Correspondence: Engages Asia? Caveat Lector Correspondence Nicholas Khoo and Michael L.R. Smith David Shambaugh China Engages Asia? Caveat Lector

To the Editors:

In his recent article in International Security, David Shambaugh provides a far-ranging and thought-provoking account of China’s engagement policy with the wider Asian re- gion,1 which he argues is “a principal catalyst in shaping a in Asia.”2 Shambaugh posits that “the traditional underpinnings of in Asia are undergoing profound change, and the rise of China is a principal cause” (p. 64). Other causes of change that he points to include the relative decline of U.S. inºuence in the region; the growing role of norms espoused by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and attendant growth of ASEAN-linked institutions; increased tech- nological and economic interdependence in the region; and improvements in China’s relations with key regional states including India, South Korea, and Vietnam. As a re- sult, Shambaugh asserts that in contrast to the situation just a few years ago, “the ma- jority of Asian states currently view China as more benign than malign and are accommodating themselves to its rise” (p. 67). Following other observers, Shambaugh sees regional bandwagoning dynamics operating in China’s favor.3 We contend, however, that there are serious problems in Shambaugh’s thesis, which collectively leave us with much less room for optimism about China’s Asia policy both in the present, as well as for the future. Three key points of critique merit further elabo- ration. First, Shambaugh devotes inadequate attention in his article to China’s relations with two states, Japan and Taiwan, whose interactions in the last decade patently con- tradict his portrayal of skillful Chinese .4 Second, his claim that “most na- tions in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful

Nicholas Khoo is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. Michael L.R. Smith is Reader in War Studies, King’s College, University of London.

David Shambaugh is Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs and Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University.

The authors extend their thanks to Frank Scott Douglas, Stephen Liebmann, and Andrew Nathan for their constructive comments and observations.

1. See Evan Medeiros and R. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 22–35; and Brantly Womack, “China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership, and Normalcy,” Paciªc Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Winter 2003–2004), pp. 520– 548. 2. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), p. 65. Additional references to this article appear parenthetically in the text. 3. Shambaugh argues that “the nascent tendency of some Asian states to bandwagon with Beijing is likely to become more manifest over time.” Ibid., p. 99. David C. Kang adopts a similar perspec- tive when he argues that “Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. Rather they seem to be bandwagoning.” Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), p. 58. 4. Shambaugh asserts that “bilaterally and multilaterally, Beijing’s diplomacy has been remark-

International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 196–213 © 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

196

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 197

listener, and a nonthreatening ” merely illustrates short-term trends in the post– era, mostly since 1997 (p. 64). A strong case can be made that many Southeast Asian states are economic competitors with China, and that some are hedg- ing against its rise by consolidating their long-standing relations with the United States. Third, even if one were to look past the ªrst two points of criticism, Shambaugh pro- vides no convincing reason for why China should not simply be viewed as acting stra- tegically, and behaving itself while it is on its ascent, so as to not induce balancing by regional states.5 In this view, once China feels that it has sufªcient economic and mili- tary power, it will behave as other great powers have done in the past and insist that its preferences are respected, by force if necessary.

critical oversight: china’s relations with japan and taiwan While Shambaugh is correct to point out the improvement in China’s relations with a number of Asian states—notably some of the ASEAN states, along with South Korea and India—a sustained discussion of China’s relations with two key states in the region—Japan and Taiwan—is conspicuously absent. This is a signiªcant oversight because China’s relations with these states are (1) arguably enormously important to re- gional stability; (2) have historically been prone to conºict; and (3) have been on a downward trajectory since the mid-1990s. At a minimum, Beijing’s relations with Tokyo and Taipei call into question Shambaugh’s conclusion that Chinese diplomacy is as astute as he claims (p. 64). Space constraints require that we paint only the general trends in China’s relations with these two states. As Thomas Christensen has argued, China exhibits a visceral and historically rooted distrust toward Japan and is resistant to the idea that any Chinese actions could pose a threat to it.6 This is an important issue because Chinese insensitivity to Japanese fears of a rising China is already fueling mutual suspicions that could easily activate security dilemma dynamics in Asia.7 Since the downturn in its economy in the 1990s, which has coincided with sustained Chinese economic growth and military modernization, Japan has quite naturally developed apprehensions about being eclipsed by China. As a re- sult, Tokyo has consistently worked to develop closer ties with the United States, its formal alliance partner since 1951. While the main impetus for revising the U.S.-Japan alliance guidelines were the 1991 Persian and the 1994 North Korean crisis, the Chinese role in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96 added urgency to the consolida- tion of the alliance.8 The inability or unwillingness of the Chinese to rein in the North

ably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the region.” Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” p. 64. 5. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Ste- phen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 156– 179. 6. Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/Octo- ber 1996), p. 44. 7. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49–80. 8. Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.- China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 48–85. The North Korean cri-

