Flight of the Goeben

Home , Flag officer, Grand admiral

THE FLIGHT O F THE

‘ GOEBEN ’ AND THE ‘ B RESLAU ’

The

‘ ’ Flight o f the G oeben

‘ ’ and the B r eslau

An Episode i n Naval

BY S A B RK LEY M LN B DMI RAL m . r . A E E I E,

ma n.

LONDON EVELEIGH NASH CO MPANY

LIMITED

PREFACE

F TE R u a 1920 of A the p blic tion in March , , “ the Ofﬁcial History of the War ' Nav al

I u . Operations, Vol . by Sir J lian S I Corbett, represented to the First Lord of the Admiral ty that the book contained u u serio s inacc racies , and made a formal request that the Admiralty should take action in the matter . As the Admiralty did not think proper to accede to my u I u u s req est, have tho ght it right to p bli h f the ollowing narrative .

ERKE LE Y I LNE . A . B M

Admi ral . Jan uary 1921 .

CONT ENT S

PREFACE

I . OFFI CI AL RESPONSIB IL ITY

I I . THE SITU ATION IN JU LY 1914 PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS THE FRENCH DISPOSITIONS

FI M G W V . RST EETIN ITH GOEB EN

NE W DISPOSITIONS

“ ” THE OFF ICIAL VERSION GOEB EN AND B RESLA U AT MESSINA SECOND MEETING WITH GOEB EN AND

FURTHER D IS POS ITIONS

XI . THE MIS TAKEN TELEGRAM THE S EARCH RES UMED THE ES CAPE

L XI V . THE S E'UE

XV . CONCLUS ION

OFFICIAL RESP ONS IBILITY

OFF ICI AL RE S P ONS IB ILITY

u u fﬁ I N j stice to the p blic, to the O cers

r u and men who se ved nder my command ,

own u I u and to my rep tation, have tho ght it right to publish the following narrative Of the events in the Mediterranean imme diat ely preceding and following upon the u W o tbreak Of war, concerning hich there u u has been, and is , some nfort nate mis apprehension .

Du s ring the war, when ecrecy with to n regard naval Operations was ecessary, it was natural that the public anxiety u ﬁnd u S ho ld expression in conject res , and ul I that false impressions sho d prevail . select the following passages from Hansard as examples ' Hansard (House of Com mons 313i Jul 1 916 E c ) , y, . s ape Of the

Goeben reslau and B (Despatches) . 11 1 2 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

Commander B ell airs asked the Fi rst o o of L rd f the Admiralty, in view the fact that the disasters Of the Dardanelles and the Baghdad advance are about t o be u W inq ired into by Commissions , hether he is aware that the entry Of Turkey into the War originated in the esca pe Of the Goeben and Breslau from Messina to the Dar danelles in August 1 91 4 and Whether he can now publish the despatches dealing with the matter, together with the dis positions Of Ships of which the Board Of Admiralty have expressed their approval '

Dr . Macnamara The Admiralty have hitherto only published despatches which u deal with act al engagements , and not ’ reports on the disposal of His Majesty s

or ships , whether not those dispositions succeeded in bringing about an engage

hon ment . My right . friend (the First

al u to Lord , Mr . B fo r), does not propose

- depart from this well established practice . He must not be as sumed as giving unqual i

ed u o ho ﬁ conc rrence to the view f my n. OFFICIAL RES PONS IB ILITY 1 8 and gallant friend that the entry Of Tu rkey into the War originated with the arrival

tw o n Of these ships at Consta tinople .

12th March, 191 9 .

Mr . H . Smith asked the First Lord of the Admiralty Whether he Will lay u pon the Table Of the House the Repo rt of the proceedings of the Court Of Inquiry which inquired into the circu mstances attending

Goeben reslau the escape Of the and B , and which acquitted Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne Of all respo nsibility therefo r '

AS Dr . Macnamara ' stated in reply to r a question by my hon . f iend the Member

or u on 26th f Portsmo th North , the

u no u u Was Febr ary, Co rt of Inq iry held in the case of Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne . The Admiralty issued a statement on the 3 u u 1 91 4 f oth A g st, , to the ef ect that z The conduct and dispositions of Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne in regard to the German vessels Gaaban and Breslau have been the subject of the careful 1 4 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

of l examination Of the Board Admira ty , with the result that their Lordships have approved the measures taken by him in ’ all respects .

These , and other perfectly correct state

G on u ments Of the overnment the s bject , not did , however, serve to dispel the

misapprehensions t o which I refer . The Government have consistently refused to publish the documents concern ing the openi ng of the war in the Mediter

ranean us , the reason for their ref al being that the history of the affai r woul d be related in the Ofﬁcial History Of the

u r war, in preparation by Sir J lian Co bett . 1 5th 1 920 On the November, , for instance , the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty stated in the House of Commons

so u u that, far as the near f t re is concerned, it is not proposed to publish the docu ments in regard t o the escape Of the Goeben the matter had already been dealt with in the Naval History of the ’ W r a . OFFICIAL RES PONS IB ILITY 1 5

It was , therefore , to be expected that the facts of the episode in questio n would be impartially set fo rth in the Ofﬁcial

W r History of the a ' Naval Operations ,

Vol . I . u by Sir Jul ian S . Corbett, , p blished 920 in March 1 . u ﬁ That expectation has not been f l lled . Nor have the Admiralty thought proper to take any action to correct the erroneous

r own imp ession which , in my view, is disengaged by the Ofﬁcial historian ’ s pre

ntati on of . se the case Indeed , a reference of u to the statement Sir James Craig, q oted above , shows that the Admiralty profess t o regard the account Of the matter written by Sir Julian Corbett as an exact version of

’ the documents upon which the historian s

of u version them was fo nded . It is not a

u ﬁnd t o concl sion I myself able accept .

If, writing as an independent historian, Sir Julian Corbett was impelled to criticise the conduct of the naval Operations by ﬁ the of cers in command Of them, I should

ea ro hold that the Admirals at s , being p 1 6 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

fessional r seamen, were p obably better able to judge Of the requirements Of the

S u u on it ation than an amate r shore , and the matter woul d resolve itself into a f B ut simple dif erence Of Opinion . the

so m case is not si ple as that . Neither the Co mmittee Of Imperial Defence nor the Admiralty can be absolved from a deﬁnite share in the responsibility for the ﬁ Of cial History . The First Lo rd Of the Admiralty stated

on 1 8th u r 1 920 a fﬁ Febr a y, , th t the O cial History is being co mpiled under the di recti on of the Commi ttee of I mperi al

e enc ar 1 8th u D f e (Hans d , Febr ary, The same statement was made by the Parliamentary Secretary t o the Admiralty

on 2 h o r 1 920 n . 7t Oct be , (Ha sard) The Prime Minister informed the House

t o er 1 920 of Commons on l s N vemb , , that

or u r a Sir Jul ian C bett, I nde st nd , is writing the Ofﬁcial account Of the war

lt oi nt o vi ew n r from the Admi ra y p f (Ha sa d ,

l st November,

1 8 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

u u of appearing in yo r iss e this month , your contributor gives the weight of his name to a widely prevailing impression

u t o rr which I wo ld beg leave co ect . Referring to the Ofﬁcial Naval His ’ of War u for tory the , as the main so rce

of the facts the case, he says , As regards this incident , it has evidently been heavily ’ u censored . That s ch an impression is u but nat ral , I do not deny, it is entirely u untr e . I was given the freest possible access to the secret ﬁles which contain the telegrams that passed between the

al Admiralty and the Admir , as well as

u o to the instr cti ns, logs and the rest , and from these sources a narrative was con

u t o of str cted the best my ability . After bei ng tested for accuracy of detai l by seni or o icers who were en a ed i n the o erati ons ﬁ g g p ,

u m t o r it was s b itted the Admi alty, and ,

t u n o u af er caref l exami ati n, ret rned to

wi th a ew su esti ons as to me , f gg the

di n o certai n assa es o wor g f p g . Bey nd i th s, no censoring took place , and OFFICIAL RESPONS IB ILITY 1 9 the tenour of the comments remai ned

The narrative was not censored at ll a , nor was any telegram relating to opera tions ignored or misrepresented in the text . — In regard to this episode and indeed — to the whole volume I can only look upon

’ u the Admiralty censoring, s ch as it was , as rank assi stance r an accurate f i n secu i ng , l a rred ful nd i mpart i al record of what occu . u Yo rs obediently,

JULIA CORB E TT. (Sgd . ) N S .

M a i s —A B M y it l c . . .

It will be Observed that Sir Julian

r Corbett, while denying that the Admi alty

u r censored his acco nt Of the matte , deﬁnitely states that it was submitted to the Admiralty, and that their Lordships made a few suggestions as to the word ” a ing Of certain passages . He dds that the tenour Of the comments remained u ” nchanged . 20 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

o ﬁ It is , theref re , clear, rst, that the Admiralty reserve to themselves the right u to s ggest alterations in the text ; second ,

r that, in the case under conside ation, their Lo rdships made no such alterations in the tenour of the comments It is “ ” the tenour of the comments t o which

I take grave exception . I can only ’ u look pon the Admiral ty censoring, “ u u as s ch as it was , writes Sir J lian , u u frank assistance in sec ring an acc rate , ” full and impartial record of what occurred . It is a view with which I regret I cannot ul u agree . Sir J ian Corbett f rther states that his narrative was tested for accuracy of detail by senior ofﬁcers who were engaged ” in the operations . That is a statement u u u I am q ite nable to nderstand . I was Commander - in- Chief in the Mediterranean at the period in question ; I came home in August 1 914 ; and neither then nor subsequently did Sir Julian Co rbett com

ani ee m cate with me . I did not s his account of the episode until the Ofﬁcial OFFICIAL RE SPONS IBILITY 21

u 1 920 History was p blished in March . I regard it as extremely unfortunate (at least) that Sir Jul ian Corbett shoul d per

or mit hims elf to assert , to imply, that his narrative was submitted to me before

u of publication . After the p blication the u u book, I called pon Sir J lian , and , expressing my regret that he had not u u cons lted me , when I sho ld have had great pleasure in giving him all the assist ance in my power to Obtain accurate

no information , I asked him why he had t

ms of avail ed hi elf my services . Sir Jul ian w as u f , however, nable to af ord me any of u to explanation his fail re do so .

a e According to the st tements Of Minist rs , Sir Julian Corbett is compiling his history under the directions of the Committee ” r al Of Impe i Defence, and from the ” W o Admiralty point Of view . hether r not it is possible logi cally to reconcile ’ u own u Sir J lian s acco nt Of his position ,

ﬁ ﬁ of u with the Of cial de nitions it, the p blic u will , I think, agree that it is the d ty of 22 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

o c the Committee f Imperial Defen e , and

o r who of the Board f Admi alty, are jointly fﬁ responsible for the O cial History, to protect from aspersio n the reputation ’ Of His Majesty s ofﬁcers . The Prime Ministe r stated on 1st Novem ber that the preparation Of the history is a charge on the Treasury Vote for the

o Committee Of Imperial Defence , to wh m Sir Jul ian Corbett is responsible as author

l st (Hansard , November, The cost of ﬁ the Of cial History, therefore , is defrayed out of public money ; and the public have the right to demand that the Committee of Imperial Defence should ensure accuracy and impartiality in Ofﬁcial publications for which the Committee are o resp nsible . u In the case nder consideration, there is presented the curious anomaly Of a narrative , the proofs Of which were passed , ” u with a few s ggestions , by the Admiral ty but of which the tenour of the comments contradicts the statement Of the Admiralty, OFFICIAL RES PONS IBILITY 23

u on 3 u p blished by the Board oth A gust,

1 914 ou of , and read to the H se Commons by the Parliamentary Secretary to the

on 12 1 91 9 Admiralty th March , , that the conduct and dispositions of Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne in regard to the German vessels Goeben and Breslau have been the subject of the careful examination Of the

o u B ard Of Admiralty, with the res lt that their Lordships have approved the measures ” al l taken by him in respects . In what that conduct and those dis u po sitions and meas res consisted , it is my purpose t o relate in the following pages .

