Command in Air War Centralized versus Decentralized Control of Combat Airpower MICHAEL W. KOMETER Lieutenant Colonel, USAF Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama June 2007 Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data Kometer, Michael W. Command in air war : centralized versus decentralized control of combat airpower / Michael W. Kometer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58566-164-3 1. Command and control systems—United States. 2. Air warfare. 3. United States. Air Force. I. Title. 355.3’3041—dc22 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. Air University Press 131 West Shumacher Avenue Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5962 http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . 1 Notes . 18 2 HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF AIRPOWER CONTROL ISSUES . 23 The Levels of War . 25 Technology’s Role . 41 Conclusions . 45 Notes . 48 3 THE COMBAT AIR OPERATIONS SYSTEM . 53 Combat Air Operations . 54 Effects-Based Operations . 55 Command and Control . 56 Command Relationships . 57 Leveraging and Depth of Command Relationships . 60 Constraints on Specific Actions and Time-Sensitive Targets . 62 The CAOS as a System . 63 Conclusions . 78 Notes . 79 4 THE STRATEGIC LEVEL AND CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION AGE . 83 From Vietnam to Desert Storm . 85 Lessons from Desert Storm . 87 Integrating with the Clinton Administration . 90 Intervention with Caution––Somalia and Bosnia . 92 Institutionalizing Command and Control . 94 Kosovo . 96 iii CONTENTS Chapter Page Ascendance of the AOC . 100 A New Administration and the War on Terror . 102 Conclusions . 107 Notes . 110 5 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CAOS . 115 Organizations and Command Relationships . 116 Desert Storm . 119 Allied Force . 126 Enduring Freedom . 129 Iraqi Freedom . 138 Conclusions . 144 Notes . 146 6 THE CENTER OF THE CAOS . 153 Desert Storm . 155 Allied Force . 160 Enduring Freedom . 164 Iraqi Freedom . 168 Conclusions . 178 Notes . 181 7 DECISION MAKING INSIDE THE LOOP . 185 Desert Storm . 187 Allied Force . 192 Enduring Freedom . 197 Iraqi Freedom . 203 Conclusions . 207 Notes . 210 8 DISTRIBUTED COGNITION IN THE CAOS . 213 Desert Storm . 215 Allied Force . 222 Enduring Freedom . 227 Iraqi Freedom . 234 Conclusions . 242 Notes . 244 iv CONTENTS Chapter Page 9 SYSTEM ACCIDENTS IN THE CAOS . 249 Notes . 266 10 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . 269 How Has the Information Age Affected C2 of Combat Airpower? . 270 Have Technological Changes Impacted the Military’s Adherence to the Doctrinal Tenet of Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution? . 272 Is There a General Formula That Better Characterizes the System’s C2? . 276 Where Are These Changes Heading? . 286 Notes . 293 ABBREVIATIONS . 295 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 301 INDEX . 325 Illustrations Figure 1 Typical subordinate commanders under the JFC . 58 2 The aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process––non-CLIOS representation . 64 3 CLIOS diagram of subsystems in policy sphere . 65 4 Symbology for subsystem CLIOS diagrams . 66 5 Strategic subsystem . 68 v CONTENTS Figure Page 6 Plans subsystem . 72 7 Adjustment subsystem . 73 8 Force-application subsystem . 77 9 ADOCS joint TST manager coordination view . 173 10 Overall command and control feedback pattern in the CAOS . 273 vi About the Author Colonel Kometer with wife Cheryl, daughters Maria and Anna, and son Michael in 2006 Lt Col Michael W. Kometer, a senior navigator with approxi- mately 1,000 flying hours, was born and raised in Kohler, Wis- consin. He was commissioned upon graduation from the US Air Force Academy with a bachelor’s degree in Engineering Sciences in June 1988. He completed undergraduate navigator training in May 1989 as an electronic warfare officer (EWO) and was as- signed to the 16th Special Operations Squadron (16th SOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida, where he served as an EWO on the AC- 130H Spectre gunship. His tour of duty with 16th SOS included operations during conflicts in Panama, Saudi Arabia, and Soma- lia. While flying with the 16th SOS, he was assigned to Head- quarters Special Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Cen- ter to perform operational flight testing of special operations vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR aircraft. In 1994 he was selected to attend the Georgia Institute of Technology for a master’s degree in Industrial/Systems Engi- neering and, subsequently, was chosen as one of the top 10 graduates in the School of Engineering. In 1995 Colonel Kome- ter was assigned to a classified location as a special projects test director, later serving as the flight commander and operations