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Indonesia: Tensions Over Aceh's Flag

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Indonesia: Tensions Over Aceh's Flag Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°139 Jakarta /Brussels, 7 May 2013 Indonesia: Tensions Over Aceh’s Flag I. Overview The decision of the Aceh provincial government to adopt the banner of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) as its official provincial flag is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Jakarta, heightening ethnic and politi- cal tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of Aceh and raising fears of violence as a national election approaches in 2014. On 25 March 2013, the provincial legislature adopted a regulation (qanun) mak- ing the GAM’s old banner the provincial flag. It was immediately signed by Governor Zaini Abdullah. The governor and deputy governor are members of Partai Aceh, the political party set up by former rebel leaders in 2008 that also controls the legislature. The central government, seeing the flag as a separatist symbol and thus in viola- tion of national law, immediately raised objections and asked for changes. Partai Aceh leaders, seeing the flag as a potent tool for mass mobilisation in 2014, have refused, arguing that it cannot be a separatist symbol if GAM explicitly recognised Indonesian sovereignty as part of the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 that ended a nearly 30-year insurgency. Partai Aceh believes that if it remains firm, Jakarta will eventually concede, as it did in 2012 over an election dispute. Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s government is torn. On the one hand, it does not want a fight with the GAM leaders; the 2005 peace agreement is the most im- portant achievement of a president who, in his final term, is very much concerned about his legacy. It also is unwilling to provoke GAM too far, fearful that it will return to conflict, a fear many in Aceh discount as unwarranted but one that Partai Aceh has exploited with relish. On the other hand, it does not want to be branded as anti- nationalist as the 2014 election looms, especially as some in the security forces remain convinced that GAM has not given up the goal of independence and is using democratic means to pursue it. The president and his advisers also know that if they allow the GAM flag to fly, it will have repercussions in Papua, where dozens of pro- independence activists remain jailed for flying the “Morning Star” flag of the inde- pendence movement. GAM leaders see little to lose by standing their ground. The flag is a hugely emo- tive symbol, and defying Jakarta is generally a winning stance locally. Some individ- ual members of parliament see it as a way of regaining waning popularity for failing to deliver anything substantive to their constituencies. Also, Partai Aceh took a con- troversial decision to partner with Gerindra, the party of former army General Pra- bowo Subianto, for the 2014 election. Leaders like Muzakir Manaf, deputy governor and former commander of GAM’s armed wing, may want to use the flag issue to show Indonesia: Tensions Over Aceh’s Flag Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°139, 7 May 2013 Page 2 they have not compromised their principles by allying with a man whose human rights record is often questioned. Within Aceh, adoption of the GAM flag has sparked protests from non-Acehnese ethnic groups in the central highlands and south west. The GAM heartland has always been along the east coast; to highlanders like the Gayo, the flag thus represents the domination of the coastal Acehnese at their expense. The issue has revived a dormant campaign for the division of Aceh into three by the creation of two new provinces, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) for the central highlands and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS) for the south west. If GAM does not back down on the flag, support for that cam- paign by the intelligence services is likely to rise, and with it, the probability of in- creased ethnic tensions. The options for breaking the stalemate seem to be as follows: the government concedes; GAM concedes, making slight changes to the flag by adding or removing an element; GAM agrees to limits on how or where the flag can be displayed; or the dispute is taken to the Supreme Court, thereby delaying any resolution. In the meantime, the power of the GAM machinery in Aceh continues to grow. II. The Dispute The dispute over the flag is the first major public tussle between Aceh and the cen- tral government since Partai Aceh’s team won the governorship in April 2012.1 It be- gan when after months of debate, Qanun No.3/2013 on the Flag and Symbol of Aceh was adopted by acclamation in a legislature controlled by Partai Aceh.2 Partai Aceh is run by a small GAM elite led by Malek Mahmud, a Singaporean- born Acehnese who for years was “prime minister” in GAM’s