Summer 2008 Volume XXII, No

Home , 18th Wing, 35th Fighter Wing, 36th Airlift Squadron, 36th Wing, David Deptula, Exercise Ardent

Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen T. Michael Moseley Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen William R. Looney III Commander, Air University Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz http://www.af.mil

Chief, Professional Journals Lt Col Paul D. Berg Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Maj James C. Ulman Editor Capt Lori Katowich Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor http://www.aetc.randolph.af Darlene H. Barnes, Editorial Assistant Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power Journal Web Site Catherine Parker, Managing Editor

The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, Air and Space Power Journal and other matters of national defense. The views and 401 Chennault Circle opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004 of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, e-mail: [email protected] Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air [email protected] (alternate) University, or other agencies or departments of the US Visit Air and Space Power Journal online government. at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. Summer 2008 Volume XXII, No. 2 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspectives A House Divided: The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ...... 5 Lt Gen David A . Deptula, USAF Maj R . Greg Brown, USAF Fifth Air Force: Ready for the Future ...... 16 Maj Gen Larry D . James, USAF

Focus Area Expeditionary Operations ...... 29 Lt Col Paul D . Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Features Cleared to Engage: Improving the Effectiveness of Joint Close Air Support ...... 71 Maj Michael H . Johnson, USMC A Practical Approach to Effects-Based Operational Assessment ...... 82 Capt Clinton R . Clark, USAF, Retired Capt Timothy J . Cook, USAF

Departments Prelaunch Notes Remembering Almerisio Lopes ...... 22 Ricochets and Replies ...... 23 The Merge Commentary on Lt Col Kenneth Beebe’s “Reply to ‘Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?’ ” ...... 30 Col August G . “Greg” Jannarone, USAF, Retired MSgt Charles G . “Chuck” Doig, USAF, Retired

PIREPs Adding Less-Lethal Arrows to the Quiver for Counterinsurgency Air Operations ...... 33 Col Ernie Haendschke, USAF The Role of Air Force Civil Engineers in Counterinsurgency Operations ...... 44 Lt Col Kendall Brown, USAFR, PhD, PE Timing Is Everything: Operational Assessment in a Fast-Paced Fight ...... 51 Lt Col Kirsten R . Messer, USAF Air-Intelligence Operations and Training: The Decisive Edge for Effective Airpower Employment ...... 61 Col D . Scott George, USAF Lt Col Robert Ehlers, USAF The ABCs of Strong Leadership ...... 68 Col Brad Ashley, USAF

2008-2 contents.indd 1 4/29/08 7:43:56 AM Quick Look Education in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance beyond the “Green Door” ...... 100 Lt Col Jeff S . Hinrichs, USAFR

Book Reviews Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in Your Corporation ...... 103 James P . Womack and Daniel T . Jones Reviewer: Dr . Richard I . Lester The Future US Air Force ...... 104 Min Zengfu [ 闵增富 ] Reviewer: Guocheng Jiang Blood on German Snow: An African American Artilleryman in World War II and Beyond ...... 106 Emiel W . Owens Reviewer: Lt Col Robert F . Tate, USAFR, Retired LeMay ...... 106 Barrett Tillman Reviewer: Dr . David R . Mets Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power— Economic and Military ...... 107 William Mitchell Reviewer: Dr . David A . Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Retired Political Handbook of the Middle East, 2006 ...... 108 Reviewer: Col Joe McCue, USAF, Retired What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat ...... 108 Louise Richardson Reviewer: Lt Col Chris Eisenbies, USAF Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military ...... 109 David S . Alberts Reviewer: Col Darren D . Medlin, USAF With God on Our Side: One Man’s War against an Evangelical Coup in America’s Military ...... 110 Michael L . Weinstein and Davin Seay Reviewer: Col Chris J . Krisinger, USAF, Retired Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945 ...... 111 Paul Addison and Jeremy A . Crang, eds . Reviewer: Lt Col Peter W . Huggins, USAF Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan ...... 111 A . C . Grayling Reviewer: Lt Col Peter W . Huggins, USAF Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm ...... 113 Col Darrel D . Whitcomb, USAFR, Retired Reviewer: Col Paul R . Harmon, USAF Children at War ...... 114 P . W . Singer Reviewer: Col Gregory J . Lengyel, USAF

2008-2 contents.indd 2 4/29/08 7:43:57 AM Spying from Space: Constructing America’s Satellite Command and Control Systems ...... 115 David Christopher Arnold Reviewer: Lt Col John E . Shaw, USAF The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare ...... 116 Michael Russell Rip and James M . Hasik Reviewer: Maj Eric J . Felt, USAF Boys of ’67: From Vietnam to Iraq, the Extraordinary Story of a Few Good Men ...... 117 Charles Jones Reviewer: Lt Col Richard J . Hughes, USAF Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway ...... 119 Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully Reviewer: Maj Christopher Parrish, USAF Espionage: A Reference Handbook ...... 119 Glenn Hastedt Reviewer: Maj Reginald L . Bullock, USAF Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of Modern U.S. Military Power ...... 120 Michael Andrew Knights Reviewer: Cadet Dayton J . Miller, USAF The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West ...... 121 Niall Ferguson Reviewer: Col Thomas A . Henwood, USAF Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 1939–1945 ...... 122 Richard G . Davis Reviewer: Cadet George H . Van Dyke III The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror ...... 123 Bernard Lewis Reviewer: Lt Col Ken Sersun, USAF Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster ...... 123 Markus Wolf Reviewer: Lt Col Roftiel Constantine, USAF

Mission Debrief ...... 125

2008-2 contents.indd 3 4/29/08 7:43:57 AM Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers

Col Ronald K. Bartley, USAFR Dr. Tom Keaney Air University Johns Hopkins University Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired Naval Air Station Department of Homeland Security Patuxent River, Maryland Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired Dr. Kendall K. Brown Burke, Virginia NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired RAND Montgomery, Alabama Mr. Douglas E. Lee Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Air Force Space Command US Army War College Dr. Richard I. Lester Dr. Mark Clodfelter Eaker College for Professional Development National War College Mr. Brent Marley Dr. Conrad Crane Redstone Arsenal, Alabama Director, US Army Military History Institute Mr. Remy M. Mauduit Col Michael D. Davis, USAF Air University Air University Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired West Chicago, Illinois USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Daniel Mortensen Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF Air University The Pentagon Dr. Richard R. Muller Dr. Stephen Fought USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF Air War College Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF Air University USAF Academy Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Westport Point, Massachusetts Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Air University Maxwell AFB, Alabama Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired Ohio State University USAF Public Affairs Center of Excellence Dr. Amit Gupta Dr. Steve Rothstein USAF Air War College Colorado Springs Science Center Project Dr. Grant T. Hammond Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Dean, NATO Defence College Air University Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air University Sci-Ops Consulting Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Dr. Christopher H. Toner The Pentagon USAF Air Command and Staff College Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Navarre, Florida Auburn University Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

2008-2 Board of Reviewers.indd 4 4/29/08 7:46:55 AM A House Divided The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Lt Gen David A. Deptula, USAF Maj R. Greg Brown, USAF

Through technological advances and Airmen’s ingenuity, we can now surveil or strike any target anywhere on the face of the Earth, day or night, in any weather. A more challenging issue today—and for the future—is determining and locating the desired effect we want to achieve. Because ISR capabilities are at the core of determining these desired effects, ISR has never been more important during our 60 years as an independent service. ISR has become the foundation of Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power. —Gen T. Michael Moseley

ith these words, the chief has always experienced some degree of separa- of staff of the Air Force points tion among intelligence, surveillance, and re- out a radical transition in the Air connaissance—organizationally, programmati- Force view of the relationship cally, and culturally. Indivisibility has to do with Wamong intelligence, surveillance, and recon- principles, not feasibility. In our Pledge of Al- naissance (ISR). Just as the operational con- legiance, when we assert the indivisibility of our struct of global vigilance, reach, and power nation, we address the cultural memory of a denotes the indivisibility of airpower, so can catastrophic Civil War. Indivisibility does not we best understand its foundation through mean that division is not conceivable; instead, the inherent interdependence of its parts— it is the realization that division destroys the ISR is indivisible.1 synergistic effects that unity provides. How can one make such an assertion? Cer- ISR is indivisible because the effects it pro- tainly, throughout Air Force history the service vides depend upon the synchronization and

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integration of the intelligence, surveillance, “What is ISR?” When someone explained the and reconnaissance activities. That is the prin- abbreviation to him, Rumsfeld supposedly ciple. Intelligence relies on surveillance and summarized it in his own unique way: recon- reconnaissance for its data and information. naissance is find it; surveillance is keep in Conversely, we do not know what to surveil, touch with it; and intelligence is why you give where to reconnoiter, or when to do either a damn in the first place.4 Although this is a without intelligence. The data collected de- pithy way of putting it, accurate understand- pends upon processing and exploitation coming requires more detail. mon to all three activities. Decision makers do As it turns out, the definitions are easy to not care much about the who and how behind find. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of their intelligence. No one is asking for sepa- Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated rate “I,” “S,” and “R” streams on different dis- Terms, defines “intelligence, surveillance, and plays or in different formats—they are expecting reconnaissance” as “an activity that synchro- integrated products on identical timelines. nizes and integrates the planning and opera- In a speech delivered in 1858, Abraham tion of sensors, assets, and processing, exploi- Lincoln cited a New Testament verse: “A house tation, and dissemination systems in direct divided against itself cannot stand.”2 This is support of current and future operations.”5 true of the internal Air Force’s view of ISR, These words contain much nuance. Some of the and, to cite Lincoln once again, we cannot wait subtleties are positive. For example, “activity” for it to “cease, until a crisis shall have been in joint parlance implies a function, mission, reached, and passed” (emphasis in original).3 or action, as well as the organization that per- As an Air Force, we need to get our own house forms it; thus, ISR is functionally and organi- in order if we wish to optimally present ISR zationally indivisible.6 Other subtleties foster capabilities to decision makers. To do so, Air- misperceptions. “Direct support” accurately men must realize, accept, and act on the prin- reflects the fact that, like all operations, ISR ciple that ISR is indivisible. Such indivisibility exists to advance the achievement of national rests on four tenets: first, ISR is operations; security objectives; however, it also implies second, ISR denotes synchronization and in- subordination of ISR to other missions.7 “Op- tegration; third, ISR is domain neutral; and erations” include any national security objec- fourth, ISR is about capabilities and effects, tive, at any level of conflict, so the term is ap- not personnel, platforms, and culture. This propriate; but to many readers, it connotes article addresses each tenet in turn, but first and perpetuates an artificial distinction be- we would do well to review how we came to be tween intelligence personnel and those who where we are now. conduct operations.8 JP 1-02’s definition of ISR as a synergistic whole highlights the interdependence of its components, yet for full un- Why Intelligence, Surveillance, derstanding, it further defines intelligence, and Reconnaissance? surveillance, and reconnaissance separately to illustrate their distinctive capabilities and dif- The indivisibility of ISR is reflected in the ferent purposes. definition of the component terms.T he collec- Thus, “intelligence” is “the product result- tive term ISR first came into common usage in ing from the collection, processing, integra- the mid-1990s. Coined by Adm William Owens, tion, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation who at the time served as vice-chairman of the of available information concerning foreign Joint Chiefs of Staff, integrated ISR was pre- nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or sented as a vital component of the revolution elements, or areas of actual or potential opera- in military affairs, defined by the information tions. The term is also applied to the activity age, and implemented through the concept which results in the product and to the orga- of net-centric warfare. Early in 2001, Secretary nizations engaged in such activity.”9 The art of of Defense Donald Rumsfeld allegedly asked, intelligence involves rapidly and systematically

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analyzing data and information gathered of effective decision making. Together, ISR through surveillance and reconnaissance and operations provide decision makers the intel- synthesizing it with existing contextual knowl- ligence and situational awareness necessary to edge to produce accurate assessments needed successfully plan, operate, and preserve forces; for informed decision making. The essence of conserve resources; accomplish campaign ob- intelligence is improved situational awareness jectives; and assess kinetic or nonkinetic ef- for decision makers. “Effective . . . intelligence fects across the range of national security op- results when actionable information derived erations. They are integral to gaining and from a detailed understanding of adversary maintaining decision superiority. Why, then, systems, capabilities, and intentions is deliv- does the indivisibility of ISR need explanation? ered in time to make germane planning and operational decisions on how, when, and where to engage enemy forces” to achieve the The Roots of Division desired effects.10 ISR has never been quite what it is today. “Surveillance” is “the systematic observa- The importance of the principle of indivisible tion of aerospace [air, space, and cyberspace], ISR reflects how the information age has al- surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, tered the strategic landscape. The nature of or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photo- graphic, or other means.”11 “Loosely, another ISR has not changed, but the character has. variable in the all-encompassing term recon- Information-age warfare differs distinctly from naissance,” surveillance is usually broken out its industrial-age predecessor. Precision has as “a specific function.”12 Surveillance is a sus- supplanted mass, timing has become com- tained process, often passive and not oriented pressed, and service interaction has increased. to a specific target. Rather, it is designed to Twenty-first-century demands require that what gather information by a collector or series of we once tolerated as related tasks now become collectors having timely response and persis- a single, integrated process. Battlespace aware- tent observation capabilities, a long dwell time, ness is the effect sought by national-security and clear, continuous collection capability. decision makers. Coordination and interopera- Surveillance observations provide data for up- bility are no longer good enough. dated intelligence assessments of enemy ac- Knowledge is of no greater value today than tivities and threats, thus allowing the detection in the past. Intelligence, gleaned from recon- of changes in enemy operations over time. naissance, has existed since the dawn of war- Finally, “reconnaissance” is “a mission under- fare. What has changed in the information taken to obtain, by visual observation or other age is the capability—the realistic expecta- detection methods, information about the action—of how data can be assimilated, synthe- tivities and resources of an enemy” or a poten- sized, and delivered in time to be useful. As tial enemy.13 Reconnaissance operations are capabilities increase, the inefficiencies of the transitory in nature and generally designed to past are no longer sufficient for the task. actively collect information against specific Both of the world wars and the Cold War targets for a specified time by a collector that exemplified industrial-age warfare.T he Ameri- does not dwell over the target or in the area. can view of intelligence springs from this Reconnaissance generally has a time constraint legacy. In the industrial-age model, intelli- associated with the tasking. Because it seeks to gence was a massive, personnel-intensive op- collect information about an adversary, recon- eration aimed at supporting national and naissance is a fundamental tactic that helps to military decision making. Specialization and build an intelligence picture. differentiation followed the demands of tech- Clearly, as defined in the modern context, nology and a monolithic adversary. Accord- ISR is an operational function with the goal of ingly, in true factory-like, assembly-line form, providing accurate, relevant, and timely intel- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ligence to decision makers; it is the lifeblood were each individually organized around very

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specialized inputs and outputs: take a photo- two effects. First, classification by application graph, process the film, interpret the informa- ignored the onboard processing and interpre- tion, create a picture, write a report, deliver it tation inherent in determining the informa- to the relevant decision maker; intercept a ration’s relevance; somehow, since intelligence dio transmission, decode it, interpret its mean- personnel did not do the analysis, some did ing, write a message, deliver it. The intelli- not consider it intelligence. Second, ignoring gence cycle was sequential. the core function increased the likelihood of In an age when airpower itself was artifi- overlooking other potential uses for the infor- cially divided between strategic (supporting mation. Put another way, the industrial-age national or nuclear policy) and tactical (sup- model created artificial distinctions between the porting local or conventional combat opera- intelligence “ends” and surveillance and recon- tions), it comes as no surprise that ISR was naissance “ways” of collecting its necessary data. similarly divided. Legitimate divisions between A compounding factor during the Cold the strategic and tactical levels of war became War was the strategic nature of that conflict artificially (and incorrectly) synonymous with and the relative “luxury” of squaring off platforms and weapons. This artificial division against a monolithic and predictable adver- of ISR had three consequences: first, it mar- sary. After the early decades of the Cold War, ginalized so-called strategic ISR as irrelevant strategic surveillance and reconnaissance mis- to tactical military operations; second, we per- sions mostly flew periodically on catalogued ceived ISR missions as support activities; and routes. We had built up a good intelligence third, at the so-called tactical level, it drove a knowledge base of the adversary; we knew wedge between intelligence on the one hand where he lived; and we knew how he intended and surveillance and reconnaissance on the to fight. The relatively static nature of strate- other. Tactically, unit-level intelligence per- gic surveillance and reconnaissance missions sonnel briefed background information from created a perception of intelligence as strate- finished intelligence products. Surveillance gic. For tactical airpower, intelligence for air- and reconnaissance personnel reported rele- crews stopped at the premission brief. Direct, vant, updated information of immediate value tactical situation updates came from aircrews in raw form not as intelligence, but rather eu- on the surveillance and reconnaissance mis- phemistically as combat information. sion; they were operators because they flew. Radar surveillance of the air domain repre- Though seemingly trivial, one cannot over- sents an extreme example of the division of state the institutional importance put on fly- labor typical of industrial-age, task-based orga- ing. Organizational culture is powerful in nizations. Originally conducted using ground- large institutions such as the Air Force. Over based radars and revolutionized by the EC-121 time, Cold War separatism cemented the per- Warning Star in Vietnam and its progeny, the ceived organizational bias between strategic in- E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control Sys- telligence support and tactical surveillance and tem (AWACS), radar early warning located reconnaissance operations. What Airmen wore enemy aircraft, warned friendly forces of the and where they did their work outweighed the threat, and dispatched friendly fighters to engage them. Application of the intelligence intrinsic, functional relationship among intel- gleaned from radar surveillance became known ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. as air battle management (ABM), which provides aircrews enhanced situational awareness, en- ISR Is Operations abling them to plan in advance what tactics they will employ. ABM is decision making at the tac- The paradigm of industrial-age warfare de- tical level; the currency of ABM is intelligence. fines operations as putting iron on a target. Categorizing the product of radar surveil- Attrition is the focus. Accordingly, the Air lance not by its function (intelligence) but more Force spent most of the last century perfect- narrowly by its specific application (ABM) had ing precision—the technology, tactics, tech-

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niques, and procedures necessary to put iron not feel comfortable with using so-called sen- accurately on any target, anywhere. In the in- sor platforms as shooters. The US Navy pro- formation age, operations have to do with ef- vides one example of a different cultural per- fects. The 1990s evidenced this evolution in a spective.15 Perhaps because of the traditional clear elucidation of the kill chain—find, fix, need for immediate prosecution of targets in track, target, engage, and assess. At least two- antisubmarine warfare, the Navy arms manned thirds of kill-chain operations are ISR; increas- ISR assets, putting AGM-65 Maverick and ingly, the target and engage steps are non AGM-84 Harpoon missiles on the P-3 Orion kinetic. Knowledge comes before power, and maritime patrol aircraft. our asymmetric ISR capabilities are able to ISR is the linchpin of an effects-based ap- achieve effects all on their own. proach to operations (EBAO). One cannot ac- This is the changed character of ISR. In the curately predict the effect of operations on an modern context, the find and fix links of the enemy system without good intelligence; nor kill chain are much more difficult than the en- can one assess the effects without detailed sur- gage link, particularly for kinetic operations. veillance and reconnaissance. Intelligence re- The character change is reflected in the first- quirements for an EBAO and effects-based as- ever Air Force doctrine for ISR—Air Force sessment (EBA) are much more demanding Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-9, Intelligence, than the old attrition-based “bean-counting” Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, 17 model. The increased intelligence detail nec- July 2007. The truth resides in the title—ISR is essary for EBAO/EBA makes focused recon- operations. The Air Force did not lump ISR naissance and persistent surveillance opera- together for its own purposes; in the intended tions increasingly crucial. spirit of joint doctrine, AFDD 2-9 uses the ISR definition in JP 1-02.14 ISR efforts today make up the vast majority ISR Denotes Synchronization of the operations required to achieve our se- and Integration curity objectives. Operations range from finding the enemy, to deconstructing his network There is nothing new about the nature of and intentions, to putting weapons or other intelligence—Sun Tzu spoke extensively of its effects on target, to subsequently assessing the importance around 500 BC in The Art of War. results. In Iraq, to eliminate Abu Musab al- Likewise, reconnaissance is as old as combat Zarqawi, Predator unmanned aircraft exe- itself: “It is hard to imagine that the first two cuted over 600 hours of reconnaissance and combatants in war, whoever they might have surveillance operations to build sufficient in- been, embarked upon conflict without at- telligence for about 10 minutes of F-16 kinetic tempting to gain some knowledge of the capa- operations. bilities of their enemy.”16 On the industrial-age Increasingly, a single platform executes the battlefield, scout reconnaissance teams re- entire kill chain. Aircraft normally associated ported what they saw “over the hill” to their with strike operations have excellent sensors commander. Airborne reconnaissance was ef- on board, and in many cases their sensor data fects based from its beginnings with the use of can be networked to others who can turn it balloons by the French against Austria in 1794. into actionable intelligence. Armed unmanned The balloons not only collected valuable intel- aircraft systems (UAS) offer another approach ligence data but also reportedly had a demor- to this hunter-killer combination. In fact, the alizing effect on the Austrian troops. al-Zarqawi incident involved an armed Preda- Conversely, only “surveillance” is a relatively tor, though ultimately an F-16 executed the modern term, truly gaining its distinction in strike. Air Force UAS pilots are very compe- World War I, when indirect artillery fire proved tent and comfortable with the responsibilities key to many battles. Accurate, timely recon- of finishing the kill chain when called upon to naissance over time—surveillance—became do so, yet a subculture in the Air Force does necessary for targeting beyond the commander’s

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line of sight. Effective surveillance emerged of the confusion of personnel and platforms from the nexus of airpower and radio commu- with purpose. In this case, the personnel are nications and was among World War I Air- Airmen with air-battle-manager Air Force spe- men’s original core missions. From this nexus cialty codes (AFSC) 13B (officer) and 1A4 we also see the genesis of the cultural distinc- (enlisted), and the platforms are the E-3 tion between intelligence ends (missions) and AWACS and E-8 Joint Surveillance Target At- the surveillance and reconnaissance ways (tac- tack Radar System (JSTARS). The combina- tics) by which it was collected. tion of multiple purposes is the point of con- Technology can exacerbate the conflation tention. Airborne early warning (in the case of ways with ends. The inherent link between of the AWACS) and ground early warning intelligence on the one hand and surveillance (JSTARS) are both surveillance missions. Both and reconnaissance on the other continues to are subsets of ABM, which, in turn, is a subset be analysis. Collection through surveillance of command and control (C2). and reconnaissance provides the input to the Like ISR, C2 is a foundational operational ISR enterprise—intelligence is the tangible function inherent to effective operations. C2 output. Confusion about the nature of this is the end (purpose), ABM is the way (method/ link emerges when the intelligence need is tactic), and radar surveillance is the means simple or has been automated to such a de- (sensor/system). In the case of ISR, intelli- gree that it is discernable without specialized gence is the end, surveillance and reconnais- analysis or interpretation. Airborne full-motion sance are ways, and radar is a means. Such a video (FMV), the prevalent modern example, view clearly reveals that situational awareness provides the intelligence that every ground is the common thread. Effective C2 is based commander has desired since the dawn of on accurate, up-to-date intelligence of the ad- warfare—the ability to see what the enemy is versary’s air and ground situation, provided doing over the next hill. Simple FMV surveil- through surveillance. In other words, air battle lance fills the intelligence requirement, but managers are interpreting the surveillance when we don’t need dedicated intelligence data to make sense of it—interpreting its intel- analysis and production, it can easily be misin- ligence value—for the purpose of C2. terpreted as a stand-alone surveillance capa- Ultimately, though we have many ways of bility. This is still the intelligence cycle, only drawing the distinction between surveillance executed in parallel rather than the sequen- and reconnaissance, in all cases we see that tial mode common to industrial-age warfare. they are means of gathering data, from which, In this misinterpretation, we lose any notion through analysis and synthesis, we derive intel- of how much all-source intelligence analysis ligence. Such intelligence fuels decision mak- we need to get that FMV-collection capability ing—whether for the ground commander, the in the right place, the automated processing air battle manager, the counterair mission necessary to provide a formatted data stream, commander, or the commander in chief. and the dissemination architecture required to provide that feed in such a way as to have significance to the untrained eye. ISR Is Domain Neutral Balloon reconnaissance during the French Revolutionary Wars and airborne artillery spot- Just as ISR is indivisible by mission, neither ting in World War I may have established the can it be segregated by domain without dimin- basis of the cultural distinction between intel- ishing its effects. To repeat General Moseley’s ligence support (staff) and reconnaissance and pronouncement, ISR is “the foundation of surveillance operations (fliers). FMV is a proxi- Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power.” ISR is mate example in the current conflict. The the one major mission area in the Air Force prevailing cultural distinction, however, is the that truly cuts across all domains and affects result of efforts to distinguish airborne early almost every other mission area. Air, space, cy- warning from intelligence. It is the classic case ber, and surface ISR capabilities are tailored

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to provide the flexibility, responsiveness, ver- listic missile launches—from space. In both satility, and mobility required by the strenuous cases, we do the surveillance for the purpose demands of fluid, global taskings. of situational awareness—filling intelligence We use the information collected through gaps. Conflating ways, means, and ends- cre surveillance and reconnaissance and con- ates barriers and rivalries among domains, verted into intelligence by exploitation and commands, career fields, and information analysis to formulate strategy, policy, and mili- channels, ultimately diminishing the effective- tary plans; develop and conduct campaigns; ness and credibility of ISR. guide the acquisition of future capabilities; Today, some are applying similar logic to and protect, prevent, and prevail against the stand-up of Air Force Cyber Command, threats and aggression aimed at the United but to an even greater extreme. These people States and its interests. Air Force ISR opera- have advocated subordinating all of the Air tions are not inherently strategic, operational, Force’s ISR under this new command. Such a or tactical in nature; rather, they gather infor- move would quickly flesh out an organization mation and provide knowledge to meet re- chart at minimal cost to existing MAJCOMs, as quirements at all levels of warfare. ISR opera- the intelligence community funds large portions cut across all domains and are conducted tions of ISR capabilities. This line of thought, throughout the range of military operations however, misses the fact that, although we from peace, to war, to conflict resolution. conduct parts of the Air Force’s ISR mission in Today, Air Force ISR is undergoing an ac- the cyber domain, those parts are no more or tual revolution in effects-based application rather less significant than those in the air, space, than simply evolving to meet increasing de- and surface domains. mands. The revolutionary view of effects-based No specific domain can or should lay claim application of ISR points instead to the role to a monopoly on the Air Force’s ISR mission. that Air Force intelligence plays as a global, Although our service flies and fights in the data-bridging function among all domains as commons of air, space, and cyberspace, it does well as assets. Truly efficient ISR effects de- not confine its ISR to a specific medium. ISR mand integration of all air, space, and cyber capabilities in one domain share a comple- feeds into the Global Information Grid. Still, mentary role with those in another, and to op- the demonstrated importance of ISR in mod- timize the benefit of information access, we ern warfare has made it a cross-domain battle must employ them in a completely synergistic space. Everyone wants a piece of this hot manner. This was the rationale behind estab- growth area. Even those who accept the indi- lishing the Air Force ISR Agency as an Air visibility of ISR as a mission have a tendency to Force–wide enterprise and changing it from divide ISR organizationally by domain. In prac- reporting to one MAJCOM to having it report tice, such advocates are interested in owner- instead to the Air Force deputy chief of staff ship of the parts of the ISR mission that oper- (DCS) for ISR. ate in, to, or from their domain. ISR effectiveness is determined by its utility The space and cyber domains exemplify to decision superiority; thus it serves as a bal- this phenomenon. When Air Force Space Com- ance among accuracy, completeness, timeliness, mand stood up as a major command (MAJ- and accessibility. Stovepiping ISR by domain COM) in 1982, it took a certain amount of produces needless duplication and rivalry, control of ISR within the space domain. The creating the need for convoluted coordina- command’s core missions include space sur- tion and cross-checking between organizations veillance and early warning. From a domain- to make up for the dysfunction that such arti- neutral perspective, these missions are both ficial separation introduces into the intelligence surveillance. Space surveillance involves sur- cycle. Ultimately, decision makers care about veillance of space—satellites and debris—from the so what of intelligence. The where of collec- the surface. Early warning is surveillance of tion—from surface, air, space, or cyber, or of the air and surface—mostly warnings of bal- surface, air, space, or cyber—is of little conse-

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quence. ISR is an operational mission, inter- of the cockpit. In the current program-centric dependent with other operations of all the budgetary world of the DOD, narrowly fo- services and commands and across all domains. cused optimization of individual platforms, sensors, and systems is the norm. Absent a clear definitive strategy, the big picture is lost ISR Is About Capabilities to a collection of kluged-together widgets. In and Effects, Not Personnel, the current environment, why would the AC- 130 program-element manager spend the Platforms, and Culture program’s funds on seamless integration of A key barrier to realizing the inherent indi- the aircraft’s sensor data into the Global Infor- visibility of ISR is the way the Department of mation Grid if doing so doesn’t put more Defense (DOD) collectively manages ISR as rounds on target? Conversely, why would the individual program elements within a defense- intelligence community contribute funds to a budget process that one can at best describe program outside its control, knowing that the as Byzantine. Where is not the only misguided funds could be redirected? question that affects the recognition of opti- By converting to a capabilities-based con- mum ISR operations in the Air Force. Too of- struct, we will seek to close the existing Air Force ten, advocates of divided ISR focus on ques- cultural rifts in ISR by aligning the service’s tions of who and how. Who improves the ISR capabilities with Joint Capability Areas. As situational awareness of the decision makers? previously illustrated with FMV and space How does the information flow? Who owns or early warning, artificial distinctions can con- controls the systems or assets? How was the sys- fuse who accomplishes the process with what tem or asset funded? effect the process achieves. An Airman with From the previous tenets, it follows that the AFSC 14N (officer) or 1NX (enlisted) need not Air Force should effectively manage ISR with a necessarily be involved in the process for the capabilities- and effects-based approach. Gen- effect to be correctly considered intelligence. eral Moseley recognized this when he estab- Providing imminent threat warning to a lished the new Air Staff A2, elevating the posi- pilot in combat illustrates this point. An in- tion to a DCS responsible for ISR collectively telligence Airman (officer or enlisted), either as an Air Force–wide enterprise. The consoli- at the air operations center or even at a wing dation of ISR under a DCS is consistent with operations center, could process and ana- strategic guidance in the Quadrennial De- lyze incoming information, recognize a threat fense Review of 2006, which directed that each to an ongoing mission, and relay that intel- “Department will work to re-orient its pro- ligence to the threatened pilot through vari- cesses around joint capability portfolios.”17 ous C2 nodes. Although this happens, it is The capabilities-based construct dictates that cumbersome, time consuming, and unlikely for all actions—from planning, to program- to enjoy broad success. We routinely use a ming, to acquisition, to employment—ISR ef- streamlined version of this process when fects and capabilities must drive and shape the RC-135 Rivet Joint mission-crew Airmen pass effort to satisfy the needs of joint decision imminent threat warning. Receivers on board makers. Effective ISR simply cannot be driven the jets collect various electronic signal data by numbers of platforms or pots of money. in the environment, onboard systems pro- Under the program-based construct, too cess the data into usable information, and often the narrow focus of program optimiza- crew members interpret which information tion results in missed opportunities to integrate, constitutes a threat requiring action. The analyze, and interpret information of value to AFSC of the analyst and disseminator is im- war fighters and decision makers. Most com- material—the effect is enhanced situational bat aircraft in the US military have some type awareness for the combat pilot through the of sensor on board, yet virtually all of that po- input of timely, accurate, and relevant intel- tential ISR data is figuratively left on the floor ligence.

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We see a further simplified version of this ISR is a mission set and must be prioritized process when aircraft are equipped with radars, on par with other Air Force missions. No lon- radar warning receivers, and other systems de- ger can we treat ISR missions as support to op- signed to collect, process, and interpret many erations. ISR is operations and is foundational threats without outside intervention, depend- to everything the Air Force does. ing on the aircrew to decide which inputs re- ISR is about synergy. Integration and synchro- quire action. Although a radar warning re- nization make the effects of collective ISR far ceiver may lack the fidelity and accuracy of exceed their potential when they are sepa- more refined techniques of signals-intelligence rated. All of the data and information required analysis, the need for timeliness of intelligence for the production of intelligence are the rein threat-reaction situations drives the accep- sult of reconnaissance and surveillance collec- tance of greater risk. Untold ISR goes into the tion; conversely, the sole purpose of surveillance development and programming of these sys- and reconnaissance is to collect data and information for the production of intelligence. tems to allow the aircrew to make the final in- ISR deals with knowledge, regardless of terpretation of the provided intelligence and where its effects are (to, from, in, or through) act accordingly. In all of these cases, however, and regardless of who produces or receives it. the increased situational awareness of the pi- We must view ISR in terms of capabilities and lot results from intelligence based on recon- effects. It has to do with decision superiority— naissance, surveillance, or both. not platforms, sensors, and AFSCs. The US military must ensure that strategy guides and informs the programming of budgets—not the The Flight Plan reverse. A coherent cross-domain ISR strategy The lines between intelligence, surveil- must underpin budgetary decisions. lance, and reconnaissance are the product of Moving forward on these tenets of indivisible historical and institutional biases. Today, our ISR starts with doctrine. By definition, doc- EBAO and joint UAS operations demand a trine is the body of fundamental beliefs about transformed mind-set and new organizational guiding principles. Thus, the principle of in- construct. The Navy made this leap years ago. divisible ISR as discussed herein is in fact an Submarines have always been hunter-killers— Air Force doctrine for ISR and should be in- armed ISR platforms. Conversely, antisubmarine cluded in AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 platforms are in a constant state of doing ISR. November 2003, which currently does not Submarines, the original stealth assets, are define ISR collectively. As such, it is out of among the hardest things in the world to find. synch with joint doctrine and the more recent AFDD 2-9. The Navy learned the hard way in two wars The nature of ISR has not changed, but its against submarines that if the kill chain is not character has. The challenge before us is to nearly immediate, the probability of a submarine transform today to dominate an operational kill drops precipitously. There are parallels to- environment that has yet to evolve, and to day in hunting for terrorists, which will carry counter adversaries who have yet to materialize. into future air warfare against armed, hostile The transformation of Air Force ISR is in 18 UAS and hostile stealth aircraft. progress. The Air Force DCS for ISR is craft- Our service must embrace cross-domain ing a unified ISR strategy for the service—an ISR as a major Air Force mission that enables instrument to connect ends, ways, and means and optimizes the effects of every other mis- to maximize the synergy of ISR capabilities in sion. In the information age, the intelligence air, space, and cyber beyond the scope of our gleaned from surveillance and reconnaissance current program plan. It will look out more also has effects all its own. To fully recognize than three budget cycles in order to break the all the effects of ISR requires that we change programmatic bonds that currently tie us to parts of our organizational culture. an old culture of systems, platforms, and pro-

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grams. It is the difference between conceiving neutral tenet of indivisible ISR by integrating of “the son of JSTARS” (a marginally better air, space, and cyber analysis in a single reach- airplane with evolutionary sensors) and “the back node. Likewise, targeting is a recognized future of surveillance” (a seamlessly inte- Air Force intelligence analytic competency grated, network-centric collection capability). that currently consists of pockets of expertise At the employment level, we have provided spread across the MAJCOMs. I also intend to to the Joint Functional Component Com- recommend to the chief of staff that we estab- mand for ISR the core for a global ISR con- lish an Air Force Targeting Center of Excel- cept of operations that reflects the optimal lence to reinforce the Air Force as the DOD’s integration of ISR operations, manned and targeting focus, provide a single point of con- unmanned, across all domains—air, sea, land, tact, and enhance the discipline by consolidat- space, and cyber. The intent is to provide a ba- ing expertise. sis for combatant commanders to address ISR The magnitude and speed of change are in a holistic and joint fashion. To institutional- the twenty-first century’s defining features.T he ize this kind of approach inside the Air Force information-age world is increasingly inter- and to develop and execute integrated, holis- connected, and knowledge of crises around tic ISR tactics, techniques, and procedures, the world reaches global audiences as they the Air Force is forming an ISR Center of Ex- happen, lowering flashpoints and decreasing cellence at Nellis AFB, Nevada. margins for error. As with every other aspect Parceling out ISR capabilities breeds inef- of the information age, victory will go to those ficiency; promotes multiple, overlapping con- who create and exploit knowledge faster than cepts of operations and tactics, techniques, and procedures; and desynchronizes processes. their opponents—and increasingly in ambigu- Capability hubs—centers of excellence—offer ous and uncertain situations. Meeting this a more efficient means to present integrated challenge requires a shift from a Cold War ISR capabilities consistently and effectively, mind-set that treats ISR as a supporting func- while maximizing capacity. tion to a new understanding that in the twenty- For example, the Air Force chief of staff re- first century, ISR will perhaps become the key cently directed consolidation of the Air Force mission set in achieving our national security Distributed Common Ground System—the first objectives. Accordingly, we should more ap- global network-centric weapon system—into a propriately view ISR as the key integrating ele- single wing. Where previously five key system ment for effective national security policy and nodes belonged to three different MAJCOMs, operational design, planning, and execution. now the 480th Intelligence Wing will be the This will require adjusting concepts and pro- focal point for all Air Force airborne ISR processes to allocate, plan, and employ ISR as a cessing, exploitation, and dissemination. cohesive entity. Doing so may result in a syn- Furthering this tenet, my plans for Air Force ergy of ISR much greater than we have ever ISR include establishing an analysis center of experienced in the past, which will make excellence at the National Air and Space Intel- ISR—like airpower writ large—one of America’s ligence Center, which will exhibit the domain- asymmetric advantages. ❑

Notes

1. the indivisibility of airpower was the tacit argu- http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/ ment behind the secretary of the Air Force’s white paper speeches/house.htm. The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Global 3. ibid. Power (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, June 1990). 4. rich Haver, “Why ISR? The Significance of an AF 2. Abraham Lincoln, “House Divided Speech” DCS for ISR” (prepared comments for the 55th Wing ISR (Springfield, IL, 16 June 1858), Abraham Lincoln Online, Symposium, Omaha Hilton, 24 May 2007).

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5. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- 14. see ibid., 271. Conversely, the acronym RSTA (re- tionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as connaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition) offers amended through 17 October 2007), 271, http://www an example of how nonjoint terminology occludes pro- .dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. ductive dialogue; target acquisition is simply a specific 6. ibid., 5. intelligence product or outcome, not a mission in and of 7. ibid., 163. itself. 8. ibid., 392. 15. Fifty-seven percent of targets engaged by the US 9. ibid., 268. battleships Missouri and Wisconsin were located from the 10. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force air by UASes. Jordan, “Surveillance and Target Acquisi- Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 54, https://www.hqafdc .maxwell.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/ tion,” 887–88. Doctrine_Docs/afdd1.pdf. 16. david Jordan, “Reconnaissance/Reconnoiter,” in 11. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 525. Oxford Companion to Military History, 760–61. 12. david Jordan, “Surveillance and Target Acquisi- 17. department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Re- tion,” in The Oxford Companion to Military History, ed. Rich- view Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 ard Holmes (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), February 2006), 68, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ 887–88. pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. 13. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 453. 18. haver, “Why ISR?”

01-SLP-Deptula.indd 15 4/29/08 7:47:38 AM tary under Pres. Vladimir Putin. On 11 Janu- Fifth Air Force ary 2007, China launched its first antisatellite weapon against one of its aging weather satellites, successfully destroying the spacecraft Ready for the Future and demonstrating another building block in China’s capability to deploy asymmetric force. Maj Gen Larry D. James, USAF On 9 October 2006, North Korea detonated its first nuclear weapon, leading Japan’s prime minister to declare that the test was “unpar- n 11 August 2007, a pair of Rus- donable” and that the region was “entering a sian Tu-95 bombers flew from east- new, dangerous nuclear age.”1 ern Russia, skirted the coast of Ja- At the geographic and political nexus of all Opan, turned south, and headed for this activity stands Japan and its coalition part- Guam, where US forces were conducting Ex- nership with the United States. Since 2002 our ercise Valiant Shield, which involved over 280 leaders have moved the relationship forward aircraft, 30 ships, and more than 20,000 ser- at a record pace. The US secretaries of state vice members. Although the Russian bombers and defense and the Japanese ministers of for- never approached closer than 380 miles from eign affairs and defense have constructed the Guam, this mission offered one more indica- Defense Policy Review Initiative, a joint plan tion of the revitalization of the Russian mili- to transform the alliance and infuse it with greater capabilities. As the air component in Japan, Fifth Air Force has been instrumental in each of these events and is now engaged in multiple initiatives that will strengthen our alliance, serve as a counterbalance to potential threats in the region, and posture us for a successful future.

