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INTERPRETING INTERVENTIONS:
IDENTITY, IMAGES, AND THE PERCEPTION OF NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment o f the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By
Vaughn Parnell Shannon, MA, BA
The Ohio State University 2001
Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Richard Herrmann, Adviser
Professor Ted Hopf Adviser Professor Randall SchweOer Political Science Graduate Program UMI Number: 3031265
UMI
UMI Microform 3031265 Copyright 2002 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company. Ali rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ABSTRACT
I examine bow states perceive and judge military interventions in world politics.
Conventional approaches assume observers perceive a state’s actions much the same, and that judgment varies either on the basis of material interest considerations or on the normative basis of intervention. I argue for a theory of “ethnocentric inference” that suggests differences in state identity leads to differences m the understanding, and thus evaluation, of interventions. I argue that evaluations of acts and actors are nonnatively driven, as constructivists suggest and materialists overlook. But I go further to argue that the interpretation of behavior interacts situationaUy with a state’s self-image and image of the intervener. I trace this influence of identity and im%e in a series of case studies of
US and US-led military interventions in the Post-Cold War era. I look at countries with various identities and images and how these effect interpretations of mterventions justified on normative grounds. I conclude that perception is heavily influenced by prior ideational baggage, especial^ in situations of normative ambiguity. The clearer that an act is socially (mjappropriate, the more perceptions converge; the more ambiguous the act, the more divergence in perceptions occurs along the lines o f identity and hnage. In terms o f intervention behavior and the United States’ image abroad, these conclusions suggest that UN-authorized multilateralism deflates critics, whereas unilateralism empowers critics and creates negative hnages that could lead to a challenge to US power. Dedicated to my mother and 6tber, without whom none of this extended foray into higher education could have been physically, mentally, spiritually or financially possible.
lU ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many thanks to Richard Herrmann for serving as adviser, mentor, role, colleague, and collaborator during my stay at Ohio State. His input into this project was invaluable tough love that certainly improved the project significantly. Thanks as well to Ted Hopf for the intellectual inspiration firom the constructivist side, and to Randy Schweller for keeping me grounded in the real(ist?) world with regards to my research and the process of academic politics. Together, this dissertation committee covers the spectrum of thought in IR, and the push and pull of it can only have helped the final product.
1 also would like to thank others with whom I've shared my work, particularly
Amy Gurowitz, who provided usefiil comments early in the project. This work also
benefited from a spirited dialogue at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the International
Studies Association, where a portion of the dissertation was presented as a paper.
Then, of course, there are also the people unfortunate enough to have had to
endure me durmg the tortured path of self-disciplined dissertation research and writing,
most notably my lovety and brilliant wife, Amanda, who proves that love is indeed
“patient and kind.” Thank you.
IV VITA
February 10,1971 Bom - Cleveland, Ohio
1993 B.A. Political Science, Ohio University
1995 M j A Political Science, Virginia Tech
1995 - 2001 Graduate Assistant and Presidential Fellow, The Ohio State University
2001 - Visiting instructor, Miami University
PUBLICATIONS
Richard EC Herrmann and Vaughn P. Shannon, “Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making.” International Organization 55(3):621-54 (2001).
Vai^hn P. Shannon, “Norms are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation.” International Studies Quarterly 44(2)-.293-316 (2000).
FIELDS OF STUDY
Mtgor Field: Political Science TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ...... ü.
Dedication...... iiL
Ackoowledgments ...... iv.
Vita...... V.
List of Tables ...... ix.
List of Figures ...... x.
Chapters:
1. Introduction: Interpreting Interventions ...... I
1.1 Overview ...... 1 1.2 Focus of Study...... 7 1.2.1 Scope Conditions ...... 7 1.2.2 The Approach of This Study ...... 12 12.3 Universal or Unique? A Thhd Way to Approaching Actors ...... 14 1.3 Significance ...... 21 1.4 Plan o f the Dissertation ...... 26
2. A Theory of Ethnocentric Inference ...... 29
2.1 Overview ...... 29 2.2 Prevailing Approaches ...... 30 22.1 Rationalist Approaches ...... 32 2.2.2 Ideational Approaches ...... 38 22.3 The Social Actor Model: The Case for Ideas and Agency ...... 45 2.3 The Theory o f Ethnocentrk; Inference ...... 52 2.3.1 Assumptfons and Concepts ...... 52 2.3.2 The Constniai Phase: Evaluating Intervention ...... 63 2.3.3 The Judgment Phase: Evaluating Interveners ...... 72
VI 2.3.4 Rival Theoretical Expectatrâns ...... 76 2.4 Conclusion ...... 83
3. Identifying Identities: Method and Presentation of Identity Profiles of Observer States...... 84
3.1 Overview ...... 84 3.2 Testing ...... 85 3.2.1 Independent Variables: Identity and Image ...... 85 3.2.2 Dependent Variables: Evaluation and Judgment ...... 88 3.2.3 Case and Country Selection ...... 89 3.2.4 Limits, Caveats and Responses ...... 94
3.3 Identifying Observer States ...... 98 3.3.1 Revisiting Identity and Images ...... 99 3.3.2 Ingroup Insider: Japan ...... 104 3.3.3 Outgroup Insider: France ...... I l l 3.3.4 Ingroup Outskler: Egypt ...... 115 3.3.5 Outgroup Outsider In ^ and China ...... 119 3.3.6 Out, In and Out Again: Russia’s Identity Crisis ...... 133 3.4 Conclusion ...... 140
4. Interpreting Interventions: A First Cut ...... 143
4.1 Overview ...... 143 4.2 Norms Regarding the Use o f Force ...... 144 4.3 Unilateral Interventions: Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan ...... 148 4.3.1 Background and U.S. Justifications ...... 148 4.3.2 Foreign Responses ...... 152 4.4 Multilateral Intervention: The Gulf War ...... 159 4.4.1 Background and U.S. Justi&ations ...... 161 4.4.2 Foreign Responses ...... 166 4.5 Discussion imd Conclusion ...... 173
5. Interpreting “Liberal Interventions” ...... 177
5.1 Overview ...... 177 5.2 Norms Regarding Interventmn for Human Rights and Democracy...... 178 5.3 “Humanitarian Interventions:” Bosnia and Kosovo ...... 184 5.3.1 Background and U.S. Justifications ...... 185 5.3.2 Fore%n Responses ...... 194 5.4 “Democracy Promotion:” Panama and Haiti ...... 208 5.4.1 Background and U.S. Justifications ...... 209
Vll 5.4.2 Foreign Responses ...... 221 5.5 Discussion wd Conclusion ...... 230
6. Identity AfSliates and Interpretation ...... 234
6.1 Overview ...... 234 6.2 Egypt’s Identity; Who is “Us”? ...... 235 6.3 Target or Beneficiary? Identity AflOiates and Interpretation...240 6.3.1 AffiUate as Bene&iary: Bosnia and Kosovo ...... 241 6.3.2 Affiliate as Targets: Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan ...... 246 6.3.3 Evaluation of the U.S ...... 250 6.4 Extension: Affiliate as Victim and Target (The Gulf War) 252 6.5 Discussion and Conclusion ...... 254
7. Conclusions ...... 258
7.1 Overview ...... 258 7.2 Summary and Analysis of Findings ...... 259 7.3 Alternative Explanations Compared ...... 269 7.4 Implications for Theory and Practice ...... 271 7.5 Suggestions for Future Research ...... 274 7.6 Conclusion ...... 277
Appendix A Observer State Eûtes, 1989-1999 ...... 280
Appendix B Identity and Image Dictionary ...... 282
Appendix C Freedom House Scores of Observer States ...... 284
Bibliography ...... 285
VIU LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
2.1 Effects o f Liberal and VictimDimensions on Constniai ...... 70
2.2 Identifying Insiders and Outsiders ...... 71
2.3 Images and Attributions ...... 77
2.4 Identity Matrix...... 78
2.5 Predicted Evaluations of Act ...... 79
2.6 Predicted Evaluations of Intervener ...... 79
3.1 The Identity Matrix: Identifyn% Observer States ...... 141
4.1 Evaluations of Interventions ...... 176
4.2 Evaluations of the United States ...... 176
5.1 Evaluatkms of “Liberal” Interventions ...... 232
5.2 Evaluations of the United States in “Liberal” Interventions ...... 232
6.1 Egypt’s Interpretations of Intervention ...... 256
7.1 Summary Evaluations of Interventions ...... 261
7 2 Summary Evaluations o f U.S ...... 262
7.3 Identity and Evaluations ...... 264
7.4 Images and Judgment ...... 264
7.5 Multilateralism and Evaluations ...... 266
7.6 Multilateralism and Judgment ...... 266
ix LIST OF nOURES
Figure Page
2.1 A Two-Step Model of Ethnocentric Inference ...... 62
3.1 Observer Identities: Insklers and Outsiders ...... 101
3.2 The Identity Matrix: Observer States ...... 104
7.1 Multilateralism and Evaluations ...... 268
7.2 MutHateralism and Judgment ...... 268 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
INTERPRETING INTERVENTIONS
1.1 Overview
How is the use of force perceived and evaluated by observing states in the international system? Can the perpetrator of military force control or influence bow its regime is judged by third parties? How a state and its behavior are perceived in the international arena is important, for states are interested in self-presentation in their relations with others, eager to signal to others a certain image that suits their
interests. The US operation in Afghanistan following the September 11,2001,
terrorist attacks, is full of references to the “battle for hearts and mmds”—a reference
to the US not just to use force but use it in a way that allays the concerns of others
and reassures them o f the moral rightness o f US action.
Much work has been done on signaling behavior related to compellence,
deterrence and the credibility of threats,' but the dynamic of impression management
' Schelling 1966; Fearon 1994,1997. is much more wide-rangii^ than traditional signaling theory suggests/
Constructivists in recent years have begun to highlight the extent to which international behavior is socially embedded and “identity-creating.” To the extent that international society judges one’s actions as good or bad, constructivists argue that a state can acquire an identity related to those qualities, the consequences of which a&ct subsequent interactions. Leading constructivist scholar Alexander
Wendt speaks of a “knowledge of others” that states obtain from observing behavior, acKi suggests this knowledge is “made reliable by experience” over the course of interactions, with “inferences about each other’s intentions...tested and revised against the reality of what those intentions really were.”^
Yet behavior and intentions are not so self-evident as Wendt suggests, and
international socfety, as a judge o f international behavior, is better conceived not an
“it” but a “they.” Nonetheless, rationalist and constructivist accounts of the
mterpretation of behavior tend to bomogence the audieiKe of such signals, and
therefore feü to account for or theorize about variation in perceptions of the same act.
Despite all social psychology has taught us about the influence of agent beliefe and
biases on human reasoning, conventional theories do not theorize about variation in
perceptions of acts, and have assumed a direct link from the evaluation of an act to a judgment about the actor. Rationalist models of signalinginq>ly that everyone views
^ For a broad treatment of signalingand impressfen management m international relations, see Jervis 1970.
3 Wendt 1999:108,140. the same behavior similarly, assuming that judgments of evidence are independent of expectations. Institutional variations of the rationalist approach suggest that whatever noise and distortion affects the interpretation of acts, and subsequent inferences of intention, can be solved with the transparency of institutions, which provide others with information and access to actors in an otherwise ambiguous world. Even constructivists, as mentioned above, tend to exude what Kier and Mercer call
“unwarranted optimism” about the ability of socially shared norms to guide judgments about the behavior and intentions o f mtemational actors.'* It is commonplace to End references to “the international community” responding to events, or to certain behaviors as an affeont to “mtemational society.” Accompanying this tendency is the theoretical position of many constructivists and liberal theorists to presume that actions are interpreted with uniformity, based on collectively understood mtemational norms.
Such a bomogenizing view of world normative stmctures belies evidence to the contrary. The 1999 NATO action in Kosovo, called by some as the “first war for values” rather than “interests,” had as many detractors as supporters worldwide.
China, even prior to the NATO bombing o f its embassy in Belgrade, was calling the operation a “barberu: act” and comparing the US to Nazi Germany. Even the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has been seen different^ by different actors on the world stage.
Especially m a situation where little traditional material interests were at play for observing states, what accounts for these differences in perceptions?
■* Kier and Mercer 1996. Perspectives that homogenize audience responses fly in the &ce of an amassed body of literature and evulence from social and political psychology that cautions against optimism in the ability of “informative behavior” to convey intended messages to audiences. Robert Jervis, himself criticized for not explaining signal foilure in his earlier, seminal work on signaling,^ now warns against models that give short shrift to the mediating role o f audience perceptions, saying;
No...inferences are self-evident in the sense that all people under all circumstances looking at the mformation would draw the same conclusion... While behavior may reveal something important about the actor, often it is not clear exactty what is being revealed, what is intended to be revealed, and what others will think is being revealed.^
Jervis elsewhere has highlighted the biases leadmg elites to expect their actions to be seen as they see it—benign and justified, or firm but fofr—and critics of rational deterrence theory have shown such biases to exist with consequences for crisis outcomes.^ Yet these efforts do not account for variation m perceptions of signals.
What is needed to explain the variation in both interpretations o f action and judgments of actor is a theory o f the observer. That is the intention o f this dissertatiotL
I seek to establish in the following p%es a theoretical framework for understanding how states interpret and judge military interventions, based on the
interaction of the act and observer. I take up Jervis’s suggestion for studies that are
^ Vertzberger 1990.
® Jervis 2001. “two-sided in looking at both actor and perceiver”—that is, both “the image an actor is trying to project and what influences the perceiver and the inferences it draws."^ I do this by examining how states justify an act as well as how other states perceive and judge the same act. My argument is that current approaches to signaling and perceptions fell to account for variation in perceptions across observers in the international audience, and feil to address the ideational bases of such dififerences.
The two are related, in that a state’s preconceptions filter the interpretation and judgment of acts, and thus such interpretations will vary according to individual differences among observers. This distinguishes my argument firom systemic- ideational theories that posit global normative fiameworks as the arbiters of agents’ judgments about particular acts.
1 offer a “Social Actor Model” that places states, in interaction with their normative environments, at the center of analysis. Looking to transcend (rather than refute) materialist arguments, I argue that the evaluations of acts, specifically military interventions, as well as the actors who carry them out, are ideationaily and nonnatively driven, as constructivists suggest and rationalists overlook. But I also argue that the interpretation o f normative behavior interacts situationaUy with (1) state klentity, (2) the identificatfen with other groups targeted in the interventfen, and
(3) pre-existing images of the Other. I develop a theory of ethnocentric inference that explains the basis of evaluating acts m terms of these three aspects of identity and images, then trace their mfluence on interpretatfens of US and US-led military
^ Jervis 1976:354-55; Lebow 1981. interventions in the Post-Cold War era. I look at countries with various identities, defined as “insiders” and “outsiders” to the current Western-liberal normative order, and how these identities affect interpretations of interventions justified on normative grounds. I also show the role that positive and negative images of the intervener play in influencing judgments of that actor. Finally, I look at cases in which a state’s identity, extended to a group helped or hurt by intervention, serves as an important mediator of interpretations. I conclude that action is heavily influenced by prior ideational baggage, especially m situations of normative ambiguity. The more clearly that an act is socially appropriate, the more perceptions converge; the more ambiguous or contested the act, the more divergence in perceptions occurs along the lines of identity and image.
The remainder of this introductory chapter elaborates on the focus of the study, including scope conditions, as well as identifies major concepts central to the study: identity, images, and military intervention. I then detail the approach of this study, which is phenomenological and psychological in nature. I discuss the debate between rationalists who treat agents as “universaT and interpretivists who see them as “unique,” then delineate a “third way” that recognizes the importance of agent perspective while still m a generalizable positivist framework with predicted patterns.
From there I move on to discuss the significance and caveats of the study before outlining the contents of the chapters to follow.
* Jervis 2001. 1.2 Focus of Study
This section considers the approach of this study, including the behaviors to be investigated and the time frame in which the study occurs. These scope conditions are justified in terms of methodological control This section then turns to the particular approach of this study, including a discussion of agency and generalizabOity within the context of international relations theory.
1.2.1 Scope Conditions
To explore the different approaches to interpreting and evaluating international behavior, I have chosen to limit the scope of this study in both time and subject area, to the consideration of perceptions of U.S. and U.S.-led military
interventions since the end of the Cold War. By limiting the study to such cases, I
accomplish several goals related to “controF over potential variables in the analysis.
First, this controls for time period to avoid distinctions that may have occurred under
different systemic material conditions, such as the bipolar Cold-War rivalry. Second,
the limited time frame also controls for systemic normative conditions, or what has
been called the “normative structure of battle.”’ I agree with constructivists who
suggest prevailing ideas of appropriate behavior (norms) matter, to the extent that
they serve as a basis for judgment of actions. This study, and ny theory, is a
Rieff2000. generalizable discussion of the process o f perception, meaning the mechanisms I suggest are at play, identities and hnages m the interpretation of norms and behavior, should be generalizable across normative and historical epochs. Nonetheless, the focus on that process within one such normative context, that of post-Cold War
“emergent liberal world order,” permits some control over the prevailing normative order so that variable normative structures are removed from the explanatory equation. This also allows us to examine the variable role of identity and image withm a systemic structure argued to possess a common influence on all actors.
The focus on military interventions, which I define as the use or threat o f military force by one or more outside powers against the territory o f another, accomplishes several tasks. First, it controls for activities that are judged, and for which the US is judged. The focus on one sort of mtematfonal behavior avoids variation in outcomes based on the sort of behavior undertaken. Second, as an activity of the state, military intervention also is a salient act most likely to receive international attention and to draw opinions related to international norms and the US role as a superpower. This has practical research benefits, as data on opinions of
Hughes 2000: chapter 8; Barnett 1997. The “liberal order,” developed in subsequent chapters, refers to the systemic prevalence of norms m international law, treaty and institutions that reflect liberal ideas of democracy, human rights, and multilateralism. This does not mean, however, that all norms in the system are liberal
“ Haass 1996; Vertzberger 1998:114-16; von Hippel 2000:3. The “threat” of force indicates that such interventions are not always implemented with force, such as the case o f Haiti in Chapter 4. Geldenhtqrs (1998:4-7, chapter 3) suggests the term “foreign poky engagen»nt” to account for the range of coercive methods associated with mterventions short of actual use of force. lesser sorts of acts are harder to come by. This also has a theoretical logic, though, since the judgment of the use of force is an important feature of international society and can have grave implications for the subsequent judgment of the intervener as a benign or threatening member o f the international system.
The focus on the use of force also directs us to international norms related to the use of force as the baseline forjudging acts and actors. Sociological arguments about normative behavior suggest unjustified norm violations create a sense of anti social unpredictability that makes Others uncomfortable and feel threatened. By focusing on use-of-force norms and actions, I try to maximize the odds that this is the case for the null hypothesis of the structural normative perspective. Violations that are less drastic in kind may not necessarily generate much fear or contempt—in some instances, counter-normative behavior can be quirky or endearing, such as
Switzerland’s refusal to join the UN. Violation of use-of-force norms, however, would seemingly not be a thing to be taken lightly, increasing the odds that such actions will be consequential if the sociological perspective has merit. As Tucker and
Hendrickson put it, ‘*the eternal need to justify action is perhaps never more apparent than when nations resort to force.”'^ If international norms have the power to direct states’ conceptions of right and wrong, constrain their behavior and constitute their very identities, then they should be the baseline ofjudgments about the nature of
Scott and Lyman 1968; TedescU and Reiss 1981:5; Edgerton 1985.
Tucker and Hendrickson 1992:132. mterventions and the interveners. This argument about the power of norms is developed and critiqued in Chapter 2.
While I agree that norms serve an important basis for the evaluation of international behavior, a function often ignored in rationalist signaling theory, I take the position that such many norms and acts taken in their name are sufBciently ambiguous as to allow for variation in how they are understood. As I have stated elsewhere, oftentimes “norms are what states make of them.”^'^ Kier and Mercer agree tiiat military interventions are “full of ambiguities and uncertainties,” and that
“states commonly disagree over the nature of military interventions."^^ Vertzberger states that international norms “have made foreign military mtervention morally and legally difficult to Justify in some mstances but easier to justify in others.”'^ Scholars note that ambiguity and indeterminate normative standards make it harder to know what is expected and easier to justify non-compliance. To the extent that norms and situations have such elasticity and malleability, it becomes difficult to presume the uniformity of perceptions across actors typ^ing much rationalist and constructivist literature on meaningful action.
Consider those who argue there is a trend in 6vor of a more permissive attitude toward intervention “in cases where universal values are threatened and
Shannon 2000.
Kier and Mercer 1996:98-99.
Vertzberger 1998:152-53.
Brümayer 1989; Franck 1990:52-53.
10 members o f the international community reach a consensus on the need for intervention.”'^ What exactly is a “universal value,” and what constitutes
‘international consensus,” are important questions often taken for granted in the literature on norms of intervention. Intervention for ‘iiuman rights” or
“democracy” may or may not be considered universal values, and “international consensus” may or may not even include ail the permanent members o f the UN
Security Council, let alone aU members. To the extent that intervention occurs in the
name of universal values, it may elicit support or opposition based on the norms
themselves or on the procedure by which the intervention was approved. Some may
not agree with the “umversaT norm or in the belief that such a norm is worth the
forcible intervention into the domestic a&irs of another state. Some may not agree
that such action can take place unilaterally but must gamer UN approval, while still
others see the UN as a rubber stamp for the US and the West. Such foctors cannot be
assumed; rather, the nature of the act—the normative content and procedure—must
be considered in interaction with the perceptual lenses of observer states.
These provocations about the interplay of systemic norms and agent identity
are central to try approach to the problem of interpreting intervention, and so I turn
now to an introduction to nqr ^proach.
Lyons and Vhistanduno 1993 (enq)hasis mine).
Reed and Kaysen 1993; Barkin and Cronm 1994; Cronin 1998.
II 1.2.2 The Approach ofThis Study
To get at this problem of interpreting norms and normative behavior, I advance an interactionist perspective rooted m social psychology that focuses on state leaders pursuing interests, processing information and making decisions ‘In an environment structured by social and organizational systems to which one belongs."^"
I Snd reintroducing agency to be critical for understanding state behavior with regard to international norms, and it is too often overlooked in fovor of more parsimonious systemic, structural approaches.^' Domestic identity and politics is rarely treated seriously, nor theorized extensively, relative to the role of the international distribution o f capabilities^ or global norms and culture.^ Yet why should international foctors be so privileged? As Krasner has noted in his critique of systemic normative arguments.
The international system is one of the most complex and weakly institutionalized. It lacks authoritative hierarchies. Rulers are likely to be more responsive to domestic material and ideational mcentives than international ones. Norms are sometimes mutually inconsistent. Power is asymmetrical No rule or set of rules can cover all circumstances. Logics of consequences can be compelling. Organized hypocrisy is the norm.^*
“ Tetlock 1992:336.
Checkel 1998, 1999.
“ Waltz 1979.
^ Finnemore 1996a, Katzenstein 1996a.
Krasner 1999:42.
12 Likewise, Bruce Andrews comments that, while the international environment’s rules ‘*are more ad hoc, fragile, transient, and pragmatic,” domestic society can be said "to provide the interests and values to which the international considerations are geared.”^ As with Krasner, I take an actor-oriented approach that takes political rulers of states as the basis for theorizing action and assumes such leaders want to remam in ofSce and “promote the security, prosperity and values of their supporters.”^* This does not mean, however, that 1 am following Krasner’s rationalist, utilitarian approach to norms. From an interactionist perspective, I acknowledge the importance of social structure as a constraining force and for providing a baseline for judgment in international relations. But within these social webs of significance is often much room for maneuver, ambiguity and interpretation.
The approach I take assumes that the “connection between environment and decision is...mediated by subjective perceptual representation” and that the construction of the environment is in the decision-maker’s mind.”^^ Under such a fi-amework, great significance is given to the phenomenological world of subjective and mtersubjective realities. Taking a phenomenological approach, long a staple m decision-makmg and foreign policy studies,^' I place the analytical premium on how these political rulers understand tbefr world, not how analysts impute that they do.
^ Andrews 1975:535.
“ Krasner 1999:43.
Vertzberger 1990:35.
^ Sprout and Sprout 1956; Sender, Bruck and Sapin 1962.
13 Given the nature of my inquiry, which is to unearth leaders’ understandings of seK other, and interventions, a large-N study is beyond the practical reach of this study.
Instead, I offer a small-N study o fte a l world” case studies which, precluding random selection, are chosen to highlight my key theoretical arguments, control for other explanatory variables, and allow comparison to rival theoretical expectations.
1.2.3 Universal or Unique? A “Third Way” to Approaching Actors
Given my focus on agency, it is hard to avoid entering the disciplinary debate about the nature of theory and the actors that theorks purport to explain. Stoked by the provocations of Robert Bates, the rational choice gauntlet thrown suggested that
“area studies” and cultural perspectives either did not belong in the enterprise of social science or, if anything, played a subservient role to the “real” science of rational choice.^ One major divide, in simplified terms, is between those seekmg
universal generalizations about actors (rational choice) and those stressing the
uniqueness of actors and their perspectives (area studies). The former see all
political actors as essentially the same, reasoning and choosing optimal courses of
action based on ranked preferences and judgment about the costs and benefits of
alternative courses of action.^" The latter are more dubious about the prospect of
Bates 1996,1997.
Riker 1990.
14 coveri% laws and generaiizability of such simplified models of reality/^ Deeper understandings of actors’ uniqueness yield insights into things such as the origins of preferences (treated exogenously by rational choice) and thus differences in behavior.
A rational-choice approach to politics claims to offer an explicit display of logic and assumptions, rigorous “scientific” testing of evidence, and generalizable theory and results owmg to the universality of the model It is universal in that it reduces politics and the political animal to that of a unitary rational actor motivated by preferences either imputed by the scholar, tautologically derived fi’om outcomes, or exogenously given. Importantly, actors are argued to behave generally the same way, given such preferences, across cultures or situations with similar structure.
Manipulating games or utiles produce generalizable patterns o f change in outcomes.
Rational choice calls itself scientific because it, like science, seeks “to identify lawful regularities.’"^ In so doing, game theoretic and other rationalist models make assunq)tions about the like nature of actors. In mtemational relations theory, the notion of states as “like units” gained special prominence with Kenneth Waltz’s
Theory o f International Politics. Part of Waltz’s simplifying assunq>tions in forging a structural theory was the idea that all states were similar m fimction and purpose when confionting the international system. For Waltz, power is the only relevant
Johnson 1997; Lustick 1997.
Bates 1997:166.
15 difference among states, not domestic attributes of culture or regime type.^^
Statesmen are assumed to calculate security interests rationally within the con&ies of international structure, regardless of culture or regime. Even interests and motivation are reduced to a base level of security seeking in Waltz’s neorealist formulation.^*^
This simplified view of rational actors has been critiqued foom many comers for many years, with many arguments focusing on the dangers o f tautology and the empirical triviality and discrepancies associated with much rationalist Iherature.^^
From the sociological perspective, a major critique has to do with the origms of preferences that rationalists impute or take for granted. Actor-specific social contexts and processes shape preferences, yet this is either flagrantly ignored or shakily accounted for.^* For the sociologically informed, however, culture, history, and ideas mfonn preferences and constrain or limits the options actors consider.^^ As Hudson and Sampson put it, rational choice and realpolitik ‘*cannot exclude options on the
Waltz (1979). This point is made (much more eloquently) in Waltz’s (1954) earlier work.
^ SchweOer (1996) critiques neorealism’s security-seeking bias; see Schweller (1994, 1998) for a réintroduction of revisionist and status-quo identifiers for states— revisith^ concepts of classical realists (Morgenthau 1978; Wolfers 1962). For a critique of this taxonomy, see Cottam (1977).
35 Simon 1985; Walt 1999; Monroe 1995,2001.
Those who try to account for “subjective expected utOhies,” such as Bueno de Mesquita (1981,1992), nonetheless measure this “subjective” utility with objective indicators, such as alliances, power, and proximity. I thank Richard Herrmann for this msight.
Monroe 1995:11. For different perspectives on this, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Sylvan and Voss 1998; Tettock 2000.
16 basis of cultural impossibility.”^* Sociological critiques also suggest that historico- cultural ‘Variables” help solve problems o f multiple equilibria (ie. when more than one “optimal” outcome can be rationally deduced).^^
This alternative perspective highlights the social nature o f actors, and the unique nature of their historical^ and culturally informed views. In the interpretivist tradition, the meaning of social action is derived from these particularistic vkwpomts.
Social action is understood within contexts of social meaning, contexts that are more or less spatially and temporally delimited.^ Clifford Geertz popularized this interpretivist approach with a call for “thick description”—the need to understand the perspective and meaning that actors hold about other actors and behaviors—to replace “thin description” that focuses only on behavior. Geertz suggests the correct route is for the observer to become deeply enmeshed in the cultural contexts of the actors to uncover the meaning o f actions as they see h. From these “webs of significance,” the analyst may ascertain the meanmg of behavior.
The criticism of thin description is simple and important; one either leams very little by only scratching the behavioral surâce, or risks learning the wrong lessons by inqjuth^ meaning casualty through academic fiat of assunqjtion. Either
38Hudson and Sampson 1999:669.
Rationalists have attempted to incorporate culture in such a fiishion (Kreps 1990; Goldstein and Keohane 1993), but often m ad hoc ways (Blyth 1997; Walt 1999), leading to the continual critkpie that most “action” and explanation reside in things outside the rational model (Shnon 1985).
4 0 Geertz 1973; Welch 1993.
17 way, knowledge building is being disserved. Interpretivism is a way to gain insight into the meaning behind behavior by going to the source. The assumption is that behavior is culturally bound and thus the context of action must be understood. Only by seeing things as the actors do can you learn why they act and respond as they do.
'T^ormal science” cringes at such idiosyncrasy, for without generalizable Gndings and patterns of inference, what is the pomt of knowledge? Without applying what has been learned laterally (beyond the setting and set of actors) nor longitudinally
(beyond the time of the observation), all one is left with is a string of spatio- temporally bound isolated anecdotes of non-cumulative idiographic cultural cases.
The two approaches discussed above can be summarized as “universalism” and “particularism.”^' Universalism is aimed at uncovering universal practices or beliefo studied across culture, focusing on the “psychic unity” o f humankind and demonstrating universality despite surfoce differences. Particularism tends to focus on unique aspects of culture, elucidating distinctive interrelations of meaning within a particular culture. The authors then offer a “third way”—namely the investigation of
“diverse cultural expressions of a universal practice...to understand cultural differences related to...how the universal is expressed.”
In a world where the universals of rationality, self-interest and perception meet the particulars of national idiom, I suggest taking the “third way” less taken.
Such an approach examines how universal qualities and processes are contextually
41 Fiske et aL 1998:945.
18 and diflferently enacted in international interactions, from perceiving acts to inferring intent from those acts. That there are commonalities all humans share, as well as cultural specificities that distinguish some from others, is not controversial But the debate over such trivialities prevents the important question from being asked: when do these universal or particular aspects o fpolitical actors matterl As is the case with a choke o f methods, the answer to this question should be considered in the context of the relevant research puzzle.
I seek to avoid the perils of rationalist approaches that “assume interests to be transparent and universal”^^ and that all states are essentially the same vis-à-vis the international system. As with “culturalists” and other phenomeno logically based perspectives such as psychology, I “assume interests to be located in individuals in contexts only knowable through empfrical analysis.Therefore, 1 start with the assumption of difference, if not uniqueness, among actors and their perspectives.
I qualify this argument o f particularism, however. While cultural and historical forces differ from actor to actor, whether they differ substantially enough to be called “unique” is an empirical question. It may be that very similar cultures and histories create similar perspectives when confronted with events, as I argue below. I also qualify the particularistic account because I argue some psychological processes to be universal and applicable to the puzzle of interpreting interventions. The two
bases of generaiizability I propose are identity —defined in this study as a national
Ross 2000:40.
Ross 2000.
19 elite’s seif'im^e—and image —defined in this study as a national elites mental picture of another state.^ States with different identities but with the same positive or negative images of the United States may respond similarly based on those images.
Thus I follow others who stress the need for actor understandings as provided by area studies while seeking some level o f generalization, however proscribed, in the
positivist tradition.*^ In this study, generaiizability occurs across states with similar
identities, across states with similar images, and within states across time.^ The
theoretical question drives the study and the issue of generaiizability; do countries
perceive actions in patterned ways according to theoretical expectations across cases?
To answer this question, I must develop the theoretical fi’amework on which to base
the empirical cases, all o f which occurs in the following chapters.
More broadly I seek to help effect a "paradigm shift” m the discipline called
for by those long familiar with the power of social and psychological variables.^^ In
taking a phenomenological perspective, I concentrate on how actors understand the
world, not how the analyst assumes they do or should. Despite this orientation, I
remam m a positivist fiiamework to the extent that I "test” how countries respond to
real actions, and to the extent that I offer a general theory regarding states’
** See chapter 2 for theoretical elaborations of identity and image; see chapter 3 for operationalization o f these two master variables.
See as an example, Christensen 1996.
^ Akin to “single-country” theories; see Rosenau 1987; Brecher 1975.
The call for a "paradigm shift” comes ftom Monroe 2001.
20 differences in perspective. None of this is new for those steeped in social theory or political psychology. What is new, I hope, is a synthesized and fresh rendering of the forces that shape how states perceive military interventions that can inform broad debates in international relations theory and policy circles alike.
1.3 Significance
The study of how interventions are perceived by Others in the international system is important for a variety of reasons. This dissertation answers the call put forth by APSA President Robert Keohane in his presidential address to develop an understanding of the relationship of beliefr and values with rational strategic action.'*^
But I dispute Keohane’s contention that *\mtil recently, students of mtemational politics paid too little attention to beliefr.” His words are true only if one ignores the noajor contributions of political psychology from Ken Boulding to Robert Jervis to a variety of studies revealing the import o f images, beliefr, schema, heuristics, analogies and other cognitive devices in the decision-making process.'*^ It is true, but not new, that '^understanding historical and cultural context is critical” to analyses of strategic interaction, dependent as they are on the expectations of actors.^ It is my
■** Keohane 2001:7.
Boulding 1956; Jervis 1976; Khong 1992. See extensive reviews by Rosati 2000 and Vertzberger 1990.
Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995.
21 contention that these historicaUy/cuituraDy infonned expectations not only vary significantly between actor and target but also among observers of the actor.
Theoretically, the variation in interpretations and inferences is often overlooked, and its consequences have been under-theorized in the literature to date.
The following challenges social theories of international relations that cast norms at the systemic level Abstract norms serve as a filter forjudging actions, but ny study raises two cautionary notes. First, arguments that cast international norms at a global level imply that international society is one, without variation. I pose mstead what has already begun in “second-wave” constructivist research^ ‘—that the cultural match between particular countries and international norms may vary, and this variation can have implications for international relations. My introduction of state identities as
“insiders” or “outsiders” to the current Western-dominated system, provides a useful way to e?q)lore the consequences o f such variation for how the use of force is viewed when committed on behalf of “universal values.” It also offers nuance and substance to popular quips about the “West versus the rest,”^ while providing theoretically and empirically defensible bases for identity categorization different ftom the essentialized broad-brush assertions of a “clash of civilizations.”
A second caution regardmg the sociological perspective of norms regards the
power o f norms over state behavior that is assumed to be clear and consistent. There
is reason to doubt that norms are enacted in such a manner—even by states that share
" Checkel 1999; Gurowitz 1999a, 1999b; Cortell and Davis 1996,2000.
^ Huntington 1993a, 1996.
22 the norms in the abstract. Motivated and cognitive biases serve as interpretive gatekeepers for incoming data and for wfaetter and how norms are applied in concrete circumstances. Images of others constitute such perceptual lenses, mediating the interpretation of actions and actors in ways not considered at the sociological level
The “social actor model” I propose gives norms its place, however, and thus offers a view of signaling and judgment that adds a normative evaluative component.
The use o f force now can signal more than “resolve” or “toughness” or credibility, it can signal “morally correct” or “good” and “evfl” evaluations that states do make of others and that influence subsequent relations on that basis. In this way, I seek to show ideational fectors are important to mtematmnal politics in ways ignored by rationalists and different hom constructivists. The attention to identity is not meant to challenge the role of material interests but rather subsume and transcend it by showing that (I) acts have consequences for observers even in the absence of material interests, and (2) “interests” also have ideatwnal origins, defined in terms o f values associated with elite understandings about who “we” are and “what is appropriate.”
As political psychologists and constructivists have argued for years, then, belief and biases are not contrary to rational choice, they are complementary, providing the content of preferences and accountmg for behaviors that seem “irrationaT or sub- optimal when ignormg the role of biases and values in the decision calculus.
The arguments made here are not onty theoretically interesting but also policy-relevant. If it is true that “the pursuit o f establishing and sustaming
23 international legitimacy for intervention” is difiBcult/^ one may ask why the US or any other state should care about international legitimacy for wbat they do? Some complain in policy and opinion circles about the US—despite being the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era—insistmg on multilateralism for much of its security policy. Acting through, and on the specific consenting endorsement o f an international mstitutional body is seen as kowtowing to the UN and has been described as part of the impotence of omnipotence.^'^
I hope to ignite the belief that audience matters and that myopic behavior that ignores the broader repercussions of normatively suspect actions can have consequences. Actions such as the use of force, even in places fiir &om others and their interests, still leave an impression and thus need to be conceived in terms of the broader context of international politics. The resort to force purportedly on behalf of
‘hmiversal values” cannot be assumed to be viewed as benign by others, and in fact may threaten other states who view the action as dangerous precedent for what is yet to come against them. If there are negative consequences for counter-nonnative behaviors (eg. unjustified unilateral interventions), such as the creation o f a balancing coalition such as has been proposed by China, Russia and India in recent years, then caution and sensitivity may be needed as to how actions are perceived. Those with positive images of the US may not be easily turned by counter-normative behavior.
S3 As is argued by Vertzberger 1998:152-53.
^Charles Krauthammer, “President’s Foreign Polfcy Kowtows to UN and Others,” Columbus Dispatch, 6/15/98, p.7a; Daniel Johnson, “The Impotence of Omnipotence,” Washingfon Post National Weekly Edition, 11/30/98, p.21.
24 and normatively appropriate behavior may not win over those who already see the US as imperial or hegemonic, but there are many whose juries are still out, includmg
“objective” allies such as France. In these cases, if the reason for growing anti-
Americanism stems from US behavior, US policymakers iKed to know the consequences of their actions. Insensitivity about one’s image abroad can lead to unnecessary conflicts and problems of varying degrees o f significance. The benefits of such “crusades” must be weighed against these strategic consequences.
If the US has a concern about its position in the post-Cold War system, then knowing the dynamics behind the judgment o f its behavior is valuable. It is important for US power and its role in the world to understand the contours of persuasion and perception. Persuasion is based on several dimensions, beyond material capability.
Acquiescence to American primacy in world afi&irs is likely to be tied to legitimacy, that is, how others perceive its role and trust in its intentions to behave in appropriate
ways.^^ One thing this study does is alert the US against the tendency to think or
assume others share its views about its interventions and the justifications for them.
This may help limit the extent to which the US and other states pay an unnecessary
price for the unintended consequences of opposition and spawned resistance resulting
from “misunderstood” or differently understood interventions. The study also
clarifies what fectors are out of the control o f the signaler, what fectors are inherent to
the observer, and how the two mteract.
” Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990.
25 This study also speaks to the practical issue of how "international society” assesses norm violations and responds to them. To the extent that “an effective, consistent punishment mechanism” enhances norm compliance and helps socialize states into knowing what is “right and wrong,”^^ then erratic punishment can be said to hamper the growth of norms and compliance behavior. If normative and situational ambiguity, and the pre-existing biases, belief and interests of states, permit diffuse interpretations of an act as justified or not, international responses to violations are likely to be inconsistent and firaught with double standards, as some experimental survey research has shown.^^ Thus, examiningthe conditions under which acts are assessed and declared violations or justified behavior helps us understand the many paths to violation and loopholes in punishing such violations in a world without a central authority. I also can shed some insight into what behaviors lead to more or less clear assessments of violation, though—as I discuss m the conclusion—the leap from judgmg a violation to punishing it is at times a great one.
1.4 Plan of the Dissertation
The dissertation proceeds with a theoretical elaboration of the basis for how states to interpret interventions and judge interveners. Chapter 2 develops the theoretical debate, and offers a theory of ethnocentric inference that suggests the
Andrews 1975:528; Axelrod 1986; Nadelman 1990:481; Goertz and Diehl 1992:636-40.
26 importance of state identity and images of the Other in filtering international interventions, especially those undertaken in normatively ambiguous circumstances.
Chapter 3 details the methodological basis for establisbii% both independent and dependent variables, then presents the ‘identity profiles” of the observer countries related to this study. Chapters 4-6 present case studies exploring the construction of
US interventions by various Others, focusing on the three key features of identity theorized in Chapter 2 to influence interpretations and judgment.
Chapter 4 begms the empnfeal study with an analysis of perceptions of interventions within the context of general norms about the use of force. I argue below that multilateral interventions, defined as UN-authorized, produce more homogeneous responses than unauthorized unilateral actions, with the former less normatively contested and the latter more suspect and susceptible to variable interpretations. Comparing such cases permits us to see the role of norms and identity in different surroundings to see if the predicted patterns of mterpretation and judgment hold. By focusing on interventions agamst Iraq in 1991 and 1998, as well as the 1998 unilateral attacks against A%hanistan and Sudan, we also control for regional variation as a mitigatii% fector.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis o f identity and image to cases o f “liberal interventions,” where the norms of justification in question relate to human rights or democracy promotion. The focus on insider and outsider identity in this chapter pertains to a sensitivity to interventions justified on behalf of liberal Western
^ Herrmann and Shannon 2001.
27 conceptions of normative correctness, especially when done so unilaterally by
Western, powerful states. The cases o f “human rights” interventions m Bosnia and
Kosovo, and “democracy promotion” in Panama and Haiti illustrate these dynamics.
Chapter 6 turns attention to another aspect of identity that mediates perceptions of actions as right or wrong: the identity affiliation one has with targets or victims in an intervention situation. If those who are perceived as part of an identity
(in-group) are aided by the intervention, perceptions of the intervention are biased in
&vorabie ways. If the identity affiliate instead is the target o f mtervention, this biases interpretations in a negative &sbion. Controlling for observer as well as bnage of the intervener, I examme Egypt’s responses to the interventions m Kosovo and Bosnia, where Muslims are aided by US action, and to the 1998 interventions against Iraq,
Afghanistan and Sudan, where Musinns were the target of interventions.
Throughout these chapters, I also trace the effects of observers’ pre-existing
nnages o f the mtervening state on evaluations. To the extent that one has an image of
the intervener, the observing state should judge the intervener in a 6shion consistent
with these pre-conceived belief. Given a positive image, regardless o f “objective
normative conditions,” a violation may be seen as justified or appropriate, and the
violator is not judged harshly. The converse would be true with a negative image.
Chapter 7 concludes the study with an analysis o f the cases in whole. I discuss
the implications o f this study for mtemational relations theory as well as for US
foreign policy, specifically its desire to retain a position of primacy in the unipolar
post-Cold war world.
28 CHAPTER 2
A THEORY OF ETHNOCENTRIC INFERENCE
2.1 Overview
In this chapter I offer a theory o f ethnocentric inference, arguing that norm-
laden actions interact with pre-existing ideational baggage of actors to form
understandings o f behavior and judgments about actors.Interpretations of
interventions, and inferences about interveners, are influenced by the interaction of
observer state identity with the normative nature of the intervention. Mediating this
process are the presence of positive or negative images of the intervener, as well as
the occasional presence of identity collates —those whom the observer state includes
as part o f “us” in its identity. These three components, identity, image, and identity
affiliate, are exammed below for their roles in the interpretation and judgment of
mterventions.
I start by outlining the basis for interpreting acts and mfèrring intent in social
interaction, revwwing and critiquing conventional approaches to signals and
perceptions. From this review I make the case for ideas and agency, leadii^ to an
interactionist “social actor model” of state judgment that focuses on the nature of the
29 act (multilateral or unilateral) and state leaders in interaction with their domestic and international normative environments. I develop the theory o f ethnocentric oiference, embedded in assumptions and theory drawn from social psychology and unit-level, actor-oriented constructivism.
2.2 Prevailing Approaches
Following many others, I understand prevailing theory according to then
placement along two metatheoretical axes: agent-structure, and material-ideational.^^
With regard to signaling and perceptions thereof different theories suggest different
responses to the two questions at hand: (1) how do states interpret others actions, and
(2) how do states judge other actors? With regard to the first question, materialist and
rationalist theories, structural or otherwise, do not theorize agent differences but posit
a billiard-ball approach whereby agents are &irty adept at reading their environments.
Realist theory and game theory concede that uncertainty in the environment exist, but
it usually appifes to the underlying motives, credibility, or "type" o f state one is
dealing with, not the interpretation of their actions per se. Neo liberal institutions are
a variant of this, structuring agent interactions in order to bring clarity and overcome
uncertainty so to accomplish optimal goals. As forjudging such actions, it is
expected that exogenous^ defined, materially driven economic and security mterests
are the arbiters of evaluating an act and actor as good or bad.
Hollis and Smith 1990; Adler 1997; Desch 1998; Wendt 1999.
