Südosteuropa 57 (2009), H . 2/3, S . 284-304
DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY
WIM VAN MEURS
Romania: New Membership and Old Habits?
Abstract. Political developments in Romania as well as the resulting deficits in transition management since EU accession raise a number of fundamental but difficult questions . Should Romania’s “old habits” be thought of as a Huntingtonian blend of the country’s pre-communist political institutions and political culture mixed with “Ceauşescuism”, that is, Romania’s exceptional type of state socialism, sometimes dubbed “sultanism”? Or should these “old habits” actually be explained in terms of an event as recent as Romania’s EU accession proc- ess – and thus be seen as a sort of “post-accession syndrome”? Or should at least some part of the supposed Romanian or Balkan exceptionalism, to which Romania’s “old habits” are often attributed, be viewed in comparison with recent trends in the political culture – that is, the democratic attitudes of the citizens and the informal rules of the political process – in West European polities? Questioning path-dependencies cannot alleviate the problems caused by the obvious flaws in Romania’s political process, but thinking through negative pan-European trends does imply rethinking stereotypes about the Balkans .
Wim van Meurs is an Associate Professor at the History Department of Radboud University, Nijmegen .
History and Characteristics of Transformation
Historically, Romania has been characterized by a modernization gap be- tween its southern and eastern regions, which remained under Ottoman rule until 1878, and its more modern, urbanized western and northwestern regions, which were under Habsburg rule until 1918 . In the interwar period, the newly unified Romanian state underwent a process of a political and economic mod- ernization in dependency, a process that continued the trend initiated in the mid-nineteenth century . Western models of statehood, democracy and market economy were grafted onto a Romanian society rooted in heterogeneous tra- ditions . The result was a quasi-democracy dominated by small political and economic elites; a political model that did not allow for the representation of wider societal interests or the internalization of the concept of popular sover- Romania 285 eignty . Nationalist mobilization became a substitute for modernization and the further integration of Romanian society .1 Despite some breakthroughs after the communist takeover in 1945-1947, the new regime failed to solve many of the problems of the prewar period . In fact, many of these problems were further accentuated during the last decade of Ceauşescu’s rule . Once again, an external model of modernization was grafted onto a Romanian reality . Political elites continued to perceive the state and the bureaucratic apparatus as their property rather than a policy instrument . This perception resulted in rampant nepotism, etatism and simulated reforms – even during the more liberal decade after 1965 2. By the early 1980s, the combination of an autonomous foreign policy and Stalinist approaches to modernization and domestic affairs had run its course . The result was nationalist mobilization and economic decay 3. Lacking a substantial, outspoken and influential opposition – partly because the Ceauşescu clan monopolized national(ist) mobilization and repressed organ- ized dissent and independent voices within the party – the revolution of 1989 was essentially a power struggle among different segments of the nomenklatura rather than the beginning of a widespread political transformation . Thus, al- though Romania was the only country in Eastern Europe to witness a violent end to communism, the net outcome of Romania’s 1989 is generally considered to have been more of a “palace revolution” than a clear break with the past 4. Be- ing highly distrustful of market economics and pluralist democracy, and facing some distinct disadvantages in comparison to most of the other East European states on the path towards EU accession, Romania increasingly fell behind its neighbors in the reform process of the 1990s 5. When the democratic opposition finally won the presidential and parlia- mentary elections in 1996, expectations were quite high . The new center-right government under President Constantinescu and the Democratic Convention of Romania (DCR) initiated the restructuring of heavy industries and the min- ing sector, liquidated economic black holes, consolidated the banking system, privatized several large state-owned enterprises, liberalized most input prices
