Airpower Journal, Published Quarterly, Is the Professional Journal of the Uijifed States Air Force

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n't l' i r Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Ervin C. Sharpe, Jr.

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor Capt John J. Doherty

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the Uijifed States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Winter 1991, Vol. V, No. 4 AFRP 50 2

Editorial 2

The Composite Wing in Combat Brig Gen Lee A. Downer, USAF 4

Of Demons, Storms, and Thunder: A Preliminary Look at Vietnam's Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Campaign \laj Mark Clodfelter, USAF 17

Air Power in Desert Storm and the Need for Doctrinal Change Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF 33

Toward a Rational Space- Transportation Architecture Lt Col Alan J. Parrington, USAF 47 The Soviet Military and the New Air War in the Persian Gulf Mary C. FitzGerald 64

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 81 Notams Notices of Interest 89 Index 91 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL

The Confidence of Quality

ELF-PRESERVATION is a basic hu- sion and the way it is accomplished, man instinct. Not only is it the reason building excellence into every aspect of thatS people band together into groups, it the organization, and—through team- also is the reason they compete with each work—improving the quality of mission other. At the basic level, cooperation accomplishment. between group members promotes each For the team approach to work, there person's sense of self-preservation and must be an atmosphere of cooperation well-being. But people’s instincts to ad- wherein the members feel confident, ap- vance their own cause may at times take preciated. and essential to their group’s higher priority than the group’s need for success. They must see that there is plenty cooperation. This attitude sets the stage for of recognition, satisfaction, and praise for contention, competition, and hostility. everyone. In such an environment, the Such self-centeredness can emerge if peo- achievements of any member would be a ple feel that they have “ lost” if someone reflection on the entire group’s quality. else "wins” something they did not. For Military organizations are beginning to example, when the boss recognizes certain appreciate the potential of total quality workers, a coworker may resent their good leadership. But implementation will take fortune and feel left out. With this outlook, time. Several roadblocks are in the path— life begins to be played as a zero-sum especially in the context of a reduction in game. the military force structure. Selective Early The traditional “ management by re- Retirement Boards, talk of reductions in sults” theory led to judging the worth of force, and other uncertainties tend to organizations by their conformance to encourage self-preservation rather than the arbitrary standards or their attainment of confidence that is needed for teamwork. imposed goals or quotas. Experience Once the force trimming is over, however, shows that this theory brings out that old the path should be much clearer. self-preservation instinct and saps much of If the concepts of total quality lead- the group’s energy because people begin to ership are to take hold, we need funda- look out for themselves and feel short- mental, institutional changes and a re- changed if someone else gets a pat on the assessment of the ways we have tradi- back. tionally operated. One target for evaluation A better way of thinking indicates that a is the “up-or-out” system, which is essen- team approach is much more effective in tially geared toward management by re- accomplishing the real purpose of an orga- sults. We must ask whether this system nization, which is to perform its mission stimulates the instinct for self-preservation with excellence and assure the long-term or whether it produces a mind-set that well-being of its members. This approach, encourages quality and teamwork. The called total quality leadership, invites bottom-line question is. Does it nurture people into the decision-making process careerism, or does it increase military and focuses the organization’s energies on excellence in defense of the nation? RBC performance. It requires studying the mis-

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- sive defense techniques rediscovered in the spondence should be addressed to the Editor, 1980s, including inflatable dummy aircraft and Airpovver Journal, Walker Hall. Bldg. 1400. radar reflectors. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the At first USAFE made rapid progress toward right to edit the material for overall length. this goal, at least in Germany while occupation deutsche marks were available, but Washington did not follow through on funding. By 1957 the AIR BASE SURVIVAL AND program had bogged down. The dispersed oper- AIRCRAFT DISPERSAL ating bases soon degenerated into standby bases, several of which were reopened in Captains Bahm and Polasek’s otherwise infor- France with great difficulty during the Berlin mative article. “Tactical Aircraft and Airfield Crisis of 1961. Recovery” (Summer 1991), states that “between Another somewhat bizarre basing concept of the Korean War and the Vietnam War. the Air the late 1950s and early 1960s was the zero- Force again neglected the critical role of run- length launch (ZEL) program, which generated ways and air bases.” Since many Air Force considerable planning in USAFE and NATO as leaders in that era had learned something about well as a number of spectacular tests at combat airfields in World War II, this neglect Edwards AFB, California. The ZEL program was not quite total. would have strapped rockets to fighter-bombers During the late 1950s. United States Air for instant takeoff from mobile trailers or spe- Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the Strategic Air cial hardened shelters—much like ground- Command's air divisions in the European the- launched cruise missiles. Their mission would ater completed one of the greatest peacetime have been the same: preplanned nuclear construction efforts in military history. From a strikes. mere dozen or so mostly noncombat airfields at Details on these and many other related the start of the decade, the Air Force built an extensive network of more than 40 active main topics may be found in my historical study. USAF Aircraft Basing in Europe. North Africa, operating bases stretching from England to and the Middle East. Morocco to Turkey. Only a rapidly shrinking 1945-1980 (April 1981), remnant of these remains today. which is available at the Air University Library and many Air F’orce history offices. Although the USSR's conventional capabilities were not yet much of a threat to most of As addressed in the companion article bv these installations in the 1950s, USAFE’s lead- Maj Jeffrey C. Prater, “VSTOL and Power Pro- ership did not ignore the danger posed by new jection: A Leap in Faith” (Summer 1991), the Soviet nuclear weapons. As part of the nuclear Air Force stubbornly resisted the development war-fighting doctrine of those days, Lt Gen and acquisition of aircraft designed for true dis- William H. Tunner, C1NCLISAFE, implemented persal, such as the Harrier. As reasons, it has an ambitious dispersal program for NATO's consistently cited performance limitations of Central Region in 1954 that went well beyond the aircraft and the logistical inefficiencies of the criteria recently established by Su- scattering support resources. Now, in an era of preme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe shrinking defense budgets, it may be too late to (SHAPE). obtain a close air support aircraft capable of USAFE's plan envisioned an extensive net- deploying with the troops. work of dispersed operating bases, landing The main reason for the Air Force's tradi- areas, and parking areas (including “hideaway tional aversion to VSTOL combat aircraft has bases" and autobahn strips) that would leave probably been more cultural than technical. no more than eight aircraft at each site when on Few people, whether aircrews or support per- alert. Associated with this concept was a wide sonnel, join the US Air Force so they can live range of infrastructure survivability measures, such as hardened shelters and mosi of the pas- continued on page 79

3 THE COMPOSITE WING IN COMBAT

Brig Gen Lee A. D owner, U S A F

N 17 JANUARY 1991, day one US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) that re- of Operation Desert Storm, the ceived the call. Turkish government quietly granted border-crossing ap- provalO for offensive operations against How the Wing Got Started Iraq. A cadre staff of the 7440th Composite Wing (provisional) had already planned, This unique organization originated dur- organized, and coordinated a series of ing the first few weeks after Iraq’s invasion options that ultimately allowed the flaw- of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 when a hand- less launch of a 20-ship package from ful of young officers in the 52d Tactical Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, within a few Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, short hours of that historic decision. This Germany, developed a concept to base first combat mission occurred in the midst electronic combat support in Turkey to of the arrival of over half of the newly support the forces preparing in the Gulf. formed wing’s initial forces, equipment, They wanted to complicate the Iraqi de- and personnel. The successful opening fense problem by diverting the enemy’s actions—as Desert Storm raged—were a attention and resources should war com- tribute to the readiness of the units from mence. The proposal picked up steam as it COMPOSITE WING IN COMBAT 5

moved through channels, ending up at operations, maintenance, and resources; Headquarters United States European and the combat support group’s com- Command (USEUCOM) where it was ap- mander—was the priority task, one that proved and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs would affect the entire operation. Between of Staff (JCS). While the JCS staffing and those key colonels and the home-station political approval process was under way, wing commanders of deploying squadrons, USEUCOM began forming a joint task we sought out recommendations for the force (JTF), later named JTF Proven Force. best group of company- and field-grade As the details and force options of this JTF officers in the command to fill the key bil- solidified. USAFE began to form the unit lets. The superstar approach worked es- that would provide the air component—a pecially well, giving us the intellectual composite wing whose commander would and technical horsepower to meet the also serve as the Air Force forces com- inevitable challenges. mander. USEUCOM commander Gen John Building the composite force was a bit R. Galvin and Gen Norman Schwarzkopf tougher. The most modern or most capable agreed that the JTF and its Air Force forces systems were already serving in Southwest commander would be under the opera- Asia, offering a range of solid capabilities tional control of USEUCOM but that all but not all that were desired to meet the operations would be under the tactical potential JTF objectives. Some forces that control of US Air Forces, Central Com- played an important role in our mission mand (CENTAF). were already present for duty at Incirlik. To man the unit, I was given the oppor- As Operation Desert Shield began, a train- tunity to start with a blank sheet of paper, ing detachment of F-lllEs based at Royal as well as access to all of the personnel Air Force Base Upper Heyford, United resources of USAFE. My objective was to Kingdom, but operating from incirlik, was surround myself with superstars, clear given orders to remain in place until fur- obstacles for them, and then get out of ther notice. Additionally, a squadron of their way. Selection of the key staff—a F-16s from Torrejon Air Base, Spain— vice-commander; deputy commanders for deployed for a NATO exercise—was held 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

in place to join the F-lllEs. Later, when Aircraft and personnel of Joint Task Force (JTF) Proven President George Bush added more forces Force. Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. Mart h 1991. Proven Force to the US Central Command area, 10 F-15s eliminated any illusion of safety that the Iraqi leadership from Bitburg Air Base, Germany, and four may have had about northern Iraq. Strategic Air Command KC-135 tankers from Dvess AFB, Texas, joined the base complement. The four organizations oper- included placing all the forces at Incirlik ated on a peacetime training detachment under one commander, developing an philosophy, retaining their home-station organization that could task and control chain of command for leadership, direc- forces from several major commands, and tion, and support. preparing to grow as the situation dictated. As these future elements of the com- The challenges of deployment and the pos- posite wing operated at Incirlik, the wing’s sibility of combat were two items in a long organization began to take shape on paper list of obstacles to be addressed. At this at Headquarters USAFE. The first tasks point, combat seemed remote, since major COMPOSITE W/NC IN COMBAT 7

already been identified were immediately given a JCS warning order to deploy. They received execution orders on 16 January and deployed the next day—day one of Desert Storm. As yet, the deployment order did not include approval for combat operations, but the order itself was a major step toward that end. We remained skepti- cal but did not diminish our massive effort to prepare for every eventuality. With the crushing initial blows of the air war already in full swing, 24 F-4G Wild Weasels, six EF-llls, four additional F-lllEs, 14 additional F-15s, eight additional KC-135s, three E-3Bs, and three EC-130s launched for Incirlik from bases around Europe. Finally—approximately midday—with aircraft, people, and equipment landing every few minutes, the 7440th received word that the government of Turkey had approved US unilateral offensive operations from Incirlik Air Base as soon as the Turk- ish General Staff could provide implementing instructions. Since early January 1991, we had been closely linked with CENTAF. which had given the wing a series of targets and times that would mesh the day-one and day-two attacks in northern Iraq with those from CENTAF, taking various potential force mixes into account. In the event Wild Weasels for surface-to-air missile suppres- sion or F-15s for counterair and other electronic combat support were not available, we had built an option to attack less

26 TRW PHOTO heavily defended targets. Sensing that border-crossing authority was imminent political and diplomatic hurdles still had and understanding that offensive opera- to be overcome. A cadre element deployed tions should be demonstrated as soon as in late December 1990 and early January practical, we narrowed our focus to a night 1991 to begin planning and preparation. attack on four early-warning sites rela- The 39th Tactical Group. Incirlik’s peace- tively close to the border. CENTAF agreed. time organization, worked hard to open as With acceptable risk, the F-llls could many options as possible, pending a deci- ingress Iraqi airspace at low altitude, sion to increase forces. attack assigned targets, and return with Secretary of State James Baker's visit to limited support. The takeoff at 23.50 Zulu President Turgut Ozal of Turkey on 12 Jan- (Greenwich mean time) on 17 January uary 1991 set many wheels in motion, 1991 came only a few hours after the allowing the bulk of the 7440th Composite awaited implementing directive from the Wing staff to deploy. The possibility of Turkish General Staff, but with the de- substantial force increases at Incirlik now tailed planning, coordination, and solid became a reality—the forces that had training base of all participants, the mis- 8 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

sion went like clockwork. USAFE and the F-16 pilots of the 7440th Composite Wing (provisional) in a 7440th were in the war. preflight briefing at the squadron operations center at Incirlik AB. Handpicked commanders planned the mission, picked the routes, and briefed all participants about three hours before launch time. Organization Organization of the wing was tradi- and provided guidance to the eight tactical tional. My experience as a wing com- aircraft maintenance units, each of which mander made the organization of the continued to report directly to its opera- deputy commanders easy to deal with. tional squadron commander. The big air- Superficially, the organization was identi- craft (KC-135s and E-3Bs) combined main- cal to that of a regular wing—in actuality, tenance under one organization with a however, it was significantly different. command relationship similar to that of The deputy commander for operations the aircraft maintenance units. The main- led 10 organizations of varying sizes. tenance operations center and the quality Additionally, he supervised intelligence assurance, statistical analysis, mainte- and led a control center with two director- nance scheduling, and ammunition units ates—current operations and combat were all part of the CAMS. To improve the plans. span of control and provide visible flight- The deputy commander for maintenance line leadership with the authority to pri- subsumed the Incirlik-based consolidated oritize tasks and equipment, the deputy aircraft maintenance squadron (CAMS) commander adjusted the organization after COMPOSITE WING IN COMBAT 9

a few weeks. That is. he created the would best attack those targets. As the equivalents of an aircraft generation Proven Force staff became experienced squadron commander and equipment with the northern one-third of Iraq, we maintenance squadron/component repair began to nominate other targets for CEN- squadron combined commander. Since the TAF approval. The 7440th combat plans aircraft maintenance units reported di- function, in coordination with the JTF rectly to their operational commanders, Proven Force staff, developed a campaign these new positions were more like flight- to attack the targets provided and ap- line coordinators than commanders, but proved by CENTAF in a prioritized man- the troops understood their purpose and ner that minimized risks to attackers yet better flight-line results were immediate. ensured maximum target destruction. Operational squadron commanders under- Two people were key to the operation— stood the relationship, since it was very the chief of combat plans and the mission similar to the standard used in peacetime commander. The former assisted JTF/J3 weapons training detachments throughout (Operations) in developing the campaign the command. plan, consolidated the daily operations The deputy commander for resources concept, and produced the air tasking owned transportation, supply, and budget. order (ATO). The initial inputs came from His biggest challenge was unifying the CENTAF as target lists, sometimes with supply systems for the various units in the CENTAF priorities or other special in- wing. The three squadrons that had de- structions attached. JTF/J3 then wrote a ployed to Incirlik prior to the war were daily operations order, which finalized the well established on the Incirlik supply JTF commander’s priorities. From this computer, but it took several weeks to order, combat planners then coordinated include the subsequent units. Eventually, with maintenance, resources, tactical even the E-3Bs from Tactical Air Com- squadrons, and off-station supporting mand were managed from a single com- units (such as the RC-135s at Hellenikon puter, providing excellent visibility into Air Base. Greece) to propose an operations problem areas in mission capability parts concept to the composite wing’s director for all aircraft. of operations. Operations tempo, decep- The combat support group continued its tion plans, weaponeering, package com- normal functions, augmented to support position, and limitations—if any—were the 5.500 additional people who were essential ingredients at this point. When eventually based at Incirlik. The group approved, the plan was transformed into also provided support for 550 people at an ATO. Approximately 28 hours elapsed Batman, an austere Turkish air base 300 from the beginning of the cycle to the start miles east of Incirlik where special forces of the execution day—beginning at 0001 and combat search and rescue forces were Zulu. Throughout Operation Desert Storm, located. the wing flew two to three packages per day—two during the day and one at night. Command and Control Efforts to remain unpredictable and to sus- tain the maintenance health of the wing The command relationship that CEN- drove the changing tempo. Since the ef- TAF tailored to Proven Force allowed us forts of thousands of people were affected considerable flexibility in mission execu- by the ATO, creating this document was a tion. Although the 7440th did not receive critical process. a true mission type order, our instructions came close to that. We were told to destroy Mission Planning the war-fighting capability of northern Iraq and were given a target list—developed and Execution and approved by CENTAF—but we had Once the ATO was published, the mis- the latitude to develop a campaign that sion commander—one per package—took 1U AIRPOYVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 over. Selected from officers in the attack- end of the mission, one of the most impor- ing squadron, the mission commander was tant tasks given to this busy officer was the one of a small number of the unit’s most mass debrief. This session, involving all experienced flight leaders—typically a participants in the package, was always squadron commander, operations officer, rich with incisive observations and no- or flight commander. Some of the mission holds-barred critiques of every aspect of commanders were graduates of fighter the mission. The vast amount of informa- weapons instructor courses, and some had tion that we learned from Proven Force attended NATO’s tactical leadership pro- operations can be attributed in large meas- gram. In addition, the many missions that ure to this critical event. they led or participated in during various As mission commanders became experi- flag exercises at Nellis AFB, Nevada, or enced in the process, it became obvious Cold Lake, Canada, provided perfect train- that they needed some nonflying help. ing and allowed these leaders to suc- Thus, mission monitors were created to cessfully accomplish the critical task of assist the mission commanders and relieve mission commander from day one. Mis- them of some of their tasks. A monitor (a sion commanders put the package plan captain or major with extensive opera- together, picked the route or routes to the tional experience) was assigned to each target, assigned specific duties to the sup- package and stayed with it from creation porting forces, and briefed all the par- of the ATO to final reporting of mission ticipants—usually three hours prior to package-launch time. The overall task The night Wild Weasel mission was probably the most required a flight plan, launch plan, tanker challenging mission early in the war. pitting F-4s and F-16s plan, and tactics and backup plans—a con- against unseen electronic threats. Additional investments in siderable work load that required delega- ach-anced night-fighting technology will help integrate all tion of effort and constant attention. At the players in this increasingly critical environment. COMPOSITE WING IN COMBAT 11

results. This officer ensured that the pri- isolation and preparation of the battlefield orities in the daily operations order were and finally to the ground campaign, clearly understood, attended the mass Proven Force stayed in the strategic phase. brief, briefed the wing commander on the We were too far from the Kuwaiti theater entire package, followed the progress of to contend with a battlefield situation. the mission in the wing operations center, Our lack of precision-guided and hard- attended the mass debriefing, and made structure munitions dictated a different sure that all reporting was completed. tactical plan than that prosecuted by Most importantly, the mission monitor CENTAF. The Proven Force campaign provided the commander and chief of ensured that specified nuclear, chemical, combat plans with direct feedback on the biological, and missile production facili- specific successes and failures of each ties were systematically destroyed and that package as part of a constant correction over 100 other key command-and-control, process. Without a doubt, the six mission war-production, and airfield targets were monitors of the 7440th made a major con- seriously damaged. But most of all, Proven tribution to the mission. Force eliminated any pretensions to safety that the Iraqi leadership may have had for the north. Results The composite wing’s accomplishments are impressive. We were tasked to open a second front, prevent Saddam Hussein Observations from creating a sanctuary in the north, and Given this background, the key question prevent his defenses from concentrating remains, Does the composite wing work in on the south. In the months of intense combat? The answer is obvious: Abso- planning between August 1990 and the lutely, with no reservations. I will not dis- beginning of the war, CENTAF had not cuss dollar or manpower costs, specific counted on Turkish approval for offensive aircraft, munitions, or quality of people, support to Desert Storm. As the air offen- since each is a separate success story that sive plan developed, it was necessary to needs more telling. Rather, 1 will answer convince the Iraqis that no target in the the question by commenting on various country was safe from coalition attack; observations that have come to light as a therefore, aircraft based in Saudi Arabia result of the 7440th’s experience. The were tasked to attack a number of strategic story would be incomplete without men- targets in northern Iraq. To continue this tioning the positive things that allowed us operation, however, would have diverted to organize and operate with virtually no coalition efforts from and diluted their preparation. Any lesson learned from the effect on the Kuwaiti theater of operations wing, however, must be tempered by cer- and other important southern targets. tain unique circumstances. For example, From an operational standpoint, the trip not all bases have Incirlik’s facilities and north was no trivial matter. The distance space. Looking to the future, I also com- from Taif. Saudi Arabia, to northern Iraq ment below on a number of matters that is 900 nautical miles versus 400 from would enhance our ability to do this again Incirlik. Furthermore, attacks from Saudi or that would need more work to ensure Arabia would require increases in tankers success in the next contingency. and would run the risk of not having the necessary E-3, Wild Weasel, and Compass Call support. Proven Force joined all the Why the Composite Wing W orked So Well coalition forces in phase one of Desert The composite training undergone by the Storm, but when forces in the south made wing’s personnel contributed to the suc- the transition from strategic operations to cessful completion of their mission. The 12 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 key leaders in each of the 10 squadrons of Mission-Planning Systems. The money the wing had all participated in at least invested in advanced intelligence and one flag-type exercise. Squadron com- mission-planning systems is proving to be manders, therefore, easily adapted to the well spent. State-of-the-technology equip- organization. Most importantly, selected ment such as Sentinal Byte, Intratheater mission commanders were typically expe- Intelligence Communications (IINCOM) rienced in flag exercises and, in some network. Constant Source, Mission Sup- cases, were graduates of NATO’s tactical port System II, and Identification of Com- leadership programs and USAF fighter mand and Control Operations Nodes weapons instructor courses. The ease with (ICON) performed with excellent reliabil- which the operators made the transition ity. Although all operators were not famil- from peacetime to wartime operations is iar with this equipment, it was so user surely a tribute to our entire training friendly that they learned to use it without investment. All aircrew members (the difficulty. The growth potential in these wing had over 450) felt ready to do their systems for intelligence data management, jobs when the war started. This is not to threat and target analysis, mission plan- say that they did not desire more informa- ning, and campaign planning will keep tion or ask questions, but that they felt operational intelligence people busy for confident because of the training they had some time to come. We must continue to received. The extensive planning, exercis- stay on the leading edge of this exciting ing, integration, and training done be- technology. This type of system must be tween August 1990 and January 1991 by organic to any wing and must be used in units based in the south were not available peacetime training as much as possible. to the 7440th. Instead, the years of training and exercises that were common to all the Incirlik Air Base. Operating from an squadrons allowed the composite wing to established main base designed for combat enter the fight on the run from day one of operations made a substantial difference in the conflict. Was everything perfect? No. our ability to posture, receive forces, and The basics were there, but much was done conduct combat operations. Parking areas, to improve the initial integration of all this dual-access loops for hardened shelters, combat power. robust fuel storage and distribution systems, and an extensive NATO infrastruc- Evaluation and Inspection. Tactical ture of hardened facilities made our effort evaluations, operational readiness inspec- easier than it would have been had we tions, and other readiness exercises have deployed to a bare base. This experience created a solid foundation of training in suggests that there are significant advan- both units and individuals. Squadrons, tages to using collocated operating bases in command-and-control functions, and Europe or in other areas of the world. quick-response teams went directly to work. The breakout of combat gear, run- Turkish Air Force Support. Rapid deci- ning checklists, work-center activations, sions on airspace control procedures, gen- and dispersal of critical assets occurred erous offers of facilities, increased security with virtually no direction and without a forces, and air defense of the air base were hitch. The beginning of Desert Storm at all vital contributions to the success of Incirlik appeared to be no different than Proven Force. The courageous decision by the start of hundreds of exercises that had the government of Turkey to allow offen- kicked off over the last 10 years. The battle sive operations from Incirlik was one of staff only had to clear a few obstacles and the diplomatic highlights of the war. concentrate on the details of the “real- world" tasking. The tens of thousands of Areas That Need More Attention and Work hours of hard work and the (sometimes reluctant) participation in evaluation and Much is left to do to bring the concept of exercises paid off handsomely. the composite wing to maturity. The chal- COMPOSITE WING IN COMBAT 13

lenges we overcame in one way or another may have been the night Wild Weasel mis- illustrate the most obvious needs and are sion. F-4s and F-16s were flying tactical worth brief comment. These translate into formation in moonless skies and dueling observations to analyze for potential with unseen electronic threats, all the lessons learned. We will learn many les- while trying to keep from becoming totally sons from this war, and most of them are disoriented. In addition, AGM-88s (high- mirrored in the experience of Proven speed antiradiation missiles—HARM) Force. I mention only those lessons that streaking through the night sky were bear upon the composite wing. enough to evoke a few surprised knee-jerk Night Operations. We need to get reactions from the rest of the players in the serious about conducting composite activi- package. Until every one of the crews ties—not just individual training—at understood what each of the other aircraft night. Further, the night should not be types brought into the fight and how they reserved just for attack fighters, but should affected the mission, each night brought a include supporting aircraft as well. The few new surprises. Clearly, aircraft with most challenging activity early in the war state-of-the-art night capabilities did significantly better, but we must continue to invest the time and dollars to integrate Personnel from the 52d Tactical Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem all players in this increasingly critical AB, Germany, attached to the 7440th Composite Wing, watch their F-16s taxi into takeoff position at the Incirlik AB environment. flight line. Despite its ad hoc creation, the joint task force Day and Night Operations. The aircrew was able to operate smoothly, especially as its members ratio (i.e., the number of squadron air- gained experience under combat conditions. crews to the number of assigned aircraft) 14 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

was augmented to allow some squadrons into wartime planning and operations. to more efficiently engage in 24-hour oper- There are endless variations on this con- ations. Although all units may not be cept, but just reacting to current events tasked for 24-hour operations, those that would be a start. A team with a basic are may require extra aircrews. Typically, fighter or bomber background should be supporting missions cause the problems— prepared to handle scenarios of at least if night bombing is required, then Wild moderate difficulty only a few hours after Weasels, F-15s, and tankers may be crucial tasking, and a wing commander should to success. Even though this is a tough expect a well-trained team to develop an issue for peacetime costs and aircrew pro- initial target list within a few days. Contin- ficiency. we might well achieve surge uous analysis and research will refine and increases in aircrew ratio through innova- improve the product, assuming that time is tive means that would be well worth the available. additive costs. The maintenance work Intelligence. We still have work to do force had few problems adjusting to the here. Without a doubt, the aircrews and 24-hour operation since current technol- planners received a great variety of mate- ogy made certain that reliable, easily main- rials, analyses, and data. Because of the tained aircraft could fly virtually any work done in the theater-level production sortie rate for some period of time. The centers and technical squadrons that rou- limiting factor during Desert Storm was tinely support USAFE’s central region mis- the number of aircrews. sion, the streamlined wing intelligence staff at Incirlik obtained information and Tasking and Targeting. Significant por- imagery filtered for Proven Force operations of peacetime flying training should tions. In addition, the intelligence com- be tasked via the ATO. We should do this, munications systems proved invaluable in not to prove that the squadrons can break efficiently moving much of the data from out the ATO and read it. but to guarantee the production center to the wing, but the that the process of building, integrating, aircrews were still dissatisfied with the and coordinating the order is an ingrained imagery that they received to plan and fly part of the training and quick execution of their missions. Much of the imagery they the combat plans function. The mecha- had at the start of the war did not allow nism should be in place to facilitate the the desired level of detail for planning dif- immediate transition to contingency or ficult targets, mobile targets, or targets in wartime operations. areas where accidentally inflicting collat- In addition, training must be integrated. eral damage was a distinct possibility. In For example, to be considered effective, addition, wing-level planners lacked much of an’F-15 pilot's training should bomb-damage assessment imagery. Some include work with E-3s and electronic targets were successfully struck—and combat aircraft. Further, an attack pilot’s attacked again; others needed to be reat- training should include the use of E-3s, tacked before engaging other targets of F-15s. and Wild Weasels to ensure that lower priority. Aircrews and planners also training sorties are integrated. The plan- felt that electronic orders of battle did not ning. communications, mutual support, sufficiently reflect their current experi- and execution should be routine events in ence. To some degree, this problem has all of the training and exercising for the roots in our peacetime training. Aircrews, composite wing. planners, and especially commanders Campaign Planning. The entire team— need to task their intelligence staff prop- intelligence, combat plans, current opera- erly. Asking the right question can be an tions, weapons, resources, and mainte- enlightening experience. Some of the prob- nance—must practice solving problems to lem would be easily solved with addi- be sure that the wing can flow smoothly tional focus and a rejuvenated concern COMPOSITE WING IN COMBAT 15

with the "customers’ needs,” not just their available to meet taskings. In fact, the wing stated requirements. enjoyed a 99.4 percent rate of scheduling effectiveness over the 42 days of Desert Imagery. A dedicated and flexible Storm. source of imagery for the use of aircrews Although the supply of spare parts was a and planners is critical to the successful success story, the timely delivery of those and efficient tasking of fighters and parts is a challenge that must be addressed bombers that employ precision weapons. for the sake of future composite wings. The imagery must be compatible with the Two-level maintenance puts an increased sensor used to attack the target. That is, if burden on the transportation system. Bro- the sensor is a visual, digital, or video sys- ken parts should be shipped efficiently to tem, then photographs are important. If it the repair facility or home base, and is radar, then one needs radar imagery. In repaired parts should be sent back quickly addition, commanders and planners need to meet the wing’s new requests. damage assessment imagery for campaign A composite wing includes flexible, planning and execution. mobile forces that integrate a number of Air Base Defense. As tactical ballistic reinforcing capabilities. These forces missiles become available and proliferate, should be able to operate with some air defense—specifically, air base de- degree of autonomy for a short time while fense—becomes a critical problem for the heavier or single-aircraft-type wings mobi- deployed commander. Air defense mis- lize and deploy. Thus, the organization siles provide the only active deterrence or should be as light as possible without sac- counter to the threat from tactical ballistic rificing combat capability. A small con- missiles. A composite wing that is rela- tingent of dedicated—although not neces- tively close to an adversary’s border and sarily assigned—tactical airlift aircraft, that operates from a base with limited however, could improve efforts to resup- hardened shelters for fighters and open ply parts and make a vital difference in the ramps for larger aircraft would be vulner- wing’s ability to face all challenges. able to even a modest attack. An active air Command-and-Control Connectivity. base defense would allow the wing’s lim- Like air defense, communications are ited air superiority aircraft to perform rarely dedicated to peacetime units. How- offensive rather than defensive counterair. ever, a unit that is expected to enter the Support from dedicated, rapidly deploy- fight on the run must understand the basic able Army air defense assets that trained connectivity it has with other units— and evolved with the composite wing whether at the deployed location or would ease the active defense problem. By dispersed—and with its tasking headquar- the same token, engineers need to develop ters, wherever it may reside. Discovering a mobile sheltering system to meet the pas- and solving communications limitations sive aspects of this issue. during the heat of battle will lead to ineffi- Two-level Maintenance. Although the cient or burdensome systems that limit the 7440th was not a pure two-level organiza- unit’s combat potential. tion or part of a controlled test of that organizational scheme, most of its intermediate support came from home wings. Military Airlift Command’s channel and specially Conclusion managed theater airlift supported engine The 7440th Composite Wing’s achieve- repair and the repair of avionics "black ments are now a part of history. The efforts boxes.'' This concept kept most of the to get the wing into the war are a special wing's aircraft flying well in excess of success story that should be told in more rates characteristic of peacetime training detail in the future. As is usually the case, and ensured that the aircraft were always once the decision to go was made, the sue- 16 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 cess of the effort was up to the people who people, I am not worried. There are no were tasked to make it work. Their accom- fundamental reasons why the concept will plishments clearly show that they as- not succeed. As we look to a smaller Air sumed the challenge with a great deal of Force that will be tasked with responding enthusiasm and skill. They knew their to a wider range of conflict in the context jobs, did not hesitate to make decisions, of Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. and kept improving the operation as they Rice’s vision of “Global Reach—Global became seasoned and experienced. Since Power,” the composite wing will prove to the future of the composite wing concept be a most important capability. □ is in the hands and minds of Air Force

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A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT VIETNAM’S IMPACT ON THE PERSIAN GULF AIR CAMPAIGN

