Correspondence: China Engages Asia? Caveat Lector Correspondence Nicholas Khoo and Michael L.R. Smith David Shambaugh China Engages Asia? Caveat Lector To the Editors: In his recent article in International Security, David Shambaugh provides a far-ranging and thought-provoking account of China’s engagement policy with the wider Asian re- gion,1 which he argues is “a principal catalyst in shaping a new order in Asia.”2 Shambaugh posits that “the traditional underpinnings of international relations in Asia are undergoing profound change, and the rise of China is a principal cause” (p. 64). Other causes of change that he points to include the relative decline of U.S. inºuence in the region; the growing role of norms espoused by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and attendant growth of ASEAN-linked institutions; increased tech- nological and economic interdependence in the region; and improvements in China’s relations with key regional states including India, South Korea, and Vietnam. As a re- sult, Shambaugh asserts that in contrast to the situation just a few years ago, “the ma- jority of Asian states currently view China as more benign than malign and are accommodating themselves to its rise” (p. 67). Following other observers, Shambaugh sees regional bandwagoning dynamics operating in China’s favor.3 We contend, however, that there are serious problems in Shambaugh’s thesis, which collectively leave us with much less room for optimism about China’s Asia policy both in the present, as well as for the future. Three key points of critique merit further elabo- ration. First, Shambaugh devotes inadequate attention in his article to China’s relations with two states, Japan and Taiwan, whose interactions in the last decade patently con- tradict his portrayal of skillful Chinese diplomacy.4 Second, his claim that “most na- tions in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful Nicholas Khoo is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. Michael L.R. Smith is Reader in War Studies, King’s College, University of London. David Shambaugh is Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs and Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. The authors extend their thanks to Frank Scott Douglas, Stephen Liebmann, and Andrew Nathan for their constructive comments and observations. 1. See Evan Medeiros and R. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 22–35; and Brantly Womack, “China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership, and Normalcy,” Paciªc Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Winter 2003–2004), pp. 520– 548. 2. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), p. 65. Additional references to this article appear parenthetically in the text. 3. Shambaugh argues that “the nascent tendency of some Asian states to bandwagon with Beijing is likely to become more manifest over time.” Ibid., p. 99. David C. Kang adopts a similar perspec- tive when he argues that “Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. Rather they seem to be bandwagoning.” Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), p. 58. 4. Shambaugh asserts that “bilaterally and multilaterally, Beijing’s diplomacy has been remark- International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 196–213 © 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 196 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 Correspondence: China Engages Asia? 197 listener, and a nonthreatening regional power” merely illustrates short-term trends in the post–Cold War era, mostly since 1997 (p. 64). A strong case can be made that many Southeast Asian states are economic competitors with China, and that some are hedg- ing against its rise by consolidating their long-standing relations with the United States. Third, even if one were to look past the ªrst two points of criticism, Shambaugh pro- vides no convincing reason for why China should not simply be viewed as acting stra- tegically, and behaving itself while it is on its ascent, so as to not induce balancing by regional states.5 In this view, once China feels that it has sufªcient economic and mili- tary power, it will behave as other great powers have done in the past and insist that its preferences are respected, by force if necessary. critical oversight: china’s relations with japan and taiwan While Shambaugh is correct to point out the improvement in China’s relations with a number of Asian states—notably some of the ASEAN states, along with South Korea and India—a sustained discussion of China’s relations with two key states in the region—Japan and Taiwan—is conspicuously absent. This is a signiªcant oversight because China’s relations with these states are (1) arguably enormously important to re- gional stability; (2) have historically been prone to conºict; and (3) have been on a downward trajectory since the mid-1990s. At a minimum, Beijing’s relations with Tokyo and Taipei call into question Shambaugh’s conclusion that Chinese diplomacy is as astute as he claims (p. 64). Space constraints require that we paint only the general trends in China’s relations with these two states. As Thomas Christensen has argued, China exhibits a visceral and historically rooted distrust toward Japan and is resistant to the idea that any Chinese actions could pose a threat to it.6 This is an important issue because Chinese insensitivity to Japanese fears of a rising China is already fueling mutual suspicions that could easily activate security dilemma dynamics in Asia.7 Since the downturn in its economy in the 1990s, which has coincided with sustained Chinese economic growth and military modernization, Japan has quite naturally developed apprehensions about being eclipsed by China. As a re- sult, Tokyo has consistently worked to develop closer ties with the United States, its formal alliance partner since 1951. While the main impetus for revising the U.S.-Japan alliance guidelines were the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1994 North Korean crisis, the Chinese role in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96 added urgency to the consolida- tion of the alliance.8 The inability or unwillingness of the Chinese to rein in the North ably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the region.” Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” p. 64. 5. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Ste- phen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 156– 179. 6. Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/Octo- ber 1996), p. 44. 7. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49–80. 8. Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.- China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 48–85. The North Korean cri- Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0162288054894599 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 30:1 198 Koreans, who declared in 2003 that they had developed a nuclear deterrent, has only added to Japanese fears. Japanese concerns about a rising China with which it has terri- torial disputes have been further accentuated by actions on the part of Beijing. These in- clude the deliberate probing by a Chinese submarine into the Japanese exclusive economic zone in November 2004 and the dispatch of drilling teams to inspect for oil and gas deposits within it. On a more populist level, the behavior of Chinese fans to- ward the Japanese national soccer team during the Asian Cup soccer ªnals held in China in the summer of 2004 shook even the most apolitical Japanese. The Japanese team was subjected to sustained abuse and vitriol as it played its preliminary group matches in various parts of China. The full-scale rioting by disgruntled Chinese soccer fans following the Japanese team’s victory over China in the Asian Cup ªnal in August 2004 appalled many in Japan, an event that continues to resonate in the Japanese psyche and will take some time to overcome.9 Tokyo, however, is not without its share of blame for the deterioration in relations.10 The publication of an ofªcial school text that glosses over Japan’s World War II–era atrocities in China and Korea has contributed to a surge in anti-Japanese sentiment (though it should be noted that China could itself deal more honestly with its own his- torical record of grievous human rights violations). While Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi delivered an apology in Jakarta on the occasion of the ªftieth anni- versary of the Bandung conference for his country’s wartime behavior,11 the larger point is that China’s instrumental use of Japan’s war record to stoke growing national- ism and lack of appreciation for legitimate Japanese security concerns about a rising China have exacerbated an already strained relationship.12 The overall effect of Chinese diplomacy toward Japan has been to cause Tokyo to strengthen its rhetorical posture to- ward Beijing. In December 2004 China was formally declared a security concern in Japan’s National Defense Program Outline.13 In mid-February 2005 government ofªcials from the United States and Japan met for their annual defense consultations.