1 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania . Regionalism, Nation-Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 . Ithaca/N .Y . 1995, 1-28 . 2 Michael Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated Change . London 1985 . 3 Avner Ben-Ner / J . Michael Montias, The Introduction of Markets in a Hypercentralized Economy: The Case of Romania, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1991), n . 4, 163-170 . 4 Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die unvollendete Revolution . Rumänien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie . München 1990 . 5 Tom Gallagher, Modern Romania . The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation . New York 2005 . 286 Wim van Meurs and established the full convertibility of the Romanian currency .6 Yet, the vari- ous DCR-led governments lacked political coordination and failed to settle their internal political differences . For these reasons,he t DCR lost both the presidency and the parliamentary majority in 2000 . Ion Iliescu was elected (again) as presi- dent and, under Adrian Năstase, a Social Democratic Party minority government supported by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania entered office7 . As a result, the same members of the former nomenklatura who had taken power following Ceauşescu’s ouster during the December 1989 revolution took office once again . The ambitious but somewhat amateurish politics of President Constantinescu and the center-right Democratic Convention (1996-2000) created a sense of reform fatigue and political disillusionment among the electorate . A broad impression of policy failure, although only partially justified, added to the extreme uncertainty and hardship among the losers of the transition process 8. While many politicians from the first and second Iliescu presidencies (1990– 1996) returned to power “sadder and wiser” in 2000 after four years in the op- position, most political parties now featured younger cadres for the first time since the revolution of December 1989 . The stability of the political system, however, was deceptive and based on shrewd control and clientelism rather than a culture of constructive policy-making . Simulated reforms, etatism, occa- sional bouts of nationalist rhetoric, incomplete separation of powers and blurred distinctions between the state, parties and the private sector still ran high in Romania 9. Overall, the new leftist government did better than most analysts expected, probably because popular expectations were at an all-time low and because the process of EU integration provided much-needed assistance as well as the basic framework and incentive for reforms . Somewhat surprisingly, the re-labeled Social Democrats were especially successful in their attempts to achieve macroeconomic stability . Their control of public expenditure left the country with very low deficits at the end of 2004 . The Social Democrats also managed to conclude all the acquis chapters negotiated with the European Union, albeit with notable red flags concerning the judiciary, the fight against corruption and institutional preparedness for EU funds . Consequently, the EU relegated Romania (and Bulgaria) to the second phase of its Eastern enlarge- ment and installed safeguard clauses and the post-accession Cooperation and Verification Mechanism to assuage the concerns of skeptical member states10 .
6 Ibid ., 142-210 . 7 Marina Popescu, The Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Romania, November 2000, Electoral Studies 22 (2003), n . 2, 325-334 . 8 Gallagher, Modern Romania (above fn . 5), 239-266 . 9 Open Society Institute, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Romania, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy . Budapest 2002, 451-515 . 10 Dimitris Papadimitriou, Romania and the European Union: From Marginalisation to Membership . London 2008, 54-63 . Romania 287
In the 1990s, Romania’s economic reforms suffered from disadvantageous framework conditions, including erratic management, and wavering popular support for economic and political transformation . The size of the national economy, the predominance of the poorly mechanized agricultural sector, and Romania’s run-down, obsolete industrial complex have made transformation particularly challenging . Ceauşescu himself created some of these problems by striving for autarky and by paying off foreign debt at the expense of domestic consumption and investment in capital goods during the 1980s .11 Successive governments were reluctant to implement reforms that would impose transition hardships and erode pro-reform constituencies . Price liberali- zation and employment reduction have produced legacies of bad credit, back- logs in large-scale privatization processes and pseudo-employed workforces . The changes of government and the absence of a coherent reform concept with enough public and political support have resulted in erratic transformation policies, especially those regarding privatization or restitution and its ever- changing laws and institutional frameworks . This situation has made both the Romanian population and international investors extremely wary 12. Overall, Romania’s hesitancy to thoroughly transform itself has been self-defeating . Critical resources for constructive polices were depleted during the 1990s due to the waning of initial domestic momentum, and a lack of competitiveness in the struggle for Western investment within the former Eastern bloc . In the 2000s, however, Romania’s relatively low labor costs gave it an edge over countries that were further along in the EU accession process . Improved transition man- agement and the credibility bonus that EU candidacy brought to the country led to six to seven per cent GDP growth rates throughout Romania from 2003 until the beginning of the global financial crisis in late 2008 .13
Democracy
