Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80

Updated February 11, 2004

Edited by Jeffrey Richelson

Originally posted December 20, 2002 Previously updated February 26, 2003

Documents Press release Further reading

Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the commencement of military ac绳on in January 1991, then President George H.W. Bush raised the specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons as one jus绳fica绳on for taking decisive ac绳on against Iraq. In the then‐classified Na绳onal Security Direc绳ve 54, signed on January 15, 1991, authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, he iden绳fied Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruc绳on (WMD) against allied forces as an ac绳on that would lead the U.S. to seek the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. (Note 1)

In the aermath of Iraq's defeat, the U.S.‐led U.N. coali绳on was able to compel Iraq to agree to an inspec绳on and monitoring regime, intended to insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD programs and did not take ac绳ons to recons绳tute them. The means of implemen绳ng the relevant U.N. resolu绳ons was the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). That inspec绳on regime con绳nued un绳l December 16, 1998 ‐ although it involved interrup绳ons, confronta绳ons, and Iraqi aꬫempts at denial and decep绳on ‐ when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, and harassment.

Subsequent to George W. Bush's assump绳on of the presidency in January 2001, the U.S. made it clear that it would not accept what had become the status quo with respect to Iraq ‐ a country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free to aꬫempt to recons绳tute its assorted weapons of mass destruc绳on programs. As part of their campaign against the status quo, which included the clear threat of the eventual use of military force against the Iraqi regime, the U.S. and Britain published documents and provided brieﬁngs detailing their conclusions concerning Iraq's WMD programs and its aꬫempts to deceive other na绳ons about those programs.

As a result of the U.S. and Bri绳sh campaign, and aer prolonged nego绳a绳ons between the United States, Britain, France, Russia and other U.N. Security Council members, the United Na绳ons declared that Iraq would have to accept even more intrusive inspec绳ons than under the previous inspec绳on regime ‐ to be carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Veriﬁca绳on, and Inspec绳on Commission (UNMOVIC) and http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 1/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction the Interna绳onal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ‐ or face "serious consequences." Iraq agreed to accept the U.N. decision and inspec绳ons resumed in late November 2002. On December 7, 2002, Iraq submiꬫed its 12,000 page declara绳on, which claimed that it had no current WMD programs. Intelligence analysts from the United States and other na绳ons immediately began to scru绳nize the document, and senior U.S. oﬃcials quickly rejected the claims. (Note 2)

Over the next several months, inspec绳ons con绳nued in Iraq, and the chief inspectors, Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohammed El Baradei (IAEA) provided periodic updates to the U.N. Security Council concerning the extent of Iraqi coopera绳on, what they had or had not discovered, and what they believed remained to be done. During that period the Bush administra绳on, as well as the Tony Blair administra绳on in the United Kingdom, charged that Iraq was not living up to the requirement that it fully disclose its WMD ac绳vi绳es, and declared that if it con绳nued along that path, "serious consequences" ‐ that is, invasion ‐ should follow.

The trigger for military ac绳on preferred by the Bri绳sh government, other allies, and at least some segments of the Bush administra绳on, was a second U.N. resolu绳on that would authorize an armed response. Other key U.N. Security Council members ‐ including France, Germany, and Russia ‐ argued that the inspec绳ons were working and that the inspectors should be allowed to con绳nue. When it became apparent that the Council would not approve a second resolu绳on, the United States and Britain terminated their aꬫempts to obtain it. Instead, they, along with other allies, launched Opera绳on Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003 ‐ a military campaign that quickly brought about the end of Saddam Hussein's regime and ul绳mately resulted in his capture. (Note 3)

As U.S. forces moved through Iraq, there were ini绳al reports that chemical or biological weapons might have been uncovered, but closer examina绳ons produced nega绳ve results. In May 2003, the Bush administra绳on decided to establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), to search the country for WMD ‐ replacing the 75th Exploita绳on Task Force, which had originally been assigned the mission. Appointed to lead the Group, whose moꬫo is "ﬁnd, exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Opera绳ons. In June, David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector aer Opera绳on Desert Storm, was appointed special advisor and traveled to Iraq to lead the search. (Note 4)

By the 绳me of the crea绳on of the ISG, and con绳nuing to the date of this publica绳on, a controversy has existed over the performance of U.S. (and Bri绳sh) intelligence in collec绳ng and evalua绳ng informa绳on about Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on programs. The reliability of sources has been ques绳oned. It has been suggested that some human intelligence may have been purposeful decep绳on by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while exiles and defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to inﬂuence U.S. policy.

The quality of the intelligence analysis has also come under scru绳ny. The failure to ﬁnd weapons stocks or ac绳ve produc绳on lines, undermining claims by the October 2002 NIE and both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell (Document 16, Document 27), has been one par绳cular cause for cri绳cism. Controversy has also centered around speciﬁc judgments ‐ in the United States with regard to assessments of Iraq's mo绳ves for seeking high‐strength aluminum tubes, and in the United Kingdom with respect to the government's claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Africa. Post‐war evalua绳on of captured material, par绳cularly two

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 2/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction mobile facili绳es that the CIA and DIA judged to be biological weapons laboratories, has also been the subject of dispute. (Note 5)

In addi绳on, members of Congress and Parliament, as well as poten绳al poli绳cal opponents and outside observers have cri绳cized the use of intelligence by the Bush and Blair administra绳ons. Charges have included outright distor绳on, selec绳ve use of intelligence, and exer绳on of poli绳cal pressure to inﬂuence the content of intelligence es绳mates in order to provide support to the decision to go to war with Iraq. (Note 6)

The material presented in this electronic briefing book includes both essen绳al pre‐ war documenta绳on and documents produced or released subsequent to the start of military ac绳on in March 2003. Pre‐war documenta绳on includes the major unclassified U.S. and Bri绳sh assessments of Iraq's WMD programs; the IAEA and UNSCOM reports covering the final period prior to their 1998 departure, and between November 27, 2002, and February 2003; the transcript of a key speech by President Bush; a statement of U.S. policy toward comba绳ng WMD; the transcript of and slides for Secretary Powell's presenta绳on to the U.N. on February 5, 2003; and documents from the 1980s and 1990's concerning various aspects of Iraqi WMD ac绳vi绳es.

