Masaryk University Faculty of Social Studies Department of Political Science

MASARYK UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS IN THE BERLINER REPUBLIC

MASTER’S THESIS

BC. HELENA TRUCHLA

SUPERVISOR: PROF. PHDR. JAN HOLZER, PH.D

UČO 414846 POLITICAL SCIENCE IMMATRICULATION YEAR: 2015 BRNO, 2018

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work. Quotations, illustrations, and citations have been duly referenced.

Brno, May 29, 2018 ......

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank to my thesis supervisor Prof Jan Holzer of the Department of Political Science at Masaryk University.

This thesis would not have been possible without the help of Prof. Dr. Dieter Ohr of the Otto– Suhr–Institute of Political Science at Freie Universität Berlin, who kindly agreed to supervise my Erasmus study stay. I am grateful to Mgr. et Mgr. Kateřina Kirkosová of the Department of Media Studies and Journalism at Masaryk University, who steered me in a new (analytical) direction.

Finally, I wish to express most heartfelt thanks to my parents, my partner, and my dearest friend V. You keep me going.

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION ...... 10

1. THEORETICAL PART ...... 12

1.2 Arguments in Politics ...... 12

1.3 Theories of Memory and Remembering ...... 14

1.3.1 History and Memory ...... 15

1.3.2 Content Centred Approach...... 17

1.3.3 Process Oriented Approach ...... 21

1.3.4 The Culture of Remembrance as a Discourse ...... 22

1.3.5 Politics Of/With History ...... 23

1.3.6 Historical Arguments ...... 24

1.4 Excursion To The Second History Of Nazism ...... 27

1.4.1 The Old Bundesrepublik Deutschland ...... 28

1.4.2 The German Democratic Republic ...... 31

1.4.3 Reunified Germany ...... 33

1.4.4 Weimar, (Berlin), Bonn, Berlin ...... 34

1.5 Conclusion of the Theoretical Part ...... 38

2 METHODS ...... 39

2.1 Paradigmatic Anchoring...... 39

2.2 Aims and Research Questions ...... 39

2.3 Research Plan ...... 40

2.3.1 Time Span ...... 41

2.3.2 Data Sources and Collection ...... 41

2.3.3 Sampling ...... 41

2.4 Analytical Approaches ...... 42

2.4.1 Corpus Lexicometry ...... 43

2.4.2 Discourse Analysis ...... 46

2.5 Quality and Limits of Analysis ...... 48

2.6 Conclusion of the Chapter on Methods ...... 49

3 MAPPING THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE ...... 50

3.1 Interpretation 1: Discourse in Numbers...... 50

3.2 Plenary Minutes Sampling: Peaks in Debates ...... 56

3.2.1 Legislative Period 14 ...... 58

3.2.2 Legislative Period 15 ...... 59

3.2.3 Legislative Period 16 ...... 59

3.2.4 Legislative Period 17 ...... 60

3.2.5 Legislative Period 18 ...... 61

3.3 Interpretation 2: Topics, Strategies, Speakers ...... 62

3.3.1 Foreign and defence policy ...... 63

3.3.2 Democracy ...... 74

3.3.3 Citizenship and National Identity ...... 75

3.3.4 Medicine and Research...... 78

3.4 Typology of Strategies...... 78

3.5 Culture of Remembrance of the Berliner Republic ...... 80

CONCLUSION ...... 84

LIST OF FIGURES ...... 87

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS ...... 88

ATTACHMENTS ...... 89

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 112

ANNOTATION AND KEYWORDS ...... 124

WORDCOUNT: 183.131

INTRODUCTION “Our past shapes our present and our culture. We are heirs of our German history … we have the common collective memory of places and events. The Brandenburg Gate and the 9th of November are parts of that memory. Or a victory in a World Cup,” wrote German minister of the interior Thomas de Maiziére for the Bild am Sonntag newspaper (2017).

History is indeed more than just a sum of past events. Since there is always a “number of allowed, legitimate, ‘objective’ and more or less appropriate arguments about one historical object” (Kocka, 1977: 470), history can very well be utilized to to provide “orientation in the present” (Leuschner, 1980: 13; emphasis added).