officer for the unit. He then attended Air Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), both based at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The SAASS se- lected him to pursue a PhD, which he did successfully at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Upon earning the degree in 2005, he became the director of operations for the 605th Test and Evaluation Squadron at Hurlburt Field, where he took com- mand of the same squadron in 2006. viii Acknowledgments I did not understand at first when a professor, after reading my proposal for this dissertation, said, “I commend you on your willingness to tackle this project.” The truth is, I did not know what I was getting into. That I have not exhausted the subject is certain; that I have not clearly communicated all I have learned is due entirely to my own shortcomings; but that the work has become more than I thought it could at first is due to the tremendous contributions of many people. The journey began when the people at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies believed in me enough to give me their support, both material and moral. The people at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology proved the value of that institution through the challenge of meeting the often unstated but ever-present standards. David Mindell’s writings and classes were the basis for a lot of the ideas in this book. He allowed me freedom with ideas but guided me through the process, giving me reassurance that I was on the right path. Sheila Widnall modeled some of the principles in this book—she let me do the writing but sent me back to the drawing board until it made sense to me. Joe Sussman boosted my mo- rale by being interested enough to offer to help, and Ted Postol challenged me to be honest just by being that way. Michael Schrage set an example for me and spurred me on by reading my drafts, taking the time to give me an honest opinion, and challenging me to get real. The people at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, espe- cially Joe Caver, made it easy to get access to, but kept me from getting lost in, the incredible quantity of data available from the recent conflicts. Many military professionals gave generously of their time to explain the inner workings of this system I have labeled the Combat Air Operations System, or CAOS. I can only hope I have done justice to the conscientious way they approach the difficult job of making decisions under uncertainty. Many of their names appear in writing, but I would like to thank them for taking the time to educate me: Calvin, Zam, UB, Stilly, Alien, Zing, Goldie, ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Knob, TSgt Frank Lofton, TSgt Bryan Lanning, Col Jeff Hodgdon, Col Gary Crowder, and Lt Gen David Deptula. There were other professionals, some of them retired military of- ficers and some not, who work tirelessly to develop and implement the technology and procedures. Many of these doors opened through Ed Green, who put me in touch with talented and dedi- cated Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research (Mitre) people like Carmen Corsetti, Mike Carpenter, Jack Sexton, Roger Dumas, and Ed Enos. TSgt Dave Pacheco made it possible for me to have a home at Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, to see what goes on in the world of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Perhaps the most influential were my family. My wife, kids, and I became a much stronger team during the research and writing of this thesis by resolving the tension between work and family. While my wife was homeschooling, I had to learn to get work done when I really wanted to play with my kids. For- tunately, they got me to play sometimes. Their support and love kept me sane. And to the One who is really in control, my Lord. In my heart I plan my course, but You determine my path. x Chapter Introduction On 2 April 2003, the United States–led coalition forces had seemingly won the war in Iraq. In just 2 days they had in- vaded Iraq, pushed past Iraq’s regular army and paramilitary fighters, and entered the city of Baghdad. When a group of Iraqis climbed a statue of Saddam in Firdos Square and looped a rope around its neck, US Marines backed an armored vehicle up and pulled it down. The cheering crowds went wild. About a year later, Arabs found cause for indignation and horror that silenced the cheering. On 28 April 2004, CBS News broadcast the first ugly images of prisoner abuse at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison. It was a prison where Saddam Hussein had tortured thousands of prisoners during his reign. Now it ap- peared the Americans were no better. Copies of the pictures were sold on Arab streets, confirming fears that Americans were the “Great Satan” that its enemies claimed.