BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN

brief 34 Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia brief 34

Contents

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 4

Executive Summary 6 About the author Acknowledgements 7

Introduction 8 Tobias Pietz Researcher, Bonn International Center Albania 10 for Conversion (BICC), Germany

Defense Reform 10 Defense Conversion 15 Conclusions 20

Macedonia 23

Defense Reform 23 Defense Conversion 29 Conclusions 34

Croatia 36

Defense Reform 36 Defense Conversion 39 Conclusions 46

Overall Conclusions 47

List of Interviewed Persons 50

Annex 52

Endnotes 68 Responsible at DCAF: Marc Remillard, Program Manager for Demobilization and Retraining

Editing: Elvan Isikozlu

Cover: NATO photos. Macedonian soldiers patrolling along the border with Kosovo.

2 B I C C BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN

brief 34 Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia

Tobias Pietz with Marc Remillard

B I C C 3 brief 34 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA Albanian Atlantic Association AAF Albanian Armed Forces ANP Annual National Program ARM Armed Forced of Macedonia BA&H Booz, Allen and Hamilton CAF Croatian Armed Forces CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization COSS Council for Oversight of the Security Services DP Democratic Party of Albania DPA Democratic Party of the Albanians DUI Democratic Union for Integration EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council EPD Economy and Privatization Directorate ESDP European Security and Defense Policy EU European Union ICTY International Crime Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IOM International Organization for Migration JNA Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia JNSC Joint National Security Committee LEPEZA (spectra) Macedonian Resettlement Project LTDP Long Term Development Plan MAP Membership Action Plan MAPE Multinational Advisory Police Force MOPO Ministry of Public Order MPRI Military Professional Resources Inc. NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council NAMRA National Association of the Military in Reserve NCO Non-Commissioned Offi cer NDC National Demilitarization Center NLA National Liberation Army PARP Planning and Review Process PCC Prague Capabilities Commitment PDP Party for Democratic Prosperity PG Partnership Goals PMC Private Military Company RASDP Reintegration Assistance for Separated Defense Personnel SAA Stabilization and Association Agreements SAIC Science Applications International Corporation SAP Stabilization and Association Process

4 B I C C acronyms

SDR Strategic Defense Review SDSM Social Democratic Union of Macedonia SP Socialist Party of Albania SP Stability Pact for South- Eastern Europe SPECTRA Separated Personnel Care and Transition Program TDF Territorial Defense Forces TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command UNEP United Nations Environment Program WEU Western European Union

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was established in October 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government. The Centre encourages and supports states and non-state governed institutions in their efforts to strengthen democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces, and promotes international cooperation in this fi eld, initially targeting the Euro-Atlantic regions. To implement these objectives, the Centre:

collects information, undertakes research and engages in networking activities in order to identify problems, to estab- lish lessons learned and to propose the best practices in the fi eld of democratic control of armed forces and civil-mili- tary relations;

provides its expertise and support to all interested parties, in particular governments, parliaments, military authorities, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, academic circles.

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Rue de Chantepoulet 11 P. O. Box 1360 CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland Tel: +41 (0)22 741 77 00 Fax: +41 (0)22 741 77 05 E-mail: [email protected] URL: http://www.dcaf.ch

B I C C 5 brief 34 Executive Summary

lbania, Macedonia and Croatia subordinate. The relations between Regarding the concrete programs Aare entering a phase of defense the main security players, such as the which are currently implemented restructuring that most Eastern Parliament, the President, the Prime for the reintegration of redundant European countries have already Minister, and the Defense Minister personnel, only Croatia’s SPECTRA surpassed. A suffi cient degree of demonstrate contradictions between program can be judged as successful stability has been established in the defense laws and everyday practice. by the author, while all the other Western Balkans following the wars Very few NGOs are involved in programs are either defi cient or have and domestic unrest of the 1990s, in security and defense matters, as they just entered the implementation which reform processes and potential mostly repeat the stereotypical goal of phase with very modest outcomes. disarmament was brought to a halt. NATO integration without providing The lack of available funding and This brief deals with the military reform civilian expert input. Additionally, qualifi ed expertise for the preparation and the defense conversion process in the legacy of the communist past and implementation of reintegration the aforementioned countries. Among continues to perpetuate a culture of programs delayed the start of the the issues covered are the adoption and secrecy and infl uences civil-military LEPEZA program in Macedonia. implementation of strategic-doctrinal relations in Albania, Macedonia and At the same time, the inability of the documents, and the modernization Croatia. MoD in Albania to offer a realistic and downsizing of armed forces, reintegration program has forced it to including the reintegration measures The fi ndings of this brief further focus on improving pension benefi ts for redundant personnel and the show that the defense reform for ex-military men, despite the fact arrangements for sale and conversion process in the Western Balkans is that funding capabilities to implement of military bases. complex. This is because it involves the pension law for ex-offi cers is rather not only the improvement of civilian minimal. The current goal of defense reforms and democratic oversight and the in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia modernization of the armed forces The conversion of military sites consists mainly of establishing small, and the Ministries of Defense, but also remains vague in all three countries. modern, effective, deployable and the adaptation of the armed forces State offi cials often equate the term interoperable professional armies. to the new global, regional and local with the transfer or sale of military With the adoption of strategic strategic environment. Yet public property and equipment, or a documents, legal frameworks, and with opinion in Albania, Macedonia and modernization or income generation, the downsizing of personnel already Croatia associates defense reforms but not necessarily with benefi ts to in an advanced stage, the essential more with the closure of military sites, individuals, local communities or yardsticks of defense have been met. loss of employment and a decline in regions. At times, the modernization This brief concludes that the reforms living standards for former military of military bases for new operational have been guided primarily by external personnel. Despite achievements in the tasks is also referred to as conversion. actors, namely by NATO, foreign defense reform process, the Western As a rule, the national MoDs are Private Military Companies (PMC) and Balkan countries have achieved the institutions that are responsible bilateral support by the US and various differing degrees of success regarding for implementing and controlling EU countries. NATO’s infl uence has the restructuring of their armed the conversion of military property. played a particularly formative role, as forces, the reintegration of redundant Consequently, sale or renting is used as reforms are one of its priority issues, military personnel, and the conversion the main “conversion model” with the carried out through various programs of military sites for civilian purposes. main purpose being to generate funds. and activities. All three countries The reintegration of ex-military men Such a money-making approach may in consider these reforms as a test of into civilian life remains a secondary part explain the lack of transparency in their capability and willingness to problem, as it is not an integral part the process, and why the MoDs cannot adopt and implement the rules and of defense reform. The issue does be seen as impartial brokers. standards of NATO as well as a step not seem to be a priority for NATO towards potential EU membership in or PMC either, leaving it up to weak To improve the overall performance of the future. national institutions that act under the conversion activities of the three huge fi nancial constraints and with countries, this study recommends to: Theoretically, defense reform should limited integration possibilities of help adjust national institutions to national economies and labor markets. Increase transparency in all NATO standards in civil-military An exception to this is the strong, planned and currently undertaken relations as well. This brief argues fi nancial and structural involvement conversion activities, but that the role of national institutions of the International Organization especially within the process of in guiding the reforms remains rather for Migration (IOM) in the Croatian the transfer and sale of military reintegration process. bases, sites and assets. The model

6 B I C C summary

of an independent agency for Acknowledgements conversion would guarantee more transparency and streamline The author would like to thank his bureaucratic procedures. colleagues at BICC for their support, particularly Andreas Heinemann-Grü- Avoid duplication of structures der for his continuous and substantial and efforts but use synergies such input into the study; Elvan Isikozlu for as the integration of IOM into the her language editing and proof-reading; set-up of the SPECTRA program, Michael Brzoska for providing helpful which could be used for other comments; and Svenja Bends and Kaska activities in defense conversion Moraht for the layout and publishing of as well. Moreover, NGOs this study. should be involved in making the process more cost-effi cient, At our partner organization for this study and, in the case of retraining – the Geneva Center for the Democratic and resettlement, to have civilian Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) partners on board for reintegrating – the author would like to thank Marc ex-military into society and the Remillard for his comments and coope- economy. ration. Moreover, Fréderique Jaquemin from NATO's Economic Directorate Drop high expectations for profi ts was very supportive and arranged mee- from transfers and sales. They tings with NATO personnel involved in are not likely to materialize. The military reform in the Western Balkans. environmental issues in particular Appreciation goes to the NATO Expert could backfi re on the planned Team on Defense Conversion for pro- sales. An option to attract new viding a cooperative atmosphere on our funds in times of low donor mission to Croatia in spring 2005. interest for military reform is to request fi nancial support for the Numerous people were supportive in clean up of polluted military sites. the three countries of this study, as well Though this presents no fi nancial as important sources of information. gain in the defense budget, it In Croatia, main thanks go to Zvonko presents a positive benefi t to Popovic and his SPECTRA team in communities. particular for always being available and eager to help, as well as Gregoire Increase and institutionalize the Goodstein and his team from the IOM exchange of experiences in the RASDP Project. In Albania, Arben Gjata region on defense reform and was indispensable for the verifi cation concrete conversion projects. of the data and for providing detailed Structures like the new Defense explanations of the defense and security Conversion Cell at RACVIAC can issues in his country. In Macedonia, Dane provide important support for this Taleski was an invaluable resource on purpose. political and military matters. Nevertheless, it goes without saying Provide the message that no social that only the author is responsible for benefi ts automatically result from the views expressed in this study. a military career, but rather that each soldier has a civilian identity and personal responsibility to society.

B I C C 7 brief 34 Introduction

efense reform, the restructuring consists in establishing small, modern, process of military reform. This Dof armed forces, NATO effective, deployable and interoperable feedback could then be used to integration and defense conversion are professional armies as opposed to formulate lessons learned to better the common issues for the Western Balkan conscript-based forces. national processes of each country countries. International organizations, analyzed in this study. such as the Stability Pact for South More specifi cally, this study analyzes Eastern Europe (SP) and NATO, think the developments, achievements, and In discussing various elements of tanks, NGOs, and private companies shortcomings of defense reform and the defense reform four aspects are are trying to respond to a growing defense conversion in Albania, Croatia presented: fi rst, the strategic planning, demand by national governments and Macedonia. The study attempts e.g., those documents necessary to for fi nancial help and expertise to single out the main factors that develop a conceptual orientation of to cope with the implications and infl uence military reform and defense the whole defense reform; second, consequences of military reforms and conversion. It is based on information the implementation process; third, the defense conversion.1 Similar to other gathered during fi eld trips to all three characteristics of armed forces to be areas of post-socialist transition and countries in March and April of 2005, achieved by the reform; and fourth, transformation, the Western Balkan and to NATO in December 2005. basic principles for executing the states are entering a phase which most Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia were process. This will include the security Eastern European countries have selected to complete a series of studies and defense strategy, the fi nancial already passed with varying degrees issued jointly by the Geneva Center aspects of the process as well as the of success. A suffi cient degree of for the Democratic Control of the strategic defense review. stability has been established in this Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Bonn region following the wars and domestic International Center for Conversion Defense conversion is seen by national unrest of the 1990s, in which reform (BICC) covering almost all Western and international actors as an integral processes and potential disarmament Balkan countries.3 part of a comprehensive Defense and was brought to a halt. Euro-Atlantic Security Sector Reform process in integration is becoming a likely The text of the following study the Western Balkans.4 Conversion has prospect for a growing number of has three country chapters and been described as the transformation states in the region while old threat an overarching conclusion with and re-use of various kinds of perceptions are slowly changing. recommendations. Each country military assets for civilian purposes.5 Judging by the recent strategic defense chapter begins with a general Therefore, activities like retraining and and security papers published in description of the state of the military resettlement of redundant military the region, military reforms and the reform, the status of Euro-Atlantic personnel, and redevelopment, clean- resulting conversion needs are gaining integration, and the degree of progress up of environmental contamination, importance in all Western Balkan in establishing functioning civil-military and rehabilitation of military bases all countries. relations. The main subchapters are the fall within the realm of conversion. analysis of policies, plans and activities However, with regard to the defense This study deals with military reform in the fi eld of military reforms and conversion in the Western Balkan and the defense conversion process the two most relevant fi elds of states—namely in Croatia, Albania and in general. Among the issues covered defense conversion: the retraining and Macedonia—national and international are the adoption and implementation resettlement of discharged military actors involved are using differing of strategic-doctrinal documents, and personnel and military base conversion. defi nitions of and approaches to this the modernization and downsizing concept of conversion, often following of armed forces.2 Part of the The criteria chosen to measure the slightly diverging agendas. The concept implementation of these goals is the achievements and shortcomings try to of defense conversion itself remains build-up of an appropriate defense answer the following key questions: vague, but it is mostly understood as planning system, an adequate and how realistic is the process of reform referring to downsizing, resettlement affordable resource allocation, a proper planning (realism)? How effi cient and reintegration of military personnel, and effi cient budgetary system, a clear, is the institutional framework of the conversion of military bases and transparent and effi cient procurement reform (effi ciency)? How suffi cient property as well as the conversion process, human management systems, are the fi nancial and human resources of defense industries. State offi cials appropriate social programs to deal (suffi ciency of resources)? What is the often equate the term with the transfer with the adverse effects of the reform, role of external support for reforms or sale of military property and public communication strategies, and (external support)? By applying equipment; with modernization or an effi cient decision-making system. these indicators the author aims to income generation; but not necessarily The ultimate goal of these reforms provide feedback on achievements with the benefi ts to individuals, local and shortcomings of military reforms communities and regions. Sometimes and defense conversion and to make the modernization of military bases for recommendations on managing the

8 B I C C introduction

new operational tasks is also referred the defense reform in the Western secure governmental and parliamentary to as conversion. The Ministries of Balkans presents a huge challenge for support for suffi cient resources. Given Defense of the three countries under all countries concerned and is a test the importance of a coordinated inter- study show similar expectations of their capability and willingness to agency approach, the reform process and visions of defense conversion adopt and implement the rules and should also be designed as a national as those of other Balkan countries standards of NATO. However, it is project. such as Serbia and Montenegro.6 For understandable that the armed forces these countries, defense conversion is of the Western Balkan countries The defense reform process in the expected to provide funding for the are psychologically and linguistically Western Balkans is complex. It modernization of military bases or unprepared to immediately start co- involves the improvement of civilian overall military reform. operating with NATO. and democratic oversight, the modernization of the armed forces However, experience shows that it is Although reform needs are perceived and the Ministries of Defense, the unrealistic to see defense conversion differently in the individual countries, adaptation of the armed forces to as a means of generating major funds “NATO members usually refer to three the new global, regional and local for defense reform.7 Savings through ‘baskets’ of ideas of defense reform”:11 strategic environment—rendering downsizing are only moderate and the the armed forces capable to deal with direct income from the sale of assets 1) Defense restructuring and reform of the new kinds of security threats is markedly reduced by the costs of defense management practices and and confl icts—and the capability for environmental clean-up. As such, institutions; international interoperability to help the profi ts of conversion for society solve crises and cope with terrorist are often not directly measurable in 2) Development of defense capabili- threats.13 This presents a huge burden fi nancial terms, but are rather of a ties required to meet both new and not only for the defense sector alone, general nature: a cleaner environment, traditional defense-related challen- but also for the environment and additional and improved infrastructure ges; and society as a whole. for local communities, and more housing, etc. Similar to the way the 3) Action that will increase the coun- Peace Dividend did not materialize as tries’ ability to contribute to NATO- had been hoped, the profi ts of defense led crisis response operations. conversion in the Western Balkan Those involved in NATO’s PfP countries are unlikely to meet the program and respective activities optimistic expectations currently held with the partner countries in the in the regional Ministries of Defense.8 Western Balkans have interoperabili- ty with NATO forces as their prime The defense reforms in the Western objective. Defense conversion is Balkans have been primarily driven by therefore a function of the overall the involvement of NATO. NATO’s goal of modernizing defense and outreach has played an indispensable military related strategies, structures role in the region and reforms are one and equipment.12 Interoperability in of its priority issues, carried out in possible future joint operations is particular through various programs the prime objective for NATO, and such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership this is likely to remain so in the near Council (EAPC), the Partnership future. for Peace (PfP), the Membership Action Plans (MAP), and the Planning Whatever the underlying conception and Review Process (PARP). These of “conversion”, the reform process programs are considered as “a vehicle should be guided by basic principles. to promote essentially the same vision Any reform must be accompanied by of defense reform, depending on each strong political support, and should be Partner’s needs”.9 NATO through carefully planned and adaptable during its PfP and MAP is among the main the course of implementation. Defense promoters of defense reform in the reform requires a clear understanding Euro-Atlantic area.10 In particular, of the security environment, the capability to anticipate and translate threats and challenges into adequate force plans as a part of an overall strategic assessment, and the ability to

B I C C 9 brief 34

Albania14

Defense Reform support for closer cooperation with their military service but had chosen NATO. Consequently, the Albanian to remain in the AAF were to make lbania has not experienced an government holds the opinion that up the future professional army. Plans Aovert interstate confl ict or frontier the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) foresaw a force strength of 14,500 change during the past decade, but have to be downsized, professionalized active duty personnel in peacetime, rather a spell of internal disorder in and modernized in order to be with an additional 2,000 civilians. They 1997, which required a brief NATO compatible with other armies in also authorized 20,000 soldiers in military intervention (“Operation NATO. Therefore, almost all changes reserve formations.24 Alba”). This was sparked by the within the AAF are the result of the collapse of the pyramid investment goal of NATO membership, including However, in mid-2003, due to a schemes that were initiated in the early the revised draft of the Military reassessment of security threats and 1990s, and many people lost their Strategy (2004) labeled as “Strategy affordable resources, the Albanian life savings as a result. This situation of NATO-integration”. This fact has Assembly authorized a further gave rise to widespread public unrest generated some criticism in Albania downsizing from 31,000 to 16,500 in March 1997, during which 1,300 that the real mission of the AAF is to until 2010. In fact, the revised Strategy army stores were looted by the general meet the NATO military standards of 2004 no longer mentions the population. During this turmoil, it as soon as possible.18 However, the strength of the reserve, but rather is reported that over 550,000 SALW Military Strategy sees the main mission states: “the AAF’s active component and about 900 million rounds of of the AAF as providing combat will be supported by an appropriate ammunition were taken from military readiness for defense; monitoring and and reasonable Reserve Force.”25 This depots. The government lost control surveillance of Albania’s sea, air, and decision was based not only on fi scal over most of the country and the land territorial space; participating in realities and a mission analysis, but environment became highly insecure. humanitarian assistance and disaster also on the desire to meet NATO relief operations; fi ghting terrorism; criteria for membership. A former During the civil unrest the army and participating in peace support high-ranking defense offi cial claimed was also disintegrated. However, operations.19 that the current personnel strength of the process of defense restructuring the AAF was something controversial, was not so much infl uenced by The AAF has been undergoing estimating them to be at around 12,000 events in the security environment transformation since 1992. Albania’s – 13,000 as of March 2005.26 NATO as by “…frequent changes of armed force structure until the year offi cials revealed the intriguing fact defense policy, a lack of any realistic 2000 comprised 5 divisions/32 that the AAF has reached the number resource management system, and a brigades with no engineers, logistic of 16,500 by this year, almost 5 years tendency to develop plans for force or civil protection structures. The ahead of the original plan.27 structures that try to save the jobs main aim of AAF restructuring, of the existing offi cer corps.”15 Basic which is planned to be completed According to the Military Strategy, strategic documents, like the National by 2010, is to achieve a smaller but the AAF is restructured into 5 Security Strategy and the Defense more capable force with appropriate Commands: Land Forces, Air Forces, Policy, were adopted in Albania fi nancial resources.20 In 2000, the Navy Forces, Training and Doctrine, only in February 2000, the Military Albanian government put forward a and Logistic Support Command. Strategy in August 2002, while the plan with two stages: to fi rst transform According to the revised Military White Book is still pending to be the AAF into smaller, more effi cient Strategy, the Land Forces are based passed through parliament.16 These forces during 2000-2004, and then to mainly in Zall Herr, Vau i Dejes, documents describe plans for the modernize them during 2005-2009. Poshnje and Yzberisht. They consist implementation of the reform process The AAF had to be downsized from of a Rapid Reaction Brigade, the up to 2010 in a more realistic manner, 43,000 to 31,000 troops.21 In 2002, Engineer Brigade, a Commando compared to previous plans. The Albania launched a 10-year defense Regiment, and a Communication Military Strategy set three main goals reform strategy sponsored by the US Battalion. Five Reserve Infantry for the defense reform, namely “…to Department of Defense in order to Brigades are subordinated to Land develop a professional army, reducing trim down and thoroughly modernize Forces Command. The Air Forces are the number of conscripts and increase the AAF.22 The Military Strategy of based mainly in Tirana (Rinas) and defense budget per 0.1 per cent of 2002 mandated the AAF’s strength Farka, as well in two reserve bases GDP annually till 2010.”17 to be at 18,00023, 70% of which have (Kuçove, Gjader). They consist of one to be professional soldiers, and 30% multi-purpose helicopter Regiment, Since NATO’s “Operation Alba”, conscripts. Conscripts that ended fi xed-wing surveillance aircraft, there has been international support an air defense brigade and troop for security improvements, and there School. Navy Forces consist of two is widespread public and political Naval Districts (Durres and Vlora), a

10 B I C C Albania

Logistics Battalion (maintenance and communicators, artillery-men, pilots cent compared with 2004, with a repair), a Shipyard for maintenance and and others over a one-year period, planned annual increase of 0.1 per cent other supporting elements. while the Basic Training Center is in of GDP until 201038 (Albanian GDP charge of the basic training of soldiers. as of 2004 was US $17.46 billion39). Training and Doctrine Command In addition to the domestic system, After 2010, the government intends to (TRADOC) is concentrated mainly hundreds of military personnel have sustain these defense capabilities with in Tirana and Vlora. TRADOC is been trained in Western countries. funding that amounts to approximately composed of the Defense Academy, Since 1993, the US has been spending 2 per cent of the GDP. However, the Military University “Skenderbej,” USD $1 million every year to train the expectations that downsizing and the NCO Academy, Basic Training Albanian military. Fifty people take modernization will decrease the Brigade, Logistic Battalion and Center part in the training program each year; military budget are not well-founded. of Military Scientifi c Research. however, not all of them are willing NATO is also skeptical as to whether The Logistic Support Command to go back to the AAF after training the annual increase of the defense provides support for the Armed abroad, and for those who do return, budget by 0.1 per cent of GDP will be Forces throughout Albania’s territory. it is not easy to fi nd an appropriate achievable, as defense reform is not a It is composed of a Supply Brigade, assignment for them.31 Among those priority of the Ministry of Finance.40 a Transport Brigade, a Maintenance laid-off in 1997, 400 offi cers had Base, a center of maintenance at received training in the West.32 The Euro-Atlantic Integration Depot Level, an Import-Export hope of the MoD is that these offi cers warehouse, a Central Laboratory of will still be needed for the envisaged Albania was among the fi rst post- the Armed Forces, and the Logistic tasks of the AAF in the future. socialist countries that joined the Troop School. In addition to the 5 However, there is no apparent logic North Atlantic Cooperation Council Commands, the General Staff has its in having offi cers trained in Western (NACC) in June 1992 and the autonomous units, such as the Joint academies, only to let them go. Partnership for Peace (PfP) in February Operations Center, Communication 1994. The PfP program based on Battalion, Support Battalion, The priorities of the AAF’s draft the defense Planning and Review Military Police Battalion, Center of Equipment Modernization Program Process (PARP) has contributed to Radio Intelligence Service, the Civil include the individual soldiers kit the restructuring of the Albanian 33 Protection Base, and the Central mainly for the units deployed abroad ; military establishment and capabilities Military University Hospital. The Command and Control Systems according to NATO standards. General Staff itself has been modifi ed for which investment is ongoing; In April 2002, Albania accepted a according to NATO standards into equipping the Helicopter Regiment demanding Partnership Goal package, nine “J-departments” dealing with with Search and Rescue (SAR) and whose implementation is supposed to Personnel, Intelligence, Training, troop transportation helicopters; be part of the new AAF Structure and Logistics, Planning, Communications, equipping the Coast Guard with fast Implementation Plan for the period Resources Management, Public Health patrol boats and SAR- helicopters; 2002-2010. NATO’s Membership 28 and Civil Military Relations. and strengthening of maintenance Action Plan (MAP) mechanism tailored 34 structures and transportation support. an assistance program that focused The transformation of Albania’s However, the only secure sources on rebuilding the armed forces, which military education system is almost of equipment modernization are included help in a) establishing the fi nished and from NATO’s point donations and grants, the most recent conceptual framework for armed of view, is the best achievement of which was an Italian donation of 6 forces41, b) starting a structural 29 35 of Albanian defense reform. The vessels. In addition, in August 2005, reorganization of the military and c) ‘Skenderbej’ Military Academy Albania was granted US $8 million managing specifi c problems, such as achieved the status of a defense by the United States for its role in ammunition storage and ordnance university and remains the main international peacekeeping and the disposal. The fact that Albania was 36 institution for training offi cers for global war on terror. Considering not included in the second wave of the Albanian Army, Air Force and maintenance and other such problems, NATO enlargement has increased Navy. The development of a career however, the Albanian MoD is now the pressure on the government to NCO corps is seen as a crucial goal of more critical about accepting different improve its defense sector. The 2008 AAF’s professionalization. The military kinds of equipment as donations and summit will most likely deal with education reform—ongoing since instead requests concrete help for another round of enlargement, and 37 1992—focuses on increasing NCO’s specifi c partnership goals. thus the year 2006 might bring Albania staff that already has a university a new invitation.42 It is hoped by the 30 degree. The specialist training schools The defense budget for 2005 was Albanian military and both sides of of the different military branches are 12,963 million Leks (about US $129.63 the political spectrum that joining preparing infantrymen, tank crews, million) or 1.5 per cent of the GDP. This marks a real increase of 20 per

B I C C 11 brief 34

NATO would mean less expenditures transparency among the allies and of reforms to bring the candidate for the army and more security for the partners.50 The Partnership Action Plan states’ political and economic systems country;43 however, the experience of on Defense Institution Building (PAP- in line with European standards.54 Eastern European countries shows that DIB) aims to enforce reforms and Albania has fi led formal applications a professionalized army in fact requires takes into account the OSCE Code of for membership and a SAA has been more expenditures. Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects under negotiation since January 2003. of Security.51 The PAP-DIB includes The November 2005 Progress Report The Albanian military is of the possible new measures to facilitate and on Albania in the context of the opinion that NATO expects from harmonize operational cooperation Stabilization and Association Process them the capacity for interoperability, between the security structures of registered progress in a number of stability and cooperation, including a member states, including those beyond areas, but called for improved results contribution to NATO peacekeeping the responsibility of the MoD. in fi ghting organized crime and operations. Tirana sees the growing corruption, enhanced media freedom, participation of new NATO-aspirants Practically all the changes within the further electoral reform and swifter in missions abroad as a relief from AAF are undertaken with the goal of property restitution. The Commission’s the burden of military personnel NATO membership in mind. However, November 2005 Enlargement from Western NATO-members.44 due to the classifi ed nature of many Strategy Paper found that Albania’s Working with NATO for Albania strategic documents, it is not possible reform progress paved the way for means working with individual to defi ne the actual size and impact the conclusion of SAA negotiations. NATO-countries, particularly with of NATO activities on the AAF’s Signature of the agreement could the US, Italy, Greece and Turkey. transformation.52 The formal eligibility take place in the fi rst half of 2006. Such cooperation includes military criteria for NATO membership was In December 2005, the European equipment assistance, training, and initially outlined in the 1995 Study on Council adopted a revised European the procurement of spare parts.45 For NATO Enlargement.53 This includes Partnership for Albania, which instance, the private US-American mainly non-military criteria like a identifi es short and medium term company “Science Applications functioning democratic political system priorities that Albania should address International Corporation” (SAIC) and a market economy; treatment of to serve as a checklist against which is supervising the Albanian defense minority populations in accordance to measure progress, and to provide reform fi nanced by the US Department with OSCE guidelines; resolution of guidance for assistance under the of Defense.46 Although it is known all outstanding disputes with neighbors EC. These priorities refl ect Albania’s that the SAIC is responsible for all and a commitment to the peaceful particular stage of development and management training for the Defense settlement of disputes; and the ability are tailored to its specifi c needs.55 Finance and Accounting Service, and willingness to make a military it was not possible to obtain more contribution to the alliance and to The overall objective of the EU’s information about the Company’s achieve interoperability with other assistance is to bring Albania closer activities in Albania. Even the web site members’ forces. Nevertheless, these to EU standards and principles, and of SAIC does not disclose its presence criteria are only loose requirements and to prepare the country for gradual in Albania.47 not necessarily prerequisites; though integration into EU structures. This they may become so with Albania’s will also have an impact on the security The NATO permanent mission in potential bid to join the EU. sector in Albania, including the Tirana, situated within the MoD, is military. However, without having yet monitoring the fulfi llment of Albania’s Although the EU is not involved in signed an Association Agreement with bilateral agreements and provides Albania’s defense reform, the rule the EU, Albania has no formalized the Government with political and of law is currently a target area that cooperation with the Western technical advice. NATO’s MAP helps the country must tackle in order European Union (WEU). Nevertheless, Albania to focus its preparations to attain candidate status for both the WEU is present in Albania. In on meeting its relevant goals and the EU and NATO. EU relations March 1997, a fact-fi nding mission priorities.48 The Annual National with Albania are part of the EU‘s from the WEU Planning Cell was sent Program (ANP) covers political, Stabilization and Association Process to Albania to monitor the situation economic, defense, resource, security (SAP). Under the SAP, Albania may following public unrest. In May 1997, and legal issues.49 The Planning and negotiate Stabilization and Association the WEU Council decided to establish Review Process (PARP) was introduced Agreements (SAAs) and getting trade a Multinational Advisory Police Force within the PfP, based on a bi-annual access and other ties to the EU on the (MAPE) in Albania, in order to provide planning cycle, and was designed to condition that it meets further specifi c advice and training to the Albanian advance interoperability and increase political and economic criteria. The EU police. Moreover, WEU is examining thus invokes the prospect of eventually if further contributions could be made inviting Albania to join the Union as leverage for insisting on a series