Political developments in Romania as well as the resulting deficits in tran- sition management since EU accession on 01 January 2007 raise a number of difficult fundamental questions . Should Romania’s “old habits” be thought of as a Huntingtonian blend of the country’s pre-communist political institutions and political culture mixed with “Ceauşescuism”, that is, Romania’s exceptional
11 Vlad Georgescu, Romania in the 1980s . The Legacy of Dynastic Socialism,East European Politics and Society 2 (1988), n . 1, 69-93, 70 . 12 Wim van Meurs, Land Reform in Romania – A Never Ending Story, South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs 2 (1999), n . 2, 109-122 . 13 Gábor Hunya, Romania on the Verge of Recession . Country Reports, WIIW Balkan Ob- servatory, February 2009, available at
14 Juan J . Linz / Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe . Baltimore 1996, 199 . 15 Ralph T . Niemeyer, Romania: Post Accession Syndrome, EU Reporter, 12 July 2007, available at
Stateness
By historical tradition, the Romanian concept of the nation is defined strongly in ethnic terms . In fact, the Romanian constitution defines it in such terms (stating that, “national sovereignty resides with the Romanian people”) and provides the normal guarantees of liberal constitutionalism . A civic concept including the significant Hungarian and Roma minorities has thus arf failed to find acceptance beyond formal legal texts . The integration of Roma in particular is hindered by widespread stereotypes and discriminatory practices . Support for nationalist- extremist, openly anti-Semitic and xenophobic parties and movements has been declining for some years . The Greater Romania Party received 13 % of the vote in 2004, but only 3 % of the vote (and no seats) in the 2008 parliamentary elec- tions . Evidence from public life and political rhetoric, however, indicates that societal perceptions of citizenship may be disharmonious with constitutional stipulations guaranteeing civic rights, and that entrenched discriminatory at- titudes still linger in society .17
Political Participation
The various elections of the reporting period – the November 2007 European elections, the June 2008 local elections and the November 2008 parliamentary elections – were generally considered “free and fair”, despite mutual incrimina- tions and allegations of fraud, attacks on political opponents and vote rigging . The Romanian Media Monitoring Agency particularly criticized biased radio and TV coverage of the parliamentary elections . Nevertheless, the functioning of elections and the building of coalitions without risk for the system of demo- cratic representation has been indicative of the consolidation of the Romanian political landscape and the acceptance of democratic procedures . Prior to the November 2008 general elections, the electoral system was changed radically from a system of proportional representation to a mixed system centered on a first-past-the-post “uninominal” concept . The stated objective of this new sys- tem is to bring a better representation of voters’ will at the regional level into parliament . Unfortunately, however, the system is bound to produce populist rhetoric and political strife because the ruling coalition drew the borders of the electoral districts in its favor .18 The Romanian constitution of 1991 provides the usual political and civil lib- erties, including freedom of expression, association and assembly . In practice,
17 Michael Shafir, Romania’s Road to “Normalcy”, Journal of Democracy 8 (1997), n . 2, 144-158; Rogers Brubaker, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town . Princeton 2006 . 18 Mihail Chiru / Ionuţ Ciobanu, Legislative Recruitment and Electoral System Change: the Case of Romania, CEU Political Science Journal 4 (2008), n . 2, 192-231 . 290 Wim van Meurs however, rights to association and assembly are often hampered by admin- istrative means . The activities of unwelcome critical NGOs, for example, are obstructed at both the local and the national level . Recently, political parties and government agencies have begun trying to co-opt particularly critical citizens or NGOs by offering them employment . In other cases these critics have been discredited through smear campaigns in media outlets controlled by the political elite . A retroactive law requiring the dismantlingof associations and foundations whose names are found objectionable was passed in 2008 . Although the law was amended in early 2009, it continues to be a sign of the permanent pressure criti- cal groups have to live with in Romania . Although most media outlets continue to hold a clear political preference, the culture of political reporting is changing and overt political interference is declining . In terms of in-depth analyses and public interest in high politics, it may be argued that political reporting has been degrading rapidly in the last few years . Measures have been taken to increase the transparency of the ownership and income (advertising) structures of the media . Despite these measures, however, the owners of media outlets continue to assert their own opinions over the professional independence of journalists . The actions of a few NGOs that serve as watchdogs for media independence, such as the Media Monitoring Agency, the Center for Independent Journalism and the Romanian Press Club, show that civil society is aware of the issue of press freedom 19.