Key documenta绳on related to the controversy that has become available in recent months makes up almost of all of the 14 addi绳onal documents contained in this updated brieﬁng book. These records include:

The full Top Secret key judgments sec绳on of the October 2002 Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate on Iraq's Con㜳nuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on (Document 15) The CIA‐DIA evalua绳on of two specialized tractor‐trailers (Document 32) Reviews by the Bri绳sh parliamentary commiꬫees concerning the quality and use of intelligence on Iraq by the Bri绳sh government (Document 34, Document 36) David Kay's unclassiﬁed statement on the ISG's interim ﬁndings (Document 39) Congressional cri绳ques of U.S. intelligence performance (Document 37, Document 41) Administra绳on rebuꬫals of those and other cri绳ques. (Document 35, Document 38, Document 40, Document 43).

Much that is of interest concerning intelligence and Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on has appeared in ar绳cles, monographs, and studies published by magazines or research groups. A list of key publica绳ons is provided immediately aer the notes sec绳on. Other important materials have been posted temporarily on government web sites. The documenta绳on provided in this briefing book collects many of the most significant of these records in one place, allowing readers to substan绳ally augment their understanding of the issues by directly comparing the different sources and conclusions, and ensuring that these materials will be accessible for the long term.

Note: The following documents are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Read the Documents

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 3/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction Document 1: Interagency Intelligence Assessment, Implica㜳ons of Israeli A橔ack on Iraq, July 1, 1981. Secret.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Informa绳on Act

On June 7, 1981, in an aꬫempt to prevent Iraqi acquisi绳on of a nuclear weapons capability, Israeli aircra bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, before it became opera绳onal. This assessment, produced by the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, examines Arab reac绳ons to the aꬫack as well as both the immediate and short‐term repercussions of the pre‐emp绳ve strike.

Document 2: CIA, Iraq's Na㜳onal Security Goals, December 1988. Secret.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released by Mandatory Declassiﬁca绳on Review

Wriꬫen aer the conclusion of the 1980‐1988 Iran‐Iraq War, this CIA survey examined Saddam Hussein's likely regional and interna绳onal objec绳ves and strategies ‐ including his rela绳ons with other Arab states and the PLO, his desire to reduce Iraqi dependence on the USSR, and his goal of preven绳ng closer 绳es between the US and USSR and Iran. With respect to weapons of mass destruc绳on, the analysis briefly discusses Iraqi a鄨tudes toward chemical and nuclear weapons. The first are considered a "short‐term fix," while the laꬫer represent "the long‐term deterrent."

Document 3: CIA, Iraqi Ballis㜳c Missile Developments, July 1990. Top Secret

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Informa绳on Act

During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq made extensive use of its Scud missile force to aꬫack both Israel and Saudi Arabia ‐ a Scud that hit a U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 28 U.S. servicemen. This paper completed a month prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait noted that "Iraq has the most aggressive and advanced ballis绳c missile development program in the Arab world" and that it already had two modiﬁed versions of the Scud B ‐ the Al Husayn and Al Abbas.

The paper examines the origins, development, and results of the Iraqi missile program ‐ in the form of the Scud B and its variants. It also examines warhead op绳ons ‐ including chemical, biological, and nuclear. In addi绳on, it discusses Iraq's missile produc绳on infrastructure as well as foreign assistance to the missile program.

Document 4: Central Intelligence Agency, Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on, March 1991, Top Secret.

Source: Freedom of Informa绳on Act

This study, completed by the CIA's Office of Scien绳fic and Weapons Research aer the conclusion of the first Persian Gulf War, examined the status of the four components of Iraq's WMD programs ‐‐ chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballis绳c missiles ‐‐ as of January 15, 1991, the day President George H.W. Bush signed Na绳onal Security Direc绳ve 54, authorizing the use of force to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 4/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction The report asserted that Iraq apparently believed that it needed chemical weapons both as a deterrent and to fulﬁll its role as "protector" of the Arab world. There were strong indica绳ons, according to the report, that Iraq was prepared to use chemical weapons in any conﬂict with the United States. The author(s) characterized Iraq's biological weapons program as "the most extensive in the Arab world." With respect to nuclear weapons, the report concluded that Iraq probably had the capability, if combined with clandes绳nely acquired foreign technology, to develop nuclear weapons in the late 1990s. Iraq's ballis绳c missile program was "the most advanced in the Arab world," the report also concluded.

Document 5: CIA, Project Babylon: The Iraqi Supergun, November 1991. Secret.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released by Mandatory Declassiﬁca绳on Review

From 1988 to 1990, Iraq was involved in an unusual weapons program, codenamed Project Babylon. The project's objec绳ve was the development and produc绳on of several large caliber guns, including a 1,000‐millimeter‐diameter supergun. In addi绳on, the project included development of both conven绳onal and rocket projec绳les for the gun. The gun was intended to deliver the explosive devices to military and economic targets up to 620 miles away. The project was being managed for Iraq by a foreign company, Space Research Corpora绳on, headed by Gerald Bull.

By early 1990, a 350‐mm‐diameter version of the gun had been successfully built and tested. In addi绳on, many of the components for the 1,000‐mm. gun and two other 350‐mm guns had been delivered to Iraq. In March 1990, Bull was murdered. The following month, the United Kingdom customs service seized the ﬁnal eight sec绳ons that were to be used in the 1,000‐mm. gun barrel. Other na绳ons followed by seizing other components of the supergun. The seizures prevented Iraq from comple绳ng the project. In July 1991, aer ini绳al denials, Iraq acknowledged the project. In October 1991, Project Babylon components were destroyed under U.N. supervision.

This document discusses the ra绳onale, origins, technical details, and history of Project Babylon.

Document 6: CIA, Iraqi BW Mission Planning, 1992. Secret.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Informa绳on Act

This informa绳on report states that in the fall of 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered that plans be drawn up for the airborne delivery of an unspecified biological agent. The probable target was Israel. The plan envisioned a conven绳onal air raid employing three MiG‐21s, to be followed by another raid involving three MiGs and a SU‐22 aircra that would disperse the biological agent.The first mission was shot down over the Persian Gulf and "no efforts were made to find another method to deliver the BW agent."

Document 7: United Na绳ons, Note by the Secretary General, October 8, 1997 w/aꬫ: Le橔er dated 6 October 1997 from the Director General of the Interna㜳onal Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary General.

Source: hꬫp://www.iaea.org http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 5/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction Part of one of the report describes the work done by the IAEA, during the period April 1, 1997 to October 1, 1997 in montoring and verifying Iraqi compliance with the nuclear disarmament provisions of U.N. resolu绳on 687 (1991). It includes an extensive summary of the technical discussions between IAEA and Iraq. The second part of the report provides an overview of IAEA ac绳vi绳es since 1991 related to on‐ site inspec绳on of Iraqi's nuclear capabili绳es and the destruc绳on, removal, or neutraliza绳on of Iraqi nuclear weapons or nuclear‐weapons related material or facili绳es.