30 On the ideational side, constructivists and systemic ideational theories answer the question of interpretation by positing systemic norms and culture that provide meanii% to actions and clarity the uncertain environment. This can range from ideas and institutions that provide *%cal points” to resolve problems of multiple equilibria,^^ to intersubjective social structures that provide meaning to actors about their environments.^ With regard to judging actors, the link between norms and legitimate action or “social purpose” means that normative behavior begets positive evaluations, while counter-normative behavior begets negative evaluations.^'
Agent-based ideational theories, derived from political psychology and agent- based social theory, approach the assumption of rational information processing from the standpoint of cognitive limits and the mediating, biasing effects ofbeliefr and perceptions on the interpretive process. The interpretation o f acts involves the biases and beliefr engendered in a particular agent. Unlike the structural ideational counterpart, this predicts differences based on agent differences. With regard to judgment, the evaluation of actors from an agent-based standpoint is subject to the same pre-existi% ideas, identities, and hnages agents have, including whether the act threatens or bolsters one’s identity or in-group, and whether one views the actor positively or negatively in the first place. I now critique these approaches, arguing
Goldstein and Keohane 1993.
^ Adler 1997; Katzenstein 1996a; Wendt 1999.
** Ruggie 1983.
31 for the last of them, with attention to our two mam questions: (1) How do states interpret the actions o f others?, and (2) How do states Judge those who take actions?
2.2.1 Rationalist Approaches
Rationalist theories are optimistic in the ability o f behavior to convey similar meaning to all actors, homogenizing the latter under the assumption o f like units. For rationalist approaches to strategic signals, the emphasis is on how states try to affect the images others have o f them. For example, a Great Power may use force in non- strategic areas to signal resolve and make observers believe the country to be credible about its commitments and willingness to use force. From this perspective, the
ôn%es or reputation a state obtains in the eyes o f others are a product o f “informative behavior, those actions believed by the perceiver to tap dimensions and characteristics that necessarily predict an actor’s future befaavior.^^ In an attempt to manipulate others’ perceptions, an actor projects a desired bnage to affect relations with states in his/her fovor. The “meaning” o f signals is said to derive from the common understanding shared between perceiver and perceived. Deterrence attempts, for example, requires both sides understanding the message the same way—a common lai^uage (at the “semantic level”) that precedes consideration of whether that message should be believed.
62 Jervis 1970*26.
32 A problem arises out of this approach, related particularly to the assumption that behavior is understood the same across observers in the international audience.
Basically, there is no theory accounting for signal foihire or for variation in how the same action is perceived.^^ Most rationalist signaling theories do not explore possibilities and consequences of variation in perceivers in understanding
“informative behavior.” These approaches assume everyone knows what the message
is being conveyed. The only question is whether to believe that message, given the
possibilities of deception.^ Signaling studies recognize uncertainty and try to solve
for it by highlighting the need for certain types of credible signals that convince an
audience that only a state of this “type” would do such a thing.^^ But these too
sidestep the variation in audience perceptions that could lead to different
interpretations of the act.
A variant of rationalist theory that deals explicitly with the problem of
uncertainty is neo-liberal institutionalism. Responding to neo-realist presumptions
that uncertainty forces states to assume the worst about others’ intentions in an
anarchic world, theorists m this vein point optimistical^ to institutions to overcome
the problem. Neo-liberals are “new” in that they take the liberal assumptions of
ratfonal pursuit o f absolute gains and match them with institutions that focflhate that
“ Vertzberger 1990; Mercer 1996.
^ Fearon 1995.
“ Nalebuff 1991; Wagner 1992; Fearon 1994,1997.
33 pursuit, overcoming the uncertainty and other unpleasantries of anarchy.^
Institutions provide information and transparency, in that the dialogue and long-term nature of interaction implied within them Êicilitates clear expressions o f intentioiL
Thus, whatever uncertainty existed in m essies is reduced by the talk and trust built m mstitutions. The norms, rules, and ideas of neo-liberal regimes and institutions are hmctional, economizing devices: providing “road maps” and “focal points” to help rational actors reach their “equilibrium.”^^ Multilateralism is the golden prescription to ensure that everyone’s “on the same page” about state intentions. We get to see below if the institutional route of UN approval has such an effect on interpretations.
The same theories described above for interpreting acts do not readily translate into theories about judging actors. The clarity of interpreting an act says nothing for rationalists about the subsequent evaluation of it and the actor. The only aspect of judgment derived from the rationalist literature is the assumption that actions speak to the character of the actor. As Mercer puts it, “Because everyone has perfect observability and interprets behavior similarly, only one reputation will form.”^ According to these models, observers treat behavior as a signal that reveals an actor’s “type”. This imposed inference that analysts assume of observii% states is problematic theoretically and empirically. I seek to show that states see different
things out of the same act and, according^, they judge the actor different^ as weD.
“ Keohane 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1993; WaUander 1999.
Blyth 1997:240-41; Kreps 1990; Goldstem and Keohane 1993.
“ Mercer 1996:34.
34 Beyond the objectivist character judgments in rationalist models, the judgment of actors for other approaches emerges from an act’s relation to one’s materially derived interests. The primacy of security and economic interests dominates realist and neo-liberal theories alike, and it is commonplace to assume that “interests” serve as the baseline for whether an actor is seen as bad or a threat, or good. Structural realism or neorealism posits that strong incentives from the nature of the international system—anarchy and the distribution of power—pressure states to conform to certain dictum, such as to balance against the powerful, in order to survive. For neo-realists, then, threat inheres in power,suggesting that the US and its disproportionate power make all states fearful of its potential to dommate. Neo-realism does not, nor does it claim to, speak to evaluations of specific acts; nonetheless, neo-realism homogenizes actors into “like units” pursuing the same goals of survival in anarchy.
Other realist theories recognize the limits o f this broad-tnush approach, and give credence to other fectors than the distnbutfon o f power. Walt’s modified neo realist theory stresses material fectors like capabilities and geography, but his notion of aggressive intentions is the “driving force” to perceptions of threat and subsequent balancing behavior.^^ Yet there is a question as to whether aggressive intentions are objective or subjective. Walt himself refers to perceptions o f mtent and how states
Waltz 1993; Layne 1993.
Schweller 1996.
Walt 1987; Goldgeier 1997:152.
35 “that are viewed as aggressive are likety to provoke others to balance against them.”^
In this sense he agrees that behavior influences inq>ressions o f intent, and prescribes that “policies that convey restraint and benevolence are best. Strong states...must take particular care to avoid appearing aggressive.”^ Left unexplained, however, is the source o f these perceptions or a discussion o f political psychology that necessarily underlies agent perceptions.
SchweOer presents an agent-oriented realism based on states identified as
“status-quo” or “revisionist” in nature.^'* This distinction is a progressive step in accounting for state differences in perceptions because there is a different baseline perspective for states as satisfied or dissatisfied with the international system. But this too is currently limited by its operationalization criteria and the limited nature of these identities as the basis o f perceptions. Just how to identify a revisionist or satisfied power has not been articulated with clarity. Given the difSculty of identifying such actors, they become problematic bases forjudging actions and actors. Do revisionists have a common perception o f acts and, if so, what is this perception? Can status-quo states find an act inappropriate even if it does not threaten the status quo?
The questions raised with these perspectives, and those arguing for the primacy o f security or economic interests or other objective material consideratk>ns,
^ Walt 1987:25.
^ Walt 1987:27.
Schwefler 1994, 1998.
36 indicate not that these views are “wrong” but merely highly contingent, indeterminate, and limiting. I offer a theory that may provide content to what it is to be a “satisfied” or “dissatisfied” power based on one’s view of the norms of the system and the use of force on their behalf. A state’s identity as an “insider” or
“outsider” o f the international system wiH shape the perception a state has of norms and interventions carried out in their name.
Neo-liberals are driven by the same pursuit of material interests, but add an element to judgment extending from the feith in mstitutioos to generate transparency.
Namely, by working through institutions and rules, states not only clarify what they are doing but their underlying intentions, calming others’ fears about motivatmn.^^
Working through “binding”mstitutions also limits the “returns to power,” signaling that a state is willing to act within predktable parameters rather than exploit and dominate for advantage.^^ Judgments o f institutionally derived action, then, should be more benign, whereas judgments of those taken outside an institutional framework make no such claim.^ This becomes a testable proposition below, investigating
interventk>ns taken outside UN auspices and comparing responses with those authorized by the international body.
Wallander 1999.
Ikenberry 1998,1998/99,2001; Kupchan 1998.
^ Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990.
37 2.2.2 Ideational Approaches
A theoretical orientation that critiques rationalist theories for their asocial nature is what I refer to as the systemrconstructivist approach. A collection of scholarship mchiding constructivists,^ “English schooF^ and “world sockty” theorists,'*^ these structural-ideational approaches highlight shared meanings among states and the homogenizing nature of social structures in international relatfons.
Hedley Bull, for instance, describes the current international system as:
A socKty of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one
another, and share in the working of common mstitutions."*'
This intematfonal society contains rules and norms both created by states and subsequently defining and constraining those states. Underlying the international law, regimes, and norms prohibitmg and prescribing a variety of international behavior is “a universal international society” grounded in the gradual homogenization and globalization o f norms developed mitially among the European
Wendt 1999; Hall 1999.
^ Bull 1977; Bull and Watson 1984.
“ M ^er 1999; Meyer et aL 1997.
" Bun 1977:12.
38 states.”" Focusing on the sociological perspective, the meaning of reality is argued to derive from collective understandings or socidfacts}^ Norms not only
(reconstitute mterests and define "a range of legitimate policy options,”^ they also serve as the basis for understanding (and judging) the actions of others.
Wendt’s Socid Theory o f IrUematioml Politics, a sweeping theory about how the normative social structure shapes states and thefr interaction, illustrates the presumed homogenizing role of systemic culture on the interpretations and klentities of actors. Opposed to Waltz’s notion of a single, timeless anarchy, Wendt suggests three “cultures of anarchy” with thefr own logics that represent different “shared understandings of violence” Structuring state interactions." Wendt’s insight that anarchy does not lend to some single universal logic is a valuable one," but by replacing one anarchy with three Wendt replicates the flaw o f assuming systemic norms and ^entities are universal^ applied to agents. Constructivists are supposed to leave identity as “an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context. ”*^ Wendt, while having solved one aspect o f identity—that o f presumed unchanging nature—has retamed the other problem of identity—that of
" Nadelman 1990:483; Wight 1966:89-131.
" Seark 1995; Adler 1997; Wendt 1999.
" Klotz 1995:461-62; Finnemore 1996b: 158.
"W endt 1999.
“ Wendt 1992, 1999.
"H o p f 1998:175.
39 homogenization. Theorizing three cultures producing three state identities, he presumes all states have that theorized identity within the spatio-temporal context^
Wendt’s anarchies are just as homogenizing as Waltz’s. This is little improvement as it ignores the different bases of identity not onty across states but also within them, and reflects the weaknesses of structural biases in the sociological perspective.
These systenMonstructivist approaches can appear as optimistic as rationalist counterparts in the ability of actors to see the “reality” of a situation (in this case, the
“socmi fects” speak for themselves). They look at global social structures in terms of commonality and homogenization. The assunq)tion that the “system structure” conveys a meaning that all understand is problematic. Such broad-brushed approaches meant to explain sweeping patterns of behavior also miss the frequent and important deviations from systemic expectations. To assume that (social) facts speak for themselves is to commit the same Third-Image sin for which neo-realism has been criticized.*’ The emphasis on “social focts” rather than material brute focts does not ameliorate the problem of optimism m inferring the meaning of acts and intentions of actors. “To argue that the international environment determines a state’s behavior,”
Jervis reminds us, “is to assert that aU states react similarly to the same
” Wendt 1999. See also Hall (1999) for a systemic homogenizing argument
*’ For a variety of critiques of neo-realism’s presumptfon that threat inheres in power alone, Walt (1987); Wendt (1992) tumselfr SchweQer (1996).
40 objective external situation.”^ Actors are different as well as similar. There is no reason a priori to expect the same understandings to span all actors m such a diffese system, with actors grounded in particular normative, cultural, historically contingent contexts. If nothing else, this is an empirical question to be investigated and theorized, not casually asserted.
Regarding the judgment of actors, constriKtivism at the system level argues that these judgments are related to the normative nature of an act. Centering on the role of norms, or shared expectations about the appropriate behavior of actors withm a society,^' constructivists argue that the relation of actions to these expectations determmes the judgment. Actors working within normative parameters are likely to be judged positively; in contrast, countemormative behavior should create a “gap between actions and expectations,” resulting in a relationship disequilibrium with one’s peers.^ Violations lead others to make dispositional attributions about the vwlator, m essence viewing behavwr as an indicator of “what kind of person” the offender is.” As one study explains, “unexpected, untoward acts are regarded as disruptions of social order because they make conduct unpredictable and offenders
Jervis 1976:18.
Katzenstein 1996a:5.
” Scott and Lvman 1968:46-52.
” Backman 1985:264.
41 untrustwortl^.”^ Behavior, then, affects how observers infer the intentions and identity of an actor.
From this perspective, judgment relates to the legitimacy and social purpose of action. Power is not a threat mherently, but is a threat when coupled with norm violations. Legitimate acts, normative^ correct, beget positive social evaluations; norm vmlations connote a daunting of social expectations, and beget negative evaluations. In terms ofjudging interventions, this translates into the use of force being circumscribed by international rules and norms. Cronin speaks of “collective security regimes” built upon normative frameworks that define just and unjust behavfor.’^ Abbott and Snidal, and Claude before them, point to the UN as a
“community representative” that enhances the legitimacy of state actions.^
Fmnemore argues that interventions, includmg humanitarian, must be UN sanctioned and multilateral to be legitimate.^ These arguments derive from the Habermasian idea that “if decisions are legitimate they must be recognized as the fidfiUment of recognized norms.”^* As with rationalist models, dispositional inferences seem to be made based on the actor’s behavfor.
^ Massey et all997-238.
” Cronin 1998.
^ Abbott and Snidal 1998; Claude 1966,1969.
^ Finnemore 1996b.
Habermas 1975:101.
42 I accept and incorporate this social aspect of judgment, in that norm conformity and violation is one basis forjudging an act to be acceptable or threatening.^ But it must be qualified with the same critique given rationalism about the clarity of acts; how do we know what is a legitimate, norm-following act? Why assume all see it the same? And how can we expect observers to be able to assess mtentfons with the same clarity and uniformity? System-level constructivism suffers fi'om the inconsistency o f claiming states can know others’ “true” motives while at once acknowledging that behavior “must be interpreted.”’*^
Risse and others challenge the structural nature of sociological constructivism, suggestmg that normative social interaction is not a clear process but often a conscious, contested process in which “actors have to figure out the situation in which
they act, apply the appropriate norm, or choose among confiictmg rules.”’*" These
communications-based scholars suggest that the process of figuring out “what does
‘good’ mean in this situation” and “what is the right thmg to do” is resolved through
Habermasian truth-seeking and argumg among states.’*’^ Persuasion o f others about
the meaning and rightness of an act is occurs through framing—connecting the act to
normative ideas that resonate with the audience. ’*’^ These justificatory devices
” Jervis 1985:14-15; Cohen 1979.
’*” Wendt 1999:330; Copeland 2000.
’*" Risse 2000:5; March and Olsen 1989,1998.
’*“ Risse 2000:6; Kratochwfl 1989.
’*^^ Payne 2001:38-39; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.
43 “provide a singular interpretation of a particular situation and then indicate appropriate behavior for that context.”'*^ Such a process is purported to occur in order to achieve a “communicative consensus” about the understandii% of a situation and relevant norms.
The process now sounds like one of inqrression management. Lauer and
Handel explain that:
By our appearance we indicate to others the line o f action we intend to pursue and the kind of person we are ...important in their determination of how we should be treated. To be treated m the ways we would like... we must appear to be the kind of person who deserves such treatment.'*^
Persuasion, some suggest, “must tqipeal to norms, principles, and values that are shared by partkipants.”"’^ The function of self-presentation is to create definitions of situations, or interpretations, that the audience will believe and mcorporate as true.
This new turn has value in challenging the problematic nature of constructivism’s presumed normative clarity and resulting inferences about actors, but it is not without problems. Leaving aside whether argumentative rationality occurs in the real world, there is the enduring unanswered question, when a state tries to sustain or achieve a positive identity in the eyes of relevant audiences,as to
Payne 2001:39.
Goffinan 1959,1967; Jervis 1970; Tedeschi 1981.
Lauer and Handel 1977:107.
Hinich 1994; Keohane 2001:10.
‘“ Risse 2000:9.
44 when this ingression management is successfiil. Who believes the accounts offered to justify “untoward” behavior/®® and when? To these questions, constructivism modeled on speech act theory, social structure, or symbolic interactk>nism has little in the way of answers/
2.2.3 The Social Actor Model: The Case for Agency and Ideas
Both rationalist and system constructivist approaches, then, suffer from flaws related to the presumed clarity and uniformity of inference Others make about one’s actfons. Jervis chastises rationalists and “the psychological naivete of signaling theories” for assuming that “judgments o f specific bits of evidence are independent of expectations.” Rather, be continues, “the way signals and mdices will be read are determined by the perceivers’ needs, theories and expectations.”^ “ That is, one’s pre existing beliefr, normative values and motivated biases filter the mterpretation of signals and can produce important differences. Likewise for constructivists, Rosow critiques the international society perspective for its “implication of closure and
'®® Tedeschi and Riess 1981:5; Scott and Lyman 1968.
Payne (2001:40-45) points out that “framing processes” are tughfy contested, with distortions and mi«8fa»aHmg claims kavmg audiences divided about the claims of a framing attempt. But be does not offer much to explain which audiences see things different ways, nor when and wly. Risse (2000) offers one msight from social psychology, that the view of a communicator as unbiased increases the persuasiveness o f an argument during communication (see Chaikenet aL 1996). This hints at an important issue to which 1 return below in nty discussfon of images.
Ill Jervis 2001.
45 universality" that “suggests the image of a unified space,” an assumption that “elides the fiagmentation, diversity and pluralism o f social identity that we find in global political space.”*A gents are not “structural idiots” but rather “bear identities, rights and obligations” in their own consciousness.**^ Finnemore admits to “tensions and contradictions among norms leave room for difference...likely to reflect the local norms and customs with which mtemational norms have to compromise.”' *'* Barnett accepts that “actors are not simply the bearers of social roles and enactors of social norms; they also are artful and active interpreters of them.”**^ To relegate agents to epiphenomena of “social structures” or “linguistic, historically contmgent webs of discourse,” is equivalent to neo-realist neglect o f unit-level variables.* *^ Yet how can states interpret systemic norms differently when analysis presumes systemically socialized agents? There needs to be room for agency, which systemic constructivists has not allowed.**^
Some constructivists leave the door to agent difference open, with the view that “alternative actors with alternative identities” can produce different “potential
**^ Rosow 1990:288.
**^ Cohen 1987:302; Adler 1997:325.
*** Finnemore 1996a:l36.
**^ Barnett 1998:27.
**^ Singer and Hudson 1992:259-61.
**’ Checkell998, 1999.
46 alternatives to... prevailingstructures.”*’* So too, then, can alternative actors perceive norms and actions differently. It is this area of constructivism, that which “surhices diversity,”"^ that provides tiuitfui insights into the puzzle of the variable interpretation of international acts. “Unit-Iever constructivism allows for shared understandings and historico-culturally informed senses of identity, only the dominant source of understandings comes from within the state. A new wave of constructivist research acknowledges that external constraints and ideas are filtered through domestic politics and structures.'^*
Because I believe “norms are what states make of them,” I suggest a focus on elites to understand how international social structure and interaction are understood.
It is here that political psychology can make a contribution, addressing constructivism’s “inability to specify the conditions under which different groups view different norms as applicable.”*^ 1 locate the politics of meaning where the individual meets ideas: the relatfonal, mteractionist level that fi>cuses on the person in the context of situation and structures not of his or her own making.*^ Both private
*** Hopf 1998:180.
**®Hopf 1998:180.
*^“ 1 have borrowed the term “unit-level constructivism” from Berger 1998.
*^* Finnemore I996a:143; Risse 1995; Checkel 1999; Gurowitz 1999a, 1999b; Cortell and Davis 1996,2000.
*^ Goldgekr and Tetlock 2001:86.
*“ Tetlock 1992.
47 beliefe and broader shared meanings combine to produce a powerful lens for interpreting the brute data of “reality.”
I propose what Andrews calls a “Social Actor Model” *^** with a baseline for evaluating action formed by the “norms and expectations” related to state identity.
From this agent-based perspective, we can establish the basis for agent constructions of situations. Andrews argues “a network of domestic conventions, boundaries, and meanings” provide a “framework for both the goals and considerations of the actors.”*^ These domestic parameters create “pre-interpreted” policies,
“foreshortening the range of perception.”'^^ States contain their own social systems of shared understandings.
The focus on agent perceptions is important to knowing how states interpret the international political environment so characterized by structural uncertainty, where preferences and information are unknown or “imperfectly specified.”'^^ It is
“tempting but misleadmg,” suggests communications scholar Ray Cohen, to think
that communication merely mvolves the “transfer o f hard, indubitable data” from
sender to receiver.'^* This mistake, which rationalists and constructivists make:
As opposed to the “rational actor modeP (see Andrews 1975:536).
Andrews 1975:523.
Andrews 1975:524.
0 . Holsti 1976:20-30.
‘2* Ray Cohen 1991:20.
48 Overlooks the problem of decoding, peeling away the outer husk of a message to reveal its inner meaning...Once a message has been physically received, it still has to be comprehended—and comprehension is a matter of psychology, not mechanics...The difBcult question is whether the receiver is able to discern the ideas contained wiUiin the message, the intention behind the words.
How the receiver discerns the “ideas within the message” is the subject of this study.
I argue that the process of discerning is oriented around the Self and one’s perspective about the sel^ the Other, and the situation. Szalay explains:
The meaning that a person attaches to the words received will come from his own mind. His interpretation is determined by his own frame of reference, his ideas, interests, past experiences, etc.—just as much as the meaning o f the original message is fundamentally determined by the sender’s mind, his frame of reference.'
The “frame o f reference” that guides the inference process is steeped in the social and psychological building blocks o f meaning, such as identity and images.
Despite this conventional wisdom from psychology, few studfes explore the variety of observers’ views o f the same actioiL One notable exception is Mercer’s
Reputation in International Politics, which theorizes that allies and adversaries view action differently, according to dynamics of attribution and their “desire” to see an action take place. ' In the context of reputations for resolve, Mercer claims
“standing firm” is desired by allies and undesired by adversaries. Through a reading of attribution theory that suggests that people use character-based attributions to explain undesvable behavior and explain away desirable actions as situational^
‘2’ Cohen 199120.
Szalay 1981:135.
49 driven, Mercer concludes that diflFerences in actors, and their desires for certain behaviors, lead to different judgments about the actor.
While I applaud this attempt to theorize and demonstrate the importance of audience differences, Mercer’s approach has madequacies related to our topk at hand. First, his theory rests on a presumption that ail states see others as “outgroups,” the basis for his predktions related to desirable and undesirabk behavior. The presumption of outgroup assignment is premature, as perceptions of ingroup and outgroup vary and is an empirical q u estio n .In g ro u p / outgroup dynamics and the subjective images of others, not merely “objective” ally or enemy, paint a filler picture of the interpretation of actions and the inferences made about the actor. My approach allows for such distinctions by use of images, establishing ingroup/outgroup feelmgs toward the US that can be empkically attained and tested.
Second, the fixation on allies and adversaries excludes a vast quantity of actors who cannot be categorized as such. In the post-Cold War world, fer example, is Russia an ally, or an adversary? What o f China? These “none-of-the-above” countries, including those who are neutrals or nonaligned, are hnportant to consider. I suggest allowing subjective relational identifications to define the basis for audience perceptions. Identities and images inform us o f a state’s general orientation and view of the actor, allowing us to theorize responses on that basis.
Mercer 1996.
Copeland 1997; Mercer 1997.
50 Third, Mercer presumes desirability, suggesting that allies always like an act that shows toughness, and that adversaries always dislike acts o f firmness and force.
Again, this can be problematic: did American allies enjoy and approve of escalating intervention in Vietnam? There is evidence to the contrary. Ifnothing else, “desire” should be allowed to vary and be more theoretically anchored. I tie “desirability” of actions to the identities of states whose vww of acts are filtered through one’s own sense of normal and proper. Whether a state is some objectively defined formal
“ally” or “adversary” is secondary to this subjective identification with an action and its meaning.
In the spirit of Mercer’s work, but at odds with the specifics just addressed, I offer a two-step model that theorizes first how an observer views the normative basis of an intervention and, second, how an observer subsequently judges the intervener. I argue that norms guide the discernment of legitimate acts but that the process of discerning the normative legitimacy of an act is oriented around one’s perspective about the Self the Other, and the situation. I offer theoretical reasons for expecting not international isomorphism but di#rence: both in the perceived meanmg o f actions and norms, and the resulting inferences drawn about those acting on the behalf of such norms.
By taking an agent-level approach to perceptions, I use unit-level constructivist logic against its structural counterpart, serving as the basis for state identity and its resulting affect on the interpretation of international acts and actors. I introduce psychological processes and biases that impose a “top-down” interpretation
51 of events. From these ideational lenses—identity and image—associated with preexisting notions of Self and Other comes the basis for both interpreting events and inferring intent about actors. I turn now to the task of developing a theory out of these component parts.
2.3 The Theory of Ethnocentric Inference
This section proceeds as follows: 16rst introduce the theory of ethnocentric inference, including the assumptions and building blocks, identity and image, on which it is based. Next, I elaborate on the component parts of the two-step model, interpretation and judgment, and theorize the role of norms and action in conjunction with observer kientity and image. 1 combine the variables of identity and image into an identity matrnc with theoretical expectations for mterpretation and judgment, whkh I lay out by way o f summary. I then introduce a third fector, identity afBliates, that affects the expectations of the model proposed in significant ways. Finally, 1 turn to issues of operationalization and research that conclude the chapter and set up the empirical part of the study that follows.
2.3.1 Assumptions and Concepts
My theory begins with several assumptions and an ontological starting point,
which is cognitive centrism: where the world is seen from an actor's perspective.
52 Êivorabfy viewing the Self and those who are considered part of the Selfs ingroup.
As the “central conceptual pillar” of the Perspective Paradigm, the Self is the referent for construal of Other’s actions and fer judging Others themselves.Evoking
Sumner’s classic definition of ethnocentrism, this approach suggests that the normal way states view things is that “one’s own group is the center of everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.”‘^^ Ethnocentrism fer Forbes is “the propensity to divide humanity into groups” and judge Others by domestic standards: utterly self-referentialB ooth describes it as the condition when “societies look at the world with their own group as the centre, they perceive and interpret other societies within their own frames o f reference.”*^^
It is my unhappy contention that ethnocentric inference, the self-centeredness of state perceptions, is the norm of intematfenal relations, not cosmopolitanism.
While international norms exist and the seedlmgs o f international society have been growing for decades, the ironic gift of the globally shared notion of sovereignty is the perpetuation of the inward looking, domestically constructed state. Ethnocentrism is more normal for states; to transcend or elmninate it “requires a difBcult exercise of
Deschamps and Devos 1998:9.
Monroe 2001; Baumeister 1998.
Sumner 1906:12-13.
Forbes 1985.
Booth 1979:13.
53 imagination and empathy on the part of the observer.”'^* This dissertation hopes to contribute precisely to that process, but it assumes that such empathy has yet to become standard Are in international politics.
What are the consequences of ethnocentrism, and the theoretical implications
I take into the empirical analysis? The motivations and biases that help preserve and enhance the Self concept are applied to those seen as part of the ingroup and used to derogate those seen as negative members of the outgroup.Ethnocentrism exacerbates and contributes to the polarization o f social categorization, including negative and positive images.'"^ To the extent that an act’s meaning or normative status is contested by t k difiusion of ethnocentrically oriented states, it is important to know the audience and judge if we are to deduce the reputation or label a perpetrator can expect to attain. For any act, one can achieve many different, reputations.'^^ I illuminate below the dynamics of communication to understand how the perceptions of acts and actors varies.
The assumptions underfying my theory of ethnocentric inference include;
(I) Actors seek to provide meaning to the environment and impose clear, coherent meaning on events.
Booth 1979:16.
Brewer and Miller 1996:24-26.
Booth 1979; White 1967; Heradstveit 1979; SQverstein and Flamenbaum 1989; Payne 1995.
Mercer 1996; Kier and Mercer 1996.
Stembruner 1974:112; Voss and Dorsey 1992:8.
54 (2) Actors organize the world into mental structures that effect the subsequent interpretation and evaluation of events.
(3) Perceivers strive for cognitive consistency, to keep internal belief relationships stable once formed.
(4) Perceivers seek to maintain a positive self-image, and incorporate evidence in ways that maintains or enhances the Setf.*'*^
Given these assumptions, which have achieved validation in social psychology to the point of accepted wisdom, I build a theory of ethnocentric in&rence. Dedsionrmakers seek to provide clear, coherent meaning on their international environments (assumption 1), and do so with the help of norms and internal structures ofbelkÈ, such as identity and images (assumption 2). They seek to maintain these constructed images o f Self and Other consistent once formed
(assumptions 3 and 4), and thus bias interpretations to maintain ego-defending priors.
I posit three building blocks for the theory below, each of them preconceptions that observers take into the construal process to resolve ambiguity.
The first aspect, identity, is defined here in psychological terms as the self-image a nation's elite has o f its country, which serves as a reference point by whkh leaders interpret their world. Second, there are those I call identity affiliates whom an agent consulers part of one’s identity, enough to be considered part of an in-group. As part of an ingroup, the identity affiliate is granted all the related biases and benefits firom
For a review, see McGraw 2000.
For a recent summary of literature on this point, see Rosati 2000.
Heider 1958; Herrmann 1985.
55 the observer perspective. The third concept ethnocentric observers bring to the construal process, ifnage, is the pre-existing mental model a nation's elite possesses about the actor under observation when the action occurs. Images stem from cognitive needs for grasping one’s environment and motivated needs to balance one’s desires and goals with feelings toward those who seem to be a help or hindrance to such desires and goals. Those granted a positive image are essentially withm the observer’s ingroup, and thus is given the special treatment and benefit of the doubt an observer gives itself. A negative image, on the other hand, demarcates a distinct
Otherness and presumed negativity that taints perceptions of acts and especially judgments of the actor. 1 take each m turn.
Identitv.
My conception of identity is psychologically based, constructed and subjectively defined by a state’s elites. I define identity as a self-image that a state's decision elites possess o f their state, which defines for elites the nature and purpose of the state and the system within which they r e s id e . Identity is a referential device through which international actions are viewed. Taking identity from the psychological perspective articulated by Eric Erikson, it can be seen as tied to existential notions of the cohesive and stable seK to states as much as individuals.
Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstem 1996; Gurowitz 1999b; K. Holsti 1970.
Bloom 1990.
56 It thus oflfers to provide an ideational source of interests and biases. A threat to identity becomes as significant as a material threat to the state. As Bloom states, “if events are presented in such a way that national identity is perceived to be threatened or the opportunity to enhance national identity is present,” the state will “seek to secure, protect and enhance national identity.”*'**
National self-images are ethnocentric, in that one by views one’s own norms and culture in a more fiivorable light than an outgroup,*'*^ and this 6ctors into elite understandings of behavior. Identities screen information in order to fit the self- sustaining notions of right and wrong, acting as a restraint on the actions and interpretations allowed to get through.*^ As a mental construct, identity imbues decision-makers with the means for comprehending one’s environment and how to evaluate actions withm it,'^* and helps define “interests” beyond the materiaL*^
These ’templates of mterpretation” filter stimuli by “drawing on their own cultural worldview.”*^
Bloom 1990:79.
Lebow 1981; Le Vine and Campbell 1972.
Schlenker 1985:70; Lebow 1981:201; Pan 1999:139.
*^* Chafetz 1998/99nm.
*^ Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996:60; Weldes 1996.
*^ PasK 1996:99-100; Hudson and Sampson 1999; Wendt 1994:385; Ross 2000:39.
57 It follows, then, that different identities lead to “different realities” and different responses, even “when con&onted with objectively identical situations.”*^
My conception of identity joins these studies’ focus on (1) normative values (what is valued, right and wrong, appropriate or not), and (2) self-schema defining the role and nature of the state. For the purposes of evahiatn% interventions, I theorize below two dimensions related to self-schema and normative values that make up relevant identities in this context. For self-schema, I assess whether a state possesses a self- image as victim or not. For normative values, I assess whether a state views itself as liberal or not. I elaborate on these below, melding them into a dichotomy of states as
“insiders” (liberal, non-victims) and “outskiers” (all the rest).
Tdentitv Affiliates.
Related to identity are identity afBliates, defined as a political entity that an actor incorporates within the observer state’s sense o f Self This can be a groupii% of people, such as Russia’s nationals in the near abroad or Egypt’s view of Arabs or
Muslims, or a territorial afBliation, as in China’s perception of Taiwan as a stray republic. This conception essentially enlarges the ingroup zone of an actor’s identity, bestowing upon the afBliate the associated consequences o f ingroup status. This includes a 6vorabk dispositmn toward them, and treating affronts to an affiliate as an affront to the Self Those perceived as an u%roup can tDt perceptions one
Hopf 1996:148; Berger 1998:9.
Brewer and Miller 1996.
58 direction or another. If an identity afBliate is the target o f the intervention, even insiders will oppose the action. If an identity affiliate is the beneficiary of an intervention, even outsiders will approve of the action. I return to this concept below as a mediating 6ctor in interpretations.
Images.
Finally, images are cognitive schemata reflecting a subject’s mental representation o f another actor in the political world}^ Image theorists posit three relational attributes—relative capability, relative valence of interests, and relative culture—whose combination creates various schema or images that serve as mental representations of another actor in the political world. On the basis of these images, observers infer intent about others and develop strategies in response to them—both as a way of bolstering the observer’s ego-defensive needs to pursue self-interest fi%e o f moral guilt.
Im%es are ethnocentric in that they serve to balance decision-makers’ affective sentiments toward an actor with a cognitive picture of that actor.
"Sentiment” is derived fiom the relationship between a state’s instrumental goals and the perceived target. That target can be a threat to one’s perceived goals, an
Boukiing 1956; Herrmann 1985,1988.
Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Cottam and Cottam 2001; 121.
Heider 1958; Herrmann 1988:182-83.
59 opportunity to be exploited to meet those goals, one who jointly benefits from the goals, or have no relation to one’s goals. Though there are many images, I refer to those indicating joint gains as positive images and those reflecting threats and opportunities as negative images, suggesting the valence of one’s sentiments. Those viewed fevorabty and who benefit or gain jointly fiom an actor over time may develop what I call an ally image of that actor, suggesting a positive relationship.
Those who feel harmed, threatened, or exploited by an actor over time develops a
negative image that suggests enmity.'^ According to the valence and intensity of an
nnage, subsequent perceptions of actions by the object of the image wül be biased in positive or negative ways to maintain justifications for holding such images. Given a
fevorable disposition, an observer is likely to downplay, forget, forgive or otherwise
wish away any negative (counter-normative) behavior committed by the said actor.
Bad behavior is attributed not to disposition but situational fectors, as one would do
himself under the self-serving attribution bias.'^‘ In so doing, the observer believes
and is allowed to believe that the act is not bad, thus solving any dissonance o f being
fifends with an axe murderer. When the fiiend does something good (normative), the
observer is bound to highlight the deed, attribute the action to disposition, and so-
See Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) for a complete taxonony; for other discussions, see R. Cottam (1977); M. Cottam (1994); Alexander et al (1999); Cottam and Cottam (2001).
“Negative images” associated with the US may be eneny, imperial, or barbarian (Cottam 1977; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Alexander et aL 1999).
Pettigrew 1979; Fiske and Taylor 1984; Brewer and Miller 1996:12-13.
60 doing bolster the positive feelings of the in-group. If a negative image is held, an observer is likely to take counter-normative behavior seriously—attributing “bad” acts to the actor’s disposition and exacerbating the normative components of the infraction. When the “bad” actor does something good (normativety correct), such actions are downplayed or caused by circumstances, hick or some situational force— allowing the observer to retain the negative image by which one can contrast one’s own positive self-image.
These three concepts—identity, identity afiBliate, and image—are incorporated into a theory explaining the interpretation of acts and judgment of actors. The theory presented here offers to explain the dynamics o f intervention impression management, considering the role of both the behavior and justifications thereof on the part of the actor, as well as the mterpretive tools of the observer. In a two-step model (see Figure 2.1), 1 discuss these dynamics first in terms of interpreting intervention, then judgmg the intervener. Using the “framework for judgment” common in psychological studies of perception, the process is divided into the construal phase and the judgment phase}^ In the first phase, observers receive and
“encode” behavior evaluatively based on the information as well as any interests and beliefr that relate to the information.'^^ 1 argue that identity afifects this evaluation, as a domestically defined self-image helps elites decide whether an act is good or bad.
Images too afifect the evaluation of actions, bestowing either the benefit of the doubt
Hopmann 1978:582; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Wyer et aL 1992; Struck 1992.
Wyer et aL 1992; Strack 1992:254-55.
61 CONSTRUAL JUDGMENT PHASE PHASE
IDENTITY IMAGES
Figure 2.1 A Two-Step Model o f Etfanocentrk: Inference
or worst-case intentions on the actor, based on whether the image is Êivorable or not.
In the judgment phase, the observer evaluates the actor based on the evaluation of the act and the attribution made regarding the cause of the a c t'^ These decisions too are subject to preconceptions. I argue that images, the negative or positive preconception one has toward an actor, biases judgments of actors independent of the act.
As states attempt to influence perceptions of their acts, what role do the actions and justifications play, and what role do observer prédispositions play? I conclude that norms matter in setting the basis for evaluation, but that pre-existing images and identity also condition perceptions of the norm and the act. I now turn to the examination of the interaction of these fiutors—identity, images and normative action—in both the representation or “construal” phase and the second, “judgment” phase.
164 Strack 1992:256; Wyer et aL 1992; Tedeschi and Riess 1981.
62 2.3.2 The Construal Phase: Evaluating Intervention
I have argued elsewhere that for a socially aware state to violate a norm rests on conditions allowii% the state to justify such action, which in turn depends on (I) the structure of the norm and (2) the situation at hand.^^^ If the situation and norm are malleable, there is room to create justificatory accounts for one’s apparently untoward behavior. Similarly, judgmg states retain the same right to interpret acts, under the constraint of normative and situational ambiguity. The more ambiguous the norm and the situation in terms of normative correctness, the more variation we can expect in interpretations—variation rooted in observer identity and images.
Other times, though, when the norms and situation are more clearly defined, norms and practice can circumscribe some interpretations by delineating the focts of the situation (eg. was an act UN authorized). Normative conformity can, in effect, deny critics any significant argument for lack of ammunition An intervention that is by the book and is clearfy so, meaning UN-approved and m accord with stated international law and the UN Charter, dampens the ability to interpret the act as countemormative and anti-sociaL Given “structural uncertainty” and the ambiguity of world politics, it is important to remember that the obstacles for situational and normative clarity are high.
All actions require interpretation, but the more ambiguous the act or normative ground on which it rests, the more preconceptions come into play as part of
16S Shannon 2000‘J04.
63 the “construal process.” This “construal process” involves labeling, or deciding on the kind of actor one is encountering, and forming expectations as a result, as well as the resolution o f ambiguity, filling in mfonnation and possibly reinterpreting information incongruent with the label or category assigned.*^ The social perceiver, equipped with preconceptions and schematic images, makes inferences and judgments not only with “heightened ease, speed and subjective confidence” but m ways that distinguish theirs firom others’ judgments comity at the problem with different preexisting schemas.This is where identity and images come in.
How do image and identity combine to tell us something about the interpretation of acts? If action is normatively imbued, the first issue to resolve is whether the observer and the actor share the fi-ame of reference on which the act is based. To the extent that agents have “overlapping ontologies” of how the world works or should work, they may better understand each other’s actions.*** To the extent that actors come from different ontological standpoints, communication becomes difBcult as meanings pass each other in the night.
Identity becomes relational in that it the Self is matched with the Other and the Other’s action. Following Checkel and Cbafetz et aL,'*^ one could contemplate a
*** Ross and Nisbett 1991:75-76.
**’ Ross and Nisbett 1991.
*** Sylvan and Thorson 1992.
**’ Checkel 1999 and Chafetz et aL 1998/99.
64 positive (+) cultural match or identification, where the act is congruent with state identity, and a negative match or identification (-), where normative understandings are in comment. Those whose identities overlap with the act and actor will find meaning in the act approximating the actor’s understanding of it. Those whose identities conflict with the action at hand are likely to find the act offensive and threatening.
To put content on this theoretical proposition, I now elaborate a conception of identities and images related to mtemational intervention. I first address the notion of identity in terms of International "'insiders” and "outsiders.”
Insiders and Outsiders
Not everybody speaking o f mtemational society speaks holistically o f an integrated, homogenized group of states. I join those who are skeptical and instead claim the existence o f a divided, uneven, pluralistic international society dominated by the values and powers of the Western world.*™ By liberal I mean to say that the values articulated and enforced in prevailing international system are those derived fix)m liberal. Western ideas of democracy and Western notions of human rights. This is not to say that these ideas are pursued and defended consistently, nor that all systemic norms are liberal, only that this agenda of values prevails in rhetork: and somethnes action over other values.
*™ Rosow 1990; Neumann and Welsh 1991.
65 It became apparent at the end o f the Cold War that a return to Wilsonian
American foreign policy was in the making.President Bill Clinton and National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake announced the policy o f “enlargement,” suggesting that communism was “a threat to market democracies” and that “now we should seek to enlarge their reach.”'^ Clinton, preparing his country for possible intervention in
Haiti, suggested in May 1994 that “the greatest opportunity for our security is to help enlarge the world’s communities of market democracies; and to move toward a world in which all the great powers govern by a democratic plan.”'^
This sort of language is not lost upon states governed by means not meeting
Western qualifications of “democracy.” Not all states share the enthusiasm for
Western notions of democracy, while other states—regardless of this first point—do not share the belief that US intentions are about such lofty goals.Some see intervention under the rubric of “promoting democracy” as a way for the US to mfiuence the outcomes of power struggles in their fovor.'^^ The assumptions of common interests and values belies the Eurocentric basis of international society, leading scholars and hegemons to mistakenly believe that actions on its behalf are understood by aU its members to be the same thing: benevolent and on behalf of
Wiarda 1997.
von Hÿpel 2000:9.
173 von Hippel 2000:95.
Schweller 1999.
Blum 1995; Robinson 1996-2-7.
66 society’s whole. There is reason for doubt, to the extent that non-liberal states with non-Western values and understandings occupy seats in international society.
Barry Buzan divides international society into core members and peripheral members.Core members are the “absolute msiders” whose character and degree of commitment to norms, rules and institutions are quite extensive. The countries most associated with the liberal norms and institutions characteristic of the current world order are the liberal states. Peripheral members are those relatively marginalized, feeling as “outsiders” to the process and game of world society: the making, judging, and enforcing of international rules. Best thought of as a matter of degree, states can be considered on a continuum of relative inclusion and identification with the
Western core.
Buzan’s identity scheme is useful, and I borrow it here. The prevalence of attention to Western definitions of democracy and human rights, particularly because they are defended seemingly erratically and by force by Western Great Power, creates a bifurcation in the international system along the lines of those countries for which this vision is familiar and those for wfakh this vision is threatening. I call these two types of states insiders and outsiders. I posit that international society can be fiuitfiilly divided between “insider” and “outsider” states, for then respective feelings of identification with the current intematfonai system. I argue that one’s
[Delusiveness and attachment to the system serves as a useful baselme forjudging actions that speak to the system and how it operates. My insider/outsider identities
Buzan 1996.
67 are comprised operationally by self-reference m normative terms as either liberal or not, and in self-schema terms as a victim o f past oppression or not. Victimized states are sensitive to interventions in a Western-dominated world, particularly if compounded by lack of identification with liberal norms that may serve as the basis for interventions.
These identities inform observers about the meaning of the actions of the US.
Interventions for human rights should sit well with liberal states but not for illiberal states, who see such actions as promoting values and setting precedents threatening to the illiberal state’s values and possibly very regime. Promoting democracy should operate likewise. All things equal, then, I hypothesce that liberal states will sympathize with interventions based on the justifications of “human rights” and
“democracy” than will illiberal states. The “cultural match” (of self-image to justificatory norms of intervention) ensures a level of shared meaning and a lack of fear about the implications o f such interventions. One reason is for outsiders to be wary of such interventions is that they may not share such normative meanings. In foct, those values may be the antithesis o f the normative context o f illiberal states, thus posing an ideational threat to one’s normative order. From the perspective of outsklers or “excluded powers,” the norms and related activity in the prevailing system are viewed as “hnposed orders” and action on behalf of norms as self-serving in the interests of the powerfuL^^ This is examined m Chapter 3.
Schweller and Preiss 1997:8; Barkawi and Laflfey 1999.
68 Another reason outsiders may be wary of mterventions is not anything against the norms per se but the perception that Western states promote these ‘Values” erratically and in pursuit of self-interest more than moral righteousness/^^ The victimhood component of identity &ctors mto perceptions of intervention in this way.