Sweden-based govern- ment-in-exile. He headed the GAM delegation to the Helsinki talks. Since November 2012, he has held the position of Wali Nanggroe (literally “guardian of the state”), a post created in Helsinki for the late GAM founder Hasan di Tiro that GAM leaders see as the successor to the old Aceh sultanate.3 Zaini Abdullah, GAM’s former “for- eign minister”, was elected governor by a landslide in April 2012 on a ticket with Muzakir Manaf, GAM’s former military commander – who also serves as general chairman of the party.4 The party now controls the executive and legislative branch- es of the provincial government and many of its most populous districts.5 1 For earlier analysis of Aceh, see Crisis Group Asia Briefings N°135, Indonesia: Averting Election Violence in Aceh, 29 February 2012; N°123, Indonesia: GAM vs GAM in the Aceh Elections, 15 June 2011; N°90, Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as Elections Approach, 23 March 2009; N°81, Indo- nesia: Pre-Election Anxieties in Aceh, 9 September 2008; N°61, Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh, 22 March 2007; N°57, Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 29 November 2006; N°48, Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, 29 March 2006; N°44, Aceh: So Far, So Good, 13 December 2005; and N°40, Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, 15 August 2005; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°139, Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, 4 October 2007. 2 Partai Aceh controls 42 of the 69 seats. It has 33 seats itself, and its faction includes the National Mandate Party (PAN) with five seats and four smaller parties that have one seat each. The Demo- crat Party has ten seats; Golkar, eight; and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and United Develop- ment Party (PPP), four each. 3 See Section IV.B below. 4 They received nearly 56 per cent of the vote; their strongest rival, former Governor Irwandi Yusuf received 29.2 per cent. 5 These include Pidie, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Utara, Kota Sabang, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Besar, Langsa and Aceh Barat Daya. Indonesia: Tensions Over Aceh’s Flag Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°139, 7 May 2013 Page 3 The flag specified in the qanun had been used by GAM throughout its struggle for independence: red background, black and white horizontal stripes at the top and bot- tom, with a crescent moon and star in the middle. Instantly recognisable throughout Aceh, a modified version was adopted as the Partai Aceh flag in 2008 – after the government had rejected the original.6 Detractors of Partai Aceh, including ethnic Gayo groups in the central highlands, supporters of former Governor Irwandi Yusuf (himself a former GAM member) and some non-GAM politicians, see the GAM flag more as a symbol of the party than of the Acehnese people. Nevertheless, the fact that the qanun was adopted unanimously by a democratically-elected legislature underscored the strength of its political support. The provincial symbol, featuring a lion and the buraq – the winged creature that carried the Prophet Mohammed from earth to heaven and back – had been used for years by the Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, the official name of GAM.7 Its more complicated iconography and relatively rare usage mean it does not have the same emotive power as the flag, although it is also controversial.8 After Qanun No. 3 was enacted, the central government immediately suggested that some “clarification” was needed.9 Gamawan Fauzi, the home affairs minister, said it was in violation of Government Regulation 77/2007 on Regional Symbols, which bans any flag “that bears similarity to the logo or flag of banned organisations or separatist movements, associations, institutions or organisations”.10 On 4 April, he went to Aceh for talks with government and party leaders and presented a request that thirteen parts of the qanun be changed, almost all of them because they clashed with this regulation.11 6 The party flag replaces the crescent and star with the word ACEH, but the colours and stripes are the same. In 2007, GAM leaders trying to register a local party under the terms of the 2005 Helsin- ki memorandum of understanding and the 2006 Law on the Governing of Aceh proposed the name “Partai GAM”, with the original GAM flag as its symbol. The law and human rights ministry, re- sponsible for registering local parties, formally rejected the proposal, after other senior officials ar- gued that using the name and symbol of GAM violated the spirit of the Helsinki agreement. This led party leaders to adopt the name “Partai Aceh” and the modified flag in May 2008. See “Partai GAM Bakal Jadi Partai Aceh”, Kompas, 1 May 2008. 7 The independence movement always used the spelling “Acheh” or “Atjeh” rather than the modern Indonesian “Aceh”.
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