Preventing Balkan Conflict: the Role of Euroatlantic Institutions

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Preventing Balkan Conflict: the Role of Euroatlantic Institutions No. 226 Strategic Forum April 2007 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of Euroatlantic Institutions by Jeffrey Simon a union of defense and interior ministers would handle its own security challenges and that Key Points work with the Southeast European Cooperation the European Union (EU) needed to improve Initiative to provide opportunities for West Bal- its military capabilities and be able to deploy Despite 15 years of international peace- kan states to move beyond stabilization toward forces outside its borders. In 1999, the EU integration. keeping and security assistance, the West launched its European Security and Defense Balkans are still beset with major security chal- These stabilization efforts and institu- lenges that will severely test the North Atlantic tional developments are cause for optimism Policy (ESDP) with a Helsinki Headline Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European but no guarantee of success. A NATO–EU Goal that called for a European Union Force Union (EU) in 2007. Balkan strategy that aims at effective and (EUFOR) of 60,000 troops to deploy within 60 Bosnia-Herzegovina still requires the pres- well-integrated national, regional, and subre- days for up to 12 months to focus on the so- ence of NATO and EU police and peacekeepers gional capacity-building efforts will be a vital called Petersberg Tasks comprising humani- and, along with newly independent Montenegro, ingredient in forestalling future conflict. tarian, peacekeeping, and crisis-management needs help in building basic institutions. The missions. EU governments also agreed to sup- same is true for Kosovo. As the United Nations Balkans in Perspective addresses Kosovo’s “final status,” Kosovar and port major new efforts to better integrate their Serbian interethnic relations will likely grow Since the end of the Cold War, the Bal- competencies in civil society, security sector more unstable, possibly with ripple effects in kan region has presented major security chal- reform, and military operations to enhance Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. lenges to the United States and Europe. The postconflict stabilization, security transition, Among the instruments for enhancing instability and weak governance of the region and reconstruction operations. Balkan stability today are NATO’s Partnership for remain an important concern in the post- Peace and the EU’s Stabilization and Association 9/11 period. Balkan regional tensions erupted Agreements, along with an array of subregional Looming Challenges organizations promoting cooperation. in several wars resulting from the disintegra- Despite successful stabilization efforts NATO and EU members—Hungary, tion of the former Yugoslavia in 1991. After a and institutional advances of the past decade, Slovenia, and Greece, along with Romania slow initial response from Europe and con- Balkan regional conflicts and the risk of state and Bulgaria, who joined the EU in January fronted by an inadequate United Nations failure, which receded into the background 2007—now provide a core for coordinating (UN) effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), NATO and EU programs in promoting West after 9/11, are likely to reemerge as challenges the United States convinced the North Atlan- requiring renewed attention from the United Balkan security sector reform, encouraging tic Treaty Organization (NATO) to initiate a regional collaboration, and providing a credible States and Europe. Three major challenges decade-long peacekeeping mission to safe- roadmap for Euro-Atlantic integration. are on the horizon: Expanding the Southeast European guard implementation of the Dayton Accords. Then, in an effort to halt a humanitarian ■ The future of Bosnia-Herzegovina in light Defense Ministerial and Civil-Military Emergen- of the recent constitutional setback and aftermath cy Planning Council for Southeastern Europe catastrophe stemming from ethnic cleansing of the October 1, 2006, parliamentary elections membership to include all West Balkan states in Kosovo, NATO engaged in an air campaign will be challenged, raising questions about likely and broadening their coverage to include inte- against Serbia and another major peacekeep- future requirements for EU Operation Althea rior ministers (police and border guards) would 1 ing operation in Kosovo. (EUFOR) and the EU Police Mission (EUPM). create the necessary conditions for advancing The Yugoslav wars during the 1990s rein- Balkan regional cooperation in a Southeast ■ With Montenegro opting for independence European Homeland Defense Ministerial. Such forced the view that Europe was unable to in the May 21, 2006, referendum, its small size