One whose identity is intimately tied to a history of perceived exploitation and oppression at the hand o f colonial powers are more likely to be sensitive to the use of force. The values and norms likely imbued by an outsider are those defending sovereignty and nonintervention, a narrower set of parameters for justified intervention than their insider counterparts. Thus, an outsider identity is likely to consider Great Power use of force in negative terms. The role of victimhood and resulting skepticism is explored in comparative responses to interventions that are not liberal in justificatory language (see chapter 4).
In sum, I argue that the identity of a state as an insider or outsider, empirically derived from their subjective self-images of a nation’s elite, provides an hnportant lens for the “construal” o f international interventions. Table 2.1 summarizes the dimensions of kientity I theorize to be important: liberalness and victimhood. I argue these not to be the only bases of identity but rather aspects that become salient in situations con&onting the use o f force. They become the relevant dimensions of a self-hnage for evaluating the normative justifications of intervention (the normative values of liberalness) and the comfort with which the Self vkws the use of force by others against other states (the self-schema of victimhood).
171 Pan 1999:146.
69 Normative value orientation Self-schema Liberal Illiberal Non-Victim Victim Affect on Expansive Restricted Normal Restricted construal normative normative tolerance for tolerance for justifications justification use of force by use of force by others Others
Table 2.1 Effects o f Liberal and Victim Dimensions on Construal
An msider is identified as the state whose elite self-image is coded liberal and non- victim; the presence o f illiberal values or victim self-schema (or both) makes a state an outsider by my theory (see Table 2 2 )—m other words, a country with more reasons to be wary o f interventions.
Modifying the effects of this baseline identity o f insider and outsider in any particular situation are (1) the normative correctness of the act, and our two other relevant theoretical concepts: (2) images and (3) the presence of an identity afiSliate.
By normative correctness, I refer to whether an act meets the requirements of appropriate action, if that can be determined. In many cases this is highfy subjective, based on one’s ideas o f appropriate, so I restrict the discussion o f normative correctness to that of UN authorization. As I elaborate in Chapter 3, use-of-force norms vary but there are a few normative givens: (1) UN authorized force is legitimate; and (2) unilateral, unauthorized force is not unless it is in self-defense or collective defense against attacks. Normative correctness mediates the role of identity by removing it firom evaluations that are "normatively correct,” or UN
70 Normative orientation: Liberal Illiberal Self-schema: Non-victim INSIDER OUTSIDER Victim OUTSIDER OUTSIDER
Table 2.2 Identifying Insiders and Outsiders
sanctioned. While there is still room for mterpretation here, as I show in the case of
Bosnia, generally speaking UN authorized interventions should dampen the variation and effects of identity. Unilateral acts th o i^ become ambiguous, contested acts that rely more on predispositions to judge them right or wrong.
Images also mediate evaluations situationally, basing interpretations in accordance with the valence of one’s preconceptions. One’s expectations of another influence subsequent evaluations o f that Other’s act.^^ While much more relevant in the judgment phase (see below), hnages also have a role in reading the best or worst into an actmn. Positive images can help see the good and justified in a normativety suspect action, so long as the normative parameters allow for such justifications.
Negative images, on the other hand, especially if combmed with an outsider kientity, push leaders to find the *^vrong" and “bad” in an act, something made easier if normatively contested.
Fmally, as for identity afGliates, Outsklers may generally oppose Great Power use of force, and Insiders may generally approve of force in the name o f human rights
179 Jervis 1976; Copeland 1997.
71 and democracy, but an important mediating variable to this proposition is the presence o f an ‘identity afBliate” in the mtervention scenario. As discussed above, an identity afGliate is basically an extension o f the Self so that interventions involving affiliates are perceived as a direct action against the observer. This can mean one of two things: (I) the affiliate is the target o f intervention (a negative action); or (2) the affiliate is the beneficiary of intervention (a positive action). In these cases, since the Self is directly confi-onted by extension, the determination of the act as for or against the affiliate determines the evaluation o f the act. Basically, an act targeting an affiliate should be interpreted negatively and an act that benefits an affiliate should be interpreted positively.
2.3.3 The “Judgment Phase”: Evaluating Interveners
Once we have analytically established an interpretation evaluating an intervention as good or bad or something in between, there is still the matter of judging the actor. As discussed above, the movement fit)m behavior to judgment is
not so clean as rationalist models suggest. Mercer argued on good ground that a reputation is acquired only if the evaluated behavior is attributed to disposition or character rather than situation. I offer a modified account of Mercer’s attribution
process that relies on expectations derived from images of the intervener and the
evaluation o f the act. Two aspects ofhnpression management in particular influence
Mercer 1996.
72 the judgment of Others: (1) responsibility and (2) consequences}*^ Responsibility refers to the extent of association between the actor and the action: is the intervener held responsible for its conduct, or was it compelled by situational circumstances to act? Consequences refer to the valence of an observer’s evaluation of an act; is the intervention seen as good or bad? I show how identity and images answer these two questions, concluding with expectations for bow an actor will be judged.
Attribution is a type of subjective construal to understand the relation of actors, situations, and behavior, and involves inferences about the relative importance of various causal fectors.'^ The inferences about causal fectors relate to whether an act is seen as situationally or dispositionally caused. Driven by the need to explain the world around us, people actively conjure up ways for attributing causes for why people do what they do. Heider dubbed humans ‘‘naïve psychologists” in the pursuit of the understanding the causes of human action, and endorsed the view that it is not just the action but how the observer understands the action that is nnportant.'^ That means the process is influenced by “top-down” thinking influenced by preconceptions and biases. Specifically, (I) judgments are biased by the apparent consistency of that evidence with the percenter’s theories and expectations; (2) people dismiss or
Tedeschi and Riess 1981.
Ross and Nisbett 1991:77.
Heider 1958; Brewer and Miller 1996:10-11.
73 discount evidence that contradicts initial views; and (3) people interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain initial belie&Z*^
Useful in understanding judgments about interventions is what is called the
Ultimate Attribution Error (UAE).‘“ Distinguishing Others by their group membership, Pettigrew suggests that one’s belief about an outgroup or ingroup influence perceptions o f behavmr conducted by a member o f the outgroup or ingroup.
Brewer and Miller summarize it thus:
In general, &Oure and negative behaviors exhibited by an outgroup member are more Hkely to be attributed to internal, dispositional causes than the same negative behavior by an ingroup member (where it is more likely to be attributed to external or situational causes). Conversely, positive acts and success are more likely to be attributed to internal causes for ingroup members than for members o f an outgroup.
A positivity bias grants “intimate others” the benefit o f the doubt, while a negativity effect causes a hated Other to be viewed as responsible for bad behaviors and not responsible for good ones.'*^
Images fit well with both the Ultnnate Attribution Error by providing the basis for ii%roup/outgroup categorization, the assignment of Others as akin to, or different firom, the Perceiver. Images identify which Other is seen as sympathetfo.
*** Lorde etal. 1979-2099; Kulik 1983:1178.
Pettigrew 1979.
Brewer and Miller 1996:83-84.
Pettigrew 1979:464.
Tajfel and Turner 1986; Brewer and Miller 1996:6.
74 suggesting such a state would fall under the positivity bias. Negative images reasonably relate to outgroups viewed unâvorably, suggesting a correspondmg
negativity effect. Once the cognitive and motivational classification of Other has occurred, this social categorization leads to divergent patterns of interpretation and
inference.'"^ By placing a valence and intensity to ingroup/outgroup relationships,
images also correct for the lack of distinction in earlier attribution and ingroup/
outgroup research. Where images are activated, these motivated biases dominate the
construal process. In the absence o f stereotypic images, construal still foces the lens
of identity discussed above.
A problem remains, though, in that neither Pettigrew nor image theory explain
how an act is seen as good or bad in order to assign dispositional or situational cause.
Out of the lab, this is a subjective process. Identity is one basis for this judgment.
Evaluations of the act must be known, then, to decide how Pettigrew’s attribution
biases play o u t We have solved this issue in phase 1, providing a basis for an
observer’s evaluation of an act as good or bad. Some suggest that “morality
judgments” affect impression formation, as perceived “bad” behavior is harmful to
others and perceivers see this as an index of likely behavior that could be used against
them.^^ I qualify this account, though, by suggesting the leap from moral evaluation
o f an act to judgment o f the actor is mediated by images of the actor. As mentioned
prior, images bias judgments m ethnocentric ways. Those with a positive image
Hewstone and Jaspars 1982.
Wojciszke et aL 1998; Reeder and Spores 1983.
75 become an ingroup and are evaluated accordingly, and much differently than another with a negative image.Intergroup biases in the attribution process fulfill
Pettigrew’s theory with ethnocentric responses to ingroup and outgroup actors.’^
Once establishing the evaluation o f an act (phase I) and the image of an actor, we get predicted judgments that appear as follows (See Table 2.3): Positive images
(+) should bring positive dispositional evaluations to acts an observer sees as good, and situational attributions to explain away the untoward actions of an ingroup member. Negative images (-) should bring negative judgments upon the intervener for committing a perceived “bad” act, and should dismiss any “good” act as situationally created. Only Cell 4 in Table 2.3, with a negative evaluation and negative image, leads to a negative judgment toward the US. The foctors leading to
Ceil 4 situations are considered n the conclusion for their policy implications.
2.3.4 Rival Theoretical Expectations
What I propose, then, is a two-step model of inference where the evaluations of acts and actors are heavily influenced by the subjective priors of the observer. The construal phase, whereby the observer establishes a definition of the situation and labels the act m descriptive and evaluative terms, is influenced by the identity of the
191 Copeland 1997; Depret and Fiske 1999:477-78.
76 Assessment of Act: Positive Evaluation Negative Evaluation Image of Actor:
Positive Image Dispositional attribution Situational attribution
Negative Image Situational attribution Dispositional attribution
Table 2.3 Images and Attributions
actor as it relates to the act. The **moral assessment” of the intervention depends on the match between the justified reasons for action and the observer’s sense of Self.
The role of identity comes in two forms: (I) establishing values and self-schema that are enhanced or threatened by the intervention, and (2) establishing “identity afiSImtes”—other actors who serve as an extension o f the Self. In the latter case, whether an identity affiliate is helped or harmed by the intervention influences the evaluatfon of that act. In either case, strong, affect-laden evaluations can emerge regarding acts mvolving few or no material stakes.
This moral evaluation is onfy the first half of the process, though, as we have discussed. An act can be construed as “good” or “bad” but whether it reflects upon the intervener still depends on the causal attribution assigned by the observer. The second phase, the judgment phase, establishes this causal evaluation of blame or credit, and itself is affected by ideational priors. In this phase, prior images of the
Hewstone and Jaspars 1982:115; Hewstone 1990.
77 IDENTITY: INSIDER OUTSIDER IMAGE:
POSITIVE (+) Insider Ingroup Outsider Ingroup
NEGATIVE (-) Insider Outgroup Outsider Outgroup
Table 2.4 Identity Matrix intervener, positive or negative, shape the direction ofjudgment toward the actor in question. Combining identity and image, as I discussed in phase I, we get an identity matrix (Table 2.4) that clarifies theoretical expectations we can take into our case studies on intervention. The four state categories resulting in the identity matrix are:
Ingroup Insiders (positive image of the US and liberal kientity without feelings of victimhood); Ingroup Outsiders; Outgroup Insiders (negative image of the US) and
Outgroup OutsWers. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 demonstrate the expectations resulting from the interaction of these identities with different normative situations, with the first table concemmg evaluations of intervention and the second pertaining to judgmg the intervener. The three types of normative situations likely to be judged are:
“Normatively Correct” interventions (UN authorized, multilateral); “Normatively
Suspect” interventions (unilateral whose normative basis is contested and ambiguous) and, a variation on the latter, Normatively Suspect Liberal mterventions. 193
Since I argue that normatively correct, UN-approval legitimates all actions, there is no separate category for normatively correct liberal interventions.
78 Ingroup Ingroup Outgroup Outgroup Inskier Outsider Insider Outsider UN + Authorized +/o +/o o/- Unilateral +/o o/- - - Unilateral + - (Liberal) o/- +/o + Indicates a &vorabie evaluation of the act, either by support or understanding of the US position. - Indicates a negative evaluation of the act, defined by criticism and understandings different than the US position. 0 Indicates an evaluation that is ambiguous, neither broadly supportive nor critical. ______
Table 2.5 Predicted Evaluations of Act*
Ingroup Ingroup Outgroup Outgroup Insider Outsider Insider Outsider UN + + Authorized 0 -/o Unilateral +/o 0 - - Unilateral + - (Liberal) 0 0 + Indicates a fevorable evaluation of the US, in terms of how the US and its motives are described. • Indicates a negative evaluation of the act, defined by critical assertions about US design and motives. 0 Indicates an evaluation that is situational, ambiguous, neither broadly supportive nor critical of the US.
Table 2.6 Predicted Evaluations of Intervener
79 Concerning the interpretation of acts, I posit that Ingroup Insiders will deem as acceptable just about any sort of intervention that transpires, owing to their expanded parameters of intervention, lack of history of exploitation and &vorable bias toward the intervener. At the opposite end. Outgroup Outsiders should interpret most anything in a negative light, with this negativity dampened in the case of UN- authorized interventmn. Ingroup Outsiders are likely to v k w multilateral interventions as acceptable, but as an outsider is likely to oppose any normatively suspect actions, liberal or otherwise. The Outgroup Insider, finally, joining all others in the acceptance of UN sanctioned interventions, as an Insider will interpret liberal interventions 6vorably but as an outgroup will interpret non-liberal normatively suspect interventions un&vorably. (It should be noted that these theoretical predktions do not account for situations where an identity affiliate is present. 1 have discussed the expectations surrounding such cvcumstances—that an affiliate as target begets negative evaluations and an affiliate as beneficiary begets positive evaluations—and will devote all of Chapter 6 to this issue).
Looking at Table 2.6, the theoretical expectations forjudging the mtervener are provided along the same determinatioos of mtervention type and identity matrix.
First, Ingroup Insiders, predktably, view the intervener positively in any case, explaining any normatively suspect act as situationally imposed upon the intervener, who is given the benefit o f the doubt. At the other end. Outgroup Outsklers are likely to judge the intervener harshly in most any case, save UN-authorized, where criticism
* This does not include the mediating effocts of identity affiliates (see chapter 6).
80 is dampened and credit is denied. Ingroup Outsiders, possessing a positive image of the intervener, are likely to attribute positive evaluations to good acts and forgive suspect acts as situationally caused. Outgroup Insiders, finally, jiidge interveners negatively for normatively suspect acts, whfoh as insiders do not include liberal acts, and draw neutral or situational conclusions about interventions that are seen as acceptable.
Thus we have a final picture of the signaling process, where the decodmg process is more complex than some anticipate. Observers of an act come to the table with subjective and intersubjective baggage that filters the communication process and acts to bolster the self in the organkatfon o f reality and comparison with others.
Judging an act and an actor rests importantly on the interaction of the type of interventions with the normative underpinnings of the observer’s kientity and the observer’s im%e of the actor. The framework I propose looks at behavior not only fiom the systemic-normative level but through the ethnocentrk: normative contexts and interpretive eyes of observers. How the intervention is framed matters as to whether the message of benign intentions is received. Accordance with normative expectations is one factor that frames an audience’s perceptions, but this is conditioned by the observer’s sense of Self and sense of the Other.
As opposed to the predictions o f ethnocentric in&rence, where the normative bass for action interacts with observer identity and hnages, the rival hypotheses offered by the traditional approaches reviewed above suggest the following expectations. With regard to evaluatmg acts, the foOowmg hypotheses apply:
81 HI ■ Material structure: All actions by the United States, by virtue o f its
preponderant relative power, are seen as a threat.
H2. Material interests: Actions that aid an observer’s defined security or
economic interests are evaluated positively; actions that harm them are
evaluated negatively (no prediction in the absence of material interests).
H3. Liberal institutionalism: Multilateral (UN authorized) interventions
should be evaluated positive^; unilateral (unauthorized) interventions should
be evaluated negatively by observers.
H4. Social structure: Interventions fitting the prescriptions and parameters of
global norms regarding the use of force should be evaluated positively;
mterventions violating global norms should be evaluated negatively.
With regard to judging the intervener after an intervention:
HI. Material structure: The United States, by virtue of its preponderant
relative power, is seen as a threat.
H2. Material interests: Observers judge the intervener positively if the action
helps an observer’s defined security or economic interests, or if the mtervener
is a declared alfy; observers judge negatively the intervener if the action harms
such material interests or if the intervener is a declared enemy.
H3. Liberal institutionalism! Observers judge the intervener positive^ if the
latter operated through the UN, owing to the transparency of intentions
hypothesized to come fix>m institutions; observers are more likely to be
distrustful of the intentfons of intervener who acts without UN approval
82 H4. Social structure: Observers judge the mtervener positively if the
intervention was carried out according to prevailing international norms and
law, observers judge the intervener negatively if the intervention violates
prevailing international norms and law.
These formulations of rival “hypotheses” are guiding expectations for comparative analysis of foreign responses to US mterventions. In each empirical chapter, I review the evidence for ethnocentric against these alternative hypotheses. The cumulative assessment of these various approaches are then discussed in the conchidmg chapter.
2.4 Conclusion
Having made the theoretical case for the importance o f both the “normative structure of battle” underlying actions and observer identity for interpreting such structures, I turn to the methodologkal considerations for operationalizmg the empirical study. Chapter 3 discusses method and case selection, including the limits and strengths thereof. The rest of the chapter empirically identijSes observer states on the identity matrix I argue is relevant for their interpretations of interventions: its self- image as an insider or outsider and its image o f the United States.
83 CHAPTERS
IDENTIFYING IDENTITIES:
METHOD AND PRESENTATION OF IDENTITY PROFILES OF OBSERVER
STATES
3.1 Overview
The present chapter is devoted to artkulatmg the methodological issues of case selection, the operationalization of variables, the conduct of research collection, and the basis for inforence underlying the empirical sections of the dissertation.
Following a discussion of the methodology for inferring identity and nnages, I identify the observing states for this study—Japan, China, Russia, India, France, and
E ^ t* ’^—fo terms o f their identitfes and images of the US. I then place them in the categorôatioa of the observer states according to the identity matrix discussed in
Chapter 2 .1 then turn to how the rest of the dissertation purports to examine and mfer the observations of states that are central to Chapters 4-6.
E ^ t , it should be noted, is not integrated into the empirical anafyses of Chapter 4-S, but is treated separately in Chapter 6 m the context of the discussion o f‘Identity afiBHates."
84 3.2 Testing
To explore the theoretical ins^hts and expectations developed m Chapter 2, we turn to the cases and procedures that allow such an exploration. I ofifer ways to explore the power of norms as well as the effects o f agent-level preconceptions (m the form of identity and nnage) to see how they interact. As Bruce Andrews notes, the
“unity, strength, and limits of the relevant norms” should be ascertained through “a close and contextual examination of the particular cases,” and “an explanation of a state’s actions, and an interpretation o f its policies in social terms, will usually depend upon such an understanding.”^’^ The power of ethnocentric in&rence can be tested against the power of norms, by looking “for variability m a person’s construal across objectively similar situations, and variability among people in the meaning even of fundamental concepts.”'’^ With this advice in mind, I turn to the nnportant issues of operationalization, method, and case selection, concluding with important caveats.
3.2.1 Independent Variables; Identity and Image
The independent variables under the ethnocentric inference framework are identity and nnages. In developing a protocol for inferring identity and hnage from
Andrews 1975:534.
Ross and Nisbett 1991:68.
85 each observing state, I followed the work of others in these traditions.*^ The source material serving as the evklentiaiy base for inforrii% Mentity and image is the discourse and words o f leaders. Given the limit on the availability of data sources for such a project, I looked at multiple sources for each country’s elite statements about their identities, images, and perceptions of interventions. State diplomatic sources, as well as UN documents and state-controlled media provided much of this material, as did a variety of supplementary secondary sources. The most heavily used resource, however, was the Foreign Broadcasting Information Servke (FBIS). This American- run service culls major statements of foreign elites and media from all regions every day on an ongoing basis. I only used statements from elites central to decision making,*^^ or spokesmen and media sources that are accepted mouthpieces of the government of a particular country.
Once establishing relevant elites for each country at each time (see below), I then systematKally examined all statements by these actors found in the FBIS system at least three months prior to the intervention moment. All entries related to the
United States or the observer country itself were examined and content-analyzed for answers to the questions relevant to this study—their identification with the two criteria of the insider/outsider klentities: (I) liberalness and (2) victimhood.
*” K. Holsti 1970; Edstrom 1999.
*’* See Appendix A for specific names associated with the national decisfon-making elite for each country.
8 6 To establish whether the elite saw their state as liberal I looked for references to support for &ee elections and democracy, civil liberties and human rights as core features o f their foreign policy priorities and sense o f Self The absence of these keywords were taken into account for establishing a state as not liberal but I also looked for references to the primacy of noninterference, cultural relativism, and social and economic definitions of rights and democracy which—combined with an absence of the former—constitute an Identity not grounded in prevailing Western ideas, or one that is reacting to perceived cultural knperialism by the West.
To establish vferimhood, I looked again for patterns of references relating to a history of exploitation or oppression, a colonial past or continued inqierial pressures on the state. Mention of backwardness, hardship, weakness, or disadvantage owing to the structure of the system or past or present Great Power machinatfons is evkience of the victimhood identity. The absence o f such rhetoric en masse is considered enough to code the state as a nonvictim. Combmed, vktimhood and liberalness create either an insider or outsider identity. Once establishing a state along each dimension, I labeled the state one or the other. An insider is only that state which was coded as liberal and nonvictim. All others are considered outsiders.
For establishing images, I turned to the literature on the subject, focusing onfy on the images practically relevant for the study of the US. For positive images, I examined state elite statements for a prevailing view mdkating a “shared fete,” the
199 See Appendix B for the exact criteria of the “identity dktionary.”
87 sense o f “mutually beneficial relations,” and “finendly” overall relations.^ For negative images, I looked for indicators o f the enemy or imperial images. Evidence included statements about US motives (aggressive, ambitious, seeking domination) as well as capabilities (too powerful, hegemonic). Though a matter of degree, a preponderance of evidence toward one valence or another decided the final coding, with mixed results culminating in a (o) for complex or amb%uous images.^”'
The results of these systematic investigations into observer identity and image are incorporated into a discussion later in the chapter that identifies states alor% the dimensions of the klenthy matrix. Before presenting such findings, however, I continue with the methodological discussfon concerning the rest of the project.
3.22 Dependent Variables: Evaluation and Judgment
We have dscussed maty items that now need to be operationalized for empirical investigation. The dependent variables for this study are (I) the evaluation o facts and (2) the Judgment o fthe actor. The interpretation of interventfons are reconstructed textual^, but also measured in positivist terms based on a valenced evaluation of the mtervention as positive (+) or negative (-). Operationally, then, for each observing country I looked for statements by relevant elites (see below) characterizing the intervention, focusing on terms that indicated a positive or
Herrmann and FischerkeDer 1995:428 (See Appendix B for details).
Cottam 1977; Herrmann 1985. supportive view (eg. “good,” “just”, etc) as well as negative or opposing views (eg.
“unwarranted,” “counterproductive,” etc). Vfixed or ambiguous assessments, which are rare, are coded with an (o). Likewise for the judgment of interveners, elite statements were mined for evaluations o f the US related to the intervention. Along with valenced evaluations, positive (“noble,” “good,” “frfond”) and negative
(“imperialist,” “hegemonic,” “aggressor”) terms, so too did I investigate situational and dispositional attributions. Words indicating blame or credit going to the intervener personally counted as dispositfonal, while statements pointing fingers at other actors or situations were coded shuatfonaL
3.2.3 Case and Country Selection
What all the cases have in common, and thus act as controls, are (1) the intervener (the United States) and thus the power and character of the actor, and (2) the time period, 1989-1999, largely assumed to be the post-Cold-War era and thus leavmg Cold War politics and calculations out of the picture. The cases provkle useful variatfon as well, allowing us to explore theoretkal alternatives that explain foreign reactfons to interventfons. One basis o f varfotfon is the multilateral/unilateral nature of interventfons. Each enprfoal sections conqxires shnilar cases that vary in terms of whether they are UN authoroed or not. This allows us to test both liberal institutionalist notions of transparency as well as constructivist “normative
89 correctness” in the interpretation o f interventions that are not ‘‘liberal” in character.
Chapter 4 examines perceptions of interventions that are more or less normatively correct, to maximize the theoretical distinctbos between image theory and systemic constructivism. Specifically, I examine an apparently normative^ correct case, the
Gulf War, which may be difficult to find a critic for under the normative view given the UN-sanctiooed nature to respond to the consensually understood Iraqi aggression to see bow countries with outsider identities and negative images of the United States perceived the act. On the fiipside, I choose cases o f more normatively suspect grounds, the bombii%s of Afghanistan, Sudan and Iraq m 1998, to see how identity and image afi^t reactions to these less clearly justified actbns.
I also select cases that provide for “liberal justifications,” defined as those justified by the intervener significant^ in terms of human rights or democracy.
Chapter 5 explores the interplay of the nature of intervention (multilateral or unilateral) and observer identity (insider or outsider) in a pair of comparative case studies each based on justified intervention based on “democracy” and “human rights.”
Within each comparative case, I further control (to the extent possible in the natural setting) for (3) geograply, m that cases compared occur m similar areas o f the world, controlling for variations in regional mterests or proximity &om observer states; and (4) the content of normative justi&ations, to the extent that the US invoked similar normative accounts for the use of force in each case. Also, to the extent possible, I focused on cases that (5) minimize material strategfo and economic
90 interests in these cases. What remains to vary, then, is the mode of intervention— UN approved (multilateralism) or not UN approved (unilateralism)—and the klentity and images of the observer states. This allows me to explore the correlation between
"msider" and “outsider” klentitks with perceptmns o f interventk>ns along
"humanitarian” and “democracy” lines. But it allows me to do so in interaction with the normative procedural issue of multilateralism to see the efkct of UN approval on interpretatmns and judgments.
Chapter 6 then pursues the mediating effects of “klentity afSliates” m the interpretive process. I focus on a comparative case that this time controls for observer country (thus klentity and image of the US) and multilateralism (both are unilateral) and varies whether an identity afSliate was the target o f the intervention or the victhn o f the target o f the interventfoiL
Because the specifics of each country are addressed in-depth in the following chapters, I only introduce the countries that serve as observers and provide some theoretical justification and some descrqitive basics about them. Since it would be practically intractable to trace and analyze in-depth the klentities, images and understandings of some-196 states, I examine a diverse sample of contemporary mkidle-range world or regional powers about whose opinions the United States might perhaps be concerned.
Since mdependent variables are much more mterestmg when they vaty,^ I selected states based on prnna focfe evidence that would maximize variation in their
^ King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.
91 (I ) identities and (2) images o f the United States. I relied in preliminary investigations on rankings of states in terms of human r%bts and democracy as shorthand for possible states deemed “liberal” and “illiberal” (see Appendbc C). I also considered countries provkhng variation in their relationships toward the US, and yielded the following countries for initial investigation; Japan, France, India, Russia,
China, and Egypt. These initial countrks 6red well m the subjective identifications along the identity matrix, and so were retained in the analysis (see section 3.3).'”^
It is a central task to provide contextual accounts of how political actors understand and interpret their social worlds. The articulations o f chief policymakers in each observer country is key to understanding how they see the events and the actor in fiont of them. These methods are suggested by those claiming “cultural understandings are most observable when made tangible in discourse.”^ Thus, for each country, I identified case by case “who matters” in terms of elites in power whose views constitute the “prevailing v k w ” o f Self and Other in the international system The articulations and representations in discourse of chief policymakers in each country is key to operationalizing both independent and dependent variables.
It is important to note this, as my point in this dissertation is the importance of subjective assessments, not objective indicators. How the states view themselves and otkrs matter, not objective notioos of democracy or alliance, for instance. An “objective” victim of colonialism or hardship may not see itself as a victim, such is the case with Japan in this study. An “objective” ally like France may not bold an “ally image” of the US, m wfakh case the image matters more in n ^ argument
2 0 4 Hudson and Sançson 1999:672-73; Johnston 1996.
92 For Russia, the President, foreign minister, and minister o f defense are the relevant actors.^*’^ For the cases v^dien the Soviet Union still existed, the General
Secretary, ministers o f foreign affairs and defense, and lead editorials in party organs all were eligible for examination of evidence.^ For China, the paramount leader.
General Secretary, Foreign Minister and vice-chairs of the Central Military
Commissfon (CMC) are centraL^^ Their comments are supplemented with editorials of party organs and other well-positioned “America Watchers.”^®* There is a “cozy relationship between the FLA and the CCP” and the input of the military is more extensively involved in matters of security and identity, shaping overall perceptions o f China’s Self and its threat environment.^” For India, the Prime Minister is the key player in foreign policy formulation, despite Constitutional authority given to the
President to command the armed forces.^’" Nehru set the pattern for a strong personal role for the prime minister, and “in the 1990s, India’s prime ministers retain their dominance in the conduct of foreign relations.^ For Japan, the Prime Minkter and
Foreign Mnister are the relevant elites when considering that country’s orientation to
Papp 1994.
Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995:439.
Hamrin 1994; Heaton 1994; Shambaugh 1994:213-115.
Shambaugh 1991.
Li 2001:6,36.
Elkin 1994:474.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/.
93 the world. WfaOe &cing legal, political and organization constraints, “the Prime
Minister is the single most important player” and “the only person who can make a decision” in the realm of foreign policy.^^^ France's Presiaent, like India’s, enjoys de
&cto control of an otherwise constitutionally murky area of foreign affairs Referred to as the “reserved domain,” there are formal powers and expectations of presidential leadership and pre-eminence in matters of defense, security and foreign polky.^'^
Thus the president is ‘^feee to determine the directions and shape the details” of foreign polky “nearly alone,”^^^ save for the foreign and defense mmisters, whom the
President selects. Finally, for Egypt, the President and his foreign minister are the central actors in the decision-making circle in foreign afifans, and so their words and those of the state news source, MENA, are relevant.*'^
3.2.4 Limits, Caveats, and Responses
There are some recognizable limitations to the study of the sort I proposed to implement, among them (I) the ‘smali-N’ problem and generahzability; (2) the
Akihiko 2001:4; Edstrom 1999.
Ben 2000:23-27; Yost 1994.
Friend 1998:200.
^"Leschl995.
94 Imited focus on the US as mtervener, also related to generalizabOity; and (3) multiple issues related to the data sources just described in the previous section.
First, the limited number of cases addressed in this study may lead some to question its generalizabOity. Certainly, as King, Keohane, and Verba pomt out, the idea of statistical generalizabOity is hampered in such smaO-N studies, further harmed by the lack of random selection—which is difBcult to accomplish in the natural setting.''^ Nonetheless, barring random selection, one can maximize the value of cases by intentmnal selection that (1) varies the relevant explanatory and dependent variables; (2) controls for other possible explanatory variables; and (3) allows for comparison with other alternative explanations. I have argued that I have constructed a study that accomplishes these things. Further, McKeown has reminded us o f the value o f case studies beyond the “statistical worldview,” in elucidating “definitions of the situation” that provide insights o f the kind 1 am interested.^'^ The cmafytical, if not statistical, generalizabOity o f the W ings is still pertinent and valuable.
Nonetheless, this should be seen as preliminary work that suggests theoretical insights to be extended in future work.
SimOarly, the focus solely on the US as intervener is a strength and weakness.
On the one hand, it allowed me to control for power and character of the actor as foctors in outcomes so that I could explore other pertinent aspects of the model But
this also Ihnits the generahzability and robustness of any findings. Future work would
King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.
McKeown 1999.
95 broaden the cases to include variation in the state being observed, comparing perceptions of different actors perpetrating the (virtually) same act.^'*
Finally, any study relying significantly on the discourse and statements of political elites runs the risk of several problems; (1) validity; (2) representativeness;
(3) source bias; and (4) tautology. First, can we trust the words gleaned fi-om published sources to be valid indicators of leaders’ “true belfe&’? This is always a problem m any research dealing with the verbal behavior of actors. To the extent possible, multiple sources were used to check for conflicting trends or ideas that would render findings questionable. Fortunately, as I have indicated in the theoretical discussfon above, much of what I seek needs not be the personal indoctrinated beliefo per se of the elites but rather the prevailing views that shape their understandings of themselves and others. Self-image can be internalized but also can mere^ reflect the political structure of legitimacy on which a regime’s authority is built. Either way, it becomes a real, constraining lens through which world affeirs must be filtered. The verbal statements related to images, again, are empirical indicators hypothesized to be related to particular perceptions within the elite, and are not to be taken as the literal direct thoughts o f decision-makers.^
Second, m addressing the concern for “representatwity,” I followed the decision rules of other empirical ana^rses of national identity. Given that the contents
Herrmann and Shannon (2001) do this in an experimental setting.
Herrmann 1985, 1988; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995.
96 and relevance of my inferences rely primarily on source materials, to be representative requires accomplishing three tasks:
(a) First, choose decision-makers who have authority in foreign policy, to serve as ofBcial spokesman for the given country as an international actor. These actors were chosen as described above, and specific actors are listed in Appendix B.
(b) Second, Snd the crucial communications representative of the perspective of these foreign policy elites. I reviewed published, translated speeches and statements from a variety of sources (described in this chapter).
(c) Identify statements from the selected documents included in the study. I reviewed aU statements in the FBIS system in the preceding three months prior to the interventions, and read and analyzed those texts that addressed my relevant variables: their notion o f liberalness, their notion of victimhood, or their view of the United States.^®
A third problem confi-onting this study, and those like it, is the language and access limitations o f this project raise the issue of source bias, which relates as well to validity. In seekmg to understand the perspectives o f many countries across many languies, a language barrier is a real issue, as I am made to rely on English-language sources. The focus on highest dedsionrmakers also puts prohibitive obstacles to more direct access to these sources, such as elite interviews. To the best of my ability, I attempted to ameliorate this problem by triangulating my research with multiple sources, inchidmg FBIS, UN speeches and government documents and media publications. The mukq>le sources, supplemented with secondary sources that reveal more evkience, allow a crosscheck to see that results are consistent across
Edstrom 1999:4. See also discussions in Berger (1998) and Checkel (1999).
97 sources (which they are), serving to confirm or challenge my findings. As a result, I do not &xl these fimhatmns damning of the enterprise I have undertaken.
Last, when elite verbal statements serve as the source of data for independent variables and dependent variables, a legitimate concern arises concerning the risk of tautology. To avoid this problem, care was taken to study only those statements pertaining to the mdependent variables—identity, klentity afiBliates, and images—that were prior to, and independent of the tnne periods and statements associated with a particular intervention.
3.3 Identifymg Observer States
In chapter 2 ,1 posited two fruitfiil divisions o f countries, in terms o f identity and images, then combined them for theoretical expectations in response to military interventions. Regardmg identity, the useful division discussed was that of'insiders” and “outsiders,” related to a country’s perceived sense of self vis-à-vis the
mternatiooal system. Regarding images, I suggested the distinctfon o f positive and
negative images, indicating the valence of stereotypic prevailing views held by
relevant elites in an observing country. The resulting 2 x 2 identity matrix allows for
four types of states: Ingroup Insiders (positive image, insxler identity). Outgroup
Insiders (negative image, insider identity). Ingroup Outsiders, and Outgroup
Outsiders. I revisit the concepts of identity and knage before situatit^ the observing
countrks within this matrix.
98 3.3.1 Revisiting Identity and Images
Establishing the identity of insider or outsider requires a focus on two dimensions of relevance—perceived liberalness and perceived victimhood. I posited that the less liberal and more victûmæd the country feels, the more cautious they will be in interpreting and judging interventions. Their realm of permissible parameters for the use o f force is narrow, as they are disinclined to fovor intervention for “liberal crusades” such as democracy promotion or human rights.
Further, the vktimhood feeling related to past perceived great-power exploits makes them suspicious of the motives of states when using force, adding to the propensity to read interventions m a negative light and setting a high bar for approval.
The more liberal and less victimized a state perceives itself the more forgiving that state will be in its read of intervention, especially with regard to those invoked on behalf of democracy and human rights. There are broader parameters of acceptable force and less baggage tied to the flaunting of power as a sign of attempted domination and exploitation.
Each state was investigated for how they measured on liberal self- identi&ation and the feeling of victimhood. I also researched these states to see how they identified themselves in terms o f the victim scale. This relies much more on self-evaluations by states; in other words, do they speak of theff country in terms of having been or being oppressed, exploded, or victmnzed? Is this a recurring, cmtral feature of the Aetoric o f state identity? “Objective” mdicators, such as whether they
99 actually had a colonial past, are dangerous if not substantiated with subjective identity. That is because not all ex-occupied states feel like victims (eg. Japan) and some states who appear just fine in Great Power status dwell on feelings of humiliation and past injustice to the point, some observe, of obsession.^' When subjectively revealed, however, we shall see that China, India and, to a lesser extent
Russia (the latter aâer 1994), feel like victims of the past or present international system. France and Japan seem not to have such components of their identities, nor did Russia during its immediate post-Sovfet rebirth.
Combinmg the liberal and victm measures. Figure 3.1 yields an array of identities for the countries in question, usefiiUy summarced as “insiders” and
“outsiders.” Insiders are in the upper left-hand quadrant, who deem themselves liberal and part of what has been dubbed the “liberal intematfenal order,”^ and who do not harbor a grievance gainst the system by way o f a victim self-image. Others would then be categorized as “outsiders.” Just as Buzan speaks of “partiaT insiders
and outsiders as well as absolutes,^ we can conceive of those in the bottom-right
quadrant, Ofiberal victims, to be absolute outsklers, feeling neither afiSnity with the
current normative order and feelmg that such an order was in feet built on their backs.
Liberal vktims and illiberal non-vktnns would constitute “outsiders” with regard to
our theoretkal questkns, but would be less severe or more equivocal
For example, China (see Pye 1999).
^ Barnett 1997; Hughes 2000 (chapter 8).
^ Buzan 1996.
100 non-victim FRANCE JAPAN
RUS 94-95 liberal illiberal RUS 98-99 EGYPT INDIA CHINA victim
Figure 3.1 Observer Identities: Insiders and Outsiders
The second relevant component of the identity matrix by which we predict interpretations and judgments of mterventions is the hnages observers have of the intervener. Recalling images to be cognitive, affective and evaluative structures in the mdivKiual and collective mmds o f decision-makers, they mvolve attributes of power and motivation that states are th o i^ t to possess.^ The prevailing im%e leaders have of another affects perception and the interpretation of information 6om that Other. These images also rationalize and justify intergroup relationships, that is the klentification of another as an ingroup or outgroup.^^
An “insider” is a country who is coded as Liberal AND non-victim (ie. The upper left quadrant).
^ Bouiding 1956; Herrmann et aL 1997.
^ Alexander et aL 1999.
lOI I have suggested that “positive images” represent Ii^roup relationships and
“negative images” represent Outgroup relationships. In the literature, the ally image constitutes the “positive image” one may have of another. A state elite with an ally image of another tends to speak of that Other’s motivation in terms of benign intentions and altruism, allowing an afBliation with that state as &vorable and morally accept^le.^^ Power is downplayed as it does not reflect a threat, and the
Other is seen for its complexity of sockty and politics. In terms of negative im^es, enemy and imperial im ages^ discuss rootivatfon in terms of evil and expansionist, c^jability that is strong but vulnerable, and a decision process that is seen as monolithic.^’ Imperialist images reveal cynicism about altruistic motives as well, and motivation is attributed to inqierial designs to inqwse economic, material and kleological wül on the rest of the world. In terms o f power, the Other is seen as the
“hklden hand” behind all that occurs and all bad that happens to the perceiving state, either externally or through subversion internally.^"
As shown m more detail below, the images state elites possessed o f the U.S. were also relatively constant th ro u ^ u t the lO-year period in terms of the dichotomy of negative and positive. Movement nonetheless has occurred along a few lines. The
^ Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995:428; Alexander et aL 1999:79.
^ Also eligible is the “barbarian” image (Alexander et aL 1999), but this did not come mto play in this study so it was not discussed.
^ Herrmann 1988; Cottam and Cottam 2001.
Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995:428.
102 Soviet Union went from a moderate enemy im ^e to a complex (neutral) image by
Gorbachev's end, to Russia’s once blushing with Western fervor and friendship, to soured perceptions as the 1990s progressed. China is also sliding in intensity from seeing the US as a "beautiful imperialist” m 199(P' to nnperialist without the beauty at the start of the Bush administration. India and China have shown negativity throughout this time period, but with increasing tendency toward stereotypical imperial imagery. Japan (and Egypt) meanwhile, hold the US in positive ally images.
France’s images o f the US approximate "complex images” for the lack of intensity in many of the views o f either country’s elites, but those views are rarely positive so they are coded negative.
The result of this investigation, the details of which come next, is an identity matrix featured m Table 3.2, indicating where each observer state is situated for theoretical purposes. Below, I present more detailed reconstructions of the evidence for each country, pointing to the basis for their identity and images in both the articulations of relevant elites and in analyses provided by secondary sources. The mferred identity/image matrix for each country is derived from two main approaches:
(1) a systematic analysis of sample statements by national elites m the precedmg three months before an intervention event; and (2) supplemental analysis txeed on secondary sources of area experts. 1 turn now to describing the identitfes and images of each o f our observer states, explaining their placenoent on the identity matrix.
2 3! Shambaugh 1991.
103 Insider Identity
(+) Positive Image Com plex /O') Negative Image
•JAP•FRA
•RUS 1994-95 •USSR 1991 •USSR 1989 •IND 1989-95 ♦EGY •IND 1998-99 •CHI 1989-91 •RUS 1998-99 • c m 1994-98 • c m 1998-99
Outsit er Identity
Figure 3.2. The Identity Matrix: Observer States
3.3.2 Ingroup Insider. Japan.
Japan, like all states, have multiple identities. Perhaps Japan’s most prevalent, dommant identity is that o f the pacific, liberal ‘‘merchant nation.”^^ Smce the end of
World War Q and its occupatkm, the pacifist culture has emerged and has been documented to be quite powerful and endurmg.^^ Prime Vfinister Kaifu Toshiki
Berger 1998:42.
Maun 1990/91; Berger 1996; Katzenstein 1996b; Katzenstein and Okawara 1996.
104 envisioned the Japanese global role to be “nonnrilitary,” stressing Japan as a civilian power concentrating on economic and environmental issues.^
But an analysis of the relevant dimensions—liberalness and victimhood— produce an identity I suggest helps us understand Japan’s response to military interventions. The liberal institutions imposed from American occupation affected
Japanese culture, from the focus on civil liberties, human rights and democracy, to the constitutionally formalized eschewing of violence as a legitimate method of conflict resolution.^^ Democracy, nnposed from the outside, has taken root in liberal institutions and Japanese culture and identity. The constitution of 1947 provides for civil and political liberties such as speech and assembly, very much in the image of the United States.
Thh summary analysis of secondary sources, suggestmg continuity in the thenxs of Westernism, democracy and humanitarian^ in Japan’s self-hnage,^^ is confirmed by the text analyses conducted in FBIS and the Japanese Diplomatic
Bluebooks that report the speeches and statements of elites. Japanese elites have felt itself as a major power worthy of a global role since the waning days of the Cold
War, but this role is defined usually as nonmilitary, and decidedly Western and liberal Leaders in late 1980s stress “a Jqxm conunensurate with its economic
^ Berger 1998:170.
^ Moody 1995:281-84.
^ Edstrom 1999.
105 affluence,” seeking a global role as contributor to peace and prosperity.^^ The result is an ambivalence that reveals itself in Japan’s reaction to these and other interventions: a distaste for the use of military force but a desire to see Western and international norms validated through a just mechanism.^’ Japan, one leader states,
“must Srmly uphold our ideal of pacifism” while also calling on it to further promote
“international humanitarian cooperation.”^ ’ Identifying with the liberal order,
Japan’s elites argued that it must “expand cooperation with its ideological partners among the advanced industrialized countrfos of the West.”^'***
In the early 1990s, Prime Minister Kaifii Toshiki also envisioned Japan’s global role as a “civilian power” concentrating on economic freedoms and environmental issues.*'*' According to one expert on Japanese foreign policy, a major motivation is the desire to be recognized for achèvements “agamst the standards of the Western liberal international economic order.”^"*^
This quote is from Takeshita, Diplomatic Bltiebook 33{266(), 2/10/89. For a discussion o f thè foreign policy theme, see also Edstrom 1999:134.
This issue arose during the Gulf War, when some criticized Japan’s foot-dragging in responding to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Prime Minister Kaifii’s speech reported in the Diplomatic Bluebook 3S:389f 5/8/91 (see also Edstrom 1999:146).
Fore%n Mmister Taro Nakayama in Tokyo’s KYODO, reported in JvBZS Daily Report: East Asia, 12/24/89.
■'*' Speech m Diplomatic Bluebook 1992 (see also Berger 1998:170).
