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Russia's New Aerospace Forces- Effective at Countering Russia’s New Aerospace Forces: Effective at Countering the Kremlin’s Key Perceived Threats? Elizabeth Zolotukhina, Head of Department, North America Programme [email protected] Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies 20-22 Wenlock Road, London N1 7GU, United Kingdom www.cgsrs.org / [email protected] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On August 1, 2015 Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decree No. 394. The document authorised the creation of a new branch of the Russian military - the Aerospace Forces (AF). The reformed structure is unlikely to deter threats to which the Kremlin thinks it is most vulnerable - hypersonic missile aacks and potential NATO airstrikes on Russian territory. However, its creation in part has spurred Washington to undertake a space resilience initiative. Both Russia and the U.S. could benefit from cooperation to counter a jointly perceived threat of Chinese ASAT weapons. However, such collaboration is likely to be stymied by Russo-phobic factors fuelling Washington’s space resilience effort. b2 Russia’s New Aerospace Forces: Effective at Countering the Kremlin’s Key Perceived Threats? ANALYSIS Introduction The Soviet Union historically treated air and space operations” (Bodner). In part the move space as separate theatres of war, and has resonated in Washington. The U.S., delineated command authority for the Air alarmed by China’s 2010 anti-satellite weapons Force, air defence, and space assets among test, has commi\ed to increasing space different command structures with limited, if resilience (Clark). The two countries’ similar any, overlap (Bodner). Worried that such responses to homologous perceived threats division was “absolutely obsolete,” and suggests a possible area of cooperation. increasingly concerned about countering the U.S. Prompt Global Strike Program (PGSP), Divergent Threats as Viewed from the Kremlin new Chinese anti-satellite weaponry (ASAT) and, to a lesser degree, North Atlantic Treaty The creation of the AF entails the consolidation Organisation (NATO) forces, Russian military of the air force, air defence, anti-missile, and planners decided to streamline the country’s air space forces under a single command. In defence and space forces (Bodner; Bodner; explaining the reorganisation Russian Defense Unaributed). Minister Sergei Shoigu cited the need to enhance coordination and efficiency in In 2011 the two entities were combined to form countering emerging and novel threats a new branch of the military, the Aerospace (Unaributed). While some analysts concur Defence Forces (ADF). The ADF was tasked with the official logic, others, such as military with “defending Russian airspace from expert Aleksandr Golts, argue that the main airborne and space-borne aacks” (Bodner). “advance” of the development rests in the Further consolidation occurred on August 1, “generals receiving posts in the new 2015 when Russian President Vladimir Putin structure” (McDermo). The truth likely is signed decree No. 394. The document somewhere in the middle. authorised the creation of a new branch of the Russian military - the Aerospace Forces (AF). Although the reformed structure may be less The newly-created AF will be responsible for cumbersome than its predecessor, it is unlikely “commanding the hundreds of planes in the air to deter threats to which the Kremlin thinks it force arsenal and managing air and missile is most vulnerable. These include hypersonic defences [as well as have] complete missile a\acks, a capability the U.S. is responsibility for all aspects of Russia’s military developing under its Prompt Global Strike Copyright© of the Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS) Elizabeth Zolotukhina b3 Program. Hypersonic missile a\acks could existing Joint Space Operations Centre (JSOC) render obsolete Russian air defence systems, located at Vandenberg Air Force base in because the laer are “deterrent against long- range bombers armed with conventional California (Clark). Like their Russian weapons traveling at supersonic and subsonic counterparts, American defence planners fear speeds” (Beckhusen). By contrast, hypersonic that China’s growing ASAT capabilities could missiles - launched at distances that exceed threaten U.S. satellites and space-based systems Russia’s ability to shoot back - could “smash (Freedberg Jr). radars, air bases... and nuclear weapons before they ever leave their silos” (Beckhusen). There is cause for concern. Beijing has Although Moscow is developing its equivalent conducted a series of tests in space of at least of the PGSP, a dearth of funding and technical one, and possibly two, of their own ASAT expertise may yet hobble the effort. The AF also systems. At least three of these tests included is intended