In politics, providing orientation usually means to justify decisions, frame actors and processes, shape identity of a given collective, or guide choices between the moral and the unacceptable. In this thesis, we are interested in discovering and describing the way, in which history and memories of National Socialism enter political discourse, in the form of argumentation used by the members of the German federal parliament – the Bundestag.

We will focus on the period of Berliner Republic (1998 – 2017), which began with moving the federal parliament and government back from Bonn to Berlin, and which provided an opportunity to redefine Germany’s collective memories and its national identity.

Specifically, we will be interested in discovering the way, in which historical arguments penetrate discussions in general policy areas - not in commemorative and symbolical politics. Such an approach has been identified in literature review as a gap in existing research.

Since the principal aim of this thesis is to map political discourse, we will begin with a large data set comprising all Bundestag plenary meeting transcripts from the given period. By combining quantitative and qualitative analytical approaches, we will reduce the corpus to the specific instances of historical argumentation within general policy topics. These will be analysed qualitatively.

Underlying logic of such research plan is to link individual analytical steps with one another, making use of the advantages of both. We will attempt to approach the interpretation in an analogous manner: combining visual representations of quantitative results with qualitative, on

broader context focused description and interpretation of the discourse. In the end, this diploma thesis should provide answers to the following research questions:

In what ways are arguments drawing from National Socialism used in the political discourse of the Berliner Republic? a. With what intensity does the topic of National Socialism appear in the Bundestag plenary debates? b. What are the topics within which historical arguments related to the NS era are used? c. What strategies do these arguments use? d. Who uses these arguments?

1. THEORETICAL PART This thesis has established the goal to examine the role of historical arguments in the political discourse of the so–called Berliner Republic. Such aim demands, of course, a clear explication of all the key terms – historical arguments, political discourse, Berliner Republic – but also a precise embedding in the theory and academic research in general. To provide both is the goal of this chapter.

We need a) to make clear what we mean by historical argument b) to find a solid theoretical foundation for the use of arguments in political discourse; c) to anchor the notion of historical arguments in theory of memory and remembering; d) to justify the choice of the so–called Berliner Republic (1998 – 2017) as the time span of the analysis, and the national–socialist era (1933 – 1945) as the reference period.

We will begin with the perspective of the theory of narration and argumentation in politics. Then, we will delve into a complex matrix of the theory of memory and remembering, and we will work our way all the way back to the notion of arguments, this time more specifically historical arguments. After that, in the fourth sub–chapter, we will conduct a concise excursion to post–war Germany, to provide context for the use of history in this milieu. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn to sum up the what and why of the thesis.

Let us begin with the question of argumentation in politics.

1.2 ARGUMENTS IN POLITICS Our point of departure is a belief that reality is to an extent constructed discursively. Through text (of all forms), we communicate our knowledge about the world, and by doing so, we simultaneously shape it. In other words, through language, we create the “representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre–existing reality but contribute to constructing reality” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 9).

It is not to claim that reality does not exist. All the objects we refer to are real. However, we can only access and understand the meaning of such reality through discourse.

Meaning arises in the sphere of communication, and one aspect thereof is an argument. To claim that politics is a space where argumentation takes place can hopefully escape contestations. A number of studies dedicated to research of argumentation in politics can serve as evidence.

This thesis does not focus on arguments primarily as “means toward [a] goal rather than ends in themselves” (Zarefsky, 2014: 1), but intends to assess them as phenomena per se, embedded in a specific context, whose mere presence or absence, form and content are of significance. There is no ambition to arrive at conclusions, which would present generalizable facts about political argumentation in Germany, but rather to “illumine significant texts or moments in their own right” (ibidem: 2).

We can begin with a definition provided by David Zarefsky. He understands arguments as in discourse situated “claims advanced in an attempt to influence others” and “reasons offered in support of the claims” (2014: 2). They are “forms of speaking and writing, which we would first separate from narrations, [but to whicht] the narrative structure is inherent” (Hofmann, Renner and Teich, 2014: 2).

