American Intelligence Journal, Volume 32, Number 2
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Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction home | about | documents | news | publications | FOIA | research | internships | search | donate | mailing list Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80 Updated February 11, 2004 Edited by Jeffrey Richelson Originally posted December 20, 2002 Previously updated February 26, 2003 Documents Press release Further reading Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the commencement of military ac绳on in January 1991, then President George H.W. Bush raised the specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons as one jus绳fica绳on for taking decisive ac绳on against Iraq. In the then‐classified Na绳onal Security Direc绳ve 54, signed on January 15, 1991, authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, he iden绳fied Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruc绳on (WMD) against allied forces as an ac绳on that would lead the U.S. to seek the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. (Note 1) In the aermath of Iraq's defeat, the U.S.‐led U.N. coali绳on was able to compel Iraq to agree to an inspec绳on and monitoring regime, intended to insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD programs and did not take ac绳ons to recons绳tute them. The means of implemen绳ng the relevant U.N. resolu绳ons was the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). That inspec绳on regime con绳nued un绳l December 16, 1998 ‐ although it involved interrup绳ons, confronta绳ons, and Iraqi aꬫempts at denial and decep绳on ‐ when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, and harassment. Subsequent to George W. Bush's assump绳on of the presidency in January 2001, the U.S. -
Iraq's WMD Capability
BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL BASIC SPECIAL REPORT Unravelling the Known Unknowns: Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq By David Isenberg and Ian Davis BASIC Special Report 2004.1 January 2004 1 The British American Security Information Council The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent research organization that analyzes international security issues. BASIC works to promote awareness of security issues among the public, policy makers and the media in order to foster informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic. BASIC in the U.K. is a registered charity no. 1001081 BASIC in the U.S. is a non-profit organization constituted under Section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service Code David Isenberg, Senior Analyst David Isenberg joined BASIC's Washington office in November 2002. He has a wide background in arms control and national security issues, and brings close to 20 years of experience in this field, including three years as a member of DynMeridian's Arms Control & Threat Reduction Division, and nine years as Senior Analyst at the Center for Defense Information. Ian Davis, Director Dr. Ian Davis is Executive Director of BASIC and has a rich background in government, academia, and the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector. He received both his Ph.D. and B.A. in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford. He was formerly Program Manager at Saferworld before being appointed as the new Executive Director of BASIC in October 2001. He has published widely on British defense and foreign policy, European security, the international arms trade, arms export controls, small arms and light weapons and defense diversification. -
D'antonio, Michael Senior Thesis.Pdf
Before the Storm German Big Business and the Rise of the NSDAP by Michael D’Antonio A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Honors Degree in History with Distinction Spring 2016 © 2016 Michael D’Antonio All Rights Reserved Before the Storm German Big Business and the Rise of the NSDAP by Michael D’Antonio Approved: ____________________________________________________________ Dr. James Brophy Professor in charge of thesis on behalf of the Advisory Committee Approved: ____________________________________________________________ Dr. David Shearer Committee member from the Department of History Approved: ____________________________________________________________ Dr. Barbara Settles Committee member from the Board of Senior Thesis Readers Approved: ____________________________________________________________ Michael Arnold, Ph.D. Director, University Honors Program ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This senior thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of Dr. James Brophy of the University of Delaware history department. His guidance in research, focused critique, and continued encouragement were instrumental in the project’s formation and completion. The University of Delaware Office of Undergraduate Research also deserves a special thanks, for its continued support of both this work and the work of countless other students. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. -
Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. -
Introduction
NOTES Introduction 1. Robert Kagan to George Packer. Cited in Packer’s The Assassin’s Gate: America In Iraq (Faber and Faber, London, 2006): 38. 2. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004): 9. 3. Critiques of the war on terror and its origins include Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (Routledge, New York and London, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America At the Crossroads (Profile Books, London, 2006); Ira Chernus, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO and London, 2006); and Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (Doubleday, New York, 2008). 4. A report of the PNAC, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000: 76. URL: http:// www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (15 January 2009). 5. On the first generation on Cold War neoconservatives, which has been covered far more extensively than the second, see Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005); Murray Friedman ed. Commentary in American Life (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2005); Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (Madison Books, Lanham MD; New York; Oxford, 1997); and Maria Ryan, “Neoconservative Intellectuals and the Limitations of Governing: The Reagan Administration and the Demise of the Cold War,” Comparative American Studies, Vol. -