12 B I C C Albania

in accordance with NATO assistance stabilization, speeding up the potential when defense-related documents are programs in the fi eld of military for development, democratic and approved. This is mainly attributed training and for restructuring of the economic reforms in the country. The to the limited expertise of many Albanian armed forces.56 Treaty is a key document on the basis parliamentarians on the issue of of which the US and other NATO defense, as well as to a lack of interest. The integration of Albania into Euro- members can help the region reach Military issues are also rarely on the Atlantic structures is considered an the standards for NATO and EU agenda of local NGOs. important element also in the context membership. The “Adriatic process” is of the Stability Pact (SP) for South seen as a vehicle that will take countries What is more, parliamentarians do not Eastern Europe. The idea of the smoothly through the MAP process to have the resources, expertise or the SP was to strengthen the countries the fi nal strategic objective of NATO time to keep a close watch over the of South Eastern Europe “in their membership.59 Regarding regional complex activities of the Government. efforts to foster peace, democracy, confl ict potentials, Albania has always Budget control is also supposed to be respect for human rights and economic tried to remain as neutral as possible at the heart of parliamentary control, prosperity in order to achieve stability in the ethnic confl icts in Kosovo and though this is an area where there is a in the whole region.” Euro-Atlantic Macedonia, and seeks normal relations gap between constitutional provisions integration was promised to all the with neighboring Slavic states. During and parliamentary practice. In Albania, countries in the region.57 Albania the various interviews held by the the draft law on the budget is approved and other countries in the region authors, no perceptions of threat were by the Parliament, which must then misperceived the SP as an additional expressed vis-à-vis Serbia, though act upon it during the three months source for fi nancial support, which did there was strong support for Kosovo’s of the end of the preceding budget not hold true. These high expectations independence. year. If the Parliament fails to do have since been abandoned because the so, the Government can spend the activities of the SP have not generated Political Guidance of Defense same monthly amount as the average any concrete projects in Albania so far. Reform monthly expense of the preceding year.61 Elected by the Parliament, the Many performance indicators show Meeting NATO’s standards for defense President of the country has a rather that progress has been made in capability is potentially a force for ceremonial function as the General Albanian’s relations with NATO and both democratic reform and military Commander of the Armed Forces EU but, all in all, the country has not modernization in Albania. However, and head of the National Security yet met their standards and is still the ongoing defense reform requires Council (NSC). According to the very much behind in offi cial rankings a permanent adjustment of national Constitution, the NSC is an advisory regarding corruption, freedom institutions to meet NATO’s standards body to the President, discussing and and democratic consolidation.58 in civil-military relations in particular, providing him with opinions on issues Nevertheless, a future invitation to which has not yet been accomplished. of defense policy, arms control and join NATO is considered among security matters.62 In practice, the the Albanian military as a given and According to its Constitution, Albania meetings of the NSC are geared mainly taken by the population at large is a parliamentary republic, whereby the for PR purposes and thus rarely have as an eventual step towards EU Parliamentary Assembly is supposed an impact on national security and membership. All political parties to be the supreme state institution. defense policy.63 The Prime Minister in Albania have NATO and EU The parliament must approve all approves the organizational structure membership as political priorities, but strategic documents on national of the army and co-ordinates the work neither organization has made a formal security and defense policy and of institutions involved in defense decision as of yet. exerts control over the armed forces. policy. Incidentally, the former Prime However, according to many local Minister, Fatos Nano, created another Regional Cooperation and external experts, the Assembly is advisory institution—the National only pretending to exercise oversight Security Committee—that does not The issue of NATO membership over the security sector and performs have any legal or constitutional basis. has infl uenced regional cooperation its functions very poorly. Especially This committee consists of the same between Albania and other Western with regard to national security and ministers as the NSC and is tasked with Balkan NATO partners. The basic defense policy, the parliament has the approval of key national security 64 platform for such cooperation is been playing a rather marginal role. documents and long-term programs. the Adriatic Treaty Agreement of For example, the parliamentarians The National Security Committee Partnership between Macedonia, have to rely on information released under the Prime Minister is a good Albania and Croatia (2003). The by the government and the military, example of the contradictions and Treaty is seen as a means of regional which are the very institutions that they are expected to oversee.60 A lack of proper debate is also evident even

B I C C 13 brief 34

gaps that exist between constitutional movement of traffi c on the streets of NGOs and Media provisions and everyday political Tirana, where most of the drivers do practice in Albania. not follow the rules. More specifi cally, The NGO sector in Albania relies if the ‘drivers’ of institutions do on foreign donors and focuses more Decision-Making in Defense not feel that they will be caught for on issues related to democratization, breaking the rules, they are less likely to human rights, and economic issues The Minister of Defense is a civilian have any respect for the law.69 rather than on military ones. Very few position. The individual in offi ce NGOs are involved in security and has full authority over all military Institutional co-ordination is known defense matters, none of which have and civilian personnel within the as the Government’s Achilles’ heel. yet presented a serious assessment department and the armed forces With little experience in following legal of Albania’s security challenges.75 in peacetime, and over the general and administrative rules, high level Because of the lack of expertise on management of the Armed Forces. offi cials and relevant experts fi nd it security issues among members of the The incumbent is responsible to the diffi cult to co-ordinate their efforts. political parties, the stereotypical goals Parliament, the President and the This results in continuous delays, of NATO membership are taken as Prime Minister for implementing gaps and ineffi ciency in implementing representative of Albania’s security the defense policy. The Minister of political programs. In addition, the needs.76 To the question: “What is Defense also has the authority to constitutional status of the President the impact of civil society on defense propose changes in defense policy and the Prime Minister is an issue and security policy?” a high-level and the budget, and takes most of the that generates tension between the MoD offi cial replied: “No impact.”77 decisions regarding Albania’s defense two institutions, since both often hold Public awareness of security and reform process. Between 1997 and different views on defense and foreign defense issues is very rare, and there 2005, the Albanian Government had policy.70 It is interesting that such a exists an attitude that such issues are eight different Ministers of Defense, complicated relationship between the classifi ed despite the fact that political resulting in the inconsistent and President and the Prime Minister is not documents on defense and security ineffi cient implementation of the seen by NATO as such a big problem, issues are generally not classifi ed as reform agenda.65 While the Chief but rather as typical for the region.71 Secret. Nevertheless, in practice, access of General Staff66 is responsible to to even a basic military document is the President, as well as the Prime Moreover it is important to keep in often a challenge. Minister and the Defense Minister, mind the legacy of the communist his subordination to these authorities era, when there existed a close link Under the framework of NATO is not always clear. For example, in between society and the military, integration, state institutions his daily work, the Chief of General but not necessarily a positive one. provide the media with lots of Staff cooperates with the Minister of The military became alienated from information, giving the impression Defense, but in times of war he may the communist authorities that used that membership is the only issue for be elected Commander of the Armed nationalistic rhetoric to justify their AAF transformation.78 The military Forces.67 repressive policies.72 Again in 1997, newspaper “Ushtria” (Army) and one of the fi rst consequences of AAF- magazine “Mbrojtja” (Defense) According to Albanian experts, the restructuring following the change provide information for the AAF and decision-making process on defense of government was the discharge are not widely known outside the AAF. reform proceeds as follows: policy of 1,500 offi cers of different ranks Even for the military these publications ideas are launched by the Council from the AAF, the military academies, are more like propaganda than good of the Ministers, specifi cally by the the General Staff, and the Ministry sources of analytical information.79 Minister of Defense. Many ideas of Defense.73 The reason for their From time to time, the non-military emerge from the political contacts discharge was that these offi cers were newspapers publish some low interest between the Minister (and high level appointees of the Democratic Party articles on defense issues, but since military offi cers) and NATO high and were thus replaced by offi cers the media is supposed to be oriented offi cials and experts. Once these ideas “loyal” to the ruling Socialist Party. toward public interest, military issues are formalized into concepts, it is up However, the current attitude in the are not necessarily a profi table topic.80 to the military experts led by the Chief general public towards the military is Since there is no disagreement on the of General Staff to translate them into one of respect, but many also hold security and defense policy between short and medium term programs and the opinion that it should only play a the Government and the opposition, plans. The Minister of Defense then modest role in today’s society.74 there are no scandals, disputes or proposes these plans for adoption any “hot news” to report on the by the Parliament.68 However, the issue. Nevertheless, journalists are implementation of these programs and often accused by military offi cials of plans is problematic and resembles the not being qualifi ed enough to cover security and defense affairs. But this

14 B I C C Albania

is most likely due to the fact that they PR and communications strategy of their monthly average salary during often ask controversial questions; for all national institutions involved in the their last year of service. If the soldier example, “What is the army doing reform process, which will also help is 47 years old (42 for women) and has today?”, “Why do we need this large generate local-buy in and support. fulfi lled at least 15 years of service (12 army in a completely different internal years for women), he or she is entitled and external security environment?”, Defense Conversion to an early pension starting at 50 per “What does defense reform mean at cent of his/her fi nal salary. The new all? We do not know! We do not see Downsizing in Albania: Benefi ts draft law, “On the supplementary any exercises!”, and “Where are the instead of Resettlement social insurance of the AAF military taxpayer’s money going?”81 personnel of the Republic of Albania,” The restructuring of the AAF foresees was approved by the Albanian 84 To say that Albanian defense reform the complete or partial closure of Parliament on 20 May 2005. It defi nes is in need of greater transparency is to garrisons and the relocation of units. signifi cant changes in receiving a state an obvious fact. The Communist Consequently, more than 17,000 transitional salary, as well as early and legacy in Albania continues to offi cers and NCO were released from supplementary pension. According to perpetuate a mentality whereby all the military service during the period the new law, a transitional salary will defense issues are classifi ed. Restricted 1992-2004 (13,000 offi cers and 4,000 be offered to ex-military men who access to information on matters of NCOs). Among these, 9,530 retired served in the AAF for over fi ve years. national security will likely remain a during 1992-1995; another 5,400 in They are entitled to two bonus salaries reality in Albania for the near future. 1996-2000; and a further 1,140 in 2001- commensurate with their rank and 50 However, the Communication and PR 2002. Only 930 offi cers and NCO per cent of their monthly salary over a Strategy of Albanian defense reform actually left the AAF during 2003 – period of two years. An early pension could be changed. A new information 2004.82 A total of 211 offi cers will have is offered to ex-military men with 15 campaign of the MoD should aim not to be demobilized in 2005-2006, the years of service (12 for women) and only toward gaining public support for large majority of which are between who are the age of 47 (44 for women). NATO membership, but also serve the ages of 40-55. The number of This pension is provided until the as a source of information on what redundant offi cers and NCOs is individual reaches the regular pension 85 this reform entails, why it must be astonishing. It is thus surprising that no age. The early pension amounts to done, and what benefi ts it will bring reintegration programs for ex-military 50 per cent of their original monthly to Albania in particular and to the men have been implemented or even salary, with an additional 2 per cent for stability of the region as a whole. The prepared for a long time. The position each year of service. A supplementary MoD has the requisite resources to of many high-ranking MoD offi cials is pension provides 40 per cent of the initiate such a policy by updating its that the current pension law covers all full pension amount, plus 2 per cent website on a regular basis and using the needs of ex-military men suffi ciently.83 for each year of service, independent media as a means of communicating of age if an individual spent 15 years in success stories of reform rather than Pensions and Benefi ts military service (12 years for women). disseminating propaganda. The annual costs of the new law’s The Euro-Atlantic perspective Redundant offi cers are entitled to a implementation amount to 75 million should be a powerful stimulus for the transitional salary for 2 years (3 for Leks (US $720 000). The new laws development of a well-functioning women), amounting to 50 per cent of were passed in January 2006, leaving military bureaucracy in Albania doubts as to whether there will be that meets the standards of NATO suffi cient funding for their full roll-out. countries. International actors, who continue to apply pressure on the reform process, will gradually reduce Figure 1: Benefi ts for ex-military men their lead role in terms of fi nancial support, and thus Albania will have Source: Albanian MoD, May 2005 to face the challenge of cultivating local buy-in and ownership over Pension benefi ts Number of personnel defense reform. In addition, there is a disconnect between the political elite On transitional salary 1,595 and demobilized offi cers with regard to the reform process, the latter of which On early pension 8,566 are frustrated by the consequences of this process , including base closures On supplementary pension 1,963 and the loss of jobs. This frustration, however, can be decreased by a new No support due to lack of work experience 4,876

B I C C 15 brief 34

The number of ex-military personnel Figure 2: Ex-military men employment statistics (1992-2005) currently included in the social insurance scheme is 12,124; another Source: Albanian MoD and authors calculations, March 2005 4,876 of redundant staff will remain without support until at least 2006 due to a lack of necessary working Agency Number of personnel 86 experience. Civilian position of AF/MoD 270 The additional benefi t of the new law Ministry of Public Order 563 includes the opportunity to apply for a National Intelligence Service 103 low rate of credit (3%) in order to buy or build a house.87 This is a remarkable Penitentiary Department 80 point because housing is not provided to offi cers in the AAF; active offi cers Court Institutions sore 10 have to rent fl ats and houses. Only a Construction Police 7 small number of young offi cers live in military hotels and barracks—facilities Others 839 that are often lacking the most basic Total 1872 military personnel standards of comfort.88 However, in reality, only high-ranking offi cers in active service enjoy the possibility of receiving such credit after applying to a special commission in the MoD.89 Most of the other demobilized offi cers do (2003) of the AAA aimed to assist According to the President of the not have such reintegration support. the efforts of the State in creating AAA, at least 40 per cent of MoD a system for social adaptation of funding was needed in order to attract Apart from the legal provisions, redundant military servicemen. The external investors for the program, the MoD’s assumption is that the basis of the program was supposed but in reality there was no single majority of retired offi cers are already to be the creation of so-called donor who was actually willing to integrated into civilian life.90 However, “Resettlement Centers”, which aimed provide such fi nancing. While NATO only 1,862 retired personnel have to provide job orientation courses in supported the program, its funding found employment with or without fi ve different areas: Tirana, Shkodra, intentions were minimal. In addition, the help of the MoD. A large part of Korça, Gjirokastra and Vlora.92 The the AAA was politically close to the these individuals were “reintegrated” funding of the Program, estimated opposition Democratic Party at the into the Albanian security sector, at 2.8 million Euro over a period of time, and thus there appeared to be 270 of which were civilian positions four years, was expected to come from little reason for the former ruling within the Armed Forces, 103 within external sources. The Program was Socialist Party (SP) to support the the Intelligence Service, 563 within scheduled to start with a Pilot Project program.95 the police units of the Ministry of in 2004 but was delayed and fi nally Public Order (MOPO), and 97 in State cancelled due to a lack of agreement Draft Program on the training and integration justice divisions. The remaining 839 with the MoD.93 According to the of the military to civil life individuals found positions within MoD, the high rate of management local governments, as well as fi nancial, personnel costs was the reason behind The termination of the MoD and educational, and private sector their disagreement, as well as “the low AAA’s cooperation was of little structures.91 number of ex-military” within the consequence. At the time of writing, AAA organization, which apparently the MoD’s activities in the fi eld are Draft Resettlement Program rendered them less credible in quite modest. The recently drafted representing the interests of discharged “Program on the training and More than 17,000 offi cers and NCO soldiers. integration of the military with civil were released from military service life” is planned to be a joint project of during the period 1992-2004, but until Although the Draft Resettlement the MoD and the Ministry of Labor, recently there was no attempt by the Program was focused more on post- and attempts to tackle the gaps of MoD to develop any reintegration military orientation and required the AAA’s Resettlement Program.96 program for them. The fi rst effort an amendment to its reintegration Namely, the approach has changed: in this direction was done not by the components, it was the only plan that cooperation between the MoD and MoD but rather by an NGO, the enjoyed the attention and support the Labor Ministry is foreseen in the Albanian Atlantic Association (AAA). of NATO’s Economic Directorate.94 form of using and maintaining 36 The Draft Resettlement Program already existing regional employment

16 B I C C Albania

offi ces. The draft program is an 20,000) of internal funding. Phase II is NGOs’ Activities improvement because it expresses supposed to offer courses in business- an understanding that training and administration, Italian language, The non-governmental sectors’ re-training measures should take into topography, small business funding, activities for the reintegration of ex- account the needs and requirements electric-repair, auto service, plumbing, military men are modest, but compared of the labor market. However, it is tailoring, computing, secretary and to the MoD capabilities they appear to essential to create a long-term strategy cosmetics skills. The second phase is be more focused.100 While the MoD for combating unemployment, one in planned to be provided by the Ministry agrees to cooperate with NGOs and which a reintegration program for ex- of Labor and Social Affairs and needs associations of ex-military men, it military men is an integral part. The extra funding by the Government and has its “preferences”. For example, intention of the draft is to promote other donors. However, there are few the National Demilitarization Center self-employment of demobilized employment prospects for participants (NDC) specializes in issues of small soldiers through small business courses of both courses.98 These two phases arms and light weapons (SALW), on how to acquire credit, and it also can therefore be seen as small inputs ammunition disposal and retraining. promotes greater transparency and by the MoD to start and attract This NGO enjoys the attention NGO involvement, which are steps in external funding at a later stage. and, more importantly, the fi nancial the right direction. According to the support of the US Embassy in Tirana. draft, the Board and Managing Staff The draft does not include a The MoD sees the NDC as the will share responsibility with NGOs description of the costs for the “true” representative of ex-military and external experts in the design and planned activities and products; in fact, interests; it is the largest association creation of reintegration programs. many activities are planned without of ex-military men, with 250 former The approximate funding requirement a concrete description of the terms. offi cers.101 The NDC conducted amounts to 100,000 Euro, which is There is no data on how long the an “SALW awareness education modest compared to the three million preparation phase will last and how project”, whereby four ex-offi cers Euro required for the AAA draft long it will take for staff training. were employed. Additionally, the program. There are also no clear achievement NDC is offering “train the trainers” indicators. However, as of June 2005, a courses and “computer training” for The practical steps of the project’s set common working group was created by future weapons collection projects up consist of two phases. According the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry and ammunition disposal. These to the MoD, Phase I is ongoing and of Social Affairs and the National courses are preparing 25 to 29 former includes short-term courses provided Association of the Military in Reserve offi cers to work on the safe handling exclusively by the MoD. (NAMRA) in order to “identify the of ammunition and light weapons, right qualifi cations in compliance with and international legislation for the The number of people trained in such the categories of military personnel to demolition of SALW. a way is planned to reach 130. This be reduced” and to “evaluate the costs will cost 1,975,000 Leks (about US$ per person for each course.”99 Another association, which is informally involved in supporting

Figure 3: Phase I

Source: Albanian MoD97

Course Number of participants Term (2005) 3-month English course (2) 30 (15 + 15) March-May September-November computer course (2) 20 (10+10) April and June laboratory assistant course 15 May-June vehicle driving course 8 March-May Mechanics course 12 September-October Air traffi c control course 10 April-May Meteorology course 10 April-May

B I C C 17 brief 34

ex-military men is the National and power. From this point of view, 600 military sites are planned to be Association of the Military in Reserve demobilization and reintegration released and converted in the near (NAMRA).102 NAMRA is not only of retired offi cers should involve future.108 Conversion planning for a preferred partner of the MoD the creation of new social roles, military property started in 1992, but even has its offi ce in the MoD’s networks, professional identities, as but only with a few concrete steps. headquarters and a network of 70 to well as helping offi cers to overcome During the last three years, the MoD 80 reserve offi cers throughout the psychological stress. However, has been in the process of registering country.103 NAMRA tries to lobby for reintegration also requires a re- all military property and conducted ex-military men by offering legal advice conceptualization of the military a feasibility study for the prospects on pension issues. In the absence of institution, which requires public of base conversion. According to State support, NAMRA also tries to dialogue and the participation of MoD offi cials, the Draft Conversion help with the employment of reserve political parties and the media. A Plan includes a Program of Military offi cers through personal networks in national strategy for the reintegration Property Conversion until 2010, but it the security and customs sectors. of ex-military men should be worked was not possible to get access to the out by asking the following questions: document at the time of writing.109 A major objective of the 1995-2000 should ex-military men in Albania be While the Draft Conversion Plan reform was to offer the new military integrated into civilian life and support was set to be passed through the offi cers the opportunity to obtain a the State social security system by Assembly at the end of 2005, it was university diploma. It was envisaged paying taxes; or should they rather be still pending as of April 2006. There is that offi cers could pursue this degree protected by this system? It seems that also not much hope for transparency, after fi nishing the ‘Skenderbej’ Military the Albanian MoD prefers the second as the Plan was announced to be Academy as full or part-time students. option by upgrading the pension law. partly classifi ed.110 According to the However, because of the high costs To date, the draft program remains in MoD, all types of bases need to be and frequent interruptions of part-time the preparatory phase and focuses only converted: air bases, navy bases and studies, this objective was rendered on post-military orientation without land forces sites.111 All together, the impossible.104 The choice of pursuing convincing reintegration components. MoD estimates that about 2100 ha of a higher education still remains—there To improve it, if such willingness military property will be transferred.112 are possibilities for studying for future exists, it is advisable to study patterns civilian jobs through weekend courses of adjustment on the job market of Similar to many countries faced with in the universities of Tirana, Skodra, those ex-military men laid off since the need for base conversion, the Vlora and Elbasan. Active and retired 1993 and to amend the fi nal draft MoD is the leading agency. It has offi cers also have the opportunity to accordingly. The goals of any potential conducted feasibility studies, drafted get diplomas in economics, journalism program must be clearly formulated, plans and will be responsible for or law through weekend courses over particularly with regard to individual their implementation. Primarily, the four years.105 Unfortunately, the cost of entitlements, and promises must be MoD is in charge for the reuse and this education is high at US $700 per kept. This is also important for the modifi cation of the military sites.113 year, which an active or retired offi cer credibility of the program and thus its However, once the Defense Minister cannot necessarily afford. Moreover, attractiveness to external partners. It is has made an appropriate decision, the the high level of unemployment in also recommended that the intellectual responsibility is handed over to the Albania does not bode well even support of international organizations, National Privatization Agency which for those with university degrees. In who are facilitating a range of bilateral has the right to organize an auction.114 such a situation, it is diffi cult to get a meetings and working groups on issues broad public support for the special of reintegration, be taken as a possible The conversion activities include treatment of former soldiers in such source of funding, presenting them the following types: military reuse; a poor country with 17 per cent with convincing arguments and realistic housing for offi cers; transfer to local unemployment.106 As a result of all reintegration models. governments; transfer to other state these factors, Albanian ex-military men authorities; privatization; renting; are generally disappointed with the Base Conversion: Reuse and and closure/demolishing.115 The lack of reintegration support from the Modernization modernization of the AAF is the Government. driving force for the sale or transfer Albania still has a decentralized defense of military property. In Albania, the The Albanian military survived the system. Before the regime change, the whole process of the reorganization of collapse of socialism in contrast to country had around 2,000 military sites bases—including also the increased use the former state planning apparatus dedicated to territorial defense, most of locations for military purposes—is of the Communist Party. National of which belonged to the army.107 At called conversion, thus using a much armies turned into symbols of present, the total number of military wider defi nition of this term. Such Statehood, national independence sites, check points and installations an increase in the use of locations for amounts to 1,117. Between 586 -

18 B I C C Albania

military purposes can occur through However, at the time of writing only or destroyed, including military depots, the addition of base functions or a a minor part of earmarked facilities points and ammunition depots.121 change of base status. Some military (25 buildings) had been transferred The premises located at the Adriatic bases have only changed their status for this purpose. The MoD also owns and Ionian could in theory attract the from active to reserve bases. Among grounds that are appropriate for the commercial interest of companies in them are the navy bases in Senin, construction of lodgings. The MoDs and outside the country, though the Sarande and Porto Romano and air Economy and Privatization Directorate policy of the MoD is to convert some bases in Legu and Kucove.116 (EPD) is planning to use these areas of those military zones into recreation for housing construction. Some of areas for military personnel and their According to the MoD, all military sites the facilities will be given to local families.122 taken together encompass about 6,000 governments, which are supposed different premises (mostly buildings).117 to be end-users of ex-military Although the Albanian government Data on the different type of premises property, though this transfer has to has been open for external proposals are not publicly available, though be declared by the Prime Minister.119 regarding conversion, the MoD did not the largest number to be transferred A small number of military facilities manage to attract donor or investor to civilian use are located in rural (31) were already handed over to the attention for civilian conversion.123 areas. Since they are far away from municipalities, and the Emergency As such, no external funding for urban zones, there is little demand Ministry will receive a certain number this type of conversion is likely to from private investors.118 The MoD of buildings as well. materialize. On the fl ip side, there are handed over the military premises expectations that privatization and located inside urban zones to be used Some of the military property will still the renting of military facilities could for housing active military personnel. be privatized or rented.120 An unknown bring new funding into the military number are also planned to be closed

Figure 4: Military reuse model

Source: Albanian MoD offi cial, March 2005.

Base Type and Location Change of Status Change of function Navy bases from active to reserve Senin, Sarande, Porto Romano Air bases from active to reserve Legu, Kucova Air base near Tirana Rapid Reaction Forces base Land forces base Bunavia Basic Training Center

Figure 5: Conversion for civil purposes

Source: Albanian MoD, March 2005.

Applied model Number Transformation for housing 25 facilities Transfer to local governments 31 facilities

B I C C 19 brief 34

budget—selling military property to There are no experiences or plans of resettlement processes. Moreover, it private persons is seen as a money- the MoD to combine base conversion is the most confusing one, because making process itself.124 However, the with the reintegration of redundant the MOD’s representatives defi ne challenge is that foreign investors are military personnel. Some ex-military base conversion primarily as a process not interested in military property offi cer associations, like the NAMRA, of modifying or reforming current in Albania.125 External support from have tried to locate empty MoD military sites for further military use. the US, Greece, Turkey and Italy is buildings throughout the country and The transformation of military sites only available for the revamping of acquire them for symbolic rent in order for civilian purposes is embedded military bases.126 Examples of such to create employment areas for other within this process as well; hence assistance are the navy bases near ex-military men, or as entertainment it is not possible to acquire much Vlore (Italian assistance) and Durres centers (such as casinos or night clubs) information due to the high level of (Greek assistance), as well as the air for active and redundant offi cers. secrecy involved. It would therefore be base in Kucove (Turkish assistance). The MoD has been skeptical toward advisable to separate the two processes The Italian armed forces are eager to such proposals despite the fact that, of military and civilian conversion. In support the transformation of the air according to NAMRA, “over hundreds addition, as the MoD is the institution base near Tirana for use by their units of buildings” were handed over from responsible for implementing and in NATO’s Rapid Reaction Forces, the MoD to other users through controlling the conversion of military while some of the already transformed political ties.131 property, it has an interest in privatizing reserve bases are foreseen to serve or renting such property for fi nancial in support of NATO in case of The MoD insists that base conversion gain. The MoD therefore cannot be emergencies.127 is an ongoing process and about an impartial or “honest broker” in this 20 per cent of the facilities have process, and it would be benefi cial for Surprisingly, the MoD assumes that already been converted.132 There is another State agency or even NGO to there are no environmental problems no independent way to confi rm these help ensure that its self-interest is kept with respect to the conversion of statements because there is no access in check. military property.128 This is rather to statistics about what, when and questionable as experiences with how military bases were converted Conclusions Eastern European military sites have over the last several years. Although proven that many of these were heavily the MoD insists that the conversion In measuring the achievements and 129 polluted areas. Moreover, some process is transparent and that civil shortcomings of defense reform in military sites are situated near areas society is informed about its activities, Albania, it is clear that the fi rst phase notorious for environmental problems. a conversion plan is not yet available of this reform is almost fi nished given One example is the navy base in Porto and access to it is expected to be the adoption of strategic documents, a 133 Romano, on the outskirts of the port restricted in the near future. There legal framework, and the “rightsizing” of Durres. The area is so toxic that in is no information about the new process already in its fi nal stages. The 2001, the United Nations Environment owners of military property or of the National Security Strategy, the Defense Program (UNEP) declared it a MoD’s income from the privatization Policy and the Military Strategy all 130 “disaster area.” of military sites. Base conversion in provide plans for the reform process in Albania is defi nitely not transparent a more realistic manner. From NATO’s enough, similar to the downsizing and

Figure 6: External assistance for military bases reuse

Sources: Interview of MoD offi cial, March 2005.