C lodfelter,

T A PENTAGON briefing on 15 “This is the first time in history that a field March 1991, Air Force Chief of army has been defeated by air power.”1 Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak General McPeak could indeed take a large summed up his service’s role in measure of satisfaction from the Air A the recently concluded Persian Gulf war:Force’s performance in the war. In less than 40 days, a devastating display of ‘ For comments and suggestions, both heeded and un- aerial might had mauled Saddam Hus- heeded. the author gratefully acknowledges Lt Col Price T. sein’s military machine, enabling a Bingham. Maj Matt Caffrev. Lt Col Harvey J. Crawford. LI Col Gary P Cox. Col Dennis M. Drew, Lt Col lames K. Feldman. “hundred-hour blitzkrieg” to oust Iraqi Col William F. Fortner. Lt Col Bernard E. Harvey, Dr David forces from Kuwait. Maclsaac. Dr Peter Maslowski. Dr David R Mets, Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger. Dr Earl H. Tilford. Jr., and Dr Harold R. President George Bush proclaimed that Winton. the totality of the triumph erased the

17 18 A1RPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

stigma of an American defeat 16 years During the Vietnam War, the Air Force paid a high price to earlier in the jungles of Southeast Asia. achieve little against a highly resourceful enemy. From After announcing a cease-fire, he declared, 1964 to 1973, the service lost more than 600 fixed-wing aircraft

bomb damage on North Vietnam cost Not until the spring of 1972 did air power American taxpayers $9.60.4 North Viet- have a telling impact on the course of the nam’s gross national product actually war, and that impact was largely for- increased during the bombing, as Ho Chi tuitous. Hanoi's decision to mount a large- Minh skillfully played off the Chinese scale conventional invasion of the South, against the Soviet Union to secure a vast President Richard Nixon’s detente with amount of military and economic support the Soviet Union and China, and Nixon’s from each.3 willingness to exit South Vietnam without Few American civilian or military a total victory for the South Vietnamese all leaders had envisaged such dismal results combined to create conditions that favored when planning the air campaign even- bombing for limited ends. tually labeled Operation Rolling Thunder. The stark differences between the nature President Lyndon Johnson’s characteriza- of the war during Johnson’s Rolling tion of North Vietnam as a “raggedy ass lit- Thunder (1965-68) and during Nixon’s tle fourth rate country” typified the sub- 1972 Linebacker air offensives have gone stance if not the style of most American unnoticed by many of the war’s air com- views of the enemy.6 Dean Rusk. Johnson’s manders, who contend that a Linebacker- secretary of state, remembered, “I thought like assault against North Vietnam in early the North Vietnamese would reach a point, 1965 would have achieved victory in short like the Chinese and North Koreans in order.9 This assertion, however, ignores Korea, and Stalin during the Berlin airlift, that Nixon’s notion of “victory” differed when they would finally give in.”7 Adm from that of his predecessor. Johnson U. S. Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific sought an independent, stable, non- Command and the individual charged Communist South Vietnam, capable of with the operational conduct of Rolling standing alone against future aggression. Thunder, initially shared Rusk’s faith that He also wanted to achieve that aim with- limited air attacks would pay dividends. out undue cost to the United States. In par- In early April 1965, one month after the ticular. he did not want to run the risk of sustained bombing of North Vietnam war with China or the Soviet Union over began, he notified the Joint Chiefs that Vietnam, nor would he permit Vietnam to "the damage inflicted by these attacks on eclipse his Great Society programs. Thus, LOCs [lines of communication] and mili- the rapid aerial destruction of North Viet- tary installations in North Vietnam will nam’s war-making capability, which air cause a diminution of the support being commanders estimated they could achieve rendered to the Viet Cong— Manpower i n 1 6 d a y s , 10 w a s n o t a v i a b l e o p t i o n . and supplies will undoubtedly have to be Moreover, destroying North Vietnam’s diverted toward recovery and rebuilding capacity to fight was no guarantee that the processes.”8 insurgency in South Vietnam would stop. Convinced that the Viet Cong insur- During the entire Johnson presidency, the gency in South Vietnam could not con- vast bulk of the Communist army in South tinue without large doses of support from Vietnam consisted of Viet Cong units who the North and that the threat of aerial fought, along with their North Vietnamese destruction would persuade Ho Chi Minh allies, an average of one day a month.11 to abandon that assistance, American civil- This infrequent combat produced a re- ian and military chiefs embarked upon quirement for such a small amount of this country’s longest bombing campaign. external supplies that no amount of bomb- They subconsciously assigned their enemy ing with conventional ordnance could Western values and translated a guerrilla have prevented their arrival. Nor did the war into a conventional conflict that they Viet Cong need—or want—a large amount could better understand, only to discover of North Vietnamese direction. As Larry that a preponderance of firepower could Cable has convincingly shown in Unholy not overcome firmly entrenched tenacity. Grail, the Viet Cong sought to minimize 20 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

Northern influence in the National Libera- of war, third-country nationals, and the tion Front throughout the war.12 In short, remains of those who died in Iraqi eliminating North Vietnam from the war in hands.13 Bush also stated that American 1965 would likely have accomplished lit- bombs were not aimed at Iraqi civilians, tle towards achieving a stable, indepen- whom he urged to overthrow Saddam Hus- dent South. By the time that removing the sein, although the president later acknowl- North would have made a difference—after edged that Saddam himself was not a the 1968 Tet offensive—the American pub- specific target.14 lic had lost its stomach for the war and the With very few exceptions, President goal had changed to “peace with honor." Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Such disparity between political goals Cheney left the choice of targets to the and military objectives did not exist in the military15—a notable difference from the Persian Gulf, and the clear-cut nature of “Tuesday lunch approach" of target selec- our announced aims heightened the pos- tion employed by President Johnson dur- sibility that air power could be a decisive ing the Vietnam War. The unprecedented instrument in a war against Iraq. In his 16 United Nations mandate permitted Bush to January 1991 announcement of hostilities, President Bush reaffirmed that the Iraqis Li Gen Charles A. Horner, air component commander of must immediately and unconditionally Operation Desert Storm, briefs the press corps on the air withdraw from Kuwait, allowing the war against Iraq (below). His chief air planner. Brig Gen emir’s government to return; they must Buster Glosson. related. “Chuck [Horner) and / remember fully accept the United Nations resolu- flying in Vietnam \\ith less than a full load of weapons. You tions; and they must release all prisoners can bet we were not going to let that happen again." OF DEMONS. STORMS. AND THUNDER 21

apply air power with minimal restraints; power—Saddam Hussein’s attack on Israel he did not have to worry about Soviet or with Scud missiles. To avoid an expanded Chinese intervention as had Johnson. Yet, conflict that threatened the fabric of the like Nixon, Bush had to consider the coalition, Bush had to persuade the potentially fragile nature of support from Israelis that he could eliminate the Iraqi the American public, especially given the menace to the Jewish state. An intensive instantaneous reporting capability of tele- air offensive offered him the means to do vision news agencies. The trauma of Viet- so. On the other hand, an air campaign nam suggested to him and his advisers that devoting significant attention to Scud sites the American home front would not toler- reduced the number of aircraft available to ate a conflict that was lengthy, bloody, or attack Iraq's key strategic targets, increas- less than decisive. ing the time needed to destroy them.16 Once the war started, an additional Throughout the planning for the Desert motive argued strongly for swiftly apply- Storm air campaign, American military ing massive doses of American military and civilian leaders alike were conscious of Vietnam ghosts lurking in the background. “I measure everything in my life Unlike President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch approach" to from Vietnam,” observed Gen H. Norman target selection during the Vietnam War. President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney, with very few exceptions, left Schwarzkopf, the commander in chief of the choice of targets to the military. Below, chairman of the Central Command, who served two tours Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gen Colin L. Powell, briefs Desert of duty in Southeast Asia.17 President Storm reconnaissance photographs to the president in Bush noted in his war message on 16 Janu- February 1991. ary 1991: ‘Tve told the American people

OFFICIAL WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPH: SUSAN BIDDLE 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 The erratic intensity of Rolling Thunder differed from the continuous air campaign of Desert Storm, which did not give the enemy time to catch its breath.

before that this will not be another Viet- nam and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back.”10 Air Force Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, Desert Storm’s air component commander, received full authority to direct virtually all air elements—Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine, and allied—as he saw fit. No analogous position had existed in Vietnam. There, the individual services waged autonomous air wars over the South, rarely coordinating with the South Vietnamese air force. Over the North, the inability to gauge the precise effects of bombing on the enemy war effort yielded another method of measuring results—sortie count. Competition developed between the US Air Force and Navy for the highest daily sortie total, leading to missions with reduced ordnance to raise the count.19 Both Horner and his chief air planner. Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, had fought in Southeast Asia, and the experience colored their judgments regarding Desert Storm. “Chuck [Horner] and I remember flying in Vietnam with less than a full load of weapons.“ Glosson re- counted. “You can bet we were not going to let that happen again.”20 In trying to-avoid the perceived mistakes of Vietnam, air commanders sought to the air campaign, enabling North Viet- destroy Iraq’s war-fighting capability and namese leaders to use it to create popular will to fight. Those two objectives had support for the war at a minimum cost. been goals of Rolling Thunder, as well as During Linebacker I and II, the logic of American air campaigns in World War proved more suitable to the unique condi- II and Korea. Air chiefs had believed that tions that then existed. The relaxation of by attacking vital economic centers they political controls, resulting from Nixon's could destroy an enemy’s war-making detente; the development of precision- capacity, which would in turn produce the guided munitions; and the conventional loss of social cohesion and the will to nature of the 1972 North Vietnamese resist. The logic proved flawed for Rolling offensive, which required massive logisti- Thunder. The multitude of political, mili- cal backing and was exceedingly vulner- tary. and operational restrictions on bomb- able to air power, all helped to make ing, multiplied by the guerrilla nature of Nixon’s bombing more effective than the ground war in the South, emasculated Johnson’s. OF DEMONS, STORMS, AND THUNDER 23

Neither Rolling Thunder nor the two enemy nation’s center of gravity consisted Linebacker operations aimed to kill enemy of five concentric, strategic rings. The cen- civilians, but air commanders did target ter ring, the essence of an enemy’s war civilian morale after attacks directed effort, was its leadership. Surrounding this exclusively against the North's war- core was a second ring containing key pro- making capability failed to produce deci- duction facilities such as oil and elec- sive results. This action meshed well with tricity. Next came a third ring of infra- the conduct of past American air cam- structure consisting primarily of the means paigns: air leaders in World War II and of transportation and communication. The Korea had also resorted to attacks against civilian populace made up the fourth ring. civilian will after discovering that bomb- While noting that air power should not be ing aimed specifically at war-making used to target an enemy population capability did not yield quick victory.21 directly, Colonel Warden also maintained, During Rolling Thunder, attacks against “It’s important that people [in the enemy morale occurred in early 1967 in concert nation] understand that a war is going on, with raids on North Vietnamese electric and they put some pressure on their lead- power facilities and industry, and the ership to stop the war.”26 Surrounding the entire Linebacker II campaign targeted band of population was a fifth ring of Northern resolve.22 In both cases, air com- fielded military forces. Warden insisted manders bombed military facilities close that fielded forces should not be the initial to population centers (not the civilian pop- focal point of an air campaign, because ulace) or structures such as electric power those forces served only to shield the crux plants that were deemed essential to both of an enemy’s war effort, the internal rings, the Communist war effort and the normal which contained the vital targets.27 functioning of North Vietnamese society. In Rolling Thunder, air commanders had Against Iraq, airmen broke with tradi- concentrated on severing North Viet- tion and designed an air offensive that tar- namese direction and support of the Viet geted war-making capacity and enemy Cong insurgency by attacking targets in the morale from the start. The rationale for the second, third, and ultimately fourth rings. approach rested on two key considerations The effort failed because of the nature of affected by the Vietnam experience: the the war; North Vietnamese support and perception of the enemy’s “center of grav- direction were not essential to the Viet ity’’ and the technological prowess of Cong’s war-making capacity. Colonel War- American air power. den observed, “Air [power] is of marginal In his nineteenth-century magnum opus value in a fight against self-sustaining On War. the Prussian military theorist Carl guerrillas who merge with the popula- von Clausewitz defined "center of gravity” t i o n . ” 28 Du r i n g t h e L i n e b a c k e r c a m p a i g n s , as “the hub of all power and movement, however, attacks against essentially the on which everything depends ... the point same targets as in Rolling Thunder paid against which all our energies should be dividends. The 1968 Tet offensive had directed.”21 Air Force colonel John War- decimated the Viet Cong, and Hanoi’s den focused on this concept in his own 1972 Easter invasion consisted of 12 North book, The Air Campaign: Planning for Vietnamese Army divisions backed by Combat, arguing that the center-of-gravity large numbers of tanks and heavy artillery. notion should guide target selection in Linebacker, along with the aerial mining of offensive air operations.2-1 A Pentagon staff Northern ports and massive doses of close officer and fighter pilot. Warden had flown air support in South Vietnam, wrecked 211 missions as a forward air controller in Hanoi's capacity to wage offensive warfare Vietnam, and his views significantly influ- and contributed to the willingness of enced the concept of air operations used in North Vietnamese leaders to negotiate a Desert Storm.25 peace ending American involvement in Colonel Warden contended that an the war. XVIII AIRBORNE C O R PS PHOTOGRAPH

Air planners noted the similarity be- Scuidivn Hussein chose not to launch air attacks on coalition tween Iraq’s predicament following the bases and ports but instead grounded his air force in invasion of Kuwait and North Vietnam’s shelters. Once those shelters became vulnerable to precision weapons, many of his aircraft flew to Iran to sit out the war. after the Easter offensive. Both nations Above, the remains of an Iraqi Su-25 Frogfoot. apparently possessed armies waging conventional war destroyed by coalition forces before it ever got airborne and. and sporting large amounts of Soviet right, a destroyed hanger containing Iraqi helicopters. equipment that needed heavy logistical support. Blockades limited the amount of imports available to the two countries. Yet munication facilities.30 North Vietnam had planners noted that Iraq was even more to import all of its petroleum needs, vulnerable than North Vietnam to an aerial boasted a single steel mill and one cement assault against the first, second, third, and factory, and had only one railroad that ran fourth rings of Warden’s model. Whereas a the length of the country. six-man Politburo led North Vietnam in The North Vietnamese, however, pos- 1972. Saddam Hussein was a monolithic sessed a key advantage that Iraq lacked—a force in Iraq whose approval was required unified populace. The fractured ethnic and in tactical as well as strategic decision religious backgrounds of the Iraqi people making. The bulk of the North Vietnamese made Saddam Hussein more dependent populace lived as rice farmers in the Red than ever on the means of communication River Delta, while 70 percent of the Iraqi to exercise control, and ties to the army population lived in cities.29 Iraq was also and his secret police were the primary relatively industrialized, containing nu- methods of exercising that authority. Iraq's merous modern oil refineries and the asso- transportation and communication facili- ciated benefits of an oil glut, such as ties were also more vulnerable than those sophisticated transportation and com- of North Vietnam, which the Linebacker

24 OF DEMONS, STORMS, AND THUNDER 25 offensives had wrecked. By 1972 the North attacked war-making capacity and the will Vietnamese had constructed an oil pipe- to resist. line through Cambodia and Laos to South An essential facet of General Horner's Vietnam,31 and the dense, triple canopy ability to attack Iraq’s capability and will foliage obscured the redundant multitude with devastating effect was another legacy of roadways and paths merging to form the of Vietnam—the widespread use of preci- Ho Chi Minh Trail. The barren environ- sion guided munitions. The United States ment of the Iraqi desert stood in stark con- had first employed “smart” bombs in trast to the Southeast Asian jungles. The Southeast Asia in late 1967, but it was vital road and rail links to Iraqi troops in during Linebacker I that the ordnance Kuwait could not be concealed, nor could achieved significant results. On 10 May vehicles traveling on them be hidden. 1972, 32 Air Force F-4 Phantoms dropped The combination of these factors—an 29 electro-optically and laser-guided urban populace accustomed to many of the bombs on Hanoi’s key span across the Red conveniences of twentieth century indus- River, the Paul Doumer Bridge.32 The trialization and splintered in its support bridge collapsed the next day. On 12 May. for the government, a dictator who de- Phantoms from the Air Force’s 8th-Tactical pended on ties to his army and his police Fighter Wing used smart bombs to wreck force to stay in power, an army that waged the defiant symbol of North Vietnam that conventional war, and an almost complete had remained standing throughout the isolation by the international commu- three and one-half years of Rolling nity—made Iraq an ideal target for a strate- Thunder—the infamous “Dragon’s Jaw’’ gic air campaign that simultaneously bridge at Thanh Hoa. 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

After the Vietnam War, the accuracy of North Vietnam. General Horner also de- precision guided munitions improved dra- signed the air campaign to give the Iraqis matically. Modern laser, electro-optical, no time to catch their breath. Rolling and infrared targeting systems used against Thunder’s bombing pauses had provided Iraq enabled Air Force pilots to bomb the North Vietnamese the chance to repair within one to two feet of a target even at damage and move supplies in safety, and night.33 The combination of precision American commanders during Desert guided munitions with another technologi- Storm intended to deny Iraq the same cal wonder—the F-117A stealth fighter— opportunity. “The air part of the campaign made the dream of an invulnerable preci- will last until the whole campaign is sion bombing capability a reality. “Desert over,” General Powell declared during the Storm was ... a vindication of the old con- war’s first week.38 cept of precision bombing,’’ commented American military leaders were further former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen determined not to underestimate Saddam Michael Dugan. “The technology finally Hussein's military machine. In contrast to caught up with the doctrine.’’34 F-117As the disdainful American attitude towards destroyed an estimated 95 percent of all Ho Chi Minh’s army following its victory key targets in Baghdad, and on one occa- over the French in the First Indochina sion a fighter guided a bomb through an War, Schwarzkopf and his lieutenants air shaft in the roof of the Iraqi air defense entered the Persian Gulf gravely concerned headquarters.35 The ability to achieve such about Iraq's combat capability. With a pop- amazing accuracy from unseen locations ulation one third the size of Iran’s. Iraq against military targets in densely popu- had fought off repeated Iranian advances lated areas permitted American air com- in the bitter 1980-88 war and ultimately manders to attack the will of a populace in prevailed. In that conflict, Saddam a manner previously thought impossible. Hussein used chemical weapons against General Horner stated that he scheduled Iranian troops and Iraq’s Kurdish minority. the middle-of-the-night raids against tar- After achieving complete air superiority, gets in Baghdad to remind Iraqis that a war his air force provided over 200 close air was being fought and that Saddam was support sorties a day in late 1982 and early incapable of containing it, as well as to 1983, when Iranian ground assaults threat- destroy the command and control network ened to score a major breakthrough, and of the Iraqi military.36 Given that Iraq was then turned to attacking Iranian cities.39 By already vulnerable to air power, the mer- the war’s conclusion. Saddam possessed a ger of stealth and precision guided muni- million-man army backed by more than tions had a devastating impact on the Iraqi 5,500 tanks and an air force of more than war effort. A captured senior Iraqi officer 500 aircraft.40 Moreover, in 1990 Iraq termed the air campaign shocking, and reportedly owned the largest supply of listed its precision as a key reason for its chemical weapons in the third world, had impact. Many of his comrades shared his developed the means to produce them, conviction.37 and had improved its ballistic missile To guarantee that the air power had a force through modifications to its Soviet maximum effect on the Iraqis, American Scuds.41 military leaders, including General To wreck Saddam’s war-making capa- Schwarzkopf and the chairman of the Joint bility. Horner attacked Iraq's vital compo- Chiefs of Staff, Army general Colin L. nents in methodical fashion. Memories of Powell, called for a massive, nonstop air Southeast Asia produced the "nuts and campaign. Air planners initially dubbed bolts" of the Desert Storm air campaign— the air offensive “Instant Thunder"—a the air tasking order (ATOJ. Horner desig- conscious effort to eliminate any vestige of nated targets for all coalition air forces, as the gradual approach to bombing that had well as for the Navy’s Tomahawk missiles, plagued Lyndon Johnson’s air war against on a single air tasking order that often ran OF DEMONS. STORMS. AND THUNDER 27

700 pages a day and listed the sorties Desert Storm, one demon from Southeast scheduled during a 24-hour span.-*- Lt Gen Asia threatened to cast its evil eye on the Jimmie V. Adams, then Air Force deputy air campaign. That ogre was the same Air chief of staff for plans and operations.* Force mind-set that had been present on observed: “We’ve got nine services singing the eve of Rolling Thunder—a war-fighting off the same sheet of music—we didn’t do doctrine geared to the policy of contain- that in Vietnam. There’s one ATO for ment and stressing potential combat with evervone who flies over Saudi Arabia."43 the Soviet Union. Before the active in- The air campaign itself was a multi- volvement of the United States in Viet- phased effort. The first phase, scheduled nam. this focus had led to the conviction to last seven to 10 days, targeted Iraq’s that adequate preparation for “general command and control facilities: airfields: war’’ with the Soviets would suffice to win Scud missile sites: nuclear, chemical, and any limited war. The 1959 edition of the biological warfare plants; and other war- Air Force’s basic doctrinal manual, which making industries. Many of those targets guided the service through the initial were located in Iraqi cities, which guaran- stages of planning for Rolling Thunder, teed that the populace could not ignore the stated: “The best preparation for limited air campaign while precision guided war is proper preparation for general war. munitions kept civilian losses to a mini- The latter is the more important since mum. Phase 2 consisted of destroying there can be no guarantee that a limited enemy air defenses to permit allied air war would not spread into general con- forces to fly unhindered over Kuwait. flict.’’47 Unfortunately, the guerrilla war Phase 3 targeted supply lines, Iraqi troops waged by the North Vietnamese and the in Kuwait, and the Republican Guard. Viet Cong did not suit the mold, and Roll- Originally projected to occur in successive ing Thunder was doomed to failure from increments totaling about 30 days,44 the the start. three phases actually transpired simul- A similar doctrinal void existed on the taneously because of the abundance of eve of Desert Storm. The unexpected end coalition aircraft available. Phase 4, the of the cold war had left the Air Force with final phase, focused on providing allied a basic doctrinal manual, dated 13 August troops with air support once the ground 1984, little changed in substance from that offensive began. By that time, however, of 1959. The belief of many air com- air power had substantially wrecked manders in Southeast Asia that Linebacker both Iraqi capability and will to resist. II had single-handedly achieved the 1973 Saddam's command and control facilities Paris Peace Agreement served to vindicate were in shambles, and he could not resup- the pre-Vietnam doctrine emphasizing a ply his battered army, whose units in potential war with the Soviets. As a result, Kuwait and along its border had suffered Air Force planning following Vietnam had 50 percent attrition.4’’ The Iraqi army had focused on fighting the Soviets where they become an eggshell that cracked once it were considered to be the greatest threat— was tapped bv advancing allied ground Europe. Planners envisioned Strategic Air forces. David Hackworth, a Vietnam Command’s bombers and missiles overfly- infantryman-turned-journalist, accom- ing the battle area to accomplish the inde- panied American troops into Kuwait and pendent mission of strategic bombing concluded. “Air power did a most impres- against the Soviet homeland with nuclear sive job and virtually won this war bv weapons. Meanwhile, Air Force fighters itself. ”4r’ would support the ground defense of the While the Vietnam legacy contributed continent. enormously to air power's success in Tactical Air Command helped the Army design its AirLand Battle doctrine that out- 'Now a four-star general and commander in chief of lined those fighters’ specific tasks.4” In Pacific Air Forces (PACAFl i tying bombers to the strategic nuclear mis- 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 sion and fighters to the mission of tactical improvising. “There were no formalized air support, air planners neglected provi- procedures for the approval of the plan- sions for an independent air campaign ning and execution of the conventional using conventional weapons against a non- strike,” General Alexander stated. “In Soviet enemy. “The doctrinal paradigm response to this requirement, the Air Force since the 1950s has been an Air Force that headed an ad hoc joint working group separated strategic and tactical applica- under the auspices of the Joint Staff and tions of air power institutionally, organiza- provided the broad conceptual planning tionally, intellectually, and culturally,” that was necessary.”52 Colonel Warden noted Maj Gen Robert M. Alexander, the directed this diverse assembly, which Air Force’s director of plans, deputy chief comprised 30 to 40 officers from the Air of staff for plans and operations. “There Force, Army, Navy, and Marines. Relying was a need for an offensive conventional on many of the ideas articulated in his independent air campaign plan against book, he developed a concept of opera- Iraq. However, there was no provision in tions emphasizing a conventional, strate- the paradigm.”49 gic air assault as the fundamental under- Doctrinal semantics contributed to the pinning of an air campaign. Generals Air Force’s difficulty in designing an inde- Horner and Glosson took Warden’s con- pendent air campaign against Iraq. Strate- ceptual design, modified it to suit their gic Air Command had long equated “stra- views, and then hammered out the spe- tegic” with “nuclear.”50 This emphasis on cifics of the Desert Storm air offensive.53 the nuclear mission resulted in B-52 crews Many observers of the operation, how- arriving for duty during the Vietnam War ever, have failed to note the emphasis “with only the barest introduction to con- placed on the air campaign’s first phase— ventional tactics” and using modified and that the phase 1 attacks were key to nuclear bombing procedures against destroying Iraq’s war-making capability. enemy targets.51 Yet with the exception of Instead, they focus on phases 3 and 4 of Linebacker II. the giant bombers’ primary the air assault (which occurred simul- mission in Southeast Asia was battlefield taneously with phase 1), contending that interdiction or close air support. Mean- Desert Storm vindicated AirLand Battle while, fighter aircraft conducted most of doctrine.54 Yet air planners in the after- the strategic missions—those aimed at math of Vietnam had envisioned AirLand North Vietnamese war-making potential Battle as a tactical concept to counter a rather than their deployed armed forces— Soviet thrust into Western Europe. The during Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I. doctrine proved adaptable to guide an air Despite the example of Southeast Asia, the offensive aimed at Iraqi forces in Kuwait perceived Soviet threat after Vietnam and on the Kuwaiti border. AirLand Battle caused SAC’s primary focus to return to did not, however, provide for a strategic the nuclear mission, while TAC, viewing application of air power against the war- its main role as assisting ground forces on making capability and will to resist of an the battlefield, focused on the AirLand enemy nation. For that conceptual design, Battle. TAC thus shunned planning for the Air Force had to rely on happen- “strategic conventional” operations, even stance—and fortunately turned to a colo- though, in terms of precisely delivering nel with profound insight who was serving ordnance against such targets as factories on the Air Staff when Iraq invaded or electric power stations, the capability of Kuwait. TAC’s fighters had far outstripped that of In contrast to air commanders after Viet- SAC’s bombers. nam, air leaders after Desert Storm must Rather than devising a makeshift air avoid the temptation to conclude that the campaign against Iraq from strategies air doctrine with which they entered the designed for war with the Soviets, air war was appropriate for it. Despite the chiefs kept the Vietnam demon at bay by spectacular success of the Desert Storm air OF DEMONS, STORMS. AND THUNDER 29

campaign, the Gulf war offers no blueprint in a desert environment and being led by guaranteeing a successful application of an international pariah who personally air power in the future. Linebacker II had made all key military decisions and relied helped achieve Nixon’s goals in December on an intricate command and control net- 1972 because of unique circumstances, but work for their implementation is unlikely many air chiefs ignored the changed to recur. nature of both the Vietnam War and Amer- Nor is it likely that the United States ican objectives in it to argue that such will soon confront a commander as inept bombing would have achieved decisive as Saddam. He granted the allied coalition results during Rolling Thunder. The situa- five and a half months to refine planning tion in Iraq 19 years after Nixon’s Christ- and marshal forces, allowing its units to mas bombing was also unique, and its undergo extensive training in desert war- uniqueness related directly to the magni- fare. During that span (and throughout the tude of success achieved by air power. The war), his commanders suffered from a lack combination of a fragmented, semi- of intelligence data, while Generals industrialized. third-world enemy waging Schwarzkopf and Horner received enor- conventional war with Soviet equipment mous quantities of information from satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and remotely piloted vehicles.55 "The air part of the campaign will last until the whole Saddam also failed to take any signifi- campaign is over." declared General Powell shortly after the start of Operation Desert Storm. Here. General Powell cant military action that might have and Col John M. McBroom. then commander of the 1st affected the course of the war. Shunning Tactical Fighter Wing from Langley AFB. Virginia, discuss an advance into Saudi Arabia after over- the air war at a base in Saudi Arabia. running Kuwait, which would have de- 30 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 nied coalition forces key staging areas, he Saddam Hussein was no Ho Chi Minh, did not seriously threaten the allied bases and the next enemy is unlikely to be a once the war began. ‘‘All you have to do is Saddam Hussein. The relaxation of super- stand in Dhahran and look at the huge power tensions makes it probable that amounts of equipment we were bringing in there will be a next enemy—sooner rather there," General Schwarzkopf remarked. "If than later. The bipolar world of the cold they 1 the Iraqis] had launched a persistent war tended to restrain regional conflicts, chemical attack that had denied the port of as the Soviet Union and the United States Dammam to us, obviously this would have could use their leverage to keep client been a major setback.’’56 The American states in line. Now, however, uncertainty commander further noted that an attack by prevails on the world stage. Secretary of Iraqi aircraft on Riyadh Air Base in Saudi the Air Force Donald B. Rice highlighted Arabia could have caused tremendous this instability in the foreword to his white damage. Saddam, however, chose to paper, ‘‘Global Reach—Global Power,” ground his air force in hardened shelters. published a little over a month before Sad- Once those shelters proved vulnerable to dam’s invasion of Kuwait. He noted: American bombs, much of the remainder “Extraordinary international develop- of his air force fled to Iran. ments over the last few years have created In the final analysis, Iraq's vulnerability the potential for a significantly different to General Horner’s air offensive could security environment as we approach the have stemmed as much from Saddam's beginning of the twenty-first century. attempt to apply the perceived lessons of These changes demand fresh thinking Vietnam as it did from efforts by American about the role of military forces.”59 civilian and military leaders to exorcise Given the changing world scene, the Air Southeast Asian ghosts. The Iraqi presi- Force needs a doctrine underscoring the dent believed that Vietnam permanently flexible nature of air power. Air Univer- sapped American will to fight a long war sity’s Center for Aerospace Doctrine. abroad. "Yours is a society which cannot Research, and Education (AUCADRE) is accept 10,000 dead in one battle,” he told currently putting the finishing touches on American ambassador April Glaspie before a new version of Air Force Manual 1-1 that attacking Kuwait.57 He likely thought that will go far towards eliminating much of five months of waiting would cause the the dogma of the 1984 edition. In particu- American public to reconsider the merits lar. the manual notes that no universal for- of combat, and that the high casualties he mula exists for the proper application of expected to inflict once war began would air power and that strategic operations are have the same impact on American will to defined by their objective rather than by fight as had, the bloody 1968 Tet offensive. the weapon system used, type of muni- Apparently to goad General Schwarzkopf tions, or location of the target. General into a premature ground attack, Saddam McPeak’s call for composite air wings that lobbed Scuds at Israel and Saudi Arabia, combine fighters and bombers should also launched assaults into Saudi Arabia help eliminate the largely artificial distinc- (Khafji was one example), and dumped tion suggested by the titles Strategic and Kuwaiti oil into the Persian Gulf. These Tactical Air Commands. ventures failed to have a major impact on The magnificent melding of technology, the war because of allied air power, a sophisticated planning, adroit leadership, capability that Saddam dismissed from the and highly trained, courageous personnel start of the crisis. "The United States relies in Desert Storm bodes well for the serv- on the Air Force." he declared on 30 ice’s ability to respond to future con- August 1990, "and the Air Force has never tingencies. For over half a century. Air been the decisive factor in a battle in the Force leaders have maintained that air history of wars.”58 Desert Storm proved power could be the decisive element in otherwise. war, and Desert Storm has finally vindi- OF DEMONS. STORMS. AND THUNDER 31

cated the claim. More importantly, how- ing the appropriate amount of force to ever. air power again demonstrated that it national objectives, which may or may not is—above all else—a flexible instrument of call for the Air Force to play the decisive national policy. If used inflexibly (as in role in combat. Now is an ideal time for Rolling Thunder), its application can be the service to come to grips with its past disastrous, but if unshackled from dogma by exorcising completely the demons of and applied with imagination and creativ- Vietnam. Yet in burying those phantoms, ity (as during Desert Storm), it may be a we must avoid creating a new spectre that decisive force. judges success or failure in future wars Despite forthcoming cuts in both man- according to whether or not the Air Force power and funding, the Air Force of the was the most decisive factor. Given both a future can continue to play a significant different foe and different circumstances role in American military operations by from those encountered in the Gulf war, focusing on flexibility as the fundamental the quest for air power’s decisiveness underpinning of service doctrine. The key may prove as bedeviled as Rolling to applying air power successfully is meld- Thunder. □