Aerospace-America-April-2019.Pdf
17–21 JUNE 2019 DALLAS, TX SHAPING THE FUTURE OF FLIGHT The 2019 AIAA AVIATION Forum will explore how rapidly changing technology, new entrants, and emerging trends are shaping a future of flight that promises to be strikingly different from the modern global transportation built by our pioneers. Help shape the future of flight at the AIAA AVIATION Forum! PLENARY & FORUM 360 SESSIONS Hear from industry leaders and innovators including Christopher Emerson, President and Head, North America Region, Airbus Helicopters, and Greg Hyslop, Chief Technology Officer, The Boeing Company. Keynote speakers and panelists will discuss vertical lift, autonomy, hypersonics, and more. TECHNICAL PROGRAM More than 1,100 papers will be presented, giving you access to the latest research and development on technical areas including applied aerodynamics, fluid dynamics, and air traffic operations. NETWORKING OPPORTUNITIES The forum offers daily networking opportunities to connect with over 2,500 attendees from across the globe representing hundreds of government, academic, and private institutions. Opportunities to connect include: › ADS Banquet (NEW) › AVIATION 101 (NEW) › Backyard BBQ (NEW) › Exposition Hall › Ignite the “Meet”ing (NEW) › Meet the Employers Recruiting Event › Opening Reception › Student Welcome Reception › The HUB Register now aviation.aiaa.org/register FEATURES | APRIL 2019 MORE AT aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org The U.S. Army’s Kestrel Eye prototype cubesat after being released from the International Space Station. NASA 18 30 40 22 3D-printing solid Seeing the far Managing Getting out front on rocket fuel side of the moon drone traffi c Researchers China’s Chang’e-4 Package delivery alone space technology say additive “opens up a new could put thousands manufacturing is scientifi c frontier.” of drones into the sky, U.S. -
A Historiography of World War II Era Propaganda Films
Essays in History Volume 51 (2018) A Just Estimate of a Lie: A Historiography of World War II Era Propaganda Films Christopher Maiytt Western Michigan University Introduction Heroes and monsters have reared their heads on celluloid in every corner of the globe, either to conquer and corrupt or to defend wholesome peace. Others grasp at a future they believe they have been denied. Such were the tales of World War II-era propaganda flms and since their release, they have been at turns examined, defended, and vilifed by American and British historians. Racism, sentiments of isolationism, political and social context, and developments in historical schools of thought have worked to alter historical interpretations of this subject matter. Four periods of historical study: 1960s postwar Orthodox reactions to the violence and tension of the war-period, the revisionist works of 1970s social historians, 1990s Postmodernism, and recent historical scholarship focused on popular culture and memory- have all provided signifcant input on WWII-era propaganda flm studies. Each was affected by previous historical ideologies and concurrent events to shape their fnal products. Economic history, lef-leaning liberal ideology, cultural discourse, and women’s studies have also added additional insight into the scholarly interpretations of these flms. Tere is no decisive historiography of WWII propaganda studies and there is even less organized work on the historical value of propaganda flms. My research is intended as a humble effort to examine the most prolifc period of global propaganda flm production and how the academic world has remembered, revered, and reviled it since. Tis historiographical work is not intended to be an exhaustive review of every flm or scholarly insight offered on the subject. -
I:\28947 Ind Law Rev 47-1\47Masthead.Wpd
CITIGROUP: A CASE STUDY IN MANAGERIAL AND REGULATORY FAILURES ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.* “I don’t think [Citigroup is] too big to manage or govern at all . [W]hen you look at the results of what happened, you have to say it was a great success.” Sanford “Sandy” Weill, chairman of Citigroup, 1998-20061 “Our job is to set a tone at the top to incent people to do the right thing and to set up safety nets to catch people who make mistakes or do the wrong thing and correct those as quickly as possible. And it is working. It is working.” Charles O. “Chuck” Prince III, CEO of Citigroup, 2003-20072 “People know I was concerned about the markets. Clearly, there were things wrong. But I don’t know of anyone who foresaw a perfect storm, and that’s what we’ve had here.” Robert Rubin, chairman of Citigroup’s executive committee, 1999- 20093 “I do not think we did enough as [regulators] with the authority we had to help contain the risks that ultimately emerged in [Citigroup].” Timothy Geithner, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2003-2009; Secretary of the Treasury, 2009-20134 * Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Center for Law, Economics & Finance, George Washington University Law School. I wish to thank GW Law School and Dean Greg Maggs for a summer research grant that supported my work on this Article. I am indebted to Eric Klein, a member of GW Law’s Class of 2015, and Germaine Leahy, Head of Reference in the Jacob Burns Law Library, for their superb research assistance. -
Canada As the Target of GDR Espionage Helmut Müller-Enbergs