Thereby defined arguments may be incorporated into the theory of narration in politics (see Fischer, 1984; Czarniawska, 2004; Hofmann, Renner and Teich, 2014) as a building block of discursively constructed political reality1.

From this perspective, we may claim that arguments have in a political arena of conflicting interests the power of explication, justification, persuasion or legitimization, which they acquire by “manipulating the extra–linguistical reality and image–building and […] creation of collective identity2 as a foundation for the [future] reception of narratives” (Sánchez, 2014: 170). Narrations and arguments compete against alternatives, “always with the perspective to a general decision or judgement to be made” (Llanque, 2014: 14).

This may sound too simplistic or naïve: people tell stories as they like and shape the world as they please. But, narratives or arguments never appear in isolation. All discourses contain a “repertoire of legitimate stories” (Czarniawska, 2014: 5) and for any argument to have the performative power, it needs to fit into this repertoire; else it would be deemed irrelevant. On a societal or political level, moreover, any argument usually refers to others (citizens whose livelihoods and identities are subject of discussion), and to correctly evaluate the repertoire of legitimate stories is a necessary condition to sound appealing and convincing. Fischer (1987,

1 Even those, who disagree with such ontological claim might endorse the assertion that „narrative is the most typical form of social life”, and thus makes a promising source of insight (McIntyre, 1990: 129, op. cit. in: Czarniawska, 2014: 3). 2 Identity being also one of the by-products of memory, as will be shown later.

op. cit. in Czarniawska, 2014: 6) calls this the principle of narrative probability (coherence and integrity) and fidelity (credibility), which are both established by “good reasons”, thus the “accurate assertions about social reality”3. Olick uses similar argumentation in his account of political culture. “People do things with words, but not in circumstances of their own choosing. Both the words themselves and the situations in which they are deployed are structured in ways that transcend individual cognition, volition and control” (2007: 39).

Another objection to the constructive power of argument stems from the fact that no political unit (a state) is so unitary and homogeneous that outliers from the “repertoire of legitimate stories” are completely powerless4. However, Czarniawska asserts – and I argue that this is true especially in a context of representative democracy–, that “it makes sense for interpretive purposes to speak of a dominant or prevalent narrative genre at any one time – […] the mainstream” (Czarniawska: 2014: 6). The centre of our interest – key institution of the German political system, the Bundestag – does indeed represent such mainstream.

For now, we will leave theorising about argumentation in politics aside and focus on theories of memory and remembering in general, only, however, to come back to argumentation with history at the end of the following subchapter.

1.3 THEORIES OF MEMORY AND REMEMBERING Any research about memory and remembering seems to begin in a conceptual jungle. Behold: memory (Gedächtnis), history (Geschichte), past (Vergangenheit), history politics (Geschichtspolitik), culture of remembrance (Erinnerungspolitik), politics of the past (Vergangenheitspolitik), dealing with the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), collective memory (kollektives Gedächtnis), communicative and cultural memory (kommunikatives und kulturelles Gedächtnis), political memory (politisches Gedächtnis). The exact meaning of notions on this (incomplete) list is anything but clear, just like their theoretical background (Schwelling, 2008: 100; Erll, 2017: 4). The matter is even more complicated for any non–native speaker of German language, that has developed a rich terminology for purposes of this very popular research field5.

3 An example of how important both principles are can be found on page 31 of this thesis, in the account of the failed 1988 speech of the Bundestag President Phillip Jenniger. 4 For instance, revisionist historical argumentation of the relatively new right-wing party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) might be a subject of research on its own. 5 In fact, German tradition in political science in general is largely influenced by the experience of the Nazi totality: consider for example the studies of non-democratic regimes or constitutionalism. 14

There is no universal theoretical programme, with which the research of history and memory may be approached (Schwelling, 2008). With the assistance of an introductory book written by Astrid Erll (2017), the interdisciplinary lexicon by Pethes and Ruchatz, (2001) and an overview contribution presented by Schwelling (2008), we will introduce two general approaches to the study of memory and remembering on a collective level, which is in the fore of our interest.