THE S ITU ATIO N IN JU LY 1 91 4

AT u 1 914 u the end Of J ly , the force nder my co mmand in the Mediterranean con sisted of the three battle cruisers of the

u u th e u Second Battle Cr iser Sq adron, fo r armoured cruisers of the First Cruiser

u R - Sq adron , commanded by ear Admiral u u u C . T . Tro bridge, fo r light cr isers and 1 fourteen destroyers .

1 MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

mm an r - i n- mir ir r Co de Chi ef Ad al S A . Be kel ey

Mi ne B t . hi e of S a f ' l , , C f t f r r hilli B M omm o o e Ri a . P m ore C. . . V O . C d ch d F , , .

S ECOND B ATTLE CRU ISER S 'UAD RON

' I - - n ezmble 8 a of C. i n C ﬂ ( fl g . a a n r ur N x C pt i A th . Lo ley . I ndefati gable (8

a a n ar e . S o er C pt i Ch l s F w by . I ndomi table (8 a a r W K n an . nn C pt i F cis e edy . 27 2 8 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

In order that the situation in the Mediter

anean u o r may be ndersto d , it is necessary to indicate the relative strength in effective heavy ships of the other naval Powers

u 1 91 4 r o in J ly . F ance , sh rtly to become our Al one r u six ly, possessed D eadno ght ,

Dantons and ﬁv e other battleships .

FIRS T CRUISER S 'U ADRON

R - mi r r B M M ar a . T . T ou ri C. . . . G . . e e C V . O Ad l C b dg , ,

D c 4- - e en e 9 10 ﬂ R . f ( ag of A. a a n Faw cet Wra C pt i y . — B lack P ri nce (6 9 10

a a n r e r D - e . n ro C pt i F d ick Gilpi B wn. — Duke of Edi nburgh (6 9 10 a a n Henr a e C pt i y Bl ck tt . ” Warri or 6—9 o 2 4- ( , 7

a ai n eor e H . B orr ett C pt G g .

LIGHT CRUISERS Chatham (8 a a n ne R Drur - C pt i Sid y . y Lowe. Dubli n (8 a a n D K e . C pt i n Joh . lly Gloucester (2 10 a a n W K . . H ar M O o e . V. C pt i A w d lly, . Weymouth (8 a a n W l i D am . ur C pt i i l Ch ch . S ITUATION I N JULY 19 14 2 9

u - u of A stria H ngary, a member the Triple e u Alliance , possess d three Dreadno ghts l and three other battleships . Italy, a so a member at that time of the Triple

o u Alliance , p ssessed three Dreadno ghts , u G and fo r other battleships . ermany had

Goeben u placed the , battle cr iser, and the

reslau u . B , light cr iser, in the Mediterranean

of In respect heavy ships, therefore , the position was

France Great B ritai n

B ut a numerical comparison affords only a partial indication Of the real position . Opposing navies are very seldom all in one on u o place at e time . A sq adr n Of one ﬂeet may be attacked by the full

of r strength another ﬂeet . F ance , if u to u req ired deal with A stria , might have been outnumbered by the accessio n of

al O It y . The three battle cruisers f Great 30 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

Britain were liable to be hopelessly over

r o whelmed by either Aust ia r Italy . ul 1 914 At the end Of J y , when war was expected , the possibility that both Austria and Italy would join Ger many

u r u m st be conside ed , and the instr ctions which I received from the Admi ralty were framed in accordance with that contin

o W or gen y . hether not the possibility was considered that the Ottoman Empire

ul G r wo d side with e many, was not known u to me . In J ne , I had visited Constanti no le I n ewi ble. p in ﬂ At that date , mines had already been laid in the Straits Of the D ardanelles ; and , in following the channel , we were brought within close range Of

o r the sh re batte ies .

In Constantinople , I was received with

u u r the greatest co rtesy by the a tho ities , who did their utmost to make my visit H M u u pleasant . . . the S ltan hono red me ,

fﬁ Of together with the O cers my staff, with

Y o u an invitation to dine at ildiz Ki sk, pon which Occasion the Grand Vizier and all S ITUATION IN JULY 1914 31

E the Ministers were present, except nver P asha, who was absent from Constanti nO le t o see Ro p . I went the yal stables , and visited an Anatoléan Cavalry Regi R H P H . ment . . . the Crown rince came

I i ble. on . . . n ew board the ﬂagship, H M S ﬂ His Royal Highness had not visited the

Goeben r , when , a few months before , Admi al ’ Souchon s ﬂagship was at Constantinople .

of our I mention these incidents reception , because (among others) they gave no sug gestion of anti -English sympathies on the Tu ﬁ but part Of rkish Of cials , rather indi cated most friendly feelings towards Great

Britain . I was asked to inspect the Turkish crew which was on the point of leaving to take over the battleship built in England for u E n bu T rkey . They arrived in ngla d , t their ship, together with another vessel

u for u u also b ilt T rkey, was acq ired by G reat Britain . These deprivations prob ably exercised a considerable effect on Turkish opinion ; for the ships had been 32 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

u u r b ilt by s bscription, and their ar ival was eagerly expected by the Turkish D P Ministers , and especially by jemal asha,

e Minister Of Marine , who had intend d to go to England and to return in one Of the new vessels .

III

PRE LIMINARY D IS POS ITI ONS

S U CH was the general situation in the on 2 7th ul 1 914 Mediterranean when, J y, , I received from the Admiralty the pre

of ni liminary telegram war ng . On that

e a day, the great r p rt Of the British Fleet was at Alexandria, in accordance with the cruising arrangements . At Alexandria

u I n ewi ble were two battle cr isers , ﬂ (ﬂag)

I nde ati able ou u s and f g , two arm red cr i ers ,

Warri or lack P ri nce u and B , fo r light

” r R cruisers and thi teen destroyers . ear

r ou Admi al Tr bridge , ﬂying his ﬂag in

u u e ence the armo red cr iser D f , with the

Gram us u destroyer p , was at D razzo in the Adriatic in accordance with Admiralty r u orders . There also were the F ench cr iser Edgar 'ui net and the German light cruiser

e lau B r s . These vessels represented the ' various Powers supporting the international 35 86 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN conference then assembled at Scutari for the purpose of settling the affairs Of Al bania . The battle cruiser I ndomitable was at u ﬁ u Malta , where her ann al re t had j st u beg n, a point to remember in relation

u u u u e to the seq el . The armo red cr iser D k o Edi nbur h f g was also at Malta, where her u ﬁ u ann al re t had j st been completed .

Goeben S ouchon The , ﬂagship Of Admiral ,

u of P was then at the A strian port ola,

ﬁ reslau where she had been re tted , and the B (as it has been said) was also in the Adriatic u at D razzo . Immediately upon receiving the pre liminary telegram of wa rning on 2 7th

u o r July, I sent instr cti ns to the Admi al Superintendent at Malta t o take all re quisite

u a preca tions against attack . Ships at M lta

r for were to be prepa ed sea , coal and stores for the Fleet were to be in readiness . A telegram was sent to Rear-Admiral Troubridge at Durazzo to take all requisite

e u pr ca tions against attack . The Fleet sailed from Al exandria on the 2 8th Jul y . PRELIMINARY DISPOS ITIONS 37

29t h u r On J ly the Fleet ar ived at Malta .

of u 1 st u u By the afternoon Sat rday, A g st, the Fleet was in every respect ready for service . Late in the evening Of 2 9th July I received the warning telegram . On the same date the Admiralty recalled the

e ence of R - r u D f , ﬂagship ear Admi al Tro

r Gr am us u t o b idge , and the p from D razzo 3ot h u Malta . On J ly, in accordance with

u P . Admiralty instr ctions, the and O .

s . i i r s . Os r s was ordered to bring B itish

si ris troops from Scutari to Malta . The O was subse quently converted into an auxil iary cruiser . ’ At eight O clock on the eveni ng Of 3oth

u e J ly, I receiv d the telegram from the Admiralty indicating the political situation nd u a containing my instr ctions . The com munication is summarised in the Ofﬁcial

of War ' History the Naval Operations , ul I by Sir J ian Corbett (Vol . . , p . as follows

Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne was in‘ 38 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN formed of the general situation and what he was to do in the case Of war . Italy u u but wo ld probably be ne tral , he (Admiral Milne) was not to get seriously engaged ’ with the Austrian Fleet till her (Italy s) ” u attit de was declared . ’ Sir Julian Corbett s summary of my instructions is sufficiently accurate so far as it goes . The phrase what he was to do ” of in the case war, however, may not be u u clearly nderstood by the p blic . As

-in- Commander Chief, I had in my posses sion written instructions given to me by the

Admiralty . It was in the discretion of the Admiralty to direct me t o proceed in

u or accordance with those instr ctions , to telegraph new orders varying them . no In the event Of my receiving new orders , u of the written instr ctions stood . It is, u u co rse, conceivable that circ mstances ’ might arise in which an Admiral s j udgment Of what ought to be done would conﬂict with his orders . As the contingency did u not, in fact, occ r in my own case, there PRELIMINARY DISPOS ITIONS 39

us is no need to disc s the point . I Wish to make it quite clear from the beginning that the question whether the dispositions ordered by the Admiralty would in all cases have been my dispositions had they

o been left to my discreti n, does not arise . Sir Jul ian Corbett proceeds as follows His (Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne ’ s) ﬁrst

oul to task, he was told , sh d be assist the

French in transporting their African Army, and this he could do by taking up a cover n u i g position , and endeavo ring to bring t o G articu action any fast erman ship , p

arl Goeben i l y the , which m ght try to inter u fere with the operation . He was f rther told not t o be brought to action in this stage against superior forces unless it was in a general engagement in which the ” French forces were taking part . Re ference to the map of the Mediter ranean will make clear the strategic posi W tion . In the estern Mediterranean the French Fleet was to protect the passage of . the French African Army from the 40 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

u E ports Of Algeria to To lon . In the astern

Goeben reslau Mediterranean were the and B , immediately dangerous ; the Austria n

a Fleet, a potenti l danger ; and the Italian u ul u Fleet, do btf ly ne tral . Between the Western and the Eastern Mediterranean

one Open two gates ; , the narrow Strait Of

Messina, the other, the wide channel between Cape B on on the African coast and Marsala in Sicily . Midway in the

are u channel placed Malta , the headq arters u Of the British Fleet, and , f rther west ,

antellaria u the Island of P . The Fleet nder

o my command , theref re , was placed between the French Fleet and hostile

E sea intervention from the astern . There P u were two owers to consider, A stria and

G r to Italy ; and two e man ships watch , one of Goeben which , the , was faster than any other vessel of the same class in the u Mediterranean . For all p rposes, the force at my disposal consisted Of three battle

u u r u u u cr isers , fo r a mo red cr isers , fo r light

u s cr i ers and small craft .