Notes 1 Quoted in Julie Bird. McPeak: Brilliant ... air decep- fonuary—28 /une 1965. K712.1623-2, USAF Historical tion." .Air Force Times. 25 March 1991. 8. Actually, air Research Center (USAFHRC), Maxwell AFB. Ala. power had destroyed armies in both world wars. In a 1918 9. Air Force generals Curtis LeMay and William Momyer. precursor of Desert Storm's air offensive. British general and Adm U. S. Grant Sharp, among others, have argued that Edmund Allenby's five Royal Air Force squadrons wrecked intensive bombing of North Vietnam could have proved deci- two Turkish divisions in a narrow defile after the planes had sive in Vietnam in 1965. previously destroyed the central Turkish telephone exchange 10. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Preparedness and Turkish army headquarters. Twenty-six years later, dur- Investigating Subcommittee, Air War Against North Vietnam. ing Lt Gen George Patton's dramatic dash across France, air 90lh Cong.. 1st sess., pt. 3. 22-23 August 1967, 212 pow'er again destroyed an army. German major general Eric 11. Headquarters USAF. Analysis of Effectiveness of Inter- Elster surrendered 20.000 troops on 16 September 1944 as a diction in Southeast Asia. Second Progress Report, May direct result of the punishment inflicted by the fighters of 1966. 7. K168.187-21. USAFHRC; Senate, Air War Against Brig Gen Otto P. Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Command. Wey- North Vietnam. 25 August 1967, pt. 4, 299. land was requested to attend the surrender ceremony. See 12. Larry Cable, Unholy Grail: The US and the Wars in Robin fligham. Air Power: A Concise History (New' York: St Vietnam. 1965 1968 (London: Routledge St began Paul (UK). Martin s Press. 1972). 41 -43. and Wesley Frank Craven and 1991). lames Lea Cate. The Army Air Forces in World UYir II. vol. 3. 13. George Bush. "Address to the Nation Announcing Europe: Argument to V-E Day. /unuorv 1944 to May 1945 Allied Military Action in the Persian Gull." 16 lanuarv 1991. (Chicago University of Chicago Press. 1951 New Imprint. in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 21 |anu- Washington. DC. Office of Air Force Mistor\, 1983). 265-66 ary 1991,51. 2. Quoted in Stanley W Cloud, "Exorcising an Old 14. "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Demon." Time. 11 March 1991. 52. Conflict,” 18 lanuarv 1991, in ibid.. 56. 3 Michael M McCrea. "US Navy. Marine Corps, and Air 15. Two targets that Cheney eliminated from the target list Force Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses and Damage in Southeast were a huge statue of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi war Asia (1962-1973)." Center for Naval Analyses study. August memorial, both in Baghdad. See Tom Mathews. "The Secret 1976. 6-28 History ot the War." Newsweek. 18 March 1991. 30. 4. The Pentagon Papers The Defense Department History 16. The hunt (or Scuds ultimately diverted about 1.500 sor- of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel ties originally designated for other strategic targets and edition, vol. 4 iBoston: Beacon Press, 1971). 136 increased the time required to finish the strategic campaign 5 Bv lanuarv 1968, Hanoi had received almost $600 mil- by three to five days See Michael Dugan, "The Air War.” US lion in economic aid and $1 billion in military assistance. News e World Report. 11 February 1991. 30. See |ason Summer's study. "Summary and Conclusions." 17 Quoted in “General admits Vietnam body counts were 10 August 1966. Pentagon Papers. Gravel edition, vol. 4 116; lies." Detroit News. 11 March 1991.6. and Department of Defense Systems Analysis report. January 18 Bush, 51. 1968. Pentagon Papers. Gravel edition, vol 4: 225-26 19 Lt Gen Joseph II Moore, oral history interview by Maj 6 Quoted in George C Herring. "Cold Blood": LB/'s Con- Samuel E Riddlebarger and LI Col Valentino Castellina. duct of Limited War in Vietnam. The Harmon Memorial Lec- 22 November 1969. 17-18, K239.0512-241, USAFHRC; Lt Col tures in Military History, no 33 (Colorado Springs. Colo.: William II Greenhalgh. interview with author, Maxwell Air United States Air Force Academy, 1990). 2. Force Base. Alabama. 17 May 1985; John Morrocco. Thunder 7 Interview of Dean Rusk bv the author. Athens. Georgia. from Above, vol. 9 (Vietnam Experience Series) (Boston: 15 |ulv 1985 Boston Publishing Company. 1984), 125. 8 Message. 040304Z April 1965. CINCPAC to |CS. in 20. Quoted in Mathews, 29. Commander-in-Chief PACOM. Outgoing Messages. 22 21 Mark A. Clodfelter. The Limits of A ir Power: The Amer- 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 icon Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 40. Phebe Marr, "Iraq's Uncertain Future." Current History 1989). This assertion is discussed at length in chapter 1. 90, no. 552 (January 1991): 1. 22. Ibid., 100-107: 177-85. 41. Ibid., 1-2. 23. Carl von Clausewitz. On War, trans. and ed. Michael 42. Dugan. “The Air War,” 28. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University 43. Quoted in Bill Sweetman, "Learning lessons of 'Desert Press, 1976), 595-96. Storm,"' Jane’s Defence Weekly. 9 March 1991, 329. 24 |ohn A. Warden 111, The Air Campaign: Planning for 44. Bird, "McPeak," 8; Dugan, “The Air War." 26. Combat (Washington. D.C.: National Defense University 45. Schwarzkopf stated that air attacks left Iraqi units on Press. 1988). Warden first discusses "centers of gravity” on the Kuwaiti border "at 50 per cent or below. The second pages 9 -1 1 and refers to the concept throughout the book. level, basically that we had to face—and these were the real 25. Richard Saltus, "Air Force says it might have won the tough fighters that we were worried about—were attrited to war in 2 more weeks.” The Boston Globe, 5 April 1991, 10. Lt some place between 50 and 75 per cent." See Ian Kemp. Gen John B. Conaway, chief of the Air Force's National "100-hour war to free Kuwait,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 15. Guard Bureau, noted at the 3 April 1991 Conference on the no. 10, 9 March 1991, 326. Air Force at Boston's Tufts University that Colonel Warden 46. David H. Hackworth. "Lessons of a Lucky War." News- was “one of the key individuals who put together the air week. 11 March 1991. 49. campaign for Desert Storm." 47. Air Force Manual 1-2, United States Air Force Basic 26. |ohn A. Warden HI. "Airpower Employment in the Doctrine. 1 December 1959, 4. Future World" (Paper presented at the Tufts University Con- 48. For an analysis of the development of the "AirLand ference on the Air Force, 3 April 1991). Battle" concept, and the Air Force’s projected role in that 27.Ibid. doctrine, see John L. Romjue. "The Evolution of the AirLand 28. Warden. The Air Campaign, 147. Battle Concept," Air University Review 35. no. 4 (May-June 29. Phebe Marr. The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, 1984): 4 -15; and James A. Machos. "TACAIR Support for Colo.: Westview Press. 19851, 270. AirLand Battle." Air University Review 35, no. 4 (May-June 30. Ibid., 130. 248-58: David Segal. “The Iran-lraq War: A 1984): 16-24. Military Analysis." Foreign Affairs 66, no. 5 (Summer 1988): 49. Robert M. Alexander. “World is rapidly changing and 952. AF must keep up." Air Force Times, 11 February 1991. 23. 31. Headquarters PACAF, Corona Harvest: The USAF in 50. Thomas A. Keaney. Strategic Bombers and Conven- Southeast Asia. 1970-1973—Lessons Learned and Recom- tional Weapons: Airpower Options (Washington. D.C.: mendations: A Compendium (16 June 1975), 82-83, National Defense University Press. 1984). 16. K717.0423-11. USAFHRC. 51. Ibid., 29. 32. Headquarters Seventh Air Force, 7th Air Force History 52. Alexander. 23. of Linebacker Operations, 10 M ay-23 October 1972. n.d., 7- 53. "Schwarzkopf: 'I Got a Lot of G u ff," Newsweek, 10. K74U.04-24. USAFHRC. 11 March 1991,34. 33. William B. Scott. "Electro-Optic Targeting Tools Bol- 54. Three analysts who contend that AirLand Battle doc- ster Bombing Accuracy of Allied Aircraft," Aviation Week Sr trine was a key reason for Desert Storm's success are retired Space Technology. 28 January 1991, 25; John D. Morrocco, Army officers Harry G. Summers, Jr., William E. Odom, and "U.S. Tactics Exploit Advances in Avionics. Air-to-Surface Trevor N. Dupuy. See Summers' "Airland doctrine seems to Weapons," Aviation Week Sr S p a c e Technology, 18 February be on target, so far," Air Force Times. 25 February 1991. 25. 1991.52. 61: Odom's "Storming Past a New Threshold in Warfare." 34. Michael Dugan. “First Lessons of Victory." US News Sr Christian Science Monitor, 4 April 1991. 19; and Dupuy's World Report. 18 March 1991, 36 "How the War was Won.” National Review. 1 April 1991. 35. Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "F-117s Drop Laser-Guided 29-31. Bombs in Destroying Most Baghdad Targets." Aviation Week 55. Barbara Starr. "Satellites paved way to victory," Jane's Sr Space Technology. 4 February 1991, 30. Defence Weekly 15, no. 10. 9 March 1991. 330. 36. Julie Bird. "Horner: F'urther AF role in gulf not 56. Quoted in "Sayings of Stormin' Norman." Time. needed," Air Force Times, 18 March 1991. 8. 11 March 1991. 27. 37. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice. "Global 57. Quoted in Charles Lane, "Saddam's Endgame,” News- Change, Global Reach and Global Power," address at week. 7 January 1991, 16. Boston's Tufts University Conference on the Air Force. 58. "Excerpts from Interview with Hussein on Crisis in 3 April 1991. • Gulf," New York Times, 31 August 1990. A-1Q. 38. Quoted in John D. Morrocco. "Allies Attack Iraqi Tar- 59. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, The Air gets: Scuds Strike Israeli Cities." Aviation Week &■ Space Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Global Technology. 21 January 1991. 22. Power (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force. June 39. Efraim Karsh. “Military Lessons of the Iran-lraq War." 1990). i. Orbis 33, no. 2 (Spring 1989)’: 217. AIR POWER IN DESERT STORM a key role in guiding how our future mili- AND THE NEED FOR tary forces will be organized, trained, DOCTRINAL CHANGE equipped, and employed. As the 1940 defeat of France showed, this guidance can spell the difference between victory and Lt Col Price T. B in g h a m, U S A F defeat.2 Unfortunately, ensuring that doctrine provides the best guidance is an immensely challenging task. One reason is ONTRARY to the underlying as- the difficulty we have in calculating accu- sumptions found in much of the rately how various developments, such as US military’s current doctrine, air low-observables, smart weapons, and night power dominated the conduct of sensor technologies, will affect the future OperationC Desert Storm. As a result, per- conduct of war.3 An even greater obstacle haps the most important lesson the US could be the difficulty of persuading those military could learn from Desert Storm is satisfied with current guidance that it that it needs to change its doctrine to rec- needs to be changed.A This is especially ognize the reality that air power can domi- true now since our success in the Gulf war nate modern conventional war (as opposed provides little incentive for making what to revolutionary war and some military are certain to be painful institutional activities short of war like Operation Just changes. We should keep this second Cause). Surface forces are still very impor- obstacle particularly in mind as we com- tant, but campaign success now depends pare the conduct of Desert Storm to Air on superiority in the air more than it does Force, Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and on surface superiority.1 joint doctrine. This comparison should Changing our doctrine to acknowledge allow us to see where the guidance in our that warfare can be dominated by air current doctrine differs from Desert Storm power is necessary because doctrine plays and thus where we need to make changes. strategic and tactical actions against the will and capabilities of an enemy.”8 The strategic actions it recommends are the same as those taken by Gen Norman Schwarzkopf. They involve “the system- atic application of force to a selected series of vital targets” that make up the enemy's “key military, political, and economic power base.”7 Accurately calculating the effectiveness that was achieved, Air Force doctrine states that “integrated strategic and tactical actions produce a cumulative effect on the enemy’s ability to wage war.”8 The lack of Iraqi resistance to the coalition’s ground offensive provides still more evidence that Air Force doctrine is right when it states, Regardless of an enemy’s will to fight on the field of battle, the stresses imposed by persistent and coordinated attacks and the iack of needed logistics and command guidance can make it physically and psychologically difficult, if not infeasible, to remain effective on the battlefield.'1 The coherency and consistency General Schwarzkopf achieved when he used a joint air component commander to employ air power in Desert Storm also validates the emphasis Air Force doctrine puts on unity of command. Air Force doctrine calls for command arrangements that centralize control of all theater air power under a single air component commander, During Desert Storm. Gen //. Norman Schwarzkopf achieved which it recognizes may not be an Air campaign objectives and kept down allied casualties by Force officer. To stress this point. Air effectively utilizing ground forces to support the employment Force doctrine quotes Gen William W. of air power. Momver. USAF. Retired, who wrote that for airpower to be employed for the greatest good of the combined forces in a theater ot Air Force Doctrine war, there must be a command structure to control tbe assigned airpower coherently and Desert Storm validated much of the consistently and to ensure that the airpower guidance found in Air Force Manual 1-1, is not frittered away bv dividing it among Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United army and navy commands.10 States Air Force. For example, Air Force doctrine claims what Desert Storm demon- Our experience in the Gulf war revealed strated—that air power “can be the deci- that another important strength of Air sive force in warfare.'”1 Anticipating how F’orce doctrine is the priority it assigns to air power was employed in Desert Storm, gaining control of the air. According to Air Air Force doctrine charges an air com- Force doctrine, air superiority should be mander with developing “a broad plan for the first consideration when employing employing aerospace forces to undertake aerospace forces.11 Air superiority is essen-

34 AIR POWER IN DESERT STORM 35

tial to success in modern conventional could pursue them and inflict even greater warfare because it prevents the enemy’s air destruction like that on the "Highway of force from interfering effectively with the Death." ability of friendly air forces to conduct Lack of guidance on operational art may strategic attacks, air interdiction, sur- be the reason for another deficiency of Air veillance and reconnaissance, airlift, close Force doctrine. It never mentions the air support, and other important air opera- impact air base availability and operability tions. Friendly control of the air not only can have on the ability to conduct effective makes these air operations more effective, air operations in a campaign. Fortunately which in turn greatly enhances the effec- for the conduct of Desert Shield and Desert tiveness of surface forces, but also can Storm, Saudi Arabia had made a large enhance the effectiveness of surface forces investment in basing infrastructure. As a by preventing detection and interference result, the obstacles General Schwarzkopf with their employment by the enemy’s air faced were not of the same magnitude as force. In addition, control of the air denies those that hampered the employment of these same advantages to the enemy. air power in World War II, Korea, and The Gulf war revealed that the silence of Southeast Asia.13 Air Force doctrine on the exercise of operational art is one area where change is needed.12 Air Force doctrine’s lack of guid- Navy Doctrine ance on the exercise of operational art may explain why some Air Force officers before Comparing the conduct of Desert Storm the Gulf war seemed to believe that the to guidance provided in Navy doctrine sole purpose of theater air power was to could be a problem since the Navy, unlike support a ground commander’s scheme of the other services, does not publish formal maneuver. As a result, these airmen did doctrine except for that dealing with fleet not realize that campaign objectives could tactics. However, the Navy’s leadership be achieved more effectively by using sur- did articulate a maritime strategy which, face forces to support an air component like the doctrines of the other services, is commander's scheme of employment. used as “a key element" in shaping pro- During Desert Storm, General Schwarz- grammatic decisions.14 Thus, maritime kopf demonstrated that it was possible to strategy can be used to compare the Navy’s achieve campaign objectives at an extraor- view on the role of air power to the con- dinarily low cost in terms of friendly cas- duct of Desert Storm. ualties when surface forces were used to The focus of the Navy’s strategy is on support the employment of air power. He using offensive sea control to defeat Soviet did this by using coalition ground and maritime strength "in all of its dimen- amphibious forces at the beginning of the sions. including base support.’’15 Perhaps campaign to "fix” Iraqi units into posi- because of this focus on fighting the Soviet tions where air interdiction could inflict navy, the Navy’s strategy needs significant terrible destruction, as was achieved by change since it does not provide much "tank plinking," while simultaneously guidance on how naval power, especially denying these units effective resupply. carrier-based air power, should be em- During this time. General Schwarzkopf ployed in a third-world contingency such also used surface forces to protect his air as Desert Storm. For example, while it bases and disrupt Iraqi surface-based air does address the importance of "antiair defenses. After his air power had de- warfare" in protecting the fleet by counter- stroyed the ability of the Iraqi army to fight ing "the Soviets' missile-launching plat- effectively, he used the maneuver of his forms." maritime strategy makes no men- surface forces during the ground offensive tion of the importance of gaining and to seize Iraqi air bases as well as to force maintaining control of the air over the Iraqi units into the open where air power land. Nor does it explain how carrier- 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

based air power should be employed to itime strategy does not address the com- achieve and maintain control of the air.16 It mand arrangements needed to integrate also does not mention the importance of the employment of carrier-based air power waging a strategic air campaign or explain with land-based air power. However, how air interdiction can contribute to cam- before Desert Storm demonstrated the paign success. value of unity of command, the Navy’s Maritime strategy’s failure to provide position that carrier-based air power guidance on the employment of carrier- should not be controlled by a functional based air power in theater campaigns may air component commander had been ex- also be due to the problems presented by pressed numerous times and had posed a such air operations. These air operations serious problem in the conduct of air oper- tend to require aircraft that can deliver a ations in both Korea and Southeast Asia.21 fairly significant payload against targets located far from where a carrier can safely operate. Yet only 20 A-6E medium-attack aircraft in a conventional carrier wing of Army Doctrine 86 aircraft possess such a capability.17 The Several commentators have already limited deep-attack capability of carrier- credited Army doctrine found in Field based air power helps explain why during Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, with the first two weeks of Desert Storm the being the key to Desert Storm’s success.22 Navy was reported to have provided only Perhaps because it is called AirLand Battle 3,500 sorties (12 percent) of the total doctrine, many of these same commenta- 30,000 sorties.18 Moreover, even this effort tors also mistakenly believe that it is Air required six of the Navy’s 14 deployable Force as well as Army doctrine. Yet, de- carriers, dependence on massive Air Force spite the opinion of these commentators refueling support, and carriers positioned and the "air” in its title, comparison of in waters that independent naval analysts Army doctrine to the conduct of Desert had previously considered too dangerous Storm reveals that it failed to anticipate for carrier operations.19 the dominant role played by air power. Gen George B. Crist, USMC, Retired, Given this failure, it should not be a sur- who served as commander of Central Com- prise that Army doctrine also provides mand before General Schwarzkopf, called remarkably little guidance on how land attention to limitations in the Navy’s operations could be conducted to comple- capability before Desert Storm. He noted ment the employment of air power. that “the US Navy is well equipped with To its credit. Army doctrine does recog- the hi-tech weaponry to wage combat nize that “the control and use of the air against the Soviet Union; it is not so ade- will always affect operations; the effective- quately prepared to deal with Third World ness of air operations in fact can decide contingencies, as the Persian Gulf experi- the outcome of campaigns and battles.”23 ence [of 1987 and 1988] demonstrated." The problem is that Army doctrine pro- General Grist concluded that correcting the vides little guidance on how land opera- problem “will take a shift from the Admi- tions can help achieve and maintain con- rals’ fixation with forward-deployed car- trol of the air. The lack of guidance is rier battle groups and the ‘maritime strat- especially apparent in the doctrine's dis- egy’ to the more mundane missions of cussion of what it calls “ deep opera- controlling sealanes, moving troops and tions.”24 Army doctrine makes no refer- providing naval gunfire and tactical air ence as to how such operations might con- support to amphibious operations.”20 tribute to gaining control of the air, per- Such a shift must include attention to haps by seizing air bases or areas suitable command arrangements. Not surprisingly, for air bases, which is how Gen Douglas in ignoring the role of carrier-based air MacArthur employed land forces in his power in third-world contingencies, mar- extremely successful campaigns in the AIR POWER IN DESERT STORM 37

XVIII AIRBORNE C O R P S PHOTO Although air base availability and operability has a critical ting both air and surface forces to operate impact on the air campaign, it is not addressed in Air Force more effectively, while denying these doctrine. Fortunately. Saudi Arabia had established an extensive basing infrastructure that accommodated allied advantages to the enemy. Thus, once air flight operations during Desert Storm. Above. F-I5s from superiority is achieved, campaign success the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. Langley AFB. Virginia, depends on how a commander exploits prepare for another Desert Storm mission at an air base in control of the air. General Schwarzkopf’s Saudi Arabia. conduct of Desert Storm shows that one of the best ways to exploit control of the Pacific.25 Nor is there any mention of con- air is through strategic air operations. ducting deep operations to disrupt an Yet Army doctrine makes no mention enemy’s surface-based air defenses, as Gen that such operations can make a signifi- Ariel Sharon did when his tanks crossed cant contribution to the success of land the Suez during the 1973 war and Army operations. AH-64s and special operations forces did Air interdiction is another way to ex- during Desert Storm when they attacked ploit control of the air. Army doctrine does Iraqi radar sites.26 note that interdiction performed by what it Of course, achieving air superiority is calls "air fires” is one of the activities typ- only a means to the desired end—permit- ically conducted as part of deep opera- 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 tions.27 It also states that arms and services AirLand Battle doctrine uses Gen Ulysses complement each other by posing a di- S. Grant’s Vicksburg campaign during the lemma for the enemy. The problem is that Civil War, rather than campaigns that Army doctrine seems to see air interdic- employed air power such as those con- tion only as a means to ‘‘support maneuver ducted by General MacArthur in the on the ground.”28 In contrast, Desert Storm Pacific during World War II, to illustrate revealed that the deployment of coalition the fundamentals of the offensive.29 Given ground forces served to “support” coali- the "air” in its title, this is somewhat akin tion air forces by fixing Iraqi forces in a to a book on the conduct of modern foot- position where air interdiction could ball containing only discussion and dia- inflict such devastating destruction that grams for running plays. many Iraqi soldiers welcomed the coalition's ground offensive so they would have the opportunity to surrender and escape The Navy does not publish a formal doctrine except for that death from the air. dealing with fleet tactics. Its "Maritime Strategy." a similar Perhaps one of the reasons the Army’s document to the other sendees' doctrine, does not provide doctrine fails to see the full potential of air adeqtuite guidance on how carrier-based air power should power can be found in its use of history. be used in a third-world contingency such as Desert Storm.

NAVY PHOTO. PH2 NAEGELE AIH POWEH IN DESERT STORM 39

Moreover, in none of these examples, Marine Corps Doctrine including Eisenhower’s, is there a single Since the Marine Corps possesses both mention of air power’s critical role. air and ground elements, some might To its credit, Marine Corps doctrine assume that Marine Corps doctrine would does address strategic actions and their provide effective guidance on how air and impact on the conduct of a campaign.34 ground forces should be employed to- However, its examples include only one gether in a campaign. However, comparing mention of air power, the 1986 raid against Fleet Marine Forces Manual (FMFM) 1-1, Libya. As with the Solomons, this doctrine Campaigning, which “establishes the fails to mention the crucial contribution authoritative doctrinal basis for military the Marine Corps made to strategic actions campaigning in the Marine Corps,” to Gen- in World War II by seizing the Mariana eral Schwarzkopf’s conduct of Desert islands. The Marianas were critical to the Storm shows that this would be a bad war in the Pacific because they provided assumption. Like AirLand Battle doctrine, the Twentieth Air Force with air bases for Marine Corps doctrine does make some its B-29s that made it possible to conduct a extremely good points about operational strategic air offensive against Japan. This art.30 Yet it is similar to Army doctrine in strategic air offensive was so successful requiring change because it almost totally that a costly amphibious assault on Japan ignores how air power has dramatically was not necessary to end the war.35 changed the conduct of war. Another deficiency is that organization Evidence of the Marines’ neglect of the arrangements receive only indirect atten- dominant role air power can play is found tion in Marine Corps campaigning doc- in the fact that, like the Army, the Marines trine. After making reference to how his use Civil War campaigns fought before the organic aviation allows a Marine air- invention of aircraft changed the conduct ground task force (MAGTF) commander to of war to illustrate their doctrine.31 Sur- project power well in advance of close prisingly, when Marine Corps doctrine combat, this doctrine states, ”A MAGTF does refer to more modern campaigns, it commander must be prepared to articulate does not discuss the Solomons campaign the most effective operational employment of World War II in any detail.32 At Guadal- of his MAGTF in a joint or combined cam- canal and throughout the war in the paign.”3b It then notes that "if he cannot, Pacific, at the operational as opposed to lie will in effect depend on the other serv- the tactical level of war, Marine ground ices to understand fully the capabilities of elements “supported” the air elements by the MAGTF and employ it correctly, an seizing and holding air bases—in this case, assumption which is likely to prove un- Henderson Field. Henderson Field was the warranted.”37 This statement supports the key to US success in this extremely impor- long-held Marine Corps position against tant campaign because it extended the giving an air component commander— range of land-based Marine, Navy, and especially a non-Marine, as was the case in Thirteenth Air Force aircraft so they could Desert Storm—control over the MAGTF's achieve air domination over the Solomon air element. islands, and in doing so, break the back of It is obvious that the doctrines of the US Japanese air and surface forces. It will Navy, Army, and Marine Corps, unlike Air probably astonish marines who fought in Force doctrine, did not anticipate air World War II that instead of using as power’s domination in the conduct of Des- examples campaigns in the Pacific—where ert Storm. As has been pointed out, these the Marine Corps played such an impor- three doctrines fail to recognize the monu- tant role—Marine Corps doctrine generally mental contribution strategic air attacks refers to campaigns from the European the- can make towards success on the bat- ater, such as Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower’s tlefield, a contribution that was especially design for the reconquest of Europe.33 apparent in Desert Storm. It is also obvious 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 that these doctrines do not put the same mandy during an air attack, Rommel emphasis on the importance of gaining reflected that “ultimately it was shown and maintaining control of the air as does that no compromise of any kind can make Air Force doctrine. up for total enemy air and artillery The low priority many soldiers and superiority.”41 marines seem to assign to achieving con- Rommel was not alone in concluding trol of the air helps explain the humor that success was unlikely without control they saw in a cartoon that appeared in the of the air. Writing about his experience 1980s. This cartoon showed Soviet gen- commanding the XIV Panzer Corps in erals watching their tanks parade through Italy, Gen Frido von Senger und Etterlin a conquered Paris and asking, “ By the noted, way, who did win the air superiority battle The enemy’s mastery of the air space imme- in the end?”38 Quite likely one reason for diately behind the front under attack was a the popularity of this cartoon is the fact major source of worry to the defender, for it that American ground forces have not prevented all daylight movements, especially experienced serious air attacks for almost the bringing up of reserves. We were accus- half a century. But there is another reason tomed to making all necessary movements by for the lack of understanding exhibited by night, but in the event of a real breakthrough some soldiers and marines regarding the this was not good enough. In a battle of critical linkage between air superiority and movement a commander who can make the the successful employment of friendly air tactically essential moves only by night and land forces. It is the failure by those resembles a chess player who for three of his opponent’s moves has the right to only one.42 officers responsible for Army and Marine Corps doctrine to learn from the experi- Perhaps the opinion of Rommel, von ence of others, such as the Iraqis, who Senger, and other foes regarding the im- have been on the receiving end of intense portance of controlling the air receives too air attacks. little emphasis by soldiers and marines Those who do not understand the domi- responsible for doctrine because they per- nant role air power can play in modern ceive such comments as attempts to de- war could learn much from a study of Des- flect blame for being defeated. Another ert Storm, although abundant evidence reason, however, could be a perception was available much earlier. Field Marshal that recognizing the tremendous role air Erwin Rommel, who first experienced the forces have had in past successes would effects of Allied air power in North Africa, somehow cheapen the contribution made made the observation that “a balance of by ground forces. Worse, they may fear power in the air would have made the old such recognition would relegate the Army rules of warfare [emphasis added] valid and Marine Corps to an unimportant role again— Anyone who has to fight, even in future warfare. This fear could not with the most modern weapons, against an be further from the truth since Desert enemy in complete command of the air, Storm revealed how essential ground and fights like a savage against modern Euro- amphibious forces can be to air power’s pean troops, under the same handicaps effectiveness. and with the same chances of success.”39 Whatever the reason, failure to recognize Unfortunately for Rommel, he was un- the full role air power must play in the able to convince fellow soldiers like Field conduct of war remains a serious short- Marshal Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt coming of the Army and Marine Corps and Gen Geyr von Schweppenburg, who doctrines. Airmen in these two services had not had similar experience, of the remain under the domination of the sur- debilitating effect Allied command of the face elements who see support running in air would have on their ability to defeat an but one direction, with air providing direct Allied invasion of Europe.40 Later, while support to ground maneuver or amphib- recovering from wounds received in Nor- ious units. Moreover, the Army and AIR POWER IN DESERT STURM 41

Marine Corps both put great emphasis on what are often less effective tactics and the contribution air power makes through munitions in order to reduce the risk of close air support. Yet. while absolutely fratricide. critical in some situations, close air support is usually the most ineffective way to employ air power in a campaign. Unlike a strategic air offensive and air interdiction, joint Doctrine close air support puts at risk only those enemy forces that are in close proximity to Given that the four services provide the friendly ground forces. If air power is officers who make up the joint staff, it employed primarily in close air support, should not be a surprise that joint doctrine the enemy would have a greater oppor- is no better than Navy, Army, and Marine tunity to use operational level maneuver to Corps doctrine when it comes to recogniz- seize the initiative. Still another disadvan- ing how air power can dominate the con- tage with close air support is that it im- duct of war. For example, the latest draft poses added communications require- of Joint Pub 0-1, “Basic National Defense ments and can force airmen to employ Doctrine,” that was circulated for comments, states that campaigns may be composed of a variety of types of operations The Army's doctrine fails to recognize the full potential of but then fails to mention the contribution air power. To illustrate the fundamentals of the offensive, AirLand Battle doctrine examines the Vicksburg campaign of that can be made by a conventional strate- the Civil War rather than campaigns that utilized air power. gic air offensive. Nor does this doctrine Below, soldiers participate in a training exercise in Saudi mention the requirement to gain control of Arabia during Desert Shield. the air, a key feature of all successful mod-

