Five Priorities for the Air Force's Future Combat Air

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Five Priorities for the Air Force's Future Combat Air FIVE PRIORITIES FOR THE AIR FORCE’S FUTURE COMBAT AIR FORCE MARK GUNZINGER CARL REHBERG LUKAS AUTENRIED FIVE PRIORITIES FOR THE AIR FORCE’S FUTURE COMBAT AIR FORCE MARK GUNZINGER CARL REHBERG LUKAS AUTENRIED 2020 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2020 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mark Gunzinger is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces, Transformation and Resources. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. Mark was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Department’s central staff for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Following the QDR, he served as Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Gunzinger holds an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, an M.P.A. from Central Michigan University, and a B.S. in Chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy. He is the recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit. Carl Rehberg is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Carl is a retired GS-15, Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot with over 6,200 hours flying time. Carl’s previous job was as Director of the Headquarters Air Force Asia-Pacific Cell, which played a pivotal role in the development of Air Force strategy, force development, planning, analysis and warfighting concepts supporting initiatives related to the Asia-Pacific and the DoD Third Offset Strategy. As Chief, Long-Range Plans of the Air Staff, Carl led the development of future force structure plans and courses of action for numerous Air Force and defense resource and tradespace analyses. In the late 1990s, he served in the Pentagon as a strategic planner, programmer, and analyst, leading several studies for the Secretary of Defense on the Total Force. He received a B.S. in Industrial Technology (Aviation Administration) from California State University, Los Angeles; an M.A. in Political Science from the University of South Dakota; and a Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of Colorado at Denver. He was also a National Security Fellow at Harvard University. Lukas Autenried is an Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on long-term military competitions, trends in future warfare, and defense budgeting and resourcing. Lukas came to CSBA after working as a Research Assistant in the Finance and Private Sector Development team at the World Bank, supporting research to improve financial access for households and firms. His previous experience also includes work in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State and the Woodrow Wilson Center. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the CSBA leadership and staff for their assistance with this report. Special thanks go to Thomas G. Mahnken, Evan Montgomery, Steven A. Fino, and a series of anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions; Timothy Walton for his analytical support; and to Kamilla Gunzinger for managing the publication of this report. The authors also thank participants in CSBA’s workshops, wargames, and other activities that informed this analysis. The analysis and findings presented here are solely the responsibility of the authors. CSBA receives funding from a broad and diverse group of contributors, including private founda- tions, government agencies, and corporations. A complete list of these organizations can be found on our website at www.csbaonline.org/about/contributors. Cover: Composite design by Kamilla Gunzinger and Lukas Autenried. XQ-58A Valkyrie develop- mental UCAV flying with a T-38 Talon trainer (not pictured) over Yuma Training Range as part of its flight capabilities demonstration program in March 2019. Photo courtesy of Kratos and AFRL. MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft: U.S. Air Force photo by Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt. B-2 and F-22s: U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Russ Scalf. Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS . I Background: Major Air Force CAF Trends .......................................i Recommendations: Five Priorities for the Air Force’s Future CAF .................... viii Report Organization ......................................................x CHAPTER 1: SIZE THE CAF FOR GREAT POWER CONFLICT: CAPACITY COUNTS . 