Aerospace Power Journal, Published Quarterly, Is the Professional Flagship Publication of the United States Air Force

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Michael E. Ryan Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Hal M. Hornburg http://www.af.mil Commander, Air University Lt Gen Donald A. Lamontagne Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Col Bobby J. Wilkes Editor Lt Col Eric A. Ash http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Senior Editor Maj Scott G. Wierschke Associate Editors Dr. Doris Sartor Capt Gilles Van Nederveen C1C Brooke Carr, USAFA Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor http://www.au.af.mil George C. Porter, Contributing Editor Mary J. Moore, Editorial Assistant Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Mary P. Ferguson, Prepress Production Manager Aerospace Power Chronicles http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil Luetwinder T. Eaves, Managing Editor The Aerospace Power Journal, published quarterly, is the professional flagship publication of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova tive thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of na tional defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc tion of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, Visit Aerospace Power Journal on line at the Aerospace Power Journal requests a courtesy line. http://www.airpower. maxwell.af.mil Fall 2001 Volume XV, No. 3 AFRP 10-1 Flight Lines Propositions Concerning the Aerial RMA . 3 Ricochets and Replies. 5 Features Who’s Got the Big Picture? . 6 Dr. Louis S. Metzger Col Donald R. Erbschloe, USAF Precision Aerospace Power, Discrimination, and the Future of War . 12 Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Jointly Published with the Royal Air Force Air Power Review The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing . 21 Group Captain Peter W. Gray, RAF Airpower and Restraint in Small Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927–33 . 32 Dr. Wray R. Johnson War Termination in the Persian Gulf: Problems and Prospects . 42 Col Mark Garrard, USAF Another View of the Myths of the Gulf War . 51 Lt Col Martin Wojtysiak, USAF Shades of Sentinel? National Missile Defense, Then and Now. 60 Lt Col Charles E. Costanzo, USAF Organizing for Success: Theater Missile Defense in Korea . 66 Col Dale C. Eikmeier, USA Out of Balance: Will Conventional ICBMs Destroy Deterrence? . 74 Dr. Robert L. Butterworth PIREP Air Force Transformation: Past, Present, and Future . 85 Maj Gen David A. Deptula, USAF VORTICES Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Operations . 92 Col Edward Mann, USAF, Retired Lt Col Gary Endersby, USAF, Retired Tom Searle Global Dynamic Operations . 101 Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell Col Allan W. Howey, USAF Lt Col Eric A. Ash, USAF Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz, USAF Riding the Information-Revolution Tiger . 108 Maj Louis E. McNamara Jr., USAF Net Assessment The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security . 122 Grant Tedrick Hammond Reviewer: Lt Col Eric Ash, USAF They Called Them Angels: American Military Nurses of World War II . 123 Kathi Jackson Reviewer: C1C Brooke Carr, USAF Academy Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat . 123 Gen Wesley K. Clark Reviewer: William M. Arkin Mission Debrief . 126 LT COL ERIC ASH,EDITOR Propositions Concerning the Aerial RMA ODAY WE HEAR a great deal about a component for protecting the fleet; trans- revolution in military affairs (RMA)— porting supplies; and achieving presence, what it is and why it is. The following control, and strike. As Colin S. Gray recently propositions provide some thought wrote in his book Modern Strategy (Oxford Tabout airpower’s role in the RMA—a role that University Press, 1999), “The tactical, opera began over 80 years ago. The argument is tan tional, and even strategic relationship be- tamount to calling a spark a fire, which is true tween sea power and airpower is so close that in many respects. A spark involves oxidation, to talk of joint air-sea, or sea-air, warfare is produces heat and light, and consumes fuel. A misleading. Sea power and airpower have be- single spark can produce a firestorm capable of come interdependent” (p. 235). incinerating thousands of square miles. The A third argument favoring the aerial RMA key determinant, however, is whether or not is the deliberate nature of its creation. RMAs the spark is self-sustaining. Many inventions do not just happen—they are not the coinci and innovative ideas die quickly; however, the dental product or even by-product of new spark of airpower in World War I survived technologies. One finds the essential precipi against all odds, sustained itself, and funda tants