The Neighborhood Jim Leach, former chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, observed that “it is in Asia where the United States will face its largest geopolitical challenges in the years ahead.”2 We have strong strategic interests in this region, home to 60 percent of the world’s population, 35 percent of US trade, and an average expenditure of 2.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on the military. Those interests will only become more important over time. The very real and present military capabilities of Commu- nist countries in the region—North Korea and China in particular—and the rapid rein- vigoration of Russian military capabilities drive home this point. Recent Six Party efforts with North Korea have led to positive results toward the denu- clearization of the peninsula. However, North

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Korea still maintains one of the largest stand- rapid military modernization represent an- ing armies in the world with almost one mil- other difficulty for US forces in the region. lion personnel under arms. Abysmal economic China’s leaders have stated their intentions conditions, outdated military equipment, and and have allocated resources to pursue broad- the lack of a modernization program leave based military transformation to enable joint that country in a weakened military position. operations that encompass forcewide profes- However, these facts do not prevent the Ko- sionalization; improved training; more robust, rean People’s Army from posing a persistent, realistic joint exercises; and accelerated acqui- credible threat. Kim Jong Il’s “military first” sition of modern weapons. For the moment, policy puts North Korea’s few economic re- China’s military is focused on assuring the ca- sources into maintaining a rapidly deployable pability to prevent Taiwan’s independence force that can inflict tremendous damage in a and, if Beijing were to adopt such an ap- short time. With numerous, long-range artil- proach, to compel the island to negotiate a lery pieces capable of targeting South Korean settlement on Beijing’s terms. At the same economic centers, one of the world’s most time, China is laying the foundation for a highly trained special operations forces, and force able to accomplish broader regional and multiple ballistic missile variants, North Korea global objectives. Analysts assess that it will still represents a threat to neighboring demo- take China until the end of this decade or cratic nations. The North’s ballistic missile later to produce a modern force capable of and nuclear tests in 2006 demonstrated this defeating a moderately sized adversary. In enduring danger. building such a capability, China’s leaders North Korea’s launch of six short-range stress asymmetric strategies to leverage their ballistic missiles and a No Dong missile in July country’s advantages while exploiting the per- 2006 reflected its maturing ballistic missile ca- ceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents. pabilities. Despite the fact that the No Dong Strategists could view the antisatellite test of launch was unsuccessful and that these launches January 2007 in this context. posed little military threat directly to the China’s central doctrine emphasizes fight- United States, they displayed Kim Jong Il’s ing a local war under modern, high-technology willingness to break his declared moratorium conditions. This type of war is limited in po- of 1999 on long-range missile tests. The future litical objectives and geographic scope; highly of North Korea’s ballistic missile technology lethal and destructive; short in duration; in- resides within the development of its Taepo formation and resource intensive; highly mo- Dong-2, No Dong, and Musudan programs. bile; and jointly executed. Moreover, it possesses The Taepo Dong-2 receives an abundance of total battlespace awareness. To manage a war attention, but the No Dong and Musudan mis- effectively under these conditions, China’s de- siles are easily capable of reaching Japan min- fense now stresses projecting forces, gaining utes after launch. The unsuccessful launch of the initiative for a decisive first battle, and the No Dong indicates that the program is still conducting joint-service campaigns. a work in progress, but the Musudan’s proven, Until recently, China’s rise as an interna- Soviet-era technology represents advance- tional player has overshadowed the gradual ment within the North’s ballistic missile pro- resurgence of Russia on the international grams. These developments, along with the stage. Recent statements from President Putin nuclear test in October 2006, exhibited Kim and principal military leaders concerning US Jong Il’s tenaciousness in pursuing his own ambitions for ballistic missile defense and the agenda despite pressure from the interna- resumption of Cold War bomber patrols give tional community. cause to pay more attention to Russia than we North Korea’s ballistic missile programs have in the recent past. Russia’s growing exports and forward-deployed military presence con- from the world’s largest natural gas reserves stitute persistent threats to regional stability. and its place as the world’s second-largest oil However, China’s unclear goals concerning producer have fueled its recent military resur-

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gence. In 2006 Russia’s real GDP grew by 6.7 fort to help reduce piracy, but the fact remains percent, marking the country’s seventh con- that the strait is an extremely important choke secutive year of economic expansion. Al- point for the entire Western Pacific, requiring though its dependence on energy exports has vigilance by our forward-deployed forces in created a vulnerability to fluctuations in the the region. price of energy, energy exports in 2005 represented 20 percent of the country’s GDP and 60 percent of its export revenues. Forward Presence As mentioned above, prior to President Given the strategic importance and chal- Putin’s announcement on 17 August 2007 of lenges of the Asia region, it is absolutely es- Russian bombers returning to Cold War levels, sential to forward-deploy forces there. Repre- two Tu-95s flew toward Guam, flexing an arm sentative Leach also noted that “maintaining a of Russia’s nuclear triad. Subsequent to Putin’s robust overseas military presence has histori- remarks, activity along old Cold War patrol- cally been a key element of the United States ling routes has increased to levels not observed national security policy in the Asia-Pacific.” in 15 years. Multiple press reports concerning This forward presence promotes regional sta- scrambles by the United Kingdom and Nor- bility and “has been maintained by successive way against Russian flights suggest that Russia is directing its attention not only to the United United States Administrations, all of which States but to the West in general. The Russians have emphasized the linkage between our net- have records of filing flight plans and posting work of alliances and friendships to a regional environment in Asia conducive to confidence notices to airmen, but the resumption of pa- 3 trols is a clear sign that they want to be taken in economic growth.” Fifth Air Force and our seriously and have the economic, military, and alliance with the Japanese Air Self Defense political means to reinforce their actions. Force ( JASDF) embody that military forward Although North Korea, China, and Russia presence in Asia. Fifth Air Force has the closest pose military challenges that require constant US Air Force (USAF) base to Russia (Misawa vigilance, we cannot forget the rest of the Air Base [AB]) and one of the closest USAF “neighborhood.” The threat of violent extrem- bases to China (Kadena AB). Our coalition ism within the Pacific is focused in Southeast operations with the JASDF send a clear mes- Asia and centered on the threat from al-Qaeda- sage every day that US forward presence is ro- influenced groups such as the Abu Sayyaf bust, ready, and prepared to meet current and Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. Threats within future challenges in the region. This strong Japan, though extremely rare, do exist in such partnership stems from over 50 years of bilat- forms as Aum Shinrikyo, now known as Aleph, eral operations and long-term relationships. responsible for the sarin gas attack in 1995. Enduring presence in Japan has been key to These and many more groups require relent- the development of this association. less observation for the next asymmetric threat The key to Fifth Air Force’s presence is the to US interests. frontline air bases spanning Japan from north Not all such threats come in the form of to south. In the north, Misawa AB is home to terrorist organizations. For example, the Strait the 35th Fighter Wing, with two squadrons of Malacca, with its narrow, 500-mile-long pas- equipped with the most modern Block 50 F-16 sageway, creates a perfect location for piracy. variant and dedicated to the suppression of Even though the strait is of immense strategic enemy air defenses. Misawa is the only bilat- and economic importance, handling up to eral, joint-service base in the Western Pacific, one-quarter of the world’s sea trade and one- sharing space with the JASDF’s 3d Air Wing and quarter of all oil trade, piracy has presented a Northern Air Defense Command, as well as the continuous threat to transiting ships. In 2004 US Navy’s Information Operations Command. the navies of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singa- In the center of Japan, just outside Tokyo, pore began increasing their patrols in an ef- lies Yokota AB, home of the 374th Airlift

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Wing and the 36th Airlift Squadron—the only ing, and large-force employment. This live- forward-based tactical airlift squadron in the ordnance training for the JASDF is critical for Pacific. The wing maintains C-130 mission- its future Joint Direct Attack Munition pro- ready aircrews to conduct tactical and theater gram. The numerous activities and support airlift, special operations, aeromedical evacua- requirements necessary to execute Cope North tion, search and rescue, repatriation, and provided many bilateral-engagement oppor- humanitarian-relief missions across the Pacific. tunities. A JASDF maintenance squadron pro- In addition, the 374th has C-12s and UH-1s vided needed equipment and personnel to for operational-support airlift and serves as remove and repair an F-16CJ ejection seat the key airlift hub for the Western Pacific, sup- while deployed to Guam. The 36th Wing’s porting multiple downrange locations in both maintenance group on Andersen AFB assisted peacetime operations and contingencies. the JASDF in repairing an auxiliary power Wrapping up Fifth Air Force’s bases is Kadena unit. JASDF and USAF flying squadrons alter- AB, in Okinawa, part of the Ryukyu Islands, nated mission commanders during the large- strategically located for all of the potential force employment and conducted bilateral major contingency scenarios in the Pacific mission-coordination briefings/debriefings for theater. Kadena hosts the 18th Wing, the largest each mission. combat wing in the USAF. With F-15 fighters, Additional bilateral-training exercises in- KC-135 refuelers, E-3 Airborne Warning and clude Keen Sword and Yama Sakura, the for- Control System aircraft, and HH-60G Pave mer a live-fly air defense exercise sponsored Hawk rescue helicopters, the 18th provides by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unmatched combat presence and capability in which spanned 1,500 miles of airspace from the Western Pacific. This strong USAF - pres Okinawa to Hokkaido. Keen Sword included ence in Japan gives the United States critical fighter and support units/aircraft from the access throughout the region, sends a clear JASDF, USAF, US Navy, and US Marine Corps. message of our strategic interests there, and pro- Additionally, under this exercise’s umbrella, vides operating locations that we can quickly several “supporting exercises” took place, in- reinforce should the need arise. cluding noncombatant-evacuation operations, search and rescue, and ballistic missile defense. Yama Sakura, a Japan Ground Self De- Bilateral Operations fense Force and US Army exercise, focused on and Training the defense of Japan. Both Keen Sword and Yama Sakura were vital tools for enhancing bi- Working together continuously with our lateral cooperation/interoperability and proved JASDF counterparts is critical to the develop- critical to defending Japan and maintaining ment of integrated operational capabilities. security in the Asia-Pacific region. Fifth Air Force; Detachment 1, Thirteenth Air Another tremendous success, the Aviation Force; and the JASDF have developed a robust Training Relocation (ATR) Program, was origi- exercise schedule to improve our capabilities nally mandated under the Security Consulta- and identify areas for improvement. Several tive Committee with the intent to utilize Japa- examples highlight this trend. In July 2007, nese air bases for US training and a particular the JASDF deployed a squadron of F-2s from focus on reducing training impacts on Okinawa Misawa AB to Andersen AB, Guam, for Exer- across all the services. Aircraft from Okinawa cise Cope North 07-2—the first deployment of bases would deploy to other JASDF bases Japanese F-2 fighters outside Japan and the throughout Japan, such as Komatsu, Hyakuri, first time the JASDF has dropped live ord- and Tsuiki and conduct training there. Fifth nance with this aircraft. Japanese F-2s, E-2C Air Force units executed multiple ATR events airborne early warning aircraft, and USAF in 2007 and plan to expand the program in F‑16CJ fighters flew 303 sorties exercising dis- 2008 and beyond. The program has provided similar air combat training, surface-attack train- numerous benefits for both US and JASDF

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forces. On the US side, it affords the opportu- throughout 2008. The second system will pro- nity to deploy in country, train with different vide critical communications for “first re- weapon systems and capabilities, and see sponders” in the event of a natural disaster or JASDF bases that we have not recently visited. contingency by connecting all service compo- ATR site surveys have allowed for more accu- nents and Japanese first responders with dedi- rate assessments of capabilities as well as po- cated, shared frequencies for land-based mo- tential shortfalls of JASDF bases. The fact that bile radios. This project is in its initial stages of planners now have more realistic planning data improves the plan’s quality. In addition, coordination and engineering. these surveys have yielded increased staff inter The heart of our bilateral air and missile de- operability and coordination on maintenance fense operations—the Bilateral Air Operations and logistic support to USAF and JASDF aircraft. Coordination System—features operational-level Dormant and rarely exercised international coordination between the USAF and JASDF in agreements and acquisition cross-servicing carrying out the roles and missions of the joint agreements are being updated to support this force air component commander, area air de- ATR initiative. For the JASDF, the program of- fense commander, and airspace control au- fers the chance for a base assessment by US thority. The system deconflicts and integrates forces and increases the number of bilateral- processes and products associated with the air training venues; it also continues the operational- and space operations center (AOC) weapon integration efforts critical to both forces. system for safe and effective operations. The Across the board, these training opportunities have produced clear improvements in our JASDF and Thirteenth Air Force staffs are co- operational capabilities. The ability to learn located at Yokota in a bilateral air component from each other, synchronize our operations, coordination element (BACCE) to execute the and build key relationships will continue to close and detailed bilateral coordination nec- pay dividends and lay the foundation for suc- essary when operating under unilateral and cess well into the future. parallel lines of command and control. In 2010 the JASDF Air Defense Command will construct a new headquarters building at Yokota Command, Control, and that will include a dedicated bilateral contin- Information Sharing gency facility for the BACCE, allowing constant, In this modern age of real-time commu- side-by-side operations and greatly improving nication, networked operations, and mas- coordination and training. Additionally, the sive data sharing, it is absolutely essential JASDF is considering the acquisition of a the- that strong command, control, and commu- ater battle-management system that will sig- nications exist between the USAF and JASDF. nificantly enhance bilateral planning and co- We are moving forward in these areas on ordination. multiple fronts. The Japanese Air Defense Overall, the integration of USAF/JASDF Ground Environment represents a key im- command, control, and information sharing provement. This new system will provide not has made noticeable progress in the last few only the same air-track data as currently re- years. The hardware, links, and processes now ceived but also the capability for Air Defense in place allow near-real-time situational aware- Command to transmit data regarding ballistic missile defense. ness, reachback to Thirteenth Air Force’s AOC Additionally, we are putting in place two in Hawaii, and strong coordination capabili- communications capabilities for bilateral en- ties among the USAF, JASDF, and US Forces gagement. The first—a dual-path, digital voice Japan. The planned improvements will con- system for flight operations in the northern tinue that trend, ensuring that the right capa- Sea of Japan—is scheduled in three phases bilities are in place to meet future challenges.

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Ready for the Future ests of the United States and Japan are addressed and well protected. ❑ Throughout the decades, Fifth Air Force— which celebrated its 66th birthday on 20 Sep- tember 2007—has led the charge in the Pa- cific, from World War II to Korea to Vietnam Notes to the Cold War and, finally, to today’s strate- 1. “North Korea Claims Nuclear Test,” BBC News, 9 gic operations. The men and women of Fifth October 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/ 6032525.stm. Air Force are engaged every day with our Japa- 2. House, America and Asia in a Changing World: Hear- nese allies, improving capabilities, integrating ing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Com- our forces, and maintaining a clear and visible mittee on International Relations, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 21 September 2006, 3, http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ presence in the region. As we look to the fu- archives/109/29971.pdf. ture, Fifth Air Force will continue to set the 3. House, U.S. Security Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Re- standard for bilateral engagement with one of structuring America’s Forward Deployment: Hearing before the America’s closest allies. In this vital strategic Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Inter- national Relations, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 26 June 2003, http:// region, it will remain an enduring presence commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa88000.000/ for decades to come, ensuring that the inter- hfa88000_0.HTM.

02-SLP-James.indd 21 4/29/08 7:53:12 AM Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Remembering Almerisio Lopes

he Air and Space Power Journal family mourns the loss of Mr. Almerisio “Al” Lopes, longtime editor of Air and Space Power Journal-Portuguese T(ASPJ-P), who passed away on 14 January 2008. A native of Brazil, Al later became a US citizen and in 1974 began working as a translator for the Brazilian edition of Military Review, the professional journal of the US Army. In 1978 he took charge as editor of Military Review’s Brazilian edition, a position he held until 1989 when he became editor of ASPJ-P. He was an exceedingly meticulous editor who spared no effort to ensure that his journal brought the best cutting-edge scholarship to his international audience. During over a third of a century of distinguished service, Mr. Lopes earned many ho- nors, including the Superior Civilian Service Award from the US Army; the Medalha do Mérito Aeronáutico from the Portuguese Air Force; the Ordem do Mérito Aeronáutico, grau cavaleiro, and the Medalha do Mérito Santos-Dumont, both awarded by the Brazi- lian Air Force; and the Ordem do Mérito Mili- tar, grau cavaleiro, Medalha do Pacificador, many officers from Argentina and elsewhere. and Colaborador Emérito do Exército, from Even if not formally sponsoring them, he was the Brazilian Army. always eager to help international officers with These official awards were only the tip of anything from automotive repairs to enrolling the iceberg. Based on his generosity and spirit their children in Alabama schools. The lengths of service, Mr. Lopes built an extraordinary to which he would go to help others needed worldwide network of friends for the US mili- to be seen to be believed. A number of these tary. For example, he sponsored numerous officers rose to high ranks and fondly remem- international officers while they attended Air bered Almerisio’s kindness. Al also made friends War College, Air Command and Staff College, by helping Air University host many inter and other Air University schools. Many of national delegations of visitors. He not only these officers were from Portuguese-speaking escorted dignitaries but also conducted im- countries such as Brazil, Portugal, and Angola, pressive briefings for them in Portuguese, but Al also spoke fluent Spanish and sponsored showcasing Air University’s reputation as a

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world center of air, space, and cyber education. languages, but I think his real gift was a genu- To understand the professional-development ine charisma that helped him befriend both needs of his overseas readers and to solicit ar- the mighty and the humble. Always graceful ticles for ASPJ-P, Al traveled extensively to and eloquent, he was equally at ease with the South America, Europe, and Africa. He seemed most senior officers and the most ordinary to know almost everyone in the Brazilian and folks. He patiently forged international under- Portuguese Air Forces and visited the Angolan standing, something in short supply. After he Air Force for the first time in 2007. died, condolences written in various languages I saw Al as a diplomat who surmounted lan- poured in from all over the world. We will con- guage barriers and geography to make friends tinue to publish the Air and Space Power Journal- for the United States on a global scale. I knew Portuguese, which he ran for many years, but him for about 12 years and watched him in will always miss our dear friend Almerisio action on four continents. He spoke several Lopes. ❑

We encourage you to e-mail your comments to us at [email protected] or [email protected]. We reserve the right to edit your remarks.

REMEMBERING ALMERISIO LOPES focus topics of the journal, I see the editor’s painstaking efforts in offering readers great On behalf of the Portuguese Air Force, for- articles that reflect the various aspects of US mer chief of staff Gen Manuel Taveira Martins airpower. Finally, I want to stress that the birth and I would like to express our deepest sad- ness for the unexpected death of Almerisio of this Chinese edition happened at the right Lopes, editor of the Air and Space Power Journal, point in time for the following reasons: Sino- Portuguese edition, and extend our sincere US high-level militaries have increased the fre- condolences to his family for such a terrible quencies of bilateral visits; defense ministries loss. have agreed to set up a Sino-US military hot- line; militaries of both countries have found Gen Luís Evangelista Esteves de Araújo Chief of Staff, Portuguese Air Force more common ground in United Nations and Lisbon, Portugal world affairs; and China’s recent successful launch of the Chang’e-1 circumlunar satellite has created a new wave of interest among Chi- INTRODUCING THE CHINESE ASPJ nese readers in “space” along with “air.” It is I read with interest the first and second issues my belief that more and more mainland Chi- of Air and Space Power Journal, Chinese edition, nese readers—potentially the biggest reading and concluded that this is a journal of value. community of your journal—will pay serious First, I very much agree with the purpose and attention to and discuss the viewpoints pre- direction of the journal. It aims to open a win- sented in your articles, which eventually will dow of exchange between Chinese and US air help lead to the goal of “exchange towards forces and military-research institutions, with transparency.” the forward-thinking intention of promoting Yan Weiping bilateral transparency between the two coun- Retired Military Academy Instructor tries. Next, from the general framework and Nanjing, China

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My reading of Air and Space Power Journal, Chi- EXPOSING THE INFORMATION nese edition, tells me that this is a high-quality DOMAIN MYTH military academic journal, based on the latest I plunged into Maj Geoffrey F. Weiss’s article military technological information and con- “Exposing the Information Domain Myth: A taining objective strategic analysis as well as New Concept for Air Force and Information fluent language. It is a journal that audiences Operations Doctrine” (Spring 2008) with a are excited to read and happy to share. Please certain skepticism, but soon it became appar- accept my heartfelt congratulations on the ent that the author “gets it.” I say this as a vet- success of this journal and my best wishes for eran of the late-1990s debate in the intelligence its continued growth. May it continue offering community over such concepts as “informa- rich information to Chinese readers. tion dominance” and “information superiority,” Liu Canglang which had mercifully short lives. The primary Fairfax, Virginia objective of information warfare (a term we can’t use due to political reasons) as well as other military operations is the human mind. After all, the mind comes up with its picture of LORENZ ON LEADERSHIP: PART 2 reality and evaluates perceived risks and re- I enjoyed Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz’s article wards for any action or nonaction. The mind “Lorenz on Leadership: Part 2” (Spring 2008). is the true battleground. It is also the most dif- I am one of many civilians going through a ficult battleground to understand and predict. difficult time getting used to the new National Therefore, researchers are now exploring Security Personnel System (NSPS) performance- (some more effectively than others) concepts rating system. My first NSPS rating was only such as behavioral influence analysis in an effort to understand, predict, and utilize what average. This was a shock because my service can or cannot influence someone to take ac- wasn’t just average. I worked hundreds of hours tions advantageous to us. And that is the op- of unpaid overtime managing an airfield. erative essence of information operations. I Prior to the NSPS, I had never minded put- believe that Air Force thinking about informa- ting in the extra hours, and I usually felt that tion operations is finally getting to where it my hard work was rewarded and reflected in should have been in the early 1990s. my rating. When I received the “valued em- Lt Col Keith Anthony, USAFR ployee” rating, I didn’t feel valued. To be hon- Xenia, Ohio est, I felt that the rating system had gone cold, and I felt low. Then I read General Lorenz’s Even though the author of “Exposing the In- article, and it reminded me of several ideas re- formation Domain Myth: A New Concept for lated to service that helped me get through Air Force and Information Operations Doc- the loss, grief, and change. First, I’m not entitled trine” wants to shift intelligence, surveillance, to an above-average rating, even if I feel like I and reconnaissance (ISR) operations doctrine deserve one. Also, my career is a marathon, under information operations (IO) because proper ISR operations are “an essential aspect and I can use the experience to motivate my- of IO” (p. 57), I feel that this is an incorrect self in positive ways. Finally, my service is not assumption. just about me, so I need to “get over it” and Major Weiss’s argument does not address press on positively in order to lead my people how or why ISR falls under IO. Using his pro- effectively and to do my best for my country. posed definition of IO as “the integrated em- Thanks for the very mature point of view. It’s ployment of Air Force capabilities to influ- some of the best advice I’ve heard lately. ence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary Gerald Sikorski information, information systems, perceptions, Beale AFB, California and/or decision making while protecting our

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own” (p. 57) does not equate to or cover the military readiness, namely, the increasing use definition of ISR from Air Force Doctrine of contractor services and the use of bonuses Document 2-9, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Re- as an incentive for retention, will gradually connaissance Operations, dated 17 July 2007. transform the volunteer force into a merce- That manual defines ISR as “an activity that nary force. There won’t be a clear line of desynchronizes and integrates the planning and marcation; it will occur over time, but it could operation of sensors, assets, processing, ex- have fatal results. ploitation, and dissemination systems in direct Col Walter J. Boyne, USAF, Retired support of current and future operations” (p. 1). Ashburn, Virginia The tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) phase of ISR operations is critical not only to IO but also to every phase EFFECTS-BASED INFORMATION of Air Force influence operations from counter- BATTLE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD air to targeting. Good TPED has nothing to In “Effects-Based Information Battle in the do with the influence, disruption, or corrup- Muslim World” (Spring 2008), Remy Mauduit’s tion of an enemy system, but with monitoring call for a counteroffensive to terrorist rhetoric and reporting in a manner that allows deci- is right on. His list of objectives and themes sion makers to launch operations against the for a proposed Department of Defense Islamic enemy decision-making process. Even as the Information Center is outstanding. His obser- author concludes that all aspects of Air Force vations that Islam is in transition, that terror operations—flying or otherwise—belong to and Islam are not the same, and that general- IO, ISR still falls outside this field because it is izations about various movements have caused a force enabler. confusion are critical. However, Mr. Mauduit’s Although I focus on ISR in my response, call to “refrain from framing terrorism in an ultimately I think that the author has made Islamic religious context” (p. 110) requires the opposite jump, moving from what he saw overlooking the reality that these terrorists as too narrow a definition of IO to one that is claim to be Muslims and diminishes incentives too broad. I think that all doctrine is best for moderates to confront those who are hi- served by a narrower interpretation. Narrow jacking their religion. doctrine allows all users to focus on their own In the long run, only Muslims themselves operational challenges within their areas be- can effectively police terrorism perpetrated by fore moving on to integrate those operations. other Muslims, and only Muslims themselves In our current operational scheme, doctrinal can effectively separate terrorism from Islam advocates represent their operational require- in the consciousness of other Muslims. ments at the air and space operations center We know that linking violence to Islam em- through a liaison officer to provide a unified barrasses Muslims. Recall, for example, the whole. Expanding everything from a single IO response to remarks Pope Benedict XVI made voice in the crowd to only an IO voice to stra- in 2006 about violence in Muslim history. If, tegic leadership does nothing to improve that contrary to Mr. Mauduit’s recommendation, unified whole. political, business, cultural, and religious lead- Maj Mark Peters, USAF ers and their spokespeople persist in calling Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina the terrorists what they call themselves, which is Muslims, and insist on questioning, based A LOOK DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE on the behavior of these terrorists, the nature of Islam, then Muslims will have increased in- After reading Maj Bryan D. Watson’s article “A centive to clean up their own house by purg- Look Down the Slippery Slope: Domestic Op- ing the terrorists from among them to restore erations, Outsourcing, and the Erosion of respectability and dignity to Islam. Military Culture” (Spring 2008), I’d say there In its struggle for what Mr. Mauduit calls is a very real danger that two new elements of “values, identity, and place in the world” (p. 109),

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contemporary Islam is like a household with wingman employing ordnance on his or her an alcoholic father. As long as outsiders coop- first combat mission all the way up to the joint erate with the family members’ denial, they force air component commander approving enable the family to avoid treatment and rean air strike against insurgent leaders. This main dysfunctional. Combating terrorism is thought-provoking piece should be required like a 12-step recovery process. Getting the reading for air and space operations center family of Islam to admit to and face its internal personnel in Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. All Air- problem is the first step to restoring peace to men entering the center would benefit from the family. reflecting on Major Brown’s words. Terrorism and Islam may be different and Lt Col James Kockler, USAF irreconcilable, but Muslim-supported and per- Norfolk Naval Air Station, Virginia petrated terrorism done in the name of Islam is a Muslim problem that Muslims can solve if we hold them accountable to do so. DAWN OF THE COGNETIC AGE Chaplain (Maj) Bruce Sidebotham, USAR Is Lt Col Bruce K. Johnson’s article “Dawn of Camp Robinson, Arkansas the Cognetic Age: Fighting Ideological War by Putting Thought in Motion with Impact” TO BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB? (Winter 2007) really a new way of thinking? One of the things that strikes me is that we I welcome Maj Jason M. Brown’s article “To have spent an awful lot of time and effort since Bomb or Not to Bomb? Counterinsurgency, 11 September 2001 reorganizing and develop- Airpower, and Dynamic Targeting” (Winter ing new task forces for specific missions. We’ve 2007), in which the author recommends ad- also spent a lot of intellectual capital on trying ditional doctrine and personnel to address to define the type(s) of war we are fighting kinetic airpower operations in a counterinsur- and going to fight (fourth-generation, asym- gency effort. Major Brown correctly suggests metric, irregular, global war on terrorism, that the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) etc). I really do like Colin Gray’s maxim no. 14 Center develop multiservice tactics, techniques, in his new book Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on and procedures (MTTP) for time-sensitive tar- War, Peace, and Strategy (Praeger, 2007): “If geting (TST) during a counterinsurgency. In Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz Did Not 2004 ALSA delivered a well-written MTTP for Say It, It Is Probably Not Worth Saying” (p. TST that’s already referenced throughout the 58). I think as we wrestle with trying to change joint force by both operations and intelligence personnel. Since ALSA is currently revising definitions, strategy, concepts, doctrine, and this MTTP, adding an appendix to address organizations, we should keep in mind Gray’s counterinsurgency operations would be both wise words. timely and relevant. COL David S. Maxwell, USA In addition Major Brown advocates that Air Fort Bragg, North Carolina Force Weapons School graduates; targeteers; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- THE INADVISABILITY OF POSTHU- sance experts integrate within Army division MOUSLY PROMOTING BILLY MITCHELL headquarters staffs to supplement the air support operations group (ASOG). In my I would like to make a comment about Col opinion, this proposal would maximize the Phillip Meilinger’s article “The Inadvisability ASOG’s ability to integrate air-to-ground op- of Posthumously Promoting Billy Mitchell” erations and enable this joint Army–Air Force (Summer 2007). Allow me to disagree par- team to achieve the joint force commander’s tially with the author. Colonel Meilinger says TST objectives. the following about General Mitchell’s literary Finally, I thank Major Brown for writing an work: “In the case of Billy Mitchell, he contrib- article relevant to everyone from the youngest uted relatively little after leaving the Air Corps

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in 1926. He lived for another decade, but in happening in the Air Corps, combined with truth, he became largely a forgotten figure, the fact that he seemed to run out of new seldom called upon by his country or his ser- ideas, his writings after 1926 are—to me—a vice. His one book, Skyways: A Book on Modern disappointment. In short, Mitchell’s most fer- Aeronautics, merely rehashed old ideas previ- tile period was from 1919 till 1925, when he ously published” (p. 35). was, essentially, the deputy head of the Air Billy Mitchell wrote much more than just Service. his famous book Winged Defense: The Develop- Thanks again for your wonderful letter. ment and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Eco- Col Phil Meilinger, USAF, Retired nomic and Military (1925) and the Skyways Chicago, Illinois book to which Colonel Meilinger refers in the quotation above. As a matter of fact, he COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER published some books (plus numerous articles) about aviation after leaving the US Army In his article “Counterinsurgency Airpower: in 1926. Air-Ground Integration for the Long War” Finally, thank you very much for the oppor- (Fall 2006), Col Howard D. Belote states that tunity to express my admiration for General the Marine Corps “published an unsupported Mitchell in this highly regarded forum. analysis suggesting that some Air Force JTACs’ Lt Col Mauro Barbosa Siqueira, Brazilian Air Force [joint terminal attack controllers’] unfamil- Rio de Janeiro, Brazil iarity with the ground scheme of maneuver proved that the Marine Corps trained its for- Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Mauro read the ward air controllers better than the Air Force Portuguese version of this article, available at trained its JTACs” (p. 61). http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinter I disagree that a formal “analysis” must be national/apj-p/2007/4tri07/meilinger.html. conducted to reach a conclusion. Colonel Belote’s article mentions Lt Col Gary Kling; I THE INADVISABILITY OF POSTHU- have received Colonel Kling’s brief and have MOUSLY PROMOTING BILLY MITCHELL: spoken with him at length about Fallujah. I THE AUTHOR RESPONDS am a qualified JTAC who has been assigned to a USMC rifle battalion as a ground forward air Thanks so much for your interesting and in- controller (FAC) and division air officer. I sightful letter. It’s true that Mitchell did not have worked with and instructed Navy SEALs, stop writing after his retirement in 1926, but I combat controllers, Air Force enlisted terminal would argue that his most fertile period was attack controllers, as well as Marine FACs and over by that point. For example, his world war JTACs; the conclusion reached by the Marine memoirs were simply that—his diary from the Corps Center for Lessons Learned—that Ma- war period published after his death. His rine FACs were trained better than Air Force book/pamphlet on his tour in Alaska prior to JTACs—is exactly what I experienced. This is World War I made no mention of airpower at what the Marines experienced in Iraq, and it all. Similarly, his biography of Gen Adolphus is what I experienced both as an F-18D weapon Greely was a discussion about the work of the systems officer FAC (airborne) and during a Signal Corps, of which Greely was head, with a tour flying F-15Es with the Air Force. Knowing thinly disguised attempt by Mitchell to discuss the ground scheme of maneuver is critical to his own activities. In my view, his Skyways book executing the ground commander’s intent, was merely a rehash of old ideas that he had and the Air Force consistently made this an written about in the early 1920s. I see nothing afterthought. The Marine Corps has been new in this book. So again, I would argue that training enlisted and officer JTACs who are Mitchell certainly did not cease writing after nonrated for the past several years to augment 1926 (he needed the money), but because he a rifle battalion’s FACs. Nonaviator JTACs do was no longer plugged into what was actually not perform as well as Marine pilots or Marine

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naval flight officers who are serving as ground THE FIRST RULE OF MODERN WARFARE FACs. Some nonaviators are superb JTACs, but experience has shown that the Marine Col Richard Szafranski’s article “The First FACs will almost always perform better than Rule of Modern Warfare: Never Bring a Knife the Marine JTAC—or any other JTAC. The to a Gunfight” (Winter 2005) has made me data regarding academic and employment think. As a Western norm, the saying “never performance of students going through bring a knife to a gunfight” typically reflects a USMC Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Western mind-set, which differs greatly from School for both prospective FACs and JTACs the Oriental way of thinking. The Western way supports this claim. Additionally, I have dis- is more linear, and the Oriental is curvier. cussed the training given to student Air Force As far as a fighter plane is concerned, an JTACs and air liaison officers (ALO) at Nellis airborne machine gun can be regarded as the AFB, Nevada, with friends who have served as “knife” and a missile as the “gun.” As early as ALOs, and I have attended USMC TACP School the 1960s, the US Air Force stopped bringing in California. The course of instruction given knives, removing the machine guns from its by the Marine Corps is indeed a better syllabus. fighter planes. Then the F-4 and MiGs had a A quick comparison of lectures and required terminal controls necessary to complete the few duels (over Vietnam) in which the former course will confirm this fact. Examination of was good with guns and the latter with knives. the Marine Corps TACP course of instruction The Air Force enjoyed a superb advantage and the qualification of Air Force pilots and over the MiGs at mid- and long-range fighting. navigators as qualified JTACs may actually im- But when the MiGs managed to get close and prove the application of airpower in support of wave the knife, F-4 pilots immediately pan- the Army or other joint forces. icked. That may explain why the US fighters Maj C. J. “Galf” Galfano, USMC were soon rearmed with machine guns. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Certainly, with the development of long- Quantico, Virginia range precision strike weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, the situation changes dramati- MY FATHER AND I AND SABURO SAKAI cally from that of the past, setting a favorable background for the US military to bring up While doing some research on World War II the same old “bring no knife” tune—that is, to Japanese naval aviators, I happened to come stress the decisive factor of the “gun” in asym- across Col Francis Stevens’s article “My Father and I and Saburo Sakai” (Chronicles Online metric conflict. The US military circle may as- Journal, 21 June 2006). I’ve read about many sume that all directly manned weapons belong amazing things done by members of our mili- to the “knife” category, and eventually all air- tary, but never have I heard of something as craft, tanks, and warships will be operated by astonishing and noteworthy as what Colonel robots on the battlefield. Stevens did in his interaction with Saburo Well, the reality is that US forces have Sakai. Although Sakai was renowned for his brought “guns” to the knife fight in Iraq, only skill and honor in aerial combat, Colonel Ste- to find themselves bogged down in it. Itis vens is a great man in terms of a far more im- therefore wiser to “keep a knife in a gunfight.” portant virtue—the personal strength of char- Li Jian acter first to forgive and then to befriend a Chief Editor, Global Defense Web Site former enemy who felled not only many of his Beijing, China countrymen but also his own father. It was a beautiful act of humanity to which more people Editor’s Note: Mr. Li read the Chinese version of should aspire. this article, available at http://www.airpower Roger Van Royen .maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-c/2007/ Santa Rosa, California fal07/szafranski.htm.

Prelaunch Ricochet 2008-2.indd 28 4/29/08 7:53:55 AM ASPJ

Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Expeditionary Operations

raditionally, expeditionary op- the Air Force to concentrate on producing desired erations have called for the physical de- effects overseas, regardless of whether those effects ployment of forces, but that notion is come from physically deploying equipment and evolving. Practically all Airmen are as- personnel. Tsigned to one of 10 air and space expeditionary Some Air Force operations are difficult to cate- forces, and Air Force leaders constantly reiterate gorize as expeditionary in the traditional sense—or the importance of being ready to deploy. Yet, cur- even as predominantly air, space, or cyber. For ex- rent joint doctrine defines an expeditionary force ample, operators in Nevada remotely control un- as “an armed force organized to accomplish a spe- manned aircraft systems (UAS) that fly combat sor- cific objective in a foreign country,” a definition ties in Iraq. These seem to be expeditionary air that does not specifically require physical deploy- operations, yet they rely heavily on space and cyber- ment overseas.1 Is the Air Force properly emphasiz- space systems to transmit signals. In a reversal of ing the physical-deployment aspect of expedition- traditional roles, the UAS’s ground crew may physi- ary operations? cally deploy to the combat zone while its operators Our service operates in the air, space, and cyber- stay home. Combat assessment and other intelli- space domains, but only the air domain lends itself gence activities that transcend single domains and to traditional expeditionary operations. Flying “reach back” to harness the talents of analysts in units typically forward-deploy personnel and equip- the United States can also resist simple categoriza- ment, establish bases, conduct operations until they tion. However one categorizes these “cross-domain” achieve their objectives, and then redeploy. Expe- operations, the key point is that they produce expeditionary space and cyber operations involve less ditionary combat effects and may represent the need for overseas deployment. Space operations wave of the future.4 place satellites in orbits that traverse the world, but Expeditionary operations constantly morph as space units and personnel often remain at their Airmen seek innovative ways to integrate and lever- home stations. Cyberspace units can also perform age air, space, and cyber power. Whether the Air many wartime duties without deploying. Force is properly balancing physical deployment Our chief of staff provided important guidance with an effects-based approach to operations re- about expeditionary operations in his white paper mains to be seen, but Air and Space Power Journal, on Air Force strategy, which mentions the word ex- the professional journal of the Air Force, dedicates peditionary only once.2 However, it also touts the Air this issue to promoting dialogue about this vital Force’s “Global Vigilance, Global Reach and Global topic. ❑ Power” (emphasis in original)—concepts that mean, among other things, monitoring opponents, positioning Air Force assets, destroying targets, and projecting other desired effects worldwide.3 De- Notes spite these expeditionary-sounding attributes, the 1. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- global war on terror challenges the service to dem- tionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as onstrate how it contributes to irregular warfare. amended through 17 October 2007), 193, http://www Daily news reports describe soldiers and marines .dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. engaged in ground combat yet seldom mention 2. Gen T. Michael Moseley, The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force, CSAF White Paper (Wash- Airmen. Highlighting Airmen’s physical presence ington, DC: Department of the Air Force, Office of the in the war zone may offer one way of counteract- Chief of Staff, 29 December 2007), 6, http://www.af.mil/ ing any potential public perceptions that the Air shared/media/document/AFD-080207-048.pdf. Force is not fully engaged in the fight; however, an 3. ibid., 1. effects-based approach to operations would require 4. ibid., 2.

Focus Area.indd 29 5/8/08 8:29:45 AM In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers are free to join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected] or [email protected]. Commentary on Lt Col Kenneth Beebe’s “Reply to ‘Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?’ ”

Col August G. “Greg” Jannarone, USAF, Retired MSgt Charles G. “Chuck” Doig, USAF, Retired*

e read with some interest Lt We offer some additional points for discussion Col Kenneth Beebe’s “Reply to and consideration in answer to the rhetorical ‘DefiningI nformation Operations question he proposes regarding a “separate” Forces: What Do We Need?’ ” influence career field for the Air Force, the -im W(Winter 2007). We generally concur with his plication that the Air Force’s “primary” PSYOP commentary; however, we wish to address the role is exclusively dissemination, and his con- following passages: cerns for IO and Air Force Cyber Command. When it comes to influence operations, I think We agree that an Air Force specialty code we need to ask ourselves if it makes sense to have (AFSC) for influence operations is unneces- a separate “influence” career field in the Air sary. In fact, in all practical senses (e.g., the Force. . . . Since the Air Force’s primary PSYOP time needed to train in multiple operational [psychological operations] role involves dissemi- disciplines, the required educational background nating the Army’s PSYOP products, the authors’ and assignment experience, and the logistics prescription makes this individual essentially a and personnel-management challenges of a deception planner. . . . This doesn’t require a career force), creating an influence opera- career force so much as it requires dedicated planners whom the Air Force can train and edu- tions AFSC is all but impossible. However, we cate in influence yet still capitalize on their prior believe that a good argument can be made for experiences. a special-duty AFSC for PSYOP. Why? The Air Force currently uses special experi- . . . What concerns me, however, is that our Air ence identifiers (SEI) to distinguish IO-trained Force leadership really hasn’t decided what to do with IO [information operations]. It appears personnel and has an officer SEI for PSYOP. to me that the creation of Air Force Cyber Com- The Air Staff is already working on an enlisted mand represents the beginning of the end for PSYOP SEI. However, the Air Force does not IO in our service (31–32). manage AFSCs by SEI and rarely codes unit

*Greg Jannarone, who served 27 years in the Air Force and in joint special operations, is currently director of Air University’s Behavioral Influences Analysis Center and an assistant professor at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. ChuckD oig, who served 21 years in the Air Force as a targeteer, weaponeer, and psychological operations planner, is currently a contractor supporting the Air Force Information Operations Center at Lackland AFB, Texas.

1-Merge-Jannarone Doig.indd 30 4/29/08 7:54:59 AM THE MERGE 31

manning documents with the necessary SEIs (e.g., AFSC 61SB—Behavioral Scientist or (especially true for PSYOP). Therefore, indi- AFSC 16F—Foreign Area Officer). This way viduals assigned to positions requiring PSYOP the Air Force can bring in the proper mix of training and expertise often do not receive the professionals at the correct grade level, leave necessary training prior to their assignment to them in the special duty for one or two tours the position. This also makes it difficult to (so they don’t kill their careers), and send them track individuals who already have the neces- back to their original AFSC with a much broader sary background and assign them to positions perspective of PSYOP and IO. It would also requiring PSYOP training and expertise. A enable Air Force personnel to receive more special-duty AFSC would alleviate these issues. robust PSYOP training (most likely through Additionally, the Office of the Secretary ofD e- the US Army) than is currently available. fense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as ser- We agree with Colonel Beebe that planning vice doctrine and policies, identify PSYOP as (and, we would add, targeting) skills are as vital an operational discipline; furthermore, cur- to a PSYOP professional as they are to a de- rent Air Force IO doctrine describes it as one ception professional. In fact, the Air Force of several influence-operations disciplines.1 possesses considerable military occupational Joint doctrine and Department of Defense strength at all levels of planning, from tactical (DOD) directives require the Air Force (along through strategic. Beginning with a planner, with the other military departments and ser- social scientist, targeteer, or experienced avia- vices) to do the following: tor provides the basis for building a compe- tent PSYOP professional. (1) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate PSYOP training and planning In the Air Force, if a function has no AFSC, skills. program element code, or organizational basis (flight, squadron, group, or even a detach- (2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces ment), it has no real programmatic existence. to execute PSYOP actions and dedicated PSYOP currently lacks all of these things, and PSYOP forces and equipment. the lack of a special-duty AFSC is both a cause (3) develop Service PSYOP doctrine relating to and consequence of this situation. the primary functions assigned to the par- We disagree with Colonel Beebe’s charac- ticular Service. terization of dissemination as the primary Air (4) Provide PSYOP forces or detachments (not Force PSYOP mission. Certainly dissemina- assigned to the Commander, USSOCOM tion is the traditional or legacy role most [US Special Operations Command]) to closely associated with the Air Force—one in combatant commanders for service in for- which the Air Force is clearly most comfort- eign countries. able—but we argue that the idea of PSYOP is (5) Provide departmental intelligence and vastly greater than delivery, dissemination, or counterintelligence assets that are trained, broadcasts; in fact, these are merely the equipped, and organized to support plan- “mechanisms” used to conduct planned ac- ning and conduct PSYOP. tions for intended psychological effects. The central idea involves conducting psychological (6) incorporate PSYOP instruction into Service actions that apply cognitive (and often social training and education programs.2 and organizational) influence effects on the per- Establishment of a special-duty AFSC for ceptions, reasoning, and decision making of a spe- PSYOP would enable the Air Force to better cific adversary actor, other human being, or meet its DOD-directed PSYOP responsibilities. group of interest. Further, it would allow the accession of trained In fact, the Air Force can generate an enor- and experienced Air Force officers and non- mous range of psychologically significant ac- commissioned officers at the mid- to senior- tions from air, space, and cyberspace domains— grade levels from AFSCs that readily lend them- most of which can be planned and assessed in selves to training and application of PSYOP advance if PSYOP planning develops appro-

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priate measures of effectiveness. Even the with IO” (p. 32). We share his concern, and, at Army recognizes the inherent psychological a more focused level, we voice the same con- effects of airpower and the psychological im- cern regarding PSYOP and influence opera- pact of all kinetic military operations. Army tions. Yet, in our opinion, there is no choice Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30 / Marine Corps involved. The Air Force must do PSYOP. The Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-40.6, Psycho- decisions are how much, how well, and with logical Operations, discusses and defines a psy- what degree of professionalism and joint inte- chological operations action (PSYACT) as “an ac- gration. We would also argue that these same tion conducted by non-PSYOP personnel, that points hold true for all of IO, and, unlike Col- is planned primarily to affect the behavior of a onel Beebe, we believe that the creation of an TA [target audience].”3 Accordingly, when Air Force Cyber Command—assuming that PSYACTs are planned in support of an exist- our service correctly defines and adequately ing PSYOP program, the Army requires syn- resources its missions and roles (especially in- chronous integration and execution of each fluence operations and PSYOP)—may finally PSYACT with its own products (e.g., leaflets mark the beginning of full-spectrum IO within and broadcasts). the Air Force and not the beginning of the At the end of his commentary, Colonel end. ❑ Beebe voices his concern that “our Air Force Maxwell AFB, Alabama leadership really hasn’t decided what to do Lackland AFB, Texas

Notes 1. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc- doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf; and Air Force Doctrine tion 3110.05D, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to Document 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, FY 2006, 8 November https://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/ 2007; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S-3321.1, AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-5.pdf. Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Ser- 2. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, II-6. vices in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of War (U), 26 July 1984; Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Doctrine for Joint The JP cites DODD S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations. Psychological Operations, 5 September 2003, http://www 3. Army FM 3-05.30 / MCRP 3-40.6, Psychological Opera- .dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_53.pdf; JP 3‑13, Infor- tions, 15 April 2005, Glossary-16, http://www.fas.org/irp/ mation Operations, 13 February 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/ doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf.

As technology matures and proliferates, and as access to space becomes available to more countries, organizations, and individuals, threats to America’s air, space, and cyberspace capabilities will continue to grow and evolve. America’s Airmen aim to be ready to meet these and all other threats to our Nation. —2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement

1-Merge-Jannarone Doig.indd 32 4/29/08 7:55:00 AM Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use this department to let readers know about items of interest.

Adding Less-Lethal Arrows to the Quiver for Counterinsurgency Air Operations

Col Ernie Haendschke, USAF*

he conflict in Iraq has enabled executing ground operations at the strategic, the war fighter to improve, and in operational, and tactical levels. The discussion some cases rewrite, many counter also reinforces the need for Airmen to con insurgency (COIN) tactics, techniques, tinue their tradition of being innovative and Tand procedures and has illustrated some gaps agile as we improve our future combat capa in our COIN capabilities. In this article, I ex bilities across the spectrum of conflict. plain one of those gaps in our weapons inven tory and address how we resolved it to give Air men two more weapons for supporting COIN Counterinsurgency Air operations. This discussion is as much about Operations in Iraq what we added to our inventory as how we added it. The Air Force has been involved across the In mid-2007, the war fighter identified a spectrum of conflict in the Iraqi theater of op need for a kinetic effect to engage insurgents erations for 18 years now. High-intensity stra in urban areas during troops-in-contact en tegic bombing campaigns took center stage gagements (a close air support [CAS] type of during the opening weeks of Operation Desert mission) while keeping noncombatant casual Storm and the opening days of the “shock and ties to a minimum and allowing strikes near awe” campaign that toppled Saddam Hussein. culturally significant or historical objects or During this period, the Air Force also spent sites.1 Insurgents use such places as sanctuar years patrolling the skies over Iraq enforcing ies, negating the CAS kinetic option for cer the no-fly zones, providing humanitarian aid, tain target areas. The following description of and occasionally showcasing its precision- how coalition forces identified and filled a engagement capabilities when confronted with COIN weapons-capability gap offers important hostile intent according to the rules of engage lessons learned that validate the importance ment as part of Operations Southern Watch of having Airmen involved in planning and and Northern Watch.

*The author is professor of air and space studies at the University of Maryland and a Fighter Weapons School and Test Pilot School graduate. He deployed last year to Baghdad, Iraq, as the deputy director of the air component coordination element.