242 Tamamoto 1997:7.
lOti Analysis of 1994 texts is complicated by the government instability that directed attention away &om international matters for the most part. Tomiichi
Murayama’s coalition government, beaded by the Social Democratic Party, was part of an historic shift away from decades of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
As it turns out, the change in power did not effect radical change in Japan’s self- image or images of the US. Humanitarian aid remained a hallmark o f Japanese foreign policy, leading with donations to developing world areas and pushing democracy at the same time.^^^ Statements m 1995 point to continued pride m identifying itself as an “industrial democracy” and providing aid to even North Korea for “humanitarian consideration,”^** and nothing in the late 1990s challenged this prevailing aspects of Japanese self-image.
In terms of victimhood—defined by statements related to feelings of havmg been or currently being oppressed, exploited or treated unjustly by some or all of international society—there is scarce evidence that this dimension is salient in the self-image of Japanese elites. As indicated in the above statements, there is a great affinity with the liberal order and “international society” in general The only mention of debate about victimhood in the documents reviewed pertains to a brief
Among major reorients in 1994 were India, South Africa and Eastern Europe; in the latter, as in Russia, Japanese officmis tfod aid to lectures on the virtue of democratization and “transition.” See reports m The Hindu, 7/1/94, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia; Johannesburg SAPA, 7/6/94, in FBIS Daily Report.'Africa; and Begii% Xinhua, 9/1/94, m FBIS Daily Report.China.
The former reported in Seoul YONHAP, 6/21/95; the latter reported in The Korea Times, 5/28/95, both in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia.
107 public rekindling of the role of Japan in Asia preceding and during World War II. A secondary cabinet member had put a “positive spin” on Japan’s Asian occupation, while implying Japan’s own hardships under the circumstances, but Prime Minister
Tomiichi Murayama criticsed and rebuked the statements, and most reafBrmed not victimhood but guilt and reconciliation regarding the war.^^^
In terms of images of the US, these positive statements about the West portend the positive image Japan holds of the United States. The view of the US as a great ally has enjoyed a “great degree of continuity” across the years, emergmg &om postwar occupation into an increasingly friendly relationship from the long rule of the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) through the new coalitions led by the Japan New
Party that came to power in 1993.^“*^ Despite rocky trade relations in the late 1980s, when this study begins, there has been an interest in Japanese leaders to build personal relationships and “smooth irritations.”^^^
Japan and the US have strong military and economic ties, feeding the propensity to see the relationship in mutually beneficial terms, thus furthering the need to justify the goodness of this strategic partner. Japanese leaders see thefr state
Reported in Beijing Xinhua, 8/13/94, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
Berger 1998:181-84.
Prime Mmister Takeshita expressed these hopes in February 1989 (New York Times, 2/3/89).
108 as a “member of the Western side” of “advanced democratic nations” and embraces
“mutual solidarity and collaboration” with the United States."**
Referring to the relationship with the US as “the axis” and “the cornerstone of
Japanese diplomacy,” Japan’s leadership in the late 1980s, including Takeshita and
Toshiki, stressed openly the past, present, and feture “friendly and cooperative relations” with the United States.^*’ At one tnne, the US is referred to as “aH- powerfUl and benevolent,”^® attributing the notion o f benign hegemony that
American ofBcials can only hope for from others. Leaders talk explicitly of the US and Japan as allied countries into the 1990s, framing the relationship in terms o f a
“global partnership.”^ ' Speaking o f their “same values,” some glowmgly speak o f a
“Pax Consortis” under a “shared vision” with the United States, seemingly happy to let the US lead .^ Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro even spoke of a “shared fete” with the US, citing the shared (liberally defined) goals of “fiee trade” and
“humanitarfen goals.”^^
24S Takeshita, Diplomatic Bluebook 32:303,1/25/88; 33:268-69,2/10/89.
See Edstrom 1999 for summaries; also Takeshita speech. Diplomatic Bluebook 32:303.
^ Foreign Vfinistry remarks, reported in The New York Times, 3/7/89.
Kaifii, Diplomatic Blr^ebook 35:369, 10/12/90 (see also Edstrom 1999:145,148).
^ PM Kiichi, reported in Edstrom (1999:155).
^ Tamamoto 1997:7.
109 These positive feelings toward US power and motives continues into the mid-
1990s. SDP rule ended the cozy Japanese relationship whh the US military under the
LDP, with Murayama coming out against sanctions on North Korea and new US bases in Japanese territory.^ Also, trade wars loomed for a time between the two allies, mostly over automotive parts and market access.^^ Nonetheless, these issues signaled no policy change nor change in overall assessments of the US. Observers and oflBcials alike reaflSrmed their “tilt toward America.”^ This “tüt” also persists through renewed economk ti& with the US in 1998 and the return of the LDP to power.**^ The closeness was affimoed in the wake o f North Korean missile tests over
Japan, and President Clinton was warmly received as a “ftwnd” of the Japanese in a visit that year.^* The spillover into 1999 reflected renewed cooperation with their
“ally” that placed lingering economk disputes (over steel) on the back burner.^’
The overall evidence in this collection of texts, primary and secondary, substantiates the notion that Japan perceives the US m a fovorable light, indicatmg an ingroup feeling and positive image o f the US.
^ Bering Xinhua Servke report, 6/30/94, in FBIS Daily Report:China.
Reported in Bangkok’s The Nation, 5/26/95, in FBIS Daily Report:East Asia.
Reported in Bangkok’s The Nation, 5/5/95, in FBIS Daily Report:East Asia.
^ See Hong Kong AFP, 11/12/98, in FBIS Daily Report. East Asia.
Reports in Hong Kong AFP, 8/31/98 and 11/19/98; in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia.
Reports in the Seoul Chui^ang Ilbo, 1/26/99 and the Seoul KBS-1 Tekviskn Network, 3/13/99, in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia.
110 3.3.3 Outgroup Insider France
France, on the other hand, is distinctly liberal by its own accounts but does not share Japan’s perceptions of the US as a “good friend” and “partner.” France sees its role in the world as both unique example of civilization and bastion of liberty and equality,^®® as well as a self-image as “the leading” European power m security af&irs.^' It prides itself on championne democracy and sees itself as the “cradle and champion of human rights,”^^^ as is seen in their rhetoric pertaining to Bosnia and
Kosovo. French identity is also said to be gaming an “mcreasingly 6vorable appreciation of liberalism.”^^^
Such observations are reinforced with the analysis of primary texts. Though direct evidence of liberal dimensions of French self-image are scant in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there are fleeting references of support for the velvet revolution transpiring in Eastern Europe, including the boast of “example” for “liberty” and
“equality.”^^ In 1994, French elites from Foreign Minister Alam Juppe to
Ehrmann and Schain 1992.
Duke et aL 2000:130.
Duke et aL 2000:130.
^ Safran 1998:63.
^ Foreign VOnistry statements, 12/11/89 and 11/1/90, reported in Paris AFP, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe.
Ill presidential hopeful Jacques Chirac were touting the importance of human rights and criticizing the world for a sluggish response to genocide in Rwanda.^®^
The following year marked a significant shiA in power, as Socialist Mitterand was replaced by Jacques Chirac, the attention remained on liberal themes of democracy and human rights. With regard to developments in Bosnia, Chirac declared “we shall not accept the return of ethnk hatred and of barbarity to the cootinent."^^ This continues in 1998 with French positions on the “human condition” in the Middle East and the Balkans.^^^ And m 1999, with another Balkan crisis on the front burner, France took a lead role dealing with the diplomatic front over Kosovo. French ofkials stressed continuously both human rights and the need to “brmg democracy” and stability to the Balkans’®* (It is not a great surprise, then, to find French reaction to the Kosovo intervention fovorable, as French forces participated—see Chapter 5).
There is, perhaps not surprisingly, no sense of victimhood in the rhetoric of
French elites, securing its place as an Insider on the identity matrix. In the documents reviewed from 1989-1999, there is no mention o f feeling persecuted or exploited by the international system (although, as discussed below, there is evidence of increased
Reported in Paris AFP, 6/23/94, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe.
Quoted in Paris AFP, 6/2/95, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe.
Defense Minister Richard refers to the pfight in Kosovo, Paris AFP, 10/24/98; Chirac remmds the world of the French humanitarian impulse in Afrka, chiding others m the process, Paris AFP, 11/27/98, m FBIS Daily Report: Western Europe.
Vedrme, quoted in Paris AFP, 1/29/99, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe.
112 feelings of a system un£iirty dominated by the US). To the extent that France held a
“Third Worldist” orientation to many issues particularly durit% the Cold War and late
1980s under Mitterand,^*’ there is sympathy for the plight o f those deemed victims, but this does not translate into victimhood itself.
Despite being an ofBciaf objective ally o f the US, through NATO if nothmg else, it is well-known that the (mutual) perceptions of these countries are not so cozy as, say, Japan’s view of their military partner. The rhetoric and views of the US for
French elites since the 1980s has reflected a complex image of their Atlantic partner, lacking an intense stereotypic view. Nonetheless, a pattern of negativism is present, signifying at least a minor case of the nnperialist image. Though not to the point of hostility or outward rancor, there is a mfld case o f an imperialist image, with French elites chafing at US hegemonism in need of temperance and resistance. France has articulated these sentiments, which date back at least to de Gaulle’s independence fi"om the US, and backed them with calls for a European De&nse Force to handle its af&irs without US meddling.^^° The enduring Gaullist line considers rapprochement with the US to be “heresy.”^^'
The “Third-Worldist” orientation to many issues in the Middle East and
Central America under Mitterand put France at odds with American anti-communism
Smith 1995:129.
Bakomb 1997.
Friend 1998:198.
113 in the waning days of the Cold W ar/^ “The fimdamental problem in French-
American relations,” one ofihcial observes, is “the American attempt to assert leadership with little or no real consultation.”^^ This tension continued mto the
1990s. Evidence of a negative slant is in actions and deeds. From the attempt to banish Americanized English from French advertising,^'* to the increasingly intense campaign for a Europe-only defense because the “Union must have the capacity for autonomous action,”^’^ the US is the focus of French elite resentment. NATO to
Mitterand was seen as “an obsolescent vehicle for US pohtkal dominance.”^^^
Whereas French elites considered itself a “lead nation,”^^ taking the largest role in peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, both Presidents Mitterand and Chirac criticized
the US for both “dragging its feet” in some cases (Rwanda, Somalia) and improper
“power poHtfcs” and unilateral hubris in other cases (Iraq; trade).^^* By 1998, the US
Smith 1995:129.
^ Reported in Friend (1998:226).
New York Times 3/15/94, Al:2.
So says the text of a 1998 defense declaration with the UK {FBIS Daily Report: Western Europe). See also Menon 1997.
276 Reported in Friend (1998:252).
^ The reference to “leadership” in Bosnia I reported in Friend (1998:221-25); regardmg a lead role m the brewing Kosovo crisis, see report in Paris Agence France Press, 12/3/98, m FBIS Daily Report: West Etirope.
Mitterand is reported m Paris AFP, 6/23/94; Quotes of Chirac on “nnproper power politics” and the “recourse to unilateralian” come from Paris AFP, 11/27/98 and Paris AFP, 11/12/98, m FBIS Daily Report:West Europe.
114 was viewed as increasingly bullying, with Foreign Minister Vedrine referring to
American “hyperpower”—a tendency to “go too fer” to exploit in dominance in economic and political matters."^ Concern for American “unilateralism” is cited as a cause for concern in issues ranging from trade disputes over bananas to the anticipated response to Iraqi intransigence.^*” This division between two “objective” allies lingers in France’s views o f interventions discussed below.
3.3.4 Ingroup Outsider: Egypt.
The prevailing identity that is contemporary Egypt can be considered an
Ingroup Outsider, given its positive view of the US and mild but persistent references to its position vis-à-vis the West and the history it has endured. Its association with the non-aligned is in tact, joining conferences and speaking of the collective troubles and promises against a system stacked against it. It is also not liberal by any stretch, despite its sometimes claims to be. Aside from touting its freedom of expression that allows mass and media criticism of the US, the West and especially Israel,^* its democracy and human rights records are dubious (see Appendix C). The Egyptian
Interview of Vedrine in Madrid’s El Pais, 7/5/98, m FBIS Daily Report. West Europe.
^ Regarding the “Banana Dispute,” see Foreign Ministry statement, in Paris AFP, 11/12/98; regarding Iraq, Chirac’s statements are reported in Paris AFP, 11/14/98, in FBIS Daily Report:West Europe.
281 Price 1999.
115 Organization for Human Rights reported often of abuses by state instruments, including torture of prisoners by security forces.^^
Subjectively speaking, though, Mubarak projects a self-image of one with mixed feelings, talking of “moving his land toward real democracy,” but also bristling at outside criticism of human rights and the record of democracy, given the domestic threats and difBculties Mubarak sees conftonting Egypt. He has eliminated opposition groups from participation and holds elections for Parliament surrounded by violence and opposition boycotts.^ The vktimbood dimension is much more clear and present in texts and statements of what Egypt “is.”
What Egypt “is” for Egyptian elites is still a member o f the struggling non-
aligned states amidst a world of Western domination. In 1989, Mubarak spoke at
various times of a need for a “strategy of its own” to “counter all stances in Europe or
elsewhere.”^*^ Calling itself the “vanguard m supporting” Arabs and Africans alike
against “colonialism, apartheid...discrimination,” Egypt joined Chinese ofiBcials in
declaring a “shared struggle to safeguard national independence” and “oppose
hegemomsm.”^*^ Mubarak speaks of “our third world” at this time, and how “our”
Reported m the New York Times 1/16/90.
^ Reported m the New York Times 11/30/90.
Reported and quoted out of the “Arab Natfon,” picked up by Xinhua out of Cairo, 12/19/89, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-89-243).
Quotes from joint briefing and statements o f Egypt and China, m Xinhua, 12/19/89, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-89-243).
116 problems afifect both the Third World “and the rich world.”^** This outsider viewpomt continues through the end of the Cold War, with ofBciai references to theh
“special” kind of democracy amidst questionable elections, and reiterating the
“independent” nature of Egypt as leader of “developing”countries and Arabs aBke.^
With the increasing carnage h Bosnia, Egypt begins in 1995 to speak more of itself as a member o f the “mtemational community” and as “a state mterested in human rights.”^'^ Still, these references appear to be fleeting and contextually attached to the issues of Bosnia and Kosovo (see Chapter 6). In terms of enduring identity themes, the nonaligned, independent outsider provides continuity in discussions of the exploitation of the less developed world and the need for redress.^^
Egyptian ofiBcials reiterate in the latter 90s Egypt’s “rejection of foreign interference”
Mubarak quoted in Cairo MENA, 12/18/89, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-89-243).
On the issue of democracy in Egypt, see report in Cairo Al-Mussawar, 8/5/94, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-94-050). On its “independent” worldview, see Musa comments in Cairo MENA, 1/13/91, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-91-OlO), and PM ‘Atif Sidqi, in Cairo MENA, 1/17/91, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-9I-0I3). On its “developing” worldview, see Ministry statements reported out of Xinhua Cano, 9/16/#, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-94-183).
Musa, quoted in Cairo MENA, 6/17/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-117). On the Muslim connection and Egypt’s view of Bosnia generally, see Chapter 6.
Ambassador to the US, Ahmad Mahir, intervfewed in Al-Musawwar, 1/20/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NFS-95-016).
117 in the “internal afifehs” of others.^^ Egypt contmues to pledge itself to causes from the Palestinians to its “sisters” of Africa, whom Egypt asserts to devote “national action...to helping the nations overcome the stage of backwardness, jom the bandwagon of modernization, and improve the standard of living.”^^'
Egypt’s identity could place its leadership in tension with their erstwhile economic patron, the United States. A bene&iary of US aid since the Camp David agreement brought peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt has to be careful about the appearance of friendly, close ties with the US while maintaining its outsider identity.^” Still, when it comes to perceptions of US actions and intentions, the positive image Mubarak’s government holds of the US reveals little concern. The
President has often publicly praised the US, in 1995 calling it “a full partner in the peace process” and exalting its leadership and rote in regional diplomacy.^’^ Though differences arise in the pace and thrust of Arab-lsraeli peace, ofBcials return again to
Briefing by Assistant Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Gheh, in Cairo MENA, 12/8/98, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98-342). Apparently this official stand excepts Bosnia and Kosovo—see chapter 6.
Mubarak, reported in Cairo MENA, 8/17/98, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98-221). This assistance is a “rote we shall never abandon,” continues Mubarak, suggesting a similarity to India’s continued prominence of the non-aligned identity (see below). On Palestinian self-determination, see attention given by Musa in Cato MENA, 3/18/99, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-99-03I8).
On the politics oflabelirg states as Western influenced, see Barnett 1998 (particularly p. 219).
Reported m Cairo MENA, 11/29/95, in FBIS Daily Report:Near East/South Asia (NES-95-242).
118 how “diflFerences” are normal, manageable and not reflective o f US character.^^
Musa refers to the US power and politics as "balanced," not dominating or imperial,"®^ and there are repeated references to warm contacts between the two countries, "common interests” in the stability of the Mediterranean, as well as a
“trust” developed that belies any notion of negative imagery/^ None of this is uncommon knowledge, as Egypt economically and politically is feirly close to the
United States. What is interesting to observe is the interplay o f the Outsider and Arab identity with such a positive image—this interplay is investigated in Chapter 6.
3.3.5 Outgroup Outsiders: India and China
What of the states identi&d as "outgroup outsiders”? India and China are chief among them, and they share common features that translate into common responses to interventions in the empirical chapters (Russia, we shall see, is at times coded an outgroup outsider but, because of its shifting identity in the period under investigations, Russia is given separate treatment below). I take each in turn.
Ambassador Mahir, mterviewed in Al-Musawwar, 1/20/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-0I6).
Musa quoted in Cairo MENA, 12/15/98, discussing regional and global American stances, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98-349).
Positive contacts are discussed by Mubarak m Cairo MENA, 8/20/98, regarda^ the peace process; over Iraq in Cairo MENA, 11/17/98; and “common interests” are discussed by Musa in Cairo MENA, 6/17/95, all m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia.
119 India is an outsider that happens to be rather liberal in nature. This means its
"'outsider" quality must come from its self-unage of victimhood, dating to its colonial history and position in the less-developed world that is still very pertinent to the
"collective psyche” of India’s elites and masses alike. As leader of the Non-aligned
Movement (NAM) for some time, India embraced the position of the ex-colonial developing state, mindful and distrustM of the Western powers from whom they forged their independence. Unlike with Egypt, India places the US in this Western light, though its negative images have fiuctuated m intensity. 1 consider the liberal and victim dimensions of identity below, before turning to the discussion of images.
India is modeled somewhat on the West, promoting economic Hberalizatfon'^ and priding itself on being the world’s “largest democracy.”^’* But this quest for a naodem, secular, democratic state is tempered by the need for consolidating its polity mto a cohesive whole, which many Indian leaders feel is difficult under mtemal and external pressures to the state.^^ Wracked with domestic terrorism, separatum and strife, India has feced criticism for its human rights record in response to destabilizing forces, and this has perpetuated “angry” resentment within government circles.^
^ Schuhnan 2000:379.
Quoted in Bangalore Deccan Herald, 5/27/94, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-94-034).
See PM Vajpayee’s comments on “secularism” and democracy, reported in Cairo’s MENA, 7/3/98, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98-I84). On Inffia’s secular democrats commitments, see also Chadda 1997.
A bout o f incidents led to critfeism by the Clmton Administratfon in 1994 (New York Times 3/10/94, p.A9).
120 u s human rights reports are called “outlandish” and “anti-India move,”^°‘ and India’s
Home Secretary relayed the “ofi^riai reaction” to an ICJ finding about India’s human rights; namety, that it was “a totalfy perverse document...lacking any objectivity.”^*^
To the extent that its 6te is attributed to such outside forces and India’s kaders feel picked on, it is best characterized as an outsider, though of the liberal ilk. Its opposition to interventfons, then, are less likely to be about the liberal norms m question but the sensitivity of its victimhood identity when confronted with, especially unauthorized. Western force.
In terms of its self-image vis-à-vis the international system, past and present, the dominant theme m the analysis o f texts is one o f victimhood. As evkienced by the address of the 1998 Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement by the Prime Minister of India, this aspect of India’s identity is alive and welL He spoke of revitalizing the
NAM agenda, pomtn% out concerns o f developing countrfes and listmg the exploits to whkh they are still subject in the mtemational econony and elsewhere. This includes the imposition of human rights standards by the West at the expense of developing countrfes. The Prune Minister reiterated the theme that economic, socml and cultural rights have been ignored and “trampled on” by colonialism, while the
\finistry response to US Congressional resohitfon to cut aid due to human ri^us in Jammu and Kashmir, reported m Bangalore Deccan Herald, 5/27/94, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-94-034).
^*^ Secretary Padmanabhaiah’s remarks relayed in Delhi’s The Pioneer, 3/7/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-045).
121 West’s ‘partial and self-serving” approach ironically indicts impoverished states for violations o f rights based on Western standards.^°^
So India’s non-aligned identity is steeped in the image of champion of those exploited and disadvantaged by the international system, past and present. This reflects their self-inn^e of their past position of being subjected to outside rule and the lingering effects on its statehood today. Especially nationalists like the BJP party elites talk of “humiliation,” of being a “huge but weak country.” In 1998, PM
Vajpayee declared “we are weak, we are poor, we are mocked around the world.”^®*
India’s identity goes virtually hand-in-hand with a negative image of the U.S.
India, while not stringently anti-American per se, reveals the sticky durability of cultural forces beyond what some inside critics would call “rationaT’ or practical circumstances. Many speak of India’s Non-Alignment (NAM) leadership identity as outmoded and “meaningless,” “inflexible,” ineffectual, and “prisoner of a dead past,” and call for India to “reorient and reshape” this role orientation to fit the post-Co Id
War world.^”^ Yet the identity endures, revealh% its constraining effects in responses to these and other interventfons.
The anti-imperial non-alignment identity has been called the “cornerstone of
India’s fo re ^ policy” from the beginning.^ To the extent that Indmn foreign polky
http://www.un.int/india/ind 1 .htm.
Quoted in Schulman 2000.
305N a u t# 1996:1-8; Jain 1996:11; Gordon 1995:252; Thakur 1994:14.
Jain 1996:11.
122 has any conceptual underpinning, writes Thakur, “it is to be found in non- alignment.”^®^ Between East and West in the Cold War, India represented and spoke for those striving for independence and autonomy from the grip of any Great Power.
Its core values of opposition to imperialism and defense of “3"* world” state rights and justice guide perceptions of the actions of major powers.^®^ Formerly an approach “between alliance and withdrawaT that mvolved political noninvolvement with Cold War quarrels, the identity and posture of nonalignment has “imbued Indian people with a sense of pride about an international role befitting their country’s greatness.”^®® Especially given the nation-building challenges of the patchwork democracy, India has sought such a basis for a “more cohesive polity.”^'®
It has been said, though, that in the emerging post-Co Id War order, where there are no longer two superpowers between whkh to situate oneself “nonalignment becomes plain anti-Americanism.”^ ' ' This is when the story gets complex. There is a definite streak of anti-American sentiment and suspicion about US motives and power, but it is not outright hostility as the two states enjoy feirfy pleasant economk
^®^ See references to non-alignment and India’s identification with it and “like- minded” people, reports in Beijing Xinhua (12/19/98) and Bangalore Deccan Herald (3/30/99), in FBIS Daily Report: China arid FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia. For a discussion, see Thakur 1994:14.
^®* Mazrui 1978.
^ Thakur 1994:15,30.
^'® Chadda 1998.
Jain 1996:13.
123 and diplomatic ties. While forging new ties with the superpower in the 1990$, it has done so while conflicted about the relationship they share. ‘Tear and doubt about the regional role of the US has not been entirely removed,” says one scholar, building off years of suspicion about US motives stemming in part from weapons sales to rival
Pakistan and the Teddy-Rooseveltesque flaunting of the US 7* fleet in the Bay of
Bengal in 1971.^'^
While its “interests” may seem to point to the need for friendly US relations, there is still a significant element that resents US dominance m the world system and that sees the US as “prime upholder of undesirable structures.”^ There has been a see saw of cooperation, inctudmg joint military exercises^and trade, living alongside sanctions over nuclear testing and the continued distrust of the powerfiiL In the waning days of the Cold War, it appeared a new relationship would emerge.
Prime Minister V.P. Smgh spoke o f efforts to “improve relations with the United
States,”^ d e sp ite hngermg suspicions about the US by officials as too powerful and
pushy. By the mid-1990s India seemed to be courting, and was courted by, all major
players: the US, China, and Russia. AH are observed as having “unproved ties,” but
Gordon 1995:253-54.
Limaye 1993 (partkularly chapter I).
Jomt exercises, “opening the door to closer military cooperation,” reported by Beijing Xinhua, 9/10/94, in FBIS Daily Report.Chim (CHI-94-1 77).
Singh, quoted in Delhi Domestic Service, 12/19/89, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-89-243).
124 the joint declarations with China and Russia continued to side with ‘Noninterference” and Niultipoianty,” statements noticeably absent in American relations.^
Especially in 1998-1999, the mood toward Washington had soured significantly, over nuclear testing and unilateral interventions described below. Indian officials cha&d at US sanctions that followed the May 1998 nuclear tests, and they began to speak of the US as “childish,” “hypocritical” and ‘hneddling.’’^'^ As we shall see in the following chapters, the hostile view o f American preponderance culminates in calls fiom Delhi, Beijing and Moscow for a possible alliance to counteract and oppose
“hegemony.”^'* The trajectory oflndian images fi-om 1989-1999, then, is one of an increased negative intensity stoce 1998 after a prior weak, ambivalent negative view.
China’s identity has undergone transformation during the same period as the breakup o f the Soviet Unmn. Unlike Moscow, though, the shift is within an identity- matrix cell, not across them. It remains illiberal and victimized in its self-image, though the latter seems to have increased and, with it, a negative view of the US.
See various reports: PM Rao visits Moscow, 6/30/94, in Moscow Interfiix, in FBIS Daily Report:Central Eurasia (SOV-94-127); PM Rao receives Chinese delegation, 9/12/94, in Beijing Xinhua, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-94-177).
See testimony and statements fi’om various administrative officials in the Bangalore Deccan Herald, 7/28/98, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98-209).
The proposals for an “Eastern axis” of alliance between Beijing, Moscow, and Delhi, to balance US power are reported in Bangalore Deccan Herald, 12/22/98 (NES-98-356) and 3/30/99 (NES-99-0329) m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia
125 Below, I explore the basis for the conclusion of identifying China as an Outgroup
Outsider.
The new China has abandoned Maoist/Mandst ideology for conservative nationalism.^'^ Tienanmen Square massacre capped a growing sense of an identity crisis, that communism was no longer a rallying cry for the cohesion of the diverse country.^^" The new identity to emerge has been of a nationalist China worthy of
Great Power status and respect.^^' The feeling of victimhood in China is thus gaining ground as it gains power. The collective memory, stoked by elites for political gain, of a “century o f humiliation” at the hands of the West,^^ makes Chinese identity akin to other less developed and marginalized “outsider” states, such as India. Jiang Zemin speaks of “a long, miserable past during which it was bullied, divided, enslaved and plundered by the world powers.”^^ China’s elites, suggests one China expert, “have inherited a deep and abidmg anxiety and uncertainty about China’s place in the international order.’^^'*
Cries 1999; Li 2001.
Kim and Dittmer 1993:286.
Johnston 1999:282-83; Levine 1994:32.
Statements reported in DeOios 1997:215; Van Ness 1993:213; Shambaugh 1991:81.
Quoted m speech reported by Beijmg Xmhua, 9/6/94, in FBIS Daily Report. Chim (CHI-94-172).
Hamrin 1994:75-76.
126 With twin suspicions of internal dissent and external pressures. China is extremely sensitive to any tampering with its borders or domestic politics. The belief that foreign elements and ideas are interfering with China's internal af&irs makes it suspicious of the US in partkular. The catchphrase for China is the ‘Tive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” summarized as; (I) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-interforence in each other’s internal afifoirs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.^^
These are not just ideas, they represent the core of China’s measuring stick of international relations. Defensive and insecure, China befiiends those who pledge to and live by them, and becomes critical when states intervene in “domestic affoirs.”
China instead pushes alternative conceptions o f rights, leading to a discussion o f the liberal dimension. The hallmarks o f China’s view of human rights include a push for cultural tolerance, relativism and noninterference. People’s “rights” are collective, not individual, as in the “rights o f people in selecting their own social system and development mode”^^^—without external interference. Democracy in
China means socialist democracy, serving the interests of the workers and peasants and providing economic equality rather than providing expression and majority rule.
1949 is bailed by Chinese ofiBcials as the “new democratism,” where the people
From a speech by Jiang Zerom in Russia, 9/6/94, reported in Xinhua, FBIS Daily ReporuChim (CHI-94-172). Note the principles appear numerous times in numerous documents.
Quote o f Jiang, 9/6/94, in Xinhua, FBIS Daily Report (CHI-94-172).
127 (through a revolutionary elite) are presumed to be spoken for.^^^ Jiang Zemin defines democracy thus: In a “diverse and colorful world, there cannot and should not be only one mode of democracy;” rather, “the coexistence of democracy in different modes is in itself an embodiment of democracy.” He offers that m China’s “period of new democratic revolution...the people, beû^ the masters of the country, now enjoy ample democracy
As for human rights, the Chinese, and some say Asian, conception o f human rights is embodied in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, which states:
[We] recognize that while human rights are universal, (they) must be considered in the context o f a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting bearing in mmd the significance o f national and regional partkularitKS and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.^^’
China’s approach and diplomacy thus stress this shared Asian perspective reflecting the primacy of individual relationships with the state, as a counterweight Western human rights defined by political and civil liberties.^^’ Chinese Premier Li Peng vowed in the early 1990s that China “attaches great importance to” human rights but af&ms that mdividual rights cannot infiinge on “the interests o f the state, society or
Quote of Jiang Zemin in speech given 9/3/94, reported in Xinhua, in FBIS Daily Report:Chim (CHI-94-172).
^ Report firom a News conference covered by Xinhua, in FBIS Daily Report:China (CHI-94-176).
Hansen 1997:85.
Johnston 1999:296.
128 coUective.”^^' Zhu Muzhi, representative of the Chinese government for human rights, highlights the dehnitional differences thus: “The US with its crime, violence and racial tension, has no right to lecture China,” which lacks certain political freedom but whose people “live in reasonable harmony and can walk the streets” sa61y/^^ On the issue of individual rights, China claims to be making some headway,^^^ but warn against pressure tactics and “bullying” by outside powers/^^
And so China àces the insecurity of being illiberal in a world where Western ideals are being pressured with sanctions and interventions, and of feeling a victim dating from the legacy of 19* Century imperialism.^^^ The twin aspects of the outsider identity collide in episodes such as the June 4* pro-democracy demonstrations, which Chinese elites considered “counter-revolutionary rebellion” fostered by the US and others trying to undermine China.^^ Premier Li Peng warned thereafter against foreign “hostile forces” working to subvert communism in China^^^
Quoted in Wilson 1993:122.
New York Times, August 28, 1994.
333For an official statement, see httn.7/un.fTnprc.gov.cn/eng/index.html
Jiang Zemin, quoted by Hong K ot^ Ta Kung Pao, 6/25/98, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-98-176). This includes a pledge to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Johnston 1999:282-83.
Shambaugh 1991:273; Johnston 1999:294; Wilson 1993:123.
Quoted m the New York Times, 1/11/90, AI.
129 As with India, and characteristic o f the inçerialist image, China sees these Westem- rights pressures and influences as holding it back and undermining it horn within.
Regarding the image o f the US, the evidence shows a negative image wax and wane in intensity, Grom a hostile image post-'June 4” to nearly amicable relations in the mid 1990s to, as with India (and Russia), an increased sense o f hegemony and negativism by decade’s end. The negative view o f the US has been coupled with the increased insecurity of China since the events of June 4. Many elites see the US as
“ideological enemies” charged with seeking to discredit socialist ideology and overthrow the rule of the CCP.^^* From its assistance to Taiwan to the promotion of human rights and democracy where China's record lacks, the US comes across as intrusive and, given its power and penchant for intervention, quite threatening. A leading expert on Chinese perceptions o f the US, David Shambaugh, calls Chinese understanding of the US “shallow and seriously distorted.”^^’ Mostly, such perceptions surround Marxist ideas that the US seeks ever-e:q)anding market control and profits and “begemonist” ideas that the US seeks global suprenoacy.^'*^ This latter view, and the most negative images o f the US, reside in the perceptions o f defense and military elites of the Central Military Commission, who have access to and a
338 Levine 1994:42.
Shambaugh 1991:41. Shambaugh’s work is an image analysis o f China’s perceptions until the late 1980s, so it offers an excellent supplement to this analysis, mcluding in-depth analysis o f original-language sources.
Shambaugh 1991:226-46.
130 “cozy relationship with” decision-making authorities.^'** To them, there is a perceived vulnerability owing to US technological superiority and the belief that the
US is expansionist and bent on regional and global domination.^'*^ This “arrogance” of influence and forced ideology that China sees flom the West is seen as “the true essence of US hegemonism,” which is to “divide and Westernize” China and keep it from “gaining its rightful status as a Great Power.”^'*^ The emphasis for its identity is not expansive notions o f rights to intervene but conservative notions stressing noninterference, sovereignty and mutual respect as the path to “peaceful coexistence.”^'*'*
Nonetheless, an olive branch was offered by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, calling for a “new pattern” in Sino-American relations, albeit “without US interference in China’s internal af&irs.”^'*^ Ministry spokesmen have spoken of
“common interests” that could bring the US and China together “so long as” the US
“abides by the Five Principles of PeaceM Coexistence.”^'** By 1994, President
Clinton greased the wheels by de-linking MFN consideration from human rights, and
^‘** Li 2001.
^•*^ Shambaugh 1999/2000:57-61.
Van Ness 1993:211; Johnston 1999:294.
^ Li Peng quoted in Tokyo KYODO, 9/8/94, in FBIS Daily Report.Chim (CHI-94- 173). See also Scalapino 1993:234; Yunling 2000:124-25.
345Quoted in the New York Times 3/28/89.
^ Ministry o f Foreign Af&irs Spokesman quoted by Beijing Domestic Service, 12/15/89, in FBIS Daily Report: Chim (CHI-89-240).
131 the two countries signed an “Industrial Cooperative Framework Agreement.”^^^ This led Chinese officials to temper their views of the US, and even conservative Premier
Li Peng spoke of “mutual benefits,” so long as the US tried to “confront” the other politically.^^ This was a difficult condition, given the issue o f Taiwan. At the same time as de-linkage and Clinton’s visit to China, the US also welcomed Taiwanese officials to Washington, prompting outcries from Beijing, who sees Taiwan as part of their “domestic a&irs.” So, even amidst a general warming, the prevailing view of the US was one of a source of threat to internal stability and external policy. Foreign
Minister Qian reiterated the demand for “noninterference” and spoke of the need to confront “hegemony” (in reference to the US); while the Ministry spokesman condemned US “interference in the internal af&irs o f China.”^^^
The ambivalent stance toward the US continued through 1998, with Jiang and
Clinton exchanging state visits while still combating on Taiwan, entry into the WTO, and recurring human rights reports by the State Department and Congress. The balance began to tilt toward a more intensely negative hnage toward the end of 1998 and intol999. China renewed criticisms o f the US as a meddling superpower when responding to claims of “religious intolerance” linked to the handling of the Falun
Reported in Beijmg Zhongguo Xinwen, 9/7/94, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-94-173).
Li Peng, quoted in Tokyo KYOEXD, 9/8/94, 'mFBIS Daily Report:China.
Qian is quoted in Xmhua, 9/13/94; spokesman Shen Guofimg is quoted in Tokyo KYODO, 9/8/94; both in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-94-178 and CHI-94-173 respectively).
132 Gong. Citing “unfounded and unreasonable charges,” ofBcials called the report
“rumors, Ëibrication and distortions” that combined with a “threat” from the US to
China’s handling of domestic af&irs.^^° It is in this context of renewed doubt and sensitivity about the last superpower’s intentions that the US takes unilateral action in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. The following chapters show how these actions helped push China’s images in a negative direction. At this time, China and Russia issue a “joint statement” of goals and priorities o f a new relationship, which includes
“opposing hegemony” and “establishing multipolarity” for the promotion of peace and stability.By 1999, interest in the “Eastern axis,” discussed above, emerges, as do more statements on the need to “oppose hegemony.”^^
3.3.6 Out, In, and Out Again: Russia’s “Identity Crisis”
Russia’ identity and US images are the most dynamic of the countries studied here and in this time frame. This perhaps is not surprising, as it dramatically underwent a physical and social identity crisis with the dissolution of the Soviet
Ministr>' spokesman quoted in Beijmg Xinhua, 10/15/98, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-984014).
Reported in Beijing Xinhua, 11/23/98, in FBIS Daily Report. China (CHI-98-327). The “Joint Statement” concludes a high-level meeting between Jiang Zonin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
Jiang’s New Year’s speech, reported m Beijing Xinhua Domestm Service, 1/2/99, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-99-002).
133 Union at the start of the 1990s/^^ With the Cold War over and the Soviet compass for steering policy vanquished, Russia had to begin anew, defining itselfi its interests and its role in the world. This led to a period, still unfinished, o f debate about the definition of Russia’s identity and interests.^^ From my best assessment of primary and secondary documents, Moscow can be argued to have gone from an Outgroup
Outsider to an Outgroup Insider in the late-Gorbachev era (1989 to 1991), to likely an
Ingroup Insider during the new Russia’s honeymoon (1991-1993), back to an
Outgroup Insider as the liberal consensus gave way to skepticism (1994-1995), to an
Outgroup Outsider after Bosnia, where Russia’s elite has felt marginalized from the order in which it hoped to be a leader. I attempt to demonstrate and explain these shifts.
The Russian identity has been in flux in the time period under study, 1989-
1999. One obvious source o f instability was the break-up o f the Soviet Union, and the subsequent need to redefine itself as a Russian state in a new world. More subtle has been the domestic negotiation o f Russian identity since 1991. Gorbachev and
Yeltsin steered Moscow’s ship o f state toward a liberal course and, for awhile, Russia thought itself very much an insider to the New World Order, dealing with the West in a new light and regarding the United States a "friend.” While never set in stone, this
identity was the prevailing compass in the decision-making circles for some time.
353Suny 1999/2000; Hopf 1999.
For various treatments of this topic, see Richter 1996; Pravda 1994; Arbatov 1993; Shearman 1996; Light 1996:37.
134 Controversy over the liberal bent of Russia ripened in 1993, related to domestic criticism over the way Russia was catering to the West.
Since then Russia has played itself in a murky zone that has distanced itself from Western liberalism and embraced a more nationalist Russian identity that is defensive vis-à-vis the current international order. This new identity has achieved
‘provisional stability’' as Yeltsin and now Putin balance ties with the West with the dooKstic pressures and feelings of exploitation that stoke nationalism. This was not inevitable, Russia’s turn &om the West—as a neo-realist interpretation may suspect— but instead was a product of domestic politics and US behavior itself as 1 illustrate in the case o f Bosnia.^^^
Many area specialists point to two distinctive “cultures” or phases in the transition from Soviet to Russian identity in this decade.^^^ The first, having begtm under Gorbachev’s perestroika and “new thinking,was that of Russia as a
Western, liberal power. The trend under Yeltsin was to join the developed West as partners and allies, overseemg the creation of a liberal government. This served as the dominant Mentity until early 1993, when domestic forces—in part responding to the tenor of US-Russian relations over Bosnia—began pushing another dominant identity that eclipses the former: a nationalist identity of Russia as a Great Power.^^'
Legvold 1994; MacFarlane 1994, 1999.
Medvedev 1999.
Herman 1996.
Heikka 1999; Medvedev 1999; Bus^uski 1996.
135 This domestic tension, between a cooperative. Westernized Russia and an assertive, nationalist Russia persists in the domestic politics of today, so that there cannot be said to be a “winning” or unified concept of the “Russian idea.”^^’ The pro-
Westem “integrationists,” who led the early transformation and still hold power in the executive under Yeltsin by the time of Kosovo, nonetheless have become increasingly constrained and won over to the idea of an assertive, independent Russia pushed by “traditionalists” and nationalists who dominate the Duma.^^ What passes as a core “unifying ideology” and common foreign policy denominator since 1993, though, is the derzhavnost, that is the aspiration of a strong state and Great Power status/^' The ideology of “Great Russia” meant a focus on domestic cohesion and the command of respect and influence abroad. Thus the identity and foreign policy of orientation has had two phases: (I) unqualified Westernism, 1991-93, and (2) a modified line toward pragmatic nationalism ever since.^^^ Its official “Foreign Policy
Concept” ended the liberal streak, and signified a more pessimistic, pragmatic Russia more assertive about its role.^*^
Cooper 1999G.
Busiqruski 1996:3-5.
Medvedev 1999:40-42; Hobboffi 1994:156-59.
Malcolm and Pravda 1996:21.
Light 1996:61-70.
136 Its approach to liberalism, such as democracy and human rights, has been ambiguous. Early on, even during the Soviet days, Gorbachev and others began to speak of human rights and international concerns. There is not enough evidence to call the USSR liberal, or an insider, by 1989, but there is increasing evidence by
1990-1991. Gorbachev even introduced limited democracy in the form of provincial elections by 1990. In terms of victimhood, Gorbachev’s Soviet Union shed off the international revolution rhetoric in 6vor of joining the “civilized part of the world community.”^^ The new Russia began with much ado about democracy and human rights, with Yeltsin’s pursuit of “rapprochement” with the “friends” to the West to assist in Russia’s recovery.^^^ Establishing a “human rights chief” of the Russian
Federation, the fledgling nation put action and rhetoric into the trappings o f Western notions of civil liberties.^“
While still present in the texts o f leaders, these trappings o f liberalism live m conflict with the increasing prominence of notions of relativism, nonintervention and sovereignty. Russia’s concern with nationals in the near-abroad leave open their own
Quoted inNosenko 1994:143-44. See also Gorbachev’s televised statement, 1/16/91, reported on Moscow Central Television, that speaks of the “world community” as a “we” of which the USSR is now a part {FBIS Daily Report:Soviet Union).
Russian Ministry quotes in article, “Russia Speeds Up Drive to Join West,” reported m Begmg Xinhua, 6/24/94, FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-94-123).
See profile o f the Chief in 1994, S. Kovalev, m Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 8/12/94, in FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia (USR-94-097).
137 possibilities of intervention for protection of human rights/^^ but the view toward
“democracy by force” or humanitarian intervention has quieted, in part due to the
Chechen problem within their borders and in part due to the domestic politics dynamics already described. Later texts, then, portray less of a liberal self-image and more of an entrenched state. For example, by 1994 Yeltsin is meeting with China and releasing a “joint statement” that presages the 1998 document described above. In this declaration, Yeltsin now speaks not of promoting democracy and human rights abroad but the need for noninterference and tolerance for different systems of norms and rules—stating Moscow and Beijing’s “viewpoints are completely identical on all issues.”^** The result is a tendency for Russia to be skeptical of interventions after
1994-95, and skeptical of the US from then on as well Joining China in calls for multipolarity and adherence to the UN Charter and international norms of sovereignty and noninterference, Russian leaders talk about commitments to human rights as wel"*
What of the evolving image o f the US from the perspective of Moscow? The image has moved in correlation with Russian identity, but for the periods involved in this study, the move has been within the domain of negative images. The Gorbachev
Cooper 1999:165. This is not inconsistent with the outsider identity, though, when accounting fer the exception of “identity affiliates” discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, )Much baskalfy says “all bets are ofT when it comes to one of your own.
Joint statement coverage, and quotes, reported in Beijing Xinhua, 9/6/94, in FBIS Daily Report:Chim (CHI-94-172). To be “HenticaT with China is indicative of a departure, to say the least, from the liberal worldview.
httpV/www.un.int/russia/other/concpt21 .htni#english.
138 era is marked by complex, slightly negative views of the US—a radical departure
&om the old Soviet images o f their Cold War nemesis. The Soviet leadership still cautious of the US, signaled a “new stage in US-Soviet relations” coming out of the
Malta summit in 1989.^^^ By the time my analysis picks up again, in 1994, the US and Russia have gone through then purported “honeymoon” (discussed above), and
Russia’s view is still a modestly critical, complex image—nothing approaching an intense negative view, but still not positive per se. Bosnia and domestic politics help explain the return to negativism, as does the emerging idea ofNATO expansion, which roiled many of Moscow’s ofBcials as threatening or at least exploitative.^^ At the same time, this is when the Contact Group is cooperating on Russia and the G-7 is inviting Russia to meetings, presenting an ambiguous relationship that sounds
&miliar with several observer states in this study.
In 1998 the ambivalence continues, with alternative statements of opposition to US unilateralism and NATO hubris m plotting respsonses to Iraq and Kosovo, while at the same time talking of being on the “same team” as NATO (in terms o f
See Herrmann 1985. For an anafysis o f late-Gorbachev imagery o f the US, see Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995.
Quote from Bering Review, 12/18/89, 'mFBIS Daily Report:China (CHI-89-243).
See comments of Defense Ministry, in Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 8/31/94, including the statement that “Russia is not some third-rate country that” the US can treat as it pleases, and to which the US can “dictate the rules of the game.” In FBIS Daily Report:Eastern Europe (EEU-94-I77).
