The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Security in Post
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
5 Editor’s Note: CE JISS In readying the content of Volume 1 Issue 2 of CEJISS, I was struck by the growing support this journal has received within many scholarly and profes- sional quarters. Building on the success of the rst issue, CEJISS has man- aged to extendThe its readership Shanghai to the universities Cooperation and institutions of a number of countries both in the EU and internationally. It is truly a pleasure to watch this project take onOrganisation a life of its own and provide and its readers Security with cutting-edge analy- sis of current political affairs. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our readers for theirin constructivePost-Soviet criticism, comments Central and continue Asiad support. Much has changed in the 6 months since CEJISS was rst launched. I would like to introduce this issue withAskhat a brief Safiullincommentary regarding the tense atmos- phereThe currently Shanghai clouding Cooperation Israeli-Syrian Organisation relations. There is growing concern of clandestine, actual or potential WMD procurement in the greater Middle Eastern Abstract: Tracing the debate on the importance and influence of the region, which has (rightly) attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on regional security integration in CentralOn 6 September Asia, this 2007, work itassesses was reported the degree that Israeliof its integration.air force jets It violated mainly Syrianaddresses airspace, the interplay and after between being engaged individual by Syrianstate security anti-aircraft needs, batteries norms were and forcedidentities. back My to proposedmore friendly perspective skies. Since is based the initial on constructivism, reports were madeinformed public, by itthe has English become school. clear that The Israel’s paper actionsconcludes were that not security accidental cooperation but rather partbetween of a deliberateSCO member strategy states to in deal the with security potential environment Syrian nuclear is impacted weapons by three(or materials) factors: acquisition,1) security, influencedpurportedly byfrom 2) identitiesNorth Korea. and Twonorms, important inducing issues states have to utilisebeen raised:3) the functions rstly, the of continued organisation dangers to their of WMD needs. proliferationThe work explores in the Middlethe implica East- and,tions possible of such security ways of cooperation countering suchin the proliferation. context of perceptions and the conduct of cooperationWhile Israel’s research. nuclear programmes have been the subject of much debate – especially as Israel refuses to allow IAEA inspectors to assess its nuclear sites and capabilities – the fact remains that Israel is a (largely) responsible state in whichKeywords: there are manyShanghai checks Cooperation and balances Organisation, to prevent the Central deployment Asia, of Russia, WMD inChina, a wanton regionalism, manner. constructivism, Unfortunately, integration,in most other cooperation Middle Eastern states such checks and balances are absent. This compounds the problem of WMD devel- opment as regimes which control internal and external security policy without signiIntroduction cant oversight are likely to utilise WMD (particularly nuclear weapons) as aOpinions strategically about deployable the Shanghai weapon Cooperation instead of Organisation’sadopting (as mo (SCO)st other1 purpose nuclear statesvary tremendously have) a strategic despite view theof WMD organisation’s as residual; explicit not a statementsecurity mantle-piece. of providing 2 its membersIf the accusations security levelled against against non-traditional Syria – regarding threats. its Questions acquisition of of whether nuclear weapons (or material) from North Korea – are accurate, then it con rms the worst1 ‘The fears Shanghai of Israeli Cooperation (and international)Organisation (SCO) security is a permanent analysts: intergovernmental that despite intense inter- internationalnational organisation pressures which and wasinvestigations proclaimed on which 15 June attempt 2001 in to Shanghai dissuade (China) WMD by de-the velopmentRepublic ofand Kazakhstan, smuggling, the People’ssuch weapons Republic may of China, be acquired the Kyrgyz with Republic, relative the ease.Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.’ From Shanghai Co- operationIsrael’s militaryOrganisation reaction, 07 June to 2002, the Syria available acquisition at: <http://www.sectsco.org/EN/brief.asp was a necessary and even> encouraging(accessed 05 response. May 2010). It demonstrated a willingness to unilaterally respond to a2 nuclearSome of provocationthe main goals are:with ‘to maturity. consolidate It multidisciplinary targeted non-civilian cooperation sites in the and maintenance focused its andattention strengthening only ofon peace, the sourcesecurity andof danger. stability inThe the regiondeployment and promotion of special of a new ground demo- cratic, fair and rational political and economic international order; to jointly counteract ter- forcesrorism, which separatism directed and extremismIsraeli warplanes in all their manifestations,to their target to fightwas dangerousagainst illicit thoughnarcotics 42 | Askhat Safiullin the SCO should be considered a counter-balance against NATO,3 or whether it was created to counter China’s influence in Central Asia, have been vigorously debated. One argument holds that the SCO successfully binds its members against undertaking any threatening action against the peace and security in the broad Central Asian region; in other words, its stated mission is to provide a working, regional collective security mechanism. Alternativly, Ambrosio argued that the SCO strengthens autocracy in Central Asian republics under the façade of promoting security.4 Additionally, the relative scarcity of research on the Central Asian region has also produced an ill-suited theoretical divide in its treatment of how the states in the region interact with global superpowers. One perspective of this debate is best represented by Ros-Lehtinen who regards the region as being ‘vulnerable to variable whims of superpower self-interest,’5 while at the other end of the spectrum Smith claims that Central Asia is not part of a ‘great game’ between superpowers6 but rather experiencing a regional power struggle for dominance. This polarisation has kept the focus of research limited to two main camps, resulting in a general ignorance over other important issues and associated problematics. The central claim of this work concerns the process of security regionalisa- tion in Central Asia, represented by the SCO, which is best understood through a theoretical framework that combines three perspectives: the English School7, and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration’, ‘Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,’ Shanghai Coopera- tion Organisation, 07 June 2002, available at: <http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69> (accessed 06 April 2010). 3 Blank, Stephen, ‘US Interest in Central Asia and Their Challenges,’ Demokratizatsiya, (April 2007), p. 318; US Congress, ‘United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission)’, Hearing: ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Is it Undermining US Interests in Central Asia?,’ 26 September 2006; Nanay, Julie, ‘Inside Track: SCO Gaining Importance,’ The National Interest online, 08 August 2007. 4 Ambrosio, Thomas ‘Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit:’ How the Shanghai Cooperation Organi- sation Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia,’ Europe-Asia Studies, 60: 8, October 2008. p. 1321–1344. 5 Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana, ‘Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia,’ Testimony to the House of Representatives Committee n International Relations, Subcommittee on the Mid- dle East and Central Asia, 25 July 2006. p. 4. 6 Smith, Dianne, L., ‘Central Asia: A New Great Game?’ Asian Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1996). pp. 147–175. 7 There are multiple definitions, but according to Robert Jackson (1992:271), the English School is ‘a variety of theoretical inquiries which conceive of international relations as a world not merely of power and prudence or wealth or capability or domination but also one of recognition, association, membership, equality, equity, legitimate interests, rights, customs and conventions, agreements and disagreements, disputes, offences, inquiries, damages, repa- rations, and the rest: the normative vocabulary of human conduct.’ The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation | 43 constructivism8 and functionalism/neofunctionalism.9 In other words, the de- gree of regional security integration, in the context of the SCO, is impacted by three factors: 1) the transitional nature of security, 2) identities and norms that are at work in the region, and 3) the organisational functionality of the SCO. According to an English school perspective, there are multiple layers of security, which are produced as a result of security regionalisation, and are at work in order to manage different types of security through those that were created and are managed by the SCO and other regional security mechanisms. These are the drivers that have an incremental impact on regional integration. In the social aspect of the English school explanation, a set of drivers that have a diverse (incremental or detrimental) effect on the process of integration is a complex of identities (ethnic, ideological, group and class identities).