violence has only begun.
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Bibliography Th e following list makes no pretense of being exhaustive. It is a summary of archival records and published sources I have consulted for writing this dissertation.
Archives
Archives Départementales de la Haute-Garonne (ADHG): 35 Fi; 140 J; 156 J.
Archives de la Fondation Chales de Gaulle (AFCDG): F 45 3; F 45 4; F 45 5.
Archives Nationales de France, Pierrefi tte-sur-Seine, Paris (ANFPFSS): 19770775/32; 19770775/35; 19770775/40; 19770828/14; 19770830/1; 19771085/102; 19771106/1; 19771106/34; 19771154/4; 19771154/5; 19771612/168; 19771623/11; 19780206/3; 19780311/60; 19780311/60; 19790092/7; 19790092/61; 19790660/2; 19800021/1; 19800092/34; 19820108/16; 19820108/22; 19850386/3; 19850386/27; 19900492/19; 2002057/38; 538AP/40; AG/5(1)/1809 (by derogation); F/60/4020; F/60/4021; F/60/4022; F/60/4027; F/60/4028; F/60/4032; F/60/4037; F/60/4050; F/60/4051; F/60/4077.
Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (ANOM): 915/157; 932/32; 933/154; 933/155; 933/160; 9113/3F/1; 9314/158; 9323/34; 9333/108; 9333/203; 9336/14; 9336/26; 9336/119/5; ALG/91/3F/132; ALG/1K/478; ALG/1K/704; ALG/1K/952; ALG/1K/1183; ALG/2SAS/98; ALG/2SAS/105; ALG/2SAS/167; ALG/4SAS/48; ALG/5SAS/191; ALG/6SAS/59; ALG/6SAS/60; ALG/6SAS/64; ALG/7SAS/45; ALG/8SAS/50; ALG/8SAS/102; ALG/9SAS/90; ALG/9SAS/209; ALG/ SAS/DOC/3; ALG/SAS/DOC/4; ALG/SAS/DOC/5; AOM B 12242–12270; AOM//84; AOM/B//12334; AOM/B//12730; AOM B 13202–13230; FM/81F/443; FM/81F/444; FM/81F/452; FM/81F/1233; FM/81F/1810; FM/81F/2148; FM/81F/2201; FM/81F/2202; FM/81F/2203; FM/81F/2204; FM/81F/2206; FM/81F/2207; FM/81F/2211; FM/81F/2212; GGA/3R/286; GGA/11CAB/62; GGA/11CAB/64; GGA/12CAB/37; GGA/12CAB/42; GGA/12CAB/124; GGA/12CAB/200; GGA/14CAB/53; GGA/14CAB/169; GGA/14CAB/177; GGA/14CAB/230; GGA/14CAB/227; GGA/14CAB/169; GGA/15CAB/91; GGA/15CAB/99;
May 2016 406 Architecture of Counterrevolution
GGA/15CAB/128; GGA/15CAB/129; GGA/15CAB/130; GGA/16CAB/1.
Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po (CHSP): 1 DV 1; 1 DV 2; 1 DV 4; 1 DV 17; 1 DV 18; 1 DV 19; 1 DV 32; 1 DV 34; 1 DV 35; 3 DV 7; GB 2.
Etablissements de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelles de la Défense (ECPAD): ACT 5349; ACT 5413; ACT 5721; ACT 5987; ACT 6099; ACT 6166; ACT 6178; ACT 57105; ACT 58133; ACT 59148; ACT 59171; ACT 60100; ALG 57 249; ALG 57 317; ALG 57 341; ALG 57 348; ALG 57 359; ALG 57 406; ALG 58 223; ALG 58 347; ALG 58 358; ALG 59 72; ALG 59 255; ALG 59 256; ALG 59 258; ALG 59 297; ALG 59 365; ALG 59 369; ALG 59 378; ALG 59 522; ALG 60 325; ALG 62 58; ALG 62 128; ALG 63 131; ALG 64 4; ALG 64 19; ALG 64 22; D104; D134; D163–40; D163–59; TAM–DIA 1192.
Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA): AFE85009449; CAF90002960; CAF90006889; CAF91041262; CAF91063148; CAF91063157; CAF94073303; CAF94073234; CAF97504958; CPF86624330.
Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Ministère de la Défence, Château de Vincennes, Paris (SHAT): 1 H 1104; 1 H 1117; 1 H 1118; 1 H 1119; 1 H 1183; 1 H 1176; 1 H 1177; 1 H 1178; 1 H 1179; 1 H 1180; 1 H 1182; 1 H 1193; 1 H 1194; 1 H 1195; 1 H 1197; 1 H 1201; 1 H 1201 bis; 1 H 1213; 1 H 1267; 1 H 1268; 1 H 1873; 1 H 2030; 1 H 2054; 1 H 2308; 1 H 2460; 1 H 2461; 1 H 2467; 1 H 2485; 1 H 2499; 1 H 2515; 1 H 2516; 1 H 2522; 1 H 2573; 1 H 2574; 1 H 2576; 1 H 2872; 1 H 3613; 1 H 4063; 1 H 4394; 1 H 4742.
Samia Henni Bibliography 407
Journals
Annales de l’Institut technique du Bâtiment et des Travaux public: no. 134 (February 1959); no. 135–136 (March–April 1959); no. 137 (May 1959); no. 138 (June 1959); no. 139– 140 (July-August 1959); no. 141 (September 1959); no. 142 (October 1959); no. 143 (November 1959).
L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui: no. 3 (March 1936); no. 5 (May 1936); no. 44 (September 1952); no. 45 (November 1952); no. 46 (February–March 1953); no. 58 (February 1955); no. 60 (June 1955).
Techniques & ARCHITECTURE: no. 1–2 (1952); no. 3–4 (1953); no. 11–12 (1953); no. 3 (1957); no. 5 (1959); no. 329 (1980).
Chantiers : no. 3 (March 1933).
Urbanisme: no. 73 (1961).
Th eses
Blanchard, Emmanuel. “Encadrer des ‘citoyens diminués’. La police des Algériens en région parisienne (1944-1962).” Th èse pour le doctorat d’histoire, Université de Bourgogne, 2008. Cohen, Muriel. “Des famille invisibles: Politiques publique et trajectoires résidentielles de l’immigration Algérienne (1945–1985), Th èse pour le doctorat d’histoire, Université Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne, 2013. Delétage, Pascal. “Bernard Bachelot (Constantine, 1930–Toulouse): Parcours d’un architecte moderne.” Master 2 en Histoire de l’art, Université de Toulouse Le Mirail, 2007. Ellingsen Kvig, Marianne. “Le débat sur l’article 4 de la loi du 23 février 2005: La bataille des mémoires coloniales.” Master, University I Oslo, 2007. Gerber, Alex. “L’Algérie de Le Corbusier: Les voyages de 1931.” PhD Dissertation, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, 1993. McLeod, Mary Caroline. “Urbanism and Utopia: Le Corbusier from Regional Syndicalism to Vichy.” PhD Dissertation, Faculty of Princeton University, 1985. Muzaff ar, Muhammad Iljal. “Th e Periphery Within: Modern Architecture and the Making of the Th ird World.” PhD Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture, 2007.