for the birth of the aerial RMA during World War I in the development of machine mentally changed warfare. guns and artillery, which made stagnated war- First, if an event is truly an RMA, it must fare too horrific for people to tolerate. Con have global significance rather than limited im sequently, as Dr. David R. Mets points out in pact on a single nation or military power. his article in the Fall 2000 issue of APJ, they Global effect distinguishes an RMA from sim sought and found new methods and tech ply an anomaly in war fighting. Obviously, nologies that would allow them to avoid such global ramifications do not occur overnight. warfare in the future (p. 60). The passage of time has validated the long- A fourth point about an RMA concerns its term impact of airpower since its introduction impact—not just on war but on society, for in World War I. Although a few isolated tribal warfare is not an isolated event. In this re conflicts in some parts of the world may not in spect, airpower, as it emerged from the Great volve airpower, for the most part, the entire War, did affect society in terms of damage, in world has embraced airpower as part of war. dustrial activity, and air-minded thinking. It A second important consideration involves was not restricted to war, as were the machine the way airpower connects the other services. gun, tank, submarine, and artillery, for exam An RMA is not based on independence or rel ple. In terms of its effect on transportation, ative “decisiveness” compared to that of the communication, and the creation of social other services—just the opposite. Rather than vulnerability, airpower fundamentally touched eclipsing “boots on the ground” or “com a broad spectrum of the civilized world. Ad mand of the sea,” airpower makes those ne mittedly, the submarine also changed the na cessities possible. What would the Army be ture of warfare and affected civilization by without its airpower, whether from its own cutting supplies and killing merchant mari helicopters or from the Air Force’s fixed-wing ners. Yet, the revolutionary nature of the assets? Similarly, navies depend upon the air submarine proved much more limited. Aside 3 4 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2001 from unique examples of scientific and ex king. Yet, we often find airpower framed in an ploratory submersibles like Alvin, used to equation of damage rather than effects. This search for the Titanic, nearly all below-surface reflects the antiair argument of World War I: naval activity has always had a military pur meager amounts of damage caused by aircraft pose—beginning with the carrying of under- compared to that caused by artillery. Yet, ar water mines. Aircraft, on the other hand, had tillery’s ability to create a moonscape on the no such exclusive orientation to war; indeed, western front failed to achieve the desired they dramatically promoted the linkage be- strategic effect of ending the war. tween war and society, as is the case today. In Interestingly, airpower’s effect has ex- an effort to spur French and American interest tended even beyond the grand strategic level. in his three-engine bomber, Gianni Caproni Just as one categorizes war into tactics, opera identified the revolutionary difference between tions, and strategy—moving from battlefield the technologies that produced the submarine to theater to globe—so does the RMA process and the aircraft: “It is not by chasing each bee become larger. Airpower connects wars and in a garden that you would get the better of warfare by spanning time. the swarm. You should rather destroy the bee An eighth RMA concept involves changing hive” (see his “Memorandum on Air War” the basic military objective from gaining [1917], p. 2). In other words, submarines could ground and/or killing and dislocating the not attack aircraft, but aircraft could attack enemy to obtaining command of the air. After submarines by going after their pens. aircraft enter the fight, air superiority be- A fifth point involves the principles of war. comes the necessary prerequisite to achieving In order to achieve revolutionary status, a new other objectives. The Schwerpünkt shifts, and form of warfare must dramatically exploit at only airpower can hit it directly. least some of these principles—for example, in- Finally, consider the RMA trinity: thought creased ability to mass, maneuver, surprise, and (codified in doctrine), organization, and tech simplify. Since World War I, airpower has im nology. Technology usually grabs the spotlight proved a combatant’s ability to do each of these. as the revolutionary catalyst, but without the Sixth, an RMA entails rapidity of change. other two, it remains merely an invention—just Consider, for example, that changes in air- a spark that cannot sustain itself.

Load more