Rule of Law
State powers in Romania are independent, and checks and balances of political power are stipulated in the constitution . Events during the year 2007, however, severely shook public confidence in democratic consolidation and the rule of law . First, the prime minister dismissed several ministers for being too close to the president . Next, the parliament ignored a judgment of the Constitutional Court by impeaching the president and simultaneously amending the threshold for a subsequent referendum in its favor . This referendum was the last consti- tutional step in the impeachment procedure . Although the formal (amended) rules of the impeachment procedure were not violated de jure, the way the impeachment process was carried out is highly indicative of the political elite’s disrespect for the separation of powers . The reasons the Parliament cited for ignoring the ruling of the Constitutional Court were rather self-serving, yet the threat of impeachment should normally suffice to compel a president to resign out of respect for his high office20 .
19 Freedom House, Romania, Nations in Transit . New York 2008 . 20 Romanian President Faces Impeachment Poll, EurActiv, 23 May 2007, available at Moreover, as expected, the bad habit of legislating via government ordinances (and thus bypassing parliament) has continued after EU accession . The executive bias and the urgency of accession can no longer serve as justification; this bad practice has simply become institutionally ingrained 21. The tug-of-war between the president and the prime minister has only added to the already widespread disrespect for the separation of powers and for the fundamental self-imposed constraints on political competition . On the otherhand, an erosion of constraints and regulations informing party politics and public debate may be discerned in most European polities since the late 1990s, in “old” EU member states as well as in “new” ones .22 The ongoing conflict between the executive and legislative branches as well as the judiciary’s powers to prosecution corruption have threatened the independ- ence of the judiciary and been detrimental to public trust . Not surprisingly, the reform of the judiciary, a key issue in the finalization (and postponement by one year) of Romania’s EU accession, remains a focal point of the post-accession monitoring process . Arguably, some of the amendments that were suggested as reforms to the criminal and civil codes threatened to make it more difficult to prosecute corrupt politicians and civil servants . The Superior Council of Mag- istrates’ position as an independent guarantor of transparency remains an issue of particular concern according to the latest EU Report on Progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism . The independence of the Council depends on its composition and the resources to which it has access . The inclusion of procurators by the executive is rated as a drawback for an autonomous body of the magistracy . The Commission concluded its report by noting that the reform of the judiciary had been backsliding in recent months .23 Overall, Romania’s track record in the field of judicial reform has been mixed over the past three years . On the one hand, the dismissal of the popular and proactive Minister of Justice Monica Macovei in February 2007 demonstrated the unwillingness of the political class to pay more than lip service to the ob- jective of anti-corruption .24 Since then, parliament has amended legislation in order to unduly strengthen the position of politicians and civil servants 163364?Ref=RSS>, 13 October 2009 . 21 Heather Grabbe, The Process of EU Accession: What Will It Bring to Southeast Europe?, Global Development Network Southeast Europe research paper, November 2003, available at Stability of Democratic Institutions The performance of Romania’s democratic institutions was severely compro- mised by two recent conflicts . The political quarrel between president Băsescu and prime minister Popescu-Tăriceanu in 2007 as well as the tensions within the governing coalition of PD and PNL proved problematic for Romania . Both parliament and the president used dubious strategies in order to further their interests . The parliament put pressure on a minister to resign without risking a motion of no confidence against the entire government while the presi- dent alleged government corruption and made public statements intentionally contradicting government policies on key political issues such as Romania’s military presence in Iraq . The frequent deadlocks between the main political parties as well as those between the president and the prime minister increased the populace’s distrust in political leadership and its weariness of politicking . Thus, many political actors who accept democratic institutions in principle are not above bending the democratic principles of separation of powers or the (unwritten) rules of democratic procedure and behavior . The president’s use of populism, evident in his derogatory statements, however, points to a deficit in political culture . Paradoxically, public trust in the political institutions of Romania increased from 2007 to 2008, albeit from a low starting point . Trust in the political parties 25 Freedom House, Romania (above fn . 