139 seeking solutions) and of “joint work” (on terrorism and other world problems)/^
The negative skew was more pronounced after US bombing of Iraq, as seen in
Moscow official statements that that action “doubtless influenced the atmosphere of
Russian-US reiatioos.”^^^ The increased perception that the US could and would act alone, referred to as its “unpredictable policy,marginalized Russia in its self- image and image of the US. It was then that Soviet Premier Primakov announced the
“time is ripe” for a strategic triangle with China and India, to counter the increasing view of a United States that does not “play by the rules” or show “restraint” or consideration for others.” *
3.4 Conchisfon
The summary of observer states along the identity matrix can be restated in
Table 3.1. Japan represents the Ingroup Insider, positively viewing the US while liberal in self-image without the baggage of a victim dimension. France too is an
Insider as de&ed for this study, but is coded an Outgroup Insider for its mild yet
Russian Foreign Ministry statements o f Igor Ivanov, 10/8/98 m Madrid El Pais, in FBIS Daily Report:Central Eurasia (SOV-98-28I); and 8/21/98, in Beijing Xinhua, FBIS Daily Report:Chim (CHI-98-223).
Yeltsin and Foreign Ministry statements reported in Moscow Interfax, 12/25/98, in FBIS Daily Report:CentraI Eurasia (SOV-98-359).
Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, quoted by Moscow Interfex, 12/22/98, in FBIS Daily Report:Central Eurasia ^OV-98-356).
140 IDENTITY: IMAGE OF US: INSIDER OUTSIDER
(Ingroup insider) (ingroup outsider)
(+) INGROUP Japan Egypt
(outgroup insider) (outgroup outsider)
(-) OUTGROUP France India USSR (1991) China Russia (1994-95) USSR (1989) Russia (1998-99)
Table 3.1 The Identity Matrix: Identifying Observer States
persistent negative view of the US. Egypt, the reverse of this, views the US in positive terms despite its marginalized self-image—illustrating that identity and
image may not be tightly coupled.
Moscow at times (1989-91 and 1994-95) too is categorized as an Outgroup
Insider, durmg the phases where Moscow feels part of the "international community”
and the West. This, I have argued, does not last. Russia in the 1998-1999 sequence,
while still ambivalent on its liberal qualities, speaks much less of being part o f the
community; rather, evidence shows they feel slighted and marginalized feom the
376 Quoted in Moscow Rossfyskaya Gazeta, 12/22/98, m FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia (SOV-98-3S6).
141 prevailing system. This relates to the view of the US, reflecting an Outgroup orientatica that varies in intensity.
Joining Russia as an Outgroup Outskier are India and China—both of whom exhibit patterned resentment at what the ‘*world” has done to their countries. India, despite their proud identification with democracy, still exhibits the victim dimension that renders it an Outsider. Both likewise view the US, as the current “leader” of the world, with some skepticism that varies in intensity as well
Having established a theory and the means by which to probe its plausibility, I now turn to the empirical portion of the dissertation. The following three chapters deal in sequence with (1) general interventions; (2) liberal interventions; and (3) the mediating effects of identity affiliates. The first of these allows a test of the differences in response to multilateral and unilateral actions justified in conventional and broad norms regarding the use of force: self-defense, collective defense and the like. The second empirical chapter again examines both multilateral and unilateral interventions, but adds a new element in the liberal-normative justifications offered by the intervening powers. This allows us to see the effects of such bases for action on the evaluations by identified “liberal” states (insiders), compared to those who are outsiders. The third empirical chapter addresses the issue of identity affiliates, and focuses on how one observing state—Egypt—responds to interventions by the same actor based on whether an identified ingroup is the beneficiary or victim of intervention. I then conclude with implicatk>ns for the US in the post-Cold War era.
142 CHAPTER 4
INTERPRETING INTERVENTIONS; A FIRST CUT
4.1 Overview
Now that the observing countries have been established, we can explore their
reactions to interventions in the following chapters to see if they approximate what
ethnocentric inference would suggest. Before turning to the cases, though, I outline
the prevailing norms concerning the use o f force that define legitimate action in the
social structure of mtemational relations—the so-called “normative structure of
battle.” After that, I consider UN authorized intervention in the Gulfi Desert Storm,
and compare it to unauthorized interventions in the region, against Iraq for
intransigence in the fece of UN resolutions, and against targets in Sudan and
A%hanistan fer their allied role m threats against the United States.
This chapter explores the relationship between observer identity and images,
and the normative basis for another’s intervention. After discussing the state of
international norms and law with regards to the use of force, I turn to the cases,
examiningthe perceiving countries’ definition and evaluative response to such
143 interventions, linking such responses to their theorized identities. One case is multilateral, the Gulf War, and two cases of more suspect normative ground, the unilateral bombings of Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.
Norms Regarding the Use of Force
I am arguing that norms set the boundaries of legitimate, acceptable behavior for states, so it is instructive to review the norms related to the use of force as a baseline for judgments o f US interventions. The general rule in the current system is that of nonintervention, so the deck is stacked agamst the use of force. Two general exceptions to this exist, however (1) self- and collective de&nse, and (2) UN
Security Council authorization. These basic normative elements serve as the basis the case studies and analysis below: they are the measuring stick by which states judge action and by whkh we judge how much norms matter. I begm with a general review of the rules pertaining to the use of force, then turn to the case studies on which these norms are based and interpreted.
The current normative order prohibits intervention into the sovereign space of another country except under a few acceptable parameters, either the exercise of collective or self-defense, or under the authorization of the UN Security CounciL^^
The notion that the multilateral use of force is legitimate, and unilateralism is not, stems from practices of the twentieth century and is codified in the UN Charter. The
3T7 O'Connell 1997.
144 norm suggests, according to Inis Claude, that “appropriate behavior” for states involves “the suspension of ad hoc national judgment regarding threats to the peace or breaches of the peace, and the surrender of national discretion regarding the resort to force in &vor o f international authorization derived from preexisting multilateral agreements or the specific stipulations of competent multilateral agencies.”^^^ In other words, the use of force against or into sovereign states should be left to an international body, not the whims of state prerogative. Finnemore echoes this idea, claiming humanitarian intervention must be multilateral to be legitimate.^^’ By multilateral, then, we mean not mere numbers but Ruggie’s qualitative definition of adhering to generalized principles and organizing and implementing action under established procedures as key to making mtervention legitimate.^^ For intervention, this means action must be organized under UN auspices or given explicit UN consent.
The proscriptive norm of nonintervention forbids “any use of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another.”^" A relatively robust norm by Legro's standards of durability, concordance, and specificity, nonintervention predates 1945 and has certainly been widely held and
This quote by Claude is taken from Cortell and Davis 1996:476.
Finnemore 1996b:176.
Ruggie 1993; Finnemore I996b:182.
381 Walzer 1992:51-63.
145 accepted since then, as codified m the UN Charter and subsequent documents.^*^
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that ail shall refi-ain fiom the use of force
“against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”^*^ This is not just norm and law but has become consistent practice, as violations of territorial integrity have diminished over the years.^^ In its various forms, the language of this proscriptive norm is consistent in specifying against direct or indirect military intervention in another state.
The proscription is but half the story, parameters inform actors as to when nonintervention applies. Norms usually contain exceptions that allow action under permissible cncumstances,^^^ and intervention norms are no exception. The use of
force into the internal af&irs o f others is acceptable in some situations. Self-defense
and the retaliatory “just war” in response to another’s aggression are classic
exemptions to nonintervention.^'^ The protection of nationals fiom clear and present
danger can be a legitimate justification if it is proportional to the task.^*^ More
recently, responses to massive humanitarian abuses, especially if multilateral, have
Legro (1997) argues these fiictors to relate to the power o f norms over the actions and identities of states.
O’Brien 1979:26-27.
^*^Zacher2001.
Edgerton 1985; Shannon 2000.
Walzer 1992:62; D. Welch 1993.
O’Brien 1979:20.
146 arguably become more acceptable.^*’ Any such response in the above conditions, however, is expected to be proportional, sincere and necessary;^*^ in other words, the punishment should fit the crime.
Force is acceptable, according to prevailing international law and norms, if used unilaterally in self-defense or collective self-defense in response to an attack, or if it is multilateral—that is, sanctioned by the UN Security Council In the latter case, intervening forces are seen as agents of the “collective will” of the international community. The UN, lacking a standing army and finding it practically difficult to lead forces of sovereign states, has resorted to “subcontracting,” authorizing multilateral intervention under the leadership of one or more countries.^^
Tucker and Hendrickson suggest that the international consensus on limiting the use o f force to that of self- and collective defense against aggression is clear.^’ '
We shall see in the following chapters that episodes of self-defense and collective defense justifications vary in their effectiveness in convmcing observer states.
Nonetheless, such a normative basis has less to do with liberal identity than a broader consensus envisioned by scholars of mtemational society.^^ The vfetimhood
Cronin 1998; Finnemore 1996b. See chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of humanitarian intervention.
^” Nanda,etaL 1990;506.
von Hippel 2000:6.
Tucker and Hendrickson 1992:134.
Bun 1977.
147 component of identity enters into perceptions of even these interventions, as those under this rubric are sensitive to Great Power force against others regardless of the justification. For them, sovereignty and noninterforence are the hallmarks of normative order pertaining to the use of force.
4.3 Unilateral Interventions: Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan
In 1998 the US exercised two sets of attacks against targets in the Middle East that were not authorized by the United Nations. The first such attack was taken by the US alone in August against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. These strikes were linked to alleged terrorist focilities that the US claimed were preparing an attack on
American assets. The second attack was taken in conjunction with British forces against an intransigent Iraq in December 1998. 1 provide background for each case, including US justifications and accounts used to project a fitvorable image. I then assess the foreign responses to both.
4.3.1 Background and US Justifications
On August 20,1998, the United States launched a missile strike against targets inskie two sovereign nations, A%hanistan and Sudan. The target in the former was a training camp in Khowst, south of the capital ofKabul near the Pakistani border. Estimates of damages fiom the US unilateral use of force included some
148 fifteen people killed at the canqj near Khowst, though Bin Laden himself was not banned nor present. The pharmaceutical plant in Sudan was destroyed, with an uncertain number of casualties and Vitalities there as well.
The American military action followed the bombing o f US embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania earlier that month, which killed 12 Americans and nearly 300
Kenyans and Tanzanians, while wounding another 5,000.^’^ These simultaneous attacks were determined by American authorities to be deliberate terrorist acts, and
for two weeks the American investigation aimed to identify the perpetrators and what they were up to next. Officials in Washington would pin the acts on a terrorist
network linked to Saudi exile Osama bin-Laden, who resided in Afghanistan at the
hub o f a transnational operation of financing and training groups and individuals for
terrorist acts. The US justified its actions toward Sudan and Afghanistan in the
context of the terrorist strikes on the embassies, and utilized the language of self-
defense.
First, said US authorities, there was “convincing information from our
intelligence community that the Bin Laden terrorist network was responsible for these
bombings.”^^ The targets were claimed to be a trainmg camp and a fecflity alleged
to produce nerve gas components for the bin Laden network, whom Clinton asserted
“share a hatred for democracy.” ReprisaL however, was not the reason given, nor is it
393New York Times, 8/21/98, pAl.; Foreign Policy Bulletin 9(15):2-3.
US Deportmera o fState Daily Press Briefing, 8/21/98; see also http’J/secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9808/980821dbJitmL
149 a justified reason to use force in international law. Instead the US justi&d the attack on grounds of self-defense. Clinton’s televised address suggested that US intelligence had reason to believe the bin Laden organization would strike agam soon.
A few months prior, and again that week, bin Laden publicly vowed to "wage a terrorist war against America” and claimed ‘Ve do not dif&rentiate between those dressed m uniforms and civilians—they are all targets.”^’^ The targets, he said, were
"terrorist-related bases” and that there existed "an imminent threat to US national security.”^^
As for violatmg the territorial integrity of the “host countries,” Clinton responded that they "persistently host terrorism” and "have no right to be safe havens.”^” “When our very national security is challenged,” he continued with the selfde&nse justification, "we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens.”^^^ The case was thus made for unilateral right of self-defense against a perceived hnpending attack that the bombings could avert. This is “normatively suspect” ground because it was not a response to attack and there was no clear evidence of impending attack to justify preemption. Nonetheless, the right to defend one’s country and nationals is recognized as acceptable if substantiated.
Foreign Policy Bulletin, September/October 1998, Volume 9(15):6-8.
Foreign Policy Bulletin 9(15):6-8; US Department o f State Briefing, 8/21/98.
Foreign Policy Bulletin 9(I5):6-8; New York Times 8/21/98, p. A9.
Foreign Policy Bulletin 9(l5):6-8.
ISO Just months after the unilateral missile attack on Afghan and Sudanese targets by the United States, the superpower again engaged in a bombing campaign that was not approved by the United Nations. This time the target was Iraq. From December
16-19, and again after Christmas 1998, the United States and forces from the United
Kingdom conducted what was called Operation Desert Fox. The campaign began after a long, frustrating bout with Iraq over access by UN monitors to potential frcOities with the means to produce chemical weapons. The right of the monitors to be there was sealed by UN resolutions at the conclusion of the Gulf War, and Iraq bad agreed to allow inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weqwns programs. Nonetheless, Saddam Hussein spent much of 1998 prohibiting entrance to a variety of locations, accusing UN inspectors of harboring spies and overstepping their bounds. When a UN report was issued that stated
Saddam Hussein’s intransigence amounted to noncomplânce with the UN resolutions to whk:h it bad signed, the US and UK commenced the bombing they had threatened off and on for months. The result, aside from the scores killed, including civilians, was the end to UNSCOM, the monitoring mission, which was expelled and never invited back.^”
The strikes, again, were not authorized by the UN Security Council What is more, this time there was not even a question of self-defense. Nonetheless, US officials defended the legality of the afrstrikes, based on previous UN resolutions that
See various related stories reprinted in Foreign Policy Bulletin., January/February 1999, Volume 10(1): 17-42.
151 spoke vaguely of the need for compliance or fece further action.^ One Pentagon ofiScial spoke of the need to demonstrate that UN resolutions “are not just bits of paper" that have no force, with another adding that the action was taken in the interests of the entire international community/°^ Was this interpretation accepted?
How were these actions perceived, and how was the US perceived for taking them?
4.3.2 Foreign Responses
The prediction, according to the theory in Chapter 2, would be that Ingroup
Insiders (Japan) would be sympathetic to the actions Just discussed, giving the US the benefit of the doubt in terms of its intentions and justifications. At the same time.
Outgroup Outsiders (India, China, Russia) should have viewed the acts as subverting
of international norms and viewed the US in negative terms to blame for the actions.
Outgroup Insiders (France), having no liberal aspect to the norms in question, are
harder to pin down but the theory expected that normatively suspect acts would be
viewed crMcalfy without a positive image to sustain a benefit of the doubt.
The responses to these two cases fit expectations feirly well With regard to
the “self-defense” missile attacks on targets in Sudan and A%hanistan, Japan
accepted at fece value that the military action was against “terrorist-related fecilities”
^ Statement by the President, in Foreign Policy Bulletin 10(l):40-42.
Quoted by the Moscow Times, 12/16/98, m the FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia,
152 and said it “fuU^ understands the decisive stance against terrorists taken by the United
States.”^^ Claiming Japan’s stand is “to respond resolutely against these threats,”
Prime Minister Obuchi afBrmed the need for the international community to combat the problem. Regarding perceptions of the US, Obuchi noted “deep respect” for the
US’ “leadership in the Sgfat against terrorism” and vowed to continue to “maintain close contact and cooperation with the US.”^^ The foreign ministry added that Japan and the US are “of one mind on the basic position to deal with terrorism in a resolute manner,” and that "6om that standpoint, we can understand (the US action).”^
Neither did Japan’s view of the United States change as the result of the unilateral action against Iraq. Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, while sympathizing publicly with the plight of the Iraqi people, welcomed the announcement that the US and UK had “achieved their mission,” calling on Iraq to comply immediately and unconditionally with UN resolutions.'*^^ Calling Iraq’s behavior “a serious violation” of international agreements, Japan lay blame for the untoward act on Iraq’s intransigence, in view of which, “Japan supports the action taken by the US.”*®^
http://www.mofa.go.ip/announce/press/l998/9/901 .htmWl.
http://wwwjnofa.go.ip/annnunce/press/1998/9/901Jitml#l.
Quoted from Hong Kong AFP, in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia, 8/20/98. The quote is from Japan’s Vice Foreign Minister Shunji YanaL
‘*®^ http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/12/1222.htmi#l
^ http://www.mofa.gn-ip/announce/announce/l998/12/1217.html
153 At the other end of the spectrum. Outgroup Outsiders saw the negative rather than the positive in these actions. Interestingly, the reaction to the “terrorist” related attack was muted, indicating there may be sympathy across states for coping with terrorism. China, Russia and India each “strongly condemned” terrorism up front in their comments.'*^^ But they also each followed up with degrees of opposition to the
US handling o f the situation.
China e;q)ressed concern about the missile attack, and advocated instead that actions be taken in accordance with the UN Charter on the basis of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity.'*®* The Prime Minister of India, addressing the
Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement shortly after the bombings in Nairobi and
Dar-es-Salaam, called those actions “violence of the utmost malignancy” but also
indirectly chastised the American response, saying “evil cannot be equated with
good” and that the fight against terrorism “cannot be done by unilateral or selective
action” but through “concerted international effort.”'*®® India reacted in a “restrained
and negative way,” condemning the US action and expressing shock and grief over
the loss of life that resulted.^*® Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes openly
The various responses are picked up by the Xinhua News Agency, China's ofBcial news agency for the English language, 8/13/98, m FBIS Daily Report: China,
■*®* Chinese Foreign Ministry statements reported in Xinhua News Agency, 8/21/98, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
■*®® http://www-un.int/india/indl.htm
Reported in a “roundup” of foreign reactions by the Xinhua News Agency, 8/21/98, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
154 criticized the US attacks as "very unfeir and excessively heavy-handed."^** Russia’s
Yeltsin “expressed indignation” and condemned the bombing, and Moscow added that the unilateral action “may create a dangerous precedent of resolving disputes in this way, thus undermining the legal framework of international relations.”^**
Nonetheless, resulting impressions of the US were not so bad as to stop talks and mutual business, hinting that this time was not too bad.
What came next, however, did not win the US any gratitude or benefrt of the doubt. Perceptions of the US m the unilateral turn agamst Iraq in 1998 take a sour turn. Military experts in China responded to Desert Fox with claims that the US
“intended to dominate the world” and “intensify their leading status in what is called maintainmg a new world order.*** *^ Condemning the actions for not securing Security
Council authorization, Chinese President Jiang Zemin said he teh “uneasy” about the
“unilateral act,” which he claimed violated international law and the UN Charter.^*^
Chinese officials also condemned the UN arms inspection Special commission for its
“*** Reported in the Hong Kong AFP, 8/22/98, mFS/S Daily Report: Near East/South Asia.
■**^ Reported by ITAR-TASS 8/21/98, picked up by Xinhua News Agency, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
^*^ This notion is particularly shared among the military elites. See Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service, 12/24/98, mFBIS Daily Report: China.
’**'* Reported in the Xmhua Be#% Domestic Service 12/21/98, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
155 "dishonorable role" in submitting the report that prompted action as "unfounded and evasive of Êicts.”^*^
Russia too responded with offense at the operations over Iraq. Condemning the actions, Yeltsin said Desert Fox “crudety violated the UN Charter, general^ accepted principles of international law and the norms and rules of responsible behavior,” stressing that the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq
‘^provide no basis whatsoever for such action.”*'^ Russia also took the additional step of recalling its ambassadors to both the US and Britain for a period of time.^^^
India as well took exception to the unilateral efforts of Washington and
London. Spumed particularly by the public and mainstream media,^'^ the actions were also opposed by India’s leadership in the context of the Non-Aligned
Movement. The airstrikes were **deplored” and the US and Britain were chastised for its “flagrant disregard of the UN Charter.”^*’
These three “outgroup outsiders” not only responded similarly but jointly as well China joined Russia in public^ calling for a halt to the airstrikes in progress.^^°
Xinhua Beijing Domestic Service, 12/21/98, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
Reported in Beijing Xinhua, 12/17/98, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
Reported in Beijing Xinhua in English, 12/18/98, m FBIS Daily Report: China.
See, for instance, reports of the Delhi Pioneer, 12/19/98,12/22/98; and the Bangalore Deccan Herald, 12/19/98, in the FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia.
Statement in conjunction with the Non-Aligned Movement, reported by Beqmg Xinhua 12/19/98, m FBIS Daily Report: China.
420Reported in Beijing Xinhua in English, 8/19/98, m FBIS Daily Report: China.
156 This was also the intervention that &st prompted these two and India to ponder openly about possible alliance cooperation to o&et perceived American hegemony.
Russian Premier Yevgeniy Primakov, visiting Delhi amidst Desert Fox, called the
“conditions ripe” for a “Moscow-Beijing-Deihi Triangle,” to which the Indians publicly responded with interest.The talk between Russia, China, and India about this “need” for “establishing peace and security in the world,”^^ continues into 1999 in the context of Kosovo (see Chapter 5).
Finally, France as the Outgroup Insider reacted within the parameters of theoretical expectations regarding Desert Fox, given the normatively suspect nature of the acts and the lack of liberal justifications and no love lost with the US. With regard to the bombing of Iraq, various French leaders made clear that they “deplored the air strikes” and the humanitarian consequences, also considering them to be counterproductive to a political solution.'*^ France made it known that “any military action should be approved by the UN Security Council” or else it would be “outside the rules as we see them.”^^* In hindsight, too, French opinion took a jab at the
Reported in Moscow Times and Bangalore Deccan Herald, 12/22/98, during a visit to India by Prnnakov {FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia and FBIS Daily Report'.Near East/South Asia).
These words belong to Primakov, reported by the Bangalore Deccan Herald, 12/22/98, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia.
Preskient Chnac as well as Foreign Minister Vedrine are quoted in Paris AFP 12/17/98 and 12/18/98, m. FBIS Daily Report: Western Europe.
Chirac, m anticipation of the strikes, reported in Paris AFP 11/14/98, in FBIS Daily Report. Westem Europe.
157 Anglo-American operation through UN Representative Dejammet, who stated “the use o f force to enable the inspectors to return is neither desirable nor practicable...[Operation Desert Fox] made that clear.”^^ With regard to the interveners themselves, opinion was cool to various degrees. Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin called for the return o f the role o f the UN Security Council, as “some have a tendency to bypass it or ignore it,” while leftists in France spoke of the US humiliating the UN with its actions because it “wants to be the supreme judge of what is good for the international community.”^^^ OveralL though, the judgment against the US was tepid and neutral Criticizing the act more than the actor, French declared that the actions would not affect international relations among the Western powers, and lay much blame on Saddam Hussein for provoking the crisis in the first place.^^^
In contrast with other “outgroup” states, France’s response to the Afghanistan and Sudan bombings was different, even positive. French authorities declared when it comes to terrorism, “every state itself makes a decision” and that “we should make a determined and firm response against terrorism wherever it attacks.”^^* Prime
www.un.int/France/fiame_anglais/decIarations_at_un/
Paris AFP, 12/22/98, m FB/S Daily Report: Western Europe.
Vedrine quoted in Paris AFP, 12/17/98, in FBIS Daily Report: Western Europe.
■*^*Reported in Beijing Xinhua, 8/21/98, in FBIS Daily Report. China.
158 Minister Lionel Jospin expressed support for the US action, saying the "terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Dar-es Salaam should not go unanswered.’**^^
These collection of reactions Gt well within the expectations of ethnocentric inference, with the curious exception o f the response to "terrorism," to which some members of the international community were somewhat forgiving. Turning now to a
multilateral intervention couched in terms of collective defense, let us see whether
observers continue to vary significantly in their perceptions or whether the nature of
the act reduces such differences.
4.4 Multilateral Intervention; The Gulf War
The Gulf War has been considered by some to be textbook collective security,
utilising the United Nations and achievmg Security Council authority, following the
norms and rules guiding the use of force m response to aggression. So Operation
Desert Storm provides, while not a perfect case, an interesting "hard case” for
American detractors to respond to normative behavior related to the use of force. We
have seen above that an intervention can be wfldfy short of normatively correct and
yet those with positive images o f the US remam undaunted in tbenr beliefe. The
following shows that a seemingly "normatively correct” case as well is viewed
different^ by different actors, and the US can be viewed negatively despite
"following the rules.”
429Reported in Beging Xinhua, 8/21/98, in FBIS Daily Report.China.
159 Kier and Mercer write that Bush sought in the Gulf War “to establish the precedent that aggression does not pay,” then suggest that a precedent requires common interpretations and that “states commonly disagree over the nature of military interventions.This is in line with n y argument, and the Gulf War is no exception to the problem of generating common, &vorable interpretations. Consider this telling list of mterpretations o f the Gulf War. The conflict has been seen as:
A traditional regional power struggle. A readjustment of power relations after the collapse of a superpower. A war fought for principle. A resource war. A one-sided massacre. A heroic victory. A setback for militarism. A reprieve for militarism. A war engineered by Mossad and the CIA. An inadvertant war. A war fought to lay the Vietnam Syndrome. A war fought to eliminate the ‘wunp &ctor.’ A war to prevent aggression. An attempt by the West to destroy the strongest Arab state. A Western pre-emptive strike against a resurgent Islam. A bid for geopolitical hegemony. A war fought to test the latest military technology. A critical defence of the New World Order. A betrayal of the promise of a New World Order. A demonstration o f the influence of the United Nations. A demonstration of the hnpotence of the United Nations. The harbmger o f North/South confiait. A war to end war. An irrelevant anachronism. A just war. An unjust war.
Kier and Mercer 1996:98.
Ramsbotham 1994:295-96. He even adds Jean Baudrillard’s interpretation that ‘The Gulf War Has Not Taken Place.’
160 Despite the variable interpretations for the intervention possible, I show that the Gulf
War interpretations fell into patterned responses explained by the multilateral nature of the action and the identities of observing states.
4.4.1 Background and U.S. Justifications
The Gulf War o f 1991 was the culmination of a crisis dating to August 2,
1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait."*^^ After the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Iraq’s efforts to rebuild were impeded by debts owed to those who bad aided it in its war with IraiL
Kuwait and others sought repayment, refused to forgive Iraqi debts, and were unhelpful in restricting world oQ supplies to boost revenues for the beleaguered Iraq.
Iraqi resentment mounted toward Kuwait, with whom they also had a border dispute
involving coveted oilfields. When United States Ambassador April Glaspie told Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussem that the US had "no opinion” on the border disagreement with
Kuwait, it suggested that perhaps the US would stay out of a military
confirontation.^" Declaring Kuwait an historic part of Iraq, Saddam’s forces invaded
and annexed Kuwait.
For treatments of the Gulf War, firom which much o f the following background derives, see Hiro 1992; Freedman and Karsh 1993; Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997.
See the "Glaspie Transcript” of the Ambassador’s meeting with Saddam Hussein, July 25, 1990 (SiftyandCerf 1991:122-33). See also Woodward 1991:211-212.
161 The international community as a whole reacted negatively, so blatant and unjustified an act that it was. Iraq’s own justification for intervention, an alleged invitation by the “Free Provisional Government of Kuwait,” was rejected since no such movement existed until a staged coup after Iraq’s invasion.'*^ A UN Security
Council Resolution (#660) condemning the invasion and naming Iraq the aggressor passed without a negative vote, 14-0.'*^^
With an interest in preventing fiirther egression against neighbormg oil states. President Bush deployed eventually 500,000 troops to Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf to deter and defend against any designs Iraq may have held for Saudi
Arabia. Bush brought together an hnpressive coalition of allies to pressure Iraq and—if need be—forcibly expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Another UN resolution
(#678) passed on November 29,1990, called for full withdrawal from Kuwait by
January 15,199I, and authorized a coalition o f states to use “all necessary means” to liberate Kuwait if the withdrawal did not occur by this deadline.^^^ Various peace overtures having felled, the deadline passed and war seemed inevitable.
The war began January 16,1991, as a US-led coalition attack named
Operation 'Desert Storm.’ The first phase of the campaign was a forty-two day air war, involving aerial bombing and cruise missile attacks from warships in the Gulf.
The coalition forces mcluded the United States, the United Kingdom, Egypt, Turkey,
Weller 1993:31.
Yemen, the 15* Council member, abstained, having yet to receive instructions from its government officials by the time o f the vote (Weller 1993:32).
436Chayes 1991:9-10; O’Connell 2000:67-68.
162 Saudi Arabia, and others, under the command of US General Norman Schwarzkopf.
The goals were to reduce Iraqi forces and defenses in Iraq and Kuwait, weaken the
Iraqi war-making infrastructure, keep allied casualties low, and hold out for Iraqi acquiescence that would render a ground war unnecessary. Targets were mostly military, but Iraqi water, electrical and communications supplies were decimated as well
On February 24, coalition forces began the ground war. A stunning and lopsided affeir, this phase lasted barely 100 hours. With forgiving terrain allowing for rapid armor deployments, American forces flanked and cutoff Iraqi troops preoccupied with the more frontal allied assault on Kuwait and southern Iraq.
Stunned, surrounded and overwhelmed, Iraqi forces took flight or surrendered m droves. On February 27, allied troops regained control of Kuwait City. The following day, with Kuwait liberated and Iraqi troops and mfrastructure devastated,
US Preskient Bush announced a cease-fire and outlmed conditions for a permanent peace.
The United States justified Desert Storm on many fronts, as we have seen in
most of the interventions discussed. Bush declared the stated goals of US-led
operations early in the crisis: (I) to obtain the unconditional and complete withdrawal
o f Iraq from Kuwait; (2) to restore Kuwait’s “legitimate government;” and (3) to
obtam security and stability in the Persian Gulf area.^^^ When war came, having
Herrmann 1994:231-32. For extended mskle accounts of US thmking durmg the Gulf crisis and war, see also Baker 1995 (chs. 15-20) and Woodward 1991 (Part IT).
163 feiled to compel Iraqi compliance otherwise,'*^* these goals guided American justifications for action. The primary basis for military action was grounded in the
UN resolutions, which embodied the principles of collective self-defense articulated
in Article 51 of the UN Charter. A sovereign state, Kuwait, had been invaded and
conquered by another, in stark violation of the territorial integrity norm and all
intemational law regarding the use o f force. The US argued that international law
and norms permit a state to use force in defense of itself or another who has been
attacked. What is more, the US and its allies held an explicit UN authorization to use
force after the January IS deadline passed.
In trying to signal that “aggression doesn’t pay,” President Bush also sought
to cast the use of force against Iraq in global terms, saying “Iraq’s aggression is not just a challenge to [Kuwait] but to the better world that we all have hoped to
buüd.”^^^ By ftaming the issue as an aggressor’s threat to world order that needs to
be met, the US argued that “every use of force unchecked is an invitation to further
aggression” and a “blow agamst the rule of law,” which “strengthens the forces of
chaos and lawlessness that, ultimately, threaten us alL”^ Bush’s January 16 speech
clarified the US position that the military actions was taken in accord with UN
resolutions and that the objectives were onfy to extract Iraqi forces and return the
For discussions of the Gulf crisis as “deterrence foihire” and foihire of coercive diplomacy, see Stein 1992 and Herrmann 1994.
Payne 1995:98.
Tucker and Hendrickson 1992:81.
164 legitimate government of Kuwait to power.^' Making this stand, Bush claimed to be setting the stage for an era where “the rule of law” governs the conduct of nations and that “no nation wül be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor.”^^ The appeal to justice and law was meant to shore up support, assuage fears, and help single out the illegality of Iraq’s “clear-cut aggression.”^^
As for the timing of the use of force, as some thought sanctions should have been given more thne to work. Bush countered with more talk of exhausting all options, the potential of an Iraqi nuclear threat and, of course, humanitarian concerns.
“While the world waited,” he argued, Saddam Hussein “subjected the people of
Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities” and “systematically raped, pülaged, and plundered a tiny nation.”^ Citing the efforts of the US, the UN Secretary-General, and regional powers to reach a diplomatic solution prior to the deadline. Bush concluded publicly that such efforts were “totally rebuffed” and that “Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait.”^*
Speech of President George Bush, 1/16/91 (Sifiy and Cerf 1991:311-12).
Speech o f President George Bush, 1/16/91 (Sifiy and Cerf 1991:313-14).
Tucker and Hendrickson 1992:132.
*** Speech of Presklent George Bush, 1/16/91 (Sifiy and Cerf 1991:312); see also Tucker and Hendrickson 1992:82.
445Speech o f President George Bush, 1/16/91 (Sifryaixi Cerf 1991:311).
165 4.4.2 Foreign Responses
Despite the apparent prima âcie case for collective defense against invasion that swallowed up a member of the UN, there remained some variation and angst about how to respond to the Iraqi action. Outside the coalition of US, British, and conservative Arab states, many bad reservations about the course of resorting to force to solve the crisis.^ But even “outsiders” like The Soviet Union, China, and India muted in criticism and generally saw the act as reasonable, given the chain of events.
A number of neutral and non-aligned states opposed the outbreak of war, with a few complaining about a breach of intemational law.^^ The “regret” over the outbreak of hostilities was muted thot^h, as expected given the UN stamp on action, whereas a unilateral response may have raised more opposition among outsider states. So we expect less polarization m responses by observers to this use-of-force episode.
For Japan, the Ingroup Insider, there is no surprise to learn that it supported the US and its actions in the Gulf. The only internal debate and dissension concerned the deployment of forces abroad, opposition to which constrained the Kaifu government from making an even minimal contribution o f personnel”^ But disinclination to participate is not the same as disapproval for the act itself Japanese public and elite opmion were extremely critical of Saddam Hussein but merely
Tucker and Hendrickson 1992:193.
WeDer 1993:40.
166 preferred not to become militariliy involved, owing to the pacifist streak in their identity discussed above.^^ Eventually, though, the Kaifii government provided over
$11 billion in assistance, opposed only by the minority voice of the Japanese Socialist
Party, who thought that the aid merely helped the “American effort to maintain global hegemony.”^^°
With assistance also came rhetorical support, indicating Japan’s perspective on the intervention. Prime Minister Kaifu stated “without any reservations” that they backed the US action and were “allies” in a “global partnership.”*^' He referred to
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as “illegal domination” and blamed Saddam Hussein for bringing about the violent events, having “trod roughshod over the efforts...for a peaceful resolution.”*^ Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama made clear the positive light in which the US was seen: suggesting that the US effort was a “national sacrifice” that was based on Security Council resolutions, came as a “last resort,” and came about because of “Iraq’s stubborn refusal to withdraw from Kuwait.”*^
Japanese leaders not only condoned the American action but endorse an image of US
*** Shiro 1997:97-98; Tamamoto 1997:6; Berger 1998:2.
**’ Berger 1998:172.
*^ Berger 1998:172.
*^' Speech of Prime Minister Kaifu, 1/25/91, Diplomatic Bluebook 35:374 (see also Edstrom 1999:145).
*^ Statement of PM Kaifu, in Diplomatic Bluebook /99/:370-7l; also in FBIS World Report: East Asia, 1/17/91.
*® Nakayama speech, in Diplomatic Bluebook /997:386.
167 leadership, suggesting the “Gulf War shows the US alone is capable of assuming the central role in the preservation of international peace and security.”^^^
As for India, though Indian Prime Minister Shekhar was somewhat sympathetic with the intemational effort, he “felt unable to participate” in the Gulf coalition due to overwhelming domestic and political forces that viewed the US position as “morally reprehensible.”^^^ The brief allowance of US military transport to refuel in Bombay created a political outcry that contributed to the resignation of the
Shakhar government/^ The Indian leadership not surprismgly relied on theh Non- aligned tendency to distrust force, and instead sought to “cooperate with the Non-
Aligned Movement and like-minded countries to find “a political solution” to the
Gulf Crisis/^ Underlying much of the Indian elite’s “deep distress,” however, was a suspicion of the economic consequences of the war; the US and coalition forces were not smgled out for aggressive intent. India appealed to the US and “all world leaders” to “bring peace to the Gul^” and did single out Saddam Hussein to “endeavor for peace.”*^
Statement of Nakayama, m Diplomatic Bluebook 1991-3%!.
Gordon 1995:251.
New York Times 2/20/91 and 3/7/91.
PM Chandra Shakhar, quoted in the Delhi Domestic Service, 1/17/91, in FBIS Daily Report:Near East/South Asia.
PM Chandra Shakhar and Cabmet members, quoted in Delhi Domestic Service, 1/17/91 and 1/18/91, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia.
168 China too remained relatively tepid in response to the happenings in the
Persian Gulf. Joining others in condemning Iraq’s invasion, China abstained firom the vote on Resolution 678, which authorized force.'*^ China called for restraint upon the commencement of Desert Storm, noting a “deep anxiety and concern” for the escalation and use of force by the allied coalition.''^ Premier Li Peng called the action regrettable, bemg “deeply worried” about the consequences of the final outcome.**^* China—the sole permanent member of the UN Security Council to abstain from the Resolution authorizmg force—refirained from dfrectly criticizing the
US-led attack and instead appealed to “all parties” to exercise restraint and search for a peacefid solution^ The discomfort with intervention, and lingermg suspicion about US capabilities and motives,^^ remained just that, and there is no evidence that
China saw the use of force as anything approaching American ulterior motives.
For the dying Soviet Union m the twilight o f the Cold War, some call the Gulf
War “a turning point for Soviet foreign policy,” pushing Moscow past détente into a
^ Weller 1993:38.
^ Foreign Ministry briefing, reported by Xinhua, 1/17/91, in FBIS Daily Report:China.
Beijing Domestic Service, 1/19/91, FBJSDaily Report.China.
Quotes of Li Peng, reported m Xinhua Domestic Service, 1/19/91, in FBIS Daily Report.China. On Security Council politics, see Hong Kong AFP, 1/19/91, m FBIS Daily Report: China.
Li 2001.
1 69 search for full cooperation with the W est.^ While not inevitable or fore-ordained, siding with the West was aided by (I) wanning Soviet-American relations and
Gorbachev’s premium on re&rm; (2) the clear-cut aggression by its heretofore client,
Iraq, which made Soviet support difScuit to justify while currying 6vor with the
West; and (3) the 6 ct that the decision was made quickly by a small cadre of elites headed by Western-leaning Gorbachev and Shevardnadze.^^ The identity of the
Soviet Union as increasingly liberal and decreasingly hostile toward the US—in other words, an Outgroup Insider (see chapter 3)—thus precedes and influences the response to events in the Gulf.
Thus, Gorbachev is seen balancing its response much as France does.
Regretful that “peace hiiled” and “war broke out,” Soviet responses place the blame for this “tragic turn of events” on the “Iraqi leadership’s refusal to fulfill the demands of the world community.”^ Gorbachev supported all UN resolutions condemning
Iraq in the pre-war phase, but hedged on matters concerning the use of force.
Hardliners in Moscow feared hnages of Soviets and Americans fighting side by side as the final nail in the Cold War, and pressured Gorbachev to find a diplomatic solution to deny the US of the initiative of w ar.^
^N osenko 1994.
^N osenko 1994:140.
^ Gorbachev speech on Moscow Central Television, I* Program Network, 1/16/91, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union.
^^Nosenko 1994:142-43.
170 When hostilities broke out, Moscow was o f two minds. Those in charge, thus those who mattered, were New Thinkers who vowed to “accept the priority of universal human values as the only criterion for its foreign policy."^ Gorbachev
complained that US actions went beyond UN resolutions and that they bad not
exhausted “all diplomatic means;” at the same time, Moscow sought to produce a
diplomatic solution to its credh.^^^ In speech amidst the war he appealed to restraint
within the parameters of the resolutions, while stating the desire to act jointly “with
the United States in the first place” and others to overcome the state of war and
prepare for a “solid and equitable security system in the region.”^™
Seeking to “work with” the US is hardly the words of a leader captured by the
negative imagery o f the Soviet past. The Gulf War episode in the end solidified and
encouraged this reformist camp to join the “civilized part of the world
community.”*^^ Despite misgivings about the action, then, it was Saddam ultimately
blamed—not the United States. Moscow’s demands were not for an “aggressive
America” to stop (as in the unilateral interventions above) but for Iraq to “comply
^*Nosenko 1994:144.
Reported m a political “roundup” by Xinhua 1/18/91, in FBIS Daily Report: China, see also Gorbachev speech on Moscow Central Televismn, 1' Program Network, 1/16/91, in FBIsiktily Report: Soviet Union.
Gorbachev statement, 2/9/91, in Sifty and Cerf (1991:329-30).
Nosenko 1994:143-44.
171 with the world community’s just demands.”^^ Conservatives in and out of power, for
their part, saw the Gulf War as a purely American design undertaken for its own
national interests and a sign of American “imperialists striving to dominate the
Middle East.”*^ Ultimately, this hardliner view lost the battle for Soviet identity
and, after a M ed coup, gave way to a reborn Russia briefly in the Western image.
True to its GauUist independent identity, perceived to be important and
integrated in the world system yet skeptical of the American lead of it, France
straddled an ambivalent course m the Gulf War, seeking diplomatic solutions prior to
war but asserting a leadership role during Desert Storm.'*^'* French popular and elite
opinion was decidedly anti-Iraq after the August 2 invasion, and President Mitterand
committed forces to Desert Shield in September, boasting of maintaming France’s
“role and its rank” throughout the crisis and contributing forces “second in rank after
that of the US, and well ahead o f any other.”^^^ Concerned about maintaining its
independence under US-led action, Mitterand noted, “I do not feel I am in the
position of a second-class soldier who must obey his commanding general”^^^
Reported by the Soviet News Agency ITAR-TASS, 1/18/91, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
Cooper 1999:135; Nosenko 1994:143.
Hanorth 1994:186.
Friend 1998:239-43; Hanorth 1994:186.
Payne 1995:110-111.
172 Notable too was the French peace initiatives up to and beyond the beginning of Desert Storm. Despite the general need to respond to Iraq’s actions, there was an uneasiness about the resort to force in popular and elite opinion. Mitterand boasted of his repeated attempts "to preserve peace,” lamenting both Iraq’s intransigence and
U.S. impatience in that regard.'*^ Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement advocated distance from the Americans, out of concern that allied actions "risked going beyond UN objectives.”^^ Nonetheless, as a participating nation, France supported the effort once diplomacy feSed. The operation bad no apparent negative impact on French views of the US and its motives, and Mitterand conceded '^ve are glad to have t k Americans in certain circumstances.”^^
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
From the results of this analysis, summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, we can draw a few preiimmary conclusfens. First, when compared to the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 2 (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4), the results o f these cases
match feirly well There are no predictions that are dead wrong; most in feet 6t
neatly within expectations. Ingroup insiders (Japan) tend to approve whatever may
happen, and view the US positively regardless, explaining away untoward actions. It
From Paris Antenne-2 TV Network, I/16/9I, in FBIS Daily Report: Western Europe.
Friend 1998; New York Times 1/30/91, All.
173 appears as well from the findings in this chapter that multilateralism plays the expected role m the perception of interventions and judgment of actors. Actions that follow normative parameters, obtaining UN authorization and following international law uncontroversially, seem to create a convergence of opinion, muting critics for lack of ammunition if nothing else. Outsider countries may “regret” or be “worried” about such interventions, pomting to their identification with the victim or target and the toll on societies subject to force, but the pattern shows that such states stop there and do not speak o f evil or atrocity. The Outgroup Outsiders may not like the US, and may be suspicious o f US motives, but criticism is mute.
By comparison, normatively suspect actions tend to polarize opinion, with interpretations determined more by the personal preconceptions of observing states.
In these cases, images tend to be the major mediator of evaluations for the unilateral interventions, though the terrorist case seemed to gamer sympathy fiom unexpected comers—a finding worth pursuing more. Perhaps there is a normative consensus among world elites that unilateralism against terrorists is acceptable behavior.
What of the alternative hypotheses and expectations with regard to these mterventions? Obviously, the variation in responses to countemormative actions belies system constructivist expectations o f homogenizatioiL The tendency for general acquiescence to the UN-mandated action corroborates liberal and constructivKt arguments for multilateralism, to be sure, but such perspectives remain inconq>lete m explainmg discrepancies in unauthorized interventions.
Friend 1998:240.
174 As for realism, the comparison of Japan with India is especially Èuitfül considering materialist theories of international relations. Both Japan and India are resource-poor countries who import the overwhelming amount of oQ (70%- 90%)
6om the Middle East. Despite these materially similar situatmns, where both expressed anxiety about the economic consequences o f instabOity in the GuK^*° they arrived at different conclusions about the Gulf War; Japan saw the economic risk as reason to back force; India’s economic risk correlated with opposition to the mtervention. Japan’s loyalty fits into the concept of alliances, but there still needs to be an explanation for differences among allies, such as Japan and France. And there is no clear material explanation for those who are neither allies nor enemies per se.
Images and identity help provide such insights.
The next chapter takes another cut at the interplay of norms, identity, and images, this time focusmg on those with “liberal” justifications. Given arguments for force based on human rights or democracy, how do our observers interpret and judge such actions? As with this chapter, riders will find Egypt exenq)t fi-om the cases of
Bosnia and Kosovo owing to the presence of Muslim communities in those mterventions, again raising the issue of identity affiliates, a mediating variable in the interpretation process to which I devote all of Chapter S.