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The one constant throughout this period • It wasn’t military-centric (i.e., it involves has been our air supremacy over the skies of much interdepartmental and interagency Iraq. Not since 1991 have US service personnel coordination). had to wonder if the aircraft flying over them • It was hard to justify big-ticket, high-tech in Iraq are friendly or not. We cannot take this hardware acquisitions that are the ser for granted, nor should we overlook it since vices’ bread and butter (i.e., IW relies controlling the skies factors into all air opera considerably less on the high-tech hard tions that currently support the conflict in ware used in traditional war fighting). Iraq. Future conflicts, even future COIN op erations, may not allow us the same luxury, so • It is complex and difficult to successfully we must remain prepared to fight to achieve execute, so some people preferred to ig control of the skies and thus allow freedom of nore it.4 action on the ground. Today in Iraq, our air These reasons reflect a mind-set that focused power is just as overwhelming and dominat more on previous, successful force-on-force ing—but in different ways due to the nature of conflicts within the military’s comfort zone the conflict. than on less-than-successful, messy, complex We can best categorize the conflict after conflicts outside that zone. The US military our invasion of Iraq in 2003 as irregular war has a mixed track record in this arena in fare (IW), which Air Force Doctrine Docu Southeast Asia, Latin American, and Africa. ment (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, defines as This myopic focus is now a thing of the past. “a violent struggle among state and non-state Since late 2003, the conflict in Iraq has actors for legitimacy and influence over the highlighted this type of warfare and resulted relevant populations. IW favors indirect and in definitive actions. The Army and Marine asymmetric approaches, though it may em Corps codeveloped Field Manual (FM) 3-24 ploy the full range of military and other capa and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication bilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, in December influence, and will.”2 This type of warfare has 2006, and the Air Force subsequently released unique characteristics that require a different AFDD 2-3 to help shape how the Air Force or approach and associated strategies than the ganizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces ones we trained in for traditional warfare. IW for this type of warfare. This is all good and is characterized according to the activities re will ensure that future Airmen are ready for quired to conduct it. At its core lie insurgency the challenges associated with IW operations and COIN. and related activities, including COIN, sup Traditionally the military has been reluc port to COIN, counterterrorism, shaping and tant to maintain its IW doctrine—particularly deterring, and support to insurgency.5 true since the end of the Vietnam War. Prior The Air Force currently supports COIN op to December 2006, the Army had not pub erations, just as it does all types of warfare, lished a manual devoted exclusively to COIN through 17 key operational functions.6 For ex for 20 years. The Marine Corps had not pub ample, since the overthrow of Saddam and lished one for 25 years.3 Until 2007 the Air the cessation of “major combat operations,” Force lacked official IW guidelines or doctrine we have made extensive use of counterland; except for the area of foreign internal de information operations; combat support; com fense. We relegated IW doctrine to the bottom mand and control; airlift; air refueling; special of our priorities or even overlooked it for operations; intelligence, surveillance, and re many reasons, including the following: connaissance (ISR); personnel-recovery opera tions; navigation and positioning; and weather • It wasn’t what we had trained for (i.e., it’s services. However, due to the nature and char not the kind of conflict the military wants acteristics of COIN operations, some func to fight). tions are more relevant than others and are

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taking center stage. In fact we steadily in one example of how the current conflict in creased the number of ISR and CAS sorties in Iraq is rewriting tactics, techniques, and pro 2007. For example, ISR missions by unmanned cedures for airpower employment as we bring aerial vehicles in Iraq surged by nearly a third new technology into the Iraqi theater of opera in the first six months of 2007 in conjunction tions and the conflict evolves. with the troop buildup.7 The number of CAS missions also grew by 30–40 percent in the spring of 2007.8 During this time, we also in Kinetic Air Operations and creased the number of bombs dropped. In Counterinsurgency the first six months of that year, Air Force and Navy aircraft released 437 bombs and missiles Although most COIN operations empha in the Iraqi theater of operations, a more than size nonkinetic functions, kinetic operations fivefold increase over the 86 used in the same have their place, commensurate with the joint period in 2006 and three times more than in force commander’s objectives, as recent in the second half of 2006.9 creases in CAS missions demonstrate. Some of With the dramatic increase in unmanned these missions have been preplanned strikes, aerial vehicles and the use of conventional fight but most have come as a result of troops-in- ers equipped with Remotely Operated Video contact encounters with insurgents or during Enhancement Receiver (ROVER) capability, the armed-overwatch missions that have caught Iraqi theater of operations is seeing the evolu insurgents emplacing improvised explosive tion of new missions, currently called armed devices (IED). overwatch and nontraditional ISR. ROVER Economy of force, a principle of war, is very capability enables ground commanders and appropriate during a discussion of kinetic joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) to COIN operations. According to the latest see real-time video of the battlespace from the draft of AFDD 1, “Air Force Basic Doctrine,” aircraft’s perspective, thereby providing critical “economy of force is defined as the judicious battlefield situational awareness and targeting employment and distribution of forces. . . . Al capability.10 Traditional CAS and armed recon though this principle suggests the use of naissance missions have been supplemented overwhelming force in one sense it also rec by the armed-overwatch mission.11 As opposed ommends guarding against the ‘overkill’ in to armed reconnaissance, armed overwatch herent in the use of excessive force. This is concerns itself with persistent surveillance particularly relevant when excessive force can and long dwell times—a sort of unblinking destroy the gaining and maintaining of legiti eye over the battlefield, coupled with the ca macy and support for an operation.”13 FM pability to engage lethally, when and if required. 3‑24 / MCWP 3-33.5 addresses the potential Although the MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial for times when overwhelming force is neces vehicle is the current all-star for this type of sary, such as destroying or intimidating an op mission, it will soon share this honor with the ponent or reassuring a population. But the MQ-9 Reaper, its larger, faster, and more lethal commander must also use appropriate and derivative. Platforms other than the known, measured levels of force. This entails applying dedicated ISR platforms conduct nontradi “force precisely so that it accomplishes the tional ISR—in Iraq, these are usually conven mission without causing unnecessary loss of tional fighters equipped with OR VER capability, life, suffering,” or physical property damage.14 For which enables them to share their full-motion ground forces, this means using escalation-of- video with associated ground commanders. force procedures to minimize potential loss of All fighter squadrons in Iraq were equipped life and collateral damage (CD).15 Combined with ROVER capability in the fall of 2007.12 air and space operations center (CAOC) air This video capability is the new gold standard planners, aircrews, and JTACs have their own for actionable situational awareness for ground such procedures and a corresponding weap commanders and their JTACs. This offers just ons inventory that they can employ to mini

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mize the potential of noncombatant casualties ians or employ weapons that would cause ex and the destruction of noncombatant build cessive CD. ings and personal property. In COIN opera The next question that we must answer af tions, minimizing CD becomes even more of ter considering the law of armed conflict spe an effects multiplier during the process of try cifically deals with the desired effects from the ing to win the hearts and minds of the popula use of force. By effect I mean the desired out tion. Any egregious CD incident will have tre comes, events, or consequences resulting from mendous implications for the insurgents’ the use of force. It is not enough simply to talk strategic information operations, due to the about the direct effects since the second- and associated political fallout. third-order effects of any action conducted in What is the right amount of force to use to the battlespace may override the direct effects. ensure that we do not alienate the very non AFDD 1 says that Air Force operational func combatant population we are trying to influence? tions are tied to achieving specific effects.18 In other words, how do we minimize CD, thereby The tactical effects of CAS can also have sig depriving our enemies—the insurgents—of nificant operational and strategic effects, material for their own information-operations based on what I call a CD-effects multiplier. media campaign to sway the population against Any CD will result in what we might call an the host government and counterinsurgents? exponential-multiplier effect, whereby the In Iraq the insurgents have quickly mastered number of casualties or the amount and sig both public media channels and Internet ven nificance of property damaged determine the ues—for example, their use of a school as a site strike’s operational or strategic negative effects. from which to launch rockets to draw a retalia The greater the number of civilian casualties/ tory strike that kills or wounds schoolchildren. deaths or extent of damage to civilian infra If that occurs, they display those killed or structure (water, electricity, oil refinery, trans wounded as innocent victims or even fabricate portation, etc.) or historical/religious/cultural the aftermath to discredit the host government structures, the greater the damage to the and counterinsurgents. COIN effort since this negatively affects the To determine the right amount of force, noncombatant population—the very people one must start with the law of armed conflict, the counterinsurgents are trying to influence which the Airman is duty-bound to observe. and win over. Among other things, the law establishes a Air Force Doctrine Center Handout (AFDCH) framework for ensuring the use of lawful 10-01, Air and Space Commander’s Handbook for means of warfare. Military necessity, a basic the JFACC [ Joint Force Air Component Commander] legal principle of the law of armed conflict, discusses effects-based principles, three of states that “attacks must be limited to military which are very applicable to COIN activities. objectives.” It “permits the application of only The handbook recommends considering “the that degree of regulated force, not otherwise full range of outcomes, events, and conse prohibited by the laws of war, required for the quences—not only direct (physical) but also partial or complete submission of the enemy indirect (including psychological and parallel with the least expenditure of life, time and systemwide) effects.”19 The second principle physical resources.”16 The next principle, pro notes that we should “seek to affect behavior, portionality, means that “military operations not just cause physical change (even attrition must take into consideration the extent of ci is really about getting the enemy units to vilian destruction and probable casualties that break or surrender).”20 The third principle— will result and, to the extent consistent with a very critical one, especially in COIN opera the necessities of the military situation, seek to tions—requires us to “determine ways of mea avoid or minimize such casualties and destruc suring all desired effects and objectives.”21 tion. Civilian losses must be proportionate to Without an appropriate measure of effec the military advantages sought.”17 In any case, tiveness, determining whether the activity the Airman must not intentionally attack civil produced the desired effect becomes very dif

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ficult.22 Battle damage assessments as well as tact with insurgents, the object is exactly the the aircrew and JTAC postmission reports same, but at the tactical level. At the same complete the measure-of-effectiveness feed time, however, coalition forces must prevent back loop that we use to determine achieve CD so as not to alienate or lose the support of ment of the desired effect. This measure be the noncombatant population. During COIN comes even more significant for nonkinetic operations, noncombatant casualties and de and low-CD weapons, designed to have the ef struction of civilian objects can take on a stra fect of minimizing physical damage and modi tegic significance that insurgents can exploit, fying behavior. Examples of nonkinetic meth setting back months of building rapport and ods include show of force (SOF) or show of forging trusting relationships with the resident presence (SOP) sorties.23 Effects of these types population. Due to this balancing act, low-CD of sorties are not easily quantifiable. For ex weapons are very critical in fighting a COIN. ample, we used SOF sorties during the Iraqi In fact, one of the paradoxes of COIN from elections to influence both the civilian popu FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 warns that sometimes lation and insurgents through a series of the more force one uses, the less effective one ground-force and airpower operations.24 In becomes.26 Our current low-CD weapons in this case, we had no way of definitively quanti ventory does not fully reflect these realities. fying the increased number of voters as a re sult of these sorties, but they did enable the Iraqis to hold a successful election with only Current Inventory of Low- minor disturbances. Collateral-Damage Weapons For these sorties to be effective, the popula tion and insurgents needed to know that coali For a long time, we have sought ways to in tion forces had both the capability and intent crease the lethality of air-dropped weapons. to engage. Equally important, the population This quest continues but is joined by parallel and insurgents had to be vulnerable (i.e., out efforts to minimize lethality in certain cases. matched in firepower and lacking defensive With the advent of the global positioning sys measures against the aircraft). In addition, tem and its corresponding precision capabili the population should know that airpower ties, we do not always need increased lethality supported the ground forces. To encourage to achieve the desired weapons effects. The the population to get out and vote, a visible current inventory of air-dropped weapons presence of ground forces highlighted the does in fact include some of these low-CD SOP sorties flown at medium altitudes near weapons that Air Force, Navy, and Marine polling locations. To discourage insurgents or Corps aircraft can drop to achieve precisely extremists, fighter aircraft flew SOF sorties tailored effects. near suspected trouble areas at lower altitudes The Air Force has some kinetic lethal weap to demonstrate the coalition forces’ resolve to ons that have proven successful in the current intervene if problems developed. Iraqi COIN operations. First, the guided bomb In summary, the military finds itself in a unit (GBU)-39/B Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB) balancing act in COIN operations—trying to achieved initial operational capability on the win over the local noncombatant population, F-15E in the fall of 2006.27 Developed by Boe the true center of gravity for this type of war ing, this bomb has been characterized as “the fare, while simultaneously defeating the insur next generation of low-cost and low-CD preci gents. Unfortunately these two actions occur sion strike weapon for employment from in the same physical space shared by both fighters, bombers and [unmanned aerial ve groups—especially in an urban setting. “The hicles].”28 An extended-range, all-weather, object of war is to impose one’s will on the day-and-night, 250-pound-class guided muni enemy by destroying his will” (also known as tion, it relies on a global positioning system / coercion) “or capability to resist” (also known inertial navigation system to self-navigate to as denial).25 In COIN, when troops are in con the desired impact point.

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Next, we used inert weapons during North phased blast explosive” fill is denser than ern Watch and Southern Watch to strike targets that of the original SDB and gives a slightly that threatened our aircraft enforcing the larger blast, but with reduced CD since the no-fly zones. Specifically, the coalition used a casing produces no fragmentation.34 It cre precision, inert GBU-12—a 500-pound, concrete- ates the overall effect of a blast-only weapon filled, laser-guided munition—to destroy se with reduced lethality. The ongoing FLM test lected targets without the blast effects of a live program will demonstrate that the weapon 29 weapon. The coalition employed them against has the same accuracy as the SDB and then threats that displayed hostile intent but were undergo a three-phase military-utility assess near schools or civilian structures, doing so to ment.35 The program office will deliver 50 destroy active surface-to-air radar sites while residual weapons to US Central Command limiting CD. Additionally, we had used the in (USCENTCOM) for such an assessment upon ert and live air-to-ground missile (AGM)-114 completion of the joint capabilities tech Hellfire—a 100-pound-class, laser-guided pre nology demonstration in the spring of 2008. cision missile—to minimize CD effects.30 The If USCENTCOM considers the assessment re inert version can penetrate targets without the associated blast effects of a live warhead. An sults favorable, the current plan calls for pro ducing 450 more FLM weapons over the next other low-CD missile carried by Air Force air 36 craft—the AGM-65 Maverick, a tactical, air-to- four years. surface guided missile—has a variant with a smaller 125-pound, antiarmor, shaped-charge The War Fighter’s Problem warhead that comes with electro-optical/tele vision guidance (AGM-65A or B) or imaging In 2007 the war fighter needed a kinetic ef infrared guidance (AGM-65D). In 2007 the fect that fell between the nonkinetic SOF and Air Force started using the AGM-65E laser- SOP sorties and the lowest CD weapon in our guided Maverick, which features a larger 300- inventory. The regularly used nonkinetic SOF pound, penetrating, blast-fragmentation war and SOP sorties prove effective when we em head (previously used exclusively by Navy and ploy them properly in deterrent and preemp 31 Marine Corps aircraft). tive roles. However, we needed something more The Navy and Marine Corps introduced when they did not produce the desired effects their own specific low-CD weapon in May in a troops-in-contact engagement. The joint 2007: the bomb live unit (BLU)-126/B Low war fighter needed a capability to threaten in Collateral Damage Bomb, identical to the 500- surgents directly in the urban setting. At a pound-class BLU-111/B but containing about minimum, this weapon should have the effect 16 percent less explosive mass and producing of forcing the insurgents to abandon their a reduced fragmentation pattern and blast ra covered positions, creating chaos, and enabling dius.32 This weapon uses the same precision- guidance kits as the BLU-111/B, including our troops to gain or retake the initiative. This those for Paveway II laser-guided bombs (des “shock effect” weapon would have to reduce ignated GBU-51/B) and the Joint Direct At the fragmentary pattern more than that of tack Munition (JDAM) kits (designated GBU- current low-CD weapons to minimize physical 38 [v] 4/B). damage and noncombatant casualties. Does any potential exist for an even lower- The war fighter needed this capability very CD-type weapon for specific target sets? In the quickly for crucial upcoming operations—that future, a variant of the SDB will be available: is, a weapon that we could quickly bring into the Focused Lethality Munition (FLM), now the theater, as well as one already familiar to in development to further decrease CD, will the logistics personnel who would store and replace the steel casing of the SDB with a com transport it, the aircrews who would employ it, posite carbon-fiber casing and will include a and the maintenance personnel who would new dense-metal explosive fill.33 This “multi build and load it onto the aircraft. In other

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words, this weapon ideally would require only ther rejects or certifies and prioritizes it, for minimum training for the Airmen involved. warding the certified JUON to the Joint Staff and JRAC simultaneously. With a Joint Staff recommendation, the JRAC designates or de The Solution clines the JUON as an immediate war fighter 38 The Army war fighter, together with the need within 14 days of submission to the cell. Airmen in Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), The JRAC tracks this need and facilitates its resolution. This process ensures that the need identified this need. These Airmen—air plan gets timely attention, undergoes cross-checking ners, JTACs, and air liaison officers—assigned against all the services to determine whether a to the expeditionary air support operations similar solution is either already available or group, are in a position to directly influence being worked, and confirms the availability of and advise Army battalion, brigade, division, and current-year funding. corps leadership on how airpower can sup In this particular case, the joint team felt port ground maneuver. At the same time, they that a two-pronged approach would help re provide feedback to the combined force air and solve the need in time for upcoming opera space component commander and his staff on tions. Therefore Multi-National Force-Iraq current issues and upcoming operations. (MNF-I) submitted a JUON to USCENTCOM. CAOC staff members and their Army and Simultaneously, the MNC-I commander sent a Air Force counterparts at Headquarters MNC-I personal memo to the combined force air and identified this problem during one of the space component commander—the support weekly synchronization video teleconferences. ing commander and dual-hatted as the Cen These Airmen were also aware of the inert tral Command Air Forces (CENTAF) com GBU-12s used in Northern Watch and Southern mander—requesting the inert weapons. The Watch, mentioned earlier. The question now previous use of inert GBU-12s with their con became whether we could use inert GBU-38 crete warheads against low-CD-type targets JDAMs in a similar manner to drive insurgents had set an unofficial precedent and became out of their urban sanctuaries during troops- an important consideration in allaying some in-contact engagements with coalition forces. of the concerns in this case. Additionally, as a The Department of Defense has developed result of the weekly synchronization video a process to handle just this type of problem teleconferences between MNC-I air planners, experienced by combatant command (COCOM) air liaison officers, and the CAOC staff, the war fighters. In the past, the acquisition com participants knew that inert weapons were al munity delivered equipment and services to a ready in-theater and could be quickly deliv COCOM involved in an ongoing operation, ered to the appropriate bases. using a very restrictive, cumbersome, and inef ficient process. This resulted in establishment of a joint rapid acquisition cell (JRAC), part of Considerations for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, that re Employment of the Inert Joint ported to the secretary of defense through the undersecretary of defense comptroller and the Direct Attack Munition undersecretary of defense for acquisition, tech To initially research the feasibility of em nology, and logistics. The JRAC monitors, co ploying inert JDAMs, the Air Armament Cen ordinates, and facilitates meeting the COCOM’s ter’s Seek Eagle and JDAM Joint Program Of urgent, operationally driven needs via the joint fices at Eglin AFB, Florida, were asked to urgent operational need (JUON) process.37 comment on any carriage, release, and accu A JUON that cannot be satisfied in an ap racy concerns. They were very helpful and propriate time frame by a service/defense pointed out a few factors to consider in using agency process goes to the COCOM for certi the inert JDAM for this particular purpose. fication and prioritization. The COCOM ei Their foremost concern was that the inert-

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warhead fill process produces inconsistent flight clearances to carry and employ the mass properties and weights that do not match weapons. As a result, the ground commander the corresponding live version and can thus and his JTACs would have yet another option affect the JDAM’s performance.39 Thankfully, to deliver the effects of these particular low- they found that these variances are not a sig CD weapons from Air Force aircraft. nificant factor for the 500-pound GBU-38 The MNC-I commander’s personal memo JDAM. The same could not be said for the also resulted in some immediate actions. 2,000-pound GBU-31 JDAM version, which The combined force air and space compo does have large variances that dramatically af nent commander responded positively to the fect its accuracy. Furthermore, they confirmed memo after examining the feasibility and suit that, compared to the live version, these inert ability of the inert JDAM. This munition had a concrete warheads generally do not fragment pattern of minimum fragmentation; the ord much, a very important factor when trying to nance was already located in-theater; and the limit CD. Lastly, previous experience with in logistics and maintenance personnel, as well ert GBU-12s showed a tendency of inert con as the aircrews, were all familiar with the weap crete bombs to broach or skip at shallow im on’s transportation, maintenance, carriage, pact angles—but the JDAM enables the and delivery procedures since we regularly operator to plan high-impact angles that mini use it for testing and training purposes. mize risk.40 This preliminary information re Airlifters flew the inert GBU-38 JDAMs to vealed no significant problems with carriage, Balad Air Base for immediate carriage as an release, or accuracy. option available for JTACs. The next day, F-16 fighters flew with the inert JDAMs, and the JTACs received briefings on the additional The Results weapon available for their use. They now had USCENTCOM adjudicated the JUON and a shock effect available to them for the surge determined that CENTAF should examine it. operations of summer 2007, when insurgents Based on the specific requirements and ef engaged their soldiers in the urban CD setting fects desired, the CENTAF staff agreed that and when Hellfire, strafing, or nonkineticO S F the inert GBU-38 JDAM would meet the needs options were inappropriate due to concerns of the JUON and deliver the effect sought by about fragmentation pattern or ineffectiveness. the war fighter. The CENTAF and USCENTCOM staff Lessons Learned working the JUON also discovered that the Navy was just taking delivery of the first of its Lessons learned during this process apply low-CD GBU-51/Bs and GBU-38 (v) 4/Bs in in any future case in which the joint war fighter the Iraqi theater of operations. However, no wishes to add an effect to the airpower reper Air Force aircraft had been certified to carry toire. First, the quicker we can identify a need, and release these weapons. In an effort to pro the better, so that requirements processes can vide the joint war fighter more flexibility when run their course, ensuring evaluation of all striking low-CD target areas, the CENTAF possible avenues. In this particular case, the commander directed the CAOC and CENTAF ground force commander needed an effect staff to investigate the possibility of certifying for troops in contact in the urban setting dur some Air Force aircraft. After staff discussions ing upcoming operations, so expediency be with the Navy on weapon availability and with came an overriding concern. Second, one the Seek Eagle office regarding carriage and should use all available resources early on to release certifications, theC ENTAF commander determine which potential options have merit decided to proceed with analysis and testing and which don’t, thereby avoiding the wasting to certify carriage and release from Air Force of time or resources pursuing dead ends. The F-16s and A-10s. Both aircraft soon received Airmen originating the request did their

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homework to expedite the process. By con had no explosive warhead. This would have tacting the Seek Eagle and JDAM Joint Pro made road repair quick and relatively inex gram Offices early in the process, they saved a pensive, compared to the repair required had great deal of time by ensuring the absence of we used a live warhead. Since this addressed a showstoppers before sending the personal high-priority need to defeat roadside IEDs, memo. Next, the importance of having Air the Air Force agreed to the experiment de men not only at the tactical but also at the op spite weaponeering analysis that showed a very erational (division and MNC-I) and strategic slim probability of success. Unfortunately, af (MNF-I) levels ensured that we were asking ter a number of unsuccessful tests, we stopped the right questions regarding the desired ef the experimentation. fects, thereby enabling airpower to become Despite this lack of success, there will be more proficient in integrating with the Army’s other legitimate times when we will need ex unique, time-sensitive requirements. These perimentation in combat to produce a specific embedded Airmen are a conduit for Army effect against a specific target, particularly if planners and leaders as well as their JTACs on the stakes are high—for example, if we were the front lines. This organizational structure trying to quickly find a way to defeat a newly guarantees that the planning for upcoming evolved tactic responsible for coalition casual operations can apply the appropriate means ties, as was the case here. However, this experi to meet the objectives requested by the ground mentation should proceed only after appropri unit from the standpoints of both effective ate leadership has made a conscious decision ness and efficiency. Another lesson learned after consulting a designed evaluation plan involves assuming nothing, no matter how ob that incorporates measures of effectiveness vious it may seem. The fact that the inert and and designed feedback mechanisms, includ live JDAM versions do have differences in mass ing means of documenting the test conditions properties and weight that can affect accura prior to and after the event. Otherwise, the cies is not intuitively obvious, especially since results would prove suspect, and the findings we employ the inert weapons routinely on would make no conclusive determinations. training sorties. Employing inert JDAMs on “suspected” or In addition, there are two very important “historically known” IED locations without reasons to educate the appropriate Army deci certain knowledge of the presence of a device sion makers and JTACs once we have fielded a or its exact location is no way to conduct field new capability—particularly in a fluid combat experimentation. environment. First, this “expectation manage ment” ensures that on-scene commanders real ize they have another weapon they can employ Conclusion and lets them know what they can expect in the way of effects. Second, it gives the ground Effective COIN operations require reexam commander and JTACs an awareness of any ination of some previously employed tactics, limitation, which guards against misuse of the techniques, and procedures and the types of new capability. Obviously, we do not want to weapons used in conjunction with them. With employ limited resources against targets un the help of Airmen assigned to the expedi less they will produce the desired results. tionary air support operations group, Army One other valuable lesson learned regard planners identified a required effect between ing combat experimentation arose after the nonkinetic SOF and the weapon with the low inert GBU-38s flew in support of Operation est CD in our inventory. The Air Force filled Iraqi Freedom. MNC-I leadership wanted to the gap quickly with the inert JDAM, making it try using the inert JDAMs as a counter to IEDs immediately available for surge combat opera along roads. In theory the weapon would have tions during the summer of 2007. Addition detonated the IED and would not have caused ally, as a result of this effort, Air Force F-16 much further damage to the roads, since it and A-10 fighters were certified to employ the

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Navy’s low-CD GBU-51/Bs and GBU-38 (v) 4/Bs airpower more effective and lethal in COIN until the next-generation low-CD weapon, the operations. The Airmen fighting today in Iraq FLM, becomes available. Both the inert JDAM and Afghanistan are continuing the fine tradi and Navy’s Low Collateral Damage Bomb give tions of agility and innovation, ensuring that joint war fighters added flexibility when they airpower remains responsive to the needs of need effects associated with a low-CD weapon. the joint war fighter throughout the spectrum This ordnance will allow access to targets for of conflict, including COIN operations. ❑ merly restricted by CD limitations and make

Notes 1. For a definition of kinetic, see Air Force Doctrine telligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance video from Document (AFDD) 2-1.9, Targeting, 8 June 2006, 115, C, L, and KU Band frequencies.” Ibid. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD 11. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense _Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-1-%209.pdf. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as 2. AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, 1, amended through 17 October 2007), defines the term https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD armed reconnaissance as “a mission with the primary pur _Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-3.pdf. pose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity, i.e., 3. Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfight enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities, in assigned gen ing Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, De eral areas or along assigned ground communications cember 2006, foreword, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/ routes, and not for the purpose of attacking specific army/fm3-24.pdf. briefed targets” (44). 4. IW should never be military-centric due to the na 12. Hanley, “Air Force Quietly Building,” 3. ture of the conflict. Since we are trying to influence a host 13. AFDD 1, “Air Force Basic Doctrine,” 27–28. population and either support the constitutional govern 14. FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 1-25. I ment or usher in another form of governmental organiza added physical property damage since any damage to tion, all elements of national power come into play, in noncombatants’ personal property also has an effect on cluding some or all of the following: political, diplomatic, efforts to persuade the local population that everything economic, informational, paramilitary, and civic actions. was done to minimize CD. 5. AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 5. 15. Ibid. According to JP 1-02, Department of Defense 6. AFDD 1, “Air Force Basic Doctrine,” topline coor Dictionary, collateral damage is “unintentional or inciden tal injury or damage to persons or objects that would not dination draft, version 3, 19 June 2007, 37, lists the 17 be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at operational functions as strategic attack; counterair; the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not counterspace; counterland; countersea; information op excessive in light of the overall military advantage antici erations; combat support; command and control; airlift; pated from the attack” (93). air refueling; spacelift; special operations; intelligence; 16. See “The Law of Armed Conflict,” http://milcom surveillance and reconnaissance; personnel-recovery op .jag.af.mil/ch15/loac.doc. Military objectives are those erations; navigation and positioning; and weather services. “objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use 7. lolita C. Baldor, “Military Branches Fight for Con make an effective contribution to military action and trol of Drones,” Oakland Tribune, 6 July 2007, http://find whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutraliza articles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20070706/ai tion . . . offers a definite military advantage.” “Civilian ob _n19359009. jects are such objects as places of worship, schools, hospitals, 8. charles J. Hanley, “U.S. Doubles Air Attacks in and dwellings. [These] objects can lose their protected Iraq,” Boston.com, 5 June 2007, http://www.boston.com/ status if they are used to make an effective contribution to news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/06/05/us_doubles military action.” Ibid. _air_attacks_in_iraq. 17. Ibid. 9. charles J. Hanley, “Air Force Quietly Building Iraq 18. AFDD 1, “Air Force Basic Doctrine,” 36. Presence,” ABC News, 14 July 2007, 1, http://abcnews.go 19. Air Force Doctrine Center Handout (AFDCH) 10- .com/International/wireStory?id=3378044. 01, Air and Space Commander’s Handbook for the JFACC, 27 10. SSgt Amanda Savannah, “Battlefield Technology June 2005, 67. Key to Atlantic Strike V,” Air Force Link, 19 April 2007, 20. Ibid. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123049599. 21. Ibid. “ROVER can receive video and telemetry data from 22. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, defines the manned aircraft [and] unmanned aerial vehicles . . . to term measure of effectiveness as “a criterion used to assess display [full-motion video] on a laptop or television changes in system behavior, capability, or operational en monitor. The receive-only terminal can receive most In vironment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an

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end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an 2007/2007-05_low_collateral_damage_bomb.htm; and Lt effect. Also called MOE” (335). Col James Auclair, Air Force Seek Eagle office, to author, 23. SOF sorties are low-altitude flybys or dry-weapon personal communication, 4 August 2007. deliveries that may or may not include expending flares. 33. SSgt Ryan Hansen, “Small Diameter Bomb Time SOP sorties are used as reinforcement or reassurance. line Remains on Schedule,” Air Armament Center Public Normally we use both types for preemptive purposes in a Affairs, 22 March 2006, http://www.afmc.af.mil/news/ deterrent role for the purpose of altering behavior. In the story.asp?id=123017916. case of noncombatants, they provide a sense of security; 34. Maj Heidi Cornell, Precision Strike Weapons Pro for insurgents/extremists, they demonstrate a sense of gram Element monitor, to author, personal communica vulnerability or a form of intimidation. tion, 26 August 2007. 24. lt Gen Robert J. Elder Jr., “Effects-Based Opera 35. Maj Heidi Cornell, Precision Strike Weapons Pro tions: A Command Philosophy,” Air and Space Power Journal gram Element monitor, to author, personal communica 21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 14, http://www.airpower.maxwell tion, 27 August 2007. The three-phase military-utility as .af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf. sessment consists of ground tests (static live fire), three 25. col Phillip S. Meilinger, “Air Strategy: Targeting weaponeering workshops, and live flight tests. for Effect,” Aerospace Power Journal 13, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 36. cornell, personal communication, 26 August 2007. 56, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ 37. For detailed coverage of the JUON process, see apj/apj99/win99/meiling.pdf. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 26. FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 1-27. 3470.1, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Opera- 27. TSgt Russell Wicke, “ACC Declares Small Diameter tional Needs (JUON) in the Year of Execution, 15 July 2005 Bomb Initially Operational,” Air Force Link, 5 October 2006, (current as of 9 July 2007). For the JRAC, see Office of the http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123028580. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 28. Ibid. and Logistics (OUSD) (AT&L), briefing, subject: Over 29. Dr. Thomas R. Searle, “Making Airpower Effective view to NDIA [National Defense Industrial Association] against Guerillas,” Air and Space Journal 18, no. 3 (Fall 2004): Central Florida Chapter Defense Forum, 21 March 2007. 19, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ A JUON is “a COCOM-certified and prioritized urgent apj/apj04/fal04/Fal04.pdf. Inert GBU-12s had limited operational need, outside DOD 5000 / military processes, success in curtailing CD during Northern Watch due to requiring a DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Train bombs ricocheting and skipping far from their intended ing, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and target. Facilities) solution that, if left unfilled, will seriously en 30. Vago Muradian, “An Interview with Gen. T. Michael danger personnel and/or pose a major threat to ongoing ‘Buzz’ Moseley,” Defense News, 22 May 2006, 1, http:// operations.” OUSD (AT&L) briefing, slide 13. integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2006/May/05252006/ 38. cJCSI 3470.1, Rapid Validation and Resourcing, de 05252006-08.htm. fines animmediate warfighter need as “a subset of JUONs . . . 31. Jack Gillum, “Air Force Mulls Maverick,” Arizona [having] a materiel or logistics solution that must be re Daily Star, 22 August 2007, 1; and “AGM-65 Maverick solved in 120 days or less” (GL-1). Guided Missile,” United States Navy Fact File, 28 August 39. Dr. Louis R. Cerrato, 678th Armament Systems 2007, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid Squadron/EN, JDAM office, to author, personal commu =2200&tid=500&ct=2. nication, 14 June 2007. The method of filling the warhead 32. The BLU-111/B penetrator is a thermally coated, produces this phenomenon. The live warheads are filled forged-steel-casing warhead—a more accurately toleranced vertically, and the inert, cement warheads are filled hori variant of the MK-82 500-pound general-purpose bomb. zontally, resulting in different mass properties. Addition See also “BLU-111/B,” GloralSecurity.org, http://www.global ally, warhead weight also tends to vary more for the inerts, security.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-111.htm; which tend to be lighter than their live counterparts. “NAVAIR Delivers Low Collateral Damage Bomb,” news 40. Broaching occurs when a weapon hits the ground release, 11 May 2007, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons or target and continues downrange, similar to a ricochet Division, http://www.nawcwd.navy.mil/nawcwd/news/ ing bullet or a stone skipping on water.

Fulfilling its role as a leader in the Information Age, the Air Force is exploring technologies and concepts of operations within the cyberspace domain. —2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement

1-PIREP-Haendschke.indd 43 4/29/08 7:55:34 AM The Role of Air Force Civil Engineers in Counterinsurgency Operations

Lt Col Kendall Brown, USAFR, PhD, PE*

hat is the role of the Air of its developing aviation assets.2 During World Force’s general-purpose forces War II, aviation-engineer battalions and air- in support of counterinsurgency borne aviation-engineer battalions were estab- (COIN) operations? Facilitators lished within the Army Corps of Engineers to Wof the 2007 Air Force Symposium on Counter- construct, repair, and defend Army Air Corps insurgency posed that question at Maxwell airfields in overseas theaters.3 After the forma- AFB, Alabama, in April 2007. A presentation tion of the US Air Force in 1947, facility con- by David Ochmanek of the RAND Corporation struction for Air Force bases remained a Corps analyzed areas of the world where insurgen- of Engineers responsibility.4 However, “to per- cies were present—or were developing—and form combat engineering support, an agree- in which the United States might determine ment was reached whereby the Army would that its national interests required US military organize, staff and train units placed under 1 involvement. His analysis concluded that the Air Force operational control for the exclusive Air Force does not have sufficient Rapid Engi- support of the USAF mission. Those battalions neers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair were designated Special Category Army with Squadron, Engineers (RED HORSE) and Air Force.”5 When the Korean War began in Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (Prime 1950, these units had low readiness levels be- BEEF) squadrons to sustain operations in cause of their unique status as US Army bat- those COIN engagements as part of the Air talions assigned to the Air Force. Although Force’s general-purpose forces. But what is the aviation-engineer battalions performed the role of its civil engineer (CE) forces in the tremendous feats during the Korean War, the COIN environment? What do they bring to resource, organizational, and command and the fight once they’ve established the base for control challenges created by this relationship the air forces supporting the joint or com- indicated that the Air Force needed organic bined mission? Do they have any specialized units with specialized capabilities for airfield capabilities? Can we simply outsource that role to a commercial entity or another service? construction and repair. World events in the In order to answer those questions, we must late 1950s and early 1960s (Lebanon in 1958, review the origins and history of civil engi- Berlin in 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis in neering in the Air Force, examine its capabili- 1962) “demonstrated a need for mobile CE ties, and then identify its possible use in future teams ready for immediate deployment to COIN operations. perform construction work during wartime or other emergencies.”6 The Air Force created the Prime BEEF team concept in 1965 to give History of Air Force it the capability to respond to such emergencies. As the service became more involved in Civil Engineering Vietnam, it once again required heavy-repair Beginning in 1918, the US Army estab- capabilities with more equipment, skills, and lished specialized units to support the needs personnel than Prime BEEF teams could pro-

*Colonel Brown is a liquid-rocket-engine system engineer at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center and a researcher at the Air Force Doctrine Development and Education Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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vide; therefore, the Air Force created dedi- systems, fuel systems, lighting, aircraft arrest- cated CE squadrons—RED HORSE—to ad- ing systems, and base sanitation; (2) aircraft dress this need.7 and structural firefighting and personnel res- CEs have supported Air Force contingency cue; and (3) explosive ordnance disposal, in- operations throughout the world since the cluding the detection and disposal of unex- Vietnam War, including those resulting from ploded ordnance and improvised explosive foreign and domestic natural disasters as devices. The expertise in specialized mission well as terrorist attacks. Beginning in the areas includes augmentation of staff engineer- 1980s, a Cold War period in which the Air ing, emergency management, and response to Force seldom used CEs’ contingency capa- explosive as well as chemical, nuclear, biological, bilities, many of its active duty and Reserve and radiological incidents. units began participating in foreign-military- In contingency situations, CEs present tai- assistance missions in Central America, South lored forces to the theater commander as America, and the Caribbean. These deploy- Prime BEEF or RED HORSE teams, propor- ments served several objectives, primarily tional to the mission requirements. providing real-world, contingency-like training for unit personnel. Secondarily, however, [Prime BEEF] teams are rapidly deployable, during these deployments, CEs would con- specialized civil engineer units, that provide a full range of engineering support required to struct or repair local hospitals, schools, roads, establish, operate, and maintain garrison and bridges, or other infrastructure projects, contingency airbases. The primary mission of providing significant benefits to the local Prime BEEF is to provide civil engineer support populace. Air Force CEs continue to partici- for the beddown of personnel and aircraft. pate in exercises such as New Horizons, con- Prime BEEF capabilities include airbase site sur- ducted annually by US Southern Command veys, establishing bare base camps and opera- with a joint and combined force to provide tions and utility system installation.9 humanitarian assistance.8 The exercises im- “RED HORSE units are self-sufficient, 404- prove joint-training readiness of US engi- person mobile heavy construction squadrons neers as well as medical and combat service- capable of rapid response and independent support units through humanitarian- and operations in remote, high-threat environ- civic-assistance activities. Each New Horizons ments worldwide.”10 One of the more recent exercise lasts several months, offering much- needed services and infrastructure, while evolutions of civil-engineering capabilities oc- giving deployed US military forces invalu- curred during fiscal year 2005, when “RED able training. These exercises generally take HORSE added an ‘airborne’ capability to rap- place in rural, underprivileged areas. US idly deliver light personnel and equipment packages by airdrop, air insert, or air transport Southern Command attempts to combine 11 these efforts with those of host-nation doc- means.” Air Force engineers are integral mem- tors, either military or civilian, to make them bers of contingency-response groups, structures even more beneficial. that facilitate accomplishment of the activities discussed later in this article. Air Force civil engineering relies upon the Capabilities of Air Force Total Force to fulfill its mobility missions, with a substantial portion of its capabilities resid- Civil Engineers ing in the Air Force Reserve Command and Air Force CE capabilities consist of three Air National Guard. In fact, members of the primary functional areas and associated spe- Reserve and Guard often come to the deploy- cialized mission areas, the former including ment with knowledge, skills, and experience (1) facility and infrastructure construction as that exceed those of their active duty counter- well as operation, maintenance, and repair of parts due to previous active duty service and pavements, structures, water systems, electrical their civilian careers.

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Applying the Air Force’s our own bombs) to determine how to repair the runways rapidly for use by coalition air- Civil Engineer Capabilities in craft.14 On the opposite extreme, when the Air Counterinsurgency Operations Force became engaged in Operation Deliber- ate Force, with most of the combat aircraft de- The primary mission of CEs is to provide ployed to Aviano Air Base, Italy, the resident combat support to the theater commander’s CE squadron, with support from specialized forces during all phases of the joint cam- planning teams, performed the majority of 12 paign. Usually, this consists of initial opera- the planning.15 tions to bed down the deployed forces, fol- In more remote locations, a planning team lowed by sustaining operations and a series of assesses the airfield’s pavements, facilities, enhancements to provide the force better fa- utilities, and fire protection, as well as surveys cilities and services. Planning COIN opera- it for explosives. The pavement evaluation de- tions is unique. Not a linear, sequential pro- termines which aircraft the runway, taxiways, cess, either it involves phases that occur and parking aprons can support. The facility concurrently, or, as a minimum, the operation assessment evaluates the existing hangars and planning in one phase explicitly considers the buildings to determine their suitability for air- intended and unintended effects on other craft maintenance, operations, and billeting. phases. Likewise, the operations themselves The survey of the utility system assesses the may be somewhat unconventional. In these condition, capacity, and compatibility of the COIN and irregular-warfare operations, we airfield’s electrical, water, sanitation, and fuel- should also use CEs unconventionally—even storage and -distribution facilities. The CE in direct mission roles. We can use the organic planning team coordinates with Air Force se- capabilities of the deployed Prime BEEF or curity forces to identify construction work re- RED HORSE teams to establish and operate quired to improve air base defense, such as the contingency air base and furnish personnel, revetments, fencing, fighting positions, and skills, and equipment to conduct influence clear zones. If the airfield happens to serve operations. Planning in this environment re- international commercial aviation, it will al- quires a paradigm shift, and the theater com- ready have fire-protection personnel and mander must draw upon the capabilities of all equipment; however, smaller airfields may of his or her forces. have little equipment or trained personnel. At the beginning of joint operation plan- CE firefighters will assess the existing capabilities ning to provide COIN support to a host-nation and determine the equipment and personnel government, the Air Force must determine required to support deployed military aircraft. the capability and condition of airfields from The final members of the advance team—ex- which it could operate and provide that infor- plosive-ordnance-disposal personnel—will sur- mation to the planning cells. If adequate in- vey the area for unexploded ordnance, mines, formation is not already available, a CE ad- improvised explosive devices, or other explo- vance planning team, either a staff-assistance sives. These planning activities are the text- team or a group of CE officers and noncom- book areas required for any Air Force forward missioned officers, could visit the airfields and deployment, but in the COIN environment, perform surveys and assessments.13 If the con- the CE advance team must look outside the dition of the airfield is so uncertain that land- airfield and get a feel for the local area and ing a mobility aircraft is not advisable, the re- needs of the civilian population. The joint op- cently added airborne RED HORSE capability eration planning team uses these airfield as- might conduct the assessments and begin ex- sessments of the contingency operating base pedient repairs. In Afghanistan during Opera- or forward operating base as it conducts force- tion Enduring Freedom, CE teams performed structure and deployment planning. assessments of captured Taliban airfields and CEs usually arrive at the airfield along with performed battle damage assessments (from security forces, communications, and control-

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lers to establish the air base and prepare for Kenya.16 The RED HORSE team repaired roads the arrival of the rest of the deployed units. and bridges, built a 1,000-square-foot clinic After the air base becomes operational, CEs and a 3,000-square-foot school house, and can transition from mission support to mis- renovated Ethiopian military billeting.17 Capt sion operations. In many situations, the de- Javier Velazquez, leader for the school project ployed location will not require much effort in Jijiga, Ethiopia, succinctly explained the to sustain base operations, so the majority of importance of these operations: “When we the engineers can either be redeployed or as- first arrived, the people acted like, ‘What are signed to other campaign-support activities. you doing here?’ By the time we finished, Each phase of the joint campaign plan can use people would rush out of their homes to wave CE capabilities to generate the theater com- at our convoys, realizing that we were there to mander’s desired effects. help.”18 During the “shaping” and “deterring” phases, An innovative role for Air Force CEs may CEs can participate in influence operations exist in the “dominate” phase of the joint cam- through engagement with the civil populace paign plan. In an effects-based-operations outside the air base. Their heavy equipment planning/targeting approach, the desired ef- can improve or construct roads; drill wells to fects may require destroying infrastructure provide clean drinking water; and repair or (airfields, roads, bridges, power distribution, construct schools, hospitals, and community water, etc.) in regions held by the insurgency. facilities. Hiring local workers as part of the As part of the planning process, we should as- construction crew for as many of these proj- sess the long-term effects of attacking that in- ects as possible serves several purposes. First, frastructure. Part of that assessment should local workers are less likely to be influenced determine whether we need to reconstitute by the insurgency if such jobs provide the the system during stability operations. A pos- means to meet the economic needs of their sible slogan for such a concept—If you decide to families. Second, the projects, in and of them- break it, plan to fix it—exemplifies the syner- selves, help demonstrate to the local popula- gism and parallelism between the “dominate” tion both their government’s support and that and “stabilize” phases. of the United States. Either we can employ If we make a reconstitution-planning pro- local laborers directly to work side by side with cess integral to the targeting process, we can US forces, or contractors with the Air Force restore infrastructure in a timely manner, en- Contract Augmentation Program can hire local abling a quicker transition from conducting contractors. Developing these contractors of- stability operations to enabling civil authority. fers a way of spurring economic development In an extreme example, upon approval of the and promoting the professional business prac- air tasking order (ATO) to destroy an infra- tices necessary for a modern marketplace. Us- structure system, we can submit a work request ing local laborers to support construction to begin planning for the Army Corps of Engi- projects also has the corollary benefit of - re neers or Air Force CEs to rebuild it. Using ducing their opportunity to participate in in- only the level of force necessary to achieve the surgent activities. If a local is working on a job desired effects will help preclude a more dif- site doing manual labor, he is less likely to ficult reconstitution. Implementing such an cause trouble than if he had nothing to do all approach would not be difficult. Leaders of day, thus buying time to address issues under- the RED HORSE or Prime BEEF deployment lying the insurgency. teams could participate in the ATO planning CEs have recent experience doing this work cycle to evaluate the longer-term effect of in the Horn of Africa. In 2004 the 823rd RED striking buildings, roads, bridges, water supply HORSE Squadron participated in Combined and distribution systems, electrical supply Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, providing and distribution systems, fuel supply and humanitarian assistance and contingency con- distribution systems, and so forth. The air struction projects in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and and space operations center’s planning cell,

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in conjunction with the host nation, non edge, and experience for the local govern- governmental organizations, and political ana- ment to become self-sufficient. lysts, can identify the COIN effects if we rap- Many recent US operations in foreign na- idly restore that system. By tracking and tions such as Kosovo, Kuwait, and Iraq have prioritizing the target list, along with conduct- relied upon commercial companies for a sig- ing poststrike battle damage assessment to nificant number of the combat-support func- evaluate the exact damage, we can initiate tions such as billeting, operation and con- planning to avoid significant delays in reestab- struction of base infrastructure, messing, and lishing services. transportation.20 In turn, this reliance on con- CE officers would require supplemental tractors has led to cuts in the number of combat- training if we want them to interact with the support personnel.21 Deciding whether to use flight-operations community and theT A O either US military combat support or civilian process.19 CE forces have the technical knowl- contractors requires good understanding of edge to perform this role, but they would also the local population’s cultural, political, and need the cultural and COIN-specific attitude social environment. In some COIN environ- in order to actually perform it. CEs and other ments, having US uniformed personnel might general-purpose support forces would supple- prove less productive than utilizing civilian ment the ATO planning cell. Such support contractors. Prior to Operations Enduring would probably require augmenting the typical Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the media was CE deployment team with one to three field- very sensitive to the killing or injuring of US grade officers and four to six senior noncom- civilians in conflicts. More recently, however, missioned officers. Actual implementation of that sensitivity has changed, and the media is the reconstitution effort may or may not lie seemingly more focused on casualties of US within the capability and capacity of the de- uniformed military than of civilian contrac- ployed engineering team; therefore, we may tors. It is almost as if the media and the public need a combatant-commander-level team to view such contractors as mercenaries who vol- manage the reconstitution project list and untarily accept the risk, while airmen, soldiers, conduct the planning. In many cases, the pref- or marines have no choice in the matter. In a erable method will involve utilizing the local COIN environment, it usually isn’t possible to population, either under direct contracting identify a distinct front line, and the entire or as hired labor under the direction of US area of operations may experience combat at forces or contractor advisers. any time. This situation might lead the com- Once we establish the airfield for use by coali- mander to desire that US military members tion forces, it inherently provides a capability serve as support personnel, with the legal au- for economic development. RED HORSE can thority to conduct hostile actions. Conversely, further develop the runway, taxiways, aircraft- if the local area has a predisposition against parking ramps, airfield lighting, and fuel storage the United States, the commander might want and distribution systems to support commercial to minimize the footprint of uniformed per- passenger and cargo aircraft. With Air Force sonnel by hiring civilian contractors. Doing so firefighters deployed and providing fire pro- creates an interesting conundrum for the tection for aircraft, they can support the local commander, requiring him or her to fully community by training and developing a pro- evaluate the mission structure using an effects- fessional fire department that meets inter based-operations approach and in-depth un- national aviation standards. As long as Air derstanding of the local culture. Force forces are deployed, they can continue COIN operations also commonly feature a to offer assistance in the local communities. higher degree of joint-force integration, with However, during the “stabilize” and “enable most forces coming from the various services’ civil authority” phases, the Air Force team special operations communities and supple- needs to move into a coaching, mentoring, mented by other units. As the US military be- and training role, providing the skills, knowl- comes more involved in COIN operations,

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demand will exceed the supply of existing spe- system, or fixing roads, they help win the cial operations forces. We may construct con- hearts and minds of the local populace. When ventional units to support the mission, com- they employ locals in construction projects, bining rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft from all providing economic support as well as the services with ground-combat forces. Combat skills and training necessary to improve their support can come from any of the services, future, they take power away from the insur- with US Army Corps of Engineers, US Naval gency. When the indigenous population can Construction Forces, and Air Force CEs all return to a normal life soon after combat opera- capable of providing base construction and tions stop, it builds up less resentment towards operation. However, the Army has primary ex- US forces, further diminishing the insurgency’s pertise in ground-combat engineering (breach- recruitment. The constructive capabilities that ing berms, bridging rivers, etc.), and the Navy Air Force CEs have for leaving the local popu- in facilities and bases to support its ships in lation with safer, more reliable infrastructure the deployment area; Air Force CEs have spe- may go much farther towards supporting US cialized capabilities to support air bases. Ac- national interests than the destructive capa- cording to Air Force doctrine, when the Air bilities of Air Force weapon systems. Accord- Force supplies the preponderance of air as- ing to Air Force Manual (AFM) 3-2, Civil Engi- sets, then an Airman should serve as the joint neering Combat Support Doctrine, force air component commander; similarly, when most air assets come from the Air Force, Air Force civil engineers are ambassadors repre- 22 senting the Air Force and the nation, both over- Air Force CEs should support them. Doing seas and at home. The professional image pro- so helps preclude miscommunication and is- jected in relations with other people is often sues with command and control relationships; vital to furthering the nation’s political and mili- furthermore, it avoids relearning the lesson of tary objectives. Builders by trade, engineers pro- Korea regarding the Special Category Army vide a nonthreatening military presence that with Air Force aviation battalions. can provide lasting benefits through training and nation building while at the same time af- fording the security of a US Government com- Conclusion mitment.23 Air Force CEs, in the form of deployable Returning to the proposition raised by the Prime BEEF and RED HORSE squadrons, RAND researcher during the COIN sympo- provide required capabilities for constructing, sium, we see that the ability of existing Prime repairing, and operating contingency and for- BEEF and RED HORSE units to support COIN ward operating air bases. CEs offer the necessary operations depends upon the number and in- experience, equipment, training, and personnel tensity of operations they are asked to sup- if the Air Force needs to operate from such port. Although Air Force civil engineering can airfields to fight terrorists or provide training provide the theater commander with capabili- and assistance to a friendly nation’s fight ties needed to support the COIN operation, against an insurgency. The COIN environ- we have only a limited supply of CEs and their ment offers unique opportunities for Prime equipment. If the Air Force is asked to in- BEEF and RED HORSE to supply direct mis- crease its involvement in COIN and irregular- sion support. When they go outside the base warfare environments, we will need additional and help improve infrastructure by meeting a Prime BEEF and RED HORSE resources to need for clean water, repairing the electrical avoid unsustainable deployment rates. ❑

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Notes 1. Adam Grisson and David Ochmanek, “The Long mission support. For example, the Airfield Pavement War: Demands for USAF Capabilities” (presentation to Evaluation Team offers detailed evaluation of airfields the 2007 Air Force Symposium on Counterinsurgency, and detailed repair and maintenance suggestions, and Maxwell AFB, AL, April 2007). the Civil Engineer Maintenance, Inspection, and Repair 2. Dr. Ronald B. Hartzer, “Foundations for the Fu- Team does depot-level maintenance and repair of elec- ture: A Brief History of Air Force Civil Engineers,” 1, trical generators, electrical-distribution systems, heating http://www.afcesa.af.mil/shared/media/document/ and air conditioning systems, and aircraft-arresting sys- AFD-070607-002.pdf. tems. See TSgt Michael A. Ward, “Pavements Team Brings 3. ibid., 2. Expertise to the Fight,” Air Force Civil Engineer Magazine 9, 4. ibid. no. 4 (Winter 2001/2002): 9. 5. Don K. Tomajan, “A Korean War Retrospective: 16. Capt Matthew “Scott” Stanford, “RED HORSE Aviation Engineer Contributions to the Air War in Ko- Rides ‘Round the Horn,’ ” Air Force Civil Engineer Magazine rea,” Air Force Civil Engineer Magazine 9, no. 4 (Winter 13, no. 1 (2005): 18. 2001–2): 13. 17. ibid., 20. 6. hartzer, “Foundations for the Future.” 18. ibid. 7. Ronald B. Hartzer, “RED HORSE History,” Air 19. Such specialized expertise might be a good role Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, http://www.afcesa for the Reserve component. In particular, individual mo- .af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=8760. bilization augmentees assigned to active duty CE units at- 8. “New Horizons 2007,” United States Southern tached to units dedicated to COIN operations could regu- Command, 12 September 2007, http://www.southcom.mil/ larly interact and train with the “operators” over a number AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=11. of years. If necessary, we could activate and deploy them 9. “United States Air Force Prime BEEF Units,” United with the team to provide such support. States Air Force Fact Sheet, https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af/ 20. in some cases, the shift towards contractor-provided USAF/AFP40/Attachment/20070703/Prime%5fBEEF base-support functions offered a means of reducing the %5ffact%5fsheet%5f2006.pdf (accessed 28 January 2008). appearance of US military involvement. In other cases, 10. “United States Air Force RED HORSE Squadrons,” the shift occurred because of previous reductions in mili- United States Air Force Fact Sheet, https://www.my.af.mil/ gcss-af/USAF/AFP40/Attachment/20070709/REDHORSE tary mission-support personnel and high operations tempo. %5ffact%5fsheet2007%5f000.pdf (accessed 28 January 21. Because of the need to increase funding to the 2008). Army for continued activities in Operations Enduring 11. ibid. Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well free up funds to re- 12. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Sep- place aging Air Force aircraft, program budget decision tember 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/ (PBD) 720 resulted in the (ongoing) cut of 40,000 active jp3_0.pdf, identifies the six phases of the joint campaign duty and 17,000 Reserve-component Air Force personnel. plan as shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, Such an action often affects Air Force specialty codes and enable civil authority (xxi). (AFSC); specifically PBD 720 required cuts to CE AFSCs. 13. “United States Air Force Prime BEEF Staff Aug- However, to help alleviate the effect on wartime readi- mentation Team (S-Team),” United States Air Force Fact ness, we moved positions from base engineering to RED Sheet, https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af/USAF/AFP40/ HORSE to maintain necessary war capabilities. See Maj Attachment/20070703/S%5fTeam%5fFact%5fSheet.pdf Gen Del Eulberg, “Transforming the CE Career Field,” (accessed 28 January 2008). Air Force Civil Engineer Magazine 15, no. 1 (2007): 4–7. 14. See TSgt Ginger Schreitmueller, “A Combat Fix: 22. Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Or- Combat Controllers, RED HORSE Join Forces to Open ganization, 3 April 2007, 39, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ Mazar-e-Sharif Airfield,” Air Force Civil Engineer Magazine jel/service_pubs/afdd2.pdf. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 8–9, 11. 23. Air Force Manual (AFM) 3-2, Civil Engineering 15. the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency has Combat Support Doctrine, 26 April 1991, 24–25. (Note that several teams that provide specialized civil-engineering this manual is now obsolete.)