Base type Location Assistance Air base Kucove Turkish AF Navy base Vlore Italian AF Navy base Durres Greece AF Air/ Rapid Reaction Forces Base Rinas/ Tirana Italian AF

20 B I C C Albania

point of view, only the fi rst year was many high-ranking and loyal offi cers Albania, such as interoperability, a diffi cult one where it had to apply to the previously ruling party. Despite stability, cooperation and participation. pressure on Albania to move forward assurances from the President Alfred But we do not know enough about with military transformation. Since Moisiu and of NATO’s engagement, how the MAP actually works and for then, Tirana has been very engaged many offi cers hold the opinion that what purpose. in defense reform.134 However, even this policy will continue with every if the national legal and strategic succeeding government. Another The demobilization of surplus framework has been established, critical point is the lack of transparency military personnel must also be seen military reform is guided primarily in the defense sector, which was also as part of an overarching process by external actors and through the proven in the course of gathering data of restructuring. However, the mechanism of the MAP. It is therefore for this text. The fi gures for defense reintegration of ex-military men into more of an international than a restructuring stated in Government civilian life remains only a “regrettable” national project. documents, by NATO headquarters consequence, not a part of Albanian and through interviews are not always defense reform. The issue does not There is some justifi ed criticism identical. It is clear that the legacy seem to be a priority for NATO or among security experts in Albania that of the communist past continues to SAIC, leaving the issue to be dealt the goal of meeting NATO military perpetuate a culture of secrecy and with by weak national institutions.135 standards is the driving force behind infl uence civil-military relations in However, despite achievements defense reform as opposed to Albania’s Albania. with respect to defense reform, the security environment, national defense main security actors in Albania are requirements, or economy. Ironically, Theoretically, defense reform should not able to deal effi ciently with the even these experts do not offer any help adjust national institutions to consequences of the armed forces’ alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration NATO standards in civil-military restructuring, such as the reintegration or to following NATO standards in relations. Unfortunately, the role of of redundant military personnel and defense reform. As a matter of fact, Albania’s institutions in guiding the conversion of military sites. The lack NATO requirements do not contradict reforms remains rather subordinate of available funding and qualifi ed the needs of Albania’s national security and weak. The relations between expertise for the preparation and and in fact consider the capabilities the main security players, such as implementation of reintegration of Albania’s national economy. the Parliament, the President and programs does not even permit them Moreover, NATO standards positively the Prime Minister, demonstrate to start. Unfortunately, the intellectual infl uence the national defense contradictions between the law and support of international organizations management system and improve everyday practice. From NATO’s point cannot solve the problem either, the professionalization of the AAF. of view, however, the appropriate and donors are not yet convinced of Nevertheless, the expectations that instruments for planning and supporting a potential reintegration downsizing will decrease the military budgeting in defense reform are in program in Albania. The inability budget and allow AAF to modernize place in Albania. Obviously, there are to offer a realistic reintegration are not well founded. Unfortunately, two different realities (or statistics)— program forces the MoD to work in there is only verbal assurance from one for Brussels and the other for the direction of improving pension NATO’s representatives that the publicity in Albania. Since very few benefi ts for ex-military men, despite defense reform process has progressed NGOs are involved in security and the fact that funding capabilities to suffi ciently, without any further defense matters, many simply repeat actually implement the upgraded comments or indicators of success or the stereotypical goal of NATO pension law for ex-offi cers is rather failure. integration. The media in particular minimal. are victims of a non-transparent Nevertheless, meeting NATO’s environment and of the disinterest of The involvement of the government’s criteria and defense capability the population in issues related to the employment offi ces, business standards obliges Albania to adopt defense sector. associations, private job counseling NATO’s culture in political institution agencies and ex-military NGOs management, civil-military relations Under these conditions, it is diffi cult in the defense reform process is and military career preconditions. In to assess the ability of Albania’s desirable. However, the unwillingness this regard, there is justifi ed concern institutions to coherently manage of the MoD to co-operate with among the Albanian military that the its own reforms and generate public some NGOs due to their political change of government means the support. In fact, these functions are affi liations or preferences does not end of their professional career for taken over by external actors like help to unite the efforts for ex-military NATO and SAIC. Even if it is not reintegration. Without external transparent, the MAP mechanism support, the MoD cannot focus on outlines the goals for understanding and interpreting defense reform in

B I C C 21 brief 34

business-oriented programs and self- and chemical storage facilities. There employment courses for ex-military is no independent way to confi rm the men. Consequently, ex-military statements of the MoD that about 20 businessmen are a very rare breed in per cent of the military facilities were Albania. In addition, it is regrettable already converted. There is no access that ex-military offi cers’ NGOs do not to statistics about what, when and how infl uence the MoD in its reintegration military bases were converted over the policy, and can only hope for, but last several years. Base conversion in not expect broad public support Albania is defi nitely not transparent for the special treatment of former enough, similar to the downsizing and soldiers. The absence of suffi cient resettlement process. Success stories conceptual and legal frameworks for of base conversion in Albania—for such reintegration can have a negative example the conversion of military impact on the public’s understanding sites into civilian residential areas, for of the whole reform process. educational purposes, or into social or cultural centers—were hard to come There are only a few concrete by. achievements in the conversion of military sites in Albania. The “Draft Although there were substantial and Conversion Plan until 2010”, even if detailed assessments136 of the security not publicly available, obviously lists and defense sector transformation what should be converted. However, in Albania, which enable an the MoD uses the term conversion understanding of the problems primarily for the modernization of involved and how to tackle them, the military bases. A very small part of capability for institutional learning military property is actually planned and course correction remains rather for transfer to civilian use. Moreover, weak. The state of affairs of defense the MoD is the institution that is restructuring in Albania therefore responsible for implementing and does not only refl ect its own lack controlling the conversion of military of capability, but also the lack of property. Consequently, sale or renting transparency in the evaluation of is used as the main “conversion model” external actors. for generating funds. Such a money- making and self-interested system could explain the lack of transparency in the process. As such, the MoD cannot be seen as an impartial, “honest broker” in the process. On the other hand, any non state agency (or direct transfer of former bases to local and regional administrations) would be in need of subsidies, and no special funding for this purpose is planned or foreseen. Unfortunately, the Albanian Government did not manage to attract any external funds for base conversion.

The MoD also assumes that there are no environmental problems with respect to the conversion of military property, which is certainly questionable. In the case of barracks or warehouses, environmental problems may simply consist of waste, surplus material and scrap left behind, though they tend to be much more serious in the case of former air bases, missile bases, as well as fuel

22 B I C C Macedonia Macedonia

Defense Reform Over the past few years, the been driven by NATO’s “Open Door” Partnership for Peace program policy, which was reconfi rmed at the he desire to establish a defense (PfP), the Membership Action Plan alliance’s Istanbul Summit in 2004.144 Tsystem according to current Euro- (MAP) and the Strategic Defense The strategic goal to become a member Atlantic trends and to become part Review (SDR) have been catalysts of NATO by 2008 drives many of of the wider European integration for transformation and reform. The the changes within the ARM and the process was outlined from the very SDR was adopted by the Parliament defense system in Macedonia as a beginning of the Macedonian State.137 in the spring of 2004 and refl ects the whole.145 The Macedonian National The goal was to build Macedonia’s own National Security and Defense Concept Security and Defense Concept states defense system and strategy and to (2003).140 It is currently under review that “The defense system should incorporate it within collective defense to ensure that it remains a relevant and attach strong signifi cance to and and security.138 The reform process viable document. The Macedonian prepare special guidance and plans began fairly early in Macedonia and has Assembly has so far passed the Army for the introduction of a system for been rather slow in the fi rst decade. Service Regulation Law (2002) and the planning, fi nancing, programming, Macedonia was not involved in the Defense Law (2005). The main goal of and budgeting in accordance with the post-Yugoslavian wars of the 1990s; the Army Service Regulation Law is to NATO standards.”146 though it found itself on the edge of a provide support for recruitment and full-scale civil war during 2001. retention of the military by creating a One of NATO’s membership personnel management system based requirements was the de-politicization During the 1990s, Macedonia was on a rational rank structure, developing of Macedonia’s armed forces. seen as an island of peaceful ethnic an NCO corps and systematic However, the formal process of de- coexistence in the region. However, military education. The Defense Law politicization did not remove all of this peace was built on the de facto provides a base for the participation the political links and preferences of division of the two main communities of Macedonian Armed Forces in the elite classes. A change of political in the state—ethnic Macedonians and operations outside Macedonia, imparts power in the course of elections ethnic Albanians—who lived in more host nation support within Macedonia, usually means a change of high or less isolated but parallel societies, and prohibits political activity within ranking offi cers in the Ministry of with a high degree of mutual mistrust. the armed forces.141 Defense (MoD), the General Staff and In February 2001, armed confl ict the ARM.147 While the Macedonian broke out in north-western Macedonia The National Defense system is Constitution does not prohibit between armed Albanian insurgents transforming itself from one based military members from becoming and Macedonian security forces. The on conscription and territorial defense members of political parties, Article National Liberation Army (NLA), to one that will be incorporated into 47 of the Defense Law clarifi es that recruiting insurgents from Kosovo Euro-Atlantic security structures. “...membership in a political party and from the Macedonia Albanian It includes plans for the army to be must not infl uence appointments, community, employed guerrilla fully professionalized by 2008, with promotions, evaluation, education, warfare and terrorist tactics, allegedly appropriate representation from additional training, rewarding and other in protest against the discrimination all ethnic communities, adequate rights of military persons and civilians of Albanians. This guerrilla confl ict downsizing and the modernization employed in the ARM.” 148 Within continued for six months and escalated of its equipment.142 The Macedonian the ARM, political parties or citizen ethnic tensions until the international armed forces (ARM) will be associations may not be organized or community brokered a cease-fi re restructured to create a small, effi cient functional. Military personnel while agreement in August 2001– the and modern force compatible with performing their service may not be Ohrid Framework Agreement. The NATO and EU forces. The SDR also guided by their political affi liation, nor agreement provided greater rights redefi nes the role of the ARM, which can they express or represent those in and representation for Albanians completed the transfer of duties for the course of their duties or infl uence and an amnesty for the NLA fi ghters border protection to the Border Police other persons. Military persons may in exchange for the disarming and at the end of 2005. A limited ARM not attend and participate in political disbanding of the NLA.139 The 2001 counter-insurgency capability will also gatherings and rallies wearing their crisis between the Macedonian and be developed after the ethnic Albanian uniforms, nor may they use any Albanian communities in the country opposition fi nally approves limited symbols of political parties. revealed a great deal of confusion support for the police in the course of and hesitation in implementing the domestic security operations.143 Similar to other defense reforms in legal authority of key governmental the Western Balkans, restructuring and security institutions. Both Albanian With the successful outcome of the downsizing is one of the key features and Macedonian militias were formed, EU-led “Operation Concordia” in late of defense reform in Macedonia. The as well as radicalized elements of the 2003, the defense reform process has active peacetime component of the national police force. ARM was reduced from 16,000 in 2002

B I C C 23 brief 34

to 12,858 (including 70% professionals to increase to 4,794, while conscription The change from a conscript-based and 30% conscripts) in 2003.149 As is planned to be abolished by the end to a professional army is aimed for of March 2005, the total strength of 2006. completion by the end of 2007. of the ARM—including employees Related to this is Macedonia’s military at the MoD—was 8,869 civilian and It is hoped that the downsizing of professional education system, which is military personnel: 1,556 of which are the armed forces will correct the a critical point for the country’s defense offi cers, 2,120 NCOs, 2,679 contract disproportionate number of offi cers reform process. The only existing soldiers and 1,365 civilians.150 As of in all ranks within the offi cer corps Military Academy was established in May 2005, the number of conscripts hierarchy. According to the Strategic 1995 and its main task is to educate, was estimated at around 10,000.151 The Defense Review (SDR), the projected train and provide professional targeted strength, which is planned to ideal rank composition inside the MoD development for ARM personnel.153 be reached by the end of 2007, is 8,460 and ARM is as follows: However, most of the training individuals, including 919 offi cers, services of the Academy are currently 1,930 NCOs and 817 civilians. The in moratorium due to a surplus of number of contract soldiers is planned offi cers in all ranks. The latest class

Figure 7: The current and planned strength of the ARM152

Source: Macedonian MoD, March 2005

Civilians Civilians Offi cers NCOs Contract Total MoD ARM ARM ARM soldiers 2005 1149 1365 1556 2120 2679 8869 2007 (planned) 453 364 919 1930 4794 8460 Difference 696 1001 637 190 +2115 409

Figure 8: Distribution of Ranks in the Offi cer’s Corps of the ARM

Source: Macedonian Strategic Defense Review, Skopje 2004.

Rank Projected % of total Current % of total Difference between in 2007 number of number of current and offi cers projected offi cers in 2007 projected number for 2007 of offi cers General 7 0.9 8 0.49 1 Colonel 58 6.3 92 5.59 34 Lt colonel 127 14 250 15.19 123 Major 205 22 284 17.25 79 Captain 1st class 0 0,00 94 5.71 94 Captain 223 24 451 27.40 228 Lieutenant 243 26 356 21.63 113 Second lieutenant 56 6.1 111 6.74 55 Total: 919 100,00 1646 100.00 727

24 B I C C Macedonia

of graduated cadets was declared Figure 9: Ethnic composition of the staff of the MoD redundant. There is one remaining class to graduate and it is also expected Source: Macedonian MoD, March 2005 to be declared redundant.154 Various models for a transformed Military Academy exist that would involve the Current total Planned of total Difference Academy in the offi cers’ professional for 2013 development. However, the will to Macedonians 4 1 5 2 0 5 - 2 1 0 transform this institution appears to be lacking. If the Military Academy is to Albanians 1 6 8 1 + 6 5 survive as an institution, it obviously must transform itself to meet the Turk - 1 2 + 1 2 military training standards of NATO. Roma - 8 + 8 Currently, the Military Academy only offers short-term (6-month) courses Serbs 1 0 6 - 4 for NCO training. The newly approved Bosniaks 23 +1 offi cers’ career path will acquire offi cer candidates directly from the University. Vlahs 91 -8 However, the NCO Working Group foresees the training of NCOs to occur solely within the Training Command of the General Staff. It now offers Basic and Advanced NCO courses. Figure 10: Integration of Albanians with university education in armed forces units in 2005 In addition to national training institutions, the American fi rm Booz, Source: Macedonian MoD, March 2005 Allen & Hamilton (BAH)155 and NATO Advisory Team (NAT) are Units Current Projects Difference providing consulting to the MoD and the ARM. Both entities are embedded MoD 16 81 +65 in the MoD (see also next chapter). BAH provides advice to the Minister, Military Academy 0 4 +4 State Secretary and State Advisors Military Intelligence 4 17 +13 within the MoD in the fi eld of planning, budgeting, logistics, human ARM 0 11 +11 resources, and language training. BAH Total 20 113 +93 also works with the General Staff, primarily with the departments of the GS as G1 (Personnel), G3 (Training) and G4 (Logistics). Its contract objectives are set by the US European Command (US EUCOM)’s annual institutions. The requirement is that offi cers’ ranks. The ethnic ratio should campaign plan with the primary goal 25 per cent of all positions within the be changed by 2013 into a more being the transformation of the MoD ARM are fi lled by ethnic Albanians. balanced proportion of 591 to 232. and ARM. The goal of the NAT is Currently, 2.54 per cent of the armed In the current personnel structure of to assist the MoD and ARM to meet forces personnel are Albanians, in the MoD, there are 415 Macedonians NATO standards and to verify that contrast to 92.79 per cent of ethnic and only 16 Albanians. However, standards are enforced in relation Macedonians.156 The number of other there are a number of senior-ranking to declared units. To that extent, minority communities (Bosniaks, ethnic Albanians within the Ministry; NAT works closely with the GS and Roma, Serbs, Turks and Vlahs) for example, the head of Sector for conducts frequent inspection visits to represented in the ARM is also planned Personnel and the Deputy Defense ARM units within Macedonia. to increase (See Annex, Table 1). Minister are Albanians.

The restructuring of the MoD and At present, there are 1,227 ethnic Two programs for minority integration ARM is part of a process to raise Macedonian offi cers, while there are into the ARM and MoD were approved the number of ethnic minorities in only 68 ethnic Albanians within the by the MoD in March 2005.157 One the ranks of Macedonian defense program targets candidates with a university education, while the other

B I C C 25 brief 34

Figure 11: Integration of of Albanians, claiming that they have the destruction of the T-55 tanks in no patriotic links to Macedonia. The January 2004 by the decision of the Albanians with university opposition party leaders also think that Government. In accordance with education into ARM in the only reason for reintegration of the Modernization Plan, 61 tanks 2006 - 2013 minorities should be their professional have already been destroyed, and the qualifi cation and skills, not their remaining 30 tanks will be destroyed Source: Macedonian MoD, March 2005 ethnicity.158 as well. Four SU-25 aircrafts have been put out of service, and the MoD There are other problematic issues hopes to fi nd a reliable partner for 2006 +50 as well. For instance, two courses for the exchange of these aircrafts for NCO aspirants from the minority other assets or maintenance services. 2007 +52 communities were completed in The disposal of Soviet weapons is 2008 +6 2005 and early 2006. For operational very controversial. However, it is seen reasons (i.e. funding), each course was as part of the ARM modernization 2009 +6 conducted as a standard NCO aspirant process and as compatible with 2010 +6 course without any skill leveling. NATO standards. From NATO’s Results of both courses were mixed, point of view, however, it is not about 2011 +6 with a sizable portion of the NCO compatibility, but rather due to the fact candidates being unable to graduate. It that Macedonians have little money to 2012 +5 is evident that the ARM is attempting maintain Soviet tanks and aircraft.161 2013 +5 to meet the OFA requirements, resulting in either fewer graduated Determined to reform its armed forces Total: 2006 – 2013 +136 minority candidates or the graduation by mostly using domestic budget funds, of unqualifi ed individuals into the Macedonia set its military budget NCO ranks. to Denar 6,108 million (US $122 million) in 2004, which was almost targets those with a high school There are also cultural differences 2.3 per cent of the projected GDP.162 education for fi lling the offi cer and between ethnic groups that may The 2005 defense budget amounts NCO positions within the ARM and make it impossible to reach some to Denar 6,413 million (US $122 the MoD. The integration program for of the goals set forth in the OFA. million), which is about 2.4 per cent minorities with a university education For example, the current service law of the GDP.163 Nevertheless, external must be completed by 2013 due to requires a high school education as assistance remains a main source of the Ohrid Framework Agreement a minimum to be eligible to join the military development in Macedonia. (OFA), which requires there to be ARM. However, some ethnic groups For instance, in 2003 the US granted a proportional representation of all still do not have access to a higher almost US $12 million—including ethnic communities in State services. education, or do not believe that a support to the Special Forces—to higher education is necessary. This is improve the mobility of units, establish From 2006 onwards, the number of a problem that should be addressed an IT- system compatible with NATO ethnic Albanian offi cers inside the nationally, as it is well outside of standards, and to develop the shooting ARM will be increased every year, to a the bounds of traditional Defense range Krivolak as an “Adriatic Charter” total of 136 in 2013. requirements. Nevertheless, minority regional training center. integration in the ARM is seen as a For people with a high school principal condition for the country’s Many performance indicators prove education, the integration plan is to be accession into NATO, and that the progress in Macedonian defense completed by 2007 with only a small alliance expects its full implementation reform. However, Macedonia still increase in the number of Albanians by Macedonian authorities. remains defi cient with regard to to 77. The modernization and procurement meeting some NATO standards. The of new equipment has to match the country’s military budget is still not The integration of minorities into the projected capabilities and capacities able to meet NATO’s requirements. ARM in general is a very controversial of the ARM and be compatible Most recently, NATO requested the issue in Macedonia, mainly because with NATO regulations and budget development of additional units with it implies a reduction in the projections. The Special Forces have specialized capabilities and, more representation of and positions open priority in getting new equipment.159 importantly, a national Air Surveillance for Macedonians. The “traditionalists” Along with the plans to buy new Operations Center (ASOC). However, among Macedonian offi cers are materials, Macedonia has to dispose these additions are not feasible under strongly opposed to the integration of obsolete and surplus military Macedonia’s current defense budget. equipment.160 The process of divesting such materials began with

26 B I C C Macedonia

Minimum projected cost for a national missions, as well as in search and poll of the Institute for Democracy, ASOC is 23 million USD. Originally, rescue operations. It also contributes Solidarity and Civil Society in the requirement for an ASOC was to transparency in defense planning. Macedonia shows public support for thought to be best served through a Moreover, the MAP launched in NATO membership at 68.89 per cent, regional solution and more realistic April 1999 guides defense reforms while 13.97 per cent voted against, for military budgets of participating in Macedonia. As with other NATO another 13.49 per cent were without countries. aspirants, Macedonia has submitted an any opinion and 2.67 per cent did not Annual National Program (ANP) on answer.170 Euro-Atlantic Integration preparations for membership. ANP targets and work schedules are updated European Union In 1993, the Macedonian Assembly each year. passed the decision to seek Euro- NATO and the EU have a common Atlantic integration of the country Daily pressure in reaching interest in the Western Balkans, which and in 1995 Macedonia joined the transformation goals and NATO is to see the emergence of stable, Partnership for Peace Program standards is applied by the American prosperous and peaceful democracies. (PfP). A NATO Advisory Team fi rm, Booz, Allen & Hamilton (BAH). To achieve this, the alliance and the (NAT) is permanently located within Both BAH and NAT struggle with Union have employed different tools. the Macedonian MoD. This team the bureaucracy and post-socialist The main one on the EU side is the is made up of army advisors from mentality in Macedonia.165 When Stabilization Association Process (SAP) different NATO member countries asked about the relationship between and for NATO, the main tools are the assigned to NAT for periods ranging NATO and BAH in Skopje, NATO PfP and MAP. The Stabilization and from 3 to 6 months. However, the representatives stated that their Association Agreements (SAA) was short assignment periods of NAT advising team plays the main role in signed by Macedonia in April 2001, offi cers makes it extremely diffi cult the ARM restructuring process and while on 9 November 2005, Macedonia to build continuous and trusting uses a coordinated approach with was granted ‘candidate’ status for relationships with their MoD or ARM BAH, who are also striving toward EU membership.171 However, the counterparts. Recently, through a bi- the same goals.166 When queried, candidate status was given with no fi rm lateral agreement, France, for instance, BAH representatives state that they prospect or deadline for membership was able to provide a Personnel and play the major role in MoD and ARM negotiations.177 Currently, the EU has Human Resources representative for a transformation and that NATO focused on four essential areas of two-year NAT tour. This will provide membership is a milestone in that support to Macedonia: democracy continuity in this critical sector for process. It is obvious that some and rule of law, economic and social NATO. The main purpose of NAT professional rivalry exists. The end development, justice and home is to provide support and assistance to result is that both entities are striving affairs, and environmental policy.173 the ARM and General Staff in meeting to move the Macedonian MoD and If Macedonia is allowed to begin NATO standards. The various tasks ARM forward to a modern defense accession talks, it will be able to seek within the Membership Action Plan structure. funding for institutional and other (MAP) and PfP have been agreed upon reforms in a much greater amount than in order to ensure that Macedonia Due to the restricted character of all the present fi nancing arrangement— meets the requirements for full NATO bilateral strategic documents, it is not known as Community Assistance for membership. The team members possible to defi ne the actual impact Reconstruction, Development and provide advice and have the ability of the NATO integration strategy Stabilization (CARDS) – allows.174 to provide additional information or on the ARM transformation. Only According to recent polls, Macedonians training as required.164 the ANP serve as the main source strongly support joining the EU and of information on the restructuring feel confi dent that the country is on NATO & PMCs of Macedonia’s Armed Forces.167 the road to membership. Data from The concepts of interoperability, the Sector of European Integration in The Macedonian Individual stability, cooperation and participation May 2004 revealed that 91.4 per cent Partnership Program (IPP) comprises in peacekeeping operations are of Macedonians answered “yes” to fi ve chapters, covering political and consistently repeated to describe the question of accession to the EU.175 economic conditions, defense and this process of transformation and All political parties in Macedonia have military considerations, resource issues, its goals.168 Sometimes it seems that therefore included NATO and EU security status, and legal matters. In the idea of NATO membership has membership in their priorities.176 Like addition, the Partnership Planning become a sort of dogma in Macedonia, in other Western Balkan countries, and Review Process (PARP) provides with no other alternative.169 The latest the possibility of joining NATO drew a tool for enhancing interoperability particular interest from Macedonia between Macedonia and NATO in the in 2002-2003, partly because it is areas of peacekeeping, humanitarian

B I C C 27 brief 34

considered easier than meeting the offered the shooting range Krivolak Some hold the opinion that the EU’s far more elaborate demands; and as a regional training center for situation has not really improved partly because of the symbolism for Armed Forces of the Adriatic Charter since 2002 –2003 and the Macedonian local countries who are transforming countries.182 Assembly has never been more of a from ‘consumers’ to ‘producers’ of “voting machine” as under the current security. Many performance indicators Political Guidance of Defense government.187 The others see only prove progress in Macedonian relations Reform slight progress, especially in relation with the EU. However, Macedonia to the MoD on budget issues; but in still remains defi cient with regard to Meeting NATO’s criteria and defense general, the infl uence of the Parliament meeting EU standards.177 capability standards can be a force for on the Government with regard to both military reform and democratic budget issues remains low. This shows Threat perceptions and regional cooperation transformation, but it also obliges the difference between constitutional Macedonia to adopt the political provisions and the marginal role of the In all strategic documents it is culture and civil-military relations of Assembly in Macedonia in reality.188 stated that there are no threats of a NATO countries. This relationship is conventional war in Macedonia.178 in the process of development with Another important institution in the However, the most common progress occurring on an intermittent civilian control of the military is the threat-perception among ethnic basis. President who is elected directly by the Macedonians is the independent status citizens and thus is not responsible to of neighboring Kosovo. Many ethnic The Parliament of Macedonia the Assembly. Moreover, with regard Macedonians hope that Kosovo will performs the supervision of the to the legislative branch, the President never achieve independence, because Government in defense and security possesses a veto on the adoption of this would set a precedent for the affairs and adopts the National laws. He is the supreme Commander Albanian community in Macedonia, Security and Defense Strategies.183 of the ARM and adopts the main which would be catastrophic The parliamentary Committee on strategic documents such as the for developing the multi-ethnic Defense and Security is responsible Defense Strategy and the Defense Plan. Macedonian society.179 By contrast, for security and defense issues. The main part of the President’s duties the Government and the President Additionally, intelligence and security is performed through decrees. Making of Macedonia have made diplomatic operations must be reported to the them operational is done through the statements supporting the resolution committee.184 While the defense MoD and General Staff. According of Kosovo’s status by the international budget is now presented to the to the Constitution, the President is community. Some Macedonian committee in fi nal form for approval head of the National Security Council politicians support strongly an or disapproval, the committee has (NSC).189 The NSC is supposed to independent Kosovo. Among them recently been able to infl uence budget consider matters of signifi cance for is the Deputy Defense Minister Talat execution by requiring expenditure national security and provide advice to Xhaferi, who stated this as his personal reports quarterly. However, taking the President and recommendations view.180 The Albanian community into account the wide range of the to the Prime Minister and Parliament. in the country also does not see any Committee’s functions and topics it According to some, it has been a rather danger if Kosovo were to be granted has to supervise, some Macedonian ‘shadowy institution’ functioning in independence. experts doubt that the Committee is a non-transparent manner.190 The capable of performing its functions Government’s competencies in defense The Adriatic process, which includes effi ciently. Theoretically, the Parliament matters are left to the MoD; but there Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, is has infl uence over the defense budget, is a lack of legal clarity regarding the regarded in Macedonia as a regional but this is not necessarily the case in precise position and responsibility vehicle that will take these countries practice. The defense budget comes of the Defense Minister. The most smoothly through the MAP process to the Parliament at its fi nal stage important issue is whether the Minister to the fi nal objective of NATO without being previously consulted is responsible to the Prime Minister or membership.181 There are various or discussed.185 Such a situation is an to the President directly. Although the activities at different expert levels, evidence, the Assembly remains on Defense Law’s inconsistencies imply a as well as training activities in order the margins of political developments, closer relationship with the President, to test and improve operational playing the role of a “voting machine” it is not necessarily the case in practice. capacities, readiness, effi ciency and for decisions made by the President The decisions of the NSC can be troop deployment of the participating and the Prime Minister.186 blocked by the Government, and the countries. The Macedonia MoD The views of local experts to the critical role of the Parliament in Macedonia do not differ very much.

28 B I C C Macedonia

President can block the initiatives of aiming to create public support for sensitive these may be (for instance, the the Government in the security and NATO- membership.198 However, matter of minority integration into the defense sphere.191 civil media coverage is at times critical, ARM). A new information campaign but like in other Western Balkan of the MoD should thus aim not only The power-sharing of the executive is countries, journalists in Macedonia are at garnering public support, but also not clearly defi ned by the Constitution then accused of being “unqualifi ed to serve as a source of information in and depends on the assertiveness cover security and defense affairs”.199 explaining what reform is, why it must of the individuals holding offi ce Journalists are blamed also for be done, which benefi ts it brings to rather than on the President and the being unable to make security issues Macedonia in particular and to regional Prime Minister. According to the understandable for common people.200 cooperation and stability as a whole. As Constitution, the Defense Minister is Generally, military matters are not with the case of Albania, the military only accountable to the Government. broadly discussed in society, and media is a tool that is already in place While the accountability of the journalists claim that the information in the country; however, it is in need of General Staff and its Chief of Staff provided to them through offi cial reform as well. is unclear. The President appoints or press conferences of the MoD is not dismisses the Chief of Staff without satisfactory.201 Establishing an appropriate defense approval by the Parliament, but the management system and a well- law stipulates that the Chief of Staff is Nevertheless, currently the perception functioning military bureaucracy similar accountable both to the President and of a military person in Macedonia to other NATO countries remains the the Minister of Defense.192 The lack of ranges from neutral to generally challenge for Macedonia. These aspects co-ordination between the President, positive. The ARM is still enjoying need to attract greater attention by, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the remarkable positive perception and the support of international actors Defense was troublesome during the of the old Yugoslav National Army who are guiding the reform process. 2001 ethnic confl ict, as contradictory (JNA). The military and the military However, the national institutions orders were coming from all three profession enjoyed a respected should be wary of the challenge institutions.193 Similar to Albania, position in the former Yugoslavia. of future ownership of defense such complicated relations between This was based on a fairly common restructuring and ask themselves how the President and the Prime Minister experience of the republics during the it can be cultivated in Macedonia where are seen by NATO as typical for the First World War and a shared partisan international organizations have been region.194 experience during the Second World playing the lead role? The negative War. However, this perception cuts consequences of defense reform, such Apart from this, there is a general lack across ethnic lines but opinions of as base closure and the loss of work, of cooperation between the executive younger Macedonians are more likely are also very sensitive in Macedonia. and the legislative branch, partly to be non-committal. Generally, to be From this perspective, those resulting from the socialist legacy of a military offi cer in a country with an institutions responsible for security and executive rule.195 The inter-ethnic unemployment rate around 37.5% is defense matters are in need of a new factor, which has to be taken into regarded as a secure job with service PR and Communication strategy to account in the process of decision- housing and reasonable holidays in better explain and promote local buy-in making, does not make cooperation military recreation areas. It is also a to the defense reform process. any simpler. Three political parties of source of stable income (See Annex, the Albanian community are present in Table 2). There are thus few examples Defense Conversion the Assembly, one of which is always of offi cers leaving the active service in the ruling coalition.196 voluntarily. Restructuring in Macedonia: Military Pensions & Individual NGOs and Think Tanks involved Similar to Albania, the MoD Responsibility in Macedonia is in need of a There are hundreds of NGOs in Communication and PR Strategy for The MoD applies different measures Macedonia, however, very few of defense reform. It is important to for downsizing202 the ARM, including which are seriously involved in overcome the sole focus on NATO the termination of work contracts, the security and defense policy. Expertise membership, even if there is no outsourcing of non-essential functions, is confi ned to governmental and alternative to the Euro-Atlantic and early retirement. From the year international actors or private perspective. The Macedonian MoD 2003 to March 2005, the total outfl ow consulting companies like NATO, has a number of success stories to of military personnel reached 1,971. 197 DCAF, Stability Pact or BAH. The present and challenges that need to Among these, 222 were employed at military media in Macedonia cover be explained to the public, however the MoD while 1,749 were discharged military issues mostly with topics from the ARM.203

B I C C 29 brief 34

Figure 12: Military personnel outfl ow (2003 – 03. 2005)

Source: Macedonian MoD, March 2005

Retirement Personal Disciplinary Death Failure to meet Contractual Total request measures requirements transfer Offi cers 167 16 1 4 0 152 340 NCOs 89 14 6 1 0 367 477 Professional 0 113 37 2 167 219 538 soldiers Civilians 278 23 4 4 0 85 394 Total 534 166 48 11 167 823

