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Updated March 24, 2020 Sanction Entity Location of Entity Date Updated March 24, 2020 Sanction Entity Location of Date imposed Status/Date of Federal Register entity expiration notice INKSNA Baoding Shimaotong China 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Enterprises Services February 14, 2020, Company Limited (China) Federal Register and any successor, sub- unit, or subsidiary thereof INKSNA Dandong Zhensheng China 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Trade Co., Ltd. (China) February 14, 2020, and any successor, sub- Federal Register unit, or subsidiary thereof INKSNA Gaobeidian Kaituo Precise China 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Instrument Co. Ltd February 14, 2020, (China) and any successor, Federal Register sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof INKSNA Luo Dingwen (Chinese China 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, individual) February 14, 2020, Federal Register INKSNA Shenzhen Tojoin China 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Communications February 14, 2020, Technology Co. Ltd Federal Register (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof INKSNA Shenzhen Xiangu High- China 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Tech Co., Ltd (China) and February 14, 2020, any successor, sub-unit, or Federal Register subsidiary thereof INKSNA Wong Myong Son China 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, (individual in China) February 14, 2020, Federal Register INKSNA Wuhan Sanjiang Import China 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, and Export Co., Ltd February 14, 2020, (China) and any successor, Federal Register subunit, or subsidiary thereof INKSNA Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Iraq 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, (KSS) (Iraq) and any February 14, 2020, successor, sub-unit, or Federal Register subsidiary thereof INKSNA Kumertau Aviation Russia 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Production Enterprise February 14, 2020, (Russia) and any Federal Register successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof INKSNA Instrument Building Russia 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Design Bureau (KBP) Tula February 14, 2020, (Russia) and any Federal Register successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof INKSNA Scientific Production Russia 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Association February 14, 2020, Mashinostroyeniya Federal Register (NPOM) (Russia) and any successor, sub- unit, or subsidiary thereof INKSNA Eren Carbon Graphite Turkey 02/03/20 Active Vol. 85, No. 31, Industrial Trading February 14, 2020, Company, Ltd. (Turkey) Federal Register and any successor, sub- unit, or subsidiary thereof Executive Order Iran Space Agency Iran 09/03/2019 Active Vol. 84, No. 231, 13382 December 2, 2019, Federal Register Executive Order Iran Space Research Iran 09/03/2019 Active Vol. 84, No. 231, 13382 Center December 2, 2019, Federal Register Executive Order Astronautics Research Iran 09/03/2019 Active Vol. 84, No. 231, 13382 Institute [aka Astronautics December 2, 2019, Systems Research Center, Federal Register Aerospace Research Institute] INKSNA Abascience Tech Col, Ltd. China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Emily Liu (individual) China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Hope Wish Technologies China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May Inc. 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Jiangsu Tianyuan Metal China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May Powder Co., Ltd. 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Karl Lee [aka Li Fangwei] China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Raybeam Optronics Co., China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May Ltd. 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Ricky Runling (individual) China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May [aka Ruan Runling, Ricky 22, 2019, Federal Ruan] Register INKSNA Shanghai North Begins China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Sinotech (Dalian) Carbon China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May and Graphite Corp. 22, 2019, Federal (SCGC) Register INKSNA Sun Creative Zhejiang China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May Technologies Inc. 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA T-Rubber Co., Ltd. China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Wuhan Sanjiang Import China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May and Export Co., Ltd. 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Yenben Yansong Zaojiu China 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May Co. Ltd. 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Defense Industries Iran 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May Organization 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Gatchina SAM Training Russia 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May Center 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Instrument Design Bureau Russia 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May (KBP) Tula 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Moscow Machine Building Russia 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May Plant Avangard (MMZ 22, 2019, Federal Avangard) Register INKSNA Army Supply Bureau Syria 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Lebanese Hizballah Syria 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Megatrade Syria 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Syrian Air Force Syria 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May 22, 2019, Federal Register INKSNA Syrian Scientific Studies Syria 05/14/19 Active Vol. 84, No. 99, May and Research Center 22, 2019, Federal Register Executive Order Mohammad Ebrahimi Iran 03/22/19 Active Vol, 84, No. 69, April 13382 [aka Reza Ebrahimi] 10, 2019, Federal Register, Fact sheet, Statement Chemical and Government of the Russia 08/27/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 166, Aug. Biological Russian Federation 27, 2018, Federal Weapons Control Register, Federal and Warfare Register Elimination Act (CBW Act) INKSNA Abascience Tech Co., Ltd. China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Easy Fashion Metal China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Products Trade Co. [aka 10, 2018, Federal Easyfashion Industries] Register INKSNA Emily Liu China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Karl Lee [aka Li Fangwei] China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Raybeam Optronics Co., China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Ltd. 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Shanghai Rotech China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Pharmaceutical 10, 2018, Federal Engineering Co. Register INKSNA Sinotech (Dalian) Carbon China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May and Graphite Corp. 10, 2018, Federal (SCGC) Register INKSNA Sunway Tech Co., Ltd. China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA T-Rubber Co. Ltd. China 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Sakr Factory for Egypt 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Developmental Industries 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Mojtaba Ghasemi Iran 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Islamic Revolutionary Iran 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Guard Corps Qods Force 10, 2018, Federal (IRGC QF) Register INKSNA Pars Aviation Service Co. Iran 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May (PASC) 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Defense Industries Iran 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Organization (DIO) 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Saeng Pil Trading Corp. North Korea 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Second Economic North Korea 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Committee (SEC) Korea 10, 2018, Federal Ryonbong General Corp. Register INKSNA Rosoboronexport (ROE) Russia 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 90, May 9, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA 183rd Guard Air Defense Russia 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Missile Regiment 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Instrument Design Bureau Russia 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May (KBP) Tula 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Gatchina Surface-to-Air Russia 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Missile Training Center 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Russian General Staff Russia 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Main Intelligence 10, 2018, Federal Directorate (GRU) Register INKSNA 18th Central Scientific Russia 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Research Institute (18th 10, 2018, Federal TsNII) Scientific Research Register Center (NITs) (Kursk) INKSNA Russian Research and Russia 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Production Concern 10, 2018, Federal (BARL) Register INKSNA Scientific Studies and Syria 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Research Center (SSRC) 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Lebanese Hizballah Syria 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Megatrade Syria 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Syrian Air Force Syria 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May 10, 2018, Federal Register INKSNA Seden Denizcilik Turkey 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Hizmeleri Sanayi de 10, 2018, Federal Ticaret Ltd. Register INKSNA Yona Star International United Arab 04/30/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 91, May Emirates 10, 2018, Federal Register Chemical and Government of North North Korea 03/05/18 Active Vol. 83, No. 43, March Biological Korea 5, 2018, Federal Weapons Control Register and Warfare Elimination Act (CBW Act) Missile Sanctions Chilsong Trading Corp. North Korea 01/31/18 Expired 01/31/20 Vol. 83, No. 21, laws January 31, 2018, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 48, March 12, 2018, Federal Register Missile Sanctions Korea Kuryonggang North Korea 01/31/18 Expired 01/31/20 Vol.
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