1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction home | about | documents | news | publications | FOIA | research | internships | search | donate | mailing list Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80 Updated ­ February 11, 2004 Edited by Jeffrey Richelson Originally posted December 20, 2002 Previously updated February 26, 2003 Documents ­ Press release ­ Further reading Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the commencement of military ac绳on in January 1991, then President George H.W. Bush raised the specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons as one jus绳fica绳on for taking decisive ac绳on against Iraq. In the then‐classified Na绳onal Security Direc绳ve 54, signed on January 15, 1991, authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, he iden绳fied Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruc绳on (WMD) against allied forces as an ac绳on that would lead the U.S. to seek the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. (Note 1) In the aermath of Iraq's defeat, the U.S.‐led U.N. coali绳on was able to compel Iraq to agree to an inspec绳on and monitoring regime, intended to insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD programs and did not take ac绳ons to recons绳tute them. The means of implemen绳ng the relevant U.N. resolu绳ons was the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). That inspec绳on regime con绳nued un绳l December 16, 1998 ‐ although it involved interrup绳ons, confronta绳ons, and Iraqi aꬫempts at denial and decep绳on ‐ when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, and harassment. Subsequent to George W. Bush's assump绳on of the presidency in January 2001, the U.S. made it clear that it would not accept what had become the status quo with respect to Iraq ‐ a country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free to aꬫempt to recons绳tute its assorted weapons of mass destruc绳on programs. As part of their campaign against the status quo, which included the clear threat of the eventual use of military force against the Iraqi regime, the U.S. and Britain published documents and provided briefings detailing their conclusions concerning Iraq's WMD programs and its aꬫempts to deceive other na绳ons about those programs. As a result of the U.S. and Bri绳sh campaign, and aer prolonged nego绳a绳ons between the United States, Britain, France, Russia and other U.N. Security Council members, the United Na绳ons declared that Iraq would have to accept even more intrusive inspec绳ons than under the previous inspec绳on regime ‐ to be carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Verifica绳on, and Inspec绳on Commission (UNMOVIC) and http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 1/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction the Interna绳onal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ‐ or face "serious consequences." Iraq agreed to accept the U.N. decision and inspec绳ons resumed in late November 2002. On December 7, 2002, Iraq submiꬫed its 12,000 page declara绳on, which claimed that it had no current WMD programs. Intelligence analysts from the United States and other na绳ons immediately began to scru绳nize the document, and senior U.S. officials quickly rejected the claims. (Note 2) Over the next several months, inspec绳ons con绳nued in Iraq, and the chief inspectors, Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohammed El Baradei (IAEA) provided periodic updates to the U.N. Security Council concerning the extent of Iraqi coopera绳on, what they had or had not discovered, and what they believed remained to be done. During that period the Bush administra绳on, as well as the Tony Blair administra绳on in the United Kingdom, charged that Iraq was not living up to the requirement that it fully disclose its WMD ac绳vi绳es, and declared that if it con绳nued along that path, "serious consequences" ‐ that is, invasion ‐ should follow. The trigger for military ac绳on preferred by the Bri绳sh government, other allies, and at least some segments of the Bush administra绳on, was a second U.N. resolu绳on that would authorize an armed response. Other key U.N. Security Council members ‐ including France, Germany, and Russia ‐ argued that the inspec绳ons were working and that the inspectors should be allowed to con绳nue. When it became apparent that the Council would not approve a second resolu绳on, the United States and Britain terminated their aꬫempts to obtain it. Instead, they, along with other allies, launched Opera绳on Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003 ‐ a military campaign that quickly brought about the end of Saddam Hussein's regime and ul绳mately resulted in his capture. (Note 3) As U.S. forces moved through Iraq, there were ini绳al reports that chemical or biological weapons might have been uncovered, but closer examina绳ons produced nega绳ve results. In May 2003, the Bush administra绳on decided to establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), to search the country for WMD ‐ replacing the 75th Exploita绳on Task Force, which had originally been assigned the mission. Appointed to lead the Group, whose moꬫo is "find, exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Opera绳ons. In June, David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector aer Opera绳on Desert Storm, was appointed special advisor and traveled to Iraq to lead the search. (Note 4) By the 绳me of the crea绳on of the ISG, and con绳nuing to the date of this publica绳on, a controversy has existed over the performance of U.S. (and Bri绳sh) intelligence in collec绳ng and evalua绳ng informa绳on about Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on programs. The reliability of sources has been ques绳oned. It has been suggested that some human intelligence may have been purposeful decep绳on by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while exiles and defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to influence U.S. policy. The quality of the intelligence analysis has also come under scru绳ny. The failure to find weapons stocks or ac绳ve produc绳on lines, undermining claims by the October 2002 NIE and both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell (Document 16, Document 27), has been one par绳cular cause for cri绳cism. Controversy has also centered around specific judgments ‐ in the United States with regard to assessments of Iraq's mo绳ves for seeking high‐strength aluminum tubes, and in the United Kingdom with respect to the government's claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Africa. Post‐war evalua绳on of captured material, par绳cularly two http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 2/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction mobile facili绳es that the CIA and DIA judged to be biological weapons laboratories, has also been the subject of dispute. (Note 5) In addi绳on, members of Congress and Parliament, as well as poten绳al poli绳cal opponents and outside observers have cri绳cized the use of intelligence by the Bush and Blair administra绳ons. Charges have included outright distor绳on, selec绳ve use of intelligence, and exer绳on of poli绳cal pressure to influence the content of intelligence es绳mates in order to provide support to the decision to go to war with Iraq. (Note 6) The material presented in this electronic briefing book includes both essen绳al pre‐ war documenta绳on and documents produced or released subsequent to the start of military ac绳on in March 2003. Pre‐war documenta绳on includes the major unclassified U.S. and Bri绳sh assessments of Iraq's WMD programs; the IAEA and UNSCOM reports covering the final period prior to their 1998 departure, and between November 27, 2002, and February 2003; the transcript of a key speech by President Bush; a statement of U.S. policy toward comba绳ng WMD; the transcript of and slides for Secretary Powell's presenta绳on to the U.N. on February 5, 2003; and documents from the 1980s and 1990's concerning various aspects of Iraqi WMD ac绳vi绳es. Key documenta绳on related to the controversy that has become available in recent months makes up almost of all of the 14 addi绳onal documents contained in this updated briefing book. These records include: The full Top Secret key judgments sec绳on of the October 2002 Na绳onal Intelligence Es绳mate on Iraq's Con㜳nuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruc㜳on (Document 15) The CIA‐DIA evalua绳on of two specialized tractor‐trailers (Document 32) Reviews by the Bri绳sh parliamentary commiꬫees concerning the quality and use of intelligence on Iraq by the Bri绳sh government (Document 34, Document 36) David Kay's unclassified statement on the ISG's interim findings (Document 39) Congressional cri绳ques of U.S. intelligence performance (Document 37, Document 41) Administra绳on rebuꬫals of those and other cri绳ques. (Document 35, Document 38, Document 40, Document 43). Much that is of interest concerning intelligence and Iraqi weapons of mass destruc绳on has appeared in ar绳cles, monographs, and studies published by magazines or research groups. A list of key publica绳ons is provided immediately aer the notes sec绳on. Other important materials have been posted temporarily on government web sites. The documenta绳on provided in this briefing book collects many of the most significant of these records in one place, allowing readers to substan绳ally augment their understanding of the issues by directly comparing the different sources and conclusions, and ensuring that these materials will be accessible for the long term. Note: The following documents are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view. Read the Documents http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ 3/21 1/9/2017 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction Document 1: Interagency Intelligence Assessment, Implica㜳ons of Israeli A橔ack on Iraq, July 1, 1981. Secret. Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Informa绳on Act On June 7, 1981, in an aꬫempt to prevent Iraqi acquisi绳on of a nuclear weapons capability, Israeli aircra bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, before it became opera绳onal. This assessment, produced by the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, examines Arab reac绳ons to the aꬫack as well as both the immediate and short‐term repercussions of the pre‐emp绳ve strike.