Thus early retirement will be the main support for retraining or reintegration there were 275,446 benefi ciaries from option to implement the planned apart from general pension benefi ts. the pension and disability insurance. downsizing. The total number of However, not all personnel departing At that time the overall number of soldiers seeking early retirement will the ARM are still entitled to a military pensioners in Macedonia was 249,421, reach 892 by 2007 (255 offi cers, 172 pension.207 only 3,083 of which were military NCO and 465 civilians). pensioners.209 In order to receive a Pensions and Benefi ts military pension, military personnel Another measure to enable further have to have spent 35 years in the downsizing is the transfer of some Under the Defense and Army Service armed forces (30 for female soldiers). functions from the MoD to other law, in order to qualify for an “old age The “Law on Early Retirement” (valid state agencies. By the end of 2005, pension”, a service member has to be for the period of 2003-2007) regulates approximately 187 servicemen will 64 years old (62 for females). The old the benefi ts for those ex-militaries who have been transferred from the MoD age pension is determined according to are forced to leave the army because to the Directorate for Rescue and an individual’s length of service. The of downsizing. Military offi cers who Protection, while 270 people will governmental sub-law (act) promises have up to this point taken early have moved from the MoD to the retired policemen and ex-offi cers 30% retirement are receiving compensation Crisis Management Center. Another in addition to the normal pension for up to fi ve years of work. This is 200 civilians dealing with production amount.208 At the end of year 2002, Macedonia’s only measure in support services within the ARM (such of the reintegration of demobilized as catering and maintenance) will personnel. have been taken over by other State companies and agencies.204 A total of 823 offi cers and NCOs terminated Figure 13: Early retired military personnel their service in the ARM in 2004 and were transferred to the State Border Source: Macedonian MoD, March 2005 Police of the Ministry of Interior. By the end of 2005, an additional 660 Year Offi cers NCOs Civilians Total persons changed from the ARM to the State Border Police.205 Retraining 2003 107 54 195 356 courses were organized in the ARM in 2004 and 2005 only for the ARM 2004 31 24 67 122 personnel to be transferred to the State 2005 48 31 50 129 Border Police (MoI).206 2006 35 33 77 145 Until recently, there were no additional 2007 34 30 76 140 measures available to demobilized offi cers and NCOs in terms of Total 255 172 465 892

30 B I C C Macedonia

The parliament recently passed the Apart from those without pension The Macedonian Resettlement: individual MoD requested amendments to the benefi ts, there is another critical group responsibility and participation Army Service law and Defense law to that is in need of attention: the former provide the Minister with the authority guerrillas of the so-called Albanian The original perspective of the MoD to dismiss service members based National Liberation Army (NLA). was straightforward with regard to on redundancy, as well as to put the These individuals participated in the the retraining of departing military military pension age at 55 with 25 2001 ethnic confl ict and were not personnel—it was considered years of service. This amendment incorporated into the special “Law ineffective given the economic and aims to put the retirement and service on compensation” since they are social situation in the Republic of age in harmony with the offi cers’ still considered enemies of the State, Macedonia. According to the data from career development concept approved despite having been granted a general the Macedonian Census Offi ce, the by the Minister of Defense. The amnesty. Families of NLA fi ghters unemployment rate in Macedonia is initial forecast for retiring service who were killed in action are not 37.5%, which includes all educational members was 607 persons at the end entitled to any compensation, while all profi les.215 Therefore, Macedonia of 2005. Among this number are 186 ethnic Macedonians are entitled to this did not have until recently a draft offi cers, 109 NCOs, and 312 civilian support.211 Public debate over this issue resettlement program. Although employees. The planned funding for provoked a negative response from the two programs for ethnic minority early retirement amounts to 23,490,138 Albanian community. The Democratic integration were mistakenly presented Euro (for the period 2003-2007) and Union for Integration (DUI) also by the Macedonian MoD during these funds are allocated from the announced that if Macedonian different workshops as re-integration State budget.210 Given the so-called “homeland defenders” are rewarded programs, these programs have in fact 55/25 rule of the MoD, many key by the State for their services, then nothing to do with the resettlement of individuals will be eligible to depart the issue of social compensation for demobilized personnel. the service. This has the potential to the families of NLA fi ghters killed create an immediate “brain drain” and or wounded in action should be In early 2006, the MoD and the severely hamper both operations and considered.212 Norwegian Embassy in Skopje the transformation process. Therefore, signed a contract for the LEPEZA the MoD is currently developing a Only some participants of the civil (mac. spectra) resettlement project.216 selective retention system to allow key war of 2001 from the Albanian side The aim of the project is to fi nd individuals the opportunity to remain are already employed by the ARM and alternative careers for surplus offi cers in service beyond the 25-year mark. civilian administrations.213 By contrast, to provide the participants with skills Albanian politicians who took part in and knowledge that would make The initial concept to support service the ethnic confl ict of 2001 are well them more competitive in the labor members forced to leave the ARM as integrated into civilian life. There are market.217 The resettlement project part of the downsizing process called three Albanian parties represented in will have the capacity to admit 700 for a small compensation to be offered the Assembly. The DUI - best known people annually. After the completion to them depending on their military as the political wing of the NLA214 of the ARM transformation period, rank, salary and time spent in the - is part of the ruling coalition. Its the annual infl ow and at the same time ARM. (Those who did not spend 35 member Talat Xhaferi is a former outfl ow of military personnel from years in the ARM were not entitled to UCK-fi ghter in Kosovo who is now ARM will be a total of around 700 an early pension or any other pension assuming the position of the Deputy people per year (See Annex, Table 3). benefi ts). Their compensation could Defense Minister. The Chief of Staff LEPEZA is designed to help departing not be higher than eight months’ of the former NLA, Gen. G’zim army offi cers with both transition salary. For instance, a 35-year-old Ostreni, is the Vice-President of the counseling and education opportunities Captain who served in the ARM for Macedonian Assembly. However, to improve their qualifi cation and about 17 years and earns a salary some experts hold that “cynically competitiveness level on the civilian of 300 Euro per month would not enough the experienced combatants labor market. This objective is planned receive more than fi ve salaries (1,500 became civilian politicians.” Indeed, to be achieved by way of a two-phased Euro) as compensation. If a military only the experienced combatants approach. person leaves the ARM voluntarily were successful in becoming civilian before having served the minimal politicians in the parliament, thus Phase 1 is accomplished wholly with amount of years, he is not entitled “reintegrating” into civilian life in the MoD assets and consists of counseling to any compensation. The group of best and most profi table way. and transition assistance in CV writing, early-retired men without 35 years learning of interview tactics, aptitude of service—the number of which is testing and etc. The fi rst step of unknown—is not included into any the project, which may also include MoD statistics. These individuals are possibilities to apply for micro-credit, not benefi ciaries of the “Law on early retirement”.

B I C C 31 brief 34

is to open a “Transition Center” in Figure 14: Conversion objects Skopje.218 The center will train staff to work in helping surplus personnel fi nd Source: Macedonian MoD, March 2005 civilian careers. Phase 2, which is still in the planning stage, is the education component and may consist of Real estate Current Identifi ed for For conversion language training, academic programs, number MoD needs and vocational training. Apart from Skopje, the Defense Ministry plans to Barracks 26 13 13 open another two regional centers in Command facilities 9 5 4 Stip and Kicevo. Facilities for health 44 The Government of Norway has care/Maintenance donated 200,000 Euro for equipment of the resettlement project. Britain, Warehouse groups 43 24 19 Sweden and Denmark have also Shooting ranges 16 13 3 committed themselves to providing fi nancial aid. Army Homes 12 3 9 For instance, a public information Military canteens 19 19 campaign has been designed for the Macedonian resettlement program and Catering facilities 4 4 will be funded at the initial level of 25,000 Euros by the United Kingdom. Swimming pools 3 1 2 The primary focus of the campaign Military resorts 3 3 will be to present information about resettlement to the Macedonian Military hotels 1 1 public. The internal communication Military economies 3 3 effort will be accomplished through internal MoD publications and a series Land reform (parcels) 37 11 26 of command information briefi ngs Business premises 21 1 20 presented to all units. It is expected to be implemented during the year Areas in q/m 3458097 1783902 1674195 2006. LEPEZA is planned to continue beyond the transformation period and is recognized as a critical element of the new professional military system. Since all offi cers are on a contract Figure 15: Facilities identifi ed by the MoD for conversion system, there will be a constant outfl ow of personnel from service and Source: Macedonian MoD, April 2005 LEPEZA will assist these individuals in reintegrating into civilian life. It is planned that LEPEZA will be funded Real estate Number Transaction from national resources after 2007. Army Homes 3 Disposal (sale)

The perception of the Macedonian 3 Concession MoD is that resettlement and reintegration support is recognition Warehouse groups 1 Disposal (sale) for having faithfully completed one’s military service. However, the 7 Rent MoD also stressed the individual responsibility of participants toward Military canteens 17 Concession this end, as they are often not Military economies 2 Concession qualifi ed for civilian life and lack several necessary requirements. For Military catering facilities 8 Concession instance, during their education at the Military barracks 6 Transfer to Ministry of Interior Military Academy, offi cers acquire a university education diploma that is Military border posts 10 Transfer to Ministry of Interior not equivalent to one obtained in the Total 57

32 B I C C Macedonia

civilian education sector. Another the Real Estate Department of the and has also not applied nor tried to factor that hinders the reintegration of MoD is coordinating and monitoring attract any external funds for base military personnel is Macedonia’s high the implementation of this transfer.221 conversion.227 It should be mentioned unemployment rate. This factor alone However, the MoD is not the exclusive that there are no legal obstacles is indicative of the critical lack of job decision-maker in the conversion for foreigners to buy property in opportunities in the country, which process and has to co-operate with Macedonia.228 Nevertheless, there burdens the process of reintegration as others state agencies. For example, is an expectation in the MoD that a whole. the Agency for Privatization is in conversion or the transfer of military charge of the privatization of all state bases will generate funds and bring Although the Macedonian resettlement property, while the “Public Enterprise about social and fi nancial benefi ts. program is only taking contours for the Management of Housing and The acquired funds from the sale of focusing currently only on post- Business Premises” is responsible for estate and other areas are planned to be military orientation, it could be prized the assessment of the value of the used for the benefi t of active military as modest but long expected input property. Finally, the “State Authority personnel, especially by providing after many intellectual pressure of for Geodesic Works” is involved with them with apartments for housing.229 international think-tanks facilitating a the registry of the property.222 The This approach is not unusual for a range of meetings and working groups coordination between these units with society where ex-offi cers are entitled to on issues of reintegration. respect to the privatization procedure housing. of military property is rather unclear. Although the Macedonian resettlement In exchange for privatized military program is only a modest effort, it is The National Property Conversion property, the MoD has already nevertheless a much anticipated and Plan foresees different ways that provided 22 apartments for military welcome initiative that follows from could be applied for military estate personnel (Skopje – 3, Kocani – 4, the work of many international experts transformation, including: disposal Kumanovo – 13, Veles - 2). Among and think-tanks, who facilitated a range or sale; exchange for apartments; those facilities were: business premises of meetings and working groups on concession/renting; transfer of the “Kumanovo”, (value 330 658,13 Euro); the issue. right to use the property to another business premises “11 Oktomvri”- state authority; transfer of the right to Kumanovo, (119 605,89 Euro); basic Base Conversion: Sale and Foreign use and redevelop the property to the auxiliary place Kocani, (value 76 213,60 Investment local administrations.223 Euro); warehouse group “Gorce Petrov” (MoD-facility)– (178 603,39 Macedonia inherited the Yugoslav The MoD claims that the privatization Euro); warehouse group “Biqanovce” defense structure based on a strategy of the military estate is an ongoing Kumanovo, (69 956,00 Euro); double of territorial defense.219 The ARM does process. As of April 2005, 57 facilities purpose shelter (Military Home) not possess large military bases and of the MoD were identifi ed for – Veles, (71 764, 00 Euro).230 so the conversion of property focuses transformation. on small-sized facilities. In total, there Institutional Set-up are 112 military objects that have to be In the spring of 2005, various sites converted or transferred.220 The total were transferred by different modes, The Public Enterprise for Management area of land with military infrastructure including:224 of Housing and Business premises is amounts to approximately 28,562 6 military barracks in Skopje, Kriva, responsible for the assessment of the ha. The ARM has to get rid of its Kocani, Delchevo, Borovo, Strumica; 6 value of the property. However, there property that has no direct military army homes in Tetovo, Veles, Kicevo, are some major concerns regarding function, some of which include Bitola, Kriva, Stip; 17 military canteens the transparency of this process military barracks, command facilities, (5000qu m) in Kumanovo, Skopje, and of the privatization of military warehouse groups, shooting ranges, Tetovo, Petrovets, Debar, Kicevo, property in general. For instance, the army homes, military canteens, catering Veles, Stip, Strumica, Krivolak, Prilep, privatization process of the ‘Military facilities, military resorts, swimming Ochrid, Bitola; 2 military economies225 Home’ in Veles was investigated by pools, and military hotels. in Krivolak and Petrovets. the Macedonian media and revealed corruption and clientelism. Many A Military Property Conversion Plan Within the framework of military journalists and opposition party has been developed by the Macedonian cooperation, the US is preparing to members were convinced that the price MoD in cooperation with other state invest in the infrastructure of the army for the Military Home exchange in agencies and aims to complete the shooting range at Krivolak.226 The Veles was artifi cially low. The income transfer and disposal of military sites MoD does not expect any external of 71,764 Euro suffi ced only to get by 2007. The transfer of military sites funding for other conversion purposes two apartments in exchange for the is regulated by the general “Law on building. Another accusation related to possession of real estate”, and thus this “conversion case” was based on

B I C C 33 brief 34

family ties between the new owner of overcome the self-interest of the MoD requires, at a minimum, some closed- the premises and the head of the local and mitigate the frequent accusations door proceedings. The accountability ruling party.231 Despite such frequent of bias and corruption in the process. and relationship of the main national accusations, the MoD insists that the players in the defense sector, such as conversion and privatization process Conclusions the Minister of Defense, the Prime is carried out in accordance with Minister and President, are not clearly legal regulations based on the “Law With the adoption of strategic defi ned by the Constitution. Their role on possession of real estate”. Apart documents, a legal framework, and and relationship depends more on the from that, a report on the progress of with downsizing already in its fi nal assertiveness and personality of the property transformation, the funds stage, the fi rst phase of defense reform individuals holding these offi ces. generated by this transformation in Macedonia is almost fi nished. The and consequent investments is to Strategic Defense Review (SDR) The same institutional weaknesses can be submitted by the MoD to the refl ects the goals of the reform be found throughout civil society as Assembly once a year in order to process; however, even if the national a whole. The post-socialist mentality 232 promote greater transparency overall. legal and strategic framework is in Macedonia is pervasive and there established, this reform is guided is considerable nostalgia for the days The MoD does not provide any primarily by external actors, namely of a united and nominally prosperous information about environmental the mechanism of the MAP. As such, Yugoslavia. The NGOs in Macedonia problems at military bases, stating it is more of an international than a are not seriously involved in security only that the military sites meet “the national project. and defense policy formulation. The ecological, geographic, hydrologic, media are victims of a general lack climate requirements prescribed by the So far, NATO standards have of interest in defense issues as well as 233 legislation.” However, a joint effort positively infl uenced the national their own lack of expertise in this issue between the MoD and the Ministry of defense management system, corrected area. The few but competent critical Environment and Physical Planning the disproportionate representation voices that have come through on will ensure that environmental within the ranks of the offi cer corps, national defense reform nevertheless 234 237 protection measures are carried out. and stimulated the professionalization make the MoD very nervous. With regard to reintegration, the MoD of the ARM. The inclusion of ethnic cannot offer any positive examples minorities within these ranks is seen It is diffi cult to assess the effectiveness of combining base conversion with as a natural element of NATO’s of national defense institutions. In reintegration and retraining of military culture. Despite all of this, it fact, many advisory functions are taken 235 redundant military personnel. Since is still hard to assess the actual state over by external actors like NATO and 2003, all tenders for the concession of progress in the realm of transition BAH. The NATO Advisory Team of military facilities like canteens and and reform, as in most cases the (NAT) is permanently located within farms are subject to the condition that issue of sustainability arises. Are the the Macedonian MoD and continues new users keep all working personnel transformed defense institutions to apply pressure on the Government 236 for at least 10 years. Unfortunately, capable of standing alone, functioning for the fulfi llment of NATO’s this regulation is quite a deterrent for as required without external advice and membership requirements. However, new owners. support? NATO is not able to get past the post- socialist mentality of Macedonian Compared to Albania, military The Macedonian MoD was praised military bureaucracy on its own. As site conversion in Macedonia is a by NATO for introducing an effi cient such, the role of a defense reform relatively transparent process with planning and budgeting instrument. “pusher” is taken over by the private some achievements presented during Unfortunately, according to some American fi rm BAH. Their combined various seminars and working groups. sources from within, the coherent efforts should help bring the ARM However, similar to Albania, the role of national institutions in guiding closer to NATO’s standards. MoD is the institution responsible the national defense reform remains Reintegration success depends on an for implementing and controlling the in name only. The Macedonian individual’s qualifi cations, age, goal- privatization of military property. Assembly has been on the margins oriented retraining and, most of all, on Consequently, the sale or renting of of military developments but is the absorption capacity of the regional such property is primarily used as a taking an ever-increasing role as the economy and labor market. Limited means of generating income for the democratic control processes mature. absorption capacities in Macedonia MoD. A separate State agency, non- The security and defense structures are the most obvious reason for why state actor or even an NGO could be like the NSC and the MoD are seen the government has not yet offered an alternative institution for overseeing by some critical experts as rather any retraining for ex-military men. this process, which would help ‘shadowy institutions’ functioning in a non-transparent manner, even if the ‘sensitive’ work of the NSC

34 B I C C Macedonia

The demobilization and reintegration or military value. There exists a in Macedonia has not yet created Conversion Plan for military sites new social roles and networks or a and a legal framework for property new professional orientation for ex- transformation. The MoD is the military men. Rather, the shift from a institution that is implementing and military profession to a post-military controlling the conversion of military “career” has resulted in the sense of property. Consequently, the sale or loss of personal security and social renting of such property is used as a prestige, which affects self-esteem means of income generation for the and the position of the male as head MoD. Such a money-making system of the family. Demobilized offi cers could explain the frequent allegations are forced to adjust themselves to the of corruption against the Ministry. prevailing patterns of civil society and Some of the most successful examples weak national economy. Until recently, of converting former military bases there were no additional measures in and integrating them into the local Macedonia available to ex-militaries economic structures in Eastern Europe in terms of support for retraining have been the transformation of these or reintegration apart from general into residential areas, for educational pension benefi ts. What is more, not purposes or into social and cultural all previously separated personnel are centers. The authors of this study were entitled to pension benefi ts. unable to fi nd such success stories in Macedonia. On the other hand, The reintegration of formerly any non-state agency or the direct separated military personnel remains transfer of former bases to local and the weakest point of the Macedonian regional administrations would be in defense reform process. Although the need of subsidies; and, even with the Macedonian resettlement plans are MoD running the conversion process, only taking contours of a program no such funding is available. At the focusing currently only on post- same time, there is the expectation military orientation, it could be prized that conversion or the transfer of as modest but long expected input military bases will in fact release funds after many intellectual pressure of and bring about social and fi nancial international think-tanks facilitating a benefi ts for military personnel. Yet, range of meetings and working groups the sale of military property by the on issues of reintegration. MoD has not even infl uenced the living standards of active military The absence of a conceptual, long- personnel, let alone retired personnel. term and stable legal framework of It is therefore unfortunate that the reintegration has a negative impact on Macedonian Government did not the support of the populace. Public manage to attract any external funds opinion associates defense reform not for military site conversion. only with Euro-Atlantic integration but also with the closure of military sites, loss of employment, a decline in living standards, as well as the integration of ethnic minorities. This is an area where the expertise of the international NGOs could best be applied. Not only could they assist the Macedonian parliament in the creation of appropriate legislation but they could also assist in obtaining initial funding for ex-military men’s counseling and retraining programs.

The conversion of military property in Macedonia focuses on small-sized facilities without any direct strategic

B I C C 35 brief 34 Croatia

Defense Reform and combat capacities—especially May 2002 in Reykjavik. It would have for classical territorial war—are not been possible without the adoption y contrast to developments in well developed, many offi cers lack of the strategic documents. post-socialist countries in the substantial education. A lot of B 240 mid-1990s, Croatia, like the Former ‘uneducated heroes’ were promoted After closing the fi rst two cycles in Republic of Yugoslavia, retained its during the war to positions where accordance with NATO’s prerequisites, traditional force structures, heavy they now face tensions with old JNA- Croatia is currently in the third cycle weaponry and territorial defense educated offi cers and young offi cers of the MAP245 but had hoped for full strategies due to its experiences in the who have undertaken advanced training NATO membership at the Istanbul Balkan wars.238 The same holds true for at Western military academies.241 With Summit in 2004. Not only did the war military reform, downsizing and the regard to downsizing and resettlement crimes suspect General Gotovina’s slow restructuring of the armed forces measures of the MoD, these groups non-compliance with the ICTY lead to for new tasks. Only after the death are likely to compete for positions and Croatia’s denial of full membership in of Franjo Tudjman in 1999 and the benefi ts. NATO, but also the insuffi cient level victory of the opposition in the 2000 of modernization of the CAF at that elections were the structure, purpose The approach towards military reform point in time.246 However, Croatia has and size of the Croatian Armed Forces did not change in favor of Euro- been contributing to NATO operations (CAF) slowly put under scrutiny. Atlantic integration until the year 2000. in Afghanistan since 2002 and took From 2000 to 2003, military reform part in various maneuvers with NATO Due to the concept of “total defense” was subject to the political games of member countries over the past of Tito’s former Yugoslavia, and the different parties with no substantial several years. Although the European huge reservoir of personnel in the improvements in restructuring and Union delayed Croatia’s accession so-called Territorial Defense Forces modernization of the CAF so that talks because of the Gotovina case, (TDF) in all Yugoslav Republics, more it may face the future challenges the goal of integration into Euro- adult civilians participated in military of interoperability with NATO. Atlantic structures remains high on the training prior to the break-out of the Nevertheless, Croatia had implemented agenda of the main political parties. A war. This training proved to be crucial some activities before turning its clear signal for the strong interest of when Croatia had to form its armed wartime structures into peacetime the Croatian Government in military forces from scratch at the beginning ones, which was mainly supported by reform is the new Strategic Defense and during the war in 1991-95. While the American private military company, Review (SDR), which has fi nally been the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), Military Professional Resources Inc. completed and awaits adoption by the with its Serb dominated offi cer corps, (MPRI), who was already involved in parliament. For the Croatian MoD, was able to rely on professional training the CAF during the war. Some the SDR is “conceived as a thorough soldiers and its share of military of MPRI’s services have been heavily inventory of the defense system equipment, Croatia had only some criticized as low quality and for lacking which will [...] propose a new defense former JNA-trained offi cers or soldiers transparency.242 Croatia was the fi rst concept”.247 The SDR is the long but the majority was civilians taking up case of comprehensive consultancy awaited basis for the still unfi nished arms to fi ght for independence. The on military reform and the production Long Term Development Plan (LTDP) so-called “Homeland War” is thus seen of strategic papers by MPRI.243 The of the CAF, which is currently under by the majority of Croat people as a fi rst National Security Strategy and discussion and likely to be agreed nation-building war for Croat society Defense Strategy for Croatia in upon in spring 2006.248 The work on to separate their country. The CAF 2002 were put together very hastily the SDR started as early as October has had a special position in society and without much involvement of 2003 with the establishment of the ever since, also due to the fact that parliamentarians or civilian experts.244 SDR Council and SDR Development Tudjman used the highly politicized It seemed that external pressure two Committee. The SDR Council security forces to stabilize his semi- years after Croatia’s admission to the included not only the key MoD and authoritarian regime and to bolster his Partnership for Peace (PfP) program CAF offi cials but also representatives own popularity as “defender of the of NATO infl uenced the acceleration from the Offi ce of the President, the country”. Therefore, any reform that of that process. Only two months after Government, Ministry of Foreign touches the CAF’s size and structures the Sabor, the Croatian parliament Affairs and Ministry of Finance. No is still very delicate.239 In particular, accepted both strategies and the independent civilian experts were the new tasks of the PfP and maybe country entered the Membership present but during the whole SDR NATO membership in the future are Action Plan (MAP) of NATO at process, the Council and Committee very diffi cult for the CAF to comply the ministerial meeting of the Euro- held regular consultations with NATO with because of its unique background Atlantic Partnership Council on 15 Headquarters and its respective expert and subsequent development. The teams visiting the country. military education of CAF personnel is still very low. Though the operational

36 B I C C Croatia

The SDR concludes that major only on paper for the years to come that the pressure applied by Austria in change has occurred in the security if the already limited funds do not October 2005 for a bargain to accept perceptions of Croatia and of the materialize. The option of postponing Turkey’s candidate status in exchange region as a whole since the end of the some of the measures is already for starting accession talks with Croatia war ten years ago. It predicts only a indicated in the SDR.251 Doctrines was more signifi cant. Nevertheless, low probability of a “conventional which are in accordance with NATO with Gotovina being in The Hague confl ict, in which the Croatian territory are envisaged only for 2007. But most since December 2005, Croatia’s highly would be part of a larger battlefi eld.”249 important is the change of mindsets visible political issues seem to be Collective and not individual security when it comes to issues of defense solved. is seen as the most benefi cial strategy and security in this fragile region. for Croatia, particularly with regard to The politically crucial issue for full Moreover, Croatia has already been the economy. And although the SDR membership—cooperation with the deeply involved in cooperation with cannot solve all the current problems ICTY—seems to have been solved NATO and EU security planning. of the CAF, it is an important with the capture of Gotovina on Though not yet a member, Croatia is framework for the LTDP and corrects Tenerife in December 2005. Therefore, considering in its March 2005 Strategic some of the naive thinking250 and the invitation for membership seems to Defense Review the contribution to reluctance to change that is pervasive be likely in 2006. EU Battle Groups and other structures in the defense sector, including the of the future European Security following: Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defense Policy (ESDP).254 Most of the planned contributions will, Compulsory service should be In March 2005, the European Union nevertheless, be the same units which abolished within the next fi ve (EU) postponed the beginning of Croatia will train and equip for NATO- years accession talks with Croatia. „No Cash led operations and structures. for The Hague“ was written on some Flexible forces for international walls, refl ecting not only the wider NATO Programs with Croatia operations within NATO, EU or public opinion but also the continuing UN missions instead of heavy reluctance of the political class to The perspective of NATO territorial defense hand over or reveal the whereabouts membership has been, for the last of General Gotovina252 who is several years, the driving force behind accused of committing war crimes the reforms in Croatia’s defense sector. Abolishment of the so called “B” during Croatia’s war against Serbs in Since its accession to the Partnership reserves which comprise 76,000 the self proclaimed Serb Republic for Peace Program (PfP) in 2000, reservists with regular training and in the Krajina region. Almost a year Croatia has increased its activities basic equipment after the Istanbul Summit in 2004, and obligations within this program. where NATO also postponed full Through the Individual Partnership The remaining reserves will form membership of Croatia in the alliance, Program (IPP), it has participated in an additional component to be this rejection by the EU was another 251 events255 in 2004 and intended called upon in the case of national failure for Croatian Euro-Atlantic to participate in 430 IPP activities in defense (including a component ambitions. Though cooperation 2005.256 In addition, Croatia agreed in of 8,000 members of contract with The Hague had improved 2001 to coordinate the Planning and reserve) during the last two years, the case of Review Process (PARP) with NATO, Gotovina at that time exposed the a biannual cycle for bilateral and Downsizing of active military still existing legacy of the Tudjman multilateral consultations on defense personnel to 16,000 , with regime, not only in the HDZ, but planning. Through PARP, the Croatian the addition of 2,000 civilian also within the Ministry of Defense side will each year agree upon a set of employees (down from the current which only recently stopped paying Partnership Goals (PG) aimed at the number of approximately 29,000) pension contributions to Gotovina.253 establishment of interoperability of However, by October 2005, the EU the CAF with NATO forces and more New equipping and modernization surprisingly changed its mind and gave affordable, modern structures. The might take until 2015 due to Croatia the candidate status it had PGs provide not only clear guidance limited funds—or even longer long wished for. It was speculated for Croatian defense reform but that this shift occurred because of the also set deadlines for each goal. As Defense reform in Croatia still has changed judgment of the UN’s Chief Croatia has also reached the offi cial a long way to go and much of the Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, regarding status of a full NATO membership modernization and restructuring Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY, aspirant, all PARP and IPP measures efforts mentioned above will remain as she was already informed of the inform the Membership Action Plan planned arrest of Gotovina a couple of weeks later. But it is more likely

B I C C 37 brief 34

(MAP) of NATO as well. Besides Parliamentary and Civilian Oversight260 MoD had ordered an investigation into that, NATO experts as well as bilateral the allegations made by a human rights missions from the UK, USA, and Based on the Defense Act and the group regarding sexual harassment Germany have been invited by the Security Services Act, the Croatian in the CAF. Ever since, the ministry Croatian government for numerous Parliament has the authority to decide has downplayed the signifi cance of other consultancies, missions and upon the main issues of defense, as the allegations. The scandal erupted workshops. Two NATO expert teams, well as the general supervision of the when another non-governmental one on resettlement and retraining of security forces including the CAF.262 group went public with stories of redundant personnel and the other on Its parliamentary committee for sexual harassment and rape of draftees base conversion, have communicated interior policy and national security dating back to 2000. The information and met with the respective members can call in offi cials from the CAF came from three offi cers and involved on the Croatian side.257 NATO experts for hearings, as well as evaluate all dozens of cases.266 Moreover, the were also involved in the preparation fi nancial and material issues of the Gotovina case showed for a long time of the Strategic Defense Review in CAF and other security services. In the lack of civilian control over all 2005. In addition, the Croatian MoD addition, the establishment of the security services in Croatia, as well as has signed up for several activities Council for Oversight of the Security the continuing legacy of networks of under the Prague Capabilities Services (COSS) in 2003 consisting the Tudjman regime.267 Commitment (PCC).258 of seven independent experts was highly acclaimed. The COSS members The Division of Control over the CAF The whole process of defense are entitled to access the reports reform seemed to be steered through from the security services and its Accumulated during the semi- workshops, joint exercises and respective personnel whom it can call authoritarian regime under Tudjman, consultations with NATO countries in for a hearing.263 Though the set- the President of Croatia holds a strong in bilateral and multilateral ways. up seems to be suffi cient and similar constitutional position as offi cial Though it is diffi cult to measure the to other oversight measures applied commander of the CAF. He is the direct impact and infl uence of NATO in European countries, the reality chairman of the Joint National Security on each and every activity in Croatian shows differently. There is a general Committee (JNSC) which includes, defense reform, the increased speed lack of civilian expertise on military inter alia, the Prime Minister and the of these reforms and the change of and security matters in the Croatian Defense Minister. Though the powers defense strategies, tasks and capabilities parliament. Due to the limitation of of the President have been reduced is clearly linked to the obligations and a four-year mandate, it is diffi cult for by the current President Mesic, deadlines set by NATO. Without the parliamentarians in the committee some areas with potential confl ict option of NATO and EU membership to build up this capacity adequately between the presidential offi ce and and the potential benefi ts they may enough to perform any serious the Government or MoD remain.268 bring, the Croatian government would oversight and control function.264 While the Minister of Defense have not initiated the defense reform This also holds true for the NGO and controls the military institutions, the process at this pace.259 research community in Croatia, where budget and the planning process, there is currently not enough expertise the strategic decisions have to be Political Guidance of Defense on security issues.265 Regarding the taken by consensus by the President Reform COSS, not only did the head of this and the Prime Minister in the JNSC. council, a well-known academic expert Though the current set-up seems to The Croatian military, as well as the on defense and security issues recently be reasonably balanced, it could lead other state security forces, were highly resign from his post, but it seems to confusion in the case of an attack politicized during the war and after that the Ministry of Defense and the or emergency.269 Constant discussions 1995 by the regime of Franjo Tudjman. General Staff are still reluctant to regarding the competencies of the Tudjman’s regime, for years classifi ed provide this forum with the requested President and the Prime Minister over by Freedom House as „Partially Free“, documents. A scandal involving the defense sector, however, decreased crumbled after his death and the fi rst the accusation of rape and sexual the effi ciency of democratic control of change of government in the 2000 harassment at the CAF is a recent the CAF and other security agencies.270 elections. Tudjman, the hero of the example for this problem, as the results The institutional set-up with a strong Croatian war against the Krajina Serbs, of the military investigation were President often leads to problems with was always in support of a strong CAF, neither made public nor given to the the division of control over the armed and thus the General Staff of the CAF respective parliamentarian committee forces, which is a common problem in successfully refused any reform for or COSS. In November 2004, the almost all former Yugoslav Republics. a long time.260 Nevertheless, Croatia While in Macedonia it has been less of has introduced various institutional an issue since the President and Prime measures to guarantee civilian oversight and democratic control of the military.