Document 8: United Na绳ons, Note by the Secretary General, October 6, 1998 w/aꬫ: Report of the Execu㜳ve Chairman of the ac㜳vi㜳es of the Special Commission established by the Secretary‐ General pursuant to paragraph 9(b) (i) of the resolu㜳on 687 (1991).

Source: hꬫp://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres98‐920.htm

This report from the execu绳ve chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) covers developments in the rela绳onship between Iraq and the Commission, priority issues with respect to disarmament, and ongoing monitoring and veriﬁca绳on ac绳vi绳es through October 11, 1998. Two months later, on December 16, UNSCOM, in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, withdrew its staﬀ from Iraq.

Document 9: United Na绳ons Security Council, Le橔er Dated 8 February 1999 from the Secretary‐ General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, February 9, 1999 w/enc: Report of the Director General of the Interna㜳onal Atomic Energy Agency in connec㜳on with the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and veriﬁca㜳on issues (S/1999/100).

Source: hꬫp://www.iaea.org

This report summarizes the status of the Interna绳onal Atomic Energy Agency's implementa绳on of U.N. Security Council resolu绳ons concerning the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear program as of February 1999 ‐ two months aer U.N. inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq. It includes an examina绳on of the remaining ques绳ons and concerns and their impact on the IAEA's ability to develop a "technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandes绳ne nuclear weapons [program] and on the IAEA's technical ability to fully implement its OMV [on‐site monitoring and veriﬁca绳on] program."

Speciﬁc ques绳ons and concerns noted in the report include: lack of certain technical documenta绳on, external assistance to Iraq's clandes绳ne nuclear weapons program, and Iraq's inability to provide documenta绳on showing the 绳ming and modali绳es of its alleged abandonment of its nuclear weapons program.

Document 10a: Forged correspondence to Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, Republic of Niger, concerning visit to Niger by Iraqi ambassador to the Va绳can, February 1, 1999.

Document 10b: Forged correspondence within Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Republic of Niger, concerning transfer of uranium to Iraq, July 30, 1999.

Document 10c: Forged leꬫer to the President, Republic of Niger, concerning agreement to supply 500 tons of uranium per year to Iraq, July 27, 2000.

Document 10d: Forged leꬫer to the Niger Ambassador to Italy, concerning protocol of agreement to supply uranium to Iraq, October 10, 2000. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 6/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction Source: Documents provided by journalist

The only publicly acknowledged evidence for the claim that Iraq had tried to acquire uranium from Africa, which President Bush made in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union address, based on Bri绳sh intelligence informa绳on, are these documents that were claimed to have been official correspondence involving officials of the Republic of Niger. The charge that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium had been deleted from a previous speech due to the CIA's objec绳on that the informa绳on had not been confirmed.

Documents 10a‐10d were all determined to be crude forgeries ‐ which included names and 绳tles that did not match the individuals who held oﬃce at the 绳me the leꬫers were purportedly wriꬫen ‐ although the Bri绳sh government has insisted it has addi绳onal informa绳on that would support the claim that Iraq was seeking to purchase uranium. The inclusion of the claim in the State of the Union despite its removal from an earlier speech, combined with the revela绳on of the forged documents, produced further cri绳cism of the Bush administra绳on and CIA Director George Tenet. Tenet, and then the president, took responsibility for the inclusion of the unveꬫed informa绳on. An FBI inves绳ga绳on into the apparent forgery that commenced in the spring of 2003 is now "at a cri绳cal stage" according the Washington Post (Mike Allen and Susan Schmidt, "Bush Aides Tes绳fy in Leak Probe," Washington Post, Tuesday, February 10, 2004; Page A01).

Document 11: UK Joint Intelligence Commiꬫee, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on: The Assessment of the Bri㜳sh Government, September 2002. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.pm.gov.uk

This extensive analysis of Iraqi WMD programs was produced by the Bri绳sh Government's Joint Intelligence Commiꬫee, which is responsible for overseeing the produc绳on of na绳onal and strategic intelligence. One part of the document focuses on Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballis绳c missile programs for the years 1971‐1998 and in the post‐inspec绳on era (1998‐2002). Other parts of the document concern the history of UN weapons inspec绳ons and "Iraq under Saddam Hussein."

In the foreword, Prime Minister Tony Blair writes (p.3) that "In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that ... Saddam Hussein is con绳nuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inﬂict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world."

Document 12: Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraq ‐ Key WMD Facili㜳es ‐ An Opera㜳onal Support Study, September 2002 (Extract) Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.dia.mil

This extract is part of a larger DIA study, produced for the United States Central Command to assist it in planning military opera绳ons. It notes the absence of reliable informa绳on on whether Iraq was producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. The authors do express their belief that "Iraq retained produc绳on equipment, exper绳se and chemical precursors and can recons绳tute a chemical warfare program in the absence of an interna绳onal inspec绳on regime." It also summarizes intelligence on possible chemical weapons ac绳vi绳es, such as renova绳on of two facili绳es formerly associated with the Iraqi chemical weapons program. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 7/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Document 13: U.S. State Department, A Decade of Decep㜳on and Deﬁance, September 12, 2002. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.whitehouse.gov

Three pages of this document focus on U.S. charges concerning Iraqi failure to comply with the restric绳ons pertaining to weapons of mass destruc绳on placed upon it as a result of the Persian Gulf War. It charges, inter alia, that "Iraq is believed to be developing ballis绳c missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers ‐ as prohibited by UN Security Council Resolu绳on 687" and "Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb." With respect to chemical weapons, it charges that "Iraq has not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unﬁlled muni绳ons, including Scud variant missile warheads."

Document 14: CIA, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on Programs, October 2002, Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.cia.gov

Issued a month aer the Bri绳sh assessment (see Document 8), this CIA study is the unclassiﬁed version of a Top Secret Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate completed shortly before its release. The study contains analysis, maps, tables, and some satellite photographs of apparent Iraqi WMD sites.

Among the study's key judgments is the statement that "Iraq has con绳nued its weapons of mass destruc绳on (WMD) programs in deﬁance of UN resolu绳ons and restric绳ons. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in execess of UN restric绳ons; if le unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade."

Document 15: Director of Central Intelligence, Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate, Iraq's Con㜳nuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on, October 2002. Top Secret (Extract).