19) . 26 Traian Ungureanu, Lawmakers Derail Romania’s Corruption Fight, Radio Free Europe, 27 July 2008, available at Political and Social Integration Over the past two years the composition and framework of the Romanian party landscape has changed gradually but substantially . The decision to elect the presidents of the County Councils directly is generally considered a positive step towards more accountability on the regional level . The separation of presi- dential and parliamentary elections as of 2004 (by prolonging the president’s term of office to five years) and, more importantly, the revision of the electoral law, have increased the incentive to create broadly-based parties rather than political parties dependent on one or a few political leaders . Electoral reform changed the electoral system from one based on proportional representation to a mixture of proportional and absolute-majority systems 28. Additionally, the break-up of the PNL-PD coalition in 2007 is expected to lead to the consolida- tion of the party landscape and to favor parties that have a stronger profile and social base as opposed to more traditional, leader-driven parties . The paralyzing schism between post-communists and democratic opposition is eroding and a more typical European range of parties is emerging – the liberal PDL, the social 27 Eurobarometru 69: Opinia publică în Uniunea Europeană . Raport naţional România, spring 2008, available at Market Economy In 2007 and 2008, high economic growth made up for most political short- comings, but the current global financial crisis is bound to reduce growth in Romania as drastically as in most other post-communist economies of Eastern Europe . Romania’s economic growth has been rather nevenu in several respects . Little progress has been achieved in the backward agricultural sector as well as in the process of industrial restructuring . Conversely, the IT and service sectors are booming in Bucharest and a handful of other cities . Consequently, socio-economic disparities between these boomtowns and other parts of the country, especially the countryside, are becoming structurally ingrained . The same applies to inequality in income levels and the availability of social infra- structure . After the concerted effort to achieve EU accession, Romanian politics returned to politicking . As a result, the implementation of the reform legislation 29 Freedom House, Romania (above fn . 19) . 30 Ibid . Romania 295 left much to be desired over the past two years . Moreover, with the EU mission accomplished, strategic political agenda-setting (i e . . a focus on plans to address issues such as social security policies and regional or social disparities) seems to have declined rapidly . Much is left to the current advantages and dynamics of the Romanian economy, while labor market reforms and social-cohesion policies are lagging 31. Institutional Framework With EU accession, the institutions of a market economy were put in place . These include the freedom of trade, currency convertibility, etc . The Romanian state was rightly criticized in the first phases of the transformation process for upholding too large a role for the state in economic development . In the mean- time, however, overregulation has turned into a laissez-faire-attitude and exces- sive capitalism . Legal and illegal Gastarbeiter and their remittances contribute substantially to the subsistence of families back home, but these contributions do not further sustainable macroeconomic development . As an EU member state, the infrastructure facilitating private enterprise is well in place in Romania . The state even offers competitive taxation regimes for foreign investors, and foreign direct investment is increasing at a rapid pace . As far as official procedures are concerned, Romania has not improved much according to the World Bank’s rankings on the ease of doing business . Romania was ranked 47th here in both 2008 and 2009, but that was not much below the regional average . Despite improvements in corporate law (in order to comply with EU norms) as well as favorable scores for ease of getting credit, Romania’s overall rank remained unchanged 32. Socioeconomic Performance Due to the growing urban-rural disparities in the processes of socioeconomic transformation and European integration, social exclusion is structurally in- grained in Romania . Gender is hardly a factor, as the Gender Related Develop- ment Index (GDI) is close to 100 % of the Human Development Index (HDI) . Other UNDP poverty-related indices, on the other hand, show that poverty, though not extreme, is a substantial problem, with almost 30 % of the population living below the national