Volume XXV, No. 1 XXV, Volume

America’s Enduring Dilemma of Fighting Insurgents Dilemma Enduring America’s with Airpower Clodfelter Mark Dr. Force the Joint Defending Lessons Learned from Balad Base Joint USAF Caudill, W. Shannon Col Lt USAF M. Packard, Anthony Col USAF M. Tembreull, Raymund Col Lt Good or GreatGood to Up It You! Is Colonel, USAF C. Kane, Robert Gen Maj USA Lackey, James COL and C. Gene Kamena Prof. with and Command Flexible Developing Control of Airpower Retired USAF, Hukill, Jeffrey Col Lt Strategy Airpower and Retired USAF, III, A. John Warden Col Forty-Five of Frustration Years Dr. Daniel R. Mortensen Daniel Dr. Spring 2011

AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Spring 2011 Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Norton A. Schwartz Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Edward A. Rice Jr. http://www.af.mil Commander, Air University Lt Gen Allen G. Peck Director, Air Force Research Institute Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired

Chief, Professional Journals Lt Col Paul D. Berg Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Maj Darren K. Stanford http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Editor Capt Wm. Howard Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Tammi K. Long, Editorial Assistant Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager

The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, Air and Space Power Journal and other matters of national defense. The views and 155 N. Twining Street opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, e-mail: [email protected] Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air Visit Air and Space Power Journal online University, or other agencies or departments of the US at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil. government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. Spring 2011 Volume XXV, No. 1 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspective

Good or Great ❙ 6 Colonel, It Is Up to You! Maj Gen Robert C. Kane, USAF with Prof. Gene C. Kamena COL James Lackey, USA

Guest Editorial

Farewell, Lt Col Paul Berg ❙ 10 Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired Director, Air Force Research Institute

Features

Developing Flexible Command and Control of Airpower ❙ 53 Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Dr. Daniel R. Mortensen The principle of centralized control and decentralized execution guides the application of airpower across the spectrum of conflict. Yet, the authors contend that “the Air Force has misapplied this pri- mary tenet” by limiting command and control (C2) of airpower only to the combatant commander lev- el. The current centralized practice works well for theater-level military operations but limits the Air Force’s ability to respond to situations requiring decision-making authority at lower organizational lev- els. This article details necessary changes to create a more flexible C2 structure by placing command authority at the appropriate level and providing greater flexibility in complex operating environments.

Strategy and Airpower ❙ 64 Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired Asserting the full capabilities of airpower in achieving national objectives, the author reminds readers that airpower resources are most effective when used in parallel to attack “virtually all of the centers of gravity directly related to strategic objectives, regardless of their location.” In defending the unique ca- pabilities of airpower, the author contends that airpower, correctly understood and applied, provides leaders greater flexibility to consider every conceivable method for affecting a center of gravity, regard- less of weapons system or class of munitions. Forty-Five Years of Frustration ❙ 78 America’s Enduring Dilemma of Fighting Insurgents with Airpower Dr. Mark Clodfelter Are the national media’s comparisons of the Vietnam conflict to the current conflict in the Middle East entirely without merit? The author identifies parallels between the two counterinsurgencies, noting the unintended consequences of bombing insurgents in their safe havens near or among civilian popula- tions. If theater planners are to improve host-nation support of allied operations, airpower, though al- ready extremely accurate, must be used with even greater restraint.

Defending the Joint Force ❙ 89 Lessons Learned from Joint Base Balad Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF Col Anthony M. Packard, USAF Lt Col Raymund M. Tembreull, USAF Prior to 2008, enemy harassment at Joint Base Balad (JBB), Iraq, impeded mission accomplishment. Traditional approaches to base defense were both reactive and insufficient. The authors describe and analyze how JBB’s leadership forged a new, proactive, and joint approach to integrated defense that successfully curtailed enemy attacks.

The Dangerous Decline in the Department of Defense’s Vaccine Program for Infectious Diseases ❙ 101 Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF The author argues that the Department of Defense needs to take swift action to revitalize its vaccine program for infectious diseases and enhance the synergy between biodefense and infectious-disease activities in order to resolve shortfalls in the acquisition and availability of vaccines. He establishes the historical impact of naturally occurring infectious diseases on military operations, the criticality of force health protection in defending the human weapon system, and the superiority of vaccines among medical countermeasures.

Departments

11 ❙ Ricochets and Replies

17 ❙ The Merge Accessibility: Improving the Mobilization Framework in Order to Leverage Availability of the Air National Guard ...... 17 Maj Sean F. Conroy, ANG 26 ❙ Views & Analyses War Fighting in Cyberspace: Evolving Force Presentation and Command and Control ...... 26 Maj M. Bodine Birdwell, USAF Lt Col Robert Mills, PhD, USAF, Retired What’s in a Name? Beyond Rescue As We Know It ...... 37 Maj Samuel Kwan, USAF Revelations in Haiti: The Side Effects of New Priorities for Remotely Piloted ISR Aircraft ...... 45 Capt Jaylan Haley, USAF

116 ❙ Book Reviews Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace . . . One School at a Time ...... 116 Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin Reviewer: Col Larry Carter, USAF, Retired The Architecture of Leadership ...... 117 Donald T. Phillips and Adm James M. Loy, USCG, Retired Reviewer: Maj Michael A. Marsicek, USAF Al Qaeda in Its Own Words ...... 118 Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds., trans. Pascale Ghazaleh Reviewer: Maj Stephane L. Wolfgeher, USAF Off I Went into the Wild Blue Yonder ...... 119 John James Knudsen Reviewer: Dr. David R. Mets Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate Change ...... 120 Kurt M. Campbell, ed. Reviewer: Maj Thomas G. Aranda, USAF The Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of the Berlin Airlift and America’s Finest Hour ...... 121 Andrei Cherny Reviewer: Lt Col Tom Cooper, USAF Circling the Earth: United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942–1948 ...... 122 Elliott V. Converse III Reviewer: CAPT Paul Younes, USNR The Adaptive Optics Revolution: A History ...... 124 Robert W. Duffner Reviewer: Lawrence R. Benson The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell ...... 125 Harry S. Laver and Jeffrey J. Matthews, eds. Reviewers: Dr. Paul A. Pohland and Col Eric A. “Ric” Pohland, USAF, Retired Hell Hawks!: The Untold Story of the American Fliers Who Savaged Hitler’s Wehrmacht ...... 126 Robert F. Dorr and Thomas D. Jones Reviewer: Kenneth P. Katz

127 ❙ Mission Debrief Editorial Advisory Board

Gen John A. Shaud, PhD, USAF, Retired, Air Force Research Institute Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Dr. J. Douglas Beason (Senior Executive Service and Colonel, USAF, Retired), Air Force Space Command Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy Lt Col Dave Mets, PhD, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)

Board of Reviewers

Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland Department of Homeland Security Dr. Kendall K. Brown Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Burke, Virginia Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth US Army War College RAND Dr. Mark Clodfelter Mr. Douglas E. Lee National War College Air Force Space Command Dr. Conrad Crane Dr. Richard I. Lester Director, US Army Military History Institute Eaker Center for Professional Development Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Mr. Brent Marley USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Redstone Arsenal, Alabama (professor emeritus) Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Duke University Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Dr. Stephen Fought West Chicago, Illinois USAF Air War College (professor emeritus) Dr. Daniel Mortensen Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF Air Force Research Institute USAF Academy Dr. Richard R. Muller Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Westport Point, Massachusetts Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Col Mike Guillot, USAF, Retired Air University Editor, Strategic Studies Quarterly Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Ohio State University The Pentagon Dr. Amit Gupta Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired USAF Air War College Air Force Research Institute Dr. Grant T. Hammond Dr. Steve Rothstein USAF Center for Strategy and Technology Colorado Springs Science Center Project Dr. Dale L. Hayden Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Air Force Research Institute Naval War College Mr. James Hoffman Dr. Barry Schneider Rome Research Corporation Director, USAF Counterproliferation Center Milton, Florida Professor, USAF Air War College Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute CyberSpace Operations Consulting Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Dr. Christopher H. Toner LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education University of St. Thomas Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Air Force Space Command Auburn University Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Col Mark E. Ware Navarre, Florida Twenty-Fourth Air Force Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Tom Keaney Johns Hopkins University

Spring 2011 | 5 Good or Great Colonel, It Is Up to You!

Maj Gen Robert C. Kane, USAF with Prof. Gene C. Kamena* COL James Lackey, USA

ver the past 10 years, I have di­ come one? This article begins to answer rectly supervised more than 90 col­ those questions, considers some of the attri­ onels in a diverse array of staff, butes of great colonels, and provides a frame­ Ocommand, and combat environments. It work for colonels to think about colonel­ has become obvious to me that the vast ship—the art of being a great colonel. No majority of them fall into two distinct cate­ “great colonel” school exists in the profes­ gories: good colonels and great colonels. sional military education system. Colonels The year that I recently spent as com­ become great by understanding what it mander of the 321st Air Expeditionary means to be a colonel, mentoring, observ­ Wing in Iraq served to reaffirm that certain ing other great colonels, reflecting on per­ tangible attributes do indeed separate the sonal experience, working hard, and prac­ great colonels from the merely good ones. ticing colonelship. In my new duties as commandant of the Regardless of their duty position, level of Air War College, my goal is to help officers command, or seniority, all colonels are ex­ understand these attributes and, more im­ pected to make things happen, arrive at de­ portantly, inspire them to become truly cisions, and solve problems. The difference great colonels. between a good colonel and a great one lies The difference between a good or great in how he or she carries out those tasks. colonel can be as discreet as the simple The “how” entails building relationships courtesy of a kind word of thanks or as ob­ with senior leaders and fulfilling the mis­ vious as a display of personal and profes­ sion. This difference involves more than sional courage and leadership necessary to nuance and is difficult to describe, yet any­ ensure a tough mission’s success. What is a one who sees great colonels in action recog­ great colonel, and how does an officer be­ nizes them as such. Typically, we react to

*Professor Kamena teaches leadership and ethics at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. A retired colonel, he served in the US Army as an infantry officer. Colonel Lackey serves as chief, Army Advisory Group, Maxwell AFB. He is also a member of the Air War College faculty in both the Warfighting Department and Leadership Department.

6 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

their effectiveness and efficiency by saying The discretion afforded colonels to de­ or thinking, “Obviously that colonel gets it!” cide when and where to place effort de­ Great colonels have the same effect as great pends upon their credibility, responsive­ teams whose whole far exceeds the sum of ness, and relationship with their immediate their parts and whose accomplishments can bosses, other superiors, and peers. Once vastly surpass expectations. Their presence they sense and acknowledge a colonel’s makes their organizations and people more professional authority, most senior leaders effective and efficient. They engender a welcome and encourage great colonels to synergy and harmony that transcend the push their limits. Building a reputation for leadership structure depicted by organiza­ taking on tough tasks and “closing deals” in tional charts or layers of bureaucracy. a manner that does not infringe on others is Great colonels need not have seniority; a vital element in the development of a rather, greatness is a matter of their per­ great colonel. Colonels must be selective in spective, judgment, and a personal awareness their efforts; they understand when to inter­ that they are empowered for a reason—to ject themselves into areas and when to let make a difference. Regardless of whether others work the problem or task. This they command or lead a staff group, great under ­standing or sense of when to act colonels fill gaps, translate, develop and en­ comes from being in tune with their envi­ dorse people, build bridges, and close deals. ronment, knowing what is happening We would do well to take a close look at around them, and then taking action, when how they execute those tasks. Unfortu­ required, based on critical thinking, experi­ ence, and judgment. nately, few senior leaders take time to ex­ Filling gaps is more art than science, so plain to new colonels the requirements for great colonels need a thorough understand­ making the move from good to great. ing of people and processes. Professional relationships and credible, responsive deci­ sions and actions represent the foundation Great Colonels Fill Gaps upon which great colonels use collegial, in­ Great colonels are often the first to see terpersonal skills to garner the trust and gaps—that is, a lack of capability in people, confidence necessary to fill gaps. Great col­ processes, or resources. A great colonel onels must develop a sense of when and works behind the scenes to reinforce, train, where to get involved; great colonels never or educate until the gap disappears. Filling say, “Not my job!” gaps works in all directions—up, down, and laterally—in other words, with superiors, subordinates, and peers. Great Colonels Translate Colonels have the latitude to define Of all the skills that colonels possess, the many of their own duties; therefore, they ability to translate—to apply the right per­ must survey the environment and discern spective—may be the most important. A where their efforts, experience, and talents good colonel becomes a great one by under­ are needed. In simple terms, most great col­ standing what the boss wants and by com­ onels effectively explore the boundaries of prehending what his words, actions, and their authority. The specific duty position emotions really mean. Great colonels add of a colonel serves only as the starting clarity and meaning to random thoughts point. Unlike a lieutenant colonel, a colonel and senior leaders’ “out-loud thinking.” does not operate within rigid boundaries; They know when to act and when to let he or she has room to place effort selec­ ideas develop. Sometimes colonels must tively or engage inside and outside the par­ ask for clarification, but after they under­ ent organization. stand the boss’s intent, it is up to them to

Spring 2011 | 7 translate thoughts into action by providing underwriting mistakes, and absorbing the direction, talking to others, establishing pri­ cost in time and money to send people to orities, or reinforcing the commander’s in­ professional development schools. Great tentions through word and deed. colonels think in terms of the immediate Several translation techniques also guar­ and long-term benefits of investing in peo­ antee that superiors remain grounded in ple; they visualize future rewards for to­ reality: holding formal and informal conver­ day’s efforts. sations and discussion, arranging the boss’s Colonels assess the strengths and weak­ schedule to facilitate an accurate picture of nesses in people and organizations and the situation, and sometimes closing the then do something to address them. They door and telling the boss the other side of work both formally and informally to de­ the story. The latter is not always easy to velop people, including subordinates, supe­ do, but it is necessary and expected of colo­ riors, and peers. Doing so requires a careful nels. Similarly, great colonels encourage consideration of workload so that no one subordinates to “close the door” and tell them person or organization becomes overtaxed. the other side of the story. Great colonels Great colonels inspire others to pursue ex­ can handle this candor, which encourages cellence, fostering a climate of team build­ their organizations to prosper and grow. ing with the goal of increasing the overall The organization and mission suffer if effectiveness of the organization’s output. colonels fail to translate the vision and in­ Great colonels not only develop subordi­ tent of superiors into action. Failure results nates but also endorse them to superiors. in frustration, inaction, wasted efforts, and Colonels help make subordinates successful even low morale. Great colonels have a by ensuring that they receive the lion’s sense of when to translate and when to share of credit for accomplishments while seek more information. They are masters at the colonels underwrite mistakes. This bal­ perceiving, both horizontally and vertically, ancing act / skill demands finesse and the second- and third-order effects, risks, thoughtfulness since the colonel delegates and considerations necessary to fully authority but always assumes ultimate re­ under ­stand a course of action or decision. sponsibility for success or failure. By the time They facilitate decision making with superi­ an officer is promoted to colonel, he or she ors and have the courage to arrive at tough must suppress the desire to receive accolades, decisions themselves. A great colonel trans­ deferring to the good of the organization. lates and connects to superiors, subordi­ Great colonels make organizations great nates, and peers—typically by working be­ by developing, endorsing, and empowering hind the scenes and without fanfare. At the people. This process takes time and energy, end of the day, great colonels obtain buy-in but, if done well, it exponentially improves and understanding. morale, efficiency, and productivity. In the long term, it creates a legacy that outlasts Great Colonels Develop and any single officer—even a great colonel. Endorse People Great Colonels Build Bridges Great colonels are mentors who use for­ mal and informal means to develop people. Great colonels consistently strive to build They realize that mentoring is the only way networks up and down the chain of com­ to leave behind a true legacy. Mentoring is mand as well as inside and outside their or­ more than a duty—training the next genera­ ganizations in order to bring people to­ tion is an obligation. All true development gether and create a more synergistic effort. includes organizing a sound mentoring pro­ They combine new ideas, talents, and re­ gram, investing in people on- and off-duty, sources to make the organization better and

8 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

more productive—they perform graduate- professionally staff a plan or proposed level team building. Great colonels bring course of action within their organization people together to create a team more ca­ and coordinate it with relevant higher, adja­ pable than its separate parts. cent, and lower echelons. They will then Relationships built upon trust and confi­ gain buy-in through relationships and build dence empower colonels and allow them to consensus before making a final decision. get things done. Good colonels work hard to They do much of this informally through build relationships; great colonels under­ relationships built upon their personal repu­ stand that relationships are a two-way street tations and credibility as honest brokers. requiring give and take. This perspective is Conceivably, a colonel might close the deal critical to success; a self-serving or unit-­ using brute force; however, over the long centric colonel will find others reluctant to haul, building far-reaching, working rela­ cooperate. In the end, garnering buy-in de­ tionships and maintaining a reputation as a pends on the ability to leverage relationships fair professional contribute significantly to for the good of the whole team. making a great colonel.

Great Colonels Close Deals Conclusion Much like the great baseball “closer” who shoulders the pressure in the ninth inning As I mentioned at the beginning of this to preserve a win for his team, the great col­ article, there are good colonels and great onel steps up and seals the deal for his orga­ colonels. The great ones operate with fi­ nization. Great colonels are closers who nesse and make things happen—not by possess well-developed skills of persuasion, what they do but how they do it. Great colo­ which, unlike pressure, is based on a logical nels make organizations great by filling and intellectually honest argument. The gaps, translating, developing and endorsing great colonel understands that sound argu­ people, building bridges, and closing deals ment is devoid of emotion. An argument inside and outside their organizations. With­ may be passionate but rarely zealous. Good out great colonels, no organization can suc­ persuasion yields consensus, the seminal ceed in today’s environment. Sometimes element of collegiality and cooperation. For being good is not good enough. Good or example, great colonels will completely and great: colonel, it is up to you! 

Maj Gen Robert C. Kane, USAF General Kane (BS, Grove City College; MS, University of Southern California) is commander of the Spaatz Center for Officer Education and commandant of the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The Spaatz Center directs, integrates, synchronizes, and supports a continuum of officer professional education, re- search, and outreach that produces leaders for joint and multinational environ- ments. The general has served in Turkey, Korea, Germany, and Iraq in a wide variety of operational and staff assignments, including commands at the squadron, group, wing, and center levels. As commander of the 86th Airlift Wing and Kaiserslautern Military Community, he was instrumental in leading the Ramstein community to win the 2006 Commander in Chief Annual Award for Installation Excellence. Prior to his current assignment, he served as commanding general, Coalition Air Force Transition Team, Baghdad, Iraq, responsible for coalition efforts to rebuild the Iraqi air force. He is a command pilot with more than 4,200 hours in the C-130, C-21, KC-135, C-37, C-32, VC-137, C-12, C-141, T-37, and T-38. General Kane is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

Spring 2011 | 9 Guest Editorial

Farewell, Lt Col Paul Berg Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired Director, Air Force Research Institute

his issue marks the end of a sig- Paul’s leadership enabled substantial nificant era for Air and Space growth in the Journal’s quality and time­ Power Journal (ASPJ). Since 2004 Lt liness, extending its relevance and accessi- Col Paul Berg, PhD, has served not bility across a new range of multinational Tonly as senior editor of ASPJ but also as readers. He established three new foreign chief of professional journals and mentor to language versions of the Journal—French five additional editorial teams that publish (now Africa and Francophonie), Arabic, and independent versions of the Journal in Chinese. Like ASPJ’s earlier Spanish and Spanish, Portuguese, French, Arabic, and Portuguese editions, these newer journals Chinese. He will soon retire from active feature unique content tailored to promote duty after 28 years of extraordinary service engagement and mutual understanding in to the nation. strategically important regions. Under Lieu- Over the past six years—roughly one- tenant Colonel Berg’s leadership, the air- tenth of ASPJ’s existence—Lieutenant Colo- power message is now accessible in locales nel Berg supplied the vision and expertise from Beijing to Bogotá, Rio to Riyadh, and that shaped the Journal and furthered its Mombasa to Montreal. ­reputation. He enlarged an already enviable Having accumulated some 5,800 flight network of air, space, and cyberspace ex- hours, two tours on the faculty at Air Uni- perts who offered both thought-provoking versity, and a “365” to the current war, Lt commentary on and unflinching peer re- Col Paul Berg is the scholar-warrior we view of articles submitted to ASPJ. Under hear about. He has put his heart and soul his leadership, the Journal served as a hub into both the Air Force and ASPJ, and we of information where airpower laureates are privileged to have served with him. On and operational leaders met to scrutinize behalf of the men and women of Air Uni- airpower axioms and forge new understand- versity, especially those affiliated with the ing of evolving capabilities and challenges. Air Force Research Institute and all ver- As a result, ASPJ consistently provided se- sions of the Journal, we congratulate him nior military and civilian leaders the benefit on his inspiring service to the nation and of independent, critical thinking across the extend our best wishes for success in his full spectrum of Air Force disciplines. future endeavors. 

10 | Air & Space Power Journal Ricochets & Replies

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A SEAT AT THE TABLE the irreplaceable assistance of ground forces, that unhinged the Taliban in a mat- Lt Gen Mike Hostage’s article “A Seat at the ter of weeks in 2001. Unfortunately, there- Table: Beyond the Air Component Coordi- after a series of various ground-centric nation Element” (Winter 2010) is a refreshing ­strategies that lacked sufficient jointness and timely reminder from a highly respected, squandered that early success. war-fighting Airman that leadership in war Perhaps it is time for a more air-minded is ultimately a human endeavor, and that (not “air-centric”) approach. To clarify, at its physical presence and personal relationships core, “air-mindedness” is not about the Air mean much in councils of war. That said, I Force or even airpower per se; rather, it is very much appreciate his wise indication an intellectual approach that emphasizes that centralized control of a high-demand, the strategic goal, and—in its most basic low-density capability such as airpower has ­interpretation—looks for opportunities to real merit, especially in terms of exploiting achieve it in ways that minimize the ability airpower’s inherent flexibility and range in of the enemy to bring his weapons to bear. service of economy of force. In this sense, it unapologetically contra- My only concern with General Hostage’s venes the ground component’s penchant for superb article is the statement that his in- the often bloody and costly “close fight.” To tent “is to make the ground commander paraphrase Gen George Patton, it is about successful” (p. 20). I am uneasy with this making the other guy die for his ideology— remark because some readers might mis­ and if that occurs from the safety of afar, so interpret it as precluding, ab initio, even much the better. Air-mindedness is about the possibility that something other than a imposing upon the enemy the proverbial ground-centric approach would achieve the “unfair fight,” and this often (but not always) nation’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan means exploiting technological prowess or, for that matter, any conflict. I believe that the enemy either doesn’t possess or that his comment is better interpreted as fails to grasp fully. Among other things, it not diminishing focus on the intent to ac- embraces persuading the enemy that he complish the mission (as opposed to simply faces a remorseless, impersonal machine enabling a particular component com- that will relentlessly hunt and kill him mander—ground or otherwise—to claim without compunction. It aims to breed pri- success). Put another way, fulfilling the mordial terror. Properly employed, air- mission is (or ought to be) a joint endeavor mindedness is a psychological endeavor rather than one that focuses on a single that inflicts not only fear but also a sense of ­military-service component. More broadly, frustration, helplessness, and—ultimately— for all the “joint” rhetoric, true jointness is hopelessness on the adversary’s mind-set. It at the lowest ebb I’ve seen in years. The Air either breaks his will or breaks his body; it Force’s enormous (yet rarely reciprocated) ruthlessly forces the enemy to choose his fate. effort to be deferent to its sister services has Airmen, authentically thinking like Air- earned it little and, in important ways, has men, necessarily bring a different perspec- been counterproductive. In particular, I tive to war fighting than do their brothers and worry that Airmen increasingly think of sisters of the ground components. I suspect themselves only as adjuncts to, and service that ground commanders actually want that— providers for, ground commanders. This is as do others. It’s worth remembering Under- not good for the nation. We should not for- secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy’s ad- get that it was multiservice airpower, with monition: “During the 80s and early 90s, the

Spring 2011 | 11 Air Force was on the leading edge in inno- In facing any crisis, our leaders should vative strategic thinking within [the Depart- take as their entering premise the goal of at- ment of Defense], driving the development taining the political objective: a better state of new concepts of operations and ways of of peace (obviously, not my original war. The Air Force was the poster child for thought). Trying to get there on the cheap thought-leadership in the Pentagon. But that will always cost more over the long haul. has become less and less true, even though Therefore, our leaders must soberly esti- we need such thinking more today than ever” mate (and frequently update) the value of (“Remarks to the US Air Force Senior Leader the political objective in light of the prob- Orientation Course” [speech, Air University, able cost in lives and treasure to the very 14 August 2009], http://www.au.af.mil/au citizens they purport to serve. In doing so, /aunews/archive/2009/0419/Articles/USDP they will achieve—over the course of nu- Remarks.htm). I found General Hostage’s merous battles and campaigns—what the article a vitally important step towards help- author advocates: “limit[ing] the exposure of ing Airmen recapture the intellectual initia- American forces to danger.” tive. Let’s not allow it to be interpreted in a Col David Gurney, USMC, Retired way I don’t believe was intended. Miami, Florida Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, Retired Duke University, North Carolina It strikes me that Colonel Meilinger and many of the people he quotes are confusing THE MUTABLE NATURE OF WAR method and nature. War and violence are inseparable. More precisely, war is insepa- As a graduate of the School of Advanced rable from the willingness to employ—and, Air and Space Studies, I eagerly read Col when necessary, absorb—violence, both or- Phillip Meilinger’s latest article “The Mu- ganized and applied to achieve some end. table Nature of War” (Winter 2010). How- The fact that some operations do not in- ever, in this piece, he erects and fells straw volve physical combat or that technological men that fail to support his thesis of mu- advances make it possible to inflict more table war. He asserts that “the role and duty damage and casualties on an adversary than of military planners from all services we absorb is neither new nor changes the should involve doing everything in their nature of war. Colonel Meilinger’s own ex- power to plan operations that limit the ex- amples highlight this fact. posure of American forces to danger” (em- Blockades and sanctions may not involve phasis in original, p. 28). Unfortunately, sustained combat, but their effectiveness this puts the cart before the horse. The role often involves willingness to employ vio- and duty of military planners from all ser- lence to enforce or breach them. Much vices should involve doing everything in ­naval history has been made by clashes be- their power to plan operations that effi- tween blockade runners and blockading ciently accomplish the mission. Later, he warships—participants would disagree that compounds the error vis-à-vis grand strategy: those actions were not violent and bloody “In facing any crisis, our leaders should take on their own scale. The Berlin airlift—argu- as their entering premise the goal of attaining ably one of history’s more effective air cam- such [bloodless] results” (emphasis in origi- paigns—succeeded because the Allies were nal, p. 28). Nonsense. This mirrors an en- willing to risk combat to breach the block- during airpower fallacy which holds that ade, whereas the Soviet Union was not will- airpower adds dignity to what would other- ing to do the same to enforce it. The US wise be an ugly brawl. I am an airpower en- blockade of Cuba in 1962 succeeded on the thusiast, but those who fancy that any tech- same principle. That neither actually came nology will make war less awful are to violence does not change the fact that pursuing a chimera. willingness to employ it—“to put our own

12 | Air & Space Power Journal Ricochets & Replies

skin on the line,” in Gen James Mattis’s limitation in our air-to-air power projec- words—was immutably part of both. tion—the vulnerability of bases “within Cyberwar—or, more appropriately, cyber- range of the area of interest” (p. 48). Fortu- combat—also doesn’t negate the violent na- nately, we have overcome this problem in ture of war. Although hacking into computer recent conflicts, but there is no guarantee infrastructure can certainly cause short- that we can do so in the next one. The au- term havoc with communications, transpor- thor’s proposed solution—arming B-1s with tation, power, and economic information, air-to-air capability—is not viable for the similar disruption due to natural disaster, following reasons. accident, and criminal activity indicates First, modifying a B-1 as the author that such action is unlikely, by itself, to proposes would create the equivalent of bend a country to another’s will. Just as an F‑15E with 48 missiles, albeit with far electronic warfare evolved during the latter less maneuverability to defend itself. Con- part of the twentieth century to negate or sider what would happen if we sent this enhance combat operations, so were the “Super Strike Eagle” up against, say, eight Russians’ network attacks on Georgian in- Su-30s in the Taiwan Strait. Unfortunately, formation systems designed for the same the Strike Eagle’s radar is not magic, and purpose—to render their opponent more neither is the advanced medium-range vulnerable to combat action. Chinese writ- air-to-air missile, or any other. There is no ings on the subject follow the same theme. doubt about the outcome of the engage- Last, equating our ability to employ vio- ment: the B-1 would either run away or lence without absorbing an equal amount find itself at the bottom of the ocean. If as a change in the nature of war is a bit star- anyone thinks other­wise, he or she can tling. Minimizing unnecessary casualties or hop in an F-15 (C or E) simulator, set the damage is not a new principle in war. Cer- missile load to infinite, and try it. Oh, and tainly the image of Predator crews launch- this includes setting a limit of no more ing air strikes from half a world away is less than three-G turns. Much more goes into gritty than that of an infantry platoon in a air-to-air combat than the number of mis- firefight. Physical stress and suffering are siles carried. The enemy probably will op- often less a factor for an aircrew member erate from his home airfields, so his prob- than an infantryman, but that does not ne- lem set will not include range, numbers, gate the fact that both are involved in apply- and persistence. ing—and, at times, receiving—violence. The Second, we have a very limited number same dichotomy has applied since the sling of B-1s left in the inventory—how many allowed one man to kill another at greater should we modify for air-to-air combat? than arm’s reach. War is the application of, What impact would this have on our inter- or willingness to apply, organized violence continental strike capability? Is that accept- to achieve a specific end. Good leadership able? The counterargument to my first in war involves controlling the level and point would involve creating the large num- application of violence while minimizing bers of B-1s that we would need to actually exposure to the same. Both principles have gain and maintain air superiority. Unfortu- survived the test of time. nately, I don’t believe we can do that be- cause of our small fleet. Col Jamie Sculerati, USAF MacDill AFB, Florida Finally, the aircrew training required to maintain proficiency in the air-to-air role GLOBAL POWER is far more demanding than that for the air-to-ground role (ask any multirole- Lt Col Bruce Cox’s article “Global Power fighter aircrew). Lieutenant Colonel Cox’s Requires a Global, Persistent Air-to-Air Ca- solution would create at least a doubling pability” (Winter 2010) identifies the key of B-1 crews’ training—is that really vi-

Spring 2011 | 13 able? What happens to their (primary) air- Kudos to Lt Gen Philip Breedlove and Maj to-ground proficiency? The rest of the Brian Tyler for their well-written article. It ­article is interesting, and I feel that re- is a good discussion of how joint force air motely piloted aircraft will likely assume component commanders (JFACC) exercise the air-to-air role in the future. For now, C2, but it didn’t fully bring to light the is- though, improving access to defendable sue of US Air Force C2 at the operational airfields in high-threat areas is a more level because it concentrates on how joint tenable solution than arming B-1s with air operations centers support JFACCs. air-to-air capabilities. That is only half of the story. I wish the Lt Col Paul Matier, USAF authors had also discussed the importance Washington, DC of Air Force forces support to both plan de- velopment and the sustainment of mission FALL 2010 ISSUE operations, as well as the importance of reachback to headquarters units to support Once again you have produced a fantastic the mission. quarterly issue that contains a terrific vari- Col Patricia Battles, USAF ety of articles that are well written and Pentagon, Washington, DC nicely sourced. That issue was an outstand- ing team effort. I truly appreciate and find CIVILIAN LANGUAGE EDUCATION very useful the leadership articles by Gen IN AMERICA Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF. Well done! Daniel McDowell I fully agree with retired Air Force colonel St. Paul, Minnesota John Conway’s article “Civilian Language Education in America: How the Air Force REENABLING AIR FORCE COMMAND and Academia Can Thrive Together” (Fall AND CONTROL FOR TWENTY-FIRST- 2010). When it comes to languages, there is CENTURY PARTNERSHIPS indeed a disconnect between ROTC, Officer Training School, and the Air Force Academy “Reenabling Air Force Command and Control on the one hand, and the rest of the Air for Twenty-First-Century Partnerships” by Lt Force on the other. One of my majors at Vir- Gen Philip Breedlove and Maj Brian Tyler ginia Military Institute (one of the five mili- (Fall 2010) is a great article that highlights the tary schools Colonel Conway mentions) was requirement for building personal relation- French. I graduated in 1994 when the world ships and flexibility in our command and con- differed noticeably from today’s post–11 trol (C2) structures. My one concern is the September 2001 environment. I began authors’ statement “With regard to the former studying French in the eighth grade and [joint trust], relationships between command- wish I had started even earlier since I’m ers are often more important than command almost fluent. relationships” (p. 13). I fear that some people In my opinion, the military is appropri- might misconstrue that statement as mini- ately targeting Farsi and Pashtoon capabili- mizing the importance of command relation- ties because those languages are the “soupe ships or else justifying not taking the time du jour” for the current war effort. Mean- required to think through command relation- while, the military seems to be deemphasiz- ships and get them correct. I believe it is ing other languages, as evidenced by its dis- more correct to say that both command rela- allowing foreign language proficiency pay tionships and personal relationships are im- for military members who speak the “Big portant because one without the other would Three” languages unless they are assigned make our C2 structures less effective. to jobs that specifically require them. How- Col Edward J. Groeninger, USAF, Retired ever, we still need the Big Three to main- Hurlburt Field, Florida tain ties to valuable allies in both Europe

14 | Air & Space Power Journal Ricochets & Replies

and Asia. Opportunities to hone skills in that the best way to get Air Force officers these languages are available only on our who are qualified in less commonly taught own time and expense while we’re away languages is to send them to DLI. from the office. The Army has a robust foreign area of- Maybe I’m just one of the too many ficer program and sends many officers French-speaking officers, but I’ll take my there for foreign language training. During commentary a step further. I have found my active duty career, the Air Force spo- that when I use French with native speak- radically attempted to start a foreign area ers, the dialogue—thus, the relationship— officer program, but without much success. becomes that much stronger because I I don’t know if that situation has since im- made the effort to speak their language proved. Colleges may institute programs in rather than assuming that my international certain languages, but financial and other counterparts would speak English (i.e., the constraints may not allow those programs quid pro quo is vastly improved). Addition- to exist for long. If a military service needs ally, I perceive that the Air Force’s develop- language training for its members, DLI mental team construct, at least in the com- gets the resources to start and sustain pro- bat air forces, barely emphasizes language grams for as long as needed. In addition, capabilities unless the teams need to fill a DLI can send out mobile teams to conduct particular quota for an intermediate or a refresher training. senior developmental education school. One very good potential source of Air Based on feedback from people I have men- Force officers with language abilities in less tored during the professional military edu- commonly taught languages is the existing cation process, I think that members who pool of enlisted cryptologic linguists. I don’t have no capability or interest in foreign lan- think that linguist retention rates after the guages are often handed opportunities to first term of enlistment are very high. Why fill those quotas and that they accept those not try harder to recruit those qualified en- assignments reluctantly. Individuals clam- listed linguists to become officers? As an oring to use language capabilities they ac- instructor for a signals intelligence officer quired prior to joining the Air Force have course in the 1980s, I trained many prior- few opportunities to do so. I think that the service linguists to become signals intelli- Air Force is not looking at the whole skill gence officers. This program virtually set of officers and is not leveraging those stopped when higher levels of command personnel who already possess language became concerned that many of these offi- capabilities. I’m a qualified attaché working cers would retire before serving long in the Air Staff while my language skills sit enough to attain field grade rank and be- on the shelf because my attaché assignment come eligible to fill managerial and com- was cancelled three years ago. I welcome mand billets. opening up dialogue on this topic. Although civilian education can certainly Lt Col Timothy P. Lyon, USAF be helpful to the military, if a service really Pentagon, Washington, DC wants officers who possess top-notch lan- guage skills, it sends them to DLI one way I read Col John Conway’s article with inter- or another; ensures they get jobs that actu- est. My background includes graduating ally make use of these languages; and from the Defense Language Institute’s makes sure they get the time and resources (DLI) Korean language program and then to maintain their language proficiency. Per- serving as a Korean linguist, signals intel- haps foreign language qualifications and ligence officer, and associate dean of three ability should become a factor in promo- different schools at DLI’s Foreign Language tions as well. Center. I retired in 1998. Although Colonel Maj Michael Markovitch, USAF, Retired Conway makes many good points, I believe Monterey, California

Spring 2011 | 15 SEEING THE WHOLE ELEPHANT and reconnaissance coverage, preparation of operational environments (such as airborne Lt Col Michael Pietrucha’s article “Seeing the electronic attack), personnel and material Whole Elephant: Envisioning a Successful transport, and close air support, US surface Light Attack Program for the US Air Force” forces would be fighting very different wars (Fall 2010) reminded me of an experience with very different results. Indeed, Lieuten- during the Vietnam War. During the early ant Colonel Martin builds his argument 1970s, while on the Air Staff, I participated mainly on the basis of such primarily US Air in a project called Credible Chase, which in- Force functions. I agree that withdrawing volved substituting a simple aircraft for an military forces before the war is won will re- AC-130 gunship and providing village or re- quire a strong air force to serve as a rear gional fire support. Various manufacturers guard. Additionally, as the author puts it, the came forward with alternative design pro- Iraq war is “not the war we might want or posals. The project eventually involved two wish to have at a later time” (p. 46). Put dif- small short-takeoff-and-landing cargo air- ferently, although the US military can influ- frames with fixed miniguns. The results ence the withdrawal timetable, it cannot de- were mixed, and funding problems eventu- termine the withdrawal environment. We ally caused the program to be cancelled. One already saw that the first US withdrawal in additional proposal that was particularly at- August 2010 occurred quietly. An unfriendly tractive involved an updated F-51 with a tur- environment is the most straightforward and boprop, which might be worth another look logical reason for the US Air Force to be the today. Good luck with this one. last military force to pull out. Lt Col Ray Hodson, USAF, Retired If I understand correctly, both Pres. Barack Austin, Texas Obama and Secretary of Defense ­Robert Gates intend to withdraw only combat forces. FINISHING STRONG IN IRAQ A large number of other US personnel, in- Assuming that the US government’s com- cluding active service members, will stay in mitment to withdraw it troops from Iraq is Iraq to support stability operations and for- not overturned by political or military un- eign internal defense. Who then will protect certainties, US armed forces will complete these other US personnel? Further, who will their pullout in about one year. As we continue to fulfill the yet-to-be-realized US know, the withdrawal process has already national objectives? These two questions ac- begun. In the eyes of many people, how- tually relate to the questions I raised at the ever, the war in Iraq, along with the with- beginning. The author stops short here and drawal announcement, has left unanswered fails to move further in this direction, but we questions about the war’s purpose, whether can surmise that these responsibilities will be it was worth all the effort, and who won. shouldered primarily by the US Air Force in After the US military pullout, more ques- the next phase of the operation. tions will arise concerning whether the war It is easy to expect that even if the US Air is really over and what will happen after Force eventually pulls out, it will not stay far the US withdrawal. With all these questions away from Iraq. Operations similar to South- in mind, I read Lt Col William Martin’s ar- ern Watch and Northern Watch will continue ticle “Finishing Strong in Iraq: Why the Air to occur. Although US Army boots may no Force Must Be the Last to Leave Operation longer tread on Iraqi ground, US fighter jets Iraqi Freedom” (ASPJ, Summer 2010; ASPJ in will maintain control of the Iraqi sky. So, in Chinese, Fall 2010). the foreseeable future, I think the US Air There is no doubt that the US Air Force Force will not leave Iraq, at least not in the has played crucial roles in all the wars and true sense of the word “withdrawal.” military operations since the first Gulf War. Jia Mingzheng Without sustained intelligence, surveillance, Nanjing, China

16 | Air & Space Power Journal The Merge

In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers are free to join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected]. Accessibility Improving the Mobilization Framework in Order to Leverage Availability of the Air National Guard

Maj Sean F. Conroy, ANG*

oing to war is not supposed to be calling into question the availability of ANG easy. Sending citizens, including units and individual guardsmen. members of the regular and reserve The word available indicates that an en- G tity has the qualities and willingness to take forces, into harm’s way is not supposed to be routine.1 The powers to declare war, regu- on responsibility and that it is accessible for late the armed forces, and call forth the mi- use—a description applicable to the ANG. litia all belong to the Congress. At the time Thus, the accessibility of ANG personnel to of the nation’s founding, placing these pow- the RegAF and their availability to fulfill ers in a body whose members could barely RegAF taskings are not the problem. The get along assured that war would not come true measure of accessibility is not the ease easily. Although recognizing the need for a with which the RegAF tasks the ANG but ready force, the framers of the Constitution how often the ANG fills Air Force needs harbored fears of a standing army.2 Together without denying the request. Accessibility, with these safeguards, the procedural pro- therefore, involves not only the ability of the RegAF to task the ANG but also the af- cesses embodied in Air Force instructions firmative ANG response when the RegAF (AFI) and business rules impose strict asks. ANG units have neither claimed non- guidelines on when and how the nation availability nor turned down the opportu- may call Air National Guard (ANG) forces nity to participate in the current conflicts. to duty. These guidelines determine the ac- The ANG has never failed to participate cessibility of the ANG—the measure of the when the RegAF gave it the opportunity to ease with which the nation obtains the ca- do so, but there are better ways to access pabilities that reside in that organization. the ANG than the current combination of However, for at least the last nine years, the voluntary and involuntary mobilization. At Air Force—unlike its sister services—has present, the RegAF programs ANG voluntary routinely circumvented many of these man- mobilizations into the deployment cycle.3 dates in order to access the ANG without This situation not only runs contrary to the employing involuntary mobilization. This precepts of AFI 10-402, volume 1, Mobiliza- loophole tactic inflates the perceived com- tion Planning and Personnel Readiness, 9 Au- bat capability of the active component of gust 2007, but also masks the RegAF’s inca- the Air Force (RegAF) while incorrectly pacity to meet combatant commander

*The author, commander of the 159th Security Forces Squadron (Louisiana Air National Guard), is an action officer in the Air National Guard director’s Strategic Studies Group.

Spring 2011 | 17 (COCOM) requirements while keeping the the Air Force to meet its taskings both at home burdens of mobilization on the ANG unit and and abroad. However, the history of the ANG, the individual Guard member instead of on especially the past 20 years, tells a completer the RegAF. The Air Force needs to build a pre- story and fully illustrates how the Air Force dictable and stable rule set prior to formaliz- has drifted away from both congressional re- ing current mobilization business rules into quirements for utilization of the ANG and its an AFI. Improving this rule set should em- own policies for such utilization. phasize normalizing and making transparent The ANG has always delivered critical ca- the requirements for voluntary and involun- pability to the United States by filling the gap tary mobilization. Such improvement will when mission requirements exceeded the eliminate any questions about the RegAF’s abilities of the RegAF’s force structure. Start- ability to access the ANG when needed. ing in 1953 and continuing after the end of This article does not argue against all vol- the Cold War, the ANG performed the home- untary mobilizations, which represent a valu- land air defense mission. At one time or an- able way for the ANG to support Air Force other, all of the 70 ANG fighter squadrons in requirements and afford members who would existence during this period participated in otherwise not deploy the opportunity to this mission. Otherwise, the Air Force could serve. However, the RegAF should not fill not have carried out homeland air defense 5 gaps in its actual readiness with capability while fulfilling its overseas commitments. provided through voluntary mobilization. In- The Cold War offers many examples of the voluntary mobilization is the proper way to ANG’s acting as a shock absorber for the Air use ANG assets to fill this capability gap. The Force and conducting operational missions 6 current conflicts will eventually wind down, such as homeland defense. but the “concept of an operational reserve, in ANG integration accelerated following the which Reserve forces participate routinely Cold War. After Saddam Hussein invaded Ku- and regularly in ongoing military missions,” wait in 1990, the United States mobilized for 4 war. Among those deployed were 12,456 mem- will endure. Therefore we need to account 7 properly for ANG use and ensure that its per- bers of the ANG. During the 12 years that fol- sonnel are accessed equitably and fairly. lowed the Gulf War, almost every F-16 and F-15 Toward that end, this article first recounts unit in the ANG deployed to the Middle East to the seamless and indispensable integration of enforce the no-fly zones in northern and the ANG into the RegAF in service to the na- southern Iraq. Much of the airlift and tanker support for these operations came from ANG tion. Next, it describes the voluntary and in- units as well.8 Many units deployed multiple voluntary mobilizations of the ANG, exploring times. Additionally, ANG fighters participated the federal laws that enable a guardsman to in no-fly-zone enforcement in the Balkans and deliver needed capability to the RegAF. The in Operation Allied Force. article then examines Department of Defense After 9/11 the DOD launched Operation (DOD) and Air Force policies that affect ac- Noble Eagle (ONE), “the name given to mili- cessibility of ANG members. It concludes by tary operations related to homeland secu- recommending changes to improve and sus- rity.”9 Ultimately, the ANG assumed most of tain total force participation based on a the air sovereignty alert missions, operating credible accounting by the Air Force of the most (16 of 18) of the alert sites as part of support it receives from the ANG. ONE ground alert (ONE GA), the 24-hour-a- day, 365-day-a-year homeland security mis- Demonstrated Accessibility sion. ONE GA fighters and tankers stand ready to launch in order to intercept poten- The years since the terrorist attacks of 11 tially hostile aircraft and other aircraft of September 2001 (9/11) have witnessed unprec- interest, including civilian planes in dis- edented use of all types of ANG units, enabling tress. ANG aircraft continually tasked for

18 | Air & Space Power Journal The Merge

ONE GA further illustrate the Guard’s ac- secretary can accept a volunteer to active cessibility and availability. duty. A guardsman, however, also requires The wars in the Middle East have witnessed the consent of state authorities, usually del- a continual ANG presence. It has supplied egated by the governor to the adjutant gen- fighter, airlift, air refueling, search and rescue, eral. Significantly, governors cannot object to special operations, and five different manned overseas service because of “location, pur- and unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and pose, type, or schedule of such active duty.”14 reconnaissance platforms alongside active Thus, the burden of activation remains on duty counterparts constantly since 2001.10 the volunteer and his or her chain of com- When Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, mand. The volunteer often faces a confused ANG units participated from day one. The op- and perturbed employer as well as a largely eration’s initial surge saw the ANG providing unengaged community. Legal protections for 236 of the Air Force’s 863 aircraft (27 percent). military service are the same, regardless of Of these aircraft, 92 were fighters (31 percent whether the member mobilizes voluntarily of the total number of fighters), 72 were C-130s or involuntarily, but the perceptions are de- (58 percent of the C-130s and 55 percent of the cidedly different. Some civilian employers Air Force’s total airlift aircraft), and 57 were accept their employees’ involuntary mobili- KC-135s (38 percent of the deployed KC-135s zations much more readily than voluntary and 31 percent of the Air Force’s air refueling mobilizations. After all, in a voluntary mobi- aircraft).11 More than 7,200 air guardsmen de- lization, the employee decides whether or ployed for the opening phase of Iraqi Freedom, not to deploy and, by extension, leave the representing 11 percent of the 64,246-strong civilian employer. Air Force contingent.12 Guardsmen are rarely part of a larger In addition to fighters, the ANG currently military community such as the one on or provides 22 percent of the combat air pa- near an active duty base. Voluntary mobili- trols (nine of 41) flown by remotely piloted zations—especially of small numbers of per- aircraft and 24 percent of the intelligence sonnel—do not generate the community data processing, exploitation, and dissemi- support that involuntary mobilizations of nation ground-based missions (10 of 41) to large units do. Often the voluntary mobili- the joint force.13 ANG airlift squadrons, air zation passes almost unnoticed. For the refueling squadrons, rescue units, air opera- member’s chain of command, a unit-based tions groups, medical groups, security force like the ANG must accept a reduced forces squadrons, and civil engineering mission-readiness level when a volunteer squadrons, among others, have mobilized in vacates one of the unit’s personnel billets. support of overseas contingency operations. The unit will report such reduced readiness status (normally in the Status of Resources and Training report) if the Air Force subse- Mobilization quently mobilizes it.15 The activation authority that brings a The RegAF relies heavily on voluntary mo- guardsman to active duty resides in Title 10 bilization of the ANG to fill shortfalls. From of the United States Code. Although Title 10 February 2000 to June 2010, the Air Guard contains many subsections, this article ad- averaged about 12,198 guardsmen on Title 10 dresses only those that pertain to war fight- active orders each month. Seventy-four per- cent of these (about 9,062 per month) volun- ing. A guardsman enters the fight in one of 16 two ways: voluntarily or involuntarily. tarily mobilized. At present, the overwhelm- ing majority of ANG combat air forces (CAF) members conduct air and space expedition- Voluntary ary force (AEF) and ONE taskings under vol- For reservists who volunteer, section 12301(d) untary mobilization rules. When the RegAF of Title 10 applies, under which the service asked the ANG for capability, it delivered.