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 30:1 198

Koreans, who declared in 2003 that they had developed a nuclear deterrent, has only added to Japanese fears. Japanese concerns about a rising China with which it has terri- torial disputes have been further accentuated by actions on the part of Beijing. These in- clude the deliberate probing by a Chinese submarine into the Japanese exclusive economic zone in November 2004 and the dispatch of drilling teams to inspect for oil and gas deposits within it. On a more populist level, the behavior of Chinese fans to- ward the Japanese national soccer team during the Asian Cup soccer ªnals held in China in the summer of 2004 shook even the most apolitical Japanese. The Japanese team was subjected to sustained abuse and vitriol as it played its preliminary group matches in various parts of China. The full-scale rioting by disgruntled Chinese soccer fans following the Japanese team’s victory over China in the Asian Cup ªnal in August 2004 appalled many in Japan, an event that continues to resonate in the Japanese psyche and will take some time to overcome.9 Tokyo, however, is not without its share of blame for the deterioration in relations.10 The publication of an ofªcial school text that glosses over Japan’s World War II–era atrocities in China and Korea has contributed to a surge in anti-Japanese sentiment (though it should be noted that China could itself deal more honestly with its own his- torical record of grievous violations). While Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi delivered an apology in Jakarta on the occasion of the ªftieth anni- versary of the for his country’s wartime behavior,11 the larger point is that China’s instrumental use of Japan’s war record to stoke growing national- ism and lack of appreciation for legitimate Japanese security concerns about a rising China have exacerbated an already strained relationship.12 The overall effect of Chinese diplomacy toward Japan has been to cause Tokyo to strengthen its rhetorical posture to- ward Beijing. In December 2004 China was formally declared a security concern in Japan’s National Defense Program Outline.13 In mid-February 2005 government ofªcials from the United States and Japan met for their annual defense consultations. In an unprecedented move, reºecting increasing Japanese concern about China’s foreign

sis of 1994 revolved around Pyongyang’s apparent violation of the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1985, and was resolved when the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was signed in October 1994. The agreement called for, among other things, the provision of two proliferation-resistant light water nuclear power reactors to North Korea in return for the dismantling of North Korea’s existing nuclear program. The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96 had its genesis in President Li Teng- hui’s visit to the United States in the spring of 1995. Li’s trip and general diplomacy were taken by Beijing as a challenge to the idea that Taiwan was part of “one China” and resulted in an escalation of tensions culminating in China’s launching of missiles into the Taiwan Strait in July 1995 and March 1996. 9. “So Hard to Be Friends,” Economist, March 23, 2005, pp. 23–25. 10. Norimitsu Onishi, “In Japan’s New Texts, Lessons in Rising ,” New York Times, April 17, 2005. 11. Raymond Bonner and Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan’s Chief Apologizes for War Misdeeds,” New York Times, April 23, 2005. 12. Ian Buruma, “China’s Persistent Japan Syndrome,” Financial Times, April 15, 2005. 13. “So Hard to Be Friends.”

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 199

policy, the Japanese agreed that the Taiwan issue should be mentioned in the joint state- ment at the end of the annual U.S.-Japan alliance consultations.14 The wisdom of these adjustments to the alliance continues to be vindicated by an ap- parent intensiªcation of anti-Japanese nationalism in China. In late March 2005 a grass- roots campaign to protest Japan’s efforts to secure a permanent seat on the Security Council garnered an estimated 22 million or more signatures.15 Soon after, a wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations, which the Chinese government did little to stop and arguably encouraged, targeted Japanese businesses and government ofªces in Beijing, Shanghai, and southern China. Understandably, Tokyo lodged a formal pro- test with the Chinese government concerning these demonstrations and demanded an apology. The response from Beijing was a counterproductive one. On April 12 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao added fuel to the ªre by strongly implying that China was opposed to Japan’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the Security Council.16 Tokyo then announced on April 13 that it was starting to review applications to drill for gas in areas in the East China Sea that are in dispute between Japan and China.17 During a hastily arranged two-day visit to Beijing by Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing rejected any idea of a Chinese apol- ogy, further straining relations between the two countries.18 Then, on April 19 Beijing effectively halted the anti-Japanese protests. Foreign Minister Li, speaking on behalf of the Chinese leadership, called an end to the protests.19 The ministry of public security underlined this statement by announcing that “unauthorized marches were illegal” and that police would “mete out tough blows” to vandals.20 Commerce Minister Bo Xilai further warned that a campaign to boycott Japanese goods would jeopardize China’s economic growth and expressed conªdence that these events would not affect Sino-Japanese economic relations.21 Still, these events demonstrate, and Shambaugh’s analysis minimizes,22 how calculating the Chinese regime is in using nationalism to ex- ploit historical grievances against Japan. Equally apparent is the negative effect that Chinese diplomacy has had on the Sino-Japanese relationship. China’s relations with Taiwan are, if anything, worse. Preventing Taiwan’s inde- pendence has become a deªning feature of current Chinese nationalism, an attribute that, as Ian Buruma observes, unites both the and its puta-

14. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 19, 2005, http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm. 15. Joseph Kahn, “If 22 Million Chinese Prevail at the U. N., Japan Won’t,” New York Times, April 1, 2005. 16. Philip Pan, “Chinese Step Up Criticism of Japan,” Washington Post, April 13, 2005. 17. BBC News, “Asian Giants Keep Up War of Words,” April 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/asia-paciªc/4443307.stm. 18. Joseph Kahn, “China’s Top Diplomat Offers No Apology for Anti-Japan Protests,” New York Times, April 17, 2005. 19. Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Ofªcial Orders End to Anti-Japanese Demonstrations,” New York Times, April 20, 2005. 20. Jim Yardley, “China Cracks Down on Protests against Japan,” New York Times, April 23, 2005. 21. Ibid. 22. Shambaugh mentions on one occasion that China is gradually shedding its “identity of histori- cal victim.” Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” p. 64.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 30:1 200

tive domestic adversaries who are committed to greater internal democratization.23 Far from being adroit or nuanced, Chinese efforts to compel Taiwan back into the fold dis- play the exact opposite, being aggressive and heavy handed, often with the conse- quence of stirring Taiwanese resistance. While China’s willingness to use force against Taiwan during the crisis of 1995–96 may have achieved some temporary deterrent effect on a formal declaration of Taiwanese independence,24 it nevertheless gave a strong stimulus to the Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, who was elected in 2000 on a platform of developing a unique and democratic Taiwan- ese identity.25 China’s unremitting hostility to Chen in large part assisted him in secur- ing re-election in 2004. Inept diplomacy would be a more accurate characterization of China’s Taiwan policy. The anti-secession law, passed by the Chinese National People’s Congress in March 2005, codiªes the threat or use of force should Taiwan cross some unspeciªed line, which Beijing reserves the exclusive right to determine. The passage of this law has led the to reverse itself and retain its embargo on the sale of military equipment to China.26 Signiªcantly, on April 14 the European Parliament voted by a margin of 431 to 85 in favor of a resolution not to lift the arms embargo.27 There is now discussion within the EU to link the lifting of the arms embargo to improvements in the human rights situation in China.28 The passage of the anti-secession law has also led to a reversal in Taiwanese leader Chen Shui-bian’s plunging popularity that was manifest in the poor performance of his governing coalition in the December 2004 elections, when it failed to win a majority. In response to the anti-secession law, hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese engaged in street protests, and a spike in Chen’s popularity occurred.29 What is particularly worrying about China’s relationships with Japan and Taiwan is that these states possess highly developed economic and trading links with China. Rather than being convincing examples of the leavening effects of economic interde- pendence that Shambaugh advocates,30 Beijing’s relations with Tokyo and Taipei un- derscore that nationalistic and political factors trump economic explanations for Chinese foreign policy. Even though Japan is China’s largest trading partner,31 relations have been at their rockiest for a decade.32 Similarly, China is now Taiwan’s largest trad-

23. Ian Buruma, Bad Elements: Among the Rebels, Dissidents, and Democrats of Greater China (New York: Random House, 2001). 24. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait,” pp. 48–85. 25. Ian Buruma, “Taiwan’s New Nationalists: Democracy with Taiwanese Characteristics,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 77–91. 26. Joseph Kahn, “Europe’s Shift on Embargo Places Taiwan at Center Stage,” New York Times, March 23, 2005. 27. Richard Bernstein, “Europe Urges Linking Lifting of Chinese Arms Ban to Rights,” New York Times, April 15, 2005. 28. Ibid. 29. Tim Culpan, “Thousands Protest in Taiwan,” Washington Post, March 27, 2005. 30. Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” pp. 65, 83–85. 31. For Chinese ministry of commerce ªgures, see http://www.mofcom.gov.cn. 32. “So Hard to Be Friends.”

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 201

ing partner. Exports from Taiwan to the Chinese mainland, including Hong Kong, ex- ceeded $63.8 billion in 2004. Taiwan’s trade surplus with the mainland, again including Hong Kong, surpassed $45 billion in 2004.33 The fact that these two entities with which China enjoys robust and growing economic ties are the most unstable of all Beijing’s re- lations in Asia would appear to cast substantial doubt on this aspect of Shambaugh’s analysis.34 Equally disturbing, China’s relations with Taiwan contain signiªcant poten- tial for a spillover to China’s relations with other Asian states that do not respect the markers laid down by Beijing. For example, Sino-Singaporean relations spiraled down- ward last year when Prime Minister–designate Lee Hsien Loong made an unofªcial trip to Taiwan before he assumed his post.35

china and u.s. alliance partners in southeast asia Shambaugh’s analysis of China’s relations with traditional U.S. allies in Southeast Asia catches only the most superªcial aspect of Beijing’s relations with these states. Scratch below the surface, and the strong hedging trends in the strategic-diplomatic sphere against a perceived rising China become apparent. In the economic realm, the structure of the Chinese and Southeast Asian economies are more competitive than complemen- tary. These basic facts suggest that Shambaugh’s characterization of Sino–Southeast Asian relations is merely a partial snapshot of relations in their honeymoon period. In general, one of the crucial oversights in the burgeoning literature ’s stra- tegic-diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian states, which Shambaugh’s article typiªes, is the lack of a comparative focus. China’s relations with these states are com- pared with relations during the Cold War when enmity or, at best, suspicious coopera- tion occurred.36 A more useful approach would be to contrast China’s relationship with Southeast Asia with the United States’ relations with this region. The United States has formal alliances in the Southeast Asian region going back half a century, notably with the Philippines and Thailand. In 2003 the Philippines and Taiwan were designated as major non-NATO allies of the United States. In addition, the United States has exten- sive defense ties with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. These relationships are cur- rently being strengthened and upgraded. The militaries of these Southeast Asian states conduct regular joint exercises with the United States, and their military ofªcers are sent for advanced training to the United States as a matter of course. China has no com- parable military-to-military ties with these states. In fact, its 1997 new security concept makes a virtue out of its weak military relations with the region’s states by denouncing such ties as relics of a “Cold War mindset.”37