' 42 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

3l st u e ence On J ly, D f (ﬂag Of Rear Admiral) and Grampus arrived at Malta ro Du f m razzo . On the same day, in accordance with Admiralty orders , the Black P ri nce was ordered to Marseilles to E embark arl Kitchener . The order was on 2nd u u lack cancelled A g st , and the B

Pri nce u ret rned to Malta, arriving there on 3rd u A gust .

u 1 st u u On Sat rday, A g st, the Admiralty ordered the Examination Service to be put u in force . Instr ctions were given to get

o the b om defence at Malta into position . By this date the whole Fleet was concen t rated at Malta . u 2nd u u in On S nday, A g st, I received formation that the Goeben had been coaling

on at Brindisi the previous day . The Admiralty informed me that the situation l was very critica . Later in the day I received from the Admiralty instructions um ﬁ s marised in the Of cial History (I .

as follows ' Then, in the afternoon, came further orders which overrode the PRELIMINARY DISPOS ITIONS 43

on n disposition he had decided . I forming him that Italy would probably remain u u ne tral , the new instr ctions directed that

but to he was to remain at Malta himself, detach tw o battle cruisers to shadow the

Goeben , and he was also to watch the approaches to the Adriatic with his cruisers ” r and dest oyers . n u In accordance with these i str ctions , Re ar -Admiral Troubridge left Malta the same evening with the battle cruisers

I ndomi table I nde ati able and f g , the three

u u e ence Warri or uke armo red cr isers , D f , , D o Edi nbur h u Gloucester f g , the light cr iser , and eight destroyers . The two battle cruisers were attached ’ to the Rear- Admiral s squadron in accord ance with the Admiralty instru ctions to detach two battle crui sers to shadow the ’ Goeben R - . The rest Of the ear Admiral s force , in accordance with the Admiralty u instr ctions , was ordered to watch the u R mouth of the Adriatic . Th s ear Admiral Troubridge left Mal ta with tw o 44 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

to u separate forces , each allotted a partic lar

u o p rp se by the Admiralty . The light cruiser Chatham went to search for the

of German ships in the Strait Messina . Four destroyers went to patrol the Malta

Channel . IV THE FRENCH DISPOS ITIONS

THE FRE NCH D IS P OS ITIONS

u 2nd UPON the same evening, S nday,

u r A gust, I received permission f om the Admiralty to communicate with the French fﬁ u Senior O cer . All attempts to comm ni cate with him by wireless having failed , on o the following (M nday) evening, I despatched the Dubli n light cruiser to Bizerta with a letter addressed to the French u Admiral . It will be Observed that pon

of im os the very eve war, it had proved p sible t o make any arrangements with the

French Naval Forces , with which I had u been instr cted to work, and hostile interference with which I had been in stru cted to prevent . It is stated in the

Ofﬁcial History (I . that the fact was , there had been a delay in getting the

to ea - of ﬂeet s . By the time table the war 47 48 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN plan it should have been covering the a u u 1 but o Algerian co sts by A g st , s

u to anxio s, it is said , were the French avoid every chance Of precipitating a conﬂict , that sailing orders were delayed i W t ll the last possible moment . hat u u ever the real ca se, it was not ntil daybreak on August 3rd that Admiral

e ut sea de Lapeyr re p to , with orders to watch the German cruiser Goshen and protect the transport of the French African troops B ut Of these matters I was necessa rily ignorant at the time . I knew nothing a Of the French n val dispositions, except that, in . whatever they consisted , it was my duty to assist in protecting the trans

r port Of the French Af ican Army . I was not informed Of the dispositions Of Admiral de Lapeyrere ; I received no reply t o wire

on 3rd u u less calls ; and Monday, A g st, I despatched the light cruiser Dubli n to

Bizerta , carrying a letter for the French

Admiral at that port .

V FIRS T MEETING WITH GOEREN B RES LA U

F IRS T MEE TING WITH GOEB EN AND B RES LA U

Now u of u I ret rn to the events S nday,

2 nd u u r on A g st . As al eady stated , the evening Of that day Rear-Admiral Trou bridge sailed for the entrance to the

r tw o u Ad iatic with battle cr isers , three

of u u ships the First Cr iser Sq adron, the light cruiser Gloucester and eight destroyers ; and later in the day I received information that the Goeben had been coaling at

r B indisi .

m . Chatham At p. the (Captain

R D u r - i Sidney . r y Lowe) , had sa led from Malta with instru ctions to search for the

of a s Goeben in the Strait Messin , and ub ’ sequently to join the Rear -Admiral s

u r sq ad on . Four destroyers were patrolling the Malta 53 54 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

was us Channel . My force at Malta th reduced to the battle cruiser I nﬂ ewible u (ﬂag) , two light cr isers and small craft .

r u According to Admi alty instr ctions, the

k P ri nce on Blac , then her way to Marseilles

r E r to emba k arl Kitchene , was recalled

she on to Malta, where arrived early

3rd u u . Monday, A g st 3 u 4 m u a . On Monday, rd A g st , at . I received further instructions from the l Admira ty . These are described by Sir u ﬁ l J lian Corbett Of cia History, I .

u 1 a . m . on u u 3rd as follows Abo t A g st , t o u t o give f rther precision their orders , the Admiralty directed that the watch on the mouth of the Adriatic was to be

i but Goeben ma ntained , that the was the

t o main Objective , and she was be shadowed ” u ’ wherever she went . Sir J lian Corbett s comment on his version Of the telegram is

o Of that, Taking this as a repetiti n the previous order which instructed him t o

r r remain nea Malta himself, Admi al Milne stayed where he was and left the shadowm g GOEB EN AND BRES LA U 55

to u Admiral Tro bridge . Here, again,

o u u the implicati n is inacc rate . Sir J lian Corbett implies that I was acting upon an u u ass mption . Altho gh , as he states, Sir

ul o s J ian C rbett had access to all telegram , and therefo re he must have read my tele gram to the Admiralty of the previous 2md u u u day ( A g st), Sir J lian Corbett neither mentions the telegram nor the fact that in the telegram I expressly submitted to their Lo rdships that my tactical dis positions required my remaining at Malta for the time being . The Admiralty reply of the following day was , therefore , both a deﬁnite conﬁrmation Of my proposed dispositions together with additional in

t ructions a s concerning them ; and I cted ,

u u but u s not pon an ass mption , pon order ' These instructions were of the greatest ﬁ u moment . The signi cant cla se was ” u but Goeben is yo r Objective . That order clearly indicated that two immediate Objects were t o be pursued simul taneously the watch upon Austria and Italy in the 56 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

u Goeben Adriatic, and the watch pon the

Of a u and that, the two , the w tch pon the

Goeben o o r was the m r e imp rtant . The e were also to be fulﬁlled the earlier inst ruc tions that I was to protect the transpor t Af Of the French rican Army, and to avoid

r u u r r r being b o ght to action by s pe io fo ces . The order to protect the French transports in was, fact, covered by the order to watch

a u G r s . It ly, A stria and the two e man ship The contingency of being confronted by

u r u u s perior fo ces , did it occ r, m st have involved the subordination of all other

o for Of considerati ns , the only way avoiding

t o action is retreat .

4 a . m . on At that Monday morning,

3rd u u i r A g st, I received the Adm alty

u o u instr cti ns . At the same time , altho gh

I knew nothing Of it, the French Fleet

ou for sailed from T lon the Algerian coast .

m a am 7 . th a . h At , the C reported that neither the Goeben nor the Breslau was in

a the Strait of Messin . At the same time I received information that Goeben and B reslau had been sighted early on the

5 8 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN with the First Crui ser Squadron to support

l ucest r the G o e and the destroyers there , and Black P ri nce was ordered to rejoin the u u Cr iser Squadron . The two battle cr isers I ndomi table and I ndefatigable were ordered to proceed through the Malta Channel

Goeben and thence westward to search for , in accordance with the original Admiralty instructions allocating these two ships for that pur pose . At the same time the Senior Naval Ofﬁcer at Gibraltar was requested to keep a close watch for Goeben

reslau and B in case they passed the Strait . m 5 . . e t o At p , as I had fail d establish communication with the French either

ul or at To on Bizerta, I despatched the u ubli n light cr iser D to Bizerta , with a letter to the French Admiral . I did not , f u o co rse , know that by that time the 1 French Fleet , steaming at 2 knots ,

sea ou had been at for eleven h rs . It appears that the British Admiralty were also ignorant Of the sailing of the French

Oﬂi ci l Fleet , for it is stated in the a ” “ r Histo y (I . that organised con GOEB EN AND B RES EA U 59 nect ion between the British and French i Admiralties had not yet been establ shed .

The Admiralty were , therefore , anxious lest the two German Ships should escape into the Atlantic . There was never the least suggestion that they might escape

r o elsewhe e . My own impressi n that the Germans would turn westward w as con ﬁrmed by a report that a Ge rman collier was waiting at Majorca . m I i ble . n eaz At p. in ﬂ , I left Malta to take up a watchi ng position in the Malta u Channel , together with the light cr iser

We mouth r - u Hu a y , the to pedo g nboat ss r

r m . re and th ee destroyers . At p. I cei v ed instructions from the Admiralty t o send two battle cruisers to Gibr altar at high speed to prevent the Goeben from leaving

I ndomi table I nde the Mediterranean . and fatigable were already on their way west ward , and they were ordered to proceed

G ral Chatham 22 . at knots to ib tar The , u which was then ro nding Sicily, and which

t o rt t o had nothing repo , was ordered

Malta to coal . 60 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

Tues 4th u u si On day, A g st, then, the po i o w as as o I n er ible t n f llows ﬂ (ﬂag) , with

We mocd h a t w as l n y and small cr f , patrol i g the Malt a Channel ; Re ar - Admiral Trou

r w r u s u b idge, ith the Fi st Cr i er Sq adron, w as about midway betwee n Malta and the

ut r on hi s e mo h Of the Ad iatic, way to r in force the Glc uw ster and the dest royers ; the li ght cruiser Dubli n had gone to

e t for Biz rta, with a let er the French Admi ral ; Chatham w as coali ng in Malta ;

t e u s e I ndomi table and the two bat l cr i rs , , in a W . e m C ptain Francis K nnedy ( com and) ,

n e 2 2 n were steami g w stward at k ots . Where were the Goeben and Bresla u '

m . on NO one . At 7 a knew Monday, the Chatham had reported they were not in

s i . w as u s the Strait Of Me s na It now T e day .

w as s The fact , they had pa sed the Strait — during the night Of Sunday 2nd Monday

ard a a of t he hat ha m . , he d C

on u s 4t h u us At a m . T e day, A g t , I received informati on t hat iB ona had been

' bo mbarded by t he Ge rm an ships . a m I ndomi table I nde ati At . . and f g able o c s , Off B na, on the Algerian oa t ,

Gochan reslau i sighted the and B , wh ch were steering to the e astward . “ The Goeben was seen at once to alter

u t i ne co rse to port , and Cap a n Ken dy

ere a C s but alt d to starbo rd in order to lo e ,

Goeben t u n the promp ly t r ed away, and in a few minutes the two shi ps were pass ing each other on opposite com at

aft but ut af , neither side sal ed , and ter

a s a t ai n led r u p s ing, C p n Ken edy o nd in a wi de circle and procee ded t o shadow the

G ben t on oe h wo uar . , with i s ships either q ter The Bresla u made O ff t o the northward

i re and and d sappea d , early in the after noo n could be heard call ing up the Cagli ari ” ”

i re ess fﬁ al i . w l stations . O ci H story , I

s of i it is Had a tate war then ex sted, probable there would have been a very

i ff r a e d e ent end to th t m eting .

e t at c Biz r a , and at my orders she left on e 62 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN to join I ndomi table in shadowing the

G e erman ships , which wer steering east

On o ward , a c urse lying north Of the u Sicilian coast , towards Messina . D ring

r ub li I i table the afte noon, D n joined ndom and I ndefatigable at a point nort h Of

Goebe Bizerta . In the meantime , n and

reslau u B , steaming at their tmost speed , were drawing away from the British battle

ru of c isers , which presently lost sight G Dubli n e the erman ships . The pick d u u 5 m them p abo t p. . , and kept them in

u 10 m she sight ntil nearly p. . , when lost

off on them the Cape San Vito , the north of u coast Sicily, and t rned back to rejoin

u Goeben the battle cr isers . The had

eﬁ P recently been r tted at ola , while I ndomi table had only j ust been docked for

r e repair when the wa ning t legram arrived .

ur I n ewi ble D ing the day ﬂ (ﬂag) , with a division Of destroyers , keeping within

of l M visual signalling distance Casti le ( alta) , waited in the Malta Channel for informa tion and instructions from the Admiralty . m l At p. . , as a ready stated , I received GOEB EN AND BRES LA U 63 information from the French Admiral at Bizerta that the Goeben had bombarded Bona and that the Breslau had bombarded n W P o . hilippeville , the Algerian coast hat

had happened (as we now know) , was that G u the erman vessels , pon leaving Messina

n of 2 nd- 3rd u u o the night A g st , made a descent upon Bona and Philippeville in order t o interfere with the transport Of the Eastern Division of the French

XIXt h t o Army Corps . According the f 55 O ﬁcial History (I . Admiral

n 6 .m . on 3rd u us So chon, at p the A g t , bu learned that war had been declared , t

no u he received orders ntil midnight , when he was instructed t o proceed with

G e l u o ben and Bres a t o Constantinople . ” u Long afterwards , writes Sir J lian Cor “ n bett , it became known that o the follow ing day (4th August) the Kaiser informed the Greek Minister that an alliance had been concluded between Germany and u T rkey, and that the German warships in the Mediterranean were t o join the ” ur T kish Fleet and act in concert . 64 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

That is an affair Of diplomacy upon which I make no comment . It is certain at least that I received no information u Of any s ch arrangement , nor, according to ﬁ ” the Of cial History, had the British authorities any knowledge Of that most u momento s treaty . All that we knew in the Mediterranean was that the t wo German ships steered eastward on the 4th u u G A g st . ermany was then at war with

but E . France , not with ngland 5 m on 4t h u u u At p. . A g st , abo t the time when the t w o battle cruisers lost sight

Goeben u Of the , I received a thority from the Admiralty t o engage the German vessels should they attack the French transports . The occasion did not arise , and the order was cancelled in the sub sequent telegram received two hour s later , informing me that the British ultimatum presented t o Germany would expire at midnight .