ARMY PHOTO. SPC HENRY 42 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

NAVY PHOTO. PHC VOLUMES ern military campaigns, except for insur- The synergies that resulted from his employment of air gencies, up to and including Desert power gave General Schwarzkopf overwhelming ad\'antages hy the time he launched his ground offensive. Above. Army Storm.43 units advance during the "Hail Mary" maneuver and. right, Compounding its error of not recogniz- the infamous "Highway of Death" littered with Iraqi ing that air power can dominate warfare, vehicles. this draft seems designed to ensure that an Air Force officer will never be in charge of future campaigns like Desert Storm. This commands with functional or space zone possibility begins with the draft’s guidance responsibilities. Given the increased doc- that “the dominant warfare or functional trinal and budgetary powers possessed by orientation of the force as a whole for con- the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tinuing day to day execution of the strate- and the combatant commanders under the gic mission should determine the Service Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, such an affiliation of the combatant commander.”44 arrangement could cause the future US The draft then divides the world into mar- military to reflect the current perspective itime, continental, and space “zones.”45 of Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and joint Such a division makes little sense unless doctrine that air power only supports sur- these zones are to identify the “dominant” face forces, not the opposite possibility form of warfare. If so, the term dominant that was demonstrated by Desert Storm. warfare is likely to be interpreted as mean- The keystone joint operations doctrine. ing that only surface services should Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and provide commanders for unified com- joint Operations, recently distributed as a mands with continental or maritime re- test publication, is yet another example of sponsibilities, while the Air Force would joint doctrine’s lack of guidance on the key be limited to providing commanders for role air power must play. This publication AIR POWER IN DESERT STORM 43 is supposed to set forth doctrine to govern cial operations forces, and long-range mis- operations by commands such as Central sile systems. Finally, he would have found Command. Yet, if General Schwarzkopf little guidance on the best organization for had looked at it when preparing his cam- integrating the air power provided by the paign plan, he would not have found any four services into a single, coherent air guidance on specific methods, concepts, campaign. All he would have found was and principles on how the air and surface the statement that “CINCs establish com- elements that make up joint forces should mand relationships and assign authority to operate together subordinates based on the operational sit- Looking at joint Pub 3-0’s list of joint uation, the complexity of the missions, operations categories, General Schwarz- and the degree of control needed to ensure kopf would not have found conventional that strategic intent is satisfied.”47 strategic air offensive or offensive coun- If General Schwarzkopf had looked at terair operations, let alone guidance in- the more focused JCS Pub 26, Joint Doc dicating that control of the air is essential trine for Theater Counterair Operations to effective military operations for both air (from Overseas Land Areas), he would still and surface forces.46 Nor would he have have found insufficient guidance. For found guidance that such control is best example, instead of a strong statement that achieved through coordinated offensive control of the air is essential to success, operations in which enemy air bases, air this doctrine only says, ‘‘When there is defenses, and command and control facili- an enemy air power offensive threat to ties are the focus of synchronized attacks friendly surface operations, the require- by fixed- and rotary-wing air forces, spe- ment for friendly counterair actions must

USAF PHOTO. TSGT MCLEOD 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 be a major consideration in the joint plan- resist the coalition’s devastating air at- ning for those operations.”4H This rather tacks, an effect compounded by the warn- vague "guidance” is followed by what the ings the coalition often gave Iraqi units Iraqi military would see as a tremendous before attacking. Thanks to his airborne understatement: "Limiting the enemy’s warning and control system (AWACS) and use of its air power provides increased joint surveillance target attack radar sys- potential for friendly force success.”49 tem [J-STARSJ, General Schwarzkopf pos- The guidance provided in joint coun- sessed unprecedented near-real-time terair doctrine on command arrangements information on air and surface operations is even more flawed, although it begins of both coalition and Iraqi forces. Plus he well when it states that "the joint force was able to deny the enemy similar infor- commander will normally designate a joint mation, which was the key to the coali- force air component commander.”50 Unfor- tion's successful shift of forces to the left tunately, the doctrine contains no explana- flank resulting in the envelopment of the tion of why such an arrangement is "nor- bulk of the Iraqi army. mally” best. Instead, it proceeds to create Control of the air allowed General ambiguity by limiting the responsibilities Schwarzkopf to use the electromagnetic and authority of the joint force air compo- spectrum to communicate quickly with his nent commander (IFACC), while simul- forces, whereas the Iraqi military was often taneously acknowledging that "nothing reduced to using couriers. Observation shall infringe on the authority of the The- made possible by control of the air greatly ater or Joint Force Commander [in his abil- enhanced the effectiveness of coalition ity] to ensure unity of effort in the accom- artillery, while simultaneously rendering plishment of his overall mission.”51 Iraqi artillery largely ineffective. Finally, Fortunately, despite joint doctrine’s lack unlike the Iraqis who had almost no sup- of guidance. General Schwarzkopf decided plies of any kind because of the coalition’s to appoint a JFACC to be responsible for air interdiction. General Schwarzkopf was developing a coherent plan for employing able to support his advancing maneuver coalition air power that was not limited to forces with bumper-to-bumper convoys of counterair operations. He then approved trucks. the plan in the form of a single air tasking In conclusion, comparing US military order that integrated the employment of doctrine to General Schwarzkopf’s con- Air Force. Army, Navy. Marine Corps, and duct of Desert Storm reveals how fortunate allied air power. Finally, he delegated to we were that Air Force doctrine fully rec- his JFACC the authority to execute this ognized air power’s ability to dominate the plan, which allowed his air forces to win conduct of modern war. Thanks to Air control of thp air and made it possible to Force doctrine, General Schwarzkopf pos- conduct a strategic air offensive and air sessed aerospace forces that made it possi- interdiction operation in a way that pro- ble for him to achieve his objectives at a duced a powerful synergy. very low cost in terms of friendly lives. By The synergies that resulted from his the same token, this comparison reveals employment of air power gave General that we are fortunate Desert Storm gave us Schwarzkopf overwhelming advantages by the opportunity to learn so cheaply that the time he launched his ground offensive. much of the US military’s current doc- The Iraqi army had been severely weak- trine, which tends to see air power pri- ened physically by intense, almost contin- marily as support for the employment of uous air attacks that had demonstrated surface forces, needs to be changed to rec- that aircraft can be extremely effective ognize that air power can play a dominant tank killers. The Iraqi army had also been role. Under these doctrinal changes. greatly weakened psychologically by the LIS military forces would be organized, knowledge that it had almost no ability to trained, and equipped to fight conven- AIR POWER IN DESERT STORM 45

tional campaigns in which surface forces sible tor doctrine that there is a need for are employed to enhance the effectiveness change. If not, the question might be, What of US air power while minimizing the risk losses will it take for the US military to of friendly casualties.52 What has not yet recognize the degree to which air power been revealed is whether our relatively has, to paraphrase Rommel, made the old low losses in Desert Storm provided suffi- rules of warfare invalid? cient incentive to persuade those respon-

Notes 1. Air power’s dominance results from its ability to 8. Ibid.. 2-13. enhance a commander's exercise of operational art in an 9. Ibid.. 2-13 and 2-14. environment characterized by fog, friction, and chance. The 10. Ibid.. 4-2. See also 2-8, 2-20, and 4-4. chance a commander will wage a successful campaign is 11 Ibid.. 2-11. increased by air power's ability to minimize his own fog and 12. The final draft of the revised AFM 1-1 that was recently friction while simultaneously magnifying the enemy's. See circulated for comments within the Air Force puts great the author's "Operational Art: An Airman's Perspective" emphasis on the exercise of operational art. (Presentation to the Military Operations Research Society’s 13. See the author's "Operational Art and Aircraft Runway Mini-Symposium on Operational Art and Analysis. Fort Requirements," Airpower /ournol 2. no. 3 (Fall 1988): 57-63. McNair. Washington. D.C.. 6-9 March 1990). 14. Adm lames D. Watkins. "The Maritime Strategy." sup- 2 For an excellent discussion of the importance of doc- plement to US Naval Institute Proceedings. January 1986. 4. trine to Germany's success in May 1940. see Robert Allan 15. Ibid.. 11. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French 16. Ibid.. 12. Armv Doctrine. 1919-1939 (Hamden. Conn.: Archon Rooks. 17. John D. Morrocco. Revolution in Jeopardy." US Naval 1985). Institute Proceedings 116. no. 6 (June 1990): 59. 3 The historian Michael Howard compares the problem of 18. leffrev Record. "AF's Future Bright after Stellar Gull verifying military calculations made in peacetime as being Showing,” Air Force Times. 11 March 1991. 36. like a sailor navigating by dead reckoning, noting that 19. Proposed budget cuts could reduce the number ol deployable carriers from 14 to 12. Morrocco. 57. Independent you have left the terra finna of the last war and are naval analysts questioned moving carriers into the Persian extrapolating from the experiences of that war. The greater Gulf where the ships would be vulnerable to mines and Iraqi the distance from the last war. the greater become the Exocets and where the narrow shallow water and the pres- chances of error in this extrapolation. Occasionally there is ence of oil rigs and shipping limited maneuverability. Rowan a break in the clouds: a small-scale conflict occurs some- Scarborough. "Carrier to Sail within Attack Distance ol Iraq." where and gives you a "fix" by showing whether certain Washington Times, 27 September 1990. 8; and Melissa weapons and techniques are effective or not: but it is Mealy. "Gamble Seen in U.S. Carrier's Entry into Narrow always a doubtful fix. ("Military Science in an Age of Gulf." Los Angeles Times. 28 September 1990, 6. Peace." Royal United Services Institute /RUSII. March 20. Cen George B. Crist, USMC, Retired. "A U.S. Military 1974. 4) Strategy for a Changing World.” Strategic Review 18. no. 1 4. The magnitude of the problem involved in making major (Winter 1990): 19. institutional changes due to the challenge of new weapon 21 See Gen William W. Momyer. USAF. Retired. Air systems is illustrated by the case of the horse cavalry. Power in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: Government Print- According to Edward L. Katzenbach. ing Office. January 1978). 51- 59. 88-99. 107 8. The military history ol the past half-century is studded 22. For example, see Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Military Doc- with institutions which have managed to dodge the chal- trine Today." Washington Post. 22 March 1991, A25. He lenge of the obvious. The Coast Artillery continued until mentions learning from retired Army colonel Harry Summers the middle of World War 11. at least in the United States. that war fighting was rediscovered after Vietnam and that it Other such institutional anomalies will spring to mind. But generated "the Army’s and Air Force's Airland battle doc- the most curious of all was the horse cavalry, which main- trine." From retired Army colonel Trevor Dupuy he learned tained a capacity for survival that borders on the mirac- that "(General Schwarzkopf| and his stall applied a doctrine ulous.. When today's weapons are already out of date which the U.S. Army and Air Force adopted about 10 years and there is therefore a daily need for reassessing our mili- ago: the AirLand Battle Doctrine," tary institutions' response to them, the strange and won- 23. Field Manual (FM) 100-5. Operations. 5 May 1986. 4 derful survival of the horse cavalry may amount to 24. Ibid.. 19-20. 37-39. something more than a curiously alarming anachronism 25. For example, see George C. Kenney. General Kenney (Edward L Katzenbach. ]r., "The Horse Cavalry in the Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War (New York: Twentieth Century A Study in Policy Response," in Amer- Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949; Washington. D.C.: Office of ican Defense Policy, ed |ohn E Endicott and Roy W. Air Force History. 1987), 91. 111. Soon after arriving in the- Stafford. Jr., 4tli ed. (Baltimore: |ohns Hopkins University ater. General Kenney convinced General Mai Arthur ol the Press. 1977|, 360-61, originallv published in Public Policy need to use ground forces to seize the Dobodura plain just 7 [1958|: 120—49) west ol Buna tor an air base. Such a base was needed to make Kenney's aircraft more effective by extending their range and 5. Air force Manual (AFM) 1-1. Ba sic Aerospace Doctrine payload since they would not have to cross the Owen Stanley of the United States Air Force. 16 March 1984, 1-3, mountains and penetrate the thunderstorms that otlen 6. Ibid.. 2-11. formed over this mountain range. 7. Ibid.. 3-2. 26. M |, Armituge and R A. Mason. Air Power in the 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

Nuclear Age (Urbana. 111.: University of Illinois Press, 19831, ship warfare, antisubmarine warfare, aerial mine laying, and 134. aerial refueling. Joint airland operations is still another of the 27. FM 100-5. 20. publication's categories. Control of the air receives only pass- 28. Ibid.. 25. ing attention when the publication states that joint airland 29. Ibid., 91-94. operations are those that "seize or defend major land areas 30. Fleet Marine Forces Manual (FMFM) 1-1. Campoign- together with associated airspace necessary for the prosecu- ing, 25 lanuary 1990 tion of the theater campaign." Under continental theaters this 31. Ibid.. 21-23. 66. publication does list joint counterair operations, but only as 32. Ibid.. 24. one of three subsets of joint airland operations, which is one 33. Ibid.. 42-43. 49. of eight types of operations in this theater. Its list of opera- 34. Ibid.. 27. tions also includes amphibious, airborne, riverine, and "joint 35. Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell, |r., USAF. Retired, Stra- or single-Service strike, interdiction, electronic warfare, spe- tegic Air War against /apan (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Airpower cial. reconnaissance and surveillance operations." The pub- Research Institute. 1980), 30-35, 90-93. lication's placement of these different types of aerospace 36. FMFM 1-1. 29. operations in a single category at the same time that it 37.Ibid. includes riverine and amphibious as categories distinct from 38. Prepared statement of David C. Isby, historian and ana- naval operations provides further evidence that this pub fails lyst. BDM, in House. Roles and Missions of Close Air Sup- to provide appropriate guidance on the key role aerospace port: Hearing before the Investigations Subcommittee of the power plavs in modern war. Proposed final pub. foint Pub Committee on Armed Services, 27 September 1990. 101st 0-1,7 May 1991. IV-7 to IV-ll. Cong., 2d sess.. 1991. 16. 44. Ibid.. V-7; III-40. 39. Erwin Rommel. The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell 45. Ibid.. III-3. Hart, trans. Paul Findlay (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 46. |oint Pub 3-0 (test pub). Doctrine for Unified and Joint Company, 1953). 285. Operations. January 1990. III-12. 40. Ibid.. 468-71. 508-9. 47. Ibid.. III-5. 41. Ibid.. 511. 48. JCS Pub 26. Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Oper- 42. Frido von Senger und Etterlin. Neither Fear Nor Hope ations (from Overseas Land Areas). 1 April 1986. III-2. (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1964). 244. 49.Ibid. 43. joint Pub 0-1. "Basic National Defense Doctrine" 50. Ibid.. HI-4. (draft), undated. V-16 through V-23. Since this draft was cir- 5 1 . ibid., 111-4 and III-5. culated for comments a new "proposed final pub" has been 52. Our tremendous superiority in aerospace technologies written but not circulated for comments. This proposed final and the public's lack of tolerance for high casualties are two pub still fails to provide useful guidance on the vital role realities that should guide the employment of US military aerospace power must play in a campaign. Evidence of the power. It they do, commanders will conduct campaigns in a problem can be seen in that the publication divides the manner that avoids putting our surface forces into situations world into maritime and continental theaters, a division that where the full effectiveness of US aerospace power cannot be lost its value when aerospace power changed the conduct of realized or where the enemy can inflict high casualties. In war Under the maritime theater, the final publication states such campaigns commanders would first employ their sur- ( ampaigns may be composed of nine types of operations, but face forces to help aerospace forces achieve control of the it does not list counterair operations as a separate type of aerospace environment. Once they achieve this control, com- operation, as it does with amphibious and airborne opera- manders would then employ their surface forces to exploit tions. Instead, the publication includes "establishing and the advantages control provides, perhaps by moving into maintaining local superiority (including air) in an area of easily defended positions that are chosen tor their ability to naval operations." The joint or single-service land-based air force the enemy commanders to expose their forces to operation category does list "antiair warfare," but also destruction by our aerospace forces. includes in this category surface sea surveillance, antisurface TOWARD A RATIONAL SPACE- TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE

Lt Col Alan J. P ar rington, U S A F

PACE IS probably the least understood of all military environments today. Whether it is the lack of personal experience in the medium or theS fantasies planted by twentieth-century science-fiction writers, more misconcep- tions exist about systems and their pos- sibilities for space than for any other theater of operations. It is not unusual, for example, to read about Department of Defense (DOD) plans for constellations of orbiting death-ray satellites or brilliant pebble intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) killers that are neither practical nor affordable. With single-satellite launch costs running in the hundreds of millions of dollars while booster reliability lingers in the low 90-percentile range, one questions whether projections for thousand- satellite weapon constellations are any- thing more than wishful thinking.1 Unfor- tunately, a large number of space power advocates, unfamiliar with the principles of satellites in orbit, are attracted to such promotions without seriously considering how these platforms would be placed in orbit or maintained, once there. This article addresses that weakness by examining what is in space, why it is there, why only certain orbits are useful, and why the first requirement of any future military space program must be a reliable, affordable, and responsive access to the theater. What evolves is an operationally derived space- transportation architecture.

47 48 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

f *i* T xbf 1 o T0

Figure 1. The time of fall for two objects dropped from orbit. To understand how a satellite re- equal heights is the same, regardless of forward velocity. mains in orbit, one need only recall the trajectory of a ball as it rolls off a table (fig. 1). A ball dropped from a fixed height (left Before aviation fans rush off to a more side of figure) will accelerate toward the familiar subject, let me first say that space floor (and the center of the earth) at a cer- is a relatively uncomplicated environment tain rate. Released at a given start time whose principles of operations were ex- (T0), it will strike the floor a fraction of a plained over 300 years ago. During the last second later at end time (TJ. If another three centuries, little has changed to com- ball simultaneously rolls off a table of the plicate the concepts that define the two- same height (right side), it will also accel- body (earth and satellite) motion that con- erate toward the earth’s center at an identi- trols orbiting satellites.2 Thus, the discus- cal rate and strike the floor simultaneously sion can be kept simple and illustrative. with the vertically dropped ball. The only More importantly, as space systems play difference between the two projectiles is an ever-increasing role in how we conduct the total distance covered by the ball and air. sea, and ground wars below, it is fun- the trajectory of the fall with respect to the damental that all military leaders become floor (and the surface of the earth). The knowledgeable about the highest frontier time actually spent in reaching the floor in order to correctly anticipate future (Tj minus T„) will be the same for both changes that are sure to occur. Space objects. power advocates, in turn, could benefit The curvature of the earth’s surface from the cross-pollination of war-fighting recedes at a rate of about 16 feet over a dis- experience that is currently the domain of tance of about five miles or 26.000 feet. aviators. This means that if the second ball in figure 1 were rolled at a horizontal velocity of five miles per second (26,000 feet per The Principle of second—fps), its arc would match the curvature of the earth (fig. 2). Thus, it would Satellites in Orbit fall toward the earth at the same rate as the An earth satellite, for purposes of this earth’s surface receded from the ball. This article, is defined as any object revolving would result in a sort of equilibrium, about the earth unpropelled—except for whereby no height (with respect to the altitude- and orbit-adjustment maneuvers. earth’s ever-receding surface) was ever The moon is an example of a satellite in gained or lost. This is the phenomenon A RATIONAL SPACE-TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE 49

from each other, the less the gravitational attraction. As orbits increase in altitude, gravity becomes measurably less, and—as a result—forward-velocity requirements decrease correspondingly. Although a satellite at an altitude of 100 nautical miles (NM) must maintain a circular velocity of about 25,000 fps, the same satellite at 19,360 NM (geosynchronous [GEO] orbit) need only maintain a velocity of about 10,000 fps.4 Earth orbits are generally described with respect to their altitude above the earth’s surface. Normally, one specifies three altitude bands: low-earth orbits (LEO) range from 60-1.000 NM; medium-earth orbits (MEO) from 1,000-19,000 NM; and high- earth orbits—including GEO—at 19,360 NM and above. All earth orbits are ellipses. ranging from near-circular to very Figure 2. An object traveling 26,000 feet per second will egg-shaped (highly elliptic). Although fall toward the earth's surface along a trajectory that matches the contour of the earth. near-circular orbits maintain fairly constant altitudes, highly elliptic orbits can change heights dramatically—from low that keeps a satellite in orbit. In other points (perigee) in the hundreds of miles words, when a satellite's forward velocity and gravitational fall combine to produce a ballistic flight path that matches the contour of the earth, it is said to be in orbit. It is neither weightlessness nor centrifugal force that keeps the object in orbit—just this simple relationship between velocity and gravity.3 Although a ball could theoretically go into orbit a few feet above the ground, the air is far too dense to allow such a blunt object to reach orbital speed. Furthermore, the enormous drag at those velocities (Mach 25 plus) would slow the ball continuously, resulting in a rapid deceleration and steepening of the trajectory. So the object must initially gain altitude to avoid the drag effects of the denser atmosphere. In addition, the farther two bodies are

The spate shuttle has not turned out to he the flexible, responsive, and affordable addition to the space transportation system that we hoped for. DOD requirements that it he able to carry large satellites made it loo heavy to provide the usual advantages of a recoverable launch vehicle. 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 to high points (apogee) in the tens of thou- satellite placed in orbit in the last four sands of miles. decades falls into one of these three broad The other common description of an classifications. As a result, satellites are orbit is its direction or inclination (i). “clustered’’ in strategically important Because of the earth’s curvature, a straight areas, which makes a military planner’s line in space describes a ground track on work far easier than might be imagined.5 earth that is almost always curved. Histor- ically, these tracks were known to ancient navigators as “great circle routes.’’ Because Communications Satellites their geographic direction with respect to Communications satellites (COMSAT) north continually changes, one cannot use were first launched into orbit in 1958, a conventional heading reference. Instead, when Project Score broadcast a re- one must substitute a common reference corded Christmas message from President point to all orbits. As a satellite passes Eisenhower to the world. Since then, over the equator in a northerly direction, COMSATs have dominated the space one measures the angle its orbit makes environment for both civilian and military with the equator and defines it as the satel- uses. Launch-vehicle constraints kept the lite’s inclination (fig. 3). If the satellite first communications satellites at low alti- were heading east at the time it crossed the tude, but by 1963 the National Aeronautics equator, its inclination would be zero and Space Administration (NASA) was degrees; if it were headed north, i would launching some vehicles into orbits at equal 90 degrees; and if headed west, i zero-degree inclination and a height of would equal 180 degrees. With these two 19,360 NM (geostationary orbit), where the simple references—altitude and inclina- majority of COMSATs are located today.6 tion—one can usefully describe all satellite orbits. As we will see, the desired As mentioned earlier, satellites at low altitude must maintain very high velocities function of the satellite determines its altitude and inclination. because of the increased effect of gravity. This requirement results in a circum- navigation of the globe about every 90 minutes. In addition, satellites rotate Satellite Functions through a relatively fixed orbital plane while the earth spins beneath. The com- Satellites have thus far proven useful for bined effect of the low altitude, high only three basic functions: communica- speed, and revolving earth means that tions, navigation, and observation. Except these satellites are in view of individual for scientific experiments, every resident ground stations for brief periods of time (fig. 4). Many of us remember the days POLAR SATELLITE when television satellites routinely faded in and out of coverage as we followed an overseas event; thus, one needed large constellations of low-altitude COMSATs to maintain continuous communications coverage. As early as 1944, writers such as Arthur C. Clarke—of 2001 and, more recently, 2010 fame—published works advocating the use of geostationary orbits for the ideal location of relay satellites.7 Not only can as much as 40 percent of the earth be viewed from such an altitude (fig. 5), but Figure 3. Measuring Inclination also the orbital mechanics are such that if A RATIONAL SPACE-TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE 51

in view of the same ground sites—which greatly simplifies antenna tracking—and three equally spaced satellites can cover most of the globe. Although GEO COMSATs have obvious advantages over LEO platforms, the altitude of 19,360 NM necessary for GEO requires approximately 60 percent more launch energy to attain than does a low- earth orbit.a Furthermore, because of the earth’s curvature, extreme latitudes above and below 70 degrees are not within line Figure 4. Direct Line-of-Sight Limitations of a Low-AI- of sight and cannot be reached from geo- titude Transmitter. From AU-18. Space Handbook, ed stationary satellites. These two limitations Lt Col Curtis D. Cochran. Lt Col Dennis M. Gorman, and Maj Joseph D Dumoulin (Maxwell AFB. Ala. . Air Univer- caused the Soviets to develop a highly sity Press, January 1985). 7-5. elliptical orbit to provide service to their northern frontier. Launched on 23 April 1965, the Molniya I communications satel- the satellite is placed in circular orbit at lite was inclined at 63.4 degrees, had a zero-degree inclination (directly above the perigee of 264 NM in the Southern Hemi- equator), it will travel once around its sphere, and an apogee of 21,487 NM in the orbit in the same amount of time that the Northern Hemisphere. The different alti- earth rotates once on its axis (24 hours). tudes resulted in a very slow speed at From the earth, the COMSAT appears to apogee and a very high speed at perigee. be stationary. Thus, the satellite is always The size of the orbit also made the satellite travel once around the globe every 12 hours. The combination of all these factors gave the Molniya COMSAT orbit a “hang time” of almost eight hours over the far north, providing excellent polar communications coverage. The Soviets continue to use these COMSAT orbits today, as do other nations with similar requirements.9 The choice of a 63.4-degree inclination provides an all-important aspect of stability. The earth, due to its spinning, is not a homogeneous spherical mass. Like most middle-aged systems, it has a slight bulge around its middle. This bulge— like that of a ball that is out of round—causes perturbations to otherwise relatively undisturbed orbits. At medium and high altitudes, these disruptive effects are negligible, but at low-altitude, high-inclination orbits (e.g., Molniya ellipses) where line-of-sight Figure 5. Concept of Three Communications Satellites in 24 Hour Equatorial Orbit, Showing Geometrical angles to the continuously changing appar- Relationships in the Equatorial Plane. From AU-18, ent center of the earth are greatest, the Space Handbook, ed Lt Col Curtis D. Cochran. Lt Col effects can be severe. However, at a 63.4- Dennis M Gorman, and Maj Joseph D. Dumoulin (Max- degree inclination, the perturbations are well AFB. Ala : Air University Press, January 1985). 7-4. uniquely cancelled out (fig. 6). This, there- 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

igation accuracy on the order of several meters.10 By the turn of the century, most aircraft and ships will probably use GPS as their primary navigation reference. Widespread Army applications are also planned.11 Interestingly, both the original US and Soviet deployment patterns were identical in nearly every respect: circular altitude of 10,800 NM, inclination of 63.4 degrees, and a constellation of 12 Soviet and 24 US satellites in three Soviet and six US orbital planes.12 The similarity is not merely coin- cidental, as these 12-hour orbits provide the best worldwide coverage for the least cost and the all-important aspect of orbital 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 stability. Although the earth’s irregular 180 165 150 135 120 105 shape causes little perturbation to GPS ORBITAL INCLINATION— DEGREES orbits at medium altitude, one must use Figure 6. Apsidal Rotation Rate Per Day for Orbits with highly elliptic transfer orbits to get there, 100 NM Perigee Attitude. From AU-18, Space Hand- and the disturbing effects during the low- book, ed Lt Col Curtis D. Cochran, Lt Col Dennis M. altitude portions of those maneuvers can Gorman, and Maj Joseph D Dumoulin (Maxwell AFB, be severe. NAVSATs, like COMSATs, are Ala.: Air University Press, January 1985), 2-45. thus confined to certain locations because their function—as well as the peculiarities fore, is the optimum inclination for highly of earth orbits—requires them to be there. elliptical orbits. It is also the inclination where most navigation satellites are found. Observation Satellites Navigation Satellites Observation satellites include a broad Navigation satellites (NAVSAT) beacon range of military and civilian systems that information to terrestrial and space users perform the missions of missile warning, to enable them to precisely determine their cartography, geodetic survey, weather sur- present location for accomplishment of veillance, and treaty verification. In the various missions. Like terrestrially based future, such satellites will probably also VHF omnidirectional radios (VOR), tacti- perform space and terrestrial military- cal air navigation systems (TACAN), and surveillance functions. Like COMSATs long-range aid to navigation (LORAN) sta- and NAVSATs, these systems are also tions. the primary requirement for NAV- deployed in strategically oriented orbits SATs is to be in a known or predictable where they can best accomplish their position. The United States and the Soviet mission. Union deployed primitive low-altitude Contemporary warning satellites systems in the past and are now replacing are deployed in geostationary orbits them with highly sophisticated medium- where they continually provide treaty- altitude constellations that greatly improve verification data. Other less-sophisticated accuracy. The partially deployed US launch-detection satellites are deployed in version—navigation satellite timing and Molniya-orbit constellations because they ranging (NAVSTAR) global positioning use a different type of sensor.13 In both system (GPS)—and its Soviet clone— instances, orbit stability is a driving con- global navigation satellite system cern for the development of useful data. (GLONASS)—will provide worldwide nav- Terrestrial-observation satellites are gen- Launch vehicles such as the Della racket have been an important part of the military space program over the years. However, newer and heavier satellites forced the Air Force and NASA to develop a new class of rockets with larger throw weights. Unfortunately, development costs have been high. erally found at low altitude in polar inclinations. One selects this orbit because the earth's rotation beneath the inertially fixed plane provides the opportunity for observation of the entire surface of the earth over a short period of time. Unlike early-warning systems placed at high altitudes for greater area coverage, observation systems are placed at low altitudes to max- imize sensor resolution. The sun’s position is also very important for photoimagery missions. To optimize sun angle and establish consistency for purposes of analysis, one selects a sun-synchronous polar orbit that maintains a constant relative sun position with respect to the orbital plane throughout the various seasons of the year (fig. 7).14 Here again, orbital dynamics define the inclination.

perturbation, known as nodai regression, causes the satellite’s orbit to slowly regress (move westerly) at about one degree per day throughout the year, thereby keeping the satellite’s orbit aligned with the sun. Sun-synchronous orbits are a function of altitude and inclination, beginning at Figure 7. Sun-Synchronous Orbit. From AU-18, Space approximately 200 NM/97-degree inclina- Handbook, ed. Lt Col Curtis D. Cochran. Lt Col Dennis tion and extending to 600 NM/100-degree M. Gorman, and Maj Joseph D Dumoulin (Maxwell AFB, inclination (fig. 8).15 At heights much Ala.: Air University Press, January 1985), 2-44. below this altitude, atmospheric drag pre- cludes long-duration flight; at heights much higher than this, one loses the For LEO observation satellites, one uses advantage of nodal regression, as well as the earth’s oblateness—or bulge around photographic resolution. the middle—to keep the orbital plane Weather satellites can be found in both aligned with the sun as the earth travels geostationary orbits for general observa- through its own orbit about the sun. This tions and in low-earth orbits for detailed

53 54 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

Future Satellite Systems Communications, navigation, and observation satellites are strategically located in certain orbits because near-earth orbital dynamics drive them to those locations. Like the great-circle navigation routes used not only by Christopher Columbus but also by the crew of the space shuttle Columbia, the orbits of the four primary bands will continue to be used—as they are now—to conduct communications/navigation/ observation missions. Indeed, the orbit reservations now on file with the Interna- tional Frequency Registration Board show no change to deployment patterns well 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 into the next century.17 What is expected 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 to change is the creation of a new class of ORBIT INCLINATION—DEGREES satellites—space-based weapons. It is not the intent of this article to deter- Figure 8 Nodal Regression Rate Per Day for Circular mine the feasibility—technical or politi- Orbits and Sun-Synchronous Altitudes. From AU-18, cal—of the Strategic Defense Initiative Space Handbook, ed. Lt Col Curtis D. Cochran, Lt Col (SDI) and similar proposals. For our pur- Dennis M. Gorman, and Maj Joseph D. Dumoulin (Max- poses, we need be concerned only with the well AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, January 1985), question of where these constellations 2—43. might be deployed if they were developed. Space, despite unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, is not the perfect medium analysis. Like other low-observation sys- for the propagation of directed-energy tems, they generally make use of sun- weapons. Energy attenuates in space over synchronous orbits in the 500-NM range.16 distance in much the same way it does in In summary, were a researcher to cata- the atmosphere. The further a target is logue space systems by type, altitude, and from an energy source, the more the inclination, it would quickly become energy beam is spread with a correspond- obvious that functional satellites fit into ing negative effect on energy density, one of four particular bands: which is the kill factor in laser-type weapons.16 Strong electromagnetic fields, • Low-earth orbits at 100-1,000 NM and solar flares, galactic-cosmic rays, solar 0-110 degrees of inclination. wind, and other solar-system phenomena • Middle-earth orbits at 10,800 NM near disrupt particle-beam weapons and thus 63.4- degree inclination. restrict their range.19 As regards kinetic • Molniya orbits at 300/23.000 NM and kill devices, the large nominal distances 63.4- degree inclination. and velocities involved in tracking, target- • Geosynchronous orbits at 19,360 NM ing. and intercepting satellites and ballis- and zero-degree inclination. tic missiles pose special problems all their So, although space is often described as own. The one common thread that runs infinitely vast, reality suggests that—like through the entire spectrum of possibili- the trade routes across the earth’s oceans— ties is that any near-term to midterm space only a limited amount of space is useful to weapon will have to get relatively close to humanity. Examination of future military its target to be effective. That is. SDI plat- and civilian uses shows no major changes. forms will be deployed in low-earth orbits A RATIONAL SPACE-TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE 55