Source: The White House

In response to the post‐war controversy over U.S. intelligence es绳mates of Iraqi WMD programs, the White House released the en绳re key judgments sec绳on of the Top Secret October 2002 na绳onal intelligence es绳mate on the subject. (An unclassiﬁed version of the NIE had been released that same month, see Document 14).

The es绳mate concluded that Iraq con绳nued its weapons of mass destruc绳on programs despite U.N. resolu绳ons and sanc绳ons and that it was in possession of chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges exceeding U.N. imposed limits. In addi绳on, it was judged that Iraq was recons绳tu绳ng its nuclear weapons program and, if le unchecked, would probably have a nuclear weapon before the end of the decade ‐ assuming it had to produce the fissile material indigenously. If Iraq could acquire sufficient fissile material from abroad it could construct a nuclear weapon within several months to a year, the es绳mate reported.

With regard to both chemical and biological weapons, the NIE reported not only that Iraq had maintained stocks of the weapons but was ac绳vely engaged in http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 8/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction produc绳on. The released sec绳on contains the assessment, based at least in part on human intelligence, that "Baghdad has begun renewed produc绳on of" a variety of chemical weapons ‐ mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. It also stated that all key aspects of Iraq's oﬀensive biological weapons program were ac绳ve ‐ including R&D, produc绳on, and weaponiza绳on ‐ and that most components were larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War. It also reported that Iraq possessed mobile facili绳es for producing bacterial and toxin biological warfare agents.

The es绳mate also examined Iraq's possible willingness to engage in terrorist strikes against the U.S. homeland and whether Saddam would assist al‐Qaeda in conduc绳ng addi绳onal aꬫacks on U.S. territory. Iraq would probably aꬫempt clandes绳ne aꬫacks in the United States if it feared an aꬫack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, probably with biological agents, according to the NIE. In addi绳on, in the event that Saddam concluded that al‐Qaeda was the only organiza绳on that could conduct the type of terrorist strike against the U.S. that he wished to see take place, he might take "the extreme step of assis绳ng the Islamist terrorists."

The released key judgments sec绳on is also notable for its repor绳ng of dissents within the Intelligence Community on two related issues ‐ when Iraq could acquire a nuclear weapon, and its mo绳ve in seeking to obtain high‐strength aluminum tubes. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) argued that while Saddam wished to acquire a nuclear weapon, it did not believe that Iraq's recent ac绳vi绳es made a compelling case that a comprehensive aꬫempt to acquire nuclear weapons was being made. INR, along with the Department of Energy, ques绳oned whether the high‐strength aluminum tubes Iraq had been aꬫemp绳ng to acquire were well‐suited for use in gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment.

Document 16: The White House, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat," October 7, 2002. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.whitehouse.gov

This speech, given by President Bush at the Cincinna绳 Museum Center, presents his administra绳on's view concerning the threat from Iraq. It discusses Iraqi chemical, biological, ballis绳c missile, and nuclear programs ‐ as well as concerns about possible Iraqi connec绳ons to interna绳onal terrorist groups. With respect to how close Iraq is to developing a nuclear weapon, Bush notes that "we don't know exactly, and that's the problem." He went on to state that "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a liꬫle larger than a single soball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."

Document 17: Leꬫer, George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the Senate Select Commiꬫee on Intelligence, October 7, 2002. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.globalsecurity.org

This leꬫer from the DCI provided an unclassiﬁed CIA assessment of Saddam Hussein's willingness to use weapons of mass destruc绳on. According to the leꬫer, Iraq "for now appears to be drawing a line short of conduc绳ng terrorist aꬫacks with conven绳onal or ... chemical and biological weapons against the United States," but if "Saddam should conclude that a U.S.‐led aꬫack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adop绳ng terrorist ac绳ons." The http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 9/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction leꬫer also discusses the ques绳on of Iraqi links to Al‐Qaeda and the basis for U.S. assessments of the links.

Document 18: DoD, Iraqi Denial and Decep㜳on for Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on & Ballis㜳c Missile Programs, October 8, 2002. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.defenselink.mil

The day aer President Bush's Cincinna绳 speech (Document 12), the Defense Department provided a brieﬁng on Iraqi denial and decep绳on ac绳vi绳es with respect to their WMD programs. These slides were used in the presenta绳on. They include a variety of satellite photographs (from commercial as well as a intelligence satellites), tables, and charts that concern Iraq's assorted programs and select facili绳es (for example, the Abu Ghurayb BW Facility). In addi绳on, the presenta绳on focused on Iraq's denial and decep绳on strategy and concealment apparatus.

Document 19: George W. Bush, Na㜳onal Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on, December 2002. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.whitehouse.gov

This strategy document is an unclassiﬁed extract of Top Secret Na绳onal Security Presiden绳al Direc绳ve 17.(2) The unclassiﬁed version asserts that "We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most destruc绳ve weapons." It also notes that "because deterrence may not succeed ... U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD‐armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through pre‐emp绳ve measures."

Document 20: Table of Contents, Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declara㜳on December 7, 2002, w/covering leꬫer from Mohammed A. Aldouri, Permanent Representa绳ve to the U.N.

Source: hꬫp://www.fas.org

This table of contents describes the content of the report submiꬫed by Iraq to the United Na绳ons with regard to its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs, as required by U.N.Security Council Resolu绳on 1441. It shows the varied methods Iraq used in trying to produce nuclear material suitable for a weapon as well as the large number of sites involved in the nuclear program.

Document 21: Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanc㜳ons, and U.S. Policy, December 10, 2002. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.house.gov/shays/CRS/CRSProducts.htm

This paper, updated from an earlier version, discusses a number of issues concerning Iraq. Outside of the WMD area, it examines human rights/war crime issues, interna绳onal terrorism, Iraq‐Kuwait issues, repara绳on payments, sanc绳ons, and the oil‐for‐ food program. With respect to weapons of mass destruc绳on, it focuses largely on the U.N. resolu绳ons placing limits on Iraqi WMD programs and the work of U.N. inspectors in aꬫemp绳ng to monitor Iraqi chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear programs. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 10/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Document 22 : Department of State, Fact Sheet: Illustra㜳ve Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declara㜳on to the United Na㜳ons Security Council, December 19, 2002.

Source: hꬫp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118pf.htm

At a December 19 press conference, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that U.S. experts found the Iraqi declara绳on "to be anything but currently accurate, full, or complete." He also charged that the declara绳on "totally fails to meet the resolu绳on's requirements." The same day the State Department issued a fact sheet providing several examples of omissions from the declara绳on.