33. See the Chinese government’s Taiwan Affairs Ofªce at http://www.gwytb.gov.cn. 34. See Gregory Noble, “What Can Taiwan (and the United States) Expect from Japan?” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May–August 2005), pp. 1–34. 35. Barry Wain, “A David and Goliath Tussle,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 2004, pp. 20–21. 36. Medeiros and Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” pp. 22–35; and Womack, “China and South- east Asia,” pp. 520–548. 37. See David Finkelstein, “China’s New Concept of Security,” in Stephen Flanagan and Michael Marti, eds., The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition (Washington, D.C.: National De- fense University Press, 2003), pp. 197–210.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 30:1 202

Measuring rising gross trade ªgures and concluding, as Shambaugh does, that rela- tions between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors are undergoing fundamental positive change based on economic interdependence is an unsatisfactory way of gaug- ing the true nature of Sino–Southeast Asian relations. As John Wong and Sarah Chan have shown, a detailed examination of the composition of both China’s and the ASEAN states’ trade structure and interactions suggests that apart from the Sino-Singaporean relationship, the ASEAN states and China are actually ªerce competitors.38 Both entities compete for the same markets in low-cost manufacturing goods in Europe and North America and for inward foreign direct investment. Indeed, a core fear of the ASEAN states is that the declaration to form a Sino-ASEAN free trade area will actually speed the fall of Southeast Asia, which began in 1997 with the onset of the regional ªnancial crisis.39 Consequently, it is no surprise that even as ASEAN signs a free trade agreement with China, its secretary-general cites competition from China as the main reason for the organization’s member states to improve ASEAN’s economic integration effort.40 One revealing ªnding from Wong and Chan’s research is that Singapore, the one coun- try whose industrial structure complements China’s, accounts for approximately 40 percent of trade with China.41 No wonder, therefore, that Singapore was the main pro- ponent of the Sino-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement while other ASEAN states, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, that are closer and more backward economi- cally were more reluctant to enter into the agreement. In Sino–Southeast Asian relations, one should look more at what both entities do as much as what they say. Not that words do not matter. Southeast Asian diplomacy is of- ten characterized by tacit signaling to the United States to increase its engagement with Southeast Asia. Words that are uttered by Southeast Asian diplomats and leaders in fa- vor of China often are thus interpretable as gestures to the United States to bolster its presence in the region. Shambaugh cites one Southeast Asian diplomat to the effect that “the United States may still dominate the [regional] balance of power, but not the re- gional balance of inºuence (p. 66). Yet in these relatively benign times in Sino– Southeast Asian relations, it would be unwise to listen too closely to this particular dip- lomat. It would be better to refer back to the words of Southeast Asian diplomats dur- ing the period of instability in U.S.-China relations in early 2001 when a U.S. Orion EP-3 reconnaissance plane that collided with a Chinese interceptor over the South China Sea was compelled to make a forced landing on Hainan Island. At that time of crisis, when Southeast Asian states’ real views were arguably manifest, another (or perhaps the same) Southeast Asian diplomat remarked: “This new incident shows that even with all its problems we still need the United States. Basically our choice is between a hegemo- ny in Washington or a hegemony in Beijing. We are still choosing the United States.”42

38. John Wong and Sarah Chan, “China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Shaping Future Economic Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May/June 2003), pp. 507–526. 39. Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co- operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, signed November 29, 2004, http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm. 40. “ASEAN Secretary-General Calls for ASEAN Economic Integration to Compete with China,” press release, March 7, 2003, http://www.aseansec.org/10227.htm. 41. Wong and Chan, “China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement,” p. 517. 42. Quoted in John Pomfret, “Jiang Caught in Middle of Standoff,” Washington Post, April 8, 2001.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 203

back to the future for realist theory? Finally, despite Shambaugh’s rejection of realist theory as a tool to understand China’s interactions with its Asia neighbors,43 he provides no convincing reason to believe that China will not act like any by establishing spheres of inºuence, utilizing force when necessary, and generally acting to maximize its relative power. An arguably stronger case can be made that Chinese behavior toward its Asian neighbors conforms to the prescriptions of realist analysis. One does not necessarily have to subscribe to John Mearsheimer’s variant of realist theory, which Shambaugh rejects (p. 94), to see how China may be a destabilizing force in twenty-ªrst-century Asia.44 That China has been engaging the Asian states in the economic and security realm since 1997 or so is insufªcient evidence to dismiss realism. Basically, China is just practicing common sense and behaving itself until it is a more consolidated and powerful entity. This is perfectly consistent with power cycle theory.45 In this view, China’s November 2002 agreement with ASEAN to temporarily shelve the issue with respect to its claims in the South China Sea is merely a prudent tactic.46 Beijing will settle the issue at a later date when it feels its power position is sufªcient to intimidate the rival claimants.47 Even the planned formation of a Sino-ASEAN free trade area by 2010 can be seen as a way to in- crease relative Chinese power over the Southeast Asian states by weaning them away from China’s competitors: Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.48 The developing ASEAN 1 3 community, which includes China, Japan, and South Korea but excludes Taiwan (in deference to Chinese sensibilities), can also be seen as a strategy for China to strengthen its ties with Asian states by excluding the United States. As Albert Hirschman wrote six decades ago, economic ties can be proªtably used by a growing power to achieve political purposes, as realist theory would lead us to expect.49 China’s conformity to realist theory is just as manifest in its behavior in regional mul-