NE W D IS P O S ITIONS

T 6 m on u A p. . the same day, T esday,

4t h u u e e r A g st , I received a t l gram f om the Admi r alty which seriou sly altered the u m strategic sit ation . I was infor ed that

r u Italy had declared st ict ne trality, which was to be rigidly respected , and that no ship Of war was to pass wi thin Six miles of

l eﬂ ect the Ita ian coast . The Of the order

bar Of resum was to the Strait Messina , p

t o t ably both belligerents , certainly o

r Goeben reslau B itish ships . If the and B u entered the Strait , they co ld not be h followed . T ey might break back west ward Or they might tur n south through u the Strait , and then either t rn eastward t o or u the Adriatic, west thro gh the channel f between A rica and Sicily . In these new circumstances I ordered 67 68 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

Chatham and Weymouth to patrol the channels between the African coast and Pant ellari a Island and between Pant ell ari a

Island and the coast Of Sicily, in case the G S ul u u erman hips sho d t rn so th ; while,

u r I ndomi table I nde ati f rther no th , and f g able er ubli n o , and , lat , D patr lled between

r e G a Sicily and Sa dinia, in cas the erm n

u ur e ships sho ld t n w st again .

7 . m e r At p . I rec ived a telegram f om the Admi r alty informing me that t he British ultimatum to Germany woul d

r Of expi e at midnight , and that no acts war should b e com mitted before that u ho r . It was now necessary to make new dis

s i n r a po itions acco d nce with my orders . The neutrality Of Italy having been de clar ed w as , I relieved Of responsibility l B ut with regard to the Ita ian Fleet . it w as still of course necessary to watch the G Adriatic , both in case the erman ships tried to enter that sea and in case the

us B ut ﬁ u A trian Fleet s ailed . my rst d ty NEW DIS POS ITIONS 69 was the protection Of the French trans

Gaoben B reslau ports from the and the . Now the Goeben had shown herself t o be at least three knots faster than the

' r u u B itish battle cr isers . The s periority in speed Of the enemy necessarily gover ned

ﬁ O all my dispositions . For the bene t f the lay reader it should here be explained that it is us eless to try to overtake a

S urs u hip which is faster than her p er . The chase merely continues until fuel is u exha sted . Therefore, in order to catch a ship which is s uperi or in S peed to her u u p rs ers , it is necessary that the faster Ship Shoul d be i ntercepted by crossing her

u eu w as co rse . That mano vre performed by

I ndomitable I nde ati able on ue and f g T sday ,

4th u u r one e A g st , when they we e at tim

Goebe within yards Of n . That pursuing ships must be so disposed

cut Off S u u as to the faster hip p rs ed , is an elementary maxim in tactics which the author Of the Offi cial Histor y strangely ignores . 70 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

In disposing my forces t o prevent the

Goeben reslau and B going westward, it

o r n was theref re necessa y to arra ge, not b ut to chase , to intercept , the enemy . At any moment the Germans might try t d i to break wes war s , in wh ch case there

ere hre ur e w t e co ses op n to them . They mi ght (I ) pass north Of Corsica ; or (2 ) through the Strait Of Bonifacio between Corsica and Sardinia ; or (3) south Of Sardinia between Sar dinia and the Afri can

t r G coas . I conside ed that the erman ships would avoid both the north Of Corsica

a of and the Strait Of Bonif cio , for fear

u s u e . French cr isers , de troyers and s bmarin s

r u In all p obability they wo ld, therefore ,

ut of try to pass so h Sardinia, and thence

c G c to Major a , where a erman ollier was waiting at Palma .

' t u s c R - mi In hese circ m tan es , ear Ad ral

u w on u Tro bridge as ordered , T esday,

4t h u us Gloucester A g t , to detach to watch the southern end Of the Strait Of Messina , i e into wh ch , it will be remember d , British NEW DIS POS ITI ONS 71

R ships Of war were forbidden to go . ear

d i u ur u A m ral Tro bridge , with fo armo red cruisers and eight destroyers w as to con i n f t ue to watch the mouth O the Adriatic . The two battle crui sers (except Gloucester ) and thr ee dest r oyers were ordered t o join

ll i 1 a my ﬂag O ff Pant e ar a Island at 1 m .

n o 5 u u . s o the f llowing day, th A g st The e di spos itio ns were co mmunicate d to the h r m . 4t u u Admi alty at p A g st .

ﬁ u e one 5t h u u t At fteen min t s past , A g s ,

ni ht Of 4th—5t h u u t on the g A g s , I received the order to commence hostiliti es agai nst

G w as ermany . I then in the Malta

I n eai ble Channel, and left at once in fl , w e u 1 1 ith thr e destroyers . At abo t a m 5th u u I n eari ble . . on A g st , fl (flag) .

mouth Chatha m ro e , and three dest y rs were

s Off Pant ellari a a sembled Island , midway in the channel between the Afri can coast

i ubli n w as t o and Sic ly . D sent back Malta , there to co al and thence to proceed with two destroyers to join Re ar - Admiral Trou 72 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

r u ri b idge at the mo th Of the Ad atic . I ndomi table and three destroyers went into

er I n eazi ble Biz ta to coal . ﬂ (ﬂag) wi th

I nde ati able Chatham We mout f g , and y h, patrolled on a line northward from Bizerta, being thus disposed to intercept the German ships shoul d they attempt to escapewestwards m n W 5 . . o 5th u u At p ednesday, A g st , the Ger man ships were reported to be coaling at Messina .

VII

THE OF F I CI AL VE RS ION

T i of I is at th s point in the series events , fﬁ ” as related in the O cial History, that the following comment is made by the ﬁ i u Of cial h storian . After q oting from my

s ul de patch to the Admiralty, Sir J ian

r Co bett Observes Nevertheless , he had left the line Of attack from Messina open, but a art rom thi s seri us de ect i n hi s di s , p f o f 1 osi ti ons hi s p , they were in accordance with

nal u origi instr ctions . The order that the French transports were t o be his first care had u not been cancelled , tho gh , in fact , there was now no need for hi m to concern himself with ” ffi r their safety . O cial Histo y, I . I do not propose t o discuss my disposi tions with Sir Julian Corbett ; b ut I would Observe that the Official historian states that , in making them , I had departed from 1 — M M i a i s A. B y t l c . . 75 76 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

r u t my o iginal instr c ions , and that the “ result Of that departure w as a serious ” u i defect . I do not nderstand what S r Julian means when he asserts that the

a r s w as line Of att ck f om Mes ina left open,

o hi s ni B u nor d es he explain mea ng . t I aﬂi r m r that the e was , in fact , no departure

ro u o and f m my instr cti ns ; that , as Sir

u r us i J lian Co bett m t be aware , my d s positions were approved by the Admi r alty

t Y et in all respec s . we have this ext ra

di r um or nary ci c stance , that the Admiralty, having had submitted t o them Sir Julian ’ et l ub Corb t s statement , al owed it to be p li shed is u l , with what virt al y their approval . Sir Julian adds that there w as no longer any need for me to concern myself with

s r s the safety of the French tran po t . Here the implication is that I knew, and also

mi r in that the Ad alty cw, the movements of e the French Fle t , and that either my original instru ctions shoul d have been

c l or S u can el ed , that I ho ld have disobeyed

t he r o them . Here , again, Admi alty all wed

u c h l the p bli ation Of w at is , in fact , a tota ly THE OFFICIAL ’ VERS ION 77 false implication ; and whi ch is indee d vi rtually contradicted by the historian

for r des cri himself ; , after inte polating a p tion Of the r apid and u nexpect ed changes in the dispositi o n Of t he French naval

r ce i e not u e o fo s , wh ch w re nd rst od at the

m t he r u o e c ti e by B itish a th riti s , and whi h

un o m e S i r u r were kn wn to , J lian Co bett pr oceeds to r em ar k that the reaso n for my own dispositions w as cle arly a belief that the Germans mi ght sti ll have an i nten tion to attack the French convoys , and

o i r a so l ng as th s was a p ctical possibility, the Admi r al could s carcely disr egard his m ” st rict inj uncti ons to protect the .

fﬁ r t r O cial Histo y , I . The his o ian goes on to describe the position and the feeli ngs Of Admi ral S ouch on and the O ﬁ cers

Of Goeben reslau and men the and B , then c i a is oal ng at Messina, dding, what per fect l u w as the y tr e , that all this in dark,

d i e n u i when A miral M lne , f eli g bo nd by h s inst ru ctions that the Goeben w as hi s ’ hi s s Objective , made last dispo itions to ” prevent her escape to the northwar d . 78 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

u u Sir J lian Corbett wo ld seem to consider,

ﬂ a - O fﬁ as he certainly implies , that a g cer

or o e may Obey dis b y, according to his fancy,

r al the o ders he receives from the Admir ty . While such a misapprehension might u nat rally be entertained by a civilian, it cannot possibly exist at the Admi ralty

t o u and I am, therefore, at a loss nderstand on what principle the Admiralty sanctioned l the pub ication Of these passages . The

r historian fu ther implies that it was , in u any case , a mistake to take meas res to prevent the Goeben and Breslau from ” r escaping northwa d . Again, that may u but be the Opinion Of Sir J lian Corbett ; ,

again, it cannot possibly be the Opinion

m r for r Of the Ad i alty, their Lo dships both ordered and subsequ ently approved that dispositi o n Of forces . It was a disposition which , at the time , I considered to be the best disposition , nor do I now perceive what in the circumstances would have been u a better strategical di strib tion . Nor does n Sir Julian Corbett suggest o e. VIII GOEB EN B RES LA U AT MES S INA

82 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

h u in mind that, at t is time , the ne tr ality

u r u Of A st ia was in do bt .

2 m e At p. . I received a tel gram from the Admi ralty informing me that Austria Hungar y had not declared war agains t

r or Gr u F ance eat Britain, and instr cting me to continue to watch the mouth Of

r so us r the Ad iatic , that the A t ian Fleet

u r u e sho ld not eme ge nobserv d , and that the two German ships should be prevented

r r u f om entering the Ad iatic . It sho ld here be remembered that the numerical and potential superiority Of the Austrian Fleet over the British Fleet made the

u u r attitude Of A stria Of s p eme moment , a point wholly ignored in the Offi cial ” r Histo y .