Document 23 : Hans Blix, An Update on Inspec㜳on, January 27, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.un.org

In Resolu绳on 1441, adopted in November 2002, the U.N. Security Council called for progress reports from UNMOVIC and the IAEA two months aer renewing inspec绳ons in Iraq. As head of UNMOVIC, Blix is responsible for overseeing inspec绳ons whose objec绳ve is to verify Iraqi chemical and biological warfare disarmament. Part of Blix's report reviews the sequence and content of U.N. resolu绳ons dealing with the disarmament of Iraq.

The key part of his paper, however, deals with the extent of Iraqi coopera绳on ‐ with regard to both substance and process. With regard to process, while he states that "Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field," he does note a number of problems, including Iraq's refusal to guarantee the safety of proposed U.N. U‐2 overflights as well as it insistence on sending helicopters into the no‐fly zone to transport the Iraqis who serve as the inspectors minders. In addi绳on, Blix notes "some recent disturbing incidents and harassment."

With regard to coopera绳on on substance, Blix's report is more nega绳ve, no绳ng that Iraq has failed to engage in the "ac绳ve" coopera绳on called for in Resolu绳on 1441. He ques绳ons Iraqi claims concerning the quality, quan绳ty, and disposi绳on of VX nerve gas produced by Iraq as well as claims that Iraq destroyed 8, 500 liters of anthrax. In addi绳on, he reports that Iraq has tested two missiles in excess of the permiꬫed range of 150 kilometers.

The ﬁnal por绳on of the report speciﬁes how the inspec绳on process can be made more fruiul ‐ including the turning over of more relevant documents, lists of key personnel, and the facilita绳on of credible interviews.

Document 24: Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspec㜳ons in Iraq, January 27, 2003 w/aꬫ: IAEA Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolu绳on 1441 (2002), January 27, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.iaea.org

While UNMOVIC handled inspec绳ons rela绳ng to chemical and biological weapons, the IAEA was charged with trying to verify Iraqi nuclear disarmament. This report from the IAEA director ElBaradei's update report provides background on previous resolu绳ons, the IAEA's ﬁndings before the end of inspec绳ons in 1998, and his agency's ac绳vi绳es since the resump绳on of the inspec绳on regime on November 27.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 11/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction The review of agency ac绳vi绳es addresses the establishment of a Baghdad field office, Iraq's declara绳ons pertaining to the status of its nuclear program, the request for and discovery of relevant documents, the inventory of nuclear material, ongoing monitoring, interviews, and specific issues raised by states ‐ including the U.S. charge that aluminum tubes procured by Iraq were intended for use in centrifuges.

While in his cover leꬫer ElBaradei observes that "we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimina绳on of the programme in the 1990s," in the update report it is also noted that "liꬫle progress has been made in resolving the ques绳ons and concerns that remained as of 1998" and that "further veriﬁca绳on ac绳vi绳es will be necessary before the IAEA will be able to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme."

Document 25: Colin L. Powell, Brieﬁng on the Iraq Weapons Inspectors' 60‐Day Report: Iraqi Non‐Coopera㜳on and Deﬁance of the UN, January 27, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.state.gov

The same day that Blix and ElBaradei addressed the UN, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a short brieﬁng to reporters on the U.S. view of those reports, followed by a ques绳on and answer session. Powell noted the statement by Blix that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it." The secretary went on to men绳on several speciﬁc issues, including Iraqi failure to account for the anthrax and VX it had produced, as well as the development of missiles exceeding the allowed range. Powell also noted impediments to the work of the inspectors, including "a swarm of Iraqi minders," an incomplete list of Iraqi personnel involved in WMD programs, and the inability of the inspectors to interview Iraqi scien绳sts in private.

Document 26: The White House, What Does Disarmament Look Like?, January 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.whitehouse.gov

As part of pressing its case that Iraq was not truly willing to disarm, the Bush administra绳on released this short paper contras绳ng the nuclear disarmament process in three other countries ‐ South Africa, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan ‐ with Iraqi behavior. It iden绳ﬁed several characteris绳cs of importance ‐ high level poli绳cal commitment, na绳onal ini绳a绳ves to dismantle weapons of mass destruc绳on, and full coopera绳on and transparency. It then asserts that "the behavior of the Iraqi regime contrasts sharply with successful disarmament examples." It goes on to note the ac绳vi绳es of several Iraqi organiza绳ons, including the Special Security Organiza绳on, and the Na绳onal Monitoring Directorate, and the areas where Iraq's "currently accurate, full, and complete" declara绳on" falls short ‐ including with respect to biological agents, ballis绳c missiles, and aꬫempts to procure uranium.

Document 27: Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Na㜳ons Security Council, February 5, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.state.gov

In the face of requests and demands that the U.S. provide further evidence in support of its posi绳on that Iraq was failing to comply with U.N. resolu绳on 1441, was http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 12/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction impeding the work of UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors, and that a resort to military force would be necessary unless Iraq's behavior changed, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the U.N. Security Council. The bulk of Powell's remarks, as contained in the transcript, involved his provision of "addi绳onal informa绳on [about] what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruc绳on, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism ..."

The intelligence provided came from a variety of sources ‐ including satellite imagery, communica绳ons intercepts, human assets in Iraq, detainees, and defectors. It represents the largest single public disclosure of such informa绳on made in support of U.S. diplomacy ‐ surpassing the scope and volume of disclosures made during the Cuban missile crisis or the campaign in response to the Soviet Union's shootdown of KAL 007 in 1983.

The transcript contains Powell's reading of intercepts, and his descrip绳on of the content of satellite imagery being shown to the Security Council. It also contains his descrip绳on of organiza绳ons and ac绳vi绳es, informa绳on about which was obtained from human sources and/or unspeciﬁed communica绳ons intelligence ‐ such as the existence of a "Higher Commiꬫee for Monitoring the Inspec绳ons Teams" as well as the presence of Al‐Qaida associates in Baghdad.

Document 28: Department of State, Iraq: Failing to Disarm ‐ U.S. Secretary of State Powell's Presenta㜳on to the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.state.gov

This Powerpoint presenta绳on provided an overview of part of Secretary Powell's remarks. It contains a selected por绳on of intercepts concerning and a satellite image pertaining to Iraq's hiding of evidence, charges that Iraq is muzzling its scien绳sts and speciﬁca绳ons of how that is being done, the asser绳on that Iraq is s绳ll seeking nuclear weapons (with reference to intercepted aluminum tubes), and the charge that Iraq is harboring terrorists, including Al‐Qaida representa绳ves.