to counter the “perceived increased the destruction of a target (Weeden). Most risk of NATO air and missile aacks on Russian significantly, the January 2010 ASAT test, soil” (Gady). “went nearly to [geostationary Earth orbit] GEO,” the location of many U.S. national Regardless of whether Russia is correct to security satellites (Clark). Appreciating a perceive a threat from NATO, the purpose of common threat in China’s developing ASAT the newly-created AF is not offensive in nature. capabilities could offer an area of cooperation Rather, the exclusion of Russia’s Strategic to Moscow and Washington. However, Rocket Forces - the entity which controls all of measures would need to be taken to foster the country’s land-based intercontinental collaboration on such a sensitive security issue. ballistic missiles - “suggests a defensive These could include; bilateral information orientation to the new force” (Bodner; Gady). sharing within defined parameters and Despite not being best suited to repel the key technical specialists’ exchanges. The perceived threats facing the country, the cooperation could be further hindered by the creation of the AF in Russia has not gone other factors driving the U.S. effort to enhance unnoticed by Washington. space resiliency. Common Threats: Moscow and Washington Divergent Threats as Viewed from Washington Washington has appreciated Moscow’s aempt Despite the common threat of Chinese ASAT to streamline its space-oriented forces under a capabilities, bilateral cooperation on the issue single command. Similarly, seeking to ensure between Moscow and Washington may space resilience, the U.S. defence community encounter additional hurdles. Namely, in has embarked on a lengthy project to establish addition to fearing Chinese ASAT capabilities, a back-up - the Joint Interagency & Coalition Washington also is worried by “rising Russian Space Operations Centre (JICSPOC) - to the threats to U.S. space-based [assets]” (Freedberg Copyright© of the Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS) b4 Russia’s New Aerospace Forces: Effective at Countering the Kremlin’s Key Perceived Threats? Jr). Moreover, U.S. officials are concerned by threat by the Kremlin. Similarly, the AF is not “Russia’s recent use of ‘hybrid warfare’ to intended as an offensive force, one which could annex Crimea and undermine Ukraine, and counter potential NATO airstrikes, another otherwise antagonise NATO” (Clark; critical perceived threat by Russian officials. Zolotukhina). Although there is ample However, its creation in part prompted U.S. evidence to back the laer worry, support for authorities to enhance space resilience. In this the former is less evident. Moscow, which is sphere, both Moscow and Washington share a reportedly developing ASAT capabilities, has common threat - vulnerability to increasingly recently “launched an undeclared object into sophisticated Chinese ASAT weapons which space which [the U.S.] military now believes to could target space-based assets. Cooperation in be some sort of microsatellite” (Lamborn). It is countering the mutual threat would be important to ascertain Russia’s intentions as advisable. However, such a course of action is such an object could be used to jam or directly likely to be stymied by other factors fuelling aack U.S. satellites. Certainly, unlike Beijing, Washington’s initiative. Moscow has not yet tested ASAT weapons. Nevertheless, however well-founded, these CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY additional concerns fuelling the U.S. effort to augment space resilience may undermine The newly-formed Russian Aerospace Forces potential Russian-American cooperation to are not intended as an offensive force to counter the jointly perceived threat of Chinese counter NATO. Instead, the exclusion of the space-based weapons. Strategic Rocket Forces from the AF suggests a defensive posture for the force. Conclusion Washington and Moscow and Moscow could benefit from collaborating on the mutually Russian defence planners had hoped that the perceived threat posed by Chinese ASAT creation of the AF earlier this month would weapons. Confidence-building measures and foster enhanced coordination and efficiency in additional information regarding Russia’s countering key perceived threats. These aims development of its own ASAT capabilities have been dashed. The AF likely would be could ease cooperation. ineffective against a hypersonic missile aack. However, such cooperation is likely to be Such capability currently is being developed in impeded by the Russo-phobic factors fueling the U.S. PGSPS initiative - a key perceived Washington’s space resilience initiative. Copyright© of the Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS) REFERENCES Beckhusen, Robert. “Russia’s Future Air Force Could Resemble... The U.S. Air Force”.
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