2-PIREP-Brown.indd 50 4/29/08 7:56:07 AM Timing Is Everything Operational Assessment in a Fast-Paced Fight

Lt Col Kirsten R. Messer, USAF*

he air and space operations center (AOC) “provides operational- 4USBUFHZ level [command and control] of air %FWFMPQNFOU and space forces as the focal point Tfor planning, executing, and assessing air and 5BSHFU "TTFTTNFOU space operations” (emphasis added).1 Within %FWFMPQNFOU the AOC, the assessment function resides in the operational assessment team (OAT), part of the Strategy Division. As the name implies, the OAT conducts assessment at the opera- .BTUFS"JS tional level of war and evaluates the effective- &YFDVUJPO "UUBDL1MBO ness of air and space operations in creating %FWFMPQNFOU desired effects and achieving the joint force "JS air component commander’s (JFACC) objec- 5BTLJOH0SEFS tives. Based on this evaluation, the OAT rec- 1SPEVDUJPO ommends changes to the JFACC’s strategy. Traditionally, we view operational assess- Figure 1. The air tasking cycle. (Adapted from ment (OA) as part of the air tasking cycle, of- Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for ten depicted as a wheel (fig. 1). In a high op- Joint Air Operations, 5 June 2003, III-23, http:// erations tempo (OPTEMPO) environment, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf.) OA must function inside the 72-hour air tasking cycle. This article offers a procedural orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. This con- framework, based on the air tasking cycle, ceptual framework provides additional insight which depicts the changing relationships be- into some of the key challenges of providing tween assessment and the other parts of the decision-quality assessments in a high-OPTEMPO cycle as the pace of operations increases. This environment. Furthermore, although presented framework considers inputs to and outputs in the context of command and control of air from the OAT. It offers insight into the assess- and space operations, this framework has ment process and provides the necessary con- broader applicability. It offers a theoretical text for developing and implementing process context for understanding assessment as an refinements within the AOCs. enabler of effective decision making in all ser- Additionally, the article presents an abstract vices, at all levels of war, and even in the con- framework based on Col John Boyd’s observe- text of business decisions in the private sector.

*Lieutenant Colonel Messer is chief, Operational Assessments, 613th Air and Space Operations Center, Hickam AFB, Hawaii. She thanks Maj Eric Murphy, Capt Tim Cook, Mr. John Borsi, Maj Dave Gwinn, Maj Joe Morgan, Maj Dave Lyle, Lt Col Dan Ourada, CDR Tom Hinderleider, and Col Tim Saffold for discussing her article’s concepts or for reading and commenting on previous versions. Any remaining errors are solely those of the author.

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Shifting Assessment Focus to use in assessing progress. Without a strong connection to the other teams in the Strategy inside the Air Tasking Cycle Division, the OAT will not truly understand The air tasking cycle “provides a repetitive the objectives and desired effects it assesses, process for planning, coordination, alloca- and assessment will fail. tion, execution, and assessment of air mis- Even that connection is not enough, how- sions.”2 As figure 1 shows, it begins in the ever. The strategy-development process yields Strategy Division with strategy development. an operational-level conceptual presentation The strategy plans team develops the joint air of the plan, but in some cases, the OAT needs and space operations plan and passes it to the a tactical-level depth of understanding. To ac- strategy guidance team, which issues guidance quire such understanding, the team needs to via the air operations directive and passes it to have knowledge of the targeting effects team the targeting effects team. The targeting ef- and MAAP as well as the changes being made fects team then creates the draft joint inte- to the ATO on the operations floor. Informa- grated prioritized target list. The next step in tion must flow into the OAT from all parts of the cycle calls for development of the master the air tasking cycle. It must have connections air attack plan (MAAP), the JFACC’s “time- to every other part of that cycle at all times. phased air and space scheme of maneuver for Figure 2 depicts the main inputs to the OAT, a given ATO [air tasking order] period.”3 The the darker arrows indicating that the connec- cycle then proceeds to ATO production and tions to strategy development and execution then to execution. The final step in the cycle— are the most crucial. assessment—evaluates whether air and space As OPTEMPO increases, the relative impor- operations are creating the desired effects and tance of the connections to the other func- achieving the JFACC’s objectives. The assess- tions shifts. At a low OPTEMPO, most of the ment team recommends changes to strategy, changes to the plan occur in strategy develop- and the cycle starts over again. ment. Tactical-level operations unfold at a Within this framework, we think of assess- relatively slow pace. In this unhurried envi- ment as occurring between execution and ronment, planners rarely make substantive strategy development, which implies that the changes to the joint integrated prioritized tar- most important relationships for the OAT are get list, MAAP, or ATO after their production. with the Combat Operations Division (execution) and the other teams within the Strategy Division (strategy development). The Combat Operations Division provides the primary in- 4USBUFHZ put to the OAT, which sends output to the pri- %FWFMPQNFOU mary recipients—the strategy plans team and strategy guidance team. 5BSHFU Looking first at inputs to the OAT, we clearly %FWFMPQNFOU see the vital connection between assessment and execution, the latter representing the part "TTFTTNFOU of the air tasking cycle that creates effects. Un- derstanding and interpreting those effects is one of the most basic functions of assessment. .""1 Equally important though, the OAT must %FWFMPQNFOU have a comprehensive understanding of the plan, gained only by participating in the planning process, much of which is conducted by &YFDVUJPO the strategy plans team. During planning, the OAT helps define objectives and tasks, specify- ing performance and effectiveness measures Figure 2. Information flow into the OAT

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As things start to speed up, however, sub- at that level. Figure 3 depicts the changing re- stantive changes begin to occur later in the lationships as OPTEMPO increases. cycle. Increases in OPTEMPO have the most A similar shift in focus occurs with respect substantial impact at the tactical level of war. to information flow out of the OAT. The true Even at extreme OPTEMPOs, the operational- value of assessment lies in offering command- level plan naturally changes at a more measured ers the opportunity to change course and avoid pace than the tactical plans that support it. possible pitfalls, rather than reacting to events Take air superiority for example. The after the fact. The OAT does this by means of operational-level plan to achieve air superi- predictive assessment—its projection of what ority by rolling back the enemy’s Integrated the assessment will be at some point in the fu- Air Defense System (IADS), destroying enemy ture. In order to leverage these projections, aircraft on the ground, populating defensive- the commander must have a mechanism to counterair combat air patrols, and employing incorporate recommended changes into the theater missile defense systems probably will plan—specifically, in the air tasking cycle, the not change significantly as the OPTEMPO in- OAT feeds those recommendations into the creases. Certainly, we wish to do those things strategy-development process. faster, but the overall plan will remain essen- That approach is well suited to a low- tially the same. OPTEMPO environment. During steady-state The situation at the tactical level, however, peacetime operations, for example, the com- is very different. Changing conditions in the mander’s desired effects are broadly defined battlespace will drive changes to the targeting and develop slowly—over a matter of months effects team and the MAAP. At extremely high or even years. In this environment, plans de- OPTEMPOs, the bulk of the changes to the velop at a correspondingly slow pace. The plan may occur during execution via the dy- OAT can pass any observations to the strategy namic targeting process. This implies that, in plans team for additional consideration and order to maintain a comprehensive under- planning; such observations will work their standing of the plan as the pace of operations way through the other teams as part of the increases, the OAT must strengthen its con- normal cycle. nection to the tactical-level plans. At the same As the pace of operations increases, how- time, assuming the team has already developed ever, the commander may need to implement a solid understanding of the operational plan, changes more rapidly. In that case, rather than it may be able to reduce its focus on changes feeding changes to the strategy plans team

4USBUFHZ 4USBUFHZ 4USBUFHZ 4USBUFHZ %FWFMPQNFOU %FWFMPQNFOU %FWFMPQNFOU %FWFMPQNFOU

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Figure 3. OAT inputs and increasing OPTEMPO. (From the author’s personal discussions with Maj Joe Morgan, Annapolis, Maryland, 12–14 June 2007.)

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and strategy guidance team and allowing those Extending this idea, figure 5 shows that as changes to progress through the normal cycle, the pace of operations increases, assessment the OAT may need to make recommendations feedback moves further inside the air tasking directly to one of the other teams. Suppose, cycle, while maintaining a persistent connec- for example, that the assessment identifies a tion to strategy development. At the highest potential problem with the JFACC’s plan OPTEMPOs, assessment may provide feed- which warrants a change to the MAAP. The back directly to the operations floor, perhaps OAT should pass that change simultaneously recommending adjustments several times dur- to the strategy plans team, the strategy guiding a single ATO period. ance team, and the MAAP team. The OAT In fact, this is quite often the way things should never bypass the strategy-development work in practice. Verbal guidance provided by function entirely. Any changes to the JFACC’s the JFACC in various settings is relayed to the guidance must be reflected in an updated air appropriate team or teams even before revi- operations directive which should then be dis- sion to the air operations directive has begun. seminated. However, passing the change to the MAAP team at the same time would en- For example, during a recent exercise that in- able its members to begin working it, knowing volved fast-paced operations and a great deal that a change to the air operations directive is of dynamic targeting, the JFACC received OA forthcoming (fig. 4). updates several times a day. In fact, during the most critical operations, the OAT provided him an update every two hours. If he had any 4USBUFHZ concerns, they went immediately to the opera- %FWFMPQNFOU tions floor, where personnel made the necessary adjustments. The next air operations di-

5BSHFU rective then incorporated the cumulative %FWFMPQNFOU effect of these changes.4 In the author’s experience, however, this is "TTFTTNFOU often a very informal process, usually involv- ing much reinventing of wheels. To provide the JFACC with the best possible assessment, .""1 &YFDVUJPO %FWFMPQNFOU the OAT must have a solid understanding of the plan and a way to implement recommended changes. During a fast-paced fight, "50 this must occur inside the 72-hour air tasking 1SPEVDUJPO cycle. AOCs should formalize the existing ad hoc practices and use this procedural frame- Figure 4. OAT output to the MAAP work to stimulate discussion as well as lay the

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Figure 5. OAT outputs and increasing OPTEMPO

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foundation for process improvements within assessments—and synthesizes them to enable the AOCs. the JFACC’s orientation and, hence, effective The approach described here, based on decision making. This context sheds more the air tasking cycle, offers a solid procedural light on why so many problems arise when we framework for OA in a high-OPTEMPO envi- attempt to conduct assessment within the air ronment within the AOCs. However its appli- tasking cycle during high OPTEMPO. The cability remains rather narrow in scope. We higher the OPTEMPO, the faster the JFACC’s develop the air tasking cycle, a task-oriented OODA loop must go in order to keep up. structure, to codify the tasks and intermediate When that loop operates faster than the 72- products necessary to produce and execute an hour air tasking cycle, assessment must keep ATO. It is not well understood within the joint up with it or become irrelevant. community or, for that matter, within the Air The OODA-loop framework applies to as- Force (outside the AOC). Assessment, particu- sessment at all levels of warfare. At the com- larly the effects-based variety, requires a batant commander (COCOM) or joint task broader theoretical structure to support dis- force (JTF) level (strategic/operational), cam- cussion of the complex concepts and relation- paign assessment provides orientation for the ships involved. The next section describes joint force commander’s decisions. At the such a structure. component level (operational), OA provides orientation for the component commander’s decisions. Lastly, at the tactical level, tactical Assessment and the Observe- assessments of various forms provide orienta- Orient-Decide-Act Loop tion for tactical-level decisions. For example, battle damage assessment (BDA) may indicate The framework described above concerns that a target was not successfully destroyed, itself with process improvements within the leading to a restrike recommendation, or per- AOCs. This section, based on Colonel Boyd’s haps an assessor on the combat-operations OODA loop, develops a conceptual frame- floor will notice a pattern in the incoming work for discussing some of the problems mission report (MISREP) data that will lead to plaguing assessment at high OPTEMPOs. an adjustment in tactics. In all cases and at all Colonel Boyd “thought that any conflict levels, assessment serves an orientation func- could be viewed as a duel wherein each adver- tion (fig. 6). sary observes (O) his opponent’s actions, orients Not only does the OODA-loop framework (O) himself to the unfolding situation, decides apply at all levels of war but also, by examining (D) on the most appropriate response or relationships between the loops at different counter-move, then acts (A).”5 He noted that levels, we gain insight into some of the com- the process of observation-orientation-decision- mon problems plaguing assessment today. If action represents what takes place during the assessment is fundamentally an orientation command and control process—which means function, then the products of assessment that the O-O-D-A loop can be thought of as be- serve two customers. First and foremost, they ing the [command and control] loop. The sec- serve the decision maker at whatever level of ond O, orientation—as the repository of our war the assessment is conducted (the “decide” genetic heritage, cultural tradition, and previ- part of the OODA loop). Second, they serve as ous experiences—is the most important part of observations to enable orientation at the next- the O-O-D-A loop since it shapes the way we ob- 6 higher level. Figure 7 shows the relationships serve, the way we decide, the way we act. (em- between OODA loops at different levels of war. phasis in original) Suppose, for example, that a JTF com- Looking at assessment in this framework, mander is making a go/no-go decision as to we see that OA serves as part of the “orienta- whether or not to launch an amphibious as- tion” piece of the JFACC’s OODA loop. The sault on an adversary, and he has directed the OAT collects observations—usually lower-level JFACC to gain the requisite degree of air supe-

3-PIREP-Messer.indd 55 4/29/08 7:56:40 AM 5BDUJDBM-FWFM $PNCBU"TTFTTNFOUT$FMM 0QFSBUJPOBM-FWFM $PNCBU3FQPSUT$FMM $PNQPOFOU

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riority to support the assault. Because the Finally, at the JTF level, the campaign as- JFACC is concerned about the surface-to-air sessment team will be informed that the JFACC threat, he has struck a number of the enemy’s is assessing whether he has attained the re- IADS targets. quired degree of air superiority (observation). Looking at the tactical-level OODA loop, Team members will synthesize that observation, the JFACC’s BDA team will collect informa- along with inputs from the other components tion about those strikes from a variety of and their own observations of the battlespace sources (observations). They will synthesize (orientation), and make a recommendation the observations and determine whether or to the JTF commander regarding whether or not the target has been destroyed (orienta- not to proceed with the amphibious assault tion). They will then issue a BDA report that (input to decision maker, fig. 8). will go to the OAT (as an operational-level ob- Many of the most widespread problems servation) and, if necessary, make a recom- with assessment at high OPTEMPOs result mendation to restrike the target (input to de- from disconnects between OODA loops at dif- cision maker). ferent levels. Take data collection and man- At the operational level, the OAT will re- agement, for example. As most people who ceive the BDA report (observation), using that have done OA will attest, the OAT usually information, along with a number of other in- spends 90 percent of its time and manpower puts, to determine whether or not our forces gathering and managing data, leaving only 10 have established air superiority (orientation). percent devoted to synthesizing the data and The team will pass the result to the JFACC (in- producing the assessment. put to decision maker), who will alter his op- When confronted with the data-collection erations accordingly, and to the JTF (as a and management issue, many people immedi- higher-level observation). ately assume that it is a technical problem

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Figure 8. Amphibious assault example

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with a technical solution. Often, the proposed not effectively communicated its requirements solution takes the form of an automated data- to the tactical-assessment teams. And some- collection system or a massive database. Auto- times the operational-level OODA loop moves mated data handling would offer an improve- so fast than the tactical-level processes can’t ment over the current approach, but no support it. This last reason, especially prob- amount of automation will address the root lematic, becomes more likely as the pace of cause of the data-management issue: a failure operations increases. of tactical-level orientation processes. Regardless of the cause, the result is the According to the framework, tactical assess- same. The OAT doesn’t get the observations it ments (the product of orientation at the tac- needs. Team members must then either try to tical level) serve as the primary inputs (obser- drive the orientation functions at the tactical vations) to the OAT. Sometimes, however, the level or resort to collecting tactical-level obser- tactical-level orientation necessary to develop vations and try to do tactical- and operational- inputs to the OAT doesn’t actually happen. In level orientation simultaneously. rare cases, this results from a complete break- It is nearly impossible to modify tactical- down of the tactical-assessment process. Usu- level orientation processes on the fly, particu- ally, however, that process works just fine larly in a high-OPTEMPO environment, so within the context of the tactical-level OODA the OAT often ends up attempting both tac- loop. In these cases, the problem emerges tical and operational assessments. In such from a disconnect between the tactical-level cases, the OAT tries to collect a select few OODA loop and the operational-level loop, high-priority tactical observations and synthe- which can occur in several ways. Sometimes size them into an operational-level assessment we have no process in place to align them. (fig. 9). This approach tends to be inefficient. Sometimes we lack sufficient manpower to It is usually not feasible for a single team to do execute the process. Sometimes the OAT has both tactical- and operational-level orientation

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Figure 9. Misaligned OODA loops

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simultaneously. The OAT generally has to do tween the component’s and the JTF’s OODA at least some tactical-level orientation to iden- loops. In this case, however, the lack of orien- tify the important observations before begin- tation at the lower level does not constitute ning its operational-level orientation process. the problem. Instead, often the JTF prefers to This approach also relies heavily on the OAT’s reserve the operational-level orientation func- comprehensive understanding of the plan to tion for itself and may disregard the orientation accurately determine the most important tac- that occurs at the components. By requiring the tical observations and rapidly fuse them into components to provide what essentially amounts an assessment. It can work if the OAT includes to observations rather than completed assess- the right people, but it represents a Band-Aid ments, the JTF puts itself in a position of hav- rather than a true solution. ing to perform both the component-level and Consider the processing and handling of JTF-level orientation functions. This also in- MISREPs during a recent exercise. When MIS- creases the workload on an already stressed OAT REPs come into the AOC, they are tactical- level observations. Although one should not that must now collect observations for transmis- attempt in-depth analysis of MISREPs during sion to the JTF in addition to performing the the heat of battle, some tactical-level orienta- orientation function for which it is designed. tion can be done during ongoing combat op- This problem also arises at low OPTEMPOs, erations. Ideally, the combat reports cell or but in the author’s experience, it tends to be other appropriate team would review the MIS- more pronounced at high OPTEMPOs. REPs as they come into the AOC and issue a Although this practice results in duplica- periodic report summarizing their content. tion of effort and lower-fidelity assessment at This did not happen. Instead, the combat re- the JTF level, it is easier to rectify than the ports cell on the operations floor passed hun- data-collection issues. After all, the orienta- dreds of MISREPs to the OAT via e-mail, over tion occurs at the component, and the result- 90 percent of which indicated that the pilot ing product is available to the JTF whenever it had nothing significant to report. The OAT cares to receive it. The key to resolving this spent hours opening these e-mails and docu- disconnect involves building strong relation- ments to find the half-dozen MISREPs that ships between the JTF and component assess- were significant. Only then could team mem- ment teams before the shooting starts. By bers begin to interpret the content of the rebuilding this foundation, the organizations ports in the context of the JFACC’s objectives. will come to understand and respect each oth- In this case, the data-management problem er’s processes. Coordination and data flow will facing the OAT was a direct result of the fail- 7 improve, the OODA loops will align with one ure of the tactical-level orientation function. another, and the assessment processes at both The long-term solution to the data-collection levels will improve. and management issue entails investing the As these examples demonstrate, using the necessary resources and effort in tactical-level OODA loop as a conceptual framework offers orientation. We should exercise the BDA process routinely during peacetime to enable a insight into some of the more complex issues smooth transition to major combat opera- surrounding assessment in a fast-moving fight. tions. Furthermore, we should codify and ex- Applying across the services and across the ercise tactical-level assessment processes for levels of war, it can be used to investigate and friendly operations, including procedures for evaluate the connections between assessment handling MISREPs. processes at different organizations or levels. Another issue that frequently arises deals In general, it opens the door for development with the exchange of assessment data between of assessment processes to handle nearly any the JTF (or other higher headquarters) and situation in which the commander needs to the air component. Again, many of these make a decision and wants assessment as part problems can be traced to disconnects be- of his or her orientation.

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Conclusions flow to the right teams quickly and efficiently, and maintains the connection to the Strategy Assessment rapidly contextualizes and syn- Division—a link essential to preservation of a thesizes a high volume of data to enable the strategy-to-task approach. JFACC’s decision making. To do that well, the In addition to the procedural framework OAT must maintain a current, comprehensive described in the first half of the article, the understanding of the plan and a process for OODA-loop construct serves as a conceptual implementing recommended changes. The framework for assessment. The loop’s structure faster the operations proceed, the quicker the JFACC must make decisions—and the more allows examination of connections between valuable assessment becomes. organizations operating at different levels of At these higher OPTEMPOs, the OAT must war. It offers a conceptual structure to enable operate inside the 72-hour air tasking cycle. understanding of some of the complex ideas This article has offered a procedural frame- and relationships involved in assessment. Fi- work to serve as a starting point for the devel- nally, it illuminates some of the roadblocks to opment of disciplined processes for infor- effective assessment. Hopefully, some of the mation flow to and from the OAT in a insights it reveals will bring assessment one high-OPTEMPO environment. The approach step closer to its true goal—enabling effective outlined here allows assessment feedback to decision making at all levels. ❑

Notes 1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Opera- 4. Author’s personal experience during Exercise Tal- tions and Organization, 3 April 2007, 105, https://www isman Sabre, May 2007. .doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/ 5. Franklin C. Spinney, “Genghis John,” US Naval In- Doctrine_Docs/AFDD2.pdf. stitute Proceedings 123, no. 7 (July 1997): 47. 2. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January 2000, 50, https:// 6. John R. Boyd, “Organic Design for Command and www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page _HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-1.pdf. Control” (slides), May 1987, slide 26, http://www.d-n-i 3. AFDD 2-1.9, Targeting, 8 June 2006, 41, https:// .net/boyd/pdf/c&c.pdf (accessed 30 June 2007). www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page 7. Author’s personal experience during Exercise Tal- _HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-1-%209.pdf. isman Sabre, May 2007.

True to our history over the past century of powered flight, the Air Force continues to maintain the most complex, diverse and ambitious Science and Technology . . . portfolio of all the Services. —2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement

3-PIREP-Messer.indd 60 4/29/08 7:56:42 AM Air-Intelligence Operations and Training The Decisive Edge for Effective Airpower Employment

Col D. Scott George, USAF Lt Col Robert Ehlers, USAF*

Through technological advances and Airmen’s ingenuity, we can now surveil or strike any target anywhere on the face of the Earth, day or night, in any weather. . . . Because ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities are at the core of determining . . . desired effects, ISR has never been more important during our 60 years as an independent Service. ISR has become the foundation of Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power. The ISR transformation initiatives we are beginning will further enhance our ability to fly and fight as America’s Air Force. —Gen T. Michael Moseley

America’s Intelligence Airmen are precious resources, engaged daily at the forefront of securing our Nation’s security objectives. —Gen T. Michael Moseley

Intelligence is operations as we move into the 21st century. —Lt Gen David Deptula

The Changing Nature of War: ployment of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to dissemination of near-real-time intelligence. Intelligence Moves to the Center For example, the Air Force’s Distributed Com- Since the attacks by Muslim extremists on mon Ground/Surface System provides well the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 over half of all operational intelligence to the September 2001 (9/11), both the world and combatant commander.1 Yet, this contribution the practice of war have changed in funda- would be impossible if we did not have su- mental ways. Perhaps the most important of perbly trained Airmen to operate these kinds these changes has been an exponential growth of vital ISR assets. Without the intelligence in the importance of agile and actionable intel- schoolhouse at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, these ligence. This is so, not just because a new gen- “precious resources”—as General Moseley, eration of technologies has emerged to facilitate the Air Force chief of staff, calls intelligence such an alteration, but because the enemies Airmen—would not get the insights they need we fight today—elusive, ruthless, technology to mature into the world’s best intelligence savvy, and extremist—represent a new kind of professionals. threat, one requiring a commensurate change The changes in warfare since 2001 have in- in our intelligence efforts. cluded an array of problems that demand so- Since 2001 the Air Force has quietly taken phisticated and precise intelligence analysis. center stage in the ISR effort, from the em- The act of striking time-sensitive targets is an

*Colonel George is commander of the 17th Training Group at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, and Lieutenant Colonel Ehlers is deputy commander of that organization.

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intelligence-dependent process that would be their talents after sending them through a rig- impossible without the ability to track high- orous training program. Combat-experienced value individuals, locate insurgent camps and analysts then returned to train new recruits. areas of operations, and engage in many other Finally, the British held their troops to the critical ISR actions that not only act as force- most stringent of standards while giving them multipliers but also serve as the “forces” that authority to make analytical judgments. Our drive our successes. To help defeat our ene- countrymen quickly followed suit.5 mies, intelligence professionals are employing Most important of all, however, the Allies sophisticated new training methodologies, tech- developed an organizational structure in nologies, and analytical techniques; sharing which intelligence sharing and coordination sources and methods very effectively; and were the norm, and within which one specific coming together organizationally in ways not organization or agency had responsibility for seen since World War II. Our intelligence Air- men are indeed precious resources. We may making the decision on a given analytical or not win all our wars with them, but we will lose operational intelligence issue. This organiza- without them.2 tional excellence, along with superb training, proved to be an essential aspect of Allied successes. This was particularly evident during Echoes: the heavy-bomber campaigns that destroyed the Intelligence Operations and German transportation and oil infrastructures in 1944–45, crippling the German military, re- Training in World War II ducing Allied casualties, and speeding the end Intelligence has always been a critical force- of the war in Europe. Sadly, for a variety of multiplier, but its importance to operational reasons beyond the scope of this article, and successes became absolutely vital during World despite the development of some relatively so- War II. The Allies’ breaking of German ci- phisticated targeting capabilities within Strate- phers paid huge dividends. Similar successes gic Air Command during the Cold War, the air- occurred in the Pacific, where the Allies broke intelligence expertise amassed during World key Japanese codes, resulting in victories from War II withered until only a shadow remained.6 Midway to the submarine campaign that iso- For the first time since 1945, the Air Force lated the Japanese home islands from their is once again moving rapidly in the direction sources of supply.3 of a vigorous intelligence program, establish- Nearly as important was the development ing new organizations such as the ISR Agency of a sophisticated intellectual infrastructure with specific mission sets as well as making for Anglo-American air intelligence. This in- each intelligence organization within the Air cluded highly trained intelligence specialists; Staff and other commands responsible for new technologies such as signals-intelligence specific programmatic, operational, and train- systems, advanced reconnaissance aircraft and ing responsibilities. Most importantly, Air Force cameras, and the tools required to exploit im- senior leaders recognized the rapidly increas- agery; operational experience built on the solid foundation laid by intensive training; ing importance of intelligence by creating an and an unprecedented degree of organiza- entirely new deputy chief of staff position, the tional coordination and cooperation that be- USAF/A2, with authority to make the changes gan among British agencies and came to in- required to bring intelligence into the twenty- clude Americans.4 first century. In fact, the chief emphasizes that In the training arena, Americans took their the first step in this process will be “to realign lead from the British. For instance, British lead- functions within the Headquarters Staff to es- ers hired intelligence personnel with the great- tablish the AF/A2 as the single focal point and est aptitude for their particular specialty. They lead for all Air Force Intelligence, Surveil- also put these people in positions that suited lance, and Reconnaissance capabilities.”7

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Renaissance: airborne ISR platforms and Distributed Com- mon Ground/Surface Systems as well as na- Terrorist Attacks of 9/11, tional technical means, has come together to a New War, and the Air- provide unprecedented situational awareness, detailed characterization of targets and their Intelligence Resurgence support networks, and the terminal tracking Assessments of military effectiveness cannot, and engagement data required to kill our ad- therefore, be reduced to the amounts of physical versaries. Yet, air-intelligence assets are trans- damage or destruction inflicted on targets, the forming how we fight in other, less obvious quantities of military equipment damaged or ways—for example, miniaturized and full- destroyed, or even to the numbers of combat- sized UASes that safeguard ground forces from ants directly wounded or killed. Instead, is- ambush. Time-sensitive targeting offers yet sues of operational-strategic effectiveness will another example. Increasingly sophisticated also necessarily involve human plans, inten- technologies and capabilities now allow intel- tions, psychology, political ends, and other ligence personnel to direct pilots, ground forces, hard-to-quantify factors and considerations. and other combatants to targets in minutes instead of hours or days. Young Airmen are —Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 2, pt. 2 developing these new skills at the Goodfellow The long post–World War II neglect of air AFB schoolhouse—the Air Force center for intelligence came to an abrupt end on 9/11. intelligence training and a key producer of in- With the United States at the center of target- telligence specialists for all the services. ing efforts by Muslim extremists, the enemy appeared easy to identify—at least at the macro level. However, once the initial cam- The Training Revolution: paigns in Afghanistan and Iraq ended, the na- Troops, Technologies, and ture of both wars changed. We and our allies found ourselves mired in counterinsurgencies, Methodologies nation building, and anti-civil-war duties. Con- The ongoing intelligence-training revolu- sequently, these campaigns demanded en- tion is the product of three components: per- tirely new air-intelligence capabilities. Fortu- sonnel, state-of-the-art technologies, and creative nately, the same building blocks that made the teaching methodologies. Our airmen, sol- 1944–45 air campaigns so successful are re- diers, sailors, and marines form the center of emerging. Perhaps the key elements of this new the training effort—they will carry the fight to intellectual infrastructure are air-intelligence our adversaries. The chief emphasized this troops and the sophisticated technologies when he noted that “our Intel Way Ahead also they continue to master at ever-higher levels addresses end-to-end Intelligence Airmen ca- of proficiency. In the wars we are waging, and reer force management, from the focus of our will wage, these troops will become one of the initial technical training to how we develop final arbiters of success.8 our intel professionals into leaders.”9 The technologies that our air-intelligence Although the troops currently in training specialists leverage in these new kinds of wars are among the best ever to pass through the are also vital to our successes because of the schoolhouse portals, the real force-multipliers enemy we fight. Consequently, ISR assets (in- in their training regimen are new training cluding Army, Navy, and Marine platforms) technologies that introduce high degrees of are the foundation of virtually every military realism, dynamism, and unpredictability into success. The key role of air intelligence is exercise play, and vastly improved teaching highlighted by efforts to locate, observe, char- methodologies that emphasize analytical skills. acterize, track, and engage extremist high- Put simply, training technologies give exer- value individuals. In several cases, the full cises the look and feel of the war we are cur- range of assets, from human intelligence to rently fighting.

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One new modeling and simulation tech- communications networks but also human nology, for instance, allows for dynamic exer- networks, zeroing in on high-value individuals, cise play by processing students’ inputs in sophis- infiltrators, and rogue elements.13 ticated ways to produce outcomes designed to The same advantages accrue to students reward sound analysis and careful employment in the analytical-intelligence tracks. Both of ISR assets while penalizing poor analysis and SIGINTers and traditional all-source analysts employment. If players send a high-value ISR benefit from advanced technologies that al- asset into harm’s way without checking the low them to work together in a capstone exercise enemy order of battle or requesting escort by that pushes their learning curve to the limit friendly fighters, they often lose the asset and while giving them an opportunity to see what must prosecute the rest of the fight—including expertise, intuition, and analytical insights intelligence-collection management and tar- their counterparts bring to the table in the geting—without it. Similarly, making poor ISR division of an air and space operations choices when building their “collection deck” center. These Air Force analysts are now work- (the assignment of ISR assets to collect against ing with Army SIGINT mission managers who various targets) will considerably reduce the use advanced training technologies to help stu- effectiveness of air strikes and other attacks.10 dent “targeteers” pick high-value, high-threat, The current suite of training technologies and time-sensitive ground targets. Similarly, enables students to practice intelligence func- new technologies will enable communications tions at all levels of war, from unconventional, and electronic-intelligence specialists (the two low-intensity, tactical engagements to conven- SIGINT subspecialties) to bring near-real-time tional, high-intensity, force-on-force conflicts. intelligence to the table, further enhancing Advanced modeling and simulation technolo- realism. This effort to bring all varieties of in- gies that use UAS feeds, satellite-orbit displays, telligence specialists together for intensive moving-target-indicator software, and sophis- training creates crucial synergy for the fight.14 ticated message-delivery capabilities arrayed Troops and technologies represent a vital in a realistic environment much like an air duo, but new teaching methodologies are and space operations center have changed equally important. These rely not only on in- the face of intelligence training in new and structor preparation but also on a steady influx dramatic ways.11 of combat-tested instructors to the schoolhouse. For instance, signals intelligence (SIGINT) They involve leading-edge teaching techniques analysts are employing a new generation of that combine intensive instruction, frequent classroom tools that allow them to listen to practical exercises, and maximum leveraging and see military activities in their target lan- of new and emerging technologies. In the of- guage, carried out in real-world situations by ficers’ course, for instance, students now focus our current and potential adversaries, thus on analytical skills from the second week of a giving them a real-world flavor we could barely nearly seven-month-long course, and they em- have imagined even two years ago. These ploy these deepening skills during every exer- training modules come complete with static, cise. All students must deliver an ISR em- background noise, different dialects, and a ployment briefing in which they analyze a host of other challenges designed to push real-world scenario from previous operations young “SIGINTers” to the limits of their capa- in Iraq or Afghanistan, determine optimum bilities.12 In coordination with national agen- employment of scarce ISR assets, and present cies, the schoolhouse is leveraging technolo- their plan to instructors. The debriefings that gies never before offered to the Department come afterwards are often delivered by combat- of Defense, all of which will soon enable young experienced instructors who know where stu- apprentices to practice even more extensively dents went wrong—or right—and drive this on real-world mission data collected by a variety home with personal experiences. Yet, instruc- of ISR assets. Just as impressive, these kinds of tors also ensure that students recognize they technologies enable students to map not only will operate in a complex, real-world environ-

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ment in which inspired analysis is difficult and New Directions: perfect analysis impossible. In this, they take their lead from General Deptula, the USAF/ Total Force, Joint Force, and A2, who notes that “you can’t expect predic- National Agencies tions with 100 percent success in intel work, and you shouldn’t, because then we drive mo- One of the often-overlooked truths of intel- tivations to tell the leadership what they want ligence training is that it would come to a to hear.”15 screeching halt without a Total Force effort. The employment of combat veterans as in- Civilians, both civil service and contractors, structors is a key linchpin in the current train- play a vital role at the schoolhouse as instruc- ing renaissance. A significant issue, therefore, tors, network engineers, technologists, re- and one the intelligence community is work- sources experts, manpower experts, registrars, ing hard to address, is the necessity of making and training managers. We cannot complete the schoolhouse an attractive assignment for the mission without them. The same is true of our Guard and Reserve personnel, who play Airmen. Fortunately, senior leaders recognize similarly key roles. This is truly a Total Force the importance of realistic joint training to effort. Even more fundamentally, it is also a the success of the intelligence enterprise. joint effort.19 Consequently, they reward personnel who Approximately 25 percent of the instruc- perform well at the schoolhouse with excel- tors at Goodfellow are from our sister services. lent assignments upon completion of their This presence is as crucial as the joint student teaching tours. During the selection board presence. Indeed, for the first time, intelli- conducted by the intelligence leadership board gence students from all services are training in 2007, all five of the officers considered from together—a huge force multiplier since it pro- Goodfellow received competitive director-of- vides insight into the kinds of intelligence operations or wing director-of-intelligence as- 16 work each service does best and, more impor- signments. The promotion picture is also tantly, brings those discrete areas of expertise improving dramatically. And so it must if we together to provide a synergy that would other- are to meet General Moseley’s and General wise be absent. In a telling statistic, nearly 80 Deptula’s vision of Air Force intelligence as percent of intelligence specialists from our sis- “the preeminent intel organization in the U.S. ter services come through the schoolhouse military, with the most respected intel personnel for initial or advanced training—or both.20 and the most valuable intelligence, surveil- 17 Jointness is vital, but interaction with na- lance, and reconnaissance . . . capabilities.” tional agencies is also crucial—and we are Put simply, this all begins with leading-edge building relationships with these key players as training. If we cannot attract and reward the well as leveraging their training assets. Efforts best people to teach at the schoolhouse, then with the National Security Agency in particular we will graduate mediocre students. are paying handsome dividends as the school- In line with this emphasis on operational house receives increased funding and leading- currency, training squadrons hone their in- edge training systems that allow us to bring structors’ skills and teaching currency by de- together national and military intelligence per- ploying them to field sites for short or ex- sonnel and products in new, essential ways.21 tended periods. Conversely, the schoolhouse hosts a huge array of subject-matter experts, active duty and retired senior intelligence of- Air-Intelligence Training and the ficers, and leaders from national intelligence agencies, all of whom bring vital perspectives Air-Intelligence Revolution to both students and their instructors while The air-intelligence revolution currently simultaneously building ties between intelli- under way is itself part of a larger phenome- gence organizations.18 non driven by rapid changes in warfare and

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concomitant intelligence requirements since attracting the most qualified, combat-tested 9/11. To an unprecedented degree, the tactics, instructors to teach the next generation of in- techniques, and procedures for employing telligence specialists and bringing in the leader- ISR assets rely on close cooperation between ship cadre necessary to tie the larger effort military and national intelligence organiza- together. Needless to say, this effort will fail if tions and agencies, all of whom bring unique we do not reward these troops for their will- attributes and capabilities that facilitate time- ingness to come to the schoolhouse. Without sensitive targeting, long-term surveillance and this human talent, we will not succeed. We target characterization, nodal analysis of hu- must remember the World War II experience: man and nonhuman target systems, vectoring our best Airmen went from the fighting front of combat aircraft and ground troops to the to the schoolhouse in order to train the next proper targets, and myriad other tasks. Yet, cadre of troops. On the other side of the coin, training lies at the heart of all of these suc- the schoolhouse is working to fend off an ever- cesses. According to an old proverb, “The more growing list of deployment taskers, which, we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war.” taken collectively, threaten to slow or even This is particularly true of intelligence train- halt several vital courses. A deployment load ing because it gives us the tools to safeguard that takes instructor numbers below the mini- American and allied lives while maximizing mum needed to teach the full range of intel- the effects we achieve against our enemies. ligence courses would have major second- and Nonetheless, we still have much to do. third-order effects in the field, where fewer intelligence specialists—and less-well-trained Tasks: ones—wage a losing battle to keep up with the enemy’s ever-changing tactics, techniques, and Bringing the Air-Intelligence procedures and threat-system employment. Revolution to Maturity We cannot afford to undercut instructor numbers and quality at the schoolhouse. We need to complete several operational Fourth, and on a related note, we must con- and training actions in order to maximize our tinue to leverage the huge pool of human talent intelligence capabilities. The first involves available to train our students and, in the case of deepening our joint and national focus and senior officers, assist the leadership at Good- interactions in terms of both training and op- fellow with its efforts to make continuous im- erations. Closer interaction at the schoolhouse can address the former, but only the develop- provements at the schoolhouse. This is pre- ment of a new intellectual infrastructure, in which cisely why we must broaden and deepen the military and civilian intelligence organizations pool of subject-matter experts, senior intelli- and agencies come together in more intense gence officers, and senior operational leaders and orderly interactions, can take us the rest who come to share their expertise and life ex- of the way. periences with the students. Second, we must continue to leverage leading- Fifth, we must bend all our efforts to creating a edge technologies. Closely tied to this is the key proper balance between preparing to fight current requirement that we employ this equipment adversaries and preparing students to fight future to train like we fight. The capstone exercise at ones. This process is under way, with the cap- the schoolhouse is moving rapidly in this di- stone intelligence exercise now featuring a rection. It enables instructors to deliver realis- high-intensity conflict and a simultaneous lower- tic, dynamic, and unpredictable training that intensity effort. This kind of play will force maximizes learning and allows students to students to employ scarce ISR assets with maxi- profit from both good decisions and bad ones mum effectiveness and efficiency while expos- at no cost to our troops in the field. ing them to the full range of real and poten- Third, we must push hard to make our “Fo- tial adversaries. Our list of those adversaries cus on Goodfellow” efforts a success. These include changes quickly; we must be sufficiently flexible

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and well trained to wage future wars with ap- close cooperation between military and civilian propriate intelligence capabilities. intelligence organizations, we will be better The central importance of intelligence to prepared than ever for the full spectrum of military operations is clear. By combining a vi- armed conflict. When merged seamlessly with sionary and highly effective program for intel- operations, intelligence will enable us to pro- ligence training with operational fixes such as a vide for our nation’s security by delivering the renewed intellectual infrastructure, including decisive edge in current and future wars. ❑

Notes 1. This includes intelligence and operations per- erational Capability, August 2006; and idem, Modeling and sonnel at Multi-National Corps-Iraq/J2, the combined Simulation Strategic Plan, September 2006. air operations center, Air Combat Command/A2, and 11. Ibid. other locations. 12. The term SIGINTer is slang for a SIGINT special- 2. The Gulf War Air Power Survey was the first publica- ist. These intelligence personnel are charged with moni- tion to look in detail at the difficulties inherent in striking toring both communications and noncommunications time-sensitive targets. Since then, scores of books and ar- electronic emissions and bringing intelligence gleaned ticles have explored this problem, and intelligence per- from these intercepts to bear during combat operations. sonnel are leveraging these insights along with new tech- 13. 316th Training Squadron/XP course documents. nologies to engage such targets in record time. See Eliot A. Cohen and Thomas A. Keaney, Gulf War Air Power Sur- 14. Commander, 17th Training Group, memorandum vey (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1993). of agreement among the 17th Training Support Squad- 3. There are dozens of good sources on the project to ron, 315th Training Squadron, and 316th Training Squad- decipher German messages, known as Ultra. One of the best ron, subject: Operation Lone Star, December 2006. is F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World 15. Quoted in “Air Force Launches Intelligence Over- War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 5 vols. (Lon- haul, Aiming to Lead Field,” InsideDefense.com, 31 January don: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1979–1990). For the 2007, 4. successes in the Pacific, see Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s 16. Message, Air Force Personnel Center, to Air Force Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945 senior intelligence officers, subject: Results of Summer (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991). 2007 Intelligence Director of Operations Board, February 4. For a detailed look at this key intelligence success, 2007. see Robert S. Ehlers Jr., “BDA: Anglo-American Air Intel- 17. Moseley, “CSAF’s Vector.” ligence, Bomb Damage Assessment, and the Bombing 18. The 315th Training Squadron hosted over 50 senior Campaigns against Germany, 1914–1945” (PhD diss., visitors in 2007, including 10 general officers or civilian Ohio State University, 2005). equivalents and over 30 colonels and civilian equivalents. 5. Ibid., 409–11. 19. Every training squadron includes at least 10 per- 6. Ibid., chaps. 6–8, 13. 7. Gen T. Michael Moseley, “CSAF’s Vector: Trans- cent civilians—in several cases, closer to 30 percent—as forming Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon- well as three to 15 Guard and Reserve personnel. Finally, naissance,” 29 January 2007, http://www.af.mil/library/ nearly 25 percent of the instructors in the 17th Training viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=299. Group’s squadrons come from our sister services. 8. Ibid. 20. 17th Training Group/TSO (Registrar) records. 9. Ibid. 21. Five recent visits by National Security Agency per- 10. 17th Training Group / Training Squadron, Model- sonnel have had a huge impact on its growing relation- ing and Simulation Initial Operational Capability and Full Op- ship with the schoolhouse.