Spring 2011 | 19 More than nine years into the current con- secretary can call every member of the re- flicts, in contrast to the intent of AFI 10-402, serve component “to active duty for the du- the RegAF continues to rely on voluntary mo- ration of the war or emergency and for six bilization. This instruction specifically defines months thereafter.”21 Thus, section 12301(a) voluntary mobilization “as a bridge to quickly also addresses involuntary mobilization. Sec- expand active force capabilities, while await- tion 12301(c) requires entire-unit mobiliza- ing legal authority to proceed with involun- tion during the involuntary mobilization of tary activation actions,” recognizing a selective “members of units organized and trained to use of voluntary mobilization “throughout a serve as units.”22 The ANG consists of units, contingency and beyond.”17 As the RegAF cur- not individuals.23 Therefore, the service rently applies this definition, the use of ANG could not mobilize an individual without volunteers allows the Air Force to claim that that individual’s consent. Partial mobilization it meets most CAF taskings without involun- is the concept embodied in section 12302: tary mobilization. This assertion is somewhat during a presidentially declared national misleading because the RegAF cannot meet emergency, the president may order any its tasking without ANG support. unit to active duty for not more than two years.24 Section 12302(c) limits this authority Involuntary to 1 million members of the reserve at any time. According to presidential reserve call-up, Contrast the discussion above to an involun- the common reference for section 12304, the tary mobilization that can occur after a declara- president may call any unit or any individ- tion of war or a presidential or congressional ual member of the selected reserve to active 18 declaration of national emergency. Such a duty, with a limit of 200,000 members for declaration renders the ANG directly acces- 365 days.25 Members of the ANG are part of sible to the RegAF.19 A governor’s consent is no the selected reserve.26 DOD policies control longer necessary. Involuntary mobilization, the actual use of these authorities. however, requires the RegAF to declare its shortfalls and fill them with members of the Air Reserve Component. In career fields with Policy exceptionally great needs (such as security The DOD and the Air Force apply these forces, tactical air control parties, and para­ mobilization laws when they access the ANG. rescue), the RegAF has involuntarily mobilized The conflicts following 9/11 have showcased guardsmen and often uses them outside the the invaluable role of the Guard. However, be- AEF construct. With involuntary mobilization, cause some policy assumptions prior to 9/11— the burdens—including the political ones—of such as the concept of a strategic reserve—no using the ANG shift from the ANG member longer hold true, both the DOD and the Air and unit to the RegAF. Finally, involuntary mo- Force are developing policy that matches the bilization ensures that guardsmen are covered current and projected use of the ANG. by secretary of defense policies regarding deploy-to-dwell time ratios (discussed below)— Department of Defense Policy a critical protection that serves to maintain the support of civilian employers and the contin- In January 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert ued availability of reservists.20 Gates issued a memorandum setting goals for The RegAF executes involuntary mobiliza- limits on how frequently the services in­ tion under three distinct sections of Title voluntarily mobilize their reserve members, 10—namely, full mobilization, partial mobili- resulting in the publication of Department of zation, and presidential reserve call-up. Full Defense Directive 1235.10, Activation, Mobili- mobilization is the common reference for sec- zation, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, tion 12301(a). During a congressionally de- on 26 November 2008.27 Finally, on 4 Febru- clared war or national emergency, a service ary 2010, the DOD released Department of

20 | Air & Space Power Journal The Merge

Defense Instruction 1235.12, Accessing the Re- AEF.34 Such use of the ANG not only runs serve Components, which combines the guid- contrary to the Air Force’s instructions con- ance contained in the previous documents. cerning voluntary mobilization but also shifts This instruction calls for a one-to-five the burdens of mobilization outlined above to (1:5) deploy-to-dwell ratio for ANG units the individual and the unit.35 Even a unit mo- that the Air Force involuntarily mobilizes.28 bilized within its own AEF bucket suffers in This goal ratio recognizes that some Guard that it does not receive credit for the deploy- units will remobilize sooner than the 1:5 to-dwell time because deployments from vol- ratio would imply.29 Related to this reserve untary mobilizations do not count. goal is an active component planning objec- The Air Force has another document—Air tive of a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio.30 Force Mobilization Business Rules—whose te- Since the ANG provides much of its service nets become applicable “when combatant in a voluntary status, the dwell ratio is an im- commander requirements exceed the active portant part of any dialogue concerning use component . . . capability and [Air Reserve of the Guard. Exceptions to the 1:5 dwell ratio Component] volunteer pool.”36 Additional require approval by the secretary of defense.31 triggers come into play when the RegAF Dwell time, however, includes voluntary ser- forces in the “AEF library are at or below a vice.32 Thus, looming over the guardsman is 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio” and when op- the possibility that he or she could return erational requirements for forces supporting from a voluntary mobilization and immedi- operations from home station exceed the ately have to mobilize involuntarily.33 ­RegAF’s capacity.37 The trigger for a reserve mobilization occurs when RegAF forces are Air Force Policy spending fewer than two time periods home for every time period deployed. “Catch-22 . . . says you’ve always got to do To avoid the 1:2 trigger, the Air Force pro- what your commanding officer tells you to.” grams the ANG squadrons against anticipated “But Twenty-seventh Air Force says I can requirements and relies upon voluntary mobi- go home with forty missions.” lization from the Guard. Additionally, the Air Force promotes the development of rotational “But they don’t say you have to go home. plans to increase voluntary participation.38 In And regulations do say you have to obey this manner, the RegAF has used voluntary every order. That’s the catch. Even if the mobilization to “reduce [RegAF] tempo and colonel were disobeying a Twenty-seventh mitigate the need for [involuntary] mobiliza- Air Force order by making you fly more tion.”39 The RegAF’s current use of ANG volun- missions, you’d still have to fly them, or tary mobilization paves the way for the RegAF you’d be guilty of disobeying an order of to claim it can meet the COCOM’s aviation his. And then Twenty-seventh Air Force needs without involuntarily mobilizing ANG Headquarters would really jump on you.” units. However, meeting those needs through —Joseph Heller, Catch-22 voluntary mobilization places the burdens (perturbed employers and unengaged commu- The RegAF programs the ANG into the nities) on the deploying member instead of on AEF rotation cycle. Both parties have a clear the service. Furthermore, the DOD and the expectation that the ANG will execute de- RegAF count time served during voluntary ployed missions when demands exceed the mobilizations as part of dwell time. True irony RegAF’s capability. In practice, upon foresee- will occur when RegAF members make this ing an AEF shortfall, the Air Force should mo- claim to the very ANG members whose volun- bilize the ANG forces that are in that same tary service enabled the Air Force to avoid in- AEF “bucket,” yet instead of involuntarily mo- voluntary mobilization. A final irony of the bilizing the ANG, the RegAF encourages ANG RegAF process, specific to the CAF, involves voluntary mobilization within the assigned the accounting used to determine the deploy-

Spring 2011 | 21 to-dwell ratio. The RegAF credits a fighter any time in which the squadron claims a squadron deployment if any unit type code 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio, the aircraft are in (UTC) made up of squadron assets deploys. a 1:5 deploy-to-dwell ratio. (Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Free- Under this accounting system, with the dom typically require 12 aircraft and 24 pilots.) trend of RegAF fighter squadrons deploying This programming and accounting situation at the rate of 120 days per 20 months and exaggerates the deployments of the squadron. ANG fighter squadrons deploying for 60 days A more accurate accounting would look at the per 20 months, the RegAF deploy-to-dwell deployment of aircraft as a percentage of the ratio is twice that of the ANG—1:5 for the total aircraft. The best accounting method RegAF versus 1:10 for the ANG. That is true would look at personnel. only on its face, however, since most ANG In the current situation, the RegAF com- squadrons have just 18 aircraft assigned. putes its own deployment time at more than twice the actual rate and uses volun- tary mobilization to mitigate the effects of Improving the Accessibility and this high claim. This doubling of the true Availability Framework rate occurs because the RegAF credits a squadron with a deployment even though Accessibility and availability are irrelevant only half of the aircraft actually leave home if the force cannot fight. The Air Force station. The figure below illustrates both funds the ANG to enable top operational the 1:2 unit deployment claim of the RegAF readiness at the same level as the RegAF. In and the 1:5 actual aircraft deploy-to-dwell other words, the ANG trains and maintains ratio. A squadron with a primary aircraft readiness in accordance with Air Force authorization of 24 gets credit for a deploy- standards; moreover, it can deploy to a con- ment even though only half of the aircraft tingency and commence operations within actually deploy. As the figure shows, for 72 hours. Only units of the Air Reserve Component can claim to meet their active counterpart’s readiness standards. By fund- 1:2 1:5 ing this high readiness level in the ANG, Claimed Unit Actual Tail the Air Force created an operational force Deploy Deploy upon which it can immediately rely. The ANG’s operational readiness includes Aircraft Dwell an additional benefit of efficiency since it Unit eliminates the need to “train-up” for deploy- Dwell Aircraft ment. Changes to DOD policy that affect the Dwell ANG include a one-year limit on involuntary Aircraft mobilization, with exclusions for predeploy- ment training and postmobilization leave.40 Unit Dwell Dwell Adm Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Aircraft Chiefs of Staff, seeks to maximize the fight- Dwell ing time of activated reserve members in Aircraft order to gain the most from the one-year 41 Unit Dwell limitation. Mobilizing the ANG for one year delivers one full year of combat capability. Deploy Aircraft Deploy The Guard, therefore, is available to immedi- ately supply any capability the Air Force needs, yet the system of ANG support to the Figure. Current deploy-to-dwell accounting for a RegAF does not work optimally. RegAF squadron with a primary aircraft authoriza- For over nine years, the Air Force has tion of 24 that deploys a 12-ship UTC had the authority to mobilize ANG forces in

22 | Air & Space Power Journal The Merge

support of the COCOM’s needs. Neverthe- tinue to task UTCs. The ANG commander less, the RegAF continues to concentrate on must then manage individuals and ensure making it easy to task ANG units without the ability to meet the Air Force’s needs in procedural safeguards and external over- the AEF bucket. Those members of the unit sight. The RegAF’s decision to use the ANG who voluntarily mobilize in support of an must come after an admission that the par- AEF tasking would gain deploy-to-dwell ent service cannot meet the COCOM’s credit for the mobilization. The onus for ac- needs. Is the RegAF avoiding some per- counting and managing the deploy-to-dwell ceived political cost of admitting a readi- ratio would then rest on the ANG com- ness shortfall that an involuntary mobiliza- mander—not the RegAF. If the ANG com- tion reveals to the public?42 If so, this makes mander fails to manage effectively and no sense since both the US Navy and US overextends his unit by allowing people to Army have regularly mobilized people in- deploy individually to diverse locations and voluntarily since 9/11.43 missions, he or she will then report a readi- If the RegAF cannot meet COCOM re- ness shortfall. quirements without the ANG, it should so The RegAF needs to review the mobiliza- state. The American public deserves both an tion rules and either update or comply with honest accounting and a say in the use of them. Staying true to AFI 10-402 mandates the ANG. Involuntary mobilizations and any that the RegAF use voluntary mobilization resulting public response constitute a critical only to bridge the gap between a rapidly check and balance, and the law requires it. developing need and authorization for in- In addition, a number of studies cur- voluntary mobilization. The necessary stat- rently under way will demand a true ac- utory authorizations are now in place and counting in order to value both the RegAF available for use. and the ANG properly. The Quadrennial De- In addition, the current mobilization fense Review Report of 2010 calls for a com- business rules—specifically, the deploy-to- prehensive review of the RegAF and reserve dwell triggering events—are meaningful component mix.44 The RegAF is also devel- only with an accurate accounting of both oping an internal review—the Total Force RegAF and ANG service. Until we have ac- Enterprise Analytic Model—that examines curate accounting, we should not validate the proper mix of RegAF and reserve com- the business rules by formally incorporat- ponent forces.45 ing them into the AFIs. Presently, account- Some practical fixes immediately present ing gives a squadron credit for deployment themselves. The RegAF should credit de- when only half of the aircraft actually de- ployments in the deploy-to-dwell calcula- ploy. Deployment figures must accurately tion regardless of whether they are volun- reflect the materiel and people deployed, tary or involuntary—the method used by not simply the squadron flag. As depicted in the Navy to count deployments of its re- the figure cited earlier, if only half of the serve personnel.46 Furthermore, the Air squadron’s aircraft deploy for four months Force should allow individual guardsmen to every year, the unit deploy-to-dwell is 1:5, waive deploy-to-dwell ratios if they want to not 1:2. Yet the squadron flag remains in deploy voluntarily. To do so would prove dwell, based upon the four-month deploy- valuable for the ANG, a force with no indi- ment of half of its assets. vidual mobilization augmentees. The RegAF cannot continue to program The Air Force looks at mobilization rates improperly used voluntary mobilizations in in squadron—not individual—terms, but the order to increase its deploy-to-dwell ratio. ANG, with its career-long homesteaded Even if the RegAF accurately accounted for force, must always consider the individuals its deploy-to-dwell ratio, programming ANG within the squadron as well as the squadron voluntary mobilizations only masks an inca- itself.47 The RegAF can—and should—con- pacity to meet COCOM requirements.

Spring 2011 | 23 Although the ANG has never failed to for voluntary and involuntary mobilization. participate when the RegAF gave it the op- Improvement will ensure that everyone portunity to do so, better ways exist for ac- ­understands the mobilization rules and that cessing the ANG than the current combina- the rules do not mask issues that cause in- tion of voluntary and involuntary accurate accounting of service. These sug- mobilization. The RegAF needs to build a gested changes will benefit the nation and predictable and stable rule set. Improving the Air Force by providing a clear picture of ✪ this rule set should focus on normalizing the capabilities accessible for service. and making transparent the requirements Washington, DC

Notes

1. Throughout this article the term reserve refers 8. For a look at the broad capabilities supplied to to the combination of the ANG and the Air Force the nation by the ANG during this time period, see Reserve Command. ibid., 20–31. 2. This is why the Constitution contains the 9. Lawrence Kapp, Operations Noble Eagle, Endur- semiannual appropriations clause. If the Army be- ing Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom: Questions and An- came too powerful, the legislature would remove the swers about U.S. Military Personnel, Compensation, funding. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James and Force Structure, CRS Report for Congress Madison, The Federalist, Gideon ed., ed. George W. RL31334 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Service, 16 February 2005), [CRS-1], http://www.fas Fund, 2001), 208. .org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31334.pdf. 3. Deployment consists of the actual departure, 10. Data from Air National Guard, Operational arrival, and operation in an overseas location. Mobi- Plans and Execution Division (NGB/A3X), current lization, which entails calling up a reservist and plac- as of 31 August 2010. ing him or her on active duty, is a necessary but not 11. The remaining aircraft included nine E-8s, sufficient condition of a guardsman’s deployment. two MC-130s, one EC-130, and three HH-60s. US Air 4. John D. Winkler, “Developing an Operational Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers Reserve: A Policy and Historical Context and the Way (Shaw AFB, SC: US Central Command Air Forces, Forward,” Joint Force Quarterly 59, no. 4 (October Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 April 2003), 3, 2010): 15, https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cgi-bin http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library /showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ndupress&CISOPTR=420 /report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf. 83&CISOMODE=print. 12. Ibid. 5. Susan Rosenfeld and Charles J. Gross, The Air 13. National Guard Bureau / A2 (intelligence), National Guard at 60: A History (Washington, DC: inter ­view by the author, 16 August 2010. Air National Guard, 2008), 9. 14. Title 10, US Code, sec. 12301(f), http://www 6. Throughout the Cold War, the Air Force had .law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10 the capacity to maintain a dedicated home-station _00012301----000-.html. This section generally refers alert force in addition to its “wartime” force struc- to mobilization of National Guard units but also ap- ture since it had 36 fighter wing equivalents. This plies to the individual volunteer. Interference with option no longer exists because capacity diminished the “State Guard’s ability to address a local emer- rapidly to 20 fighter wing equivalents after the Cold gency . . . would be a valid basis for a gubernatorial War. Adam J. Hebert, “Eighty-Six Combat Wings,” veto.” Perpich v. Department of Defense, in United Air Force Magazine 89, no. 12 (December 2006): 26, States Supreme Court Reports, vol. 496 (1990), 334, 352. accessed 22 September 2009, http://www.airforce- 15. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-401, Air Force magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2006 Operations Planning and Execution, 7 December 2006, /December%202006/1206wings.pdf. 250, par. 9.19, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared 7. Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 16. /media/epubs/AFI10-401.pdf.

24 | Air & Space Power Journal The Merge

16. NGB/A3X. untarily. See AFI 10-401, Air Force Operations Planning 17. AFI 10-402, vol. 1, Mobilization Planning and and Execution, 250, par. 9.19.1. Personnel Readiness, 9 August 2007, 15, par. 3.2.1, 35. AFI 10-402, vol. 1, Mobilization Planning and http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media Personnel Readiness, 15, par. 3.2.1. /epubs/AFI10-402V1.pdf. 36. Message, Air Force Mobilization Business 18. Executive Order 13223, Ordering the Ready Re- Rules—Change Two (2), DTG: 281928Z OCT 08, pars. serve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and Delegat- 1.A., 2.B.1. ing Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and 37. Ibid., pars. 2.B.1.1, 2.B.1.2. the Secretary of Transportation, 14 September 2001. 38. Ibid., par. 3.A. 19. Section 12301(b) also applies here. According 39. Ibid. to this section, a service secretary may order a unit 40. DODI 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Compo- “to active duty for not more than 15 days a year.” For nents (RC), 4.b.(1); Gates, memorandum; and DODD the ANG, however, the consent of the governor is 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization, 6. still necessary (Title 10, US Code, sec. 12301[f]). 41. Adm Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint 20. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) Chiefs of Staff (address, Reserve Officers Association 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC), 4 Annual Mid-Winter Conference, Washington, DC, 2 February 2010, 2, 4.b.(2). February 2009), accessed 15 June 2010, http://www 21. Title 10, US Code, sec. 12301(a). .jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1129. 22. Ibid., sec. 12301(c). After mobilization, how- 42. “When the ARC can’t deliver through volunteer- ever, the service can separate personnel from the unit. ism, the RegAF is forced to ‘suck it up’ for the mission. 23. The RegAF, however, includes UTC in the In terms of tasking the ARC: We are unwilling to mobi- definition of the unit. UTCs sometimes contain a lize them, and we can’t use them again for a long time single-person capability. The RegAF cannot involun- after they deploy.” Comments from RegAF members tary mobilize an individual, but it can mobilize the concerning use of the Air Reserve Component. Air capability of a single-person UTC. Force Lessons Learned (HQ USAF/A9L), Total Force 24. Title 10, US Code, sec. 12302(a). Integration Supporting OEF/OIF Fighter/Attack (Wash- 25. Ibid., sec. 12304(a), (c)(2). ington, DC: US Air Force, 10 September 2010), 16. 26. Ibid., sec. 10143(a); and Title 32, US Code, 43. US Navy Personnel Command, interview by sec. 502(a). the author, 2 September 2009. 27. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, memoran- 44. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense dum, subject: Utilization of the Total Force, 19 Janu- Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of De- ary 2007. fense, February 2010), 54, http://www.defense.gov 28. Deploy-to-dwell ratio refers to the amount of /qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf. home-station time granted to a person after deploy- 45. Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley, ment. This time, called “dwell,” is a function of the time “Facing Future National and Air Force Challenges” deployed. Thus, a 1:5 deploy-to-dwell ratio means that (address, 2010 Senior Enlisted Summit, Maxwell the member gains five times the deployed time at home AFB, AL, 4 May 2010), accessed 9 August 2010, station. Thus, one year deployed yields five years dwell. http://www.af.mil/information/speeches/speech 29. Gates, memorandum; and Department of .asp?id=550. Defense Directive (DODD) 1235.10, Activation, Mobili- 46. US Navy Personnel Command, interview. The zation, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, 26 US Navy Reserve is primarily an individual mobili- November 2008, 6, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives zation augmentee force, and the ANG is a unit-based /corres/pdf/123510p.pdf. force. This difference does not affect the accounting. 30. Gates, memorandum, 1. 47. Unlike a RegAF person who changes duty 31. Ibid.; and DODD 1235.10, Activation, Mobiliza- stations every few years, a guardsman may never tion, and Demobilization, 6. leave the unit, making each ANG unit deployment 32. DODD 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and an individual deployment as well. This fact may Demobilization, 6. also predict a higher individual deploy-to-dwell ratio 33. AFI 10-402 allows the Air Force to mobilize an for a guardsman over his or her RegAF counterpart already-serving volunteer as part of the home unit’s whose 20-year career includes schools, staff work, involuntary mobilization. See AFI 10-402, vol. 1, Mobi- and other nondeployable assignments. At a 1:5 de- lization Planning and Personnel Readiness, 24, par. 6.3. ploy-to-dwell ratio, the guardsman will spend at 34. AFI 10-401 refers to voluntary mobilization as least three years of a 20-year career deployed. In the a bridge between the commencement of operations course of the same 20-year career, RegAF members and the legal authorities to mobilize the ANG invol- may spend less time deployed.

Spring 2011 | 25 War Fighting in Cyberspace Evolving Force Presentation and Command and Control

Maj M. Bodine Birdwell, USAF* Lt Col Robert Mills, PhD, USAF, Retired

he Department of Defense (DOD) is ­cyberspace? Are there lessons learned from endeavoring to define war fighting in similar global-to-regional support challenges the global cyberspace domain.1 Crea­ that we might apply to cyberspace C2? We Ttion of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), offer US Special Operations Command a subunified functional combatant com- ( ­USSOCOM) as a model for cyberspace force mand (FCC) under US Strategic Command presentation and C2; however, this model is (USSTRATCOM), is a huge step in integrat- a long-term goal that is not immediately ing and coordinating the defense, protection, achievable. In the interim, ­USCYBERCOM and operation of DOD networks; however, can adapt lessons learned from space and this step does not mean that USCYBERCOM air-mobility force presentation and C2 to will perform or manage all cyberspace func- develop a building-block approach to evolve tions. In fact the vast majority of cyber- cyber force presentation and C2 from its space functions conducted by the services current nascent state to a more mature and combatant commands (COCOM), al- ­USSOCOM-like state. though vital for maintaining access to the Although other models exist, we examine domain in support of their operations, are how space, air mobility, and special opera- not of an active war-fighting nature. We ap- tions force presentation and C2 models can ply the concepts of war fighting, offense, inform the way USCYBERCOM could inter- and active defense to the domain of cyber- act with the other COCOMs—particularly space and propose several recommenda- the GCCs. We also discuss the complex in- tions to aid USCYBERCOM as it works with terdependencies, specialized capabilities, the services and geographic combatant and doctrinal approaches FCCs use as they commands (GCC) to fight in cyber­space. provide capabilities to GCCs. To begin, we That global, regional, and service com- briefly address the inadequacy of current manders will have to share command and doctrine for war fighting in cyberspace. Then control (C2) of cyberspace war-fighting ca- we examine how space and air mobility pabilities and forces raises several interest- doctrine can serve as useful, although only ing questions about how ­USCYBERCOM can partly adequate, models for presenting most effectively work with the GCCs. Spe- forces and performing C2. Finally, we pro- cifically, what is the ideal force presentation vide a building-block methodology to take method, and which C2 model should the us from current capabilities to a fully devel- DOD use for war-fighting capabilities in oped USSOCOM-like cyberspace model.

*Major Birdwell is director of operations, Air Intelligence Squadron, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. He thanks his wife, Michelle, for her assistance in editing this article; she put in long hours enabling the authors to better articulate their thoughts. Dr. Mills is an associate professor of electrical engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

26 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

Why the Existing Information essentially minimizes the importance of a war-fighting domain by burying it within Operations Model Is Insufficient the Joint Staff. Current Air Force and joint doctrine gov- Joint doctrine must separate the shared erning war fighting in cyberspace is scarce. responsibility for maintaining access to the According to Air Force Doctrine Document cyberspace domain, which should be a J-6 (AFDD) 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, “Al- (communications) function, from the con- cept of war fighting in cyberspace, which though cyberspace operations are integral 9 to all combatant commands, Services, and should be a J-3 (operations) function. Gen- agency boundaries, as of the date of publi- eral Alexander noted, “Where the principal cation of this AFDD, there is no overarch- effect of IO is to influence an adversary not ing joint doctrine for planning or operations to take an action, the principal effect of cy- in cyberspace.”2 A new joint doctrine cyber- ber warfare is to deny the enemy freedom of action in cyberspace” (emphasis in origi- space publication is being formally staffed, 10 but published joint doctrine comes no closer nal). To engage in cyber warfare as Gen- to addressing war fighting in cyberspace eral Alexander envisions it, responsibility than a discussion of computer network op- for CNA and CND-RA must expand beyond the Joint Staff and be treated the same as erations as a subset of information opera- warfare in other domains. tions (IO).3 Computer network operations and IO are clearly related, but their pur- poses differ. Gen Keith B. Alexander, com- Defining Force Presentation mander of USCYBERCOM, wrote, “Although it is understood that land, maritime, air, and Force presentation for cyber war fighting space warfare will be employed to deter (for is the manner in which USCYBERCOM and example, influence) an adversary, no one the services make CNA and CND-RA capa- believes that warfare within these domains bilities available to the GCCs. JP 1, Doctrine is uniquely ‘information operations.’ ”4 for the Armed Forces of the United States, Both AFDD 3-12 and General Alexander summarizes the roles and responsibilities of recognize that war fighting in cyberspace is the services and COCOMS: more than a subset of IO; however, at this The Services and United States Special Opera- time Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information tions Command (in areas unique to special Operations, provides the only joint frame- operations) have responsibilities to organize, work that addresses C2 for cyberspace war train, equip, and sustain forces. . . . fighting. Joint doctrine contains no guid- The Commanders, US Central Command, US ance for cyber force presentation. IO doc- European Command, US Pacific Command, trine defines computer network operations, US Southern Command, and US Northern comprised of computer network attack Command. . . . (1) deter attacks against the (CNA), computer network defense (CND), United States, its territories, possessions and and computer network exploitation.5 For bases, and employ appropriate force should the purpose of this article, we define cyber deterrence fail; (2) carry out assigned mis- war-fighting actions as CNA plus a subset of sions and tasks and plan for and execute mili- CND called CND-response actions (CND-RA).6 tary operations, as directed, in support of stra- tegic guidance.11 According to JP 3-13, CNA activities are now integrated at the theater level in the As the DOD components tasked to fight J-39 IO cell.7 JP 6-0, Joint Communications wars, COCOMs define requirements, and System, notes that CND is integrated within the services then organize, train, equip, and the J-6.8 This arrangement is problematic sustain forces to meet them. Currently because it splits related war-fighting func- ­USSOCOM is unique in that it is a COCOM tions between different staff elements and with service-like responsibilities.

Spring 2011 | 27 The force presentation and C2 models for ever, the space relationship is inherently a space, air mobility, and special operations dependent one from the perspective of the form steps along a continuum of options GCC. For this reason, GCCs must explicitly that USCYBERCOM can use when providing state all space support requirements to war-fighting forces and capabilities to the USSTRATCOM; to do otherwise would po- GCCs. The first step, space force presenta- tentially disrupt or negatively affect GCC tion, is based on an independent action war-fighting operations that depend upon model that USSTRATCOM uses to control space support. space force presentation and support the The space force presentation and C2 GCCs. The second step, air mobility force template centralize all GCC communica- presentation, is based on an interdependent tions through a specified channel within action model by which US Transportation USSTRATCOM called the joint functional Command (USTRANSCOM) works with the component command space (JFCC Space). GCCs to move forces and supplies through- That channel communicates with all GCCs out the world. Finally, special operations and maintains situational awareness of how forces (SOF) force presentation is based on space operations integrate with all GCC ac- an organic force presentation model. tivities. In order to communicate effec- tively, JFCC Space uses the joint space op- Step One: A Space Model— erations center (modeled after an air and Independent Action space operations center [AOC] construct) to command and control military space opera- Today, as the DOD develops cyber war- tions effectively. fighting capabilities, we do not have enough USSTRATCOM has delegated day-to-day cyber war fighters available to distribute communication activities to JFCC Space. them in a decentralized manner among the Likewise, JP 3-14, Space Operations, notes GCCs. Using an independent action model that “[GCC commanders] may designate a would enable USCYBERCOM to support the space coordinating authority (SCA) and dele­ maximum number of GCC requirements gate appropriate authorities for planning, because USCYBERCOM could dynamically integrating, and coordinating space opera- shift its limited resources to maximize GCC tions within the operational area.”13 In many support. USSTRATCOM has done this for regards, the SCA serves as the COCOM’s decades with space force presentation. Ap- focal point for all space support operations. plying space doctrinal concepts can help An SCA can work with JFCC Space for all USCYBERCOM take immediate measures to types of space support issues. The concept improve cyber force presentation to the GCCs. of the SCA serves as a cross-domain model Gen Kevin P. Chilton, former commander for communicating between USSTRATCOM of USSTRATCOM, clearly connected space and the GCC. The SCA gathers the require- to cyberspace: “Let’s move into the line of ments from all service and functional com- operation that we call cyberspace. Is that a ponents and, on behalf of the GCC, speaks support line for us? You bet. Just like space. with one voice to USSTRATCOM via JFCC Is it global in nature? You bet. Just like space. Space. Do we operate in it every day? You bet. Just Achieving USCYBERCOM Indepen- like space. In fact what we’re tasked to do is dent Action: Cyber Coordinating Au- to operate, defend, prepare to attack, and thority. To increase the visibility of cyber on order attack through this domain.”12 war-fighting activities, each GCC should USSTRATCOM’s actions in space occur adopt the SCA concept for cyber force pre- independently of any actions taken in the sentation, in effect creating a cyber coordi- theater. That command does not rely upon nating authority (CCA). This action is viable the GCC to carry out some task before it today because it requires limited resources. can complete its own tasks in space. How- The greatest challenge to creating a CCA

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position within each GCC lies in determin- bilities. These space proponents help GCC ing its proper placement. Space doctrine components integrate space capabilities regarding SCA placement defers this deci- within their operations. sion to each GCC.14 USCYBERCOM could Achieving USCYBERCOM Indepen- follow the space doctrinal template of defer- dent Action: Service Component Re- ring the decision to each GCC, or it could sponsibilities. The service components to recommend a CCA placement location in USCYBERCOM should act as CNA and order to best integrate USCYBERCOM activi- ­CND-RA proponents within each GCC. ties within the GCC scheme of maneuver. Those components should send liaisons to Furthermore, if a CCA were created, champion cyber war-fighting capabilities ­USCYBERCOM could continue to complete within the respective GCC service and func- many of its existing war-fighting functions tional components to maximize USCYBER- in a centralized manner. As with space op- COM’s contribution to GCC war-fighting ac- erations, the relationship would remain in- tivities. Space doctrine provides a template dependent from the FCC perspective and for integrating space within the service dependent from the GCC perspective. Within components, using the Army’s space sup- the GCC, the services maintain and operate port elements, the Navy’s space operations their own networks. USCYBERCOM would officers, the Marines’ space cadre, and the direct all CNA and CND-RA activities on Air Force’s director for space forces.16 Al- behalf of the GCC. though USSTRATCOM has no special opera- Space doctrine offers insight into cyber tions component, it does maintain a space force presentation beyond the joint force support team construct to send space “pro- headquarters level. USSTRATCOM directs ponents” to GCC special operations compo- its service components (in regard to space) 17 to serve as space proponents within their nents. USCYBERCOM’s embedded cyber service, especially the service components war-fighting proponents would advocate of GCCs: methods by which USCYBERCOM CNA/ CND-RA actions could help fulfill GCC re- Common responsibilities of each of the Ser- quirements, which would then filter back to vice components are: advocating for space USCYBERCOM via the GCC CCA. requirements within their respective Services, providing a single point of contact for access to Service resources and capabilities, making Step Two: An Air Mobility Model— recommendations to USSTRATCOM on appro- Interdependent Action priate employment of Service forces, provid- Creating a CCA and dispersing proponents ing assigned space forces to CDRUSSTRATCOM [commander, USSTRATCOM] and CCDRs throughout the GCC would lay a strong [combatant commanders] as directed, assist- foundation to build a mature methodology ing in planning in support of space operations for cyber force presentation. These initial and assigned tasking, and supporting measures to leverage lessons learned from CDRUSSTRATCOM and other CCDRs with space force presentation should continue to space mission area expertise and advocacy of evolve into an interdependent communica- 15 desired capabilities as requested. tion model. Such an intermediate step is USSTRATCOM disperses the space exper- necessary to transition cyber war fighting tise resident in its service components to from a primarily USCYBERCOM mission to the GCC service components to provide the a mission shared between USCYBERCOM GCCs “space mission area expertise and ad- and GCCs. The next building block, an in- vocacy,” as mentioned above. This approach terdependent model, would enable each enables USSTRATCOM to centralize C2 GCC to develop a nascent organic cyber space capabilities while ensuring that the war-fighting capability and develop regional GCC components are aware of space capa- cyber war-fighting subject-matter experts.

Spring 2011 | 29 Interdependent operations differ from ­JDDOC [joint deployment and distribution independent operations in that both parties operations center] and/or the JMC [joint rely on each other for mission accomplish- movement center].”20 JP 3-17 describes the ment. Interdependent operations are more DIRMOBFOR as “normally a senior officer complex than independent operations be- who is familiar with the AOR [area of re- cause they require coordination to avoid sponsibility] or JOA [joint operations area] duplication of effort and to maximize utility. and possesses an extensive background in Cyber war-fighting actions occurring at near air mobility operations. The DIRMOBFOR “network speed” will demand detailed plan- serves as the designated agent for all air ning and coordination because execution mobility issues in the AOR or JOA, and for speed may render real-time communication other duties as directed.”21 However, be- impossible. Air mobility operations offer cause the DIRMOBFOR represents the com- insight into mitigating the communication mander of Air Force forces rather than the challenges of interdependent operations. joint force air component commander, the Because of limited air mobility resources, director must work with the AOC’s com- global air mobility operations must occur mander and its air mobility division for interdependently among the FCC, intra­theater airlift operations. Within the ­USTRANSCOM, and GCCs. The DOD simply theater AOC, the air mobility division will does not have enough air mobility assets to “integrate and direct the execution of the- give each GCC all of the airlift it requires. ater assigned or attached Service organic Therefore, all components must share mobility forces operating in the AOR or JOA ­ownership and collaborate. For this reason, in support of JFC [joint force commander] air mobility force “ownership” can be seg- objectives.”22 The 618th AOC works inter­ mented into three distinct classifications: dependently with the GCC’s DIRMOBFOR those forces under the command of and AOC to ensure that the war fighter re- ­USTRANSCOM, those under the GCC (such ceives support via transportation activities as US Pacific Command), and each service’s and thus obtains the proverbial beans, bul- organic air mobility forces.18 lets, and people. USTRANSCOM maintains an air compo- Achieving USCYBERCOM Interdepen- nent, US Air Forces Transportation, which, dent Action: Director of Cyber Forces. in turn, maintains the 618th AOC. The latter, The GCC’s CCA should become the equiva- which communicates with GCC AOCs daily lent of the DIRMOBFOR for cyber war-­ to enable global mobility operations, has fighting capabilities (i.e., a DIRCYBERFOR). responsibility for the majority of inter­ The DIRCYBERFOR would continue to theater airlift, while the GCCs’ AOCs have work with USCYBERCOM, as the CCA did, responsibility for the majority of each for external cyber war-fighting capabilities GCC’s intratheater airlift.19 The 618th AOC but would also work with the GCC’s nascent and the GCC AOCs thus work interdepen- organic cyber war fighters through theater dently to ensure the success of the global organic C2 channels. In this second step, air mobility enterprise. the GCCs would develop initial cyber war- Joint doctrine offers the concept of a fa- fighting capability that will require C2 within cilitator to aid this process. JP 3-17, Air Mo- the GCC itself—external to USCYBERCOM. bility Operations, defines the director of Unlike the CCA, the DIRCYBERFOR has a ­mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR) as a “coordi- doctrinal template in the placement of the nating authority for air mobility with all DIRMOBFOR underneath the commander commands and agencies, both internal and of Air Force forces. Although the processes external to the JTF [joint task force], includ- required to integrate airlift clearly differ ing the JAOC [joint air operations center], from those to integrate USCYBERCOM’s the 618th TACC [Tactical Air Control Center, nonkinetic fires activities, the concept of a now known as the 618th AOC], and the DIRCYBERFOR has value.

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Joint doctrine gives the following guid- ter would work with GCC CWEs and ance to JFCs who stand up functional com- ­DIRCYBERFORs to prioritize, allocate, and ponents: “Normally, the Service component utilize global cyber war-fighting capabilities. CDR with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will Step Three: A USSOCOM Model— be designated as the functional component Organic Action CDR; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the op- During congressional testimony, General eration, force capabilities, and the C2 capa- Alexander observed that bilities in selecting a CDR.”23 CNA/CND-RA command and control in cyberspace is still forces are in such a formative state that more complicated [than in other domains]. GCCs will have difficulty initially determin- Computer network operations can be regional ing who to designate as the DIRCYBERFOR. and global at the same time, and can have Although not directly grounded in existing effects approaching those of weapons of mass joint doctrine, it may be best if both the destruction. The devices that give us access to CCA and DIRCYBERFOR begin at the JFC cyberspace exist in the physical world, and in level and then transition over time to create conventional military terms we can say that they are always within the area of responsi- a cyber functional component at both the bility of some geographic combatant com- GCC and JFC levels in the future. mand—but they can create effects that take Achieving USCYBERCOM Interdepen- place far away in the area of responsibility of dent Action: Cyber War-Fighting Element. a second command, and they might be en- The AOC’s air mobility division process abled to do so by unsuspecting users and could serve as a model for a theater C2 their devices located in still a third com- structure for incipient cyber forces—a cyber mand’s region. Which commander is the mis- war-fighting element (CWE). Whereas an sion lead in such a case and is military action air mobility division endeavors to direct and appropriate? Which command is supported, execute the JFC’s organic airlift mission, and which is supporting? In cyberspace, ques- the CWE would endeavor to direct and ex- tions like this must be answered at Internet speed and must take into account our respon- ecute the JFC’s cyber war-fighting mission. sibilities and obligations under international As JFCs seek to integrate cyber war-fighting law and norms.24 capabilities within the theater scheme of maneuver, a small CWE could report to the The challenges that General Alexander DIRCYBERFOR within the JFC staff. described are daunting, but they are not We should inject a word of caution at this unique—in fact, they are quite similar to point. Step one, the space model, entailed the challenges we face when combating ter- sending proponents forward to help the war rorism and conducting special operations in fighter present requirements to USCYBERCOM general. The DOD has carefully studied ter- through the SCA. Step two, the air mobility rorism and determined that the best model, cannot subsequently remove these method to confront this global challenge is forces and use them as the foundation for to direct USSOCOM to “synchronize plan- standing up CWEs because each GCC com- ning of global operations against terrorist ponent will still need cyber war-fighting networks.”25 Because of the similar chal- proponents to push war-fighter require- lenges faced by cyber war fighting and SOF, ments to the CWE and DIRCYBERFOR. USCYBERCOM should eventually adopt Achieving USCYBERCOM Interdepen- ­USSOCOM’s force presentation and C2 models. dent Action: Cyber Operations Center. USSOCOM has chosen to posture forces As forces become available to establish both globally from the continental United CWEs, USCYBERCOM should establish a States and regionally (organically) within cyber operations center modeled on the GCCs. Rather than supporting forces, or- 618th AOC to interact with GCCs. The cen- ganic forces are the doctrinal concept for

Spring 2011 | 31 GCC wartime force presentation defined commander would serve as JFC for all as- within JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of signed and attached cyber operations per- the United States.26 Based upon that docu- sonnel, as theater cyber operations adviser, ment, some type of organic cyber forces and as joint force cyber operations compo- should also be the end-state goal for GCC nent commander. Implementing this con- force presentation and C2. cept would clearly elevate cyberspace to an Like special operations, war fighting in appropriate level of importance. cyberspace is both global and regional in Achieving USCYBERCOM Organic Ac- nature. The SOF community has addressed tion: Joint Cyber Attack Component. the dual global and regional nature of ter- Organic CNA capabilities from multiple ser- rorism and developed a C2 architecture and vices should be combined under a joint cy- force presentation model that provide ber attack component. Joint doctrine pro- ­USCYBERCOM unique and relevant insights. vides guidance on how the TCYOC should All SOF forces stationed in the continental present forces to the GCC: “Functional com- United States fall under the command au- ponent commands are appropriate when thority of USSOCOM, while those assigned forces from two or more Military Depart- to a GCC fall under authority of the GCC ments must operate within the same mis- commander. As an FCC, USSOCOM pro- sion area or geographic domain or there is a vides additional forces on a temporary basis need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the to GCCs for operational employment, with assigned mission.”30 If multiple services the GCC normally exercising operational 27 provide cyber attack and defensive re- control over them. The GCC exercises C2 sponse capabilities within the TCYOC, it of all assigned and attached special forces would be appropriate to create functional through a theater special operations com- components for each. For example, JP 3-05, mand (TSOC), which provides unity of com- Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, dis- mand and serves as “the primary theater cusses how a joint special operations air SOF organization capable of performing component is often created within a joint broad continuous missions uniquely suited special operations task force when multiple to SOF capabilities” and “the primary mech- 31 anism by which a geographic combatant services have organic air assets. This com- commander exercises C2 over SOF.”28 The ponent creates a layer of oversight with air TSOC commander has three principal roles: expertise above the various SOF aviation JFC of SOF in-theater, theater special opera- elements so that the limited resource can tions adviser, and joint force special opera- be employed in the most efficient manner. tions component commander.29 This “triple In the future, a TCYOC probably would hatting” makes the position unique within have organic service components. The SOF the GCCs. Only this commander is dual hat- template illustrates a scenario in which ted as a JFC; GCC service components are multiple services could provide overlapping dual hatted as component commanders be- capabilities. Although many SOF aspects cause the service components, unlike SOF, are uniquely connected to a service compo- are inherently not joint. nent, capabilities such as air mobility and Achieving USCYBERCOM Organic Ac- airborne fires reside in two service compo- tion: Theater Cyber Operations Com- nents. Lessons learned from theater opera- mand. USCYBERCOM should adopt a tions led to the doctrinal concept of a the- ­USSOCOM force-provider mind-set for each ater joint special operations air component. GCC’s organic cyber war-fighting compo- If service CNA/CND-RA capabilities nent. Each theater would establish a theater evolved into specialized functions, a study cyber operations command (TCYOC) to pro- of SOF doctrine would indicate that cyber vide the same type of advocacy and C2 pro- service components should be adequate. vided by the TSOC for SOF. The TCYOC However, overlapping of some aspects of

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service-provided CNA/CND-RA capabilities JAOC divisions. For example, should the may warrant an additional C2 layer. TCYOC plan a significant CNA/CND-RA ac- Achieving USCYBERCOM Organic Ac- tion, the liaison elements could ensure tion: Liaison Elements. The GCC cyber proper integration and deconfliction of the war-fighting component must send liaison activity within JAOC processes. elements to other functional components. Achieving USCYBERCOM Organic Ac- Each GCC maintains a special operations tion: “Service-Like” Responsibilities. component that must liaise with the other ­USCYBERCOM should be given appropriate GCC (or subordinate joint task force) com- “service-like” responsibilities for cyber-­ ponents. According to JP 3-05, “To fully in- specific requirements modeled after those tegrate SO [special operations] and conven- of USSOCOM. The methodology for SOF tional operations, SOF must maintain force presentation addresses force presenta- effective liaison with all components of the tion from both the COCOM and service per- joint force to ensure that unity of effort is spectives. USSOCOM has service-like re- maintained and risk of fratricide is mini- sponsibilities in that it organizes, trains, and mized.”32 Special operations doctrine ad- equips SOF.36 This includes maintaining its dresses specific areas where SOF must send own major force program to procure spe- liaison elements: cialized equipment. For example, the US Air Force will procure a C-130 Hercules and de- SOF commanders have available specific ele- ments that facilitate C2, coordination, and liver it to Air Force Special Operations Com- liaison. They include . . . the special opera- mand, which then “upgrades” the C-130 into tions liaison element . . . to provide liaison to a special operations AC-130U Spooky gun- the joint force air component commander . . . ship. One benefit of this arrangement is or appropriate Service component air C2 fa- that SOF-specific requirements (regardless cility; and SOF liaison officers (LNOs) placed of the service involved) will receive an ap- in a variety of locations as necessary to coor- propriate amount of advocacy and not be dinate, synchronize, and deconflict SO within overshadowed by competing service-level the operational area. . . . All of these elements requirements. Analogously, USCYBERCOM significantly improve the flow of information, should be the DOD’s primary FCC to organize, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance train, and equip CNA and CND-RA forces. overall mission accomplishment of the joint force.33 Aside from USSOCOM, it is the role of the services to equip and educate their The TSOC integrates personnel within members. The services tend to develop and the AOC to coordinate, deconflict, and inte- acquire capabilities in accordance with grate SOF air, surface, and subsurface op- their own priorities, which may not neces- erations.34 Special operations doctrine rec- sarily favor decisions optimized for cyber- ognizes that communication between organic space operations. Furthermore, cyberspace components within the GCC requires con- is inherently a joint (or even interagency) scious effort and resource allocation. operating area, yet the services may pursue Achieving USCYBERCOM Organic Ac- different technical solutions to realize simi- tion: Cyber War-Fighting Liaison Ele- lar capabilities, such as CNA software. Gaps ments. USCYBERCOM should consider cre- may also arise in research, development, ating cyber war-fighting liaison elements and acquisition. With service-like responsi- when pursuing TCYOCs. JP 3-05 discusses bilities, USCYBERCOM could provide cyber- how the special operations liaison element space-specific advocacy for systems acquisi- integrates within the JAOC.35 Members of tion, research, and development. the former integrate into processes through- Achieving USCYBERCOM Organic Ac- out the AOC. Similarly, the cyber war-fighting tion: Joint Cyberspace Operations Uni- liaison elements could integrate cyber war- versity. To train or, in this case, educate its fighting capabilities within the various members, USCYBERCOM should develop a

Spring 2011 | 33 Joint Cyberspace Operations University The second step in the building-block modeled after Joint Special Operations Uni- approach would involve transitioning from versity. USSOCOM maintains the latter to a space to an air mobility model. The CCA provide continuing education for worldwide from the previous step would evolve into a SOF. The university focuses on educating DIRCYBERFOR for cyber war-fighting ac- senior and intermediate special operations tivities. As forces become available, GCCs leaders and selected non-special-operations would establish cyber war-fighting elements, decision makers (both military and civilian) and USCYBERCOM would stand up a cyber in joint special operations.37 Joint Cyber- operations center to interact with GCCs. space Operations University could play an Within the air mobility model, USCYBER- important role in developing future cyber- COM cyber war-fighting proponents would space leaders. It could partner with service remain embedded within the GCC, as they schools in the same way Joint Special Op- were under the space model. However, erations University partners with these within the USSOCOM model, these US- schools, including the US Air Force’s Special CYBERCOM proponents would evolve into Operations School.38 In addition, USCYBER- liaisons from the GCC cyber war-fighting COM could leverage a number of existing component to the other GCC components. cyber training and education programs, in- With this building block, the individuals cluding the Air Force’s Undergraduate Cy- would remain, but their C2 chain would ber Training School, the Air Force Institute change from USCYBERCOM to the GCC. of Technology, and the Naval Postgraduate In the third step (the USSOCOM model), School.39 It may even be possible to imple- the relationship between the theater JFC ment Joint Cyber Operations University in staff and USCYBERCOM C2 center would a decentralized manner. New schools that evolve to one of an FCC responsible for specifically address war fighting in cyber- global cyber war-fighting operations and a space, such as a Cyber School of Advanced GCC cyber war-fighting component respon- Air and Space Studies and a Cyber Weap- sible for regional cyber war-fighting activi- ons Instructor Course within the USAF ties. The USCYBERCOM C2 center would Weapons School could also meet specific also maintain responsibility for synchroniz- USCYBERCOM requirements.40 ing regional actions between GCCs. This synchronization responsibility would re- quire close coordination between the GCC Conclusion cyber components and the USCYBERCOM C2 center. USCYBERCOM can begin implementa- USSOCOM has utilized its “service-like” tion today of a building-block approach to responsibilities to advance special opera- normalize force presentation for cyber war tions war-fighting capabilities. Adapting fighting and C2. Each step would build ­USSOCOM’s service-like attributes could aid upon actions taken in the preceding one. USCYBERCOM in much the same manner. The first step, taking lessons learned from The importance of education in developing space, would require little additional man- a cyber war-fighting force cannot be over- power. Initially, USCYBERCOM would advo- stated, and Joint Special Operations Univer- cate that the GCCs adopt cyber coordinating sity offers a model that USCYBERCOM can authority for cyber force presentation. Si- adapt. multaneously, USCYBERCOM would direct Although the DOD still grapples with the its service components to send cyber war- very concept of war fighting in cyberspace fighting proponents to respective GCC ser- and remains unclear about what actions vice and functional components to better would constitute acts of war, it must still integrate USCYBERCOM’s contribution to address the question of how to present cy- GCC war-fighting activities. ber forces and exercise C2 of them. Cyber-

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space is definitely a contested domain, but cyber ­space. We therefore recommend that is it a unique one? Although some aspects USCYBERCOM adopt our doctrinally based of cyberspace are undoubtedly unique, we blueprint for presenting and exercising C2 argue that in the area of force presentation of cyber war-fighting forces.  and C2, cyberspace is analogous to other war-fighting domains; hence, we can apply Scott AFB, Illinois lessons from space and air operations to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Notes

1. Joint doctrine definescyberspace as a global 7. JP 3-13, Information Operations, IV-5. domain. See Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department 8. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, 10 June of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 2010, III-1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 30 Sep- /jp6_0.pdf. tember 2010), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new 9. For a more in-depth discussion on the impor- _pubs/jp1_02.pdf. tance of separating war fighting in the domain from 2. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace actions taken to maintain access to the domain, see Operations, 15 July 2010, 14, http://www.e-publishing Dr. Robert F. Mills, Maj M. Bodine Birdwell, and Maj .af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFDD3-12.pdf. Kevin R. Beeker, “Apples & Oranges: Operating and 3. JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February Defending the Global Information Grid,” IAnewsletter 2006, IV-5, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs 13, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 39–40, http://iac.dtic.mil /jp3_13.pdf. /iatac/download/Vol13_No2.pdf. 4. Lt Gen Keith B. Alexander, “Warfighting in 10. Alexander, “Warfighting in Cyberspace,” 60. Cyber­space,” Joint Force Quarterly 46 (Third Quarter 11. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 2007): 60, https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cgi-bin United States, 2 May 2007 (incorporating change 1, /showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ndupress&CISOPTR= 23 March 2009), ii, III-12–13, http://www.dtic.mil 20001&CISOMODE=print. /doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf. 5. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, de- 12. Gen Kevin Chilton, “Remarks to the Novem- fines computer network attack as “actions taken ber 2008 Air Force Association Global Warfare Sym- through the use of computer networks to disrupt, posium,” http://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/17/. deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 13. JP 3-14, Space Operations, 6 January 2009, computers and computer networks, or the comput- III-2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3 ers and networks themselves” (93); computer network _14.pdf. defense as “actions taken to protect, monitor, ana- 14. Ibid. lyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity 15. Ibid., IV-7–8. within the Department of Defense information sys- 16. Ibid., IV-8–11. tems and computer networks” (93); and computer 17. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, network exploitation as “enabling operations and 17 December 2003, IV-7, http://www.dtic.mil intelligence collection capabilities conducted /doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf. through the use of computer networks to gather data 18. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, 2 October from target or adversary automated information 2009, I-7, 9, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs systems or networks” (93). /jp3_17.pdf. 6. CND-RAs are “deliberate, authorized defensive 19. Ibid., II-2. measures or activities that protect and defend DOD 20. Ibid., II-4. computer systems and networks under attack or 21. Ibid., II-4–5. targeted for attack by adversary computer systems/ 22. Ibid., II-8. networks. RAs extend DOD’s layered defense-in- 23. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the depth capabilities and increase DOD’s ability to United States, V-19. withstand adversary attacks.” Chairman of the Joint 24. House, Statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6510.01E, Information As- Commander, United States Cyber Command, before surance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND), the House Committee on Armed Services, 23 September 12 August 2008, GL-7, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_di- 2010, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 6–7, http://www.defense rectives/cdata/unlimit/6510_01.pdf. .gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/docs/USCC

Spring 2011 | 35 %20Command%20Posture%20Statement_HASC_22 38. For basic information about the school, see SEP10_FINAL%20_OMB%20Approved_.pdf. “U.S. Air Force Special Operations School,” Air Force 25. “Mission of U.S. Special Operations Com- Special Operations Command, accessed 10 Novem- mand,” accessed 24 September 2010, http://www ber 2010, http://www.afsoc.af.mil/usafsos/. .socom.mil/SOCOMHome/Pages/About.aspx. 39. See “New Undergraduate Cyber Training 26. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the School Opens,” 17 June 2010, accessed 6 December United States, III-12, 13. 2010, http://www.keesler.af.mil/news/story.asp?id 27. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, =123209936; “Graduate School of Engineering and III-2, 3. Management, Center for Cyberspace Research (CCR),” 28. Ibid., III-4. accessed 10 November 2010, http://www.afit.edu/en 29. Ibid. /ccr/; and “Center for Cyber Warfare Established at 30. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the NPS,” accessed 10 November 2010, http://www.nps United States, V-4. .edu/Academics/Institutes/Cebrowski/News-and 31. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, III-9. -Events/cybersummit/docs/CyberCenter.pdf. 32. Ibid., viii. 40. Maj Paul D. Williams, “Cyber ACTS/SAASS: A 33. Ibid., III-10. Second Year of Command and Staff College for the 34. Ibid., III-12. Future Leaders of Our Cyber Forces,” Air and Space 35. Ibid. Power Journal 23, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 21–29, http:// 36. Ibid., III-2. www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09 37. Ibid., A-1. /win09/win09.pdf.