5 m . W 5th u u At p. ( ednesday, A g st) I

e ro Gloucester rec ived a report f m that ,

u n r j dging by wireless sig als inte cepted , the Goeben appeared to be at Messina . It should here be mentioned that on the preceding day I had learned that the

Genera G l , a erman mail steamer, had THE GOEB EN AT MES S INA 83 landed passengers at Messina and was

G eben remaini ng at the disposition Of the o .

r Goeben It was probable , therefo e , that ,

Breslau and General were all at Messina . A further report to the same effect was

l r 7 m received a ittle late . At p. . I received infor mation fr om the Admiralty that mines had been laid in the Dardanelles (they had been laid before I passed the Straits u in J ne) , and that the Dardanelles lights u had been exting ished . Had there been any conjecture that the Goeben would try

oul to pass the Dardanelles , it w d have been weakened by the information that u mines had been laid and lights exting ished .

B ut u n u , in fact , there was no s ch co ject re . ” fﬁ al According to the O ci History, it seems that the Ger man Admi r al himself

Of fu rr o u was in a state pain l i es l tion .

r r Acco ding to Admiral von Ti pitz, when on August 3 news was received Of

e ur the alleg d alliance with T key, orders were sent to Admi r al S ouchon to attempt t o u a break thro gh to the D rdanelles . On 84 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

August 5 the Ger man Embassy at Constan ti no le r V Of p repo ted that , in iew the

u u r for sit ation there , it was ndesi able the

S t r u hips o arrive for the p esent . There pon the orders for the Dar danelles were can

S ouchon celled , and Admiral , who was

t o then coaling at Messina, was directed proceed to POla or else break into the

Atlantic . Later in the day, however,

u of ur wa A stria , in spite the press e that s being put upon her from Berlin to declare

he was not o war, protested s in a p sition to help with her fleet In these circum stances it was thought best to give Admiral Souchon liberty to decide for himself l which ine Of escape to attempt , and he h fi ” then chose t e line Of his rst instructions . ” 1 r . 71 . Official Histo y, I , note )

1 t Ma or Mélas r v a e e re ar t o Accordi ng o ' , p i t s c t y K n ne Of r ee e t he ex en e Of t he i ng Consta ti G c , ist c

n i n r e e . On 4t h u u 19 14 treaty w as know G e c A g st , , t he Kai ser s ent for our Mi nister at Berlin and told him that he might Ofﬁcially inform Ki ng Constantine that an alli ance had be en deﬁnitely concluded on and ur e and av e that day between Germany T k y, g THE GOEREN AT MES S INA 85

If the account Of Gr and -Admiral von u Tirpitz, cited by Sir J lian Corbett , be

ur e acc ate , it will be Obs rved that the whole situ ation turned upo n the conclusio n between Germany and Tur key Of the secret

ul treaty, which , according to Sir J ian

r r Co bett , was not known to the B itish “ G r u r ove nment ntil long afte wards . ’ Again assuming v on Tirpit z s account to u u be acc rate , it wo ld be interesting to

V Sir ul Cor learn what , in the iew Of J ian

e — on 5t h u u b tt even if he had known A g st , 91 4 u i 1 , the circ mstances wh ch he relates i in his history, and wh ch he states were — unknown to the authorities woul d have been the corr ect dispositio n of the British “ Fleet remedying the serious defect

r he desc ibes . Having received no news Of the German

hi m t o un er an m oreo er a er a nl d st d , v , th t c t i y u ar a and er a R oum an a ou ran e B lg i , p h ps i , w ld g ” m t h t h r the selves on e side Of e Cent al Powers . E x-K n n a and t h r r e i g Co st ntine e Wa . Geo g M Mél H n . as . u ns o tchi , 86 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

u Of 5th—6t h u ships d ring the night A gust ,

a m on u 6th u at . . Th rsday, A gust , proceeding upon the assumption that they

r e we e at Messina, I began a sw ep to the

r or of i I n ewi l eastwa d , n th Sicily, w th ﬂ b e

I nde ati able We mouth (ﬂag) , f g and y . If the

Goeben er a e , aft co ling at M ssina, had left

r r r ou the St ait by the no th ent ance , she w ld be signalled by my squadron at about 6 m m p. . By p. . I had received no report Of the departure of the Goeben from

she Messina . That had not escaped west

She wards , I knew . might have gone

but n r north , , co sidering it imp obable that

S ul u r he wo d take that co rse , I dete mined to close the northern entrance to the Strait u Of Messina . The sq adron was disposed

or Chatha m r acc dingly . was o dered to pro o 2 0 t o P ecd at knots Milazzo oint , Off

n r Of Messina , and was i fo med the position which woul d be o ccupied by the two battle

We ut cruisers and ymo h at midnight . These dispositi ons had scarcely been

ur Glouces made when, half an ho later, the THE GOEB EN AT MES SINA 87 ter u , which was watching the so thern

t o r r t entrance the St ait , repo ed that the Goeben was com ing out Of the Str ait Of

e reslau o o her M ssina , the B f ll wing one

r t r e r . mile aste n, s ee ing astwa d The posi tion was then as follows If Goeben and

reslau m r t he r B atte pted to ente Ad iatic ,

Re r - m r r u r e r a Ad i al T o b idg , with the Fi st

rui r u r r ou C se Sq ad on and ten dest oyers , w ld

r G r p event them ; if the e man ships ,

o Gloucester her foll wed by , escaped in the

ur r u r night and t ned westwa ds , my sq ad on Of battle cruisers must be so placed as

As ru o to inter cept them . my inst cti ns strictly forbade me to enter the Str ait

r r Of Messina, I was obliged , in o de to take u u t o o o p the req isite position, c me d wn t he of W I n ezei ble west coast Sicily . ith ﬂ

I nde ati able We mouth Chatham (ﬂag) , f g , y and (recalled) I accordingly pro ceeded to r ound

of ur o the west coast Sicily . F ther rep rts

Gl ucester u u from o , which was p rs ing the S German hips , stated that they were

r - s steering eastward , then no th ea tward . 88 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

I therefore continued on my course t o

or t o o u Malta, in der coal there and to c ntin e

r at o on 7t h the chase , a riving n on Friday,

u u Chatham r r A g st . was then o de ed to

r o Off Goeben pat l Milazzo , in case and Breslau should tur n back and escape

r u r ort r th o gh the St ait Of Messina n hwa d .

1 1 m on In the meantime , at p. . the

ur 6th u u night Of Th sday, A g st , I had received a tele gram fro m the Admiralty countermanding previous instructions and

r er n Goeben n u o d i g me , if the we t so th ,

ollow her throu h the S trai t o Messi na to f g f .

or tu Unf nately, by the time the new

n ru t o i st c i ns reached me , it was too late to

ul ﬁ e r f l th m . I was then Off Ma itimo , the

e ur w st coast Of Sicily, and to ret n to Messina would have involved traversing t w o S ides Of a triangle , instead Of the one l t o r r which I had sti l t ave se , as a

er t he ar S o or ref ence to ch t will h w ; , as it stated in the Ofﬁcial Histor y Un

o un e f rt at ly, it (the telegram) did not

m e m t oo co to hand till idnight , late for the

90 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

t u r after s eering their false co rse till da k, would make for Cape Matapan (s outh Of

Gr i eece) , where , as we have seen, a coll er

r t o In had been orde ed meet them .

r r Sou acco dance with this plan, Admi al

m Glou chon , the mo ent he sighted the ce ter ours t o o S O s , altered c e p rt as to keep along the coast Of Calabria (Italy) outside ” - six . fﬁ r the mile limit O cial Histo y,

I .

u r Sir J lian Co bett , in preparing his material , had before him the orders Of

G r r s the e man and French Admi al , as well as those Of the British Admiral ; he also knew the actual dispositi ons and move ments from day to day, the Object s with

e which th y were made , and the actual

ul . res ts Obtained He seems , perhaps un

ou consci sly, to ignore the fact that the orders and the dispositions Of a ch and German ships were unknown at the time both to t he Admiralty and to the British

- i n- Commander Chief.

s u For in tance , Sir J lian Corbett , referring THE GOEB EN AT ME SS INA 91 t o o fﬁ my dispositi ns , proceeds to a rm “ that my idea was th at Admir al Trou

u r bridge , with his sq ad on and his eight

r s e t w o or r dest oyer , b sides m e which we e being hurried Off to him from Malta in

r ubli n o u cha ge Of the D , was str ng eno gh

r to bar the Ad iatic , and that there was still a possibility Of the Ger man making back to the westwar d along the south of Sicily . Here , again, the implication “ is clearly that my idea was mistaken ; and again I have t o Observe that it was

u of but not a q estion ideas , Of the best dispdsiti ons it was possible to make in the u circ mstances , dispositions which were demanded by the onl y known conditions

Of the problem, and which were approved at every stage by the Admiralty .

S ECOND GOEB EN B RES LA U

I X

S E COND ME E TING WI TH GOEB EN AND

B RE’S LA U

To return to the chase Of the Goeben and Breslau so gallantly conducted by

W o Gloucester . Captain . A . H ward Kelly in

m on u 6t h u u At p. . Th rsday, A g st , the German ships were steering north - east

of Gloa along the coast Calabria , between oester and the land . As the dark fell , they were becoming lost to sight ; and

Captain Kelly, in order to keep them in view and to get them in the light Of the moon, steered inshore to reverse the

e position . In so doing, he ran w ll within

Goeben u u range Of the , which co ld have s nk

r n u him, and p oceeded o her port q arter . The Breslau then began to pinch him inshore , and Captain Kelly was obliged

reslau t o to drop back . The B steered 95 96 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN cross hi s bows ; Captain Kelly altered course to meet her ; and the two ships passed each other at a distance Of

r ya ds . Captain Kelly, rightly considering

ﬁr u Goeben it to be his st d ty to follow the ,

ﬁre reslau r did not open . B etreated east

u - so th eastwards and disappeared . Cap

. n eben tain Kelly held o in chase Of Go . ’ u o Goeben Off At abo t two O cl ck the , then Gu u u the lf Of Sq illace , also altered co rse u to the so thward .

R - u In the meantime , ear Admiral Tro bridge, who had been patrolling with the

r ru u r e ence Fi st C iser Sq ad on (D f (ﬂag) ,

Warri or uke o Edi nbur h lack P ri nce , D f g , B )

Off ni on o Of Gr Cephalo a , the west c ast eece , upon lear ning that the German shi ps

rt - t were steering no h eastward , went nor h ,

o O in rder to engage them ff Fano Island , should they attempt to enter the Adriatic . When he lear ned that the Goeben and Breslau had altered course t o the south

- r r u r ward , Rear Admi al T o b idge , at mid 6 h— h u u night Ou the night of t 7t A g st ,

98 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

Of u i t o There is , co rse , noth ng more be said on the matter ; and my Observations u pon the episode d o not refer to Rear

r u r b ut t he ou Admi al Tro b idge , to acc nt Of the episode presented in the Oﬂi ci al

r Histo y . It is there stated that Rear - Admiral Tr oubridge had received no authority

u his s r to q it po ition , nor any o der to

u rt Gloucester s ppo the (I . The state

. 3rd u us ment is incorrect On A g t , the Rear - Admiral had received the Admir alty instru ctions (already described) to main

on tain the watch the Adriatic , and stating, ” b ut Goeben u e Nor is yo r Obj ctive .