First will be called content centred. It is more static, more closely bound with historiography, more informed by the positivist paradigm, and it lacks an account of historical arguments. However, it is represented by two German cultural scientists, Jan and Aleida Assmann, whose prominent position in this scholarly field prevents us from omitting it.

The latter – we shall call it process–oriented approach – provides more opportunities for political scientists, and it also includes the notion of historical arguments. It focuses on an active process of remembering and memorialising, and it is at its core post–positivist. This latter approach is not linked to a specific scholar (or a pair) but, instead, emerges from contributions of many authors, responding critically to the first account.

Both accounts differ substantially in their conceptualisation of basic terms, as well as the way they connect them. Let us begin with the most fundamental ones – history, and (collective) memory.

1.3.1 HISTORY AND MEMORY The German word for history (Geschichte) can be used to describe three distinct things. The events that once occurred, the research of what occurred, as well as the meaning–giving narrations about what happened (Pethes and Ruchatz, 2001: 220). The first denotation is equivalent to the meaning of past (Vergangenheit) but is used so rather colloquially. There is an agreement on the need to know history better than just in the sense of being aware of it – we want to understand it (ibidem). That is why historical research takes place, whose results are organised narratively, in written, spoken and material form. This third denotation is what we mean from now on when talking about history.

Chronologically older (and belonging to the first account) is the understanding of history as inclusive and universal. French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs called it the “memory of humanity”, and his successor Pierre Nora argued that “history belongs to everyone and no one and therefore has a universal vocation” (Nora, 1996: 3 op. cit. in Assmann A., 2010: 99).

Gradually, this view changed. Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Kocka considered history to be a contextually determined narrative construction6 (Emler, 2011: 13; Erll, 2017: 107), created in the process of:

1. documenting: subjective eyewitness’ testimonies (memories) are written down and interpreted; 2. explaining: why questions informed by the collected material are asked, and (subjective) because questions are written down; 3. reconstructing: from a distance, later historians study the sources and interpretations, they re–interpret and re–write (Emler, 2011: 13).

Reinhardt Koselleck (2001) understands history as a space of experience (Erfahrungsraum), not necessarily universal or roughly the same for everyone. When we remember, we do not recall directly the past (Vergangenheit) or objectively existing history, but either some specific history or specific memory of such history7. For this reason, it is necessary to include the theoretical foundation of collective memory to justify why historical argumentation is a relevant subject for analysis.

It was Maurice Halbwachs who coined the term collective memory in the 1920s, and his writings still serve as a source for both our outlined approaches. First, Halbwachs asserted that memory was on an individual level shaped by social frameworks, or cadres sociaux (Halbwachs, 1992). In addition to the socially constructed individual memory, he argued that there was also a genuine collective memory, emerging through communication and institutions.

Such collective memory is a sub–unit of history, by nature partial and particular, different for each group, its content guided by current preferences and needs of that group (Erll, 2017: 14). It has the power to create and sustain identity, understanding of time and past events, as well as culture and traditions of a given collective (ibidem: 15). In our case, we will be interested in collective memory on a state level (and its national history, analogically), focusing on Germany.

6 A hint on where the areas of convergence with the aforementioned theory of argumentation in politics will be located. 7 The debate about what we “see” when we remember the past (or imagine the future) is an interesting philosophical endeavour by itself. Usually, the difference is made between the “present past and present future” (gegenwärtige Vergangenheit, gegenwärtige Zukunft) – the past or future as we see it from today’s perspective - and the “past present and future present” (vergangene Gegenwart, zukunftige Gegenwart) – as they really were/will be. Neither of the latter two is accessible to us from the present viewpoint (Hagel, 2003: 107). 16

From this point onwards, our two demarcated accounts differ. Let us now first focus on the content centred approach, explain its terminology and theoretical assumptions, and assess it critically.

1.3.2 CONTENT CENTRED APPROACH German cultural scientists Jan and Aleida Assmann followed up on Halbwachs’ assertion that collective memory, despite having an ontological status sui generis and being thus more than a sum of individual memories of a certain percentage of the population (Olick, 2007: 5 – 7), only manifests itself in actions and statements of individuals.