36 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

What’s in a Name? Beyond Rescue As We Know It

Maj Samuel Kwan, USAF*

perational art is “the application of ignating “rescue squadrons” as “personnel creative imagination . . . to design recovery squadrons” can become a catalyst strategies, campaigns, and major that energizes further changes. More than Ooperations and organize and employ mili- just a new name and flight-suit patch, the tary forces.”1 The visual arts epitomize cre- concept of a PR squadron will define how ativity while challenging viewers to inter- the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips pret an artist’s message. In some instances, PR forces to operate in the joint environ- the artist’s intent is quite clear, as in Paul ment while professionally developing those Gauguin’s painting Where Do We Come From? personnel to perform duties beyond the tac- What Are We? Where Are We Going?, which tical level in order to lead the rescue mis- contemplates humankind’s existence and sion into the future. evolution in terms of birth, life, and death.2 Examining other subjects in a similar man- ner may also prove worthwhile. By apply- Where Do We Come From? ing Gauguin’s three questions to the Air Force’s personnel recovery (PR) mission, To find out where we come from, we we can design a road map for the future. must study our history. Inception of the Throughout the evolution of Air Force modern rescue force occurred on 13 March rescue, one recurring theme—the redesig- 1946 with the establishment of the Air Res- cue Service (ARS), led by Col Richard Kight, nation of forces—has more or less coincided 4 with changes in capabilities and increases under Air Transport Command. Colonel or decreases in the scope of the mission. Kight (later a brigadier general) was respon- The latest and perhaps most substantial sible for coining the “Code of an Air Rescue change to affect Air Force rescue in the last Man,” which ends with the well-known oath 5 several decades is the June 2009 adoption “These things [we] do that others may live.” of PR as one of the service’s core functions.3 Following the Korean War, the ARS reverted By doing so, the Air Force elevated the im- to a conventional peacetime civil search portance of the mission by formally assum- and rescue (SAR) mission.6 According to one ing ownership and committing to this capa- historian, “Most USAF leaders believed that bility on a par with air superiority, rapid the Korean experience had been an aberra- global mobility, special operations, and tion in warfare, and they expected that few other functions. As the only service to have lessons were to be learned.” This attitude PR as a core function, the Air Force is rec- led to cuts in ARS’s budget and personnel, ognized as the Department of Defense’s which resulted in the loss of rotary-wing (DOD) expert in this mission. But this in- doctrine and expertise.7 When the need creased focus calls for another name once again arose for combat search and res- change—one long overdue. Specifically, cue (CSAR) during the Vietnam War, the Air such a seemingly minor initiative as redes- Force assembled forces and renamed the

*The author is an HC-130 navigator currently serving as a special action officer to the commander, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia.

Spring 2011 | 37 ARS the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery mission.12 Such a problematic command re- Service (ARRS) in January 1966. However, lationship between components produced a by then, those forces had to relearn many significant lesson learned from the conflict. of the lessons of Korea, so the failed early Apart from those in Desert Storm, other years of the Vietnam conflict became recovery missions in the 1990s famously known as the “dark age of SAR.”8 Neverthe- included the rescue of Capt Scott O’Grady less, Air Force rescue later gained fame in by a Marine Corps tactical recovery of air- Vietnam for daring missions involving craft and personnel team and the recover- “Jolly Green Giant” helicopters that plucked ies, by Air Force special operations forces, downed Air Force and other services’ air- of an F-117 and an F-16 pilot during Opera- crews out of the dense jungle. Airmen such tion Allied Force. Meanwhile, conventional as A1C William Pitsenbarger, a pararescueman Air Force rescue units struggled to find and recipient of the Medal of Honor, gave their identity. On 1 February 1993, Air Mo- their lives to save others. Thus, the latter bility Command (the successor to Military portion of the Vietnam War became known Airlift Command) transferred the ARS to 9 as the “golden age” of rescue. Air Combat Command, which in turn dis- Unfortunately, Air Force rescue atro- banded it and aligned some rescue units phied again after Vietnam, and the subse- with their geographic major commands (e.g., quent 15 years saw a loss of combat rescue US Air Forces in Europe and Pacific Air capability. In the 1980s, Twenty-Third Air Forces).13 At the same time, Air Force CSAR Force owned the mission for a time, under squadrons, known as “air rescue squad- United States Special Operations Command rons,” became “rescue squadrons.” Although (USSOCOM), which later divested responsi- Air Force Special Operations Command ab- bility to Military Airlift Command, which sorbed rescue units in 2003 and Air Combat then revived the original designation, Air 10 Command reinherited the mission in 2006, Rescue Service. no significant shift occurred in the organiz- The beginning of Operation Desert Storm ing, training, or equipping of these units. brought about the hasty reassembling of Prior to Operations Enduring Freedom CSAR forces and operational command and and Iraqi Freedom, traditional Air Force control (C2) architecture. As Darrel Whitcomb CSAR forces sat alert in Turkey and Kuwait observes, “In the summer of 1990, CSAR in for Operations Northern and Southern toto was not in the best of shape,” due Watch, respectively, waiting for the distress largely to “force reductions, budget deci- call that never came, much as they had dur- sions, and reorganizations.”11 Additionally, ing Desert Storm. Today, Air Force rescue the transfer of HC-130 and MH-53 aircraft forces are certainly engaged in combat and and experienced personnel from the ARS to heroically going into harm’s way to save USSOCOM resulted in the tasking of Special lives, but the service’s PR mission is cur- Operations Command Central, rather than rently stagnating from the combination of ARS, with the CSAR mission in Desert high operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and dif- Storm. However, instead of the special op- erations component, the joint rescue coor- ficulty adapting to change. dination center—an entity that belonged to the conventional air component of Central What Are We? Command Air Forces—was assigned the C2 responsibility. This divided architecture In the 1990s, the DOD adopted the term meant that Special Operations Command personnel recovery, defined as “the sum of Central owned the primary recovery mis- military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to pre- sion for all service components while Cen- pare for and execute the recovery and tral Command Air Forces, which had no reinte ­gration of isolated personnel.”14 The ­helicopters in-theater, exercised C2 for that Joint Personnel Recovery Agency was es-

38 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

tablished within US Joint Forces Command the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have in 1999 as the DOD’s office of primary re- shown that the old paradigm of CSAR’s sav- sponsibility for PR.15 Although CSAR is only ing a fighter pilot from enemy territory a subset of PR, most people are more famil- amounts to only a fraction of what PR iar with the former, the means by which “the forces are tasked to do. The vast majority of Air Force accomplishes the PR recovery isolated personnel are ground-component task. It is the Air Force’s preferred mecha- members—US and coalition—needing ex- nism for personnel recovery in uncertain or traction from the fight. The Air Force per- hostile environments and denied areas.”16 forms this mission immensely well. HH-60 The term search in CSAR is an antiquated crews and Guardian Angels in particular misnomer that brings to mind aircraft flying have saved thousands of lives by flying in in hostile airspace “searching” for a downed bad weather, at night, and under hostile fire Airman or other isolated personnel. In to evacuate and provide immediate medical ­reality, the “locate” task of PR now usually care to wounded soldiers and civilians. In happens at the operational, not tactical, 2009 alone, Air Force crews were credited level. The air and space operations center, with a combined 768 saves and 3,594 assists joint PR center, or component PR coordina- in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.20 tion cell utilizes the gamut of intelligence, This persistent need for Air Force com- surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; sat- bat capability in Afghanistan, Iraq, and else- ellites in the Global Positioning System; and where has resulted in a low-supply, high- survival radios, such as the Combat Survi- demand PR force that spends an average of vor Evader Locator, to take the “search” out one day deployed for every day spent at of search and rescue before recovery forces home station, a ratio known as a “1:1 dwell.” ever launch.17 Understanding the operational- Even though this high OPTEMPO gives PR level capabilities and responsibilities of PR personnel extensive tactical experience, it C2 is essential for professional develop- deprives them of the chance to acquire ad- ment, which will create future PR leaders ditional PR skills and greater operational who practice operational art. However, experience—or to pursue other career-­ among the Air Force “PR triad” of HH-60, development opportunities. As the 1980s HC-130, and Guardian Angel weapon sys- and 1990s generation of senior leaders re- tems, only the Guardian Angel community tires from active service, combat veterans of is broadly educated on all phases of the PR Afghanistan and Iraq will require more than mission, from reporting through reintegra- tactical skills to lead and prepare Air Force tion of recovered personnel.18 and joint PR forces in future operations. The Air Force trains our PR triad to be They should also have background in PR C2 tactical experts in recovery—no small feat and should serve in DOD, joint, or combat- since newly assigned personnel can take up ant command staffs to gain operational to two years to progress from initial skills background and strategic acumen. training to fully mission qualified status. Among the officer corps, are we merely The Air Force needs to realize a return on individual combat rescue officers or HC-130 its training investment by deploying and and HH-60 pilots? Or should we instead be employing our PR forces in combat, but PR known as PR officers? Currently, the Air units have become victims of their own suc- Force specialty codes (AFSC) for an HC-130 cess. Without a doubt, Air Force PR repre- pilot and navigator are 11R and 12R, respec- sents the most highly trained and proficient tively, which groups them with reconnais- tactical rescue force in the world. Our PR sance, surveillance, and electronic warfare forces are invaluable to the joint team be- aviators, while HH-60 pilots (AFSC 11H) are cause no other service possesses the same aligned with other helicopter pilots. Along capability.19 Recovery of personnel by Air- with combat rescue officers, PR is the men is as old as military aviation itself, but proper specialty of HC-130 and HH-60 offi-

Spring 2011 | 39 cers, just as fighter or mobility crew mem- competency, Air Force PR, despite its un- bers are categorized into those respective matched capability and success in recovery mission areas. PR officers should hold the operations, risks losing relevancy in the AFSCs 11P, 12P, and 13P (replacing the 13D joint environment. In a meeting with the control-and-recovery designation currently Defense Writers Group, held shortly before held by combat rescue officers). These termination of the CSAR-X helicopter-­ ­AFSCs would more accurately define and replacement program, John Young—former identify the PR specialty and its associated undersecretary of defense for acquisition, knowledge, placing more emphasis on the technology, and logistics—opined, “I don’t core function than on individual weapon know that that [CSAR] community has to systems. Similarly, the Air Force created a have its own set of assets for the occasional new 18X AFSC in October 2009 for opera- rescue mission. We have new things coming tors of remotely piloted aircraft in order to on line like V-22s and other things that can recognize, capture, and develop the unique be pressed into service. When we do our skills in that community.21 rescue mission we’re going to do a come-as- By adopting PR AFSCs, the Air Force would you-are operation anyway, unless all the do a better job of capturing, developing, and CSAR assets are pre-positioned for that.”24 retaining PR expertise. We would thereby Apart from demonstrating a fundamental increase the pool of officers available to fill misunderstanding of the role of PR in to- positions on higher headquarters staffs or in day’s fight and a disregard for the risks of ad deployed joint PR centers and PR coordina- hoc recovery by untrained or unprepared tion cells. PR officers working in joint op- assets, the undersecretary’s statement sug- erational and strategic environments would gests that Air Force PR is narrowly focused tell (and sell) the Air Force’s PR story. By and its capability easily duplicated. PR forces, increasing the number of operational and like special operations forces, cannot be staff positions in combatant commands mass produced; however, Air Force PR does worldwide, we also would enhance opportu- indeed have a narrow focus. In reality, the nities to educate partner nations on PR, joint train has left the station, and Air Force thus building their capacities and helping PR needs to get on board. PR officers on them establish organic PR capabilities. staff have a duty to advocate the mission The 23rd Wing, parent unit of all of the and educate our senior leaders on PR issues Air Force’s active duty PR forces, already ranging from plans and operations to acqui- engages in limited activities at the tactical sition, requirements, strategy, policy, and level that “build partnerships,” another of doctrine. the service’s 12 core functions.22 PR Airmen recently advised Colombian forces on air- drops and infiltration/exfiltration operations.23 Where Are We Going? These types of efforts in theater security cooperation, however, are constrained by CSAR-X, the Air Force’s planned rescue- the limited availability of Air Force PR ex- helicopter replacement program, appeared perts, who are heavily tasked to support to embody the future of combat rescue until wartime commitments. We need to find a the secretary of defense cancelled it, asking way to simultaneously decrease the whether PR “can only be accomplished by ­OPTEMPO of our deployments but increase yet another single-service solution.”25 Be- our role in theater security cooperation cause current operations and the “long war” since experiences in building partner capac- necessitate meeting the urgent equipment ity undoubtedly contribute to preparing needs of war fighters, the Air Force has put well-rounded Airmen to lead PR squadrons. a high priority on acquiring new recovery Without broadly developing our people aircraft. Despite the CSAR-X cancellation, as well as our operational and strategic an HH-60 operational-loss-replacement plan

40 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

exists to compensate for 20-plus years of our core professional military education in aircraft losses during combat and training. PR, actively increasing the Air Force’s PR In addition, the Air Force has begun recapi- participation in collateral missions and ex- talizing our legacy HC-130 fleet with the ercises, widely exchanging PR specialists HC-130J model.26 But we must still address among members of the joint community, the long-term definition of joint PR. New and incorporating PR into the AirSea Battle technology and iron on the ramp will mollify operational concept. frustrations associated with aging equipment Within the Joint Personnel Recovery and increase our ability to survive and oper- Agency, the Personnel Recovery Education ate against increasingly capable enemy air and Training Center exists “to educate DoD defense threats. Nevertheless, new aircraft and selected other national and inter­ and associated tactics, techniques, and pro- national Personnel Recovery professionals, cedures will be far less useful without smart both civilian and military, in the art and sci- personnel who understand strategy and de- ence of planning and executing joint Per- sired effects. DOD leadership has already sonnel Recovery operations.”27 The center’s recognized that we need to adapt. Meeting courses train and educate joint officers and joint expectations requires widening the enlisted members but primarily instruct scope of the Air Force’s traditional thinking combat rescue officers or a select few op- with regard to rescue. erational staffers, not only on the recovery

New technology and iron on the ramp will mollify frustrations associated with aging equipment and increase our ability to survive and operate against increasingly capable enemy air defense threats. Nevertheless, new aircraft and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures will be far less useful without smart personnel who understand strategy and desired effects.

Senior leaders such as Mr. Young will phase of PR but also on the other PR execu- continue to take the Air Force’s CSAR com- tion tasks of reporting, locating, supporting, petency for granted, and our tactical units and reintegrating. Courses offered include will continue their 1:1 dwell ratio because PR Plans and Operations as well as Reinte- other nations, services, or components are gration Team Responsibilities.28 Unfortu- unable or unwilling to dedicate assets to re- nately, training slots for these valuable cover their own personnel. For those rea- courses are extremely limited. sons, we should consider several initiatives On 9 August 2010, Secretary of Defense to train others while advancing our own PR Robert Gates announced his intent to elimi- forces. These initiatives include expanding nate Joint Forces Command. Naturally, we

Spring 2011 | 41 must consider the cascading effects, includ- well as enhance joint integration. Air Force ing what will become of the Joint Personnel HH-60 crews, for example, would embed Recovery Agency. With or without that with Marines to exercise tactical recovery of agency, the Personnel Recovery Education aircraft and personnel or in Navy SAR units and Training Center could expand to be- to gain proficiency in shipboard operations come a “PR University” that would incorpo- and C2, eventually returning to Air Force rate compulsory and optional classes as units to share their experiences. Obviously, part of either mission qualification or ca- this is not a new idea, but we should break reer field upgrades.29 Additionally, the cen- down the old construct that exchange tours ter would be an ideal forum for classes on must be few and far between. Rather than rescue history and case studies that would special duties, these assignments should help build a foundation for new PR officers. become a normal part of career progres- PR University’s cadre would include experi- sion. Increasing exchange opportunities enced PR officers and specialists from all would also allow our sister services to learn the services. from the best—Air Force PR experts. Our An article entitled “A Rescue Force for service still possesses the preponderance of the World: Adapting Airpower to the Reali- PR forces and expertise; consequently, the ties of the Long War” coherently maps the 30 Air Force PR coordination cell is normally future role of Air Force PR. Specifically, it designated the joint PR center as well.33 No proposes that we extensively employ Air other service has as many dedicated recov- Force rescue assets for disaster response ery assets, including aircraft; officer and and theater security cooperation, in large enlisted aircrews; pararescuemen; and sur- part to engage other nations and win the vival, evasion, resistance, and escape in- hearts and minds of their citizenry. Along structors. Our PR officers and specialists those same lines, PR squadrons, through will serve as enablers who can train, edu- greater participation in collateral missions cate, and increase the capacity of our sister and exercises, could broaden their Airmen, services to fulfill the inherent doctrinal re- develop their future leaders, and increase credibility and relevancy in the joint and sponsibility of recovering their own person- interagency arena. Counterdrug operations nel, thereby reducing the OPTEMPO of with the Department of Homeland Security, stressed Air Force PR forces. noncombatant evacuation exercises with the The AirSea Battle concept, initiated in Marine Corps, and humanitarian relief with September 2009 by the chief of staff of the the US Agency for International Development Air Force and the chief of naval operations, represent just a few examples of activities offers a perfect forum for joint discussion of for which Air Force PR experts are ideally PR. Thus far, the concept has emphasized suited to contribute. Exercise Angel Thun- major combat operations in antiaccess envi- 34 der, the “premier personnel recovery exer- ronments. Although this type of conflict cise in the world,” held annually in the Ari- seems to set up a “classic” downed-aviator zona desert, serves as an excellent example CSAR scenario, regardless of the nature of to emulate and expand upon.31 We should the mission, the current AirSea Battle con- also incorporate PR scenarios into all Red cept makes no mention of PR as a critical Flag and Green Flag exercises since joint and collaboration between air and naval forces. coalition partners regularly attend them. It would almost certainly become the Air According to joint doctrine, PR can and Force’s responsibility to recover naval avia- should involve air, land, or naval forces— tors located beyond the range of Navy res- whatever is necessary to fulfill the mission.32 cue forces, so we should not overlook this Exchange tours offer an ideal way to in- strategic opportunity to enhance Air Force– crease participants’ knowledge of the capa- Navy integration. Further advancement of bilities of sister services and components as AirSea Battle should include discussion of

42 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

shared PR doctrine; training; C2; and tac- the requisite operational know-how and tics, techniques, and procedures. strategic vision to lead PR in the current and future joint environment. Remembering where we came from, we Conclusion must build on the contributions, lessons We have never had a better opportunity learned (both good and bad), and legacy of to advance the future of joint PR. Specifi- Airmen who came before us. To take the cally, we should leverage the increased fo- next evolutionary step, we should redesig- cus on the mission, brought about by the nate Air Force rescue units as PR squad- designation of PR as an Air Force core func- rons, led by PR officers whose professional tion, by further expanding our role. Orga- development makes them experienced not nizing, training, equipping, and committing only in tactical and operational warfare but to personnel recovery—not just the CSAR also in strategic thinking. These PR squad- skill set—will define the future relevancy of rons should integrate exchange personnel Air Force PR forces. Along with expanding from sister services and participate in a the role of AirSea Battle, the other initia- wide range of joint and interagency mis- tives will lead to a more capable joint PR sions. Of course, by increasing our depth community. Today, however, we find our- and taking on additional collateral missions, selves in a protracted high OPTEMPO that we risk becoming the proverbial jack-of-all- stretches our people and equipment to their trades and master of none. Balancing tacti- limits. The better the Air Force performs cal expertise and combat commitments our tactical recovery mission, the more with this expanded definition of Air Force likely it is that the DOD will continue to PR will prove challenging, but by continu- depend on us to provide that combat capa- ally applying operational art and creative bility for all services and components. By imagination to this dynamic mission, we will take it beyond rescue as we know it.  maintaining the status quo, the Air Force risks creating only tactical experts without Langley AFB, Virginia

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation 6. Capt Edward B. Westermann, “Air Rescue Ser- Planning, 26 December 2006, IV-1, http://www.dtic vice: A Direction for the Twenty-First Century?,” .mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. Airpower Journal 4, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 60–71, http:// 2. Paul Gauguin, Where Do We Come From? What www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj Are We? Where Are We Going? [D’où venons-nous? /apj90/fal90/5fal90.htm. Que sommes-nous? Où allons-nous?]. Oil on canvas, 7. Forrest L. Marion, That Others May Live: USAF 1897, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Air Rescue in Korea (Washington, DC: Air Force His- 3. A1C Brigitte Brantley, “Air Force Officials tory and Museums Program, 2004), 48, http://www Adopt Personnel Recovery as Core Function,” Air .airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext Force Print News Today, 29 June 2009, http://www /That_Others_May_Live.pdf. .af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=123156264. 8. Ibid. 4. George Galdorisi and Thomas Phillips, Leave 9. Darrel D. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue No Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and Res- in Desert Storm (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University cue (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008), 110. Press, 2006), xvi, http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf 5. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.6, /book/Whitcomb_Combat_Search_And_Rescue.pdf. Personnel Recovery Operations, 1 June 2005, 2, 10. Galdorisi and Phillips, Leave No Man Behind, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media 483. /epubs/AFDD2-1.6.pdf. 11. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue, 40, 252.

Spring 2011 | 43 12. Ibid., 60–61. http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive 13. Galdorisi and Phillips, Leave No Man Behind, /Documents/2009/January%202009/0109view.pdf. 503. 25. Robert M. Gates, “Defense Budget Recom- 14. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) mendation Statement” (speech, Arlington, VA, 6 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery in the Department of April 2009), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches Defense, 16 April 2009, 25, http://www.dtic.mil /speech.aspx?speechid=1341. /whs/directives/corres/pdf/300201p.pdf. 26. Senate, Fiscal Year 2011 Air Force Posture 15. Ibid., 1; and “About the Joint Personnel Re- Statement, 11. covery Agency,” Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, 27. “Personnel Recovery Education and Training http://www.jpra.jfcom.mil/site_public/about Center,” Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, accessed /history.htm. 4 August 2010, http://www.jpra.jfcom.mil/site_public 16. AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations, 3. /directorates/pretc/pretc.htm. 17. The joint PR center is the follow-on to the 28. “Personnel Recovery Education and Training joint search and rescue center, which succeeded the Center Course Catalog, 2010,” http://www.jpra joint rescue coordination center. .jfcom.mil/military/documents/2010%20PRETC%20 18. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures catalog%20for%20NIPR.pdf. 3-3, Guardian Angel, 19 October 2009. The Guardian 29. Education and training is hardly a new idea. Angel weapon system consists of the combat rescue JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 January 2007, http:// officer; an enlisted pararescueman; and the survival, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_50.pdf, de- evasion, resistance, and escape career fields. votes several pages to this topic, but I argue that we 19. Bruce Rolfsen, “Study: Air Force CSAR Should currently don’t do it. We need to expand the capacity, Grow, Not Shrink,” Air Force Times, 11 September increase throughput, and increase emphasis on edu- 2009, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/09 cation and training beyond the tactical level. /airforce_csar_091109w/. 30. Lt Col Marc C. DiPaolo et al., “A Rescue Force 20. “Combined Forces Air Component Com- for the World: Adapting Airpower to the Realities of mander, 2007–2010 Airpower Statistics,” briefing the Long War,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 3 slide, US Air Forces Central Public Affairs Director- (Fall 2007): 78–87, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil ate, 30 September 2010, http://www.centaf.af.mil /airchronicles/apj/apj07/fal07/fal07.pdf. This ar- /shared/media/document/AFD-101030-001.pdf. ticle is worth revisiting for a fuller discussion of the 21. TSgt Amaani Lyle, “UAS Career Field Deci- humanitarian relief and theater security initiatives sions, ISR Organization Discussed at Summit,” Air proposed by those authors. My argument, though, Force Print News Today, 2 October 2009, http://www aligns more closely with the broader scope of PR .af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=123170894. operations described in AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recov- 22. Senate, Department of the Air Force, Presenta- ery Operations, versus CSAR. See specifically DiPaolo tion to the Committee on Armed Services, United States et al., “Rescue Force for the World,” 86n9. Senate, Fiscal Year 2011 Air Force Posture Statement, 31. Capt Jennifer Pearson, “Angel Thunder 2010 the Honorable Michael B. Donley, Secretary of the Air Kicks Off,” Air Force Print News Today, 15 April Force, and General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff, 2010, http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id= United States Air Force, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 9 Feb- 123199914. ruary 2010, 11, http://www.posturestatement.af.mil 32. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, VI-1. /shared/media/document/AFD-100223-010.pdf. 33. Ibid., F-1. 23. SSgt Andrea Thacker, “Rescue Airmen Ex- 34. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? change Knowledge, Build Partnerships with Colom- (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budget- bian Airmen,” Air Force Print News Today, 23 Sep- ary Assessments, 2010), http://www.csbaonline.org tember 2010, http://www.af.mil/news/story_print /4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100219.Why_AirSea .asp?id=123223389. _Battle/R.20100219.Why_AirSea_Battle.pdf. 24. John J. Young Jr., “The John Young View,” Air Force Magazine 92, no. 1 (January 2009): 53,

44 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

Revelations in Haiti The Side Effects of New Priorities for Remotely Piloted ISR Aircraft

Capt Jaylan Haley, USAF*

he RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Preda- fighters, and the public a different perspec- tor, and other remotely piloted intel- tive of ISR. Providing humanitarian support ligence, surveillance, and reconnais- via remotely piloted ISR platforms contests T the established paradigm by creating debate sance (ISR) platforms typically perform combat missions to defeat improvised ex- about when and how to employ these as- plosive devices or locate and neutralize en- sets. Unified Response reveals that the emy forces. However, the US response to United States can respond to international the devastating earthquake near Port-au- humanitarian operations with ISR aircraft Prince, Haiti, on 12 January 2010 challenges whenever decision makers choose to do so. the paradigm that ISR simply counteracts Consequently, the operation demonstrates threats.1 In response to the Haiti disaster, that the ISR community must be prepared the international community initiated a mas- to conduct these operations with the neces- sive recovery and relief effort.2 The United sary manpower, support, and equipment. States alone deployed more than 22,000 mili- tary personnel, 30 ships, and 300 aircraft in support of Operation Unified Response.3 The The “When” Challenge deployed aircraft included several manned The calculus for determining when the and remotely piloted ISR platforms. United States should employ ISR RPAs is Unified Response was the first inter­ influenced by these aircraft’s operational national deployment of remotely piloted benefits of rapid deployability, long en- ISR assets in support of a humanitarian op- durance, and lack of risk to personnel, eration although some of these assets as- which may persuade policy makers to use sisted domestically after Hurricane Katrina.4 them to aid foreign states when disaster The RQ-4 and MQ-1 provided time-critical strikes. However, the prospect of using imagery support and overwatch for military scarce ISR platforms for humanitarian op- and civilian relief workers in Haiti. How- erations creates a quandary for decision ever, use of these military assets to support makers, who must determine priorities humanitarian operations complicates future for supporting combat and noncombat op- decisions regarding their employment. A erations, and for ISR operators, who must complication emerges when remotely pi- execute those priorities. loted aircraft (RPA) tackle problems beyond For example, the day the Haiti earth- their traditional roles of finding, fixing, quake occurred, the Air Force had de- tracking, and engaging targets. Specifically, ployed an RQ-4 to support combat opera- such a new role gives policy makers, war tions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because

*The author is an ISR mission commander in the 13th Intelligence Squadron, Beale AFB, California.

Spring 2011 | 45 Pres. Barack Obama ordered an aggressive tions a higher priority than combat opera- response by the US government to the tions in order to attain the benefits men- Haiti disaster, including the allocation of tioned above, then ISR operators should ISR assets to United States Southern Com- expect an expanded role in future US re- mand (USSOUTHCOM) for humanitarian sponses to international disasters. operations in that country, the RQ-4 priority for Unified Response temporarily exceeded that of US Central Command (USCENTCOM) The “How” Challenges for replacing its RQ-4 aircraft in support of 5 Like the ISR operators in Unified Re- fully engaged combat forces. It is possible sponse, their counterparts in future situa- that future priorities may prove more am- tions that require ISR support must over- biguous, complicating the division of ISR come several obstacles before they can assets between combat and noncombat op- successfully conduct an expanding mission erations. Competing policy choices be- set which encompasses humanitarian op- tween humanitarian and combat opera- erations. First, these personnel must deal tions do not constitute a new concept, but with an increased operations tempo that some decision makers do not consider ­situations like the one in Haiti a military may strain finite data collection and exploi- priority at all. Regarding the response to tation capacity. The pool of analysts, as well Hurricane Katrina, a domestic disaster, a as their specialized equipment, that dynam- House of Representatives committee re- ically collects and exploits ISR data as us- port observed that the military’s sole re- able intelligence represents a critical but sponsibility involved fighting and winning limited resource. Therefore, additional, con- America’s wars.6 Such thinking reflects an current, multitheater ISR sorties—along enduring debate concerning the use of with varying mission types (i.e., a mixture weapons of war for operations other than of combat and humanitarian operations) war. However, the new expectation for a that demand different analytical empha- US response to international disasters now ses—will likely strain these limited mission- includes ISR, and any questions concern- management and exploitation resources. ing its usefulness for humanitarian opera- Second, as the Air Force continues to in- tions have been answered. crease the pace of distributed ISR opera- Employing remotely piloted ISR plat- tions, personnel who perform missions will forms during such operations yields mul- bear additional workloads and psychological 8 tiple benefits for the United States, not stresses. Third, ISR operators who dissemi- only by enhancing national security but nate unclassified intelligence must deal also by increasing US moral authority and with the fact that standard declassification strengthening international friendships by procedures for releasing large amounts of assisting people in need. Furthermore, data within hours or even minutes of collec- ­policy makers demonstrate to the American tion do not exist for aircraft like the RQ-4. people that their investment in weapon Operation Unified Response reaffirmed the systems is useful for a wide range of mis- truism that the effectiveness of intelligence sions, including humanitarian operations. depends in part on its timeliness. Additionally, the military shares informa- To address the first and second concerns, tion with nongovernmental organizations mentioned above, the Air Force needs to (NGO), compensating for shortfalls in their assign a sufficient number of ISR operations capabilities. This symbiosis fosters closer professionals to current and emerging sce- relationships between the military and re- narios, possibly including humanitarian op- lief organizations with which the military erations. Moreover, the service should com- often partners in a variety of situations.7 If mission a study of ISR operators for the policy makers assign humanitarian opera- purpose of developing a baseline under-

46 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

standing of problems associated with con- pret data from ISR platforms networked to ducting continuous distributed ISR mis- the Air Force distributed common ground/ sions. Perhaps future or concurrent studies surface system (DCGS).13 Not only analysts could concentrate on other types of distrib- but also pilots, sensor operators, and mis- uted missions, such as those conducted by sion intelligence coordinators of the 12th space personnel—a community highly ex- and 99th Reconnaissance Squadrons and perienced in distributed operations.9 The the 432nd Air Expeditionary Wing feel the third issue justifies combatant commands’ effects of increased operations tempos dur- establishing uniform declassification stan- ing contingencies such as Unified Response. dards to alleviate confusion in the event of The DCGS functions as the brain behind another Haiti-type disaster that may call for the ISR platforms that supply inputs to the prompt declassification of a substantial overall system. The platforms, coordinated amount of intelligence. Additional or chang- by ISR mission operations commanders, ing ISR priorities require a full-spectrum collect data for DCGS analysts located at solution that considers not only hardware worldwide nodes managed by the 480th but also the software, processes, and human ISR Wing. This unit managed intelligence aspects of distributed ISR operations. exploitation, tasking, and collection for ISR personnel must contend with an up- Unified Response while simultaneously swing in operations tempo. By 2015 the Air supporting global combat requirements by Force expects to have at least 380 ISR air- requiring mission operations commanders craft, about 50 percent more than its cur- and analysts to “surge” by working longer rent inventory of 250; this growth—primarily hours.14 Even under normal conditions, in remotely piloted platforms, combined ­analysts do not exploit all of the data col- with the possibility of more Haiti-like con- lected by ISR platforms. USCENTCOM of- tingencies—will drive a need for more per- ficials reportedly used “less than one-half sonnel to perform analytical, flight, and of the electronic signals intercepts col- mission-management duties.10 In a recent lected from the Predator.”15 Surge opera- study, the Government Accountability Of- tions beyond the 12-hour days currently fice identified mission-management and demanded by normal ISR operations are to analytical capacities as critical ISR short- be expected during ad hoc contingencies; falls, noting that “since 2002, [the Depart- however, more frequent humanitarian con- ment of Defense] has rapidly increased its tingencies can severely strain our already ability to collect ISR data in Iraq and Af- limited analytical capacity. The Air Force’s ghanistan; however, its capacity for process- proposed 50 percent increase in ISR plat- ing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited forms over the next four years will place and has not kept pace with the increase in additional pressures on ISR mission man- collection platforms and combat air patrols.”11 agement and exploitation.16 Lt Gen David Deptula, retired, former Air Because policy makers might have no Force A-2 (intelligence), best characterized knowledge of the vast amount of data col- the situation: “In the not-too-distance [sic] lected by these additional platforms, they future, we’ll be swimming in sensors and could underestimate the number of ana- drowning in data.”12 RPAs create a need for lysts needed to transform that information more analysts since they fly longer sorties into useful intelligence. The increasing than manned aircraft and therefore collect number of aircraft and accelerated usage much more data, which analysts must brought about by humanitarian operations transform into intelligence. The ISR short- may unexpectedly confront the Air Force falls identified by the Government Account- with the problem of “too much data and ability Office are reflected in human terms not enough intel.”17 Consequently, tactical by the number of ISR mission commanders and operational ISR commanders might and analysts available to collect and inter- find themselves in the precarious situation

Spring 2011 | 47 of choosing between greater personnel AOR [area of responsibility]” reflects the workload and diminished mission avail- mentality of ISR operators, but sustain- ability.18 Although the simple solution ment of this “always in the fight” attitude would call for more personnel, the use of for extended periods may have undesirable discretion when deciding whether to be- psychological repercussions. come involved in contingency operations The US Army commissions an annual will continue to be the key factor in main- report detailing stressful incidents that af- taining a proper balance of force struc- fect Soldiers’ mental health. Studies assess- ture. In the spring of 2010, the 480th ISR ing data from 2007 through 2009 identified Wing began adding approximately 2,500 multiple deployments as a major contribut- intelligence personnel, predicated on ing factor to mental problems among Army ­USCENTCOM’s plan to increase its approxi- personnel.22 ISR operators, who are “always mately 40 full-motion-video combat air pa- on,” may possibly face some of the same trols to 65.19 However, this expansion does concerns as individuals who deploy multiple not take into account emerging priorities times, but no data details the short- and long- such as humanitarian operations.20 term mental health issues associated with If the number of contingency operations DCGS operations. Thus, commanders may (such as Unified Response) consistently someday confront a festering problem that exceeds projected USCENTCOM levels for could adversely affect their ISR operators. the next several years, a faster operations Clearly, those commanders should in- tempo accompanied by surge operations vest in a study similar to the Army’s to for current DCGS personnel will become gauge the likelihood of mental health is- more likely. To alleviate the subsequent sues among persons who conduct combat stress on mission-management and ana- operations from their home station. Such a lytical capacities, the Air Force may have study should address ISR operations, but to add more ISR operators than the 2,500 commanders might consider expanding it currently planned. The Department of De- to include other individuals, such as space fense has undertaken a study of ways to and missile personnel who conduct distrib- determine specific numbers of personnel uted operations. It should also deal with necessary to meet the escalating demand ISR operators who spend several years con- for ISR analysis, but its date of publication ducting uninterrupted combat and non- remains uncertain.21 Even though the mili- combat missions. The findings might help tary should certainly complete such evalu- identify potential mental health problems ations in order to attain greater clarity re- associated with DCGS operations—specifi- garding the actual manning dilemmas cally, the attitudes and reactions of ISR op- faced by the ISR community, other prob- erators to stressful situations in combat lems may exist as well. and noncombat environments. Regardless ISR operators are subject to psychologi- of the scope and scale of such a project, cal stress occasioned by the changing re- the Air Force should recognize mental quirements mentioned above. Many ISR health concerns as its operations increase operations take place from in-garrison lo- in number and vary in scope. cations throughout the United States every Even without definitive data to document day and around the clock; indeed, the these matters, some commanders seek DCGS supports a variety of missions in all ways to assuage psychological stress. One six geographic combatant commands. For initiative grants high-level security access to the 13th Intelligence Squadron, Unified chaplains who support ISR operators in Response added to its many duties, albeit highly classified operating environments. with a humanitarian rather than a combat Air Combat Command, which manages the focus. A sign outside the squadron’s op- pilot, sensor operator, and mission intelli- erations floor that reads “Welcome to the gence coordinator force, has taken similar

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steps by granting clearances to mental health siders assisting states like China, Russia, or professionals, thereby expanding their ac- Syria. Despite their likely apprehension cess to assist operators in restricted duty about the United States flying traditional areas. The side effects of including spiritual “spy” aircraft over their territory, such and mental health support personnel on or countries might permit overflights of ISR near operations floors remain unknown. aircraft in case of a severe disaster, but the Their presence could even inadvertently United States might follow more restrictive increase the pressure on task-saturated op- rules for imagery declassification and archi- erators, who might view them as a distrac- tecture than it did in Haiti. The broader im- tion during time-critical moments. How- plication is that combatant commands must ever, these initial steps will go a long way establish uniform declassification standards toward identifying and mitigating long-term and processes that provide for the release of stressors that affect people working in dis- large amounts of intelligence within hours tributed operations, as have previous US Army research efforts in the forward oper- or minutes of collection. If a uniform de- ating environment. classification process is not feasible across Solving the personnel-related matters combatant commands, then each command discussed above will not be enough to en- should establish criteria and procedures for sure that critical intelligence reaches the releasing information according to its re- intended audience during humanitarian gional standards, possibly even detailing operations. Senior leaders must also address initial country-by-country declassification problems with the systems and processes guidance that ISR operators can follow dur- that ISR operators rely upon to dissemi- ing disaster response. To prepare for future nate critical information. Declassifying operations, we should clarify processes and sensitive information and identifying the enhance tools to deliver unclassified infor- associated delivery architecture during fu- mation to NGOs now. ture humanitarian operations require Unclassified reporting standards for the planning to determine how best to deliver DCGS may represent the most appropriate this information to operators who lack se- solution for future humanitarian operations curity clearances. Initially, security clas- since they would offer the architectural sification guidance and procedures for framework for delivering unclassified data. transmitting information to on-scene op- Although disseminating unclassified intel- erators during Unified Response were con- 23 ligence is not a traditional function of cur- voluted. For about the first week of op- rent ISR operators, members of the 13th In- erations, guidance changed repeatedly telligence Squadron exploited ISR data before it stabilized: virtually all electro-­ during Unified Response and posted intel- optical imagery was to be unclassified and ligence on classified and unclassified col- transmitted through unclassified media.24 laboration websites through the 480th ISR Declassifying massive amounts of data 25 and intelligence from remotely piloted ISR Wing. On the unclassified network, many platforms so quickly was highly unorthodox, images appeared on USSOUTHCOM’s web- but personnel should expect it for future site—the All Partners Access Network—for humanitarian operations. The situation in quick distribution of information to NGOs. Haiti may have simplified the decision to However, because all combatant commands declassify data and intelligence, yet guid- do not share this standard, decision makers ance may differ considerably in case of should consider issuing blanket guidance humanitarian operations in more politi- for the unclassified distribution of intelli- cally sensitive locations. gence in order to give ISR operators direc- Releasing unclassified images may not tion for filling requests from uncleared part- prove feasible when the United States con- ners during disaster responses.