’ R r - m r n t o are the ea Ad i al s sig als me , to which Sir Juli an Cor bett presum ably had ’ r Sir u access , in acco dance with J lian s statement .

r r 65 Sir Julian Co bett p oceeds (I . ) to

the re or Of t he our - m ar a w as e in c ds C t ti l , which h ld h r e re . In ee o e a oun Of t e m a e s c t d d , his wh l cc t tt e the am e m re on The a er a e een giv s s i p ssi . p p s h v b ni e to Par am en d e d li t . GOEB EN AND BRES LA U 99

make the following extr aordinary state

R - r u ment Still , he ( ear Admiral T o

r nl on b idge) o y slowed down, and held

w as o as he , in expectati n that his two battle cruisers woul d now be sent back hi m u rt to , with instr ctions for conce ing ” action . I do not know why Sir Julian Corbett shoul d attribute that action and that

R - expectation to the ear Admiral . He did

as NO 4 u not , the chart ( . ) p blished in the ﬁ Of cial History clearly shows , hold “ on but ur as he was , t ned eastward to

Z Nor t o u ante . is it possible nderstand why the Rear - Admi r al should be described

r ru e as rega ding the battle c is rs as his ,

r Of when they we e no part his command , and as expecting the arrival Of ships

e e 300 which he kn w w re miles away, a fact whi ch Sir Julian Cor bett could have ascertained had he consulted the Admiralty chart accompanying the text Of hi s own ” fﬁ al o l O ci History . Still less is it p ssib e to understand why the Admiralty S hould 100 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN have permitted the publication Of these

u r bl nde s . A little further back in his account of

a u or e the m tter (I . Sir J lian C b tt actually represents Rear -Admiral Tr ou bridge as expecting on the previous Wed nesda 5th u us y , A g t , that his two battle cruisers woul d now be returned to him

R - r ur when the ear Admi al , Of co se , knew that they were cruising north Of Sicily . It has already been explained that the two battle cruisers were at ﬁrst attached t o ’ the Rear -Admir al s squadron for the sole purpose Of shadowing the Ger man ships .

o o r Then f ll ws this rema kable passage , in which Rear -Adm iral Troubridge is de scribed as entertaining quite inexplicable ideas Indeed , his impression was that when they (the two battle cruisers) were ﬁrst attached to his ﬂag it was a pre liminary step to the whole command

on For r devolving him . in the p ovisional conversations with Fr ance it was under stood that the British squadron at the

102 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

ar against these ch ges . I mention them ,

u u o u beca se Sir J lian C rbett , ass ming their

u r u acc racy, p oceeds to imply that I o ght t o have acted in accordance with a state of not things which did , in fact , exist . ” ra u Admi l Milne , writes Sir J lian (I .

o i f r however, to k an entirely d f e ent

V u ‘ iew, and still feeling bo nd by his ‘ ’ r e a m on p imary Obj ct , began at . .

u us 6 A g t to sweep to the eastward , intend

u of ing to be in the longit de Cape San Vito ,

- o 6 . m . the north west p int Of Sicily, by p , ’ ur S O r at which ho , he afterwa ds explained , ‘ the Goeben coul d have been sighted if ’ she r had left Messina, whe e he considered ” she was probably coaling .

The u u tr e seq ence Of events , as already ufﬁ narrated , s ciently indicates the series Of false implications contained in this passage . The main implication is , not only that I was mistaken in every par t i cul ar but r , that the Admiralty we e also

a o r mist ken . If there is any ther infe ence t o be drawn from this par t Of Sir Julian GOEREN AND B RES LA U 103

’ or C bett s History, it is that the forces Operating to the north Of Messina Should have been withdr awn in deﬁance Of all

ru o e inst cti ns , l aving that way Of escape

t o Goeben Open the .

a u n 6th—7th At bo t the time (mid ight , Au gust) when Rear - Adm ir al Tr oubridge tur ned s outh fro m O ff Santa Maura t o

er G r ubli int cept the e man ships , the D n

t w o ro er on o and dest y s , the way to j in

R - m r the ear Ad i al , sighted , in the moon

o O n or light , sm ke the h izon . Captain John

e ubli n K lly, commanding D , had been

u e r r g i d d by signals eceived f om his brother , i a W . . C ptain A Howard Kelly, command ng

Gloucester Goeben . , then chasing the At

ﬁr ubli n st Captain Kelly, in D , took the

G eben si ship in sight t o be o . Then the g nals from Gloucester told him that she

u reslau 4 a . m . m st be B , and at he altered

r e course to attack Goeben by to p do . B ut Captain John Kelly failed to ﬁnd

eben o u on u t o Go , and c ntin ed his co rse

’ - join the Rear Admiral s ﬂag . Captain 104 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

o r e Gloucester u H wa d K lly, in , contin ed

u u Goeben u his p rs it Of the . At abo t a m r 7t h u u n t o . . (F iday, A g st) , I sig alled Captain Kelly instru cting him gradually to

er t o o u a dro p ast n and av id capt re . Capt in

m r l u e on at a . es a Kelly h ld , and . B

G e a ou 1 m r lau e oeb n . . . es rejoin d At b t p , B ,

r t o Gloucester e r in o der check , b gan to d op

r or r aste n . Captain Kelly, in de to keep

Goeben e e t o in sight , d t rmined engage

reslau so ou r B , that either she w ld be fo ced

r Goeben or Goeben ul to ret eat towards , wo d

e t o u a be comp lled t rn b ck . At he

ﬁre hi r ur opened , w ch was et ned . Captain

r r u Kelly inc eased speed , b o ght the enemy on his starboard quarter and continued

ﬁre e f , it is beli ved with ef ect . The

u r u manoe v e had the res lt intended , for the Goeben turned 1 6 points and o ﬁre u pened , where pon Captain Kelly

ro Off o b ke the acti n, retreated , and then continued the chase until the German ships

r ou had nded Cape Matapan . I had ordered

e e Captain K lly, who was , I knew, g tting

X DISP OS I TI ONS

1 10 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

Here there is a clear implication on the part Of the historian that the I ndomi table should have been sent to reinforce the

- R r . a o n ea Admiral in the Adriatic Ag in,

66 I ndomi table p . , it is stated that The u 2 1 was coming p astern at knots, and when she reached Malta he (the

-in- on Commander Chief) did not send her , but kept her there till his two other ships ” S ir u had coaled . J lian Corbett here dis tinctly implies that the I ndomi table was kept at Malta without reason . The reasons , however, are contained in the documents to which Sir Julian Corbett

o had access . There were two reas ns . One was that in pursuing the Ger man ships at

u on 4th u u r u f ll speed A g st , the e occ rred

o I ndomi table b iler defects in , which made it necessary to spend twelve hours in Malta

o in repairing them . The other reas n was related to that superiority in speed

Goeben fﬁ possessed by the , which the O cial 7th u u historian ignores . At noon on A g st,

I ndomi table oeben when arrived at Malta , G FURTHER DIS POS ITIONS 1 1 1

Off u G e was the so thern extremity Of re ce ,

r I ndo and p oceeding eastwards . Had mi table (without repairing her boiler defects) been ordered t o proceed direct from B i

her zerta , at the time Of leaving that port on 6th u u she u the evening Of A g st , wo ld have been so me 350 miles distant from

Gloucester u 365 , and abo t miles distant r Goeben res f om the German ships . and B lau r we e then steering towards the Adriatic,

r R - r u r whe e ear Admi al Tro b idge, with the First Cruiser Squadron was waiting for W them . hen, later in the evening, I learned that the German Ships had turned

u Was t o r so th , it necessary p event their return westward t o attack the French r t r r d o t anspor s . In o de to so , the battle cruiser squadro n must be so disposed as

n rc er to i te ept the G man ships . As already

n r u r o explained , owi g to thei s pe i r speed , to attempt to catch them by pursuit was u seless . W u Of 7th u u hen pon the afternoon A g st, Goeben and B reslau entered the Cervi 1 12 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

I nd mi table ul Channel , o wo d have been at

1 80 r Goeben least miles distant f om , and , supposing Goeben t o continue to stea m at

1 5 oul e I n only knots, it w d have tak n domi table n 2 0 , steami g at knots , another

- u t o o r au Goeben . thirty six ho rs . ve h l

For r ad these reasons , I conside ed it visable to keep I ndomi table with the rest

a u r u ro Of the Second B ttle Cr ise Sq ad n, a decision which was approved by the

r B ut ro con Admi alty . , apart f m these

on n I ndomi table siderati s , had I se t to

Goeben u chase , the seq el shows that the onl y resul t would have been to run her out Of coal at a critical mo ment when the telegram notifying declaration Of war

' a ainst Aust ria g having been received , it

o he was necessary t concentrate t ﬂeet . With reference to the dispositions Of Rear-Admiral Troubridge on the night Of

6th—7th u u e ﬁ A g st, it is stat d in the Of cial

’ 64 - History (I . ) that the Rear Admiral s

destroyers, with scarcely any coal in u their b nkers, were all either at Santa

114 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

fﬁ l due ﬁ u a . W di c ties to de ciency of co l hen ,

r on 9th u u We ea ly the A g st, ymouth visited

P she u o ort Vathi , fo nd that the c llier had arrived as arranged . It is apparently the intention Of the whole passage in the Offi cial History referring to the lack Of coal Of the de

r r u st oyers in the Ad iatic , to s ggest neg

i en e fi l g c on my part . The dif culty of

r Obtaining coal was indeed conside able , and necessarily affected the dispositio n Of

o but not ﬁ f rces, as implied in the Of cial ” History .

It may here be explained that at noon,

h u u or R on 7t A g st , I was inf med by ear Admiral Troubridge that he was supplying destroyers with coal sufﬁcient to enable

o them to steam to Malta at 1 5 kn ts . On 8 u u the following day, th A g st (to antici

r of Gloucester pate a little the orde events) , reported that the second division Of de stroyers was kept at the Ionian Islands for R want Of coal , and in the evening the ear Admi ral informed me that no destroyer FURTHER DISPOSITIONS 1 1 5

40 had more than tons . As it has been

Vesuvi o explained , the collier had already

m u rr 2 . 8 u P ( p. , th A g st) a ived at ort Vathi ,

u o R - Ithaca , nkn wn to the ear Admiral . By 9th August three more Colliers were on their way to Port Vathi and an ample u u supply Of coal was th s sec red .

u Of 7th To ret rn to the events Friday, u u 3 m A g st . At p. . three destroyers were sent to watch the southern end Of the

Strait Of Messina , in case the German ships should return and attempt to pass the u Strait . The patrol was maintained ntil

1 5th u u As u of A g st . the French sq adron armoured cruisers was patroll ing the channel

B on on between Cape , the African coast, and

o Marsala in Sicily, b th the westward lines u Of retreat were th s effectively watched . At midnight a report was received that

G r General the erman mail steame , after transformation into an armed auxiliary

u i ou cr iser, had left Messina steer ng s th . The French Admiral at Bizerta and all his

O ships were informed f the report .

' THE MI S TAKEN TE LE GRAM

B E F ORE 1 a m on r n of u . . the mo ni g Sat r

8 u u e ru day, th A g st , the S cond Battle C iser

u ro I n ewi ble ﬂ a I ndomi table Sq ad n , ﬁ ( g ) , and

I nde ati able and We mouth com f g , y having

let ed o al p with c al , sailed from M ta to

Goeben reslau search for and B , which had

Gloucester m been last seen by , at p. . on ou n r the previ s eveni g, stee ing east at

1 5 rou r be knots th gh the Ce vi Channel ,

a ou r tween Cape M lea , the s the n extremity

G Kithera . At Of reece , and the Island Of

a m 8th u u or a o . A g st , inf m ti n was received that no Ger man ships were at

a a m hatham a ro N ples . At . . C , p t l

t o o o r ling the n rth Of Messina, was rde ed t o proceed southward through the Strait Of

20 o t o e Messina at kn ts Malta , ther to c oaL 120 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

Then occurred an incident which meces

aril a o o s y ffected the wh le Of my disp sitions , with the result that the pursuit of the German vessels was checked for twenty

r ua a u four hou s . The act l del y was m ch

r i u r longe , as w ll appear, beca se the alte a tion of dispositions involved a considerable diver gence Of course and a consequent

r r ret acing Of t ack . In the Ofﬁcial History the account of the matter is as follows ' Then fortune

o r for played an ther t ick, here he received

r r f om the Admiralty a wa ning, which had

out been sent by mistake , that hostilities u u had commenced against A stria . He co ld ’ not yet tell whether the Goeben s Objective might not be Alexandria and our Le vant

Ea but and stern trade , since his last news Of the French Fleet was that it would not be free to co - Operate with him befo re the l oth onl course seemed to be u , his y to t rn 1 back and re- concentrate hi s eet ﬂ . “ He therefo re proceeded t o a position

1 a i -A M M . . . y it l cs B .

