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Defusing Military-Civil Fusion the Need to Identify and Respond to Chinese Military Companies

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Defusing Military-Civil Fusion the Need to Identify and Respond to Chinese Military Companies Defusing Military-Civil Fusion The Need to Identify and Respond to Chinese Military Companies Emily de La Bruyère and Nathan Picarsic May 2021 FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES FOUNDATION Defusing Military-Civil Fusion The Need to Identify and Respond to Chinese Military Companies Emily de La Bruyère Nathan Picarsic May 2021 FDD PRESS A division of the FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES Washington, DC Defusing Military-Civil Fusion: The Need to Identify and Respond to Chinese Military Companies Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 6 RESPONDING TO BEIJING’S STRATEGY OF MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION ................................. 7 IDENTIFIED COMPANIES ................................................................................................................. 9 Backbone Military-Industrial Groups ...............................................................................................................9 International Infrastructure Players...................................................................................................................13 REMAINING GAPS .............................................................................................................................. 19 Centrally State-Owned Military-Industrial Companies .................................................................................19 Additional Infrastructure Players .......................................................................................................................21 Additional Military-Academic Complex Entities ............................................................................................23 A NEW MODEL: A PRIORITIZATION FRAMEWORK ................................................................. 25 Clear Definitions ..................................................................................................................................................25 Expanded Scope ...................................................................................................................................................25 Clear Prioritization...............................................................................................................................................26 Operationalizing the Documentation Effort ....................................................................................................27 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 28 APPENDIX A: FY2021 NDAA Language Concerning Reporting Requirements Pertaining to Chinese Military Companies ........................................................ 29 APPENDIX B: Chinese Entities Listed by the U.S. Department of Defense ............................................ 31 Page 5 Defusing Military-Civil Fusion: The Need to Identify and Respond to Chinese Military Companies Introduction infrastructure and supply chains through which China projects coercive power. The People’s Republic of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has emerged as America’s The 44 companies identified by DoD include entities primary strategic competitor. Both parties in purchasing aerospace firms in Michigan and Alabama, Washington now recognize this reality. Leveraging developing real estate in California, selling subway growing economic, technological, and military means, cars to the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, and the CCP is expanding China’s power and influence establishing research and development (R&D) centers internationally – including by revising international in Silicon Valley. norms and institutions. The DoD list fulfills two-decades-old congressional tasking. Section 1237 of the National Defense Beijing’s strategy of military-civil fusion (MCF) (军民 Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, 融合) plays a core role in this global campaign. MCF entails the fusion of military, civilian, and commercial as amended, directed DoD to document “Communist investments, actors, and positioning to increase China’s Chinese military companies” that are “operating directly comprehensive national power.1 The strategy is tailored for or indirectly in the United States or any of its territories and possessions.”3 The FY1999 statute required DoD the globalized commercial ecosystem: MCF leverages the 4 international integration of Chinese military companies to make its determinations by March 1, 2001. But, – both private and state-owned – in order to acquire for two decades, there was no public progress. The resources and leverage. FY1999 NDAA congressional mandate resurfaced in 2020 alongside increased attention in Washington on Since 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) MCF and on China’s competitive threat more broadly. has identified 44 Chinese companies that operate in the United States and have ties to the People’s Liberation At present, the DoD list of Chinese military-tied Army (PLA). (See Appendix B for a full list.) They companies is just that: a list. It provides neither include traditional Chinese defense contractors as well information about the identified companies nor the as companies that specialize in information technology rationale for their inclusion. DoD has not disclosed its (IT), engage in commercial business, and operate methodology. Nor does the list indicate the material in legacy industrial domains. Most are state-owned consequences for identified entities or whether an enterprises. All are state-supported. Every one of the entity’s subsidiaries or joint ventures are also implicated. 44 companies deploys internationally in accordance This report documents connections between the with Beijing’s global “Go Out”2 offensive to acquire companies on DoD’s list and the Chinese military and strategically important technology. They also develop military-industrial establishment. The report focuses on 1. Emily de La Bruyère and Nathan Picarsic, “Military-Civil Fusion: China’s Approach to R&D, Implications for Peacetime Competition, and Crafting a US Strategy,” 2019 Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Symposium, May 2019. 2. The People’s Republic of China launched the Go Out policy in 1999 to encourage Chinese companies to invest, partner, and otherwise engage internationally. The Go Out program continues to inform Beijing’s web of industrial plans. See: Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/china/2010-11-01/game-changer) 3. The statute defines “Communist Chinese military company” according to two criteria. First, the entity must be “owned or controlled by, or affiliated with, the People’s Liberation Army or a ministry of the government of the People’s Republic of China or owned or controlled by an entity affiliated with the defense industrial base of the People’s Republic of China.” Second, the entity must be “engaged in providing commercial services, manufacturing, producing, or exporting.” 4. Larry Wortzel, “The Administration Must Name Chinese Defense Companies in the United States,” The Heritage Foundation, October 10, 2000. (https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-administration-must-name-chinese-defense-companies-the-united-states) Page 6 Defusing Military-Civil Fusion: The Need to Identify and Respond to Chinese Military Companies three key, overlapping groups: state-owned backbone of a mechanism that limits the ability of military-tied military-industrial enterprises, companies building Chinese companies to operate in the global financial global infrastructure and standards, and elements of and commercial system. The United States also needs China’s military-academic complex. These entities tools for proactive, offensive competition. reflect core components of China’s MCF program. Since the adoption of the 2017 National Security However, as this report demonstrates, the companies Strategy, the U.S. government has sought to address that DoD has listed thus far represent just the tip of the asymmetric and non-traditional threats posed by the iceberg. This report points to additional Chinese Beijing in an era of renewed great power competition. military-linked companies that operate in the United Documentation of Chinese military companies is a States but have escaped scrutiny as examples of gaps part of that effort. Now, refining the documentation in the DoD documentation effort. To an extent, such and monitoring process, as well as operationalizing its gaps reflect the need to continue expanding the DoD results, offers an immediate, tractable opportunity to list – as well as to do so according to a broader scope counter the CCP’s global offensive. and set of definitions. But gaps are also endemic to the exercise. There will always be more companies that meet qualifying criteria. Simply adding new companies Responding to to the existing DoD list will not solve the problem. Beijing’s Strategy of Rather than trying to identify every Chinese military- Military-Civil Fusion tied company, DoD should adopt a clear prioritization framework to target the companies that matter most. This The FY1999 NDAA, as amended, directed DoD to report outlines a proposed framework that accounts for document “Communist Chinese military companies” companies’ roles within the MCF system (for example, that are “operating directly or indirectly
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