Document généré le 2 oct. 2021 03:58 Journal of Conflict Studies Canada as the Target of GDR Espionage Helmut Müller-Enbergs Volume 29, spring 2009 Résumé de l'article German Democratic Republic (GDR) diplomatic missions included a legal URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/jcs29art04 residentur: an intelligence service base whose presence was more or less openly acknowledged. It was staffed by the Hauptverwaltung A (HVA - Main Directorate Aller au sommaire du numéro Foreign Intelligence), one of the principal divisions within the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security). The HVA’s main task was espionage. While most of the HVA files have been destroyed, the HVA had created Éditeur(s) a special database that holds all of the information it produced between 1969 and 1989. This database allows scholars to identify which source delivered what The University of New Brunswick information and when, who received the information, and what value each piece of information had. The GDR’s Canadian embassy did not open until 1987, and ISSN due to the short term of its existence, the HVA residentur in Canada could hardly have played a significant intelligence role. And we can be almost certain that it 1198-8614 (imprimé) did not build up and manage an unofficial spy network from Canada. In fact, the 1715-5673 (numérique) HVA appears to have acquired its knowledge about Canada primarily from other sources, mainly agents within the West German foreign ministry and from other Découvrir la revue partner intelligence agencies. The GDR undoubtedly had deep insights into the domestic and foreign affairs of Canada. -
Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 2013 Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr. George Washington University Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street, 81 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1283-1446 (2013). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GW Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Paper No. 2013‐117 GW Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013‐117 Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. 2013 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283-1446 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from the Social Science Research Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327872 TURNING A BLIND EYE: WHY WASHINGTON KEEPS GIVING IN TO WALL STREET Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.* As the Dodd–Frank Act approaches its third anniversary in mid-2013, federal regulators have missed deadlines for more than 60% of the required implementing rules. The financial industry has undermined Dodd–Frank by lobbying regulators to delay or weaken rules, by suing to overturn completed rules, and by pushing for legislation to freeze agency budgets and repeal Dodd–Frank’s key mandates. -
British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Apollo British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964 William Styles Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge September 2016 This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy William Styles British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964 This thesis is concerned with an analysis of British governmental attitudes and responses to communism in the United Kingdom during the early years of the Cold War, from the election of the Attlee government in July 1945 up until the election of the Wilson government in October 1964. Until recently the topic has been difficult to assess accurately, due to the scarcity of available original source material. However, as a result of multiple declassifications of both Cabinet Office and Security Service files over the past five years it is now possible to analyse the subject in greater depth and detail than had been previously feasible. The work is predominantly concerned with four key areas: firstly, why domestic communism continued to be viewed as a significant threat by successive governments – even despite both the ideology’s relatively limited popular support amongst the general public and Whitehall’s realisation that the Communist Party of Great Britain presented little by way of a direct challenge to British political stability. Secondly, how Whitehall’s understanding of the nature and severity of the threat posed by British communism developed between the late 1940s and early ‘60s, from a problem considered mainly of importance only to civil service security practices to one which directly impacted upon the conduct of educational policy and labour relations. -
Cyber Counterintelligence - Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty
#RSAC SESSION ID: CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - DECEPTION, DISTORTION, DISHONESTY Jeff Bardin Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze Chief Intelligence Officer Principal Treadstone 71 Cyberlight Global Associates @Treadstone71LLC [email protected] 5 2 Agenda Taxonomy Types of Denial Deception Dimensions of D&D Tactics Deception Chain (see your handout) and Deception Planning D&D Russian Historical Information Criminals & Kids Notable Events Georgia US Election Background Warfare Dis-information / France – Information Complexity of Formation of cyber Troll Factories Major Players TV5Monde Warfare on Social Outsourcing troops Media Forming public Interagency Socio-Cultural Conclusions - opinion Rivalries Differences Recommendations 3 Denial and Deception - Lifecycle Types of Denial and Deception Resource Diversion Uncertainty Intelligence Proactivity Depletion • Direct an • Waste an • Cause the • Monitor and • Use adversary’s adversary’s adversary to analyze deception attention time and doubt the adversary techniques to from real energy on veracity of a behavior detect assets toward obtaining and discovered during previously bogus ones. analyzing vulnerability intrusion unknown false or stolen attempts to attacks that information. information. inform future other defense defensive efforts. tools may miss. 4 Deception Planning Consideration of all critical components of the operation. Deny, deceive, create propaganda RSA Conference - Bardin and Mshvidobadze Western Dogs Dogs Lie Like Dotards - We will hack their sites and bring them down 5 Dimensions