poverty line . FDI and economic growth are strongly 31 Interim Report From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: On Progress in Romania Under the Co-Operation and Verification Mechanism, 12 February 2009, available at 33 Romanian Government, Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural Development, Na- tional Strategic Plan of Rural Development 2007-2013 . Bucharest, 2006, available at Sustainability To some extent, environmental hazards have been reduced by deindustri- alization, but industrial air pollution is still significant in some cities and in northwestern Romania . The Danube delta wetlands are threatened by water contamination 36. Although Romania has managed to finish negotiations on the relevant acquis communautaire chapter, the implementation of EU environmen- tal protection standards remains quite minimal . Apparently, the government has become more aware and more proactive on environmental issues because of EU accession negotiations, even though many initiatives are still pushed by international organizations such as the UNDP and civil society organizations . Concerns about the water supply and of energy consumption are being ad- dressed in order to comply with EU environmental standards and international conventions . To this end, the Romanian government ndorsede a comprehensive National Strategy for Sustainable Development in November 2008 37. The main problems in Romanian education and R&D investment concern not the general level of education, but the uncontrolled mushrooming of non- accredited institutions of higher education . Government spending on education has improved, but, like in other elitist societies, the allocation of resources is skewed in favor of (public) higher education . Addressing issues of economic competitiveness and closing the urban-rural quality gap will require a substan- tial investment in primary education throughout the country . Public spending on research and development remains far below the EU or OECD average . R&D spending registered a spectacular boost in 2007 and 2008, but the effects of this increased spending are debatable . Overall, this shows that financing is just one of the many problems related to R&D in Romania, and probably not the most intractable one .38 35 United Nations Development Programme, National Human Development Report Ro- mania 2007/2008 . Bucharest 2007, 12-14 . 36 Catherine Lovatt, An der schoenen, braunen Donau . Romania’s Not-So-Blue Danube . Central European Review 1 (1999), n . 12, available at Level of Difficulty Several factors in various fields combined to constrain policy options for transition management in Romania . The PSD government (2000-2004), despite its strong rural base and connections with the rural nomenklatura, failed to create a more thorough policy of rural transformation . The prominence of sub- sistence farming in Romania continues to act as a key socioeconomic constraint . The sheer size of the country, its relatively low degree of urbanization, and the strong links between smaller cities and rural areas comprise an additional set of socioeconomic constraints . Forced industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s as well as the austerity policies of the 1980s produced non-viable, run-down heavy industry . In rural areas, weak infrastructure adds to the structural obstacles to socioeconomic transition . The absence of a clear political break from and disavowal of the communist nomenklatura in the management of agricultural and industrial enterprises has left an unfortunate legacy . The democratic op- position’s interregnum from 1996 to 2000 improved agenda setting and reform implementation, but the democrats failed to make up for time lost in the first years of the transition process because of the well-entrenched interest groups that they faced . The following government’s foot dragging on socioeconomic reforms has only perpetuated the apparent lack of a viable alternative . The younger urban population continues to reap the profits of an uneven, but accelerating, transformation process while (part of the) rural population remains ill-equipped for the consequences of market economics and social change . The continuity of a strong, xenophobic nationalist tradition from communism to post-communism has increased both conservatism and popular resistance to reforms . Unlike in Bulgaria for instance, the strength of the nationalist-extremist political wing in Romania has distorted the “normal” dynamics of a neo-communist versus democratic-reformist bipolarity . Increased political competition in recent years has been detrimental to transformation management and has increased the risks to the democratic process . At the same time, it may be argued that the weak- ness of political interference has allowed for substantial economic development and growth . Due to the weakness of the state’s role in sustainability, regional redistribution and social equality continue to be seriously threatened, not