Cognitive Theory of War: Why Do Weak States Choose War Against Stronger States?
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University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 12-2004 Cognitive Theory of War: Why Do Weak States Choose War against Stronger States? Sang Hyun Park University of Tennessee - Knoxville Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Park, Sang Hyun, "Cognitive Theory of War: Why Do Weak States Choose War against Stronger States?. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2004. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2346 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Sang Hyun Park entitled "Cognitive Theory of War: Why Do Weak States Choose War against Stronger States?." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science. Robert A. Gorman, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Mary Caprioli, Donald W. Hastings, April Morgan, Anthony J. Nownes Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Sang-Hyun Park entitled “Cognitive Theory of War: Why Do Weak States Choose War against Stronger States?” I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science. Robert A. Gorman Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend it acceptance Mary Caprioli Donald W. Hastings April Morgan Anthony J. Nownes Accepted for the Council: Anne Mayhew Vice Chancellor and Dean of Graduate Studies (Original Signatures are on file with official student records) COGNITIVE THEORY OF WAR: WHY DO WEAK STATES CHOOSE WAR AGAINST STRONGER STATES? A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Sang-Hyun Park December 2004 Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Jae-Cho Park for inspiring me and encouraging me to have a dream of social scientist. ii Acknowledgements I thank God who has guided me. I would like to thank Dr. Baek, Jong-gook (Kyung Sang National University, Jinju Korea), my spiritual and scholastic mentor. I would like to thank Dr. Choi, Young-Soo (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea) for showing me the way a good scholar should do. I would like to thank Dr. Jeff Berejikian (University of Georgia, Athens) for introducing me to Prospect Theory. I would also like to all my committee Dr. Gorman, Dr. Hastings, Dr. Nownes, Dr. Morgan, and Dr. Caprioli who gave a good advises. Lastly I would like to thank my family and friends who did not stop believing me when they were hard to do. Their encouragements made this work possible. iii Abstract The key question to be addressed in this paper is why weaker states with a slight chance of winning do not avoid war against stronger states. Even though most war theory does offer a few insights about the conditions under which weak states choose war when there is only a slight possibility of winning, explanations based on either emphasis on rationality or ignorance of “interacting structure” of international relations leave many practical remedies unexplained. This paper explains asymmetric conflict on the combination of Prospect theory and Game theory. The interacting game structure of asymmetric conflicts can be summarized. Under the threat of massive retaliation by a strong state, a weak state is forced to choose between war (defection) and withdrawal (cooperation). In asymmetric conflicts, defection (war against a strong state with a slight chance of winning) is a risky gamble, and cooperation is safe choice. In contrast to Expected Utility theory, this paper argues that weak states in a loss frame chooses risky war (defection) against a superior adversary in the hope of recovering from their crisis. This paper follows crisis analyses of other Prospect theorists. The nature and seriousness of the crisis of a weak state are analyzed. The rare occurrence and deviant characteristics of a weak state’s war choice make it suitable to use a qualitative structured analysis. The research hypothesis is applied to three case studies: the Gulf War between Iraq and the United States-led alliance in 1990, the Falkland/Malvinas Island war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982, and the Middle East War between Egypt and Israel in 1973. The implication of this study is that enforcing strategy based on superior capability is not a reasonable means to prevent a weak state in a loss frame from choosing war against superior adversary. iv Table of Contents I. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….1 II. Literature Review…………………………………………………..………………… 5 II-1. International Level of Analysis: Power Transition and Window of Opportunity……………………………..………………….…..……………..6 II-2. Domestic Level of Analysis: Diversionary Theory………..………………...10 II-3. Individual Level of Analysis: Rational Choice Theories ......………………..12 II-4. Individual Level of Analysis: Misperception and By-Product Theory……....21 III. Method of Analysis ………………………………………………………………… 25 III-1. Prospect theory……………………………………..…………………...….. 27 III-2. Game Structure of Asymmetric Conflict………………......………………. 31 III-3. Weak State in a Loss Frame under the Chicken Game ..………………….... 38 III-4. Cognitive Theory of Asymmetric War Initiation………………………….... 42 III-5. Scope and Method of Research……………………………………………... 44 IV. Desert Storm………………………………………………………………………... 51 IV-1. Iraq in a Loss Frame…………………………………………………….. 53 IV-2. The Kuwait Card……………………………………………………………. 60 IV-3. Imposition of Chicken Game by Coalition Forces………………………….. 63 IV-4. Game Structure in Desert Storm……………………………………………..68 IV-5. Iraqi Risk Calculation………………………………………………………. 73 IV-5-1. Benefits of Successful Annexation…………………………………... 73 IV-5-2. Deterring Coalitions………………………………………………….. 75 IV-5-3. Slim, but Still Remaining Chance to Win over Coalition……………. 77 IV-5-4. Peaceful Retreat from Kuwait Territory……………………………... 81 IV-6. Conclusion………………………………………………………………….. 83 V. The Falklands War…………………………………………………………………... 86 V-1. Argentina in a Loss Frame…………………………………………………... 87 V-1-1. Economic Crisis……………………………………………………….. 88 V-1-2. Political Difficulty…………………………………………………….. 95 V-2. Argentina’s Falklands Card……………………………………………....... 104 V-3. Imposition of Coercive Diplomacy by Great Britain………………………. 109 V-4. Game Structure of the Falklands War…………………………………........ 110 V-5. Argentina’s Risky Calculations…………………………………………….. 115 V-5-1. Safe Choice of Peaceful Withdrawal from the Falklands……………. 115 V-5-2. Costs and Benefits of Staying in the Falklands……..……………….. 118 V-5-3. Slim, but Still Remaining Chance to Win Over Great Britain……..... 119 V-6. Conclusion…………………………………………………………..……… 126 VI. The Middle East War in 1973 …………………………………………………….. 128 VI-1. Egypt in a Loss Frame ……………………………………………………. 130 VI-1-1. The Delayed Recovery of Lost Territory …………………………... 130 VI-1-2. Economic Difficulties …………………………………………......... 133 VI-1-3. Popular Discontents ………………………………………………… 137 v VI-2. Israeli Deterrence and Sadat’s Dilemma…………………………………... 140 VI-3. Game Structure before the 1973 October War ………………………......... 144 VI-4. Sadat’s Risky Calculation ………………………………………………… 148 VI-4-1. Risky Choice of War Initiation (Defection) ………………………... 148 VI-4-2. Safe Choice: Cooperation (Choosing not to Initiate a War ………… 154 VI-4-3. New Narrow Window of Opportunity ……………………………… 154 VI-5. Conclusion: Sadat’s Gamble ……………………………………………… 158 VII. Conclusion …………………………………………………………………..…… 161 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………. 169 Vita …………………………………………………………………………………… 207 vi List of Tables Table 3-1. Strong states’ preference order…………………………….…………..…34 Table 3-2. Weak states’ preference order……………………………….………...… 35 Table 4-1. Coalition Forces’ preference order in Desert Storm…….…………....…. 69 Table 4-2. Iraqi preference order in Desert Storm………………….………..……….72 Table 5-1. Argentina’s Economic Indicators, 1976-1983………………..……….…..90 Table 5-2. British preference order in the Falklands War……………..……….……111 Table 5-3. Argentine preference order in the Falklands crisis……..………………..113 Table 6-1. Israel’s preference order ………………………………………………... 145 Table 6-2. Egypt’s preference order …………………………………………..…….146 Table 7-1. Summary of Case Studies …………………………………………..…….164 Table 7-2. Weak States’ Choices in an Asymmetric Conflict …….……….…….…. 167 vii List of Figures Figure 2-1. Prisoner’s Dilemmas Game Structure ……..…..………………………... 16 Figure 3-1. Utility Curve of Prospect Theory………………………………….….…. 30 Figure 3-2. Decision Making Tree of International Military Conflict …………….… 32 Figure 3-3. Game structure of asymmetric conflict………………….………..………36 Figure 3-4. Chicken Game Structure………………………………………….….….. 39 Figure 4-1. GDP and Consumer Price Index of Iraq, 1978-1991…………..…………56