38 B I C C Croatia

Minister have been from the same a long time. There was no specifi c Target Group political party, in Albania and Croatia interest for that issue during the time it has often interfered with the defense of the Tudjman regime. The CAF, The prior objective of the SPECTRA reform process to a fairly signifi cant together with the other security forces, program is the support of discharged extent. formed an important power base personnel of the Croatian Armed for the regime and, even after 2000 Forces from the year 2002 onwards. In general, military reforms in offi cials remained reluctant towards Though their main approach to Croatia are already embedded in well- downsizing due to public and internal downsizing is meant to be a voluntary developed democratic structures and pressure.273 The delay of the National process, the high number of cultures and a fast growing economy. Security Strategy and the Defense discharged personnel demands that After two democratic changes Strategy contributed to that trend as some may need to be forced to leave through regular elections, Freedom well. involuntarily. The SPECTRA project House has rated Croatia since the originally envisaged 11,000 redundant year 2000 as “free”. Moreover, the Nevertheless, the development members of the CAF by the end of Bertelsmann Transformation Index of a downsizing, retraining and 2006.275 However, the planned number sees the country as a consolidated and reintegration program for redundant of 3,286 persons to be discharged in democratic market economy, which military personnel of the CAF 2002 rose to over 8,000.276 Altogether, is signifi cant when compared to the was initiated in late 2001 based on the Transition Offi ce (TO) reported cases of Albania and Macedonia.271 the Croatian Government Activity 14,632 discharged persons by the Although the demonstrations in Program for the period 2000-2004. end of 2005. With the new decision support of Gotovina in Zadar and A fi rst draft of the project proposal in the Strategic Defense Review other coastal towns in December was published in May 2002, the fi nal (SDR) to downsize to 16,000 military 2005 showed that there is still a draft was endorsed by the Croatian personnel, the number of individuals nationalist minority in Croatia, the government on 3 October 2002, and entitled to support through SPECTRA majority of the government backed the the Separated Personnel Care and will increase as well. Comparing the transfer of Gotovina to The Hague. Transition Program (SPECTRA) was personnel projections in the original The de-nationalization of Croatian established in 2003, with the fi rst SPECTRA document of 2002, with politics since Tudjman’s death has project team operational by May and current numbers provided by the TO, defi nitely had a strong impact on the other three by September 2003.274 there seem to be some irregularities. the de-nationalization of the CAF The Transition Offi ce, which is the Even the numbers of actual strength in and the improvement of civilian and coordinating body for the program, 2002 and 2003 of the CAF have been democratic control. was set-up as a distinct unit at the changed in the current documents. Ministry of Defense in Zagreb. Croatia now reached the exact same Defense Conversion

Downsizing and Resettlement in Croatia: The SPECTRA Program Figure 16: Personnel strength projection of the Similar to the situation in Serbia and CAF and number of personnel to be discharged Montenegro, the Croatian government from 2002-2005 had to decide—mainly out of budgetary reasons—to downsize and Source: SPECTRA Presentation at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, restructure its armed forces without December 2005 any of the strategic documents in place to determine the future tasks and related strength and structure Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 of the CAF. Aside from budgetary reasons, the delay in considering the Beginning strength 40.714 31.936 27.864 23.742 armed forces’ downsizing needs was Organisational separation 2.117 0 0 0 also caused by fi erce opposition and reluctance towards the process of Number of retirements 2.998 490 615 790 downsizing by the CAF itself, as well as by war veterans’ associations.272 Other forms of natural attrition 663 582 507 432 Redundant personnel separation 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 As mentioned above, the Croatian government had no clear restructuring Total annual separation 8.778 4.072 4.122 4.222 and downsizing strategy for the End strength 31.936 27.864 23.742 19.520 Croatian Armed Forces in place for

B I C C 39 brief 34

number of 19,520 already at the end of the armed forces are more willing to of four so-called Mobile Transition of 2005 which had been envisaged for volunteer for discharge and subsequent Teams (MTT) situated in the cities of 2006. support through SPECTRA since their Zagreb, Rijeka, Osijek, and Split. All chances and opportunities in Croatia’s MTTs have counselors, psychologists, Out of these 14,632277, over 9,000 current labor market are higher. sociologists, economists, and lawyers persons have received an invitational Nevertheless, for the future tasks of employed. Currently 19 people work at letter from SPECTRA to confi rm their the CAF in Euro-Atlantic structures, the MTTs.287 eligibility for support. By the end of this resource drain could prove to be 2005, 2,100 individuals have received disadvantageous in the long-run. A very unique additional component support from SPECTRA.278 Due to its of the SPECTRA program comprises budgetary and structural limitations, Institutional Set-up for Retraining and the involvement of the International SPECTRA is only able to support 800- Resettlement Organization for Migration (IOM). 1,000 discharged personnel per year. By contrast to similar projects in Therefore, the planned support of The approach towards the Bosnia and Herzegovina288, the IOM some war veterans and invalids within implementation of SPECTRA is was approached by the TO with the the program is currently left to other inter-ministerial, meaning that all request to set-up a complimentary Government initiatives and projects of relevant ministries are involved and program to SPECTRA activities. The war veterans’ associations. In general, have accepted to implement certain IOM and personnel from SPECTRA most of the discharged personnel parts of the SPECTRA program.282 and the MoD then conducted a joint have either taken the option of early The Inter-Ministerial Supervisory workshop to develop PRIOM or retirement or severance payment, Council has the overall program RASDP—Reintegration Assistance which raises the general question management responsibility—though to Separated Defense Personnel. In of whether a highly sophisticated this is more of a symbolic and political February 2004, the IOM and the resettlement program was really needed task—while the Inter-Ministerial MoD signed a cooperation agreement. in Croatia.279 Operational Council meets every Instead of duplication of offi ces and three months and reviews the status efforts as is often the case, the experts The entitlement to support by of program implementation.283 and project managers of the IOM are SPECTRA for almost all discharged The main body, however, is the integrated into SPECTRA structures persons, as well as the lack of Transition Offi ce which acts very while remaining independent in the criteria to determine who should much independently, but maintains conduct of their activities. The IOM continue their service with CAF, close lines of communication with has three sub-offi ces in the premises of has been criticized. Some military the other partners. The original the MoD in Zagreb, Osijek and Split, personnel should not be encouraged project document envisaged a which cover four regions of Croatia. to leave the CAF through SPECTRA close cooperation with NGOs Seven advisors with a background benefi ts.280 Particularly during the in implementation and oversight in training, business, psychology, initial years of downsizing and of the program, but this has not as well as the military (three ex- SPECTRA implementation, estimates materialized.284 Such cooperation offi cers) are working as mobile teams show approximately 10-15% of would have been an asset for the and visiting their benefi ciaries even the discharged personnel as highly program. Under their own defi nition in remote villages.289 The RASDP educated individuals, even some of an NGO, the SPECTRA team program supports only individuals with training at military institutes actually included Croatian war already selected by SPECTRA that of NATO partner countries. The veterans’ associations in the program have completed the orientation mentioned rivalry between old as potential NGO partners. At a workshop to maximize their chances “uneducated war heroes” and young meeting with a representative of such for employment. The IOM has offi cers with capacities in foreign an association285 it was made clear that chosen to mainly support individuals language and NATO training has led those associations are still very much living in so-called ‘Areas of Special to some frustration for the latter, as separate from SPECTRA, but that the State Concern’ (ASSC), such as war- young offi cers have had diffi culties SPECTRA program staff would like affected regions. Before setting up the in ‘climbing the ladder’ despite to cooperate more closely with them program it conducted a Labor Market having received additional training given that they have adequate funding, Survey within the ASSC to make the for future NATO interoperability but not enough capacity to implement activities under the RASDP meet the tasks.281 This claim is denied by the veteran’s projects.286 So far, the local demand.290 The main focus of MoD, though results from a survey aforementioned association has funded the activities under RASDP is self- of the International Organization for training for job hunters to assist with employment. Migration (IOM) seem to support it. veterans and other SPECTRA clients. It is likely that well-educated members Besides of the Transition Offi ce based at the MoD, the program itself consists

40 B I C C Croatia

Programs and Activities participants take part in a job interview become self-employed, while 20% which is taped and analyzed on day were in the process of starting their The SPECTRA program draft of 2002 three. Other topics on day 1 include own business. A further 12% fi nished envisaged a wide variety of activities laws and regulations, personal value, additional vocational training.293 In for redundant military personnel, problem-solving techniques, and the interviews in April 2005, the program starting with obligatory orientation production of an individual transition managers of SPECTRA revealed and transition workshops, to offering plan of each participant. slightly different numbers with only loans for employers and additional 30% of 1,600 overall benefi ciaries funds for self-employment. Some of Day 2: receiving employment, 23% self- these activities, especially the cost- On the second day, all participants employed and 15% in vocational intensive loans and payments and the elaborate their transition plan on training. By December 2005, these Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) which they had continued to work the numbers had changed, again, with support did not materialize due to evening before as homework. Besides now 2,100 benefi ciaries of which scarce funds.291 Instead, the Transition that, day 2 is “career day” with writing only 20% were employed and 42% Offi ce team of SPECTRA decided exercises for cover letters, CVs, as well self-employed. Though the changes to focus on the overall PR campaign as exercises for job-hunting and how to in the number of employed and self- to raise awareness within CAF as well approach a potential employer. employed are rather substantial, it as in Croatian society of SPECTRA, is more indicative of a shift in the the transition workshops and the Day 3: focus of business counselors towards general support and counseling service The third day is mostly spent self-employment, as employment offered for redundant personnel. After with the joint analysis of the job opportunities for ex-military are harder completing the workshop, participants interviews taped on day 1. Besides to locate. SPECTRA personnel also can choose between receiving support that, successful benefi ciaries of the explained that those benefi ciaries who for employment, self-employment SPECTRA program come back to fail to receive employment are not or vocational training. Given the talk about their current employment lacking capabilities or qualifi cations, increasing number of discharged or business. In addition, the IOM but rather do not want to be employed. military professionals, this support provides an overview of the optional Some get a job on the black market, enables the process of employment to RASDP support activities. Finally, which helps them to avoid the 50% move ahead more quickly rather than all participants receive their offi cial pension cut they would normally face having to wait for adequate funds to certifi cates. if employed in the regular market.294 be raised to implement more elaborate support programs. As a follow-up to the workshops, the The RASDP of the International counselors contact the participants Organization for Migration had from The transition workshops were after 2 days. There are three offi cial its inception a focus on supporting planned to last four days, but were counseling sessions (though some need redundant personnel mainly for self- cut very quickly to three days to raise more) for the participants to defi ne employment. Its funds are used to the number of benefi ciaries. The their employment goals for the future co-sponsor the purchase of equipment, workshops are conducted in all four and to choose one of the support provide additional training, co-fund SPECTRA offi ces in the country programs. Though it was planned from the adaptation of business facilities, and generally use the same methods, the outset to monitor the success of act as collateral for business start- with the exception of a few minor the participants over two years, this has ups and to support the benefi ciary differences (see the example of Osijek been reduced to a timeframe of up to in obtaining licenses and legal below). A mixed group of people one year—again, due to the structural authorizations for his/her business.295 according to rank and age is assembled and fi nancial limits of SPECTRA.292 IOM personnel introduce the program in the transition course, and organizers at the transition workshops of also try to include discharged female Though there is no detailed evaluation SPECTRA, and respective candidates personnel in every group, though this of the program’s impact thus far, initial receive a registration form (2,800 have is diffi cult due to the low number of numbers on the success of SPECTRA already been sent out) which they female military personnel in the CAF. indicate a positive performance, taking have to submit if they are interested The three days are structured in the into account the overall economic in participating in the RASDP. So following way: situation in Croatia and the labor far, 1,445 discharged persons have market in particular. By October requested support by the IOM. Day 1: 2004, 1,100 benefi ciaries took part in The project team has signed 667 After a general introduction and SPECTRA activities of which 40% reintegration contracts as of March icebreaking exercises, the participants were employed, 16% were able to 2005, 222 of which are in the region fi ll in a questionnaire and perform of Zagreb and Rijeka, 263 in the a capabilities test. After that, all region of Osijek, and 182 in the region of Split.396 By the end of 2005, the

B I C C 41 brief 34

overall number of benefi ciaries has associations. Of the roughly 20% of future base conversion project in order risen to 1,002 with 852 being self- unemployed persons in Croatia, 10% to raise more money for resettlement employed and 153 employed on the are war veterans, which amounts to through the expected profi ts from sales market. Co-funding of equipment was approximately 34,000 individuals.298 and lease of military assets. the most frequent type of assistance Estimates from the war calculate (76%), resulting in about 82% of that about 350,000 men and women Both, SPECTRA and RASDP face all benefi ciaries either continuing or circulated through the CAF from 1991 higher demand than they are able starting self-employment activity. to 1995. to satisfy. In the regional center in Approximately 73% have chosen Osijek alone, there are 300 people on agriculture as self-employment, such In addition to the different joint the waiting list because the transition as cattle breeding and bee keeping, activities and structures of SPECTRA courses are fully booked until June etc. Taking into account the potential and the IOM, the RASDP also 2006.303 accession of Croatia into the EU, this contributed the fi rst clear analysis choice could prove risky in the long of the target group/benefi ciaries in Recommendations run for some clients, as small-scale terms of educational background, agriculture can come under heavy age, and socioeconomic situation.299 Though SPECTRA and its IOM market pressure. When asked about The average age of the benefi ciaries is component are also struggling for this, IOM managers assured that they 40, but about 20% of the clients are funds, their work seems to have inform their clients about the risk under 35 years of age which is rather positive prospects over the next two involved and have successfully lobbied odd considering the problem of an years. The institutional set-up and for the establishment of cooperatives over-aged CAF and its challenge to activities of both organizations have and associations; IOM counselors keep and recruit younger personnel. been well thought through and applied. also cooperate with the Ministry of While only 32% of the clients had Nevertheless, some aspects remain Agriculture on this issue.297 In addition, a specialized military education, critical: since many clients already own land, approximately 6% were university have experience in agriculture, and are graduates and over 35% claimed to There is the need for clear criteria in favor of greater support, the IOM have a good knowledge of English, to be applied which prevents sees enough prospects in supporting something that would be useful for young and/or NATO-trained the approach of forming cooperatives the CAF’s future integration in Euro- soldiers (for NATO and other and associations even though Atlantic structures.300 The study also international missions) to not competition from the European proves the claim that most of the only leave the CAF but also to market might make it diffi cult. members of CAF were “civilians get benefi ts under the SPECTRA taking up guns”: 63% of the separated program. The project plans to benefi t 650 personnel were either employed individuals in 2005. Though (56%) or self-employed (7%) before These offi cers need better career monitoring started as early as joining the CAF, which constitutes and promotion opportunities September 2004 with 65 cases, it a major advantage for any type of within the CAF. is too early to judge the success reintegration assistance. As explained and sustainability of the IOM’s in the interviews with IOM personnel, Civil society NGOs and not reintegration assistance. However, the most “clients” are interested in self- only veterans’ associations fl exibility of the program and the high employment (80%), out of which should be more involved in the motivation of the team could indicate a 61% favor the purchase of equipment orientation courses, especially in prosperous endeavor, keeping in mind through the IOM program. that the IOM is serving some of the the case of redundant personnel with war experience, to help most economically diffi cult regions Funding remains one of the basic their reintegration into civilian of the country. The counselors visit problems of both projects. From the surroundings. their clients regularly on a personal outset, the SPECTRA management basis, driving even to the most remote over-projected the amount of funds villages and farms. Moreover, the from external donors at about 54% The exceptional cooperation IOM RASDP plans to expand their of the overall budget, an exorbitant with the IOM should allow for support to the broader group of sum of USD 120 Mil.301 So far, the further cooperation with other unemployed war veterans who receive transition offi ce had to sponsor its international development only minor assistance through legal own structures, and personnel costs programs in Croatia. entitlements, activities of the Ministry were approximately EUR 100,000, an of Homeland War Veterans and some amount which was planned to fulfi ll Although SPECTRA and the the needs of only one year, not three.302 IOM provided some data on the Currently, the SPECTRA management programs and its benefi ciaries, is trying to get the coordination of the

42 B I C C Croatia

they still lack a thorough Fund.305 It shows the need for a more However, there are still shortcomings evaluation of the current situation systematic calculation to present a for concrete and successful next of previous benefi ciaries. Such precise overview on the status of base steps in this process. In the National an analysis could also enable the conversion in Croatia. Annual Program for the third cycle of SPECTRA program to approach the Membership Action Plan (MAP) donors for additional funds. The issue of abandoned and hidden presented to NATO, the MoD stresses sites of the Territorial Defense Forces the need for the modernization of IOM plans to also include war could present some diffi culties for important military sites, as well as the Croatia.306 As one can see in Bosnia sale of some facilities to raise money veterans without regular army 309 entitlements into their program. and Herzegovina, TDF weapons for the CAF and SPECTRA as well. The Transitional Offi ce of caches and hidden sites comprise It sets a deadline for the establishment SPECTRA should contemplate an ecological and security issue and of a concrete transfer and conversion such an extension, too, which therefor a threat to local communities. program with a leading department in could lead to a joint program with It is not clear how big that problem is the MoD and all legal issues (property the Ministry of War Veterans and in Croatia and if or how it has been rights, etc.) to be solved by the end various veterans’ associations. addressed so far. of 2004. External pressure has also increased on the MoD on this issue. Base Conversion: Profi ts for Moder- Although the transfer of military The offi ce of the president of Croatia nization? sites began as early as 1992—with fi led an offi cial request to the MoD 64 sites already transferred by 1995 to compile a systematic list of all 310 A large number of defense installations out of 511– there was no systematic military facilities and their status. in Croatia have been closed down in procedure for base conversion in The MoD has assigned a working recent years, and even more will be place. It seems that during the war, group with the task of developing a given up within a period of ten years. strategically unimportant bases plan for the conversion of surplus According to the latest estimates, the were just abandoned to free money facilities. However, the problem of the and personnel of the CAF for the lack of a Long Term Development military authorities will have a need 307 for only 1/3 of the current number of war effort. So far, there is no Plan of the CAF, which could indicate installations. Those that remain under systematic analysis of what happened which military facilities would actually their authority will need to be updated to these sites. Similar to the issue of be needed for future tasks, persists. to modern standards. downsizing, base transfer—let alone Though the draft of the LTDP is conversion in general—was not now circulating, NATO offi cials have Although the Croatian Armed Forces high on the agenda of the Tudjman indicated that they do not expect Government, which tried to keep up an offi cial adoption until late spring (CAF) was created from scratch during 311 the war of 1991-1995, the newly its strength to deter another attack of 2006. Even though the Strategic independent state inherited a lot of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia Defense Review from March 2005 military bases and sites on its territory. and retain power against domestic was seen as an important step towards Some of these were former sites opposition. From 1996 to Tudjman’s the LTDP it is, again, postponing of the JNA, the Territorial Defense death in 2000, only 22 sites were clear decisions. For example, the SDR transferred, compared to 25 and 41 in mentions the fi nancial burden of Forces, and others were maintained 308 by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) the years 2002 and 2003 respectively. maintaining and guarding the oversized for its paramilitary forces. Moreover, number of military sites, but it leaves some military sites were already put The lack of strategic documents it to the LTDP to “defi ne goals and long term plans for the armed and dynamics for the development under the responsibility of towns and 312 districts in 1992. A classifi cation of forces have had a similar impact of buildings and infrastructure”. military property in that year shows a on the process of site transfer and Without those goals, it seems to be total of 657 military sites, of which 511 conversion as on the downsizing rather odd to transfer military facilities, were under the control of the MoD, of military personnel. Overall, this which might be needed for future 43 of the MoI, and 103 of towns and impact has resulted in the absence interoperability with NATO forces. districts.304 The different ownership of systematic approaches; the ad- and typology (JNA/TDF) of the sites hoc sale of property; and no clear Nevertheless, and without clear has led to some irritation in terms of analysis of future needs for integration targets for the future structure of the overall calculations of the sites that are within Euro-Atlantic security CAF, the MoD has transferred 124 structures. Recently, the MoD and military sites between the years 2002 maintained and those that have been 313 transferred to other state agencies, the government have realized that the to 2004. Of the 336 sites currently communities, or the Privatization issue of military facilities is a costly still maintained by the MoD, only 203 one, but one that may also generate benefi ts if a structured approach for transfer and conversion is initiated.

B I C C 43 brief 34

will be kept by the armed forces. 71 focus to conversion results that only at the Fund, but did not explain its sites are ready for transfer while 62 appear benefi cial to the MoD. A case set-up, constituents and decision- still have to be vacated by the armed needs to be made that a structured making procedures.320 It seems that forces.314 Aside from the issue of transfer and conversion of military there is still a lack of effi cient and releasing potentially important future assets should be benefi cial to the transparent structures with clearly set sites, this policy makes sense from the country and its economy as a whole, tasks and responsibilities, not only in perspective of the Croatian MoD. The and not just to the MoD. the transfer of military assets, but also sooner the MoD transfers these sites, in the transfer of State-owned property the more they can increase their budget When it comes to the fi rst offi cial in general. and personnel and allocate them for transfer or sale of state-owned other purposes.315 However, the general property, this is managed by three Procedures for Transfer interest of the Croatian Government different bodies, depending upon the and State in a structured and benefi cial estimated value of the installation: Similar to the loopholes in the conversion process should weigh more institutional set-up for the transfer and heavily than the short-term interest The Central State Administrative conversion of military facilities, the of the military in acquiring quick and Offi ce for State Property procedures are still in the development profi table transfers. Management (up to KN 100,000) phase based on the Defense Strategy and the SDR. The military facilities Regardless of the numbers, it is The Assets Committee of the have been nevertheless organized into clear that Croatia has had already Croatian Government (from KN four groups: numerous experiences in base closure, 100,000 to KN 10 million) conversion or redevelopment with up those that have military prospects to 204316 “transferred” sites to date. If The Croatian government (over no general evaluation of these cases KN 10 million) those that have temporary military has taken place so far, the Croatian prospects; MoD should seriously consider such The working procedures of the three an evaluation before it takes any new bodies are unclear, as is their relation those without military prospects; steps in terms of establishing a new to the Privatization Fund. During institutional set-up or other procedures. the last two years, the majority of A collection of best practices (different additional ones to be procured for transfers were handled by the Assets 321 types of successful re-use, effi cient the Armed Forces. Committee, some by the Croatian structures for conversion processes on government and none by the Central the local level, etc.) would be an asset. Based on this typology, the MoD has State Administrative Offi ce.318 These decided to keep 203 of the current 336 322 The Institutional Set-up for Transfer and bodies transfer the sites either directly military facilities. Again, it has to be Sale to local municipalities, towns or cities, stressed that a selection of bases for or to the Privatization Fund. Of the closure without all strategic documents 124 sites transferred between 2002 In 2001, the Croatian government in place could lead to problems in the and 2004, 54 were handed over to the established a state agency to manage future restructuring and modernization Privatization Fund for free in 2002 and the disposal or transfer of state processes. 2003. However, it appears that there assets: the Privatization Fund (PF). has been a recent change of policy A constraint for the transfer and Next steps for a site selected for since no site had been transferred to conversion of military assets is that disposal are the compilation of the the PF in 2004, and only one site was the State agency is responsible for information listed below, which is then given away for free even though this disposing of assets ‘belonging’ to all put together by the MoD in a survey policy was practiced for the past two government departments, and thus for the Central State Administrative years.319 the process can be quite slow. The Offi ce for State Property Management: MoD is currently sponsoring a Bill Perhaps the model of an independent to Parliament so that it can transfer Copy from the land register agency handling all conversion issues the facilities itself. There seems to be could be an option for Croatia. At a no signifi cant opposition to this,317 Certifi cate on the status and meeting with the NATO Task Force although the MoD was candid in purpose of the lot according to in Zagreb, the Privatization Fund’s its admission that there was little town planning support for it outside the MoD. The representative mentioned a newly built Interagency Subgroup for Conversion proposal has the potential advantage Information about the lot status of speeding up the transfer of on the date of enacting the Law military facilities, but also the potential on agricultural land disadvantage of giving too narrow a

44 B I C C Croatia

Information on the Refund over the process by providing some up environmental issues. Although the Request made based on the Law basic data. The market assessments by Republic of Croatia has no property on refund for property seized the Tax Administration agency of the contaminated with radioactive material, during the Yugoslav Communist Ministry of Finance are sometimes there is a certain percentage of System signifi cantly higher than those carried property surrounded by mine fi elds.”328 out by local towns interested in buying Declaration of Croatian Woods on or leasing the site (see Box 2 on Objectives of the MoD the lot status Krizevci). In addition, there have been complaints by the local municipalities The two main objectives of the MoD that the market value assessment takes for the transfer of sites and assets are: Market value assessment by Tax 325 Administration Agency of the too long. Ministry of Finance To free resources for the Property rights and ecological problems modernization of promising Photographing the property military property or the Another important issue for the construction of new ones conversion process is the ownership Field examination of the sites. This issues not only deals To free resources for the with the question of whether or not realization of the SPECTRA Opinion of proper Public these sites and potential profi ts belong program and the reorganization of authority323 to the state, but also in terms of the MoD329 property rights of pre-socialist times Between 2001 to 2005, 262 surveys or from the successor of the JNA, the Through the envisaged “conversion have been passed from the MoD to the Serb and Montenegrin Armed Forces. program, the MoD wants to generate Central State Administrative Offi ce for In some cases, a dispute over the funds for the modernization of the State Property Management, leading ownership of a particular site remains CAF and the whole defense system, to 100 assets being transferred.324 a constraint. Croatia has received a loan as well as the support of redundant Again, these numbers and the overall from the World Bank to establish a personnel. This plan seems to be rather procedure raise a couple of questions. land registry, as the current registers are questionable. The military budget Of the 124 sites that were actually not exhaustive. transferred, none was given to the should not depend on expected profi ts from sales of military sites, as these are Central State Administrative Offi ce The offi cials interviewed for this study too unpredictable. In fact, conversion for State Property Management. downplayed the issue of the pollution often implies more costs than profi ts in Moreover, only assets of minor value of military sites several times.326 should be given to that authority, but However, taking into account the the initial years of the process. barracks and bases are likely to have experiences with other sites in Eastern a higher value than KN 100,000. Europe, one can expect that similar Looking at the decisions of the Asset Clearly, this shows the inconsistent problems exist in Croatia. In particular, Committee from 2002 to 2004, the and nontransparent nature of the the aging ammunition and other expectations for income generation at structures and procedures currently in explosive ordinances from sites of the the MoD and other respective State place, as well as the lack of institutional Territorial Defense Forces likely pose agencies have increased over the last 330 While in 2002 and most and centralized knowledge at the MoD an ecological and security threat to the several years. of 2003 the majority of sites were and other cooperating State agencies local population, as it does in Bosnia given out for free, in late 2003 and on passed and current processes in that and Herzegovina.327 From the meetings fi eld. with MoD offi cials, it was not clear if especially in 2004, the number of sites there are any environmental specialists given away for free decreased to only More importantly, the question remains involved in producing the surveys on 1 in 20. Why did the policy change? as to who actually conducts such military sites, or if special units and Does the MoD want to raise the surveys. If the MoD is in charge for programs exist at the CAF to clean profi ts? Does this development show a the whole input of that process, there up polluted bases. An offi cial reply by growing demand and interest by local might be a confl ict of interest. The Croatia’s Ambassador to NATO in towns in owning military sites? Judging main goal for the MoD is the quick October 2005 fi nally showed that the from the conversion experiences in and profi table sale of military sites. MoD is acknowledging the problem. other post-socialist countries, the MoD Although the Tax Administration The offi cial statement reads that “The should lower its expectations: the peace Agency of the Ministry of Finance is most cost-consuming conversions will dividend rarely materialized in those doing the market assessment, there is be those of ex-fuel storages, since they countries. However, conversion and room for the MoD to exert infl uence have had no proper maintenance, nor have they been used. These will bring

B I C C 45 brief 34

the redevelopment of bases do offer One way to speed up the Domestic politics have nevertheless the possibility for general benefi ts to conversion process may be the been a major obstacle for many society and the local economy that creation of a real-estate advisory defense reform measures for quite cannot be measured by fi scal profi ts. team with a good knowledge of some time, especially during the the Croatian real-estate market, time of the Tudjman Regime when Most of the objectives of the MoD are real-estate economy, and fi nancing. democratic control of the military was short-term, looking for quick solutions This team may either constitute lacking. Civil-military relations are to and sales with high profi ts. Rather a part of the MoD or be more some extent still defi cient in Croatia, than having the MoD in charge of independent so as not to allow but the country and its military have the conversion process, the Croatian itself to be infl uenced by them. nevertheless been de-nationalized. State should try to formulate long- This team could serve two main However, it seems that parliamentary term objectives and partnerships for purposes: actors or civilian experts have had the conversion process that could minimal impact on the current benefi t the society as a whole. Since Contribute to giving a realistic conversion issues and the respective many military sites are also situated picture of the conditions for a planning process. in under-developed war-torn areas, sale and conversion, both with the the Croatian State has to take into MoD and local authorities The two major areas of conversion account more factors than simply activities—the SPECTRA program military ones. Base closure can have Give affected local authorities and the newly set-up conversion severe consequences in such areas.331 professional help so that the program—are well-designed and, in the Perhaps a similar partnership to that conversion process starts quickly case of SPECTRA, well implemented with the IOM on reintegration would considering the limited amount of be benefi cial. Linking up the base A collection of best practices (for funds and compared to similar projects conversion process to SPECTRA example, on different types of in neighboring countries. However, assistance could be also useful. successful reuse, effi cient structure the process of base conversion SPECTRA managers are currently for conversion processes on the and redevelopment needs more looking for funds for an activity local level, etc.) would be a useful transparency and independent analysis. called “Military Base Conversion for tool. More detailed information on A clear review of all transfers of Agricultural Purposes”332 which would the sites and facilities which have bases is needed in order to improve include ecological redevelopment, the been transferred is also needed. the output of the program and maybe provision of plants and seeds, and even generate income. Nevertheless, which should help some ex-military The communities in Croatia the MoD should lower its own people become self-employed in that have assumed property expectations in acquiring external agriculture. need to organize a network to funds for both projects, as well as in share experiences and to act as the potential profi ts it may acquire Recommendations an homogeneous group to push through the sale of military property. forward adequate legislation and policy in this fi eld. However, the Croatian reforms in To achieve the “best value the defense sector have a signifi cant for money”, the possible re- advantage: they are embedded in a use of military facilities needs Conclusions growing economy and a consolidated to be subject to investment democracy. Since October 2005, the appraisal. This will involve the While defense reform in general European perspective on Croatia systematic comparison of the has been very much infl uenced by and its ability to reach Euro-Atlantic costs and benefi ts of different external pressure and incentives defense standards is more realistic and re-use options for any given such as prospective EU or NATO positive than for any other Western site. Independent “assessors” membership, the concrete measures Balkan country. European funds should carry out the valuation undertaken in the two areas of for the environmental clean-up of of installations being sold. downsizing and resettlement and military sites, support for ex-military Confi dence problems would base conversion have also been employment measures, and increased therefore be avoided and price pushed by fi nancial considerations. forein direct investment in tourist areas discussions made easier. Naturally, By reducing the number of personnel are within reach and would mean a this is conditional on there being and military bases, the MoD hopes to great difference for future of Croatian an independent body of assessors free more money for social benefi ts base conversion and reintegration in Croatia. for redundant personnel, as well as for the modernization of the CAF programs. as requested by NATO through their accession programs.