Document 29: U.S. Department of State, Iraq: Failing to Disarm, February 5, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.state.gov

These images cons绳tute the full set of slides used by Secretary Powell in support of his presenta绳on. They contain the full text presented of intercepts, all nine satellite images, and other slides.

Denial and Decep绳on Part 1 Denial and Decep绳on Part 2 Biological Weapons Chemical Weapons Delivery Systems Terrorism Nuclear Systems Human Rights Viola绳ons End of Slide Presenta绳on

Document 30 : Dr. Hans Blix, Brieﬁng of the Security Council, February 14, 2003. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 13/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction Source: hꬫp://www.un.org

In accordance with UN Resolu绳on 1441, UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix delivered a progress on his organiza绳ons ac绳vi绳es in Iraq, its ﬁndings, and Iraqi compliance with the resolu绳on.

Blix noted that "so far UNMOVIC has not found any [weapons of mass destruc绳on], only a small number of chemical muni绳ons which should have been declared and destroyed." However, he also noted that many proscribed programs had not been accounted for, a maꬫer that he characterized as being of "great signiﬁcance." He speciﬁcally men绳oned programs for the produc绳on of anthrax, VX nerve gas, and long‐range missiles. He also noted the status of UNMOVIC inves绳ga绳ons of the Al‐ Samoud and Al‐Fatah missiles as well as cas绳ng chambers. With regard to Iraqi ac绳ons, he reported that Iraq had formed two commissions to search for relevant documents and that the Na绳onal Monitoring Directorate had provided a list of 83 individuals who could allegedly verify destruc绳on of chemical weapons and expresses his hope that Iraq will draw up a similar of individuals who par绳cipated in the destruc绳on of biological warfare items.

Document 31 : Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspec㜳ons in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update, February 14, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.iaea.org

In his update report, the director of the IAEA noted that his agency's inspec绳ons had moved from the "reconnaissance phase" (aimed at re‐establishing knowledge of Iraqi nuclear capabili绳es) into the "inves绳ga绳ve phase" (achieving an understanding of Iraqi capabili绳es over the previous four years).

He also reported on the status of the inspec绳on process ‐ no绳ng that in the preceding two weeks the IAEA had conducted 38 inspec绳ons at 19 sites, and that its methods included sampling air, water, and sediment, as well as the use of hand‐held and car‐borne gamma‐ray detectors. With respect to speciﬁc issues he addressed, among others, uranium acquisi绳on, uranium enrichment, and the high explosive, HMX.

Similarly to Blix, he reported that "we have to date found no evidence of nuclear or nuclear related ac绳vi绳es in Iraq," but that "a number of issues are s绳ll under inves绳ga绳on." ElBaradei also noted that a new document provided by Iraq contained "no new informa绳on," and expressed the hope that the newly established Iraqi commissions "will be able to uncover documents and other evidence that could assist in clarifying … remaining ques绳ons."

Document 32: Central Intelligence Agency/Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Produc㜳on Plants, May 28, 2003. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.cia.gov

In his February 5, 2003, presenta绳on to the U.N. Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell charged that Iraq had begun construc绳ng mobile facili绳es to produce biological weapons in the mid‐1990s. This program involved, he charged, the manufacture of mobile trailers and railcars to produce biological agents, designed to evade U.N. inspectors. Agent produc绳on reportedly took place from Thursday night http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 14/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction through Friday, a period during which the United Na绳ons did not conduct inspec绳ons due to the Muslim holiday.

This paper presents a joint CIA‐DIA evalua绳on of two specialized tractor‐trailers and a mobile laboratory truck discovered in Iraq aer the U.S. invasion. Kurdish forces took one tractor‐trailer into custody near Mosul in late April. U.S. troops discovered the other in early May, at the al‐Kindi Research, Tes绳ng, Development, and Engineering Facility in Mosul. U.S. troops also found the mobile laboratory, in late April. The CIA and DIA analysts concluded that the discoveries cons绳tuted "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program."

The text of this paper reviews the Intelligence Community's pre‐war sources on the Iraqi mobile program (including a chemical engineer, a civil engineer, and a defector from the Iraqi Intelligence Service), and the Community's pre‐war assessment of the program. The paper also asserts that the discovered plants are consistent with intelligence reports, and that legi绳mate uses, including hydrogen produc绳on, are unlikely.

According to a subsequent New York Times report, engineers from the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined the trailers concluded in June that the vehicles were probably used to produce hydrogen for ar绳llery weather balloons, as the Iraqi had claimed.

Document 33 : CIA Statement on Recently Acquired Iraqi Centrifuge Equipment, June 26, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://www.cia.gov/cia/wmd/iraqi_centrifuge_equipment.htm

Aer Saddam Hussein's regime was deposed in March 2003, Dr. Mahdi Shukur Ubaydi, who headed Iraq's uranium enrichment program before 1991, turned over to U.S. oﬃcials in Baghdad a volume of centrifuge documents and components he had hidden in his garden.

This brief CIA statement reports on some of what Dr. Ubaydi told U.S. oﬃcials. The images, which were removed from the CIA's web page shortly aer their ini绳al appearance, include both photographs of centrifuge parts and blueprints.

Document 34: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Commiꬫee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Ninth Report of Session 2002‐03, Volume I (London: The Sta绳onary Office Limited, July 2003). Unclassified.

Source: hꬫp://www.uk.gov

The primary purpose of this document is to report the commiꬫee's assessment of whether the Bri绳sh Parliament received "accurate and complete" informa绳on from the government in the period leading up to military ac绳on in Iraq ‐ par绳cularly with respect to weapons of mass destruc绳on.

The two key sec绳ons of the report examine the claims made in the government's September and February "dossiers," including asser绳ons concerning Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability, its long‐range missile eﬀort, its nuclear weapons program, Iraq's alleged aꬫempt to acquire uranium from Africa, and the asser绳on that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of being given an order to do so.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 15/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction The report also contains 33 conclusions and recommenda绳ons. The commiꬫee concluded that the government genuinely perceived "a real and present danger" from Iraq, that in the absence of signiﬁcant human intelligence Britain was heavily dependent on US technical intelligence, defectors, and exiles "with an agenda of their own," and that the accuracy of Bri绳sh assessments could not yet be determined.

Document 35: Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate on Iraq's Con绳nuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruc绳on, August 11, 2003.