USAF PHOTO. SSGT SCHMITTEN

where orbital dynamics drive deployment The Challenger disaster and the failures of new military patterns to the previously described booster rockets combined to put the entire US space program on hold. The Air Force has opted to rely more inclination (i.e., 100-1.000 NM and 0-110 heavily on unmanned satellites at a time when other nations, degrees i). especially the European space partners, are moving ahead in In short, space systems envisioned for the development of recoverable space vehicles. the next 20 years show no major changes in deployment-orbit selection. The exclu- sive use of the four bands of limited altitude and inclination should remain constant. What will change—indeed, must Space-T ransportation change—is the method by which we reach these strategically important destinations. Systems Now that we are armed with the knowl- For the past 40 years we have relied edge of what is in space and why it is upon expendable launch vehicles (ELV) to there, a brief look at the development of deliver payloads to space. ELVs, like bal- US space-launch systems will reveal in- loons in the early days of aviation, were herent flaws in our current methodology selected over other systems because—at and provide a basis upon which to ration- the time—they provided the most lift for alize a future space-transportation archi- the least technology. Unfortunately, like tecture. early balloons, they were (and still are) 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 large, cumbersome, highly explosive vehi- velocity (i.e., over 17,000 miles per hour). cles that could operate only in good Although the majority of acceleration weather; they were also unaffordably occurs outside the earth’s atmosphere expensive.20 NASA recognized these (above 300,000 feet) where drag is at a inherent drawbacks in the 1960s and pro- minimum, laws of physics still require an posed the development of the space- exponential amount of energy to reach transportation system (STS), which prom- such high speeds (kinetic energy equals ised to revolutionize space launch.21 one-half mass times velocity squared). The STS was to have consisted of three Energy, of course, translates into fuel parts: (1) a two-stage, fully reusable space required. Compounding the problem is the shuttle that hauled cargo and fuel to (2) a absence of oxygen with which to burn the low-earth-orbit space station where (3) an fuel. As a result, the vehicle must carry an orbital-transfer vehicle (OTV) transferred oxidizer, which increases total propellant satellites from the space station to final weight by as much as six times, which, in orbit. Each part of the system was reusable turn, increases fuel and oxygen require- and optimized for its own peculiar envi- ments even further. Thus, the vehicle must ronment, promising long-term efficiencies. be very large.25 The overall $10 billion price tag was, how- To put the problem in perspective, we ever, too much for the Nixon administra- need only point out that Sputnik I—the tion to swallow, given the technology risk world’s first satellite—weighed a mere 184 involved. With an expensive war in Viet- pounds but used a 588,735-pound rocket nam and inflation problems at home, the to propel it ihto orbit.26 The first US satel- ambitious STS program was reduced to lite, Explorer I, was but a 10-pound radio development of the space shuttle by itself; launched atop a 64,000-pound Juno I test even the shuttle’s design was modified to vehicle.27 Even today’s most advanced sys- rely heavily on existing expendable tech- tems have payload-to-gross-weight ratios nologies. The resultant space shuttle, as of only 2 to 3 percent. Hence, large satel- we know it today, took on the very charac- lites require massive launch vehicles teristics of the ELVs it was supposed to weighing millions of pounds. correct. Consequently, it could not pro- The shuttle is particularly large because duce the economies originally promised.22 in 1971 the Air Force established the The $200-300 million shuttle launch requirement that it be capable of carrying costs, although cheaper than those for the largest US satellite, even though 90 competing ELVs, are still too high for any- percent of existing payloads were less than thing other than a very limited space pro- one-half that size.28 The proportional gram. NASA studies have attributed the growth in payload size forced an exponen- high costs to-the shuttle’s expendable com- tial increase in the overall structure due to ponents. its vertical launch, the need for the factors mentioned. The programmatic extensive ground support, and its enor- loss of both the space station (for refuel- mous size.23 No doubt, the shuttle was a ing) and the OTV further compounded the marvel of engineering expertise, but at 4.5 problem by adding the necessity of car- million pounds of lift-off weight (seven rying an expendable upper stage for times the weight of a Boeing 747), its oper- higher-orbit transfers. So, rather than build ational limitations were numerous.24 To a system of small vehicles—each opti- the outside observer, the question, Why is mized for its own peculiar environment— the shuttle so big? naturally arises. To get the US elected to construct one large, all- at the root of the problem, one needs to purpose launcher that, in the end, satisfied ask, Why are space-launch systems, in no one. general, so big? Improvements in electronics during the To establish a low-earth orbit, one must 1970s and 1980s greatly reduced the size accelerate satellites to over 25,000 fps of most satellites, but expected savings A RATIONAL SPACE-TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE 57

in launch costs were offset by high 1970s because of its high cost, the low- aerospace-industry inflation factors. By altitude space station came of age in the 1985. costs exceeded $3,000 a pound to late 1980s and is scheduled for deploy- LEO and 10 times that for GEO.29 In turn, ment in the late 1990s. The concept in- the high cost of space launch drove the cludes a manned low-earth-orbit platform, military services toward •‘piggybacking” at least one unmanned polar platform, and one satellite onto another, so that it reusable orbital-transfer/-maneuvering became difficult to discern the real driver vehicles.34 of payload size—the satellite’s function or The manned platform is to be placed in the launch vehicle itself. a “low inclination” 250-NM orbit, where it Numerous government-funded studies can be serviced from the Kennedy Space concluded that a completely reusable Center in Florida. A phenomenon of con- launch system could be developed that temporary space-launch vehicles is that would provide a capability to launch 90 the latitude (degrees north or south of the percent of all military and civilian satel- equator) of the launch point determines lites at one-tenth the cost incurred during the minimum inclination in which a pay- the 1980s.30 Before the proposals had a load can be placed. NASA's operating base chance to mature, however, the space at Cape Canaveral, Florida—28.5 degrees shuttle Challenger’s attempted launch dur- north latitude—limits the inclination for ing out-of-the-envelope weather condi- the space station to between 28.5 and tions resulted in catastrophic failure and 151.5 degrees (the difference between 180 the reversal of DOD policy.31 and 28.5 degrees). Ideally, the space sta- Ironically, the Challenger mishap oc- tion should be placed in equatorial orbit curred in the midst of a string of ELV (zero-degree i) where it can most easily failures that left the entire US space pro- access geostationary satellites, but to do so gram grounded. No common fault was would preclude its use by all ELVs found among the five accidents, but— launched from US bases. The European faced with the embarrassing prospect of Space Agency’s launch site in French being unable to launch critical military Guiana, South America, can access all payloads—DOD impulsively returned to inclinations, but it makes little sense for its 1960s doctrine of reliance on a mixed the agency to launch a satellite into a 28.5- fleet of unmanned vehicles. Thus, the ini- degree orbit only to return to where it tiative to develop new manned concepts started upon reaching geosynchronous went the way of the Wright brothers’ altitude. These conflicting ELV limitations biplane, passing out of the hands of the US have created some doubt as to the utility of military and into the waiting arms of the station until the US develops a more Europe’s aerospace industry. At the very flexible concept such as the one the Euro- moment DOD was reversing its policy of peans are pursuing. reliance on the shuttle, British, French, The USAF’s position on the space sta- German, and Japanese authorities were inition has been the familiar, Who needs it?35 tiating research into new reusable sys- The answer to this rhetoric is, The future tems.32 The European objective was to Air Force needs it! We simply cannot con- build a vehicle capable of servicing tinue to expend the cost of a B-2 bomber another US innovation—a permanently for every major satellite launch. Nor can manned space station.33 we afford to let foreign nations unilaterally As previously pointed out, a US space develop a reliable, responsive manned station was an original part of NASA’s access to space while we remain content space-transportation architecture—the des- with our 1960s-era methodology. The US tination point for the reusable shuttle that made a similar mistake with the airplane delivered satellites, supplies, and fuel. in the early 1900s and paid the price in Unsupported by Congress in the early World War I.36 If we are to remain a leader 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 in space, we must first solve our basic now have we reached the point in scien- problem of getting to and from important tific progress where the century-old idea of orbits in an efficient manner. a space-transportation system consisting of a completely reusable launcher, space station, and OTV can be developed with minimum risk and long-term economies. A Proposed At the core of a rational space- Space-T ransportation transportation architecture is a new earth- to-orbit launch concept that will be to Architecture spaceflight what the aeroplane was to avia- Although the space station was an tion (fig. 9). Because it must operate in the integral part of NASA’s 1960s space- atmosphere for launch and recovery, the transportation system, its concept is vehicle will use conventional runways and almost a century old, having originally have strong aerodynamic qualities that been proposed by Russian schoolteacher will enhance its reliability and operability. Konstantin Eduardovich Tsiolkovsky in It will be capable of delivering a 20,000- the early 1900s. Tsiolkovsky also envi- pound payload to an easterly orbit of 250 sioned an aerospace vehicle that could NM or 10,000 pounds to polar inclinations rocket into space and return by “braking at 600 NM. Most likely, it will be a two- itself against the air and gliding without stage vehicle consisting of a carrier/tanker explosions.’’37 The usefulness of space first stage and an aerodynamically capable became apparent in the radio age of the orbiter as the second stage.38 1920s, but it wras another 30 years before Separation will occur around 100,000 technology caught up with the professor’s feet and Mach 3—a trade-off between sim- ideas to orbit man-made platforms. Only plicity and on-orbit maneuverability requirements.39 Although a purely single- NASA PHOTO stage-to-orbit (SSTO) system seems most desirable from its simple airplane-like concept of operations, both technology and operational requirements argue against this specious alternative. From an engineering standpoint, most experts consider the SSTO system very high risk because the performance required to get to orbit in one stage demands a fuel/engine/structural efficiency combination that is unlikely to be available until well into the next century.40 Current technology has already been stretched near its theoretical limit, and—short of some unexpected scientific breakthrough—the best that one can hope for in the near future is a hypersonic single-stage vehicle that cannot reach orbit. From an operational standpoint, the argument against the SSTO system is even

The ability of the spare shuttles to rendezvous on-orbit with other satellites gives us the flexibility to retrieve and repair satellites. However, our current method of launching by direct insertion is complex, costly, and time-consuming. Offset launch techniques would eliminate phasing problems. A RATIONAL SPACE-TRANSPORTATION ARCIIITLCTURI- 59

tal conditions.41 The two-stage concept Separation 100.000 ' -v also provides a flexible launch-point fea- Crtr return to baso ture that converts a seeming handicap into a significant advantage.

Offset Launch versus Direct Insertion Americans were extremely proud of NASA's 1984 shuttle missions that ren- dezvoused with the malfunctioning Solar Max. Palapa B, and the WESTAR (Western Union) satellites. The shuttle’s inherent flexibility and on-orbit maneuverability Figure 9. Takeoff and Recovery Profile Using Advanced allowed in-space repair and retrieval of Tactical Fighter and Shuttle Engine Technology malfunctioning space systems for the first time ever. However, very few of these same enthusiasts were aware of the ex- more compelling. The system, if it were tremely complex and time-consuming pro- possible, would produce an on-orbit vehi- cedures that had to be executed to effect cle significantly larger than any staged sys- the space rendezvous because of the ELV tem using comparable technology. Further- direct-insertion launch technique em- more, the relationship is not linear but ployed by the shuttle. exponential, as alluded to earlier. Suffice “In a rendezvous mission, it is impera- it to say. if next-generation space-launch tive that the orbiter closely match the orbit vehicles are to have any operational value, plane of the target at launch, as changing they must have the capability to maneuver the orbit plane after launch is very fuel in space in order to perform rendezvous expensive.”42 In fact, a 60-degree plane with the space station, a satellite, or even change requires almost as much energy as that age-old soldier’s nemesis—to get it takes to get to orbit in the first place. within weapons parameters. To maneuver One matches orbital planes by allowing on orbit, vehicles must use thrust, which the intended launch site to rotate under burns precious fuel. For a given payload the inertially stabilized orbital plane and capability, an SSTO vehicle would have then launching the interceptor in the far less maneuvering potential than a desired direction. This is called direct smaller staged system and would reduce insertion. “The time at which a direct its flexibility to perform a variety of launch into the orbital plane can be made missions. is called a launch window.”43 For low- The amount of required maneuverability earth-orbit launches, only one or two is open to debate. Obviously, more is bet- launch windows exist each day. This is ter, and that’s where staging is particularly independent of the target's location inside useful. The higher and faster the final sep- the orbital plane. Thus, a launch must aration maneuver, the smaller and lighter occur when the plane passes overhead, the final vehicle can be. (A helpful analogy regardless of where the target is in the is the dependency of fighter aircraft on air- orbit. This, in turn, results in the orbiter's borne tankers or drop tanks.) In the case of having to chase the target to match orbits payload-to-gross-weight ratios of only 2 or and phase for join-up. Like two kids sepa- 3 percent, every pound saved pays a rated on a Ferris wheel, the procedures are highly leveraged dividend. Additionally, not all that simple for two ballistic vehi- rocket engines—unlike jet engines— cles falling at 17,000 mph. It can be done become more efficient as ambient air pres- only by orbiting at different altitudes, sure decreases; therefore, one can design a which results in different periods of orbit two-stage system to optimize environmen- (time to complete an orbit). The process is 60 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 further complicated by the fact that on- • Low-earth orbits at 100-1,000 NM and orbit burns (to adjust altitude) change the 0-110 degrees of i. shape and alignment of the orbit if not • Middle-earth orbits at 10,800 NM near done at perigee or apogee.44 63.4- degree i. Rather than digress into the unusual and • Molniya orbits at 300/23,000 NM and confusing phenomenon of on-orbit maneu- 63.4- degree i. vering, suffice it to say that one cannot • Geosynchronous orbits at 19,360 NM simply thrust when and where one wants and zero-degree i. to. Burns have to be anticipated far in A space-transportation architecture must advance and programmed at specific inter- be capable of servicing these destination vals to accomplish the rendezvous. To do orbits. this, the shuttle employs a double coellip- The low-earth orbits can best be reached tic rendezvous sequence which, as the directly by taking off in the two-stage sys- name suggests, takes days—sometimes tem using normal turbofan jet-engine weeks—to accomplish, this can all be power (fig. 9). A cruise at an altitude of eliminated and the rendezvous reduced to 30,000 feet for up to 700 NM in any direc- less than two hours by employing what tion provides the necessary offset to can be called the offset launch concept.45 achieve a minimum-time rendezvous. If An offset launch is the capability to the vehicle used a combination of rocket move the launch point to its optimum and afterburning turbofan power, a climb location in order to eliminate phasing to 100,000 feet and acceleration to Mach 3 problems. By moving the launch-insertion would give the initial momentum to the point to the ideal lead point, one can time orbiter, which would continue to orbit the insertion burn with the phasing burn with a 400-second insertion burn after sep- to produce the desired rendezvous in one aration. The burn would be programmed and one-half orbits. The F-15 antisatellite to achieve the desired orbit ephemeris for employs a similar technique, although the payload deployment, satellite rendezvous, weapon remains suborbital. A two-stage or observation duties. The 10,000-pound carrier/orbiter launch system with a first- polar (20,000-pound easterly) payload stage range of 700 NM is all that is re- capability would handle 90 percent of all quired to accomplish any low-earth-orbit future satellite requirements. Infrequent rendezvous.46 So, while building a two- large/outsized payloads that could not be stage system may seem like a handicap to accommodated by the two-stage vehicle some observers, from an operational view- could be sent aloft on ELVs whose modu- point it is a significant advantage whose lar launch components (i.e., engines) attributes have not been lost on our Euro- could then be retrieved by a following pean competitors. A two-stage vehicle is orbiter. also much cheaper to build than the SSTO-svstem prototype.47 Of course, any Geostationary orbits are best served by idea can be taken too far. and there is a launch to the iow-inclination space sta- practical limit to how much performance tion, where rendezvous, docking, and should be required for the next-generation berthing would occur. As discussed space-launch vehicle. A review of basic earlier, all geosynchronous payloads— satellite orbits will define what that limit without the need for integral upper stages should be. and fuel—could quite easily be handled by a 20,000-pound capability. At the station, the payload would be mated to an orbital- Space-Transportation Requirements transfer vehicle for propulsion to geo- We previously established that all current synchronous orbit, where plane change and future satellite systems will be located and acceleration to circularize the ellipti- in one of four particular bands: cal transfer orbit would occur. After one A RATIONAL SPACE-TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE 61

established the correct longitudinal position. the OTV would deploy its payload and return to the space station, using either propulsive or synergistic means. The OTV could also be used to retrieve malfunctioning or fuel-depleted geosynchronous satellites for repair. GPS-tvpe medium-earth circular orbits and their Molniya counterparts are a more interesting situation. As one would expect, all orbits in the same inclination are not Figure 10. Two Equally Inclined Noncoplanar Orbits. coplanar—that is. not in the same slice of Adapted from AU-18, Space Handbook, ed. Lt Col Curtis space (except for equatorial orbits). Refer- D. Cochran, Lt Col Dennis M Gorman, and Maj Joseph ring to a Mercator projection with two D. Dumoulin (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, equally inclined orbits (fig. 10) will help January 1985), 2-33. explain this fact. Recall that inclination was defined as the angle made by a satellite’s orbit as it crossed the equator on an ascending pass. In the figure, both ascend- tial, then a low-altitude, 63.4-degree space ing passes make a 60-degree angle with the station would pass through every medium- equator but are clearly not coplanar. In altitude coinclined plane once every 100 fact, their orbital planes intersect at two days 1(360° - 3.5°) -s- 3.5°/day = 100 places called nodes and would require a days). Although not being able to visit a remarkable turning maneuver to become particular GPS or similar orbit for an aver- coplanar. The point is that although a age of 50 days may seem restrictive, one space station may be inclined at 63.4 must remember that satellite lifetimes and degrees, its orbital plane is totally out of on-orbit spares provide necessary redun- sync with all other equally inclined dancy to ensure continued operation of the planes. Therefore, using a 63.4-degree- system. inclined military space station as an OTV The military impact of a moderately interface would almost always require a inclined space station would also enhance difficult and fuel-expensive plane change our ability to observe other nations' by the OTV7 unless one employed an orbi- activities wdthin the same plane, as w'ell as tal anomaly to correct this deficiency. provide the opportunity for human over- Recalling that low-altitude, sun- flight of most of the world's landmass synchronous orbits use the perturbation of twice per day. In fact, a military space nodal regression to remain aligned at the station—in conjunction w'ith the other proper sun angle throughout different sea- transportation components advocated in sons of the year, the same effect can be this article—promises to revolutionize the used to drag a 63.4-degree low-altitude entire space program by providing new' space station through the other equally reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, inclined—but noncoplanar—orbits. Nodal and w'eapon-delivery options. It would regression varies with altitude and inclina- move the United States out of the tion. In the case of equally inclined orbits, twentieth-century space-support environ- the nodal-regression rate becomes solely a ment and into the twenty-first-century function of orbit altitude. space-operations arena. But until we solve At 250 NM and 63.4 degrees i, nodal the basic problem of getting to and from regression is about three and one-half orbit in an efficient manner, those degrees per day. whereas at the Molniya forward-looking ideas will remain just and medium altitudes the regression is wishful fantasies of twenty-first-century almost negligible. If one uses this differen- planners. □ 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

Notes 1. Lowell Wood. "From Smart Rocks Come Brilliant Peb- 27. Ibid., 290-91. bles." Aerospace America 24, no. 4 (April 1990): 18-20. 28. Baker, 7. 2. Lt Col David Lupton. On Space Warfare: A Space Power 29. Michael Dornheim, "Air Force Amends Contract for Doctrine (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), Phase 1 ALS," Aviation Week & Space Technology 127 145: and Charles MacCregor and Lee Livingston, eds.. Space (20 July 1987): 25. Handbook (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. 1977), 30. Eric Rice. Transatmospheric Vehicle (TAV) Concept 2- 20. Evaluation and Development (Phase 1). vol. 1. Executive 3 The analogy of a ball rolling off a table to describe the Summary Report (Columbus. Ohio: Battelle Laboratories. principle of orbits was presented in a book by Wernher von 1983). 10. Braun, the title of which the author has long since forgotten. 31. Malcolm McConnell. Challenger: A Major Malfunction 4. MacGregor and Livingston, 3-7. (Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday, 1987), 243. 5. Lupton. 21. 32. Donald Fink. "US Adopts New Space Strategy." Avia- 6. Kenneth Gatland. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Space tion Week & Space Technology 121 (27 August 1984): 14. Technology. A Comprehensive History of Space Exploration 33. Jeffrey Lenorowitz. "Company Formed to Manage Next (New York: Salamander Books. 1981). 267-70. Phase of Europe's Hermes Space Plane Program." Aviation 7. Ibid., 86. Week B- S p a c e Technology 133 (12 November 1990): 76-77. 8. Robert Giffen. US Space System Survivability: Strategic 34. Thomas Moser. "Getting Ready to Go," Aerospace Alternatives for the 1990s (Washington. D.C.: National America 26, no. 9 (September 1988): 16-27. Defense University Press. 1982). 12. 35. Lupton. 147. 9. Gatland. 81; and MacGregor and Livingston. 12-5. 36. I. B. Holley. Jr.. Ideas and Weapons (Washington. D.C.: 10. MacGregor and Livingston, 12-6. Office of Air Force Historv. 1983). 178. 11. David Baker. The Shape of Wars to Come (New York: 37. Gatland. 10-11. Stein and Day. 1984). 194. 38. Rice, 10. 12. Pierre Kruh. "The NAVSTAR Global Positioning Sys- 39. Rice, vol. 2. Detailed Technical Report. 5-13. tem Six-Plane 18-Satellite Constellation” (El Segundo, Calif.: 40. Ibid.. 10. Aerospace Corp.. n.d.). 1. 41. MacGregor and Livingston, 3-6. 13. Gatland, 80. 42. Steven Clark and Daniel Sedej. Rendezvous/Proximity 14. MacGregor and Livingston. 2-50. Operations Workbook (Houston. Tex.: NASA Johnson Space 15. Ibid. Center, 1983). 1-46. 16. Gatland. 100. 43. "Astronautics 332 Course Text." vol. 2 (Colorado 17. MacGregor and Livingston. 7-9. Springs. Colo.: USAF Academv. 1984). V-74. 18. Ibid.. 9-13. 44. Ibid.. Vl-10 to VI-11. 19. Ibid., 1-14. 45. The term offset launch arose out of a discussion 1 had 20. Donald Fink. “Milstar Satellite Booster Cost Reaches with my supervisor at USAF Space Command in 1984 when I SI Billion Per Mission.” Aviation Week fr Space Technology was developing a concept of operations for a military aero- 128 (9 May 1988): 27. space vehicle. The idea was mine; the term came from my 21. lerrv Grey. Enterprise (New York: Morrow. 1979), 53. supervisor—Lt Col Mike Rhynard, USAF. The term has been 22. David Baker. Space Shuttle (New York: Crown Pub- widely used in articles and publications since. lishers, 1979), 6. 46. Due to the earth's rotation, orbit ground tracks pro- 23. Charles Eldred. "STS-II—Beyond Shuttle" (Paper pre- gressively work their way westward, depending on the sented at the 1984 American Institute of Aeronautics and inclination and period of the orbit. For LEO the worst-case Astronautics NASA Space Systems Technology Conference, scenario is a polar orbit of 1.000 NM. in which case the earth Costa Mesa, Calif.. 5-7 )une 1984). 5-6. will rotate approximately 1.400 NM at LIS launch-site lati- 24. Space Shuttle System Summary (Los Angeles: Rock- tudes. Thus. 700 NM is the farthest the vehicle would have to well International Space Systems Group. 1980). 25-26. fly to reduce the phase angle to zero for launch or wait for 25. MacGregor and Livingston. 3-1 to 3-6. the next orbit to occur 107 minutes later. 26. Gatland. 26-27. 47. Rice. vol. 1. Executive Summary Report. 10. Fall 1991 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNERS

Roger D. Launius Betty R. Kennedy

for their article A Revolution in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter

Congratulations to Roger D. Launius and Betty If you would like to compete for the Ira C. R. Kennedy for their selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award, submit an article of feature Eaker Award winners for the best eligible arti- length to the Airpower Journal, Walker Hall. cle from the Fall 1991 issue of the Airpower Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is for Journal. Dr Launius and Ms Kennedy receive a the best eligible article in each issue and is $500 cash award for their contributions to the open to all US military personnel below the Air Force’s professional dialogue. The award rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov- honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or through the support of the Arthur G. B. M etcalf equivalent. Foundation of Winchester, Massachusetts.

63 THE SOVIET MILITARY AND THE NEW AIR WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF

M ary C. Fit zGer al d

ROMPTED by the abortive coup or numerous successor states—will con- attempt, the Soviet revolution of tinue to be a major concern to those August 1991 has opened a new nations themselves and the rest of the chapter in Soviet military affairs. world. Nuclear deterrence, supplemented PAlthough accurate predictions of ultimateby a smaller and leaner conventional mili- effects on the Soviet armed forces are tary establishment, will likely emerge as impossible until the situation stabilizes, the military component that will back up one can make rudimentary judgments strategic concepts. The great Soviet strate- regarding basic forces and general tenden- gic debates of the 1980s and 1990s will cies. Written before the coup attempt, this leave a lasting imprint on the future. Cur- article nevertheless provides the basis for rent lags in the military-technical sphere such judgments by examining both long- will therefore remain a central concern, term trends in Soviet military thought and while obstacles to implementing the new recent lessons learned from the Persian military-technical revolution may initially Gulf war. multiply. The Soviet General Staff will Issues of national security and geopoli- likely remain both a viable structure and tics—whether of the Soviet Union. Russia, the chief articulator of the nature of future SOVIET MILITARY AND NEW AIR WAR IN PERSIAN GULF 65

war. Defense Minister Ye. I. Shaposhnikov nologies perceived to be at the heart and Chief of the General Staff V. N. Lobov, of future Soviet military capabilities. for example, have long supported tech- Weapons that employ these technologies nological modernization of the Soviet include advanced conventional munitions armed forces to cope with the high-tech (ACM), directed-energy weapons, and nature of future warfare—especially as space-based systems. Convinced that the exemplified in the Gulf war. wide-scale deployment of these weapons was inevitable, the Soviet military developed a comprehensive and revolutionary vision of future war long before the Per- Soviet Views on sian Gulf conflict. According to prominent military scien- Future War tists, the ongoing development of nuclear In Soviet military thought, the armed and nonnuclear strategic offensive forces forces must be structured according to the provides a basis for predicting a near-term nature of future war. Soviet military doc- shift toward the waging of an “essentially trine is thus riveted to future military new type of war—the aerospace war.”1 capabilities and environments even in the era of “new thinking” and perestroika. Although the Soviet military establishment has undergone substantial changes under President Mikhail Gorbachev, main- stream views on future war reflect the same focus on emerging military technologies that Marshal N. V. Ogarkov initi- ated in the early 1980s. Despite a notice- able degree of civil-military divergence regarding the future of the Soviet armed forces, the civilian leadership has not • oR sought to impede the development of tech- 66 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