4X0 Berger 1998:171-72; Edstrom 1999:144- 45.
175 Country; Japan France USSR/ India China Case: (ingroup (outgroup Russia (outgroup (outgroup insider) insider) (see below) outsider) outsider)
Persian Gulf + + 0 o/- 0 (1990/91) (outgroup insider)
A%hanistan/ + o/+ ol- - Sudan (1998) (outgroup outsider)
Iraq (1998) + - — - (outgroup outsider) ' Indicates a &vorable évaluation of the act, either by support or understanding of the US position. • Indicates a negative evaluation of the act, defined lÿ criticism and understandings dififerent than the US position. 0 Indicates an evaluation that is ambiguous, neither broadly supportive nor critical. ______
Table 4.1 Evaluations of Interventions
Country: Japan France USSR/ India China Case: (ingroup (outgroup Russia (outgroup (outgroup insider) insider) (see below) outsider) outsider)
Persian Gulf + 0 0 0 0 (1990/91) (outgroup insider)
Afghanistan/ + 0 0 0 0 Sudan (ou^roup (1998) outsider)
Iraq (1998) + - - - (outgroup outsider) + Indicates a &vorable évalualion of the us. in terms of how the LS and its motive s are described. - Indicates a negative evaluation of the act, defined by critical assertions about US design and motives. O Indicates an evaluation that is ambiguous, neither broadly supportive nor critical of the US. ______
Table 4.2 Evahiatmns o f United States
1 7 6 CHAPTERS
INTERPRETING “LIBERAL INTERVENTIONS”
5.1 Overview
This chapter, as did the last, explores the relationship between observer identity and the normative basis for another’s intervention. This time, however, the interventions have normative justifications of a particular character. The social content of the justifications of these interventions, “Human rights” and “democracy,” win be considered in relation to observer identities and, of course, the multilateral nature of the act. I show below that ideational difikrences Imked to state kientity become the source of variation in judging interventions, particularly when the intervention is not UN authorized.
Specifically, I show that interventions in the name of “democracy promotion” and “human rights” are opposed by “outsider” states either out of a suspkion of such values becoming the basis for interference m domestic affairs of states, or out of a suspicion as to whether these are the true motives of the intervener. “Inskler” states, on the other hand, with more liberal orientations matching the normative justifications o f the interventfons and less feeling o f victimizatfon, are more amenable to such
177 interventions—«ven when procedurally questionable such as in the case of Kosovo or
Panama.
This chapter proceeds with a discussion of the state of intemational norms and law with regards to human rights and democracy promotion. I then turn to illustrative cases of intervention justified on behalf of human rights, Bosnia and Kosovo, followed by cases justified on the grounds of “restoring democracy.” For each case, I examine perceiving countries’ definition and evaluative response to such interventions, linking such responses to their theorized identities.
5 2 Norms Regarding Intervention for Human Rights and Democracy
Smce the following cases deal with interventions whose major justifications were humanitarian or democracy promoting, it is helpful to establish some background on the state of normative parameters in the modem international system.
We learned firom the last chapter what the universally accepted norms are related to the use of force: self and collective defense, and UN Security Council authorization.
Thus any discussion of democracy and human rights as justifications automatically takes us into contMted terram. Differences of interpretation not only involve whether the normative criteria are met (eg. was this a case of self-defense?) but also whether the normative criteria themselves are valki (eg. are democracy and human rights acceptable bases for mtervention?).
178 Humanitarian intervention, defined as the threat or use of armed force with the object of protecting human rights,'**' is a normative^ murky area, due to the competition between the norm of sovereignty and that of protecting people fi-om gross human rights violations. As mentioned above, however, the bottom line is that “non intervention is the rule."**^ There is a high bar for the use of force for humanitarian or any other reason. Yet several authors seem to think that that the post-Cold War era has witnessed an expansion in the criteria surrounding interventions, including “an emerging consensus that the intemational community has an obligation to protect at least a minimal level of human rights within states.”'**^ Barkm and Cronin suggest the end of the Cold War las seen a reaction agamst nonintervention in the domestic af&irs of other states, and for the role of the West in promoting its political and economk kieals internationally.*** I seek to show that this misconception of some global consensus is overstated.
There are basically two schools o f thought on the subject: traditionalists and moralists.**^ The traditionalist view is the prevafimg normative consensus through the ages, placing primacy on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.
**' Brownlie 1974:327.
**^ O’Brien 1979:9.
Cronin 1998:170; Brune 1998:6.
*** Barkm and Cronin 1994:125.
**^ Wheeler and Morris 1996; Murphy 1996.
179 According to this perspective, nonintervention is the norm—bound up with the rule that states are entitled to independence and sovereignty.^
There is a minority view, though, that feels legally or morally that humanitarian intervention is permissible in some circumstances. Teson argues that unilateral humanitarian intervention is allowed in order to uphold the “community interest” in preventing widespread violations o f human rights, as long as intervention does not aim to violate the independence or integrity of the state beyond the mission hself.'^^ He suggests that humanitarian intervention is permitted by intemational law because the prohibition on force under UN Charter Article 2(4) orders states to
“refrain from force... in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN,” and that promoting human rights is in 6 ct consistent and central to the language of the
Charter.^**
Some are observing what they see as a changing practice as a basis for
“emerging norms of humanitarian intervention,”^^’ where actions signal a need and justification to go beyond the “Charter paradigm” o f the traditionalists in the name of humamty.**” But others point out that interventions have been justified on
BuH 1984:280; O'Connell 1997.
^ Teson 1997; O’Brien 1979:32-33.
Teson 1997:150-51; Delbruck 1992; Lillich 1974.
Reed and Kaysen 1993.
Arend and Beck 1993; Glennon 1999.
180 humanitarian grounds throughout the ages/^^ International legal scholars concede that a pattern of “contrary practice” could reveal an implicit agreement to alter or overturn a rule, convention or normativeexpectation but that practice has not achieved that volume as of ye t/^ One reason is the “Pandora’s Bo^f’ that might result firom overturning the primacy of nonintervention. Even liberal democracies are reluctant to legitimate unilateral humanitarian bases for interventions,^^^ and
Kosovo—as we shall see—was explicitly referred to as an exception to the rule of nonintervention, rather than a precedent for changing norms.
So are there “benign exceptions”*^ to nonintervention? The result of this discussion seems to be that, regarding humanitarian intervention, it is a normatively murky area. From this discussion and the evidence to follow, it is premature to conclude that “new norms” have become “universally accepted.” Finnemore examined humanitarian military interventions over time and claims only that they are now more permissible than ever but that it must be multilateral to be legitimate.*^^
Working through UN authorization increases transparency, reassures others as to one’s intentions, and places requirements on the ways in which intervention wül be
Akehurst 1984:95; Krasner I999:chapter 4.
*” Brownlie 1974; Farer 1991:192.
*” See arguments in Brownlie 1974; Farer 1991.
*’* So labeled by Henkin 1991:41.
Finnemore 1996b:176.
181 carried o u t/^ This is an improvement, but still is limiting. I agree that multilateral interventions, if defined as UN-sanctioned as I have done, will be broadfy considered legitimate and acceptable, but some may even support unilateral action from the moralist perspective. It depends on the observer and the situation.
So there is an inherent contradiction in the “liberal world order" of which we speak, with normative proscriptions on the interference into the domestic afifeirs of states on the one hand and the safeguarding of human rights on the other.^^ Yet, whatever the norms and standards for the use of force for humanitarian purposes, they dwarf the number of allowable circumstances for the use of force to promote democracy. As Ernst Haas reminds us, there is “fer from being a consensus” in intemational society as to the sanctioning of the use of force to promote democracy.'*’’ Henkin has quipped, “states are still not agreed as to what democracy means, but they (agree) that it should not be achieved by force.’**”
There are at least two other reasons for the lack of consensus surrounding the use o f force in the name of democracy. First, democracy is “an essentially contested concept.”^ Illiberal and socialist states have deferent ideas of democracy, and are existentially threatened by Western notions of democracy promotion, in that it
■*” Finnemore 1996b:176-83.
Cronin 2001; Hoffinann 1995.
Haas 1993.
Henkin 1991:61-62.
Gaffie 1956.
182 directly undermines the identity and authority of the state. A second reason that forcible democracy promotion is not universally embraced has to do with not democracy itself but the suspicion of the use of force toward that end or suspicion of the motives behind interventions justified by democracy promotion.^'
MuravchDc rht^)sodizes about “America’s spirit” and the effectiveness of the
US in “advancmg the democratic cause” both in terms of self-interest and as “good deeds.”^*^ His premature optimism in America’s ability to “crack the desiccating foçade” of the “clique of octogenarian autocrats” m China, which he says would be “a blessed deliverance for all of its unhappy subjects” may also shed insight into my point linking kleas to identity to threat The idea of democracy, when carried on the rail of military might by way of intervention, threatens a country whose identity and rule are based on something other than democracy. The intervention to a non democracy whose legitimacy-building identity is not based on free and foir elections becomes a portend of what could happen to them, as well as a public act that undermines the identity in question. Every advance for the cause of democracy, that is, is an assault on the kientity, legitimacy and authority of a regsne that does not meet the definitional standards of the intervener. That is a threat. Thus, others are less sanguine about the blissful rhetoric o f liberal peace, speaking mstead of an “imperial peace” where powerful Western states inqsose their vision of democracy upon others.
Robinson 1996; Barkawi and LafEby 1999.
^ Muravchik 1991:4-7.
183 The preceding discussion inqjlies that a state’s feelings about democracy and human rights-justified intervention will be a function of one’s identity (shared values) and the image of the intervener (related to trust in motives), as well as whether the act is normatively correct (multilateral). We can explore these fectors in the followüog cases.
5.3 ‘‘Humanitarian Intervention:” Bosnia and Kosovo
This section examines perceptions of interventions that the United States and
Allies m NATO justify chiefly on tiie grounds of defending human rights agamst
violations. In both the multilateral case of Bosnia, and the unilateral case of Kosovo,
the US led forces against Serb forces charged with gross human rights violations
against Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians respectively. Yet the seemmgly
righteous interventions were not received equally well among international observing
states. What is the reason for the variation—were the critics merely human rights
opponents, enemies of the United States, or allies o f the Serbs? Was it a sinq>le
question o f conflicting material interests?
The picture is not so simplistic. While certain states that identify with
Western notions of human rights tended to be more supportive and less suspicious,
there were also Western or Westernizing countries—Russia and India—who
questioned the conduct of the campaigns or the motives of the US. Likewise, illiberal
Muravchik 1991:6.
184 States like Egypt (see Chapter 6) embraced the humanitarian crusade, their identity tied more to the plight of Muslim populations. Even when the answer seems obvious—eg. Russia’s opposition to the picking on of “fellow Slavs” in Serbia—the following study reveals the need to explore the perspective of the actors, not imputing identity from a&r. This chapter shows that the chief Russian identity serving to # e r events in each case is the identity of Great Power, not Slav Power. As Lord Owen puts it, the Russian-Serbian relationship was “one of declining sentiment, not one of vital mterest,” and that this relationship “became the symbolic measure within Russia o f whether Russians were being treated as genuine partners by the US and Europe.”^**^
I begin with a review of the two interventions, providing historical background and context as well as the American justification of the mterventions. 1 then compare the justificatory pretexts of the intervening states with how the interventions and their perpetrators are perceived across our sample of observer states. The section ends with an analysis and implications for human rights interventions.
5.3.1 Background and U.S. Justifications
The US-led interventions into both Bosnia and Kosovo have many similarities, to the extent that the latter could be considered a sequel to the unfinished busmess o f the former. Both tianspfred in the conflict-prone post-Cold War Balkans.
Owen 1995:358.
185 Both were conducted by NATO under the heavy lifting, prodding and leadership of the United States. Both were interventions into the internal boundaries of sovereign states, rather than in response to interstate conflict. Finalfy, both were substantially justified on humanitarian grounds, to stop and prevent mass killings predominantly by
Serbs against Bosnian Muslims or Kosovar Albanians respectively. There is, however, at least one significant difference between the two interventions: Bosnia was a UN-sanctioned (multilateral) intervention, Kosovo was the unilateral decision of NATO. What difference does this fiictor make in the perceptions of intervention?
Bosnia. The war in former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina^®^ was over politics at its most basic: “who rules.” The pressures for Balkanization included the desire, expressed m a 1992 referendum, by the mostly Muslim population of
Bosnia to be free of an increasmgfy nationalist, Serb-dommated Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY). Upon independence, many o f the 31% of the Bosnians who were ethnic Serb msisted on breaking with the new Muslim-dominated Bosnian state to join Serbia.^ This zero-sum situation gave way to violence as the final arbiter.
What distinguished the war m Bosnia fix)m your everyday bloody civil war was the tendency, especially by the Serbs, to commit atrocities against civilians, chiefly the Bosnian Muslims. Amidst reports o f human rights violations emerged
Hereafter called Bosnia for convenience.
Ullman 1996a:2. Bosnian Croats then also got into the land-grab, envisioning a Greater Croatia.
1 8 6 evidence of a conscious, patterned policy of targeting unarmed civilians for violence in order to eliminate likely opponents (often males) and ftigfaten everyone else into leaving the land coveted by the perpetrators.*®^ This came to be known as “ethnic cleansing.” Initial evidence of human rights violations in Bosnia became clear in early 1992. In May 1992, a Red Cross relief convoy was shelled outside Sarajevo, a
UN convoy was hijacked, and a couple of days later the town of Korzarac was overrun and several of its Muslim inhabitants massacred by Serb forces. At the same time, Serbs began shelling Sarajevo for a week, climaxing with the very public shelling of a Sarajevo breadline. These events “turned world public opinion decisively and permanently against the Serbs.”*®' UNSC Resolutions 758 and 764 turned over to the UN the Sarajevo airport for the “delivery of humanitarian assistance.” UNPROFOR units ftom Croatia were transferred to Bosnia under consent.
The United States and NATO became involved in the Bosnian conflict to oversee and hnplement no-fly zones aixi later “safe areas” in Bosnia. The desire to do something about atrocities and instability in their own “backyard” fectored into this commitment, and the commitmentin turn especially reinforced the pressure to do something. But this involvement was equivocal and reluctant, with leaders seeking to
“do good” without risking harm to their own personnel in a situation with no
*®’ Cigar 1995; Rieflf 1996; Mueller 2000.
*®* Burg and Shoup 1999:131-33.
187 perceived vital interests at stake.^*^ NATO was also constrained by the “dual key” concept Under UNSC Resolution 836, which called for “all necessary measures” to protect UNPROFOR units in “safe areas,” aiy NATO action had to be approved and coordinated with the Secretary General of the UN and the UNPROFOR mission.^
In effect both NATO command and the UN representative in the Balkans, Yasushi
Akashi, had to OK the use of force. This created tension and paralysis in any effort to stop atrocities, contributing to a NATO credibility problem.
Following this multilateral approach, a Contact Group was formed by US,
Russia, France, UK, and Germany to hash out a solution themselves.^' ' For a considerable length of time, little constructive was done to bring an end to atrocities on the ground. Over 100 UN resolutions were passed between 1992-1995
proclaiming concern and demanding cease-fires, but these foce-saving actions served
countries more in the sense of giving “the appearance of being involved...at minimal
cost.”^'^ While the Contact Group discussed a suitable peace,*'^ NATO sought to
alter the military balance throt%h a new Croat-Muslim alliance. Aware of continued
opposition to ending the arms embargo, the US began to “look the other way” on
^ Cushman and Mestrovic 1996; Bert 1997; Gow 1997.
Reed 2000:400-01.
Burg and Shoup 1999:264-300.
Barnett 1996:151,140.
They agreed on a plan for “phased suspension of sanctions” in return for compliance with UNSC Resolutions and a withdrawal to territorial limits defined by the Contact Group (Burg and Shotq) 1999:302).
18 8 incoming arms to Muslims.^^^ NATO used military force in February 1994 against
Serb fighters violating the no-fiy zone, and agam at the Secretary General’s request, after Serbs bombarded “safe area” Gorazde April NATO also planned for extensive NATO airstrikes in response to a scrws of determmed “trigger events.” The
UN effectively ended “dual key,” tumii% over authorization fi-om Akashi to
UNPROFOR French commander Bernard Janvwr, working closefy with NATO. The
“trigger events” were interpreted out of existing UNSC Resolutions, so that NATO would be authorized to strike overwhelmingly against Serb assets and capabilities the next time they attacked or concentrated force outside any designated “safe areas.”^'^
The actual trigger event occurred August 28, 1995, when the shelling of
Sarajevo killed 38. The response was a massive show of force constitutii% an intervention event meant to “stop the killing.” 3,515 NATO sorties brought about
Serb withdrawal and ultimately the peace arranged at Dayton.^The United States and NATO claimed to be acting on humanitarian principles, to “save lives” and punish aggressors for the human rights violations amassed over the years. But how this massive military noterventfon was perceived is another question.
Burg and Shoup 1999:307-9.
saber and Little 1996; Weiss 1996.
Reed 2000:406-7.
Ullman I996b:24; Davis 2000.
189 Kosovo/** It is instructive to engage in the comparative method when opportunity affords it, and scholars and the international community regrettably was given a second occasion to address ethnk cleansh^ in the Balkans before century’s end. Kosovo, a province withm Serbia within Yugoslavia, had been a problem waiting to happen, not (as conventional wisdom holds) since 1389 but since 1989, when Serbia forced Kosovo to rescind its autonomy within Yugoslavia. In a power play by Slobodan Milosevic and allies to trump up Serb nationalism and prevent further decentralization, the reassertion of control over Kosovo actually hastened the ungluing of Yugoslavia and everything Milosevic fought and killed for. The increased nationalism made it easy for non-Serb majority states to vote independence in the wave of democracy following the end of the Cold War. Kosovo, too, chose
independence,^*’ but unlike Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia, remained
under the tight reins of Serbia proper.
Denied not only autonomy but independence, Kosovar frustrations turned to
violence for some. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged m 1993 with the
first o f a series of strikes aimed at terrorizing Serbs, both police and civilian. Given
these provocations, there was ample justification for Milosevic to order a crackdown
in Kosovo (which he did in earnest in 1998) that may not have raised outside
^** For an excellent, conq)rehensive collection o f history through documents, see Auerswald and Auerswald (2000).
^*’ The Kosovo Parliament declared mdependence on 10/19/91, and the next year Kosovars elected Ibrahim Rugova president o f a “shadow” Kosovo. See Judah 2000:57-65.
190 attention. The problem was, again, in the tactics employed out of Belgrade. Serbs responded somewhat indiscriminate^, killing twenty-five, including civilians, in revenge for four killed by the KLA. The makings o f “ethnic cleansing” became apparent, with Kosovar Albanian refijgees this time, rather than Bosnian Muslims, serving as rape victims and the dead.
The international community responded with an anns embargo on Yugoslavia
(UNSCR1160). US Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced that “we are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no
longer get away with doing in Bosnia.”^^** Nonetheless, reports of forced expulsions
and mounting civilian deaths in Kosovo continued throughout the year, with several
hundred thousand people displaced by Fall 1998.^^‘ UNSC Resolution 1199 was
issued September 23rd, demanding an end to hostilities and atrocities, and calling for
“further consideration” should parties not comply. Resolution 1199 was backed by a
NATO threat of airstrikes; both events seemed to work as Milosevic halted the
attacks and allowed the displaced to return home in October.
Aside from the threat in September 1998, NATO also met on October 13* and
authorized an Activation Order permitting and plarming a strike against Serbia.^^
This unfolding of events was concurrent with broader consultations among the old
Kay 2000:73.
Kay 2000:72; Mandelbaum 1999:4.
^ Solana 1999:116. On the legality of the Activation Order and its implementation, see O’Connell 2000.
191 Contact Group, wherem Russia was insisting that Kosovo be bandied under the auspices of the
The peace held until the New Year brought in new skirmishes. Important for events was the veiy public and very brutal slaughter at Racak on January 15, 1999, where forty-five Kosovar Albanians were massacred. By all accounts, this was the turning point for US decision-makii%, swaying fence-sitting advisors either on moral grounds or the affiont it posed to NATO credibility. The stage was set for a “final chance at peace” at Rambouillet, France. The US and other members of NATO and the Contact Group assembled representatives of Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians, offering in effect a “take-it-or-get-bombed” ultimatum demanding (1) withdrawal of
Serb forces firom Kosovo; (2) fiee and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access by
NATO throughout all of Yugoslavia; (3) and eventual call for referendum on Kosovo independence within three years.^* The Serbs rejected the deal, and NATO called for the withdrawal of KVM and began bombn% March 23,1999.
That bombing mission, dubbed Operation Allied Force by NATO, lasted 78 days before Serbia acquiesced. At first blush, this operation appears to be a humanitarian effort to prevent and stop ethnic cleansing. Clinton declared the reason behmd NATO action to be “to avert a humanitarian disaster,” and that “had we not acted, the Serbian offensive would have been carried out with inq>umty.”^^ Later he
^ O ’Connefi 2000:76.
Chomsky 1999:106-8; Mandelbaum 1999:4.
Clinton speech. New York Times, 4/2/99.
192 announced that ‘^vhether you live in Afiica or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse...and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.”^® NATO Secretary General Solana reiterated the view that “NATO 6ced...either witnessing a deliberately engineered mass expulsion o f people in a region bordering NATO and the EU or addressing the
Kosovo crisis in fulL”^^^ US Ambassador to NATO Alexander Verhbow later claimed that “the world is not so transformed that we can relegate to history the need to take up arms and use military force m support of a just cause.”^^* State Department officiaisjustify intervention on Yugoslavia’s violation o f international law, the existing “human catastrophe,” and the “acute threat” to neighboring states.^^^
The basic thrust of the NATO justification for action, then, stressed humanitarian necessity and a moral mission to avert further atrocities. Several
Western intellectuals supported this interpretation, with Vaclev Havel calling it
“probably the first war that has not been waged in the name o f‘national interests’ but rather in the name of principles and values.”^^° Was this view o f intervention, and the benign mage of NATO intentions, shared by the international community of states?
Reported in Kay 2000:72.
^ S o la n a 1999:116.
Kay 2000:72.
^ O ’Conneü 2000:80.
New York Times, February 22,1999.
193 5.3.2 Foreign Responses
The use of force in Bosnia followed UN guidelines and derived from a mandate set forth in UN Security Council Resolutions. The use of force in Kosovo was quite the contrary. Though some weak attempts were made to justify NATO action within UNSC 1199, neither that nor any Resolution ever authorized the use of force. The unilateral use o f force, as mentioned above, is normatively prohibited except in cases of collective or self-defense. Kosovo was neither. How is the international community to respond? If ethnocentric inference is correct, we might anticipate Others to be relatively acquiescent on the use o f force in Bosnia, while the response to the US-led intervention in Kosovo would be varied, ameliorated for
“insiders” by the normative conflict regarding the clash of sovereignty with the moral aspect of human rights.
Jtq)an saw both Balkan mterventions as NATO did, in terms of human rights, though the approval given was tempered by an enduring regret for the use of force.
Identity and image combined, Japan’s perceptions o f the US and its interventions make some sense. Their responses are largefy fevorable, seeing the interventions as humanitarian, seeing the responsibility for the horrors as belonging to the Serbs, and seeing the use offeree, while regrettable, as justified.^^' Perceptions of the United
States do not change; words about the country are fevorable, and the focus is on Serb responsibility and the desire for international cooperation for a just resolution and a
531 Foreign Ministry statement, 8/31/95, Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
194 return to peace and the restoration of human rights. Japanese Fore%n Minister
Masahiko Komura, speaking of the unilateral Kosovo intervention, revealed an understanding that “NATO air strikes are to prevent a further increase in the number of victims in Kosovo,” rather than being something of malicious intent.^^ Prime
Minister Obuchi expressed concern “at the rapid deterioration of the situation, particularly in the human rights situation in Kosovo," and ofBcials made clear to blame the resort to airstrikes on “‘the uncompromising attitude’ of the Yugoslavia government for the Mure of the talks.”^^^ In terms of their view of the US as the head of the mission, Japanese ofiBcials claimed to “understand” the action, in the context of Yugoslav violations of UN Security Council Resolutions.^^ Japan stressed that they remain “a good ally” of the US."^ To Japan, then, the US acted in accordance with international law, responded to extenuating situational conditions, and was seen m a positive light as well.
India’s enduring identity of non-aligned leader of the 3"^ World made it more skeptical and hostile to Great Power intervention, and Indian leaders saw the interventions as imperialist in design. Regarding the two Balkan interventions.
Foreign Minister Komura, in Hong Kong AFP, 3/24/99, in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia.
Reported in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia, 6/10/99. This sentiment is echoed by Jq>anese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, reported in the Hong Kong AFP, 3/24/99 (FBIS Daily Report:East Asia).
^ See comments o f FM Komura, in Hong Kong AFP, 3/24/99, m FBIS Daily Report: East Asia.
195 perceptions of the use of force and associated motives differed from muted ambivalence to hostile opposition. According to Satish Nambiar, the Force
Commander and Head of the Mssion of the UN force in Yugoslavia in 1992, India has a strong afGliation with, fohh in, and commitment to the UN as a means to address conflict and poverty, and its contribution to the UN is a matter of pride to all
Indians.^^^ India was quiet with regard to Bosnia, owii% much to its own domestic political and regional problems. But India recognized and monitored ongoing atrocities, and NATO's bombii^ did not provoke any significant reaction from the
Indian government one way or the other.^^^ The NATO bombing m Bosnia had a
“degree ofjustification,” according to an observer, in that the Bosnian Serbs attacked a declared UN “safe area.”^^*
Kosovo, on the other hand, was a different story. The actions of the US and allies were seen in India’s policy circle as biased against Yugoslavia, and India strongly condemned NATO’s resort to force, both withm government and outside it.
Citing “near unanimity” among India’s elites in the strategic community, Nambiar relays India’s distress at the “arrogant violation of all mtemational treaty norms, the transgression of state sovereignty,” the ‘indiscriminate destruction of civilian
httpy/www.mofa-go. jp/announce/press/1999/3/326.htn#3.
Nambiar 2000:260.
The ofScial texts reflect this dismterest by the absence of much comment pro or con (Nambiar 2000:262). Given the resulting reliance on secondary sources in this case, the results are more tenuous and should be conskiered as such.
Reported in Nambiar 2000:266.
196 infrastructure” and the “killing of innocent civilians” by the Western organization.^^®
PM Atai Behari Vajpayjee called for an immediate end to NATO airstrikes in
Kosovo, saying it was "contrary to the UN charter,” it violated “the independence and sovereignty of a country,” and undermined the authority of the entire UN system.^
These sentiments are echoed in statements of Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Sii^h, citing opposition to the strikes and calling for their halt.^' The Non-Alignment identity reveals itself in both cases as well, playing up the “one-sided” nature of
Western force. Yugoslavia’s being a founding member of non-alignment no doubt fed these interpretations. Kamalesh Sharma, the Indian representative to the UN, passed on the government’s view that NATO was “trying to intimidate a government through unprovoked aggression to accept foreign military forces on its territory.”^"
Calling the attacks “completely illegal” according to Articles 2(7) and 53 of the UN
Charter, India rebuked what it saw as an “arbitrary, unauthorized and illegal military action.”^^ To this India added the vkw that “both international law and the authority of the Security Council are being flouted by countries that claim to be
Nambiar 2000:261.
^ Reported in the Bangalore Deccan Herald, 3/30/99, in FBIS Daily Report.Near East/South Asia.
Reported in Hong Kong AFP, 3/26/99, in FBIS Daily Report:Near East/South Asia.
UN Documents 3/24/99.
UN Documents
197 champions o f the rule of law,” accusing NATO of intimidating the Serb-led government “to accept foreign military forces on its territory.”^
Furthermore, India placed blame for the humanitarian crisis squarely at
NATO’s door, owing to the dramatic increase in atrocities and refugees after March
24*. Pointing out the irony with the blame, India’s UN representative noted that the
‘‘unüaterai actions m contravention of the UN Charter,” as the Kosovo intervention was viewed, was justified for the “prevention of human sufferings,” but “it is, m foct, resulting in even more human rights violations.”^^
In terms of the resulting perception of the US for its actions in Kosovo, the result was a decided negative. Accusing the US and NATO of believing it is “above the law,” India said it “cannot accept any country taking on the garb of a world policeman.”^ It was at this point, it should be noted, that India’s elites restated an interest in “an arrangement” with Russia and China “to dilute the domination of the
Western Alliance.”^ ’
China’s response to these mterventions were different especially in intensity.
While not fond of either action, the use o f force in Bosnia elicited a much more muted response than the use of force in Kosovo. As a country self-proclaimed to have
^ Reported in Nambiar (2000:263).
Reported in Nambiar (2000*264-65,268).
^N am biar 2000.
Support for the “Strategic triangle” reported in The Pioneer (Delhi), 2/18/99 and again cited by PM Vajpayee in the Hong Kong AFP 3/28/99, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia.
198 “no special interest in the area” and showing “no partiality to either side,” Chinese officials declared support throughout the crisis for "any efforts by the international community which are conducive to a peaceM resolution, and political solutions acceptable to all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina."^* Regarding the initiation of bombing by NATO in Bosnia, China expressed deep concern with both Serb shelling and NATO’s airstrikes, and called on parties to keep restraint and pursue peaceful negotiations/'*^ China asserted it “is not in &vor of launching air attacks,” but arguing only that it would complicate the dispute and not solve the crisis/^ That is, the complaint was not over US intentions so much as perceived efficacy of US actions. As the an campaign continued and re-ignited after a pause in early
September, 1995, China repeated its deep concern over events, adding now regret over evidence of civilian casualties and civilian 6cQities. At one point China called upon the Security Council to stop NATO’s “abuse of force” in Bosnia, referring to perceived indiscriminate bombing and the civilian toll it produced, indicating that
China’s definition of what the UN authorized was increasingly questioned.^^'
Foreign Minister Qian Qkhen, reported in Beijing Xmhua, 3/17/95, in FBIS Daily Report.'China.
Foreign Mmistry briefing, reported in Beijing Xinhua, 9/5/95, in FBIS Daily Report: China
Foreign Nfinistry briefing, reported m Beijing Xinhua, 9/5/95, in FBIS Daily Report: China
Reported in Beijing Xmhua, 9/14/95, in FBIS Daily Report: China
199 Nonetheless, China did not single the US or NATO out as aggressors to be feared, but rather saw them as flirtii^ with the letter and spirit of UN parameters of action.
The Chinese response to Kosovo, however, was much more pronounced and much more negative. China’s UN representative relayed Beijing’s characterization of the Kosovo action as strong bulging the weak” and interference in the internal a&irs of others.^^^ Qin Huasun added that “strikes by NATO, with the United States at the lead. ..amounted to a blatant violation of the UN Charter, as well as the accepted norms in international law,” and highlighted the need for a solution “based on the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Yugoslavia.^^^ In the context o f “a US’ perceived quest for global domination,” Kosovo was seen as a precedent for humanitarian intervention inside sovereign states and the use of alliances for “out-of-area crisis response” that foreshadows US attempts to impose its values on others by force.^^ China referred to NATO operations against Serbia as a
“barbaric attack” and “naked aggression.”^*^ The People’s Daily, mouthpiece o f the
CCP, lambasted US “hegemonism” and “imperialism”as akm to the aggression of
Nazi Germany.Joining Russia in a UN resolution to hah the bombing, Chma’s UN representative called Kosovo “an mtemal matter of the FRY.”^^
UN Documents 3/24/99.
UN Documents 2/24/99.
Shambaugh 1999/2000:66.
"*Nicholl999:72.
Shambaugh 1999/2000:78.
200 Similar statements were made about Yugoslavia during the Bosnian crisis and intervention, though more muted. This suggests that perhaps the difference in UN authorization mattered to the only Security Council member not ‘in the loop” in both crises. Yunling cites a fear o f precedent over Kosovo, that NATO’s real goal was to
“bring democracy to Serbia” and that this could be the future for China, whose minority and human rights policies are criticized by the West.^^' Despite the negativism, things had not gotten so bad as to turn relations with the US on their heads: the People's Daily on June 3,1999, stated that ‘iipholding the independent foreign policy of peace also covers promoting friendly cooperation with Western countries, including the US.”^^’
Russia’s picture is the most complicated and dynamic. In the early 1990s, and early in the Bosnian affair, Russia’s identity—already in crisis after the dissolution of the Soviet Union—tended to be de&ied by the Western, liberal trend in government. The cooperation and sensitivity to human rights, though, ran up against a nationalist identity that grew in power since 1993, one demanding Russia’s respect as a Great Power rather than a patsy o f the W est^^ Yeltsin increasingly sees actions through this lens as the balance of domestic forces shifts in the nationalist direction.
Reported in Donfried 1999:102.
Yunling 2000:117,122.
5» Yunling 2000.
Braun 1997; Marantz 1997.
201 The implication is that Russia is concerned with inclusion and being treated as a peer; its interpretations have to do with process more than content. When they were in the loop, Russia saw the interventions as legitimate. It is when unilateral decisions replace consultation with Russia that problems arise and the skepticism toward
America begins to grow, a trend begun in the Bosnia case and quite visible in the
Kosovo case. Chinese elites perceive their state to be a great power that, like Russia, deserves respect and, like India, feels it has suffered humiliation at the hands of
Western meddling. The image o f the US is complex, reflecting—as with their
Russian and Indian counterparts—domestic politics where conservative forces view the US as imperial and threatening.
The image of the US in Russia has paralleled the unfolding identity crisis just discussed. In the honeymoon period of newborn Russia, the US was seen as a friend and ally. Both Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev were part of the liberal, mtegrationist camp, and relations with the last remaining superpower gushed with the hope of enduring cooperation and shared values. Increasmg criticism focused on
Russia playing "good citizen” in the world and catering to US demands on issues such as handlmg the Bosnian issue.^^ Yeltsin’s acquiescence on UNSC Resolution
757, placing an embargo on Yugoslavia, and support for subsequent resolutions opening Serbs up to potential military action, fed the notion that the "fellow Slav” state was a patsy to the West. Nationalists and conservatives especially sought an
Goble 1996:187.
202 independent Russian role, and this seeped more into Yeltsin’s perceptions and actions.
The &ct that Russia was involved in the Contact Group for both the Bosnia and Kosovo crises helped satisfy the need to feel like an Insider with a seat at the table. Russia’s view of the Bosnian situation was filtered less through its relationship with their Serb brethren and more through its domestic political situation and its perceived position in the post-Cold War order. Seeking to retain an influential role in the ’^ew World Order,” Russia balanced its desire for respect and independence with the new desne in becoming “Western.Under the Western identity, Russia had to show concern for human rights, such as the concession on the embargo following the
Sarajevo breadline shelling in 1992. Sympathetic to the primacy of sovereignty, which Russia had directly analogized to its own situation with Chechnya, Russia played the role of the conscience of Article 2(4). In each case they also set parameters of acceptable action, vowing to veto any “robust action” requested in the Security
Council to be taken against the Serfos,^^^ and opposing the lifting o f the arms embargo in Bosnia. When Muslim forces seemed to exploit “safe area” protections and strike out at Serbs, Russia tried (and Med) to pass a resolution condemning the Muslim offenses.^^ But Russia did ultimately sign off on resolutions that would allow UN to embargo and later bomb the Serbs. Thus, it could be said that Russia sought to be a
Meikka 1999.
Barnett 1996:151.
^ Burg and Shoup 1999:156.
203 player, to be consulted, regardless of the content of peace making. The idea of
“fraternal Slavs” has been overstated, it is suggested; instead, “pan-Slavdom,” while a motivation behind a portion of the Russian elite, notably from the right, was more a usefril vehicle by which Russia could assert itself in the new emerging order, attempt to exert influence in important diplomatic measures, and command the attention and respect of the West.
It thus was a bit of a sting when NATO took action without immediately prior
Security Council authorization m either case.^*^ With Bosnia, NATO relied on UN- arranged “trigger events” to determine military reprisal within the guidelines of UN
Resolutions, but the initiation o f attack did not involve Russian approval With
Kosovo, NATO acted unilateral^, as we have discussed. In each case, then, Russia was miffed enough to make pronouncements against NATO actions. Russian identity commanded that these situations be read as hurtful to Russian pride as a major power.
When UN-authorized airstrikes occurred in February 1994 in response to violations of the no-fiy zone, Yeltsin blasted NATO not over the strikes themselves, suggests
Lord Owen, “so much as the humiliation of being pushed to the skielines.”^
As a member of the Contact Group in each case, Russia was often in the know and knew what would be coming. When it knew, it was content. When it was out of the loop, it protested and recoiled. Russia at one point almost dropped its
Owen (1995:246-47) discusses the ambiguity of NATO authority from the Russian view.
^ Owen 1995:265.
204 membership in the Contact Group over the feeling that they were not treated as a
“proper partner” when the August 1995 bombing began. Yeltsin criticized NATO but essentially acquiesced, demanding onfy “proper consuitation.^^^ Likewise in 1999, two days after the start of the bombing, Russia (no doubt miffed about being cut ftom the loop, again) introduced a resolution at the Security Council condemning the act as
“a violation of the Charter and as a threat to international peace.”^^ A combination of wounded pride and the domestic political angle ftom those alarmed by the precedent of unilateral Western interventions into any state it felt violated human rights, made Kosovo an issue that strained US-Russian relations.^^^
The overall result, though, is not what conventional wisdom tells. Russian responses were not as hostile as some of the rhetoric, nor were perceptions influenced by Slavic feelings of brotherhood so much as the Russian intent on reafGrming its
identity as a Great Power. As a Great Power, it was willing to punish, chastise and at
tunes defend the Serbs, while sitting at the table with the “big boys.” The responses were similar in each case: perhaps because Russia was in the loop enough via the
Contact Group, it was not UN multilateralism that mattered so much to creating the transparency about NATO intentions.
Buszyuski 1996:71-73; Owen 1995:330-59.
^“ O’ConneU 2000:80.
Reported in Nichol 1999. Holoboff (1994:166-67) shows how some believed Yugoslavia was a “practice run” fer eventual mvotvement in the Former Sovfet Unk>n (FSU).
205 One analyst observes that “the developments of this conflict have influenced
Russia’s ideas about its relations with the outside world in a more fundamental way than most other events during the past decade.”^™ Wamii% that “the virus of a unilateral approach could spread,” the Russian representative in the UN Security
Council, Sergey Lavrov, echoed China’s concern with “a dangerous precedent,”^’' a continuing theme among “outsider” states. Balkan envoy chimed in on the “unilateral war” by chiding the “negative tendency” of the US and allies to give preference to
“the use o f force instead of the norms of international law.”^^
The “new NATO” is seen as “an expansionist alliance with offensive armed forces and operational plans” and there is concern whether the Kosovo precedent may serve as a pretext for “humanitarian intervention” in the borders of the Former Soviet
Union, including Chechnya.^^^ Russia, an outsider that wants to be an insider, chafes at the feeling of exclusion, and Kosovo fed the idea that Russia is being relegated to the sidelines. Russia’s attitude, one analyst si^gests, depends on whether or not it gets to be part of the “nucleus” of the oligarchic rule of Great Powers.^’'* Thus, as intimated in Chapter 3, the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo actually served as catalysts
Baranovsky 2000:101.
UN Documents: 3/24/99.
^ Printed in Moscow ITAR-TASS, 6/21/99, while discussmg the pivotal role of Russia in helping bring an end to the conflict In FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia.
See reports by Dobrianslqf 2000; Baranovsky 2000:104-109.
Baranovsky 2000:106-107.
206 for changing Russia’s self-image (from Insider to Outsider) as well as its image of the
US (from Ingroup to Outgroup).
France, as a participant of NATO operations in both cases, not surprisingly viewed both of the interventions in a positive light,^^^ though no special credit is given to the US as a result. Despite initial hesitation on taking sides m the Balkans, the French as mentmned became a leader in contributions to peacekeepmg in the area and pushing for conflict solutions.^^ With regard to Bosnia, UN Representative
Dejammet vowed “that act was aimed at bringing an end to the violence.”^
Likewise, the operation concemmg Kosovo was justified as “peace in Europe was at stake today.”^^' Blaming the normatively suspect action on Belgrade for not respecting its obligations under UN Resolutions 1199 and 1203, the action was considered a response to Vfilosevic’s violations o f international wüL Further, France viewed the act as humanitarian, adding that “human rights are also at stake” and suggestii% “we cannot abandon” the ethnic Albanians to “violent repression.”^^^ As for the judgment of the US, then, their 6tes were tied to the same acts and thus were both viewed as acting in proper and benign &shk)n.
Duke et a l 2000.
Friend 1998:221-25.
^ www.un.mt/France/fraipe anglais/declarations at un.
UN Documents i/24/99.
^ www.un.int/France/franie anglais/declarations at uni.
207 And so there seems to be a predictable split in the responses to interventions.
Insiders (Japan and France) shared the humanitarian interpretation of the US, and evaluated both the Bosnian and Kosovar acts positively. Outsiders (India and China) on the other band tended to view the Kosovo operation through the prism of sovereign noninterference. The reaction to Bosnia was less severe, dampened perhaps by the apparent UN mandate, though Russia and China questioned such authority as implemented. We now turn to a second pair of cases involving “liberaT' justifications, namely the promotion of democracy, which allows us another stab at testing the expectations of ethnocentric in&rence.
5.4 “Democracy Promotion:” Panama and Haiti
This section examines perceptions of interventions that the United States justify extensivefy in terms of promotmg and sa&guardmg democracy. As with the humanitarian mterventions above, I have chosen a multilateral (UN sanctioned) case—that of Haiti—and a unilateral case—that o f Panama. In both cases, the US had committed to the forcible overthrow of rulers m the Western Hemisphere who clung to power at the expense of democratically elected leaders-in-wait. With
Panama, force was used in December 1989. In the case of Haiti, hostile invasion was averted at the last moment with a deal struck with the junta in Port-au-Prince (in the
latter case, nonetheless, opinions formed about the US consideration and near-
implementation of the massive military effort). Both cases are geographically
208 proximate and distant from the observer states and their interests, offering useful
“controls” in the study of perceptions o f the interventions. As we have learned, there is no normative basis in international law for the use of force on behalf of
“democracy promotion,” making these even more controversial than the humanitarian interventions based on conflicting, murky normative prescriptions and proscriptions.
As with the previous cases, I begin with a review of the two interventions, providing historical background, context, and the American justification of the interventions. I then compare the intervener’s justificatory pretexts with how observers perceive the interventions and then perpetrators. The section ends with a summary analysis and implications for democracy-promoting interventions.
5.4.1 Background and US Justifications
Panama. The American desire for the ouster of Panamanian strongman
General Manuel Noriega, dated back to the latter days of the Reagan administration.^^ Formerly an ally of US intelligence and on the CIA payroll, the
increased salience of the drug war and a Florida court’s 1988 indictment of Noriega for racketeering, drug trafSckmg and money laundermg, fiieled a change in attitude toward the Panamanian dictator. This shift in opinion and policy included sanctions
against Panama, frozen assets and the formulation of contingency plans to oust the
dictator of Panama.
5S0 Much of this background is adapted from Shannon 2000.
209 Despite the new disdain for the Panamanian leader within the Reagan/Bush circle, there lacked consensus over the perception of the situation there, the threat posed by Noriega, and of the acceptability of the use of force to settle US demands.^**
The debate tilted against the use of force to oust Noriega, with Defense Secretary
Frank Carlucci and Joint Chiefe Chair Admiral William Crowe arguing that force could not be justified/^ Important to understand is that the Re^an, and later Bush, administrations defined the self-defense parameters o f the norm, ruling out military intervention as unacceptable except to protect the Canal or US lives/*^
The Bush administration continued to be guided by these understandings of parameters and proportionality. Agreeing that “Noriega must go,”^*^ Bush nonetheless ruled out overt, massive military intervention in fevor o f lesser means.
The diplomacy, multilateral appeals to the OAU, and economic sanctions reflect an attempt to achieve desired goals m socially acceptable way, both fer efficiency purposes and for lack of a justification to do otherwise. The resort to several covert operations on several occasions-mnging helping opposition candidates to helping
Noriega rivals to mount coups—bore no fiuit.^“
Baker 1995:177; Woodward 1991:83-92.
^ Gilboa 1995/96:548; PoweU 1995:416.
Scranton 1991:147.
Reported in Gilboa 1995/96:552.
Gilboa 1995/96:551; Scheffer 1992:115.
210 Fuel to the interventionist fire in US policy circles came after the botched
Panamanian elections nullified by Noriega in May 1989. There was evidence that
Noriega had rigged elections in 1984/“ while a US ally, but now the Cold War was ending and Noriega had become demonized as antithetical to an emerging “New
World Order” of democracy and human rights. On election day. May 7 , 1989,
Noriega’s “Dignity Battalions” attacked opposition candidates and intimidated voters.
At the same time, Noriega’s Electoral Tribunal and mtemational observers were reaching 6 r different conclusions about the elections. The former put Noriega’s candidate ahead by a 2-1 margin. The latter, beaded by Jhnmy Carter, clanned the opposition candidate, Guillermo Endara, won by a landslide and asserted “the
Panamanian people have been robbed.”^” On May 10*, Noriega nullified the elections, claiming foreign interference in the process.