4-PIREP-George Ehlers.indd 67 4/29/08 7:57:24 AM The ABCs of Strong Leadership

Col Brad Ashley, USAF*

Leadership is unlocking people’s potential to become better. —Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ)

oday’s Air Force needs strong saying, “I can’t make you do it, but I can make leadership at all levels and role models you wish you had!” I guarantee that he affected to serve as great examples for our the attitudes of his Airmen each and every Airmen. They help all of us become day. Strong leaders affect our attitudes even Tbetter. Authors have written much on the sub- when they are no longer around. Our Air ject of leadership over the years; it remains a Force has built its rich heritage on decades of complex, multifaceted art with countless attri- strong leaders and their wonderful examples. butes. Strong leaders affect the attitudes of Strong leaders also go out of their way to their people, prioritize the organizational “big “walk the talk.” Once, walking out of a head- rocks” to provide focus and direction, and dis- quarters entryway, I observed several Airmen play courage while making tough decisions. standing around watching the snow fall, ap- parently waiting for civil engineering to clear the sidewalk to the parking lot. Several snow “A”—Affect Attitudes shovels stood idle in the corner of the foyer. Strong leaders affect attitudes. Attitude is Without saying a word, I grabbed a shovel, everything—there is nothing more powerful went outside, and began to enjoy shoveling than a “Hooah! Can do!” attitude. The Air the walkway. Soon the other Airmen (enlisted, Force can teach an individual technical skills civilians, and officers) grabbed shovels and and a job, but it cannot teach attitude. Indi- joined in the festivities. We had a good time viduals make that decision and bring their at- working together in the falling snow, chatting titudes to the work center each and every day. as we cleared the sidewalk and making our Our attitudes can become a powerful force area safer. Strong leaders affect attitudes with multiplier that affects our productivity, safety, their words, their examples, and—most im- effectiveness, and view of our profession. Lead- portantly—their actions. ers’ attitudes can have a powerful effect, not only on themselves but also on the entire or- “B”—Big Rocks ganization. Indeed, all organizations reflect the attitude of their leadership. Therefore, it Strong leaders focus on the big rocks. If is important to remember that leaders are re- everything is important, then nothing is im- sponsible for setting the tone—for affecting portant. If every task is a crisis and every proj- the attitudes of their people. ect has equal importance, then nothing is re- I still remember Staff Sergeant Allen, my ally important. Leadership effectively balances basic-military-training instructor from Lack- our many mission requirements with scarce land AFB, Texas. Boy, could that man affect resources (funds, personnel, tools, time, and attitudes! He always looked like a recruiting floor space) and makes tough decisions about poster: crisp and sharp, the embodiment of our priorities. We must decide on our top is- Air Force professionalism. He was famous for sues and work them first.

*The author is director of communications and chief information officer at Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois.

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Steven Covey, famous author of books on about the daily courage to do the right thing— management and leadership, describes a con- moral courage. Some say that moral courage cept he calls the big rocks.1 In his demonstra- involves standing up for what a person believes tion, he uses a glass container, separate piles in or knows is right. Others say it requires tell- of big and small rocks, sand, and a glass of wa- ing the truth in spite of the consequences. ter. He asks participants to fill the container Still others declare that moral courage entails with all the materials. Needless to say, the task doing what’s right in the face of adversity in- seems impossible. After the participants have stead of turning the other way—the easier repeatedly failed to fit all the materials into choice. One of our Air Force core values, “in- the container, Covey explains the proper tegrity first,” provides the foundation for method: all the materials will not fit unless the building strong leadership and moral courage. big rocks go in first. The small rocks fill in the Every leader in today’s Air Force should gaps between the big ones; the sand and water strive to achieve this admirable character trait: do the same. His demonstration illustrates to stand up for what is right! As leaders, we that we must first put our own organizational must establish a standard of fairness and cre- big rocks on our calendars and in our organi- ate a work environment of trust and integrity. zational job jars. Otherwise, they may not fit Our people deserve nothing less. Mark Twain or get done. Strong leaders take time to re- once observed, “It is curious that physical flect, select their organizational big rocks, and courage should be so common in the world then communicate them as priorities to the and moral courage so rare.”2 entire team. Lesser priorities will fit in around Every day we’re faced with hundreds of deci- the big ones. sions. Our decision-making process shows those Strong leaders also make conscious deci- around us the quality of our character. True sions when they select their big rocks: family tests of character come when the stakes are time, fitness, mission, and so forth. Because high—when we know that we must make our time is a precious commodity to a leader, he decision even though it will not be popular. or she must cherish and safeguard it. Airmen When we do that, we reveal our true character. should always remember that if they can’t be Some of our toughest leadership decisions on time, they should be early! concern people and disciplinary cases, all of I recently spent an hour traveling across which, of course, involve at least two sides. base to present one of my vice-commander’s Leaders review the facts of the case, consider coins for excellence. On my way back to the inputs from supervisors and commanders, office, someone asked me how I find the time and receive advice from the judge advocate for these individual recognitions. My response general. Ultimately, however, the commander was simple: “Recognizing and taking care of must weigh all the facts and make the tough our Airmen are one of my personal big rocks, decision. Strong leaders carefully consider all so I put these activities on the schedule first the facts, lean on their moral courage, and and make sure they don’t get bumped by make the right decisions. At one time, I faced lesser priorities.” I do not “fit them in” around the tough decision to remove a key subordi- other hectic daily activities; rather, my more nate from his Air Force leadership position routine daily activities should fit in around the because of unethical behavior. A respected big rock of recognition. Airmen should iden- Airman, he had been a good friend for over tify their own big rocks and determine why 10 years, so, personally, making the decision they consider them important. proved difficult. But it was easy in the context of the corporate Air Force, which, along with “C”—Courage the base, squadron, and all its fine Airmen, benefited by the removal. I never regretted Strong leaders display courage. I don’t just that decision and am still thankful I had the mean courage during combat; I am talking moral courage to make it.

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The job we do is important, not only to our- on the important “big rocks,” and displaying selves and our families but also to our nation. moral courage, we can help our great service The men and women serving on our front make everyone into better, stronger leaders. lines depend on us for their lives. The dedica- By applying these virtues to our daily missions, tion, skill, and moral courage of our Airmen we will never falter—and we will not fail. will help us fulfill the Air Force’s top priority Hooah!! ❑ of winning the global war on terror. It will protect the lives of our war fighters and preserve freedom for the next generation. Our Airman’s Creed closes with the decla- Notes ration “I am an American Airman: wingman, leader, warrior. I will never leave an Airman be- 1. Steven R. Covey, A. Roger Merrill, and Rebecca R. Merrill, First Things First: To Live, to Love, to Learn, to Leave hind, I will never falter, and I will not fail.” Strong a Legacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 88–89. leadership is critical to the success of our Air 2. Mark Twain, “Purchasing Civic Virtue,” in The Por- Force mission. Therefore, by properly affect- table Mark Twain, ed. Bernard DeVoto (New York: Viking ing attitudes, helping our organizations focus Press, 1946), 571.

5-PIREP-Ashley.indd 70 4/29/08 7:57:52 AM Cleared to Engage Improving the Effectiveness of Joint Close Air Support

Maj Michael H. Johnson, USMC*

Editorial Abstract: The importance of close air support (CAS) is greater now than in any of our most recent conflicts, dating back to Operation Desert Storm. Since the joint aspects of CAS are also magnified more than ever, crucial issues and deficiencies with joint doctrine and training highlight a glaring need for improvements in both arenas. The author proposes numerous, specific ideas for addressing these shortfalls for all services involved in joint CAS operations.

he term close air support (CAS) much more. Arguably the most difficult mis- evokes scenes from the movie Pla- sion flown by aircraft on today’s battlefield, toon, in which a ground commander CAS has remained at the heart of airpower de- exhorts aircraft to “drop all remain- bates for decades.1 It requires the highest level Ting on my pos[ition]” to avoid being overrun of integration with ground forces, indirect fires, by enemy forces. The mission has evolved into and other assets; furthermore, in most cases,

*This article is derived from the author’s 2007 Air Command and Staff College thesis, which received the Commandant’s Award for Research Excellence as the top paper for academic year 2007.

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CAS demands the greatest precision due to dresses ways to improve CAS effectiveness by the proximity of friendly forces.2 Finally, it has focusing on doctrine and training. the highest potential for negative ramifications if something goes wrong, such as fratri- cide, civilian deaths, or the overrunning of Close Air Support Doctrine ground forces. CAS has its roots in the early decades of the The global war on terror has elevated the twentieth century. The advent of the airplane importance of CAS. Ground forces increas- quickly led to its application in strafing and ingly rely on the effects that airpower provides. bombing on the battlefields of Europe in The percentage of missions classified as CAS World War I. Marine aviators developed an was small during Operation Desert Storm (6 early form of CAS in the Nicaraguan civil war percent) and Operation Allied Force (0) (be- of 1927.8 Principles guiding these early uses of cause of the absence of terminal attack con- airpower in support of ground troops gradu- trollers on the ground in Kosovo).3 In Opera- ally matured through World War II, the Ko- tions Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, rean War, and Vietnam War into the doctrine this percentage increased drastically. During we have today. Operation Anaconda, nearly all such missions Service viewpoints on CAS diverged after supported ground forces in the Shah-e-Kot Valley.4 During the push to Baghdad in 2003, World War II. Many Air Force proponents con- 75 percent of Navy and Marine air involve- sidered strategic bombing the primary role of 5 airpower and viewed CAS as “a maximum ment consisted of CAS missions. According 9 to the US Central Command Air Forces report waste of firepower.” The Army looked at air- entitled Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Num- power in terms of supporting a ground cam- bers, 79 percent of targets struck during the paign. These perspectives continue within the campaign fell under the kill-box interdiction/ two services in some form to the present day. CAS category.6 In current Iraqi Freedom op- The underlying tension regarding the dif- erations, almost all air missions require posi- fering viewpoints on CAS affected interservice tive control to engage ground targets. relationships and aircraft procurement through- Recent combat operations have become out the 1960s. The Johnson-McConnell agree- increasingly joint in nature—for example, ment of 1966 further delineated the Air Force’s Air Force F-16 multirole fighters and Army role as the sole provider of fixed-wing CAS to AH-64 Apache helicopters provide CAS for the Army while recognizing that Army heli- 10 Marine battalions, Marine AH-1 Cobra helicop- copter missions included fire support. Sub- ters support Army brigades, and Navy F/A-18 sequently, in 1975 a letter outlined the Air multirole fighters support special forces. This Force’s and Army’s understanding of the use increased joint interaction, coupled with ser- of airpower, shaping the latter’s doctrinal stance vice differences in the approach to doctrine on CAS.11 Army leaders first used the term di- and training, has decreased the effectiveness rect aerial fire support to describe helicopter of CAS. CAS and attached a definition that would not Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, antagonize the Air Force: “fire delivered by Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, aerial vehicles organic to ground forces against lists eight conditions for effective CAS: (1) ef- surface targets and in support of land opera- fective training and proficiency, (2) planning tions.”12 This evolved into “close in fire sup- and integration, (3) command, control, and port” and, currently, “close combat attack.”13 communications, (4) air superiority, (5) tar- Viewing CAS through a much different get marking and acquisition, (6) streamlined lens, the Marine Corps approaches warfare by and flexible procedures, (7) appropriate ord- stressing combined-arms fires and aviation nance, and (8) favorable weather.7 Doctrine fires as integral parts of the overall plan. In and training affect all of these except air supe- 1935 the Corps established aviation as an in- riority and favorable weather. This article ad- dependent section “primarily for the support

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of Fleet Marine Forces in landing operations bilities.”16 Army helicopters do conduct CAS and in support of troop activities in the field.”14 but under the guise of calling it something The Marine Air Ground Task Force construct else. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-04.111, Avia- includes an aviation element to provide fire tion Brigades, defines close combat attack (CCA) support. This air-ground approach endured as “a hasty or deliberate attack in support of due to the use of a historically lighter force, units engaged in close combat. During CCA, with aviation fires providing the required sup- armed helicopters engage enemy units with port. Additionally, Marine aviation historically direct fires that impact near friendly forces. . . . has focused on the tactical level. Having no CCA is coordinated and directed by a team, strategic bombers, the Marine Corps has platoon, or company-level ground unit using avoided the debate within the Air Force on standardized CCA procedures in unit [stan- the most efficient application of airpower.H ow- dard operating procedures].”17 ever, this contributes to problems with joint Compare the CCA definition with the cur- integration as Marine leadership constantly rent joint definition of CAS: “air action by wrestles over the right mix of providing aircraft fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile for a joint air campaign while maintaining the targets that are in close proximity to friendly direct-support capability of Marine aviation. forces and that require detailed integration JP 3-09.3 governs CAS procedures. Many of each air mission with the fire and move- current CAS debates deal with different ser- ment of those forces.”18 CCA even goes so far vices’ approaches to CAS and their under- as utilizing the joint CAS nine-line briefing standing of the doctrine. Service parochialism format but calling it the “close combat attack also significantly motivates the differing view- briefing.”19 points. The argument of whether or not CAS Prior to Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Free- constitutes an effective use of airpower lies be- dom, Army helicopter units generally supported yond the scope of this article. The underlying only Army ground units; thus, this doctrinal debate, however, drives the Army’s and Air approach did not influence joint operations. Force’s mind-set and each service’s approach Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September to the mission. 2001 (9/11), however, Army attack helicop- Helicopter development provided Army ters have provided fire support for special ground commanders with an organic air plat- forces and Marine ground units. The Army form to deliver fire support.15 The Army encountered problems since its pilots were viewed this as critical due to its perception of not well versed in CAS procedures.20 Based on a lack of support from the Air Force, whose this doctrinal issue, the service made adjust- focus remained on strategic bombing. This ments to procedures for command and con- development, unfortunately, also involved the trol (C2) and forward air control (FAC) when use of semantics and wordsmithing to avoid AH-64s supported Marine units.21 “encroaching” on the Air Force’s responsibility Within the Air Force, one finds a persistent of providing CAS to the Army. Over the years, perception that CAS is a lower-priority mis- this tit for tat resulted in an almost supersti- sion or a less effective use of airpower than tious avoidance of using the term within Army interdiction or strategic bombardment.22 Cur- circles or implying that Army aviation per- rent Air Force doctrine perpetuates this performed the mission. A letter from the Army ception: “CAS applications must be weighed and Air Force chiefs of staff to the chairman against other, potentially more effective, uses of the House Armed Services Committee in for CAS-capable assets such as [air interdic- September 1975 defined the role of the attack tion] or even strategic attack.”23 This approach helicopter as “integral to the Army ground inhibits effectiveness since units spend less maneuver unit and an extension of organic time training for CAS. Historically, this did firepower.” The two services agreed that “the not present a major problem because A-10 air- attack helicopter does not perform CAS but is craft provided the preponderance of CAS sor- intended to complement Air Force CAS capa- ties and because their pilots were generally

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well versed in CAS procedures. Technology bute this imbalance, in part, to the fact that and an increase in CAS taskings have changed the Army does not conduct CAS or FAC (air- this drastically during Enduring Freedom and borne) (FAC[A]) missions. However, Marine Iraqi Freedom. Advances in weapons and sen- attack helicopters routinely execute them. sors now enable many different aircraft to per- During Anaconda, Marine AH-1 Cobra heli- form the CAS mission, including B-52 and B-1 copters did not perform FAC(A) or strike co- bombers. This shift to CAS support from other ordination and reconnaissance due to a lack aircraft can result in the mission’s utilization of understanding within the joint task force’s of aircrew members with little or no under- chain of command concerning their capabili- standing of the ground scheme of maneuver ties.29 One cannot blame this problem on the or the intricacies of an integrated fire-support Army commanders, whose exposure to rotary- plan. In these situations, one commonly sees wing attack aviation in most cases was limited the “bomb on coordinate” mentality; that is, the to AH-64s, which do not routinely perform aircrew focuses on target coordinates for deliv- those missions. Such a lack of knowledge re- ery of a precision-guided munition (PGM), miss- garding helicopter capabilities leads to ineffi- ing the importance of an assigned final-attack cient employment of these assets.30 The prob- heading or a time on target—both critical 24 lem also affects training since service FAC(A)s pieces to the ground unit or controller. (except those in the Marine Corps) rarely One must also consider doctrinal differences control helicopters during FAC(A) training.31 concerning fire support coordination mea- Moreover, technology has a dramatic effect sures. Discussion of fire support coordination on doctrine, which cannot keep pace with ad- line (FSCL) emplacement lies outside the vancements. More frequent use of PGMs af- scope of this article; however, it does affect the fects the execution of CAS missions. The ineffectiveness of CAS. Nowhere does the joint creased standoff and delivery ranges of PGMs CAS publication state that CAS is tied to a spe- require that ground commanders have a cific fire support coordination measure. In higher level of confidence in both their air fact, it says that the FSCL “does not divide an controller and the CAS platform. area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep areas or create a zone for Video feeds such as those from the remotely CAS.”25 Misunderstanding of this basic prem- operated video-enhanced receiver allow joint ise places undue restrictions on aviation fires terminal attack controllers (JTAC) to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and aircraft and unnecessarily requires CAS control for 32 missions meeting the definition of interdic- sensors to aid in targeting. JTACs no longer tion. Understanding what CAS is and is not must see the target with their eyes in order to still varies within the branches.26 For example, engage it, and in many cases, they may be sev- briefings given at the Joint Close Air Support eral kilometers from the target. Unfortunately, (JCAS) Conference of 2004 described Scud this situation can lead to micromanagement missile-hunting missions in the western desert of tactical attacks because commanders now of Iraq during Iraqi Freedom as CAS.27 Confu- have a bird’s-eye view of an engagement and sion over the difference among CAS, interdic- feel the need to step in rather than let the tac- tion, and terminal guidance operations has tical operators execute the mission.33 The fact also led to recommendations to call opera- that UAV usage also outpaces the ability to de- tions something else, such as battlefield air fine doctrine and TTPs for CAS missions has interdiction or ground-aided precision strike.28 many ramifications for CAS, including clear- Current CAS doctrine also falls short by fo- ance of fires, UAV control authority, airspace cusing almost exclusively on fixed-wing tactics, deconfliction, and target handoff. techniques, and procedures (TTP). A total of Many of these doctrinal problems affect six pages in the current joint CAS publication training as well. CAS training varies from ser- covers rotary-wing CAS employment, control vice to service and conflict to conflict. - Stan points, tactics, and weapons. One can attri- dardization has improved for terminal attack

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controllers, but many areas in the training of maintain proficiency and competency in all CAS aircrews still need improvement. taskings and missions, but they should not neglect training in one of the most likely areas of employment in-theater. Close Air Support Training The fluidity of operations also contributes All members of the military have heard the to training issues. During the Iraqi ground oft-repeated expression “train like you fight, campaign in 2003, the diverting of many sor- and fight like you train.” Nowhere is this more ties after they became airborne to provide important than in CAS. Nevertheless, aircrews CAS precluded effective pre-mission planning and controllers often improvise during execu- and integration.38 It also perpetuated the notion due to a lack of practice or training in tion of CAS as a pickup mission that we can CAS procedures. Recent years have seen the execute on the fly and that consequently re- incorporation of several standardization ini- quires little emphasis during training. tiatives, but most of them focus on terminal Other external requirements also affect controllers. Unfortunately, because aircrew training. Army restructuring places greater standardization varies among services and demands on the Air Force for terminal attack units, we still have hurdles to negotiate in CAS controllers and calls for more training sorties training before effectiveness improves. with the same amount of aviation support.39 The first obstacle involves a paucity of joint The Marines face a similar situation with the training, highlighted by the General Account- stand-up of the single-seat FAC(A) program ing Office’s report of 2003 on military readi- within fixed-wing units.40 ness as one of four main areas for improve- Furthermore, technology can inhibit CAS ment.34 Recent initiatives such as the Joint training. In many cases, CAS aircrews and National Training Capability by Joint Forces controllers develop ad hoc TTPs. Failure to Command (JFCOM) are attempting to ad- capture TTPs at a central point for dissemina- 35 dress the problem. Although such efforts tion leads to varying degrees of proficiency represent a good first step, service-specific and different procedures amongst units. In taskings and a lack of central oversight and au- some cases, shortages of systems such as ad- thority remain problems. Training require- vanced targeting pods limit aircrew training ments as well as high operational tempo often prior to deployment, leading to less effective force units to forgo joint training in lieu of application in-theater.41 higher-priority service taskings. Additionally, The doctrine and training issues outlined even though JFCOM facilitates joint training above do not usually prevent forces from re- and can provide funding incentives for exer- ceiving CAS. The world leader in applying cises, it holds no authority to compel units to military power, the United States concedes participate. This problem occurs even within nothing in the conduct of that mission; regard- the Marine Corps, which generally performs less, implementation of the following recom- air-ground integration well. The fact that Ma- mendations will increase effectiveness across rine ground units tend to train with Marine all services and make CAS truly joint. aircraft because they are familiar with each other inhibits controllers and aircrews from becoming more knowledgeable about joint Doctrinal Recommendations air assets.36 The failure of some units to emphasize CAS The following recommendations focus on training raises another hurdle. Instead, they first correcting deficiencies in CAS doctrine. concentrate on other missions, such as air-to- In some cases, they require a dramatic shift by air engagements or interdiction, despite their services in their approach to CAS. This is nec- low probability of occurrence—especially in essary, however, to facilitate subsequent im- current Iraqi operations.37 True, units must provements in CAS training.

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Encourage Air Force and Army Headquarters to 58 scout helicopters of the 101st Airborne Di- Acknowledge That Army Attack Aviation Performs CAS vision.45 Marine AH-1 Cobra and UH-1 Huey Airpower employment continues to evolve helicopters already function as rotary-wing long after the two services agreed that attack FAC(A)s. helicopters “do not perform CAS.”42 To per- Proof of concept training for this idea oc- petuate such a myopic view is reprehensible. curred in January 2006, when four US Army Both services agree that the Army relies on ex- AH-64D Apache pilots from the 1st Battalion, ternal support for fixed-wing CAS, the pre- 227th Attack Regiment received FAC(A) aca- ponderance of which comes from the Air demic training, spending two weeks flying rotary- Force, based on historical precedent and wing FAC(A) missions with Marine Aviation agreements. The attack helicopter is a viable Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1), CAS platform, as demonstrated for over 35 which provides tactical standardization and years by the Marine Corps and by the Army in advanced-level training for all Marine Corps recent operations in Enduring Freedom and aviators. AH-1W FAC(A) instructors flew in Iraqi Freedom. This fact does not threaten ei- AH-64D aircraft, offering live-fire FAC(A) in- ther service’s mission sets or support. Army at- struction. The proof of concept affirmed the tack aviation can still perform as maneuver AH-64 as a viable and capable platform for elements and conduct other required mis- FAC(A) and showed that senior Army attack sions. This proposal merely formalizes what pilots could proficiently conduct FAC(A) fol- already occurs. Acknowledgement that the lowing the training.46 Although we must ad- Army does CAS is crucial since Army aviation dress support issues to stand up a FAC(A) pro- actively provides CAS to Army, Marine, and gram, we should base our decision on honest special forces units in Enduring Freedom and analysis of the increased capability that it Iraqi Freedom; hence, pilots need training to would provide—not on traditional missions become familiar with CAS procedures. A within the services. Casey-Moseley agreement similar to Johnson- Many requirements are already in place to McConnell or the one between Gen David C. implement the program. The Joint FAC(A) Jones, Air Force chief of staff, and Gen Freder- Memorandum of Agreement outlines certifi- ick C. Weyand, Army chief of staff, in 1975 cation standards and requirements. We could would reaffirm the Air Force’s commitment to quickly incorporate rotary-wing FAC(A) TTPs providing fixed-wing CAS for the Army while already established and used by Marine heli- acknowledging the latter’s attack-aviation role copters into Army doctrine and publications.47 in CAS and FAC(A).43 Furthermore, by leveraging MAWTS-1 FAC(A) instructors under a “train the trainer” concept Stand Up an Army FAC(A) Program to stand up an initial cadre of Army FAC(A) instructors, we could conduct initial training An Army rotary-wing FAC(A) program offers of Army pilots. many advantages. Trained to operate under standardized procedures outlined in the Joint Encourage the Services to Place Greater Emphasis FAC(A) Memorandum of Agreement, FAC(A)s on the Close Air Support Mission provide Army commanders increased capability to control aerial fires. In some cases, this capa- Emphasis on the CAS mission has improved bility could ease the requirement for addi- since 9/11; however, the advent of advanced tional JTACs as units restructure under the sensors and PGMs thrust many platforms into brigade concept. Army attack aviation has the CAS role without a solid understanding of practiced many FAC(A) functions for years or exposure to CAS doctrine. Units that have under the joint air attack team concept.44 In recently begun employing their platforms in Vietnam, controllers routinely flew in Army the CAS role are most affected. Increased doc- helicopters. More recently in Iraq, terminal trinal emphasis on the mission by service attack controllers flew in the right seat of OH- headquarters will expand unit awareness of

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CAS doctrine and TTPs, thereby increasing Update Close Air Support Tactics, Techniques, standardization and effectiveness.48 and Procedures to Reflect Current Technology Finally, CAS doctrine must catch up to tech- Change the Services’ Doctrinal Approach to Fire nology. We must filter and codify the combat Support Coordination and Close Air Support expertise of CAS aircrew members and con- Such change requires education and discus- trollers into JCAS doctrine. Moreover, we must sion of CAS employment procedures and doc- implement a detailed expansion of TTPs on trine within each service’s C2 structure. Per- PGM targeting and delivery, usage of video sonnel manning the battlefield coordination feeds, and UAV integration. Additionally, we detachment, air support operations center, or must discuss the UAV role in CAS, possibly indirect air support center must thoroughly under- cluding joint fires observer and/or FAC(A) stand what CAS is and is not, as well as how training for UAV operators. Incorporation of management of fire support coordination the latest information into JP 3-09.3 will en- measures and fires critically affects CAS. Edu- sure that a baseline level of knowledge reaches cation and discussion must include ground all controllers and aircrews rather than re- commanders at all echelons. Their under- maining at a unit or service level. standing of CAS employment principles also drives the effectiveness of air-delivered fires.49 Training Recommendations Expand Detail in Close Air Support Doctrine on Commanders and units must constantly em- Helicopter Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures phasize training that routinely exercises CAS tactics, techniques, and procedures. Success- Expansion of Army attack aviation into CAS ful CAS training will result in safe and effec- and FAC(A) roles will increase the utilization tive CAS employment. of rotary-wing CAS. Knowledge of helicopter CAS TTPs varies greatly within fixed-wing —Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-23.1, units and the services. Marine fixed-wing pi- Close Air Support, 8 September 2007 lots generally know the most about helicop- Doctrinal changes will have little effect un- ters due to habitual unit relationships within less they are accompanied by improvements the Marine Air Ground Task Force construct. in training. Joint training does occur to vary- We must make a concerted effort to incorpo- ing degrees, but on an ad hoc basis and often rate more information and TTPs regarding through the buddy system via telephone con- helicopter operations into doctrine. versations or e-mail between squadrons. Al- though this may succeed in meeting the Promote Better Understanding of Close Air Support squadron’s training requirements, it is an in- Control Types and FAC(A) Utilization by Ground formal method, and neither squadron receives Commanders credit for joint training. Continued education and inclusion of ground commanders in JCAS will greatly improve that Establish a Joint Training Requirement process. Offering a CAS “primer” as part of Deciding to levy an additional requirement the services’ commanders’ courses would bet- on units would not sit well with them due to ter familiarize incoming commanders with current operations tempo and deployment JCAS and FAC(A) TTPs.50 Increased integra- cycles, but it would increase joint interaction tion of ground officers into forums such as the between units. We should take a commonsense JCAS and Joint FAC(A) conferences would approach to minimize the impact on overbur- also prove beneficial since their participation dened units—for example, aligning units to at these two conferences is usually limited. joint-training opportunities reasonably near Most participants come from aviation or ter- their home stations. We should also consider minal controller backgrounds. joint-tasking requirements a key factor in de-

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termining unit participation. Moreover, this Establish a Close Air Support Mission-Essential Task training should count towards service-specific List for All Aircraft Performing the Mission predeployment training requirements. This task list should mirror those lists estab- This recommendation requires expansion 54 of the Integrated Training Initiative sponsored lished for JTAC and Joint FAC(A) training. by the Air Force, which does include joint- Such a list would increase the effectiveness of training opportunities.51 We need to increase CAS assets by outlining expectations of the participation from the other services, how- platforms. The JTAC and Joint FAC(A) memo- ever, to offset the initiative’s focus on Air Force randums of agreement outline much of this units. Expansion of the initiative to include standardization. Service and platform CAS ex- alignment of units to joint exercises, based on perts can modify those existing standards to mission requirements and deployment cycles, define aircraft-specific requirements, includ- would enhance the effectiveness of units con- ing those of UAVs. Leveraging CAS syllabi ducting JCAS operations. It would also meet from similar fixed- and rotary-wing platforms the increased requirements for training CAS will provide information for units expanding controllers and FAC(A) aircrew members. or creating a CAS training syllabus. Aligning units based on training requirements allows a more efficient use of aviation assets Elevate the Importance of Close Air during training. Support Training in the Air Force Increase Joint Interaction among In the past, concerns arose regarding whether the Services’ Weapons Schools aircraft had the capability to perform the CAS Joint interaction at the services’ weapons mission. Targeting pods and precision weap- schools has improved in recent years, but par- ons now allow many different aircraft to ac- ticipation is often limited to high-demand/ quire and engage targets in support of this low-density platforms such as the Airborne mission, but CAS training has not advanced with Warning and Control System, Joint Surveillance these capabilities. Until we assign CAS train- Target Attack Radar System, or EA-6B Prowler. ing the same importance as air interdiction or We should increase participation by JCAS air- strategic attack, units will view it as a second- craft and should include conferences on tactics ary mission and attach less significance to it.55 and lessons learned. Granted, the JCAS and Many platforms have missions that focus on joint FAC(A) conferences represent excellent areas beyond CAS, but we need some baseline forums for discussing TTPs and lessons learned, but, ideally, we should strive for greater inter- of standardized training if we want them to action at tactical forums such as the Air Force perform effectively in the CAS role. Weapons and Tactics Conference.52 Platforms from all services would benefit from many Incorporate Close Air Support Training into CAS/FAC(A) lessons learned and TTPs at Syllabi for Training in Army Attack Aviation such a conference. An increase in training must accompany ac- Services also benefit from the cross -train ceptance of CAS as a rotary-wing mission. ing of CAS and FAC(A) subject-matter ex- Training syllabi for Army AH-64 Apache and perts. Familiarization flights with another ser- OH-58 Kiowa pilots should incorporate CAS vice’s CAS or FAC(A) platforms would work to everyone’s advantage.53 Such joint interaction academics and flight training. Stand-up of a enables greater understanding of the employ- FAC(A) program also requires more training. ment TTPs of different platforms, sensors, Marine AH-1W and UH-1N syllabi can undergo and weapons, which leads to more efficient review with an eye towards developing a satis- execution the next time the two platforms or factory syllabus to sufficiently prepare Apache units work together. and Kiowa pilots in CAS and FAC(A) TTPs.56

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Create an Army Weapons School Force Weapons School courses. The benefits of standing up an AAWTS reach beyond Army Currently, Army aviation standardization re- aviation and would positively affect all services. sides at Fort Rucker, Alabama, with the Direc- torate of Evaluation and Standardization, while the Directorate of Training and Doctrine Conclusions handles doctrinal literature and standardization of tactical operations.57 The Army has no Close air support is good for your morale; it’s weapons-and-tactics course that confers ad- really, really bad for the enemy’s. I think the vanced training on pilots. These “patch wear- confidence of the 0311 [rifleman] that’s behind ers” in the other services are considered the the mortar hole, with RPGs [rocket-propelled subject-matter experts on weapons and tactics grenades] [bouncing] off sandbags—I think for their respective platforms.58 The Army has it’s good for him when a five hundred pound a wealth of knowledge and experience in its bomb drops in the vicinity of where he was just aviation corps, but the absence of a weapons taking fire. It’s certainly good at the company school prevents the service from effectively level, and it’s certainly good at the battalion harnessing and institutionalizing this knowledge. level, as in, “We’re in control here; we can take The proposed Army Aviation Weapons and this over at any time we want to.” HUMINT Tactics Squadron (AAWTS) could pattern it- [human intelligence] reports [showed that] it self after a construct similar to that of MAWTS- was devastating, absolutely devastating to them. 1, the Marine Corps weapons school. The Di- —Interview with FACs of the 22nd Marine rectorate of Evaluation and Standardization expeditionary Unit, 5 June 2004 would handle flight standardization and train- Most of the issues outlined in this article ing for units and pilots, while the AAWTS are not new. A review of CAS literature over would assume responsibility for tactical stan- the last 30 years reveals many recurring topics. dardization and advanced-level training. This The question then becomes, what is the impe- would encompass functions similar to those of tus for resolving these matters? The answer MAWTS-1, including advanced training such lies in the conflict we face in the global war on as FAC(A), production of tactical publications, terror and the realities of limited resources. doctrine input, and test and evaluation of To become more effective, the services must emerging technology or procedures. embrace the reality of JCAS. The Army’s Yuma Proving Ground com- Approaching CAS from a systems stand- plex in Arizona would serve as an ideal loca- point, we have made improvements in many tion for the AAWTS. It provides access to sev- areas. Technology allows us to utilize air assets eral aviation-training ranges and is centrally in the CAS role in ways we could not have located, near the Air Force’s Fighter Weapons imagined 20 years ago. Standardization of ter- School at Nellis AFB in Las Vegas, Nevada; minal attack controllers and updates to doc- Luke AFB in Phoenix, Arizona; the Marine trine have enabled us to apply those technolo- Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twenty- gies more effectively during missions. The last Nine Palms, California; and MAWTS-1 in areas that we must address involve the aircrew Yuma, Arizona. This location promotes syn- members and units that perform the mission. ergy by increasing joint interaction for all ser- Applying the outlined doctrine and training vices. The AAWTS instructor courses would recommendations completes that step. Ide- allow access to Army helicopters and aircrew ally, a day will come when support to the JTAC members for joint training during Marine will be uniform, regardless of the platform or Weapons and Tactics Instructor courses or Air service providing it. ❑

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Notes

1. Lt Col James D. Reed, “Army’s Transformation Im- 18. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for pact on Close Air Support Terminal Attack Control,” Close Air Support (CAS), I-1. Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army 19. FM 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, Q-16. War College, 2006), 8. Reed states that the joint terminal 20. Lt Col Jim Adams, operations officer,M arine Avia- attack controller’s mission “is highly demanding and of- tion Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1), discus- ten complex.” Ibid. sion with the author, March 2005. Colonel Adams served as 2. David A. Deptula and Sigfred J. Dahl, “Transform- aircraft maintenance officer for Marine Medium Helicop- ing Joint Air-Ground Operations for 21st Century Battle ter Squadron 266, the Aviation Combat Element for the space,” Field Artillery, July–August 2003, 4. Deptula and 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, which conducted com- Dahl note that “it takes advanced situational awareness bat operations in support of Enduring Freedom in the and weapons systems knowledge to both ‘rack-and-stack’ Tarin Kowt region of Afghanistan, April–July 2004. During multiple flights of attack aircraft and choose the correct these operations, AH-64s were tasked to support Marine delivery system and ordnance for desired effects.” Ibid. Expeditionary Unit operations on several occasions. 3. rebecca Grant, “The Clash about CAS,” Air Force Maga- 21. maj Michael D. Grice, “AH-64 Apache Attack He- zine 86, no. 1 (January 2003): 56 (“Stretching the Definition”), licopters: Integrating the AH-64 into the MAGTF Battle http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2003/0103cas.pdf. space,” Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 3 (March 2007): 27–30. 4. Ibid. 22. Lawing, “American Armed Forces’ Service Cul- 5. Arthur P. Brill Jr., “Close Air Support: More Improve- ture,” 3. ment Is Needed,” Sea Power, November 2003, 1, http:// 23. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.3, findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3738/is_200311/ai_n Counterland Operations, 11 September 2006, 34, http:// 9311629/pg_1. www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2-1-3.pdf. 6. Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers (Shaw AFB, 24. Author’s experience as a forward air controller SC: Assessment and Analysis Division, US Central Com- and forward air controller (airborne) instructor at Ma- mand Air Forces, 30 April 2003), 5, http://www.au.af rine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1. .mil/au/awc/awcgate/af/oifcentaf.pdf. 25. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 7. Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, Close Air Support (CAS), III-22. and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 3 September 26. Deptula and Dahl, “Transforming Joint Air-Ground 2003 (incorporating change 1, 2 September 2005), I-6, Operations,” 4. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_09 27. The author’s experience while attending the JCAS _3ch1.pdf. conference in 2004. 8. robert L. Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation 28. Lt Col Eric E. Theisen, Ground-Aided Precision in World War II (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, Strike: Heavy Bomber Activity in Operation Enduring Freedom, 1952), 25. Maxwell Paper no. 31 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 9. Douglas N. Campbell, The Warthog and the Close Air Press, 2003), 1. Support Debate (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 29. Author’s experience as flight lead during Ana- 2003), 39. conda with AH-1W detachment from HMM-166, the avia- 10. The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles tion combat element for the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Missions, comp. and ed. Richard I. Wolf (Washington, attached to the 10th Mountain Division, 4–26 March 2002. DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 379. 30. Ibid. 11. Ibid., 403. 31. Author’s discussions with service FAC(A) repre- 12. Benjamin F. Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Devel- sentatives during the Joint FAC(A) Conference in Yuma, opment of Close Air Support (Washington, DC: Office of Air AZ, December 2005. Force History, 1990), 455. 32. That system receives camera images from nearby 13. For the former term, see Maj Rhett B. Lawing, aircraft and UAVs, integrating them with other US posi- “American Armed Forces’ Service Culture Impact on Close tioning and targeting software and thus enabling the Air Support,” Chronicles Online Journal, 18 December 2006, JTAC to view the target from the aircraft-sensor perspective. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/ 33. excerpt from briefing, Marine Light Attack Heli- lawing.html. copter Squadron (HMLA)-773, MAWTS-1, subject: Lessons 14. Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation, 32. Learned, May 2005. HMLA-773 deployed in support of 15. J. Kristopher Keener, The Helicopter Innovation in Enduring Freedom from October 2003 until March 2005. United States Army Aviation (Cambridge, MA: Massachu- 34. Report to the Ranking Minority Members, Subcommit- setts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program, tees on Total Force and Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, 2001), 13, http://web.mit.edu/SSP/Publications/working House of Representatives, Military Readiness Lingering Train- _papers/wp_01-1.pdf. ing and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces 16. United States Air Force: Basic Documents, 403. (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 2003), 2. 17. Field Manual (FM) 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, Au- 35. “Joint National Training Capability (JNTC),” United gust 2003, Q-15, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ States Joint Forces Command (Norfolk, VA: USJFC, library/policy/army/fm/3-04-111/fm3-04-111.pdf. 2003), http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jntc.htm.

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36. Author’s experience while serving as AH-1W divi- 50. each service has a program designed to provide sion operations officer during Weapons and Tactics- In information to prospective commanders. The Marine structor courses and Desert Talon exercises at MAWTS-1, Corps Commanders’ Program provides information and June 2004–June 2005. a course of instruction to enhance their performance as 37. Author’s discussions with F/A-18 instructors, Ma- commanders. See http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/catalog/ rine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1, during 21cdrprog.pdf. revisions to manual on training and readiness, 2005. 51. United States Air Force Air Combat Command, 38. michael D. Millen, “Improving Detailed Integration “Integrated Training Initiative,” https://totn.acc.af.mil/ in Close Air Support Planning and Execution” (thesis, US xoya/int_training_conf. The Integrated Training Initia- Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), 50. tive—a single-source forum for combining tactics, train- 39. reed, “Army’s Transformation Impact,” 1. ing, and scheduling from all weapons systems from all 40. Previously, two-seat F/A-18D aircraft were the only joint and multinational services—consists of both this fixed-wing aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory that scheduling Web site and a quarterly conference held the conducted the FAC(A) mission. In 2005 the Corps added third week in the second month of the quarter. The Inte- the FAC(A) mission to the single-seat AV-8B and F/A-18C grated Training Conference attains training efficiency manuals on training and readiness. through a “bottom-up” strategy of comparing/linking 41. marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, “VMA schedules from all fighter; bomber; command, control, Operations: Quick Look Report,” 16 February 2007, 2, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; combat https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document_repository/ search and rescue; tanker; distributed mission operations; IORs/VMA%20513%20Quick%20Look%207_0.pdf. AV-8B air defense artillery; and other assets. In this process, areas pilots from VMA-513 expressed the need for more prede- of commonality are identified and subsequently “synchro- ployment training on procedures for employing their tar- nized” into a single training event. geting pods to detect potential improvised explosive devices. 52. United States Air Force Air Combat Command, 42. United States Air Force: Basic Documents, 403. “Weapons and Tactics Conference,” http://www.acc.af 43. The Casey-Moseley agreement is named after Gen .mil/library/weaponsandtactics.asp. An annual two-week George W. Casey Jr., the current Army chief of staff, and event that focuses on joint war fighting, the Combat Air Gen T. Michael Moseley, the current Air Force chief of Forces Weapons and Tactics Conference brings together staff. See United States Air Force: Basic Documents, 405. hundreds of war fighters from the combat air forces to 44. FM 90-21, JAAT Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air discuss current issues, look at future issues, and provide Attack Team Operations, 1998. JAAT operations are defined solutions for the joint employment of forces. New tech- as coordinated attacks by rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, nology is a key area. Although mostly Air Force personnel normally supported by artillery or naval surface fire support. attend, the conference has seen an increase in participa- 45. Bruce Pirnie et al., Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, tion from the Army, Navy, and Marines. 2005), 72, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/ 53. As an instructor at MAWTS-1, the author flew in RAND_MG301.pdf. AH-64D, F/A-18D, F-16DG, and AH-6M aircraft, an expe- 46. Author’s opinion, based on his experience as the rience that gave him invaluable insight into serving as a rotary-wing FAC(A) subject-matter expert for MAWTS-1 CAS and FAC(A) instructor in the AH-1W. and the performance of the pilots and aircraft in con- 54. Joint mission-essential task lists, developed for ducting the FAC(A) mission. units performing specific missions, are derived from the 47. NTTP 3-22.3-AH1W, Combat Aircraft Fundamentals, universal joint task list outlined in Chairman of the Joint AH-1W (U), 2005. Chap. 11 of this tactical manual covers Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List, rotary-wing FAC(A) TTPs for Marine Corps AH-1W and 1 August 2005. UH-1N helicopters. 55. Air Force pilot, interview by the author, Novem- 48. None of the Air Force–sponsored research topics ber 2006. The pilot admitted to having never read the for 2006–7 dealt with CAS. The list of topics from the JCAS publication but acknowledged that his platform Combined Arms Center for Army Command and General conducted CAS, albeit not as a primary mission. Staff College and the School for Advanced Military Studies 56. manuals on training and readiness outline the aca- for 2006–7 included “Air-Ground Integration in Counter- demic and flight-training requirements forM arine AH-1W insurgency Operations.” and UH-1N pilots who perform CAS. See http://www 49. L. Ross Roberts, Ground Truth: The Implications of Joint .tecom.usmc.mil/atb/Training%20and%Readiness.htm. Interdependence for Air and Ground Operations, Occasional 57. “Fort Rucker, Alabama: Command and Director- Paper no. 52 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and ates,” http://www.united-publishers.com/rucker/command Technology, Air War College, 2006), 16. Roberts notes .html#des. that during the first five days of operations in Iraqi Free- 58. After attending the Air Force Weapons School or dom, the V Corps commander hesitated to open kill boxes the Marine Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, gradu- short of the FSCL for fixed-wing interdiction even though ates receive a patch to wear on their flight suits signifying there were no friendly forces in those boxes. Ibid. that they have completed the course.

1-Johnson.indd 81 4/29/08 7:58:50 AM A Practical Approach to Effects-Based Operational Assessment

Capt Clinton R. Clark, USAF, Retired Capt Timothy J. Cook, USAF*

Editorial Abstract: Operational assessment is the joint force air component commander’s process for evaluating joint air, space, and cyber operations. The authors provide a commonsense methodology that greatly enhances the evaluation of effects-based operations, enabling strategists to answer two fundamental questions: “Are we doing things right?” and “Are we doing the right things?” The answers to these questions will assist decision makers in executing more efficient and effective operations while considering operational risk.

*The authors would like to express their sincere thanks to Mr. Doug Lee, Lt Col Marc Jameson, Lt Col Kirsten Messer, Lt Col John Schaefer, Maj Maurice Azar, Maj Steve Cox, Maj Stewart Greathouse, Maj Alan Kastner, Maj Joseph Morgan, Maj Patrick Ritchie, and Maj Christopher Solo. Their advice, commentary, witticisms, and criticisms were invaluable.