Source: hꬫp://cia.gov/cia/public_aﬀairs/press_release/2003/pr08112003.htm

In the face of cri绳cism in the press and Congress over the apparent dispari绳es between the claims of the October 2002 Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate on Iraqi WMD and the failure to ﬁnd weapons stocks or open produc绳on lines in the aermath of the war, DCI Tenet issued this statement in defense of the es绳mate.

He characterizes much of the commentary as "misinformed, misleading, and just plain wrong," and goes on to state that "we stand by the judgments in the NIE," and promises that aer the Iraq Survey Group completes its work, "but not before," the Intelligence Community, "will stand back to professionally review where were are."

Tenet's statement goes on to defend the consistency of the community's analysis concerning Iraqi programs as well as its collec绳on eﬀorts aer the departure of U.N. inspectors in 1998. He then proceeds to examine intelligence performance with each component of Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on programs ‐ nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and delivery systems.

The most extensive part of his statement is a defense of the es绳mate's judgment that Iraq was seeking to recons绳tute its nuclear weapons program. He states that this conclusion was based on six factors, which did not include its reported aꬫempt to acquire uranium from Africa. In addi绳on, he describes the alterna绳ve views within the Intelligence Community as to whether Iraq was aꬫemp绳ng to obtain high‐strength aluminum tubes for use in uranium enrichment or for conven绳onal military uses.

Document 36: House of Commons Intelligence and Security Commiꬫee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on ‐ Intelligence and Assessments (London: The Sta绳onery Oﬃce Limited, September 2003). Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.cabinet‐oﬃce.gov.uk/reports/isc/

The House of Commons Intelligence and Security Commiꬫee deﬁned the objec绳ve of their report as determining "whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reﬂected in [Bri绳sh] Government publica绳ons."

The ini绳al por绳ons of the report provide overviews of the commiꬫee's inves绳ga绳on, of the intelligence assessment organiza绳ons (the Joint Intelligence Commiꬫee and Assessments Staﬀ), and of JIC assessments from August 1990 to September 2002. The subsequent parts of the study focus on the September 2002 dossier (including the claims that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes and had sought to purchase uranium from Africa), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 16/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction assessments from October 2002 to March 2003, the February 2003 document on Iraqi denial and decep绳on (which included substan绳al por绳ons, without aꬫribu绳on, from a previously published, non‐governmental analysis), and several other issues, including intelligence support to U.N. inspectors.

The report includes twenty‐six conclusions and recommenda绳ons concerning a variety of topics ‐ including the adequacy of the Secret Intelligence Service's human intelligence eﬀort in Iraq, whether it was reasonable that Bri绳sh intelligence analysts drew the conclusions they did given the available intelligence on Iraqi WMD programs, how quickly it appeared Iraqi forces could employ chemical or biological weapons, and decisions to include or exclude certain informa绳on or conclusions about Iraqi capabili绳es and the extent of the threat posed to Britain.

Document 37: Leꬫer, Porter J. Goss and Jane Harman, House Permanent Select Commiꬫee on Intelligence, to George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, September 25, 2003. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp‐dyn/A36817‐2003Oct2?language=printer

This leꬫer cri绳cizes the Intelligence Community's performance in providing intelligence related to Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, as well as with respect to Iraqi 绳es to al‐Qaeda. Goss and Harman, the commiꬫee's chairman and vice chairman, respec绳vely, write that a "dearth of post‐1998 underlying intelligence reﬂects a weakness in intelligence collec绳on" ‐ poin绳ng to past commiꬫee concerns about inadequacies in human intelligence (HUMINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) crucial to producing accurate assessments on weapons of mass destruc绳on and terrorism. The "lack of speciﬁc intelligence on regime plans and inten绳ons, WMD, and Iraq's support to terrorist groups appears to have hampered the IC's ability to provide a beꬫer assessment to policymakers from 1998 through 2003."

Document 38: Leꬫer, George J. Tenet to Honorable Porter J. Goss, October 1, 2003. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp‐dyn/A36712‐2003Oct2?language=printer

In this leꬫer to Porter Goss, the chairman of the House Permanent Select Commiꬫee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet disputes the contents of the September 25 leꬫer Tenet received from Goss and Commiꬫee Vice Chairman Jane Harman. He also cri绳cizes the Commiꬫee's distribu绳on of the leꬫer to the press "before providing the Intelligence Community any reasonable opportunity to respond."

Tenet argues that the HPSCI was not in a posi绳on to fully assess the Intelligence Community's performance on Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on programs or its 绳es to al‐Qaeda. The Commiꬫee, Tenet charged, had reached its conclusions without having heard from David Kay, special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group ‐ which had been charged with searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruc绳on.

Further, Tenet charged that the Commiꬫee's asser绳on that the Intelligence Community did not challenge longstanding judgments and assessments was "simply wrong." He also accused the Commiꬫee of having failed to try to understand the scope of U.S. collec绳on ac绳vi绳es targeted against Iraqi WMD programs.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 17/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Document 39: Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Commiꬫee on Intelligence, the House Commiꬫee on Appropria绳ons, Subcommiꬫee on Defense, and the Senate Select Commiꬫee on Intelligence, October 2, 2003. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://cia.gov/cia/public_aﬀairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html

In the aermath of Opera绳on Iraqi Freedom, coali绳on forces failed to uncover produc绳on facili绳es for, or stocks of, weapons of mass destruc绳on. To improve the chances of success, an Iraq Survey Group was established under the direc绳on of Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Opera绳ons. Dr. David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapon inspector for several years aer the 1991 Persian Gulf War, was appointed as a special advisor to the group, and would direct the group's opera绳ons in Iraq.

Kay's October 2 presenta绳on to the Congressional commiꬫees provides an unclassiﬁed summary of the group's interim report. Kay told the aꬫending members that the ISG had not yet found stocks of weapons, but was not at a point where it could be determined deﬁni绳vely that such weapons stocks did not exist or that they existed before the war but had been relocated.

Kay also noted a number of factors that had hindered the ISG's search ‐ including the compartmentaliza绳on of Iraqi WMD programs, deliberate dispersion and destruc绳on of material and documenta绳on related to those programs, post‐war loo绳ng, and a "far from permissive environment" for search ac绳vi绳es.

In addi绳on, Kay summarized some of the Survey Group's discoveries, which included: a clandes绳ne network of laboratories and safe‐houses controlled by the Iraqi Intelligence Services containing equipment suitable for CBW research; reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scien绳sts home; documents and equipment hidden in scien绳sts' homes that could be used for resuming uranium enrichment ac绳vi绳es; and a con绳nuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD missiles.

Document 40 : Stuart Cohen, Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from So Myths, November 26, 2003. Unclassiﬁed.