Spring 2011 | 49 The Next Unified Response logical health, and (3) we would have is- sued clear guidance for ISR support to re- Consider what might happen in the near covery and relief workers well in advance future if we implemented the recommen- of the operation. These factors would culmi- dations discussed above and then faced a nate in a response even more effective than hypothetical tsunami in Indonesia, compa- our efforts following the 2004 tsunami in rable to the one that struck there in 2004. Indonesia or the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Suppose that the Indonesian government Moreover, the Indonesian situation is an- rejected a US offer of military forces to as- other example of using remotely piloted ISR sist with initial recovery yet granted over- platforms to secure US national interests in flight permission for ISR aircraft. The operations other than war. United States could then provide assis- Future humanitarian operations may tance, largely unbeknownst to the local populace. The RQ-4 could immediately de- temporarily take precedence over combat ploy from its forward station in Guam to operations, and a variety of challenges will supply nearly uninterrupted imagery cov- likely accompany this new reality. As they erage for humanitarian operations.26 Addi- address concerns about limited data pro- tionally, tactical RPAs such as the Shadow cessing capacity, psychological effects as- and Raven could employ their sensors to sociated with high operations tempo, and investigate situations requiring further procedures for declassifying intelligence, scrutiny of RQ-4 imagery. If these and decision makers and ISR operators should other tactical RPAs—potentially numbering also recognize the benefits of humanitar- in the hundreds—linked into the DCGS, an ian ISR operations. If Haiti is any indica- unprecedented amount of data would tion of the United States’ ability to respond stream to analysts around the world. Per- quickly, efficiently, and effectively to in- sonnel could promptly send data garnered ternational disasters, US policy makers from these ISR platforms to our Indone- have yet another tool with which to ad- sian partners and supporting NGOs via un- vance our national interests. Moreover, le- classified, or possibly classified, means. veraging remotely piloted ISR weapons of In this scenario, the United States could war in a socially constructive manner will show solidarity with its Indonesian part- pay dividends well beyond the initial in- ners, fostering a deeper friendship with an tent of the weapons’ design. By means of increasingly important international this new paradigm, the DCGS and other player—home of the world’s largest Muslim portions of the ISR community have dem- population. We would expect surge opera- onstrated their ability and willingness to tions to occur during execution of such a transition from a purely combat focus. Be- humanitarian mission. Nevertheless, the cause ISR operators will probably improve ISR mission would remain effective since upon the lessons of Operation Unified Re- (1) ISR personnel would not receive task- sponse, future humanitarian efforts will ings beyond what resources allow, (2) we become even more effective.  would have a better understanding of how increased operations affect their psycho- Beale AFB, California

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Notes

1. “Intelligence assets monitor foreign states, College, 18 March 2005), 4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi volatile regions, and transnational issues to identify -bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433681&Location=U2&doc threats to US interests in time for senior military =GetTRDoc.pdf. leaders to respond effectively.” Joint Publication 2-0, 8. Distributed ISR operations leverage mission Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007, I-23–24, http://www management and analytical capabilities by physi- .dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf. cally separating the personnel who perform those 2. “Magnitude 7.0—Haiti Region,” US Geological duties from the ISR asset during mission execution. Survey, 12 January 2010, accessed 5 February 2010, By their design, all RPAs and their ISR operators http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews conduct distributed ISR operations. /2010/us2010rja6/#summary. 9. See Col Keith W. Balts, “Satellites and Remotely 3. US Southern Command, “Narrative History of Piloted Aircraft: Two Remotely Operated Ships Pass- Operation Unified Response,” 25 May 2010,http: //www ing in the Fight,” Air and Space Power Journal 24, no. .southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFilesLarge.php?id=138. 3 (Fall 2010): 35–41. 4. The Air Force’s ISR assets deployed in the af- 10. Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review termath of Hurricane Katrina, marking the first Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, time they were “collectively called to domestic con- February 2010), xvii, http://www.defense.gov/qdr tingency service to provide imagery and full-motion /images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf; John A. Tirpak, video to military decision-makers and on-scene re- “The RPA Boom,” Air Force Magazine 93, no. 8 (Au- sponse providers.” Maj Kevin L. Buddelmeyer, “Mili- gust 2010): 36–42, http://www.airforce-magazine tary First Response: Lessons Learned from Hurri- .com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2010/August cane Katrina,” research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: %202010/0810RPA.pdf; and Christopher Drew, “Drones Air Command and Staff College, 2007), 3–4. Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda,” New 5. Jesse Lee, “Thoughts and Prayers for Haiti,” York Times, 16 March 2009, accessed 12 July 2010, White House Blog, 12 January 2010, http://www http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business .whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/01/12/thoughts-and /17uav.html?_r=1&hp. -prayers-haiti. USCENTCOM maintained its normal 11. House, “Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon- complement of ISR assets in-theater; however, the naissance: Overarching Guidance Is Needed to Ad- expected replacement RQ-4 was delayed due to op- vance Information Sharing,” Statement of Davi M. erations in Haiti. Additionally, two RQ-1 orbits were D’Agostino, Director, Defense Capabilities and Manage- dedicated to relief operations in Haiti. See Sharon ment, Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Weinberg, “Military Drone Diverted from Mideast to Land Forces and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Haiti,” AOL News, 15 January 2010, http://www.aol Committee on Armed Services, House of Representa- news.com/world/article/military-drone-diverted-from tives, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 17 March 2010, 5, http:// -mideast-to-haiti/19318294; and Judith Snyderman, www.gao.gov/new.items/d10500t.pdf. “ ‘Global Hawk’ Photographs Damage to Help Relief 12. Jim Hodges, “The Get-Well Intel Plan,” C4ISR Effort,” American Forces Press Service, 15 January Journal, 1 January 2010, http://www.c4isrjournal 2010, accessed 12 July 2010, http://www.defense.gov .com/story.php?F=4411944. /news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57540. 13. “Air Force Distributed Common Ground Sys- 6. “We cannot expect the Marines to swoop in tem,” fact sheet, Air Force Link, 31 August 2009, ac- with MREs [meals, ready to eat] every time a storm cessed 5 August 2010, http://www.af.mil/information hits. We train soldiers to fight wars. You can’t kill a /factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=15433. storm.” House, Select Bipartisan Committee to In- 14. TSgt Matthew McGovern, “ISR Wing Members vestigate the Preparation for and Response to Hur- Contribute to the Fight,” Air Force Link, 18 March ricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of 2010, accessed 12 July 2010, http://www.af.mil/news the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the /story.asp?id=123195175; and MSgt Dale Yates, Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina “480th ISR Wing Airmen Aid Haiti Recovery,” Air (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Force Link, 8 February 2010, accessed 12 July 2010, 2006), 15, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123189385. /creports/pdf/hr109-377/overview.pdf. 15. House, “Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon- 7. Col Floresita C. Quarto, “U.S. Military/NGO naissance,” 6. Interface: A Vital Link to Successful Humanitarian 16. Ibid. Intervention,” US Army War College Strategy Re- 17. An analyst uses data—the raw information search Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War garnered from ISR assets—to produce intelligence.

Spring 2011 | 51 18. Although the operations in Haiti did not ad- sory Team V Report,” Army Medicine, 6 March 2008, versely affect the overall capacity of the DCGS, it http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/releases does not have unlimited capability. Commanders, /20080306mhatv.cfm; and Jerry Harben, “Mental however, can augment capacity through extended Health Advisory Team VI,” Army Medicine, 13 No- work hours and work weeks for DCGS personnel—a vember 2009, http://www.armymedicine.army.mil process known as “surging.” /news/releases/20091113mhatvi.cfm. 19. C4ISR Journal 8, no. 9 (October 2009), ac- 23. In this context, classification means distin- cessed 12 July 2010, http://www.c4isrjournal.com guishing between data too sensitive to release to the /story.php?F=4251691; and Barry Rosenberg, “Mov- general public and data not sensitive enough to war- ing at the ‘Speed of War’ Is Air Force ISR Unit’s rant withholding from the general public. Goal,” Defense Systems, 5 April 2010, accessed 11 July 24. Although electro-optical images—similar to 2010, http://www.defensesystems.com/Articles/2010 those produced by regular handheld cameras—were /04/06/Interview-Maj-Gen-Bradley-Heithold-ISR unclassified and released, other images (infrared -Agency.aspx. and synthetic aperture radar) were not released. 20. 2nd Lt Nicole White, “1st Global Hawk Lands in Guam,” GlobalSecurity.org, 3 September 2010, 25. Unclassified information was posted to accessed 15 September 2010, http://www.global ­USSOUTHCOM’s NGO collaboration website—All Part- security.org/intell/library/news/2010/intell-100903 ners Access Network—a “community of communities” -afns01.htm. that combines the benefits of unstructured collabora- 21. House, “Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon- tion (wikis, blogs, forums) and structured collabora- naissance,” 7. tion (file sharing, calendars) with the personalization 22. Judith A. Lyons, “Commentary on MHAT-IV: of social networking to facilitate unclassified sharing Struggling to Reduce the Psychological Impact of with multinational partners and NGOs, as well as War,” Traumatology 13, no. 4 (December 2007): 40–45; among various US federal and state agencies. Jerry Harben, “Army Releases Mental Health Advi- 26. White, “1st Global Hawk Lands in Guam.”

52 | Air & Space Power Journal Developing Flexible Command and Control of Airpower Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Dr. Daniel R. Mortensen

ver the coming decades, the Air airpower only at the combatant commander Force can expect to be involved in (CCDR) level. Although productive for ma- missions across the full spectrum of jor combat operations, this “one-size-fits-all” Oconflict. Increasingly complex security en- configuration runs contrary to fully effec- vironments will require the service to pro- tive command and control of Air Force ca- vide not only forces—ready and able to de- pabilities across the spectrum of conflict. ploy quickly around the globe—but also the History demonstrates that effectual com- command and control architecture for those mand and control of airpower requires flexible forces and their operations. Without the control, centralized at the appropriate level proper command and control of Air Force of command. The current centralized prac- capabilities, the achievement of national tice works well for operations led military objectives will suffer. at the CCDR level but limits the Although centralized control—a guiding Air Force’s ability to respond principle for organizing, training, and (other than through ad hoc equipping Air Force command and con- means) to situations requir- trol—sounds straightforward, it is in fact ing decision authority be- very complex and often misunderstood. low this level. The Air The Air Force has misapplied this primary Force must adjust its tenet by creating organizational structures with centralized command and control of

Spring 2011 | 53 Hukill & Mortensen current organizational structures to create vided unequivocal evidence to all theater flexible command and control options that leaders of the need to assure that central- place decision authority at the appropriate ized command and control resided with Air- level of command in order to prepare for men. The British learned the same lesson the complex operating environment of the when they fought Field Marshal Erwin future. This adjustment will better prepare Rommel in the Western Desert. After the Air Force to respond to situations across ­Kasserine, Allied leaders centralized both the range of military operations. American and Allied air forces into one combined force. Centralized command and control of Historical Context these forces did not imply centralization at only one level of the Allied command struc- Command and control encompasses the ture. The vast multidivisional front in way the Air Force organizes, commands, France established the need for clear cen- plans, controls, and executes capabilities to tralized command and control at the appro- 1 attain a joint force commander’s objectives. priate organizational level. The most famous Historically, the most basic issue of com- practitioner of this concept, Gen Elwood mand and control involved determining the “Pete” Quesada, commanded all tactical air best way to organize in order to concentrate forces on the continent, some more directly the effects of airpower. Although the decen- than others. He answered to Ninth Air tralization of air operations for tactical ap- Force but controlled his own IX Tactical Air plications such as artillery spotting, obser- Command. His other tactical air commands vation, and reconnaissance proved useful in included the XIX Tactical Air Command of World War I, Gen John Pershing needed Gen Otto “Opie” Weyland, who famously concentrated air forces for the massive supported Gen George Patton’s charge Saint-Mihiel offense of 1918. Gen Billy across central France. Quesada trained all Mitchell demonstrated the vital importance levels of his command for the common pur- of centralization when he controlled over pose of supporting the ground team, and he 1,500 aircraft necessary for all of the mis- continually ensured that his wing, group, sions—reconnaissance, interdiction bomb- and squadron leaders understood his com- ing, and fighter defense of the battlefield­­— mand intent. He also worked closely with associated with that successful battle. Lt Gen Courtney Hodges, commander of In the early 1940s, Army air and ground Army forces in France. Quesada saw to it planners understood the need to concen- that Hodges’s subordinate ground forces trate air resources to fight the powerful Axis under ­stood the relationship and philosophy air forces. The architects of America’s first of a shared mission with Airmen, and North African operation understood the ­Quesada’s air forces operated flexibly to centralized command of air resources. How- match the situation. They flew constant com- ever, the vast distances separating the three bat air patrols—a form of penny packets— amphibious assaults of November 1942, over Patton’s moving forces, yet Quesada coupled with rudimentary communication could pull groups away from other support capabilities, created issues with span of con- missions to offer concentrated air forces as trol.2 These concerns prompted Twelfth Air necessary in coordination with the sup- Force to temporarily split its forces into ported Army command.3 three parts for operations in Morocco, Al- These command and control structures giers, and Oran. Consequently, several were designed to balance the proper degree Army ground commanders inferred that of centralization with decentralization, those air forces were allocated to the task seeking to preserve flexibility at the strate- force commands, so they attempted to di- gic and operational levels of war yet main- rect them. The Battle of Kasserine Pass pro- tain tactical flexibility as well, thus helping

54 | Air & Space Power Journal Developing Flexible Command and Control of Airpower to increase the tempo of operations. Addi- operations, may work better with a more tionally, the Air Force needed command flexible command and control approach. and control capabilities to support simulta- Such an approach seeks to put decision au- neous global, theater, and subtheater opera- thority and planning expertise at the appro- tions. To balance these demands and sus- priate level of command, not to give every tain unity of command, unity of effort, and Army company commander his or her own the proper span of control, the Air Force air assets. PAD 06-09 stipulates that in the built structures that placed commanders event one theater CCDR establishes mul- who controlled elements of Air Force capa- tiple JTFs, airpower control should remain bility at various organizational levels.4 with the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC at the Since Operation Desert Storm, Airmen CCDR level. To support the JTFs, the have settled on the idea that the proper ­COMAFFOR/JFACC may deploy air compo- command and control of Air Force capabili- nent coordination elements (ACCE) as liai- ties must reside only at the CCDR level. Af- sons to ensure proper airpower support.7 ter the successful Desert Storm campaign, The ACCE construct represents an effective the concept of the theater commander, Air solution for situations not requiring com- Force forces / joint force air component mand decisions. However, since ACCEs are commander (­COMAFFOR/JFACC) became not commanders, they lack legal authority codified in joint and service doctrine.5 Des- to command and control air forces. As liai- ert Storm’s theater COMAFFOR/JFACC sons, these elements are better defined by model proved extremely effective in inte- what they are not than by what they are. grating airpower assets of other services in Specifically, ACCEs will not perform strat- support of a single CCDR-led campaign. egy development, guidance, apportion- With the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC model ment, targeting, development of targeting in place and in the context of information effects, assessment, planning, production technology’s improving the ability to plan, and dissemination of air tasking orders, organize, and control operations over long real-time execution, or command and con- distances, along with personnel reductions trol of air and space operations.8 (Since the due to budget constraints, the service con- publication of PAD 06-09, joint doctrine has tinued to centralize its command and control renamed the term to joint air component structure at the CCDR level.6 coordination element [JACCE].) Total centralization of Air Force com- With the implementation of PAD 06-09 mand and control at the CCDR level for- and subsequent directives, the Air Force mally began with the service’s release of lost its command and control flexibility Program Action Directive (PAD) 06-09, Im- across the range of military operations. It plementation of the Chief of Staff of the Air built a structure in which command and Force Direction to Establish an Air Force Com- control of airpower resides with the theater ponent Organization, on 7 November 2006. COMAFFOR/JFACC at the CCDR level. This guidance for a redesign of the Air This model effectively plans and executes Force’s operational command and control global and theater missions; however, it structure emphasized centralized control, may enjoy less success when span of con- placing centralized command and control of trol and tactical flexibility become con- airpower at the CCDR level for execution by cerns. The Air Force is not organized, the theater COMAFFOR (normally also des- trained, or equipped to provide command ignated the JFACC). This concept works and control elements to command levels well for Air Force operations intended to below the CCDR except to a few select sub- produce operational and strategic effects. unified commands, other than through ad Other situations, such as employing joint hoc means. Doctrine, as well as current task forces (JTF) within a single theater, and future real-world operations, demands distributed ground operations, and tactical alternative command arrangements.

Spring 2011 | 55 Hukill & Mortensen

Current Operations Hint at bilities at the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC level while balancing the demands of work- Future Challenges ing in an operational environment that re- The theater COMAFFOR/JFACC model quires decision making and planning exper- worked well in the major combat phases of tise at lower organizational levels. Although Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi the Air Force has the first piece of the puz- Freedom, with overall theater operations zle—the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC under close direction of the CCDR. How- model—it still needs to create capability for ever, as air operations evolved into other the rest by developing doctrine to help de- missions across the range of military opera- cide the appropriate time to deliver Air tions, seams developed that hindered the Force command and control below the integration of airpower into the component CCDR level and then organize, train, and and supported commands. These seams equip its forces to meet this need. arose due to the lack of Airmen with com- mand authority at the JTF level, a less- Determining When to Be Flexible than-full range of Air Force planning exper- Ascertaining the organizational level for ef- tise below the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC fective command and control of airpower is level, and the absence of Air Force repre- no simple task. It is as much an art as a sci- 9 sentation on JTF staffs. ence. Constant tension exists between joint Not all future operations will resemble the force command elements during the pro- current ones in Afghanistan and Iraq, but cess of determining the degree of central- certain attributes are likely to characterize ized control of airpower. One must under- them, such as continuous, simultaneous stand the appropriate time to use concepts combinations of offensive, defensive, and such as the JACCE rather than another stability or civil-support operations con- command-relationship construct or a com- ducted in a highly integrated, networked, bination of concepts. In his paper Central- and distributed environment under the con- ized Control and Decentralized Execution, Col trol of a JTF. Effective operations in this en- Clint Hinote identifies a practical way of vironment may call for the presence of com- identifying proper Air Force command ar- manders empowered with decision-making chitectures based on experiences from authority at lower organizational levels—in- World War I to current operations. He poses dividuals who can provide optimal span of five questions that offer direction for bal- control, unity of command, and tactical ancing centralization of the command and flexibility. Although Air Force and joint doc- control of airpower. trine describe the possibility of creating these lower-level command structures, the What Is the Nature of the Operation? Air Force has chosen to organize, train, and A careful assessment of the military situation equip itself for only one model—the theater is critical when determining the appropriate COMAFFOR/JFACC model with JACCE sup- degree of centralization. Different scenarios port at the subtheater or staff level. will drive different balances. For example, a campaign employing strategic attack as a line of operation will require a high degree of cen- tralization under an air commander. The air Recommendations commander must have the authority to direct The Air Force must create flexible com- operations, including attack sequencing, and shift them as operations unfold. In contrast, mand and control structures to meet the tactical air operations in direct support of needs of the current and future operating ground commanders, such as close air sup- environment. It should prepare for the en- port [CAS] and armed overwatch, are more tire range of military operations by retain- effective when conducted with a high degree ing centralized control of appropriate capa- of decentralization. While the air command-

56 | Air & Space Power Journal Developing Flexible Command and Control of Airpower ers need to reserve the authority to shift as- allow these to be decentralized. A great ben- sets [based upon joint force commander pri- efit, however, exists in centralizing control orities], it is usually best for airpower to be over assets that can range over a theater or allocated and distributed through tactical more. . . . command and control nodes such as the ASOC [air support operations center] and Who Has the Best Situational Awareness? then allow airmen to work directly with the . . . The JFACC’s command and control sys- ground commander to preserve tactical re- tem, also called the tactical air control system sponsiveness. Furthermore, missions such as (TACS), must be flexible. In certain stages and interdiction and counterair require a mix of phases, the TACS must be highly centralized, centralization and decentralization, as cen- with the AOC [air and space operations cen- tralized direction at the operational level of ter] taking the lead in many activities. In war is necessary to direct the overall priori- other phases, especially during irregular war- ties and weights of effort, but decentralized fare and stability operations, a highly decen- execution at the tactical level allows for a tralized TACS is more likely to be effective, faster tempo of operations. and such subordinate elements of the TACS as the ASOC will have a large role to play. At all Where Should Flexibility Be Preserved? times, the JFACC maintains the ability to ad- A command and control structure designed to just operations if the strategic/operational ensure flexibility at the operational and stra- environment changes. The art of airpower tegic levels of war almost always requires re- command and control is finding the right bal- strictions at the tactical level, and the oppo- ance between centralization and decentraliza- site is true as well. It is important, therefore, tion in light of the specific situation.10 that commanders decide the appropriate level In addition to considering Colonel Hi- to preserve flexibility. Nuclear operations, for example, are highly centralized—for good rea- note’s questions, commanders should deter- son. They are designed to give the president mine if trust has been established between flexibility at the strategic level, so they are joint and service commanders. If so, trust highly restricted at the tactical level. Con- between the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC versely, counterinsurgency operations tend to and the JTF commander will facilitate the be highly decentralized, ensuring flexibility decision to place an Air Force commander for the tactical commanders to increase legiti- below the theater level. Creating truly joint macy and influence within the population. JTF staffs will help establish trust. Addition- Other military missions tend to fall some- ally, these individuals should not use tech- where between these two extremes. . . . nological (i.e., virtual) means as the primary method for creating personal relationships. How Many Assets Are Available? Granted, communication technology can Simply stated, if plenty of assets are available, connect theater commanders with lower air operations can be highly decentralized joint and service organizational levels, but it with a low risk of dilution. Unfortunately, this is not the preferred solution for establishing is almost never the case, because air assets trust among commanders. To quote an of- are usually limited, and their capabilities are highly desired by the joint force. Fewer assets ten-used observation, “Virtual presence is drive the need for more centralization. . . . actual absence.” Developing a commander’s trust demands “actual presence.” Teamwork What Is the Geographical Range of Effects? and trust are best built through personal contact and shared experiences—not solely Another key factor is the geographical range of airpower. Few benefits [accrue] to central- through the use of video teleconferencing. izing command and control of assets with a Just as personnel must understand the na- limited range, such as some rotary-wing and tional culture when they conduct opera- unmanned systems, as it is difficult to shift tions, so must they understand the culture them to other missions. Once the initial allo- of the services that need air, space, and cation decision is made, it is usually best to cyber­space effects. The culture of the ser-

Spring 2011 | 57 Hukill & Mortensen vices that Airmen work with daily—the Ma- appropriate command and control forces rine Corps and the Army—thrives on personal below the CCDR level along two tracks. relationships. Technology must support the Track One: Presenting Command and command and control of airpower but not Control Elements to the Subtheater replace the presence of commanders and Level. The first track involves either attach- planning expertise at the appropriate plan- ing these forces to the subtheater-level JTF ning levels. Sometimes presence alone ob- or organizing them to support the JTF di- tains the desired effect. rectly.12 If the combatant commander de- Finally, leaders should consider the fol- cides to attach forces, such as an air and lowing, additional questions as they seek to space expeditionary task force (AETF), to a formulate command and control arrange- JTF, then the AETF commander would be ments below the CCDR level. First, does the designated as the COMAFFOR for those as- more pressing operational need exist at the signed forces and could be designated as subtheater or theater level? Second, does the JFACC (fig. 1). If the JTF already has a the need for Air Force capability require JACCE assigned, then the JACCE can be forces to operate (swing) theaterwide? dual hatted as the COMAFFOR, retained as a separate position, or eliminated. The Third, is the subtheater air command and AETF can leverage distributed operations control requirement an AOC and AFFOR through reachback to the theater AOC and staff element or a tailored one? Fourth, is AFFOR staff. However, the tailored AETF the desired command and control even command and control capability must pro- available? Finally, if the situation calls for a vide the AETF commander who serves as command and control element below the the JTF COMAFFOR/JFACC enough capa- CCDR level, would operational or tactical 11 bility to employ Air Force forces in accor- control be more appropriate? dance with the JTF commander’s orders as well as the ability to prepare and sustain Choosing among Options for Organizing, forces to carry out those orders. Training, and Equipping Unity of command and effort for attached If answers to all of the preceding questions Air Force forces will reside at the JTF level. lead a commander to establish an Air Force Command of global and theater forces not attached to the JTF but supporting it will command element below the CCDR level, remain at the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC then the service must create a formal orga- level. This arrangement allows for unity of nizational structure within which to place command and effort of forces that routinely the required command and control exper- swing throughout the theater and around tise. This organization should promote ef- the globe. Moreover, the CCDR has the au- fective integration and synchronization of thority to reassign forces attached to a JTF Air Force capabilities with the joint mission, to address higher theater priorities. including aligning forces and establishing Personnel currently used only on the command authority along with planning JACCE staff can support the JTF COMAFFOR/ expertise at the appropriate organizational JFACC after establishment of the task force. level. Joint doctrine calls for this capability, The personnel system must identify those and the Air Force needs to organize, train, individuals who have performed JACCE and equip to support that option. Expecta- staff duties to facilitate their assignment to tions regarding future defense budgets sug- a newly established JTF or their replace- gest that the Air Force will likely find itself ment of already deployed personnel during unable to fully staff and equip an AOC to extended operations. These members support every JTF. With this constraint in should possess the expertise to apply the mind, the service needs to address the chal- full range of Air Force capabilities to sup- lenge of organizing, training, and equipping port a potential JTF. Whether they perform

58 | Air & Space Power Journal Developing Flexible Command and Control of Airpower

CCDR

COMARFOR JFACC COMAFFOR COMNAVFOR COMMARFOR

Theater-Retained CDR JTF 1 Air Force Forces CDR JTF 2

COMMARFOR COMARFOR COMNAVFOR COMAFFOR/ COMAFFOR/ COMARFOR COMNAVFOR COMMARFOR JFACC JFACC

Marine Forces Army Forces Navy Forces Air Force Air Force Army Forces Navy Forces Marine Forces Forces Forces

COMARFOR-Commander, Army Forces Combatant Command COMNAVFOR-Commander, Navy Forces Operational Control COMMARFOR-Commander, Marine Corps Forces Tactical Control Support Administrative Control

Figure 1. Air Force forces attached to a joint task force. (Adapted from diagrams developed at the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.) strictly JACCE or JTF COMAFFOR/JFACC having to regain control from the JTF com- duties, such personnel must receive qualifi- mander. However, this idea does necessitate cation and currency training for credibility creation of an organizational construct for and readiness upon creation of the JTF. The the new intermediate expeditionary unit.14 use of unit type codes will permit the build- At present, no established Air Force echelon ing of subtheater JACCE/COMAFFOR mod- of command for a multiwing expeditionary ules beforehand to further expedite deploy- unit exists below the level of the numbered ment of qualified personnel. Air Force. Historically, the air division rep- If, however, the CCDR decides not to at- resents the correct designation, and resur- tach forces to an established JTF, an appro- rection of this concept as a provisional unit priately sized expeditionary unit composed denotation for expeditionary operations of all Air Force forces physically present would prove quite useful. An expeditionary within the JTF’s joint operating area can be air division in direct support of a JTF com- designated to directly support the com- mander would provide unity of effort at the mander (fig. 2).13 Since the forces are essen- JTF level yet retain unity of command and tially dedicated to the JTF commander un- effort at the CCDR level. der a single Air Force commander, this Track Two: Subtheater-Level Planning construct offers unity of effort at the JTF Integration Challenges. The successful level. Unlike the situation when forces are command and control of joint forces de- attached to the JTF, the COMAFFOR retains pends upon the effective integration of op- operational control, creating unity of com- erational planning processes. As it has done mand at the CCDR level. This arrangement with command authority, the Air Force has allows the COMAFFOR to retain the authority excessively centralized its planning expertise and flexibility to shift those forces in re- at the operational level of war.15 Centraliza- sponse to the CCDR’s direction without first tion of planning at the theater COMAFFOR/

Spring 2011 | 59 Hukill & Mortensen

CCDR

COMARFOR JFACC COMAFFOR COMNAVFOR COMMARFOR

CDR JTF 1 Air Force CDR of Multiwing Air Force CDR of Multiwing CDR JTF 2 Unit (Proposed Name Is Unit (Proposed Name Is a Numbered Expeditionary a Numbered Expeditionary Air Division) Air Division)

Air Force Forces Air Force Forces

COMMARFOR COMARFOR COMNAVFOR COMARFOR COMNAVFOR COMMARFOR

Combatant Command Marine Forces Army Forces Navy Forces Army Forces Navy Forces Marine Forces Operational Control Tactical Control Support Administrative Control

Figure 2. Air Force forces in direct support of a joint task force. (Adapted from diagrams developed at the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.)

JFACC level is fine for traditional major that process, but the core cadre should con- combat operations but less appropriate for sist of permanently assigned trained profes- missions in noncontiguous areas of opera- sionals. This permanent structure would tion in which ground units must conduct replace today’s ad hoc TACP organization planning at the tactical level to encourage that supports the noncontiguous fights in small-unit initiative.16 Distributed planning Iraq and Afghanistan. consists of placing the correct expertise and Although staffing these modified TACPs appropriate planning tools at locations where can prove difficult because of budget con- operational plans are born and refined. straints, the Air Force could, for example, Air Force units known as tactical air con- push planners out from AOCs. The fact trol parties (TACP) align at various organiza- that more of the planning now occurs at tional levels with Army units to integrate lower levels reduces the number of per- CAS. These organizations provide ready sonnel needed within these centers. The structures to place a broader range of Air Air Force should handle this available pool Force planning expertise, improving plan- in two ways. First, it should designate some ning integration. The Air Force must per- AOC slots for JTF JACCE/COMAFFOR/ manently assign experienced planners with JFACC support. Individuals identified for air planning, electronic warfare, intelli- JTF-level duties and assigned to these slots gence, space, airlift, and cyber expertise to would work daily in an AOC but could these units rather than rely on taking peo- move to a JTF should the need arise. Sec- ple from the service at large through the air ond, it could transfer the remaining slots and space expeditionary force process. to the modified TACPs, using them as a These more robust TACPs could be supple- ­career-broadening opportunity for person- mented with additional personnel through nel assigned to the AOC.

60 | Air & Space Power Journal Developing Flexible Command and Control of Airpower

Finally, despite tight budgets, the Air air forces. Commanders have made count- Force might consider investing in additional less adjustments to the command and con- resources to develop command and control trol system over the years, and it appears and planning expertise. In 2006 the Air that another adjustment is necessary. Force faced a similar choice. The Army’s The emerging environment and nature reorganization and the distributed nature of of modern military operations will become irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan increasingly joint, coalition, distributed, prompted a greater need for joint terminal complex, intense, and global. These changed attack controllers. Regardless of substantial conditions demand flexible command and personnel cuts, the Air Force deemed the control of airpower with appropriate deci- CAS mission so critical that it increased the sion authority at the correct level of com- controller career field by approximately 900 mand. In particular, Airmen are discussing people. The service may face this same di- how best to provide an effective subtheater lemma unless it can gain enough manning command and control system. The current by pushing planners out from the AOC. To system relies upon the master tenet of cen- ensure the proper integration and synchro- tralized control—one that can take advan- nization of air, space, and cyberspace tage of the unique characteristics of modern power, the Air Force may have to make dis- airpower, including speed, range, and multi- tributed planning resources a priority de- dimensional operations. The complexity of spite restrictive budgets. operating across the full range of military operations calls for a review of how the Air Force applies this concept today. The ser- Conclusion vice must prepare to command its air re- sources at the global, theater, and even sub- Command and control systems have tied theater levels. together ground and air forces for nearly 100 The Air Force is well prepared at the first years. Tensions between air and ground lead- two levels. Now, as the idea of subtheater ers have equally deep historical roots, re- command and control becomes truly viable, flected in the command element which en- it must conduct an overarching study, de- sures that leaders can adequately direct their velop a concept of operations, organize forces and in the control or communications forces, train new commanders, and identify equipment that permits a workable intersec- equipment necessary to control units at this tion among commanders of both ground and lower level. 

Notes

1. Grasping the issues concerning command and 2001 (as amended through 30 September 2010), 84, control depends upon an understanding of the fol- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. lowing definitions. One joint publication defines Two other documents apply this definition to a joint command and control as “the exercise of authority force as follows. The authority to direct joint opera- and direction by a properly designated commander tions proceeds through the designation of a joint over assigned and attached forces in the accomplish- force commander (JFC), a general term applied to ment of the mission. Command and control func- three levels of command: a CCDR, a subunified com- tions are performed through an arrangement of per- mander, or a joint task force (JTF) commander. A sonnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and JFC exercises command and control of airpower procedures employed by a commander in planning, through service commanders, functional command- directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and ers, or joint staffs. If service commanders exercise operations in the accomplishment of the mission.” command and control, the designated commander Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense of an Air Force service component assigned or at- Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April tached to a JFC is called the commander of Air

Spring 2011 | 61 Hukill & Mortensen

Force forces (COMAFFOR). At the unified and sub- to accomplish the assigned mission.” JP 1, Doctrine unified command levels, the COMAFFOR is the pre- for the Armed Forces of the United States, II-3, par. 2c. designated Air Force service component com- Unity of effort is the “coordination and cooperation mander. For example, the commander of Air Forces toward common objectives, even if the participants Central is a COMAFFOR at the unified command are not necessarily part of the same command or level, and the commander of Air Forces Korea is a organization—the product of successful unified ac- COMAFFOR at the subunified level. A COMAFFOR tion.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 489. can also be established at the JTF level when Air 5. The JFACC is “the commander within a uni- Force forces are assigned or attached to a JTF. Im- fied command, subordinate unified command, or portantly, COMAFFORs at the unified and sub­ joint task force responsible to the establishing com- unified levels are predesignated, but at the JTF level mander for making recommendations on the a COMAFFOR is established only if Air Force forces proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or are attached or assigned. If a JFC decides to use made available for tasking air forces [sic]; planning functional commanders, the COMAFFOR with his or and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing her command and control capability should be pre- such operational missions as may be assigned. The pared to assume responsibilities as the combined/ joint force air component commander is given the joint force air component commander. Finally, a authority necessary to accomplish missions and JFC could decide to plan, direct, and control joint tasks assigned by the establishing commander.” JP air operations with the assistance of the JFC staff 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 247. The only. In this situation, the JFC would retain command ­COMAFFOR is “the senior US Air Force officer desig- authority and responsibility, normally requesting nated as commander of the US Air Force component augmentation from appropriate components to per- assigned to a joint force commander (JFC) at the form the command and control air function as well unified, subunified, and joint task force level. In this as assist in planning and coordinating joint air op- position, the COMAFFOR presents the single US Air erations. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Force voice to the JFC.” AFDD 2, Operations and Or- Operations, 12 January 2010, I-2–II-2, http://www ganizations, 150. .dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf; and Air 6. The Air Force eliminated some of its mobile Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Operations command and control capability, including airborne and Organizations, 3 April 2007, 35–42, http://www command, control, and communications aircraft. .e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFDD2.pdf. 7. Headquarters USAF, Program Action Directive 2. With regard to span of control, “The desired 06-09, Implementation of the Chief of Staff of the Air reach of the JFC’s authority and direction over assigned Force Direction to Establish an Air Force Component or attached forces will vary depending on the mission Organization, 7 November 2006, A-4, par. 7.4. and the JFC’s ability to [command and control] the 8. Ibid., A-I-8, par. 5.8.6.2. actions required. Span of control is based on many 9. Office of Air Force Lessons Learned, Focus factors including the number of subordinates, num- Area: Air Force Innovations for the Joint Fight Role of ber of activities, range of weapon systems, force ca- the Air Component Coordination Element, Lessons pabilities, the size and complexity of the operational Learned Report (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force area, and the method used to control operations Lessons Learned, 22 June 2010). See also Office of (centralized or decentralized).” JP 1, Doctrine for the Air Force Lessons Learned, Integration of Airpower in Armed Forces of the United States, 2 May 2007 (incor- Operational Level Planning, Lessons Learned Report porating change 1, 20 March 2009), IV-19, par. 14b, (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force Lessons http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf. Learned, 22 August 2008). 3. Since World War II, the term penny packets has 10. Lt Col Clint Hinote, Centralized Control and meant parceling out airpower to ground forces. The Decentralized Execution: A Catchphrase in Crisis?, use of penny packets serves the individual ground Research Paper 2009-1 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force commander, but it prevents air commanders from Research Institute, March 2009), 59–64, http://aupress concentrating airpower to support important ground .au.af.mil/digital/pdf/paper/Hinote_centralized operations or to strike strategic targets. _control_and_decentralized_execution.pdf. 4. “Unity of command is accomplished by estab- 11. Doctrine Summit, Curtis E. LeMay Center for lishing a joint force, assigning a mission, or Doctrine Development and Education, Maxwell objective(s) to the designated JFC, establishing com- AFB, AL, October 2010, briefing slide no. 8. mand relationships, assigning and/or attaching 12. Direct support is “a mission requiring a force appropriate forces to the joint force, and empower- to support another specific force and authorizing it ing the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to answer directly to the supported force’s request

62 | Air & Space Power Journal Developing Flexible Command and Control of Airpower for assistance.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- tation of Forces and C2 Requirements” (Doctrine tionary, 138. The authors derived concepts in this Summit, October 2010). discussion from multiple interviews at the Air Staff, 14. This construct is not an AETF since the latter major command, AFFOR, and component-numbered is attached with specification of operational control Air Force levels; the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Air to a JFC, which occurs when forces are attached to Force Doctrine Development and Education; and a the JTF. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 43–44. read-ahead paper entitled “Caging the USAF Presen- 15. Office of Air Force Lessons Learned, Integra- tation of Forces and C2 Requirements” (Doctrine tion of Airpower in Operational Level Planning, uses Summit, October 2010). that assessment as a recurring theme. 13. The authors derived concepts in this discus- 16. For discussion of planning during distributed sion from multiple interviews at the Air Staff, major land operations, see AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 command, AFFOR, and component-numbered Air August 2007, 66–68, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil Force levels; the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Air /shared/media/epubs/AFDD3-24.pdf. See also Of- Force Doctrine Development and Education; and a fice of Air Force Lessons Learned, Integration of Air- read-ahead paper entitled “Caging the USAF Presen- power in Operational Level Planning, 6.

Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Lieutenant Colonel Hukill (BS, Norwich University; MBA, Gonzaga University; MMIS, Auburn University) joined the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) in March 2008 and has served as chief of the Research Division and as a military defense ana- lyst. His principal research interests include integration of air/ground operations, force presentation, and an effects-based approach to operations. Prior to joining AFRI, he worked as a senior military defense analyst at the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, teaching and writing on a variety of air and space power subjects such as the air and space expeditionary force process, antiaccess strategies, and Air Force and joint command relationships. During his 22-year Air Force career, he served in operational, command, and education posi- tions, including assignments as installation commander, chairman of the War The- ory and Aerospace Power Studies Department as well as dean of Distance Learning at Air Command and Staff College, and B-52G electronic warfare officer. He is a coauthor of “Operation ANACONDA Case Study” (2003), directed by the chief of staff of the Air Force, and of the article “Anaconda: A Flawed Joint Planning Pro- cess” (Joint Force Quarterly, 4th quarter 2007). In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Hukill has contributed to a variety of other journals such as Armed Forces Journal and Defense Analysis.

Dr. Daniel R. Mortensen Dr. Mortensen (BA, MA, University of California–Riverside; PhD, University of Southern California) is dean of the Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, where he also served as chief of the Research Division. Previous positions include senior historian, Air Staff; adjunct historian, Air Staff Group and Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group; senior historian, Air Support Office, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC; deputy command historian, Air Force Communications Com- mand; adjunct professor, University of Maryland–College Park; instructor, Air- power History Course, Maxwell, AFB, and Bolling AFB; and director, Pentagon Airpower History Course, Bolling AFB and the Pentagon, the latter for the Air Force Intern Program. His professional work includes staff ride guide, Normandy, France, with Marine Squadron VMFA-224, 86th Operations Group, and Headquar- ters US Air Forces in Europe and Third Air Force, Ramstein AB, Germany; sheriff and publication chairperson, Potomac Corral of Westerners International, Wash- ington, DC; member of the board of directors, Westerners International, Okla- homa; and chairperson, Military Classics Seminar, Fort Myer, Virginia. Dr. Mortensen’s publications include Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the Evo- lution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine, 1940–43 (Air University Press, 1998) and many articles on the history of airpower and air technology.

Spring 2011 | 63 Strategy and Airpower Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired

hen a new technology appears in clared that “there is no reason for any indi­ business or war, advantages in cost vidual to have a computer in his home.”1 W or efficiency—albeit initially mar­ In the military sphere, airpower—any­ ginal—may be clear almost from its appear­ thing guidable that moves through the air ance. Conversely, decades or even centu­ or space, manned or remotely piloted—has ries may pass before we conclude that the encountered the same problem, as evi­ new technology is not a substitute for the denced by Marshal Ferdinand Foch’s re­ old but offers the opportunity to move into ported evaluation of the airplane when he a new dimension previously not available was a professor of strategy at France’s École or even conceived. Such myopia often leads supérieure de guerre (war college) before World War I: “Airplanes are interesting toys, otherwise competent observers to under­ 2 estimate significantly the new technology’s but of no military value.” Certainly, few people today would go as far as Marshal potential. Two business examples stand out: Foch in dismissing airpower as just a toy, in 1876 Western Union observed that “this but perhaps equally few understand that ‘telephone’ has too many shortcomings to airpower can and should fundamentally be seriously considered as a means of com­ change the very nature of war. munication. The device is inherently of no value to us”; and in 1977 Ken Olsen de­ Strategy and Airpower

The first known combat employment of of sea power in the defeat of Napoleon is the airplane took place over Libya during conspicuous by its absence. the Italo-Turkish war of 1911, just a century Land operations have so dominated the ago.3 In the intervening years, range, speed, study of war that war itself has come to be payload, and accuracy have improved sub­ defined almost exclusively as the clash of stantially, and airpower has profoundly in­ armies. The clashes, the battles, became not fluenced the outcome of every conflict fol­ only the measure of success but also some­ lowing its first major application in World thing to be desired. As Clausewitz said, War I. Despite its past successes, however, Combat is the only effective force in war; its we still tend to see airpower as a means of aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a improving or facilitating old ways of war means to a further end. . . . It follows that the rather than the path to revolutionary change destruction of the enemy’s forces underlies of enormous value to the United States. all military actions; all plans are ultimately Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can based on it, resting on it like an arch on its never realize its real capability so long as it abutment. . . . The decision by arms is for all remains bound to an anachronistic view of major and minor operations in war what cash war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On payment is in commerce. . . . the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of Thus it is evident that destruction of the enemy age, it must do so in the context of a mod­ forces is always the superior, more effective ern concept of war that associates the use means, with which others cannot compete.4 of force as directly as possible with end- game strategic objectives, not with the act Our purpose is not to critique Clausewitz of fighting. If this is to happen, the opera­ (in many ways the pontiff maximus of West­ tors of airpower must understand, believe, ern armies for a century and a half) but to and teach end-game strategy as the founda­ use him as a writer still much read and as tion of airpower. Failure to do so will con­ an example of how most people, including demn airpower to suboptimization and de­ heads of state and their senior officers, prive its owners of using force in such a think about war. To them, war is inevitably dramatically different way that will achieve the clash of arms—to repeat, “The destruction national objectives quickly and at minimum of the enemy’s forces underlies all military cost. To succeed, airpower advocates must actions. . . . That destruction of the enemy stop trying to use airpower as a substitute forces is always the superior, more effective for its military predecessors, connect it di­ means, with which others cannot compete.” rectly to strategic end-games, adopt a new It is amazing how this idea has remained so vocabulary to match airpower’s promise, embedded in our thinking and culture, es­ and become serious promoters not of ma­ pecially in light of a number of historical chines but of ideas. examples of wars either won or significantly War seems part and parcel of the human influenced by some other means. Readers condition although we have reasonable need no reminder that one of the world’s knowledge of details about wars only of the truly great empires grew largely on the last several thousand years. Most of those back of a Royal Navy that frequently won occurred between opposing land forces, and “wars”—or prevented them—by its mere the bulk of our thinking and writing has fo­ presence. cused on the land aspect of conflict. Less Exponents of On War largely overlook has been written about sea power although the fact that even Clausewitz said that the it often played a crucial role in the outcome “aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a of conflicts dating back at least to the an­ means to a further end.” Then, for a variety cient Greeks. As evidence of what we might of reasons, he and his followers focused consider a fixation, consider Carl von their thinking, writing, and fighting on Clausewitz’s book On War, in which the role fighting! And this is our problem: we only

Spring 2011 | 65 Warden give lip service to “the further end,” remain­ tics—a bomb, bullet, or torpedo—until ing fixated on an infatuation with battle. we well understand everything else. So here is a proposition: let us resolve to 4. Exit. How do we move on, following expunge the words fighting, battle, shape the success—or failure? Occasionally, en­ battlefield, battlespace, and the war fighter from our vocabulary, to relegate the “means” deavors as complex and dangerous as of war to the last thing we think about, and war lead to success for one of the an­ to elevate the “end” to the pedestal of our tagonists. Moving on from success, consideration. In other words, let’s bury however, is not easy, and we must thousands of years of bloody battle stories, think through it at least as carefully as as heroic as they were, and start looking at we considered the decision on the fu­ war—and eventually airpower—from its ture picture and the decision to go to end point, which by definition means from war. Even more dangerous is the a strategic perspective. much more likely event of making Strategy can be complex, but for our pur­ significant mistakes along the way. poses we can simplify it considerably. At Failure to have a plan for failure leads the most basic level, strategy addresses four to a high probability of disaster. words: Where, What, How, and Exit. These Assuming that we can create a future words serve as the foundation for the four picture for ourselves and our opponents, strategic questions: the two questions of direct relevance to our 1. Where do we want to be in the future? topic of airpower and strategy are the sec­ In other words, what do we want our­ ond (What?) and the third (How?), although selves and our opponent to look like we can certainly make a case that with­ at some specific point in the (postwar) drawal (Exit) from an airpower war gone future? For simplicity, we can call this well (or badly) is much easier than from a future picture. one in which ground power dominated. Seemingly, if we want anything (a future 2. What can we put our resources against picture) different from that which currently that will create the conditions to allow exists, something must change to make it us to realize the future we have just happen. In the geopolitical world, if we described? At the highest level of analy­ have a future picture (strategic objective) sis, we start this process by identifying for an opponent (which may be a nation- the systems that need to change so state, group such as al-Qaeda, or tribe), that that we can realize our future picture; adversary must change in some way to re­ at the next level of analysis, we con­ flect our future picture. Since the opponent tinue by identifying the centers of probably doesn’t want to change, we need gravity (the control or leverage points) to do something to force it. against which to apply real resources 5 Opponents are complicated things with to force needed system change. many moving and static parts, but we can 3. How and in what time frame can we simplify our analysis by seeing them as a affect the things against which we are system, which means that they function in applying our resources? In this step, some reasonably connected manner. Sys­ we will eventually make decisions about tems exist for a purpose—in this case, to do the tactics, but we will start with deci­ something (which may be little more than sions about the time we can afford and survive) that we don’t want them to do. To the sequence of attacking centers of do something, the nation-state or group gravity within that time frame. We go uses its internal components to realize the out of our way not to choose our tac­ “something.”

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If a state, for example, wanted to attack 3. The state would ensure that the roads another state, it would go through steps and other infrastructure were adequate similar to the following: for survival and for supporting attack 1. One or more individuals (leaders with operations. or without portfolio) would espouse 4. It would take steps to ensure either the idea, find other leaders to help adequate support from the population them, or suppress those who opposed or to suppress opposition. their idea. 2. It would develop or put into motion 5. Finally, it would send some of its the processes necessary to garner sup­ fielded forces (almost always a rela­ port from more members of the state tively small part of the population, at and to acquire resources such as arms least since the days of the Mongols) to and ammunition for the attack; put carry out the assigned attack. other processes into motion to recruit, train, and equip the forces needed for Note that sending forces off to attack is the attack; and nurture the processes the last step in the simplified process and necessary for survival of the state, that the state probably has the ability to send such as communications, food produc­ more forces if the initial batch runs into tion and distribution, financing, and problems. A visual depiction of this organiza­ manufacturing. tional pattern helps us understand it (fig. 1).