122 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

r Corbett, in compiling his nar ative , had

o u o or access to c pies of those instr cti ns, he had not . If he had access to them, I am at a loss to understand why he should h u imply t at there was an alternative co rse , or that any considerations other than my n u u i str ctions co ld possibly affect my action . If Si r Julian Corbett did not see my instruo u ff ul u tions , it is eq ally di ic t to nderstand why he shoul d have drawn conclusions for

the which he had no warrant, and why

l Of Admira ty, which were aware the facts, shoul d have allowed those conclusions to pass . What actually happened was that at

2 m on u 8 u u p. . Sat rday , th A g st, when the squadron was half-way between Sicil y and G reece , steering eastward , I received a telegram ordering ho stilities against Austria u to be beg n at once . Acting instantly upon the instructions provided for that

ro to o contingency, I p ceeded a positi n in which I could support Rear-Admiral ’ Troub rid e s u g sq adron , then watching the THE MISTAKEN TELEGRAM 123

u Of mo th the Adriatic, and issued orders concentrating the Fleet . to u In order exec te these dispositions,

r t o u - it was necessa y t rn north westwards , and to steer for a rendezvous 100 miles

u - so th west Of Cephalonia, at which the Rear- Admiral was ordered to join my

We ut ﬂag . ymo h was sent to join Dubli n

ou i hat at the m th Of the Adr atic, and C ham was ordered to join them so soon as she

ﬁ loucester had nished coaling at Malta . G o u was ordered to c nvoy destroyers . Th s , at the critical moment Of the search for w the German vessels, the hole Of the light cruiser force was diverted northwards from the line Of pursuit . m 4 . . At p , a telegram was received from the Admiralty negativing the previous

a telegram . The new mess ge being made

rr u a u in a somewhat i eg lar m nner, it co ld not be accepted as genuine without con

ﬁrmation o u . , which was acc rdingly req ested

6 m ﬁr The reply, received at p. . , con med the negative telegram . A little later, in 124 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

u l a f rther telegram from the Admira ty, the situation with regard to Austria was u described as critical . In these circ m

u t o o u stances , it was my d ty c ntin e to act u pon my instructions relating to the con

in en ar u u t g cy Of w with A stria . It is eno gh

sa Oﬂi cial o to y , as the History c rrectly

1 u o states , that those instr cti ns involved the concentration Of the Fleet and couse quently the entire abandonment Of the u u G p rs it Of the erman vessels .

on u 9th u u At noon S nday, A g st, I received a telegram from the Admiralty stating deﬁnitely that Great Britain was not u u at war with A stria, and instr cting

u u u of Goeben me to res me the p rs it the . Twenty-four hours had thus elapse d since the arrival Of the order from the Admiral ty i u to begin host lities against A stria , com

1 Later on i n the day (August 8) he w as i nform ed a t he a arm w as a e but as at the am e m e th t l f ls , , s ti , he w as instruct ed that the relati ons with Austri a ere r a he on nue m o em n for con w c itic l , c ti d his v e t ” ” en ra on noon on t he 9th . O ﬁ i i or c t ti till f c al H st y,

I .

x11

S EARCH RESUMED

1 30 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

some risk, since , for the time , it left ” r r u r air Admi al T o b idge in the . It is an expression I am unable to under

nor ﬁ a i a stand , does the Of ci l histor n ex

u w as plain what other co rse possible . Sir Jul ian Co rbett proceeds Since Admiral Milne ca me down the Greek coast at only 1 0 u knots , pres mably to allow his light

u r o m t u 3 a . cr ise s come p, it was not till . ” on u u 1 0 ZE ean A g st that he entered the g . The passage clearly implies that time

o r u a was l st . That er oneo s implic tion is ’ evidently due to Sir Julian Corbett s ignor ance of the tactical problem involved in

u r Goeben the s perio speed possessed by the ,

l a a ready described . Slow speed was m de , not presu mably in order t o enable the light cruiser s to rej oin the Second Battle

u r u d r u a r Cr ise Sq a on, as Sir J li n Co bett

ur but o u ur conject es , abs l tely for that p pose ; for the simple reason that to search for ships Of superior speed among the islands Of the ZEgean Sea with battle cruisers alone would have been an insane THE S EARCH RES UMED 1 31 proceeding . The only chance Of catching the Ge r man Vessels was t o discover their position wi th the swift light cruisers and then to manoeuvre with the battle cruisers

cut O ff to them .

Dur n u 9th u u r i g S nday, A g st , I eceived no reliable infor mation concerning the

G As re position Of the erman vessels .

ﬁ r Goeben corded in the Of cial Histo y,

reslau enusa and B were in fact at D , a

u ZE ean small island at the mo th Of the g , at which they arrived on the morning Of u 8 u u Sat rday, th A g st ; and the armed

u General a xiliary steamer , after holding

u ou r ur a so thern c rse f om Messina , t ning

- n o r north eastward and passi g n rth Of C ete , had arrived at Smyrna on the morning of 9th u u 1 Sunday, A g st . As the movements and intentions of the German vessels were utterly unknown to

1 mi ra S on on was a ua i at D nusa Ad l ch ct lly st ll e , waiting t o hear that permissi on t o enter t he D r ha n o a B ut not a or a danell es d been eg ti ted . w d could t he General pass him Of any alt eration i n t he ” ” ua n. O ﬁ ci al H or I . sit tio ist y, 182 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

t o u me , it was necessary take meas res in accordance with probable contingencies . These were (1 ) That the Goeben might

to u Gr attempt take ref ge in a eek port , where Admiral Sonchon could rely on the

fﬁ of G G good o ces reece . (The erman Admiral was accustomed to use Phal erum

of 2 oeben in time peace . ) ( ) That the G might proceed to Sal onika to attack that u u port and th s destroy the Serbian s pplies . (3) That she might turn south to attack

- the south feastem trade and to destroy British shipping at Al exandria and Port

4 a m u Said . ( ) Th t she might atte pt to ret rn

r westward and to leave the Mediter anean . Under these conditions it was clearly my duty to try to keep the Ge rman ships to

r o u the north . The ef re the battle cr isers must remain in the south -west part of the E g ean until deﬁnite information of the positio ns of the German ships could be

e obtain d .

e In accordance with thes considerations , the battle cruisers having rounded Cape

134 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

the nal a as sig s became we ker, the squadron u t rned northward again . In the meantime Weymouth was search

a u 6 m ing among the isl nds . At abo t p. . I nde ati able Chatham f g looked into Milo . , proceeding to Cape Malea , was given her u co rse to search among the islands . To wards dark the three battle cruisers assembled and proceeded in company

u S i hano thro gh the p Channel .

m 5 a m n 4 a . o u Between . and . . , T esday,

1 1th u u of A g st , the wireless signals the German armed auxiliary General increased in strength ; whereupon Weymouth was ordered to proceed to examine the Gulf of Smyrna ; further instructions to search among the islands were given to Chatham ; u and the battle cr isers , keeping within searchlight signalling distance , were spread

6 a m ubli n to search . At . D , sent to join

R - r u my ﬂag by the ear Admi al , ro nded Cape Malea and was sent to Milo Island to coal . XIII ESCAP E

1 38 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

ZEgea n Sea) to maintain a watch for the German vessels until their position could u be ascertained by the light cr isers . Chatham and Gloucester were o rdered to

r ubli n rejoin ﬂag after da k . D , then coal

o r r ing at Mil Island , was o de ed to be ready t o pick up and pursue Goeben if she ca me u so th .

m r r At p. . I received a teleg am f om the Admiralty stating that Goeben ’ and B reslau had arrived in the Dardanelles u r u pon the p evio s evening, and ordering me to establish a blockade of the Dar u u danelles , an order which was s bseq ently modiﬁed to instructions to keep watch

a G r out in c se the e man ships came . “ ” In the Ofﬁcial History (I it is stated that the order was to block

e ade the exit , and th re is no mention ” of u u the s bseq ent change to watch . To blockade involves t he stopping and

r of u r P r sea ching of all ships ne t al owe s ,

u e to which notice m st be giv n beforehand .

o r o T watch is a no mal Operati n . THE ESCAPE 139

5 . m . u 1 1th u u We At p , T esday, A g st , y mouth r off a rived Dardanelles , where she

u o was met by two T rkish torpedo b ats , and was greeted by a blank char ge ﬁred by one of the forts . She reported that the signal station refused her permissi o n to enter the

r u of o on St aits , and that the g ns the f rts

o r r u o We b th sides we e t ained p n her . y mouth was or dered t o r emain three miles outside the Dardanelles and t o report if

w ho out the enemy, was at Chanak, came . The battle cruisers were dispersed u pon a patrol whose northern limit was seventeen

u - miles so th west from Tenedos Island . Chatham and Gloucester were assigned watchi ng positions '

W 12 u u ur On ednesday, th A g st , a T kish

o fﬁ out r military cer came in a to pedo boat ,

a m W i and at 8 . . he informed Captain ill am

u We mouth D . Ch rch , in command of y , that the Goeben and Breslauwere then at Constantinople and that they had been

s u G purcha ed by the T rkish overnment .

o Dur ing the day, I was inf rmed that the 140 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

Goeben had sailed from Chanak for Con st antino le 2 m on r u p at p. . the p evio s day ; that the Breslau was anchored off Nagara Point ; that the General (with the Car covado) w as at Constantinople ; and that all these vessels were ﬂying the German

ﬂag .

u W 12 u us D ring ednesday, th A g t , a close

on r watch was maintained the Da danelles ,

Gr and all steamers were boarded . A eek destroyer was also watching the Dar

e r t G danelles . She r po ed that two reek cruisers and a destroyer ﬂotilla were at

Po u ro rt M d s . At a little past midnight on the night of 1 2 —13t h u u or th A g st , I received ders from the Admiralty to pr oceed in I nﬂ ewi ble

l t o r (f ag) Malta . Shortly afterwa ds was received the Admi r alty telegram ordering hostilities to be commenced against

u e e A stria . At the same time I r c ived instructions with regard t o the ships to be placed under the orders of the French

r -i h - Commande Chief.

XI V

THE S E'U EL

I n ewi ble We mouth ﬂ (ﬂag) , with y and

li 3 a m on u ub n . . D , sailed at Th rsday,

1 th u u r 3 A g st, and ar ived at Malta m 4 1 u u . at p. . on Friday, th A g st

r u In acco dance with my instr ctions , I made arrangements for turning over the records of the station to Rear - Admiral

r r on Ca den . Acco ding to the agreement c cluded between the French and British G 6t h u u overnments on the A g st , the su preme command in the Mediterranean

r r was to pass to the F ench Admi al , while all French ships on all other stations in the world were to com e under British

fﬁ s e o cers . A I was of s nior rank to the French Co mmander -i n- Chief in the Medit er

- r anean r . ue La e , Vice Admi al A Bo de p y é w as u r re, the arrangement that I sho ld 143 1 44 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN return to England so soon as the Fr ench Vice -Admiral was able to take over the

u r s p eme command .

