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IFES Faqs on Elections in Indonesia: 2019 Concurrent Presidential And

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IFES Faqs on Elections in Indonesia: 2019 Concurrent Presidential And Elections in Indonesia 2019 Concurrent Presidential and Legislative Elections Frequently Asked Questions Asia-Pacific International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011 Crystal Drive | Floor 10 | Arlington, VA 22202 | www.IFES.org April 9, 2019 Frequently Asked Questions When is Election Day? ................................................................................................................................... 1 Who are citizens voting for? ......................................................................................................................... 1 What is the legal framework for the 2019 elections? .................................................................................. 1 How are the legislative bodies structured? .................................................................................................. 2 Who are the presidential candidates? .......................................................................................................... 3 Which political parties are competing? ........................................................................................................ 4 Who can vote in this election?...................................................................................................................... 5 How many registered voters are there? ....................................................................................................... 6 Are there reserved seats for women? What is the gender balance within the candidate list? ................... 6 What are the election management bodies? What are their powers? ........................................................ 7 How many polling places are set up on Election Day? ................................................................................. 8 Is out-of-country voting allowed? ................................................................................................................. 8 How will voters with disabilities cast their ballots? ...................................................................................... 8 What technology will be used? ..................................................................................................................... 9 Where are vote counting and tabulation held? ............................................................................................ 9 Who can observe during Election Day? How can they get accreditation? ................................................... 9 When will official results be announced? ................................................................................................... 10 How will election disputes be adjudicated? ............................................................................................... 10 Resources .................................................................................................................................................... 12 Disclosure: These FAQs reflect decisions made by the Indonesian elections authorities as of April 9, 2019, to the best of our knowledge. This document does not represent any IFES policy or technical recommendations. Elections in Indonesia: 2019 Concurrent Presidential and Legislative Elections Frequently Asked Questions When is Election Day? For the first time since Indonesia’s transition to democracy, presidential and legislative elections will be held on the same day – Wednesday, April 17, 2019. Election Day is a national holiday in Indonesia. Polling stations open at 7:00 a.m. and close at 1:00 p.m. Counting starts at the polling station level at 1:00 p.m. and continues until all votes from the polling station are counted. Who are citizens voting for? Citizens will select both the next president and vice president of Indonesia, as well as national and subnational legislators in 34 provinces and 514 regencies and municipalities from 245,660 candidates. What is the legal framework for the 2019 elections? Indonesia is a representative republic, with the president serving as both the head of state and government. The amended 1945 Constitution of Indonesia is the foundation for the country’s system of government and provides for a separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Members of the legislative bodies and the president and vice president are elected by the people every five years. The president is the head of the executive branch and can be elected for a maximum of two five-year terms. Incumbent President Joko Widodo was first elected for office in the 2014 election with 53.15 percent of the vote. He is currently running for his second and last term. In 2017, the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) passed a new General Elections Law (Law No. 7/2017), which consolidated Law No. 15/2011 on Election Management Bodies, Law No. 8/2012 on Legislative Elections and Law No. 42/2008 on Presidential Elections and introduced changes in the law to respond to the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) ruling in 2014 that called for the legislative election and presidential election to be held on the same day. This changed the prior practice where legislative elections were held several months ahead of the presidential elections as the law used to require that political parties reach a threshold of votes or seats in the legislative election for nomination of presidential candidates. The new law states that any political party or coalition of political parties that won 25 percent of valid votes or won at least 20 percent of the seats in the DPR in the previous legislative election can nominate candidates for president and vice president. The president and vice president are elected directly by the people as a pair. The electoral legal framework now comprises the following four laws: • Law No. 7/2017 on Governing General Elections; • Law No. 10/2016 on Governing Regional Head Elections, an amended version of Law No. 1/2015; • Law No. 2/2011 on Governing Political Parties; and • Law No. 2/2018 on Governing the Structure of National and Sub-National Legislatures (MD3). Page 1 of 12 Elections in Indonesia: 2019 Concurrent Presidential and Legislative Elections Frequently Asked Questions For the 2019 cycle, the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU), has set April 17 as the date for the presidential and legislative elections. On September 20, 2018, the KPU announced two presidential candidate pairs eligible to run in the election. Following the MK ruling in 2014, which declared that any candidate pair in a two-ticket race must win an absolute majority to win the election, there is no potential for a run-off vote.1 The presidential inauguration is scheduled for October 20, 2019. How are the legislative bodies structured? There are two elected national legislative assemblies in Indonesia: the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). The DPR can pass legislation, while the DPD – formed in 2004 by a constitutional amendment in a move toward bicameralism – has a more limited mandate.2 In joint session, the two chambers are known as the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) and their mandate includes the final step in the presidential impeachment process. Members of both the DPR and DPD are elected for five-year terms. The DPR has a total of 575 representatives from 80 multi-member electoral districts. Each district has between three and 10 seats, based on the district’s population. Representatives are elected from political party lists through an open-list proportional representation system. To earn parliamentary seats, parties need to surpass a parliamentary threshold of 4 percent of the vote. The parliamentary threshold only applies to the national DPR, not to subnational legislatures. On Election Day, each voter receives one DPR ballot listing all political parties and candidates running in their electoral district. The voter then uses a nail to puncture a hole in the ballot to select one candidate, one political party or both. However, a ballot will be considered invalid if the political party chosen is not the party of the candidate chosen. The DPD has 136 representatives, four from each of 34 provinces. Nonpartisan candidates from the respective provinces are elected through a single nontransferable vote system. The law requires each DPD candidate to demonstrate voter support by submitting copies of the identification cards of between 1,000 and 5,000 voters, depending on the number of registered voters in each province (Article 83 Law No.7/2017). Each voter receives one DPD ballot listing all candidates running in their province. The voter punches only one hole to mark the candidate of their choice. The four candidates with the highest vote totals in each province are elected. Additionally, voters will be electing members of the Provincial People’s House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi, DPRD Province). Thirty-five to 120 members are elected in each of the 34 provinces, depending on the population of the province. For the 2019 provincial-level 1 Prior to this MK ruling, a candidate pair needed to fulfill two conditions to avoid a run-off vote: 1) win an absolute majority of votes and 2) win at least 20 percent of votes in more than half of all provinces. 2 DPD law-making authority is limited to providing non-binding input to the DPR regarding regional autonomy, establishment of new regions, management of natural resources
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