46 B I C C conclusions Overall Conclusions

he three countries analyzed in this new tasks. Better military education as the main factors for the current Tstudy differ very much regarding well as the reintegration and vocational problems faced in Croatia, Albania and the status of reform, modernization training programs not only lead to Macedonia. There are still structural and professionalization of their armed more qualifi ed personnel, but also to defi ciencies in the security sector, forces. This also holds true for the a change of socialist and paternalistic including the lack of civilian control programs initiated or implemented in mindsets. In addition, the new armed of the armed forces, competing the area of defense conversion, where forces in the three countries have competencies of Government all three countries are facing different lost their illusions and unrealistic structures on defense issues, and problems or are in different phases expectations regarding equipment, the lack of input or independent of the project cycle. Therefore, an available funds, and threat perceptions. analysis by NGO or think tanks. analysis of the level of reform and Those defi ciencies have often led to planning, the identifi cation of lessons Another positive result is the absence frequent changes, delays and mediocre learned and issues to be considered in of major disruptions or social unrest production of strategic defense and defense conversion programs in the by discharged military personnel or war security papers, which has had an future was undertaken, rather than a veterans in the slowly consolidating effect on long-term planning of the formal comparative study. The scope democracies of Albania, Croatia and defense forces, their bases, and their of the study was limited by a general Macedonia. However, particularly equipment. lack of systematic analysis in the in the case of Croatia where the countries‘ defense sectors for project war traumatized a large portion of Without long-term strategies and design and implementation, which the population, it is important to plans, the downsizing, resettlement is common to almost all programs examine the psychosocial problems of and transfer of military bases might examined. In addition, basic data sets reintegration and its impact on society, lead to ineffi cient and poorly-equipped on defense issues often do not exist, such as organized crime, domestic forces. The lack of plans and the are not accessible or change depending violence or an increased rate of suicide remaining structural problems in the on the sources. Therefore, the study among ex-military personnel. defense sector have had an impact also begs the following questions: on the way in which resettlement and How can research institutes, but also In addition to the reform process, reintegration, as well as conversion has implementing agencies measure the exposure to Western training and been dealt with in all three countries so success of defense reform if data is consultancy has supported the de- far. In all three cases, clear analysis and not accurate enough? What about nationalization and internationalization reviews of past conversion activities when clear indicators are missing, or of the armed forces in all three and the evaluation of current situations when the different agendas of external countries. In the case of Croatia, the of ex-military are lacking. Such reviews and internal actors are to some extent capture and trial of Gotovina might could have guided ongoing, as well blurring the information? fi nally disclose the role of some parts as newly planned measures in base of the CAF in the war against the conversion and the resettlement and Nevertheless, there are commonalties Krajina Serbs and thus support its reintegration of military personnel. between the three cases that allow transformation. The fl awed reporting culture that is for the identifi cation of several present in all three defense sectors achievements, shortcomings, and Regarding the concrete programs prevent the much-needed analysis and determinants for defense reform which are currently implemented on accurate data that all projects would in post-socialist countries in South defense conversion, only SPECTRA benefi t from. Eastern Europe.333 These will be can be judged as successful, while all discussed in turn. other programs are either defi cient or In addition, all three countries have have just entered the implementation for a long time held misguided Achievements phase with very modest outcomes expectations in terms of external (LEPEZA). It is clear that only funding or profi ts through the sale The primary success of all defense SPECTRA has been able to deliver or transfer of military bases. Under reforms in the Western Balkans is support under scarce funding funding of programs is a main the signifi cant downsizing of military conditions and with high employment problem, even in Croatia where the structures, which guarantees the future rates for ex-military personnel. economy is recovering at a much stabilization of this war-affected higher rate than in the other two region. In most cases, the downsizing Shortcomings countries. projects have led to changes not only in the structure of the military personnel, The late start of defense reform but also in education and training for in the Western Balkans and the postponement of strategic papers in most of the countries constitute

B I C C 47 brief 34

Determinants The different outcomes of the established in all three countries, reform processes in Croatia, was not only unclear, but also Prospective membership in NATO and Albania and Macedonia are mainly seemed to be rather unpractical the EU also seems to be the driving infl uenced by the level of realism for implementation. force behind the reform measures with regard to prospective NATO of all three countries analyzed in this or EU memberships. In the case of Planning has to be predictable and study. However, fi nancial pressure on Macedonia, the ethnic heterogeneity long-term oriented; and also the their defense budgets is also playing clearly complicates this process, benefi t packages and entitlements a major role, as is the recognition particularly with the necessary changes have to be predictable and guided of dysfunctional military legacies. that are being undertaken at present. by transparent criteria. Ironically, the fi nancial pressure is Moreover, the scope of the problems somewhat increasing due to the in demobilization and reintegration, as The good example of avoiding demands for modernization and well as base conversion, differ a great duplication by integrating IOM restructuring of the armed forces deal. Croatia clearly benefi ts from into the set-up of the SPECTRA and their equipment through the its great economic growth and the program could be used for other obligations outlined in NATO’s consolidation of democratic structures. activities in defense conversion accession schemes. A unique case is In addition, the overall capacities of as well. Moreover, NGOs Macedonia, because the restructuring the political regime to control and should be used—as well as of the armed forces is also pushed effi ciently govern the defense sector existing national agencies—to by the political agenda to achieve is much better developed in Croatia make the process more cost- an ethnically balanced military. The than in the other two countries, effi cient, and, in the case of exposure to Western culture and as is the degree of action against retraining and resettlement, to military training is also infl uencing corruption. The involvement of have civilian partners on board the scope of reforms, as well as the international organizations such as for reintegrating ex-military into generation change that all three armed the IOM in Croatia has also increased society and the economy. forces are undergoing. In all three the performance of projects like countries, PMCs are playing a role in SPECTRA. Croatia and Macedonia High expectations for profi ts pushing the reforms forward, although have also benefi ted, and will continue from transfers and sales have to their impact is not measurable and to do so from their growing chances of be reduced. They are not likely to is openly questioned by local and EU membership. materialize. The environmental international experts. Recommendations for conversion issues in particular could backfi re on the planned sales. Another Most of the intervening factors which programs option to attract new funds in have hindered rapid reforms originate times of decreased donor interest in the slowly vanishing socialist More transparency is needed in all in supporting military reform is mentality and post-war nationalism planned and currently undertaken to request fi nancial support for which was crucial for nation-building conversion activities, but especially the clean up of polluted sites. in Croatia and Macedonia, but which within the process of the transfer Though this has no direct impact now constitutes a burden for these and sale of military bases, sites on earnings for the MoD, it will countries. Moreover, institutional and assets. In order to achieve have a positive effect on the legacies have had a negative impact such transparency, parliamentary neighboring communities. on the scope and speed of reforms, committees have to be better particularly the tensions between trained and strengthened. In Presidents and Prime Ministers on addition, more independent The exchange of experiences in defense competencies, but also the expertise in consulting, the region on defense reform and inexperience of parliamentarians implementing and evaluating such concrete conversion projects has with military oversight and control. measures is crucial. to be increased. Structures like the By contrast to Western states, new Defense Conversion Cell at parliamentarians in all three countries Perhaps the model of an RACVIAC can provide important can also not rely on independent independent agency for support for this purpose and analysis and advice since there is a conversion would guarantee contribute to documentation and general lack of civilian capacities in the more transparency and streamline evaluation mechanisms for the defense sector, such as experts, think bureaucratic procedures. An programs in the region. tanks and academia. independent assessment of market value would be particularly important for this purpose. The institutional set-up, which was

48 B I C C conclusions

Reintegration programs should take into account the different situations, environments and opportunities in each country, and not adopt a “one-size-fi ts-all” approach.

In the case of retraining and reintegration, there should be a clear message that no social benefi ts automatically result from a military career, but rather each soldier has a civilian identity and responsibility to civilian society. In the long run, this will support the notion that military personnel are also a part of the society and should hold civilian capacities and values as well.

B I C C 49 brief 34 List of Interviewed Persons

golli, Ilirjan, Voice of America, Cela, Arben, MoD, Human Resources Kolchaku, Baedhyl, MOD, AJournalist, Tirana, Albania, 2 Management, Expert, . Tirana, Albania, International Cooperation Directorate, March 2005 31 May, 1-2 June 2005 Maj., Tirana, Albania, 3 March 2005

Aleksoski, Mile, General Staff (J5), Cota, Ilja, IOM Program Manager, Konci, Besnik, Former Ambassador to MOD, Lt. Col., Skopje, Macedonia, 23 Osijek, Croatia, 13 April 2005 Serbia, Tirana, Albania, 3 March 2005 March 2005 Crvtila, Vlatko, Defense Adviser in the Kosirnik, Rok, Land Force Analyst Atanasovski, Emil, NDI, project Offi ce of the President & Faculty of and PARP Country Offi cer, Defense offi cer, Skopje, Macedonia, 21 March Political Science of the University of Policy and Planning Division, NATO, 2005 Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia, 3 April 2005. Brussels, Belgium, 9 December 2005.

Babic, Tomislav, IOM Program Dimevski, Sasko, Utrinski Vesnik, Kovacev, Ivan, Croat Privatization Manager, Osijek, Croatia, 14 April Journalist, Skopje, Macedonia, 26 Fund, Coordinator of the Department 2005 March 2005 for Conversion, Zagreb, Croatia, 7 March 2005. Basic, Ivan, Program Manager, Drenova, Ismet, President of NGO SPECTRA, Zagreb, Croatia, 10 March National Demilitarization Center Kroj, Zyhdi, President of NGO 2005, 12 April, 12 December 2005. (NDC), Tirana, Albania, 1 March 2005. NAMRA, Col.(R), Tirana, Albania, 5 March 2005 Bega, Ermir, Albanian Special Forces, Fuerst, Albert A., Booz/ Allen/ Cap., Tirana, Albania, 28 February, 3 Hamilton Inc., Offi cer, . Skopje, Kuzev, Stojan, Military Academy, MoD, March 2005 Macedonia, 24 March 2005 Chief of department of strategic research, Skopje, Macedonia, 22 Begalla, Engjell, Ministry of Foreign Gerveni, Kris, General Staff, MOD, March2005 Affairs, Chief of Ceremonial, Tirana, Director of the Defense Planning Albania, 4 March 2005 Directorate, CAP I R., Tirana, Albania, Kuzmanovsky, Slobodan, Macedonian 28 February, 3 March 2005 Assembly, Advisor, Skopje, Macedonia, Bilandzija, Zeljka, Journalist, Agence 25 March 2005 France Press, Zagreb, Croatia,13 April Gjata, Arben, TRADOC, MoD, Lt. 2005. Col.(R), Former Security Advisor to Mahecic, Zvonimir, Assistant to the Prime Minister, Tirana, Albania, 1 Head of the Offi ce of Military Affairs Biskovski, Jovan, MoD, Head of March, 3 March, 5 March 2005 of the President of the Republic of the real estate department, Skopje, Croatia, Zagreb, Croatia,13 April 2005. Macedonia, 24 March 2005 Golubovic, Vjekoslav, Transition Workshops Manager, SPECTRA, Malinkova, Verica, MoD, Head of Boland, Frank, Director of Force Zagreb, Croatia, 12 April 2005. Department for Personal Management, Planning, Defense Policy and Planning Skopje, Macedonia, 23 March 2005; Division, NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 9 Goodstein, Gregoire, Chief of Zagreb, RACVIAC, Croatia, 1-2 June December 2005. Mission, IOM, Zagreb, Croatia, 10 200530-31 May, 1 June 2005 March 2005. Bonovil, Ana, Counselor, SPECTRA, Millj, Cesk, MoD, Chief of Projects Bonn, 12 December 2005. Hudhra, Thimi, General Staff (J5), Monitor Offi ce, Col., Zagreb, MoD, Director, Col., Prime Minister’s RACVIAC, Croatia, 1-2 June 2005 Bradic, Tomislav, Atlantic Council of military advisor., Tirana, Albania, 1 Croatia, Zagreb, Croatia, 12 April 2005 March 2005 Moro, Mario, Transition Manager, SPECTRA, Osijek, Croatia, 14 April Cadri, Mariana, Dr., MoD, Human Hrg, Branko, Mayor of the City, 2005. Resources Management Directory, Krizevci, Croatia, 8 March 2005. Director, Tirana, Albania, 22 March Morffew, Chris, Air Force Analyst 2005 Ivanovski, Zoran, Dr, Military and PARP Country Offi cer, Defense Academy, MoD, Maj., Lecturer, . Policy and Planning Division, NATO, Ceko, Ivan, Project Manager, IOM Skopje, Macedonia, 22 March 2005 Brussels, Belgium, 9 December 2005. RASDP, Zagreb, Croatia, 12 April 2005. Jaquemin, Frédérique, Economics Directorate, ,NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 9 December 2005.

50 B I C C interviewed persons

Nikoloski, Aleksandar, VMRO- Starova, Arijan, Member of Parliament DPMNE, Member of Executive (DP), Former Minister of Foreign Committee, Skopje, Macedonia, 26 Affairs, President of NGO AAA, March 2005 Tirana, Albania, 3 March 2005

Pogace, Mehdi, Vice-President of Taleski, Dane, Center for European NGO „NAMRA“, Col.(R), . Tirana, Integration/ Friedrich Wilhelms Albania, 2 March, 5 March 2005 University, Master Fellow, Bonn, Germany, 14 March, 1 April, 10 June Ponziani, Enrico, IOM, Chief of 2005 Mission, Skopje, Macedonia 23 March 2005 Temelkova, Vilma, Macedonian Assembly, Defense and Security Popovic, Zvonko, Head of Transition Committee Expert, Skopje, Macedonia, Offi ce, SPECTRA, Zagreb, Croatia,10 24 March 2005 March 2005, 12 April, 12 December 2005. Xhaferi, Talat, Deputy Minister, MoD, Skopje, Macedonia, 25 March 2005 Rredhi, Bardhyl, former Albania Representative in NATO, Col (Ret), . Tirana, Albania, 1 March 2005

Seierstad, Knut Are, LTC, Defense Planning Sub Division Land, Allied Command Transformation, SHAPE, Zagreb, Croatia, 11 March 2005.

Schellekens, Frank, Maritime Force Analyst and PARP Country Offi cer, Defense Policy and Planning Division, NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 9 December 2005.

Shiqerukaj, Elez, U.S Embassy Offi cer, Maj.(R), Tirana, Albania, 2 March 2005

Simunovic, Pjer, National Coordinator for NATO, Croatian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Zagreb, Croatia, 7 March 2005.

Sikiric, Katarina, Counselor, SPECTRA, Bonn, 12 December 2005.

Skupnjak-Kapic, Suncanica, Project Coordinator, IOM RASDP, Zagreb, Croatia, 12 April 2005.

Spajic, Darko, LTC, Head of NATO/ PfP Directorate of the Croatian MoD, Varazdin, Croatia, 11 March 2005.

Spiljak, Robert, Head of Transition, SPECTRA Rijeka Offi ce, Osijek, Croatia, 14 April 2005.

Spirollari, Mihallaq, UNDP, National Project Offi cer, Lt. Col.(R), Tirana, Albania, 1 March 2005

B I C C 51 brief 34 Annex

Figure 1: Ethnic representation structure in the ARM

Source: Macedonian MoD, February 2006.

R E V I E W of MOD and ARM personnel status on 01.02.2006

ARM personnel MOD and Total in MOD 334 MA personnel Civilians in Professional and ARM Offi cers NCOs Total ARM No. ARM service Soldiers Group

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %

1 MK 566 85.76 1227 87.96 1430 76.59 1021 0 2139 78.29 5817 80.66 6383 81.08

2 Albanian 52 7.88 68 4.87 316 16.93 80 6.57 420 15.37 884 12.26 936 11.89

3 Turk 7 1.06 13 0.93 27 1.45 9 0.74 41 1.5 90 1.25 97 1.23

4 Serbs 16 2.42 24 1.72 32 1.71 62 5.09 63 2.31 181 2.51 197 2.50

5 Roma 3 0.45 3 0.22 6 0.32 9 0.74 28 1.02 46 0.64 49 0.62

6 Bosniac 2 0.30 12 0.86 18 0.96 5 0.41 7 0.26 42 0.58 44 0.56

7 Vlahs 10 1.52 17 1.22 7 0.37 11 0.9 9 0.33 44 0.61 54 0.69

8 Other335 4 0.61 31 2.22 31 1.66 21 1.72 25 0.92 108 1.50 112 1.42

Total 660 100.00 1395 100 1867 100 1218 100 2732 100 7212 100.01 7872 99.99

52 B I C C annex

Figure 2: The current pay scales within the ARM

Source: Macedonian MoD, February 2006.

Number Rank Average salary - Average salary - Average salary - Average salary - special units special units other in ARM other in ARM

in Macedonian in $ in Macedonian in $ denar (MKD) denar (MKD)

1 major general 43,500.00 870.00 2 brigadier general 32,700.00 654.00 3 colonel 35,800.00 716.00 25,600.00 512.00 4 lieutenant colonel 30,200.00 604.00 21,600.00 432.00 5 major 24,400.00 488.00 18,500.00 370.00 6 captain 1 class 23,700.00 474.00 17,200.00 344.00 7 captain 22,900.00 458.00 16,400.00 328.00 8 lieutenant 22,300.00 446.00 14,900.00 298.00 9 second lieutenant 23,300.00 466.00 14,500.00 290.00 10 command sgt. major 15,300.00 306.00 11 sergeant major 20,400.00 408.00 14,600.00 292.00 12 staff sergeant 20,300.00 406.00 13,900.00 278.00 13 sergeant 1 class 19,600.00 392.00 13,500.00 270.00 14 vodnik 1 kl 20,100.00 402.00 13,800.00 276.00 15 sergeant 19,400.00 388.00 12,600.00 252.00 16 junior sergeant 19,500.00 390.00 12,300.00 246.00 17 corporal 18,100.00 362.00 12,000.00 240.00 18 private 1 class 17,500.00 350.00 11,900.00 238.00

B I C C 53 brief 34

Figure 3: Outfl ow of military personnel in Macedonia until 31.12. 2007

Source: Macedonian Ministry of Defense, February 2005

Category Rank 01.09.2005 31.12.2007 Difference

General 7 6 1 Colonel 87 59 28 Lieutenant colonel 213 127 86 Major 262 205 57 Offi cers Captain I class 55 0 55 Captain 428 223 205 Lieutenant 287 243 44 Second lieutenant 103 56 47 Total offi cers 1441 919 512336 I st year at MA II nd year at MA 3 3

Cadets III rd year at MA 1 1 IV th year at MA 88 88 Total cadets 92 92 Sergeant major 80 38 42 Master sergeant 171 135 36 Staff sergeant I class 271 213 58

Ncos Staff sergeant 247 425 -178 Sergeant I class 5 0 5 Sergeant 1055 1119 -64 Total ncos 1829 1930 -101 Total (offi cers, ncos and cadets) 3453 2849 503

54 B I C C annex

Figure 4: Overview of property in use, property to be abandoned and property ready for transfer in Croatia

Source Table 1-8: Croatian Ministry of Defense, March 2005

Type of military facility In use To be abandoned Abandoned

Barracks, HQs, af bases 56 10 Logistics capacity 37 26 Special purpose facilities 76 24 Drilling-grounds, training ranges, and shooting ranges 30 2 Other 4 0 Total 203 62 71

= 336

Figure 5: classifi cation of military property in 1992 in Croatia

Type of military property MOD MOI Towns and districts

Barracks, hqs, af bases 155 14 48 Logistics capacity 133 1 19 Special purpose facilities 72 1 Drilling-grounds, training ranges and shooting ranges 34 6 Lots (meadows and woods) 39 1 13 Armed forces halls 25 1 6 Tourist-catering facilities 16 1 1 Military health facilities 1 9 Guard-houses 3 25 Other 33 Total 511 43 103 = 657

B I C C 55 brief 34

Figure 6: Surveys passed on to the Croatian Central State Administrative Offi ce for State Property Management 2001-2005

Type of military property Surveys passed on Transfered property

Barracks, hqs, af bases 77 46 Logistics capacity 61 15 Special purpose facilities 31 9 Drilling-grounds, training ranges and shooting ranges 6 3 Lots (meadows and woods) 42 10 Armed forces halls 12 2 Tourist-catering facilities 3 11 Other 30 4 Total 262 100

Figure 7: Transfer of military property in Croatia in the period 1992-2005

Type of military property Mod-92 Transfered

Barracs, hqs, af bases 155 77 Logistics capacity 133 30 Special purpose facilities 72 14 Drilling-grounds, training ranges and shooting ganges 34 4 Lots (meadows and woods) 39 27 Armed forces halls 25 9 Tourist-catering facilities 16 13 Other 37 10 Total 511 184

56 B I C C annex

Figure 8: List of transfered military property in Croatia

Military property 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total

Barracks, hqs, af bases 13 10 2 1 1 2 2 5 9 13 19 77 Logistics capacity 7 7 1 3 2 9 1 30 Special purpose facilities 3 1 1 2 2 5 14 Drilling grounds, training 1111 4 & shooting ranges Lots 731511927 Af halls 5 2 1 1 9 Tourist 1 1 10 1 13 Other 1 2 1 2 2 2 10 Total 37252 3 2 9 4 212254122184

Figure 9: Decisions for transfer of military real estate by Assets Committee of the Croatian government in 2002

Location User Descriptor, comment

BAŠKO POLJE – holiday resort Croatian Privatization Fond, based On the Government Decision, for free and campsite, BAŠKA VODA on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee SUTJESKA (Croatia) – vacation Croatian Privatization Fond, based On the Government Decision, for free resort, BAŠKA VODA on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee BILOGORA – barracks, BJE- City of Bjelovar Decision, Contract of donation and Annex LOVAR, part of training ground Contract of donation to Contract, buying a new site for MOD as Lepirac compensation KRIŽEVAČKA bb – economy City of Bjelovar On the Decision of the Assets Manage- (fi sh-pond) «PULMAN», BJELO- Decision of Govn‘t Committee ment Committee of the Croatian Govern- VAR ment KUKAVICA – training center, Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Government, for free BJELOVAR on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee EDEN (BELGRADE) – resort, Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Government, for free CRIKVENICA on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee

B I C C 57 brief 34

Location User Descriptor, comment

PARK (Istria) – resort, CRIKVE- Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Government, for free NICA on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee UVALA SLANA – motor-camp, Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Government, for free SELCE on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee VILA ISTRANKA – resort, CRIK- State Assets Agency of Croatian Decision of the Government Committee, VENICA Govn‘t, based on the Decision of RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES Govn‘t Committee DONJI MIHOLJAC – blockhouse, Town Donji Miholjac, based on the Decision of the Government Committee DONJI MIHOLJAC Decision of Govn‘t Committee for State Property Management, for free

TRSTENIK – barracks, DUGO Ministry of Interior, based on the Decision of the Croatian Government, SELO Decision of Govn‘t Committee State Property Agency, the user pays the maintenance and utility costs MOSLAVINA – barracks, IVANIĆ Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Croatian Government, Sta- GRAD on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- te Property Management Agency, for free mittee LOGORIŠTE (S.M. ŠILJO) – Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the State Property Manage- barracks, KARLOVAC - shelled on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- ment Agency, for free mittee POPOVIĆ BRDO – ammunition Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the State Property Manage- depot, economy, KARLOVAC on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- ment Agency, for free mittee BORŠT – fuel depot, ŠAPJANE Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the State Property Manage- on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- ment Agency, for free mittee STUDENA (LISKOVAC) – depot, Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the State Property Manage- KLANA on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- ment Agency, for free mittee SENJAK – quartermaster depot, Town Knin, based on the Decision KNIN of Govn‘t Committee Decision of the State Property Manage- ment Agency, for free STRMICA – depot, KNIN Town Knin, based on the Decision Decision of the State Property Manage- of Govn‘t Committee ment Agency, for free

KRVAVICE – water pool, MA- Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Government Committee, KARSKA on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- for free mittee KRVAVICE – resort, MAKARSKA Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Croatian Government, for on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- free mittee GOLI – quay, island MLJET Public institution National Park Decision of the Government, State Assets «Mljet», based on the Decision of Management Committee, for free Govn’t Committee BONASTER – barracks, island of Croatian Privatization Fond, based on Decision of the Government, State Assets MOLAT the Decision of Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

58 B I C C annex

Location User Descriptor, comment

Bay LUČINA – blockhouse , MO- Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Croatian Government LAT, ZADAR on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- Assets Management Committee, for free mittee ARMED FORCES HALL AND Town Ogulin, based on the Decision Decision of the Croatian Government BARRACKS, Frankopana 7, OGU- of Govn‘t Committee Assets Management Committee, the town LIN ensures for civil servants two apartments (ca. 60 m²), writes off the debt of the State and releases the MOD from paying utility costs

GALGE – complex, OGULIN Town Ogulin, based on the Decision Decision of the Croatian Government of Govn‘t Committee Assets Management Committee, the town ensures for civil servants two apartments (ca. 60 m²), writes off the debt of the State and releases the MOD from paying utility costs

PERNA – resort and motor-camp, Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of Croatian Government, for free island of PELJEŠAC, OREBIĆ on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee TENJA – warehouse, OSIJEK DUMPING d.o.o. Osijek, sale Decision of the Croatian Government contract State Assets Management Committee, sold to DUMPING d.o.o. in Osijek. The money was paid to the state budget.

POD KRPELJ – ammunition de- Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Croatian Government pot, OŠTARIJE on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- Assets Management Committee, for free mittee ŠPILNIK – complex, OTOČAC Town Otočac, based on the Decision Decision of the Croatian Government (devastated) on site exchange Assets Management Committee, exchange for a site in Runjavica KARLO ROJC – barracks, PULA City Pula, Decision of Govn‘t Com- Decision of Croatian Government, write mittee off the debt of the state to the value of the property PINETA (13. MAJ) – resort, Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of Croatian Government, for free FAŽANA, PULA on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee LAĐARSKA (VASIL GAĆEŠA) Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of Croatian Government, for free – barracks, SISAK on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee POTOČANI – shooting range, Town Slatina, Decision of Govn‘t Decision of Government Committee, for SLATINA Committee free

SLATINA – barracks, SLATINA Town Slatina, Decision of Govn‘t Decision of the Croatian Government Committee Assets Management Committee, for free

SV.NIKOLA (LORA) – barracks, City of Split, contract of donation Decision of the Croatian Government part, SPLIT Assets Management Committee, payment of the assessed ammount underway

B I C C 59 brief 34

Location User Descriptor, comment

SEGET, MEDENA – resort, Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of Croatian Government, for free SPLIT on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- mittee BIOCE – warehouse (KOSA) Town Šibenik, Decision of Govn‘t Decision of the Government Committee, ŠIBENIK Committee write off the debt of the state to the value of the property KULINE – barracks, ŠIBENIK Town Šibenik, Decision of Govn‘t Decision of the Government Committee, Committee write off the debt of the state to the value of the property JALKOVEČKE ŽRTVE – bar- Town Varaždin, contract of donation Decision of the Croatian Government, racks, VARAŽDIN Assets Management Committee, com- mitment of the town to do construction work on the barracks «Ivan V. Drašković» in Varaždin according to the specifi cations and bill of cost of the MOD

JALKOVEC – training range and Town Varaždin, Decision of Govn’t Town Varaždin, Decision of Govn’t drilling ground, VARAŽDIN Committee Committee ensure sites for construction of 1000 apartments for MOD employees. RIBNJAK – drilling ground, Town Varaždin, contract of donation Decision of Government Assets Ma- VARAŽDIN nagement Committee, ensure sites for construction of 1000 apartments for MOD employees.