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ffects-based operations (EBO) The Evolution of are “actions taken against enemy systems designed to achieve specific ef- Operational Assessment fects that contribute directly to de- Responsible for attaining multiple opera- Esired military and political outcomes.”1 Huh? tional objectives that compete for scarce air, Perhaps more clearly, EBO is simply a “way space, and cyber resources, the JFACC makes 2 of thinking” about military operations. An resource-allocation decisions for each air task- effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) ing order (ATO), based on his or her assess- offers a “better way of expressing what EBO ment of the operation. Consequently, the OA really is,” and Air Force doctrine has recently team exists to help the JFACC make informed adopted the term EBAO to add clarity to these decisions. Fundamentally then, OA deals with 3 concepts. The crux of EBAO lies in the ex- decision making—a potentially complicated plicit linkage of tactical actions to operational and confusing process, though one that need and strategic military effects. Ultimately, its not rely exclusively on “gut feel.”6 To develop goals call for the efficient and effective use of and refine its OA methodologies, the JAOC scarce resources to produce the commander’s can leverage a large body of decision-making desired effects. techniques that have been successfully imple- The joint force air component commander mented across “a wide variety of situations.”7 (JFACC) derives specified and implied tasks According to John S. Hammond, Ralph L. from the joint force commander’s (JFC) guid- Keeney, and Howard Raiffa, ance. Translated into the JFACC’s mission, these tasks serve as the basis for determining an effective decision-making process fulfills these his or her operational objectives. The JFACC six criteria: utilizes the joint air and space operations cen- • it focuses on what is important. ter (JAOC) as the primary means of com- • it is logical and consistent. manding and controlling the planning, exe- • it acknowledges both subjective and objective cution, and assessment of operations designed factors and blends analytical with intuitive thinking. to fulfill his or her objectives. Within the • it requires only as much information and JAOC, the strategy division has responsibility analysis as is necessary to resolve a particular for developing, refining, disseminating, and dilemma. assessing the JFACC’s air and space strategy.4 • it encourages and guides the gathering of rele- The operational assessment (OA) team sup- vant information and informed opinion. ports the division throughout the strategy- • it is straightforward, reliable, easy to use, and development process; however, it focuses pri- flexible.8 marily on “evaluating the effectiveness and 5 All of the OA techniques in use across the efficiency” of joint air operations. In other JAOCs through mid-2006 violated two or more words, the team provides joint air operational- of these criteria. This section briefly reviews level assessments to the JFACC. Thus, this the evolution of OA and the most common article confines itself to OA. practices in the field today. Several senior Air Force leaders have shown interest in developing and refining Going with Your Gut OA methodologies and tools, believing that the service needs a sound, effects-based OA Assessing the situation is an integral compo- methodology to implement EBAO success- nent of decision making. Before a strategy di- fully. This article details an effects-based OA vision and its OA team existed, commanders framework that emerged from a survey of ex- relied exclusively on gut feel to guide their as- isting OA techniques, an in-depth review of sessment, drawing on years of tactical experi- joint and Air Force doctrine, and consulta- ence to process all of the intelligence and mis- tion and collaboration with numerous strate- sion reports and using their intuition to assess gists and war fighters. how things were going. Although producing a

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sound assessment depends upon such experi- Force has widely applied it to the planning of ence, the absence of an analytic approach for joint air operations and is typically document- interpreting the data can leave room for bias ing this technique in a joint air operations and ultimately lead to bad decisions. plan or an air operations directive.10 In gen- Adm Chester Nimitz demonstrated the short- eral, strategy-to-task hierarchies have focused comings of this method when he assessed the on targets, using the following structure: preparatory bombardment of Iwo Jima, be- - operational objective (OO) lieving the explosive tonnage dropped by his - tactical objective (TO) forces “sufficient to pulverize everything on the island.” The Marines, however, discovered - tactical task (TT) an entirely different set of circumstances. Dur- - measure of performance (MOP) ing the bombing campaign, the Japanese ac- Table 1 depicts a notional, admittedly incom- tually increased the number of major defen- plete, strategy-to-task hierarchy for a single sive fortifications from 450 to over 9 750. By OO. In general, a JFACC has multiple such relying exclusively on his experience, Admiral objectives, each requiring a strategy-to-task Nimitz reached a conclusion exactly the op- hierarchy. The strategy-to-task hierarchy intro- posite of reality; namely, he believed that he duced a logical thought process into military had rendered the island indefensible, but in planning and assessment activities, but it lacked reality the Japanese had substantially increased a means of accurately determining the result- their defensive capability. ing effects of military operations.

Strategy to Task The “Roll-Up” Model The strategy-to-task framework, a hierarchical A roll-up model of the strategy-to-task hierarchy structure, establishes a coherent chain linking served as the foundation for the first major ef- tactical-level tasks all the way up to the na- fort to add quantitative analysis to JAOC OA, tional security strategy. Since its introduction pioneered by United States Air Forces in Eu- to strategy-to-task thinking in 1989, the Air rope (USAFE). The logic and mathematics of

Table 1. Generic strategy-to-task hierarchy for one operational objective

OO: Gain and maintain air superiority TO: Degrade enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems TT: Destroy enemy SA-2 systems MOP: Percent of known enemy SA-2 launchers destroyed MOP: Percent of known enemy SA-2 radar vans destroyed TT: Degrade enemy SA-3 systems MOP: Percent of known enemy SA-3 launchers destroyed MOP: Percent of known enemy SA-3 radar vans destroyed TO: Degrade enemy air forces TT: Degrade enemy airfields MOP: Percent of enemy airfields nonoperational MOP: Percent of enemy airfields with limited operations TT: Destroy enemy aircraft MOP: Percent of enemy fighters destroyed MOP: Percent of enemy bombers destroyed TO: Degrade command, control, and communication of enemy integrated air defense TT: Degrade higher-headquarters communication links MOP: Percent of higher-headquarters facilities destroyed TT: Degrade operational-level communication links MOP: Percent of sector operations centers destroyed

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this model are quite simple, the former assum- additive models, often yielding meaningless ing that the completion of a set of activities at results. In all cases, the OA team had to em- one level of the hierarchy implies the comple- ploy qualitative “override” scoring inputs. In tion of another at the next. For example, com- terms of the bottom line, evaluating perfor- pleting all of the TTs (destroy enemy SA-2 sys- mance and effects metrics together broke the tems and degrade enemy SA-3 systems) implies model, and OA teams regressed to relying on achievement of the TO (degrade enemy SAM gut feel. systems). Carrying out the TOs (degrade enemy SAM systems; degrade enemy air forces; and A Brief Discussion of Measures degrade command, control, and communica- Measures define the degree to which we action of the enemy’s integrated air defense) complish something.11 For our purposes, mea- implies meeting the OO (gain and maintain sures of effectiveness (MOE) define the de- air superiority). To create a mathematical gree to which we produce effects, and MOPs model, we assign weights to each line in the define the degree to which we have completed hierarchy, indicating the relative importance tasks. The use of MOEs and MOPs lets us proof each MOP, TT, and TO. Rolling up (using vide unambiguous evaluations of how well we weighted averages) the lower-level scores, be- generate effects or perform tasks.12 ginning with an initial value for each MOP, The proposed assessment model takes the generates a score for each OO. We typically form of a linear weighted-additive model— refer to such roll-up models as linear weighted- sometimes called an additive utility function.13 additive models. Therefore, the units of measurement must Although the USAFE model made great be uniform: we can’t add apples to oranges strides within OA, it suffered from two major without first applying a mathematical trans- shortfalls. First, the logic assumes that our under- formation to equate the units. To facilitate standing of the enemy system matches reality. this process, we transform apples and or- In other words, faulty intelligence combined anges into a normalized “value” via an indi- with traditional planning approaches can lead vidual utility function.14 That is, we transform to lower-level actions that do not roll up to the attributes associated with an apple or an complete higher-level objectives. Second, this orange into a value on the range [0, 1] based model focuses solely on carrying out tasks in on the commander’s belief system. An ex- the strategy-to-task hierarchy while disregard- ample appropriate to an air operations plan ing the key elements of the operational plan— would equate the number of enemy fighters the commander’s desired effects. Not perfectly destroyed to the combat effectiveness of suited for assessment of EBAO, this model enemy ground forces. Figure 1 offers ex- nevertheless provides the natural stepping- amples of individual utility functions for no- stone to methodologies that combine perfor- tional MOPs and MOEs. mance and effects in a mathematically logical, As an extension of the models briefly dis- yet straightforward, approach. cussed, the methodology presented in this article overcomes the mathematical limitations Rolling Up with Effects and enables the OA team to assess both de- As EBAO spread, the joint air estimate process sired operational effects and the performance evolved to support its concepts. Although vary- of planned actions simultaneously. Its devel- ing approaches exist, each JAOC has begun to opment grew out of experience in the JAOC transform the strategy-to-task structure into strategy divisions along with the support of an effects-based planning and assessment tool. many JAOC OA personnel, EBAO experts, and OA models began providing a “roll-up score” Air Force senior mentors. The approach meets that combined both performance and effects the six requirements for a sound decision- metrics. Doing so, however, violated the major making tool and thus provides a clear, simple mathematical assumptions of linear weighted- structure for conducting solid OAs.

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.0&/VNCFSPGGSJFOEMZGJHIUFSTEFTUSPZFECZFOFNZ .01&TUJNBUFEQFSDFOUPGLOPXOFOFNZTVSGBDFUP EVSJOHMBTUIPVST TVSGBDFNJTTJMFMBVODIFSTSFNBJOJOH

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Figure 1. Sample individual utility functions

A Practical Methodology for the direction of the strategy. Inherent in this process is the capability to point out areas with Operational Assessment greater operational risk—highlighting potential Given one tenet of this article—that OA trade-offs for allocation decisions. must support the effective and efficient use of Figure 2 provides an overview of the effects- air, space, and cyberspace power—OA must based OA process, which ties directly to the air answer two fundamental questions: Are we do- operations plan. The “plan” should detail the ing things right? Are we doing the right things? JFACC’s desired operational-level effects with The first question addresses the performance corresponding MOEs and success indicators. of planned air operations by focusing the as- In addition, it should detail the tasks the JFACC sessment on the completion of tasks. The sec- considers necessary to achieve his or her ob- ond considers the efficient use of scarce air- jectives as well as the corresponding MOPs for power resources by focusing on production of these tasks. The remainder of this article as- the JFACC’s desired effects. The synergy be- sumes the validity of the operational-planning tween the answers enables the OA team to structure (mission➜objectives➜effects➜tasks) provide the commander with actionable infor- of Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation mation upon which to base decisions about Planning.15 To assess an air operations plan, we

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construct two mathematically independent In addition, when we pay attention to causal models—one to evaluate fulfillment of the links, mathematically independent scoring JFACC’s desired effects and a second to evalu- models for effect and performance provide ate the performance of the JFACC’s planned great utility since they help highlight “weight of tasks. “Several good reasons” exist for objec- effort” and “achievement of objective” trade-offs. tively quantifying the subjectively built plan This approach proves especially useful during into models.16 The primary reason: they help the planning phase since it helps mitigate the clarify the meaning of the effects and “[facili- dangers of assessments becoming too “fuzzy”; tate] all aspects of decisionmaking.”17 however, we must balance it against a desire to perform an overly quantitative assessment. Tasks, Effects, and Causal Links Notation We perform tasks to create effects—the necessary links to achieving objectives. While inde- Before describing the detailed mathematics in pendently scoring effect and performance, OA our methodology, we would do well to intro- teams must maintain task and effect linkages duce the notation that we will use, especially when making overall assessments. Separating that dealing with weighting, scoring, and in- tasks and effects may marginalize or over dexing in relation to our overview of assess- emphasize one or the other and may diminish ment methodology (fig. 3). Aw represents the

the linkage between the two, which lies at the relative importance weight. For example, w(i) very heart of effects-based thinking. This as- refers to the relative importance weighting of sessment methodology is designed to explicitly objective i. M, O, E, and T represent calculated assess these linkages through the juxtaposition scores for various plan levels: missions, objec- of effect and performance results. tives, effects, and tasks, respectively. Subscripts

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Figure 2. Overview of operational-assessment methodology. (The dashed lines to and from the “Suc- cess Indicators” block denote that those indicators may add value to the model but are not necessary for it to be effective.)

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.JTTJPO-FWFM .JTTJPO-FWFM .JTTJPO &GGFDU 1FSGPSNBODF 4DPSF 4DPSF W ME MP

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Figure 3. Assessment-structure notation

E and P indicate effect and performance scores, model. The MOE and MOP scores, between 0 respectively. For example, OE(i) refers to the and 1, indicate the level of a particular effect objective-level effect score for objective i. or task, respectively. A score of 1 indicates complete success—at least temporarily. This Effect and Performance Scoring holds true for all scores at each level. We assess effects and performance with two Operational Assessment mathematically independent, linear weighted- additive models. The mathematical mechan- The JFACC allocates resources to perform ics involve an iterative process that repeats the tasks, which create effects. The methodology similar steps for each level in the model hier- presented gives the OA team a process to as- archy. At the lowest levels, each effect has a sess our performance of tasks and determine number (x) of MOEs associated with it, and if these tasks produce the desired effects. A each task has a number (y) of MOPs associ- high score for performance suggests comple- ated with it. In addition, we assign each MOE tion of many of the planned tasks. A high and MOP a weight reflecting relative impor- score for effect suggests achievement of many tance. For each assessment period, we observe of the JFACC’s desired effects. Low scores for values associated with each MOE and MOP performance and effect naturally have an op- and input them into their respective models. posite interpretation. Drawing inferences based Figure 4 outlines the effects-scoring model; on comparing the resulting scores for perfor- figure 5 outlines the performance-scoring mance and effect represents one key to this

2-Clark Cook.indd 88 4/29/08 8:01:39 AM ME = w(1)OE(1) +w(2)OE(2) +...+w(i)OE(i) i w =1 .JTTJPO where ∑ n n=1 Equation 1: Mission-Level Effect Scores

OE(i) = w(i,1)EE(i,1) +w(i,2)EE(i,2) +...+w(i, j) EE(i, j ) j w =1 0CKFDUJWF where ∑ (i,n) n=1 Equation 2: Objective-Level Effect Scores

E = w MOE +w MOE +...+w MOE E(i, j ) (i, j)1 (i, j)1 (i, j)2 (i, j)2 (i, j)x (i, j)x x &GGFDU w =1 ∑ (i, j )n n=1 Equation 3: Individual Effect Scores

Figure 4. Equations for effects roll-up model

MP = w(1)OP (1) +w(2)OP(2) +...+w(i)OP(i) i w =1 .JTTJPO where ∑ (n) n=1 Equation 4: Mission-Level Performance Scores

OP(i) = w(i,1)EP(i,1) +w(i,2) EP(i,2) +...+w(i, j) EP(i, j) j 0CKFDUJWF w =1 where ∑ (i,n) n=1 Equation 5: Objective-Level Performance Scores

EP(i, j) = w(i, j,1)TP(i, j,1) +w(i, j,2)TP(i, j,2) +...+w(i, j,k)TP(i, j,k) k &GGFDU w =1 where ∑ (i, j,n) n=1 Equation 6: Effect-Level Performance Scores

T = w MOP +w MOP +...+w MOP P(i, j,k) (i, j,k)1 (i, j,k)1 (i, j,k)2 (i, j,k)2 (i, j,k) y (i, j,k) y y 5BTL where w =1 ∑ (i, j,k)n n=1 Equation 7: Individual-Task Performance Scores

Figure 5. Equations for performance roll-up model

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methodology. Table 2 provides some general- efforts to turn the local populace against the ized interpretations for various combinations government (effect), but due to a communi- of high and low scores for performance and cations outage we cannot receive reports of effect. civilian uprisings (MOE). In addition, we may We can characterize the independent scores have battle damage assessment indicating de- for performance and effect in three ways: (1) struction of all enemy fuel storage (perfor- similar, (2) performance > effect, and (3) ef- mance), but we won’t see how it affects enemy fect > performance. Similar scores suggest operations (effects) for two weeks. Finally, we that the operation is proceeding as expected— may have destroyed all national power pro- that our understanding of the enemy system duction (performance) to limit enemy com- and the causal linkages between tasks and ef- mand and control, but because the enemy fects appears correct. In this case, we produce employs couriers and handheld radios as his effects in proportion to the level at which we primary means of communication, command carry out subordinate tasks. and control remains intact (effect). Disconnects between scores for effect and In other words, our assumptions about di- performance indicate that portions of the plan rect links between the achievement of objec- may require further examination. When per- tives and their prerequisite, lower-level effects formance scores are higher than effect scores, and tasks may be flawed. In fact, the OA pro- the completion of tasks, to this point, has not cess may prove most valuable under these con- created the desired effects. Numerous issues— ditions. In this case, OA should focus primarily including data latency, delayed effects, or a mis- on quickly identifying and recommending re- understanding of the enemy system—can drive quired changes to the plan. such score mismatches. For example, we may Conversely, when effect scores are higher have confirmation of successful leaflet drops than performance scores, we have produced (performance) supporting special-operations desired effects without the comparable com-

Table 2. Interpretation of generalized operational-assessment results

High Performance: We have done little to affect Performance: We have significantly degraded the enemy system. the enemy system. Effect: We are achieving our desired effect. Effect: We are achieving our desired effect. Interpretation: Situation is different than Interpretation: Situation as expected. We have expected. We have exerted much less effort exerted significant effort to achieve our effect. than expected to achieve our desired effect. The OA team may recommend shifting Shifting resources may be an option but resources with low operational risk. could entail assuming risk. Performance: We have done little to affect Performance: We have significantly degraded

Effect the enemy system. the enemy system. Effect: The enemy is denying us our desired Effect: The enemy is denying us our desired effects. effects. Interpretation: Situation as expected. We Interpretation: Situation is different than have exerted minimal effort and are not expected. We have exerted significant effort but achieving effect. Look for opportunities to have not achieved the desired effect. This could shift resources to this objective. indicate a faulty understanding of the system, so we need to adjust our plan to go after the Low “right things.” Low High Performance

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pletion of subordinate tasks. Numerous issues, But offering effective strategy recommenda- including data latency, enemy deception, tions requires that we view the results pro- good fortune, and a misunderstanding of the duced by this quantitative model in the con- enemy system could lead to these score mis- text of the operation. At this point, the matches. For example, we do not have battle strategist’s application of operational art be- damage assessment from our strikes on the comes critical. enemy’s strategic SAMs (performance), but The science of this methodology generates he has not launched them during the last five scores, not assessments. Producing OAs re- ATOs (effect). Further, although we haven’t quires a blend of operational art and mathe- taken any action against enemy fighters (per- matical science. The models produce scores formance), the enemy has chosen not to fly. that draw attention to areas of interest. Never- This situation may arise simply due to the fact theless, we must investigate the results for that the enemy has hidden these aircraft in cause-effect relationships and bring into play caves; regardless, our air operations have pro- the trained eyes of experienced strategy pro- ceeded without inhibition (effect). fessionals to interpret them. The scores will In this case, our potentially mistaken as- highlight opportunities for recommendations sumptions about task and effect linkages may to “stay the course,” “change the plan,” or enable a reallocation of resources. Identifying “shift weights of effort”; ultimately, though, these opportunities will allow the JFACC to such decisions will emerge only after collabo- execute operations more efficiently. The OA ration with the entire strategy team. team should now focus on identifying which objectives warrant additional resources and Where Is the Data? on determining operational risk (based on remaining enemy capability) assumed by the Lack of data represents a real problem for all JFACC if resources shift to other objectives. analytic OA methodologies, including this one. Situations of high scores for effect with low We find data-collection and dissemination scores for performance can quickly reverse challenges in every theater, and we must plan themselves, for example, if the enemy brings for them. Experience and sound judgment, his aircraft out of hiding. already a necessary ingredient for quality assessments, increase in importance when we do Where Is the Operational Art? not possess the required information (military The process of developing an effective strategy intelligence, battle damage assessments, mis- requires “significant creativity and hard think- sion reports, etc.) for assessment models. The ing” and must involve the entire strategy team, reality of limited data, however, does not re- consisting of operations, intelligence, logis- lieve the OA team of its responsibilities to de- tics, analysis, and sister-service personnel.18 velop a sound assessment structure, identify Development of the plan’s structure—the de- intelligence and other information require- composition from missions to tasks—is an en- ments, and conduct a sound OA. tirely qualitative process based on the experi- Even in the worst cases of data deficiency, ences and judgment of strategists. Additionally, great benefits accrue to implementing an as- assigning weightings for relative importance sessment methodology such as that described and choosing success indicators, MOEs, and in this article since this “structuring . . . results MOPs must be based on the knowledge and in a deeper and more accurate understanding experiences of the entire strategy team. of . . . the decision context.”20 Further, by pro- Well-structured plans provide the basis for viding a sound analytic framework, the OA the use of quantitative-assessment models.19 team will have a frame of reference when it Therefore the OA team must play a critical discusses confidence in results. The team can role in developing the air operations plan to couch OA results and recommendations in ensure the ability to assess results accurately. terms of data availability, providing the JFACC

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greater insight into the balance of art and sci- tional example (see table 3 for a generic plan ence in the current assessment. framework). Admittedly incomplete, the plan Finally, a consistent and methodical approach nevertheless highlights the benefits of effects- to OA can counter the inevitable effects of a based OA. The responsibility for developing lack of continuity in the JAOCs. Although a such a plan falls to the strategy division, of lack of data, combined with the constant rota- which the OA team is a critical component. tion of personnel assigned to the JAOC, may Therefore, the team should not undertake seem an impenetrable barrier to sound OA, a this task alone; conversely, it must not be ex- method such as the one proposed here can cluded during development of the hierarchy. reassure the JFACC that assessments and rec- Any strategy-to-task hierarchy constructed with- ommendations are based upon a consistent out assessment in mind from the beginning approach. will likely contain immeasurable portions that will force assessment back into the realm of an exclusively gut feel.21 Methodology Demonstration Now that the plan is complete, we can build This section applies the OA methodology the effect and performance models. Figure 6 developed in the previous section to a no- depicts the effect-scoring model for our generic

Table 3. Generic strategy-to-task hierarchy

Mission: Restore sovereignty of allied nation

Objective(1): Gain and maintain air superiority throughout the joint operations area

Effect(1,1): Friendly fighters unaffected by enemy action

MOE(1,1)1: Number of friendly fighters destroyed by enemy in last 24 hours

MOE(1,1)2: Number of friendly fighters damaged by enemy in last 24 hours

MOE(1,1)3: Number of friendly fighter retrogrades due to enemy action in last 24 hours

Task(1,1,1): Degrade enemy SAM systems

MOP(1,1,1)1: Percent of known enemy SAM launchers destroyed

MOP(1,1,1)2: Percent of known enemy SAM radar vans destroyed

Task(1,1,2): Degrade enemy air-to-air capabilities

MOP(1,1,2)1: Percent of enemy airfields nonoperational

MOP(1,1,2)2: Percent of enemy airfields with limited operations

MOP(1,1,2)3: Percent of enemy fighters destroyed

Effect(1,2): Friendly ground forces have freedom from enemy air action

MOE(1,2)1: Number of friendly ground casualties due to enemy action in last 24 hours

MOE(1,2)2: Number of friendly battalion-sized units halted prior to objective

Task(1,2,1): Destroy enemy air-to-ground capabilities

MOP(1,2,1)1: Percent of known enemy air-to-ground fighters destroyed

MOP(1,2,1)2: Percent of known enemy bombers destroyed

MOP(1,2,1)3: Percent of known enemy attack helicopters destroyed

Objective(2): Prevent enemy second-echelon forces from reinforcing main effort

Effect(2,1): Enemy second-echelon forces unable to reach main battle area at combat-effective strength

MOE(2,1)1: Status of Red Battalion (miles from friendly troops and estimated combat strength)

MOE(2,1)2: Status of Purple Battalion (miles from friendly troops and estimated combat strength)

Task(2,1,1): Destroy available avenues of approach

MOP(2,1,1)1: Percent of key river crossings destroyed

Task(2,1,2): Destroy second-echelon forces

MOP(2,1,2)1: Estimated combat effectiveness of Red Battalion

MOP(2,1,2)2: Estimated combat effectiveness of Purple Battalion

Based on Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, III-60, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/ jp5_0.pdf.

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plan, including the model structure and rela- of the performance-scoring model, with relative importance weights for each objective, ef- tive importance weights shown for each objec- fect, and MOE. Figure 7 provides the structure tive, effect, task, and MOP.

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2-Clark Cook.indd 93 4/29/08 8:01:41 AM 94 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2008

We can use several techniques, such as simple mathematics required to produce ef- “pricing out,” “swing weighting,” or “lottery fect and performance scores for this notional weights” to derive the hierarchy weights.22 A example. detailed discussion of these methods lies beyond the scope of this article, but it is impor- Model Calculations for Air Tasking Order “A” tant to note that the method chosen depends upon the personality, values, and experience This section walks the reader through the of the commander—not the analyst. The mathematical mechanics of our methodology method most straightforward to the com- for a sample data set. Tables 4 and 5 supply mander will prove most useful in eliciting his notional data for one ATO period we call or her true belief system. “ATO A.” The “Observed” column contains With the structure defined and weights notional observations, and the “Value” column elicited, we can build an assessment tool. The the resulting individual utility scores. Again, calculations required by this methodology are higher scores are better, with a maximum rudimentary enough to be performed by value of one. hand, with a calculator, or in a simple spread- The calculations below determine the indi- sheet model. The next section highlights the vidual effect score for the notional effect

Table 4. Sample MOE inputs for ATO A

ATO A Measures of Effectiveness Observed Value MOE: Number of fighters destroyed by enemy in last 24 hours 6 0.4 MOE: Number of fighters damaged by enemy in last 24 hours 21 0 MOE: Number of fighter retrogrades due to enemy in last 24 hours 12 0.1 MOE: Number of friendly ground-force casualties due to enemy air in last 24 hours 400 0 MOE: Number of friendly battalion-sized units halted prior to objective 0 1 MOE: Status of Red Battalion (miles from friendly troops and estimated combat strength) 65 mi, 95% 1 MOE: Status of Purple Battalion (miles from friendly troops and estimated combat strength) 25 mi, 95% 0.3

Table 5. Sample MOP inputs for ATO A

ATO A Measures of Performance Observed (%) Value MOP: Percent of known enemy SAM launchers destroyed 40 0.4 MOP: Percent of known enemy SAM radar vans destroyed 10 0.1 MOP: Percent of enemy airfields nonoperational 0 0 MOP: Percent of enemy airfields with limited operations 0 0 MOP: Percent of enemy fighters destroyed 10 0.1 MOP: Percent of known enemy air-to-ground fighters destroyed 5 0.05 MOP: Percent of known enemy bombers destroyed 5 0.05 MOP: Percent of known enemy attack helicopters destroyed 0 0 MOP: Percent of key river crossings destroyed 20 0.2 MOP: Estimated combat effectiveness of Red Battalion 95 0.05 MOP: Estimated combat effectiveness of Purple Battalion 95 0.05

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“friendly fighter operations unaffected by enemy JFACC, however, a picture is often worth 1,000 action,” using equation 3 (“individual effect words. Because a briefing typically presents scores”), the weights from figure 6, and the the JFACC with the OA results, we must con- values from table 4. For each MOE, we multiply vey this large amount of information clearly the assigned relative-importance weighting by and concisely in a short period of time, tailor- its observation value from ATO A. We then ing presentation techniques to the prefer- sum the three MOE scores to produce the in- ences of each JFACC. We offer some sample dividual effect score of 0.25. As previously presentation options here. stated, scores are between 0 and 1; a score of For demonstration purposes, we present 0.25 would indicate to the OA team that we results for a notional subsequent ATO that we have far to go to realize the desired effect. call “ATO D,” which has four objectives: air su- E = w MOE + w MOE + w MOE periority (AS), counterland (CL), counter- E(1,1) (1,1)1 (1,1)1 (1,1)2 (1,1)2 (1,1)3 (1,1)3 maritime (CM), and information superiority

EE(1,1) = (0.6)(0.4) + (0.3)(0) + (0.1)(0.1) (IS). In addition, we set thresholds for “stop- E = 0.24 + 0 + 0.01 light charts” so that scores less than 0.3 are E(1,1) red, scores from 0.3 to 0.7 are yellow, and

EE(1,1) = 0.25 scores above 0.7 are green. We would set actual assessment thresholds through collabora- Using inputs from figures 4 and 5, the tion with the JFACC. weights from figures 6 and 7, and equations The first, and perhaps most important, as- 1–7, we computed the effect and performance sessment slide presented to the JFACC pro- scores for the mission, objective, and effect vides an overall assessment across his or her levels as well as the performance scores for each objectives. It offers a quick status of the opera- task. Table 6 contains all the calculated effect tion; allows the JFACC to swiftly determine the and performance scores for ATO A. The next progress of air, space, and cyber activities; and section discusses interpretation of results. identifies risk areas and potential resource trade-offs between missions. Figure 8 provides Presentation of Assessment Results a notional macro ATO D assessment across The methodology described in this article the four JFACC missions described above. and its associated calculations are critical to This figure clearly indicates attainment of producing a sound, effects-based OA. For the our desired air-superiority effects early in the

Table 6. Effect and performance scores for the notional example

Effect Performance Score Score Mission: Restore sovereignty of allied nation 0.52 0.14

Objective(1,1): Gain and maintain air superiority throughout the joint operations area 0.43 0.15

Effect(1,1,1): Friendly fighters unaffected by enemy action 0.25 0.26

Task(1,1,1,1): Degrade enemy SAM systems 0.34

Task(1,1,1,2): Degrade enemy air-to-air capabilities 0.03

Effect(1,1,2): Friendly ground forces have freedom from enemy air action 0.60 0.05

Task(1,1,2,1): Destroy enemy air-to-ground capabilities 0.05

Objective(1,2): Prevent enemy second-echelon forces from reinforcing the main effort 0.65 0.13 Effect : Enemy second-echelon forces unable to reach main battle area at combat-effective (1,2,1) 0.65 0.13 strength

Task(1,2,1,1): Destroy available avenues of approach 0.20

Task(1,2,1,2): Destroy second-echelon forces 0.05

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presentation format additionally affords the 0CKFDUJWFT"50% opportunity to observe the impacts of risk- "4 *4 acceptance decisions made across multiple ATOs by observing the daily interaction be- $. tween effect and performance results.

&GGFDU To provide greater insight to the JFACC, the OA team should “peel the onion back” an $- additional layer. Figure 10, an in-depth look at

a single air-superiority objective, permits additional insight by examining effect-performance 1FSGPSNBODF discrepancies at the lowest levels. This “stop- light chart” highlights the cause that drives Figure 8. Macrolevel assessment of JFACC objectives the difference in our overall effect and performance scores for air superiority. Although enemy fighters have not affected friendly campaign (effect score: 0.95)—significantly fighter aircraft (“green” effect score), we have more than expected, given the level of perfor- done little to degrade the adversary’s fighter mance (performance score: 0.59) thus far. Be- capability (“red” performance score). fore recommending strategy changes (such as This outcome highlights a potential discon- shifting the weight of effort to other missions), nect in our assumed causal linkage for this the OA team should further investigate these results. Figure 9, an alternative display option, task and effect, as well as an opportunity to provides greater insight into air superiority. reallocate scarce airpower resources. However, This graphic, focused on a single mission, sup- we could cite numerous explanations for this plies the JFACC with critical trend informa- observation. The enemy may have redeployed tion, allowing quick observation of the daily his fighters deep within his borders—beyond progression of this objective and again re- our reach but available for use later (high fu- minding the JFACC that, although we can ob- ture risk). He may have buried his aircraft in serve our desired effects, the enemy appears the desert, never to use them again (opportu- to retain a significant capability. Further, it nity to reallocate resources). The enemy may seems that we have reached or are approach- be using his fighter aircraft for purposes we ing a point of diminishing returns, in which did not anticipate—ones that do not affect continued effort applied to this objective will friendly fighter aircraft. However, enemy air- produce limited gains in desired effects. This craft may be significantly affecting the JFC’s campaign by posing a viable threat to neigh-

"4"JS4VQFSJPSJUZ boring nations (we may not understand the enemy system). As needed, this approach allows the OA team to provide greater depth and breadth of assessment that will help the JFACC execute 1FSGPSNBODF &GGFDU air operations more effectively and efficiently. 4DPSF Designed to support a strategist’s recommendations to the JFACC, this methodology does not eliminate the need for operational art; "50" "50# "50$ "50% rather, it quickly highlights areas of opportunity and risk for strategists to consider when Figure 9. Air-superiority trend analysis they make recommendations to the JFACC.

2-Clark Cook.indd 96 4/29/08 8:01:42 AM A PRACTICAL APPROACH 97

"TTFTT "50% 0CKFDUJWF"JS4VQFSJPSJUZ &GGFDU 1FSGPSNBODF

0CKFDUJWF (BJOBOENBJOUBJOBJSTVQFSJPSJUZUISPVHIPVU ( : UIFKPJOUPQFSBUJPOTBSFB ( ( &OFNZBJSUP &GGFDU 'SJFOEMZGJHIUFSTVOBGGFDUFECZFOFNZBDUJPO HSPVOEUISFBU 5BTL %FHSBEFFOFNZ4".TZTUFNT ( ESJWJOHEJGGFSFODF 5BTL %FHSBEFFOFNZBJSUPBJSDBQBCJMJUJFT JOQFSGPSNBODF ( BOEFGGFDU &GGFDU 'SJFOEMZHSPVOEGPSDFTIBWFGSFFEPNGSPN FOFNZBJSBDUJPO ( 3 5BTL %FTUSPZFOFNZBJSUPHSPVOE DBQBCJMJUJFT 3

%FTJSFEFGGFDUTPCTFSWFE (HSFFO &OFNZIBTOVNFSPVTBJSUPHSPVOEBTTFUTSFNBJOJOH :ZFMMPX 3FNBJOJOHBTTFUTSFEFQMPZFEUPCBTFTOFBSXFTUFSOCPSEFS 3SFE "JSUPHSPVOEBTTFUTVOBCMFUPSFBDIGSJFOEMZHSPVOEGPSDFT 'VFMJTTVFTXJMMESBNBUJDBMMZMJNJUTPSUJFHFOFSBUJPODBQBCJMJUZ 3FDPNNFOEBUJPO3FBMMPDBUFSFTPVSDFTBTTJHOFEUPUBTL UPPUIFSUBTLT "TTFTT "50%

Figure 10. Focused assessment of air superiority

Summary and knowledge, the JFACC can make adjustments Recommendations to the strategy as required. OA will prove useful to the JFACC if it adds Real-World Implementations to his or her understanding of the campaign’s Numerous JAOCs have implemented the assess- progress. By independently evaluating perfor- ment methodology presented in this article, mance and effect, the OA methodology de- Seventh Air Force having done so the most scribed in this article provides a better under- completely and effectively. After the OA team standing of the relationship between the demonstrated the methodology during Exer- actions of friendly forces and their impact on cise Ulchi Focus Lens 2006, the chief of the the enemy system. Previous OA methodologies strategy division and the JFACC issued imme- suffered from various limitations that yielded diate guidance to adopt it. Following the exer- difficult-to-interpret information when events cise, the division chief focused his strategy re- did not proceed according to plan. Compar- write conference on “planning for assessment,” ing performance and effect enables the JFACC fully implementing the methodology in support to determine if he or she is doing things right of his strategy-development process for Seventh and doing the right things. Armed with this Air Force’s primary war plan. The Seventh’s

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Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement, and for a major theater war; a modified version has Integration 2007 exercise validated the value supported steady-state operations. However, of this methodology. we still have room to improve this approach. Thirteenth Air Force modified this approach to assess steady-state operations. The The Way Ahead and Future Research current pace of operations is such that the Recommendations commander’s decision brief (including OA The way ahead for OA calls for adopting a reporting) occurs weekly. Due to the relatively standard methodology across the JAOCs. Al- low operations tempo, OA team members though each JFACC faces unique issues, a core found that assessing performance on a weekly set of assessment processes exists. We developed basis was a straightforward matter, but discern- ing changes in effects from week to week proved this methodology to support the core OA needs extremely difficult. To address this situation, of the JFACCs while offering the flexibility they applied a similar approach to the one de- needed to address their unique, area-specific scribed in this article, separating the assess- issues. The first practical benefit of adopting a ment of effects and performance. Under the standardized approach would involve rapid new approach, the team briefs its assessment methodological improvements arising from of performance to the JAOC commander each the inevitable collaboration across JAOCs. week. To accurately assess changes in effects, The first step to establishing standard tools the OA team examines them over a longer time and training entails adopting a standard OA span (generally 60–90 days), thus providing the methodology. By developing a standard set of commander with a longer-term look at each tools, we can reduce the workload of the OA objective while still allowing sufficient time for teams’ chiefs by eliminating the need to de- the changes in effect to become apparent. velop and maintain their own tools. Further, Deployed analysts in Ninth Air Force imple- we could link a standard set of tools to the mented a similar approach in late 2005. The backbone of JAOC software—Theater Battle OA team assessing Operations Iraqi Freedom Management Core Systems or its successors— and Enduring Freedom struggled to provide potentially automating much of the data- the commander with an effects-based assess- collection effort. Currently, the collection and ment of his objectives. In that case, team mem- input of relevant data make for a very labor- bers decided to limit themselves to assessing intensive process for OA teams, reducing the performance, leaving the assessment of effects time they have for interacting with the strategy to the supported command, who briefed this division during development and refinement to the deputy combined force air component of courses of action. Additionally, each team commander along with a performance assess- requires augmentation during contingency ment conducted by the OA team.23 operations. A standard OA methodology would First Air Force’s strategy division adopted enable us to provide initial qualification train- the methodology presented here in 2006, during for OA augmentees, minimizing the ing development of the joint air operations “pickup game” approach to assessing opera- plan for Defense Support to Civil Authorities, tions. This training would certainly incorpo- designed to provide guidance for joint air op- rate the use of a standardized tool set, enabling erations during events similar to Hurricane deployed OA team members to contribute to Katrina. Exercise Ardent Sentry stressed this strategy and assessment quickly during contin- plan, and the OA methodology proved suc- gency operations. cessful in supporting JFACC decision making Initially, future research efforts should fo- during the exercise. cus on methodology. Any assessment faces the Applied across multiple theaters for a wide problem of missing data—a major issue ad- variety of operations, this methodology has dressed by many existing statistical approaches. supported homeland-defense scenarios as well JAOCs can exploit these techniques to enable as the development and exercising of strategy better assessments. Gaining insight into causal

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linkages, during both planning and execu- causal relationships between our performance tion, is a growth area for strategy and OA. and effect results. That is, we could correlate Strategists often use the term assumed causal the completion of our tasks with the achieve- linkages because they develop them based on ment of our desired effects. Further, we could limited, often biased, understanding of the employ numerous statistical techniques, such enemy system. By assessing operations accord- as canonical correlation, neural networks, and ing to the methodology described in this ar- logistic regression, to add greater understand- ticle, we could use the raw results to develop ing to our causal linkages. ❑

Notes

1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force 12. Kirkwood, Strategic Decision Making, 25. A thor- Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 98, https://www.doctrine ough discussion of measurement theory lies beyond the .af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine scope of this article; however, interested readers can con- _Docs/afdd1.pdf. sult Maj Richard K. Bullock, “Theory of Effectiveness 2. Lt Gen David A. Deptula, “Effects Based Opera- Measurement” (PhD diss., Air Force Institute of Technology, tions,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 2006): Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 2006). 4, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ 13. Robert T. Clemen and Terence Reilly, Making apj06/spr06/spr06.pdf. Hard Decisions with Decision Tools (Belmont, CA: Duxbury 3. J. P. Hunerwadel, “The Effects-Based Approach to Press, 2001), 100. Operations: Questions and Answers,” Air and Space Power 14. ibid., 610. Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 53–62; and Headquarters 15. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Air Force Doctrine Center, Doctrine Watch no. 26, “The 26 December 2006, III-13, III-60, http://www.dtic.mil/ Effects-Based Approach to Operations,” 31 January 2007, doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp. 16. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking, 129. 4. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-1AOC, vol. 3, Opera- 17. ibid. 18. ibid., 56. tional Procedures—Air and Space Operations Center, 1 August 19. ibid. 2005, 14, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/ 20. ibid., 69. epubs/AFI13-1AOCV3.pdf. 21. for a cogent discussion of the characteristics of 5. ibid., 19. well-written objectives, effects, tasks, MOEs, MOPs, and 6. Craig W. Kirkwood, Strategic Decision Making: Multi- success indicators, see Maj John J. Schaefer III and Maj objective Decision Analysis with Spreadsheets (Belmont, CA: Alan D. Kastner, “Operational Assessment of Effects Based Duxbury Press, 1997), 1. Strategies: Proposed Approaches to Measurement Assess- 7. ibid. ment in Effects Based Operations: Tools for Effects Based 8. John S. Hammond, Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Assessment” (presentation, 12th International Command Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Deci- and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Hyatt sions (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 4. Regency Hotel, Newport, RI, 19–21 June 2007), http:// 9. James Bradley with Ron Powers, Flags of Our Fathers www.dodccrp.org/events/12th_ICCRTS/CD/html/ (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), 135. papers/160.pdf. 10. Glenn A. Kent, A Framework for Defense Planning 22. Clemen and Reilly, Making Hard Decisions, 614–20. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989), https:// 23. Maj Kirsten Messer and Maj Shane Dougherty, “A rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R3721.pdf. New Operational Assessment Paradigm: Splitting the Stop- 11. Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking—A Path to lights,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 3 (Fall 2006): Creative Decisionmaking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- 65–68, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ sity Press, 1992), 100. apj/apj06/fal06/Fal06.pdf.

2-Clark Cook.indd 99 4/29/08 8:01:44 AM Education in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance beyond the “Green Door”

Lt Col Jeff S. Hinrichs, USAFR

ountless pundits have accen- put, there is no shortage of directives for intel- tuated the importance of intelli- ligence professionals that define ISR or indicate gence in the aftermath of the terrorist where it should go. However, for individuals attacks of 11 September 2001 and “beyond the green door,” it is an entirely dif- OCperation Iraqi Freedom. Broadly speaking, a ferent story. strategy-to-task intelligence, surveillance, and Educating future senior leaders outside the reconnaissance (ISR) transformation effort is intelligence community about ISR within the under way to more effectively assess the accel- context of the global war on terror (GWOT) erated threats of this new geopolitical land- has become lost in translation. “Most [non scape. However, with the spotlight squarely on intelligence officers] have a lot of misconcep- ISR’s significance, current and future strategic tions of things we can’t do or things we can leaders outside the proverbial “green door” do, and most don’t understand how ISR has know little about ISR and what it can or can- changed to fight the [GWOT].”2 This poi- not do. Strategic leaders must formally em- gnant statement comes from a senior intelli- phasize education in joint ISR as part of the gence officer in the field who drives the point professional development of senior leaders, further: “If an F-16 or F-18 is weather or [main- and they can find a perfect avenue through tenance] canceled, no one notices. If an ISR the Intelligence Directorate (IN) of the newly platform is so much as delayed, it is a 2-star formed Air Force Doctrine Development and level issue in about 60 seconds.”3 Certainly, Education Center (AFDDEC) at Maxwell AFB, ISR education could help. However, authori- Alabama. tative guides that dictate curricula for senior developmental education in joint professional military education (JPME) do not specify a Background need for ISR education.4 “This ideological struggle of the 21st cen- Despite this shortcoming, AFDDEC/IN pro- tury will require . . . good intelligence.”1 More vides ISR education to current and future se- reflective than prophetic, President Bush’s nior officers through developmental-education comment suggests what he and many strategic electives and national-level war games. Though leaders have been professing, namely that ISR only a small slice of the overall JPME pie, Air must transform to meet today’s challenges. University (AU) touches over 2,000 current Indeed, ample guidance on strategic ISR— and future senior officers through its JPME ranging from the National Intelligence Strategy programs. Further, it hosts these officers as a to directives issued by the Office of the Direc- captive audience for an extended period of tor of National Intelligence and the Office of time. As part of AU, AFDDEC/IN is the only Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR (Headquarters organization in the Air Force that can reach USAF/A2)—promulgates ISR’s value. Bluntly this number of joint senior leaders with ISR

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education. Without formal strategic guidance one notable risk: nonintelligence command- on such education, however, it must forge ahead ers through the chain could debunk the ne- with curricula loosely tied to ISR inferences cessity or urgency for organizational change hidden within the authoritative JPME guides. in ISR JPME. Despite the risk, AFDDEC/IN must use its chain of command. However, requesting that AETC own the issue may not be Analysis necessary. ISR education transformation is not ISR Alternatively, with the chain’s permission, training transformation. The issue at hand AFDDEC/IN could take the issue directly to does not involve training those outside the in- Headquarters USAF/A2. Unlike AETC representation, that headquarters serves as the Joint telligence career field to become ISR profes- Staff authority that would approve the trans- sionals. To the contrary, the transformation of formation of ISR education. Directly request- ISR education in this context represents a ing its sponsorship entails a lower risk of rejec- functional awareness on the part of nonintel- tion than asking AETC to carry the ISR torch. ligence leaders (i.e., what ISR can or cannot Regardless, the risk remains that Headquar- do for them). The extent of their deficiency in ters USAF/A2 might not view the transforma- understanding ISR requires further analysis, tion of ISR education as necessary or urgent. but one assumes that they do not possess “suf- Using the chain of command may seem obvi- ficient” awareness to wield the most effective ous, but determining who sponsors organiza- operational or strategic art. tional change in ISR JPME is no trivial matter One may also infer that the dearth of JPME when one considers its ultimate success. guidance has caused the lack of ISR under- To increase the chances for success, AFDDEC/ standing outside the ISR profession. Although IN could do more than petition a cause by re- culture, complexity, and parochialism may vealing a problem; it might consider a broadly contribute to the problem, one may truthfully outlined solution. As noted, an ISR JPME elec- say that guidance on ISR JPME simply does tive and war-game curriculum, already in exis- not exist. Some individuals think that ISR cur- tence, touches thousands of nonintelligence ricula would come at the expense of other leaders annually. Analysis-based statistical data specialties or not meet the thresholds of JPME highlighting deficiencies in nonintelligence requirements. Whatever the reasons, the facts personnel’s awareness of ISR may further help remain that some degree of ISR misunder- identify specific curriculum topics. Regard- standing exists, a condition exacerbated by the less, AFDDEC/IN should hone a general ISR lack of strategic guidance for ISR JPME (not- curriculum with a simple theme of “what ISR withstanding strategic leaders’ profession that can and cannot do.” Finally, details are impor- ISR is central to the GWOT). Infusing ISR into tant, but specific tenets of the ISR curriculum JPME could only positively affect the situation. most likely will transform as ISR evolves in the Within the context of the Air Force’s JPME, rapidly changing environment. Nevertheless, AFDDEC/IN finds itself in a great position to AFDDEC/IN must consider a suggested cur- champion an institutional paradigm shift in riculum that directly transforms ISR education. JPME ISR. However a number of factors will Convincing senior leadership of a problem ultimately determine the fate of any effort to in ISR awareness may prove easier than fight- transform ISR education. ing for formal senior-level guidance regarding AFDDEC/IN could inform senior leader- ISR JPME. Sponsors from across the Depart- ship of the problem. Communicating the is- ment of Defense can nominate up to 10 spe- sue through its chain of command at AU, Air cial areas of emphasis annually for formal in- Education and Training Command (AETC) clusion in JPME.5 Aside from the laborious could request that the Air Staff lobby for a nomination/approval process, functional spe- change in ISR JPME at the Joint Staff level. cialties such as ISR rarely “make the cut.” Fur- However, this normalized approach carries thermore, the nomination of ISR in this case

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must compete against other areas and special- IN redefinition could positively affect ISR ties. Though existing special areas of emphasis JPME now. within the guides suggest the importance of ISR, approving an ISR-specific requirement— though difficult—would formally direct the Conclusions/Recommendations development of ISR JPME in the following Undoubtedly, ISR is fundamental to fight- academic year. ing the GWOT. Unfortunately, anecdotal evi- Apart from the formal pursuit of transform- dence suggests that military personnel beyond ing ISR education, AFDDEC/IN could also the green door do not possess adequate ISR redefine its newly merged role to further the awareness to fight our nation’s new war effec- case of ISR JPME. It has an unprecedented op- tively. Although several factors may contribute portunity to seize upon the former Air Force to the problem, lack of strategic guidance for Doctrine Center’s reputation as the foremost ISR JPME remains a key culprit. AFDDEC/IN authority on doctrinal thought. Mentoring its must alert strategic leadership to the problem personnel to lead this charge, AFDDEC/IN and request formal JPME direction. could position itself as an institution of excel- Ultimate success will hinge on whether or lence to which leaders of all backgrounds go not AFDDEC/IN can convince Headquarters for ISR answers. One risk is that this process USAF that a problem exists with ISR aware- would take time and might do little to address ness and then solicit top-level sponsorship of the immediate need for enhanced ISR aware- the issue. The most promising choice calls for ness outside the intelligence community. Fur- approaching Headquarters USAF/A2 directly; ther, redefinition does not address one- con relying on AFDDEC/IN to redefine itself tributing factor to the problem: lack of would take too much time, given the immedi- strategic guidance for ISR JPME. As a vision, acy of the issue. Without top-down support, however, such reflective thought could only however, the transformation of ISR education improve the future quality of ISR JPME. will have to rest on the inadequately authorita- Though remote, there is a chance that tive shoulders of AFDDEC/IN—an unaccept- AFDDEC/IN redefinition could make a direct able choice for today’s new world. ❑ impact on ISR JPME within AU. Armed with a transformed reputation, at the collegial level, it could present the ISR awareness problem to AU faculty leadership and request formal Notes ISR representation in the core curriculum. 1. pres. George W. Bush (address, Reserve Officers Based on past experience, objections would Association, Washington, DC, 29 September 2006). 2. Col Kimberly B. Sievers, Air University, to Col Ronald likely center on competing course require- Bartley, AFDDEC/IN director, e-mail, 11 April 2007. ments as well as the absence of formal ISR 3. ibid. references in the authoritative JPME guides. 4. adm E. P. Giambastiani, acting chairman, Joint In the future, however, if faculty leadership Chiefs of Staff, to chief of staff, US Army; chief of naval operations; chief of staff, US Air Force; commandant, US perceives AFDDEC/IN as having greater au- Marine Corps; and president, National Defense Univer- thority, new opportunities for ISR JPME may sity, memorandum, 15 February 2007. arise. Whatever the perceptions, AFDDEC/ 5. ibid.