least because of the global financial crisis39 . Outside polarized political circles, conflict intensity seems rather low . Social conflicts pose a major potential risk, but the population has found coping strate- gies outside of the political elite’s transformation management . Discrimination against the Roma minority, however, seems to continue unabated . Ethnic conflict 39 Ibid . Romania 299 and resentment vis-à-vis the Hungarian minority in Transylvania seem to be declining, a fact that is evident in the demise of the voraciously anti-Hungarian Greater Romania Party . Still unwarranted provocations by mainstream politi- cians have continued into recent years . Both UNICEF and Amnesty Interna- tional have reported on widespread social discrimination concerning the Roma minority in areas such as employment, housing, health (70 per cent of Roma households do not have direct water supply) and education . Hate speech and intolerance in the media and by some public authorities has continued 40. The same discrimination applies to sexual minorities, a societally taboo segment of the population with few vocal advocates . Steering Capability The prospect of EU membership and the process of accession since 1999 have guided, stimulated and assisted reform policies . Yet, the deeply ingrained tradition of simulated reforms and exploitation of the state, combined with the structural skepticism and subversion of the population vis-à-vis state policies, have at times brought the reform process to a virtual standstill . Anti-corruption policy is a telling example . Obviously a major flaw in the reform process, cor- ruption, also became the focal point of EU criticism and very nearly blocked Romania’s EU accession .41 Despite verbose promises to the contrary, the Ro- manian political elite has failed to sustain the anti-corruption agenda . Instead, it has cut resources in order to erode the independence of the anti-corruption agencies and used blunt political interference in high-profile cases such as that of former PM Năstase 42. The government is committed to democracy and market economy but it has had only limited success in implementing reforms and overcoming structural obstacles . In many cases, follow-through has been het main problem . Thus, even when the correct initial policy choices were made by the Romanian government and accepted by the European Union and international financial institutions, the government often failed to pay enough attention to their implementation . This lack of government attention enabled interest groups to sabotage reforms 40 UNICEF, Romania Annual Report 2006, available at Consensus-Building Although the political establishment has accepted in principle the goals of market economy and democracy, a sub-current of etatism remains, largely ir- respective of the party coalition in power . Thus, het previous Popescu-Tăriceanu government tended to invest more in power conflicts within the political realm than in broadening societal trust and building support for government poli- cies . The general atmosphere of political polarization and its effects in society have been detrimental to broader consensus-building on long-term objectives and strategies . The main cleavages threatening social cohesion and coherence are the per- sistent socio-economic disparity between urban and rural Romanians as well as the disparity between the winners and losers of the transformation process . These disparities have an increasingly apparent regional dimension . Whereas the Bucharest-Ilfov development region has long since reached 75 per cent of the EU average standard of living, predominantly rural regions in the North- east and Southwest of the country have barely reached the 25 per cent mark 44. Market mechanisms within the EU common market as well as scarcely targeted governmental policies and strategies, are behind these growing cleavages and conflict potentials . The partially illegal migration of segments of the labor force 43 Frank Schimmelfennig, Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Mem- bership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe, International Organization 59 (2005), n . 4, 827-860 . 44 UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008 (above fn . 