Such a war is characterized by a massive Both the war pIan put together hv Gen Colin Powell and the employment of cutting-edge technologies: coalition's theater command structure reflected the ballistic missiles with maneuvering war- innovative mix of modern weapons anti careful planning that heads, long-range cruise missiles, ACMs, the Soviets characterize as "intellectualized warfare." reconnaissance-strike complexes, orbital aircraft, wide-scale application of stealth armed forces, (2) destruction of the oppo- technology, directed-energy weapons, nent’s military-economic potential, and (3) space-based* strike weapons, and third- overthrow of the opponent’s political sys- generation nuclear weapons. Gen-Maj V. I. tem. In the past, achieving these objectives Slipchenko believes that by the year 2000 was said to be impossible without captur- the space-based layer alone will be capable ing and occupying the opponent's terri- of destroying 30-50 percent of the oppo- tory. Today, however, the capture and nent’s retaliatory strike means.2 occupation of territory are unnecessary. Proceeding from such analyses, Soviet With the help of ACMs alone, it is possible military theorists envision a future war to deliver powerful strikes against impor- whose politico-military objectives are tant strategic targets and to destroy the achieved not by seizing and occupying ter- opponent’s military infrastructure. As ritory. but by destroying the opponent’s a result, the political system will not military capabilities and military infra- survive.3 structure. General Slipchenko maintains Air- and space-based systems now give that the three criteria for achieving victory war a new dimension, and the Soviets are (1) destruction of the opponent’s assert that while they lack sufficient quan- SOVIET MILITARY AND NEW AIR WAR IN PERSIAN GULF 67

tities. they have already developed the nologies into Soviet military theory and technologies required to wage such a war. practice have now been vindicated. These technologies are reflected in air- and The Soviet military's assessments of its sea-launched cruise missiles, remotely own doctrine and strategy in light of the piloted vehicles, and space-based means of Gulf war cover a spectrum ranging from supporting ground actions. The Soviets obsolete to prophetic. Col A. Tsalko. for predict that by the year 2000, both sides example, observed that the crushing defeat will have accumulated these systems in of the Iraqi army demonstrated the obso- sufficient numbers to conduct the aero- lescence of not only Soviet military doc- space war. During the ongoing transition trine, but also the entire model of military period, warfare will resemble that con- development.6 Speakers at a conference of ducted in the Persian Gulf, with a declin- the Moscow City Council noted that the ing role for piloted aircraft and a growing war revealed “considerable drawbacks” in role for air-, sea-, and space-based Soviet doctrine and its principles of mili- directed-energy weapons.4 tary development and pointed up the out- dated quality of prevailing Soviet views on modern war.7 In a milder vein, Marshal V. Through the Prism of Kulikov, former commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact, has acknowledged that the the Persian Gulf Gulf operations “modified the ideas we In the Persian Gulf war, the Soviet mili- had on the nature of modern military oper- tary has seen the nature of future war- ations.” A deeper analysis is necessary, he fare—and it works. Representatives of the concluded, “but one point is already clear: General Staff Academy term the Gulf war a the Soviet Armed Forces will have to take technological operation and therefore a a closer look at the quality of their prototype of future war. As a result, the weapons, their equipment, and their development of the Soviet armed forces strategy.”8 will now be planned through the prism of On the other hand, prominent Soviet the Persian Gulf. The Soviet military has military scientists argue that the impres- been quick to link the coalition’s victory to sive performance of high-tech weaponry in the achievement of surprise and air superi- the Gulf represents the realization of the ority at the outset of war. Military experts qualitative revolution in military affairs have thus begun to argue that the Gulf war that Ogarkov forecast nearly a decade ago. dictates significant changes in Moscow’s In his 1984 interview in Krasnaya zvezda defensive doctrine. (Red Star), for example, Ogarkov noted According to the Soviets, the operations that the emergence of automated search- in the Persian Gulf represent the first con- and-destroy complexes; long-range, high- crete example of “intellectualized” war- precision. terminally guided combat sys- fare. General Slipchenko thus explains tems; remotely piloted vehicles; and that the Persian Gulf war was a clash qualitatively new electronic control sys- between two concepts of war: the past tems will inevitably alter the nature of (Iraq) and the future (the US-led coalition). modern operations.9 All of the devel- The coalition forces won because they opments that Ogarkov highlighted were were fighting in the future, and Iraq lost used in the Gulf war, including the auto- because it was fighting in the past.5 The mated search-and-destroy complex or Soviets, therefore, view the war as a transi- reconnaissance-strike complex (i.e., joint tion between old and new, a stage that has surveillance target attack radar system now arrived because the basis of victory IJSTARS] aircraft in combination with the was the action of air-attack weapons. Mar- multiple launch rocket system [MLRS]). shal Ogarkov's prescient demands for a Soviet military experts have stressed rapid incorporation of emerging tech- repeatedly that the coalition won so 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 quickly and with minimal losses because tant targets not destroyed by massed of its ‘‘overwhelming superiority in con- strikes. Furthermore, one can extensively temporary methods of warfare: in aviation, employ remotely piloted vehicles plus ACMs, and means of reconnaissance, com- ground- and air-based radio-electronic munication, command and control, and warfare systems to blind the opponent’s electronic warfare.”10 Also telling was the air defense systems. coalition's superiority in strategy and tac- Such an air war can include delivering tics; the skillful combination of fire and unpiloted air strikes to disable state and maneuver; and coordination among tank, military C2 points, interdict lines of com- motorized infantry, artillery, aviation, and munications and supplies, and paralyze marine units. Further, according to ana- both the rear area and the country’s econ- lysts such as Gen-Lt V. Gorbachev, the omy. Targets would include vulnerable centerpiece lesson of the Gulf conflict is areas of the economy, C2 centers, road net- the allied achievement of surprise and works, bridges, and so forth. The destruc- command of the air at the very outset of tion of up to 50 percent of such important war.11 targets could plunge even the Soviet Prominent military scientists such as Union or the United States into a crisis. General Slipchenko have characterized the Strikes will also be delivered against mili- Gulf war as prototypical of an air war.12 tary targets during an air war—above all, Col M. Ponomarev, for example, has against airfields, naval bases, missile described the allied air operation as a con- launch positions, and battlefield C2 points. temporary version of Giulio Douhet’s strat- The military can extensively employ egy of command of the air, but applied in space-based reconnaissance, communica- this case to create an ‘‘aerial blitzkrieg.”13 tions, and attack means to support the air Gen-Lt A. Malyukov writes that the Gulf war; in the future, it can employ means of w'ar was conceived from the outset as an destroying targets from space. air war to wear out the opponent by means Military experts such as General Slip- of air strikes, disorganize his command chenko describe the Gulf conflict as pro- and control (C2) systems, destroy his air totypical of a war to be conducted with defenses, and weaken the strike power of massive employment of advanced tech- the ground forces. In terms of choice of nologies. Opponents will use remotely objectives, it was therefore more a classical piloted vehicles, robotics, electronic war- air offensive than an airland battle.14 fare systems, long-range guided weapons The Soviets contend that the United systems with artificial intelligence, and States used the theory of the air war space-based weapons, as well as recon- against Japan in World War II. But the naissance and deception.15 capabilities of air-attack forces and means Soviet experts argue that all of this is were then insufficient. Today, however, radically changing the nature of future these capabilities have grown immeasur- war. Large groupings of ground troops will ably—to the point that air forces can actu- not be employed. Massive strikes will be alize the theory of air war. delivered by remotely piloted, precision In such a war, say the Soviets, tens of guided weapons and reconnaissance-strike thousands of precision guided cruise mis- systems capable of automatically finding siles capable of striking point targets at and destroying the target to any depth of long ranges can be used simultaneously to the opponent’s territory. The entire coun- destroy thousands of targets. The air war try being subjected to precision strikes will can include the delivery of tens and even become the battlefield, and the war will hundreds of massed strikes by ACMs from proceed without borders or flanks. The a variety of axes. In the intervals between terms front and rear will be replaced by massed strikes, air forces can deliver pin- the concepts of subject to strikes and not point ACM strikes against the most impor- subject to strikes (i.e., targets and non- SOVIET MILITARY AND NEW AIR WAR IN PERSIAN GULF 69

targets). First-priority targets will be state the employment of ground forces. Warfare and military C2 points, energy sources, and has shifted from reliance on these forces to military targets—especially retaliatory reliance on air-attack weapons.16 The role strike means. of piloted aircraft has also changed—from By concentrating the enormous might of accomplishing missions over enemy terri- strikes on the farthest depth of the oppo- tory to delivering standoff weapons. The nent’s territory, air forces can now achieve Gulf war demonstrated that an air war both operational-strategic and strategic alone can be conducted to achieve victory. objectives. In fact, the Soviets say that in The introduction of such novel elements such a war the lines between tactics, oper- as ACMs—especially cruise missiles— ational art. and strategy disappear. The permitted the execution of a technological war can begin and end with a powerful operation that was not massive but suffi- strike by precision guided weapons— cient to prove its effectiveness. painstakingly planned and precisely executed within a designated period of time. General Slipchenko notes further that High-Tech Weaponry the Gulf war dictates essential changes in in the Gulf The surprise and air supremacy achiev ed by coalition air Gen-Maj N. Kutsenko, deputy chief of forces allowed them to inflict heavy losses on Iraq's armored staff of the General Staff’s Center for forces. Some observers saw this "aerial blitzkrieg” as a Operational-Strategic Studies, observes clear demonstration that Sirviet military theory and that the NATO leadership exploited the force-development doctrine are obsolete. Gulf war as an opportunity for testing the

XVIII AIRBORNE C O R P S PHOTO

4 70 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 latest weapons systems and military tech- seems an understatement.18 But Kutsenko nologies, many of which have already also notes that the desert terrain and cli- entered the arsenals of NATO armies.17 mate revealed serious deficiencies in coali- These include the F-117A stealth fighter- tion equipment.19 Further, Gen-Maj S. bomber; the Patriot air defense missile Bogdanov has noted that the war was a complex with its antimissile missiles; the proving ground for employment concepts E3A airborne warning and control system of high-tech weapons against an oppo- (AWACS) aircraft with its radar system for nent who could not field appropriate ground-target reconnaissance and target countermeasures.20 designation: reconnaissance-strike com- According to Rear Adm A. Pauk, the sea- plexes; air- and sea-launched cruise mis- based Tomahawk cruise missiles demon- siles; laser-guided bombs; and new ar- strated a high degree of combat effective- mored equipment. Equipped with targeting lasers, the Patriot and Hawk missiles The fate that befell Iraqi aircraft shelters, such as this one in were highly protected against interference. Ali Al-Salem. Kuwait (below), convinced Soviet air defense Indeed, to remark that “this is very prom- officials that they needed more advanced surface-to-air ising weaponry the Americans have” missiles and radar systems. SOVIET MILITARY AND NEW AIR WAR IN PERSIAN GULF 71

GENERALDYNAMICS

High-lecli. precision weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise in the allied victory. According to General missile gave theater commanders greater flexibility in Kutsenko, allied forces of battalion size selecting specific targets in populated areas. The success of advanced conventional munitions in the Gulf war and higher utilized space-based communi- demonstrated that the quality—rather than the quantity—of cations systems, and allied staffs used sat- weapons will he emphasized in future warfare. ellite reconnaissance to monitor developments along the front.23 In fact, the first article in Voyennaya mysl’ (Military ness. In just the first days of the air Thought) to examine Gulf operations operation. US ships launched about 100 of focused on the performance of space-based these missiles against ground targets. The systems. The authors of the article, Cols V. launches were coordinated with the ac- V. Romanov and V. P. Chi gak, decl ar e that tions of carrier-based and tactical aviation, these systems constituted “the basis of all while computerized trajectories allowed technical reconnaissance’’ in the war.24 the missiles to approach heavily defended With a resolution of about half a meter, targets from different directions. Targets of electro-optical means provided the capa- the Tomahawks included the command bility to swiftly and reliably detect posts of the Iraqi armed forces, posts and changes in the operational configuration of centers for surveilling the air situation, Iraqi armed forces. administrative and industrial structures, In addition, the US is said to have electrical stations, and the communica- experimented with ways of expanding the tions system.-1 Remarkably, the Toma- application of space-based reconnaissance hawk is said to have a circular error means. For example, space-based systems probability of about 30 centimeters. Rear proved effective in detecting ballistic mis- Admiral Pauk also praised the perform- sile launches, thereby increasing warning ance of sea-based remotely piloted vehi- time from one to five minutes. These sys- cles. They accomplished such tasks as tems also proved effective in correcting the final reconnaissance of targets, adjustment trajectories of airborne and cruise missiles. of artillery fire against the shore, damage Further, space systems functioned effec- assessment, and so forth.22 tively at all levels of coalition forces, In addition to ACMs, the Soviet military including the tactical. Because the Iraqis points to the role of space-based systems lacked radio-electronic means of suppres- 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

sion, space-based systems ensured unin- formulas for US-Soviet arms control. The terrupted and undetected C2 of troops and coalition victory invalidated the quantita weapons.25 At the same time, Romanov tive paradigm that is the heart of current and Chigak note that the effectiveness of treaties and proved that a qualitative para- space-based systems was reduced by the digm will determine the balance of forces Iraqis’ use of decoys; measures of disinfor- in future warfare. The Soviets have long mation and operational maskirovka (cover, argued that emerging technologies are concealment, and deception); the dispersal negating many of the traditional measures and concealment of equipment and sup- of military power and are generating a rev- plies; and poor meteorological conditions. olution in future warfare. In the Gulf war, Moreover, the war is said to have refuted a smaller, technologically superior force the assertions of “American specialists” was thus able to defeat a much larger, that space-based systems could detect dug- technologically inferior one. in targets.26 Speaking shortly after the outbreak of On the whole, however, authoritative the war, General Lobov warned that US Soviet analyses stress that the Gulf war testing of advanced weapons such as was the first example of the significant—if cruise missiles and stealth aircraft could not decisive—role that space can play in “disturb the qualitative parity in the modern warfare. General Slipchenko notes weapons sector and have serious con- that past warfare had two dimensions— sequences for the future.”30 Among others. latitudinal and longitudinal—but that air- Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev has pinpointed and space-based systems are giving war a the performance of stealth technology; new, third dimension.27 Before the Gulf automated command, control, communica- war, space-based systems were said to tions, and intelligence (C3I) systems; increase combat effectiveness by 50 to 100 ACMs; cruise missiles; and laser-guided percent. However, according to Gen-Maj aviation bombs.31 “A crisis had only to A. N. Bazhenov, editor of Military break out in the Persian Gulf region,” Thought, the Gulf war demonstrated that argues Maj M. Zheglov, “for NATO to these systems can increase combat effec- begin putting the brakes on programs to tiveness by 150 to 200 percent. He also reduce armed forces and armaments, and observes that the Gulf war confirms the to call for the creation of new mobile need to shift warfare to theaters of military forces capable of operating in any re- operations in space.28 gion.”32 This Western response to the The head of the strategy section of the coalition victory is said to undermine all General Staff Academy argues that with arms control progress of the recent past.33 the Gulf war, so-called duels—which use A senior defense ministry official com- only strike means—have become a phe- ments that the Soviet armed forces possess nomenon of the past for civilized states. weapons similar to most of those used by Now one must take all weapons into the US forces in the Gulf.34 On the other account—not only strike means, but also hand, Gen-Maj V. Chepurnoi stresses that means of reconnaissance, radio-electronic the Gulf war demonstrated the necessity of combat, guidance, and effective defense. “technically re-equipping” the Soviet Iraq’s lack of such systems greatly reduced armed forces on the basis of the latest the capability of its strike means, which weaponry.35 were unprotected, and led to great losses in the Iraqi army.29 The performance of coalition weaponry Roles of in the Gulf war has triggered Soviet concerns over the future of arms control. Surprise/lnitial Period According to the Soviet military, the war The Soviet military believes that ACMs demonstrated the obsolescence of current have generated an enhanced role for sur- SOVIET MILITARY AND NEW AIR WAR IN PERSIAN GULF 73 prise in modern warfare. In discussing the total command of the air while sustaining impact of ACMs on combat operations, for minimal losses.42 example, Gen-Maj I. Vorob’yev notes that Before the Gulf war, says General Slip- in the past, one achieved surprise by using chenko, achieving surprise was not really passive methods: all types of maskirovka, possible because of the need to mass large decoy targets, demonstrative moves, ground forces and because of the lack of smoke screens, and so forth. Today, how- sufficient ACMs. But the Gulf war showed ever, active measures are more important that achieving surprise with ACMs and and include surprise maneuvers on land aviation is now realistic. For the first time and in the air, unexpected offensive in nonnuclear warfare, surprise is now and nonstereotypical battle formations, said to be "decisive for the course and out- and novel systems of fire destruction. come of the war.’’43 The best means of Automated reconnaissance systems and deterring the temptation to launch a sur- computer-based homing ammunition are prise strike, the Soviets say, is to ensure now used to disrupt the opponent’s troop- that the armed forces of both sides are and weapon-control systems. The idea is fully prepared to fight such a war—in to blind the opponent before the onset of other words, to ensure parity in non- action by a massive use of electronic war- nuclear strategic offensive forces. fare against his reconnaissance, warning, Coincidentally with the US adoption of and C2 systems.36 the AirLand Battle, Soviet military writers According to Vorob’yev. ACMs facilitate began to link the importance of a future the use of surprise on a much wider scale war’s initial period with the combat than before. Surprise ACM strikes en- characteristics of ACMs. Writing in late sure the achievement of not only the 1985, for example, Gen-Lt A. I. Yevseyev operational-tactical but also the strategic asserted that if a war begins with ACMs. initiative on the future battlefield.37 Promi- the initial period can exert an "enormous nent theorists such as General of the Army influence on the subsequent course of mil- Lobov have gone so far as to argue that the itary actions.”44 By 1988, however, promi- incorporation of ACMs "raises the issue of nent military scientists argued that an achieving surprise in both the defense and initial period with ACMs can exert a the offense’’38 (italics added). If achieved, “decisive influence on the course and out wrote Gen-Lt N. G. Popov, surprise can comei” of the war45 (italics added). Long exert a "decisive" influence on the course before the Gulf war, then, the Soviets were of the war.39 Long before the Gulf war, already viewing a high-tech initial period Vorob’yev asserted that the skillful appli- as the decisive factor in victory. cation of the principle "guarantees a General Yevseyev also made a statement victory.”40 unprecedented for Soviet military thought. Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye In contrast to past wars, he wrote, "the (Foreign Military Review) reports that the main content of the initial period in coalition used the factor of surprise to sup- present-day conditions can be the delivery press Iraq’s air defense, disrupt its military by the belligerents of nuclear strikes or C2. disable nuclear and chemical centers, strikes with conventional means of de achieve overwhelming command of the struction ... for achieving the war’s main air. and seize the initiative.41 Among objectives”46 (italics added). By Soviet def- others, Gen-Maj G. Zhivista of the General inition, the war’s main objectives are to Staff's Center for Operational-Strategic destroy the opponent’s war-fighting poten- Studies has reiterated that the US used the tial and war economy. In the past, there- element of surprise to almost completely fore, only an initial period with nuclear disable Iraq’s air defense and C2 systems, weapons was said to achieve these main thereby disrupting the operations of Iraqi objectives. But since 1985, Soviet military ground forces. In addition, the US gained thought has explicitly acknowledged the 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 potential of ACMs to accomplish these the Gulf war reveals the impossibility of nuclear tasks in a future war.47 For all accomplishing all missions without a practical purposes, the achievement of large-scale use of ground forces.51 In addi- these objectives signifies victory. tion, General Bogdanov asserts that the General Gorbachev states that the out- war graphically demonstrated the “deter- come of the Gulf war was determined “in mining role” of ground forces in achieving its first few minutes” by the ability of the war’s ultimate objectives.52 allied air forces to seize the initiative in Even before the Gulf war, Foreign Mili- the air and win command of the air at the tary Review noted that, according to the outset. Having no opposition in the air, the foreign press, the Air Force was the only coalition was able to compensate for Iraq’s branch of the US armed forces capable of superiority in tanks.48 concentrating its efforts on the scale Experts assert that the Gulf war thus required by a future war waged with illustrates that future warfare will involve cutting-edge technologies. “American spe- a massive use of technology and will be cialists” therefore focus on (1) perfecting over quickly. In fact, say the Soviets, the the capability for delivering precision air conflict demonstrated that war’s “course” strikes on fixed and mobile targets in the and “outcome” are now “a single phe- opponent’s deep rear without entering the nomenon.” Indeed. General Slipchenko range of his air defense and (2) continuing declares that the initial period is “essen- the development of space-based offensive tially the only period in future war.”49 and defensive systems and systems for controlling them.53 Among others. General of the Army 1. M. Tretyak has stressed that Changing Force Structure air defense is also a critical element of the conventional “aero-space war.”54 In general, initial Soviet commentary on the Gulf war has confirmed earlier predic- According to General Gorbachev, supe- tions of a declining role for ground forces rior US technical intelligence and highly and growing roles for air, air defense, and accurate weapons played a key role in naval forces. But this commentary in par- neutralizing Iraq’s air defense system.55 In ticular is clearly influenced by the paro- addressing the USSR Supreme Soviet, chial and budgetary factors endemic to any Defense Minister D. T. Yazov thus admitted that the allied victory in the Gulf war military organization. Soviet military assessments of the im- had prompted the Ministry of Defense to pact of Gulf operations on the role of reexamine its air defense capability. He ground forces span a predictably wide warned that, while the Soviet Union is spectrum. According to Col A. Tsalko. for currently capable of repelling attacks, this example, it- is “sheer madness” to be- might not be true in two or three years. lieve—as some military authorities in the Yazov even admitted that Soviet air Soviet Union continue to do—that “the defense systems already have “weak outcome of a war is determined by a clash s p o t s . ” 56 C o l - G e n R. A k c h u r i n wa s e q u a l l y of huge masses of ground troops.” The direct: “Today our anti-aircraft defenses Gulf war clearly demonstrated that “the are capable of repelling the attacks of any Iraqi army was simply overwhelmed by air targets.” But he warned that “the echo of missile thunder in the desert must put airstrikes and the troops had to keep their noses buried in the sand.” Tsalko goes so us on our guard.”57 far as to argue that the main lesson of the Soviet air defense (PVO) officials state war is that huge numbers of tanks, ar- that the allies employed several new mored vehicles, and artillery pieces were means of avoiding air defenses: space- “absolutely useless.”50 based reconnaissance systems, universal On the other hand, the head of the Mili- use of electronic warfare systems, and the tary Academy of Armor Troops insists that preventive cruise missile strike. Further. SOVIET MILITARY AND NEW AIR WAR IN PERSIAN GULF 75 the high-speed antiradiation missile Soviet military experts from all of the (HARM) was another new type of weapon branches agree that the Gulf war suggests employed. Altogether, allied air power that all future military operations will exceeded the Iraqi air defense potential begin with a massive use of air power. On tenfold.58 Soviet PVO officials highlight the whole, however, their analyses con- the lack of automated fire control as the clude that air power alone was insufficient main reason for the relatively low level of to accomplish all of the war’s final Iraqi air defense activity. These experts objectives. point out that modern battle management General Malyukov notes that the Gulf is impossible without automated systems. war was the first wherein aviation accom- The lack of these systems could reduce plished almost all of the main missions. Iraqi air defense capability by about 40 But it also demonstrated that having mod- percent.59 ern aviation in the arsenal is not enough— PVO officials also note that by the year one must also ensure operational, materiel, 2000. the Pentagon plans to have tens of and technical support. From its first days, thousands of strategic and tactical super- the Gulf war was clearly a war of modern sonic cruise and operational-tactical mis- high-tech Systems—that is, of everything siles. The role of air- and space-attack that modern aviation represents. “He who forces will keep growing, which makes the does not realize this runs the risk of falling Soviet air defense capability an extremely hopelessly behind in the qualitative important factor. Only armed forces improvement of aviation equipment—with equipped with modern weapons and mod- all the ensuing consequences.”64 ern air defense technology will be able to The success of the war as a whole, withstand massive aviation strikes at the according to General Bogdanov, turned on outset of future wars.60 Most Soviet experts the outcome of the struggle to achieve agree that a critical lesson of the Gulf war command of the air. In other words, it is the need for a high degree of combat depended on the result of the air opera- readiness and air defense assets that can tion. The apparent trends in modern war- fight against the new. most advanced fare “really do predetermine to a certain air and space means of attack at any degree the priority of aircraft as the most moment.61 These experts assert that the long-range and maneuverable means of PVO badly needs to be upgraded with the combat.”65 As a result. General Malyukov most advanced systems. Obsolete models insists that “major [Soviet] investments” of weapons, which accomplished little in are necessary to keep up with high-tech the Gulf war. should be retired. Clearly, as US air power.66 ground troops are reduced. PVO power The Soviets are convinced that the Gulf should increase and its combat deploy- war was determined by air forces, marine ment made denser.62 PVO officials main- corps units, and naval aviation, which tain that combat operations in modern war should “vividly show us what lies in store will undoubtedly start with the destruc- in the near future in local clashes or any tion of reconnoitered military targets by air other potential combat operations.”67 Gen- force operations. To fight more effectively eral Slipchenko offers that the Soviet in such conditions, the Soviets are said to forces of the future are the Strategic Rocket require different types of surface-to-air Forces, the air force, the navy, and the Air missiles and radar systems, as well as a Defense Forces. The Soviets had discussed high degree of automation in battle man- the diminishing role of ground forces for agement. reconnaissance, and target guid- years, “but now we have proof.”68 On the ance. Neither the Patriot nor the Hawk other hand, General Chepurnoi argues that would have performed as effectively as in the future the Soviet armed forces could they did without reconnaissance, includ- consist of three branches: the “Aero-Space ing space-based reconnaissance.6-1 Forces," the navy, and the Group Troops.69 76 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

Whither the Soviet once envisioned for a nuclear war. In addi- Military? tion, one will achieve these objectives without the collateral damage and political According to prominent military scien- complications associated with the use of nuclear weapons. tists, the Gulf war dictates several specific directions for the qualitative improvement Initial Soviet commentary also high- of the Soviet armed forces. These include lighted several larger and more long-term (1) the development of a rapid-deployment lessons of the Gulf war. First, the war con- capability for the ground troops, (2) major firms Marshal Ogarkov’s forecasts on the investments in high-tech air power, (3) a nature of future war. In the early 1980s, review of the national air defense network Ogarkov predicted that the order-of- and systems, (4) a higher degree of auto- magnitude improvements in emerging mation in C:1I and weapons guidance, and nonnuclear technologies were making (5) an overall technical reequipping of the these systems equal to nuclear weapons Soviet armed forces. and were generating a revolution in the In addition, authoritative Soviet analy- methods of conducting combat operations. ses highlight the impact of the Gulf war on Second, the Gulf war is said to invali- specific dimensions of future warfare. date Moscow’s 1987 defensive doctrine, First, military experts assert that the war which is now viewed as extremely dan- portends a new type of arms race—one gerous for both the armed forces and the emphasizing capabilities for implementing country. So.viet military doctrine has strategic mobilization and deployment in always been defined as having two as- theaters remote from the homeland. Ob- pects: the sociopolitical and the military- servers thus stress the US ability to move a technical. Since the early 1980s, the sizeable force and conduct an impressive sociopolitical side of doctrine was de- logistical buildup in a distant region that scribed as defensive because the Soviet lacked a well-developed communications Union would never launch aggression infrastructure. against any nation. For the first time, how- Second, Soviet military assessments of ever, the 1987 defensive doctrine pro- the Gulf war focus on the role of surprise claimed that henceforth the military- as the key to victory in modern war- technical side of doctrine would also be fare. According to Defense Minister defensive: the Soviet armed forces would Shaposhnikov, the Gulf war demonstrated eliminate the capability for launching surprise attacks and mounting offensive oper- that air power is the “ main means” of ations in general. But since the Gulf war, achieving surprise—now said to be the the Soviet military has redefined the decisive factor in determining both the defensive doctrine to include only the course and .the outcome of the war.70 sociopolitical side: the defensive doctrine, Indeed, the course and outcome of war are they argue, means neither a defensive now said to be a single phenomenon. strategy nor a rejection of the offensive. Thus, as previously mentioned, the war's initial period is now said to be the only Third, the Gulf war has prompted the period in future warfare. Soviet military to redefine the whole con- Third, Soviet military experts stress that cept of deterrence. While nuclear parity the Gulf war is the prototype of the so- remains the linchpin of strategic stability, called technological operation. Charac- the performance of ACMs in the war is terized by a massive use of technology, said to prove that the new nonnuclear such a war will be short. Because ad- technologies are threatening the old strate- vanced nonnuclear technologies will gic equation. The Soviets now believe that accomplish all of the missions previously deterrence requires not only nuclear par- reserved to strategic nuclear forces, these ity, but also parity in high-tech nonnuclear systems can achieve all of the objectives forces. SOVIET MILITARY AND NEW AIR WAR IN PERSIAN GULF 77

Finally, the Gulf war has generated future war. It is significant, however, that serious Soviet concerns over the future of Chief of the General Staff Lobov has long US-Soviet arms control negotiations. The called for a rapid qualitative development crushing weight of advanced technologies of the Soviet armed forces to cope with the confirmed that high-tech weapons and the high-tech nature of future warfare—much systems employed to integrate them could as Marshal Ogarkov did a decade ago. In negate the more traditional measures September 1991. Ogarkov wrote that of military power and revolutionize the Gulf war. which many military men combined-arms concepts. The arms con- regrettably regarded as merely an episode, trol process must therefore include such demonstrated in my view that victory in critical elements of future warfare as modern warfare can be achieved not only by electronic warfare systems. In short, the quantity, but mainly by quality. We must see Gulf war demonstrated that a qualitative this and learn from it. Our country must also future has replaced the quantitative past of adopt definite decisions on this.71 warfare. According to Soviet military According to Defense Minister Shaposh- experts, the heart of current arms control nikov, there is no sense in cutting R&D treaties belongs to that past. because of the current Soviet lag in ACMs In the chaotic aftermath of the August and stealth technology. “Here we should 1991 coup, it is impossible to predict not be second best,” he argued, “as far as whether or not the Soviet military will our partners are concerned.”72 □ ultimately implement its new vision of

Notes 1. Gen-Maj V. I. Slipchenko. "Impending Changes from 20. Gen-Maj S. Bogdanov, "The General Staff Is Attentively Reform Plans for Employing the Soviet Armed Forces." Watching ihe Development of the Situation." Krasnaya presentation at National Defense University. Washington, zvezda. 31 lanuary 1991. D.C . 15 and 20 March 1991. 21. Rear Adm A. Pauk, “The Gulf War: Conclusions and 2. Ibid. Lessons; The Naval Aspect." Krasnova zvezda. 23 April 3. Ibid. 1991. 4. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 23. Quoted in Barbara Starr. "Satellites Paved the Way to 6. Moscow Tass International Service in Russian. 1 March Victory." /one's Defence Weekly. 9 March 1991, 330. 1991 24. Cols V. V. Romanov and V. P. Chigak. "On the Use of 7 Moscow Tass International Service in Russian. 3 March Space-Based Means in the Persian Gulf," Voyennuva mys/' 3 1991. (1991): 76. 8. Kulikov Defends Soviet Weaponry." Foreign Broadcast 25. Ibid., 78. Information Service Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV)-91-042. 26. Ibid.. 80. 4 March 1991. 43. 27. Slipchenko presentation. 9. "Defense of Socialism: The Experience of History and 28. Gen-Maj A N. Bazhenov, presentation at the Brookings the Present." Krasnaya zvezda. 9 May 1984 Institution. Washington. D.C.. 25 March 1991. 10. Maj M. Pogorelvi. "From a Military Observer's View- 29. "General Staff Officer Analyzes Gulf War Results.” point: What the War Showed." Krasnaya zvezda. 8 March FBIS-SOV-91-046. 8 March 1991. 25-26. 1991 30. Quoted in "Military Forced Soviet Initiative," Wash- 11 Gen-Ll V. Gorbachev, "Tanks Will Not Save the Day.” ington Times, 20 February 1991, A ll. Izvestiyo. 21 lanuary 1991. 31. Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev, "Soviet Briefings Aided 12. Slipchenko presentation. Allied Assault." Wall Street /ournal, 11 April 1991. 13. Col M Ponomarev, "The Picture Begins to Clear," 32. Maj M. Zheglov, "The Warsaw Pact and European Krasnaya zvezda. 25 lanuary 1991. Security." Krasnaya zvezda, 22 February 1991. 33. Col I. Vladimirov. “Western Europe and the Crisis in 14 Gen-Lt A Malyukov. "Gulf War: Initial Conclusions: the Persian Gulf." Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozrenive Air Power Predetermined Outcome," Krasnaya zvezda. 2 (1991): 11. 14 March 1991. 34. "Military Expert Views Iraqi Gulf War Lessons," FBIS- 15 Slipchenko presentation. SOV-91-050. 14 March 1991, 16-19. 16. Ibid. 35. Gen-Maj V. Chepurnoi, "What Kind of Army Do We 17 Quoted in Maj Yu. Rubtsov. "A Unified Armed Forces Need?" Krasnaya zvezda, 16 May 1991, for a Unified State," Krasnaya zvezda. 23 February 1991. 36. Gen-Ma| I. Vorob'yev, "New' Weapons and Principles ol 18 Col O. Falichev. "The Shilka vs. the B-52; Experience Tactics," Sovelskoe voennoe obozrenie 2 (1987): 18. Gained from the Gulf War.” Krasnaya zvezda. 5 April 1991 37. Quoted in "Lobov Criticizes NATO Stand," FBIS- 19. Quoted in Rubtsov. SOV-89-086. 5 May 1989, 3. 78 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

38. Col-Gen V. N. Lobov, "On the Question of Surprise and 54. Detensive Sufficiency and Air Defense" (interview Unexpectedness,” Voyennaya mysi' 3 (1988): 8. with General of the Army I. M. Tretyak). Voyennaya mysi', 39. Gen-Lt N. G. Popov. "Surprise—An Important Factor of no. 12 (1990): 5. Success in Operations." Voyennaya mysi' 6 (1985): 18. 55. Gorbachev. 40. Vorob'yev, 18. 56. Quoted in "Soviet Review," U.S.A. Today, 1 Marc h 41. Col G. Vasil'yev, ''The Military Operation 'Desert 1991, 3A. Storm’," Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye 3 (1991): 11. 57. Reuters, 28 February 1991. 42. Gen-Maj G Zhivista. "How Professionals Wage War." 58. Falichev. Izvestiya, 19 January 1991. 59. Ibid. 43. Slipchenko presentation. 60. Ibid. 44. Gen-Lt A. 1. Yevseyev, "On Certain Trends in the 61. For example, see "Air Defense Forces Chief Tretyak Changing Content and Character of the War’s Initial Period.” Interviewed." FBIS-SOV-91-074. 17 April 1991. 65-66. Voyenno-lstoricheskiy zhurnal. no. 11 (1985): 17. 62. Col A. Ladin, "Prepared Statements from the Podium, 45. Gen-Maj V. A Gidaspov, "The Influence of High- Honest Talk in the Lobby," Krasnaya zvezda. 22 March 1991. Precision Weapons on the Development of the Principles of 63. Falichev. Operational Art of NATO Joint Armed Forces," Voyennaya 64. Malyukov. mysi’ 10 (1988): 80. 65. "Lessons of 'Desert Storm'.” 46. Yevseyev. 14-15. 66. Quoted in "Comrades in Arms." Wall Street Journal, 47. Gen-Lt N. G. Popov. "Characteristic Features of the 12 April 1991. Aggressor's First Operations in the War’s Initial Period." 67. "Navy Faces Budget. Conversion Issues.” FBIS- Voyennaya mysi' 3 (1987): 16. SOV-91-067. 8 April 1991, 55-60. 48. Gorbachev. 68. Slipchenko presentation. 49. Slipchenko presentation. 69. Chepurnoi. 50. Moscow Tass International Service in Russian. 1 March 70. "The Air Force and State Security" (interview with 1991. Col-Gen Ye. I. Shaposhnikov), Voyennaya mysi', no. 6 (1991): 8-14. 51. Quoted in "Round Table: Military Reform and the Ground Troops," Krasnaya zvezda. 18 April 1991. 71. "Appointments" (interview with General of the Army Victor N. Lobov), Izvestiya. 2 September 1991. 52. "Lessons of 'Desert Storm"' (interview with Gen-Lt S. 72. "Shaposhnikov Comments on Defense Ministry Tasks," Bogdanov). Krasnaya zvezda. 17 May 1991. in FBIS-SOV-91-183. 20 September 1991, 35. 53. Gen-Maj A. Sanin. "Views of the U.S. Politico-Military Leadership on Developing the Air F’orce in the 90s,” Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye 1 (1991): 42.