ČEŠKA VILA – warehouse, VIS Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Croatian Government, on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- Assets Management Committee, for free mittee CAF HALL – VIS, island of VIS Town Vis, Decision of Govn‘t Decision of the Croatian Government Committee Assets Management Committee, write off the debt of the State towards the town RUKAVAC, land, VIS Croatian Privatization Fond, based Decision of the Croatian Government, on the Decision of Govn‘t Com- Assets Management Committee, for free mittee SAMOGOR (MARIJAN BILIĆ) Town Vis, Decision of Govn‘t Decision of the Croatian Government – barracks, VIS Committee Assets Management Committee, write off the debt of the State towards the town ANTE BANINA (STANOVI, Town Zadar, Decision of Govn‘t Decision of the Croatian Government NOVI LOGOR, VIŠNJIK) – part Committee Assets Management Committee, part of of barracks, ZADAR the barracks given to the town which will ensure the construction work on the Air Force Hall in Zadar

PUT MURVICE, ex. Tvornica elektroničkih proizvoda Decision and Contract on Exchange of KONJUŠNICE – warehouse, d.d. Zagreb, Contract on exchange Property ZADAR of property VUKOVARSKI BRANITEL- Ministry of Justice, local administra- Decision of the Croatian Government JI (KUMROVEC) – barracks, tion and local government, Assets Management Committee, for free ZAGREB Decisions of Croatian Government

60 B I C C annex

Figure 10: Decisions for transfer of military real estate by Assets Commit- tee of the Croatian government in 2003

Location User Descriptor, comment

BILJE SAVOJSKI – woods, Municipality Bilje Decision of the Government Assets Ma- BILJE Contract of donation nagement Committee, for free

GLAVICA – barracks, MILNA, Municipality Milna Decision of the Government Assets Ma- island of BRAČ Decisions of Croatian Government nagement Committee, for free

U PRIGORJU II – warehouse, Municipality Brdovec Government Committee decision, for free BRDOVEC Contract of donation

KUPARI – resort and motor- Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Government decision, for free camp, DUBROVNIK of Croatian Govn‘t Committee

SALI, blockhouse, island DUGI Ministry of Interior Decision of the Government Assets Ma- OTOK Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Committee nagement Committee, paying the utility costs

PEROVEC (PREČEC) – Ministry of Interior Decision of the Government Assets Ma- warehouse, DUGO SELO Decisions of Croatian Govn‘t nagement Committee, for free

MAGARČEVAC MS 400 Hrvatske šume d.o.o. Zagreb Decision of the Government Assets Ma- (PETROVA GORA) – Special Decision of Croatian Government nagement Committee, Hrvatske šume are purpose facility, KARLOVAC Committee paying the utility costs FRANKOPAN (I.L.RIBAR) Veleučilište u Karlovcu (college) Decision of the Government Assets Ma- – barracks, KARLOVAC Contract of donation nagement Committee, for free

MATE BLAŽINA – barracks, Municipality Klana Decision of the Government Assets Ma- KLANA Contract of donation nagement Committee, municipality Klana will write off the debt of the State to the value of the property STARA STRAŽA – fuel depot, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of the Government Assets Ma- KNIN of Croatian Govn‘t nagement Committee, for free

BIŠEVO, underground and Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of the Government Assets Ma- battery site, island BIŠEVO of Croatian Govn‘t nagement Committee, for free

PODHUMLJE – barracks, Town Komiža, Exchange for land necessary for construc- KOMIŽA, VIS – part of bar- Decisions of Croatian Govn’t tion of radar-site. racks SUBOTICA I – warehouse, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Based on the Decision of Croatian Govern- KOPRIVNICA of Croatian Govn‘t Committee ment, State Property Management Commit- tee, for free

B I C C 61 brief 34

Location User Descriptor, comment

SUBOTICA II – land, KOP- Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of Croatian Government, State RIVNICA of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Property Management Committee, for free

WATER TANK, UBLI, island Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of Croatian Government State LASTOVO of Croatian Govn‘t Property Management Committee, for free

KAŠTEL – Special purpose Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of Croatian Government State facility, island LASTOVO of Croatian Govn‘t Property Management Committee, for free

MARŠAL TITO ex. – barracks, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of Croatian Government State LASTOVO of Croatian Govn‘t Property Management Committee, for free

NIŽNO POLJE – warehouse, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of Croatian Government State LASTOVO of Croatian Govn‘t Property Management Committee, for free

PRODAVAONICA, Ubli, island Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of Croatian Government State LASTOVO of Croatian Govn‘t Property Management Committee, for free

RUTVENJAK MALI, island Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of Croatian Government, State - land, LASTOVO of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Property Management Committee, for free

LAND – land register no. Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of Croatian Government State 6929/8, island LASTOVO of Croatian Govn‘t Property Management Committee, for free

ANĐELI BB – Special purpose Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of Croatian Government State facility – underground, MA- of Croatian Govn‘t Property Management Committee, for free TULJI CONCRETE PILLBOX, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Government, State Property NAŠICE of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

CONCRETE PILLBOX, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Government, State Property NAŠICE of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

CONCRETE PILLBOX, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Government, State Property NAŠICE of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

DUGOUTS, NAŠICE Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Government, State Property of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

DUGOUTS, NAŠICE Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Government, State Property of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

DUGOUTS, NAŠICE Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Government, State Property of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

LAND – Novo Naselje, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Government, State Property NAŠICE of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

62 B I C C annex

Location User Descriptor, comment

LAND – Ulica Kralja Petra Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Government, State Property Krešimira, NAŠICE of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee, for free

IVA GORICE – drilling ground Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of the Government State Property NOVA GRADIŠKA of Croatian Govn‘t Management Committee, for free

KAPELA – fuel depot, LIČKE Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of the Government State Property JASENICE, OGULIN of Croatian Govn‘t Management Committee, for free

CAF HALL – OTOČAC, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of the Government State Property devastated of Croatian Govn‘t Management Committee, for free

VOLINJA – ammunition depot, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of the Government Committee, KOSTAJNICA, PETRINJA of Croatian Govn‘t for free

CROATIAN NAVY HALL, Town Ploče, Decision of the Government State Property PLOČE, Zmijanac Decision of Croatian Govn’t Committee Management Committee, for free

CAF HALL, POŽEGA Town Požega, Požega College Decision of the Government State Property Decision of Croatian Govn’t Committee Management Committee, for free

MEDVIJAK – warehouse, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the Croatian Government, State island PREMUDA of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Property Management Committee, for free

NOZDRA – land, island PRE- Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision of Decision of the State Property Management MUDA Croatian Govn‘t Property Management Committee, for free Committee MONUMENTI – barracks with Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of the State Property Management island «KATARINA» PULA of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Committee, for free

VLADIMIR GORTAN – bar- Town Pula, Decision of the Government State Property racks, PULA Contract of donation Management Committee, town Pula will reconstruct the building of the State Admi- nistration in Istra County St. KATARINA (NIKOLA Ministry of Interior, Decision of the Government State Property CAR_ČRNI) – barracks, RIJE- Decisions of Croatian Govn‘t Management Committee, pay for utility costs KA TRSAT (ŠPANJ: DOBROVOL- Town Rijeka Decision of the Government State Property JCI) – barracks, RIJEKA Contract of donation Management Committee, town Rijeka frees the MOD of paying utility costs for the next 10 yrs. MARKOVO POLJE – ware- Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of the Government State Property house, burnt down, SESVETE of Croatian Govn‘t Management Committee, for free

MARKOVO POLJE- DUBO- Croatian Privatization Fond, Decisions Decision of the Government, for free KI JARAK- land, SESVETE of Croatian Govn‘t

B I C C 63 brief 34

Location User Descriptor, comment SKRAD – part of military me- Municipality Skrad Decision of the Government State Property dical center, SKRAD Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Management Committee

Bay POLJUD – park, rowing On lease Decision of the Government State Property club, SPLIT Contract of lease Management Committee, leased to «Venzor» d.o.o. from Split for a period of 10 yrs. Sv. KRIŽ, ex. DRAČEVAC Town Split Decision of the Government State Proper- – barracks, SPLIT Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Committee ty Management Committee, commitment of the town Split to take over solving the problem of property rights and dividing into lots of the land, as well as prolonging the contract of lease on to 10 yrs. for the buil- ding where the state administration is placed.

LUŠA (BRODARICA) – drilling Community College Zagreb, Decision Decision of the Government State Property ground, ŠIBENIK of Croatian Govn‘t Property Manage- Management Committee, turned over to the ment Committee Community College for the next 20 yrs. With the requirement of renovation. VELJI VRH – Special purpose Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision Decision of Croatian Government, State facility, island ŠIPAN of Croatian Govn‘t Committee Property Management Committee, for free

VELA STRAŽA – barracks, Association «Zelena akcija» Zagreb, De- Decision of Croatian Government, State ŠOLTA cision of Croatian Govn’t Committee Property Management Committee, to be used for the next 10 yrs. SEGET, MEDENA, resort, Croatian Privatization Fond, Decision By decision of the Government State Pro- SPLIT of Croatian Govn‘t perty Management Committee, turned over to the motor-camp of the Civil servant‘s Union in Seget Donji near Trogir. BOKANJAC – drilling and trai- Town Zadar, Decision of Croatian By decision of Croatian Government ning ground, ZADAR, part Govn‘t Committee State Property Management Committee, with commitment of the town to do the construction work on the barracks «Stjepan Radić» FRANKO LISICA ex. ĐURO Town Zadar, Decision of Croatian By decision of Croatian Government ĐAKOVIĆ, ZADAR, part Govn‘t Committee State Property Management Committee, with commitment of the town to do the construction work on the State Administra- tion Offi ce in Zadar County and the Coun- ter-intelligence Agency in the barracks «S. Radić» to the value of the donated property PUT DIKLE (MOCIRE) Town Zadar, Decision of Croatian By decision of Croatian Government State – warehouse, BRODARICA, Govn‘t Committee Property Management Committee, with ZADAR commitment of the town to write off the debt of the State to the value of the donated property

BARUNA FILIPOVIĆA – bar- Ministry of Justice, local administration Government Property Management Com- racks, ZAGREB and local government, mittee, for free Decisions of Croatian Government STUBIČKA SLATINA – bar- Ministry of Interior, Decision of the Government State Property racks, ZABOK, ZAGREB Decisions of Croatian Govn‘t Management Committee, the user pays for utility costs

64 B I C C annex

Figure 11: Decisions for transfer of military real estate by Assets Committee of the Croatian Government in 2004

Location User Descriptor, comment

CAF337 HALL, BREGANA Town Samobor By the decision of the Croatian Government Contract of donation Assets Committee, town Samobor writes off the debt, commits to compensating HVIDRA Samobor and transfer to state ownership a 60m² apartment in the area of Zagreb

NIKOLA ŠUBIĆ ZRINSKI Ministry of Interior, By the decision of the Central State Administ- (27. JULI) – barracks, Central State Administration Agency ration Agency for State Property Management, ČAKOVEC for State Property Management facility No. 11 turned over to use

CAF HALL, B.Pavlića bb Zagreb County, Decision of Cro- By the decision of the Croatian Government – DUGO SELO atian Govn‘t, the Govn‘t Assets Assets Committee, 1st fl oor turned over to Committee Primary School «Dugo Selo» to be used till the new school building is fi nished CAF HALL, GOSPIĆ Town Gospić, Decision of Croatian By the decision of the Croatian Government Govn’t Committee Assets Committee, the town commits to write off the debt of the State to the value of the property MILAN FRKOVIĆ ĆIĆOV Town Gospić, Decision of Croatian By the decision of the Croatian Government (KANJIŽA) – barracks and Govn’t Committee Assets Committee, the town commits to write warehouse, GOSPIĆ off the debt of the State to the value of the property PAZARIŠKA (V. Čerine) Town Gospić, Decision of Croatian By the decision of the Croatian Government – mixed depot, GOSPIĆ Govn’t Committee Assets Committee, the town commits to write off the debt of the State to the value of the property MANOJLOVAC; ammunition Public institution National Park By the decision of the Croatian Government depot, KNIN «Krka», Contract of donation Assets Committee, for free under the term that two buildings within the complex be turned over to the Town Museum of Drniš PERE KRVAVICE br.6 Croatian war veteran‘s Association By the decision of the Croatian Government – library, KNIN, (Krešimirova «Tvrđava Knin», Decision of Croati- Assets Committee, turned over to the Associati- br.6) an Govn’t Assets Committee on of Croatian War Veterans for temporary use during 5 yrs. RAŽNJIĆ – barracks Municipality Lumbarda Based on the decision of the Croatian Govern- KORČULA Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Assets ment Assets Committee, turned over to Volun- Committee teer fi re department and utility services for use

SLAVONSKI GRANIČARI County Brodsko-posavska By the decision of the Croatian Government (M.KLJAJIĆ) – barracks, part, Central State Administration Agency Assets Committee part of the barracks turned NOVA GRADIŠKA for State Property Management over to Primary School «Mato Lovrak» for use until the school building is renovated.

B I C C 65 brief 34

Location User Descriptor, comment OŠTARIJE II – near the Municipality Josipdol By the decision of the Croatian Government railway station – quartermaster Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Com- Assets Committee, the town commits to write depot, OŠTARIJE, in ruins mittee off the debt to the value of the property and provide for the separated MOD personnel through the SPECTRA Program (employment and self-employment) VALDEBEK – shooting range, Ministry of Interior, Based on the Contract of lease for 1 yr. PULA Contract of lease

DRAGA – warehouse, RIJE- Viadukt d.d. Zagreb By the decision of Croatian Govn‘t, Assets KA Decision of Croatian Govn‘t, Assets Committee, lease of ca. 10000 m² and facilities Committee of Cro. Govn‘t No. 5, 7, 9 ca. 2720m² for the period of 2 yrs. Compensation: construction work on a promi- sing barracks.

CAF HALL – PETRIČEVAC, Alkar (tilting) Society Sinj By the decision of the Croatian Government SINJ Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Com- Assets Committee donation of the State to the mittee Alkar Society

DUILOVO – resort, SPLIT Town Split Contract on establishing the right of use with Decision of Croatian Govn‘t fi nancial commitment of the town Split to connect the military complex Duilovo to the new collector. RAČICE – land, SKRADIN, Town Skradin By the decision of the Croatian Government ŠIBENIK Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Com- Property Management Committee, the town mittee commits to write off the debt to the value of the donated property BARUTANA, NOVA VES Republic Croatia By the decision of the Croatian Government – warehouse, VARAŽDIN Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Com- Property Management Committee, the property mittee will be sold on public sale, the initial price is determined by the Ministry of fi nance, Regio- nal Tax Offi ce in Varaždin

O.KERŠOVANIJA – administ- Town Virovitica By the decision of the Croatian Government rative complex, VIROVITICA Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Com- Property Management Committee, the town mittee commits to write off the debt to the value of the donated property MAKSIMIRSKA 63 – admi- Central State Administration Offi ce By the decision of Croatian Government Pro- nistrative building, ZAGREB Decision of Croatian Govn‘t Pro- perty Management Committee, for free perty Management Committee

PANTOVČAK br. 258 – admi- Public Procurement Administrative By the decision of the Central State Administ- nistrative building, ZAGREB Offi ce and Personal Data Protection ration Offi ce for State Property Management, Agency 3rd fl oor (ca. 136 m²) turned over to the Public Decision of Cro. Govn‘t Procurement Offi ce, and 2nd fl oor (ca. 185 m²) turned over to the Personal Data Protection Offi ce

66 B I C C annex

Figure 12: The total size of the armed forces in Albania, Croatia and Macedonia between the years 1991-2005

Sources: The Military Balance (1996-2001 and 2003) The Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS). London: Oxford University Press. The Southeast European Yearbook 1994-1995 by Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1995, Athens. World Development Indicators 2004-2005 by the World Bank World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (1991-1994) by US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Facts on International Relations and Security Trends Database (FIRST)

ALBANIA CROATIA MACEDONIA

1991 48.000 N/A N/A 1992 65.000 103.000 10.000 1993 65.000 103.000 10.000 1994 41.300 (22.800 conscripts) 105.000 (65.000 conscripts) 10.400 (8000 conscripts) 1995 87.000 150.000 10.000 1996 54.000 ( 22.050 conscripts) 64.700 (41.400 conscripts) 10.400 (8000 conscripts) 34000 1997 58.000 (33.500 conscripts) 15.400 (8000 conscripts) 22000 1998 56.180 (33.500 conscripts) 20.000 (8000 conscripts) 27000 1999 61.000 (21.000 conscripts) 20.000 (8000 conscripts) 2000 47.000 (not exact number) 61.000 (21.320 conscripts) 16.000 (8000 conscripts) 2001 27.000 ( construction period) 58.300 (18-20.000 conscripts) 16.000 (8000 conscripts) 2002 13.000 34.000 N/A 20.800 (7.000 conscripts)- subject to an arms limitation 2003 22.000 ( construction period) 12.850 (5.200 conscripts) regime under Dayton peace control 2004 2005

B I C C 67 brief 34 Endnotes

1 These organizations include DCAF 12 See www.nato.int for more 24 Government of the Republic of and BICC, but also private military information on the PfP. Albania. 2002. Military Strategy of the companies like MPRI, SAIC and Republic of Albania. Tirana. BA&H. 13 9th Workshop of the PfP Consortium Study Group “Regional 25 Government of the Republic of 2 The armed forces of all Western Stability in South East Europe”. Albania. 2004. Military Strategy of Balkan countries are faced with Sofi a, 21–24 October 2004, the Republic of Albania. A Strategy for oversized territorially-bound forces, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/ NATO Integration. Tirana. drastically lacking resources, and publikationen/10_wg9_taf_10.pdf. with a decreasing living standard. See 26 Interview with Arben Gjata, Former Jazbec, Milan. 2005. Defense Reform in 14 The following two chapters on Security Advisor to the Prime the Western Balkans: The Way Ahead. Albania and Macedonia are based Minister. Tirana, 3 March 2005. Geneva: DCAF. on information compiled by Igor Grebenschikov during two fi eld trips 27 Interview with representatives 3 In 2003 and 2005, two studies in 2005. from NATO’s Defense Policy and analyzed conversion issues in Bosnia Planning Division, Brussels, and Herzegovina and Serbia and 15 Katsirdakis, George, 2002. “Defence 9 December 2005. Montenegro. See Heinemann- Reform and NATO.” In Gyarmati, Grüder, Andreas and Tobias Pietz. Istvan and Theodor Winkler, eds. 28 All NATO armies’ General Staff is 2003. Turning Soldiers into a Workforce. 2002. Post-Cold War Defense Reform: structured in 9 departments. Demobilization and Reintegration in Lessons Learned in Europe and the Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. United States. Washington: Brassey’s 29 Interview with representatives Brief 27. Bonn: BICC. See also Inc., pp. 189–204. from NATO’s Defense Policy and Pietz, Tobias and Marc Remillard. Planning Division, Brussels, 2005. Demobilizing and Retraining for the 16 So-called “White Book” of National 9 December 2005. Future. The Armed Forces in Serbia and Defense Policy. Montenegro. Brief 31. Bonn: BICC. 30 The Defense Academy is responsible 17 Caparini, Marina. 2004. “Security for the NCO’s military qualifi cation. 4 See description of the Working Table sector reform in the Western III of the SP at www.stabilitypact. Balkans.” In SIPRI Yearbook 31 Interview with Elez Shiqerukaj, org. 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and American Embassy offi cer, Tirana, International Security, Oxford: Oxford 2 March 2005. 5 Refer to BICC publications. University Press, pp. 251–282. 32 Bumçi, Aldo. 2003. “Security Sector 6 See Pietz, Tobias and Marc Remillard. 18 There is no real opposition to Reform in Albania.” In Jan A. 2005. Demobilizing and Retraining for the Euro-Atlantic integration even Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. Future. The Armed Forces in Serbia and among some critics of the current Defence and Security Sector Governance Montenegro. Brief 31. Bonn: BICC. government’s approach to defense and Reform in South East Europe: transformation. Interview with Insights and Perspectives. Albania. A 7 See e.g. the annual updates in the Arben Gjata. Tirana, 3 March 2005. Self-Assessment Study. Geneva: DCAF, BICC Conversion Surveys. p. 6. 19 Government of the Republic of 8 See Brömmelhörster, Jörn, ed. 2000. Albania. 2002. Military Strategy of the 33 The Albanian army participates in Demystifying the Peace Dividend. Baden- Republic of Albania. Tirana. the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Afghanistan and Iraq. 20 Institute of International and 9 Katsirdakis, George, 2002. “Defence Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 34 Government of the Republic of Reform and NATO.” In Gyarmati, 2004–2005. IISS, London. Albania. 2004. The Membership Action Istvan and Theodor Winkler, eds. Plan for the 2004-2005 Cycle. The 2002. Post-Cold War Defense Reform: 21 Simon, Jeffrey. 2001. Roadmap Annual National Program of the Republic Lessons Learned in Europe and the to NATO Accession: Preparing for of Albania. Tirana. United States. Washington: Brassey’s Membership. INSS Special Report. Inc., pp. 189–204. 35 Government of the Republic of 22 Institute of International and Albania. 2004. The Membership Action 10 Ibid. Strategic Studies. The Military Balance Plan for the 2004-2005 Cycle. The 2004–2005. IISS, London. Annual National Program of the Republic 11 Ibid. of Albania. Tirana. 23 Ibid.

68 B I C C endnotes

36 Selimaj, Erlis. “Albania Receives intermediate level as well as training 56 Abazi, Enika. 2003. “An Institutional Financial Assistance From the and education for senior offi cers. See Perspective on Security Issues.” United States”, Southeast European www.saic.com. In Jan A. Trapans and Philipp H. Times, Tirana, 3 August 2005, http:// Fluri, eds. Defence and Security Sector www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/ 48 NATO Handbook. Available at Governance and Reform in South East xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/ http://www.nato.int/docu/ Europe: Insights and Perspectives, Volume features/2005/08/03/feature-01. handbook/2001/. 1; Albania; Bulgaria; Croatia; A Self- Assessment Study. Geneva: DCAF, pp. 37 Interview with representatives 49 Government of the Republic of 133–148 from NATO’s Defense Policy and Albania. 2004. The Membership Action Planning Division, Brussels, Plan for the 2004-2005 Cycle. The 57 ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern 9 December 2005. Annual National Program of the Republic Europe’, http://www.stabilitypact. of Albania. Tirana. org/about/default.asp. 38 Individual Partnership for Peace program between Albania and 50 NATO Handbook. Available at 58 With regard to the “Political Rights NATO for 2004–2005. http://www.nato.int/docu/ or Civil Liberties” the country handbook/2001/. remains only partly free, http:// 39 Central Intelligence Agency. 2005. www.freedomhouse.org/research/ The World Fact Book. http://www. 51 A regime for the democratic control freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf. cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ of armed forces exists in the OSCE In the Freedom House statistics, geos/al.html. area through a “Code of Conduct Albania ranks 107 among the on Politico-Military Aspects of countries of the world, http:// 40 Interview with representatives Security” (1994). It commits the freedomhouse.org/research/ from NATO’s Defense Policy and OSCE member states to a regular pressurvey/comparison0405.pdf. For Planning Division, Brussels, exchange of information on the “Economic Freedom” the rank is 9 December 2005. status of the democratic control of 67. Albania belongs to the category their armed forces, as well as on such “mostly free”. http://www.answers. 41 According to an interview with issues as the fi ght against terrorism com/topic/index-of-economic- representatives from NATO’s and the stationing of troops on freedom. In the UNDP Human Defense Policy and Planning foreign soil. http://www.osce.org/ Development Index, Albania’s rank Division on 9 December 2005, documents/sg/1994/12/702_en.pdf. is 65, which means that Albania is NATO does not agree that there is not among the 50 most developed a fi xed NATO model that potential 52 Applying strict NATO classifi cation countries in the world, http:// new members have to adhere of documents is considered as hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/ to. NATO consults according to unnecessary by high-ranking offi cials country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_ALB. situational needs and analysis of the of the General Staff in Tirana, and html. According to Transparency particular country. makes the process less transparent. International, Albania holds place Nevertheless, the GS adheres to that No.126 out of 159 countries 42 Interview with representatives policy. ranked in the corruption perception from NATO’s Defense Policy and index. Albania is surrounded by Planning Division, Brussels, 53 NATO. 1995. “Study on NATO Uganda and Niger, http://www. 9 December 2005. Enlargement”. http://www.nato. transparency.org/pressreleases/2 int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm. 005/2005.10.20.cpi.en.html. The 43 Interview with Bardhyl Rredhi, Bertelsmann Transformation Index Tirana, 1 March 2005. 54 Caparini, Marina. 2004. “Security sees the country as defi cient in sector reform in the Western terms of a market-based democracy 44 Interview with an AAF-offi cer, Balkans.” In SIPRI Yearbook ranking Albania as 37 out of 119 Tirana, 28 February 2005. 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and countries, http://www.bertelsmann- International Security, Oxford: Oxford transformation-index.de./fi leadmin/ 45 Interview with Thimi Hudhra, University Press, pp. 251–282. pdf/BTI_2006_Ranking_GB.pdf. Tirana, 1 March 2005. 55 European Commission. EU-Albania 59 ‘The Adriatic Charter’, http://www. 46 Interview with representatives Relations. http://europa.eu.int/ adriaticcharter.gov.mk/adriatictreaty. from NATO’s Defense Policy and comm/enlargement/albania/eu_ htm. Planning Division, Brussels, albania_relations.htm. 9 December 2005. 60 Bumçi, Aldo. 2003. “Security Sector Reform in Albania.” In Jan A. 47 SAIC is postured as a premier Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. provider of training at the entry and Defence and Security Sector Governance

B I C C 69 brief 34

and Reform in South East Europe: 71 Interview with representatives 84 6th Meeting of the DCAF- Insights and Perspectives. Albania. A from NATO’s Defense Policy and Demobilization and Reintegration Self-Assessment Study. Geneva: DCAF, Planning Division, Brussels, Working Group. RACVIAC, 1-2 p. 12. 9 December 2005. June 2005.

61 Gumi, Viktor. 2003. “The Parliament 72 Bumci, Aldo. 2003. “Security Sector 85 65 years of age for men and 60 for and the Security Sector.” In Jan A. Reform in Albania.” In Jan A. women, see http://www.ssa.gov/ Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2004- Defence and Security Sector Governance Defence and Security Sector Governance 2005/europe/albania.html. and Reform in South East Europe: and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives. Albania. A Insights and Perspectives. Albania. A 86 An individual is entitled to early Self-Assessment Study. Geneva: DCAF, Self-Assessment Study. Geneva: DCAF, pension after at least 15 years of pp. 45-57. p. 25. military service. To be entitled to full military pension benefi ts, a Captain, 62 The NSC is composed of the 73 Bumci, Aldo. 2003. “Security Sector for instance, can leave the army after President, Prime Minister, Minister Reform in Albania.” In Jan A. having been in service for 17 years, a of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. Major after 20, Lt. Col. after 27, Col. Defense, Minister of Public Order, Defence and Security Sector Governance after 40 years. The average military Minister of Transportation and and Reform in South East Europe: pension amounts 46 000 LEK (US$ Minister of Health, Chief of Insights and Perspectives. Albania. A 200) for a Captain and US$ 750 for GS and Chief of the National Self-Assessment Study. Geneva: DCAF, Lt. Col., Interview with Ermir Bega, Intelligence. Other actors are also p. 6. Tirana, 28 January 2005. invited to participate depending on the issues that are being addressed. 74 Interview with Arben Gjata, Tirana, 87 Interview with Thimi Hudhra, See Government of the Republic 5 March 2005. Tirana, 1 March 2005. of Albania. 1998. Constitution of the Republic of Albania. Tirana. 75 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

63 For instance the meeting of the NSC 76 Ibid. 89 Interview with MoD representatives, in Winter 2005 was devoted to the RACVIAC, 1 June 2005. civil emergency situation resulting 77 Questionnaire to MoD, Tirana, from heavy snow falls. Interview March 2005. 90 Interviews with MoD with Arben Gjata, Tirana, 3 March representatives, Tirana, 28 January, 2005. 78 Interview with Ilirjan Agolli, Tirana, 1 March 2005. 2 March 2005. 64 Ibid. 91 DCAF-Workshop. “Retraining and 79 Interview with an AAF- offi cer, Reintegration of retired military 65 Interview with Arben Gjata, Tirana, Tirana, 3 March 2005. personal”. Tirana, 5 November 2004. 3 March 2005. 80 Interview with Mihallaq Spirollari. 92 Draft Resettlement Program. 66 The General Staff (GS) and the Lt. Col.(R), UNDP, National Project Albanian Atlantic Association, Ministry of Defense (MoD) reside in Offi cer. Tirana, 1 March 2005. Tirana, December 2003. the same building. 81 Interview with Ilirjan Agolli. 93 Interview with MoD representative, 67 Government of the Republic of Journalist, Voice of America. Tirana, Tirana, 3 March 2005. Albania. 2000. Law on the powers 2 March 2005. and command authority and strategic 94 Interview with Arijan Starova, management of the armed forces. 82 Albanian Atlantic Association. Tirana, 3 March 2005. Draft Resettlement Program. Tirana, 68 Interview with Arben Gjata, Tirana, December 2003. 95 A more optimistic perspective for the 5 March 2005. Resettlement Program was expected 83 Early retired military personnel is by the AAA-president Arijan Starova 69 Interview with Engjell Begalla, treated according to the “Law on after parliamentary elections in July Tirana, 4 March 2005. extra social insurance of the Armed of 2005. The election removed the Forces personnel of the Republic Socialist Party and brought victory to 70 Interview with Arben Gjata, Tirana, of Albania.” Interviews with MoD the Democratic Party. 5 March 2005. representatives, Tirana, 28 February and 1 March 2005.