43. Referring to the impact of China’s rise on the contemporary Asian strategic landscape, Shambaugh argues that “realist theory seems particularly incapable of explaining such a complex and dynamic environment, and it thus tends to offer oversimpliªed (and sometimes dangerous) policy prescriptions.” Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” p. 99. 44. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 45. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 171–194; Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Pro- gram,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 6 (December 1999), pp. 675–704; and David Rapkin and William R. Thompson, “Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re)emergence of China,” International Interactions, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 315–342. 46. For the agreement reached between China and ASEAN, see “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” signed in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, November 4, 2002, http:// www.aseansec.org/13163.htm. 47. See Leszek Buszynski, “ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea,” Con- temporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (December 2003), pp. 343–362. 48. Jane Perlez, “Chinese Premier Signs Trade Pact at Southeast Asian Summit,” New York Times, November 30, 2004. 49. Albert O. Hirschman, and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 30:1 204

tilateral institutions, where Shambaugh argues there has been a convergence of views between China and Southeast Asia with respect to “norms” (pp. 73–74). According to Shambaugh, this convergence is the result of a socialization process that has taken place within the context of the parameters framed by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN ϩ 3 framework.50 Again, Shambaugh has mistaken rhetoric for what is re- ally going on in the region’s international relations. It is true that the ASEAN states see the ARF and the ASEAN ϩ 3 meetings as an opportunity to socialize China into ASEAN’s “norms” embodied in its 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Socializa- tion, however, can work both ways. One can argue that China sees its meetings with ASEAN as a way to socialize its members to China’s norms and that Beijing has suc- ceeded in doing this. One consequence of the aforementioned multilateral dialogue has been a decline in ASEAN support for Taiwan and a consolidation of ASEAN states’ support for the one-China policy. This is in no small part a result of Beijing’s diplomatic efforts. For example, when China joined the ARF, no similar invitation was extended to Taiwan. Further, there was an implicit understanding that the status of Taiwan, a key regional security issue, would not be discussed. In the track-2 Conference on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Paciªc (CSCAP), this was made more explicit. In the 1993 and 1994 CSCAP meetings, China did not participate because of concerns about Taiwan’s status in the organization. After two years of negotiations, in December 1996 an agree- ment very close to China’s terms was reached. Although individual experts from Taiwan were permitted in working group meetings, no formal Taiwanese membership was allowed in the annual meetings or in the steering committee. It was also agreed that cross-strait relations would not be discussed.51 At the 2004 ASEAN summit with China, ASEAN unequivocally endorsed the one-China policy.52

Conclusion

David Shambaugh asserts that the phenomena heralding China’s rise have “begun to attract growing attention in diplomatic, journalistic, and scholarly circles, both region- ally and internationally” (pp. 64–65), and his article is clear proof, itself being a symp- tom of such interest. But whenever a coalition of diplomats, journalists, and especially scholars develop an interest in something, a fashionable and often seductive orthodoxy is usually never far behind.53 So it is with the current enthusiasm of commentators to evaluate the “rise of China.” If the past informs us of anything, it is that we should be skeptical toward the growth of orthodox understandings, especially where Asia is con-

50. For the argument that ASEAN states have not even succeeded in socializing themselves, let alone China, see Nicholas Khoo, “Constructing Southeast Asian Security: The Pitfalls of Imagining a Security Community and the Temptations of Orthodoxy,” Cambridge Review of International Af- fairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 2004), pp. 137–153. 51. Thammy Evans, “The PRC’s Relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum: Realpolitik, Re- gime Theory, or a Continuation of the Sinic Zone of Inºuence System?” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July 2003), pp. 737–763. 52. “Chairman’s Statement of the 8th ASEAN ϩ China Summit, Vientian, 29 November 2004: Deepening ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership,” http://www.aseansec.org/16749.htm. 53. See the copious citations in Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” p. 65 n. 2.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 205

cerned. Remember the rise of Japan, the Southeast Asian economic “miracle” pre-1997, and portends for the coming “Paciªc century”? In historical perspective, as analysts have suggested, China has, in Western eyes, been rising (and falling) for centuries.54 In this context, China’s current trajectory is far from predetermined, and a lot can go wrong as even a cursory familiarity with Chinese history reveals. No one understands this history better than the Chinese Communist Party itself, and this explains why it feels that domestic stability has to be maintained, if necessary, by channeling nationalistic sentiments toward the appropriate triumvirate of scapegoats: namely, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States. Shambaugh has given his readers a par- tial snapshot that captures some skilled conduct in Chinese diplomacy since 1997. However, he misses aspects of current Chinese foreign policy in that period that under- mine his thesis, notably China’s relations with Japan and Taiwan. The analysis of China’s relations with the Southeast Asian states underplays the degree to which key states there are hedging against Beijing by relying on the United States for their secu- rity. With respect to the future, the reader is provided with little basis for believing that China will not behave according to the dictates of realpolitik.55 Accordingly, observers should not be surprised if future Chinese policy toward Asia utilizes rising as a tool of diplomacy, and perhaps even force.56 In all these respects, China’s “peaceful rise” may easily transform itself into a less paciªc one. —Nicholas Khoo New York, New York —Michael L.R. Smith London, United Kingdom