1 USAF Force Planning Construct Recommendations ............................... 1 Summary ........................................................... 12 CHAPTER 2: CREATE A MORE SURVIVABLE CAF . 13 The Evolving Threat Environment .......................................... 13 CAF Capabilities Designed for Threat Environments of the Past ..................... 21 Capabilities for a Future, More Survivable CAF ................................ 23 Summary ........................................................... 28 CHAPTER 3: GENERATE AIR COMBAT POWER FORWARD .. 29 Approaches for Creating a More Resilient Air Force CAF Posture .................... 30 Improving Posture Resiliency: A Prerequisite for Both Approaches .................. 34 Summary ........................................................... 40 CHAPTER 4: EXPLOIT THE FORCE MULTIPLYING POTENTIAL OF CURRENT AND FUTURE UAS . 41 Rethinking Roles and Missions for UAS. 42 Potential Attritable UAS and Their Applications. 45 Summary ........................................................... 52 CHAPTER 5: PRIORITIZE THE DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER FUTURE FORCE MULTIPLIERS . 53 Hypersonic Weapons and Other Advanced Munitions ............................ 54 Advanced Engines to Increase Aircraft Combat Ranges/Mission Persistence ........... 61 Battle Management Command and Control in Contested Environments ............... 64 Summary ........................................................... 65 CONCLUSION . 67 Recommendations ..................................................... 67 Conclusion .......................................................... 69 LIST OF ACRONYMS . 70 FIGURES FIGURE 1: TRENDS IN THE SIZE AND AVERAGE AGE OF THE AIR FORCE’S FIGHTER INVENTORY ......II FIGURE 2: TRENDS IN THE AIR FORCE’S AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT FUNDING .................. III FIGURE 3: TRENDS IN THE SIZE AND AVERAGE AGE OF THE AIR FORCE’S BOMBER INVENTORY .......V FIGURE 4: AIR FORCE STUDY FORCE SIZING CONSTRUCT .................................2 FIGURE 5: AIR FORCE GRAPHIC ON ITS 2030 “THE AIR FORCE WE NEED” ......................3 FIGURE 6: TRENDS IN CAF STRIKE INVENTORY AND TOTAL PAYLOAD CAPACITY ..................8 FIGURE 7: QUICKSTRIKE ER WITH TAILFINS TO EXTEND ITS RANGE ..........................11 FIGURE 8: ILLUSTRATING THE INTEGRATED USE OF LOW-FREQUENCY RADARS TO DETECT AND CUE AN AIR INTERCEPT ................................................17 FIGURE 9: ILLUSTRATING PASSIVE COHERENT LOCATION OF AIRCRAFT .......................18 FIGURE 10: TRENDS IN PLA AIR FORCE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT GENERATIONS .....................19 FIGURE 11: CAF CAPABILITIES DESIGNED FOR THREAT ENVIRONMENTS OF THE PAST .............21 FIGURE 12: CHARACTERIZING THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE AIR FORCE’S 2019 CAF AIRCRAFT .......22 FIGURE 13: LOW OBSERVABILITY AND OTHER STEALTH TACTICS REDUCE SENSOR DETECTION RANGES AND IMPROVE AN AIRCRAFT’S ABILITY TO PENETRATE .............24 FIGURE 14: ILLUSTRATING THE IMPACT OF INCREASING MISSION DISTANCES ON WEAPONS DELIVERY POTENTIAL AND AERIAL REFUELING REQUIREMENTS ..................31 FIGURE 15: ILLUSTRATING THE NUMBER OF FIGHTERS AND AERIAL REFUELING TANKERS NEEDED TO SUPPORT 12 CONTINUOUS COMBAT AIR PATROLS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ..........32 FIGURE 16: MQ-9 AT A POLISH AIRFIELD AND POTENTIAL FUTURE MQ-9 MISSIONS ...............44 FIGURE 17: XQ-58A VALKYRIE FIRST FLIGHT. 47 FIGURE 18: ARTIST’S CONCEPT OF C-130 CARGO AIRCRAFT RECOVERING ATTRITABLE GREMLINS ...48 FIGURE 19: ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPTS FOR MANNED-UNMANNED TEAMING ....................49 FIGURE 20: WEAPONS AND SORTIES NEEDED TO ATTACK A NOTIONAL LARGE TARGET SET INCREASE AS WEAPONS PROBABILITY OF ARRIVAL DECREASES ............................54 FIGURE 21: ILLUSTRATING A MANEUVERING WEAPON ...................................56 FIGURE 22: ILLUSTRATING KILL CHAIN TIMING ........................................57 FIGURE 23: PROXIMITY MATTERS FOR HIGHLY MOBILE/RAPIDLY RELOCATABLE TARGETS ..........58 FIGURE 24: ILLUSTRATING AN HPM CRUISE MISSILE SORTIE ..............................60 FIGURE 25: NOTIONAL LONG-RANGE PLAAF AIR-TO-AIR ENGAGEMENT OF AN AIR FORCE AERIAL REFUELING TANKER AIRCRAFT ....................................................61 FIGURE 26: ILLUSTRATING THE IMPACT OF ADAPTIVE CYCLE ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES ON
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