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Selected Publications
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Alston, Philip. Th e United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal. Oxford [England]; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1992. Alwan, Mohamed. Algeria before the United Nations. Cairo: Middle East Publications, 1960. Amiraux, Valérie. “From Empire to Republic, the French Muslim Dilemma.” In Muslims in 21st Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives. London/ New York: Routledge, 2010. Amiri, Linda. La bataille de France: la guerre d’Algérie en métropole. Paris: Robert Laff ont, 2004. Amiri, Linda, and Benjamin Stora. Algériens en France: 1954 - 1962 ; la guerre, l’exil, la vie ; [Exposition “Vies d’Exil, 1954 - 1962. Des Algériens en France Pendant la Guerre d’Algérie” à la Cité Nationale de l’Histoire de l’Immigration, Paris]. Paris: Éd. Autremont [u.a.], 2012. Amrani, Mehana. Le 8 mai 1945 en Algérie: les discours français sur les massacres de Sétif, Kherrata et Guelma. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010. Angelo, Joseph A. Nuclear Technology. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004. Anta, Claudio Giulio. Les pères de l’Europe: sept portraits. Bruxelles: PIE Peter Lang, 2007. Armand, Sophie, and Jean-Loup Marfaing. Bernard Bachelot. 1930-2011. Toulouse: Conseil régional Midi-Pyrénées, 2013. Aron, Raymond. L’Algérie et la République. Paris: Plon, 1958. ———. La tragédie algérienne. Paris: Plon, 1957. ———. Paix et guerre entre les nations. París: Calmann-Lévy, 1962. Association des amis de Michel Debré. Michel Debré et l’Algérie: actes du colloque, Assemblée nationale, 27 et 28 avril 2006. Paris: Editions Champs Elysées, 2007. Aussaresses, Paul. Services spéciaux: Algérie, 1955-1957. Paris: Perrin, 2001. Aussaresses, Paul, and Robert L Miller. Th e Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957. New York: Enigma Books, 2002. Avermaete, Tom. Another Modern: Th e Post-War Architecture and Urbanism of Candilis-Josic-Woods. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2005. ———. “CIAM, Team X, and the Rediscovery of African Settlements: Between Dogon and Bidonville.” Modern Architecture and the Mediterranean / Ed. by Jean-Franois Lejeune and Michelangelo Sabatino, 2010, 250–64. Avermaete, Tom, Maristella Casciato, Yto Barrada, Takashi Honma, and Centre canadien d’architecture. Casablanca Chandigarh: A Report on Modernization, 2014. Avermaete, Tom, Serhat Karakayali, and Marion von Osten. Colonial Modern: Aesthetics of the Past--Rebellions for the Future. London: Black Dog, 2010. Avermaete, Tom, and Johan Lagae. L’Afrique, C’est Chic Architectuur En Planning in Afrika 1950- 1970 = Architecture and Planning in Africa 1950-1970. Rotterdam: NAi Uitgevers Pub., 2010. Bardet, Gaston. Alger... Paris: la Documentation française. Secrétariat général du Gouvernement
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Editions Larose, 1953. Zasloff , Joseph J. “Rural Resettlement in South Viet Nam: Th e Agroville Program.” Pacifi c Aff airs 35, no. 4 (1962): 327–40.
Filmography
Une nation, l’Algérie (René Vautier, 1954). La distribution de pain (Cécile Decugis, 1957). J’ai huit ans (Yann Le Masso and Olga Poliakoff , 1961). La Battaglia di Algeri (Gillo Pontecorvo, 1966). Rih Al-awras (Mohamen Lakhdar Hamina, 1966). L’opium et le bâton (Ahmed Rachedi, 1969). Avoir vingt ans dans les Aurès (René Vautier, 1971). La Guerre d’Algérie (Ives Courrière and Philippe Monnier, 1972). Chronique des années de braise (Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina, 1975). La Guerre sans nom (Bertrand Tavernier, 1992). Escadrons de la mort, l’école française (Marie-Monique Robin, 2003). Hors-la-loi (Rachid Bouchareb, 2010).
May 2016
Th is dissertation examines the intersection of French colonial policies and counterinsurgency operations in architecture in Algeria during the Algerian Revolution (1954–1962). During this bloody and protracted armed confl ict, the French civil and military authorities profoundly reorganized Algeria’s vast urban and rural territory, drastically transformed its built environments, rapidly implanted new infrastructure, and strategically built new settlements in order to keep Algeria under French colonial rule. Th e colonial regime had designed and completed not only tactical destructions, but also new constructions to allow for the strict control of the Algerian population and the protection of the European populations of Algeria. Th is study focuses on three interrelated spatial counterinsurgency measures: the massive forced resettlement of Algerian farmers; the mass-housing programs designed for the Algerian population as part of General Charles de Gaulle’s Plan de Constantine; and the fortifi ed administrative new town planned for the protection of the French authorities during the last months of the Algerian Revolution. Th e aim is to depict the modus operandi of these settlements, their roots, developments, scopes, actors, protocols, impacts, and design mechanisms.
PhD Candidate: Samia Henni
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Philip Ursprung, ETH Zurich, Switzerland Prof. Dr. Tom Avermaete, TU Delft, Th e Netherlands Prof. Dr. Jean-Louis Cohen, Institute of Fine Arts, New York University, USA
May 2016