I Can Write Better Than That! OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you’ve got something to say, send it to us. We ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpower Journal focuses on the operational level of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 15,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. HICOCHETS 79

Ricochets doctrine we’re talking about—your experience, continued from page 3 your knowledge of what works in the air vice what works in space. You know the environ- in the field like soldiers or marines. Although ments are different, the systems are different, the Air Force was blessed by access to an abun- and the capabilities are vastly different. Of dant network of modern bases in Desert Storm, course the employment doctrine and basic war- this may not be the case next time. fighting concepts differ. Why can't we officially tell it like it really is? Lawrence R. Benson Look at what has happened to our national Kirtland AFB. New Mexico and military space programs over the past 10 years. Sure there has been technological prog- SPACE DOCTRINE DELIBERATION ress, and there were strokes of luck in recent contingency operations, but where is our space Capt James R. Wolf, in his “Toward infrastructure today? Think of the irrevocable Operational-Level Doctrine for Space’’ in the impacts on evolving system acquisition pro- Summer 1991 issue, astutely identifies “one of grams and national military strategy if we allow the most divisive issues facing scholars of doc- these basic doctrinal compromises and un- trine and one of the greatest obstacles to pub- truths to be perpetuated in the future. lishing Air Force doctrine for space.’’ He Space operations doctrine must first of all be reports that the Air Force has consciously viewed from a joint perspective. For this rea- decided "not to separate air and space doctrine son, the Joint Staff tasked Headquarters United but rather to promote the concept of integrated States Space Command (USSPACECOM) in aerospace power” (emphasis added). His thesis 1988 to write JCS Publication 3-14, Joint Space is that this "reflects the current reality in which Operations Doctrine. An intensive doctrine the Air Force exercises responsibility in both planning group effort was mounted, and a final mediums.” In essence, this leads me to conclude that organizational interests are about to draft, dated 31 March 1990, was completed for supersede fundamental doctrine and national approval by USC1NCSPACE. But political differences over the content and approach for the military strategy interests. The implications for document reduced the original draft to little national security are not only foreboding, they are dangerous. The inescapable reality is that more than another summary of space policy space is different from air is different from land that is now being coordinated with the unified is different from sea, and neither policy nor and specified commands and services. Part technology nor a decision by an organization of the difficulty has been the inability of like the United States Air Force can alter this USSPACECOM to establish a consensus be- fundamental doctrinal truth. tween its components as well as the services What we are being asked to do here is to con- and defense agencies on how to operate in done publication of another pair of fuzzy docu- space. This stems from a problem in DODD ments on "aerospace” doctrine. As detailed in 5100.1; namely, each service is assigned the "Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine," same missions and responsibilities in space. appearing in the Winter 1988 issue, the current The conflict is that each service has a different version of AFM 1-1 compromises effectiveness doctrine; so the implementation of these of space doctrine, and the now rescinded AFM assigned missions and responsibilities natu- 1-6 offered little more than a policy statement rally differs for each service. on space by the Air Force. The approach This begs the question. How does space play described by Captain Wolf, however, would in the doctrine of not only the Air Force but of adjust air doctrine in AFM 1-1 to accommodate each of the services? The US Army, Navy, and a dissimilar space doctrine: at the same time, a Marine Corps have just as much at stake here; new AFM 2-25 will attempt to bridge the “basic the integration of space with land power and and operational doctrinal gaps” that are organi- with sea power is just as relevant as “integrated zationally unacceptable in either document. aerospace power" proposed by the Air Force. The end result will be another compromised While each of these integrated doctrines needs space doctrine, except this time we will also to be developed, no single service can address compromise well-established and proven air joint space operations doctrine, which lies at doctrine. the heart of the controversy. Instead of an Aii Come on, airmen and spacemen, let our lead- Force manual on space operations doctrine, we ership know you are not this naive. This is your need a joint space operations doctrine articu- 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

lated from a joint perspective by joint space directly into finished doctrine. Characteristics operators. Until this happens, our space infra- of space forces should be independent of his structure and assured mission support to the "politically/legally influenced characteristics” services and the CINCs will continue to in the doctrine. As pointed out by Captain Wolf flounder. himself, policy should influence strategy and Consider Desert Shield/Desert Storm, where plans, not doctrine. Also, Lupton’s "logistics many joint space operations-related con- influenced characteristics” should derive from tingency capabilities were proven for the first capabilities and characteristics of the forces time in actual conflict. These capabilities are in and the environment, not the other way no way espoused by the doctrine in AFM 1-1; around. Please see "Real Tenets of Military but the resounding success of the air campaign Space Doctrine” (Winter 1988) for clarification clearly exemplified AFM 1-1 at its best. Instead, of these basic doctrinal principles for space. space operations in support of the war effort The employment principles, briefly listed in directly reflected joint doctrine in the orig- the article, are incomplete. Although they may inal draft JCS Pub 3-14, now discarded by address how to employ forces for space control, USSPACECOM. The success of space in these they do not address how space forces are joint operations, aptly termed a watershed employed for space force enhancement, force in the evolution of space capabilities by application, or space support. Also, the princi- COMAFSPACE, heralds even greater depend- ples state neither how space forces are inte- ence and integration in the future. So this is not grated with other military components nor how just an Air Force problem; it is a joint problem. Although the lack of “jointness” is a major joint forces support the mission of space con- flaw in the proposed Air Force doctrine, there trol. Thus, the Air Force is proposing a doctrine are other problems. Of the four philosophical to singly "gain and maintain control of space, premises stated in the article for AFM 2-25, centralize control and decentralize execution, attack the enerrfy’s centers of gravity, seize the only two appear reasonable. The premise that initiative, execute concentrated and persistent "doctrine should attempt to anticipate future attacks, and maintain sufficient reserves.” In capabilities and modes of operation" is cer- the real world, the proposed employment con- tainly vital, particularly with the rapid pace of cept could not be implemented without joint change in space technology. The premise that services and unified and specified commands doctrine should not be "constrained by policy” support. This is another key reason why mili- could potentially, for the first time, unleash a tary space doctrine needs to be articulated from more realistic, powerful statement of official doctrine for space forces that would signifi- a joint war-fighting perspective. cantly enhance our future national security It appears to me that a major organizational posture. change is required before real military space On the other hand, the premise that the four doctrine can be officially recognized and imple- broad mission areas of space (space control, mented. 1 submit that the best way out of our force application, force enhancement, and predicament is to create a new service organiza- space support) are "extensions or larger group- tion dedicated to resource management for mil- ings of basic Air Force missions and supporting itary space forces. After all, doctrine has as tasks” cannot realistically accommodate either much to do with efficient preparation of forces the roles of all the services in support of these as it does with effective operations and sup- missions or how these missions support each of port. This is a service-related responsibility, not the services. Finally, the premise that “AFM the responsibility of a unified or specified com- 2-25 will toe the party line ... [and that it is] ... mand. A separate service could articulate real- integrated aerospace power that most effec- istic doctrine in conjunction with all the tively accomplishes Air Force missions" is a services and implement assured mission sup- veritable admission that this will be a politi- port capabilities for all the unified and spec- cally contrived, single-service-oriented docu- ified commands, the defense agencies, and the ment rather than real, joint doctrine that we all national command authorities. Unless respon- know works best. sibility for space forces is assigned to a single, Lt Col David E. Lupton's work on the charac- independent military department for space, teristics of space forces, in his seminal On budget competition and interservice rivalries Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine, will continue to overshadow attempts to imple- appears out of context in the article. His care- ment realistic space doctrine. ful, erudite analysis of the “characteristics of Until such time that a space service organiza- space forces" does not necessarily translate tion can be independently established, how- RICOCHETS 81 ever, let us “jointly” work toward publication here at Laughlin felt out in left field during of a realistic space operations doctrine in JCS Operation Desert Storm. It was a real push to Pub 3-14. The task will be challenging for all know that there are folks like you out there in DOD components, but it will be equally re- the real world who know and care. Thanks. warding if we succeed. At the same time. Air Since I discovered the Air University Review Force doctrine in AFM 1-1 and the 2- and and Airpower Journal years ago, I’ve tried 3-series publications as well as comparable to read every copy that I could find. They basic, operational, and tactical doctrine for the have always been educational and thought- other services should be revised. Changes in provoking. service-related doctrine should properly reflect Maj Geoff Whisler, USAF not only how space power is really exploited Laughlin AFB. Texas by the war fighters in each service but also how basic service missions really support the needs of joint space operations. COMPLIMENTS TO THE CHIEF Col Kenneth A. Myers, USAF Fort McNair. Washi ngton D.C. CMSgt Robert D. Lewallen’s article “Sex, Power, and Ethics: The Challenge to the Mili- tary Professional” (Fall 1991) was important, timely, and relevant to all workplaces! The IP SATISFACTION careers of several people that I have known I was sitting in a conference room waiting for were "terminated" due to their lack of under- yet another supervisor/SMS meeting to start standing of these basic principles. I will refer- when I read the editorial “Have you hugged ence the chief’s article in the future. your IP Lately?” (Summer 1991). Most of us Lt Col Ben Jester Offutt AFB. Nebraska net assessment

Kiss the Boys Goodbye: How the United States Nixon already had declared (for public con- Betrayed Its Own POWs in Vietnam by sumption) that the last of the POWs had been Monika Jensen-Stevenson and William Ste- returned. venson. New York 10016: Dutton. 1990, 493 Monika Jensen-Stevenson. formerly of CBS’s pages. $21.95. news program “60 Minutes,” and her husband, novelist William Stevenson (A Man Called In the waning months of 1972, President Intrepid: The Secret Wur), claim in Kiss the Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Boys Goodbye that this is the beginning of a Kissinger offered Hanoi billions of dollars in cover-up which left hundreds of American postwar economic assistance as an inducement POWs hanging (figuratively and literally) in to reach an accord. They did this in response to prison camps in Vietnam and Laos. The authors pressures to end the Vietnam War from an trace a complex conspiracy which began when increasingly impatient electorate and a Con- a cynical Congress, suffering from its own gress bent on legislating an end to the war con- brand of post-Vietnam stress, clamped down on tingent only on the return of American covert activities conducted by the Central Intel- prisoners of war (POW). To keep Washington ligence Agency (CIA). In response, a group of honest. Hanoi retained a significant number of determined cold warriors within the govern- American POWs to use as bargaining chips. In ment and the military developed informal (and April 1973. responding to North Vietnam’s con- illegal) groups—proprietary companies—and tinuing violations of the Paris Accords and to made contact with international drug and arms stories of torture by returning POWs, Congress dealers to finance and support certain initia- forbade any future aid to Hanoi. Meanwhile, tives. These included the Contras in Nicaragua, 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (who were fight- ment has written off the soldiers missing in ing the Vietnamese-backed government in action (MIA). I would be more at ease dismiss- Phnom Penh), and a Laotian resistance move- ing their thesis if it were not for men like ment. The models already existed from the Richard Secord, Ed Wilson, and Oliver North, "good old days" of clandestine operations in and a sleazy operation called the arms-for- Laos. (Air America had been a CIA proprietary hostages deal which marked the Iran-Contra company.) Covert military operations, such as affair. Furthermore, it now seems possible that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam's high-ranking American officials were rather (MACV) studies and observations group and tight with Panamanian strongman Manuel Nor- the Air Force’s Project 404 in Laos provided a iega as a part of a conspiracy to provide arms pool of potential operatives and agents. If these and money to anticommunist forces throughout groups were to retain their emerging but still Latin America. Furthermore, having served in officially nonexistent covert capabilities, they Air Force intelligence, I know that—as Hamlet had to write off American POYVs still held in said—"There are more things in heaven and Laos and Vietnam. Should any of the POWs earth . . . than are dreamt of in your philoso- return, former high officials like Nixon and phy.” Maybe Kiss the Boys Goodbye is not all Kissinger might be embarrassed. Beyond that, a Ramboloney. potential "can of worms” could be opened if At the crux of the authors’ argument is the former and present high-level members of the troubling figure of Bobby Garwood. In 1979, six government were ever tied to past and current years after Nixon declared the last of the POWs illegal, covert activities. The potential scandals, home, US Marine Private Garwood surfaced in ruined careers, and possible jail terms would Hanoi. According to Kiss the Boys Goodbye, make pale by comparison the Watergate and both the US and Vietnam—for a variety of Iran-Contra conspiracies. To keep the secrets, a reasons—needed to discredit Garwood. Neither powerful group of Americans—in and out of government wanted anyone to believe that he government—engaged in intimidation, charac- was a legitimate POW, and both Hanoi and ter assassination, and murder. Fantastic! Washington feared that he might reveal the There is a great deal of smoke in Kiss the existence of many more POWs in Vietnam and Boys Goodbye, and much of the book will Laos. Hanoi cast him as a collaborator, and the appeal to the same people who groove on Marines court-martialed and convicted him of Rcimbo films and like to muse at the possibility treason. Now that Garwood's reputation was that John Lennon may be alive in a vegetative ruined and his credibility destroyed, no one state in a Tijuana hospital. Historians deal in would believe his potentially dangerous allega- facts based on verifiable evidence. As a histo- tions that the United States had abandoned rian who served in Air Force intelligence, American POWs still in enemy hands. Covert working with the secret war in Laos, I know operations continued, and the reputations and there is a shadowy world where rules of evi- careers of many important, influential Ameri- dence, logic, and—sometimes—human decency cans remained secure. do not apply. To accept the thesis of Kiss the The book asserts that with Garwood dis- Boys Goodbye, one has to forsake the rules of missed. the POW/MIA issue was sent back to its scholarship and put into jeopardy one’s con- corner to be acknowledged as a worthy cause cept of honor (like the notion that the military by the same hypocritical government that takes care of its own—warriors as well as wanted this issue buried and forgotten, even if bureaucrats) and enter a world where conspir- American servicemen (and others) still being acies and forces operating beyond the law are held in Vietnam were buried as well. The givens. This is the world of novels and spy- cause, however, persisted simply because it thrillers, not history. But when I served in Air made good press for the political right. Addi- Force intelligence, I occasionally made the tionally, the authors point to a group of die- excursion into a kind of Alice in Wonderland hard POW/MIA activists who remain convinced world where facts were relative to whatever that Americans may still be held in caves in institutional prerogative was at issue and integ- Laos or prison camps in Vietnam. Leading this rity was in short supply. group is retired Navy captain and former POW It is much more comfortable to be a history Eugene ("Red”) McDaniel. He is supported by professor. Fifteen years have passed since I was retired Air Force Lt Gen Eugene Tighe who, as in the "intelligence business,” and I can write a former head of the Defense Intelligence off books like Kiss the Boys Goodbye as easily Agency, brings credibility to the effort. H. Ross as the authors can claim that the US govern- Perot. Texas billionaire and long-time sup- NET ASSESSMENT 83

porter of the POW/MIA cause, lends his consid- Everywhere the authors play the omniscient erable resources to the fray- This would be a observers; close on or from afar, their right to formidable alliance except that their most pronounce derives from an assumed position at potentially important constituency is the right the heart of the policy-making process. The wing of the Republican party. Instead of receiv- tone of their reporting is intimately conversa- ing the important backing they need, the POW/ tional. They unfold the story of the Gulf war MIA activists have been attacked and dis- sequentially. They place their emphasis heavily credited by this group's members because the on the momentous weight of personality in latter are the very ones who have gained access deciding the course of conflict. But nowhere do to power by supporting illegal activities like the the authors risk a documented citation. The Iran-Contra affair. Many of these people hold book is. as the title suggests, a secret dossier. influential positions in the State Department, Hence, to disclose the identity of their infor- Defense Department, and various intelligence mants would naturally open to scrutiny the agencies, and they do not want their careers privileged source of their information. So the jeopardized for the sake of a potential handful truth is precisely what the authors say it is— of Americans who may still be alive in Indo- take it or leave it. china. Furthermore, these people are powerful Such writing leads, at best, to some amusing enough to discredit or eliminate those who pretensions and, at worst, to a number of patent cross them. absurdities. To establish a tone of intimacy, the The problem with Kiss the Boys Goodbye is authors pepper the book with good-old-boy, twofold. First, it is poor history. As a scholar, I folksy dialogues. For example, Secretary of can shove it to the end of the bookshelf next to State james Baker is reported to preface an The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, the important telephone call to his Soviet counter- 1972 expose by Alfred McCoy, Cathleen B. part, Eduard Shevardnadze, with the question, Read, and Leonard P. Adams. More troubling, How’s your vacation, Shev? (page 133). Since however, is the second problem. Where there is neither man is known to speak the other’s lan- so much smoke, there is often fire. While the guage, one can only guess how “Shev" trans- scholar can denigrate this book, the ex- lates into Russian! Then there is the report of a intelligence officer is not so sure. I. along with statement made in Libya by Muammar Qadhafi many others, do not believe that all of our pris- to Yassir Arafat, chief of the Palestine Libera- oners of war were returned in 1973. In that part tion Organization (PLO): ‘“Abu |Abu is the PLO of me. I know that the same evidence which is chief’s real name], it’s absolutely essential to the warp and woof of the historian's trade is find a peaceful solution’” (page 109). If the less relevant in the murkier world of covert authors had even the slightest conception of the operations. Arabic language and culture, they would have Dr Earl H. Tilford, Jr. known that Yassir is, in point of fact, the PLO Maxwell AFB, Alabama chief’s real name and that Abu is the first element of Abu Ammar, Arafat’s two-word honor- ific title pronounced in tandem. Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda behind the To the authors, history is obviously the Gulf War by Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent. actions of Great Men. and the remainder of the New York 10014: Penguin Books, 1991, 241 book is devoted to their importance in the pages. $9.95. shaping of it. The impersonal factors inherent to the environment in which Great Men operate This book is a journalistic “quickie," a fast count for nothing. fix for the mass market on the policies and per- Here are some of the authors’ findings. sonalities that shaped the Gulf war. Like most Because he likes to be liked. President George quickies, it panders to the public need for an Bush conducts personal diplomacy and relies immediate and vicarious participation in epic heavily on the opinions of people he trusts. events. By gratifying this need, the book allows Until the last moment. Bush thought that Sad- the public to dismiss the experience altogether. dam would not attack Kuwait since President There have been better-quality quickies about Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Hussein of the war, such as Bob Woodward's The Com Jordan told him so. Mubarak turns out to be the manders. published this year. Sadly, Salinger Machiavellian heavy. Bush the resolute hawk, and Laurent’s book is not one of them. and Hussein the dupe of Saddam. For hawkish- The novelistic style and narrative format ness, however, John Sununu—White House compromise the book's claim to authority. chief of staff—upstages his chief’s character 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

transformation with a “nuke ’em till they glow” soldiers gained a reputation among the latter attitude, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (and many US servicemen) as dedicated, coura- of Great Britain is credited with originating the geous fighters. However, those same peasants famous Hitler metaphor. During the crisis, King saw the officials from the government in Saigon Fahd of Saudi Arabia is shown to be out of his as aristocratic, corrupt, and unable or unwilling intellectual depth, Emir Jabir al-Ahmad al- to accomplish any significant military or civil Sabah of Kuwait a cringing neurotic, and James operations without American intervention. Baker too obsessed by his relationship with Hence, the combination of attrition and paci- Shev and Gorby to pay much attention to Sad- fication administered by the Americans may dam Hussein's bounding ambitions. have kept the communists from winning, but Concealed somewhere in this insider’s story victory would never be realized so long as the of the events and personalities that have altered people continued to identify themselves with the present and prepared the way for the future the enemy rather than with the Saigon regime. new world order, there is a bit of analysis. Such The only hope for success, Bergerud concludes, analysis contends that, although he was a was to get to the root of the problem and have nasty, Saddam could have been managed diplo- the Republic of Vietnam instigate political and matically if only we had understood the Pan- social reforms, a task that both Military Assis- Arab political culture from which he springs. tance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the South That conclusion may be safe enough, but Vietnamese government were unwilling—and nothing in this book establishes in any way its probably unable—to undertake. credibility. To prove his point, Bergerud confines his Secret Dossier is a book to be avoided. One analysis to the single province of Hau Nghia. wonders why Penguin Books, which has the He chose this particular province because of its reputation for printing serious literature, would geographic proximity to the South Vietnamese agree to publish Salinger and Laurent’s capital. Because many of the directives that “quickie” at all. If the reader feels, neverthe- came out of Washington (and then Saigon) were less, the need for an immediate fix, this book put into effect in Hau Nghia, this province will no doubt be found on the local super- became a military laboratory for both attrition market shelves—next to the National Enquirer. and pacification strategies. Bergerud shows Dr Lewis Ware how these strategies evolved by tracing the Maxwell AFB, Alabama short history of the province from its inception by decree of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, through the introduction of American advisors who preceded the US Army’s 25th Division, the operations and effects of the Tet offensive, the The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in advent of Vietnamization and consequent with- Hau Nghia Province by Eric M. Bergerud. drawal of the Americans, to the occupation of Boulder. Colorado 80301: Westview Press. the province by North Vietnamese troops in 1991. 383 pages, $29.95. 1975. Throughout this history. Bergerud con- The strategic debate over the Vietnam War tinually emphasizes the failure of the South has generally pitted conventional warriors Vietnamese government to elicit the people's against pacification advocates. In his in-depth support even after some American successes in study of Hau Nghia province, Eric Bergerud ridding the country’s hamlets of Vietcong. In asserts that while the United States used both short, the Saigon government simply lacked force and pacification measures with some legitimacy in the eyes of the Vietnamese. degree of success to diminish the communist While Bergerud does a fine job of explaining presence in the area, it could never hope for a how the general conduct of the war translated lasting victory since the Vietnamese people specifically to operations in Hau Nghia. he is never supported the Saigon government. The less clear about if and how the experiences of Vietnamese saw North Vietnam as a nation this lone province were a microcosm for the forged in battle, its independence earned with entire war. Nowhere does he compare events in blood. On the other hand, they saw South Viet- Hau Nghia with similar occurrences in other nam as the illegitimate child of French imperi- provinces. One might wonder, for instance, if alists, supported by Americans. Soldiers of the the Marine combined action platoons on the National Liberation Front and People’s Army of coast were experiencing the same problems or Vietnam came from the same background that successes with their pacification program as produced common Vietnamese peasants. These were the Army advisors in Hau Nghia. Such NET ASSESSMENT 85 examples would have strengthened Bergerud’s sions are a bit shaky, and none are very well case. supported by a specific relationship to fact or Research is the author’s strong point. Nearly analysis). If there is a bias, it is toward ground all his sources are either primary documents forces and is very slight, though some of the held at the Center of Military History and the ramifications are serious. Probably the worst is Federal Records Center or interviews with the author's casual acceptance of the 38-day air advisors and soldiers who were stationed in the war as merely "the opening phase of the air province. In addition, he includes an extensive campaign portion of ... Air-Land [sic) Battle.” bibliography. In fact, both the planning and execution of this While The Dynamics of Defeat is inappropri- air campaign represent a dramatic departure ate as a general book on the Vietnam War, it is from the precepts of AirLand Battle, which quite appropriate for people who have a basic emphasizes air support of a land campaign— understanding of the conflict and are searching not the potential of air to lead the way in some for more detailed information. It is also a good scenarios, like Desert Storm. This is a mistake study of the concepts of insurgency for students easily enough made by a former Army officer interested in unconventional warfare. (Blackwell is a retired major). AirLand Battle is, Capt John F. Farrell, USAF after all, Army doctrine. For all the potential USAF Academy, Colorado seriousness of this mistake, there is no smoking gun here. Desert Victory, on the other hand, is a free- wheeling blend of fact, fiction, and Navy apoc- rypha more clearly linked to interservice acquisition issues than to “assessment.” We Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait by Norman learn, for instance, that the only truly mobile Friedman. Annapolis, Maryland 21402: forces we have are aircraft carriers and marines, Naval Institute Press, 1991. 435 pages, even though the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing and $24.95. the 82d Airborne Division were arriving in Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tac- Saudi Arabia by 8 August 1990. Again, even tics of the Persian Gulf War by James Black- though the USAF had around 270 aircraft in well. New York 10103: Bantam Books, 1991, theater by 15 August and an additional 300- 252 pages, $12.50. plus by 31 August, Friedman claims that “the carriers on station probably accounted for the In the publishing business, being first has its bulk of available airpower in the theater until advantages. Almost everyone who is interested late fall 1990__ Without the instant avail- will buy the first work on a subject. When the ability of the maritime forces there would have subject is as interesting as Operation Desert been no five-month buildup, no military op- Storm, it isn't even necessary to be first. Just tion.” (His internal logic fails here, however, as being early carries some of the same advantage. he later tells us that the Iraqis were stopped at Eventually, however, economics takes over, the Saudi border by the maintenance status of and one reaches a point where the book must their tanks.) Perhaps the cruelest blow of all also be good if one is to sell enough copies to was learning that “neither ground service justify printing. The Naval Institute Press and lemphasis added—clearly in reference to the Bantam Books are both obviously cognizant of Army and the Air Force!) (can) live, let alone this reality. Having missed being first, both fight, for long unless the navy” manages to beat publishers claim to have produced definitive off opposing naval forces (in this instance Iraqi works with Desert Victory and Thunder in the missile boats). The concept of scenario depend- Desert. Thunder in the Desert is touted as “the ence seems to escape him completely. first comprehensive, in-depth history” of the Friedman does manage to perform a most war, while Desert Victory is purportedly ‘‘a amazing feat: transforming defense into offense thoroughly researched assessment." Neither at the turn of a phrase. He tells us that since a work hits the bull’s-eye, but one is certainly carrier represents “an offensive threat” to the much closer than the other. enemy, it draws attacking enemy aircraft, Thunder in the Desert, though not a docu- which are then destroyed by the carrier’s defen- mented history, is a very balanced reporting of sive fighters. Since this constitutes destruction events accompanied by thoughtful analysis of of an enemy’s offensive capability (the attack- what worked, what didn’t, why, and what it ing fighters), presto-whacko—offense! This bit might mean for the future (though some conclu- of wisdom is offered twice in the book, just in 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991 case the reader thought it was some sort of slip. Desert Victory), contain only two actual refer- Certainly, the logical end of his argument ence citations: Friedman's U.S. Maritime Strat would prove Saddam Hussein the offensive egy (1988) and "Sealift: Keystone of Support," genius of all time and turn Gen Norman an article in US Naval Institute Proceedings Schwarzkopf into a quivering Caspar (May 1991). Lest anyone become confused, Milquetoast. these are not general references for the entire Dr Friedman’s analytical balance might be section. They merely support specific state- restored by a careful reading of Thunder in the ments and demonstrate the extremely sporadic Desert. “The fact is that no single service won nature of documentation in the book. Nowhere this war; all of them did. None was singularly does Friedman give any indication of the depth sufficient and each was absolutely necessary.” of his research or the sources of the bulk of his Only a limited number of examples can be information. In fact, it appears to have come offered here, but these are genuinely represen- from casual conversation with Navy partici- tative of the tone of each book. pants in Desert Storm. There is no indication Representative of the relative overall quality whatsoever that any formal interview or docu- of the two books is the authors’ handling of mentary research was done to support the documentation, and each has a problem. One work. Nor is there any reason given to accept deals with it; the other tries to fool us. Black- his credentials as an individually acceptable well makes ho attempt to feign academic rigor. source. (Imagine, this from a PhD! Shame!) His "primary source” is his "own collection of With Thunder in the Desert. James Blackwell experiences and images” from wartime service has attempted to faithfully report the historical with Cable News Network. He also refers to “an background for Operation Desert Storm, the sig- unusually robust collection of field notes” from nificant actual events of the war, and their the military services, numerous personal inter- meaning in the aftermath. He has fairly well views. discussions at the Center for Strategic accomplished that. Norman Friedman, having and International Studies (where he is deputy established the same objective, has failed— director for political-military studies), official electing instead to vent his spleen and make an briefings, and other sources. In this sense, his undisguised pitch for John Lehman's 600-ship work is more journalistic than scholarly—he Navy. It won’t float. Improve your military reports what he believes to be true after con- library and save the trees. Buy Thunder in the ducting extensive research but doesn't tie infor- Desert—recycle Desert Victory. mation to specific sources. This doesn't help us Lt Col Edward C. Mann III sift for factual errors (there are most assuredly Maxwell AFB. Alabama some), and it keeps his book from being truly useful history, in the textbook sense. Of course, no one has suggested that it should or will be a text. Russian Roulette: Afghanistan through Rus- Desert Victory is a different story altogether. sian Eyes by Gennady Bocharov. New York Friedman’s book, which is unabashedly touted 10022: Bessie/Harper Collins, 1990, 181 as a likely “standard text,” takes an entirely dif- pages, $18.95. ferent tack here. One of the commentaries i could never shake off a feeling of depression quoted on the book's dust jacket declares it a in Afghanistan. I felt it most sharply even “fully documented study.” Being a military before I flew to Kabul, at the moment when ... man, the commentator is apparently easily 1 heard about the Soviet government's decision taken in by an old academic trick—endnotes by to send troops into Afghanistan. volume. Desert Victory has 58 pages of notes—a —Gennady Bocharov huge quantity of documentation if indeed it were documentation. Actually, the vast bulk of Gennady Bocharov is a Soviet journalist who these notes are merely expanded text. Only has had a variety of assignments for the popular rarely does Friedman offer real source docu- Literaturnava-gazeta. His first trip to Afghani- mentation. and then usually from a standard stan came in February of 1980, only one month reference text or popular news journal. after the first Soviet armored units rolled into For example, the six and one-half pages of that country. Until the first of the Soviet notes from chapter 5, “The Buildup" (a section "Geneva columns” withdrew to the USSR eight for which timely resources ou£ht to have been years later. Bocharov was sent frequently to abundantly available during the writing of Afghanistan for extended stays. Even under the NET ASSESSMENT 87

most repressive censorship of the early years of failures, the vulnerability of infantry fighting the conflict during the Brezhnev regime, the vehicles, the fact that there were never enough author was considered the best source of accu- radios or none at all. untrained or half-trained rate information about the war. The events from commanders, and supplies that are wrong or 1980 to 1988 marked staggering changes, not late. Tactics could never seem to change fast only in Afghanistan, but also through four enough to be effective against mines, snipers, Soviet regimes. According to Bocharov, “The and Mujaheddin fanaticism. The rigidity of transition from total silence to miserly glasnost Marxist doctrine prohibited adaptive and inno- was unforgettable" (page 55). vative strategies in the Soviet army, but the The assignment of Soviet journalists, wher- relaxation of Marxism left nothing in its place. ever they may have been, was to establish and Marxist doctrine had dismissed, then confirm the soundness of the Marxist ideologi- ignored, religion as a force in human history. cal basis on which all actions were justified. The war in Afghanistan reopened ancient hos- The Procrustean process of censorship was the tilities of atheist versus believer and of Islam art of fitting events to the correct Marxist ana- against all others. It was a hard lesson. “There lytical framework. ' Here,” observed Bocharov, is not one atheist under the sun who can pre- "the politician is king of a multitude of varia- dict what will happen in the next minute in the tions, a journalist is the slave of what he has world of believers. Nor a single Christian who seen” (page 50). This book is a rejection of all can foretell what will occur in the next moment analytical frameworks, as well as a rejection of in the world of the Muslims. No believer wants doctrines and definitions. It becomes instead a to know a world other than his own" (page 11). search for the human dimensions of a pecu- The author lashes out at all of these matters liarly horrible war. in a way that leaves the reader thinking that The author alternates chapters entitled “The perhaps he has at last been able to publish all Journalist's Story” with those called "A Sol- those pieces from his notebooks that have dier’s Tale," roughly in pairs. (Curiously, each remained hidden until glasnost freed them. chapter of "The Journalist's Story” is prefaced Perhaps, but there must be more. Even now, by a passage from the Book of Ecclesiastes.) Bocharov saves his harshest attacks for the saf- "The Journalist's Story” chapters sketch some est targets. Mikhail Suslov, former chief of the aspect of the conflict, while "A Soldier's Tale” International Department of the Central Com- chapters illustrate in greater detail the pro- mittee, is a particular object of ire, and found impact that these incidents had on indi- Bocharov refers to him as “an unliving intel- vidual lives. Bocharov’s sketches are just that— lect.” But Suslov is now long gone from the quick phrases, unfinished sentences, verbal scene. Concepts and doctrines are good targets. snapshots that leave behind intensely subjec- They do not shoot back, especially now that tive impressions that impart a sense of grit and they are in a state of disrepute. It is also quite gore. orthodox to take a potshot at the United States He writes with compassion for the soldiers by comparing its involvement in Vietnam to and empathizes with them. (Are the names that of the Soviets in Afghanistan, thereby real? It does not matter. The soldiers are real.) damning both at once. Afghan nationals willing He sees the endless sorrow of the family whose to identify themselves with the Soviet son went to Afghanistan to do his duty as a occupiers are objects of derisive comment. good internationalist, only to return in a sealed After all, who could defend collaborationists? box and rest in a grave which must remain Bocharov has been a working journalist in unmarked by order of the Communist party. the Soviet Union for many years. He has sur- There is the soldier who can never drive a truck vived many regimes and repressions because again because both hands are gone. There is the his professional agility is remarkable. The soldier sentenced to years of hard labor for reader would do well to take careful note of committing murder. (His defense was that he where and how the author chooses his targets. was following orders.) There was another Russian Roulette is well worth the effort for whose courage under fire led to madness and those readers who have a discerning eye and a the muffled calm of a padded room. strong stomach. A dose of vodka to go with it In all of these stories. Bocharov highlights might help. soldiers' anger and frustration over equipment Bonnie J. Baker Maxwell AFB, Alabama Basis of Issue

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,Air University Review Index nology (AFIT), with a follow-on assignment to the Military Studies Division. Applicants The Air University Press has published a com- should have three to seven years of commis- plete index of the Air University Review (1947- sioned service, an outstanding military record, 87). This reference work contains an author and impeccable military bearing and appear- index, a title index, and a cross-referenced sub- ance. Interested individuals should consult ject index. Any Air Force or other government chapter 8 of AFR 36-20, Officer Assignments, organization, college or university library, or for application procedures or write Capt Bob similar organization with a need for this index Angwin, Headquarters USAFA/CWIS, USAF can be placed on distribution. Requests for dis- Academy CO 80840-5421 or call DSN tribution and other inquiries should be ad- 259-3257/3248. dressed to Capt John Doherty, AUCADRE/RI, Walker Hall. Bldg. 1400, Maxwell AFB AL New Publications from Air University Press 36112-5532. Captain Dohertv can also be con- tacted at DSN 493-6629 or (205) 953-6629. Base Air University Press announces the release of libraries may have copies of previously pub- Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and lished issues of Air University Review. Why by Dr Earl H. Tilford, Jr. Dr Tilford, a retired USAF intelligence officer, takes a critical look at how the Air Force flew and fought in Southeast Asia. He argues that although the Instructor Opportunities USAFA Air Force effectively applied air power in par- The Military Studies Division at the United ticular places at particular times (e.g.. Khe States Air Force Academy is seeking highly Sanh, An Loc, and Linebacker I), it was unable qualified captains for instructor duty. This duty to devise a strategy and doctrine appropriate for involves motivating and teaching cadets in the conflict in Southeast Asia. Tilford surmises university-level courses that stress air power, that the Air Force's institutional experience the art of war. military theory, doctrine, and and the mind-set of its leadership doomed it force employment. Since its inception in 1980, from the beginning to expect much but achieve the curriculum in professional military studies little with air power. He points out that the 94- has evolved into one of the most interesting targets list devised by the Air Staff was deeply and demanding areas of study at the academy. rooted in the mind-set of the plan for the strate- A master’s degree is required of all applicants. gic bombing offensive that emerged in AWPD-1 Preferred degrees for military studies instruc- during World War II. The Air Force leadership tors are in history, military history, political firmly believed in the efficacy of that strategy. science, and international relations, or in area Air Force doctrine, rooted as it was in the studies of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or World War II experience and leaders, prevented the Middle East. Experience in tactical or stra- the generals from realizing that Vietnam was a tegic operations or in operationally related spe- far different war and that North Vietnam did cialties is highly desirable. The division can not have a clearly defined center of gravity (i.e., sponsor a few highly qualified applicants with a modern industrial and transportation infra- the appropriate background for a master's structure that supported the war machine of degree through the Air Force Institute of Tech- North Vietnam).