38) . Romania 301 to other EU countries, human trafficking, and the related import of remittances contribute substantially to upholding the rural population’s subsistence and abilities of economic consumption . For the first time in more than a decade, the Hungarian UDMR is not part of the government coalition 45. By upholding the government’s dominance in most policy fields, albeit at a basic level, politicians promote continued reliance on the state rather than social engagement . The state engages with think tanks and NGOs only as a result of Western pressure or an organization’s increasing popularity, or when the state administration itself lacks the required competence . Overall, the government does not appear to welcome a broader policy dialogue with civil-society or- ganizations . At best, it accepts cooperation with an elite of not necessarily rep- resentative think tanks and NGOs . The gradual increase in career permeability between government bureaucracy and political representative institutions on the one hand, and civil society and advocacy organizations on the other hand, may be considered a positive trend . Unfortunately, some of the few critical voices have been effectively silenced by co-optation into administrative and political responsibilities . Younger politicians with a civil-society background, moreover, are usually relegated to relatively unimportant positions . Due to the quasi-revolution of 1989 and the ensuing continuity of the politi- cal and economic elite, violations of human rights under the Gheorgiu-Dej and Ceauşescu regimes were not tackled comprehensively and purposively dur- ing the first post-communist decade . Concerns about Romania’s international reputation, particularly in response to European pressure, have induced recent governments, with former president Iliescu taking the lead, to address specific issues more seriously . These issues include a collective and historical re-thinking of the country’s communist history . Initiatives by NGOs and internationally supported academic organizations have played a crucial role in this process .46 A Holocaust commemoration day was introduced into the national calendar, and the long-taboo subject of the Holocaust in Romania was finally integrated into the school curriculum, albeit without initiating a campaign of reconcili- ation or anything resembling a truth and justice commission 47. The past two years have not seen major government initiatives to address the injustices of the past authoritarian/fascist and communist regimes . Apart from some vocal civil-society groups, revisiting historical injustices seems to have low priority in Romanian society as a whole . The protracted process of property restitution, close to completed in most other post-communist countries, has been delayed 45 Ibid . 46 Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Bucha- rest 2004, available at International Cooperation Overall, Romania has made effective use of the international support for political and economic transformation that it has received from the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the IMF, and the World Bank . Differences of opinion on economic strategies have not led to major tensions . The implementation of reform legislation, however, remains an issue of concern, both on the political and the economic level . Reform programs concerning the judiciary, local administration and corruption have all demonstrated Romania’s strong inclination to follow international guidelines and advice on the basic principles of the reform frameworks . Yet, the failure of successive governments to invest in details of the implementation has subverted the original objectives of the reforms . Despite the drawbacks of corruption and state exploitation, Romania’s in- ternational standing has improved, as indicated by its newly acquired status as an EU member state . Romania’s transformation management credibility has suffered a severe blow with the virtual disintegration of governmental develop- ment strategies right after EU accession, however . Both the political infighting and the apparent loss of a sense of direction and grand objectives after acces- sion have been detrimental to Romania’s credibility as an international partner . Romania’s involvement in the Bush administration’s war on terror and its role 48 Dragoş Bogdan / Suzana Dobre / Sorin Ioniţă, Property Restitution: What Went Wrong in Romania?, Romanian Journal of Political Sciences 8 (2008), n . 2, 3-23 . 49 Mayor Paints Town Red – and Yellow and Blue, BBC News, 09 November 2001, avail- able at Strategic Outlook Romania’s post-accession progress is both impressive and fragile . Since 2006, economic growth had been solid, but decelerating (growth occurred at a rate of six to seven per cent over the past three years but the prognosis is only two per cent) 52. The global financial crisis is bound to have a mid-term detrimental impact for Romania, as well . Thus far, impressive growth rates have covered up two underlying structural problems . First, economic growth in Romania is typically concentrated in specific economic sectors and a handful of urban centers . Second, Romania’s economic growth was only partially the result of adequate government policies, implementation and strategic agenda setting . The global financial crisis will put Romania’s apparent macroeconomic stability and the new government’s capability as a responsible socio-economic (crisis-) manager to the test . It may also exacerbate the unwelcome side effects of the past economic transformation – massive illegal migration to other EU countries, 50 Dan Bilefsky, Inquiry Ties European Nations to C .I .A . Prisons,New York Times, 07 June 2006, available at