Source: hꬫp://www.cia.gov/nic/speeches_iraq_wmd.htm

The author of this essay served as ac绳ng chairman of the Na绳onal Intelligence Council when the October 2002 Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on was wriꬫen. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of informa绳on available would have reached "conclusions or alterna绳ve views that were profoundly diﬀerent" from those reached by the CIA and the na绳on's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to iden绳fy and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 es绳mate, including "the es绳mate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administra绳on," divergent views were buried and uncertain绳es concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underes绳mated the WMD threat in 1991."

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 18/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Document 41: Congresswoman Jane Harman, "The Intelligence on Iraq's WMD: Looking Back to Look Forward," January 16, 2004.

Source: hꬫp://www.house.gov/harman/press/releases/2004/011604_WAC.html

This speech given by the Jane Harman (D‐CA), the vice chairman of the House Permanent Select Commiꬫee on Intelligence, characterized the October 2002 Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on programs as "significantly flawed." She singled out two specific conclusions ‐ that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, and that it was recons绳tu绳ng its nuclear weapons program, no绳ng that "these were the centerpieces of the NIE and of the case for war and it appears likely that both were wrong."

Harman went on to call for crea绳on of a Director of Na绳onal Intelligence who would serve as a member of the president's cabinet, increased collabora绳on within the intelligence community, and "virtual reorganiza绳on" ‐ crea绳ng "task forces" through altered personnel policies and providing virtual workplaces.

Document 42: Transcript of David Kay tes绳mony before Senate Armed Services Commiꬫee, January 28, 2004

Source: hꬫp://www.ceip.org/ﬁles/projects/npp/ pdf/Iraq/kaytes绳mony.pdf

David Kay appeared before the Senate Armed Services Commiꬫee shortly aer he resigned as special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group. Kay states, referring to the expecta绳on that there would be substan绳al stocks of, and produc绳on lines for, chemical and biological weapons in Iraq, that "we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here." He also notes that other foreign intelligence agencies, including the French and the German, also had believed that Iraq possessed such stocks and produc绳on lines. In addi绳on, he discusses the issue of whether poli绳cal pressure had any impact on the content of the October 2002 na绳onal intelligence es绳mate (Document 15). Kay also notes that "based on the work of the Iraq Survey Group … Iraq was in clear viola绳on of the terms of [U.N.] Resolu绳on 1441. He goes on to note the discovery of hundreds of instances of ac绳vi绳es prohibited by U.N. Resolu绳on 687.

Document 43: George J. Tenet, Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruc绳on, remarks prepared for delivery at Georgetown University February 5, 2004.

Source: hꬫp://www.cia.gov/cia/public_aﬀairs/speeches/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html

In the midst of the con绳nuing post‐war controversy over intelligence es绳mates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on program, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet gave this speech in which he addressed "how the United States intelligence community evaluated Iraq's weapons of mass destruc绳on programs over the past decade, leading to a Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate in October of 2002."

In his talk, Tenet reviewed the "three streams of informa绳on" available concerning Iraqi WMD programs ‐ Iraq's history, the inability of Iraq to account for weapons that it possessed at the 绳me of the 1991 Gulf War, and informa绳on obtained aer U.N. inspectors le Iraq in 1998. He also compared the es绳mate's descrip绳ons of Iraqi WMD ac绳vi绳es with what has been discovered by the Iraq Survey Group. He http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 19/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction argued that "it would have been diﬃcult for analysts to come to any diﬀerent conclusions than the ones reached in October of 2002," but went on to say that "in our business that is not good enough."

Tenet also spoke about the role of U.S. and Bri绳sh intelligence in monitoring Libyan WMD, the ac绳vi绳es of Pakistani nuclear scien绳st A.Q. Khan, and related topics.

Notes

1. George W. Bush, Na绳onal Security Direc绳ve 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, January 15, 1991. Top Secret. See Na绳onal Security Archive Electronic Brieﬁng Book Number 39, Opera绳on Desert Storm: Ten Years Aer, January 17, 2001, Document 4.

2. See Sharon A. Squassoni, Congressional Research Service, Iraq: U.N. Inspec绳ons for Weapons of Mass Destruc绳on, October 7, 2003, pp. 13‐14.

3. Accounts of the war and the diploma绳c baꬫles prior to it, include Todd S. Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2003); William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe, and the War in Iraq (New York: Public Aﬀairs, 2004).

4. James Risen, "U.S. Asks Ex‐U.N. Inspector To Advise on Arms Search," New York Times, June 12, 2003, p. A14; Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI Tenet Announces Appointment of David Kay as Special Advisor," June 11, 2003, (available at www.cia.gov); Kenneth Gerhart, "The Changing Face of ISG's Home Base," Communique, July‐August 2003, pp.5‐7.

5. On the various element of the controversy, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The Atlan绳c, January 2004, pp. 78‐92; Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Maꬫhews, and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq: evidence and implica绳ons (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna绳onal Peace, 2004); Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for War," New York Review of Books, December 4, 2003, pp. 12‐17. With regard to the possibility that human sources knowingly provided false informa绳on on weapons of mass destruc绳on as well as Saddam's whereabouts on the opening night of the war, see Bob Drogin, "U.S. Suspects It Received False Iraq Arms Tips," Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2003; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, January 2, 2004, p. A7.

6. See note 5, the cita绳ons for Pollack; Cirincione, Maꬫhews and Perkovich; and Powers.

7. Joby Warrick, "Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake," Washington Post, March 8, 2003, pp. A1, A18.

8. Mike Allen and Barton Gellman, "Preemp绳ve Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine," Washington Post, December 11, 2002, pp. A1, A26.

9. Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen Not Biological Arms," New York Times, August 9, 2003, pp. A1,

For Further Reading

David Albright, Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separa㜳ng Fact from Fic㜳on, December 5, 2003, (available at hꬫp://www.isis‐online.org)

Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Maꬫhews, and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq: evidence and implica㜳ons (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna绳onal Peace, 2004) (available at hꬫp://www.ceip.org)

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 20/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction Anthony Cordesman, Intelligence and Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on: The Lessons from the Iraq War, July 1, 2003 (available at hꬫp://www.csis.org)

Barton Gellman, "Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper," Washington Post, January 7, 2004, pp. A1, A14‐A15.

Interna绳onal Ins绳tute for Strategic Studies, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, September 2003).

Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The Atlan㜳c, January 2004, pp. 78‐92 (also available at hꬫp://www.theatlan绳c.com)

Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for War," New York Review of Books, December 4, 2003, pp. 12‐17.

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