89 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

Other recent books and monographs: Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transforma- ANZUS in Revision: Changing Defense Fea- tion of the Post-War World,” 15-17 October tures of Australia and New Zealand in the 1992. For further information, contact Capt T. Mid-1980s by Lt Col Frank P. Donnini, USAF, N. Castle, Headquarters USAFA/DFH, USAF 1991 (book). Academy CO 80840-5701 or phone (719) Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Chal- 472-3230'. lenges by Dr Stephen Blank et al.. 1991 (book). Space Control and the Role of AntisateJJite Desert Storm Subm issions Weapons by Maj Steven R. Petersen, USAF, Air University and the Squadron Officer School 1991 (monograph). are looking for lieutenants and captains who Military Airlift: Turbulence, Evolution, and participated in Desert Shield/Storm and who Promise for the Future by Lt Col Thomas E. would like to share their experiences in an Eichhorst, USAF, 1991 (monograph). upcoming book. Submissions should be no more than 10 typed, double-spaced pages or the To order the above publications, contact the Air handwritten equivalent. Any photos that illus University Press, Publication Support Branch, trate the story should accompany the man Maxwell’AFB AL 36112-5532 or call (205) uscript along with a biography and photo of the 953-6452 or DSN 493-6452. author. Mail to Capt Michael Vriesenga, SOS/ EDOA, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5582 before June 1992. You may call Captain Vriesenga at Conference Announcement (205) 952-2294 or DSN 493-2294. Material will The United States Air Force Academy will host be returned if a self-addressed, stamped the Fifteenth Military History Symposium, “A envelope is enclosed.

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AUTHOR INDEX

Bahm. Capl Peter C.. and Capl Kenneth W . Polasek. "T a c- in A ir Transport: A cqu iring the C - I 4 I S ta r lifte r ," no. 3 (Fall 1991): 68-83. tical Aircraft and Airfield R ecovery." no. 2 (Summ er 1991): 42-53 Launius. Roger D.. and Betty R Kennedy. "A Revolution Bateman. Capt Vance C. "T h e Role o f Tactical Air Power in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter," no. 3 in Low-Intensity Conflict.” no. I (Spring 1991): 72-80. (Fall 1991): 68-83. Bingham. Lt Col Price T. "A ir Power in Desert Storm and Lewallen, CMSgt Robert D. "Sex. Power, and Ethics: The the Need for Doctrinal C hange," no. 4 (Winter 1991): Challenge to the M ilitary P rofessional,” no. 3 (Fall '* 33-46. 1991): 57-66. Boyd. Lt Gen Charles G ., and Lt Col Charles M . W est- Morris. Capt George C. "T h e Other Side of the COIN : enhoff. "A ir Power Thinking: Request Unrestricted Low-Technology Aircraft and Little W ars." no. 1 (Spring Clim b'." no. 3 (Fall 1991): 4-15. 1991): 56-70. Clark. Lt Col Richard B ' The Confidence of Quality" Parrington. Lt Col Alan J. "Tow ard a Rational Space-Trans- (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1991): 2. portation Architecture,” no. 4 (Winter 1991): 47-62. ______"Snorkeling and Historical Surges” Patton. Capt James H.. Jr. "Stealth Is a Zero-Sum Game: A (editorial), no. 3 (Fall 1991): 2-3. Subm ariner's View of the Advanced Tactical Fighter." ______"... Three to Get Ready ." (editorial). no. 1 (Spring 1991): 4-17. no. 1 (Spring 1991): 2. Polasek, Capt Kenneth W . and Capl Peter C. Bahm. "T a c- Clodfelter. Maj Mark. "O f Demons. Storms, and Thunder: tical Aircraft and Airfield R ecovery." no. 2 (Sum m er A Preliminary Look at V ietnam 's Impact on the Persian 1991): 42-53. Gulf Air Campaign." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 17-32. Prater. Maj Jeffrey C. "V S T O L and Power Projection: A Cunningham. Jim. "Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Leap in Faith." no. 2 (Summer 1991): 54-70. Media, and the F-117A.” no. 3 (Fall 1991): 16-34. Schubert. Group Capt David. Group Capt Brian Kavanagh. Doherty, Capt John J “ Have You Hugged Your IP and W ing Comdr Gary W aters. "A ir Power: An A us- Lately?" (editorial), no. 2 (Summer 1991): 2. tralian Approach," no. 1 (Spring 1991): 27-40. Downer. Brig Gen Lee A. “ The Composite Wing in Com- Straight. Maj M ichael L. "Preparing for Theater Air bat." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 4-16. Defense as an Airland Team ." no. I (Spring 1991): 18-26. FitzGerald. Mary C "T h e Soviet Military and the New Air Tice. Capt Brian P. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force War in the Persian G ulf.” no. 4 (Winter 1991): 64-78. Multiplier of the 1990s.” no. I (Spring 1991): 41-55. Furr. Lt Col W illiam F Joint Doctrine: Progress. Pros- Tircuit. Lt Col Elwood C. "Framework for STA RT II." no. pects. and Problem s," no. 3 (Fall 1991): 36-45. 3 (Fall 1991): 46-56. Gray. Dr Colin S. "Defense Planning for the Mystery Tour: W aters. Wing Comdr Gary. Group Capt Brian Kavanagh. Principles for Guidance in a Period of Nonlinear and Group Capt David Schubert. " A ir Pow er: An A us- Change." no. 2 (Summer 1991): 18-26 tralian Approach." no. 1 (Spring 1991): 27-40. Hooker. Gregory T. "Trends in the Development of the W estenhoff. Lt Col Charles M . and Li Gen Charles G. Soviet Air Defense Forces.” no. 2 (Summer 1991). 4-17. Bovd. "A ir Power Thinking: Request Unrestricted Kavanagh. Group Capt Brian. Group Capt David Schubert, C lim b'.” no. 3 (Fall 1991): 4-15. and W ing Comdr Gary W aters. "A ir Power: An Aus- W olf. Capt Jam es R. “ Toward Operational-Level Doctrine tralian Approach." no. 1 (Spring 1991): 27-40. for Space: A Progress Report." no. 2 (Summer 1991): Kennedy, Betty R . and Roger D. Launius. " A Revolution 28—40.

TITLE INDEX

Air Power: An Australian A pproach." Group Capl Brian "Defense Planning for the Mystery Tour: Principles for Kavanagh. Group Capt David Schubert, and Wing Comdr Guidance in a Period of Nonlinear C h an ge," Dr Colin S. Gary Waters, no. I (Spring 1991): 27-40. Gray. no. 2 (Summer 1991): 18-26. Air Power in Desert Storm and (he Need for Doctrinal "Framework for STA R T 11." Li Col Elwood C. Tircuit. no. C hange." Lt Col Price T Bingham, no 4 (Winter 1991) 3 (Fall 1991): 46-56. 33-46. "H ave You Hugged Your IP L ately?" (editorial). Capt John Air Power Thinking: Request Unrestricted Clim b . " Lt J Doherty, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 2. Gen Charles G. Boyd and Lt Col Charles M W estenhoff "Joint Doctrine: Progress, Prospects, and Problem s." Lt no. 3 (Fall 1991): 4-15. Col W illiam F. Furr. no. 3 (Fall 1991): 36-45. Composite Wing in Combat. T h e." Brig Gen Lee A. "O l Demons. Storms, and Thunder: A Preliminary Look at Downer, no 4 (Winter 19911: 4-16. Vietnam's Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Campaign," Confidence of Quality. T h e " (editorial). Lt Col Richard B Maj Mark Clodfelter. no. 4 (Winter 1991): 17-32. Clark, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 2. "O ther Side of the C O IN . The: Low -Technology Aircraft Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, (he M edia, and the and Lillie W ars." Capt George C. Morris, no. I (Spring F -II7A . Jim Cunningham, no. 3 (Fall 1991). 16-34. 1991): 56-70.

91 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

‘‘Preparing for Theater Air Defense as an Airland T ea m ." ‘Tactical Aircraft and Airfield R ecovery," Capt Peter C. Maj Michael L. Straight, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 18-26. Bahm and Capt Kenneth W. Polasek, no. 2 (Summer "Revolution in Air Transport. A: Acquinng the C -141 Star- 1991): 42-53. lifter," Roger D. Launius and Betty R Kennedy, no. 3 ‘ . . T h r e e t o G e t R e a d y . . . " ( e d i t o r i a l ) , L t C o l R i c h a r d (Fall 1991): 68-83. B. Clark, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 2. "R ole of Tactical Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict, T h e," ‘Toward Operational-Level Doctrine for Space: A Progress Capt Vance C. Bateman, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 72-80. R ep ort," Capt Jam es R. W olf, no. 2 (Summ er 1991)- "S e x , Power, and Ethics: The Challenge to the Military Pro- 28-40. fessional,” CM Sgt Robert D. Lewallen, no. 3 (Fall ‘Toward a Rational Space-Transportation Architecture," Lt 1991): 57-66 Col Alan J. Parrington, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 47-62. "Snorkeling and Historical Surges" (editorial), Lt Col Trends in the Development of the Soviet Air Defense Richard B Clark, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 2 -3 . Forces," Gregory T. Hooker, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 4-17. "Soviet Military and the New Air W ar in the Persian Gulf. ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force Multiplier of the T h e," Mary C. FitzGerald, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 64-78. 1990s." Capt Brian P. Tice, no. I (Spring 1991): 41-55. "Stealth Is a Zero-Sum Game: A Submariner’s View of the 'V STO L and Power Projection: A Leap in Faith." Maj Advanced Tactical Fighter." Capt James H. Patton, Jr., Jeffrey C. Prater, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 54-70. no. I (Spring 1991): 4-17.

SUBJECT INDEX

Air Base Survivability M orris, Capt George C. "T h e Other Side of the COIN: Bahm. Capt Peter C., and Capt Kenneth W. Polasek. "T a c- Low-Technology Aircraft and Little W ars," no. I (Spring tical Aircraft and Airfield Recovery,” no. 2 (Sum m er 1991): 56-70. 1991): 42-53. Tice, Capt Brian P. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force Multiplier of the 1 9 9 0 s." no. 1 (Spring 1991): 41 -5 5 . Aircraft Launius, Roger D.. and Betty R. Kennedy. "A Revolution Air Power History in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter," no. 3 Launius, Roger D.. and Betty R. Kennedy. "A Revolution (Fall 1991): 68-83. in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter," no. 3 Air Defense (Fail 1991): 68-83. Hooker. Gregory T. "Trends in the Development of the Aviation Technology Soviet Air Defense Forces," no. 2 (Summer 1991): 4-17. Cunningham. Jim. “ Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Straight. Maj Michael L. "Preparing for Theater Air Defense Media, and the F -II7 A ," no. 3 (Fall 1991): 16-34. as an Airland T eam ," no. I (Spring 1991): 18-26. M orris, Capt George C. "T h e Other Side of the COIN: Air Force Organization Low-Technology Aircraft and Little W ars." no. 1 (Spring Bateman. Capt Vance C. "T h e Role of Tactical Air Power 1991): 56-70. in Low-Intensity Conflict.” no. I (Spring 1991): 72-80. Patton, Capt James H., Jr. "Stealth Is a Zero-Sum Game: A Downer. Brig Gen Lee A. "T he Composite Wing in Com- Submariner’s View of the Advanced Tactical Fighter." bat," no. 4 (Winter 1991): 4-16. no. 1 (Spring 1991): 4-17. Prater. Maj Jeffrey C. "V S T O L and Power Projection: A Prater, M aj Jeffrey C. "V S T O L and Power Projection: A Leap in Faith," no. 2 (Summer 1991): 54-70. Leap in Faith." no. 2 (Summer 1991): 54-70. Tice, Capt Brian P. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force Airlift Multiplier of the 1990s,” no. 1 (Spring 1991): 41-55. Launius, Roger D.. and Betty R. Kennedy. "A Revolution Basing in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter." no. 3 Bahm. Capt Peter C.. and Capt Kenneth W . Polasek. "T a c- (Fall 1991): 68-83. tical Aircraft and Airfield R ecov ery." no. 2 (Summer Air Power 1991): 42-53. Bingham. Lt Col Price T. "A ir Power in Desert Storm and Budget/Planning Process the Need for Doctrinal C hange," no. 4 (Winter 1991): Gray. Dr Colin S. "Defense Planning for the Mystery Tour: 33-46. Principles for Guidance in a Period of Nonlinear Boyd. Lt Gen Charles G ., and Lt Col Charles M West- C hange." no. 2 (Summer 1991): 18-26. enhoff. "A ir Power Thinking: Request Unrestricted Launius, Roger D.. and Betty R. Kennedy. "A Revolution Clim b-," no. 3 (Fall 1991): 4-15. in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter." no. 3 Clodfelter. Maj Mark. "O f Demons, Storms, and Thunder: (Fall 1991): 68-83. A Preliminary Look at Vietnam’s Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Cam paign," no. 4 (Winter 1991): 17-32. Counterinsurgency Kavanagh. Group Capt Brian. Group Capt David Schubert, M orris, Capt George C. "T h e Other Side of the COIN: and W ing Comdr Gary W aters. "A ir Power: An Aus- Low -Technology Aircraft and Little W ars," no. I (Spring tralian Approach." no. 1 (Spring 1991): 27—40. 1991): 56-70. INDEX 93

Defense Reform Interservice Conflict Clark. Lt Col Richard B. "The Confidence of Quality" Bingham. Lt Col Price T. "A ir Power in Desert Storm and (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1991): 2. the Need for Doctrinal C hange," no 4 (Winter 1991): ______"Snorkeling and Historical Surges" 33-46. (editorial), no. 3 (Fall 1991). 2 -3. Furr. Lt Col W illiam F. "Joint Doctrine: Progress. Pros- Furr. Lt Col W illiam F. "Join t Doctrine: Progress, Pros- pects. and Problem s." no. 3 (Fall 1991): 36-45. pects. and Problem s." no. 3 (Fall 1991): 36-45. Joint Operations Deterrence Bingham. Lt Col Price T. “ Air Power in Desert Storm and Tircuit. Lt Col Elwood C. “ Framework for ST A R T II." no the Need for Doctrinal C hange." no. 4 (W inter 1991): 3 (Fall 1991): 46-56. 33-46. Straight. Maj Michael L. "Preparing for Theater Air Defense Doctrine as an Airland Team .” no. I (Spring 1991): 18-26. Bateman. Capt Vance C. "T he Role of Tactical Air Power in Low-Intensity C onflict." no. I (Spring 1991): 72-80. Leadership/Management Bingham . Lt Col Price T . " A i r Pow er in Desert Storm and Clark. Lt Col Richard B. "The Confidence of Quality" the Need for Doctrinal C hange," no. 4 (W inter 1991): (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1991): 2 33—16. Lewallen. CM Sgt Robert D. "S e x . Power, and Ethics: The Boyd. Lt Gen Charles G .. and Lt Col Charles M . West- Challenge to the M ilitary P rofessio n al." no. 3 (Fall enhoff. "A ir Power Thinking: Request Unrestricted 1991): 57-66. C lim b'." no. 3 (Fall 1991): 4-15. Furr. Lt Col W illiam F. "Jo in t Doctrine: Progress, Pros- Low-Intensity Conflict pects. and Problems,” no. 3 (Fall 1991): 36-45. Bateman. Capt Vance C. "The Role of Tactical Air Power Kavanagh. Group Capt Brian. Group Capt David Schubert, in Low-Intensity Conflict," no. I (Spring 1991): 72-80. and W ing Comdr Gary W aters. “ Air Power: An Aus- Morris. Capt George C. "T he Other Side of the COIN: tralian Approach." no. I (Spring 19911: 27-40. Low-Technology Aircraft and Little W ars." no. 1 (Spring W olf. Capt James R "Tow ard Operational-Level Doctrine 1990:56-70. for Space: A Progress Report." no. 2 (Summer 1991): Nlanagement/Organization 28-40. Dowmer. Brig Gen Lee A. "The Composite Wing in Com - Editorial bat." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 4-16. Furr. Lt Col William F. "Joint Doctrine: Progress, Pros- Clark. Lt Col Richard B "The Confidence of Quality," no. pects, and Problem s," no. 3 (Fall 1991): 36-45. 4 (Winter 1991): 2. ______"Snorkeling and Historical Surges." no. 3 Military Technology (Fall 1991): 2-3. FitzGerald, Mary' C. “ The Soviet Military and the New Air ------"... Three to Get Ready ..." no. 1 (Spring War in the Persian G ulf." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 64-78. 1991): 2 Military Thought Doherty, Capt John J "H ave You Hugged Your IP Lately?" no. 2 (Summer 1991): 2. Boyd. Lt Gen Charles G ., and Lt Col Charles M. W estenhoff. "A ir Power Thinking: Request Unrestricted Flying Training Climb-," no. 3 (Fall 1991): 4-15. Doherty. Capt John J. "Have You Hugged Your IP Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "Snorkeling and Historical Lately?” (editorial), no. 2 (Summer 1991): 2. Surges” (editorial), no. 3 (Fall 1991): 2-3. Patton, Capt James H.. Jr. "Stealth Is a Zero-Sum Game: A Foreign Military Forces Submariner's View of the Advanced Tactical Fighter," FitzGerald, Mary C "T h e Soviet Military and the New Air no. 1 (Spring 1991): 4-17. War in the Persian Gulf," no. 4 (Winter 1991): 64-78. Military Training Hooker. Gregory T. "Trends in the Development of the Straight. Maj Michael L. "Preparing for Theater Air Defense Soviet Air Defense Forces," no. 2 (Summer 1991): 4-17. as an Airland T eam ." no. I (Spring 1991): 18-26. Kavanagh. Group Capt Brian. Group Capt David Schubert, and W ing Comdr Gary W aters. "A ir Power: An Aus- Morale tralian Approach." no 1 (Spring 1991): 27-40. Clark. Lt Col Richard B. "The Confidence of Quality" Geopolitics (editorial), no. 4 (W inter 1991): 2. Lewallen. CMSgt Robert D. "Sex. Power, and Ethics: The C lark. Lt Col Richard B "S n o rk e lin g and H istorical Challenge to the M ilitary P ro fessio n al," no. 3 (Fall Surges" (editorial), no. 3 (Fall 1991): 2-3. 1991): 57-66. Intelligence National Security Policy Cunningham. Jim "C racks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Cunningham. Jim. "Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Media, and the F - I I7 A ." no. 3 (Fall 1991): 16—34 Media, and the F-I I7 A ." no. 3 (Fall 1991): 16-34. International Relations Gray. Dr Colin S. "Defense Planning for the Mystery Tour: Tircuit. Lt Col Elwood C. "Framework for STA RT II." no Principles for Guidance in a Period o f Nonlinear 3 (Fall 1991): 46-56. Change," no. 2 (Summer 1991): 18-26. 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1991

Tircuil. Lt Col Elwood C. “ Framework lor STA R T II." no. Lewallen, CM Sgt Robert D. "S e x , Power, and Ethics: The 3 (Fall 1991): 46-56. Challenge to the M ilitary P rofessio n al." no. 3 (Fall National Strategy 1991): 57-66. Tircuit. Lt Col Elwood C. “ Framework for ST A R T II." no. Public Affairs 3 (Fall 1991): 46-56. Cunningham. Jim. "Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Naval Operations Media, and the F-l I7 A ," no. 3 (Fall 1991): 16-34. Patton. Capt Jam es H., Jr. "Stealth Is a Zero-Sum Game: A Soviet Air Power Submariner's View of the Advanced Tactical Fighter." Hooker, Gregory T. "Trends in the Development of the no I (Spring 1991): 4-17. Soviet Air Defense Forces," no. 2 (Summer 1991): 4-17. Pacific Region Affairs Soviet Doctrine Kavanagh, Group Capt Brian. Group Capt David Schubert, FitzGerald, M ary C . " T h e Soviet Military and the New' Air and W ing Comdr Gary W aters. "Air Power: An Aus- War in the Persian G u lf." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 64-78. tralian Approach." no. I (Spring 1991): 27-40. Soviet Military Persian Gulf Conflict FitzGerald. Mary C. "T h e Soviet Military and the New Air Bingham, Lt Col Price T. "A ir Power in Desert Storm and War in the Persian G u lf." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 64-78. the Need for Doctrinal C hange." no. 4 (Winter 1991): Hooker. Gregory T. "Trends in the Development of the 33-46. Soviet Air Defense Forces,” no. 2 (Summer 1991): 4-17. Clodfelter. Maj Mark. “ O f Demons, Storms, and Thunder: Space Operations A Preliminary Look at V ietnam 's Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Cam paign." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 17-32. Parrington. Lt Col Alan J. "Toward a Rational Space-Trans- Downer. Brig Gen Lee A. "T he Composite Wing in Com - portation Architecture,” no. 4 (Winter 1991): 47-62. bat," no. 4 (Winter 1991): 4—16. W olf. Capt Jam es R. "Tow ard Operational-Level Doctrine FitzGerald. Mary C. "T h e Soviet Military and the New Air for Space: A Progress Report," no. 2 (Summer 1991): War in the Persian Gulf." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 64-78. 28-40. Personnel Issues Space Technology Clark. Lt Col Richard B "The Confidence of Quality" Parrington. Lt Col Alan J. "Tow ard a Rational Space-Trans- (editorial), no. 4 (W inter 1991): 2. portation Architecture," no. 4 (Winter 1991): 47-62. Lew alien. CM Sgt Robert D. "S e x . Power, and Ethics: The Strategic Operations Challenge to the M ilitary Professional.” no. 3 (Fall Clodfelter, M aj Mark. " O f Dem ons, Storms, and Thunder: 1991): 57-66. A Preliminary Look at V ietnam 's Impact on the Persian Planning Gulf Air Cam paign." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 17-32. Clodfelter. M aj Mark. " O f Dem ons. Storm s, and Thunder: Strategy A Preliminary Look at V ietnam 's Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Cam paign." no. 4 (Winter 1991): 17-32. Clodfelter. M aj Mark. " O f Demons. Storms, and Thunder: A Preliminary Look at Vietnam's Impact on the Persian Gray. Dr Colin S. "Defense Planning for the Mystery Tour: Gulf Air Cam paign," no. 4 (Winter 1991): 17-32. Principles for G uidance in a Period o f N onlinear Change." no. 2 (Summer 1991): 18-26. Tactical Air Power Political-Military Relations Bahm. Capt Peter C.. and Capt Kenneth W . Polasek. "T a c- tical Aircraft and Airfield Recovery.” no. 2 (Summer Cunningham. Jim. "Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the 1991): 42-53. M edia, and the F -I I 7 A ." no. 3 (Fall 1991): 16-34.’ Bateman. Capt Vance C. "T h e Role of Tactical Air Power Launius. R oger D.\ and Betty R . K ennedy. " A Revolution in Low-Intensity Conflict." no. I (Spring 1991): 72-80. in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter," no. 3 Prater. Maj Jeffrey C. "V S T O L and Power Projection: A (Fall 1991): 68-83. Leap in Faith." no. 2 (Summer 1991): 54-70. Procurement Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Launius, Roger D . and Betty R. Kennedy. "A Revolution Tice, Capt Brian P. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter," no. 3 Multiplier of the 1990s." no. 1 (Spring 1991): 41-55. (Fall 1991): 68-83. Vietnam War Professionalism Clodfelter, Maj Mark. "O f Demons, Storms, and Thunder Clark. Lt Col Richard B. "... Three to Get Ready ..." A Preliminary Look at Vietnam’s Impact on the Persian (editorial), no I (Spring 1991): 2. Gulf Air Cam paign." no. 4 (W'inter 1991): 17-32. contributors

served as a fighter and tanker duty controller in the MACV/USSAG Tac- tical Air Control Center. He later served in the Doctrine and Concepts Division. Headquarters USAF. Colo- nel Bingham is a previous contribu- tor to the Airpower lournal.

Brig Gen Lee A. Downer (USAFA: MS. Auburn University) is deputy Maj Mark A. Clodfelter (USAFA; chief of staff for operations at Second MA. University of Nebraska: PhD. Allied Tactical Air Force. Rhein- University of North Carolina) is pro- dahlen. Germany. Immediately pre- fessor of airpower studies at Air Uni- ceding this assignment, he was in- versity’s School of Advanced Air- spector general and deputy chief of power Studies (SAAS). He has staff for productivity. Headquarters served as an air weapons controller US Air Forces in Europe. Ramstein at Myrtle Beach AFB. South Car- Air Base. Germany. As a commander olina. and Osan AB. Korea, and as and command pilot with more than director of military history at the US 3.500 flying hours, he led the 421st Air Force Academy. Major Clodfelter Tactical Fighter Squadron, flying is the author of The Limits of Air- F-16s at Hill AFB. Utah, and the 20th power: The American Bombing of Lt Col Alan |. Parrington (BS. Colo- Tactical Fighter Wing, flying F -llls North Vietnam. at Royal Air Force (RAF) Upper rado State University: MA. Univer- Heyford. United Kingdom, prior to sity of Alabama) is deputy foreign- forming the 7440th Composite Wing poiicy advisor to USCINCPAC. Camp at Incirlik Air Base. Turkey. His H. M. Smith, Hawaii. Previous as- other operational assignments in- signments include chief. Bases and cluded RAF Bentwaters. United Units Division. Headquarters Pacific Kingdom: DaN'ang Air Base. South Air Forces. Hickam AFB. Hawaii; Vietnam; Hahn. Spangdahlem, and chief. Standard ization/E valuation Zweibrucken air bases. Germany; as Division. 49th Tactical Fighter W'ing, well as Homestead AFB and Eglin Holloman AFB. New Mexico; and AFB. Florida A tour in the Director- the US Space Command research fel- ate of Plans. Tactical Forces Division low. Air University Center for Aero- of the Air Staff added to his experi- space Doctrine. Research, and Edu- ence. General Downer is a graduate cation (AUCADRE). Maxwell AFB. of Squadron Officer School and the Alabama. Colonel Parrington. who Royal College ol Defence Studies. has previously published in Air- London, and is a distinguished grad- power Journal, is a graduate of Air uate of Air Command and Staff Command and Staff College and Air College War College.

Lt Col Price T. Bingham (USAFA; MA. University of Alabama) is chief. Current Doctrine Division. Airpower Research Institute. Air University Center for A erospace Doctrine. Re- search. and Education (AUCADRE), M axwell AFB. Alabama. He has flown fighters in TAC, USAFE, and Southeast Asia During his third tour in Southeast Asia. Colonel Bingham

95 Mary C. FitzGerald (BSFS. MS. and MA, Georgetown University) is a research fellow in Soviet military affairs at the Hudson Institute. Wash- ington, D.C. She was recently ap- pointed by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to serve as a consultant on Soviet reactions to the Persian Gulf war. Ms FitzGerald has served as a researcher in Soviet military affairs at the Cen- ter for Naval Analyses. Alexandria. Virginia, and at Abbott Associates. Annandale. Virginia. Her articles on Soviet military affairs have appeared in such journals as Naval War Col- lege Review. Strategic Review, and Defense Analysis. She is the author of Soviet Views on SDI (1987) and Changing Soviet Doctrine on Nu- clear War (1989).

96 Tear Out and Remove PLEASE PRINT PLEASE PLEASE PRINTPLEASE FEEL LIKEUP? SPEAKING Filland cards out onecomment of attached the card to comment card to comment issue on this We are always interestedin hearing from Pleaseour readers. use this COMMENT CARD AIRPOWER JOURNAL AIRPOWER JOURNAL AIRPOWER COMMENT CARD card to comment on this issue______cardtoon issue______comment this We arein Pleaseinterestedalways use hearing from our readers. this Rank/Titie First name Initial Last Last name Street Initial Rank/Titie First name Rank'Tfle First name initial Last Last name initial First Rank'Tfle name drop itdrop inmailany box. City City ______

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