No. 226, April 2007 Strategic Forum 1 (population 620,000) and embryonic state insti- continues to resist police reform under a state- Five shortcomings are most evident. First, tutions may prove to be an impediment to achiev- level ministry of interior. As BiH constitutional the new country is only now in the midst of writ- ing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and could have an amendments to do this failed to acquire the ing its constitution, which presumably will define impact on governance in Belgrade and on regional necessary two-thirds majority in both parlia- the powers between the president and prime min- stability and security. ment houses in spring 2006, the new govern- ister. Apparently operating under the Montene- ■ With Kosovo final status negotiations moving ment that assumed office after the October 1, grin Republic’s constitution of 1992, the presi- toward conclusion without resolution by Belgrade, 2006, parliamentary and presidential elections dent has already decreed that the Montenegrin Pristina, and Kosovo Serbs, an “imposed” settlement could have significant implications on Kosovo’s will have to renew the constitutional debate. armed forces will abandon conscription and field statehood prospects, Kosovo Force’s (KFOR’s) future, an all-volunteer force. (Thus far, it is in the pro- and Serbia. If Kosovo fails to remain a multi-ethnic NATO and the EU will cess of reducing from 6,300 troops to a goal of entity, it could also have an impact on stability and 2,500.) Second, although Montenegro has a play significant roles in security in the West Balkans, Southeast Europe, and newly appointed defense minister (the prime beyond (for example, Transniestria, Abkhazia, and preventing a backslide minister had previously been dual-hatted), it still South Ossetia). into conflict does not have a defense ministry, nor does it have In each case, NATO and the EU, along sufficient adequately trained personnel to pro- with subregional organizations, will play sig- But initial indications are not promising, as RS vide necessary civilian (budget, defense policy nificant roles in preventing a backslide into President Nebojsa Radmanovic and Prime Min- and plans, personnel management, and logis- conflict, but the character of these roles will ister Milorad Dodik do not want a unified Bos- tics) oversight of the military. Third, members vary. Bosnia and Montenegro need assistance nia.2 Weak governance and a destroyed eco- of parliament also need assistance in developing in building their civilian and defense insti- nomic base have led to chronic unemployment, appropriate skills to perform necessary defense tutions, respectively, while Serbia and Kosovo which official statistics put at roughly 40 per- committee oversight of operations and budget. will need help developing cooperative activi- cent but which is probably closer to 20 percent Fourth, of the planned 2,500 troops in the Mon- ties with each other and their neighbors, as because of the gray economy.3 tenegrin armed forces, only 13 speak English, well as advancing security sector reforms. EUFOR’s mission will be accomplished and only 3 have observed or participated in UN Bosnia-Herzegovina: Unresolved when BiH state-level institutions have been peacekeeping operations.4 Finally, Montenegrin Issues. BiH continues to face the challenge created and are functioning adequately. No financial resources will likely prove to be a major of building state-level institutions. To begin one can predict when this will happen, how- constraint. Montenegro’s planned 2007 defense moving toward its objective of joining Euro- ever. Recognizing that local politicians must budget of €40 million (less than the 2006 bud- Atlantic structures, BiH started negotiations ultimately accept responsibility for the result, get) represents 2 percent of gross domestic prod- in November 2003 and approved a feasibil- the EU Office of the High Representative uct, is insufficient to meet its planned require- ity study with the EU, but it still has outstand- believes it is still premature to shift to state- ments, and likely will be difficult to sustain over ing issues of police reforms. Recent efforts to level institutions, preferring that the EU Spe- time. Montenegro may find that its planned pro- amend the constitution to strengthen the state cial Representative remain in the country for fessional force is too large and expensive to sus- over ethnic entities failed and had to be post- at least another year. tain or maintain at operational levels and likely poned until after the October 1, 2006, parlia- Montenegro’s New Start. Montene- will require reassessment. mentary elections, which were successfully gro proclaimed its independence from Serbia In sum, Montenegro’s expectations about convened. It remains to be seen if unity of the and Montenegro
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