1. Leaders

2. Processes

3. Infrastructure

4. Population

5. Fielded Forces

Figure 1. The enemy as a system—the five rings

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Reversing the sequence just described center ring and work from the inside to the (i.e., moving from the outside rings to those outside to find the right centers of gravity. inside) reveals that the state could probably Note the following simplified examples: lose the entire force that it dispatched but, other things being equal, could nevertheless 1. Leaders (ring one). If a strong leader remain an entirely capable organization (re­ such as Attila, Napoleon, Bismarck, call the very rapid recoveries from British Hitler, or bin Laden is taking an oppo­ losses at Yorktown in 1781 and British and nent in a particular direction, the re­ Commonwealth losses in Singapore in 1941). moval of that leader (and perhaps his Conversely, if the state’s leaders were close associates) will normally result gone or had lost their interest in conflict, either in a reversal of direction or sig­ and if communication were limited, food nificant deceleration. If we wanted production and distribution broken, and such a change, removal or conversion movement difficult to impossible, then the of a leader (through force, persuasion, state (or group) could no longer function at or even bribery) would constitute a its prior level—and, indeed, would be direct strategic action since change in doomed over some period of time. Recall the center of gravity is directly associ­ Germany and Japan in 1945. Despite suffer­ ated with a strategic objective. ing significant losses in their attack forces, 2. Processes (ring two). If an opponent quite large Japanese forces, in particular, refuses to agree to desired terms, we were still fighting well at the time of surren­ can put it into a position that makes der. This fact suggests that the opponent’s impossible any pursuit of objectives armed forces (whether highly trained pilots that conflict with our future picture. In or suicide-belt bombers) could hardly be the World War I, the Allies imposed a block­ place to start thinking about attaining geo­ ade on Germany’s food-distribution political objectives. In fact, it would seem process that B. H. Liddell Hart consid­ the least appropriate place imaginable. Our ered “fundamental” to the outcome of thinking should always move from the in­ the war; more directly, continuation side rings to the outside ones, never from of the blockade into 1919 forced the the outside to the inside. postwar German government to ac­ If we see the enemy as a system, we first cept the harsh terms of the Treaty of determine what the system needs to look Versailles.6 Germany could not sur­ like so that we can realize our future pic­ vive in the face of a blockade that pro­ ture for it. At one extreme, Rome envi­ duced a direct strategic effect. sioned Carthage’s disappearance at the end of the third Punic War, which necessitated 3. Infrastructure (ring three). A nation- the system’s destruction. At the other end state or a group needs some amount of the spectrum, during the first Gulf War, of infrastructure to function. It may attaining the United States’ major objective belong to someone else, but even in of regional stability meant that Iraq could today’s world we need to put our feet not remain a strategic threat to its neigh­ down someplace in order to conduct bors, which in turn meant weakening but business. In the current Afghanistan not destroying Iraq as a system so that it war, we produced the important and could function and defend itself but not early effect of depriving al-Qaeda of ­undertake new foreign adventures. infrastructure that had served it well Once leaders choose the desired overall as a base of operations and for train­ system effect, the next step is to find the ing and indoctrination camps. This centers of gravity whose alteration will cre­ loss did not destroy al-Qaeda, but it ate the desired system change as directly did severely complicate its ability to (strategically) as possible. We start with the do business. This is an example of an­

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other center of gravity closely linked likelihood: organize and send more; to a needed strategic effect although, negotiate to buy time to send more or by itself, it did not reduce al-Qaeda to hope for something good to happen; a manageable level. or agree to proffered peace terms when the terms look more attractive 4. Population (ring four). Nation-states than continuing to fight. Note that the and groups need elements of the popu­ choice is up to the opponent and that lation (demographic groups) to be the choice is unpredictable. In only a sympathetic and helpful in a variety few circumstances does changing the of ways. In the Malayan Emergency, fielded-force center of gravity produce the United Kingdom isolated the eth­ direct strategic results. Affecting nic Chinese, who represented the fielded forces is usually a difficult heart of the problem, thus making the means to a murky and distant end. situation manageable.7 Here, a focus on the population center of gravity A little thought will suggest that the cen­ helped lead to direct strategic re­ ters of gravity in the five rings do not all sults—the end of the emergency. have the same value in terms of their re­ turn on the investment needed to affect 5. Fielded Forces (ring five). If we follow them. Normally we realize a far higher re­ Clausewitz, we see enemy fielded turn on investments (whether bombs, bullets, forces (the enemy military) as the fo­ or bullion) to affect the inner rings than on cus of our efforts—something to en­ those to affect the outer rings (fig. 2). This gage and defeat in battle. And that is does not mean that we can or should al­ how we have traditionally dealt with ways ignore the outer rings; it does mean, them. When a nation-state or a group however, that we can expect the cost of loses some part of its fielded forces, it dealing with the outer rings to be quite high does one of three things in order of in comparison to the return on the operation. High Return on investment

1. Leaders 2. Processes 3. Infrastructure 4. Population 5. Fielded Forces Low

Rings Figure 2. Return on investment for efforts to affect different rings

Spring 2011 | 69 Warden

In the strategy methodology just dis­ change a center of gravity—a bribe, an aerial cussed, we first identify our strategic objec­ bomb, a hack, a proxy, a conference, an tives, our “where”—the future picture for award, assistance funding, or a thousand the opponent. (We really need to do it first other possibilities. Rather interestingly, a for ourselves, but that is another subject.) ground attack against an army would be Then, looking at our opponent as a system, one of the last things put on the list. we find the centers of gravity that, when If we end up choosing to use force as a affected, will have the most direct effect on major or complementary way to achieve realizing our strategic objectives. In a few strategic objectives, the methodology just cases, we may find that just one or two will described (or something similar to it) is cru­ prove adequate, but in most instances we cial to the effective exploitation of airpower. must affect several in a relatively com­ This methodology allows us to select the pressed period of time. Notably, even in a most appropriate centers of gravity and large system such as the United States or then apply airpower (if appropriate) to pro­ China, the number of targets associated duce direct strategic results. It helps us with strategic centers of gravity is rather avoid the siren lure of “battle” and prevents small—considerably fewer than 1,000, more us from starting with the “means” à la than likely. Clausewitz, while giving only a nod to If we need to address the opponent’s “other ends” and really having no clear idea fielded forces at all, we can and should use exactly where the “means” will lead. To the exactly the same methodology that we used extent that national leaders understand this at the strategic level. After identifying our methodology, they understand the value of objective, which could range from destruc­ airpower; to the extent that they don’t, they tion through immobilization to recruitment, will not understand and will become vic­ we analyze the fielded force as a system and tims of thousands of years of tactical history find the relevant centers of gravity, starting that has lost much of its relevance. Another from the center. The number of centers of critical and generally ignored component of gravity with which we have to deal in this strategy, however, accentuates even more case will normally translate into far fewer the importance of airpower—and that is targets than if we took the traditional ap­ time itself. proach of a war of attrition against the Leaders of any competitive enterprise, force’s personnel and equipment. The num­ including leaders of a nation (or any other ber of targets associated with operational- group), must understand the importance of level centers of gravity for even a large time, for it is a critical yet normally mis­ fielded force is again surprisingly small— managed element. As Sun Tzu said two mil­ probably in the low thousands at most (e.g., lennia ago, “Thus, though we have heard of the Iraqi army in Kuwait in 1991). stupid haste in war, cleverness has never After identifying the centers of gravity, been seen associated with long delays. . . . we decide what they must become (de­ There is no instance of a country having stroyed, isolated, converted, paralyzed, etc.) benefited from prolonged warfare.”8 This and how we will measure success. Only at statement is as true today as when he wrote the very end do we decide the methodology it—except that long or prolonged may have (the tactics) that we will employ to affect meant many months in Sun Tzu’s era, them. Note that if we start with the last whereas today they could mean hours or step—choose a tactic such as a ground at­ days. Very simply, short is categorically tack—we subvert the whole strategy process good, and long is categorically dangerous and will probably do nothing that makes and bad—because of something called the sense, let alone do the best thing. The stra­ “time value of action,” which in turn derives tegic approach gives us the freedom to con­ from the phenomenon of shock effects pro­ sider and mix every conceivable way to duced by compressed, parallel attacks on

70 | Air & Space Power Journal Strategy and Airpower centers of gravity. During serial attack, the entire year was just one.10 Although these opposite of parallel attack, forces attempt to strikes caused considerable damage and affect one or a small number of strategic forced the Germans to reallocate resources centers of gravity sequentially over time. for defense and repair, Germany as a sys­ To realize the future picture, we must tem functioned well at the end of the year. change the opponent system, which we do Due to bad weather and bomber diversion by affecting one or more of its centers of to support the planned D-day invasion, at­ gravity. The resulting impact on the system tack intensity effectively moved operations will be a function of how quickly the cen­ from serial to parallel only at the end of ters are affected. If we do so too slowly (se­ 1944. By the conclusion of the war in May rially), the system will probably find ways 1945, the changed use of airpower had be­ to repair itself, protect itself against further come a key factor in creating a state of pa­ attacks, and begin its own operations against ralysis in Germany because too many its opponent’s systems. Conversely, if we things were broken to allow effective repair, affect enough centers of gravity quickly defense, or competent counterattack. enough (in parallel), the system will go into A similar phenomenon took place in Op­ a state of paralysis, preventing it from re­ eration Allied Force against Yugoslavia (Ser­ pairing itself, protecting itself against future bia) in 1999: serial attacks in the first month attacks, or making competent attacks went largely against fielded forces. Serbian against its opponent’s systems. Over the leader Slobodan Milošovic´’s forces operated last half century or so, we have actually effectively under this attack methodology, seen several examples of both the serial and even stepping up operations in Kosovo. Af­ parallel approaches. ter the attacks in the second month became In World War II, the United States con­ parallel and included direct leadership and ducted serial aerial attacks on German tar­ process centers of gravity, internal dissen­ gets in 1943.9 The US Eighth Air Force, for sion at the highest levels of government ap­ example, hit only about 11 target areas that peared within a week; Yugoslavia claimed it could be considered “centers of gravity”; six was withdrawing forces from Kosovo two of these went directly or indirectly against weeks thereafter; and in the eighth week fielded forces (aircraft and ships). Of the following the change in attack methodology, remaining five, only the attacks on marshal­ Yugoslavia essentially offered to capitulate ling yards, synthetic oil installations (three by saying it would accept the European Group attacks total against two locations), and, to of Eight’s “principles for a peace deal.”11 some extent, ball bearing factories approached Movement from the parallel domain to the status of a second-ring (processes) cen­ the serial domain causes the probability of ter of gravity that could have had a general success to begin to fall dramatically.12 Tak­ impact on Germany as a whole. Note that ing a very long time decreases the chances no attacks occurred on ring one (leader­ considerably. It isn’t impossible to win a ship) or on such key ring two (processes) long war, but the odds are very low—and targets as electricity, command and control this applies to both sides, despite significant communications, energy other than oil, differences in their centers of gravity. Since transportation other than rail marshalling good strategy depends heavily on under­ yards, food, finance, or radio broadcast, to standing probabilities, deliberately embark­ name just a few. At the time, attacking ing on a low-probability, long serial war some of these centers of gravity lay beyond does not make much sense. the available technology. In addition, we Another phenomenon occurs as we followed a very measured rate of attack: move into the serial domain in war or busi­ none (involving more than 10 aircraft) took ness. In war the cost of operations goes up place during 21 weeks of the year, and the dramatically in terms of lives, money, and median number of attacks per week for the equipment for both sides. Conversely, and

Spring 2011 | 71 Warden somewhat paradoxically, a parallel attack is how long it should take in order to create actually less costly for both sides although parallel effects and succeed at an accept­ initial commitment and expenditures may able cost. So important is this concept that be higher than for the serial strike. In busi­ we can use it to help determine whether or ness the costs include time to market, in­ not we want to go to war. If we cannot or efficient use of people and facilities, and will not operate in the parallel domain, lack of strategic information. The huge dif­ then we should first look for ways to avoid ference manifests itself when we look at the war (in any event, probably a reasonable cost from inception to conclusion. In addi­ course in most instances). tion the cost associated with operating in We began by suggesting that our war con­ the parallel domain is reasonably clear in cepts and vocabulary were outmoded and part because predicting the short term is far dysfunctional and that we still follow an an­ easier than predicting the long term. Fore­ cient idea of war captured in Clausewitz’s seeing the cost of serial operations is extra­ focus on battle. The old ideas had some ordinarily difficult, and actual expenses al­ practical value in the past when the mili­ most always far exceed the estimates. tary forces available to any state or organi­ Examples abound, including estimates for zation were small and had limited speed government acquisition projects and those and range. On the one hand, if an organiza­ for the cost of wars. Figure 3 captures the tion defeated the military of another organi­ concept of the time value of action, show­ zation, usually nothing stood between the ing some of the many things that may go victor and the real reason for war—seizing wrong as a protagonist moves into the serial wealth, whether in the form of crops, land, domain. It also depicts an averaged line for gold, or slaves. On the other, failure to over­ the cost of operations. come the opponent’s military lay one’s own Very simply, whether in war or business, wealth open to seizure and destruction. our normal approach to the time element is Most of our thinking and operations, then, exactly backward: we ask ourselves how really flowed from the extraordinarily lim­ long something will take rather than decide ited capability of the available forces, so we

Opponent begins to react e ectively High

Opponent reallocates resources to manage the attack and begins counterattacks Cost of operations

Ideal plan: Opponent uses new approaches Highly compressed, Contest devolves into attrition war highly parallel, inside opponent reaction time External environments shift

Probability of success Probability Serial Attacker unable to maintain focus Parallel domain domain (inside e ective opponent reaction Likelihood of achieving objectives time) Low Very short Very long Time to a ect relevant centers of gravity Figure 3. Time value of action

72 | Air & Space Power Journal Strategy and Airpower had no compelling reason to think beyond the necessary components of war, by defini­ the battle. Imagine, however, that armies of tion. We would then ask ourselves why we old could have instantly transported them­ have wars. The answer is simple: we go to selves into the rich heartlands of their op­ war to get something we otherwise would ponents where the plunder would have not have because another state or group been theirs for the taking. Would not our will not voluntarily give it to us. War then is whole concept of war have been much dif­ very clearly a means to an end—and thus ferent? In addition, the military forces not a strategic starting place. Obviously we themselves could rarely attack more than will want things in the future that the pos­ one thing at a time, so they had to proceed sessor is not inclined to surrender, so the serially. Only within the last 75 years has something becomes our strategic objective.

Airpower enables us to think about conflict from a future-back, end-game-first perspective as opposed to one based on the battle obsession of Clausewitz and his followers. It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.

airpower made it possible to attack multiple Knowing the strategic objective, we start centers of gravity in parallel. Can there be looking for the means to achieve it. Our any question that we desperately need to choices would range from war defined as rethink war? bloody and destructive to cajolery of some Airpower enables us to think about conflict kind. In the middle of this spectrum, we from a future-back, end-game-first perspec­ might find something (currently nameless) tive as opposed to one based on the battle that makes it physically impossible for a obsession of Clausewitz and his followers. It possessor of something we want to withhold also opens another very exciting possibility: it but involves little or no bloodshed and conflict with little or no unplanned destruc­ destruction. To make discussion easier, let’s tion or shedding of blood. call this “bloodless force.” If we had this op­ Traditionally we have thought about war tion at a reasonable cost, we would prob­ as quintessentially battle, bloodshed, and ably choose it in those instances when ca­ destruction; indeed, the tools of war previ­ jolery failed and when we could not ously available left us little choice. If, how­ reasonably argue that we should take the ever, presented with a way to conduct war bloody war path as a first choice. This without unplanned destruction or blood­ brings us back to the other objection fre­ shed, would we shun or welcome it? Some quently raised to bloodless force—that poli­ would choose the former very quickly while ticians would resort to it too often. others would choose the latter. We cannot know whether politicians Those who would shun relatively blood­ would more frequently resort to bloodless less war argue that without bloodshed and force than they have to traditional war. In destruction, war would not be war and that, fact our ability to predict what politicians in any event, it would prove too tempting will do in any circumstance is rather close for the politicians. Let’s assume for the mo­ to zero. The argument might have validity if ment that bloodshed and destruction are we had a long record of politicians avoiding

Spring 2011 | 73 Warden war, but such is not the case. The bloodi­ takes into account the impact of time, ness and destruction of war seem to have and preplans an exit. had little dampening effect on politicians • e W should focus on direct, strategic through the ages (perhaps just the oppo­ centers of gravity to the maximum ex­ site); thus, we have no reason to think that tent possible. we would encounter many more instances of physical action against opponents than • Our conflict vocabulary flows from an­ we have up to the present. cient times and traps us mentally and When we engage in conflict, we should physically into concepts that no longer always make our strategic objective the make sense, so our vocabulary must ­creation of a better peace. Normally, in a change. better peace the vanquished do not bear • The objective of a conflict is to achieve such hatred for the victors that another trial a future picture, not to kill and destroy. becomes inevitable. One way of reducing postconflict enmity involves lessening the Our last task, perhaps the easiest one, suffering and recovery time of the defeated has to do with seeing if we can employ air­ party. Traditional wars have perverse and power effectively in the service of system- long-lasting effects, but airpower may some­ centric rather than battle-centric strategy— day offer an alternative. and do so in such a way as to move to a more Some would agree that truly bloodless efficient, effective approach to conflict that force would be great but that it is techno­ does not emphasize death and destruction. logically impractical. And it might well be— With regard to strategy and airpower, today. Tomorrow, however, is a different • Strategy provides the framework for find­ story; we have already made great progress, ing the best means to attain objectives. as evidenced by the wars of the 1990s, in which high-tech powers represented one • If we want to change our opponent as side of the conflict. Because airpower al­ a system to conform to our objectives, ready has the ability to deliver energy with then the most direct approach entails great accuracy (precision of impact), even affecting opponent centers of gravity now we can largely confine weapons to hit­ closely related to the objectives. ting their intended targets. The next step • Fast action and short conflicts are im­ calls for making serious progress in achiev­ perative and far less expensive than ing real precision of effect whereby the en­ slow, long ones. ergy delivered does only what we want it to do. The new small-diameter bombs are a • As we consider conflict, we should ex­ step in the right direction. With precision of plore bloodless-force options exhaus­ effect combined with precision of impact, tively before reverting to traditional bloodless war becomes a reality. war and battle. To this point, we have tried to make the • “Battle” is at best an expensive and case that airpower can realize its potential risky means to a distant end, and we of moving us into a new sphere of conflict should almost always avoid it. only if it is tightly linked with a future-back, end-game strategy that rejects anachronistic If we accept these points, we can begin to ideas about war. Specifically, find the means to realize them. Our options, in the broadest sense, in­ • The best approach to strategy starts clude ground power, sea power, and air­ with a future picture, determines the power, but before we examine them, some systems and centers of gravity that amplification is worthwhile. In the world of must change to realize that picture, real organizations, armies and navies have

74 | Air & Space Power Journal Strategy and Airpower airpower, while air forces normally have The overwhelming, game-changing value very little ground power beyond that needed of airpower should be clear—but such is not for light security. To keep this simple, we the case for the majority of government of­ will not talk about current service organiza­ ficials and military officers, including many tions. Thus, ground power is anything es­ who operate some facet of airpower. To see sentially tethered directly to the earth, in­ such a valuable resource properly used, cluding people, tanks, and artillery; sea however, we Airmen must stop thinking we power is anything that operates on or under can do so via the two methodologies most water but does not include aircraft or mis­ prominent in the last few years: trumpeting siles launched from ships; and airpower is our spectacular technology and asking anything guided that flies through the air merely to be treated as equal members of a and space, regardless of who owns it or its team composed of the three forms of power. launch platform. If we want to avoid paro­ The technology is spectacular, but we chial arguments that confuse our assess­ should take a page from business, which ment of the options, we need to stay with long ago learned that selling a product had these definitions. After reaching conclusions, to involve much more than touting its tech­ we can decide which organizations should nical goodness. Products sell because cus­ own and operate the three types of power. tomers see them as filling a real need in Ground power, the oldest and historically their lives; airpower advocates have not most prevalent tool of conflict, is slow and done well in this regard. If airpower is normally affects only an opponent’s fielded something different, we must highlight its forces—the outer, fifth ring that is only differences and show convincingly that it rarely directly connected to a strategic ob­ fills a vital need. jective. Ground power has minimal ability This brings us back to strategy. Our sale to conduct parallel operations on its own or of airpower—which, like it or not, has to to operate without significant destruction precede its smart application—must start by and bloodshed. connecting it uniquely to a new approach to Sea power can operate against centers of gravity directly or closely related to strate­ success in conflict. If our approach to strategy gic objectives but only if those centers are finds acceptance, airpower becomes the ob­ accessible by water. Although much of the vious solution; if it fails, we are just another world fits into this category, much does hawker of new gizmos. Marketing, then, not—and even the majority of states and becomes a number-one priority for air­ organizations with coasts normally have a power even though many airpower advo­ large number of their centers of gravity cates are not very comfortable with or well removed from the sea. Sea power can knowledgeable about it. move faster than ground power and can We must direct our marketing toward tax­ bring more centers of gravity under attack, payers and decision makers at large; in­ but in most circumstances it cannot execute deed, we must think through the problem parallel operations. It can conduct opera­ in the same way we would think through tions with far less destruction and blood­ something like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait shed than ground power. in 1990. That is, we must have a future pic­ Airpower can operate against virtually all ture of airpower, understand the need to of the centers of gravity directly related to change our own system, apply our efforts strategic objectives, regardless of their loca­ against centers of gravity within our own tion. Because it can bring many under attack system, and strive to operate in parallel so in compressed periods of time, it is well as to give ourselves maximum probabilities suited for parallel operations. Finally, air­ of success at the lowest possible cost. If we power can produce appropriate effects with don’t take this approach, we limit ourselves little destruction and bloodshed, if desired. to trying to convince advocates of ground

Spring 2011 | 75 Warden power and sea power to agree to something our mind instead of “airpower has no lim­ they think is against their best interests. its”? In other words, we should at least be­ Our successes with airpower over the gin with the presumption that airpower can last century have flowed primarily from carry out any military task. If we fail to do connecting it uniquely to a new approach to so, we create a self-fulfilling prophecy and success in conflict. When the public and don’t even examine the possibilities be­ senior civilians in government understood cause “everyone knows” we have always the value of airpower, including the cost of used bayonets guided by human beings as depending on other means, plans for novel the preferred tool and that will “never application won acceptance—witness the change.” Offhand, I can think of only one British use of airpower in 1920s Mesopota­ thing that airpower cannot do and that mia, emphasis on airpower in the 1930s as some other form of military power can: another European war loomed, long-range physically take people into custody. But if it aerial attacks on Germany and Japan as a won’t work today, what would we need to major part of the World War II effort, the do to make it work tomorrow? huge investment in airpower as a weapon After careful consideration of a problem, and deterrent in the first half of the Cold we may decide that airpower will not work. War, and the use of airpower in the 1990s. That is an acceptable answer—for now. None of these efforts could have happened Of course, espousing the unlimited con­ had they depended on a vote by the “joint cept of airpower exposes the advocate to team.” In other words, airpower has enjoyed success when it played what we might call charges of airpower zealotry, a lack of the outside game and far less success when “jointness,” or some other nasty label. But it tried to play the inside game. we need to become confident enough to Airpower exponents not only need to shrug off these labels. At one time, Airmen connect airpower directly to strategy and refused to be marginalized by such attacks market their product well, but also need to and pressed on to do the impossible, time start believing in it. Those who begin a dis­ after time. If we want a brighter airpower cussion by noting that airpower “can’t do tomorrow and a brighter, more affordable, everything” do themselves and their listeners more effective, and lower-risk future for our a real disservice. They probably mean that nation, then we must reclaim the courage military power cannot do everything or ful­ and confidence of our forebears. If we do, fill some objectives—a completely true we can reforge airpower into an invaluable statement. If, however, a problem is amenable concept for our nation and civilization—one to military solution, why disqualify air­ that will return huge dividends on the hu­ power from any aspect of it? Why should man and monetary investments needed to we start out with “airpower has limits” in realize its extraordinary promise. 

Notes

1. The quotation from Western Union is widely 3. Encyclopedia Britannica, academic ed., s.v. attributed to a company internal memo dated 1876. “Military Aircraft: Early History,” accessed 23 Novem- See, for example, All Great Quotes, http://www.all ber 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked greatquotes.com/stupid_quotes124.shtml. For the /topic/382295/military-aircraft/57483/Early-history Olsen quotation, see Jonathan Gatlin, Bill Gates: The ?anchor=ref521642. Path to the Future (New York: Avon Books, 1999), 39. 4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, rev. ed., ed. and 2. See Great-Quotes.com, http://www.great-quotes trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, .com/quote/861686. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 97.

76 | Air & Space Power Journal Strategy and Airpower

5. Two or more people who are cooperating con- 10. Ibid. Data extracted from CD files “1943.xls” stitute a system. and “I Sheet Key.pdf.” For this analysis, I counted as 6. Sir B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Me- an “attack” only missions that started with 10 or ridian, 1991), 204. more aircraft. Of the approximately 72 missions of 7. A key part of the British Briggs Plan to defeat fewer than 10 aircraft, 29 hit undefined industrial the insurgency called for isolating insurgents from areas, and 30 ended up striking undefined targets of their supporters among Malaya’s ethnic Chinese opportunity (in 1943 the latter generally meant any population. The plan involved the forced relocation alternative target, selected when aircraft could not of about 500,000 rural Malayans, including 400,000 find assigned targets due to bad weather). The 11 Chinese, from squatter communities into newly target categories hit in 1943 are as follows (the num- constructed guarded camps called New Villages de- ber in parentheses indicates the ring in which I be- signed to keep the inhabitants in and the guerrillas lieve the target would have fit using the five-ring out. Many relocated people became content with the system): aircraft manufacturing (five); bearings better living standards in the villages. See Wikipedia: (two); industrial areas (three or four); marshalling The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Malayan Emergency,” yards (two); synthetic oil plants (two); port areas accessed 28 November 2010, http://en.wikipedia.org (five); shipping (five); steel (two); rubber (two); tires /wiki/Malayan_Emergency. (five); and U-boat shipyards (five). As an aside, if I 8. Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest were planning a similar attack against a similar Military Treatise in the World, trans. Lionel Giles (To- ronto: Global Language Press, 2007), 11, 12. opponent today, I would not hit steel, industrial 9. RAF Bomber Command was quite active dur- ­areas, or rubber because they do not have a general ing 1943, but it directed virtually all of its attacks impact on the enemy as a system and therefore are against cities at night, with a major objective of not really ring-two targets. “lowering morale and de-housing workers.” See 11. “Operation Allied Force,” GlobalSecurity.org, ­Richard G. Davis, Bombing the European Axis Powers: accessed 28 November 2010, http://www.globalsecurity A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive, .org/military/ops/allied_force.htm. 1939–1945 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 12. I use the word domain in this context to illus- April 2006). I extracted my data from the book’s CD, trate the dramatic difference between the world of which includes the files “1943.xls” and “I Sheet Key.pdf.” serial and parallel attacks. The US Air Force does The quotation above comes from p. 6 of the latter not refer to serial and parallel domains, using the file in a section entitled “General Information.” word domain in connection with air, space, and cyber.

Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired Colonel Warden (USAFA; MA, Texas Tech University) retired from the Air Force as commandant, US Air Force Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala- bama, in June 1995. In his active duty career, he had extensive experience in flying, command, and staff positions. He has more than 3,000 flying hours in a variety of aircraft, including the F-4, OV-10, and F-15; flew over 250 combat missions in Viet- nam as a forward air controller; and served as commander of the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing in Germany. His nonflying assignments included two tours on the Air Staff with the second as deputy director for war fighting, in which capacity he led the planning effort to develop the strategic air campaign (originally titled Instant Thunder) for the first Gulf War. After the war, he was a special assistant to the vice president of the United States, focusing on American-competitiveness issues. Fol- lowing his retirement from the Air Force, Colonel Warden founded Venturist In- corporated, which has specialized in helping a wide variety of companies improve their results through strategic thinking and execution. He has appeared on a num- ber of television programs and is the author of two books: The Air Campaign and Winning in FastTime. Colonel Warden is a graduate of Squadron Officer School (correspondence), Air Command and Staff College (seminar), and the National War College. His decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, and Air Medal with 10 oak leaf clusters.

Spring 2011 | 77 Forty-Five Years of Frustration America’s Enduring Dilemma of Fighting Insurgents with Airpower

Dr. Mark Clodfelter

nalogies are popular among strate- its lead article “Iraq: Learning the Lessons gists, and the Vietnam War is a fa- of Vietnam” by former secretary of defense vorite target for comparisons. Pundits, Melvin Laird.1 Similarly, the 9 February policyA makers, journalists, and historians 2009 cover of Newsweek read, “Obama’s have raised the specter of a Vietnam-like Vietnam: How to Salvage Afghanistan.”2 Bob quagmire in virtually every conflict that the Woodward’s recent book Obama’s Wars re- American military has fought since the fall counts that Vietnam “ghosts” affected Pres. of Saigon, and the current conflicts in Iraq Barack Obama’s decisions to increase troop and Afghanistan are no exceptions. As totals in Afghanistan and relates a Novem- America’s involvement in Iraq deepened, ber 2009 warning that Vice Pres. Joe Biden the cover of the 22 November 2003 issue of gave to the president on the need for firm National Journal displayed the headline direction in dealing with the Afghan War: “Iraq as Vietnam”; one year later, the cover without strong guidance, Biden insisted, headline in Newsweek read, “Crisis in Iraq: “we’re locked into Vietnam.”3 The Vietnam Factor”; and one year after Despite such seemingly specious pro- that, the cover of Foreign Affairs highlighted nouncements, parallels between Vietnam

78 | Air & Space Power Journal Forty-Five Years of Frustration and the current conflictsdo exist, although finitive answers for Iraq or Afghanistan, it to say that Vietnam provides an exact tem- does provide, as B. H. Liddell Hart pointed plate for gauging military actions today is out regarding the value of history, “the op- naïve. All wars are unique; disparate vari- portunity to profit by the stumbles and ables mix together to form the specific con- tumbles of our forerunners.”4 text of each; and what works in one may be a prescription for failure in another. In many respects, the conflict in Vietnam has far Cultural Comparisons more dissimilarity than congruence to the wars in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Yet, for One significant difference between Viet- strategists to dismiss the example of Vietnam nam and the current conflicts is the compo- when evaluating America’s actions in Iraq sition of the belligerents. In Vietnam, reli- and Afghanistan would be a mistake. Al- gious and ethnic distinctions were minimal though the enemies that the United States among the local combatants, and political/ faced in Vietnam differ in many ways from ideological goals dominated the fight for 5 those confronted in Iraq and Afghanistan, control of the South. National Liberation the type of war waged by current foes re- Front insurgents, known by their moniker flects the intermittent guerrilla struggle “Vietcong” or “VC,” received manpower and waged by the Vietcong and their North Viet- material support from their North Vietnam- namese allies for most of Lyndon Johnson’s ese partners to help overthrow the American- presidency. Likewise, President Johnson’s backed Saigon government. Indeed, Ho Chi goal of a stable, independent, noncommunist Minh sent increasing numbers of North South Vietnam, which proved extremely dif- Vietnamese troops south until by August ficult to translate into viable military objec- 1967 the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) tives, mirrors the political goals now sought comprised 45,000 out of a total estimated by President Obama in Afghanistan and Iraq. enemy force of 300,000, the remainder of In addition, President Obama, much like whom were Vietcong.6 South Vietnam ulti- Johnson, must consider the global ramifica- mately raised a substantial ground force of tions of his actions in choosing the instru- almost a million men, and many received ments of American military power best American training.7 That force proved incon- suited to achieving his political aims. sistent in battle, however, causing President President Johnson concluded that air- Johnson to increase American troop totals power was a key military instrument that from 16,000 advisers in 1963 to an active could limit the ability—and will—of enemy force of more than 500,000 men by the time forces to overthrow the American-backed he left office in 1969. He also secured lim- regime in Saigon. President Obama has also ited assistance from America’s Asian allies, turned to airpower to help preserve nascent including 50,000 South Korean troops.8 Yet, governments in Baghdad and Kabul. The to numerous South Vietnamese—including Vietnam example presents an intriguing many who supported the Saigon regime— comparison to current airpower efforts, the ethnically distinctive Americans and given the similarities between America’s their allies appeared as occupiers.9 political objectives and the type of war The ethnic and religious homogeneity of waged by the opposition. Collectively, those the Vietnamese stands in stark contrast to episodes illustrate the inherent difficulty of the disparity among the local combatants in using bombs to help attain broad-based po- Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq the Shiite- litical goals against determined enemies Sunni split has produced considerable sec- who eschew conventional combat and who tarian violence, and in 2010 fighting still have substantial backing on the stage of claimed hundreds of civilian lives a world public opinion. Although the Viet- month.10 Many religious leaders, such as nam experience may not produce any de- Moqtada al-Sadr, have formed militia armies

Spring 2011 | 79 Clodfelter that, on occasion, have clashed with gov- Policy Comparisons ernment forces as well as those of opposing sects. Ethnic differences also abound. The In Vietnam President Johnson also Kurdish minority in the northern part of worked to keep a fledgling government vi- the country has long harbored hopes of in- able. He defined America’s war aim in dependence, yet Kurds—along with Shiites— Southeast Asia as a stable, secure, noncom- comprise significant segments of Iraq’s se- munist South Vietnam—a goal that defied curity forces. As of September 2010, those quantifiable measures of progress—and he forces consisted of more than 660,000 men saw the struggle there as a key episode in although their reliability has been inconsis- the broader effort to contain worldwide com- tent despite intensive training efforts by munist aggression.17 Accordingly, he viewed American troops.11 Besides the militias, in- Ho as a minion of the Soviet Union and digenous criminal elements have gained China, and gauged American actions to pre- periodic footholds in some parts of the serve a noncommunist South Vietnam in country, extremist groups and Baathists still terms of how they might trigger responses conduct frequent attacks, and a smattering from Moscow or Beijing. Johnson was fur- of bombers continues to arrive from Syria.12 ther concerned about how American actions Technically, the United States has ended its might be viewed on the stage of world public combat role in Iraq but maintains almost opinion, where the image of an American 50,000 troops there, and in 2010 hostile fire Goliath pounding a hapless North Vietnam- had claimed 20 American lives by November.13 ese David would undercut not only Ameri- In Afghanistan a disparate assortment of can efforts to bolster the South, but also the tribal clans prone to waging internecine support needed to thwart communist ad- warfare makes the prospect of a unified war vances elsewhere in the world. Finally, the effort against Taliban and al-Qaeda ele- president sought to minimize the amount of ments a thorny proposition. Sectarian dif- attention that Vietnam garnered from the ferences abound as well: the largest clan, American public because Johnson wanted the Pashtun, contains predominantly Sunni that public focused on funding his Great So- Muslims with a smattering of Shiites though ciety programs at home, not on paying for a it is itself divided into two major tribes, the war 8,000 miles away. Ghalji and the Durrani; the Tajiks, another America’s objectives in Iraq mirror the large clan, are a mix of Sunni and Shiites; expansive goals sought in Vietnam. Pres. the Farsiwans are Shiites; the Hazaras are a George W. Bush initially sought a specific blend of Sunnis and Shiites; and the Uzbeks objective—the removal of Saddam Hussein and Turkmen are Sunni.14 More clans exist, from power to prevent him from obtaining with a corresponding blend of sectarian loy- weapons of mass destruction. After realiz- alties, and the territory of many spans ing that goal, the president expanded the across borders into Pakistan, Turkmenistan, aim to fostering democracy as well as bring- and Uzbekistan. In September 2010, the Af- ing security and stability to the country.18 ghan National Army totaled 138,200 men, Much like President Johnson in Vietnam, comprised of troops from multiple clans with Cold War superpowers China and the trained by North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- Soviet Union hovering in the background, tion (NATO) advisers.15 NATO’s own President Bush had to consider the backdrop 140,000-man International Security Assis- of the war against global terror in deciding tance Force (ISAF), which now includes what actions to take in Iraq. Applying too nearly 100,000 Americans, heightens the much force could spur enemy recruiting, ethnic disparities in the country as those either from radical fundamentalists outside troops work to bolster the government of the country, such as al-Qaeda, or from fac- Hamid Karzai, a Durrani Pashtun who has tions within the country who viewed the often criticized NATO and American efforts.16 excess force as a direct assault on their par-

80 | Air & Space Power Journal Forty-Five Years of Frustration ticular ethnic or religious group. President Following Similar Paths Obama has continued to work for Iraqi se- curity and stability.19 Although the level of Besides the broad American political violence has lessened, compared to that goals that have accompanied the wars in faced by his predecessor, Americans and Afghanistan and Iraq, the type of conflict Iraqis continue to die from violent acts, and that has emerged in those two nations bears the nation remains insecure. an eerie similarity to the type of war that President Obama faces similar challenges confronted the United States in Southeast in Afghanistan, where goals of security and Asia during the bulk of the Johnson presi- stability have also dominated American ef- dency. In contrast to Vietnam, both Iraq forts since the initial focus on eliminating and Afghanistan began as conventional con- the Taliban regime. In Afghanistan, though, flicts and rapidly evolved into sporadically the president must blend his objectives waged guerrilla wars, while Vietnam was with those of NATO and its multinational predominantly an insurgency when America force, and those aims do not always mesh intervened with active force in 1965 and well. In addition, disparate Afghan clans stayed that way until the 1968 Tet offensive, provide varying degrees of support to the al- which decimated the Vietcong. Like Presi- Qaeda and Taliban enemies, some elements dent Johnson, President Obama has spent much of his presidency trying to defeat in- of which reside across the border in Paki- surgents adept in guerrilla tactics; President stan—a nuclear state that has its own prob- Bush did so as well. Also like Johnson, both lems of security and stability—which has, Bush and Obama turned to airpower— on occasion, assisted the Afghan Taliban.20 bombing in particular—to play a substantial In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the lofty goal role in defeating the insurgent enemies. of democracy that once guided American Given the combination of America’s expan- efforts has slowly morphed into “accommo- sive political goals and the enemy’s method dation,” but achieving that objective has of waging war, airpower’s ability to achieve proved no less daunting a task, given the positive results has proved problematic. abundance of ethnic and sectarian differ- 21 Lyndon Johnson turned to bombing as ences plaguing the two nations. his first military option to halt the Vietcong During his speech at West Point in De- insurgency. Believing that the VC could not cember 2009, President Obama outlined fight without the support of the North Viet- American objectives in Afghanistan in more namese, Johnson aimed to stop the flow of specific terms as denying al-Qaeda a safe military supplies and men from Hanoi to haven, reversing the Taliban’s momentum South Vietnam. Airpower seemed ideally and preventing it from overthrowing the suited to the task—the president could care- government, and strengthening Afghani- fully control the intensity of the bombing, stan’s security forces and government so thus avoiding an outcry from the Chinese that they could “take the lead responsibility or Soviets, or the world public at large, and for Afghanistan’s future.”22 To help attain preventing the American public from di- those objectives, he authorized the deploy- verting its focus from the Great Society. ment of an additional 30,000 American Moreover, airpower was a “cheap” alternative troops and stated that American forces to ground troops in terms of risking Ameri- would begin withdrawing from Afghanistan can lives, and its use was likely to bolster in July 2011. The Afghan troops would then the resolve of the Saigon government and begin to assume a larger role in providing its armed forces. Finally, a bombing effort security, an approach similar to the “Viet- of gradually increasing intensity would sig- namization” plan that was the cornerstone nal Ho that his country faced ultimate de- of America’s strategy in Vietnam during the struction from the air and persuade him to last years of that conflict. call off the Vietcong insurgency to avoid his

Spring 2011 | 81 Clodfelter country’s ruin. Those fundamental assump- them, but they were just as likely to be in- tions guided Johnson’s “Rolling Thunder” nocent peasants returning to their ancestral air campaign against North Vietnam when homes as they were to be Vietcong. Both the it began in March 1965.23 VC and NVA took advantage of the American Unfortunately, the assumptions proved propensity to rely on airpower when it was incorrect. The Vietcong (and their North Viet- available. A favorite tactic involved placing namese allies) fought an average of only one one or two snipers in a hamlet and hoping day a month and hence needed a meager 34 that the Americans would respond with an tons of supplies each day from sources out- air strike that destroyed the village.27 In a side South Vietnam—an amount that just war purportedly waged for “hearts and seven two-and-a-half-ton trucks could de- minds,” indiscriminate firepower was the liver.24 As long as the enemy chose to fight insurgents’ best friend, and many of the such a sporadic war, no amount of bombing four million tons of bombs that fell on South could stop the paucity of supplies it needed. Vietnam were anything but discriminate. The morale boost that the Saigon regime Indiscriminate firepower has not been a received from Rolling Thunder soon ebbed, staple of bombing in either Iraq or Afghani- while Ho gradually increased the numbers of stan. Truly remarkable advances in “smart” NVA troops heading south. He appreciated munitions have occurred since their first the constraints that limited Johnson’s bomb- widespread use over North Vietnam in ing and knew that he had little to fear from it. 1972, and pilots today—whether in the air President Johnson turned to additional overhead or in ground control facilities half American ground forces to confront the VC a world away—can launch bombs many and the NVA, and Rolling Thunder continued miles from a target and have satellites guide with gradually increasing intensity for the them to within a few feet of the bull’s eye, next three years—the rationale now was that regardless of weather conditions. Of the it would limit the magnitude of the war that 18,000 bombs dropped in Iraq by the US Air the enemy could wage in the South. The sur- Force during the first month of Operation prisingly large scale of the 1968 Tet offensive Iraqi Freedom in 2003, 11,000 were guided shattered that myth. munitions, compared to only 15 percent of Despite the three-and-a-half-year dura- the 227,000 bombs and missiles delivered tion of Rolling Thunder, it accounted for by allied air forces during the 43 days of only a fraction of the bombs that fell on Operation Desert Storm in 1991.28 Similarly, Southeast Asia during America’s eight-year in Afghanistan during the first five weeks of struggle there. The United States ultimately Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, 2,300 dropped eight million tons of bombs, with of the roughly 6,000 bombs and missiles de- one million of those falling on North Viet- livered were satellite-guided 2,000-pound nam, three million on Laos and Cambodia, Joint Direct Attack Munitions.29 and four million tons falling on its ally, South Regrettably, the overwhelming emphasis Vietnam.25 In contrast to the highly con- on smart bombs has not eliminated the strained bombing of the North—which prospect of civilian casualties. In October killed an estimated 52,000 civilians during 2001, five villages near Kandahar collec- Rolling Thunder—attacks on Southern tar- tively reported more than 100 victims of US gets had relatively few restrictions.26 To bol- air strikes; local commanders and Afghan ster security, American commanders cre- officials corroborated the claims.30 In the ated “free-fire zones,” hostile areas in which spring of 2003, bombing killed an estimated American or South Vietnamese troops re- 1,500–2,000 Iraqi civilians during the first moved all inhabitants and deemed anyone six weeks of Iraqi Freedom.31 Those deaths who then ventured into the zones an enemy occurred during the periods in Afghanistan combatant. Air strikes frequently occurred and Iraq dominated by conventional com- in such areas once people appeared in bat, in which American forces pursued the

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“finite” objectives of wrecking the Taliban open combat, Iraqi insurgents have mini- regime and eliminating its safe haven for mized their exposure to American fire- al-Qaeda, and ousting Saddam—thus remov- power in ways that require few external ing the perceived threat of Iraqi weapons of supplies; the disbandment of Saddam’s mass destruction. The fast-paced start of the army in 2003 produced an array of ordnance two conflicts, with tangible war aims rap- scattered throughout the country. Such tac- idly achieved, tended to downplay the ef- tics have become the norm in Afghanistan fects of civilian casualties. as well, where Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters increasingly rely on hidden munitions to employ against American and NATO troops. Enemies Changing Tactics By mid-November 2010, US forces had suf- fered 1,058 combat deaths in Afghanistan; The episodic fighting that has since oc- of those, IEDs were responsible for 583.37 curred in Afghanistan and Iraq not only has From October 2009 to October 2010, rates of heightened the impact of civilian losses but effective IED attacks increased 30 percent also has revealed a fundamental change in in Afghanistan.38 initiative that bears a striking resemblance to Attempts to thwart this sporadic enemy Vietnam. The Vietcong and their NVA allies combat activity with airpower have pro- determined when and where they would duced mixed results. In concert with the fight, as well as how they would do so. Dur- 2007 “surge” of an additional 30,000 Ameri- ing 1967 and 1968, the two years of peak can Soldiers in Iraq, five times as many air combat activity in Vietnam for American strikes occurred that year compared to troops, only 1 percent of American patrols 2006.39 Air Force leaders said that the added made contact with the enemy; adding South troops had pushed insurgents out of urban Vietnamese patrols to the mix dropped the areas and into places easier to target and number to 0.1 percent.32 Yet, 1967 and 1968 that better intelligence had provided a were also the bloodiest years for American clearer picture of the battlefield. Still, the forces, claiming 10,000 and 15,000 American bombing that occurred since the beginning lives, respectively—of which 23.7 percent of April 2007 had produced more than 200 were lost to mines and booby traps.33 During civilian deaths by the end of the year. Hell- the frequent lulls in open combat, the un- fire missile attacks by Apache helicopters seen ordnance could produce 40 percent or and Predator drones also significantly in- more of American deaths.34 Airpower and creased, with more than 200 Hellfire strikes artillery provided a steady supply of booby- occurring in Baghdad during a two-month trap explosives since the dud rate for bombs span in spring 2008.40 Many of those raids dropped by B-52s was 5 percent, and that targeted enemy elements in the heart of the from artillery shells 2 percent, which to- city, and despite intense efforts to avoid ci- gether equated to more than 800 tons of ord- vilians, such losses still occurred. “It’s not nance a month available to the enemy.35 Hollywood and it’s not 110 percent perfect,” In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the insur- commented an aviation brigade commander. gents have also frequently dictated the “It is as precise as very hardworking sol- war’s tenor and tactics. In both locales, the diers and commanders can make it. These percentage of American lives lost to impro- criminals do not operate in a clean battle vised explosive devices (IED) has eclipsed space. It is occupied by civilians, [including] those lost to unseen munitions in Vietnam. law-abiding Iraqis.”41 As of 10 November 2010, IEDs had caused In Afghanistan, American and NATO air- nearly two-thirds of the 3,483 American craft conducted 3,572 air strikes in 2007, more combat deaths in the Iraq war and had than double the total for 2006 and 20 times wounded 21,583 American military person- the number for 2005. That bombing caused nel.36 Relying on roadside bombs instead of an estimated 300 civilian casualties in 2007,

Spring 2011 | 83 Clodfelter

­triple the number reported for 2006.42 An air analogous to Vietnam’s free-fire zones have strike by B-1 bombers in May 2009 against not always met with success. Ten days ear- insurgents in Farah province may have killed lier, American bombs meant for al-Qaeda as many as 86 civilians.43 In response to such instead killed three women and two chil- losses, Gen Stanley McChrystal, who took dren in the same area.47 To limit collateral command of American forces in Afghanistan damage, the Air Force has resorted to drop- a month later, ordered his troops to break off ping concrete-filled bombs to detonate IED combat with insurgents who hid among vil- sites and often relies on 250-pound GBU-39 lagers. He further restricted the use of air- “small-diameter bombs” to minimize blast power and artillery in such situations. “Air effects. The key, though, is determining power contains the seeds of our own destruc- when civilians might be present near a po- tion if we do not use it responsibly,” he stated tential target, and the Vietnam practice, in June 2009. “We can lose this fight.”44 now used in Iraq and Afghanistan, of “doing The ramifications of such civilian deaths a show of force to get civilians out of the loom large for the prospects of realizing the area” is no guarantee of positive results.48 overarching goals of security, stability, and a In July 2010, Gen David Petraeus re- semblance of democracy. After a 12 October placed General McChrystal as American 2007 air strike on an insurgent stronghold commander in Afghanistan, and soon after- near Baghdad killed nine children and six ward the number of air strikes began to in- women, Rear Adm Greg Smith stated that the crease significantly. From November 2009 killings were “absolutely regrettable” but then through May 2010, US and NATO aircraft blamed the insurgents for using civilians as a expended ordnance an average of 207 times shield when they shot at a nearby American a month; from June through October 2010 unit. “A ground element came under fire from that monthly average increased to 517.49 that building that we had to neutralize,” he General Petraeus, who had commanded in remarked. “The enemy has a vote here . . . Iraq during the “surge,” had intensified and when he chooses to surround himself bombing there in concert with the increase with civilians and then fire upon U.S. forces, in American troops; the increased Afghani- our forces have no choice but to return a com- stan bombing has coincided with the arrival mensurate amount of fire” (emphasis of the additional 30,000 troops that Presi- added).45 In all likelihood, the “vote” went just dent Obama authorized in his December the way the enemy wanted, and a Vietcong 2009 speech at West Point. The greater vol- sniper team 45 years ago would have appreci- ume of air strikes has also produced in- ated the technique. The civilian death toll creased civilian casualties although the “in- from the bombing was one of the highest to cident rate of causing civilian casualties has result from a single American military action actually decreased,” according to NATO.50 thus far during the Iraq war, and it received Still, coalition forces killed 49 civilians in extensive media coverage. October 2010, compared to 38 the previous In trying to take the initiative with air- October, an increase of 30 percent. In con- power in Iraq and Afghanistan, American trast, insurgent forces killed or wounded commanders actually risk undermining in- 322 civilians in October 2010, a similar per- digenous support for the new governments centage increase from a year ago.51 in Baghdad and Kabul. On 10 January 2008, Despite the greater number of insurgent- two B-1s and four F-16s dropped a com- caused civilian deaths, those caused by bined 20 tons of bombs on suspected mili- ­coalition forces are the ones most likely to tant hideouts, storehouses, and defensive generate violent reactions from the Afghan positions in central Iraq. Americans had populace. A July 2010 study by the National warned residents to leave the area, and Bureau of Economic Research on the effect most did, resulting in no civilian casualties.46 of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Yet, such attempts to create “secure” areas Iraq found that “counterinsurgent-generated

84 | Air & Space Power Journal Forty-Five Years of Frustration civilian casualties from a typical incident have produced outrage in Punjab and Sindh, are responsible for 6 additional violent inci- Pakistan’s two most populous provinces.59 dents [against ISAF forces] in an average With increased bombing in both Afghani- sized district in the following 6 weeks.”52 stan and Pakistan, the United States—despite The study further noted that “the data are all of its high-tech wizardry—has significantly consistent with the claim that civilian casu- increased the probability of collateral damage, alties are affecting future violence through and every occurrence of it diminishes the pros- increased recruitment into insurgent groups pects of stability and security. Such episodes after a civilian casualty incident.”53 In short, attract media attention and serve as excellent “when ISAF units kill civilians, this in- recruiting tools for opposition forces. In the creases the number of willing combatants, final analysis, bombs cannot have a significant leading to an increase in insurgent attacks.”54 impact against a determined enemy who The study cited revenge as a primary mo- chooses to fight an infrequent guerrilla war. tive for the violent reactions (observing that The crafty insurgent will rely on his asymmet- similar reactions did not occur in Iraq) and ric approach not only to negate America’s air- noted that violence was more likely to oc- power advantage but also to transform it into cur in response to ISAF-caused civilian ca- an instrument that furthers his cause. As long sualties than in response to insurgent- as the United States uses bombing to help at- caused civilian deaths.55 tain such amorphous political objectives as “se- The war against the Afghan Taliban has curity” and “stability,” much less “democracy,” also spilled across the border into Pakistan, the insurgent is likely to thwart those efforts by which has served as a Taliban sanctuary in waging a sporadic guerrilla war. Indeed, bomb- ing can do little to negate the greatest threat to much the same way that Laos and Cambo- the civilian populace of both Afghanistan and dia served as sanctuaries in Southeast Asia Iraq— ­suicide terrorism—and evidence mounts for the VC and NVA. In Pakistan, though, that continued episodes of civilian deaths from American air strikes have been far more airpower spur more suicide attacks.60 discriminate than those in either Laos or In many respects, America’s enemies in Cambodia, which together ultimately re- Iraq and Afghanistan (and Pakistan) face ceived more than three million tons of easier tasks than their Vietcong predecessors. American bombs. The American bombing The United States pursues goals in both of of Pakistan began slowly, with only one air the current wars that are difficult to achieve strike occurring in 2004 and again in 2005, and parallel those sought in Vietnam; more- three raids transpiring in 2006, and five in over, it faces an array of disparate opponents 2007. In 2008 the number jumped to 35; in in Iraq and Afghanistan compared to the 2009 to 53; and, as of 19 November, the 2010 homogeneous foes confronted in Southeast 56 total was 101. Those numbers primarily Asia. Facing these disparate opponents fur- consist of drone missions, controlled by the ther complicates American strategy. In ad- Central Intelligence Agency, though they dition, whereas Lyndon Johnson and his do include some Air Force strikes and a lim- advisers had to deal with the impact of me- ited number of helicopter attacks.57 Since dia coverage that ultimately revealed bomb- 2006 the Long War Journal estimates that air ing mistakes to the world at large, they did strikes in Pakistan have killed 1,606 Taliban not have to grapple with the constant, in- and al-Qaeda fighters (including 57 senior stantaneous television coverage provided by leaders) and 108 civilians, with 662 enemy such media giants as CNN, BBC, and Al combatants dying in 2010 compared to only Jazeera. That news, as well as the slant it 14 civilians.58 Pakistani sources, however, receives from outlets like Al Jazeera, has a claim that between 2007 and 2009, drone tremendous impact on molding the opin- strikes killed 700 civilians and only 14 ter- ions of many in the Middle East, where 38 rorist leaders; the perceived civilian losses percent of the populace is illiterate.61

Spring 2011 | 85 Clodfelter

Final Observations power—specifically, airlift and reconnais- sance—greatly enhance America’s ability to In so-called wars for hearts and minds, per- fight insurgent enemies, as demonstrated ceptions count more than reality—indeed, numerous times in Vietnam. The problem perceptions are reality. The skilled insurgent, for American air chiefs—and political lead- whether motivated by political, ideological, ers—is that their default position for apply- ethnic, or religious concerns, will do every- ing airpower is often its kinetic aspect. thing he can to fight in a way that offers him American air commanders today cannot be the greatest chance of success. He will work expected to forgo the bombing option when hard to paint his cause in a positive light and insurgents attack US troops or when intel- to cast his enemy’s efforts as evil. Open- ligence pinpoints “high-value” targets. Yet, ended American political goals, reliant on those commanders—and their political lead- bombing as a key means to help realize them, play directly into the insurgent’s hand and ers—must have a complete appreciation for intensify the likelihood that he will wage a the potential costs of such bombing and for sporadic guerrilla war that American air- whether the potential long-term price is power is ill equipped to obstruct. worth the desired short-term gain. In cer- Airpower can play a role in defeating tain cases, the costs may appear justified. such an enemy, but bombing is not the an- For most, though, restraint is probably the swer. Lethal airpower against insurgents prudent course of action. The emphasis on works well only when they can be isolated kinetic airpower helped doom America’s from the “sea” of population in which they pursuit of broad-based political goals against prefer to “swim.” Against such a savvy op- an insurgent enemy in Vietnam and may ponent, those instances of isolation will be well to do the same as America follows rarities. The nonlethal applications of air- those footsteps in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Notes

1. National Journal 25, nos. 47–48 (22 November 8. Terrence Maitland and Peter McInerney, A 2003); Newsweek 143, no. 16 (19 April 2004); and For- Contagion of War (Boston: Boston Publishing Com- eign Affairs 84, no. 6 (November–December 2005). pany, 1983), 91. 2. Newsweek 153, no. 6 (9 February 2009). 9. That view is reflected throughoutA Vietcong 3. Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Si- Memoir, written by former Vietcong minister of jus- mon and Schuster, 2010), 97, 279, 324. tice Truong Nhu Tang with David Chanoff and Doan 4. B. H. Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn from Van Toai (New York: Vintage Books, 1985). History? (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971), 16. 10. Larry Kaplow, “Think Again: Iraq,” Foreign 5. Out of a total population of 40 million Vietnam- Policy, 15 November 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy ese at the end of the war, an estimated 2.9 million were .com/articles/2010/11/15/think_again_iraq. Roman Catholics. The remainder subscribed to a 11. Brig Gen Jeffrey S. Buchanan and Brig Gen blend of Buddhism, animism, and astrology; Confu- Kendall P. Cox, press conference, 7 September 2010, cian principles also held sway for many. See Delia Operation New Dawn: Official Website of United States Pergande, “Roman Catholicism in Vietnam,” in The Forces-Iraq, http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/press Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and -briefings/brig-gen-jeffrey-s-buchanan-and-brig-gen Military History, ed. Spencer Tucker (New York: Oxford -kendall-p-cox-sr-sept-7. University Press, 2000), 360. 12. Kaplow, “Think Again: Iraq.” 6. “Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Viet- 13. Ibid. nam,” 18 August 1967, Meeting Notes File, box 1, 14. Differences also exist among many of those Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Aus- clans containing Shiite components. The Tajik Shiites tin, Texas. are of the Ismaile sect, while the Hazaras contain 7. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: members of the Ismaile sect as well as the more con- Oxford University Press, 1978), 455. ventional “Twelver Shia” group.