70 B I C C endnotes

96 Government of the Republic of 108 Interview with MoD representative, 125 Foreign investors have no rights to Albania, Ministry of Defense. Draft Tirana, 28 January 2005. own property in Albania. The law Program on the training and integration only allows a 99-year renting. Ibid. of the military into civilian life. Tirana, 109 Interviews with MoD April 2005. representatives, Tirana 28 January, 1 126 Interview with MoD representative, and 3 March 2005. Tirana, 28 January 2005. 97 5th Meeting of the DCAF- Demobilization and Reintegration 110 Interview with MoD representative, 127 Interview with MoD representative, Working Group. Skopje, 23–24 Tirana, 28 January 2005. Tirana, 1 March 2005. March 2005. 111 Some bases, like the air base Gjader, 128 Questionnaire to MoD, Tirana, 98 Interview with Cesk Millj, are totally closed, empty and only March 2005. RACVIAC, 1 June 2005. guarded by some soldiers. At least three general-purpose airfi elds 129 See Myrttinen, Henri. 2003. Base 99 6th Meeting of the DCAF- (Sanandra, Skulari and Kukes) Conversion in Central and Eastern Demobilization and Reintegration are no longer used by the MoD Europe 1989—2003. Brief 30. Bonn: Working Group. RACVIAC, 31 and could be handed over for BICC. May–2 June 2005. agricultural purposes. Interview with Arben Gjata, Tirana, 3 March 2005. 130 Blacksmith Institute. Polluted 100 The associations of ex-military Places, http://www.pollutedplaces. men (like many NGOs in Albania) 112 Questionnaire to MoD, Tirana, org/region/e_europe/albania/ are organizations which mostly March 2005. portoromano.shtml, See also work for the acquisition of funds. Michaud, Hélène. 2004. Albania’s They have the status of non-profi t 113 Ibid. environmental nightmare—ecological organizations so that they don’t timebomb near the Adriatic, Radio have to pay taxes. Most try to attract 114 Interview with Arben Gjata, Tirana, Netherlands, 22 November, external donors for small projects 3 March 2005. http://www2.rnw.nl/rnw/ of international interest. en/features/development/ 115 Questionnaire to MoD, Tirana, 041122albania?view=Standard. 101 NDC-Presentation, Tirana 3 March March 2005. 2005. 131 Interview with NAMRA 116 Ibid. representatives, Tirana, 5 March 102 In Albania, associations are 2005. sometimes also classifi ed as NGOs 117 See website of the Albanian or Non Profi table Organizations. Ministry of Defense, http://www. 132 Interview with MoD representatives, mod.gov.al/eng/default.asp. Tirana, 1 March 2005. 103 Interview with Zyhdi Kroj, Tirana, 5 March 2005. 118 Ibid. 133 Interview with MoD representatives, Tirana, 28 January 2005. 104 Lleshi, Sander and Aldo Bumci. 119 Questionnaire to MoD, Tirana, 2003. “Good Governance in March 2005. 134 Interview with representatives Civil-Military Relations.” In Jan A. from NATO’s Defense Policy and Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. 120 There are even proposals to use Planning Division, Brussels, Defence and Security Sector Governance disposed submarines as museums 9 December 2005. and Reform in South East Europe: and restaurants. Insights and Perspectives. Albania. A 135 NATO insists that the Self-Assessment Study. Geneva: DCAF, 121 Interview with Baedhyl Kolchaku, demobilization and resettlement p. 90 Tirana, 3 March 2005. process is part of the MAP and integrated in the Annual National 105 Interview with Ermir Bega, Tirana, 122 See website of the Albanian Program (ANP). 3 March 2005. Ministry of Defense, http:// www.mod.gov.al/eng/industria/ 136 Trapans, Jan A. and Philipp H Fluri. 106 DCAF-Workshop. “Retraining and privatizimi.asp 2003. Albania. A Self-Assessment Reintegration of retired military Study, Geneva: DCAF. personnel”. Tirana, 5 November 123 Interview with Arben Gjata, Tirana, 2004. 5 March 2005. 137 In 1993, the Macedonian Assembly passed the decision to pursue the 107 Interview with MoD representative, 124 Interview with Bardhyl Rredhil, goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. Tirana, 1 March 2005. Tirana, 1 March 2005.

B I C C 71 brief 34

In 1995, Macedonia joined the with representatives from NATO’s independence. The fi rst one was Partnership for Peace Program of Defense Policy and Planning Military Professional Resources NATO. Division, Brussels, 9 December Inc. (MPRI), which implemented 2005. the “equip and train” program with 138 Buckovski, Vlado, 2004. “Macedonia the Macedonian ARM under a US and NATO – From Defense 146 Government of the Republic of military aid program. MPRI also Reforms Towards the Open Macedonia. 2003. National Security advised and equipped the NLA Euro-Atlantic Gates.” in: CehuliC, and Defense Concept of the Republic of (UCK), which is responsible for the Lidija, ed. 2004a. NATO and New Macedonia. Skopje, February. terrorist assaults in Macedonia in International Relations. Zagreb: 2001. Atlantic Council of Croatia and 147 Interview with Zoran Ivanovski. Political Culture, Publishing and Skopje, 22 March 2005. 156 Questionnaire to Macedonian MoD, Research Institute, pp. 195–204. Skopje, May 2005. 148 Government of the Republic of 139 See Caparini, Marina. 2004. Macedonia, Ministry of Defense. 157 Programa za ostvaruvan’e soodvetna i “Security sector reform in the Defense Law of the Republic of pervichna zastapenost na pripandnize Western Balkans.” In SIPRI Yearbook Macedonia, http://www.morm.gov. od zaednizite so visoko obrazovanie; 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and mk/english/defencelaw.htm. Programa za ostvaruvan’e soodvetna i International Security, Oxford: Oxford pervichna zastapenost na pripandnize od University Press, pp. 251–282. 149 The Center for South East zaednizite so sredno obrazovanie. Skopje, European Studies. 2004. March 2005. 140 The issue of force restructuring Macedonia—Armed Forces, http:// is dealt with in the Resolution www.csees.net/?page=country_ 158 Interviews on 22 and 25 March and on Defense and Armed Forces section&country_id=5&sec=8. on 1 April 2005 in Skopje. Transformation, adopted by the parliament in May 2004. See Jazbec, 150 Questionnaire to Macedonian MoD, 159 Strategic Defense Review. 2004. Milan. 2005. Defense Reform in the Skopje, March 2005. Western Balkans: The Way Ahead. 160 Government of the Republic of Geneva: DCAF. 151 Interview with MoD representative, Macedonia. 2004. Annual National RACVIAC, 30 May 2005. Program for Membership of the Republic 141 Simon, Jeffrey. 2001. Roadmap of Macedonia in NATO 2004/2005. to NATO Accession: Preparing for 152 In the chart of NATO’s Tirana. Membership. INSS Special Report, Economic Directorate the current http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ strength of ARM defi ned as: 161 Interview with representatives strforum/SR_02/SR_02.htm; offi cers—1556, NCOs—2120, from NATO’s Defense Policy Government of the Republic of professional soldiers (defi ned as and Planning Division, Brussels, 9 Macedonia, Ministry of Defense. short-term volunteers)—2679, December 2005. Army Service Regulation Law, http:// and Civilians (without MoD)— www.morm.gov.mk/english/ 1365. See: NATO Unclassifi ed, 162 Government of the Republic of armylaw.htm. PASP(DECO)(2005)0303, NATO Macedonia. 2004. Annual National Expert Team, October 2005. Program for Membership of the Republic 142 Caparini, Marina. 2004. “Security of Macedonia in NATO 2004/2005. sector reform in the Western 153 The Military Academy is named Tirana. Balkans.” In SIPRI Yearbook after General Mihailo Apostolski 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and who was a commander of the 163 A total of €14 million is to be spent International Security, Oxford: Oxford General Staff of Macedonia during on modernization in 2004 and some University Press, pp. 251–282. the Peoples’ Liberation War 1941– €16 million in 2005. See: Caparini, 1945. Marina. 2004. “Security sector 143 Ibid. reform in the Western Balkans.” In 154 The degree granted by the Military SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, 144 See Jazbec, Milan. 2005. Defense Academy after 4 years of study is Disarmament and International Security, Reform in the Western Balkans: The Way not recognized by the Macedonian Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ahead. Geneva: DCAF. civil education establishment, nor is pp. 251–282. it valued by the commercial sector. 145 From NATO’s point of view 164 www.nhqs.nato.int/nat/nat.htm any accession date is possible, 155 BA&H is the second private there might be an invitation for military company having assisted 165 Interview with BA&H membership in 2006. Interview the Macedonian ARM since representative, Skopje, 24 March 2005.

72 B I C C endnotes

166 Interview with representatives is already a candidate. IPA funding org/cpi/2005/2005.10.18.cpi. from NATO’s Defense Policy will still draw a distinction between en.html#cpi. The Bertelsmann and Planning Division, Brussels, 9 the two categories in terms of the Transformation Index sees the December 2005. kind of funding made available, country as having good prospects but in either case, learning to work for consolidation of a market-based 167 Government of the Republic of under the new system will pose an democracy ranking Macedonia as 29 Macedonia. 2004. Annual National additional challenge for Macedonian out of 119 countries, http://www. Program for Membership of the Republic institutions. See Angelovska, bertelsmann-transformation-index. of Macedonia in NATO 2004/2005. Nevena. 2005. “Balkan Crisis de./fi leadmin/pdf/BTI_2006_ Tirana. Report – EU Funds for Macedonia Ranking_GB.pdf. in the Balance.” Institute for War 168 ARM units in the German and Peace Reporting, 178 National Security and Defense contingent take part in the 1 November, http://www.iwpr. Strategy, Defense Plan, Policy International Security Assistance net/?p=bcr&s=f&o=257734&apc_ Framework, SDR, etc. Force in Afghanistan. In June state=henpbcr. 2003, ethnically mixed members 179 Albanian paramilitary units, formally of the special units Scorpions and 175 Nikolovski, Zoran. 2005. dissolved, could be re-established Wolves departed for Iraq. See The “Macedonia Poised to Become overnight following a signal of Center for South East European Success Story for Western Balkans.” the Albanian political leadership. Studies. 2004. Macedonia—Armed Southeast European Times, 18 Interview with Macedonian offi cer, Forces, http://www.csees.net/ April, http://www.focus-fen.net/ Skopje, 22 March 2005. ?page=country_section&country_ index.php?focus=analys&a=2&aid= id=5&sec=8. 7315&acat=3. 180 Interview with Talat Xhaferi, Skopje, 25 March 2005. 169 Public distress reached its peak 176 See Caparini, Marina. 2004. during the 1999 NATO military “Security sector reform in the 181 http://www.adriaticcharter.gov. intervention in neighboring Western Balkans.” In SIPRI Yearbook mk/adriatictreaty.htm. Yugoslavia in 1999. 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford 182 2004. “Rumsfeld Issued Orders 170 Institute for Democracy, Solidarity University Press, pp. 251-282. to Prepare Krivolak for NATO and Civil Society at www.idsco.org. Training Center.” REALITY mk. 177 Concerning Political Rights or Macedonia, 16 October, http://www. Civil Liberties the country remains realitymacedonia.org.mk/web/ 171 EurActiv.com. EU-Western Balkans only partly free, http://www. news_page.asp?nid=3766. relations. freedomhouse.org/research/ http://www.euractiv.com/ freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf. 183 Government of the Republic of Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-129607- The rank 107 with a partly free Macedonia. 2001. Defence Law of 16&type=LinksDossier. status relates to Freedom of Press, the Republic of Macedonia. Tirana. http://freedomhouse.org/research/ (amended in 2003). 172 Despite Macedonia’s progress pressurvey/comparison0405.pdf. over the last four years, the EU With respect to Economic Freedom 184 Since early 2004 the Defense and has not set a date for negotiations the place 69 makes Macedonia Security committee has had expert to begin. See: Waterfi eld, Bruno. “mostly free”, http://www.answers. support from two staff advisors, 2005. “Macedonia Gets EU Entry com/topic/index-of-economic- funded externally by DCAF, Status—But No Dates.” REALITY freedom. Human Development through a regional South East Macedonia, 16 December. Index for Macedonia is 60. It European parliamentary capacity- http://www.realitymacedonia.org. means that Macedonia is not among building program. mk/web/news_page.asp?nid=4359. the top developed 50 countries, http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/ 185 Goreski, Vladimir and Blagoj 173 European Union. 2004. EU Action data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_ Handziski. 2001. Democratic Civil Programme for the Former Yugoslav MKD.html Moreover, according Control of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Macedonia. to Transparency International, Republic of Macedonia. Geneva: Macedonia is “enjoying” place DCAF. 174 The following year, the EC will 104 out of 159 countries ranking bring in a new funding mechanism for the corruption perception 186 Vankovska, Biljana. called the Instrument for Pre- index. Macedonia is surrounded 2003.“Democratic Control over Accession (IPA), which will apply to by Gambia and Swaziland, Defence and Security: Between Macedonia regardless of whether it http://ww1.transparency. Principles and Reality.” In Jan A.

B I C C 73 brief 34

Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. 194 Interview with representatives 207 The pension benefi ts for all Defence and Security Sector Governance from NATO’s Defense Policy and categories of pensioners are and Reform in South East Europe: Planning Division, Brussels, regulated by the “Law on Insights and Perspectives. Macedonia, 9 December 2005. Retirement and Disability A Self Assessment Study. Geneva: Insurance”. See: Law on retirement and DCAF, p. 28. 195 Interview with Slobodan disability insurance, 1993. Kuzmanovsky, Skopje, 25 March 187 Communication with Biljana 2005. 208 The average pension for ex-military Vankovska on 5 April 2006. men amounts to around €250. 196 At present, the Albanian Interview with Vilma Temelkova, 188 Communication with Vilma Democratic Union for Integration Skopje, 24 March 2005. Temelkova on 5 April 2006. (DUI) is a coalition partner of the Macedonian Social Democratic 209 Pension and disability insurance 189 The members of the NCS are the Union of Macedonia (SDUM). fund of Macedonia, Skopje, July President of the Parliament, the 2003, http://www.piom.com.mk/ Prime Minister, and the Ministers 197 5th Meeting of DCAF- share/Prezentacija%20angliska.pdf. of Defense, Interior and Foreign Demobilization and Reintegration Affairs plus three other members working Group. Skopje, 23–24 210 Questionnaire to MoD, Skopje, named by the President. See: March 2005. March 2005. Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 1991. Constitution of the 198 The newspaper Армиски Збор (Word 211 5th Meeting of DCAF- Republic of Macedonia. Skopje. of the Army) and an illustrated Demobilization and Reintegration monthly magazine Одбрана (Defense). Working Group. Skopje, 23–24 190 Vankovska, Biljana. 2003. March 2005. “Democratic Control over Defence 199 The local papers “Dnevnik” and and Security: Between Principles “Utrinski vestnik”, for example, 212 Vankovska, Biljana. 2006. Current and Reality.” In Jan A. Trapans reported on corruption in the perspectives on Macedonia, Heinrich- and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. Defence privatization of military property Böll-Foundation, p. 5. and Security Sector Governance and or criticized the government for Reform in South East Europe: Insights the decision to destroy Soviet 213 Interview with Talat Xhaferi, Skopje, and Perspectives. Macedonia, A Self armaments (like the tank T-55 and 25 March 2005. Assessment Study. Geneva: DCAF, p. the jet SU-25) in order to fulfi l 36. NATO requirements. Interview 214 Interview with Aleksandar with Stojan Kuzev, Skopje, 22 Nikoloski, Skopje, 26 March 2005. 191 Vankovska, Biljana. 2006. Problems March 2005. and Prospects of Security Sector Reform: 215 It means that 400,000 of the total Confl ict Prevention and/or Post-confl ict 200 Ibid. population are unemployed. 16,000 reconstruction in Macedonia. http:// of them hold university degrees. www.boell.de/downloads/konfl ikt/ 201 Interview with Sasko Dimevski. vankovska_pt4.pdf. Utrinski Vesnik. Skopje, 26 March 216 Similar to the Croatian SPECTRA 2005. - Separated Personnel Care and 192 Government of the Republic of Transition Program. See: next Macedonia. 2001. Defence Law of the 202 Some experts see the process as chapter. Republic of Macedonia. Tirana, Article rightsizing. See Jazbec, Milan. 2005. 27. Defense Reform in the Western Balkans: 217 Norwegian Embassy to Macedonia. The Way Ahead. Geneva: DCAF. 2006. “Norwegian Project to Re- 193 Vankovska, Biljana. Qualify Surplus Army Offi cers 2003.“Democratic Control over 203 Questionnaire to MoD, Skopje, Opened”, 13 February, http:// Defence and Security: Between March 2005. www.norway.org.mk/projects/ Principles and Reality.” In Jan A. Project+cooperation/lepeza.htm. Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri, eds. 204 Questionnaire to MoD, Skopje, Defence and Security Sector Governance March 2005. 218 Norwegian Embassy to Macedonia. and Reform in South East Europe: 2006. “Norwegian Project to Re- Insights and Perspectives. Macedonia, 205 Ibid. Qualify Surplus Army Offi cers A Self Assessment Study. Geneva: Opened”, 13 February, http:// DCAF, pp. 38-39. 206 By the end of 2005, an additional www.norway.org.mk/projects/ 385 military men planned to be Project+cooperation/lepeza.htm. retrained for these purposes. Ibid.

74 B I C C endnotes

219 It was a concept of Total Defense 235 Ibid. 249 Ibid., p. 9–10. foreseeing the decentralization and dispersal of small military sites all 236 Interview with Verica Malinkova, 250 Such as sticking to a Croatian over the country, where every city RACVIAC, 1 June 2005. Airforce or keeping huge reserve had to be a center of resistance and forces. every human a soldier. 237 See various publications by Prof. Dr. Biljana Vankovska. 251 Ibid. 220 5th Meeting of DCAF- Demobilization and Reintegration 238 Edmunds, Timothy. 2003. Defense 252 Gotovina means ‘cash’ in Croatian. working Group. Skopje, 23–24 Reform in Croatia and Serbia and March 2005. Montenegro. Adelphi Paper 360, 253 Watkins, Amadeo. 2005. Croatia at London: Oxford University Press a Crossroads: The EU-ICTY Debate. 221 Questionnaire to MoD, Skopje, for the International Institute for Balkans Series (05/15). London: March 2005. Strategic Studies, pp. 37–38. Confl ict Studies Research Center, p. 3. 222 Ibid. 239 Stanicic, Mladen. 2004. “Croatia: Defense Reform, Civil-Military 254 “Strategic Defence Review”, March 223 5th Meeting of DCAF- Relations and Euro-Atlantic 2005, p. 11–12. Demobilization and Reintegration Integration.” In Gyarmati, Vesel. working Group. Skopje, 23–24 2004. Security Sector Governance in 255 Such events cover different areas of March 2005. the Western Balkans, Baden-Baden: cooperation, from Military Training IISS/SIPRI, p. 157. and Doctrine or Defense Policy 224 Ibid. and Planning to English Language 240 Interview with Tomislav Bradic, Training. 225 Food production units of the ARM. Zagreb, 13 April 2005. 256 See Croatian Mission to NATO at 226 BA&H is developing the project, 241 Vujcic, Zeljka. 2005. “Army http://nato.mfa.hr. planning to equip the shooting under Scrutiny.” Transitions Online range with simulators for tactical, (28/01/2005). 257 Mladen Stanicic even speaks of combat, and peace operations authorization of the resettlement training. It is planned to renew 242 Edmunds, Timothy. 2003. Defense program through NATO: “NATO’s existing and to build new structures Reform in Croatia and Serbia and Economic Council, as a very to house personnel as well as Montenegro. Adelphi Paper 360, important step in the process buildings for administration. http:// London: Oxford University Press of accession, authorizes the www.realitymacedonia.org.mk/web/ for the International Institute for [SPECTRA] program”. See Stanicic, news_page.asp?nid=3766. Strategic Studies, p. 55. Mladen. 2004. “Croatia: Defense Reform, Civil-Military Relations 227 Questionnaire to MoD, Skopje, 243 Interview with Vlatko Crvtila, and Euro-Atlantic Integration.” In March 2005. Zagreb, 13 April 2005. Vesel Gyarmati. 2004. Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans, 228 Interview with Talat Xhaferi, Skopje, 244 Interview with Zvonimir Mahecic, Baden-Baden: IISS/SIPRI, p. 162. 25 March 2005. Zagreb, 13 April 2005. 258 In 2002, NATO adopted a series 229 Strategic Defense Review, Skopje, 245 At the end of the third cycle, of measures in Prague aimed at 2004. Croatia hopes to establish full ensuring that NATO is equipped membership in NATO. for the full spectrum of modern 230 Income for a successful sale would military missions. The new go into the budget of the MoD. 246 Interview with representatives capabilities initiative, the Prague from NATO’s Defense Policy Capabilities Commitment, differs 231 Interview with Aleksandar and Planning Division, Brussels, 9 from its predecessor, the Defense Nikoloski, Skopje, 26 March 2005. December 2005. Capabilities Initiative, in that individual allies have now made fi rm 232 Strategic Defense Review, Skopje, 247 SDR Final Document, English political commitments to improve 2004. Version, 2005, p. 4. capabilities in more than 400 specifi c areas. 233 Questionnaire to MoD, March 2005. 248 Interview with representatives from NATO’s Defense Policy and 234 Questionnaire to MoD, March 2005. Planning Division, Brussels, 9 December 2005.

B I C C 75 brief 34

259 Watkins, Amadeo. 2005. Croatia at the Western Balkans, Baden-Baden: 285 The Association of Volunteers a Crossroads: The EU-ICTY Debate. IISS/SIPRI, p. 159. in the Croatian Homeland War Balkans Series (05/15). London: (UHBDDR). Confl ict Studies Research Center, 271 See BTI 206 at http://www. p. 3. bertelsmann-transformation-index. 286 Interview with Zvonko Popovic and de. While Croatia is ranked 7th, Vjekoslav Golubovic, 12 April 2005. 260 Watkins, Amadeo. 2004. PfP Albania being 37th and Macedonia Integration: Croatia and Serbia and 29th are still way behind. 287 Ibid. Montenegro. London: Confl ict Studies Research Center, p. 6. 272 Stanicic, Mladen. 2004. “Croatia: 288 See Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas Defense Reform, Civil-Military and Tobias Pietz. 2003. Turning 261 For detailed information, see Relations and Euro-Atlantic Soldiers into a Workforce. Demobilization Zunec, Ozren. 2003. “Democratic Integration.” In Vesel Gyarmati. and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia Oversight and Control over 2004. Security Sector Governance in and Herzegovina. Brief 27. Bonn: Intelligence and Security Agencies.” the Western Balkans, Baden-Baden: BICC. In Jan A. Trapans and Philipp IISS/SIPRI, pp. 161–163. H. Fluri, eds. Defence and Security 289 Interview with Ivan Ceko and Sector Governance and Reform in South 273 Ibid. Suncanica Skupnjak-Kapic, 12 April East Europe: Insights and Perspectives. 2005. Croatia. A Self Assessment Study. 274 Interview with Zvonko Popovic, Geneva: DCAF, pp. 66–92. 10 March 2005. 290 Research of the Labor Market in Areas of Special State Care, 2004. 262 Stanicic, Mladen. 2004. “Croatia: 275 SPECTRA Project Document, Defense Reform, Civil-Military Zagreb, October 2002, p. 7. 291 Interview with Zvonko Popovic and Relations and Euro-Atlantic Vjekoslav Golubovic, 12 April 2005. Integration.” In Gyarmati, Vesel. 276 Interview with Zvonko Popovic and 2004. Security Sector Governance in Vjekoslav Golubovic, Zagreb, 292 Ibid. the Western Balkans, Baden-Baden: 12 April 2005. IISS/SIPRI, pp. 157–158. 293 SPECTRA Program Information, 277 11,770 military and 2,862 civilian November 2004. 263 Ibid. employees. 294 Interview with SPECTRA and IOM 264 Ibid. 278 Ibid. representatives in Osijek, 14 April 2005. 265 Watkins, Amadeo. 2004. PfP 279 Interview with representatives Integration: Croatia and Serbia and from NATO’s Defense Policy and 295 IOM RASDP Summary Leafl et, Montenegro. London: Confl ict Studies Planning Division, Brussels, March 2005. Research Center, pp. 10–11. 9 December 2005. 296 Ibid. 266 Vujcic, Zeljka. 2005. “Army 280 Interview with Zvonimir Mahecic, under Scrutiny.” Transitions Online 13 April 2005. 297 Interview with Ivan Ceko and (28/01/2005). Suncanica Skupnjak-Kapic, 12 April 281 Interview with Zeljka Bilandzija, 13 2005. 267 Watkins, Amadeo. 2005. Croatia at April 2005. a Crossroads: The EU-ICTY Debate. 298 SPECTRA Project Document, Balkans Series (05/15). London: 282 Besides the MoD, this includes Zagreb, October 2002, p. 6. Confl ict Studies Research Center, the Ministry of Homeland War pp. 3–4. Veterans, the Ministry of Small and 299 “Socio-Economic Analysis of Medium Enterprises, the Ministry Separated Ministry of Defense 268 Ibid, p. 6. of Finance, Ministry of Education, Personnel”, September 2004. Ministry of Economy, as well as the 269 Ibid. Croatian Employment Service. 300 Ibid., p. 8-9.

270 Stanicic, Mladen. 2004. “Croatia: 283 SPECTRA Project Document, 301 SPECTRA Project Document, Defense Reform, Civil-Military Zagreb, October 2002, pp. 18–19. Zagreb, October 2002, p. 23. Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration.” In Vesel Gyarmati. 284 Ibid., p. 20. 302 Interview with Zvonko Popovic and 2004. Security Sector Governance in Vjekoslav Golubovic, 12 April 2005.

76 B I C C endnotes

303 Interview with SPECTRA and IOM approximately €473 million, while 2005 to the NATO Expert Team representatives in Osijek, 14 April maintenance of the sites adds up to regarding base conversion in 2005. 4 million Kuna or €540,000. Croatia.

304 See Table 2 in the Annex. 316 “Base Conversion. Offi cial 329 PowerPoint Presentation of the Remarks.” Offi cial reply of the MoD, Zagreb, 7 March 2005. 305 As one can see in the different Croatian Ambassador in October Tables in the Annex which have 2005 to the NATO Expert Team 330 See Tables 6–8 in the Annex. been provided by the MoD. regarding base conversion in Croatia. 331 Stanicic, Mladen. 2004. “Croatia: 306 There was no reply to that question Defense Reform, Civil-Military in a meeting of the NATO Task 317 There was no opposition to it at Relations and Euro-Atlantic Force Defense Conversion with the meeting of the NATO Task Integration.” In Vesel Gyarmati. representatives of the Croatian Force Defense Conversion with 2004. Security Sector Governance in MoD, MFA, Privatization Fund and representatives of the Croatian the Western Balkans, Baden-Baden: the SPECTRA program in Zagreb, MoD, MFA, Privatization Fund and IISS/SIPRI, p. 161. 7 March 2005. the SPECTRA program in Zagreb, 7 March 2005. 332 Presentation of SPECTRA at BICC, 307 See Table 5 in the Annex. Bonn, December 2005. 318 See Tables 6–8 in the Annex. 308 Ibid. 333 And the three countries in question 319 Ibid. share those with other Balkan 309 National Annual Program countries, too, such as Serbia (NAP) for the third cycle of 320 Interview with Ivan Kovacev, and Montenegro or Bosnia and the Membership Action Plan, Zagreb, 7 March 2005. Herzegovina. See Pietz, Tobias and September 2004, p. 91–92. Marc Remillard. 2005. Demobilizing 321 PowerPoint Presentation of the and Retraining for the Future. The 310 Interview with Vlatko Crvtila, MoD, Zagreb, 7 March 2005, Armed Forces in Serbia and Montenegro. Zagreb, 13 April 2005. provided in electronic form to the Brief 31. Bonn: BICC; See also authors. Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas and 311 Interview with representatives Tobias Pietz. 2003. Turning Soldiers from NATO’s Defense Policy 322 See Table 1 in the Annex. into a Workforce. Demobilization and and Planning Division, Brussels, 9 Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and December 2005. 323 PowerPoint Presentation of the Herzegovina. Brief 27. Bonn: BICC. MoD, Zagreb, 7 March 2005, 312 SDR, Zagreb, March 2005, p. 39–40. provided in electronic form to the 334 Military Academy authors. 313 See Tables 6–8 in the Annex. Again, 335 Others: Croatians, Bulgarians, this number is contradicted by Table 324 See Table 3 in the Annex. Kosovars , Greeks and Hungarians 3 indicating that 100 sites have been are extremely limited in number. transferred in the years 2001 to 325 Interview with Branko Hrg, 2005. Krizevci, 8 March 2005. 336 The number of individuals can change with the change of the 314 See Table 1 in the Annex. This 326 Meeting of the NATO Task Law amending and modifying the contradicts the NAP from October Force Defense Conversion with Army Service Law, adopted in 2004 that indicated 256 facilities representatives of the Croatian December 2005. This number does to be kept. On the other hand, MoD, MFA, Privatization Fund and not include the planned amount the NAP also cites the number of the SPECTRA program in Zagreb, of offi cers for accession from the 1992 (657 sites) to be currently 7 March 2005. ethnical communities for 2006 and at the disposal—though by 2004 2007, which is 113. The table will already hundreds of those had been 327 See Paes, Wolf-Christian, Tobias be updated after the selection of transferred. NAP, p. 91–92. Pietz, Hans Risser. 2004. Small Arms individuals who will be retired and Survey for BiH. Sarajevo: UNDP. will be included in the fi nal version 315 According to Croatian sources, the of the project. value of potential surplus facilities is 328 “Base Conversion. Offi cial estimated at about 3.5 billion Kuna, Remarks.” Offi cial reply of the 337 Croatian Armed Forces Croatian Ambassador in October

B I C C 77 BICC at a glance

ICC is an independent, non-profi t These three main areas of analysis are B organization dedicated to promoting peace complemented by additional crosscutting and development through the effi cient and aspects, for example, gender, pandemics, or effective transformation of military-related environmental protection. structures, assets, functions and processes. Having expanded its span of activities beyond Along with conducting research, running the classical areas of conversion that focus conferences and publishing their fi ndings, on the reuse of military resources (such as BICC’s international staff are also the reallocation of military expenditures, involved in consultancy, providing policy restructuring of the defense industry, closure recommendations, training, and practical of military bases, and demobilization), BICC project work. By making information and is now organizing its work around three main advice available to governments, NGOs, and topics: arms, peacebuilding and confl ict. In doing other public or private sector organizations, this, BICC recognizes that the narrow concept and especially through exhibitions aimed at the of national security, embodied above all in general public, they are working towards raising the armed forces, has been surpassed by that awareness for BICC’s key issues. of global security and, moreover, that global security cannot be achieved withoutseriously While disarmament frees up resources that reducing poverty, improving health care and can be employed in the fi ght against poverty, extending good governance throughout the conversion maximizes outcomes through the world, in short: without human security in the careful management of such transformation of broader sense. resources. It is in this sense that they together contribute to increasing human security. Arms: To this end, BICC is intensifying its previous efforts in the fi elds of weaponry and disarmament, not only through its very special work on small arms but also by increasing its expertise in further topics of current concern such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms embargoes and new military technologies. Published by Peacebuilding: BICC is extending its work in the © BICC, Bonn 2006 area of peacebuilding. In addition to examining Bonn International Center for Conversion Director: Peter J. Croll post-confl ict demobilization and reintegration Layout: Katharina Moraht of combatants and weapon-collection Publishing Management: Svenja Bends programs, the Center aims to contribute, An der Elisabethkirche 25 D-53113 Bonn among other things, to the development Germany of concepts of security sector reform with Phone +49-228-911960 Fax +49-228-241215 an emphasis on civilmilitary cooperation, E-mail: [email protected] increased civilian control of the military, and Internet: www.bicc.de the analysis of failed states. ISSN 0947-7322

Confl ict: BICC is broadening its scope in the Printed in Germany All rights reserved fi eld of confl ict management and confl ict prevention, including tensions caused by disputes over marketable resources and transboundary issues such as water.