1-Quick Look-Hinrichs.indd 102 4/29/08 8:02:10 AM book, lean thinking offers a way to make work more satisfying and challenging by providing regular feedback on efforts to convert waste into value. Dif- fering noticeably from the recent emphasis on process and organizational reengineering, lean provides a way to create a new methodology and design for work rather than just destroying jobs for the sake of achieving efficiency. A classic, this book serves as a map, guide, and manual on how to create real, lasting value in any organization. In several respects, Lean Thinking is relevant to Air Force Smart Opera- tions for the twenty-first century since it addresses continuous process improvement and makes sense of the concept and practices of lean. A powerfully compelling aspect of the book is that it strategically considers not only how to think of lean but also what to think of it. The authors have written a timely, intelligent, and comprehensive text that addresses provocative ideas for driving greater efficiency in eliminating waste. Their innovative strategy encompasses initiatives touching all of an organization’s business functions and processes. They correctly argue that waste is the enemy. In their judgment, to consume, spend, or employ uselessly or without adequate return is dysfunctional, counterproductive, and potentially devastating to any activity. It is obvious to the reader that the more savings we achieve, the more committed we become to finding even more Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in opportunities to further improve the way we do Your Corporation, revised and updated by James business and generate additional savings. If compa- P. Womack and Daniel T. Jones. Free Press (a nies wish to survive, continuous improvement in division of Simon and Schuster) (http://www reducing waste must become a priority organiza- .simonsays.com), 1230 Avenue of the Americas, tional value. This is a clear imperative in any highly New York, New York 10020, 2003, 400 pages, competitive global environment. The authors con- $30.00 (hardcover). tend that practitioners who have a passion for improving the way they operate need a simple-to-read In their superb book Lean Thinking, James P. and simple-to-use source, coupled with improve- Womack and Daniel T. Jones offer hard-hitting, ment strategies that bring usable tools to the work- practical principles on banishing waste and improv- place. By correctly utilizing these methods, and pro- ing productivity in organizations. Success for the viding proper leadership and commitment, they can leader is the ultimate destination, and that depends make a major difference in the conduct of work. on the tools we bring with us. Lean Thinking will Appearing on Business Week’s best-seller list of help leaders develop the skills they need for a suc- business books, Lean Thinking consists of four inter- cessful journey in combating waste. As defined by related parts. Part 1, “Lean Principles,” explains Womack and Jones, “lean” involves the ongoing actionable principles for creating lasting value in elimination of unnecessary, non-value-added steps any business venture. This requires a conscious at- within a process, which contributes to bottom-line tempt to precisely define product value, capabili- results, increased competitiveness, and improved ties, and prices through a dialogue with customers. levels of customer service. As prescribed in this Applying these principles in a step-by-step process

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necessitates close observation of the entire set of particular relevance to lean in that today, in both activities entailed in creating and producing a government and business, no one has a blank value-added product or service. Part 1 considers re- check. Thus organizations must become signifi- defining the work of functions and departments cantly more effective and efficient (the central within organizations, submitting that the reengineer- message in lean). Absent here and in other por- ing movement has recognized that departmental tions of the book, however, are the element of cul- thinking without a broader organizational vision tural change and its fundamental psychology—as can become one-dimensional and suboptimal. A well as ways to bring it about. key aspect of this involves employing the principle Part 3 optimizes the value created for the cus- to shift attention from organizational categories tomer while minimizing time, cost, and errors. En- (departments) to lean, thus value-creating strategic titled “Lean Enterprise,” it portrays the need to processes. It also speaks persuasively to lean metrics focus intently on the customer. Correctly conclud- by analyzing profiled companies that have success- ing that responsive customer relations account for fully utilized lean thinking. Pointing to Toyota as most of the value perceived by customers, the au- their leading exemplar of lean, the authors care- thors recommend that firms conduct rapid analy- fully explain the mechanics of why that company ses and then take fast-strike improvement actions has achieved real and sustainable value for its cus- to ensure they meet customer needs. This type of tomers, employees, and the company itself. Key ele- action requires total organizational support. ments of Toyota’s success concern production In part 4, the “Epilogue,” Lean Thinking tracks methods, product distribution, uses of technology, trends in inventory and metric management. Look- car service, and a highly effective business cycle. ing to Toyota as an example, Womack and Jones But omitted from this list, as elsewhere in the book, have done some excellent work in capturing the is the role of the leader and leadership as opposed basic process building blocks that contribute to the to management. Books of this type should encour- implementation of lean. Whereas many companies age a better balance between these two concepts. in the United States are rushing to manufacture in This reviewer holds that the practice of lean must address how organizations can free their people China, Toyota is bringing its cars and huge profit from time-consuming activities to enable them to making to this country. General Motors is retiring have more opportunity to implement the processes over 50,000 employees, but Toyota is hiring. In cited in Lean Thinking. Much of the potential of this Texas, Toyota received job applications from over type of reflection disappears unless one grasps the 115,000 people for fewer than 2,000 positions. realities of each aspect of part 1. Labeled “perfec- Why? Toyota simply gives its people respect, pro- tion,” this portion of lean stresses the careful inte- vides them a sense of value regarding what they do, gration of all the concepts cited within part 1. By and promotes organizational effectiveness. seriously considering and holistically implement- In summary, Lean Thinking, which includes a ing these ideas, one can make significant advances good glossary, notes, bibliography, index, and con- in getting lean thinking “right.” tributions from a number of individuals, is an ex- The message in part 2, “From Thinking to Ac- cellent book to keep on the shelf. Readers should tion,” is both simple and profound—the mark of study it carefully, particularly in group settings. In deep experience. Acting on the belief that the true the study of lean, few other publications, if any, can end of thought is action, the authors show how to equal it. apply the principles addressed in part 1, doing so Dr. Richard I. Lester not with any idealistic notions but in a step-by-step, businesslike approach, considering both large and Eaker College for Professional Development small companies. Like readers of Alice in Wonderland, Maxwell AFB, Alabama we learn from it according to the background we bring to the reading. Relying on a variety of case studies and experiences from the United States, Germany, and Japan, part 2 radiates lean’s realistic The Future US Air Force by Min Zengfu [ 闵增富 ]. and clear-eyed approach from thinking to action. PLA Publishing House, no. 40 Di’anmen Xidajie Selected topics addressed include installing busi- Street, Xicheng District, Beijing, China, 2007, ness systems to encourage lean thinking, teaching 318 pages, ¥22.00 ($3.00) (softcover). lean thinking and skills to everyone, creating a workable action plan, and being aware of costs at How does the Chinese military view the US Air every level in any operation. The latter topic has Force (USAF)? The Future US Air Force, recently

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published by a Chinese senior colonel, may pro- noticed. Chapter 7 asserts that the USAF now clearly vide the answer. regards air and space as one seamless battlefield and The author divides his book into nine chapters. has begun building and deploying its forces to cover The first two, “Roadmap Leading to the Future the airspace vertically, all the way into deep space, USAF” and “Military Transformation as Seen by the and horizontally, over every corner of the globe. USAF,” serve as background descriptions. They tell One can easily find the book loudly echoing the fa- how the objective of “Global Reach and Global mous speech by Gen John Jumper, former USAF Power,” put forth in 1990, evolved into “Global Vigi- chief of staff: “Let me be perfectly clear—in our Air lance, Reach, and Power” in the USAF document Force, every Airman is expeditionary.” Air Force Vision 2020 (2000). The author agrees that Chapter 8 examines the risks involved in Air Vision 2020 is much more detailed and executable Force transformation and ways of measuring its because it now specifies six core capabilities neces- success. Readers who do not have time to read the sary for fulfilling the general objective. entire book may want to skip this chapter but Against this background, the following five chap- should not miss the final one—“Revelations from ters focus on key aspects of building the future USAF Transformation.” Here, the author does a USAF: force organization and structure; doctrines wonderful job of comparing the USAF with its and plans; key capabilities and technologies; weap- counterpart in the former Soviet Union and present- ons; and the future battlefield and force deploy- day Russia. Although his admiration of the USAF is ment. Readers will appreciate the author’s pains- obvious, he is somewhat critical of the force struc- taking effort in creating this framework, which ture of the Russian Air Force. Specifically, the au- greatly facilitates an understanding of future USAF thor believes that the integration of air, space, air objectives. defense, and strategic forces under the USAF is a Not only is the framework noteworthy but also much more farsighted and far-reaching solution in the contents prove informative and insightful. Chap- terms of efficiency, budget control, utilization of ter 3 discusses why the USAF restructured its forces resources/assets, and joint operations than the into nine major commands as well as 18 numbered Russian command structure. However, he stops air forces after the first Gulf War. The author con- short of mentioning the fact that, in China, the Sec- tends that this new force configuration serves the ond Artillery Force is also a separate service. Never- USAF’s global mission much better and will remain theless, he does poignantly state that “the strategic unchanged for a relatively long period. missile force does not have its own battle space Chapter 4 discusses the development of USAF [and] therefore lacks the sufficient basis of becom- doctrines and operational plans, describing how ing a separate service” (p. 315). Col John Warden’s five-ring system theory—as well This book of more than 300 pages depicts a as derivative theories, such as parallel operations clear picture of how the USAF, guided by the road and effects-based operations—influenced the plan- map of Air Force Vision 2020, is fast becoming a truly ning and execution of Operation Allied Force in expeditionary force while gradually shifting from Kosovo and various operations in the ongoing war an air-centric focus to a space-centric one. Readers in Iraq. The author points out that through adapt- may not find much discussion in the book about a ing itself, the current and future USAF will feature third equally important battlespace—cyberspace. three force types: basic forces, special task forces, But we should not blame the author since the USAF and mobility forces, all designed to execute future added cyberspace to its mission statement only re- operations ranging from command, control, com- cently; even today, its definition remains the - sub munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, ject of debate. and reconnaissance (C4ISR), to global strike, global A top-class Chinese military researcher, Sr Col mobility, homeland security, global reactive strike, Min Zengfu has published several influential books and nuclear operations. and more than 100 articles/monographs. The sheer Chapters 5 and 6 provide in-depth discussion on volume of publications speaks to the breadth and the key capabilities, critical technologies, and ad- depth of his knowledge. The Future US Air Force is his vanced air and space weaponry needed for develop- latest addition but certainly not the last. The author ing the future USAF. Their content may be familiar to notes in the foreword that “this book is intended for some US audiences but will surely attract many Chi- those who want to get a glimpse of the future US Air nese readers thirsty for such exciting information. Force.” By many measures, it fulfills that purpose. The USAF differs from most other air forces in that it flies not only in the air but also more and Guocheng Jiang more in space. This trend has certainly not gone un- Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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Blood on German Snow: An African American Ar- That being said, Blood on German Snow does offer tilleryman in World War II and Beyond by Emiel the reader a look into an obviously sensitive man W. Owens. Texas A&M University Press (http:// and some of his wartime recollections. His vivid de- www.tamu.edu/upress), John H. Lindsey Build- scriptions of the deaths of comrades and of Ger- ing, Lewis Street, 4354 TAMU, College Station, man civilians caused by his artillery make apparent Texas 77843-4354, 2006, 160 pages, $24.95 the fact that he would rather forget the details of (hardcover). “his” war. Similarly, Owens gives us a glimpse of a man finally coming to terms with dealing with non- I’m continually drawn to memoirs of men who blacks in a significant manner for the first time in fought in World War II. To me, reading about their his life. I found one anecdotal story amusing. In experiences and recollections is infinitely more in- April 1945, the author was walking when, without teresting than the cold facts and bland rehashing any sound, something hit the ground right in front of unit movements and battle progressions. When of his feet, splashing mud over his body from head authors can tie such an important part of their lives to toe. When he looked down, he saw that it was an to a historical event, it makes that situation much unexploded German 88 mm shell. Immediately af- more memorable. In other words, I love reading terward he went to a rest camp in Belgium for a week memoirs. Let me rephrase that: I love reading to regroup. Such are the fortunes and luck of war. “most” memoirs. Although the book includes 22 photographs and In Blood on German Snow, the author gives us in- three maps, it leaves the reader wanting more of sight into the life of a black soldier fighting against Owens’s combat experiences to balance out his pre- the forces of Nazism in Europe during a time in our and postwar endeavors. As a significant historical history marked with decidedly dark undercurrents. contribution, this book leaves me sitting squarely Emiel W. Owens is an interesting man whose life on the proverbial fence. It does give the reader a shines with the academic achievements that most look into the contributions of black combat sol- people can only dream about. Holding a PhD in diers—a facet of World War II generally ignored. It economics from Ohio State University, he has also illustrates one man’s desire to excel in all en- taught and lectured around the world, including deavors and aspects of his life. Without a doubt, the Europe and Africa. His life after the war makes for author succeeded as a man, a father, and an educa- a compelling study in itself. tor. But at a rather steep $24.95, Blood on German Born in the small town of Smithville, Texas, in Snow is a hard sell. Do I recommend reading it? Yes. 1922, Owens grew up in the usual, repressive Jim An easy read, it will give people insights they prob- Crow environment found throughout the South. ably haven’t experienced before. Would I consider Due to the influence of his family, however, he ob- this a significant historical contribution? Although tained an excellent education. His love of learning I found it interesting, the author’s lack of commit- and academic achievement stayed with him his en- ment to wartime details makes Blood on German tire life. In 1943 Owens was drafted into the Army, Snow fall just a bit short of my expectations of a where he became part of the segregated 777th Field “wartime memoir.” Artillery Battalion, in which he served throughout the European conflict. Lt Col Robert F. Tate, USAFR, Retired Regarding Blood on German Snow as a memoir, I Montgomery, Alabama have to say that in some ways it disappointed me. One would expect much more discussion of the author’s contributions and experiences in combat. This book reveals that he had many of them. That LeMay, Great Generals Series, by Barrett Tillman. is not to say he doesn’t relate any of these stories, Palgrave Macmillan (http://www.palgrave-usa but only 57 pages cover the actual fighting in Eu- .com), 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York rope. This includes his initial arrival on the conti- 10010, 2007, 224 pages, $21.95 (hardcover). nent through the German surrender. Although the author’s unit took part in the deadly fighting inside The cover of my advance copy of LeMay pro- the Hurtgen Forest in November 1944, for example, claims it the “First Major Biography” of the sixth one finds surprisingly little detail about the fight- chief of staff of the Air Force and the second coming. Therefore, readers searching for a black artil- mander of Strategic Air Command (SAC). A major leryman’s memoir that gives detailed descriptions biography it certainly is not. Its brevity alone dis- of artillery operations in the European theater of qualifies it for that designation. The research is operations should look elsewhere. superficial, dealing primarily with the most com-

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mon published sources. Twenty of the first 35 cita- the US government and military leadership to rec- tions come straight out of LeMay’s own Mission with ognize airpower as a necessary revolution in mili- LeMay: My Story (1965) (with MacKinlay Kantor). tary affairs with monumental economic application: Nothing in the current work would prove objec- “Those interested in the future of the country, not tionable to the authors of that volume or to LeMay’s only from a national defense standpoint but from a heirs. Barrett Tillman has published 40 books, civil, commercial and economic one as well, should mostly for the popular market. His writing is good, study this matter carefully, because air power has but the depth of his research is minimal. Stuffing not only come to stay but is, and will be, a dominat- the story of the life of a major actor in so much of ing factor in the world’s development” (p. 119). our air history (including World War II, Korea, and Mitchell emphatically expressed that America Vietnam) into such a short narrative is out of the needed to embrace airpower as a primary means of question. national defense and deterrence of aggressors As noted, LeMay is very conventional in its inter- through the establishment of an independent US pretations. It might be suitable for Junior ROTC Air Force: “Our development must be based on the students but not for the readers of this journal. grand hypothesis that future contests will depend Rather, they should turn to LeMay’s own Mission primarily on the amount of air power that a nation with LeMay: My Story; Tami Davis Biddle’s Rhetoric could produce and apply” (p. 31). His comprehen- and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and sive understanding and articulation of the required American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 force and equipment structure, support infrastruc- (2002) (on strategic bombing up to Hiroshima); ture, aircraft capabilities and employment tactics, Harry R. Borowski’s A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air training, maintenance, role of government in fi- Power and Containment before Korea (1982) (for the nancing design development (based on capability initial weakness of SAC); and Walton S. Moody’s needs), manufacturing of aircraft, and so forth Building a Strategic Air Force (1996) (on LeMay’s were incredible, reflecting sheer visionary genius. work in rebuilding SAC). The author also relies Emphasizing the value of airpower’s speed, he also heavily on Thomas M. Coffey’s Iron Eagle: The Turbu- saw the economic value of air transport, noting the lent Life of General Curtis LeMay—not a definitive biog- numerous commercial roles that airplanes would raphy but certainly a better source than Tillman’s. eventually play in transporting goods and provid- I recommend that you do not use up space on ing services for businesses and consumers as well as your professional reading list for Tillman’s concise federal, state, and local governments. summary. At that time, many people considered his thinking regarding the role of airpower too futuristic, Dr. David R. Mets radical, possibly self-serving, and controversial to Maxwell AFB, Alabama be taken seriously. However, he proved through re- corded exhibitions that emerging airpower capabilities had a distinct strategic advantage over conventional stand-alone ground and naval forces. Winged Defense: The Development and Possibili- Furthermore, Mitchell argued that this advantage ties of Modern Air Power—Economic and Mili- would widen, making the United States vulnerable tary by William Mitchell. Dover Publications to attack. In retrospect, his clarity of purpose, vision, (http://www.doverpublications.com), 31 East and strong conviction—while others wandered lost 2nd Street, Mineola, New York 11501-3852, in the myopic fog of the time—was uncanny. Acting 2006, 320 pages, $9.95 (softcover). on concerns of risking service reliance and obsoles- cence, the Navy and War Departments eventually In their book The Dynamics of Military Revolution, embraced airpower in fighting future wars by devel- 1300–2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, oping the Navy carrier and Army Air Corps. This 2001), editors MacGregor Knox and Williamson adaptation led to great successes during World War Murray observe that revolutions in military affairs II. Subsequently, Mitchell’s notion of an indepen- require the assembly of a complex mix of tactical, dent Air Force would come to fruition. organizational, doctrinal, and technological inno- His vision of airpower proved prophetic and an vations to implement a new conceptual approach unparalleled instrument for change in military de- to warfare or a specialized subbranch. William fense and economic activities. His unwavering, single- Mitchell’s book Winged Defense, originally published minded advocacy of the importance of airpower in 1925, reads as a smartly articulated, remarkably and the lead role he insisted the United States play detailed, passionate, and persuasive argument for in its development and application culminated in

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an unrivaled, cutting-edge air and space industry tions,” and “Intergovernmental Representatives” that has become the envy of the world. identify current incumbents. Arguably no American was more instrumental The publisher, CQ Press, has put its vast rein promoting the development and use of airpower sources to good use in producing this worthwhile than Billy Mitchell. Winged Defense remains a pre- book. I recommend it to the serious student of re- mier aviation classic and a must-read for all service gional studies, the individual who wants to know and commercial aviators. Logisticians, military his- what has caused the current situation in this region, torians, entrepreneurs, economists, leaders of all and the general reader who desires a deeper ap- types, and those interested in the power of ideas preciation for news about that area of the world. will find this book valuable. Political Handbook would make an excellent addition to their professional libraries. Dr. David A. Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Retired US Army Command and General Staff College Col Joe McCue, USAF, Retired Leavenworth, Kansas Springfield, Virginia

Political Handbook of the Middle East, 2006. Con- What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, gressional Quarterly (CQ) Press (http://www Containing the Threat by Louise Richardson. .cqpress.com), 1255 22d Street, NW, Suite 400, Random House Publishing Group (http://www Washington, DC 20037, 2006, 452 pages, $125.00 .atrandom.com), 1745 Broadway, 18th Floor, (hardcover). New York, New York 10019, 2006, 336 pages, $25.95 (hardcover). Neither a light read nor a work of fiction,Political Handbook is a comprehensive work of detailed docu- Amongst the hundreds of books about the na- mentation on the political background of countries ture of terrorism, its causes, and the motivations of terrorists, What Terrorists Want provides a unique commonly considered as comprising the Middle and absorbing perspective on how these aspects in- East. Basically a textbook, it offers ready access to teract and influence the United States’ challenges information concerning the political foundation, in the international-security environment. The background, evolution, and current status of this book is a historically based survey of various terror- region. The book’s wonderful introduction sets the ists, groups, and their motivations, including ex- stage for the detailed material to follow and gives amples from nineteenth- and twentieth-century the reader a taste of the crisp writing style found anarchists, Cold War–era nationalist and postcolo- throughout. At the end of the book, one finds a nial movements, and the post-9/11 environment, treasure chest of useful facts on such important laced with religious fervor and increasingly lethal international entities as the Organization of Petro- means. The author, Dr. Louise Richardson of Har- leum Exporting Countries, United Nations, Arab vard University, begins part 1 of What Terrorists Want League, and Palestine Liberation Organization, to with a well-organized and insightful analysis of indi- name a few. vidual terrorists and groups. Part 2, also effective Its real value, however, lies in the body of the and interesting, includes rather controversial rec- work, which offers detailed descriptions of the po- ommendations on existing strategies and tactics litical organization of Middle Eastern countries. For that are working—and failing. All in all, this book is each of the selected 25 nations, the study examines an engaging study that enables the reader to better “The Country” (a historical look at its political for- consider policy options and assess shortcomings in mation); “Government and Politics” (a view of the the continuing and evolving global war on terror political background and issues that molded the (GWOT). country, including a consideration of its constitu- Raised in the 1960s and 1970s in rural Ireland, tion and government structure); “Current Issues” the author describes the emotional appeal of Irish (what has recently [within the last five years] - oc patriots along with the emotional dissonance cre- curred in the political realm—in other words, what ated by British tactical and strategic missteps and captures the interest of the current government); blunders in attempting to defuse the often-violent and “Political Parties and Groups” (a composite Irish independence movement. Her technique lays snapshot of dominant political organizations). Fur- the foundation for a sense of empathy (if not sym- thermore, sections on “Legislature,” “Communica- pathy) for understanding why moderates and main-

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stream Catholics came to tacitly support or join the self-defeating results, undermining long-term suc- “activists’ ” cause, despite their methods. Dr. Rich- cess. As she states, “The urge to declare war in re- ardson does an excellent job of conveying the logic sponse to atrocity . . . is very understandable. I have of those who feel they have no choice other than argued, however, that it is also very unwise” (p. standing up to perceived injustices perpetrated 199). Her recommended approach is to disrupt the upon the persecuted, and she shows linkages be- cycle of “revenge, renown, and reaction” by starving- tween how they create, build, and maintain support off and making irrelevant the leadership and vision from a wider community. provided by today’s Islamic radicals. This implies In part 1, Dr. Richardson extends her reflections deemphasizing direct force, public displays of and analysis to causes and trends in current trans- American pride, and overt support to certain national terrorism. She extracts her conclusions friends and allies. Her concluding chapter makes a not only from her early experiences but also from number of recommendations familiar to anyone her work in terrorist studies. In describing the dy- who has read the National Strategy for Combating Ter- namics of what motivates Islamic radicals (focusing rorism (2003) or various Department of Defense on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda), “revenge, re- counterinsurgency documents and counterterrorist nown, and reaction” emerge as driving forces that doctrine. They include separating terrorists from energize and perpetuate the use of terrorist tech- their communities, knowing one’s enemy, setting niques more generally. One of the unique insights achievable goals and establishing alliances, and co- of Dr. Richardson’s argument suggests that these operating in the international community. groups, unable to defeat their enemies outright, Despite concluding with these generic and pe- derive maximum benefit by humiliating them. Hu- destrian policy recommendations, which one can miliation has become a source of power and per- question as idealistic or impracticable, What Terror- petuation for their cause by enabling them to at- ists Want is a timely, interesting, and useful read. Dr. tract new recruits, cause political concessions, and Richardson’s style is direct and easy to synthesize. withstand violent and catastrophic losses to their Her ability to bring personal experience into the infrastructure. In fact, she convincingly shows how story and to convey a sense of perspective from the using terrorist actions to provoke state actors into radicals’ point of view makes this book work. It violent reactions helps accelerate and sustain these gives the reader a sense of how US strategy and be- groups and their agendas. havior operate in the cycle of terrorist behavior. Thus, Dr. Richardson seems to reassert a rather Although the author seems strident in her critique well-known or at least intuitive theory: state actions of US foreign policy at times, her provision of a can often provide fuel to the terrorist fire. But she framework for understanding how terrorists think both enhances and extends the credibility of this and what they want will enhance any military offi- common assertion—not by blaming the United cer’s comprehension of US effectiveness in the States for 9/11 but by showing how suicide terror is continuing GWOT. part of a fabric of social conflict and resistance to perceived injustices of a merciless and overwhelm- Lt Col Chris Eisenbies, USAF ing enemy. One question, where do the terrorists Air Force Fellow “get the social support they needed to sustain University of Illinois–Champaign-Urbana them?” (p. 134), marks the transition from part 1 to part 2 of What Terrorists Want, wherein she addresses counterterrorism, losing some momentum as she analyzes what has and has not changed in the na- Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st ture of terrorism after 9/11. Some of her thoughts Century Military by David S. Alberts. Department are controversial, including assertions that al-Qaeda of Defense Command and Control Research Pro- does not have foreseeable, credible access or suffi- gram (http://www.dodccrp.org), Washington, cient will to employ weapons of mass destruction. DC, 2002, 145 pages. Free download available from Also, she places less focus upon the inherent cor- http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_IAT.pdf. ruption and bankruptcy in some of the societies that provide the breeding ground for radicalized Information Age Transformation offers a thought- groups. Meanwhile, she spends a great deal of time ful look at challenges to the Department of Defense discussing the hubris and self-serving agenda of (DOD) as it incorporates the ongoing revolution in American and other Western foreign policies. information technology. The book’s author, Dr. However, Dr. Richardson finishes strongly by as- David Alberts, director of research for the assistant sociating how and why these behaviors can create secretary of defense, has published or coauthored

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multiple books on command and control (C2) and the challenge of identifying quality information technology topics. This book is a rewritten and up- from the outset. dated version of his study Unintended Consequences of Information Age Transformation does examine is- Information Age Technologies (1996). In that National sues associated with “the quality and distribution of Defense University publication, Alberts argues for information within the organization—its richness, an effective DOD technology-insertion strategy to its reach, and the quality of the interactions” (p. maximize the positive contributions of the infor- viii). The author’s observations regarding informa- mation revolution and the evolution to an “Infor- tion flows and the impact on organizations are in- mation Age organization” (p. 2). Information Age structive, as are his recommendations regarding Transformation updates terminology and combines experimentation—the need for integrated plan- the themes of network-centric warfare (NCW) with ning and a more holistic approach to acquisition recommendations on how to think about and ac- and integration. As a review of some of the issues commodate change, specifically changes brought the DOD faces as it struggles to incorporate all the on by improved information flows. potential of the information age, Dr. Alberts’s short Dr. Alberts expresses his concern that we have book would appeal to department members en- not given enough consideration to all aspects of in- gaged in experimentation, test and evaluation, and corporating new information capabilities. In his the design or acquisition of C2 systems. opinion, factors such as organization and training often receive short shrift while the material aspect Col Darren D. Medlin, USAF of the technology itself receives the lion’s share of Air Force Fellow attention. Identifying the military’s concept of C2 Santa Monica, California as one of the greatest roadblocks to fully exploiting new capabilities, he suggests a process of consulta- tion, collaboration, and convergence as an optimum C2 model for fully exploiting the information age, With God on Our Side: One Man’s War against an particularly in a joint and combined environment. Evangelical Coup in America’s Military by Michael Information Age Transformation contains a brief L. Weinstein and Davin Seay. St. Martin’s Press recap of the DOD’s publications and some still- (http://www.stmartins.com), 175 Fifth Street, unanswered questions about the information revo- New York, New York 10010, 2006, 272 pages, lution, followed by a collection of the author’s $25.95 (hardcover). thoughts on the best way for the department to exploit opportunities yet avoid adverse consequences. While conservatives dominate talk radio and lib- The book makes the significant proposition that erals now make movie documentaries, anyone can the onslaught of new information-age technologies write a book on a hot-button issue. For Michael will revolutionize military organizations and the very “Mikey” Weinstein, a book must have seemed the concept of command (p. 49). Although Alberts next logical step in his continuing campaign to sup- touches on a significant number of NCW issues, he ply ingredients for more nationally reported head- does not offer a list of recommendations so much as lines like those originating from the Air Force he conducts a philosophical exercise to allow leaders Academy over the last several years. Weinstein, of to appreciate conditions needed to take advantage course, is the academy graduate who argues that of opportunities and avoid pitfalls of greatly im- evangelical Christian values were illegally pushed proved information sharing in military operations. on cadets, including his two sons, who, like their One can clearly appreciate the author’s vision of father, are Jewish. He contends that the events at an information-rich future in which every military the academy are symptoms of a “creeping evange- element has access to an endless sea of data/aware- lism” in the military that violates both First Amend- ness and can employ a collaborative-and-convergence ment rights and the “separation clause” between approach, versus a C2 system, leading to an all- church and state. For Weinstein, the academy case knowing, “self-synchronizing” force (p. 40). This serves as evidence for his broader charges of “sys- transformed military may have given rise to the temic problems of religious bias and Constitutional quick victory against Iraq’s military in 2003. The neglect that continue to occur within the United means by which these information-technology States armed forces” (Gordon Lubold, “Religious transformations enhance phases of military opera- Bias Complaint Filed with DOD IG,” Air Force Times, tions before and after major combat operations has 12 December 2006). In just over a year, Weinstein has not proven as obvious. I wonder if any information filed suit against the Air Force and has organized and system or command paradigm can compensate for headed up a religious watchdog group—the Military

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Religious Freedom Foundation—because of his per- of the stakes as well as the turbulent events that so turbations over alleged improper evangelization. closely followed in the wake of the academy’s sexual- So, if the reader is looking for a dispassionate, assault scandal. Ironically, the antithesis of Weinstein’s balanced investigative report to chronicle, explain, case, now before the courts, is also making head- and analyze what occurred at the academy, this lines. A military chaplain is suing the government, semiautobiographical volume is not it. Instead, this charging the military with violating his First Amend- is “one man’s war against an evangelical coup” (ac- ment rights by forbidding him to pray “in the name cording to the dust jacket). Weinstein’s campaign is of Jesus” at public ceremonies. a frontal assault on an institution that is not only his Even though a federal judge dismissed Wein- own alma mater but also one he saw fit to have his stein’s suit in the fall of 2006, primarily on grounds sons attend. As his coauthor informs us, Weinstein that the plaintiffs didn’t have “standing with the is an angry man: “His anger is never out of reach, court” to file it (i.e., they weren’t cadets anymore) foulmouthed explosions of bitterness are launched and could not prove they were harmed, a sequel against the evangelical forces that sometimes seem will undoubtedly appear. Weinstein may not write to feed on the rancor he pours forth” (p. 209). it, the setting will probably not be the Air Force The release of the book in the fall of 2006 Academy, and the case will likely stem from differ- roughly coincides with the hearing of his litigation ent circumstances. against the Air Force in federal court. With annexes As long as Americans remain divided over their offering selected official reports and documents to understanding, let alone interpretation, of the im- support his claims, it probably could have been portant constitutional principles of First Amend- filed with the court as the brief for his lawsuit (mi- ment rights and the separation clause governing nus the invective). church and state relationships in the twenty-first Readers will likely find themselves distracted by century, divisive cases such as Weinstein’s will un- several literary devices used by Weinstein and his fortunately continue to appear. coauthor. The flow of the story is frequently dis- rupted by a style that abruptly and awkwardly Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired bounces in and out of Weinstein’s first-person nar- Burke, Virginia rative and Seay’s third-person narration. Their prose is also prone to bombastic alliteration. The reader encounters far too many sentences such as the following: “The ‘Passion’ [Mel Gibson’s movie] Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945 edited had in short, become a promulgating powerhouse, by Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Crang. Ivan R. and within the cloistered confines of the Academy Dee (http://www.ivanrdee.com), 1332 North its persuasive potential was given full sway” (p. 37). Halsted Street, Chicago, Illinois 60622-2694, More importantly, the largely professional and 2006, 272 pages, $16.95 (softcover). military audience ultimately interested in reading such a book, including many Air Force personnel with academy connections, may be put off by the Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral author’s self-adulation of personal and professional Legacy of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in accomplishments that are routinely and commonly Germany and Japan by A. C. Grayling. Walker found among his likely audience. Just how many times and Company (http://www.walkerbooks.com), can one pull off mentioning “He was a lawyer in the 104 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10011, Reagan White House” to an already-overachieving 2005, 320 pages, $25.95 (hardcover). group of lawyers, astronauts, engineers, test pilots, general officers, corporate executives, and other Moral questions regarding the use of force are professionals? often the toughest issues for practitioners and Overall, the book is raw and biased, reflecting thinkers of warfare to face. Most military people Weinstein’s own angry views as a litigant against the recognize, at least on an instrumental level, the Air Force and, by extension, the entire US military. need for restraint in warfare; morality plays an im- For the future, his case also represents the opening portant role if for no other reason than to provide salvo in a forced debate on the future role of US mili- a vision for how we ought to fight. Yet morality can tary chaplains, base chapels, and their programs—a be a tough taskmaster, leading to stinging critiques role that is fundamentally at odds with today’s of our performance on the battlefield and forcing model. Nevertheless, With God on Our Side is essen- us to confront episodes of history that one might tial reading for someone seeking an understanding prefer to leave undisturbed.

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Two recent works provoke that level of discom- strong prima facie case for it to consider the bomb- fort. Both Firestorm, edited by Paul Addison and ing [of Dresden] as a war crime” (p. 180). In doing Jeremy A. Crang, and A. C. Grayling’s Among the so, Bloxham provides a thoughtful discussion on Dead Cities take fresh looks at “area bombing” dur- the principle of proportionality and airpower—that ing the Second World War. In doing so, they force is, what is the balance between the hoped-for mili- the reader to face up to the very real moral issues tary advantage gained from area bombing on the surrounding the use of airpower in this period. one hand and the resulting civilian deaths and de- Firestorm is an edited volume based on a collo- struction of property on the other? All in all, this quium held at the University at Edinburgh in May volume is an important addition to the literature 2003 “to discuss the causes, the conduct, and the on the use of airpower and morality in the Second consequences of the bombing” (p. ix) of Dresden World War. in February 1945. The contributors do not share In Among the Dead Cities, British philosopher A. one particular viewpoint regarding the event; in C. Grayling takes a similar yet broader tack than fact, the authors disagree at times on certain con- Donald Bloxham’s contribution in Firestorm by seek- clusions. But collectively they provide an important ing to answer the question “Did the Allies commit a reexamination of the bombing of Dresden and the moral crime in their area bombing of German and ways it “has come to symbolize the military and Japanese cities?” (pp. 2–3). Unlike Firestorm, which ethical questions involved in the waging of total focuses exclusively on the bombing of Dresden in war” (p. x). February 1945, Among the Dead Cities casts a critical The work offers a number of important contri- eye at area bombing throughout the war, including butions to the scholarship on Dresden. Richard the USAAF’s XXI Bomber Command’s firebomb- Overy makes a compelling case, based on recently ing of Japanese cities starting in March 1945. In do- discovered primary sources, that the number of ci- ing so, the book provides a passable synthesis of the vilian casualties resulting from the raid was signifi- history of the intellectual development of the RAF’s cantly less (approximately 25,000) than previously bombing doctrine, as well as the history of Bomber unsupported assertions by authors such as David Command in the Combined Bomber Offensive Irving. Both Tami Davis Biddle and Sebastian Cox (CBO), but does not make any new contributions agree that the raids represented “business as usual” to the current understanding of the field. Grayling for both the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Bomber Com- also scrutinizes British public dissent of the RAF’s mand and the United States Army Air Force’s area-bombing campaign and makes a compelling (USAAF) Eighth Air Force. However, while Cox ar- case that the government was aware of the humani- gues that Dresden was a militarily significant target, tarian impact of this policy. He also analyzes the as a center of administration and communication arguments used in defense of area bombing. Grayling as well as war industry, Sönke Nietzel maintains that is to be credited for at least presenting these de- the raid, in the end, produced no military advan- fenses; in some cases, however, he discounts gener- tage for the allies. ally effective arguments, such as Richard Overy’s The contributors assert other, more disturbing, compelling line of reasoning about the CBO’s over- conclusions. Biddle makes the case that one of the all impact on the German war effort. Allied objectives for the Dresden raids was to create Nonetheless, as rich, detailed, and nuanced as an obstacle, through the use of refugees, to hinder Grayling’s moral argument is against Bomber Com- the German Wehrmacht’s attempts to reinforce the mand’s efforts in Europe, he fails to make a simi- Eastern Front against the approaching Soviet of- larly strong case against the USAAF’s efforts in the fensive. She also notes that, unlike what one might Pacific. In fact, the disparity in both prose and evi- have expected to happen at the beginning of the dence between the two suggests that the discussion war, no debate occurred amongst Allied war leaders of the area-bombing campaign against Japanese cit- about the use of civilian refugees for this purpose. ies was added as an afterthought. Two examples will Biddle attributes this lack of debate to “hardened illustrate. First, Grayling devotes almost 60 pages to attitudes” among the war leaders at this stage of a examining Bomber Command’s efforts in Europe long and exhausting war, as well as their anxiety but spends only three pages to investigate the United about the conflict’s future direction in the immedi- States’ efforts over Japan. As a result, he does not ate aftermath of the Ardennes offensive. Donald unearth and examine the reasons underlying Maj Bloxham contends that the bombing of Dresden Gen Curtis LeMay’s decision to change tactics from was, in fact, a war crime: “Had an independent war precision to area attacks. Second, Grayling does crimes tribunal with full international jurisdiction not conduct a systematic analysis (as he did with been established in 1945, there would have been a Bomber Command) of the military gains achieved

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by the firebombing and atomic bombing of Japa- tage? Do current doctrine, technology, or organiza- nese cities against the costs of doing so, implicitly tional imperatives lend themselves to causing hu- assuming that the American effort against Japan man suffering, even as an unintended consequence? was disproportionate since no military gain could In an era of instant news and when every bomb possibly offset the humanitarian costs. Although it could have an indirect strategic effect, war fighters would not be difficult to conduct such an analysis, and commanders need to examine the moral les- Grayling’s failure to do so and his broader lack of sons that can be gleaned from past conflicts. Such attention to the bombing of Japanese cities in com- an examination could produce discomfort and per- parison to his effort with Bomber Command con- haps even anger. But if it leads to a more discrimi- stitute an important defect in this work. nate and proportional use of the military instrument, Grayling’s work has further flaws. First, it is in- such an examination will be well worth the effort. ternally inconsistent. In but one example, at the beginning of the book, he notes that his work “is Lt Col Peter W. Huggins, USAF not intended to impugn the courage and sacrifice Maxwell AFB, Alabama of the men who flew RAF . . . bombing missions over Nazi-dominated Europe” (p. 7). Yet at the end of the day, he chastises Bomber Command aircrews for not refusing to accept the orders to bomb Ger- Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm by Col man cities. Second, and more importantly, he at- Darrel D. Whitcomb, USAFR, retired. Air Uni- tempts to link Bomber Command’s efforts and the versity Press (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/ resulting destruction of German social fabric to the aupress), 131 West Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell so-called Morgenthau Plan—the proposal by Henry AFB, Alabama 36112-6615, 2006, 328 pages Morgenthau, US secretary of the treasury at the (softcover). Free download available from http:// time, to divide, deindustrialize, and pastoralize www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/ Germany to ensure it would never again become Whitcomb%20CSAR/Whitcomb.pdf. powerful. Grayling offers no evidence in support of such a provocative assertion other than noting the Operation Desert Storm now has a secure place in coincidence that the ends of area bombing would the history books. Many surveys, books, and personal go a long way toward establishing conditions neces- accounts of senior officers who led the planning and sary for the Morgenthau Plan’s success. execution of the operation have scrutinized its air Despite its flaws, Grayling’s argument against campaign. Despite the successes, all parties have ex- Bomber Command is compelling—certainly worthy pressed frustration with combat search and rescue of reading and inclusion in any good library. Taken (CSAR) during the war. Writers have inquired why together with Firestorm, both volumes represent im- our forces did not rescue more downed aircrews portant contributions to the literature on airpower and other isolated personnel. Fighter crews felt be- and morality in warfare. Beyond their significant trayed when their buddies did not receive the same contributions in historical and moral argument, sort of CSAR effort as did the men who flew in Viet- the two books include themes that resonate today. nam 25 years earlier. We know much about the plan As our nations confront the threat posed by radical and the sophisticated technology that were developed fundamentalism, when might it be appropriate—if and employed, but up until now no one has exam- at all—for the exigencies of national security to ined the one part of the air campaign considered a trump our moral responsibilities, codified as inter- disappointment. In Combat Search and Rescue in Desert national humanitarian law, for the protection of Storm, Darrel Whitcomb takes on the challenge of civilians and noncombatants? Even though today’s finding out what went wrong and what went right. precision weapons produce less collateral damage Intimately familiar with CSAR, the author flew and less destruction overall, certain types of dual- combat as a forward air controller in Vietnam, use targets—such as electrical power—if disabled, worked as a contractor within the Joint Personnel could result in human suffering beyond the mili- Recovery Agency, and wrote The Rescue of Bat 21 tary advantage gained in striking them. In our con- (Naval Institute Press, 1998). He has also published temporary “long war,” should military leaders guard articles on the subject in Air and Space Power Journal. against becoming callous over an extended and ex- In his latest thoroughly researched study, Whitcomb hausting conflict against an adversary who does not dissects the Joint Rescue Coordination Center’s hold himself to the same moral and legal traditions (JRCC) mission logs and unit histories, and his and who is willing to use our readiness to restrain firsthand interviews with the planners, senior offi- our conduct in this manner to his military advan- cers, and aircrews who participated in CSARs—