86 | Air & Space Power Journal Forty-Five Years of Frustration

15. NATO Media Backgrounder, “Afghan National 25. Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., Security Forces (ANSF),” 26 October 2010, http:// The Air War in Indochina (Boston: Beacon Press, www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets 1972), 11, 168–72; and Earl H. Tilford Jr., Crosswinds: /1667-10_ANSF_LR_en2.pdf. The Afghan National The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam (College Station: Police numbered 120,500 in September 2010. Texas A&M University Press, 1993), 109. 16. Joshua Partlow, “Karzai Calls on U.S. to 26. NSSM 1 (February 1969), Congressional Re- Lighten Troop Presence,” Washington Post, 14 Novem- cord 118, pt. 13 (10 May 1972), 16833. ber 2010; “Attacks Kill 8 Foreign Troops in Afghani- 27. Such episodes are recounted in the oral his- stan,” Reuters, 14 October 2010, http://www.reuters tory interview of A-4 pilot John Buchanan that ap- .com/article/idUSTRE69D10P20101014; and Karen pears in Harry Maurer, ed., Strange Ground: Ameri- DeYoung, “Obama Pushes Back on Karzai Criticism,” cans in Vietnam, 1945–1975: An Oral History (New Washington Post, 21 November 2010. The latter article York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 371–80. See lists a total of approximately 140,000 ISAF troops in in particular 377–78. Afghanistan; the first article lists 150,000. 28. Sandra Jontz and Kendra Helmer, “Still Going: 17. “NSAM 288, U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam, War Emphasizes Need to Keep Aircraft Carriers,” Stars 17 March 1964,” in Neil Sheehan et al., The Pentagon and Stripes, “Freedom in Iraq” ed., June 2003, 25, Papers (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 283. http://www.stripes.com/mideast/iraq.pdf; and Eliot 18. See, for example, the text of “President George A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” Foreign W. Bush’s Address to the Nation Regarding Iraq,” 7 Affairs 73, no. 1 (January–February 1994): 110. September 2003, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net 29. William M. Arkin, “Bad News in the Good /terrorism/bushiraq5.html; and of “President George News,” Washingtonpost.com, 12 November 2001. W. Bush’s Address to the United Nations,” 23 Septem- 30. Susan B. Glasser, “Afghans Live and Die with U.S. Mistakes,” Washington Post, 20 February 2002. ber 2003, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism 31. “Database,” Iraq Body Count, http://www /bushiraq6.html. .iraqbodycount.net/database. Data from 19. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in 19 March–1 May 2003 reveal that aerial muni- Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Opera- tions likely caused a minimum of 1,612 and a tions in Iraq” (Washington, DC: White House, Office maximum of 1,855 civilian deaths, but these of the Press Secretary, 31 August 2010), http://www numbers omit 1,473–2,000 Iraqi noncombatants .whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks reported dead at Baghdad hospitals from war -president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq. wounds inflicted by unknown causes. 20. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. 32. Edward Doyle and Samuel Lipsman, America and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Takes Over, 1965–67 (Boston: Boston Publishing Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), 219–39, 265–92. Company, 1982), 60. 21. Steven Lee Myers and Alissa J. Rubin, “U.S. 33. Lewy, America in Vietnam, 309. Scales Back Political Goals for Iraqi Unity,” New York 34. Ibid. Times, 25 November 2007. 35. Ibid., 101. 22. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in 36. Defense Manpower Data Center—Data, Analy- Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghan- sis and Programs Division, “Global War on Terrorism: istan and Pakistan” [United States Military Academy [Casualties] by Reason, October 7, 2001 through No- at West Point, West Point, New York] (Washington, vember 10, 2010,” http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil DC: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1 De- /personnel/CASUALTY/gwot_reason.pdf. A total of cember 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press 2,195 Americans have died in Iraq due to IEDs, and -office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward the loss rate from the devices has remained steady for -afghanistan-and-pakistan. the past three years. See Rick Atkinson, “The Single 23. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The Most Effective Weapon against Our Deployed Forces,” American Bombing of North Vietnam (Lincoln: Uni- Washington Post, 30 September 2007. versity of Nebraska Press, 2006), 59–60. 37. Defense Manpower Data Center, “Global War 24. Headquarters USAF, Analysis of Effectiveness of on Terrorism.” Interdiction in Southeast Asia, Second Progress Report, 38. Chart, “Afghanistan IED Data for Stratcomm,” May 1966, Air Force Historical Research Agency, November 2010, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Maxwell AFB, AL, file K168.187-21, 7; and Senate, Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). “Effective” IED at- Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investi- tacks are those causing casualties. gating Subcommittee, Air War against North Vietnam, 39. Josh White, “U.S. Boosts Its Use of Airstrikes 90th Cong., 1st sess., 25 August 1967, pt. 4, 299. in Iraq,” Washington Post, 17 January 2008.

Spring 2011 | 87 Clodfelter

40. Ernesto Londoño and Amit R. Paley, “In Iraq, Room, 10 November 2010, http://www.wired.com a Surge in U.S. Airstrikes,” Washington Post, 23 May /dangerroom/2010/11/bombs-away-afghan-air-war 2008; and Tom Vanden Brook, “Drone Attacks Hit -peaks-with-1000-strikes-in-october/. High in Iraq,” USA Today, 29 April 2008. Predator 51. Ibid. drones conducted 11 attacks with Hellfires in April 52. Luke N. Condra et al., The Effect of Civilian 2008 alone, nearly double the previous high in Pred- Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, Working Paper ator attacks for one month of the war. 16152 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 41. Londoño and Paley, “In Iraq, a Surge.” Research, July 2010), [1], “Abstract,” https://afghan 42. White, “U.S. Boosts.” coin.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Announcements 43. Jason Motlagh, “U.S. to Limit Air Power in /Attachments/4/working%20paper.pdf. Afghanistan,” Washington Times, 24 June 2009. 53. Ibid., 3. 44. Ibid. 54. Ibid., 4. 45. Paul von Zielbauer, “U.S. Investigates Civilian 55. Ibid., 2–4. Toll in Airstrike, but Holds Insurgents Responsible,” 56. Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Charting New York Times, 13 October 2007. Similar rationale the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2010,” came from US military representatives in the after- Long War Journal, http://www.longwarjournal.org math of a 2 May 2008 air strike with precision muni- /pakistan-strikes.php. See also Greg Miller, “U.S. tions against a “criminal element command-and- Seeks More Drone Strikes to Slow Insurgents,” Wash- control center in Sadr City.” Television footage and ington Post, 20 November 2010. eyewitness accounts indicated that the bombs fell 57. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “C.I.A. Steps close to a hospital and wounded civilians, but “U.S. Up Drone Attacks on Taliban in Pakistan,” New York military officials have repeatedly blamed Shiite Times, 27 September 2010. fighters for operating within densely populated ar- 58. Roggio and Mayer, “Charting the Data”; and eas and said they should be held responsible for any Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Senior al Qaeda civilian deaths caused by American missile strikes.” and Taliban Leaders Killed in US Airstrikes in Paki- See Amit R. Paley, “5 U.S., 2 Georgian Troops Die in stan, 2004–2010,” Long War Journal, http://www Iraq, Officials Say,” Washington Post, 4 May 2008. .longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts.php. 46. Solomon Moore, “U.S. Bombs Iraqi Insurgent 59. David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Hideouts,” New York Times, 11 January 2008. Exum, “Death from Above, Outrage Down Below,” 47. Ibid. New York Times, 16 May 2009. 48. White, “U.S. Boosts.” 60. Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, Cut- 49. USAFCENT Public Affairs Directorate, “Com- ting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terror- bined Forces Air Component Commander 2007–2010 ism and How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chi- Airpower Statistics,” 31 October 2010, http:// cago Press, 2010), 164–66. timeswampland.files.wordpress.com/2010/11 61. Tony Corn, “World War IV as Fourth-Generation /afd-101030-001.pdf. Warfare,” Policy Review, web special, January 2006, 50. Noah Shachtman, “Bombs Away: Afghan Air 8, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy War Peaks with 1,000 Strikes in October,” Danger -review/article/6526.

Dr. Mark Clodfelter Dr. Clodfelter (USAFA; MA, University of Nebraska; PhD, University of North ­Carolina–Chapel Hill) is a professor of military strategy at the National War Col- lege. A former US Air Force officer, he served in radar assignments and teaching posts during a 23-year Air Force career. He twice taught history at the US Air Force Academy, ultimately serving as the academy’s director of military history, and was part of the initial cadre of instructors at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He also served as commander of the Air Force ROTC detachment at the University of North Carolina. Dr. Clodfelter is the author of The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (University of Nebraska Press, 2006) and the recently published Beneficial Bombing: The Pro- gressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917–1945 (University of Nebraska Press, 2010).

88 | Air & Space Power Journal Defending the Joint Force Lessons Learned from Joint Base Balad

Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF* Col Anthony M. Packard, USAF Lt Col Raymund M. Tembreull, USAF

Effective integration of joint forces exposes no weak points or seams to an adversary. They rapidly and efficiently find and exploit the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and other weak points as they contribute most to mission accomplishment. —Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

talian general Giulio Douhet long ago noted that “it is easier and more ef- fective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.”1 This conceptI is reflected in Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine: “Air and space power is most vulnerable on the ground. Thus, force protection is an integral part of air and space power em- ployment.”2 However, base defense—defending one’s air assets on the ground—is one of the least understood operational aspects of air- power. Today’s Air Force strategy for defending air bases is known as integrated defense (ID) (formerly known as air base defense or air

*The authors acknowledge Maj Gen Craig A. Franklin, USAF; Col David C. Ptak, USAF; LTC Eric Timmerman, USA; and Maj Keith E. McCormack, USAF, for their critical input to the devel- opment of this article. We also thank Dr. Bill Dean of the Air Command and Staff College faculty, as well as Maj Darren Stanford and Lt Col Paul Berg, both of the Air and Space Power ­Journal staff, for their encouragement and recommendations.

Spring 2011 | 89 Caudill, Packard, & Tembreull base ground defense). ID provides the req- the base operating support integrator (BOS-I) uisite secure foundation from which the Air for Joint Base Balad (JBB) (formerly known Force launches combat operations and pro- as Logistics Support Area Anaconda and tects its personnel and resources. Without Balad Air Base). This role gave the Air Force strong ID, Air Force personnel and re- responsibility for defending the base and its sources, as well as those of the joint force, assigned joint forces, including the conduct are vulnerable to attacks that would de- of counterinsurgency (COIN) and counter- crease their combat effectiveness. indirect-fire (IDF) operations outside the Prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, base perimeter.9 Personnel nicknamed JBB the Air Force considered threats outside the “mortaritaville” because it came under air base perimeter the responsibility of either nearly daily attack by mortars and rockets, the host nation or sister service forces.3 In threatening both the combat mission and 1985 the Air Force and Army signed Joint Se- the joint force.10 Employing IDF, insurgents curity Agreement 8, which formally tasked successfully interrupted and impeded op- the Army with the exterior defense of Air erations. The base defense strategy prior to Force bases.4 By 2005 the Air Force had ac- 2008 essentially chased the IDF shooters knowledged that the Army would not have after attacks or employed counter battery sufficient forces in some instances to perform fire against the incoming fire’s point of ori- exterior air base defense missions effectively. gin. Before the Air Force became the BOS-I, As a result, Air Force and Army leaders termi- one could describe the posture of exterior nated the agreement, giving Air Force com- base defense as reactive: manders more latitude in defending air bases 5 In early 2004, Balad initiated a program to with their own assets. In 2006 Brig Gen counter the insurgents [sic] stand-off attacks. ­Robert Holmes, the Air Force’s former direc- The plan entailed the extensive use of UAV’s tor of security forces and force protection, [sic] [unmanned aerial vehicles], helicopters, wrote that “land-component maneuver forces counter-battery radar, and response forces to will be stretched thin for the foreseeable fu- attack enemy forces once they initiated stand-off ture, so the Air Force must invest in its capa- attacks. Quick reaction forces were positioned bilities to securely project combat air and— on-base (often helicopter transported) and off- now—ground power.”6 In 2007 the Air Force base in vehicles. The results were more than announced a new strategy for defending air disappointing—attacks against Balad increased dramatically.11 (emphasis added) bases. This ID concept called for the “applica- tion of active and passive defense measures, It soon became clear that the service employed across the legally-defined ground needed a new approach to base defense. As dimension of the operational environment, to BOS-I the Air Force committed Airmen to an mitigate potential risks and defeat adversary exterior base defense role in the largest com- threats to Air Force operations.”7 The ID op- bat deployment of security forces since the erational approach called for new thinking Vietnam War. Implementing an ID philoso- that emphasizes ground intelligence-collection phy, that new role proved successful in de- efforts in the operational environment and fending JBB for several reasons: (1) the Air shifts security operations from a compliance- Force heeded lessons learned from defending based model to a capabilities-based construct air bases in Vietnam by committing intelli- as a “fundamental battle competency for all gence analysts to ground defense intelligence; Airmen, whether garrison or deployed.”8 ID (2) Airmen took a proactive COIN approach encouraged a truly collaborative base de- designed to gain synergy with friendly and fense operation with joint and combined host-nation forces, best illustrated through the partners as well as a systems approach to partnership with the Army ground force com- defending air bases. mander (known as the battlespace owner By 2008 the Air Force had accepted a [BSO]), who controlled the terrain surround- new leadership role in Iraq when it became ing the installation; and (3) JBB organized a

90 | Air & Space Power Journal Defending the Joint Force unique ID method that featured tactics, tech- rockets against JBB since the Air Force took niques, and procedures designed to influence defense responsibility as BOS-I. These at- the battlespace as well as deter and disrupt tacks resulted in no aircraft losses and only attacks.12 This success made JBB the model a few aircraft damaged; furthermore, just 50 for implementing ID concepts in a combat percent of the rounds fired actually landed environment. Reviewing the history of Air on the base.14 The adversary’s IDF effective- Force base defense—especially the important ness against JBB, as measured by the latter lessons from Vietnam—illustrates how Air- criterion, was the lowest among the four men applied historical lessons to JBB’s opera- most commonly attacked bases in Iraq. This tional environment, including innovative fact indicates, among other things, that in- ways to counter IDF. surgents hurried their attacks, lacked the tactical loiter time needed for massing their fires, and feared the prospect of being ei- Learning from Vietnam ther targeted by a ground patrol or video- taped by an air platform. (Videotape often In both Vietnam and Iraq, IDF was the serves as evidence in Iraqi courts.)15 number-one threat to air bases because Since US operations began at JBB, the base standoff weapons enable enemy forces to not only suffered more attacks than any other attack from a distance, thus giving them a installation in Iraq but also came under IDF better chance of survival. In Vietnam, Viet- attack more frequently than all US air bases cong and North Vietnamese forces attacked combined in Southeast Asia during a com- American air bases 475 times between 1964 parative range of years during the Vietnam and 1973, primarily with IDF, destroying 99 War (see figure).16 As in Vietnam, JBB’s IDF US and South Vietnamese aircraft and dam- attacks profited from the terrain, which fea- aging 1,170 aircraft.13 By contrast, insur- tured lush farmland, trees, vineyards, and the gents have fired more than 340 mortars and most complex ground in all of Iraq due to the

500

400

300

200 Joint Base Balad

100

Number of Attacks Number 0 Bases in Vietnam 1967 vs. 2004 1968 vs. 2005 1969 vs. 2006 1970 vs. 2007 1971 vs. 2008 1972 vs. Year-of-War Comparison 2009 Figure. Comparison of attacks on Joint Base Balad to those on all US air bases in the Vietnam theater. (From Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995], 69, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR553.pdf. JBB data derived from Col Anthony Packard, 332d Expeditionary Security Forces Group, Joint Intelligence Sup- port Element, 1 March 2010.)

Spring 2011 | 91 Caudill, Packard, & Tembreull concentration of irrigation systems and drain- to penetrate bases to destroy aircraft and key age canals that support the country’s agricul- defenses.18 Eight of those attacks utilized IDF tural breadbasket. One hears echoes of Viet- as a diversion for base defense forces, nam in the base defense challenges found in thereby screening attackers during ground countering IDF in the terrain surrounding assaults.19 Unlike Vietnam, sapper attacks JBB. As a RAND report of 1995 observes, “The have not materialized in Iraq because they standoff threat, particularly from rockets, are highly complex, synchronized operations proved troublesome through the end of the requiring a disciplined, trained military force [Vietnam] war. Given the nature of the con- lacking in the Iraqi insurgency. flict and the terrain, there was no foolproof Moreover, unlike Vietnam, the 2008 US- countermeasure to this threat.”17 Iraq security agreement substantially al- In Iraq the security at JBB’s entry control tered the rules of engagement by making points and perimeter drove the enemy to the war a “law enforcement fight” that obli- IDF attacks as the course of least resistance, gated US forces to build criminal cases with giving him the best chance for disrupting supporting evidence against their attack- US operations. Each attack required person- ers.20 The agreement presented multiple nel at the installation to take cover and limiting factors for defending the air base; clear the terrain of unexploded ordnance nevertheless, it bolstered the larger strate- prior to returning to normal operations. gic effort to support Iraqi rule-of-law pro- The patterns of attack in Iraq have shown a grams and had the added benefit of making lack of specificity in targeting, but their ba- Iraqi police and courts the centerpiece of sic objectives sought to disrupt coalition long-term Iraqi success. Furthermore, by military operations and inflict casualties in requiring that the Iraqi police handle all order to undercut the American public’s re- cases against alleged insurgents and process solve. Iraqi insurgent forces ranged from them through the court system, the new well-trained former Baathists to disenfran- policy promoted a more favorable image of chised tribes with militia-like capabilities US Airmen, casting them as partners in up- and unskilled attackers motivated solely by holding the Iraqi rule of law rather than as monetary reward earned from performing an occupying force disrespectful of local IDF attacks against JBB. Consequently, authority. As such, Soldiers, Air Force secu- many IDF attacks were perpetrated by nov- rity forces, Airmen with the Air Force Of- ices who undertook subcontract work for fice of Special Investigations, and pilots insurgent groups. JBB’s counter-IDF strat- from both services testified in Iraqi courts, egy focused on deterring and disrupting at- resulting in successful criminal prosecu- tacks to prevent the enemy from massing tions under Iraqi law.21 fires for maximum effect. As a result, en- Commenting on the US-Iraq security emy IDF attacks were typically short in du- agreement of 2008, Maj Gen Mike Milano, ration and performed hurriedly from unpre- USA, points out that “what we and the Iraqis pared firing positions. are striving for is a condition known as police Vietnam-era base defense and that at JBB primacy. . . . Under police primacy, the Iraqi also differed significantly in terms of the police forces have primary responsibility for complexity of attacks. Those in Vietnam internal security, under civilian control, in proved more effective because enemy forces accordance with the Iraqi constitution and had more freedom of movement, enabling consistent with the rule of law.”22 �JBB,BB, therethere-- them to mass fires and ground attacks due to fore, initiated further partnering with the the inability of air base defenders to effec- Iraqi police and built a local police substation tively patrol the IDF threat ring around their to provide a law enforcement partnership for installations. Vietnam theater air bases en- the base. US Soldiers and Airmen worked dured not only IDF attacks but also 29 sap- alongside Iraqi police, often conducting joint per attacks, during which forces attempted and combined patrols and operations.

92 | Air & Space Power Journal Defending the Joint Force

Knowledge of the Enemy: fight, essentially sweeping for the enemy in the location from which the IDF round Committing Air Force Intelligence came, as indicated by radar and spotter re- Analysts to Base Defense ports. This reactive approach becomes a frustrating exercise comparable to a game In contrast to bases in Vietnam, JBB en- of “whack-a-mole”: chasing the enemy joyed a true commitment of intelligence around the battlespace without generating assets for base defense. In Vietnam, Air any lasting effects. Though only temporary, Force intelligence assets emphasized air op- these results nevertheless require a tremen- erations to the detriment of intelligence dous expenditure of energy and resources. about ground base defense threats—a situa- The JISE’s analysis led to an intelligence- tion that proved highly problematic. As the driven targeting process that enabled Air Office of Air Force History notes, “Hobbling Force security forces to move from a mostly external security [in Vietnam] was the lack reactive defensive posture to a proactive of reliable intelligence on enemy activities scheme of maneuver. Lasting effects of this within striking distance of bases. This rose strategy require dominance of the human chiefly from the Air Force’s failure to gener- terrain within and outside an installation as ate tactical ground intelligence.”23 well as understanding the relationships To remedy this historical shortfall, the among key groups, tribes, and individuals. wing at JBB, as part of its BOS-I base-defense This reality drove Airmen to study and gain responsibilities, stood up a dedicated, ground- insights into the violent extremist networks focused force-protection intelligence organi- operating in the area and to participate ac- zation in November 2008. Led and manned tively in mapping and pressuring these net- by Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and works through a constant presence. Airmen reconnaissance (ISR) professionals, this fed the intelligence cycle by gathering in- joint intelligence support element (JISE) formation from relationships they had es- received assistance from contracted intel- tablished in the battlespace, thereby closing ligence analysts. Robust ground intelligence the intelligence gap between themselves operations fully enabled Army and Air and the enemy network. Force ground forces to defend JBB through Joint ID operations adopted an intelligence- proactive deterrent patrols in areas where driven model that followed four lines of IDF tended to originate. operation based on JISE analysis: (1) deny The BSO fully leveraged Air Force intel- the enemy unobserved freedom of move- ligence analysis and capacity to create a ment, particularly in traditional attack lo- synergy with his own intelligence staff, cations; (2) map out insurgent networks thereby optimizing the JISE’s capabilities. and identify key leaders, weapons facilita- This completely synchronized effort sup- tors, and support nodes; (3) establish pat- ported intelligence fusion designed to drive terns of life (i.e., determine who met with defense operations in the base security whom, when and where they met, and zone. The JISE’s goal of attaining predictive how they moved, shot, and communi- battlespace awareness called for foreknowl- cated); and (4) map out the human terrain edge and the ability to shape operations to discover fault lines among locals who based not only on reviewing the enemy’s hate the coalition, those who grudgingly past actions but also on predicting actions tolerate but do little to help coalition he would likely take in the future. Classic forces, and, finally, the ones whom those approaches to intelligence based on analyses forces might convince to support efforts to of historical trends tend to drive a defense secure the installation and the area sur- posture that responds after attacks occur. In rounding it. those paradigms, ground forces are no more This effort prompted the development of than “shot responders” in a counter-IDF an intelligence-collection plan and opera-

Spring 2011 | 93 Caudill, Packard, & Tembreull tional framework that cycled over a two- to lected intelligence, logging hundreds of three-week period, maximizing the existing hours as they followed insurgent leaders to ground combat power. For example, denying meetings at all times of the day and night, unobserved freedom of movement every­ and Army aviation units loitered at a dis- where at all times proved impossible with tance, capturing imagery of insurgents’ pat- the resources at hand. However, intelligence terns of life. The JISE orchestrated a collec- analysis of historical data produced a strat- tion plan adaptable to residual flight egy that denied the enemy access to his fa- schedules to piece together persistent ISR vored locations for launching attacks during 15 to 60 minutes at a time—the length of the most likely times for hostile activities. time that a residual asset would make itself Each intelligence objective had a list of sub- available for the local ISR effort. The JISE objectives for signals intelligence resources, collection coordinator produced a daily col- a similar list for airborne ISR resources, and lection plan known as the “residual deck.” so forth, including one for security forces For each collection target, the plan included Airmen during their combat patrols. specific elements of information meant to Leveraging air assets directly enabled enable JISE analysts to fill gaps in their base defense. JISE strategy fostered a col- knowledge of the target, his activities, and laborative atmosphere among many joint insurgent networks associated with him. players. Through the standard air tasking JISE partner analysts supplied crucial infor- order and collection-management pro- mation about the activity patterns of each cesses, the JISE obtained regular Global target by maintaining this information on a Hawk and Joint Surveillance Target Attack simple spreadsheet compiled each week. Radar System geospatial products as well as Given the nature of the Iraqi insurgency, nationally derived intelligence products de- successful ISR operations had to include livered through the combined air operations ground-based collection by patrols in close center’s forward-deployed Air Force Na- contact with high-value individuals and the tional Tactical Integration Cell. (It is more populace surrounding them. accurate to say “nationally derived intelli- Like the airborne collection plan, the gence products” since they were often of a ground-based plan began by examining the multi-intelligence nature.) Despite the use- overall ISR strategy to determine tasks fulness of these planned ISR assets, they suited to the patrols. Security forces Airmen were dwarfed by contributions of the expe- proved critical to successful implementa- ditionary operations group and Army avia- tion of the JISE’s intelligence-collection tion units, both fixed and rotary wing, strategy. Each day, patrols operated in the which delivered countless hours of “resid- battlespace, conducting terrain-denial op- ual” ISR. To realize the most value from erations and interacting regularly with planned and residual airborne assets, the some portion of the roughly 120,000 Iraqi JISE had to produce, execute, and assess a citizens who lived within 10 kilometers of comprehensive collection plan. the base perimeter. These patrols presented The JISE was effective at pulling to- an enormous intelligence opportunity, es- gether disparate units to reach a commonly pecially in mapping the human terrain and desired end state: protecting its own people relationships among key individuals and from IDF attacks. Because of the absence of groups in the battlespace. According to Gen an insurgent air threat and a paucity of op- David H. Petraeus, “the human terrain is portunities to strike targets kinetically, pi- the decisive terrain.”24 This statement trans- lots and air planners welcomed the oppor- lates to battling insurgents for influence tunity to fly residual ISR to protect the base, and support from the contested population, utilizing their remaining fuel and loiter whose cooperation, trust, and support we time after completing their primary mis- must secure in order for security and sta- sion. Members of the operations group col- bility to take root.

94 | Air & Space Power Journal Defending the Joint Force

The BSO’s campaign plan and JBB’s ID op- with the BSO and partner units to improve erations emphasized attempts to influence coordination and information sharing. the human terrain. In each neighborhood, Those meetings included a review of intel- Army and Air Force patrols struck up conver- ligence operations, operations synchroniza- sations with locals to determine the identities tion, targeting, the BSO’s weekly effects of individuals with whom they were speak- summary, and numerous synchronization ing, their occupations, and how they felt meetings at the field-grade- and company- about topics such as their security situation, grade-officer levels. For operators this government services, and so forth. By identi- meant providing support such as ISR data fying occupants of the various houses and on the locations of high-value individuals, obtaining grid coordinates for each dwell- sweeps over IDF hot spots, aerial monitor- ing, the patrols literally mapped the human ing of security for Iraqi election polls, and terrain surrounding JBB. JISE analysts duti- aerial shows of force with F-16s over terrain fully recorded each individual, using the from which IDF attacks frequently originated. data to build a completer picture of the hu- The BSO was responsible for synchroniz- man terrain. While traditional intelligence ing all friendly forces in his area of opera- sources enabled security forces to narrow tions, which included conducting kinetic down the location of a high-value individual and nonkinetic actions, maintaining situ- within a block of five to 10 houses, Airmen ational awareness of all forces, and control- and Soldiers on the ground easily pinpointed ling fire-support coordination measures. the exact residence and its occupants simply The BSO leveraged the capabilities of all by asking locals to provide information about coalition, host-nation, and other partner the individual of interest. This practice units, including nonmilitary entities such as proved so effective that it sometimes startled the Department of State’s provincial recon- the individual himself when he answered a struction teams and nongovernmental orga- knock on the door to find a squad of Airmen nizations. Their accomplishments proved or a platoon of Soldiers in his front yard. that, if properly synchronized, such mutu- ally supporting operations create a symbi- otic relationship and unity of effort, ulti- Counterinsurgency mately yielding a more efficient use of resources. US Joint Forces Command noted Synchronization: that the BSOs are learning to take advantage Developing Joint and of all available operational enablers: “Many Combined Partnerships joint players . . . operate in the battlespace owners’ areas of operation. . . . Battlespace At JBB, Airmen learned to leverage non- owners are becoming increasingly more kinetic assets and operations to achieve comfortable with these ‘non-assigned’ play- lasting effects in support of the BSO’s COIN ers in their battlespace.”25 and stability campaign plans. The wing It was important to recognize that all op- hosted biweekly COIN and civil-engagement erating bases in the BSO’s area of operations synchronization meetings to ensure full can have profound positive or negative support to the BSO from the Army, Air ­second- and third-order effects across the Force, and Department of State partners at operational environment. These include JBB. Conversely, the BSO embraced Air decisions that may appear confined to the Force and other partner units as a means of base itself, whether they are air provost ser- realizing his overall campaign objectives vices (law and order operations), contract- along three decisive lines of operations: se- ing, construction, or something as simple as curity, economic development, and gover- hosting a local children’s event. If such op- nance. No fewer than five times per week, erations and activities are poorly coordi- wing representatives and JISE analysts met nated and if local national ties are not

Spring 2011 | 95 Caudill, Packard, & Tembreull clearly understood, they can undermine the viding wheelchairs for the disabled, and BSO’s relationship with key local Iraqi offi- conducting a multitude of small but impor- cials and adversely affect efforts along mul- tant community-outreach activities to em- tiple lines of operation. JBB operated with phasize JBB’s “good neighbor” philosophy. diverse host-nation forces, including local To counter the disadvantages that combat and federal Iraqi police, paramilitary groups forces faced in terms of limited coverage and like the Sons of Iraq, locally contracted Iraqi loiter time, JBB realized that a comprehen- entry-control screeners, and Iraqi Army and sive and continuous synchronization pro- Air Force elements. US Air Force security cess was essential. This effort produced the forces conducted combined patrols with air portion of the task force’s combined pa- Iraqi Army units to build this relationship, trol and the ISR synchronization matrix—a which, paired with many US Army and Air snapshot of ground patrols and projected air Force key-leader engagements with the Iraqi coverage for every 24-hour period during Army, ultimately led to the Iraqi Army’s the weekly BSO effects cycle. The synchro- moving forces onto JBB in August 2010.26 nization matrix specifically addressed JBB’s Combat operations, both kinetic and non- IDF threat rings and supplied visibility on kinetic, demand coordination across the both BSO and Air Force ground and air as- spectrum of COIN operations. The BSO’s sets. This synchronized effort ensured that campaign plan required Airmen to under- ground and air patrols covered the predicted stand operational COIN doctrine and phi- IDF threat windows generated by the JISE. losophy as well as how their daily opera- tions and public interactions affected the battlespace. Importantly, leaders of the Organizing for an 332d Air Expeditionary Wing saw partner- Integrated Defense ing with the BSO as an operational impera- tive, tasking one staff officer to focus exclu- In order to achieve the desired ID effects, sively on synchronizing wing operations the 332d Air Expeditionary Wing organized and host-nation outreach with the BSO. This its base defense assets under the JBB de- effort reduced friction, eliminated seams fense force commander, an Air Force secu- between policies, and fully synchronized rity forces colonel responsible for ensuring JBB with the BSO’s information operations ID of the base by executing force protection and public relations messaging. Some ex- and defensive operations.27 This individual amples of nonkinetic COIN efforts at JBB worked to leverage the joint assets operat- included special events for local children ing in the vicinity of JBB to guarantee a col- and businessmen, Airmen on combat patrol laborative approach with partner joint units conducting key-leader engagements with and host-nation forces that would produce Iraqi forces or local tribal leaders, Air Force operational gains and “mitigate potential firemen training local volunteer fire depart- risks and defeat adversary threats to Air ments in American fire department tech- Force operations.”28 Furthermore, the de- niques, and security forces and medical fense force commander synchronized his personnel providing emergency treatment ID operations through the joint defense op- at base-entry control points. They also in- erations center, collocated with a BSO tacti- cluded complying with local or host-nation cal operations center. The joint defense op- statutes such as water rights and employ- erations center directed and integrated all ment opportunities used to reward tribes subordinate security system and communi- for cooperating with the coalition, conduct- cations elements, serving as a tactical inte- ing frequent walking patrols to build relation- grator of both intelligence and guidance for ships with local tribes and farmers, render- BSO effects that drive the base defense effort. ing emergency medical aid in local villages, A truly joint team, JBB’s joint defense delivering school and medical supplies, pro- structure included tactical control of the

96 | Air & Space Power Journal Defending the Joint Force counter-rocket artillery mortar (C-RAM) Conclusion joint intercept battery. C-RAM Soldiers and Sailors were responsible for employing the The Air Force’s official history of air base system’s intercept, sense, respond, and defense in Vietnam illustrates how the warn capabilities, together with combat competing priorities of ground commanders power, as a unique defense against enemy made the commitment of Air Force ground IDF attacks and as a localized warning to combat power to protecting air bases an op- populated areas of the base. Placing C-RAM erational imperative: “Reliance on other under tactical command of the Air Force services for the defense of air bases was a problem for the [Royal Air Force] on Crete, defense force commander has ensured the the Luftwaffe in North Africa, and the best possible integration of C-RAM capabili- [United States Air Force] in Vietnam. In ties into the overall physical security and each case, air base defense had to compete force-protection architecture of JBB and the with other missions on which ground com- counter-IDF plan. manders placed higher priority.”29 In order to produce effects in the battle­ To remedy these historic shortfalls, the space, the defense force commander and his joint partners at JBB fully integrated their Airmen partnered with a ground BSO who limited base defense assets to present a uni- had operational responsibility for the terrain fied front to the adversary and limit defen- surrounding JBB and responsibility for de- sive seams that he might exploit. They did veloping and executing a campaign plan sup- so through multiple levels of information porting national objectives within a specific sharing that gave base defenders a common geographic area. As part of the BSO con- operating picture through shared intelligence. struct, all personnel transiting through the Integrated ground and air operations forces BSO’s domain must comply with his com- interdicted and captured 22 IDF shooters mander’s intent for the battlespace, Army and triggermen for improvised explosive tactical command and control protocols, devices over a five-month period, validating ­mission-planning requirements, and the the joint approach to base defense. These scheme of maneuver supporting the BSO’s operations eliminated more than half of the campaign plan. Compliance with all of the enemy’s upper-tier high-value individuals guidance and generation of the desired effects and more than a dozen of the JBB security demanded a fully synchronized and coordi- belt’s “most wanted” enemy personnel. nated effort between the Air Force and Army Air Force leaders should learn many im- ground forces that defended the air base. portant lessons from the JBB defense model Significantly, the BSO viewed JBB’s base since asymmetric threats to air operations likely will increase in the future. As pre- defense as a subset of an extensive list of dicted by a RAND study on air base de- operational mission tasks within the opera- fense, “We expect that [air base] opponents tional environment. To put the BSO’s opera- might pursue three different objectives with tional challenges in perspective, he had re- these [future] attacks: (1) destroy high-value sponsibility for a large geographic area far assets critical to USAF operations, (2) tem- beyond the IDF threat ring affecting the air porarily suppress sortie generation at a base—specifically, more than 3,000 square critical moment in a crisis or conflict, or kilometers rather than only the 243 square (3) create a ‘strategic event’—an incident as kilometers encompassing the JBB standoff- decisive politically as loss of a major battle attack threat area. Analysis of the JBB op- is military or operationally—that could re- erational environment easily indicates how duce U.S. public and/or leadership support a BSO can be stretched beyond capacity and for the ongoing military operation.”30 how external force protection of an air base The lessons learned in defending JBB could be relegated to a low priority. have highlighted capabilities and ID

Spring 2011 | 97 Caudill, Packard, & Tembreull strengths that the US Air Force can contrib- engagements, increases in the capacity of ute to the joint fight to defend against asym- Iraqi security forces, economic develop- metric threats. The Air Force must continue ment, and construction projects. At JBB the to refine its ID approach, train leaders who BSO stated that Air Force security forces understand and embrace the ground BSO provided the equivalent of more than one concept, and develop leaders who can infantry company’s worth of combat power readily plug into joint operations in COIN that he could use to attain specific desired and stability-operation environments. For effects outside the wire.32 By sending Air- example, as recently as 2010, the Integrated men out to meet the enemy on the ground Defense Command Course, the Air Force’s and in the air, the Air Force has enjoyed premier base defense leadership course, greater security and freedom of movement still does not require coordination with a to support its own air operations and BOS-I ground BSO or host-nation partner for its base defense responsibilities. exercise scenarios and remains devoid of True joint warfare involves caring less any of the technology and synchronization about getting credit and more about produc- methodologies so essential to the synergy of ing effects. At JBB, Air Force leaders at all joint base defense. The Air Force must levels embraced the ID concept and searched codify the operational lessons of JBB’s ID for ways to support the BSO’s COIN cam- into organizational and operational con- paign plan because it paid dividends to the structs that it can apply to current and fu- installation’s defense, ensuring the conduct ture base defense operations. of air operations in a more secure and stable The JBB defense model has proven that environment. As the BSO noted, “Dealing Airmen can ensure their place on the with challenges presented by this complex battle­field as true joint and combined part- environment required multiple agile think- ners by defending not only their own air ers and holistic problem solvers capable of assets and war fighters but also those of the identifying and implementing operational- joint team. The commitment of Airmen to environment-specific full-spectrum- or the joint force protection of JBB has proven ­stability-operations-based effects.”33 These critical to keeping IDF at a manageable battlefield effects speak volumes about level and diminishing its effects on air op- what Airmen can achieve with their joint erations. The results were impressive: be- and combined partners when they are ef- tween November 2008 and March 2010, IDF fectively integrated and positioned to bring attacks decreased by 52 percent, and sur- their ID capabilities to bear in support of face-to-air fire decreased by 40 percent.31 the joint fight. Base defense experiences in This success allowed the BSO to concen- Iraq demand a fresh look at the role the Air trate limited combat assets on core tasks Force plays in defending its own assets and that supported activities such as key-leader those of the joint force. 

Notes

1. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. 4. Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Dino Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, DC: Air Force–Army Cooperation (Washington, DC: Office Office of Air Force History, 1983), 53–54. of Air Force History, 1987), 125. 2. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic 5. “Validating the Abrogation of Joint Service Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 25, http://www.dtic.mil Agreement 8,” AF/XOS-F staff package, 18 November /doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1.pdf. 2004. 3. Maj David P. Briar, “Sharpening the Eagle’s Tal- 6. Brig Gen Robert H. “Bob” Holmes et al., “The ons: Assessing Air Base Defense,” Air and Space Power Air Force’s New Ground War: Ensuring Projection of Journal 18, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 65–74, http://www.airpower Air and Space Power through Expeditionary Secu- .au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/fal04/Fal04.pdf. rity Operations,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no.

98 | Air & Space Power Journal Defending the Joint Force

3 (Fall 2006): 51, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil 16. Data derived from Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s /airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/Fal06.pdf. Nest, 69; and Col Anthony Packard. 7. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-1, Inte- 17. Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 102. grated Defense, 7 July 2007 (incorporating change 1, 18. Ibid., 90. 22 April 2009), 2, http://www.af.mil/shared/media 19. Ibid. /epubs/AFPD31-1.pdf. 20. “Agreement between the United States of 8. Ibid. America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal 9. SSgt Don Branum, 332d Air Expeditionary of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organiza- Wing Public Affairs, “Balad Airmen Look Back: 2008 tion of Their Activities during Their Temporary in Review,” 1 January 2009, Joint Base Balad, Iraq, Presence in Iraq,” 17 November 2008 (made official http://www.balad.afcent.af.mil/news/story.asp?id on 14 December 2008), http://iraq.usembassy.gov =123129950. /media/2010-irc-pdfs/us-iraq_security_agreement 10. “Warrant Officer: ‘It’s Just a No-Win Situa- _ena.pdf. tion,’ ” National Public Radio, 13 July 2007, http:// 21. Armand Cucciniello, “Iraq Proves Fertile www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId Ground for Rule of Law Programs,” 18 March 2008, =11952622. Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, http:// 11. David T. Young, “Applying Counterinsurgency iraq.usembassy.gov/prt_news_03182008.html. Theory to Air Base Defense: A New Doctrinal Frame- 22. “Police Primacy and Rule of Law in Iraq work” (thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September Dominate Press Conference,” Press Release no. 2005), 29, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc 090619-01,����������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������Multi-National Security Transition Com- ?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA439510. mand-Iraq, Public Affairs Office, Phoenix Base, 19 12. Battlespace owner is not an approved joint or June 2009, Operation New Dawn: Official Website of service term, but JBB’s joint forces and ground force United States Forces-Iraq, http://www.usf-iraq.com commander uses it to describe his authority over the /?option=com_content&task=view&id=26970& geographic area surrounding the base. The term is Itemid=128. used by the Joint Warfighting Center, United States 23. Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic Joint Forces Command, and has been utilized in of Vietnam, 1961–1973 (Washington, DC: Office of numerous publications, including the following: Air Force History, 1979), 171. Gen Gary Luck, Col Mike Findlay, and the Joint War­ 24. “Opening Statement, General David H. Petraeus, fighting Center Joint Training Group, “Insights and Confirmation Hearing: Commander, ISAF/US Forces- Best Practices: JTF Level Command Relationships Afghanistan, 29 June 2010,” United States Central and Joint Force Organization,” Focus Paper no. 4 Command, http://www.centcom.mil/en/from-the ([Norfolk, VA:] United States Joint Forces Command, -commander/gen-petraeus-isaf-confirmation-hearing. Joint War­fighting Center, November 2007), 5, https:// 25. Luck, Findlay, and the Joint Warfighting Cen- jko.harmonieweb.org/lists/Sitelinks/attachments ter Joint Training Group, “Insights and Best Prac- /63/JTF%20level%20Command%20Relationships tices,” 5. %20and%20Joint%20Force%20Organization%20-%20 26. SSgt Phillip Butterfield, 332d Air Expedition- Focus%20Paper%204%20-%20Nov%202007.pdf; and ary Wing Public Affairs, “Iraqi Army Returns to Joint Gen Gary Luck, Col Mike Findlay, and the Joint Base Balad,” Air Force News Service, 18 August 2010, Warfighting Center Joint Training Division, “Joint http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123218187. Operations: Insights and Best Practices,” 2d ed. 27. AFPD 31-1, Integrated Defense, 8. ([Norfolk, VA:] United States Joint Forces Command, 28. Ibid., 2. Joint Warfighting Center, July 2008), http://www 29. Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, 108. .ndu.edu/pinnacle/docUploaded/Insights%20on%20 30. David A. Shlapak and Alan Vick, “Check Six Joint%20Operations.pdf. See also AFPD 31-1, Inte- Begins on the Ground”: Responding to the Evolving grated Defense. Ground Threat to U.S. Air Force Bases (Santa Monica, 13. Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History CA: RAND Corporation, 1995), 15–16. of Ground Attacks on Air Bases (Santa Monica, CA: 31. Col Anthony Packard. RAND, 1995), 68, http://www.rand.org/content/dam 32. Lt Col Eric R. Timmerman, commander, 1st /rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR553.pdf. Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment “Black Lions,” 4th 14. Col Anthony Packard, 332d Expeditionary Infantry Brigade Combat Team, the battlespace Security Forces Group, Joint Intelligence Support owner, interview by Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill, 17 Element, 1 March 2010. July 2010. 15. Ibid. 33. Ibid.