The Author Replies:

One of the refreshing and rewarding aspects of academe is the opportunity it affords to engage colleagues in intellectual discourse and advance our ªeld of study. In this spirit, I welcome the opportunity to respond to Nicholas Khoo and Michael Smith’s lengthy rejoinder to my article “China Engages Asia.”1 Khoo and Smith contend that there are “serious problems with my thesis” that China’s proactive engagement of its periphery

54. See David Martin Jones, The Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought (London: Palgrave, 2001). 55. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” pp. 37–52; and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post–Cold War Period,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Co- lumbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261–318. 56. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior, 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” China Quarterly, No. 153 (March 1998), pp. 1–30.

1. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 64–99. Further references to this article appear in parentheses in the text.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 30:1 206

has served to stabilize and reshape the regional order. I anticipated that my article would provoke those more inclined to view China through a realist lens and as an inse- cure and destabilizing power. Nonetheless, I ªnd Khoo and Smith’s criticisms to be use- ful food for thought and discussion. More speciªcally, Khoo and Smith assert that my article pays insufªcient attention to two important cases—Japan and Taiwan—that challenge my argument and evidence. They have a valid point. Indeed, for the reasons they elaborate, these two cases have been the most problematic of all of China’s regional relationships, and both have been beset by antagonisms and deep-seated suspicions. In retrospect, my article should have paid more attention to these two disconªrming cases. I was certainly not trying to ig- nore them, nor was I trying to skew the evidence to ªt my general argument. Yet even in these two cases, China’s relations with each are mixtures of “hot economics” and “cold politics,” with a substantial amount of interaction among the three societies. These relationships are hardly frozen in antagonism. They are dynamic, interdepen- dent, and multileveled. By focusing on the difªculties in the political domain, one misses the enormous presence of Japanese and Taiwanese business and investment on the mainland, as well as other forms of nongovernmental contact. In any event, China’s dysfunctional political relationships and the nascent security dilemma with Japan and Taiwan are major features of the East Asian strategic landscape, and they remain blights on China’s more general successes in regional diplomacy. Nevertheless, the main purpose of my article was to take a macro look at China’s re- gional relations in four spheres—economic, security, multilateral, and political/diplo- matic—and to distinguish the meta trends in these relationships and functional issue areas. Moreover, in selecting three country cases for elaboration—South Korea, Viet- nam, and India—I was attempting to provide new data on these relationships and to demonstrate China’s success in turning around three signiªcant relationships that not so long ago were highly antagonistic. One could add Russia and Indonesia to this list. Thus, I do not agree with Khoo and Smith that China’s troubled relations with Japan and Taiwan undermine the broader trend in China’s regional diplomacy. In fact, over time one may see China’s successes elsewhere being used as leverage by Beijing in its relations with Tokyo and Taipei. Khoo and Smith also discuss at length the swelling anti-Japan sentiment in China, which culminated in the state-supported public demonstrations of April 2005. This is all good data and discussion that they might want to include in an article of their own, but these events transpired after the publication of my article. I ªnd it curious, though, that they did not mention the momentous May 2005 visits of Taiwan’s leader Lien Chan and People’s First Party leader James Soong to the mainland (al- though these events might undermine their thesis about the antagonistic nature of cross-strait relations). Both events underscore the ºuctuant nature of China-Japan and China-Taiwan relations. Khoo and Smith’s second criticism concerns my treatment of China–Southeast Asian relations. They contend that “many Southeast Asian states are economic competitors with China and that some are hedging against it strategically by consolidating their long-standing relations with the United States.” These too are good points with which I am in partial agreement.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 207