The US led the OAS in condemning the electoral fi-aud, refused to recognize the newly installed President, recalled its ambassador and sent additional troops to bases in the Canal Zone.^“ While additional pressure to “do something” mounted domestically, this did not prompt serious consideration of mvasion. Responding to the elections. Bush spoke of the problem in terms of a “conflict between Norwga and the people of Panama ’^”
5S6 von Hippel 2000:29.
^'"Muravchik 1991:171.
^“ Muravchik 1991:171-72.
^*’ Gilboa 1995/96:553.
211 Personnel change and a dramatic event culminating patterns of Panamanian behavior Meditated a new consensus among the US decision. A major force in resolving the dilemma internally of what to do was the replacement of CINCSOUTH
Woemer with General Maxwell Thurman (September 3O‘*0 and, the next day, of JCS
Chief Crowe with Colin PowelL^^ Woemer opposed intervention efforts; Thurman thought the military should be exploited more aggressively in the war agamst drugs, including Noriega.*’ ^ Contrary to Crowe’s ambivalence, Powell saw the need to “take the PDF down” to solve the problem.^^ He initially had reservations about using force but believed that, if force were necessary, “it all had to go.”^’^
A dramatic series of events in October tilted the balance of perceptions of the situation. A foiled coup against Noriega on October 3"^ caused US elites to doubt
Panama could take care o f the problem itself. The foiled coup and Bush’s lack of support for it generated domestic criticism. Crowe surmised the mood, observing
“the only way the situation is going to get resolved in Panama is with military
force.^^ After October 3"*, plans for intervention were drafted in short order,
building on existing contingency plans dating to the Reagan administration. The new
Flanagan (1993:23-24) calls these replacements “singularly propitious” to the shift.
Woodward 1991:95.
Donnelly 1991:65-66.
Dinges 1991.
594 Donnelly 1991:64-65.
212 plan called for massive force aimed not just at Noriega but at ridding the country of the entire PDF.^’® The M ed coup, started by PDF insiders, was not supported by the
US, not “because of conflicting perceptions and internal debate” but because of the lack o f time and “lack of enthusiasm” for the coup leaders, seen as unsavory as their afGliates/^
Plans for military intervention developed in “an unimpeded effort to try to topple Noriega,”^” Still missing though, as Powell recalls, was “whether we had sufBcient provocation to act.”^^' The wiU was there, but a justification for the constrained superpower to “go in” had yet to materialize. That perceived justification would come in December. Within two hours o f each other, two events on December
16,1989, provided dramatic culmination of a pattern of harassment that justified intervention in the eyes of US decision-makers. The shooting of an off-duty Marine by PDF guards at a checkpoint, followed by the abusive interrogation of an American couple,were perceived as confirmatory evidence o f a Panama ruled by a monolithic, corrupt and wicked force. In subsequent meetings of Bush’s inner circle, few references were made to the individual guards that committed the heinous acts;
^ Powell 1995:420.
^ M. Cottam 1994:160.
^ Cottam 1994:160.
^ PoweU 1995:425.
Dinges 1991:307; Donnelfy 1991:94-95.
213 instead the acts were attributed to the “P D P or “forces” under Noriega’s command, or “Noriega’s reckless threats and attacks.”^ Asking whether the incidents were “the work of errant PDF solders,” General Larry Welch was told by Powell and Kelly that
“they were as sure as they could be.”“ ‘ Others asserted that Noriega “was personally covering up for his organization,” implying that these isolated, unusually violent
incidents were part of a “pattern of aggression.”^ This simplification and attribution of complex events to one man and his monolithic reach confirms the colony image,
suggesting a motivated bias to read events &vorabiy toward justifying the use of
force.
The rapidly achieved consensus that these mcidents were worthy of military
invasion is impressive: the decision to invade came “without sharp dissent or debate,”
and the President “offered no high-fiown reflections and did no last-minute
agoruzmg.”^^ Powell called the events “unignorable provocation” and representative
of “an increasing pattern of hostility toward US troops.”^ They were convinced that
the entire PDF was corrupted and beyond negotiation and assistance.^
Powell 1995:422; Historical Documents o f1989:706.
Woodward, 1991:165.
Dinges 1991:307-8.
^ Excerpt fiom Cottam 1994:161; for a similar anafysis, see Scranton 1991:201.
Quoted in Kempe 1990:11-12; see also in his own words, Powell 1995:422.
Woodward 1991:168.
214 The US invasion was justified along several lines, including the protection of the Panama Canal and the arrest of Noriega on crhninal charges.^ The restoration of democracy featured prominently among the reasons for the invasion and ouster of the
Panamanian regime. Hailed by some as a “victory for democracy,”^ American elites claimed the intervention would help good citizens fiom the bad rulers, turning invasion into a humanitarian effort to “defend democracy’' in Panama,^^ The White
House declared that the action was to “restore the democratic process” to Panama by installing the man international observers say won the May 1989 election, US-backed
Guillermo Endara.®®’ The US also invoked UN Charter Article 51 and OAS Article
21 for the right to self-defense as another part of their explanation for action.®'® Bush stated in his public justification, c laiming to have “no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens.”®' '
Believmg they were justified, American policymakers explained away the
significance and smcerity o f international reaction in advance. The Sovfets, OAS and
Third World states. Baker argued, would “feel an obligation to denounce the
interference,” but he insisted that most would privately be “neutral or even
®®® Levitt 1991:228-29; von Hippel 2000:34.
®®’ Muravchik 1991:170.
®®* Maechling 1990:122; Vertzberger 199S.
®®® Speech o f President Bush, m Historic Doctments o f1989:1%.
®‘®Scheffer 1992:122.
®" Speech of President Bush, Historic Documents o f 1989:706.
215 pleaseA”^*^ This is important because the subjective interpretation norms not only empowers actors to violate norms but also to believe that others will recognize the US action as a benign, legitimate exemption to social convention, not a violation.^
Haiti There is no subtlety in the US desire to justify the use of force against
Haiti in 1994 as promoting democracy. Operation Uphold Democracy was meant to remove by force the junta whose coup denied Haiti its democratically elected leader,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide. After a long campaign by the US to introduce democracy in
Haiti elections were finally held in December 1990.*’“* Sweeping into power with
70% of the vote, Aristide lasted less than a year before being overthrown and exiled in September 1991.*’*
The mitial response by the United States was not as belligerent as one might expect, given how things turned out a few years later. Two days after the coup, the
OAS placed sanctions on the new regime, calling for Aristide’s return, and the US took steps to freeze Haitian assets.*’* But the United States relaxed these sanctions, with trade from the United States increasing from S316 million in 1992 to $375
*’^ Quoted in Woodward 1991:170; see also Baker 1995.
*" Jervis 1976.
*’^ Muravchik 1991:153-57.
*’* Brune 1998:44-45; von Hippel 2000:98.
*’* Acevedo 1994.
216 million in 1993.®*’ The US also refused to consider the coup in the UN Security
Council at first. Part of the reason for this was division in domestic policy circles.
The troika of coup-plotters was led by General Raoul Cedras, who turned out to be a leader o f an intelligence group in Haiti opposed to Aristide and connected to the CIA and DIA.®*' Aristide had won election over the US-backed and funded candidate in
1990, and was not seen in a positive light by all in Washington.®*’
Candidate Clinton put Bush on the hot seat over his inaction concerning Haiti, committmg the US to doing something once elected. Although Clinton largely assumed the Bush stance of wah-and-repatriate, there was a slow build of pressure to deal with increasing refugee flows and domestic protest about US inaction fiom within his own party. The US took the lead in a push for a worldwide embargo, and
OAS sanctions were made mandatory under the UN Security Council in Resolution
841 in 1993.®’®
Under pressure fiom sanctions, Cedras agreed to meet with Aristide to reach an agreement about the latter’s return to power in exchange for the former’s amnesty.
The resulting "Governor’s Island Accord,” reached in July o f 1993, suggested Cedras and bis cohort would acquiesce to an international presence starting in October to
®*’ Robinson 1996:300-304.
®** Brune 1998:40-41.
®*’ Blum 1995; Robinson 1996.
®“ O’Connell 2000:64; Brune 1998:48.
217 ensure this transition.®^^ Come October 12, however, there apparently was a change of heart on the part of the junta. The USS Harlan County approached Port-au-Prince with American and Canadian advisors on board to implement the accord. This component o f the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was stopped from docking by extended displays of protests and menacing off-shore, mcluding threats to harm
passengers who came ashore. On the heels of a debacle in Somalia that left eighteen
Americans killed—some of them publicly dragged through the streets—the Clinton
Administration was on the defensive regarding interventions and had no interest in a
replay of such sordid events and images.®^ He ordered the Harlan County home and
Cedras remamed in power into 1994.
This intransigence did not go unpunished, however. Comprehensive sanctions
were imposed on Haiti, owing to noncompliance with the accord and UN resolutions
as well as the general oppression visited upon the Haitian people. Also, the US made
clear of its contingent plans for a possible invasion to restore Aristide to power. In
their effort to solicit the help of other nations, American elites ran into problems.
OAS members who were opposed to the coup likewise were opposed to military
mtervention to resolve the issue.®^ On July 21,1994, US Ambassador to the UN,
Madeline Albright, requested and received permission from the UN Security Council
®^‘ Brune 1998:49.
®^ von Hippel 2000:100; Brune 1998:50.
®^ Brune 1998:54-55. Argentina and Antigua were exceptions. Many OAS members, however, dul offer and deliver forces for the UN peacekeepmg mission following the resolution o f the crisis.
218 to remove the junta by whatever means necessary.^^ UNSCR 940 was passed July
31,1994, authorizing “all necessary means to Ëicilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governor’s Island Agreement” and “the prompt return of the legitimate^ elected President.”^
The resolution authorizing force to restore Aristide was careful to highlight the “unique character” of the situation in Haiti which required an “exceptional response,” so as not to set precedent for future interventions on behalf of democracy.^ This language, demanded by Chma in exchange for an abstention, assuaged concerns of the intentions and tenor of the emerging new order of world politics. Nonetheless, linking thwarted democracy to a “threat to mtemational peace and security” was quite a step for the UN Security Council to take.
The passage of a UN-sanctioned authorization to use force seemed to bring credibility to the threat of force in the eyes of the junta, as Cedras sued for peace shortly thereafter. Preparations began for an invasion. Operation Uphold Democracy, that would involve a 27-country multinational force o f25,000 troops led by the
United States. Unlike Panama, this intervention was not unilateral and secret but very public and heavily involvii% the UN. A deadline was set for September 19,1994, and the junta cut a deal with American emissaries with the ships steaming toward
Speech of Ambassador Albright, 7/31/94, m Foreign Policy Bulletin 5(2), pp.20- 21, September/October 1994. See also von Hippel (2000:100).
^ www-un.org/Docs/scres/1994/9431222e.htm.
von Hippel 2000:92.
219 Haiti The multinational force landed without resistance and proceeded with the UN
mission to restore order, restore Aristide to power
The United States sought to &ame the intervention, as with the others, in a
way that conveyed a signal to similar targets—an issue of credibility in
commitments—as well as signaled others o f the benign intentions of the use o f force.
OfBcial US justifications centered on the denial of democracy, as well as additional
humanitarian concerns of rape, murder and torture that are often cited in such cases.
The OAS had agreed to uphold democracy in the Western Hemisphere and counter
threats to it. The "disruption" caused by the Haiti problem amounted to what the US
called a "total firacturing o f the ability o f the world community to conduct business in
the post-Cold War era.”^ Attempting to indicate that all other efforts were
expended, Clinton cited that the “fimdamentai interests of the United States justified
an attack if it was the only method to restore democracy.”^^’ And, of course, “gross
human rights violations” were cited, with Clinton’s public address to the world on the
eve of the would-be invasion referring to those in power as brutal thugs.^°
Brune 1998:57.
von Hippel 2000:103.
Speech of President Clinton, in Foreign Policy Bulletin 5(3), pp. 18-19, September/October 1994.
Speech of Presklent Clinton, m Foreign Polity Bulletin 5(3), pp. 18-19, September/October 1994 (see also Brune 1998:55-56).
220 After the resolution of the crisis, Clinton claimed victory in that “we sent a powerful message to the would-be despots” that “democracy in the Americas cannot be overthrown with impunity.”^ ^ The regional parameters of this statement perhaps sought to assuage fears of others that this sort of intervention would be tried in their neck of the woods. Yet he was not always this careful in language, expanding his parameters at times, like this comment on October 6,1994:
The world knows that the United States will stand up for human rights and against slaughter, stand up for democracy, honor our commitments and expect those who make commitments to us to honor them as welL^^^
Note that little was said of the refugee problem as a motivation behind resolving the
Haiti problem, despite the 6ct that 20,000 refugees bad been counted by the US in
June-July of 1994 alone, with anticipated fears of up to 300,000 possible, at a cost of
S14 million per month to house, aid, and process.^^^
5.4.2 Foreign Responses
The operation in Haiti was quietly approved or disapproved by all sorts, with
Russia and China voicing qualms about using force even if it were UN sanctioned.
But the US view of the invasion of Panama as justified on the grounds of democracy, self-defense, and human rights, was not shared by very many in the international
Clinton speech, quoted in von Hippel 2000:102-3.
Clinton speech, quoted in von Hippel 2000:126.
6 3 3 von Hippel 2000:102.
221 community. Arguments about safeguarding Americans’ fives were not the issue so much as the proportionality of the American response in its name. Avoiding a veto in the Security Council, the UN General Assembly voted 75-20 to condemn the US and demand withdrawal &om Panama. The OAS voted 20-1 to condemn US actions, with the United States the lone dissenter.^^^
For Insiders, though, Panama was not seen as a tragic a&ir but a “victory for democracy.” Japan was among those who saw the Panamanian incursion in acceptable terms. Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama suggested approval of the action by affirming that the “establishment of a democratic government is overdue there” and callir% the nullification of May 7 elections as “totally regrettable” and
“inexcusable in international society.”^^ Having recalled its ambassadors and suspended aid after Noriega refused to step down, Japan now expressed hope of
“progress toward democratization” and announced the return of official contacts to
Panama.^^^ Japanese elites also viewed the Haitian episode 6vorably, again making direct links in terms of democracy. Foreign Minister Yohei Kono hailed the outcome
UN Documents 7959:A/44/PV.86 and .88. See also Scheflfer 1992:123.
This reaction by Foreign Minister Nakayama, in Tokyo KYODO, 12/20/89, in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia.
Reports covered in Tolqfo KYODO, 12/21/89 and 12/22/89, in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia. This official response, it should be noted, contrasts with publk and media criticism, with some Japanese dailies denouncing the invasion as a violatbn of Panamanian independence and sovereignty.
222 as “important progress toward the restoration of Haiti’s democracy.”^^ Japan backed the verbal support for democracy with pledges of reconstruction aid to assist the
“legitimately elected government.”^ '
With the support of these two actions too come positive views of the US by
J^anese ofGcials. Despite the normatively suspect nature of the intervention, Japan relieved the US of the blame, suggesting the “US had to take military action in order to protect its nationals” and saying that, “while regretting that the situation has arisen,” Japan “understands the background against which [the US] had to take military actions.”^^’ Citing Panama’s declaration of war and the killing, detention and
torture of Americans, PM ToshOd Kaihi said the US was essentially “goaded into
action” and that he “understands the reason behind America’s action.”^ Japanese officials particularly gave glowing remarks to the US regarding Haiti, having stood
up for democracy while accomplishing change while securmg “peace.”^^
France, an Outgroup Insider, treated the cases of Panama and Haiti almost
identically. Regarding Panama, the foreign ministry expressed that the resort to force
Reported in Beijing Xinhua, 9/19/94, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
Report, including quotes o f FM Yohi Kono, m Beijing Xmhua, 9/19/94, in FBIS Daily Report: China.
Reported in Tokyo KYODO, 12/21/89, in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia
Reported in Tokyo KYODO, 12/21/89, in FBIS Daily Report: East Asia
Japan’s foreign ministry view of the US as “peace negotiators” is part of a “roundup” of international reactkm reported by Beging Xmhua, 9/19/94, in FBIS Daily Report:China.
223 is “always regrettable and cannot be approved,” but placed the blame on Noriega not the United States.^^ At the same time, French officials hailed the outcome of the restoration of democracy, and affirmed “resolute support” for democracy in Panama and everywhere.^^ The ambivalent response regarding the US, chiding yet
^proving, represents this tension between “Insider'' support for democracy but
“Outgroup” skepticism.
In the case of Haiti, a former colony of France, they expressed regret should force occur, and relief when it did not. France had participated in the diplomacy to secure Aristide’s exile, had contributed some 200 troops to the UN Mission in Haiti in 1992, and was a “Friend o f the Secretary-GeneraT helpmg negotiate the
Governor’s Island accord.^ When the coup-leaders then balked on the accord,
France approved “all necessary means” to remove them in the UN Security Council
Foreign Mmister Alain Juppe stated bluntly "this pseudo (Haitian) Government and its m ay must go,"^^ Nonetheless, French officials remained ambivalent on how this would be achieved. Despite clanning "we have agreed to all the Security Council resolutions aimed at achieving this,” Juppe cited a preference for diplomacy, announcing that France would take part in the UN monitoring force after democracy
FM Dumas, quoted in Paris AFP, 12/21/89, m FBIS Daily Report: West Europe.
Reported in Paris AFP, 12/21/89, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe.
^ Geldenhuys 1998:229-32.
From a discussion with journalists at a meeting with French Ambassadors, reported in Paris AFP, 9/1/94, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe.
224 was restored to Haiti, “but would not support intervention.”^ In each case, then,
French leaders championed the advancement of democracy that occurred, though no particular credit nor blame was attached to the US in the evidence I uncovered.
China’s Foreign Ministry, addressing the issue of Panama, stated the US invasion “constitutes an infringement against a sovereign state of the Thfrd World and violates the norms of mtemational law and the aims and purposes of the UN Charter,” adding that “we were shocked and condemn this act.”^^ Ambassador Li Luye referred to it as an “aggressive action,” and, sticking to its guns of the “Five
Principles o f Peaceful Coexistence,” China reiterated its opposition to “interference in the internal affeirs o f another country under any pretext and in any form, particularly by the use o f military force.”^ ' Chinese ofGcials, smarting from souring relations with the US after Tianenman Square and resulting sanctions earlier that year, saw the
US in a negative light. Referring to “military mvasion” rather than liberation or self- defense, Chinese ofGcials called the US “aggressor” and the case as a “glaring act of hegemonism.”^^
^ Quoted in Paris AFP, 9/1/94, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe', New York Times 5/13/94, A8.
Foreign Ministry brieGng, reported in Beijing Xinhua, 12/21/89, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-89-244).
Quoted in Beging Xmhua, 12/21/89, in FBIS Daily Report.China (CHI-89-244).
See reports and commentaries m Xinhua Domestic Service, 12/21/89 and 12/22/89, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-89-244 and -245).
225 China abstained or voted for the resolutions regarding Haiti, reflecting a different tenor in relations by 1994. Recalling Chapter 3, this period of wannii^ with the US follows Clinton’s de-linking MFN from human rights. In the context of relations, negative views o f the US are dançened, and a UN-authorized multilateral mission, then, is not so threatening in this context, as China’s abstention attested.
Nonetheless, as an Outgroup Outsider, China is still mindful of the use of force by member states within a UN mandate (see also their response to Bosnia in Chapter 5).
UN representative Li Daoyu voiced Beijing’s reservations with the method of military action, and Jiang Zemin, General Secretary o f the CCP, declared “no country should attempt to force its will and model on another.”^^ The UN mandate needed to translate into multinational operations, that “US troops alone will not be sufBcient” in
leghimizing the ndssion.^^' Chinese ofBcials made clear they preferred a diplomatic
solution, stressmg that the “opportunity for peace” still existed.^^^ So they were
uncomfortable with the pending use of force and US willingness to use it to promote
democracy, and pleased that the situation was resolved without such a resort to force.
Quoted in Xmhua Domestic Servfee, 12/14/94, in FBIS Daily Report. China (CHI- 92-240).
Defense Minister Chi Haotian, reported in Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO, 9/13/94, m FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-94-177).
Foreign Vfirdstry Mefrng, picked up by the Shanghai People’s Radk> Network, 9/19/94, in FBIS Daily Report.China (CHI-94-181).
226 which some considered a “dangerous precedent” in the year of the 40* anniversary of
China’s “Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”^^
India was coincidentally dealing with a domestic crisis during the Panama intervention, so their responses is limited in this case. On the actual day o f mvasion in December 1989, the ruling BJP 6ced and survived a vote of no confidence.
Nonetheless, External Af6irs Minister IJC Gujral reflected the government position when he openly “deplored” the invasion o f Panama.^^ Indian officials invoked noninterference and described the afifeirs there as an “internal situation in Panama,” and demanded that American forces be withdrawn fiom Panama “ferthwith."^^^
Regarding Haiti on the other hand, India was seemingly less concerned about the prospects of force agamst a less developed country, perh^s because of the role of the UN. India’s Minister of State for External Afifeirs, R.L. Bhatia, first declared that his country had “no intention of participating m the expected mtervention in Haiti,”^^^ reflecting India’s difficult balance between a pro-democracy stance and its identity as
See the roundup on US use of force, in Xinhua Domestic Service, 9/16/94, and official commentary on Beijing China Radio International, 9/17/94, both in FBIS Daily Report. China (CHl-94~I81and 94-182). On tlm 40* anniversary o f the “Principles,” see Li Peng’s comments in Beijing Xinhua, 6/24/94, in FBIS Daily Report. China (CHI-94-123).
Quoted in Delhi Domestic Servfee, 12/21/89, in FBIS Daily ReportcNear East/South Asia (NES-89-244).
Gujral quoted in Delhi Domestic Services, 12/22/89, in FBIS Daily Report:Near East/South Asia (NES-89-245).
Reported by Beijing Xinhua out of New Delhi, 9/15/94, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-94-180).
227 a Non-aligned “victim” country. Nonetheless, this lack o f physical assistance did not mean lack of support, as Indian ofBcials praised the goal and outcome of “restoring democracy,” and offered “to cooperate in the...reconstruction” of Haiti with peacekeeping assistance to the “legitimate constitutional authorities.”^^^
Moscow’s responses to Panama and Haiti obviously occurred in their own quite distinct contexts: 1989 in the waning days of Soviet rule and 1994 m the blossommg days of a new Russia. The late 80s and early 90s under Gorbachev were times of and Outgroup Outsider undergoing increased liberalization and decreased hostility toward the US, yet Moscow bad yet to achieve a liberal self-image. By 1994
Russia had gone through the honeymoon phase of its new liberalism—including a strong friendship with the US and strong commitments to democracy and Western notions of human rights and liberties. Bosnia, the previous section argued, was the catalyst for the end o f the honeymoon, as skepticism and division arose within
Russian domestic politics concerning US intentions and Russia’s independence within the New World Order. The response in Haiti, then, occurs amidst this transition, with Russia still embracmg democracy and liberal norms but increasingly disillusioned with American “benign” intentions.
Despite the warming with their Cold War rival in the late 1980s, the Soviets still viewed American force with skepticism. Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr
Belongogov called the mvasfon of Panama “intolerable bloodshed,” and ofBcials
Foreign Ministry briefing, reported by Beijing Xinhua out of New Delhi, 9/15/94, m FBIS Daily Report:China (CHI-94-180).
228 declared that, whatever argument the US may make, it was to be “condemned” as a
“flagrant violation of the UN Charter.”^* Soviets saw it as a violation of international law and it was “flatly condemned” as a negative affect on world peace.^^^ Interestn%ly, though, the negative view of the act did not translate into a uniformly negative judgment o f the US. While some issued condemnations o f the US as “aggressors,” Information Mmistry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev relayed the ofGcial line that the invasion “doesn't necessarily hurt relations” with the US, as actions now needed to be viewed not in the “old” (Cold War) context but in a more nuanced, new w ay.^ This suggests that the intense negative imagery has escaped prevailing views in Moscow, a finding confirmed by the Gulf War (see chapter 4).
With regard to Haiti, the new Russia, still in the throes o f liberalism when the crisis broke out in 1993, was committed to the support of democracy. Russia joined the Group of Seven (G-7) in declarii% such support. The G-7 leaders and Russian
President Boris Yeltsin urged the Haitian military leaders to comply with the U.N. resolutions calling for “the restoration of the legitimately elected government.”^ ^
Reported in Moscow Domestic Service, 12/20/89, in FBIS Daily Report:Soviet Union (SOV-89-244); the Ambassador is quoted m Beijing Xinhua, 12/21/89, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-89-244).
Reported in the New York Times, 12/22/89.
^ On views of the US, see TASS International Service, 12/21/89, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union (SOV-89-245)', on Deputy Perfifyev’s comments, see Nfin^try briefing reported by Moscow Domestic Servke, 12/20/89, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union (SOV-89-244).
Reported by Moscow ITAR-TASS, 7/10/94, mFBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia (SOV-94-132).
229 Russia also voted for the UN resolution, authorizing “any means necessary” to accomplish this task.^^ Nonetheless, there was an unease with US intentions, and an appeal to the aversion or minmdzation of violence, calling on invading forces not to mfringe upon the sovereignty and territorial mtegrity o f Haiti, expecting any action to conform with UN accords and not go beyond UN resolutions.^^ There is not much evidence to support that the US was glorified or vilified for the outcome of the action, only approval that force was averted.
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The results of these case studies, summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, tend to remArce the fiodings of Chapter 3 and the theoretical expectations outlined in
Chapter 2. Fust, identity seems to correlate with evaluations in expected ways, m that
“insiders” viewed mterventmns justified along humanitarian and democracy- promoting Imes more fiivorably than did “outsiders.” This suggests a discomfort on the part of outsiders either with the norms themselves or, as they relayed, with the violation of norms more pertinent to them, namety sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also Actoring in is a suspkion as to the real motives, mdicative of the sensitivity of “victnn” states.
^ http:ZAmbfenet.un.org/webpac-bm/wgbroker70607112504063251
Reported in Beying Xinhua, 9/21/94, in FBIS Daily Report: China (CHI-94-183).
230 The second nnportant &dnig is mteractive: these evaluations between insiders and outsiders polarized m unilateral interventions but were muted in multilateral ones. This too matches the expectations of the mteractionist framework of
Chapter 2. UN-sanctioned use of force removes one normative qualm from the picture, at minimum eliminating a normative pomt of contention from consideration.
The legitimacy of UN authorization may also serve to mute criticism or win support for such acts. Thus responses are homogenized across the board. In unilateral cases, however, differences of opinion were heightened, with the countemormative nature of un-approved intervention playing into outsider negative perceptions while bemg downplayed or explained away by insiders satisfied with the normative basis of intervention on humanitarian and democratic grounds.
What of our alternative explanatory possibilities to comprehend the reactions to the interventions described in the Balkans and Latin America? In most cases, it was (fifficuft to pomt to any material mterests Imkmg observer states to the specific areas in question—precisely one o f the problems of relying on materia&t arguments.
Russia’s Imk to the Balkans, and France’s Imk to Haiti, are the only plausible examples of some economic ties, but even these do not dictate one obvious conclusion about responses. As with the previous chapter, there seems not to be a uniform negative response to a unipolar world of American power, suggestmg threat mheres in something more than power.
Again, as with before, the normative and neoliberal clahns about multilateralism receive some support, m that responses to Bosnia and Haiti are more
231 Country: Japan France USSR/ India China Case: (ingroup (outgroup Russia (outgroup (outgroup insider) insider) (see below) outsider) outsider)
Panama + 0 - - (1989) (outgroup outsider)
Haiti (1994) + +/o o/+ 0 0 (outgroup insider)
Bosnia (1995) + + 0 0 (outgroup insider)
- Kosovo + + - (1999) (outgroup outsider)
+ Indicates a fevorabie evaluation of the act, either by support or undkrstanding of the US position. - Indicates a negative evaluation of the act, defined kÿ criticism and understandings different than the US position. 0 Indicates an evaluation that is ambiguous, neither broadly supportive nor critical. ______
Table 5.1 Evaluations of “liberal” interventions
Country. Japan France USSR/ India China Case: (ingroup (outgroup Russia (outgroup (outgroup insider) msider) (see below) outsider) outsider) Panama + 0 o/- -- (outgroup outsider)
Haiti + 0 0 0 0 (outgroup insider)
Bosnia + 0 0 0 -/o (outgroup insider)
Kosovo + o/+ (outgroup outsider)
+ Indicates a 6vorable evaluation of the US, in terms of how the US and its motives are described. • Indicates a negative evaluation of the act, defined by critical assertions about US design and motives. 0 Indicates an evaluation that is ambiguous, neither broadly supportive nor critical of the US. ______
Table 5 2 Evaluation o f United States in “liberal” interventions
232 tempered and less varied than the unilateral cases of Kosovo and Panama. An interesting caution is warranted on this point; namely, there are times where “UN authorized” is itself subjected to rival interpretations. Somewhat with Haiti but particularly with Bosnia, countries such as Russia and China read the mandates differently than the US and allies. This is to say that institutions and authorization do not automatically generate uniform perceptions of legitimacy or transparency of actions. Also, as we have already seen, system constructivism and neoliberal approaches are less effective in explaining variation in the responses to unilateral/ countemormative cases. My identity framework of ethnocentric inference seems to offer a plausible explanation where these other perspectives &fl.
I now turn to the unfinished business of the final mediating variable in the ethnocentric inference model yet to be addressed: identity affiliates. Chapter 6 explores how the presence o f an identity affiliate influences Egypt’s interpretations of various interventions already discussed—Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan/Sudan, Iraq and the Gulf War.
233 CHAPTER 6
IDENTITY AFFILIATES AND INTERPRETATION
6.1 Overview
Recalling Chapter 2 ,1 discussed the concept of identity affiliates. Acting as an extension o f the S elt these political entities become part o f the mgroup feelmgs of the ethnocentric observer. The result is a different dynamic in the interpretation process than what we have discussed to this point. Akin to introducing vital national interests into a situation, this affective ingroup bias filters the interpretation of acts in a fiishion consistent with maintaining a positive ingroup and Self This means that if the identity afSliate is being banned by an intervention, it is equivalent to an attack on the observer, and should be seen as a negative act. If the klentity afBliate is being helped by and intervention, that should be perceived as a good thing.
I explore the role of identity afSiiates in the interpretation o f mterventions through the lens of Egypt’s perspective. I review Egypt’s location on the identity matrix below, and demonstrate the presence of an identity afBliate for their state identity—that of Muslims and Arabs. After elaborating on this aspect of Egyptian identity, I revisit cases o f interventfons with a new focus on whether Muslim or Arab
234 populations are the target of mtervention or the beneficiary of intervention. Bosnia and Kosovo provide cases of the latter, while Iraq and Aghanistan/Sudan illustrate the former. Following an analysis o f Egypt’s evaluations o f these acts, I then look at the second step of the model—the judgment of the intervener—to show that a Judged
“bad act” does not necessarily lead to a Judgment of “bad actor” when the intervener is held in a positive image.
6.2 Egypt’s Identity; Who is “Us”?
In Chapter 3 ,1 presented the identity matrix of varwus observer countries, including Egypt, concluding that Egypt be considered an “ingroup outsider.” This means Egypt’s leadership feels margmaUzed fiom the international system and does not adhere to the prevailing liberal normative order dommated by the West. Yet this also nigans that Egypt’s elites possess a positive image of the United States despite this. The expectation for such an identity on the interpretation of interventions would be skepticism about interventions, particular^ those that are unilateral and “liberaT in nature, but fevorable Jut^ments of the intervener. In other words, Egypt should not approve of such interventions, but it should absolve the US of much culpability for the actions, giving Washington the benefit of the doubt or invoking situational attributions that explain the untoward actfens.
This assessment is complkated by a final variable, that of the identity affiliate.
Intervatfens mvolving an klentity affiliate effect change on the first stage o f
235 ethnocentric inference, the constmal process, as those seen as “like us” are directly affected by an intervention. To see whom elites account for as “their own” in their conception of identity, I engage in an analysis of statements by Egyptian elites that declare other peoples or territories as “one of us,” as “brothers and sisters,” or
“fellow” in any pattern over time were candidates for identity affiliates. As discussed in Chapter 3, for Egypt, the President is supreme in the foreign policy domain, defining the national interest and what to do about Throughout this intervention period, the president is Homi Mubarak. He and his foreign minister, ‘Amr Musa, are the central actors in the decision-making circle in foreign affeirs, so it is their statements on which I concentrate, supplemented with secondary source anafysis. I present the findings o f this investigation next, then turn to the cases applying identity affiliate to the interpretation of interventions.
Egypt’s national identity can be seen as at once unique m Egyptian nationalism and a leader of the Arab and Muslhn cause.^^ The recent trend of
“reasserting Arabism” and patron o f Islam is rooted in domestic politics, as President
Hosni Mubarak attempts to retain, restore, and revive a semblance o f legitimacy in the secular. Western allied state.^ With its credibility as a nonaligned leader
tarnished by its frkndly relations with the United States since the 1970s, Egypt has
attempted to re-integrate with its regional neighbors and convince discontented
Lesch 1995.
^ Talhami 1992:154; Lorenz 1990.
^ AfiandDian 1993:26-32.
236 domestic forces of its Arab and Islamic credentials.^’ The identity through which
Egypt views international a&irs, then, is rooted a good deal in pragmatism and the legitmiacy of the regime.^ Despite instrumental origins, this identity prevails in perceptions, as governments “demonstrate they are working to protect and advance
Arab and Muslim rights.”**’
Thus Mubarak speaks often about the “supreme goaT of safeguarding “the security of Egypt and the Arab world,” and reviving Nasir’s phrase, al-shaqiqa al- kubra, or “the big sister of the Arabs.”*™ The President refers to “preserving its national dignity and Arab policy,” and asserts Egypt’s “role” to “safeguard its national and Arab responsibilities.”*’' Though pan-Arabism is prominent, and has been since Nasir in the 1950s, Islam has long been related, and invoked as part o f
Egyptian identity.*™ While being a secular state, Egypt like others in the region nonetheless seek to embrace the mantle of Islam for a sense of legitimate authority at home. The Islamic revival in Egypt, dating back to Sadat’s openness to Islam and declaratfon of Egypt as “a state of science andfaith,” has been aimed at quelling the
667 Quandt 1990; AftaodHian 1993:65-70.
*** See Hudson (1978) on the legitimacy crisis generally in the Middle East, and in Egypt’s recent past.
**’ AftandOian 1993:19.
*™ Aftandaian 1993:33,36.
*’' Mubarak interview, in Cairo MENA, 1/29/95, in FBIS Daily Report.Near East/South Asia (NÈS-95-0I9).
«’2 Talhami 1992:29.
237 domestic elements who see the state as un-Islamic, or lacking authenticity.®^ Facing political pressure &om foundadonalist militants as well as the more peaceful Islamic center,” Mubarak’s Egypt claims the cause of Muslims as its own as welL®^* The drive for a leadership role places greater weight to both Arab and Muslhn concerns, and seeks to deflect charges o f insensitivity toward these constituencies.®^®
In terms of “identity afSliates,” then, Egypt can be said to have two, according to its own patterns of rhetoric and self-identification: that of Muslims and that of
Arabs. If “the place of Islam has always been central to the question of Egypt’s identity,®^® the pendulum has swung from Nasser’s “fiuled secularization” back to embracing Islam as part of Egypt’s identity concept. Some of this construction is driven perhaps domestic politics, such as the popular pressures for linking interests to
Islam or the plight o f other Arabs m what is called “The New Arabism.”®^ If
Mubarak’s reghne is a “government on the brink,®^® it is practical that he embrace
Islam in Egyptian domestic and foreign policy. Mubarak has responded to domestic pressures at home by sanctioning moderate groups like the Muslim Brotherhood
®^ Talhami 1992:131-34.
®’® Baker 1997.
®” Aftandilian 1993:2.
®’® Lorenz 1990:122.
®^ Lorenz 1990:119.
®’* Price 1999:41.
238 while discrediting, marginaliziry and cracking down on radical groups like Jihad.
Takfir wa al-Hijra, and Ga’amat®^’
But there is also a sense that the afBliation with Arabs and Muslims runs deeper in history and culture. Lorenz suggests that “strands of Arabism, Islam and patriotism are so interwoven in the national consciousness that frequently no one of them can be separated out as the motive for a particular foreign policy.”^ Whatever the case, for our study there was a definite pattern of identification with “fellow
Arabs” and Muslims around the world, indicating a shared sense of history and destiny. This translates into predictive expectations for how Egypt would view interventions involving populations that are Arab, Muslim or both.
Already having established that Egypt holds a positive knage o f the US, and that it is an Outsider Identity by my reckoning (see Chuter 3), the role of identity afSliates allows me to compare expectations of Egyptian responses not only with normative and materialist alternatives but with the general predictions reserved for
Ingroup Outsiders in my own theory o f ethnocentric inference. In the following analysis then, I first compare Egyptian perceptions of interventions where Muslims are the beneficiaries of US intervention with those of interventions where Muslims and Arabs are the target of US intervention. The expectation, given the argument
about identity affiliates, is that reactions to the former wiH be positive and reactions
to the latter will be negative—regardless o f other aspects of the intervention:
Price 1999:46.
Lorenz 1990:122.
239 multilateralism, unilateralism, liberal justifications, all that we have discussed as inqwrtant.
The second step of the analysis in this cluster is to return to the issue o f judgment of the mtervener. To this point I have spoken o( and made claims only to, the “representation phase” of interpreting events. An important follow-up question is whether the presence of an identity affiliate also significantly alters predictions about the judgment of the intervener. I have suggested that it does not, in that evaluation and judgment are separated by the important mediating role of images. I show below that Egypt’s positive image of the US in 6ct does allow it to separate “bad acts” from their perpetrators. Looking at cases where Muslims and Arabs were targets o f US intervention, the intervention is seen in negative terms but the view o f the US was not adversely affected; the action is explained away as situational or just forgiven.
I address each part o f the analysis in turn in the next two sections. Since we have visited these interventions in previous ch^ters, to avoki redundancy I avoid any substantial descriptives about them, providing a minimum o f background and assuming that the reader is familiar with the cases in question.
6.3 Target or Beneficiary? Identity Affiliates and Interpretation
This section proceeds with a comparison of cases in which the identity affiliate is beneficiary o f an intervention (Bosnia and Kosovo), followed by a comparison of cases in which the identic affiliate is a target of the use of force (Iraq,
240 Sudan, and Afghanistan, 1998). Focusing on the mediating role of “identity afBliates” in the interpretive process, I use the comparative cases of Iraq and Sudan/
Afghanistan to control for observer country (thus identity and image of the US) cmd multilateralism (both are unilateral), while varying whether an identity afiBliate was the target of the intervention or the victim of the target of the intervention. Kosovo and Bosnia, on the other hand, vary m UN authorization but not in identity afiBliate; this allows us to explain similar responses using not multilateralism but the common variable of identity with the victims.
I examine the cases first, however, grouped by the common feature of whether the identity affiliate is a target of US intervention or a vktnn being akied by US intervention. The results are then summarized and discussed in the context of alternative explanations.
6.3.1 Affiliate as Beneficiary: Bosnia and Kosovo
Recalling fiom Chtq)ter 5 the US-led NATO interventions against Serb targets first over Bosnia and then over Kosovo, we discussed the humanitarian concerns cited by the Western powers that justified their use of force in each case. The intervention over Kosovo was also carried out without the authorization of the UN Security
Council, with most observers agreeing the act was illegal according to prevailing international law. Normal^ to a state with an Outsider identity, with both illiberal tendencies and a müd case of victimhood m its self-image, mterventions under such
241 circumstances would not be well met. Particularly a unilateral intervention, with
Western Great Powers using their muscle at will and against international rules, should make an Outsider suspicious, if not down right opposed, to such an act.
Chapter 5 showed this to be the case with other outsiders like China and India.
But these are not ordinary cases when it comes to the observing Outsider,
Egypt. The humanitarian basis for US justifications to intervene in Bosnia and
Kosovo was the prevalence o f patterned and systematic harassment, torture and
“ethna; cleansing” of targeted populations by Serb forces. These populations, as it h^pened, were both Muslim. The Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians, each striving for autonomy and independence firom what was left of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), became targets of Serb reprisals and abuses.®** The affinity for
Muslims in the region extended to the existence o f the Yugoslav Egyptians’
Association, founded in 1990 and is 15,000 strong by the end of that year.®*^ In each case, then, Egypt took up the Muslim cause, joining an Islamic Contact Group on the
issue, condemning the ongoing atrocities and goading the international community
into taking action.®*^ When the NATO bombings commenced, in August 1995 and
March 1999 respectively, Egypt’s evaluation of the actions was decidedly positive.
®** This oversimplifies things. The Serbs were not the only perpetrators of misdeeds (see Chapter 5).
®*^ Reported in the New York Times 11/21/90.
®*^ Reported in Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR, 1/20/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-016).
242 Regarding Bosnia, Egypt—this illiberal state that squelches political parties, dissension, and many avenues o f expression—became a loud advocate of human rights, focusing attention on the plight of Bosnian Muslims. Commenting on ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Musa viewed "any concession on tins issue is regarded as a concession on all human rights.”^^ Regarding trials for Serb war criminals, this became a priority, and Egyptian ofBcials spoke o f sharing this humanitarian stand with many countries, led by the United States.^^^ Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa referred to Bosnia in terms o fa "holocaust” that had gone unpunished and as a
"wound that sears” his h eart.^ Musa spoke of the Bosnian crisis from the perspective o f "a state interested in human rights and as a Muslim country,” which
"prompts us to play an active role in the Bosnian issue, an issue which concerns "not only the Islamic world but also the international community.”^
Upon the commencement ofNATO bombing, Mubarak gave "full backing” to the action, stressing the need for a "swift answer to Serb aggression,” referring to the
^ Foreign Ministry briefing reported in Cairo MENA, 12/15/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-242).
^ Briefing in Cairo MENA, 12/15/95, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-242).
Musa, quoted in Cairo MENA, 9/10/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-I72).
^ Quote of Musa taken from Cairo MENA, 6/17/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95~II7, JI7).
243 shelling of Sarajevo.®** Continuing the “active role” after the commencement of the bombing, Egypt, through the Organization of Islamic Conference (QIC), agreed to supply arms to Bosnian Muslims, warning the Serbs of the consequences, if they continued ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.®*’ Egypt’s leadership also heaped praise on the
US, and lauding their “decisive response to the Serb arrogance.”®’®
Regarding Kosovo, the perceptions are much the same, with the situation and intervention read through the prism o f Islamic identity and human rights. Islamic writer Fahny Howeidy, m a syndicated column, summarized Egyptian sentiment toward Kosovo with a sprinkle of hyperbole: “The slaughter and mayhem unleashed by the Tartars seven centuries ago in the sacking ofB% bdad...I have no doubt what the Serbs are doing in Kosovo is even worse.”®’* To express condemnation of Serb
policies against Kosovar Muslims, Egypt withdrew its ambassadors from
Yugoslavia®’^ and sent aid in the form of medicines and foodstuff for the refugees
resulting from the crisis.®” The NATO action, as in Bosnia, was welcomed and
®** President Mubarak, statement in Cairo MENA, 9/5/95, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-168).
®*’ Reported in Bangkok’s The Nation, 9/14/95, in /vB/S Daily Report: East Asia (EAS-95-I77).
®’® Musa’s comments recorded in Cairo MENA, 9/7/95, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-95-170).
®’*Karawan 2000:216-17.
®’^Karawan 2000:220.
®®* Mubarak’s decision to send aid reported by Cairo MENA, 3/30/99, in FEES Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES~l999-0330).
244 encouraged by Egypt. As for perceptions of intervener, Egypt lay blame on the
Serbs, saying “the rejection by the Serbs” of peace overtures and UN resolutions “led to the current sttuation.”^^ Musa said “no human being, government, or people can
tolerate what has been happening to the people and mdividuals in Kosovo,” that “the
breaches of human rights there were extremely dangerous, unjustified, and
intolerable.”^”
If anything, in both cases the US, NATO, and especially the UN were fiiulted
for delay—doing too little too late, not too much. Musa made a reference to how “the
US-led NATO operation against Yugoslavia should have been authorized by the
United Nations Security CounciT but in the same statement criticized that body for
fidling “to instantly deal with the situation ever the Serbs’ ethnic cleansing campaign
agamst Albanian Kosovars came to ligbt.”^”
In both cases o f intervention, Egypt’s response was essentially the same.
Fellow Muslhns were victims o f persecutmn, and the use o f force was justified on the
grounds that it would stop that persecutmn—even when the intervention was not
authorized by the United Nations. Egypt’s identity afiBliate was perceived to be the
beneficiary of mtervention; by extension, the interventions benefited Egypt at the
Comments of Musa, reported m Cairo MENA, 3/25/99, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-1999-0325).
Musa, quoted m Cairo MENA, 3/25/99, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-1999‘0225).
Reported in Cairo MENA, 6/16/99, in FBIS Daily Report. Near East/South Asia (NES 1999-0617).
245 ideational level Now we shall consider Egypt’s perceptions of interventions by the same actor—the United States—and with the same absence of UN authority.