Spring 2011 | 99 Caudill, Packard, & Tembreull

Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF Lieutenant Colonel Caudill (BS, Norwich University; MS, Central Michigan Univer- sity; MMS, Marine Corps University) is the deputy director, Department of Strategy and Leadership, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Prior to his current assignment, he was commander of the 532d Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron (the Lions), Joint Base Balad, Iraq. As a career Air Force security forces officer, he has worked at the unit, major command, and Joint Staff levels; commanded three security forces squadrons; served in four overseas assignments; and accumulated 18 months of combat experience in Iraq. Colonel Caudill has written numerous white papers and articles on terrorism, interagency leadership, and law enforcement, which have been published in Joint Force Quarterly, Ameri- can Diplomacy, and The Guardian—the Joint Staff’s antiterrorism publication. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Joint Forces Staff College.

Col Anthony M. Packard, USAF Colonel Packard (USAFA; MA, US Naval Postgraduate School) is the deputy train- ing director, National Security Agency / Central Security Service. In 2009–10 he deployed to Iraq to serve as the officer in charge of the joint intelligence support element, Joint Base Balad, Iraq. In this latter role, he advised the defense force com- mander on ground-based threats to the installation and provided threat warning and intelligence overwatch to members operating outside the wire in the base security zone. Colonel Packard is a career intelligence officer who previously com- manded the 451st Intelligence Squadron, Royal Air Force Menwith Hill, United Kingdom, and has held staff positions at Headquarters Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, and the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency. Colonel Packard is a distinguished graduate of both Squadron Officer School and Air Com- mand and Staff College, and he has completed a fellowship with RAND’s Project Air Force.

Lt Col Raymund M. Tembreull, USAF Lieutenant Colonel Tembreull (BS, University of Michigan; MA, American Military University) is chief of the Weapon System Security Branch, Force Protection and Operations Division, Directorate of Security Forces, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. From October 2009 to April 2010, he was deployed as the direc- tor of operations for the 332d Expeditionary Security Forces Group, Joint Base Balad, Iraq. He has also served at the unit and major command levels. Colonel Tembreull is a three-time squadron commander, having commanded the 15th Security Forces Squadron, Hickam AFB, Hawaii; the 741st Missile Security Forces Squadron, Malmstrom AFB, Montana; and the 36th Security Forces Squadron, Andersen AFB, Guam. During his first command with the 36th, he developed a revolutionary integrated base defense (IBD) concept that was adopted as the command standard in Pacific Air Forces and benchmarked by the Air Staff as the base-level implementation model for IBD. He has focused on security improve- ment his entire career, refining his academic body of knowledge by pursuing unique professional development opportunities, including the FBI National Academy and the Air Force National Lab Technical Fellowship at Sandia National Labs.

100 | Air & Space Power Journal The Dangerous Decline in the Department of Defense’s Vaccine Program for Infectious Diseases

Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF* biological threats of deliberate rather than natural origin. The Department of Defense or over 230 years, vaccines advanced (DOD) responded by partitioning its bio­ by the US military research and de­ defense and infectious-disease vaccine ac­ Fvelopment (R&D) community have quisition programs, with biodefense vac­ dramatically reduced the impact of natu­ cines holding a higher acquisition priority rally acquired infections, not only in Amer­ and receiving more robust funding than ica’s armed forces but also in society at ­infectious-disease vaccines. This choice has large. In recent years, however, the mili­ significantly eroded the DOD’s ability to tary’s vaccine program for infectious dis­ ensure the acquisition and availability of eases has lost considerable emphasis, fund­ the right vaccines at the right time to opti­ ing, and mission capability. In the 1990s, mally protect US forces from established with the burgeoning concern for weapon­ and emerging natural infections now and ized bioagents in Iraq and North Korea, in the future.1 Congress turned its attention to combating

*I wish to thank Col Gilbert Hansen, USAF, my adviser for the Air War College research paper from which I derived this article.

Spring 2011 | 101 Hall

The DOD needs to take swift actions to mortality, disability, and mission degrada­ revitalize its infectious-disease vaccine pro­ tion. As thousands of his troops fell ill—and gram and enhance the synergy between hundreds died—from smallpox during the biodefense and infectious-disease activities first two years of the American Revolution, to resolve shortfalls in vaccine acquisition resulting in campaign losses, poor morale, and availability. Specifically, the DOD must and sparse recruiting, Gen George Washing­ collectively assess and prioritize all biologi­ ton lamented, “Should the disorder infect cal threats, whether natural, accidental, or the Army, in the natural way . . . we should deliberate in nature; consolidate redundant have more to dread from it, than from the vaccine acquisition activities; elevate the sword of the enemy.”3 Via inoculation, the priority of infectious-disease vaccines; and Continental Army dramatically reduced provide ample resources to sustain a robust smallpox mortality from 160 to 3.3 per 1,000 vaccine acquisition capability to protect US cases, all but eliminating the threat.4 The military forces against validated and priori­ US Civil War saw almost twice as many tized biological threats.2 deaths from disease (65 per 1,000) as from This article first establishes the historical battle (33 per 1,000).5 Of the 6 million dis­ impact of naturally occurring infectious dis­ ease cases among 2.8 million enlistees on eases on military operations, the criticality both sides, over 95,000 died and roughly of force health protection (FHP) in defend­ 250,000 were discharged for disability.6 Ty­ ing the human weapon system, and the su­ phoid fever, malaria, and yellow fever ac­ periority of vaccines among medical counter­ counted for 80 percent of US military measures. It then makes a case for why US deaths in the Spanish-American War, forc­ military leadership in R&D for infectious- ing a rapid withdrawal from Cuba soon after disease vaccines must remain a vital FHP the end of hostilities.7 Although World War I imperative for safeguarding the war fighter saw—for the first time—near parity be­ and optimizing the US military’s mission tween US deaths from battle (50,510) and effectiveness. Next, the article analyzes how disease (51,477), the latter’s impact on com­ unbalanced threat assessment and mission bat operations was demoralizing.8 Various focus, disparate organization, disproportion­ diseases accounted for 95 percent of Ameri­ ate funding, and dissimilar priority status can battlefield hospital admissions in World hinder the DOD’s acquisition efforts regard­ War II, 69 percent in Vietnam, 71 percent in ing infectious-disease vaccines; in so doing, the first Gulf War, and over 95 percent in it points to the department’s loss of adeno­ Somalia.9 Unchecked, natural infections can virus vaccine as an example of the pro­ wreak havoc on military forces.10 gram’s decline. Finally, it recommends ways to enhance FHP vaccine acquisition and availability that will posture the DOD Criticality of Force Health and America’s military forces to assure na­ Protection in Defending the tional security in the twenty-first century. Human Weapon System The DOD’s FHP doctrine characterizes Historical Effect of Infectious every service member as a human weapon Diseases on US Military Readiness system requiring total life-cycle support and and Effectiveness health maintenance.11 Protecting the human weapon system, the central element of mili­ Throughout America’s wars, naturally tary power, is pivotal. Absent “craniums at acquired infectious diseases—many pre­ the controls,” “boots on the ground,” and ventable by vaccine—have eclipsed bombs “hands on deck,” wars cannot be won. and bullets as the culprits of morbidity, Strained budgets, emerging technologies,

102 | Air & Space Power Journal The Dangerous Decline in the DOD’s Vaccine Program and evolving threats have pressed the The Case for US Military Leadership United States to transform its military into a lighter, leaner, and more agile force. With in Researching and Developing fewer people performing more specialized Infectious-Disease Vaccine roles, it is critical that each military mem­ ber remain healthy, fit, and effective. Main­ Fielding a licensed vaccine is a long, taining this ideal can present a challenge complex, high-risk endeavor. It requires the since DOD personnel often find themselves synergy of expertise and resources from in austere locations, on short notice, and multiple partners spanning government, industry, academia, nonprofits, and inter­ under stressful conditions involving an 16 abundance of naturally acquired infectious national organizations. Managing the sub­ threats, naïve immune systems, and limited stantial scientific and financial risks de­ health-care support. A vital part of FHP, im­ mands cooperation. In general, no partner munization is effective in mitigating these can develop and produce a vaccine counter­ operational hurdles.12 measure alone. The DOD, for instance, must rely on industry for scale-up produc­ tion, just as industry relies on the DOD to bring its many unique R&D capabilities to Superiority of Immunization among the cooperative effort.17 Nevertheless, the Medical Countermeasures DOD should play a leading role in vaccine development for a number of reasons. In defeating health threats, primary pre­ First, the DOD can draw on its unique vention—action prior to exposure—reigns experience. The US military codeveloped supreme. Immunization affords the lowest more than half of the routine vaccines risk, highest efficacy, and most cost-effective given to service members today.18 Beyond protection to vaccine recipients. Immuniza­ protecting its own forces, the military’s ad­ tion is superior to therapeutics (e.g., anti­ vances also created solutions to diseases of biotics and chemoprophylactics) and per­ dire importance to national and inter­ sonal protection (e.g., repellents and bed national public health. The DOD played a nets) since it does not require knowledge of significant role in developing eight of the 15 exposure; is not contingent upon an accu­ adult vaccines licensed in the United States rate and timely diagnosis; protects against since 1962.19 Currently used worldwide, severe diseases (e.g., rabies) and those for these include vaccines for influenza, which treatment is unavailable, ineffective, ­meningococcal disease, hepatitis A, hepati­ or prone to cause side effects; does not re­ tis B, rubella, adenovirus, typhoid, and quire individual compliance (e.g., antima­ ­Japanese encephalitis.20 In addition, investi­ larials); and neither contributes to nor is gators who began their careers at US military fazed by microbial resistance. Immunization R&D centers supervised the development can also notably reduce the medical logisti­ of licensed vaccines for yellow fever, mumps, cal footprint in-theater since every casualty measles, varicella, and oral polio.21 In the requires five personnel in the evacuation high-risk business of vaccine production, and treatment support chain.13 Furthermore, experience breeds proficiency and efficiency, vaccines not only offer a direct benefit to curbing the scientific, regulatory, and finan­ recipients but also afford herd immunity to cial risk that can stifle product development. those in the communities with whom they Second, the DOD offers unique facilities. live and work.14 Finally, despite perceived Currently, the Walter Reed Army Institute differences between weaponized and natu­ of Research houses one of the nation’s three ral pathogens, “vaccines are a unifying tech­ pilot facilities dedicated to the production of nology proven to effectively and efficiently a variety of investigational vaccines for use defeat both of these threats.”15 in clinical trials.22 Industry actively seeks

Spring 2011 | 103 Hall the institute’s in-house laboratory capabili­ US military mission that [it] should be pre­ ties to conduct animal modeling studies. pared to conduct with proficiency equiva­ Third, the DOD features unique intellec­ lent to combat operations.”29 Infectious dis­ tual property sharing.23 Highly sought after eases contribute significantly to social by industry, DOD partnerships attract com­ unrest and conflict in these scenarios. In­ panies by allowing them to retain intellec­ fections not only ravage the local civilian tual property rights for use in lucrative ci­ populace but also can decimate the strength 24 vilian markets. of their national militaries. The prevalence Fourth, the DOD has a unique R&D net­ of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 25 work. Because the Food and Drug Admin­ infection and acquired immunodeficiency istration (FDA) requires pivotal clinical tri­ syndrome (AIDS) in Africa serves as a per­ als of products on people living in areas suasive example. Of 33 million people liv­ where infectious diseases are endemic, the ing with HIV worldwide, two-thirds reside DOD’s overseas laboratories serve as bases in sub-Saharan Africa.30 Armed forces in for conducting trials that attract industry this region experience HIV infection rates partnerships.26 Because of its enduring pres­ two to three times those of the civilian pop­ ence, strong host-nation relationships, and ulation, further eroding local, national, and professional development of host-nation sci­ 31 entists, the DOD has successfully executed regional prospects for stability. The follow­ complex clinical trials with industry and ing excerpt from a 2002 report by the Cen­ international partners.27 ter for Strategic and International Studies Fifth, and most important, the DOD focuses well summarizes the significance of this US on the often unique needs of the war fighter. national security concern: This mission distinguishes its infectious- In Africa, HIV/AIDS is spreading fastest in disease activities from those of other organi­ the Horn of Africa, where the United States zations that conduct what may appear to be already has deep concerns about lawlessness similar R&D. The global effort to develop and extremism. In both Ethiopia and Kenya, anti ­malarial countermeasures provides one potentially important regional hubs in the example. Outside the DOD, this effort empha­ violent and volatile East African subregion, sizes drug therapies to attenuate lethal adult HIV-prevalence rates are over 10 per­ disease in children and pregnant women in cent. Nigeria, an essential guarantor of secu­ underdeveloped countries. The DOD’s pro­ rity and economic growth in the West African gram, on the other hand, seeks to prevent the region, has more than 3 million citizens living war fighter from ever contracting the debili­ with HIV or AIDS. The adult prevalence rate tating illness in the first place. To that end, in South Africa, which plays a similar eco­ nomic and security role in the southern Afri­ DOD research has concentrated on develop­ can region, is 20 percent. . . . If these two re­ ing prophylactic drugs and, more recently, a gional hegemons cannot send peacekeepers, malaria vaccine solution. Additionally, any contribute to growth and stability, or guaran­ drug or vaccine used to protect US war fight­ tee their own internal stability, U.S. security ers must be licensed by the FDA. Because interests in the continent . . . are severely many companies are reluctant to take on this threatened.32 costly risk independently, the DOD’s R&D community plays a key role in moving prod­ This situation demonstrates the powerful ucts with potential military relevance through potential effect that vaccines for endemic early development, FDA licensure, and even­ diseases could have on geopolitical stability.33 tual use by the US military.28 An effective HIV vaccine could remarkably Also compelling is the potential effect of strengthen foreign militaries, secure vulner­ infectious-disease vaccines on the military’s able families and communities, bolster increasing role in stability operations, inter­national public health, and reinforce which the DOD recently designated “a core US national security.34

104 | Air & Space Power Journal The Dangerous Decline in the DOD’s Vaccine Program

Natural infections will continue to chal­ cines in 1995, the DOD—with a push from lenge the US military and its R&D commu­ Congress—justifiably turned a focused eye nity. With 1,500 known human pathogens to biodefense.40 By 1998 the DOD had estab­ continuously lurking about and novel lished the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Pro­ agents like H1N1 (influenza A virus or gram (JVAP) and significantly increased “swine flu”) constantly emerging, infectious funding for advanced biodefense vaccine diseases will remain a formidable national development, while core funding for R&D security threat indefinitely.35 Worldwide, involving infectious-disease vaccines de­ 14.7 million people die each year from clined.41 Because of the anthrax letters (sent known and preventable contagions.36 Even after the terrorist attacks of 11 September in industrialized nations, 46 percent of all 2001), fears about the proliferation of state- deaths result from infectious causes.37 Dis­ sponsored weapons of mass destruction by covery of emerging infections has occurred Iraq, and al-Qaeda’s interest in bioagents, at the rate of one per year since the late the nation felt extremely vulnerable to bio­ 1980s.38 Pathogens adapt, persist, and logical attack.42 The DOD responded with emerge—this pattern will continue.39 Keep­ wholesale investments in biodefense as ing pace with the evolving threat calls for a funding for infectious-disease R&D re­ robust US military vaccine program for in­ mained level.43 fectious diseases that draws on the vener­ Reportedly, about a dozen states and able experience, proven track record, and multiple nonstate actors either possess or unique attributes that no agency other than are pursuing biological weapons.44 Their the DOD can bring to bear. Such a program potential use clearly poses a level of danger can continually improve upon the depart­ to US forces in the contemporary battle­ ment’s unparalleled protection of America’s space, as do established and emerging natu­ warriors and, in the process, the nation’s ral infections. To date, the DOD has yet to citizens and global neighbors. incur a single case of weaponized disease, yet reports cite some 3,400 cases of natural- origin and vaccine-preventable infectious The Department of Defense’s diseases in deployed US forces since 1998.45 Unbalanced Biological-Threat Certainly a potential threat, bioterrorism against US interests nevertheless has been Assessment and Mission Focus limited to the sending of anthrax-tainted Since the Cold War’s end, the DOD has letters to 22 American citizens, five of become fixated on combating biological whom died. Moreover, the letters may have threats of deliberate rather than natural ori­ come from a lone American researcher hav­ ing no association with either state sponsors gin. This section examines its lopsided fo­ 46 cus on notional bioweapons even though or nonstate actors. natural infections continue to plague mili­ In contrast, by 2008 the West Nile virus tary operations. had sickened 28,961 Americans—claiming 1,131 lives—since its arrival on US soil in 1999.47 The emergence of severe acute re­ Weaponized Pathogens: spiratory syndrome in 2003, H5N1 (influ­ A Matter of National Insecurity enza A virus or “bird flu”) in 2006, and Despite its remarkable history, the US mili­ H1N1 in 2009 further underscores the clear tary infectious-disease vaccine program has and present danger posed by natural infec­ taken a backseat to countering the bio­ tious diseases. Also, to some experts, the terrorism threat since the mid-1990s. Begin­ emergence of a novel strain of adenovirus ning with its stand-up of the Joint Program among military recruits in 2007 served to Office for Biological Defense in 1993 and “remind us that we are at least equally formalized requirements for biodefense vac­ likely . . . to soon experience large-scale

Spring 2011 | 105 Hall morbidity through epidemics of emergent laria, and Lyme disease accounted for 96.3 pathogens” as we are to experience a bio­ percent of the disease burden. Through logical weapons attack.48 Undoubtedly, the 2004, leishmaniasis prompted 4.4 percent of United States must prepare its public and the monthly medical evacuations during military for the intentional use of biological Iraqi Freedom.52 The occurrence of 126 agents, but vigilance for natural infections cases of meningococcal disease reflects the warrants at least the same level of emphasis. absence of an effective vaccine for subtype B of this potentially lethal pathogen. Each Natural Pathogens: of these operational experiences empha­ An Operational Reality Check sizes the current threat from naturally ac­ quired pathogens and justifies continued All the while, natural-origin infectious dis­ development of vaccine solutions for the eases continued to pose real challenges to mission-crippling diseases they cause. US military commanders in terms of lost manpower days, reduced effectiveness, in­ creased medical visits, and frequent medi­ Signs of a Program in Serious Decline: cal evacuations.49 In one triservice study, of 15,459 Operation Iraqi Freedom and Opera­ Loss of Adenovirus Vaccine tion Enduring Freedom deployers surveyed, While the DOD shifted its emphasis to up to 75 percent reported having at least biodefense, the department lost ground in one bout of diarrhea, 69 percent suffered its portfolio of infectious-disease vaccines. one or more episodes of acute respiratory Major vaccine shortfalls resulted from a va­ illness, and “one-quarter believed that com­ riety of economic, regulatory, scientific, bat unit effectiveness had been negatively 50 and legal pressures that the existing DOD affected by these common illnesses.” vaccine-acquisition apparatus could not Twenty-five percent of those surveyed re­ mitigate (table 2). Previously licensed vac­ quired intravenous fluids, and over 10 per­ cines for Lyme disease, cholera, and plague cent were hospitalized during their deploy­ are currently unavailable. Ten investiga­ ments. Furthermore, roughly 13 percent of tional new drug (IND) vaccines are no lon­ ground-force personnel missed at least one ger produced and have limited availability. patrol, and 12 percent of aircrew members The most instructive example is the 51 were grounded. DOD’s loss of adenovirus vaccine. Because Table 1 summarizes the incidence of the of crowding and various stressors, adeno­ four leading—and potentially vaccine-­ virus frequently causes acute respiratory preventable—infectious diseases in de­ disease in unvaccinated military recruits.53 ployed US forces between 1998 and 2009. Prior to the initiation of routine immuniza­ Of the 3,371 total cases, leishmaniasis, ma­ tion in 1971, adenoviral outbreaks in DOD basic-training units were common. Infec­ Table 1. Summary of the major, potentially tion rates approached 50 percent, hospital­ vaccine-preventable infectious diseases incurred izations reached 10 percent, and occasion­ 54 by deployed US military forces, 1998–2009 ally trainees died. Outbreaks stressed medical services, eroded training effective­ Lyme Meningococcal ness, and sometimes stalled the training Leishmaniasis Malaria Disease Disease pipeline altogether.55 During 25 years of Active 771 990 551 106 use, the adenovirus vaccine provided to re­ cruits on day one of training virtually elimi­ Reserve 420 68 445 20 nated the disease.56 In the mid-1990s, how­ Total 1,191 1,058 996 126 ever, negotiations between the DOD and Data from “Defense Medical Surveillance System,” Armed Forces Health the sole manufacturer of adenovirus vac­ Surveillance Center, 10 December 2009. cine failed to produce a financial agreement

106 | Air & Space Power Journal The Dangerous Decline in the DOD’s Vaccine Program

Table 2. Shortfalls of previously licensed and visits to medical clinics, and 852 hospitaliza­ IND-only infectious-disease vaccines tions among the roughly 213,000 active duty and reserve trainees enrolled in basic train­ Vaccine ing each year.62 Another study projected Adenovirus, types 4 and 7 $26.4 million as the related annual medical and training costs for the US Army alone.63 Previously Lyme disease licensed but The loss of adenovirus vaccine “sounds a unavailable Cholera warning for the fragile system supporting Plague other vaccines of military and public health 64 Argentine hemorrhagic fever importance.” To stay in business, vaccine manufacturers need to realize a profit. To Chikungunya virus do so, they must weigh what it costs to Eastern equine encephalitis manufacture a product, how much of it IND product Q fever they can sell at what price, and what they could make if they used their production no longer Rift Valley fever produced capacity on a different product. The eco­ and of limited Tularemia nomic pressures brought on by evolving availability Venezuelan equine encephalitis regulatory requirements caused this sole- source manufacturer to abandon its produc­ Western equine encephalitis tion of a limited-market vaccine used Botulinum toxoid mainly by the military. Competing priori­ Tickborne encephalitis ties and the lack of a single agent with the Data from Stanley M. Lemon et al., eds., Protecting Our Forces: Improving authority and budget to preserve the avail­ Vaccine Acquisition and Availability in the U.S. Military (Washington, DC: ability of adenovirus vaccine were signifi­ Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, National Academies cant DOD shortcomings. Press, 2002), 44–45. concerning upgrades to the production fa­ Disparate Organizations, cility required by the FDA. In 1996 the Disproportionate Funding, and manufacturer could no longer afford to pro­ duce the vaccine. As supplies waned across Dissimilar Priority the DOD, prevaccination program morbid­ Despite overlapping missions, the DOD ity returned, with unvaccinated trainees 28 maintains separate organizations for the de­ times more likely than vaccinated trainees velopment, procurement, and product man­ to test positive for the types of adenovirus 57 agement of infectious-disease and biodefense covered by the vaccine. All stocks were vaccines. Each has exclusive budgetary au­ depleted by 1999, and by the end of 2000, thority and product-line responsibility. This seven basic military training centers had 58 section investigates the negative consequences experienced adenoviral epidemics. of the DOD’s decision to decouple its vaccine Today, the DOD still has no adenovirus programs while granting preferential fund­ vaccine, and the disease continues to sicken ing and priority to its biodefense efforts. trainees, burden medical systems, and dis­ 59 rupt training. For the 12 months prior to Disparate Organizations December 2009, over 4,400 military recruits with febrile respiratory illness tested posi­ “The mission of the Military Infectious Dis­ tive for adenovirus.60 Not all who became ill eases Research Program (MIDRP) is to protect were tested; the actual number of cases was the U.S. military against naturally occurring higher.61 One DOD study found the loss of infectious diseases via the development of adenovirus vaccine responsible for an esti­ [FDA-]approved vaccines” and other protec­ mated 10,650 preventable infections, 4,260 tion systems.65 The JVAP exists to “develop,

Spring 2011 | 107 Hall produce and stockpile FDA-licensed vaccine First, separate acquisition precludes a systems to protect the warfighter from bio­ unified approach to the identification and logical agents.”66 These agencies feature dis­ prioritization of vaccine solutions based pri­ parate command and control relationships marily on operational risk rather than the (fig. 1). In reality, the number of players nature of the threat. Similarly, it impedes a and interactions is much more complex, united approach to the acquisition of “dual- indicative of the fragmented and diffuse or­ use” vaccines, those that could counter both ganization that encumbers acquisition. Con­ a natural and a weaponized threat to mili­ gress directed the split-management scheme tary personnel.68 The National Select Agent to raise the visibility of biodefense and Registry, utilized for monitoring the posses­ streamline acquisition procedures.67 In retro­ sion and use of 48 pathogens and toxins spect, however, separating the acquisition that pose a severe threat to human health, of infectious-disease and biodefense vac­ contains 13 bioweapons that are also natu­ cines was ill advised for multiple reasons. ral infections for which vaccines have been,

SECDEF

USD(P&R) Sec ARMY USD(AT&L) CJCS

ATSD* ASD(HA) Army SG AAE JRO-CBRN** (NCBD)

DATSD MRMC JPEO-CBD DTRA (CBD)

MIDRP WRAIR USAMRIID CBMS

Biological Defense (BD) Program Involvement JVAP Infectious Disease (ID) Program Involvement BD+ID Program Involvement Command / Control DVC Coordination / Oversight *Central Oversight Authority for NCBD **Directs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting for all BD Research

AAE Army Acquisition Executive JVAP Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program Army SG Army Surgeon General MIDRP (US Army) Military Infectious Diseases Research ASD(HA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs Program ATSD(NCBD) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and MRMC (US Army) Medical Research and Materiel Command Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Sec Army Secretary of the Army CBMS Chemical-Biological Medical Systems SECDEF Secretary of Defense CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff USAMRIID US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious DATSD(CBD) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Diseases and Biological Defense Programs USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency Technology, and Logistics DVC DynCorp Vaccine Company (Prime Systems USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Contractor) Readiness JPEO-CBD Joint Program Executive Office-Chemical and WRAIR Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Biological Defense JRO-CBRN Joint Requirements Office-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

Figure 1. Simplified organizational chart depicting DOD infectious-disease and biodefense vaccine programs. (Adapted from Lt Col Coleen K. Martinez, “Biodefense Research Supporting the DOD: A New Strategic Vision,” Research Report no. 1-58487-288-8 [Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2007], 11; Rudolph Kuppers, US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command [USMRMC] / Military Infectious Dis- eases Research Program [MIDRP], to the author, e-mail, 11 December 2009; and Col Charles Hoke, MD, US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, retired, to the author, e-mail, 24 January 2010.)

108 | Air & Space Power Journal The Dangerous Decline in the DOD’s Vaccine Program or currently are, in some stage of develop­ contributed significantly to the lack of the ment by the MIDRP.69 additional investment required for contin­ Second, separate acquisition fosters pro­ ued production of [adenovirus] vaccine.”75 grammatic redundancy. Many more simi­ larities than differences exist among the Disproportionate Funding pathogens, science, technology, and business processes for vaccines against natural and Although discrete programs with no single weaponized agents. Their development and oversight authority are problematic, the piv­ production follow like pathways, encounter otal issue in separating the acquisition of in­ similar difficulties, and present comparable fectious -disease and biodefense vaccines is developmental and financial risks. budgetary. In 1993 the DOD’s annual budget Third, separate acquisition dilutes lim­ for the advanced development of biodefense 76 ited expertise and splits budgetary power. vaccines amounted to $1 million. By 1998 The complexity of vaccine development de­ funding levels had risen to $25 million per 77 mands highly skilled and experienced pro­ year. Between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY fessionals in all facets, from scientists to ad­ 2008, the US government allocated $57 bil­ ministrators. Also, the industry average cost lion to biodefense, the DOD receiving nearly 78 to bring a new vaccine through the develop­ $12 billion. In FY 2009, governmentwide ment process from concept to licensure allocations jumped by 39 percent over the ranges from $800 million to $1.6 billion previous year to $8.97 billion; the DOD share 79 over 14 years; to sustain a fielded product came to $1.72 billion. The Department of costs millions more. Separation curbs pro­ Health and Human Services and the DOD fessional and budgetary synergy.70 received billions to develop, produce, pro­ Fourth, separate acquisition hinders the cure, and stockpile vaccine countermeasures Total Life-Cycle Systems Management against weaponized pathogens.80 Since FY (TLCSM) of vaccine products—“the imple­ 1997, the annual US budget for biological de­ mentation, management, and oversight, by fense has increased over 47-fold, from $137 [a single accountable authority], of all activi­ million to $6.5 billion by FY 2008.81 ties associated with the acquisition, develop­ Several points arise regarding MIDRP ment, production, fielding [and] sustainment funding for its core research since 1994 and . . . of a DOD weapon system across its life projections to FY 2011 (fig. 2). First, man­ cycle.”71 The Joint Program Executive Office agement of biodefense vaccine transitioned for Chemical and Biological Defense leads from the MIDRP to the JVAP in 1998, ac­ the TLCSM of biodefense vaccines.72 To date, counting for the associated funding spike no single locus of TLCSM authority, respon­ and subsequent dip. Second, there is a rela­ sibility, and accountability exists for infec­ tive budget flatline in actual-year dollars tious -disease vaccine products.73 Separation over the period. In FY 1994, the MIDRP’s underserves the acquisition of infectious- annual budget was $42 million. By FY 2009, disease vaccine and precludes collaboration it had increased only to $47 million. Third, in enterprisewide vaccine TLCSM. when adjusted for inflation to FY 2005 dol­ These issues have contributed to signifi­ lars, the buying power of the FY 2009 bud­ cant problems in vaccine availability, such get came to only $41 million, less than that as the loss of the adenovirus vaccine, as of 15 years earlier. Fourth, the inflationary previously described. They also signify the gap is widening. In FY 2011, the MIDRP’s level of commitment required by the DOD $46 million annual budget is worth, in ef­ not only to bring militarily important vac­ fect, roughly $37 million in FY 2005 dollars. cines on line but also to keep them avail­ Inflation has a mounting effect on the able.74 In its 2002 report to the DOD, the MIDRP budget through FY 2015 (fig. 3). Institute of Medicine was “convinced that Given the projected funding levels, the the disjointed authority . . . within DOD MIDRP cannot keep pace with inflation. This

Spring 2011 | 109 Hall

70 sive. In the past five years, these costs have ID Program - Actual Dollars 65 risen from $15,000 to as much as $26,000 per ID Program - In ation Adusted 83 60 enrollee. In light of static funding and less

55 buying power, the MIDRP’s ability to develop vaccine products is, and will remain, seri­ 50 ously constrained. 45 40 Dissimilar Priority 35 To make the best use of limited resources, 30 the Defense Acquisition Management Sys­

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 tem has rules that govern the acquisition of military vaccines. Acquisition categories Figure 2. US Army MIDRP funding for core re- (ACAT I, II, and III) assign priority and de­ search on infectious diseases (with inflation ad- termine the level of DOD review, decision justed to FY 2005, in millions of dollars, exclu- authority, and milestones that apply to a sive of the HIV program). (Adapted from Rudolph given project.84 On the one hand, the Kuppers, USMRMC/MIDRP, to the author, e-mail, MIDRP’s infectious-disease vaccines are 11 December 2009.) now managed as an ACAT III “less than ­major” program, the lowest priority level, with each vaccine managed as a separate acquisition project.85 On the other hand, the JVAP develops biodefense vaccines as an ACAT II “major system” program under 55 the Joint Program Executive Office for 50 Chemical and Biological Defense.86 The 45 ACAT II designation affords biodefense 40 vaccines not only higher priority for acqui­ 35 30 sition funding but also higher visibility 25 than vaccines against infections of natural 20 origin. The lack of emphasis on these natu­ ral infectious-disease countermeasures has 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 contributed to the loss of licensed vaccines (e.g., adenovirus, plague, and cholera) and Figure 3. US Army MIDRP budget (FY 2000–15, the inability to advance IND products (e.g., in millions of dollars, exclusive of the HIV pro- tickborne encephalitis, Rift Valley fever, gram). (Adapted from Rudolph Kuppers, USMRMC/ and eastern equine encephalitis vaccines) MIDRP, to the au­thor, e-mail, 11 December 2009.) to full licensure. Additionally, the inferior priority of infectious-disease vaccines makes their funding vulnerable to becom­ ing offsets for higher ACAT programs.

Recommendations dismal scenario is exacerbated by the rising cost of advanced product development and This section recommends four impera­ clinical trials, which accounts for roughly 75 tives for ensuring the DOD’s ongoing ability percent of total development outlays.82 Also, to produce vaccines against natural infections clinical trials on human subjects to assess a and offers final thoughts on reversing the vaccine’s safety and efficacy are very expen­ dangerous decline in the US military’s ability

110 | Air & Space Power Journal The Dangerous Decline in the DOD’s Vaccine Program to conduct infectious-disease R&D. The Elevate the Acquisition Priority of challenges are formidable, but the DOD can Infectious-Disease Vaccines cure its ailing infectious-disease vaccine Like those intended for biodefense, vac­ program and regain its former status as the cines to counter natural infections deserve world’s premier force health defender. management at the ACAT II major-system level (or higher). Doing so would be consis­ Redesign the Biological-Threat tent with the first recommendation, above, Assessment Process to consider all biological threats—regardless of origin—of equal potential harm to war The DOD should concurrently consider all fighters. This priority will ensure appropri­ biothreats, regardless of origin, and then pri­ ate visibility of and emphasis on the acqui­ oritize them based on a balanced assessment sition of both infectious-disease and biode­ of notional and experiential risks to war fight­ fense vaccines within the DOD. ers, independent of the nature of the threat.87 To facilitate this process, it should institute a Increase Funding for Research, standardized cost-benefit computation for Development, and Procurement of candidate vaccines and strategies, where solu­ Infectious-Disease Vaccines tions to natural or weaponized biothreats with the most compelling calculations garner the In addition to raising overall program fund­ ing, the DOD should fund each infectious- highest priority for funding.88 disease vaccine as a separate line item in the Future Years Defense Program to en­ Merge the Management of Infectious- sure TLCSM.90 These are the most impor­ Disease and Biodefense Vaccines tant actions the department must take. To The DOD should have a single program to be clear, we do not need a zero-sum re­ unify needs identification, prioritization, alignment of resources for biodefense and basic and advanced research, production, infectious-disease vaccines. Biodefense vac­ procurement, and ongoing product man­ cines should remain fully funded, with rela­ tive parity achieved for the development of agement.89 We must vest program leader­ infectious-disease vaccine. Currently, at ship in a single agent with the authority, least half of national biodefense funding responsibility, and accountability for en­ serves both biodefense and public health suring effective TLCSM of all vaccines that ends.91 This kind of overlap should become protect war fighters against natural and the rallying cry of DOD vaccine prioritiza­ weaponized pathogens. Combining pro­ tion and resource allocation. A successful grams will facilitate the synergistic sharing biothreat vaccine program demands coop­ of ideas, expertise, and resources; incentiv­ eration, not competition. ize cohesive thinking on vaccine solutions of mutual benefit to infectious-disease pre­ vention, biodefense, and public health; and Conclusion underpin the maintenance of a robust, The president’s 2009 National Strategy for adaptable technology base that can flex to Countering Biological Threats calls for “a com­ conduct timely research on the moving tar­ prehensive and integrated approach . . . to get of natural and weaponized biothreats. prevent the full spectrum of biological In addition, a unified program champion threats . . . whether . . . natural, accidental, will provide the strongest advocacy for or deliberate [in nature].”92 To meet his in­ infectious­ -disease vaccines to balance tent, the DOD needs to reorganize its cur­ against the government’s proclivity for bio­ rent infectious-disease and biodefense vac­ defense countermeasures. cine -acquisition stovepipes and establish a

Spring 2011 | 111 Hall unified program to effectively assess, priori­ to the sustained development of vaccines tize, develop, and procure vaccines to protect for infectious diseases as well as biodefense. war fighters against threats from all causes. Anything less places force health, combat Staying ahead of the changing threat re­ readiness, and operational effectiveness at quires the DOD to refocus on the full range serious risk.  of biothreats and commit ample resources

Notes

1. In this article, acquisition denotes the DOD’s 4 (2005): 713–19, accessed 21 October 2010, http:// process for ensuring that vaccines are acquired and www.ajtmh.org/cgi/reprint/73/4/713. maintained for the protection of its forces, from needs 11. Joint Publication (JP) 4-02, Health Service identification, prioritization, and basic research to Support, 31 October 2006, GL-14, accessed 21 October advanced development, testing, production, and pro- 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4 curement. Availability involves having on hand the _02.pdf; Lt Col Anthony P. Tvaryanas, Col Lex Brown, right vaccine for the right threat at the right time. and Nita L. Miller, PhD, “Managing the Human 2. National Security Council, National Strategy Weapon System: A Vision for an Air Force Human- for Countering Biological Threats (Washington, DC: Performance Doctrine,” Air and Space Power Journal National Security Council, November 2009), ac- 23, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 34–41; and Joint Chiefs of cessed 15 January 2010, http://www.whitehouse Staff (JCS), Force Health Protection Capstone Docu- .gov/sites/default/files/National_Strategy_for ment (Washington, DC: JCS, 2000), 2, http://www _Countering_BioThreats.pdf. .deploymentlink.osd.mil/pdfs/fhp2004.pdf. 3. Stanhope Bayne-Jones, The Evolution of Pre- 12. JP 4-02, Health Service Support, IV-5. ventive Medicine in the United States Army, 1607–1939 13. Richard D. Nidel, JVAP Office video, accessed (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 5 December 2009, http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/packs /DocHandler.ashx?DocId=4711. Department of the Army, 1968), 52, accessed 28 Oc- 14. John D. Grabenstein, “Immunization to Pro- tober 2009, http://history.amedd.army.mil/books tect the US Armed Forces: Heritage, Current Prac- docs/misc/evprev/default.html. tice, and Prospects,” Epidemiologic Reviews 28, no. 1 4. Specifically, this was variolation, an “obsolete (2006): 10, accessed 21 October 2010, http://epirev process of inoculating a susceptible person with .oxfordjournals.org/content/28/1/3.full.pdf+html. material taken from a vesicle of a person who has 15. DOD, Report on Biological Warfare Defense smallpox.” WordNet, Princeton University, http:// Vaccine Research and Development Programs (Washing- wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=variolation. ton, DC: DOD, July 2001), 7, accessed 21 October 2010, 5. Bayne-Jones, Evolution of Preventive Medicine, 99. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReportonBiological 6. Ibid. WarfareDefenseVaccineRDPrgras-July2001.pdf. 7. Ibid., 124. 16. Rudolph Kuppers, US Army Medical Research 8. Ibid., 151. and Materiel Command (USMRMC) / Military Infec- 9. Mark S. Riddle et al., “Past Trends and Current tious Diseases Research Program (MIDRP), to the Status of Self-Reported Incidence and Impact of Dis- author, e-mail, 11 December 2009. ease and Nonbattle Injury in Military Operations in 17. Ibid. Southwest Asia and the Middle East,” American Journal 18. Ibid. of Public Health 98, no. 12 (2008): 2199; and Stanley M. 19. “History and Achievements,” MIDRP, ac- Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine cessed 5 January 2010, https://midrp.amedd.army Acquisition and Availability in the U.S. Military (Wash- .mil/info/HAchieve.html. ington, DC: Institute of Medicine of the National 20. Ibid. Academies, National Academies Press, 2002), 10. 21. Ibid. 10. John W. Sanders et al., “Impact of Illness and 22. “CBRN Medical Countermeasures (MCM) Non-Combat Injury during Operations Iraqi Free- Manufacturing Capabilities Analysis of Alternatives dom and Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan),” Ameri- Report” (Livingston, NJ: The Quantic Group, 15 can Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 73, no. June 2009), 10.

112 | Air & Space Power Journal The Dangerous Decline in the DOD’s Vaccine Program

23. Intellectual property is “the group of legal www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310.pdf. The rights to things people create or invent. Intellectual top five infectious-disease killers include HIV/AIDS, property rights typically include patent, copyright, pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, and tuberculosis; trademark and trade secret rights.” “Glossary,” Site- arguably, climate change is significantly changing point, accessed 21 October 2010, http://www.sitepoint weather patterns and disrupting ecosystems, leading .com/glossary.php?q=I. to the emergence of new niches for infectious-disease 24. Kuppers to the author, e-mail; and Lemon et pathogens and vectors. Lynch to the author, e-mail. al., Protecting Our Forces, 87. 37. Burnette et al., “Infectious Diseases Invest- 25. Col Charles Hoke, retired, MD, US Army ment,” 174. Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, 38. Davies, “Securitizing Infectious Disease,” 298. to the author, e-mail, 24 January 2010. 39. Hoke to the author, e-mail. 26. A pivotal clinical trial must be controlled, 40. Edward T. Clayson, Joint Vaccine Acquisition have a double-blinded design when practical and ethi- Program (JVAP) Product Management Office, JVAP cal, be randomized, and be of adequate size. See “Ap- overview presentation slides, 30 May 2003, slide 5. pendices—Clinical Trials Insight,” AdisInsight, 2000, 41. Ibid.; and Kuppers to the author, e-mail (com- accessed 21 October 2010, http://www.adisinsight pares 1997 and 1999 MIDRP funding). .com/aClientServiceinfo/CTI%20Appendix.pdf. DOD 42. US Senate, Testimony for the Senate Foreign overseas labs are located in Thailand, Peru, Kenya, Relations Committee by Amy Sands, PhD, Deputy Di- Egypt, and Indonesia. Hoke to the author, e-mail. rector, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey 27. Col Julia Lynch, USMRMC/MIDRP, to the Institute of International Studies, before the US Senate author, e-mail, 18 January 2010. Foreign Relations Committee, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 19 28. Kuppers, to the author, e-mail. March 2002, accessed 7 January 2010, http://cns 29. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) .miis.edu/pubs/reports/asands.htm; and Lt Col 3000.05, Stability Operations, 16 September 2009, 2, Coleen K. Martinez, “Biodefense Research Support- accessed 21 October 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/whs ing the DOD: A New Strategic Vision,” Research Re- /directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf. port no. 1-58487-288-8 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US 30. World Health Organization (WHO), Towards Army War College, 2007), 23. Universal Access: Scaling Up Priority HIV/AIDS Inter- 43. Kuppers to the author, e-mail. ventions in the Health Sector, Progress Report 2009 44. US Senate, Statement by Assistant Secretary of (Geneva, Switzerland: WHO Press, 2009), 7, accessed State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford, Jr. 9 January 2010, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations /2009/9789241598750_eng.pdf. Hearing on Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Bio- 31. Mark Schneider and Michael Moodie, The logical Weapons, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 19 March Destabilizing Impacts of HIV/AIDS (Washington, DC: 2002, accessed 7 January 2010, http://www.fas.org Center for Strategic and International Studies, May /bwc/news/testimony/CT2002March19Ford.htm; 2002), 2, accessed 21 October 2010, http://www and US Senate, Testimony by Amy Sands. .reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5DWGVF 45. “Defense Medical Surveillance System,” /$FILE/csis-aids-may02.pdf?OpenElement. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, accessed 32. Ibid., 4. 10 December 2009, http://www.afhsc.mil/dmss. 33. Kuppers to the author, e-mail. 46. “Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation,” Federal 34. In June 2009, a US Army–led phase-three Bureau of Investigation, accessed 28 January 2010, community-based trial of a candidate HIV vaccine http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm. was completed, yielding encouraging preliminary 47. “West Nile Virus: Statistics, Surveillance, and results but requiring further research. Hoke to the Control,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, author, e-mail. accessed 22 December 2009, http://www.cdc.gov 35. Lynch to the author, e-mail; and W. Neal /ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&controlCaseCount99 ­Burnette et al., “Infectious Diseases Investment De- _detailed.htm. cision Evaluation Algorithm: A Quantitative Algo- 48. Gregory C. Gray and Margaret L. Chorazy, “Hu- rithm for Prioritization of Naturally Occurring man Adenovirus 14a: A New Epidemic Threat,” Journal Infectious Disease Threats to the U.S. Military,” Mili- of Infectious Disease 199 (15 May 2009): 1413, accessed tary Medicine 173, no. 2 (February 2008): 174–81. 5 November 2009, http://www.journals.uchicago.edu 36. Sara E. Davies, “Securitizing Infectious Dis- /doi/pdf/10.1086/598522. In 2007, 23 trainees at Lack- ease,” International Affairs 84, no. 2 (2008): 295–313; land AFB, Texas, hospitalized for pneumonia, were and WHO, “The Top Ten Causes of Death,” fact sheet, found to be infected with a variant strain (type 14) of February 2007, accessed 15 January 2010, http:// adenovirus; one of the trainees died. Amesh A. Adalja,

Spring 2011 | 113 Hall

“Adenovirus 14: An Emerging Threat,” 17 April 2009, 64. Gray et al., “Adult Adenovirus Infections,” 667. Clinicians’ Biosecurity Network, accessed 27 Novem- 65. “MIDRP Overview,” Military Infectious Dis- ber 2009, http://www.upmc-cbn.org/report_archive eases Research Program, accessed 27 December /2009/ 04_April_2009/cbnreport_04172009.html. 2009, https://midrp.amedd.army.mil/login.jsp. 49. Sanders et al., “Impact of Illness and Non- 66. David Williams and Calvin Carpenter, “Medical Combat Injury.” Systems: Advanced Planning Briefing to Industry,” 50. Ibid., 714. Campylobacter, Shigella, Esche- briefing slides, Joint Program Management-Chemical richia coli and norovirus have been the most com- Biological Medical Systems, 7 May 2009, slide 8. monly reported diarrheal infections in deployed 67. Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces, 64. forces. Rhinovirus, Coronovirus, parainfluenza virus, 68. Ibid. and adenovirus have been the most commonly re- 69. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and ported causes of acute respiratory infections in de- Toxins, Interim Final Rule, Code of Federal Regulations, ployed forces. “Defense Medical Surveillance System.” title 42, pt. 73, accessed 4 November 2009, http://www 51. Sanders et al., “Impact of Illness and Non- .cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/42cfr73.pdf ; and Lemon et al., Combat Injury,” 716. Protecting Our Forces, 40–41. The National Select Agent 52. C. G. Hawley-Bowland, Casualty Analysis: Registry “currently requires registration of facilities, Health Policy and Services (Washington, DC: US including government agencies, universities, research Army Medical Command, 2004). institutions, and commercial entities, that possess, 53. James Chin, ed., Control of Communicable use, or transfer biological agents and toxins.” See the Diseases Manual, 17th ed. (Washington, DC: Ameri- registry’s Web site, “Overview,” accessed 19 July 2010, can Public Health Association, 2000), 428. http://www.selectagents.gov. 54. Grabenstein, “Immunization to Protect the 70. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, and US Armed Forces,” 13. Henry G. Grabowksi, “The Price of Innovation: New 55. Gregory C. Gray et al., “Adult Adenovirus In- Estimates of Drug Development Costs,” Journal of fections: Loss of Orphaned Vaccines Precipitates Health Economics 22, no. 2 (2003): 180, accessed 21 Military Respiratory Disease Epidemics,” Clinical October 2010, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc Infectious Diseases 31, no. 3 (September 2000): 663–70, /download?doi=10.1.1.128.4362&rep=rep1&type=pdf. accessed 21 October 2010, http://www.journals 71. Office of the Assistant Deputy Undersecre- .uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/313999. tary of Defense for Logistics Plans and Programs, 56. Although referred to as a single entity in this Total Life Cycle System Management (TLCSM): Plan of article, actually two adenovirus vaccines were lost: Action and Milestones, 6 January 2003, 2, accessed 31 types 4 and 7. January 2010, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/sci/exec 57. Sanders et al., “Impact of Illness and Non- _info/sm_milestone_plan010603.pdf. Combat Injury,” 663. 72. “Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program (JVAP) 58. Gray et al., “Adult Adenovirus Infections,” 668. Storage, Distribution, and Testing of Government 59. Lynch to the author, e-mail. The DOD is pur- Owned/Regulated Chemical Biological Defense,” suing an adenovirus vaccine from a new manufac- GovCB.com (Government Contract and Bid), ac- turer with the assistance of the Walter Reed Army cessed 31 January 2010, http://www.govcb.com Institute of Research. That product was successfully /H-Joint-Vaccine-Acquisition-Program-ADP11981138 tested in a phase-three efficacy study conducted by 560001613.htm. military investigators in 2008. Licensure is cur- 73. Hoke to the author, e-mail. rently pending FDA review. 74. Ibid. 60. “Febrile Respiratory Illness (FRI) Surveil- 75. Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces, 59. lance Update” (San Diego, CA: Naval Health Re- 76. Clayson, JVAP overview, slide 5. search Center, Department of Respiratory Diseases 77. Ibid. Research, week ending 16 January 2010), accessed 78. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 25 January 2010, http://www.med.navy.mil/sites Federal Funding for Biological Weapons Prevention /nhrc/geis/Documents/FRIUpdate.pdf. and Defense, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009, 15 April 2008, 61. Ibid. accessed 21 October 2010, http://www.armscontrol 62. Gray et al., “Adult Adenovirus Infections,” 668. center.org/media/fy2009_bw_budgetv2.pdf. 63. M. René Howell et al., “Prevention of Adeno- 79. Ibid. viral Acute Respiratory Disease in Army Recruits: 80. Ibid. Cost-Effectiveness of a Military Vaccination Policy,” 81. D. R. Franz, “Ways Ahead: USG Biodefense American Journal of Preventive Medicine 14, no. 3 Program from 2010 to 2020” (Washington, DC: De- (April 1998): 168. fense Threat Reduction Agency, Biodefense Way

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Ahead Project Workshop, 16 September 2009), 2; algorithm for conducting this type of (annually re- and Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, curring) prioritization. Federal Funding for Biological Weapons Prevention. 89. No fewer than five separate studies have pre- 82. Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces, 52. viously made this recommendation: DOD, Report on 83. Kuppers to the author, e-mail; and “Phase 3 Clin- Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine, ii; DOD, Quadren- ical Trial Costs Exceed $26,000 per Patient,” LifeSciences- nial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Depart- World, 13 October 2006, accessed 31 January 2010, ment of Defense, 30 September 2001), 52, accessed http://www.lifesciencesworld.com/news/view/11080. 21 October 2010, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs 84. DODI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acqui- /qdr2001.pdf; US General Accounting Office (GAO), sition System, 8 December 2008, accessed 21 October 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Imple- /pdf/500002p.pdf. menting Best Practices, Testimony before the Subcom- 85. Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces, 33. mittee on Readiness and Management Support, Com- 86. The DOD estimates that major systems will mittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, GAO-02-469T require an eventual total expenditure for research, (Washington, DC: GAO, 27 February 2002), 3, ac- development, test, and evaluation of more than 140 cessed 21 October 2010, http://www.gao.gov/new million in FY 2000 constant dollars or an eventual .items/d02469t.pdf; Lemon et al., Protecting Our total expenditure for procurement of more than 600 Forces, 58; and University of Pittsburgh Medical Cen- million dollars. Department of the Army, Weapon ter, Ensuring Biologics Advanced Development and Systems 2010 (Washington, DC: Department of the Manufacturing Capability for the United States Govern- Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army ment: A Summary of Key Findings and Conclusions, for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, 2009); and Final Report for Cooperative Agreement Research Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Study with Defense Advanced Research Projects for Chemical and Biological Defense, Department of Agency (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program An- Medical Center, 6 October 2009), 66, accessed 21 Oc- nual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2005), E-38, accessed 14 July 2010, tober 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435936. ?AD=ADA506569&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 87. Burnette et al., “Infectious Diseases Invest- 90. Hoke to the author, e-mail. ment,” 174. 91. Franz, “Ways Ahead,” 2. 88. Hoke to the author, e-mail. See Burnette et 92. National Security Council, National Strategy al., “Infectious Diseases Investment,” for a viable for Countering Biological Threats, 3.

Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF Colonel Hall (BS, Virginia Tech; DVM, Auburn University; MPH, Harvard University; MSS, Air War College) is the deputy command surgeon, Headquarters US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Ramstein AB, Germany. He has served as commander of the 27th Special Operations Medical Group, Cannon AFB, New Mexico. Colonel Hall has supported numerous combat operations, including Iraqi Freedom, Endur- ing Freedom, and Desert Storm. His other military positions include deputy com- mand surgeon and command public health officer at Headquarters Air Combat Com ­mand, Aerospace Medicine Squadron commander, command public health officer and health promotion director at Headquarters USAFE, chief of public health and prevention at the Air National Guard Readiness Center, medical inspec- tor at the Air Force Inspection Agency, and base public health officer at state­side and overseas installations. A chief Biomedical Sciences Corps officer, he is board certified in veterinary preventive medicine. Colonel Hall is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

Spring 2011 | 115 taineer to cofounder and executive director of the Central Asia Institute (CAI) and adviser to senior military leaders. That transformation be- gan in 1993 after his failed attempt to climb K2—a peak in northeastern Pakistan and, at 28,267 feet, the world’s second highest mountain and the most difficult to climb. During the de- scent, he became separated from his group, suf- fered from exposure, and stumbled into the Balti village of Korphe. The family of Haji Ali, the vil- lage’s chief elder, nursed him back to health. ­Appreciating what the villagers had done for him and recognizing the value they placed on educa- tion, he promised to build a school for their 84 children. A man of modest means who supported his Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to mountain climbing habit with his income as an Promote Peace . . . One School at a Time emergency room nurse, Mortenson had to find by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin. sponsors who could finance the school in Korphe. Viking (published by the Penguin Group) He met Jean Hoerni, a Silicon Valley pioneer, (http://us.penguingroup.com/), 375 Hudson who donated the $12,000 Mortenson needed for Street, New York, New York 10014, 2006, 352 the project. Construction of the school, which pages, $25.95 (hardcover), ISBN 9780670034826; involved working with the village’s elders and 2007, 368 pages, $16.00 (softcover), ISBN using local labor, did so much to create benefi- 9780143038252. cial relationships and develop his reputation that elders in nearby villages asked Mortenson to As Gen Stanley McChrystal traveled from help build schools in their communities as well. ­Kabul, Afghanistan, to Washington, DC, on Despite Mortenson’s desire to help, lack of re- 23 June 2010, he e-mailed a message to Greg sources presented a problem. Hoerni, who was Mortenson: “[I] will move through this and if I’m dying from leukemia, helped solve it by cofound- not involved in the years ahead, will take tre- ing the CAI with Mortenson and endowing it mendous comfort in knowing people like you with enough money to build additional schools are helping Afghans build a future.” The note in rural Pakistan and Afghanistan. arrived in Mortenson’s in-box at approximately Since then, the scale of Mortenson’s and the 0100 eastern standard time. Nine hours later in CAI’s efforts has increased exponentially. In Pak- the Oval Office, President Obama accepted Gen- istan and Afghanistan, the institute has funded eral McChrystal’s resignation. The president had and organized the building of over 144 schools no disagreements with either McChrystal’s policy by local villagers in coordination with their el- or his conduct of the war in Afghanistan, declar- ders. It underwrites those schools and their ap- ing that “we are in full agreement about our proximately 1,200 teachers, who have educated strategy” (Elisabeth Bumiller, “Unlikely Tutor more than 64,000 students (including 52,000 Giving Military Afghan Advice,” New York Times, girls). Additionally, the CAI has helped with 17 July 2010; and “Obama Relieves McChrystal women’s education, public health, and conserva- over Critical Remarks, Names Petraeus as Re- tion projects. By making a difference in the placement,” FOXNews.com, 23 June 2010). quality of life in that region, both the institute McChrystal’s note, a reply to an e-mail of sup- and Mortenson have earned the respect of the port from Mortenson, reflected a growing bond villagers. Consequently, Mortenson and his CAI between the latter and senior military leaders. team were able to set up more than 35 meetings Increasingly, they had sought his insight into throughout Afghanistan between village elders and advice on the tribal cultures of rural, moun- and General McChrystal and his senior staff. tainous Pakistan and Afghanistan to help adjust Three Cups of Tea offers the reader an enjoy- their counterinsurgency theories to the realities able nonfiction adventure story of a respectable on the ground. hero operating in a culture very different from In Three Cups of Tea, Mortenson relates the his own—one located in a beautiful, exciting, story of his unlikely transformation from moun- and physically challenging part of the world.

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Mortenson’s story alone, which includes ac- region and giving hope to an entire generation” counts of his dealing with kidnapping, death (“Stones into Schools,” Central Asia Institute, threats, and fatwas issued by village mullahs, is 2009, http://www.stonesintoschools.com). worth the read. But this book offers so much more—specifically, insight into the culture of the Col Larry Carter, USAF, Retired people who inhabit the mountainous areas along Air Force Research Institute the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It illumi- Maxwell AFB, Alabama nates their customs, the principles they value and respect, and their visions of a desirable fu- ture. The reader is exposed to the lessons that Mortenson learned as he muddled through his The Architecture of Leadership by Donald T. first years in the region, driven by a sense of Phillips and Adm James M. Loy, USCG, Retired. purpose to keep his promise to build a school in Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org Korphe. Indeed, the book’s title derives from one /navalinstitutepress/index.asp), 291 Wood Road, of those lessons: “Haji Ali taught me the most Annapolis, Maryland 21402, 2008, 96 pages, important lesson I’ve learned in my life . . . to $16.95 (softcover), ISBN 978-1-59114-474-8. share three cups of tea, to slow down and make building relationships as important as building Preparation equals performance. Those three projects” (p. 150). Other lessons included how to words form the basis of The Architecture of dress, wash, worship, eat, and negotiate without Leader­ship and provide the reader with a primer being offensive. He learned the importance of on how to become a better leader. A quick read, and the power associated with the types of people this book uses the basic tenets of architecture to found in most communities—from family mem- describe how leadership can be built from the bers, clerics, and tribal leaders to military com- ground up, much like building a house. The au- manders and warlords. The larger and more im- thors begin with a foundation based on character portant lessons Mortenson communicates are and values that leaders tend to display. They his thoughts about building relationships and then move to laying down a floor, highlighting a empowering communities, as well as his realiza- drive to achieve while tempering that drive with tion that education and literacy offer the most a capacity to care. The framework of their house effective and enduring way for promoting peace is built from a series of innate traits exhibited by and stability—particularly for women. those who tend to take on the leadership mantle. Three Cups of Tea begins Mortenson’s adven- Filling in this framework is a list of acquired skills tures in Pakistan, and his follow-on book Stones necessary in completing the “house.” Covering into Schools (Viking, 2009) continues the story as this framework is the ceiling of opportunity—the Mortenson and Sarfraz Khan (one of his most architecture of the house is of no value unless valued associates) expand their school-building the leader has the opportunity to tie everything efforts into Afghanistan. Mortenson, the CAI together. Finally, the author’s research culmi- staffs in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and CAI fund- nates with the roof of the house, signifying per- raisers in Montana are making a significant dif- formance, bringing all the components together ference in the region’s quality of life and its ad- and succeeding where others may have failed. vance toward long-term peace and stability. Although this sounds like it could be a rather Recognizing those accomplishments, General dry read, the authors do an excellent job of McChrystal, NATO’s most senior military com- weaving throughout the book historical examples mander, took time to write Mortenson an en- of past great leaders who have exemplified a par- couraging note on his last day of command. Adm ticular trait or ability. All of the chapters include Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of interesting and enjoyable highlights in the form Staff, attended the opening of one of Mortenson’s of quotations attributed to those leaders, each of schools in a remote village in Afghanistan’s which has relevance to its own chapter and con- Hindu Kush mountain system and voiced a simi- nects to the others. One of my favorites is from lar thought: “What Greg understands better than Adm Grace Hopper: “You manage things, you most—and what he practices more than anyone lead people.” How many people reading this re- else I know—is the simple truth that all of us are view have felt they were subject to just the oppo- better off when all of us have the opportunity to site kind of leader? The book culminates in a learn, especially our children. By helping them story about the US Coast Guard’s response to learn and grow, he’s shaping the very future of a Hurricane Katrina and the ways that response

Spring 2011 | 117 demonstrated successful application of the myr- Islamic movements, but they remain tactically, iad facets comprising leadership found in The operationally, and strategically relevant. Kepel Architecture of Leadership. and Milelli present the contributions of scholars Donald T. Phillips and Adm James M. Loy are and professors from the Institute for Political both eminently qualified to speak on the topic of Studies in Paris, whose expertise ranges over leadership. Phillips has published numerous Islamism, contemporary Islam, Arabic, and po- books on leadership, perhaps best known for litical movements in Saudi Arabia, and who of- Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Strategies for fer summaries of the lives, noteworthy events, Tough Times (Warner Books, 1992), a staple of and significant writings of Osama bin Laden, professional military education for years. Admiral Abdallah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Loy has practical experience as a leader, having Musab al-Zarqawi. served more than 45 years in federal service and Milelli emphasizes the importance of this reaching the pinnacle of his military service as knowledge since their ideology lives on, even commandant of the Coast Guard. He also served after death, and is frequently used by other as deputy secretary for the Department of radical jihadi organizations. In many cases, the Homeland Security and has spoken extensively world is simplified into one fight against terror- about leadership. ism, and people have failed to truly understand Well laid out, the book follows a logical se- what resonates with and motivates the al-Qaeda quence that anyone can relate to: the building of organization. The images, media blips, and ex- a house. The chapters walk readers rapidly cerpts from writings serve as a good exhibition, through the book, and it is over before they even but a more comprehensive understanding of the realize it. One can almost describe the book as a influential actors and their written works “allows checklist of those traits that a leader can work its readers to enter into a way of thinking, to get on to help create a recipe for success. The ex- to the very heart of a specific worldview” (p. 4). amples relate well to the topic at hand and offer Described as the most well-known al-Qaeda the reader a glimpse into past decisions made by member, Osama bin Laden actually possesses other great leaders worthy of emulation. little theoretical depth. Contributor Omar Saghi Straightforward and effective in scope and appli- objectively details events in bin Laden’s life and cability, The Architecture of Leadership has great provides the reader a cognitive “map” to follow relevance to leaders from all sectors of society, bin Laden’s movements through physical space, not just the military. Another must-have for any his social awareness, and his interactions with library, it provides a solid foundation for effec- other influential actors such as Abdallah Azzam tive leadership that public, private, and nonprofit and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Readers are exposed to leaders will benefit from enormously. eight different writings (e.g., the “Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Maj Michael A. Marsicek, USAF Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries” and “Message Hill AFB, Utah to the American People”), some of them ex- cerpts, detailing bin Laden’s ideas and positions. More importantly, examining these writings fos- ters understanding about what the intended au- Al Qaeda in Its Own Words edited by Gilles diences of the world are reading and how that Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli. Translated by may affect their decision to join, or not join, Pascale Ghazaleh. Belknap Press of Harvard radical organizations. University Press (http://www.hup.harvard.edu), Abdallah Azzam, probably the least well known 79 Garden Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts actor, is considered the theoretician of contem- 02138, 2008, 384 pages, $27.95 (hardcover); porary, worldwide jihad. Thomas Hegghammer 2009, 384 pages, $17.95 (softcover), ISBN 978- extensively recounts Azzam’s history, showing 0-674-02804-3. that although Azzam was not the first person to use jihad as a form of political change, he justi- Al Qaeda in Its Own Words is a skillfully writ- fied it politically and described his vision for im- ten, easily digestible combination of history, plementation. Azzam advocated conflict against analysis, and review of the correspondence of the occupiers but did not urge violence against some of the most well-known, influential actors the “far enemy” in their territories. In many in- in the al-Qaeda organization. Unlike Sayyid stances, his viewpoints differed from those of Qutb, these actors are not the “fathers” of radical other radical ideologues. Hegghammer includes

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five excerpts (of over 100 books, articles, and Off I Went into the Wild Blue Yonder by conferences) from Azzam’s thoughts. John James Knudsen. Pelican Publishing Considered the main “thinker” of al-Qaeda, (http://www.pelicanpub.com), 1000 Burmas- Ayman al-Zawahiri forms the link between ter Street, Gretna, Louisiana 70053-2246, ­Azzam’s ideology and its current implementa- 2007, 304 pages, $19.96 (hardcover), ISBN tion, including the movement towards more 978-1-58980-494-4. martyrdom operations. Stéphane Lacroix guides us through al-Zawahiri’s life, revealing the peo- As with many memoirs, Off I Went has a num- ple, places, and events that influenced his ideo- ber of historical errors. It also contains more edi- logical position. The book offers four excerpts torial faults than it should. The book has nothing from al-Zawahiri’s writings, including the denun- to do with air combat. It is full of examples of ciation of the Muslim Brotherhood (in “Bitter poor flying-training methods. Nevertheless, read- Harvest”) and a piece laying the foundation for ers of Air and Space Power Journal might find it jihad according to his interpretation (“Knights worthwhile reading. John Knudsen has an en- under the Prophet’s Banner”). gaging writing style, and his story is entertain- Al Qaeda in Its Own Words ends with a discus- ing, so one might read it for recreation. Beyond sion of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, included here not that, the book may also prove useful in expand- because of his inspirational contributions to radi- ing the reader’s knowledge of the history of the cal Islamic movements but because of his prac- Air Force, notwithstanding its factual defects tice of targeting Shiites as the main route to cre- (which say something about the roots of our cul- ating mayhem in Iraq. Jean-Pierre Milelli takes ture, for it appears that Knudsen writes what is the reader through a brief history of al-Zarqawi in his memory). The image he has about the his- but focuses mainly on his interactions with tory of World War II is fairly common among members of al-Qaeda and his position on how to veterans, and its divergence from the facts is in- pursue jihad in Iraq. The book’s sole excerpt structive in itself. He makes no bones about from al-Zarqawi’s correspondence (“Letter to Bin many of his (typical) pilot’s prejudices of the Laden and Zawahiri”) illuminates his identifica- day, and that teaches us something about what tion of the Shiites (or, as he calls them, the her- we used to be and how far we have come. His etics) as the real “near enemy” to fight. After ex- descriptions of the indiscipline of the wartime, plaining his reasoning and intentions, al-Zarqawi stateside Air Corps in the air and on the ground asks for approval from bin Laden even though are appalling to the modern reader, but they he makes clear that he will proceed as planned, have the ring of truth. (The service had become regardless. This stance highlights the real rela- the US Army Air Forces before Knudsen entered, tionship between al-Qaeda and al-Zarqawi. but the term Air Corps continued to be used The editors have included extensive notes, many years afterwards. Technically, an Air Corps background information, and points of clarifica- existed on paper until shortly after the war.) tion for each section. Though not essential to John James Knudsen was born in 1922 and understanding the book, this material provides lived to 2008—and thus witnessed the Great De- excellent supporting information for the reader pression, World War II, and the entire history of not well versed in Islam, Islamic radicalism, the the Air Force. Brought up in Great Falls, Mon- Quran, and other related fields. tana, by a father who had emigrated from Den- Reading this book will not create a better mark and a mother from Ireland, he possessed a leader, better bomb dropper, or more technically largely rural, Catholic value system. Clearly, he competent Airman, but it does offer a glimpse was a hardworking, intelligent lad who earned into the minds, experiences, and thought pro- much of his way through Woodbury College in cesses of the enemy. By understanding him bet- Los Angeles by laboring in the Lockheed plant. ter, one can take more appropriate actions (or He graduated with a bachelor’s degree in com- refrain from certain other actions) to counter mercial art shortly after Pearl Harbor and en- that enemy. I recommend Al Qaeda in Its Own tered the Air Corps in 1943. He never got out of Words to anyone who really wishes to under- the continental United States during the war, stand whom we are fighting and the ideology for spending most of his time as an instructor pilot which they are fighting. although he was trained in the B-17 and B-24 to- ward the end of the war. He was on track for Maj Stephane L. Wolfgeher, USAF B-29 training when Hiroshima occurred, and he Monterey, California left the service a few months later. Thereafter,

Spring 2011 | 119 he spent his life as an editorial cartoonist in Cali- NW, Washington, DC 20036, 2008, 237 pages, fornia, married in 1947, and helped raise eight $29.95 (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-8157-1332-6. children. Though he was never in combat, it is clear enough that his short time in the Army Air The release of Vice Pres. Al Gore’s docu- Forces was a major influence on his life. mentary film An Inconvenient Truth sparked re- Off I Went vividly depicts the helter-skelter newed interest in the national security implica- character of the training and equipping of the tions of global climate change. In 2007 a report greatest air force in history. The harsh condi- by the Center for Naval Analysis concluded that tions under which Airmen lived and worked climate change is a serious threat to national stand in stark contrast to those we have enjoyed security. In June 2008, a national intelligence since the end of the Korean War. Shaky technology assessment noted that climate change has the and weak maintenance added to the fear that potential to indirectly, yet seriously, affect the was a constant companion for all flyers. Knudsen national security of the United States. Climatic relates a string of horror stories about flying Cataclysm, an anthology edited by Kurt M. challenges that do much to explain why the ac- Campbell, adds to this chorus of concern. Seven cident rate of his day was an order of magnitude of the 12 contributors to the book hail from the Center for New American Security or the Center higher than it has been since, say, 1960. He for American Progress. Two others served in the makes no secret of his contempt for nonflying Clinton administration. officers. The weakness of wartime junior leader- The analysis of Dr. Campbell and company ship and the general indiscipline among Airmen depends upon the validity of existing climate do much to demonstrate the great exodus of the models. Dr. Jay Gulledge, a senior scientist for most experienced flyers after Hiroshima and the the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, pro- need to rebuild the new US Air Force almost vides the scientific foundation for three climate- from the ground up. That the survivors of the change scenarios: expected, severe, and cata- Great Depression were able nevertheless to gen- strophic. He uses climate models to project erate the endurance, courage, and skill to temperature increases and then extracts the achieve a remarkable victory confirms the great- relevant environmental effects from a report ness of that generation. It also teaches the im- issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli- portance of maintaining a technological, indus- mate Change. The other authors then apply trial, and professional military base in peacetime their expertise in national security to create against an unpredictable future. plausible geopolitical scenarios. Dr. Gulledge I recommend that Off I Went occupy a fairly carefully points out that these scenarios are not high place on the aspiring warrior-scholar’s read- predictions of the future but projections that ing list for the entertainment, lessons on chang- “[describe] an outcome that is deemed plausible, ing military culture, and warnings it provides. often subjectively, in the context of current un- Even its factual errors and prejudices have edu- certainties” (p. 51). The authors do not associate cational value for the modern reader: memoirs likelihood with any scenario, yet they describe are not history, but perception often can have a the first one as expected. greater effect on outcomes than reality itself. It In scenario one, by 2040, global average tem- takes a long time for realistic history to develop; perature rises 1.3º C above 1990 levels, and even then, it is never complete. Meanwhile, we global mean sea level rises by 0.75 foot. The au- behave according to our perception of reality thors describe a domino effect whereby water rather than reality itself. shortages lead to food shortages, which cause conflict over these resources, which results in Dr. David R. Mets migrations and new conflict in adjoining regions. Niceville, Florida The developing world is at the greatest risk, but wealthy nations are not immune. The authors call on the United Nations, European Union, and United States to prepare to respond to the ex- Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and pected humanitarian crises. Furthermore, unrest National Security Implications of Climate in the developing world leads to disruptions in Change edited by Kurt M. Campbell. Brook- oil production that put upward pressure on en- ings Institution Press (http://www.brookings ergy prices. Russia, an exporter of energy and .edu/press/), 1775 Massachusetts Avenue one of the few nations that stands to gain in this

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scenario, will likely see increased crop produc- The fictional Patton and Muir disagree about tion from warmer temperatures in higher lati- the production of coal-to-liquids (CTL) fuel, Muir tudes. Of greatest concern is the authors’ belief disliking it because it emits CO2 but Patton liking that this scenario “is . . . to a large extent inevi- it because it undermines oil. The United States table” (p. 97). has an abundance of coal, and CTL fuel is one of Scenarios two and three arbitrarily double the few alternatives to petroleum that can power scenario one’s average temperature rise to 2.6º C aircraft. As the leading US government consumer in 2040 (scenario two) and 5.6º C in 2100 (sce- of oil, the Air Force has expressed interest in pro- nario three). The associated rises in sea level are curing half of its fuel from synthetic sources by 1.7 feet and 6.6 feet, respectively. The authors 2016. Although the proposal is not economical consider this increase plausible because existing when oil trades below $60 a barrel, there is strate- models do not include feedback mechanisms, gic value in having alternatives to foreign oil. such as the release of greenhouse gases from The strength of Climatic Cataclysm lies in the melting permafrost. authors’ sound geopolitical analysis of the im- The author of scenario two waxes Malthusian pact of potential climate change. However, they in concluding that reduction of the human popu- offer little in terms of analyzing the cause. Al- lation is an inevitable consequence of severe though climate scientists deem the scenarios climate change. War and disease cause vulner- plausible, they suggest no way of evaluating able populations to die off. Worse still, a nuclear their likelihood, which makes weighing the mer- exchange could decimate the human race. As an its of policies such as the Air Force’s CTL plan alternative, he suggests that states may establish difficult. Do the possible long-term conse- reproductive restrictions to control population quences of global climate change outweigh the growth—a morally repugnant prospect to those clear near-term benefits of reducing dependence who value reproductive freedom, but attitudes on foreign oil? Climatic Cataclysm has no answer. may be different in 2040. However, the authors do provide an imaginative Scenario three paints an even worse picture. and worthwhile examination of what could be- Large democracies such as India collapse. China’s come the greatest threat to our nation’s security. gains over the last century are completely re- Maj Thomas G. Aranda, USAF versed. Los Angeles, New York, Houston, and The Pentagon other US coastal cities become uninhabitable Washington, DC after 2040. The developed world, entirely pre­ occupied with its own survival, becomes isola- tionist. Genocide reigns unchecked in Africa. Still, scarcity eventually returns the earth into The Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of balance but at an extremely high price. the Berlin Airlift and America’s Finest Although the authors’ analysis focuses on the Hour by Andrei Cherny. G. P. Putnam’s Sons effects rather than the causes of climate change, (http://us.penguingroup.com/static/pages the solutions they offer focus entirely on preven- /publishers/adult/putnam.html), 375 Hudson tion. R. James Woolsey, former director of the Street, New York, New York 10014, 2008, 640 CIA, proposes the most interesting solutions pages, $29.95 (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-399- from a military perspective. During a fictional 15496-6; 2009, 640 pages, $18.00 (softcover), dialogue between John Muir, founder of the na- ISBN 9780425227718. tional parks system and first president of the Sierra Club, and Gen George S. Patton, the two An excellent history, Andrei Cherny’s The agree on nine policy options that have the dual Candy Bombers addresses the role of airpower in effect of reducing CO2 emissions as well as vul- defeating an enemy’s ideas. The book describes nerability to malignant threats. Providing tax global issues associated with the conflict be- incentives for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, tween the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, serves to reduce both greenhouse- with Berlin stuck in the middle; military pre- gas emissions and dependence on foreign oil. paredness; decision making and politics; and the Promoting micropower generation by means of lives of key players in the airlift as well as their wind turbines and solar panels decreases emis- influence on the outcome. Portraying how “smart sions and diversifies power production, making power” can lead to victory over a competing set energy infrastructure more resilient to attack. of ideas, Cherny recounts the new US Air Force’s

Spring 2011 | 121 and its leaders’ first victory of the Cold War. Such ton decision makers, the “Air Force was firmly advocates of smart power as Joseph S. Nye and convinced that the air operation is doomed to Richard Armitage would likely approve of this failure” (p. 290). book because of the author’s ability to demon- The author also addresses challenges to op- strate an effective combination of hard and soft erational leadership, reflected in his depiction of power (i.e., smart power). General Clay as the middleman between Wash- A former White House speechwriter and edi- ington and Moscow and the organizational ef- tor of the quarterly journal Democracy, the au- forts of Maj Gen William Tunner. Readers dis- thor clearly believes that the United States can cover Clay’s desire to be a combat commander use generosity and moral superiority to defeat during the hot conflict in Europe, his develop- threats to its security. Alluding in the introduc- ment as a trusted leader who rises to the chal- tion to the atrocities committed during the ter- lenge of irregular war, and his incredible success rorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and Soviet during the airlift. The description of Clay’s re- brutality during the initial push into Berlin fol- turn to the United States demonstrates the au- lowing the fall of the Nazi regime, he establishes thor’s belief that the general personified all of parallels in terms of foreseeing possible victory the heroes of the airlift. in the “long war.” By emphasizing freedom and Another hero, General Tunner had an amaz- democracy as the strongest weapons brought to ing ability to convert a “temporary measure to the fight by the United States, Cherny advocates furnish some extra food and supplies” (p. 263) the use of smart power. into a precise, efficient, record-setting, long-term The Candy Bombers captures the political in- trigue surrounding a presidential election during effort. Tunner’s work also captures the frequent a time of international crisis. The campaigns of disconnect between functioning as a leader who Pres. Harry Truman, Gov. Thomas Dewey, and deals with technological and organizational is- Vice Pres. Henry Wallace in the presidential sues while simultaneously seeing to his Airmen’s election of 1948 illustrate how politicization of morale and well-being. international affairs and domestic use of the The title of the book calls to mind the nick- threat of war can sway voter support. The ac- name of Col Gail Halvorsen, who, during Opera- count of decision making during the election tion Little Vittles, dropped candy to Berlin’s iso- campaign offers excellent insight into civil- lated children, thus establishing perhaps the military relations and US history. most well known image of the airlift. Indeed, his Readers learn how direct action of the com- efforts became a symbol of one man’s efforts to mander on the ground overcomes Washington’s change the world. If none of the geopolitical or lack of political unity regarding Soviet expansion national political issues presented in The Candy into Berlin. Both Gen Lucius Clay, military gov- Bombers appeal to a student of airpower history, ernor of Germany, and Col Frank Howley, com- then the Halvorsen story alone makes it a worth- mander of the military government in divided while read. However, in the process of relating Berlin, arrived with animosity for the Germans how air mobility and the new US Air Force con- but quickly realized how loyalty to the popula- tributed to the first face-off of the Cold War, tion and the city of West Berlin confirmed West- Cherny succeeds in demonstrating the impor- ern resolve against Soviet expansionism. To the tance of using smart power to address our cur- point of nearly sacrificing his career, Clay re- rent national challenges. peatedly stands up to Washington decision mak- ers to prevent the United States from abandon- Lt Col Tom Cooper, USAF ing Berlin and thus avoid armed conflict with Scott AFB, Illinois the Soviet Union. Cherny notes Washington’s desire to return to its smaller, pre–World War II military posture as well as the rapid demobilization of the military Circling the Earth: United States Plans for a following the war, captured through comparisons Postwar Overseas Military Base System, of Soviet and Western ground forces and the in- 1942–1948 by Elliott V. Converse III. Air Uni- ability to field significant numbers of airlift air- versity Press (http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil), craft. Clearly the US Air Force saw its air mobility 155 N. Twining Street, Maxwell AFB, Alabama role undermined at this point. As an assistant 36112-6026, 2005, 265 pages, $22.00 (soft- secretary of the Air Force declared to Washing- cover), ISBN 1-58566-141-4. Available free

122 | Air & Space Power Journal Book Reviews

from http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress technological limitations of Air Force bombers /Books/Converse/converse.pdf. led to the need for bases despite previous analy- sis to the contrary. This debate was heavily in- Circling the Earth is a comprehensive narra- fluenced by the increasingly aggressive insis- tive and analysis of the post–World War II base- tence by the Army Air Forces (AAF), precursor planning efforts that began in 1942. Although of the US Air Force, that airpower would prove this topic may sound dry and uninteresting, decisive in future conflicts. ­Elliott Converse has written an excellent study All of the major military bureaucracies, in- for people who follow defense bureaucracies and cluding the Army, Navy, Department of War, analyze how they operate as they attempt to bal- AAF, Department of State, and Civil Aeronautics ance the competing priorities, conflicting objec- Board, were involved in strategy formulation and tives, demands, and personal peccadilloes of the conflict over resources. Converse describes those they serve. Most planners working in the in some detail the interplay among the JCS, Pentagon recognize themselves in the author’s AAF, and Navy, and how interservice rivalry description of attempts to match broad policy over future roles and budgets affected strategy and grand strategy to well-designed plans. development and base locations. The study provides an interesting mirror to Of special interest is the description of civil- recent base-planning efforts. Like most weapon military relations and their evolution from the systems, bases require extensive resources prior beginning of the war to the reorganization of the to their introduction, as well as during construc- US security establishment in 1947. The direct tion and operations. As in the post–Cold War era, access to Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt enjoyed by planners in the 1940s assumed that the defense the JCS created many problems for the civilian budget would see dramatic cuts after the end of secretaries of war and the Navy, as they at- World War II. The lessons presented here are tempted to put their own imprints on policy. helpful to any student of the military establish- After Roosevelt’s death, the author describes ment who attempts to reconcile strategy with how the civilian secretaries began to interpose limited resources. themselves, together with the various organiza- Converse’s extensive use of primary sources tional and bureaucratic mechanisms they estab- makes this analysis exceptionally plausible and lished, into the base-planning process. The tran- authentic. Most of them come from the ar- sition from the elevated status the military chives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the occupied during the war to the relegation ex- personal papers, memoranda, and memoirs of pected at war’s end acted as a substantive driver individuals who took part in or oversaw the for much of the sparring that occurred during planning effort. the planning process. The development and formulation of US base Circling the Earth has some shortcomings. For planning were part of a larger effort to define the example, it includes extensive discussion about role of the United States and its military in a the economic and commercial aspects of basing postwar era. The author traces the evolution of that were an important factor in base require- policy from a regional to a global security out- ments and location. President Roosevelt pushed look as it became clear that observed threats the base-planning effort early and hard, con- would not come from several different, histori- vinced that civil aviation would become an im- cally hostile countries, but from a more mono- portant driver of postwar economic success, and lithic and powerful Soviet Union. This fact that the United States would compete with its changed the perceived role of US military forces allies to secure commercial routes and refueling from part of an international police force, re- points. However, the book gives no indication sponsible for keeping the peace in internation- that other commercial aspects may have played ally designated zones, to a force that would have a role in base planning, especially for the Navy. to remain strong to defend the United States as Furthermore, it fails to address the potential of well as parts of Europe and Asia. The role of the merchant shipping as an economic motivator, military base shifted from a means of promoting leaving the reader to wonder whether this omis- peace and commerce to an outpost for conduct- sion stems from the lack of discussion about the ing aerial attacks against an aggressive Soviet importance of port access and seaborne trade Union. Additionally, the geographic focus shifted routes, or whether the subject remains an unex- from Asia to Europe and the Middle East, due to plored part of the historical record that the au- security issues and economic interests. The thor chose not to pursue.

Spring 2011 | 123 Readers would definitely benefit from the have incorporated this adaptive-optics technology, inclusion of organization charts describing the and many older ones have been retrofitted. structure of the Department of War, Department Dr. Robert Duffner, longtime historian for the of the Navy, and JCS, as well as their connec- Air Force Research Laboratory directorates and tions to the executive branch. In addition, maps predecessor organizations at Kirtland AFB, thor- featuring the proposed base locations and de- oughly explains the development of adaptive marcation lines, as described in the text, would optics in this informative book. Because military have been helpful in visualizing changes that uses for adaptive optics include tracking, identi- took place from 1942 to 1948. fying, and (theoretically) disabling satellites in Moreover, most planners like to see how their orbit as well as focusing directed-energy weap- superiors receive their efforts and how well their ons to destroy missiles and other targets, devel- plan worked. Circling the Earth describes only opment of this technology was shrouded in se- the planning efforts—not the execution of strategy crecy from its birth in the 1970s until the end of or actual placement of bases. Although the au- the Cold War. As the author makes clear, the mili- thor may have used this approach to limit the tary potential of adaptive optics encouraged the scope of his topic, a short summary of the plans’ Air Force, the Defense Advanced Research Proj- execution could have provided perspective on ects Agency, and later the Strategic Defense Ini- whether the United States actually implemented tiative Organization (now the Missile Defense what the JCS and services had developed, and Agency) to keep investing the money and time would have offered valuable lessons to modern- required. Bringing the story almost up to date, day planners. Finally, readers find little detail on the book describes the Air Force’s continued actual negotiations by the State Department that work with adaptive optics, including its sophisti- took place to secure bases or base rights or on cated telescopes in New Mexico and Hawaii, as how that department addressed the unwilling- well as the YAL-1A Airborne Laser. ness of other countries to host US bases. The author bases his study on exhaustive re- search, enhancing its credibility by providing CAPT Paul Younes, USNR source citations for almost every paragraph. NR C2F Expanded Missions Unit These include interviews with more than 70 Newport, Rhode Island ­people—not only scientists and engineers but also managers, commanders, and high-level deci- sion makers (including several former Air Force secretaries, chiefs of staff, and other Department The Adaptive Optics Revolution: A History of Defense executives). In describing the tech- by Robert W. Duffner. University of New nical challenges that had to be overcome, Duffner Mexico Press (http://www.unmpress.com), gives full credit to various military organizations, 1312 Basehart Road SE, Albuquerque, New MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, and many private Mexico 87106-4363, 2009, 485 pages, $44.00 companies; quite appropriately, he also empha- (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-8263-4691-9. sizes “in-house” teams of Air Force civilian and military personnel responsible for some of the In May 1991 Dr. Robert Fugate, an Air Force most impressive breakthroughs. scientist from Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, as- To help readers unfamiliar with lasers, optics, tounded a standing-room-only audience at the or the history of defense research, the author 178th meeting of the American Astronomical provides plenty of background information and Society in Seattle. He disclosed eagerly antici- other details. At the risk of being repetitious, pated details about an innovation that would many chapters summarize material covered pre- bring an exponential improvement in the quality viously. Some of the topics can seem a bit too of images from space. Showing “before and after” technical for the average reader, but almost 100 photos as proof, he described how specialized well-placed illustrations and photographs aid in laser beams integrated with waveform sensors, understanding the text. Unfortunately, the pub- high-speed processors, and deformable mirrors lisher did not use a color version of any of the could compensate for the atmospheric turbu- images of adaptive optics in action for the book’s lence that had heretofore blurred the vision of dust jacket; doing so would have better indicated the world’s most powerful terrestrial telescopes. its contents than the old black-and-white snap- Since that revelation, all new large telescopes shot selected.

124 | Air & Space Power Journal Book Reviews

The Adaptive Optics Revolution is a prime ex- may find an opportunity to relive a portion of ample of technology transfer—that is, how mili- their own history. Third, some readers may tary research and development (R&D) programs become acquainted for the first time with some can spin off beneficial civilian applications. This lesser-known figures. Fourth, students of well-written history should be of special value to leader ­ship may rediscover the power of trans­ all R&D professionals and anyone interested in actional and transformative leadership in mili- modern astronomy. tary guise. The text provides insights into the enormous contributions made by nine genuine Lawrence R. Benson American heroes. Albuquerque, New Mexico Despite the generally positive tenor of this review thus far, we find The Art of Command flawed in several respects. First, separately and collectively, the essays contribute little The Art of Command: Military Leadership new to our knowledge of leadership, in either from George Washington to Colin Powell its theoretical or applied sense. For example, edited by Harry S. Laver and Jeffrey J. Mat- to point out repeatedly that leading from the thews. University of Kentucky Press (http:// front, showing determination and flexibility, www.kentuckypress.com), 663 South Lime- and having consideration for subordinates stone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008, seems hardly original. Second, with the excep- 2008, 304 pages, $32.50 (hardcover), ISBN tion of H. R. ­McMaster, who draws upon the 978-0-8131-2513-8. classic work of Carl von Clausewitz, the essay- ists appear to systematically ignore the extant The Art of Command is a collection of nine literature on military leadership, as well as the essays, each written by a different author on larger body of leadership research in business various facets of military leadership. The presen- and management. tation of the essays preserves the sweep of Imprecision in language also flaws the text. American military history from the outset of the For example, the contributors use terms like Revolutionary War in 1775 through the Gulf Wars styles, traits, themes, and qualities interchangeably of the 1990s to the retirement of Gen Colin Powell, and, in our view, inappropriately. This pattern chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from active carries over to essay titles that make no duty on 30 September 1993. ­differentiation between characteristics of leader- The editors identify nine leadership “themes” ship (integrity, determination, vision, and adap- and nine military officers who exemplify those tiveness) and the context of leadership (institu- themes, stating explicitly at the outset that “each tional, cross-cultural [more precisely, coalitional], leader personified many, if not all nine, of our and technological). All were simply “themes.” key themes” (p. 3). We add that the essayists We must also point out biases in the text. For identify many more than nine. example, of the nine individuals profiled, It is not difficult to recommend The Art of seven—including Henry H. “Hap” Arnold—were Command to a broad spectrum of readers. For career Army officers. Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller those who have neither the time nor the inclina- served in the Marine Corps, and Hyman G. tion to read book-length biographies, this collec- ­Rickover was a Navy admiral. All nine were flag tion provides brief accounts (20–30 pages) of the officers, and all but one (Powell) were white lives and contributions of the selected American males. The hidden messages are clear, if un­ military men. More importantly, “Integrity and intended, despite the fact that the nine selected Leadership,” the opening essay on General undeniably deserve respect and honor. Finally, Washington, elaborates one of the prominent we note that the editors only minimally achieve themes in current research on leadership: their purpose, as articulated in the “Introduc- namely, the influence of the leader’s character tion,” of “provid[ing] . . . a historically grounded upon the success of any enterprise. Caroline Cox exploration of leadership development ” (empha- brilliantly clarifies the relationship of character sis added, p. 2). Although all the essayists refer to actions in the life of Washington. to their subject’s efforts regarding professional We have other reasons for recommending development, they clearly consider that topic of the book. First, the essays’ order of presentation only minor importance. from Washington to Powell offers a useful over- Despite its shortcomings, we recommend The view of US military history. Second, veterans Art of Command to the military and general

Spring 2011 | 125 ­readership. We do so in large part because in our extensive interviews that they conducted with current age of historical revisionism and political aging veterans of the 365th. correctness, it is refreshing to find a book that After two initial chapters describe the action unabashedly profiles and celebrates genuine the Hell Hawks saw over Normandy during the American military heroes. first few days of the June 1944 invasion, the nar- rative returns to the activation of the unit in 1943 Dr. Paul A. Pohland in Richmond, Virginia; its training in Dover, Dela- West Paducah, Kentucky ware; and its deployment to England in Decem- Col Eric A. “Ric” Pohland, USAF, Retired ber of that year. In succeeding chapters, the Hell Hawks have their combat debut, move to a for- Melbourne, Florida ward airfield in Normandy, and then fight across Europe. By September 1945, the group had turned in its war-weary aircraft for scrapping and re- turned to the United States for deactivation. Hell Hawks!: The Untold Story of the Ameri- Drawing on their interviews, the authors can Fliers Who Savaged Hitler’s Wehrmacht paint a vivid picture of the 365th Fighter Group by Robert F. Dorr and Thomas D. Jones. Zenith at war. As one would expect, the book includes Press (http://www.zenithpress.com), 729 plenty of stories of air combat, as the Hell Prospect Avenue, P.O. Box 1, Osceola, Wiscon- Hawks’ powerful and rugged Thunderbolts in- sin 54020, 2008, 352 pages, $24.95 (hard- flict heavy losses on enemies in the air and on cover), ISBN 0-7603-2918-4; 2010, 336 pages, the ground. Of course the protagonists also suf- $17.99 (softcover), ISBN 9780760338254. fered losses—and not only in the air. Based close to the front, the Hell Hawks faced some of the Perhaps the most fundamental airpower issue same threats and discomforts as their comrades is the relationship between air forces and surface in the ground forces. Pilots detailed as forward forces. At one extreme one finds the doctrine of air controllers came within small-arms range of Giulio Douhet, as expounded in his seminal the Germans. Death could come by way of a work The Command of the Air. According to German air raid or a motor-vehicle accident on Douhet, airpower is best employed as an inde- an icy road. The authors describe how the en- pendent arm, directly attacking the enemy listed members of the unit maintained the air- homeland and achieving victory by bombarding craft, always outdoors, in primitive conditions it into submission. The United States applied and in all weather. Dorr and Jones also stress the Douhet’s theory in its purest form during the equal importance of logistics, which involved mid-to-late 1950s, when its military strategy em- moving into a base, operating from it, and then phasized Strategic Air Command. At the other in a few weeks moving to another base, as the extreme, airpower functions as an enabler and Hell Hawks supported the offensive on the force multiplier, but the ground force is the deci- ground and then relocated to keep up with it. sive arm—an apt description of the use of air- No book can be everything to all readers, so it power in Operations Enduring Freedom and is worth mentioning what Hell Hawks! is not. It Iraqi Freedom. is not a book about the P-47 Thunderbolt, nor is In the middle of this spectrum lies a balanced it an analysis of how airpower contributed to the approach, whereby air and land forces are equal campaign in which the 365th Fighter Group par- partners in a combined-arms team. One finds an ticipated. It is essentially a view of war from the example of this middle way in the successful perspective of the enlisted men and junior offi- drive of the 12th Army Group and Ninth Air Force cers whom the authors interviewed. across northwestern Europe from Normandy to Hell Hawks! is a fine contribution to the col- lection of World War II unit histories. Students Germany in World War II. In Hell Hawks! avia- and practitioners of airpower will enjoy this tale tion writers Robert F. Dorr and Thomas D. Jones of how our predecessors fought in the greatest of tell the story of the 365th Fighter Group, nick- all wars, nearly seven decades ago. named the “Hell Hawks,” which operated P-47D Thunderbolt fighter-bombers as part of Ninth Air Kenneth P. Katz Force. The authors use as their primary source Longmeadow, Massachusetts

126 | Air & Space Power Journal Mission Debrief

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The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, Air and Space Power Journal and other matters of national defense. The views and 155 N. Twining Street opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, e-mail: [email protected] Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air Visit Air and Space Power Journal online University, or other agencies or departments of the US at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil. government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. Volume XXV, No. 1 XXV, Volume

America’s Enduring Dilemma of Fighting Insurgents Dilemma Enduring America’s with Airpower Clodfelter Mark Dr. Force the Joint Defending Lessons Learned from Balad Base Joint USAF Caudill, W. Shannon Col Lt USAF M. Packard, Anthony Col USAF M. Tembreull, Raymund Col Lt Good or GreatGood to Up It You! Is Colonel, USAF C. Kane, Robert Gen Maj USA Lackey, James COL and C. Gene Kamena Prof. with and Command Flexible Developing Control of Airpower Retired USAF, Hukill, Jeffrey Col Lt Strategy Airpower and Retired USAF, III, A. John Warden Col Forty-Five of Frustration Years Dr. Daniel R. Mortensen Daniel Dr. Spring 2011

AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Spring 2011