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both rescuers and isolated personnel—lend further leadership did not want to risk special-operations credibility to this important book. aircrews to retrieve just one flyer. Whitcomb con- The author sets the stage with several vignettes ducted in-depth discussions with the wing and squad- from Vietnam-era rescues in which Air Force Jolly ron leadership to understand their decision process Green forces made courageous pickups under such for all missions handed down to SOCCENT. He also intense opposition that the pilots later received Air spoke not only with several pilots who attempted to Force Crosses. One of them, Capt Dale Stovall, later rescue Stroke 65 and Corvette 03 but also with the became the vice-commander of Air Force Special ones who successfully rescued Slate 46A in a daring Operations Command, and another, Capt Bennie daylight mission on 21 January 1991 and Benji 53 Orrel, became director of operations for the 1st during a night rescue on 17 February. Special Operations Wing. A third officer, 2d Lt The author devotes several pages and detailed Richard Comer, assumed command of the 20th analysis to the nonrescue of Corvette 03—the most Special Operations Squadron, directed Air Force controversial mission of the war. The pilot and helicopters in Desert Storm, and was decorated for weapons-systems officer evaded the enemy for three other actions in Southeast Asia. Whitcomb dispels days, walking nearly 15 miles toward the Syrian bor- the myth that these senior officers in Air Force der before they were captured. Clearing the air on Special Operations Command during Desert Storm this matter, Whitcomb presents the facts as to why were career special-operations types with no rescue no dedicated search for these men occurred prior background. to their capture. He does a credible job of highlight- The author also looks at the command-and-control ing these missions as well as SOCCENT leadership’s structure for CSAR, explaining why the Air Force deliberate decision-making process and efforts to did not deploy its Air Rescue Service during the op- rescue downed crews. eration. Regardless, Gen Norman Schwarzkopf tasked Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm—a long Lt Gen Chuck Horner, the air component commander, overdue, objective analysis—thoroughly examines with the responsibility for theater rescue but not the the facts without pointing fingers. On the modern authority to order the special-operations compo- battlefield, CSAR is no longer just a tactical mission nent’s Air Force and Army helicopters to launch on to bring our countrymen home; rather, today’s a mission. The special-operations commander (an around-the-clock news cycle gives it greater strategic Army officer) had CSAR as a mission but retained status in the information war. Colonel Whitcomb’s both operational control of his assets and launch book is a must-read for students of modern warfare, authority. However, because he did not own the as- air planners, and personnel who may be tasked to sets to perform the search, he had to rely on the air perform CSAR in an effort to do a better job of leav- component (mainly Air Force) for that function. ing no man or woman behind in future conflicts. Whitcomb then addresses why our forces did not rescue more downed Airmen than they did. Ex- Col Paul R. Harmon, USAF amining the low success rate (p. 259), he discusses Hurlburt Field, Florida whether or not the JRCC initiated a search and the feasibility of rescuing a particular aircrew, analyzing the circumstances of each mission by drawing on JRCC logs and interviews with crews. Many times Children at War by P. W. Singer. University of Cali- he finds that the downed aircrew members knew fornia Press (http://www.ucpress.edu), 2120 they would land close to forces they had just Berkeley Way, Berkeley, California 94704-1012, bombed or near Bedouins whom Saddam Hussein 2006, 278 pages, $16.95 (softcover). paid to turn them over to Iraqi soldiers. The barren landscape as well as the distance the rescue heli- P. W. Singer’s book Children at War is a sad, trou- copters had to fly further exacerbated their recov- bling look at a growing problem in the world today: ery efforts. Whitcomb suggests that many of the children serving as soldiers. He looks at the his- aircrews who made it to the ground faced long torical precedent concerning the use of children in odds even if the rescue force had been closer. warfare, from the time-tested concept of bestowing The book also addresses the complaints that Spe- honor and power upon warriors in exchange for guar- cial Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), anteeing protection for the unarmed—especially specifically Air Force Special Operations Forces “the old, the infirm, women, and most particularly, (AFSOF), stayed too busy doing special-operations children” (p. 3)—to the point where no civility or missions, that they did not have enough helicop- honor in conflict currently exists in much of the ters to perform both missions, and that AFSOF world. “The participants in battle are often no lon-

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ger honored warriors, guided by an ethical code, prepare our personnel to recognize children as po- but rather new predators, who target the weakest of tential threats and to deal with the psychological society” (p. 4). Interspersed throughout the book impact of killing children, even in self-defense; for are heart-wrenching quotations from child soldiers that reason, training and doctrine should be modi- that make readers want to hug their own children fied accordingly. I recommend Children at War to and thank God for being born in a free country any US military leader who might deploy personnel under the rule of law. anywhere beyond Western Europe. The numbers of children serving as soldiers are staggering. Singer canvasses the globe with examples Col Gregory J. Lengyel, USAF such as the Sierra Leone civil war (1991–2001) in Air Force Fellow which up to 80 percent of all fighters ranged from Brookings Institution, Washington DC ages seven to 14, many of whom were abducted (p. 15). He points out that in 68 percent of the world’s current or recent conflicts, children under the age of 18 have served in combat. Particularly disturbing Spying from Space: Constructing America’s Satel- are examples of the brutal methods by which many lite Command and Control Systems by David children are recruited into war: “Now we were in a Christopher Arnold. Texas A&M University hideous state—they killed my parents in front of Press (http://www.tamu.edu/upress), John H. me, my uncle’s hands were cut off and my sister was Lindsey Building, Lewis Street, 4354 TAMU, raped in front of us by their commander called College Station, Texas 77843-4354, 2005, 232 ‘Spare No Soul.’ After all this happened, they told pages, $48.00 (hardcover). us, the younger boys, to join them. If not, they were going to kill us” (p. 61). As an Airman currently assigned to a satellite The author does an excellent job of sizing up command and control (C2) squadron and having the problem and addressing many of the underlying served previous tours in the space C2 arena, I causes, such as poverty and the lack of economic looked forward with great anticipation to reading and educational opportunity. The solution set, David Arnold’s first-ever, full-length history of however, is a much more daunting task. Some of America’s early satellite C2 systems. I was not disap- the causes have been around much longer than the pointed. Arnold has done a spectacular job of weav- problem of child soldiers. Singer calls for greater ing previously untapped and unpublished informa- amounts of aid, pointing out that “the United States tion from Air Force Space Command archives lags far behind the rest of the developed world in together with interesting and invaluable personal its aid to those less well off” (p. 136). Although that interviews to construct a history of the burgeoning is true for government aid, it fails to account for the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (forerunner of significant amounts donated by Americans through today’s Air Force Satellite Control Network) from nongovernmental charitable organizations. Other, its infancy in the days of Sputnik to its culminating more achievable steps that he offers as part of the point at the end of 1969. solution involve a change in US government policy First, a necessary corrective observation: the title that would support efforts of the United Nations Spying from Space is somewhat misleading since Ar- and other elements of the international commu- nold’s book is far less about early on-orbit recon- nity to clamp down on the illegal trade of light naissance systems themselves (such as the Corona weapons and that would criminalize the practice of program) and much more about the development having child soldiers so, at the least, legitimate state and growth of the terrestrial infrastructure neces- armies would stop using children. sary to control and exploit those as well as other The chapter dedicated to the issues and impact early space systems. I have learned that the original of having to fight against children is perhaps the title (changed by a well-intentioned editor/pub- most important to today’s US military officer. Al- lisher) was Supporting New Horizons, a much more though it is unlikely that any 14-year-olds will be go- appropriate choice, giving a nod to the early post– ing one-on-one against any F-22 pilots, it is entirely World War II Army Air Forces’ Towards New Horizons possible that a child with an AK-47 could make his future studies that laid the initial foundation for way to the gate of “Base X.” In fact Iraq, Afghani- military space programs. stan, and other potential US deployment locations This different approach to early military space are not excluded from the rising use of children as history is both immediately refreshing and long soldiers. Singer correctly points out that current overdue because, despite countless publications on US military training and doctrine do not adequately the first orbital systems themselves, not until now

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have we had a study devoted fully to the manage- What tales do space-operations veterans of the 1980s ment, technology, and people required to operate and 1990s have to tell, and how do those compare these systems from the ground. The latter story is in to the stories of the Sat C2 pioneers in Arnold’s work? many ways the more captivating. It is unfortunate How has the transition of Sat C2 from exclusively that so few people outside the world of space opera- strategic-reconnaissance programs such as Corona tions truly appreciate the difficulty of sustaining to the inclusion of more “mainstream” systems such satellites on-orbit today—not to mention the mag- as Milstar and the global positioning system nitude of the challenges of satellite C2 (“Sat C2” in (with their vastly wider user communities) led to the space-operations vernacular) in its earliest days. changes in training, doctrine, and execution of Sat Arnold brings these pioneering endeavors to life, C2? This book, which will serve as the foundation explaining how—in the shadow of post-Sputnik for such future histories and analyses of US Sat C2, angst—the Air Force strove to create the Sat C2 is a necessary read for air and space professionals network needed to command, control, and sustain desiring to better understand and appreciate the its new satellites on-orbit. Thus begins the tale of rich heritage of space operations. the rise of space-operations Sat C2 sites at Sunny- vale, California; Vandenberg AFB, California; and Lt Col John E. Shaw, USAF such dispersed locations as Hawaii, Alaska, and Washington, DC Greenland. Arnold’s book also includes first-person interviews with the late Gen Bernard Schriever and a number of other Air Force space pioneers and vet- The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of erans from the 1960s. To me, these personal recol- Aerial Warfare by Michael Russell Rip and James lections represent the most valuable and interest- M. Hasik. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni ing part of the study. Those who work in today’s Sat .org/press/press.html), 291 Wood Road, An- C2 world of (relatively) high data rates, dozens of napolis, Maryland 21402-5034, 2002, 448 pages, satellites, hundreds of commands, and thousands $55.00 (hardcover). of telemetry points will find retired Air Force lieutenant general Forrest McCartney’s contrasting New technological advances such as sliced musings on “four total available commands” and bread, indoor plumbing, automatic machine guns, agonizingly slow telemetry-tape playbacks over phone and blitzkrieg warfare seemed revolutionary at lines both archaic and charming. Equally interest- their inception, but we quickly adopted them and ing are the first-person descriptions of those Sat C2 took them for granted—in retrospect, sometimes dynamics that have not changed over the decades, we even considered these innovations obvious or such as the “competitive spirit” between blue-suit inevitable. Such is the fate of precision weapons operators and their contractor counterparts, or the and the global positioning system (GPS). The Preci- tension between the intelligence and operations sion Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare communities. Still another key achievement of the offers an excellent review of the history of the GPS book is its brief (perhaps too brief) description of and describes the revolutionary impact it had on the parallel developments of the Soviet Union’s Sat airpower during the conflicts of the 1990s. Preci- C2 system and how it compensated for the compara- sion engagement has become so engrained in to- tively poor (at least with regard to the Sat C2 mis- day’s Air Force that we can hardly remember the sion) geographic location of Soviet territory with navigation and weapon-delivery challenges we faced creative orbits, international agreements, and tech- little more than a decade ago. Authors Michael nical solutions (such as “fishing trawlers” anchored Rip, a professor at Michigan State University, and at various points on the globe). James Hasik, a former Navy officer who now works In Spying from Space (or, again, more appropri- as a management consultant specializing in defense ately, Supporting New Horizons), David Arnold has issues, increase our appreciation of the GPS’s tre- taken a precious first step towards preserving and mendous value for today and the future. sharing the history of the US Sat C2 story. In the They have filled the book with hundreds of pho- end, this avant-garde work demands a sequel or tos, drawings, and maps that greatly aid readers’ two: How did the nature of Sat C2 change with the understanding and keep their interest level high. dramatic shift of operations during the 1980s from Chapter 2, for example, contains a brief history of the cramped Satellite Test Center in Sunnyvale to military air and space navigation, focusing on the sprawling Consolidated Space Operations Cen- World War II navigation problems as well as radio ter (now Schriever AFB) east of Colorado Springs? and radar systems developed to address those issues.

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The chapter contains detailed diagrams of how the difficult question of what precision navigation and Knickebein, X- and Y-Verfahren, and Gee radio- engagement mean to the future of aerial warfare. navigation systems worked, together with pictures Although written prior to the terrorist attacks of

of and from the H2S radar system. 9/11 (the book includes a postscript composed The book then rushes quickly through the Cold shortly thereafter), the study’s predictions for the War satellite systems used by submarines as well as challenges the United States would likely face in the ballistic missiles launched by those platforms future conflicts are certainly coming true today in and on to the GPS and the Soviet Global Naviga- North Korea, Iran, China, Iraq, and Afghanistan. tion Satellite System. Barely mentioning Vietnam, The GPS is one of the reasons that enemies know Rip and Hasik discuss the first use of laser-guided they cannot defeat the United States in a conven- precision bombs but, unfortunately, do not cover tional conflict. Concluding that only nuclear weap- other important, pertinent navigation and weapon- ons can absolutely guarantee their security, they delivery technologies (e.g., tactical air navigation have therefore increasingly emphasized maskirovka and TSQ-81 bombing radar). Thus, readers seek- (concealment and deception), mobility, and asym- ing a full history of aerial navigation and weapon metric warfare to make targets very hard to find. delivery will be disappointed. Rip and Hasik’s use of hundreds of useful statis- Following an excellent and easily understood tics and charts to support their analysis makes The description of how the GPS system works, the au- Precision Revolution a valuable airpower reference thors dedicate most of the book to a history of the book certain to be used and cited by scholars inter- use of the GPS in conflicts of the 1990s—from Op- ested in these topics. Extremely well written and erations Desert Storm to Allied Force—and de- engaging to a variety of readers, it will appeal to scriptions of today’s GPS weapon systems together anyone who wishes to understand more about the with their capabilities and limitations. They present history and analysis of the GPS, its effect on aerial thoroughly researched statistics and detailed ac- warfare, and the strategic challenges facing air- counts of how GPS aids aerial and ground naviga- power as a result of the “precision revolution.” I tion, precision-weapon delivery, and search-and- recommend it highly. rescue missions. Their study makes a strong case that we are in the midst of a “precision military- Maj Eric J. Felt, USAF technical revolution” similar in transformative scope Air Force Fellow to the Napoleonic, industrial, mechanized, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency nuclear revolutions. Rip and Hasik effectively explain both the technical and nontechnical limitations of both GPS and precision-weapon technology, noting that autono- Boys of ’67: From Vietnam to Iraq, the Extraordi- mous GPS-guided weapons have limited utility nary Story of a Few Good Men by Charles Jones. against mobile and well-concealed targets. We learn Stackpole Books (http://www.stackpolebooks why GPS jamming is not as serious a concern since .com), 5067 Ritter Road, Mechanicsburg, Penn- low-power jammers, though easy to build, are easy sylvania 17055-6921, 2006, 416 pages, $29.95 to counter, and high-power jammers, though ex- (hardcover). pensive to build, are easy to find and destroy. The book examines why precision weapons require pre- At first glance,Boys of ’67 appears to be a rousing cision intelligence, citing examples of how intelli- text, somewhat akin in spirit to Stephen Ambrose’s gence shortfalls have caused precision munitions Band of Brothers or James Kitfield’s Prodigal Soldiers; to fail to produce desired political effects. Similarly, after all, the cover boasts a positive review from it discusses the dangers of becoming infatuated Rick Atkinson, author of the Pulitzer-prize-winning with precision technology, noting the “cruise mis- work An Army at Dawn. It also contains a respect- sile diplomacy” of the 1990s, wherein GPS-guided able foreword by Gen Anthony Zinni, former com- weapons functioned perfectly from a technical per- mander of United States Central Command and spective but often did not achieve hoped-for results. one of the most respected military leaders in recent The book does not lay out a technical vision for history. Thusly prepared, one expects a motivating the future of either the GPS or precision weapons, text that both educates and inspires. Unfortunately, leaving unanswered such questions as how we could this is not the case. make the GPS even more accurate, reliable, robust, Boys of ’67 follows the careers of three Marine and/or ubiquitous, and what military benefits officers—Gen James L. Jones Jr., Lt Gen Martin R. might ensue. Instead, the authors tackle the more Steele, and Maj Gen Ray L. Smith—from their at-

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tendance at the Basic School (where newly com- ity of M-60 tanks and that the workers “tended to missioned Marine lieutenants learn the art and sci- talk to him more, and even confide in him” while ence of the warrior trade), through combat action supervisors “nervously shooed him away” (p. 190). in Vietnam, and on through the rest of their ca- Jones alludes to the fact that Major Steele’s follow- reers. Although this book does a fine job of chroni- on report, dealing with tank periscopes, was “la- cling the formative years of these officers—espe- beled top secret” and that “because it was handled cially the chapters on their initial combat exploits quietly, and was a classified matter, the internal af- in Vietnam—it later falls short in meeting the ex- fair has . . . never been publicly scrutinized” (pp. pectations generated from reading the first few 196–97). One problem—there is absolutely no pages. Indeed, instead of a story of perseverance (zero) documentation or sourcing for this chapter. and pride, the author presents the officers’ careers And this is not the only unsubstantiated “fact” in in a fairly disjointed manner, jumping across the Boys of ’67. years instead of providing a logical flow of informa- Subsequent chapters highlight the three officers’ tion. Furthermore, one underlying characteristic careers. For the most part, the author presents detracts greatly from the work: the relationship of them in the same style—that is, with little sourcing, the author to one of the main subjects. somewhat accurately, and painting an overly flatter- Author Charles Jones is the son of Lt Gen Wil- ing picture of the protagonists. Of note are several liam K. Jones, USMC, and the cousin of Gen James pages wherein Jones, a lieutenant general at the Jones, one of the key figures in the text. Thus, one time, advises Secretary of Defense William Cohen can understand that Jones’s admiration of his cousin on Khobar Towers. Predictably, the author high- as a warrior might color his views a bit. However, lights the contributions of his cousin while provid- throughout Boys of ’67 the author fails to provide an ing a much less charitable view of the Air Force objective view not only of his cousin but also of the leadership with regard to this incident. Indeed, other officers as well. Indeed, the mostly one-sided throughout the text, sister services and their lead- perspective of events further heightens the sense of ership just don’t measure up, but the marines doc- infallibility regarding his subjects. The book opens umented appear stellar in every way. with several unflattering (and unnecessary) anec- Although each of the officers is a fine, noble dotes of Gen Tommy Franks, with the author quot- man, the book’s underlying bias detracts from their ing his cousin (once again, a general) as describing respective stories. The author highlights how Gen- Franks’s book as “flawed, self-serving, and inaccu- eral Jones served as an aide to several general offi- rate” (p. 2). Unfortunately, that critique can apply cers and went on to spend five years in the Penta- to Boys of ’67 as well. gon as a military liaison. Furthermore, he illustrates The work is very scantily sourced; many chapters how working with Senator William Cohen and in my advance copy have very few documented other members of Congress benefited his career sources to support Mr. Jones’s portrayal of events. later on as Secretary of Defense Cohen’s military Indeed, one chapter lists not a single reference at advisor and eventually as commander of European all. Furthermore, the text contains glaring inaccu- Command. The story suffers greatly from this over- racies that even a novice would detect, let alone any whelming sense of patronage. serious reader of military affairs. For example, in a After reading this book, Air Force officers would chapter on Vietnam, the author refers to reports of have the impression that if they are related to a alleged atrocities “including the murder of twenty- general officer, good things can happen to them, two Vietnamese civilians at My Lai” (p. 110). Over regardless of their own bravery and dedication to 100 people were killed and wounded at My Lai, a service. Furthermore, if they serve multiple staff tours fact easily sourced. Jones also refers to the USS Blue as a general’s aide and then go on to make friends Ridge as “a hulking destroyer whose guns glistened in Congress, they will become quite successful, even in the sun” (p. 328), but this ship is a command though they are warriors in their own right. vessel with limited armament. Granted, these two However, one bright spot in Boys of ’67 will reso- examples may appear trivial, but they typify the nate with many Air Force members—author Jones book’s problem—poor documentation and ques- includes several pages on Clebe McClary, a Marine tionable sourcing. junior officer and one of the keynote speakers at In fact, in chapter 13, “Combat at Chrysler,” Squadron Officer School. Jones presents a very Jones tells the story of Marty Steele, a major at the touching vignette of McClary, who, after being time, assigned as a liaison officer to supervise tank wounded in Vietnam, went on to become a dy- production in Michigan. We learn that Major Steele namic motivational speaker and a living inspiration confronts the Chrysler management over the qual- for everyone. If Jones had written a book on

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McClary, that would have been a truly inspiring USS Hornet’s torpedo squadron, and the notion text; unfortunately, Boys of ’67 is not. that the Americans were tremendously outnum- bered. By doing so, Parshall and Tully substantively Lt Col Richard J. Hughes, USAF discredit Mitsuo Fuchida’s Midway: The Battle That Maxwell AFB, Alabama Doomed Japan (Naval Institute Press, 1955) and explain why the Japanese version of the battle has been late in coming to the West. Although they believe that the American side of events has been ad- Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of equately covered in Gordon W. Prange’s Miracle at Midway by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully. Midway (McGraw-Hill, 1982) and Walter Lord’s In- Potomac Books (http://www.potomacbooksinc credible Victory (Harper & Row, 1967), most portions .com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia of those works that rely on Fuchida as a source for 20166, 2005, 568 pages, $28.00 (hardcover). Japanese perspective now have to be taken with a grain of salt. Indeed if there is a shortcoming in the Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully have pro- work, it is by design. The authors purposely confine duced a work designed to do nothing less than fun- their examination to the Japanese side of things; damentally change our understanding of the Battle thus, a novice should read their book in conjunc- of Midway. Examining the battle from the Japanese tion with either Prange’s or Lord’s work. perspective, the authors contend that the reasons For even the casual student of the Pacific War, for the Japanese defeat lay not in decisions made however, Shattered Sword succeeds decisively in during the battle but in the doctrinal, technological, changing perceptions of the Imperial Japanese and ideological development of the Imperial Japa- Navy, the role of doctrine and training, and the nese Navy and decisions made before the battle Battle of Midway. The book exhibits the best uses of that flowed from such development. Along the way, both technological and “revisionist” history, funda- Parshall and Tully dispel several long-standing mentally transforming the historical record in light myths regarding the battle that emerged shortly af- of new evidence and new techniques—not new so- ter the war and hardened in the minds of scholars cial agendas. Shattered Sword will have a significant and laymen alike. They are tremendously success- impact on the historiography of the Battle of Mid- ful on both counts. way and the Pacific War. Hopefully, its success will The authors logically detail the Imperial Japa- lead other scholars to look for new perspectives in nese Navy and its carrier force’s development prior a theater that many have considered “dead territory.” to World War II. They show various influences, from the Royal Navy, to the Russo-Japanese War, to the Maj Christopher Parrish, USAF interwar period, and the way they produced a force Dyess AFB, Texas optimized for hyperoffensive warfare at all levels. Parshall and Tully also explore the technological and doctrinal capabilities of the carrier force— from radar, to search planes, to damage control. Espionage: A Reference Handbook by Glenn They do so not in the vein of “gun boors” who revel Hastedt. ABC-CLIO (http://www.abc-clio.com), in the esoteric minutiae of calibers and muzzle ve- 130 Cremona Drive, Santa Barbara, California locity, but by way of explaining what Adm Nagumo 93117, 2003, 225 pages, $45.00 (hardcover). Chuichi and his force could do, could not do, and what they were trained to do. The authors also illus- Author Glenn Hastedt’s theme throughout Es- trate these issues by exploring the carrier force’s pionage: A Reference Handbook is that espionage is pre-Midway battle record. Doing so allows them to the act of secretly collecting information—more examine the battle in context—judging the Japa- commonly known to Americans as spying. Argu- nese not in light of what Western historians think ing that espionage and its inevitable partner, they should have done, but according to what was counterespionage, are central to a state’s national reasonable to them, given all of these factors. Their security, Hastedt skillfully explores numerous his- narrative is both enlightening and persuasive. torical examples from the American Revolution to The authors systematically examine and debunk events subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep- many of the prevailing myths of the battle, includ- tember 2001, tracing the evolution of intelligence- ing the “fatal error” of Nagumo’s rearming his strike collections capabilities—particularly human intel- aircraft during the battle, the “pivotal” role of the ligence (HUMINT). He demonstrates that from Tone’s floatplane no. 4, the “noble sacrifice” of the the Boston Tea Party to the Civil War, espionage

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has played a key role in the planning phases of from 1990 to 2005. Offering a wealth of technical combat. Indeed, protecting ourselves against na- knowledge, it summarizes years of continuous mili- tional security threats has become a high priority. tary conflict between the United States and Iraq. Hastedt uses historical examples to show how ter- Although the level of detail at times becomes over- rorism has made counterespionage crucial to the whelming, anyone interested in acquiring an in- safety of our citizens and what can happen when depth understanding of the forces driving this con- we get it wrong. flict has much to gain by reading this work. We learn that the field of military intelligence Knights presents extensive information regard- and organizations such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ing the tactics, planning, doctrine, employment, Office of Strategic Services, and Central Intelligence and development of weapons systems as well as the Agency emerged to facilitate intelligence collection strengths and weaknesses of both the US and Iraqi as a response to newfound requirements for secret militaries. Moreover, he provides thorough descrip- information. Interestingly, Hastedt points out that tions of the operational decisions made by com- many of these organizations came about as a result manding officers during all of the major combat, of trial and error. Following the discovery of weak- beginning with Operations Desert Shield and Des- nesses in various US government departments, new ert Storm. Knights also describes the implementa- agencies seemed to evolve to compensate for the tion of no-fly zones during Operations Northern security threat or breach that might have occurred and Southern Watch, the “Tomahawk diplomacy” in the prior organizational structure. of Operations Desert Strike and Desert Fox, and Using biographical sketches of intelligence offi- removal of the Baathist regime and the ensuing in- cers, key figures, and declassified cases, the author surgency emerging from Operation Iraqi Freedom. illustrates why spies do what they do, indicating that The author discusses the sequence of military most are male and that they usually become in- conflict in Iraq in several ways, beginning with volved in espionage because of issues related to United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions money, women, and/or blackmail. Some people and their enforcement during combat operations. have spied for all three reasons, taking advantage He also touches on some amazing US military firsts, of their security clearances, access codes, plans, including the first-ever air-to-air combat between and the trust of the American people to sell out the manned and unmanned aircraft and the first bomb- United States. Thus, espionage makes counter ings by female pilots in combat. Knights then ex- espionage necessary. Just as the United States uses plains the changes experienced by the US military its resources to gain valuable information about throughout its dealings with Saddam Hussein, such other nation-states, so do other entities spy on as shifting from its original strategy of containment America. In most cases, US counterespionage ini- to an all-out offensive geared towards dismantling tiatives lead to the capture of their agents. Iraq’s military capability following years of endur- Weaving a tapestry of HUMINT’s history from both an institutional and a personal perspective, ing that country’s “cheat and retreat” tactics (e.g., Espionage presents its subject most effectively. I interference in the UN weapons-inspections pro- recommend it to anyone interested in the world of cess, massing troops on the borders of neighboring spying. states, and numerous violations of the no-fly zones). The author also reminds us that warfare—even Maj Reginald L. Bullock, USAF high-tech war—is still subject to the same age-old Air Force Fellow restrictions that not even advances in US war-fighting Washington, DC technology can overcome. These include the difficulty of performing air strikes through dense cloud cover, the inability of pilots to laser-designate ground targets through blowing sand, the role of Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of Modern stress and fatigue, and the crash of several Apache U.S. Military Power by Michael Andrew Knights. helicopters due to violent sandstorms. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/ Along with the highs and lows of combat opera- press/press.html), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, tions, Knights intersperses some inspiring narra- Maryland 21402-5034, 2005, 462 pages, $39.95 tives of selfless bravery by US military personnel. (hardcover). One such account depicts Marine Corps helicopter pilots risking their lives while flying at treetop level Cradle of Conflictby Michael Knights is a compre- in sandstorms to provide close air support to troops hensive summary of US military operations in Iraq trapped by intense fighting.

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Although very well written, Cradle of Conflict con- ress, was so bloody. Ferguson’s premise is that the tains a surprising number of misspellings and gram- typical historical rationales for the extreme levels matical errors. Despite its lack of adequate editing, of violence in the twentieth century—expanding it does an exceptional job of explaining how “the populations living closer together, class conflict, Baathist regime’s decades-spanning campaign to economic crises, emergence of the modern state, resist U.S. military pressure was the crucible on and increasing destructiveness of weaponry—do which the post–Cold War U.S. military was forged not provide a satisfactorily complete explanation. and given its keen edge” (p. xi). I highly recommend Instead, he proposes three phenomena to account this book, which is a must-read for any serious stu- for the outbreak of conflict at specific times and dent of modern Iraq. locations: ethnic conflict, economic volatility, and the decline of empires. Cadet Dayton J. Miller, USAF Ferguson analyzes the contribution of those phe- Air Force ROTC, University of Houston nomena to twentieth-century conflict within three time frames. The first period covers World War I through the Korean War. According to the author, this period was characterized by a “succession of The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict head-to-head collisions between the world’s empires and the Descent of the West by Niall Ferguson. played out in the crucial conflict zones at either end Penguin Group USA (http://us.penguingroup of the Eurasian land mass” (p. 606), which he calls .com), 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York the “War of the World.” One of the many interesting 10014, 2006, 544 pages, $35.00 (hardcover). observations he offers is that World War I was not “an inevitable consequence of deep-seated great- In H. G. Wells’s classic The War of the Worlds power rivalries” (p. 91), as postulated by some histo- (1898), Martian invaders launch a series of cata- rians. Instead, Ferguson analyzes economic factors strophic attacks, decimating major cities through- such as the relative stability in bond markets during out the world and ravaging their inhabitants. Ac- 1914, concluding that “rather than a long road to cording to Niall Ferguson, a history professor at catastrophe, there was but a short slip” (p. 91), thus Harvard University and author of The War of the bolstering the idea that World War I resulted from World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the an avoidable political error. West, Wells’s description of death and destruction is During the second time period, defined by the an apt metaphor for the nature of conflict during Cold War, conflict shifted to more remote regions the bloodiest century in modern history: of the world and involved proxy wars between the superpowers. Ferguson believes that this change Invaders approach the outskirts of a city. The inhabitants are slow to grasp their vulnerability. But the in- resulted from the diminished possibility of ethnic vaders possess lethal weapons: armored vehicles, flame conflict in the western and eastern borderlands of throwers, poison gas, aircraft. They use these indis- Eurasia, a reduction in the volatility of growth in criminately and mercilessly against soldiers and civil- the world’s seven biggest economies, and imperial ians alike. The cities’ defenses are overrun. As the in- decline in those regions where conflict occurred. vaders near the city, panic reigns. People flee their He calls this era the “Third World’s War” and high- homes in confusion; swarms of refugees clog the roads lights the absurdity of remembering the Cold War and railways. The task of massacring them is made as a time of peace and stability by pointing out that easy. People are slaughtered like beasts. Finally, all 19 to 20 million people died in approximately 100 that remains are smoldering ruins and piles of desic- cated corpses (p. xxxiii). military conflicts between 1945 and 1983. Finally, the period after the collapse of commu- Unlike Wells’s war between worlds, the war of the nism and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world and surreal acts of violence described by Fer- “New World Disorder,” has featured fewer wars be- guson in his history of twentieth-century conflict tween states but a soaring number of civil wars. The are perpetrated not by aliens but by human beings. author examines the breakup of Yugoslavia, the re- With two world wars that resulted in the killing sulting carnage in the Balkans, and the genocide in of significantly larger percentages of the world’s Rwanda. Citing one estimate that global warfare population than had died in any previous war of has decreased by over 60 percent since the mid- comparable magnitude and at least a dozen other 1980s and is now at its lowest level since the late conflicts that had death tolls exceeding a million, 1950s, he offers some reason for optimism. How- The War of the World explores the question of why ever, Ferguson anticipates the end of the New the twentieth century, a time of unparalleled prog- World Disorder and the potential for future con-

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flict with the rise of China and demographic advan- In Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical tages of radical Islam. Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 1939–1945, Exhaustively researched (the book includes 109 Dr. Richard Davis demonstrates his talent for exten- pages of endnotes) and well written, The War of the sive research and analysis, guiding the reader World is a fascinating study of the nature of conflict through virtually every conceivable facet of plan- in the twentieth century. Readers of Air and Space ning and execution faced by Anglo-American Power Journal will find the sections describing the forces in World War II. His detailed descriptions of effects and effectiveness of the strategic-bombing missions performed by the Allied command reflect campaign during World War II worthwhile. Ferguson his extensive use of sources, including original gov- devotes the bulk of his study to the origins of ethnic ernment documents for verifying all of the bomb- conflict in the interwar years as well as the events ing statistics. The book includes a CD-ROM con- and battles comprising World War II. (He has previ- taining a listing of numerous spreadsheets, charts, ously written about World War I in Pity of War: Ex- aircraft diagrams, maps, and historic photos, the plaining World War I [Basic Books, 1999].) A more latter two useful in helping the reader visualize the in-depth look at the last four decades of the twenti- bombing campaign. The spreadsheets’ and charts’ eth century, which he addresses in the epilogue, organization of the information makes analysis of would have proved beneficial but likely would have the bombing operations as simple as comparing pushed the length of the book beyond 1,000 pages numbers on a screen. and intimidated many potential readers. Further- The book begins with a comprehensive overview more, placing all maps in the relevant chapters for of the difficulties that attended the organization of easy reference rather than at the very beginning of Allied forces; it then proceeds with a monthly chro- the book seems more sensible. Finally, although nology of the war. Through subsequent chapters, Ferguson identifies the descent of the West and re- Davis reveals many important points that greatly af- orientation of the world to the East as the most im- fected the war effort: portant developments of the twentieth century, he • Reluctance of Allies to admit to city bombing devotes only a few pages in the introduction and until the end of the war despite dedicating epilogue to exploring this topic, failing to ade- numerous sorties for this purpose. quately explain how the emergence of the United States as the world’s lone superpower at the end of • Arguments between advocates of the Royal the millennium fits into his thesis. Still, I highly rec- Air Force’s (RAF) night bombing and those ommend The War of the World, especially in light of who championed the Army Air Forces (AAF) the global war on terrorism and the United States’ daylight bombing, leading to creation of the recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Combined Bomber Offensive. Ferguson notes at the end of his book, “We shall avoid another century of conflict only if we under- • Gen Carl Spaatz’s and other commanders’ stand the forces that caused the last one—the dark combat-tour policies and their effect on mo- forces that conjure up ethnic conflict and imperial rale and survival of aircrews. rivalry out of economic crisis, and in doing so ne- • Radar development and testing on aircraft by gate our common humanity” (p. 646). the RAF and modifications by the AAF. Col Thomas A. Henwood, USAF • Mine-laying operations and their value. Air Force Fellow Georgetown University • Development of long-range fighter escorts as the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces sustained high casualty rates while bombing deep into Germany. Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical Throughout Bombing the European Axis Powers, Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 1939– Davis cites information available to Allied com- 1945 by Richard G. Davis. Air University Press manders and then analyzes their decision making. (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress), His practice of making available accurate postwar 131 West Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Ala- records to facilitate the critiquing of decisions is bama 36112-5962, 2006, 648 pages, $55.00 quite effective, especially when he describes how (softcover). Free download available from http:// the original formation of the Allied command www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Davis structure (particularly the AAF’s) led to disorgani- _B99/Davis_B99.pdf. zation and misinformation.

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The portion of the book that addresses the Sicily dresses the long, downward spiral of Muslim world campaign still has relevance for modern readers. dominance as an example of why we are seeing vio- Davis explains the problems that commanders lent reactions today from Muslim fundamentalists. faced while staging air attacks on marshaling yards He begins by defining Islam as a way to shift the in Rome, particularly the fact that the Vatican standard Western paradigm. Traditionally, Western- posed a serious political obstacle because of its lo- ers view the world in terms of nation-states with gov- cation only a few hundred yards from a primary erning bodies and political leaders; however, Islam target. The attack had a surprising psychological transcends this rudimentary model by representing outcome: Mussolini’s overthrow by a coup just six over 1.3 billion people scattered from Morocco to days later. However, Davis quickly notes that, “Italy, Indonesia, bound by a common religion and sepa- as did others, bowed to the will of its enemies be- rated by “state” demarcations, most of them drawn cause of a complex combination of economic, po- by Western European rulers without regard to Is- litical, geographic, and military pressure, not from lamic culture or desires. Among many other prob- the coercion of airpower alone” (p. 150). As for the lems, the book points to the creation and support of strategic bombing campaign in the final months of Israel as a prime area of confrontation in the region. the war, the author observes that “by the beginning Perhaps the highlight of the book, the final two of April 1945 the Anglo-American strategic bomber chapters—“The Marriage of Saudi Power and Wah- commanders could scarcely find a target in the de- habi Teaching” and “The Rise of Terrorism”—ef- tritus of the Nazi state that justified the expense of fectively tie the previous seven chapters together to mounting an operation against it” (p. 555). paint a vivid picture of why we find ourselves in our Although Bombing the European Axis Powers proved current situation. Although the author stops short incredibly informative and included many interest- of proposing solutions, he does give the reader an ing conclusions, some readers may struggle with its unbiased appreciation for some of the strife felt by detail and length, which may have more appeal to Muslim fundamentalists and the continuing threat academics. However, it is a must-read for anyone of Western democracy (and decadence) in the region. looking for an in-depth study of strategic bombing Lewis does a good job of supporting his positions during World War II. with hard-hitting examples, often citing the Quran Cadet George H. Van Dyke III to show how terrorists improperly use it as justifica- Air Force ROTC, University of Houston tion for their actions. The Crisis of Islam is not necessarily an easy read: readers should come to it with a basic knowledge of the appropriate geography and history. Despite the fact that I was not intrigued by The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror Lewis’s writing style, I felt that he did present the by Bernard Lewis. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Orion material in a logical, comprehensible manner, and Publishing Group (http://www.orionbooks.co.uk), I therefore recommend it to anyone desiring to 5 Upper Saint Martin’s Lane, London, WC2H know more about Islam and the Middle East. 9EA, 2003, 192 pages, $19.95 (hardcover); 2004, Lt Col Ken Sersun, USAF 208 pages, $12.95 (softcover). Air Force Fellow, RAND Santa Monica California Author Bernard Lewis, Cleveland E. Dodge Pro- fessor of Near Eastern Studies, Emeritus, at Prince- ton University, is one of the world’s foremost historians on the Middle East. His more than two dozen books include The Arabs in History (1950), The Emer- Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Com- gence of Modern Turkey (1961), The Assassins: A Radical munism’s Greatest Spymaster by Markus Wolf. Sect in Islam (1967), The Muslim Discovery of Europe Public Affairs (http://www.publicaffairsbooks (1982), The Political Language of Islam (1988), The .com), 250 West 57th Street, Suite 1321, New Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years York, New York 10107, 1999, 460 pages, $19.00 (1995), and What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam (softcover). and Modernity in the Middle East (2003). His book The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Do you yearn for a good Cold War espionage Terror leads the reader through Islamic history as story, one full of the cloak-and-dagger drama of distant as the thirteenth century but uses events of treacherous cross-border operations? This book the twentieth century as its primary focus. Lewis ad- will cure that itch, for sure—and with a unique

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twist. Wolf’s autobiography is the real-world story effective and efficient of all Communist espionage upon which so many spy novels are based. services. He retired in 1985, four years before the Col Gen Markus Wolf served as chief of the For- Berlin Wall came down. eign Intelligence Service in the East German Minis- Wolf was tried for and convicted of treason in try of State Security, known as the Stasi, where he 1993, a ruling overturned by a higher court in 1995. directed over 1,000 agents who infiltrated all sectors In the book, he reveals that he did not feel treason- of West German political life, business, and other ous but wrongly prosecuted, complaining of victor’s sectors of society. They also penetrated the Na- justice. By uncovering the existence of multiple tional Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Nazis in the West German government (proof of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and even West which he provided to West Germany at strategic German chancellor Willy Brandt’s inner circle (the moments), Wolf helped maintain a half century of greatest spy scandal in postwar Germany.) His story peace, the longest Europe had ever known. He felt covers exotic and dangerous operations such as spy vindicated by this act, which gave statesmen some exchanges, dead drops, sleeper agents, recruiting assurance that they would not be surprised by the and running moles, false identities, turning cap- other side. tured spies into double and triple agents, psycho- Wolf directed the majority of his efforts toward logical warfare, disinformation, kidnapping, Romeo West Germany, capitalizing on a unique cultural spies, and the never-ending quest for hard currency and geographical situation that excused his agents to pay off his West German agents. Interestingly, from learning new customs and traditions or nu- John le Carré, who authored a trilogy of books con- ances of new languages. In addition, his people cerning the British Secret Intelligence Service dur- were largely interchangeable with the ones on the ing the Cold War, featured spymaster George Smiley other side of the border. Travel, distances, and min- as his protagonist. Rumor has it that Wolf served as gling did not present significant obstacles. Thus, he the model for Smiley’s opposite Soviet number, code- could rely almost exclusively on human intelligence named Karla, although le Carré has denied this. (HUMINT) with little need for signals and imagery Referred to in the West as “the man without a intelligence (SIGINT and IMINT). In contrast, the face” for his ability to avoid being photographed, bulk of the United States’ intelligence-gathering Wolf was born in southwest Germany in 1923; his efforts is based upon SIGINT and IMINT, with father was a Communist and a Jew. The family fled HUMINT playing only a limited role. As many people Nazi persecution and settled in Moscow in 1934, have pointed out, our intelligence shortcomings in where Wolf attended elite party schools and be- the lead-up to the Iraq war underline the limita- came a Soviet citizen, a convert to Stalinism, and tions of relying almost exclusively on SIGINT and fluent in Russian. He also joined the Communist IMINT. International (Comintern), where he underwent Anyone associated with intelligence gathering, training in intelligence work. After Stalin dissolved including US military personnel, should certainly the Comintern in 1943, Wolf was assigned as a radio read and study Man without a Face, which will give reporter in Moscow, where he met Walter Ulbricht, them an understanding of how HUMINT can work later the first leader of East Germany. Wolf covered and how important it can become; furthermore, the Nuremberg war trials while working as a re- Wolf’s autobiography will give them the chance to porter in Berlin, returned to Moscow for a brief make use of some of its lessons learned. I am not diplomatic assignment, and then returned to Ber- certain how significant this story might be for a lin in 1951 to assist in setting up East Germany’s run-of-the-mill military officer—or even a senior of- embryonic intelligence network. ficer—not involved in intelligence work. Although Less than two years later, Ulbricht promoted it may satisfy a personal curiosity, I have my doubts Wolf, just 29 years old, to oversee East Germany’s as to its professional usefulness. Foreign Intelligence Service. Wolf never indicates (As an aside, like a character in any good spy why Ulbricht selected him, although he was sure novel, Wolf’s life ended with a twist: he died on 9 that his upbringing and connections with Moscow November 2006—the 17th anniversary of the fall of had much to do with it. His mission called for gath- the Berlin Wall, the symbolic end of the Cold ering political, scientific, and technical intelligence War.) (as well as intentions) about West Germany / West Berlin and passing all of this information to Mos- Lt Col Roftiel Constantine, USAF cow. For the next 34 years, Wolf developed his de- Air Force Fellow partment into what became recognized as the most Cambridge, Massachusetts

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Mission Debrief.indd 125 4/29/08 8:03:35 AM OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Lt Gen David A. Deptula (BA, MS, University Maj Gen Larry D. James (USAFA; MS, Massa- Maj R. Greg Brown (BA, University of Okla- of Virginia; MS, National War College) is deputy chusetts Institute of Technology) serves as homa; MS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Uni- chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, and vice-commander, Fifth Air Force, and deputy versity; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology; reconnaissance, Headquarters US Air Force, commander, Thirteenth Air Force, Yokota Air MS, School of Advanced Air and Space Stud- Washington, DC. General Deptula completed Base, Japan. His staff assignments have in- ies) is an ISR strategist for the deputy chief of ROTC at the University of Virginia as a distin- cluded positions at Headquarters US Air staff for intelligence, surveillance, and recon- guished graduate. He has flown more than Force, US Space Command, and Air Force naissance, Headquarters US Air Force, Wash- 3,000 hours (400 in combat), including multiple Space Command. General James has com- ington, DC. Major Brown was commissioned assignments to operational fighter commands. manded at the squadron and group levels. Ad- through ROTC at the University of Oklahoma He has significant experience in combat and ditionally, he commanded the 50th Space as a distinguished graduate. He has served as leadership in several major joint contingency Wing at Schriever AFB, Colorado. He also chief of intelligence for the B-1B Formal operations. General Deptula has twice been a served as the senior space officer for Opera- Training Unit, intelligence weapons officer for joint task force commander, a joint force air tion Iraqi Freedom at Prince Sultan Air Base, a composite wing and the provisional wing component commander, and director of a Saudi Arabia. Prior to assuming his current supporting Operation Southern Watch, and combined air operations center. He also served position, he served as director of signals intel- instructor at the USAF Weapons School. He as the principal attack planner for the air cam- ligence systems acquisition and operations at has also served twice on the Air Staff. Major paign during Operation Desert Storm. He has the National Reconnaissance Office, Washing- Brown deployed as the intelligence duty offi- served on two congressional commissions ton, DC. General James is a graduate of Squad- cer in the combined air operations center dur- charged with outlining America’s future de- ron Officer School, Air Command and Staff ing Operation Enduring Freedom and again fense posture: the Commission on Roles and College (top-third graduate), and Air War Col- as deputy director for intelligence, Air Force Missions of the Armed Forces and the Na- lege (top 10 percent). forces, in the immediate aftermath of Opera- tional Defense Panel. Prior to assuming his tion Iraqi Freedom’s major combat opera- current position, he served as commander of tions. He was the director of operations for the the General George C. Kenney Warfighting 609th Air Intelligence Squadron and has been Headquarters in the Pacific. General Deptula selected to command the 547th Intelligence is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, US Squadron. Major Brown is a graduate of Squad- Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Air Com- ron Officer School, USAF Weapons School, mand and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff the Air Force Institute of Technology, and the College, and National War College. School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

126

Bios - 2008-2.indd 126 4/29/08 8:04:18 AM CONTRIBUTORS 127

Maj Michael H. “Hojo” Johnson, USMC (USNA; Capt Clinton R. Clark, USAF, retired (BS, MEd, Capt Timothy J. Cook (USAFA; MS, Air Force MMOAS [Master of Military Operational Art and Lamar University; MS, Air Force Institute of Institute of Technology) is an executive officer Science], Air Command and Staff College), is cur- Technology), is a graduate student at Rice at Headquarters Air Force A9 (Studies, Analy- rently the future operations officer, Marine Air- University in Houston, Texas. He previously ses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned). He craft Group 26, Marine Corps Air Station, New served as current operations analyst at Head- previously served as the lead action officer for River, North Carolina. He previously served with quarters Air Combat Command A9 (Studies, the combat analyst program at Headquarters Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned Air Force, responsible for developing and guid- 1, Yuma, Arizona, as an AH-1W instructor pilot Division), responsible for developing and imple- ing implementation of operational assessment and subject-matter expert for joint close air sup- menting operational assessment techniques; models, procedures, and tools. He has men- port and joint forward air controller (airborne) continuous process improvements; and identi- tored operational planners and assessors as they (FAC[A]) issues. He is qualified as both a FAC(A) fication, validation, resolution, and dissemina- developed operational assessment plans for First, instructor and joint terminal attack controller. tion of lessons learned across the combat air Seventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Air Forces. Major Johnson also served as a weapons and tac- forces. He has supported operational assess- Additionally, he served on operational assess- tics instructor with Marine Light Attack Helicop- ments for First, Seventh, Eighth, Thirteenth, ment teams supporting Operation Noble Eagle ter Squadron 369, deploying in support of Opera- and Fourteenth Air Forces. Captain Clark, a and Exercises Ulchi Focus Lens; Terminal tions Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He distinguished graduate of the Air Force Insti- Fury; Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement, has over 2,400 hours as a pilot in AH-1W, UH-1N, tute of Technology, is the 2005 Air Force Com- and Integration; and Ardent Sentry. Captain AH-6M, AH-64D, F-18D, and F-16DG aircraft. pany Grade Analyst of the Year. Cook graduated in the top third of his class at Squadron Officer School.

Bios - 2008-2.indd 127 4/29/08 8:04:18 AM Subscription to the Air and Space Power Journal for People Not Affiliated with the Military or Government

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subscription.indd 128 4/29/08 8:04:52 AM EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired, Air University Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University (professor emeritus) Dr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National Laboratory Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War College Lt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus) http://www.af.mil

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Left to right: Mr. Rémy Mauduit, editor of Air and Space Power Journal-Français; Col Jules Ndihokubwayo; Brig Gen Salvator Harushimana; Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, commander, Air University; Brig Gen Vénérand Barendégéré; Col Jean Niyungéko; Col Nestor Ndarusanze; and Maj Gen Stephen Miller, commandant, Air War College, during the Burundian military delegation’s visit to Air University (12 March 2008).