With respect to the economic dimension, Khoo and Smith assert that I understate the competitive element of China-ASEAN commercial relations. They correctly note that Southeast Asians are indeed concerned about (1) Chinese competition for export mar- kets in Europe and North America; (2) the diversion of foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia to China; and (3) the hollowing out and displacement of tertiary indus- tries. But these are the very issues that the 2001 ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement is meant to address, and China is well aware of these concerns and perceptions. China- ASEAN trade, however, is not a win-lose game: a good deal of low-technology manu- facturing in China is ªnal product assembly of components originally produced in Southeast Asia. Moreover, China is increasingly sending outbound investment to the region (p. 84). ASEAN is currently China’s ªfth largest export market and fourth largest source of imports.2 This is why I portrayed the emerging regional economy as interde- pendent and not based on zero-sum competition (p. 97). The regional supply chain and global economy have moved beyond this outdated model. With respect to Khoo and Smith’s point about Southeast Asian states’ strategic hedg- ing against China by maintaining their security and other ties with the United States, I only partially agree. On the one hand, as I wrote in my article, “Even though some countries remain unsure of China’s long-term ambitions, and are thus adopting hedg- ing policies against the possibility of a more aggressive China, the majority of Asian states currently view China as more benign than malign, and are accommodating them- selves to China’s rise” (p. 67). On the other hand, hedging seems to be limited. There is some evidence of hedging in the case of Singapore, but I do not detect much in other Southeast Asian countries. All ASEAN states, including U.S. allies Thailand and the Philippines, have developed very close relationships with China. Sino-Indonesian rela- tions have also improved considerably.3 The key point is that ASEAN states—indeed virtually all Asian nations—seek strong relations with both China and the United States. As I argued, their nightmare scenario is to be put into a position where they are forced to choose between the two (p. 97). In this regard, they serve simultaneously as an important adhesive and buffer between the two major regional powers. Less clear is why U.S. defense relationships in the region, which Khoo and Smith be- gin to elaborate and suggest is evidence of regional hedging, should be seen only through a China-hedging prism. These ties far predate China’s regional ascendance and have efªcacy for preserving regional stability and sea lines of communication, as well as beneªting the national militaries concerned. Indeed, there is some evidence that China itself has come to appreciate the utility of the U.S. security relationships and mili- tary presence in Asia. Khoo and Smith further argue that China’s security linkages in the region are dwarfed compared with those of the United States. Even if true, this im- balance is not ipso facto evidence of hedging but rather of China’s inability, to date, to provide such security protection and military support to Southeast Asian states.

2. “ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations,” http://www.aseansec.org/5874.htm, accessed June 27, 2005. 3. See Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “Assessing the Sino-Indonesia Strategic Partnership,” PacNet No. 25 (Honolulu, Hawaii: Paciªc Forum CSIS, June 23, 2005), http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0525.pdf.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 30:1 208

Khoo and Smith also argue that mutual socialization is occurring between China and ASEAN. I fully agree, which is why I argued that a normative convergence about re- gional and interstate relations is taking place between China and ASEAN (as well as other regional states). In my view, this convergence is increasingly deep, strong, and binding. In this regard, I am largely in agreement with the arguments concerning the emergence of a regional cooperative and normative security framework set forth in Muthiah Alagappa’s Asian Security Order.4 Alagappa summarized this framework as “the development of a widely shared framework in Asia that promotes state survival, eases the security dilemma, sustains normal political, diplomatic, economic, and secu- rity interaction, and facilitates coordination and cooperation among states that are part of the Asian security system.”5 As I asserted, the of this emerging regional normative framework supplements the existing of the U.S. military pres- ence and alliance architecture, as well as the growing economic and technological inter- dependence occurring throughout Asia. The broader implicit and useful point that Khoo and Smith make, though, is that—in both the security and economic spheres—any analysis of ASEAN requires some disaggregation. Just as with the European Union, ASEAN is a collection of individual members states—each of which has its own national interests, strengths and weak- nesses, comparative advantages, insecurities, histories, and relationships with China. Analysts (myself included) should be careful not to fall into the trap of overgeneraliza- tion about ASEAN. Khoo and Smith’s next criticism concerns my alleged “rejection of realist theory.” It is true that I was particularly critical of offensive realism and John Mearsheimer’s analy- sis of China’s supposed drive for hegemony, as well as his policy prescription of “pre- emptive ” (my term not his). I do not subscribe to his hegemonic theory of the history of international relations nor its application to contemporary China, and I reject his policy prescription as misguided and dangerous. While also apparently trying to distance themselves from the extreme Mearsheimer thesis, Khoo and Smith nonetheless argue in their concluding section that, as China grows stronger, it will succumb to using “economic power as a tool of diplomacy, and perhaps even force.” I agree and never argued otherwise. Like other major powers, China can certainly be expected on occasion to leverage its economic clout in support of its political goals. The use of force is another and more complicated matter. China has used force against its neighbors in the past and may do so again in the future. Although it should not be ruled out, particularly against Taiwan, I would argue that the economic and normative constraints on possible Chinese coercion have grown in recent years. Yet this still leaves open the question of the exact nature of China’s relations with its neighbors and its place in the evolving regional order, for which various descriptions

4. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002). 5. Muthiah Alagappa, “Author’s Response: Getting Asia Right,” in book review roundtable “Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 2005), p. 255.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 209