Revisiting the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan/Sudan in 1998, we see that Egypt’s tune changes from approval to harsh opposition. In the absence of material concerns in these cases, a plausible, even compelling, explanation rests with the presence of identity affiliates at the receiving end o f intervention—as targets, not rescued victims.
6.3.2 Affiliate as Target: Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan
What happens, then, when the tables are turned, as they are in the cases of
intervention %amst Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998, and against Iraq in
December 1998? In cases where the same actor is involved, the United States, and
the same image of the US holds, and the same absence of UN authorization exists as
was the case in Kosovo, we see that the important difference in outcomes rests with
the shift in identity affiliates from the role of beneficiary to the role of target.
The August 1998 unilateral Amerkan strikes against targets within
Afghanistan and Sudan were meant for a network of terrorists with presumed
operations at each location. The Muslim identity of the countries, and of the targeted
people, was compounded ty the ftict that civilian casualties occurred in the strikes.
Coupled with the normatively suspect nature of the act, using force without UN
authorization in purported “self-defense” prior to any alleged attack for which no
246 evidence was produced, set the stage for a negative reaction by an Outsider country with a Muslim identity afBliation.
The Arab League, of which Egypt is a member, held an emergency meeting over the airstrikes, and condemned the action, focusmg particularly on the questionable target of the Khartoum pharmaceutical 6ctory alleged to produce chemical weapons parts.^^ Foreign Mmister ‘Amr Musa stated the Egyptian position that, while completely against terrorism, responses to it need to take place through international channels not unilateralism, and that the US was no "alternative to the
Security Council”*’*
Though mildly critical of the intervention agamst ta^ets in Afghanistan and
Sudan, the Egyptian response was mute compared to the response to the strikes on
Iraq later that year.*” The attacks on Iraqi targets for Saddam Hussein’s intransigence were unauthorized, unprovoked, and aimed at an Arab, Muslim target.
Civilian casualties from the strikes were estimated m the dozens. The p l ^ t o f the
*” Reported in Paris AFP, 8/21/98, in FB/S Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98‘233).
*” Musa quoted in Cairo MENA, 8/22/98, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98-234).
*” This again may owe to the terrorist aspect of the intervention, which seems to invoke a synçathy Actor across various observers (see Chuter 4).
247 Iraqi people was always in Mubarak’s speeches, as he sought to separate the deeds of
Hussein from suffering Iraqis.^”
When the airstrikes commenced, Egypt was out in front to oppose the action and demand its end. Receiving news o f Desert Fox with "great sorrow,” Mubarak publicly called for a halt, and sent a letter to Clinton asking the same, citing the loss of 116 of "the fraternal Iraqi people.”™' As with the Balkans, Egypt sent humanitarian aid to help those harmed by the attack and "as a sign of solidarity between the Egyptian and Iraqi peoples.”^*® On December 19*, the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Russia together states their “strong opposition” to the air strikes and calling for thefr cessation.^'’^
When the strikes ceased, Egypt was quick to take credit. Musa vowed that the diplomatic overtures to the US by extensive Egyptian contacts, including phonecalls
from Mubarak, "contributed to ending the military operatfen.”^ Mubarak played up
its role on all fronts, citing their influence on the halt and tying its efforts to a
http://www.sis.gov.eg/egvptmflpolitics/preside/intview/html: see also report in Cairo MENA, 12/18/98, in FBIS Daily Report. Near East/South Asia (NES-98-352).
Quoted in Cairo MENA, 12/19/98, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES~98-253).
Story on Red Crescent aid from Egypt in Cairo MENA, 12/19/98, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES~98-353).
Statements of Amr Musa and Igor Ivanov (relayed through Russian Ambassador Vladimir Goudev), reported in Cairo MENA, 12/19/98, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98-353).
(Quoted in Cairo MENA, 12/21/98, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98-355). Note the strikes began %ain after the pause on December 21^.
248 “historical and deep pan-Arab responsibility” and the 6ct that Egypt cares for and defends “Arab rights everywhere.”™^
These cases demonstrate that placing an identity affiliate on the receiving end o f military intervention fundamentally alters perceptions of the act toward a negative evaluation. Taken with the case where the identity afBliate was a beneficiary of intervention m likewise normative^ suspect chcumstances (Kosovo), the relatfenship of identity and interpretation becomes clear at a new level An Ingroup Outsider’s responses to unauthorized unilateral actions fi:om an Outsider country would be expected to be less enthusiastic than Egypt’s response to Kosovo, and less hostile than Egypt’s response to Iraq in 1998. By way of comparison, consider Egypt’s response to a normatively suspect act perpetrated by the US in which no identity affiliate is involved: the case o f Panama. My investigation showed a response that was mildly disapprovmg,^°^ as one might expect of an Outsider, yet not damning of the act or the actor. Egypt abstained from the vote of condemnation taken after the invasion of Panama,™^ as one might expect of an Ingroup Outsider tom between a
(Quoted in Cairo MENA, 12/28/98, m FBIS Daily Report:Near East/South Asia (NES-98-362).
Mubarak reported in Cairo MENA, 12/20/89, expresses “regret” over the resort to force, but does not single out the US for blame or harsh tenns. See FBIS Daily Report. Near East/South Asia (NES-89-245). Note the evkfence on this case is sparse—one reason for leaving Egypt out of the previous analyses of both Panama andHaitL
707 http://unbisnet.un.org/webpac-bm/wgbroker?06071125040632512+1+searcb.
249 positive relationship with the intervener and the clash of unilateralism with an
Outsider’s conception of normative correctness.
6.3.3 Evaluation of the U.S.
This discussion leads us to revisit and stress the second part of the two-step
model: the judgment of the actor. Identity and identity afBliation affect perceptions
of acts, assigning them evaluative valences of positive or negative by degree. But the
issue of judging the intervener for the intervention still requires a consideration of
normative correctness and particularly the preexisting images an observer holds for
that actor. So it is likely to be that an observer with a positive image o f an actor will judge them leniently in the case of interventions that are seen as “bad.”
As expected, negative judgments did not flow firom negative evaluations of
the interventions that targeted Egypt’s identity afBliates. Egypt appears sympathetic
to the terrorism problem even while chiding American unilateralism.^^' After
Operation Desert Fox, whkh was even more negatively vkwed by Egypt, images of
the US did not seem phased. While condemning the acts, at the same time Mubarak
spoke of talking with and reasoning with US officials, calling Clinton and others
“reasonable” in hearing the demands of Egypt.^*^ Mubarak in an interview asserted
Musa, quoted m Cairo MENA, 8/22/98, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia(NES-98-234).
^ In Cairo MENA, 12/28/98, m FBIS Daily Report: Near East/South Asia (NES-98- 362).
250 “there is no strain whatever in E s'p t’s relations with the US” and minimizing the recent policy clash with a dismissive note that “there will be differences at times, but this is the case with international relations in general/'”
The 6ct that evaluations of act and judgment of actor do not necessarily correspond is noteworthy as a reminder that identity and image, the rendering of Self and Other, do not always jibe in obvious and predicted ways. Some have said that a view o f Other speaks to a view of Selt^" This may be, but these Sndings remind us that the converse is not always so; Egypt’s view of Self does not speak to its view of the United States. They are different in many ways, yet the prevailing view of the US among Egypt’s elite is indicative of the overridmg perception o f common 6te derived
Srom their special relationship since the late 1970s. A question to pursue further along this theme o f identity and hnage, however, may be how many assaults on one’s identity—meaning negatively evaluated acts—does it take to take a toll on one’s image o f the other? This is a question we cannot answer conclusively in these pages, but 1 return to it in the conclusion when discussing the policy inq)lications of various forms o f intervention.
™ http://www.sis.gov e^/ei^tinfpolitics/preside/intview/htmL
Kowert 1998/99.
251 6.4 Extension: AfBliate as Victim and Target (The Gulf War)
While the evidence in the previous sections point to a validation of the identity afBliate hypothesis, before concluding we must ponder a natural question that arises &om this discussion. Namely, one might wonder if Arabs and Muslims are identity afBliates, and the location of an afBliate in an intervention as target or beneficiary affects interpretations, what happens when there is an Arab and Muslim affiliate both m the target position and the position o f beneficiary? The Gulf War is a salient example, as it is a case in this dissertation. Reflecting, an obvious answer is that the response will be muddled, all things equal The observer should be tom at the tragedy of “brother against brother,” and hope for a resolution to the problem that caused the situation.
In the Gulf War case, however, all things are not exactly equal While most cases in this dissertation have minimal “interests” involved, a conscious decision so that I could show that other dynamics matter, Egypt did have a “horse” in this race. It considered Iraq a regional competitor and rival and so was not conflicted in siding against it after so blatant an aggression against fellow Arab Kuwait.^'^ The US and allies also forgave $20.2 billion in Egyptian debt in part as thanks and m part as reimbursement for Egypt’s participation in the coalition during the GuIfWar.^" As a participant in the American-led coalition, then, it is hard to separate ideational fectors
Barnett 1998:218-221.
Reported in the New York Times 5/27/91.
252 fix)m security and economk: fectors in assessing why Egypt saw Desert Storm as a good thing.
Nonetheless, Egypt demonstrated great angst and Mubarak rode the fence to the extent possible, as expected when Islam and Arab were both the target and the beneficiary of US intervention. Prior to Iraq’s August 2 invasion, Egypt, seeking renewed regional leadership after its ‘‘rehabilitation” for its “misdeeds at Camp
David,” offered to mediate between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990.^^** Mubarak promoted a
“strictly Arab fi-amework” and encouraged outsiders like the US “not to complkate the problem between two neighboring fiatemal Arab states.
After Iraq’s mvasion and when Egfpt had taken sides, there still is a tenor to
Egypt’s rhetoric aixi approach mdicative of the identity conflict that accompanies the pending and actual use of force against an identity afBliate (Iraq). Mubarak stated clearly that “we have no argument and will never have one with the people of Iraq,” suggesting that Iraqis were “an mtegral part of the Arab nation.” He followed by then laymg blame squarely on Saddam Hussein, saying “the decision to protect the people of Iraq and all Arab people...is the Iraqi President’s alooe.”^'^ So, finm Egypt’s perspective, a normatively suspect action, warring with fellow Arabs, required justifications and the attribution of blame on someone else.
^‘'‘ Chubin 1994:11.
Chubin 1994:14.
Reported in Cairo Domestic Service, 1/16/91, in ifS/S Daily Report: Near East/ South Asia (NES-91-Oll).
253 In an interview, Mubarak stated he was “for the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces” from “and Arab country” in order to “convince the international community to stop this operation.” Responding to “the request o f brother^ Saudi Arabia and
United Arab Emirates,” Mubarak claimed Egypt to be “the shield for the entire Arab nation” carrying out Arab Summit resolutions to defend Saudi Arabia and Kuwait/^^
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The lesson from this chapter seems to be an endorsement o f the theme that
interpretations are contingent, and that substantive knowledge of a country, its
identity, and who that country includes as an ingroup, helps to understand otherwise
unexpected responses. Table 6.1 summarizes the role both of identity on evaluations
and the role of hnages on judgments in the cases discussed above. Read in columns
or rows, the patterns are informative. There are clear, opposite reactions to
interventions in which the intervener (the US) and mode of intervention (unilateral)
are held constant, leaving as explanation the role o f identity afiBliate (Muslims) as
either the target of intervention or the victim of the target of interventioa Yet,
equally interesting b the apparent role of Egypt’s hnage of the US in subsequent
Mubarak quoted in Cairo MENA, 1/19/91, in FBIS Daily Report:Near East/South Asia (NES-90-01S). Similar statenments presented by Egypt’s Deputy PM and FM in Egypt’s Consultative Council’s Foreign Relations Commfttee, Tsmat ‘Abd-alrMajid, reported by Cairo’s Domestic Servke, 1/17/91, in FBIS Daily Report: Near East/Soath Asia (NES-9I-013).
254 evaluations of the intervener. There is a diqoint between evaluations of negative acts and judgments of the actor who perpetrated them.
The general model o f ethnocentric inference remains contingent on mediatmg variables, sacrificing some parsimony for accuracy. Nonetheless, it is still ethnocentric inference that is transpiring: the Sel^ projected through an identity affiliate, is the baseline for evaluating actions taken for or against it. The Se% too, is the measuring stick for images o f Others, and the positive image of the US held by
Egyptian officials renders judgments that otherwise may have been more harsh.
As for alternative explanations, the Gulf War case certainly makes an argument for the role of strategic considerations in the Iraq/Egypt relatfonship, at
least in terms of taking sides. Still, the conduct and rhetoric of Egypt reflected the
identity-induced tensfons in its cautious approach that ultimately handcuffed the scope of the mission, were the coalition to remain united. These considerations of
how to limit the fighting alongside Westerners against “brothers” is not reducible to
material considerations.
The analysis of this cluqpter adds another layer of unit-level differentiation that
questions systemic constructivism’s emphasis on global norms. Fluctuation of
opinion from a single state based on situational differences such as identity affiliates,
further undermines the power o f norms at the mtemational level. As for neoliberal
institutional arguments, this chapter can merefy report the correlation between UN
authorized missions and Egypt’s approval of such missions. As with previous
ch^ters, it is questionable whether institutioos made the difference, as opposed to
255 Evaluation of Judgment of Intervention United States AfBliate as Target of Intervention Afghanistan/Sudan - 0 Iraq 1998 - 0 AfBliate as Victim of Target Bosnia 1995 + + Kosovo 1999 + +
Table 6.1 Egypt’s Interpretations of Intervention identity or strategic considerations. Further, as before, the variation in responses to unilateral actions transcends the institutional argument’s reach.
Before concluding this discussion of identity afSliates, a possible question raised by this discussion of identity affiliates, and particularly the concrete example o f Egypt and fellow Muslims and afBliation along ethnic and religmus lines. One might wonder whether this suggests the validity of the world predicted by Sam
Huntington in his controversial writings on the "clash of civilizations?”^'* Though in these cases the results are consistent with Huntington, it is nnportant to distinguish between essentialist and subjectivist renderings of identity and identity affiliation,^'’
The former approach, to which Huntington adheres, takes the Identity grouping, such as that along Islamic lines, as primordial and given; the latter approach makes clear that any identification with Others, along religious, ethnic or other lines, is a
Huntington 1993, 1996.
Laitin 1998.
256 provisional and constructed identity, neither permanent nor inevitable. Such distinctions can be made in future research by showh^ other objectively Arab or
Muslim leaders with much different responses to the plight of Arabs and Muslims around them. It is instead because Egypt under Mubarak has consciously constructed meaningful attachments to Arab and Muslim identity that actions taken against these groups take on the interpreted significance that they do.
Having now probed empirically the theoretical frontiers of identity, images, and norms in the previous three chapters, I now turn to drawing conclusions from the various analyses presented.
257 CHAPTER?
CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Overview
This dissertation set out to explain how states perceive and judge the interventions of others. In pursuit of an explanation for how states interpret behavior and make judgments about others, I offered a theory considering the role of norms, identity and im%es. Wedding agent and social structure, I suggested that norms contribute to evaluation and judgment by intimating an action’s legitimacy according to expectations of appropriate behavior. But importantly, I add that when the normative nature of an act is ambiguous or contested the particular preconceptions of agents become vital mediators of interpretation. In terms of interpreting
interventmns, this translates into somewhat homogenized reactions to multilateral
(normatively correct), UN sanctioned actions and more diffuse responses to unilateral
interventions. In the latter cases, state identities and preconceptions of the US
become significant determinants of evaluations of both act and actor. I argue that
these theoretical expectatmns were naore or less sustained by the evidence in this
dissertation.
258 I proceed with a review and ana^is of the results &om this study, discussing the importance of observer identity and images, as well as the role of multilateralism in affecting perceptions of intervention. I then address alternative possible e^lanations, highlight the limits and caveats of the research and point to Anther research avenues that may be fmitful along this line of inquiry. I also focus attention on the implkations o f this study for both international relations theory and practice, including U.S. foreign policy in the post-cold war era.
7.2 Summary and Analysis of Findings
The findings o f this study are reviewed below and placed in analytical context to highlight the main points of the dissertation: that interactionist role of identity and behavior. I summarize the overall patterns of perceptions, then deal with trends in subcomponent parts of identity, hnages and the nature of actions, speci&ally the role o f multilateralism and unilateralism.
Tables 7.1 and 1 2 summarize the overall results of how states interpret US interventions and judge the United States. In the "observed" columns (marked "O”), it shows the valence of state evaluations of the acts as generally positive (+), negative
(-) or neither (o). The “expected” columns (marked “E”) provide the theoretical predfotfon o f the theory o f ethnocentric mference provkled m Chapter 2.
259 Recalling the identity matrix &om Chapter 2 ,1 suggested that states can be categorized usefulty by their self-image of being an “insider” or “outsider” in world politics and by their image o f the US as positive or negative, or ingroup or outgroup.
I suggested then that Ingroup Insiders were likely to be &vorable of most anything the US did. Our country example of this, Japan, bears out this expectation in Table
7.1, having positively evaluated all actions regardless ofUN authorization or the normative justifications. On the other end. Outgroup Outsiders are hypothesized to be skeptical o f most anything the US does, and rarely praising such actions. In multilateral cases, this comes in muted form as muted criticism or neutral stances, and in unilateral cases this comes in extreme form as countemormative behavmr seen through suspicious eyes. As indicated, China and India’s reactions generally endorse this expectation. Outgroup insiders, like France in this study, are likely to be in between, seeing unilateral acts in generally bad or neutral terms unless justified in liberal normative terms, with which mskier states are likely to sympathize. This is shown by France’s negative evaluation o f the strike on Iraq m 1998 but positive evaluatmn o f “democracy promotmg” in Panama in 1989.
Turning now to the second questk)o of the study, how state judge interveners, in our case the United States, we see sim ilar expectations general^ con&med in
Table 11. In terms ofjudging actors, I suggested that prior images of an actor mediate judgments of that actor, with positive nnages making observers see the good in acts and forgiving the bad and negative images doing the reverse. This means unilateral mterventions should be tied to harsh judgments of the intervener in
260 PANAMA GULFHAITI BOSNIA AF/SUD IRAQ KOSOVO 98 E 0 E 0 E 0 E 0 E 0 E 0 E 0 [nerouD Insider. + + + + + + + + +/o + +/o + + + Japan OuterouD Insider. +/o 0 +/o + +/o +/o +/o + - o/+ - - +/o + France USSR/ Russia +/o 0 +/o o/+ +/o o/- (1991; 1994-95) Outsroup Outsider. -- ol- 0 ol- 0 ol- 0 - -/o - - - - China
India - - o/- o/- o/- 0 ol- 0 o/- -/o o/- - ol- -
USSR/ Russia -- o/- - o/- - Ol~ - (1989; 1998-99) + Indicates a &vorabie évaluation of the act, either by support or understanding of the US position. • bdicates a negative evaluation of the act, defined ly criticism and understandings different than the US position. O Indicates an evaluation that is ambiguous, neither broadly supportive nor critical.
Table 7.1 Summary Evaluations of Interventions
261 PANAMA 1 GULF I HAITI | BOSNIA I AF/SUD I IRAQ 98 I KOSOVO I E 0 E 0 E 0 E 0 E 0 E 0 E 0 Introw Insider. + + + + + + + +/o + +/o + + -t- Japan Outeroua Insider. 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 - 0 - - 0 o/+ France USSR/ Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1991; 1994-95) Outerom Outsider. - - ol- o ol- 0 ol- ol- - 0 - --- China
India -- o!~ 0 ol- 0 oi- 0 - 0 '- --
USSR/ Russia -/o - 0 --- (1989; j 9 9 8 g ^ + Indicates a &vorable evaluation of the US, in tenns of how the US and its motives are described. • Indicates a negative evaluation of the act, defined by critical assertions about US design and motives. 0 Indicates an evaluation that is ambiguous, neither broadly supportive nor critical of the US.
Table 1 2 Summary Evaluations of U.S.
262 dispositional terms by Outgroup states, while Ingroup states would not be as affected, either seeing the act and actor as good or, if the act is seen as bad, explaining it in situational or forgivii^ terms. Japan shows much of this “understanding” for unilateral actions, while Russia, India, China were less forgivmg. Multilateral interventions, because they are UN authorized, appear to mute criticism somewhat and thus the effect of negative images are less pronounced. In these cases, judgments are not positive per se but neutral or mildly critical.
The results can be disaggregated to show the mdividual and interactive rote of
identity, images, and normative basis o f the act on the interpretations. Table 7.3
highlights the relevance o f the Insider/Outsider distinction in evaluating “liberal”
interventions based on arguments about “democracy” or “human rights.” Combining
coded evaluations from all observers by then status as “Insider” or “Outsider,” the
table clarifies the general tendency for fovorable evaluations (+) o f “liberal”
interventions by Insider states con^jared to outsiders (8-0), and a general tendency for
negative evaluations to reside with Outsiders compared to Insiders (6-1). Liberal
mterventfons, then, are likely to draw a line down world opinion, especially if done
unilaterally.
The results also suggest that images play a significant role m the judgment of
the intervener. Table 7.4 shows that those with positive images of the US prior to
mterventfons judged the US positively more after interventions than those holding a
prfor negative image (10-2). Conversely, those with negative prior images of the US
tend to judge the US more negative^ than those with positive images (11-0).
263 INSIDERS OUTSIDERS
Evaluation o f act + 0 - + 0 •
PANAMA 1 I 0 0 0 3
HAITI 3 2 0 0 2 0
BOSNIA 2 0 I 0 2 0
KOSOVO 2 0 0 0 0 3
Tabie 7.3 Identity and Evaluations
POSITIVE IMAGE NEGATIVE IMAGE
Judgment of U.S. + 0 - + 0 -
PANAMA I 0 0 0 2 3
AFGHANISTAN/ 1 1 0 I 4 0 SUDAN IRAQ 1 1 0 0 0 4
KOSOVO 2 0 0 1 1 3
Unilateral total 5 2 0 2 7 10
GULF WAR 2 0 0 0 4 0
HAITI 1 0 0 0 4 0
BOSNIA 2 0 0 0 4 1
Multilateral total 5 0 0 0 12 1
GRAND TOTAL 10 2 0 2 19 11
Table 7.4 Images and Judgment
264 The results of Table 7.4 also suggest an interactive role between images and the normative nature of the intervention. When operations occur pretty "by the book” normatively speaking, meaning in accordance with globally shared rules of behavior
(UN authorization unless in self-defense), there is some convergence in judgment by observers about the intervener. In multilateral situations, the bulk of all judgments are either positive or "neutral,” the latter suggesting mixed or nonjudgmental evaluations of the character of the US. Those with positive images see the expected pro-social behavior o f a friendly country, while those with negative images are denied the ammunition by which to criticize events and the perpetrator of events. On the other hand, images interact with normatively suspect intervention in a polarizing way; providh% fodder for those with negative preconceptions to see the worst in a situation, while those holding positive images maintain them m the fece o f possibly unpleasant evidence. As Table 7.4 shows with regard to states with negative images, only one of the thirteen judgments coded is negative in the multilateral cases (7% of the total), while ten of the nineteen judgments (53% of the total) in the unilateral cases are negative.
This discussion of the interaction o f images and multilateralism leads us to another conclusion drawn by the results, a theme recurrent m the enq)irical chapters above: multilateralism matters. Apparently endorsing the conventional wisdom of neoliberals and normative theorists alike, there appears to be patterned differences in observer evaluations of acts—and judgments of actors—based on whether the intervention is authorized by the UN or not. Table 7.6 and 7.7 show the breakdown
265 Ingroup Outgroup Outgroup Total Insider Insider Outsider
Evaluation: + 0 - + 0 - + 0 • + 0 • Intervention: Multilateral 3 0 0 4 3 I 0 6 1 7 9 2
Unilateral 4 0 0 2 2 I 0 I 12 6 3 13
Table 7.5 Multilateralism and Evaluations
Ingroup Outgroup Outgroup Total Insider Inskier Outsider Evaluation/ + 0 + 0 - + 0 - + 0 Intervention Multilateral 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 1 3 12 1
Unilateral 4 0 0 I 3 I 0 4 9 5 7 10
7.6 Multilateralism and Judgment
266 of observer evaluations and judgments respectively, both by identity and in sum. In terms of proportion of responses, there is a tendency for greater shares of evaluations and judgments to be positive or neutral in multilateral cases, and more negative in unilateral cases—with the exceptmn of Ingroup Insiders, for whom it does not seem to make a difference. The overall patterns of positive, neutral, and negative reactions to intervention and intervener alike are demonstrated more graphically in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 respectively. These graphs show the precipitous drop in negative responses under multilateral conditions overall, as well as definabfe increases m negative responses under unilateral conditions overall
Overall reviewing the evidence and comparing the observed responses to the expected predictions, there is a general fit with the idea o f ethnocentric inference— that is, that different states read interventions differently based on their images of self and other that serve as measuring stfeks for interpreting normative behavior. It also suggests that some actions encourage more diverse mterpretations than others: unilateral acts or those justified on “liberaT norms do not hold universal appeal and thus are more likely to succumb to agent-level differences than more ‘^normatively correct” actions. There were some discrepancies with the predicted model particular^ with the case of A^hanistan/Sudan, Wiere the US engendered more sympathy than expected. This may have to do with the credibility that the response to terrorism was seen as a normatively acceptable response of self-defense, as the US claimed. Still others did not accept this interpretation, yet did not judge the US harshty, suggesting a possible “sympathy” fector among kindred Great Powers who
267 Evaluation of Interventions
Seriesi m M Series2 II J?K 0 Evaluation
Figure 7.1 Evaluations of Interventions*
Evaluation of U.S.
15
u 10 ■Seriesi -Series2
,i-.MtJaTLM.AZn# , •■.■•...-» .J%d7&T
+ 0 Evaluation
Figure 7.2 Judgments of United States
* ‘‘Series I” is évaluations of multilateral interventions; “Serks 2” is unilateraL
268 all confront the thorny problem of terrorism. Given the events of September 2001 and beyond, this is a likely explanation.
Of course, the measure of the study is not just “goodness of fit” but how my theory fiires compared to alternative explanations. I turn to such a discussion now.
7.3 Alternative Explanations Compared
Why the variation in how the US is perceived in the post-Cold War world? All do not resent and hate and fear the US for its mighty power, as neorealists might suggest. Neither do all embrace the US for the benefits of economic openness and aid the US provides, as some liberal theorists would predict. Each perspective may say its rational to balance the US (for fear of dominance) or to embrace it for economic absolute gains, but this is not happening with any sense of uniformity.
This study was not a “hard test” o f realism, nor does it claim that material economic and military fectors are unin^rtant. Instead, I sought to control for these aspects o f international relations so to fijcus on the ideational mechanisms that operate in the absence of conventional realist variables. Power was a constant in the uniform results, vWiich did not prevail But evidence at tunes is consistent with realism, as m Japan’s reactions, whkh, as a formal ally o f the US, probably do not surprise realists to be so consistently supportive. But it is important to note that
France too is an American aQy m “objective” terms, and its reactions diverged from
Japan’s along paths predicted by ethnocentric inference.
269 To the extent that material interests were introduced, they did not seem to pomt to a single interpretation, thus leaving us wanting for fuller explanation. For example, at first blush, the Gulf War scenario may have placed a primacy on material interests in the intervention. But India and JtqMin, both heavily dependent on trade to and oil importation firom the Gulf area, interpreted the danger to these interests in different ways: India sought to avoid conflkt, Japan sought decisive conflict. If oO interests do not determine the evaluation of the act, what does? India was heavily driven by elite and domestic constraints imposed by its identity as nonraligned, suspicious of American motives. Japan, on the other hand, its fete tied to the US in its images, gives the US the benefit o f the doubt, including the provision of financial aid in the conduct of the operations.
This study engages neo liberal and normative theories that predict results based on the structural presence of norms or the use o f institutions as homogenizing perceptions of acts and subsequent evaluations of them as appropriate or not. Some suggest that constructivism and neo-Uberalism are “birds o f a feather,”^*’ sharing the presumed fiinctiooal effickncy of norms and institutions to produce their desired predicted results. The discussion of multilateralism in these pages suggests the similarities are real So too, then, are the tessons for each that come fiom this dissertation. Theq)propriatenessofanact,Ishow,inmanycaseshasmoretodo with the judge’s partkular predilections than some ^ e m ic rules of right and wrong.
7 2 0 Sterling-FoDcer 2000.
270 7.4 Implications for Theory and Practice
The implications of this study for theory and practice are that agents matter, ideas matter, and “multilateralism matters. Agents and social structure are both inqwrtant to full explanation, since structures do not always offer a “focal point” but require interpretation. International norms and law are “auto-interpretive” or sutgect to indivKlual judgments o f the focts, whkh may differ from state to sta te .^ Structural fectors alone can be inadequate to explain mtemational behavior, m whkh case agency and the perspective of states becomes important. This has been an effort to remind constructivists to put the agent back in agent-structure theorization™ As discussed in the previous section, I also argue that material fectors are insufficient in explainit% much that is o f interest in this study.
This also advances more generally an understanding of inqrression management, signaling and perceptions m international politks, and leaves room for generalizability and future research on the foundatkns of political psychology. Smce this dissertation is in part about impression formation, how does one influence whether a state perceives your act as good or bad? Since I argue that both behavior and observer predisposhkns matter, one can influence impressions by manipiilaring either of these fectors. I have suggested that working through UN authorization is the
™ Ruggie 1993.
™ Doswald-Beck 1985:366.
™ Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Carlsnaes 1992.
271 best option for tmpressbn management, confirming wfaat has been argued for years but never systematically explored ençiricaily.^^
Affecting others’ predispositions is obviously more difficult, but I consider it here. Afifectmg identitfes means reducmg feelings o f victimhood or increasing liberal-ness. Victimhood can be reduced by being inclusive and going through proper channels m the UN, consuttmg Security Council members rather than sbowmg them disdam. Russia was pleased to have a seat at the table with Bosnia and Kosovo, when
it had that seat. Increasing the liberal identity of states may be more difi&uh, smce it strikes at the nature o f a regime. Promoting democracy, after all, I have argued
exacerbates illiberal states rather than convinces them. Still, to the extent that the US
chooses engagement and tries to bring states like China and Russia into the fold of
institutions like the WTO, institutions founded on liberal ideals, some suspect the
spillover into domestic structures is a matter o f time.
Affecting images, I have suggested, is a matter o f acting legitnnatefy
according to normative expectations. Though actions will never be perceived
identfea% across all states as ^ e m constructivists impty, there seems to be more
variation as more normative parameters are pushed. Multilateralism dampens
mterpretations of selfishness, I have shown, own% to the UN’s endorsement.
The implications of this study for practice are significant for a world where
mterventfons are becommg commonplace and where the US has a stake. Some lament
Claude 1966, 1969.
272 the resort to multilateralism—defined as activity taken through the consent o f the
UN—as a sign of weakness at the height of American power. Commentators talk of the US “kowtowing to the UN” and decry the “impotence of omnipotence.”
Krauthamnoer asserts that the US should “lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules o f world order and being prepared to enforce them.”™
Nonetheless, it appears that such an approach helps the US control how its interventions and itself are seen by others. As a normatively correct approach, multilateralism provides legitimacy to, and reassurance about, the mtentions of US actions.™ Such reassurances may further US “milieu goals” o f sustaining an order in which it and its values retain prominence and avoid challenge.™ Conversely, the costs of rule-violations for a transgressor can be a bad reputation,™ one that begins to convince at least some other great powers that one’s willingness to flaunt rules with the use o f force requires some sort o f balancing. As Henry Kissinger commented in
Newsweek m 1999, “A country that thinks of itself as acting in the name of universal values is seen by too many others as actmg arbitrarily, or inexplicably, or arrogantly.”™
™ Krauthammer 1990/91.
™ Claude 1966; Abbott and Snklal 1998; Cronin 1998; Finnemore 1996b.
™ Wolfors (1962) discusses “milku goals” as long-term systemic interests, contrasted with immediate short-term gaiiL On the Amerkan attempt at institutional order, see Ruggie (1996) and Ikenbeny (2001).
™ Keohane 1984:105-6.
™ Reported in Yunling 2000:121.
273 There is a caveat worth noting with regard to multilateralism’s role in perceptions of intervention: it mattered to the extent that it was perceived to have occurred. In a few cases, perceptions of ^patently UN-sanctioned uses of force were interpreted as unauthorized and met with disq)provaL notabty Russia’s view of the
NATO bombing in Bosnia and China’s view o f the in^xnding US mvasion of Haiti and in the Gulf War. It seems that UN ^ r o v a l to use “ail necessary means” does not translate into full-fledged support that those means should be used, at least not without further UN deliberation. The perception that the US was pulling strmgs and doing as it pleased, partly due to images of the US and partly due to the truth of it, shows that even the institutional route is subject to interpretation. Interesting^,
Russia’s evaluations of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo correlated more with its
being consulted and included in the process, regardless of whether there was a formal
UN mechanism operating. Russia was at its angriest when NATO action occurred
without involving or inferming Russia, yet it was fine with even unilateral actions if it
got a seat at the table, suggesting that its identity as a great power worthy of respect
trumped UN fennalisms.
7.5 Suggestions for Further Research
As discussed in Chapter Three, there are some recognizable limitations to the
study o f the sort I proposed to mgtlement, among them (1) the ‘anall-N’ problem and
generalizability; (2) the limited focus on the US as intervener, also related to
274 generalizability; and (3) multiple issues related to the data sources just described in the previous section. Regarding generalizability, I have sought to maYîmiVg the value of cases by intentional selection that (1) varies the relevant explanatory and dependent variables; (2) controls for other possible explanatory variables; and (3) allows for comparison with other alternative explanations. The analytical, if not statistical, generalizability of the findings is stiU pertinent and valuable. Nonetheless, this should be seen as preliminary work that suggests theoretical insights to be extended in future work that covers more cases to build broader, more confident quantitative results.
I also mentioned that the focus solely on the US as intervener is a strength and weakness. On the one hand, it allowed me to control for power and character of the actor as fiictors in outcomes so that I could e}q>lore other pertinent aspects of the model But this also limits the generalizability and robustness o f any findings.
Future work would broaden the cases to include variation in the state being observed, comparing perceptions of different actors perpetrating the (virtually) same act. Also,
future work could compare “normative epochs” to explore differences of msiders,
outsiders and the “normative structure of battle” to generalize beyond the limited
scope and domain of this Study.
This study also speaks to those interested in the origins of threat perceptions
generally, and the status of the US as a “benign hegemon” in the post-cold war era.
Observers of international relations have noted an absence of actfon agamst the
United States since the end o f the cold war and assume that “benign hegemony” must
275 be working and everybody likes it this way, with the US on top.^° But casual enq)iricai correlation can be deceivh%. Mine is the first ‘*test” o f sorts of the status of
American hegemony since the end of the Cold War. I show what second-tier states are thinkmg about the United States and how it behaves, and in this way I can give preliminary and modest insights into how things are going and why. The focus on these cases, whik they do not deliver a lot of action, stresses the importance and value of learning now what the US might be doing to effect others’ ideas about it before something does happen. I believe the trade-off to be worthwhile.
This study lends to future research along a few lines. One area that deserves continued and increased attention is the origins o f threat perception, which I have argued can be kleational h nature. Exploring the role of norms, values and identity difference in the generation o f threat perception can also lead to new thmking about the basis o f “rising challengers” and the “balance o f interests” that lead to hegemonic challenges and those other “few inqportant things” studied by security specialists.
I also have suggested that these perceptions can be changed. Despite their admittedly complex origins,^' images need to be studied more as a dependent variable. It can be eschewed as untenable and contrary to the teachings of the cognitive revolution to attendit to identify causes of images, but at the same time the prize for identifying such influences is great. Much ofthe game here is about
perceptions and how to influence vfoat others think o f states. I have demonstrated the
™Joffe 1997; Kagan 1998.
Herrmann and FischerkeBer 1995.
276 role o f images in mediating efforts at signaling intentions, but so too have I provided at least a glimpse at the role of normative and counter-normative behavior in shading images o f the perpetrator of such acts. Research should continue along this path, as negative images are so often the basis for protracted intransigence, violence, or discrimination between rivals.
7.6 Conclusion
It is hnportant to consider whether and how to try to sustain American primacy. Most of the following is concerned with testing the "how" rather than normatively debating the “whether,” though the conclusions and findings of this dissertation may speak to the latter.^^ The difforential growth of states over time may render the debate moot, though Wohlforth rightly pomts out there is no logical necessity that—were differential growth to occur—the US would not be the one outpacing others.^^ The neoreaUst position is pessimistic on the question of enduring unipolarity. Because m anarchy “threat inheres in power,” the US by definition constitutes a threat to countries who rely on self-help for their security.^"* Others
The debate on “whether” is beart% engaged by Jervis (1993) and Huntington (1993b), among others. See BrSmayer (1994) for an ethical defense of American hegemony.
Wohlforth 1999. See G%in (1981) for an argument about the differential growth rate of states.
734 Waltz (1993); Layne (1993). See also Huntington (1999).
277 argue that the US can retain primacy regardless of how countries react to it, by sustaining the overwhelming inequality of capabilities that 6vors the US. All that is needed, it is argued, is the will to invest in loi^-tenn dominance.^^
Though interpretations are heavily filtered through domestic and preconceived lenses o f the observer, the preliminary findmgs of this plausibility probe indicate that the US can inihieiKe the 6 te o f perceptions to some extent. To the extent that
unilateralism pushes the intensity o f negative feelings, this should caution elites,
should relations with relevant states be valued. Multilateralism may not assuage
fears, but neither does it seem to exacerbate them. This is not to say that the US
should never engage in unilateral interventions, only that decision-makers add to their
calculation the repercussions of actions for long-run American interests, or “milieu
goals,^^ and its standing in the international order.
I also suggest that the liberal basis for many interventions will continue to be a
dividing line for international relations. A modified, contextualized “West vs. Rest”
is conceivable if forceful American promotion of liberal values continues (consider
the “Eastern Axis” proposal among Beging, Moscow and Delhi). As Joseph Nye puts
it, “if moral outrage or unilateralist temptations blind Americans to their other 'A list’
priorities, the US may dangerously overreach itself and turn a just cause into a
Wohlforth 1999; Huntiogton 1993.
Wolfers 1962; Posen and Ross 1997; Ruggie 1996.
278 counterproductive crusade.”^^ Nye’s call for prudence, avoiding the crusades of the left and the nationalist unilateralism of the right, coupled with multilateralism is the best formula for avoiding a counterbalance that destabilizes the system. This dissertation demonstrates only that interveners have choices—both whether to intervene, and bow (through the UN or not)—as well as the consequences of those choices. International law is often dismissed for its weakness in constraining behavior; this study suggests that its importance may not be in its power to constrain but its power to serve as a measuring stick for others’ evaluations. That is, the US may easily violate norms and law, but not without generating resentment and animosity that can turn into balancing coalitions down the road.
^^Nye 1999:34-35.
279 APPENDIX A
OBSERVER STATE ELITES, 1989-1999
Country/ Year CHINA EGYPT FRANCE 1989 Deng Xiaoping Hosni Francois Mitterand Jiang Zemin Mubarak PM Michel Rocard PM Li Peng FM Roland Dumas FM Qian Qichen
1990-91 Zemin Mubarak Mitterand Li Peng Rocard Dumas DM Chevenement 1994 Jiang Zemin Mubarak Mitterand FMQian PM Edouard Qichen Amr Musa Balladur DM Chi Haotian FM Alain Juppe 1995 Jiang Mubarak Mitterand/Jacques Qian Amr Musa Chirac FM/PM Alain Juppe 1998 Jiang Mubarak Chirac Qian Amr Musa PM Lionel Jospin Premier Zhu FM Hubert Vedrine Rongji DM Alain Richard 1999 Jiang Mubarak Chirac Qian Vedrine Zhu DM Chi Haotian
280 APPENDIX A (continued)
OBSERVER STATE ELITES, 1989-1999
Country/ Year INDIA JAPAN USSR/RUSSIA Noboru Mikhail V.P. Singh Takeshha; Gorbachev 1989 Sosuke Uno; ToshDd Kaifu FM Eduard FMTaro Shevardnadze Nakayama 1990-91 Chandra Shekhar Kaifu Gorbachev Nakayama Shevardnadze / Aleksandr Bessmertnykh 1994 P.V Narasimha Rao Tomiichi Yeltsin R.L. Bhatia, Murayama FM Andrei Minister for Kozyrev External Af&irs DM Grachev 1995 P.V. Rao Tomiichi Yeltsin Murayama Kozyrev FM Hosokawa Grachev Hata 1998 I.K. Gujral / Keizo Obuchi Yeltsin Atal Vîÿpayee FM Igor Ivanov PM Yevganiy Primakov 1999 Vajpayee PM Obuchi Yeltsin FM Jaswant Singh FMMasahiko Ivanov Komura
281 APPENDIX B
IDENTITY AND IMAGE DICTIONARY
AI. Identity: Decision Rules and Keywords
The Liberal Dimension fa)=liberal: (b)=Uliberal
Do elites stress (a) human rights as universal or (b) country-specific?
Do elites stress (a) ciyü/political rights or economic/social rights, neither or both?
Do elites advocate (a) the spread of individual rights and fieedoms or (b) respect for cultural di&rences, sovereignty and noninterforence?
Do elites focus on (a) democracy as competitive elections or (b) democracy as ruling on behalf of the people without popular suffrage or competitive elections, or neither?
Do elites talk of the ‘industrial democracies” or "liberal democracies” in terms of (a) "we” aixl “us” and "common, shared fote” or in terms o f (b) “them” as "domioant” and “pushy”?
The Victim Dimension f\es)=victim: fm)=no victim
Do elites talk of international society as a "they” run by the great powers or the West or the US?
Do elites stress a history o f e?q>loitation, oppression, and humiliation under imperial, colonial, or western domination?
Do elites talk of being weak, dependent or behind due to past or present outside political forces from the West?
Do elites talk of mtematfonal society or the West or the "Industrialized nations” in terms o f “we” and "dared fide” or "common values” or “common goals” {yes=m victim; no=victim)^
282 APPENDIX B (continued)
Identity Affiliates
What, if any, group, peoples, or territory do elites refer to in terms of “us,” “we,” “brothers and sisters,” “fellow,” “compatriots,” whose “struggles are our struggles”?
A2. Images: Decision Rules and Keywords
The Capabilities Dimension /'a)=positive ima^e: (b)=ne^atrve imase. Do elites refer to US power as (a) “benign” and “defensive,” or “strong enough to do the world’s good,” or (b) “all-powerful,” strong, dominant, hegemonic, strong but vulnerable, overbearing, too much?
Do elites see US power behind bad things occurring within the elite’s country (yes=negative image; no=positive image)?
The Intentions Dimension (a)=positiye ima^e: fb)=negative image Do elites refer to US motivations as (a) benign, feiendly, harmless, good, or (b) malign, aggressive, imperial, dominating, hegemonic?
Do elites speak of the US in terms of (a) trust or (b) distrust, hypocrisy, conspiracy, and deceit?
Do elites speak of US intentions as (a) akin to theirs, part of a common purpose or shared fete, or (b) against theirs, unlimited aims at undercutting the elites’ state, values and attenq>t at greatness?
The Cultural Dimension fa)=positive imaife: (b)=neeative imaee Do elites refer to US culture as (a) vibrant, dynamic, good, similar to theirs, or (b) corrupt, degenerate, backward, hedonistic, and bad?
The Decision-Making Dimension fa)=vositive imaee: Ib)=neifative ima^e Do elites refer to the US and its government m terms of (a) divided government, complex organizations and organized authority, or (b) monolithic, controlled feom above and united m purpose?
283 APPENDIX C
FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES OF OBSERVER STATES,
1989-99” *
1989 1990 1994 1995 1998 1999 China 6,6 NF 7,7 NF 7,7 NF 7,7 NF 7,7 NF 7,6 NF Egypt 5,4 PF 5,4 PF 6,6 NF 6,6 NF 6,6 NF 6,6 NF France U F 1,2 F 1,2 F 1,2 F 1,2 F 1,2 F India 2,3 F 2,3 F 4,4 PF 4,4 PF 2,4 PF 2,3 F Japan M F 1,1 F 2,2 F 2,2 F U F 1,2 F USSR/ 6,5 NF 5,4 NF 3,4 PF 3,4 PF 3,4 PF 4,4 PF Russia
Source: http://www.6eedomhouse.org/Tatings/index.htm
” * This data and the following methodological information were obtained from the Freedom House webshe: http://www.freedomhouse.org/Tatnigs/mdex.htm. Since 1972, Freedom House has published an anrnial assessment of countries’ “state of freedom” by assigning each country and territory the status of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free" by averaging thefr political rights and civil liberties ratings. Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are generally considered "Free;" 3-5.5 "Partly Free;" and 5.5-7 "Not Free." Countries that receive a rating of 6 for politkal rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either "Partly Free" or "Not Free." The total number o f raw pomts is the definitive foctor which determines the final status. Countries and territories with combmed raw scores of 0- 30 points are "Not Free," 31-59 pomts are "Partfy Free," and 60-88 are "Free." More information about the criteria used by Freedom House ana^fsts to determine individual country ratings can be fotmd m the metbodologv sectkm o f the current Survev o f Freedom.
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