1 8th u u I leai ble On A g st , I left Malta in nf for P u lymo th . ﬁ 67 u In the Of cial History (I . ) occ r the following co mments ' The outcom e of u so r a sit ation which had been p omising, and which might well h ave resulted in a

u o of s ccess , priceless at the pening the

r a o B ut war, was a seve e dis pp intment . on his return home the Commander -i n Chief was able to give explanati ons of his difﬁculties and he was exoner ated fr om

of ru o blame . In view the inst cti ns which the Admiralty had given him in their anxiety t o protect the French tr ansport

n re e eu r of li e and t o sp ct the n t ality Italy, it is clear that what blam e there was coul d not rest solely on the shoulders of the

m a ur due e Ad ir al . His f il e was , at l ast

t o o t o t he r a in part , the fact that , wing pid

u o r changes in the sit ati n , it was p actically impossible for the Admi ralty to keep him

1 46 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

r u a of u b o ght ag inst me . There was , co rse ,

u r r v e no s ch cha ge . I was , in fact , p i ileg d to receive the expression of the approval of the Lords Commissioners of the Admir alty ; as Sir Julian Corbett must

e re ou have b en well awa , alth gh he omits

r u to mention the ci c mstance .

2 9t h u u 1 9 14 r On A g st , , the Admi alty further issued to the Pr ess the following ofﬁcial announcement

The Adm ir alissim o of the French R r - m r ou e e er Fleet , ea Ad i al B de Lap yr e , has assumed command of the com bined o - r e err e Angl F ench Fl et in the Medit an an . u e i r e As a conseq enc , Adm ral Sir Be kel y w ho e or t o Milne , Bart . , is s ni this o ﬁ e er the om m f cer , has giv n ov c and of the Mediterranean Fleet and returned home . The conduct and dispositio ns of Admir al Sir Berkeley Milne in regard to t he Germ an vessels Goeben and Breslau have been the subj ect of the careful of r of m r examination the Boa d Ad i alty, with the result that their Lordships have prov ed the meas ures taken by him in zﬁ ” respects . THE SE'UE L 147

In connecti on with the whole account of t he episode contained in the Ofﬁcial

r Histo y, it is pertinent brieﬂy t o recapi tul ate the tenour of the gener al instructions

m e ro r received by f m the Admi alty . The Goeben and Breslau were t o be pre vented from interfering with t he tr ansport of r ro the French Af ican Army, and f m leaving the Mediterranean by the Strait of G r r ib alta . The Goeben and Breslau were to be pre

r r vented f om entering the Ad iatic . In case of the emer gence from the Adriatic of u of w ar l A strian ships , these vesse s were to be watched . The Goeben and Breslau were t o be pre vented from i nter feri ng with the trade in the Easter n basin of t he Mediterr anean . The possibility that It aly would j oin Austria and Ger many was to be borne in mind . The neutrality of Italy was t o be ri gidly

no i of w ar e er respected , sh p b ing p mitted to go withi n six miles of the Italian coast . 1 48 FLIGHT OF THE GOEDEN

or e u In acc dance with th se instr ctions , di spositions were made to prevent the m W German ships fro going westward . hen they moved eastward , it was necessary to prevent them from again tur ning west

W r ZE ean ward . hen they ente ed the g u Sea, dispositions were made , sho ld they

u r u r either t rn westwa d , or so thwa d towards E u E the astern trade ro tes and gypt , to u u u u ens re that they wo ld be closely p rs ed . The possibility was also considered that the German vessels might go to Salonika in order to interfer e with the transport of u Serbian s pplies . It is therefore evident that the purposes indicated in my orders ul ﬁ were f lled .

CONCLU S I ON

UPO N my retirement from the Royal

ru r 1 919 Navy in Feb a y , the Lords Com m issioners of the Admiralty published the following statement in the Press

On the retirement of Admi r al Sir e e ee r Berk l y Milne , it has b n b ought to ’ the notice of t he Boar d that thi s o fﬁcer s pr ofessional reput atio n is stated t o have suffered in the Opinion of the publi c owing t o its being generally suppos ed that he did not take u the Com mand at t he Nore — p to which he h ad been appointed before War—or e e ur er o e the rec iv f th empl ym nt , in cons equence of events co nnected with t he escape of the German ships Goeben and

u 1 9 14 not c e . Bresla in . This is the as The Admi ralty at t he time issued an o fﬁci al a e em a s on re or st t ment , which r in c d , r ne rom e exoner ating Admi al Mil f blam , and intim ating that t he gener al disposi tions and meas ures taken by him were 15 1 1 52 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN full y approved It has been s olely owing t o t he exigenmes of the Service that the ” m n t o Ad iral has o been further empl yed .

It will be o bserved that the Ofﬁci al Histor y was published (Mar ch 1 920) a year after the Admir alty had issued their

e u o u stat ment q oted ab ve . D ring that

r u a or e yea , Sir J li n C b tt states that the

r e r o of Admi alty had r ad the p ofs the book, in which certain alter ati o ns had been made in accor dance with the suggesti ons of the

ra r um Admi lty . These ci c stances make it even m ore difﬁcult t o understand the acti o n of the Boar d in per mitting the publicati o n of the inaccurate statem ents and inj uri ous reﬂecti ons contained in the

ﬁ or and Of cial Hist y, the subsequent refus al of the Admi ralty to take steps t o have the 1naccur at e statem ents corrected and the adverse co mm ents based o n those

ur e inacc ate statem nts deleted . The Pr im e Mi nister has stated that the cost of the Ofﬁci al History of the War

r out of u is def ayed p blic money . The

1 54 FLIGHT OF THE GOEREN

5 . P l st v e The rime Minister, on No emb r,

1 920 o , stated in the H use of Commons “ that Sir Julian Cor bett w as responsible as author t o the Committee Of Imperial

Defence . 6 P n . o l st The rime Minister , November,

1 920 e ou of , also stat d in the H se Commons “ that Sir Julian Cor bett is writing the Ofﬁcial account ofthe warfrom theAdmi ralty ” oi nt o vi ew p f .

7 u of r . In the co rse a letter appea ing ” in t he Nineteenth Century and After (November Sir Julian Corbett states that he submitted the proof Of his work

r to the Admiralty, and that the p oofs , ” after careful examination were returned t o me with a few suggestions ” of as t o the wording certain passages .

sum u The fﬁ To p. book is o cial . It

ﬁ c u r is not Of cial . It is ompiled nde the

of directions a Cabinet Committee . It is written from the point of view of the

m r r u Ad i alty . The p oofs are s bmitted to CONCLUSION 1 55 the Admiralty and are altered by the r Admi alty . The Admi r alty are not res pon 1 . u al o r s sible The a thor is ne e ponsible .

1 rom Han ar Hou e of omm ons 28r d un F s d ( s C ), J c,

1920 .

NAVAL OPE RATI ONS OF W THE AR .

Mr am . L bert asked the Fir st Lord of t he ‘ mi ra e er i n Vo um e I . of Na a O Ad lty wh th , l v l pera ’ on of the War S ir u an or had a ti s , J li C bett ccess t o all the docum ents i n the pos sessi on of the Admi ralty relati ng t o t he events described ; whether t he proofs ' of o um e ere u m e t o and a ro e this v l w s b itt d , pp v d of t he m ra and W e er t he m ra , by Ad i lty ; h th Ad i lty accepts responsibility for t he statem ents contai ned i n this history bas ed on olﬁci al docum ents ' Mr on ' I be suﬁi ci ent for m e t o uo e . L g t will q t m th e a e of the o um e t he st ate ent which faces e titl p g v l , nam ely ‘ The Lords Commi ssi oners of the Admiralty have given t he author access t o omcial docum ents r ra on of or but e are i n no i n t he p epa ti this w k, th y w ay r esponsible for hi s readi ng or presentati on of ’ the facts as stated . The Admiralty saw the proofs and agreed t o but as a e do not a e res onsi publicati on ; , st t d, cc pt p bili ty

er e a al ou Mr . am er I t will be obs v d th t , th gh L b t “ ll ” asked if S ir Juli an Cor bett had access t o a um n t he i r or i n re m en one t he doc e ts , F st L d his ply ti d

docum ents only . 156 FLIGHT OF THE GOEDEN

u P The tr th is , that the rime Minister , having stated in Parliament that the Ofﬁcial Histor y of the War ' Naval

rom Han ar Hou e of omm on 15 F s d ( s C s), th

De em er 1920 . c b ,

ATTLE or U TLAND B J .

S ir . ra Al l the m a er al i n u n a ai n J C ig t i , cl di g C pt ’ ’ Har er re or be a e at S ir u an or e p s c d , will pl c d J li C b tt s i o a and un er a n w b e n er re e d sp s l , this d t ki g ill i t p t d i n the e o e w a The m ra a e wid st p ssibl y . Ad i lty h v no control over t he use which Si r Juli an Cor bett m a e of hi s m a er a and ere ore so far as e k s t i l , , th f , th y are on erne o en t o him t o u t he c c d , it is p p blish m r a i ev er orm he n r r ate i l n what f thi ks p ope .

- R ear Admiral Adai r ' Will t he right hon. en em an sa e er the a e a a ou g tl y wh th it is c s th t , lth gh re or i s an e t o S ir u an or e t he this c d h d d J li C b tt , Admiralty refus es all responsibility as t o what he publishes ' S ir ra ' w e i n re ar t o a J . C ig All e poss ss g d wh t

I have enum erated will b e handed t o Sir Juli an. We a no n r m a r a h ve co t ol over hi fte th t . ir R Hal W t h oo u e Sir S . l ' ill e b k p blish d by Juli an Corbett b e regarded as t he Ofﬁcial Nav al History of t he War ' i r r a f t h r S r J . C ai g I am not quite ce t in o e te ms under which S ir Juli an w as asked t o write t he or of t h War He w as a e t o do so hist y e . sk d by the om m ee of Im er a De en e and not the C itt p i l f c , by m r Ad i alty .

1 58 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

While Sir Julian Cor bett was preparing

r r his mate ial I was enti ely at his service , and I should have had much pleasur e in o giving him any assistance in my p wer . ’ S ir u or J lian C bett s statement , contained in his letter published in The Nineteenth Century (November that his nar rat iv e was tested for accur acy of detail by senior ofﬁcers who were engaged in the ”

r u . ope ations , is the more s rprising It was - certainly never submitted to me before publication ; and the results of the ” testing for accuracy of detail after e publication appear in the foregoing pag s . u I have already said that , pon my dis

u u or c ssing the matter with Sir J lian C bett , he was unable t o afford me any explanation or u to s ggest any redress . Sir Julian Cor bett also states in the same

e re l tter , that he was given the f est possible access to the secret ﬁles which contain the telegrams that passed between

r l the Admiralty and the Admi al , as we l as t o the instructions It is therefore CONCLUSION 1 59 clear that although S ir Julian Corbett was cognisant of my instructions relating t o

u a on 69 war with A stri , in the passages p . ” of ffi r the O cial Histo y, in which he refers to my di spositions made at the time when I was inform ed that a state of war

u Gr existed between A stria and eat Britain,

u o those instr cti ns , whether by inadvertence or r r hi t o design , we e igno ed by the s rian .

u as It is eq ally clear that in this case , in

r o others , the Admi alty all wed a false u implication to pass . If, in the j dgment of ul the Admiralty, or of Sir J ian Corbett , o of w as t o r both , it inadvisable state in

r r what those inst uctions consisted , the e can have been no indiscretion in stating either that they existed or that they were

u ﬁ e s u f l ll d . The ab ol te necessity Of instantly fulﬁlling Admi ralty orders con cer ning my dispositions in t he event of w ar

r i n r t he with Aust ia did , fact , gove n whole

o u e situation . The c nseq ent d lay enabled the Goeben and Breslau to make good their retreat . 1 60 FLIGHT OF THE GOEB EN

That the telegram announcing a state of u r e war with A st ia was despatch d , was

e u evid ntly an accident . S ch accidents u occ r in war as in peace . I have accurately narrated the course of u events , and the p blic are now enabled u to form a j st estimate of the episode . It remains for the authorities to ensure that the Ofﬁcial History of the War ” . Vol . Naval Operations . I is so cor rect ed as to accor d with the facts contained in the Admiralty records .

o ns i rs n Pmm n m GREAT B a rr u s av R I C HARD Cu r S , L m ,

GARDEN su n ronn sr . a n. 1 AND B UNOA Y sor row . m ars , , , ,