and models have been suggested. These include the U.S. alliance architecture (“hub and spokes”); balance of power (U.S. and allies vs. China); structural asymmetry and inevitable clash between the predominant and rising powers; multilateral security co- operation; a growing normative security community; hierarchy (with China at the peak); bandwagoning (with China); balancing and hedging (against China); complex interdependence; concert of powers; and pluralistic security community.6 Khoo and Smith seem to believe that I belong to the bandwagon school, asserting that “Shambaugh sees regional bandwagoning dynamics operating in China’s favor.” It should be noted, however, that in my article I very consciously used the word “accom- modating” rather than “bandwagoning.” In fact, I detect little pro-China bandwagon- ing in the region. Rather, I see a combination of pragmatic accommodation, normative convergence, economic interaction, and some strategic hedging taking place between China and most of its neighbors. Asian recognition and accommodation of China’s rightful place as a major—if not the major—regional power is not bandwagoning. Nor is it to argue that the region is becoming Sinocentric. As I noted, “It remains far too early...toconclude that the regional order is becoming a modern version of the impe- rial ‘tribute system’ or that China is becoming the dominant regional hegemon” (p. 66). One does not have to be a realist to recognize that China seeks to become the preemi- nent power in Asia.7 I would not dispute this; indeed, I know few China specialists who would.8 But why should China’s pursuit of regional preeminence be considered unnatural (as Khoo and Smith imply)? And how does this differ from U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere? Is it unnatural, for example, for China’s navy to patrol the sea-lanes of East Asia (and perhaps the Indian Ocean) and establish a string of security partnerships as the United States has done throughout the Americas? I would suggest that these aspirations are legitimate and will one day become reality. Yet as I argued, it will be some time before China achieves such preeminence (p. 66), given the enduring U.S. presence and the emerging roles of Japan, ASEAN, and India. The central underlying question posed by Khoo and Smith, and on the minds of all observers of the international scene today is: How will China exercise its power and inºuence as it grows wealthier and stronger? Although no one knows for certain, ªve basic perspectives are clear. Each lends itself to a different set of policy prescriptions— not all of which are mutually exclusive. First, for realists, China—like all rising powers before it—will inevitably challenge the United States’ domination of the region and, in the process, become more expan- sionist and coercive as it seeks to maximize its sphere of inºuence. In the realist view, the regional order is structurally asymmetrical and unstable. Realists of various stripes

6. Notes from my speech to the Sino-American Security Dialogue conference “U.S.-China Rela- tions and the Emerging East Asian Order,” Shanghai, China, June 17–19, 2005. 7. I very consciously elect to use “preeminence” instead of “predominance,” given the latter’s coercive connotations. 8. See, for example, Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleªeld, 2005).

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 30:1 210

thus argue that China must be “balanced,” “checked,” “offset,” “countered,” or “hedged against.” Second, for liberal institutionalists, China’s emergence is a natural phenomenon and is to be welcomed. Moreover, liberal institutionalists of various types argue that China’s emergence should be channeled and shaped through proactive engagement and integration into existing and new institutions. Through this enmeshment in a wide range of organizations, regimes, and architectures, China’s potential for disruptive be- havior can be constrained and its behavior can be conditioned through experiences in these institutions. Economic interdependence is a variant of this school of thought. Third, constructivists share this liberal institutionalist view and argue that China can be socialized into a set of norms that will not only pacify it, but will also make Beijing a status quo power and cooperative partner. This viewpoint rests on the internalization of behavioral norms and self-restraint. It does not reºect acceptance of the Hobbesian anarchic premise of realism, nor does it place as heavy an emphasis on formal institu- tions as do the liberal institutionalists. Rather, once China fully internalizes the relevant norms (which many believe it already shares), it will view adherence to them as being in its own best interests—and hence there will be no need for an external institutional authority to enforce them. Fourth, for some China specialists, especially historians, a stronger and regionally preeminent China will tend to behave toward its neighbors and the region as it did un- der the “tribute system” (approximately the ªfth through eighteenth centuries) As noted in my article, this system relied on “a combination of patron-client ties, economic interdependence, security protection for those closest to China (especially Korea), cul- tural assimilation into Confucian customs (lai Hua), political ritual (koutou), and benev- olent governance (wangdao)” (p. 95). The policy implications of this perspective are that China’s neighbors need not fear its preeminence because—as long as they pay obei- sance to Beijing—they will be integrated into mutually beneªcial relationships and a win-win regional order. Fifth, what about the Chinese? Do they have a view on how their nation will behave as a regional (and global) great power? All of the above perspectives are held by ana- lysts outside of China. Although one should certainly be careful about generalizing about such a large sample, Chinese across the professional spectrum regularly claim that because of China’s past horriªc encounters with foreign imperialism and hegemo- ny, it will never exert the same on others. China’s modern history has left an indelible imprint on the society, which leads the Chinese government and people to argue that they will not do unto others as was done unto them. This nearly unanimous view can- not be written off as propagandistic indoctrination, and it should be respected by for- eign analysts. Since the 1950s there has been a strong continuity in Chinese articulations about the impact of this historical experience, China’s preferred regional and global or- der, and China’s future place in it. There are no doubt other viewpoints to be voiced about China’s regional (and global) roles. My main concern in the bourgeoning discourse on this subject is that analysts ground their predictions inductively and empirically, rather than deductively and theo- retically. Theory is supposed to be derived from data and patterns of observable phe-

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 211

nomena. In this regard, Asian area studies expertise should be brought into the debates and discourse about Asia’s and China’s trajectory in the pages of this journal and else- where. To be sure, area studies and international relations theory are by no means mu- tually exclusive. Rather they should be seen as complementary and used in tandem.9 I am grateful to Nicholas Khoo and Michael Smith for their reactions to my article and this dialogue. —David Shambaugh Washington, D.C

9. See the observations of Jonathan D. Pollack, “Does the Study of Asian International Relations Require International Relations Theory?” Issues & Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 220–224.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021