In their writings, they introduced a categorisation of collective memory and explained their vision of the relationship between cultural remembering, collective identity development and political legitimization. Their account developed with time, see Assmann A., 2006: 210 – 224; Šubrt, Maslowski and Lehmann, 2014b: 38; Assmann J., 2010: 122).

A recent update by Aleida Assmann maintains there are four distinct forms of memory: the individual memory, the intergenerational social–communicative form of memory, and the true transgenerational–collective memory, which is cultural (mythical) and political (Assmann A., 2006: 215, emphasis in original).

Social (communicative) memory is the matter of socialisation and everyday interpersonal and oral communication. It is implicit, heterogeneous, fuzzy, and emerging in a bottom–up manner. It is egalitarian in the sense that no actors have privilege in its forming. It reaches to events at a maximum of three to four generations back (80 to 100 years), where it is separated from a grey zone of the “time before” by a space of limbo, called the floating gap.

The content of social memory may, however, enter the cultural and political collective memory, which is explicit, homogeneous, institutionalised and top–down formulated. It is intentional and selective, which is a key factor for its central function: identity building. Selecting only some aspects of the common past gives a collective the sense of meaning and continuity. “It is a truth of a higher level, which is not only true, […] but articulates normative demands and possesses a formative power” (Assmann, 2005: 76).

Political collective memory keeps alive and relevant the identity and legitimacy of a political unit (Kubišová, 2014: 90). Nations or states never have a collective memory naturally, their institutions need to make one up in commemorative events, celebrations of anniversaries,

through museums and exhibitions, by erecting statues and memorials, through education (Assmann A., 2006) 8.

Let us now assess the potential of this approach for this thesis.

The theory is relevant at least in one sense. Assmanns’ estimate of the social memory stretching approximately three to four generations to the past combined with the most recent generational change in the German society brings us with final effect to the stage in which “without eyewitnesses, the society must increasingly rely on two other modes of establishing the references of the past: through scholarly historical research and the media–supported cultural [or political] memory” (Erll, 2017: 3). The available empirical evidence provided by Langenbacher (2010a) or Becker (2013) and presented in the following subchapter, suggests, that we may indeed find ourselves on the brink of the floating gap, in which it will show, whether and in what shape the memory of Nazism will survive in the long–term German memory (Assmann, 2006: 221).

On the other hand, I argue that this approach does not suffice as theoretical background for analysis as foreseen in this thesis. It is with no doubt a useful theoretical frame, but it is not applicable as a concept for analysis. It is at the same time too narrow and too vague, and for our purposes also too static and neglecting the role of individual actors.

a) First, insisting that the political collective memory is always a product of intentional and conscious acts prevents us from looking for arguments that inform it in a political space in a broader sense – where history, memory, and commemoration are not of primary interest. In this sense, the theory is too narrow. b) Second, where exactly should we look for sources of collective memory? The successor of Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, suggested that in the realms of memory, where the “spontaneous national memory turns into the conscious and tactical construction of national history” (Šubrt, Maslowski and Lehmann, 2014b: 33). The trouble with such account is that these places are self–referential – there is no evidence for their existence

8 Political memory can reach further to the past than to the founding moment of the institutions that bear it. The condition for that is that the new political unit accepts such past as its own. This is the case for the Nazi era memory in the Berliner Republic. Germany is however an exception in letting the shame and guilt enter the active part of collective memory, and thus the political memory. Normally, these remain hidden in the non-activated archival section (Kubišová, 2014: 92). 18

located outside of the already existing narratives of history, outside of discourse (Pethes and Ruchatz, 2001: 222). In this sense, the account is too vague. c) Third, collective memory is in this account described as storage, with emphasis on its content. The result is that even if we knew where to look for sources of such memory, there is no clear description of the way it arises or translates itself into identity and culture. Also, despite Assmann’s assertions that in the 21st century, forgetting (Vergessen) has become an important part of collective identity building, there is not too much space left for an account of not remembering something. Due to its emphasis on content over process, the theory is too static. d) Fourth, the theory is my opinion incoherent in ascribing roles to individuals. On the one hand, Assmann retains the division between history and memory, which may be spotted for instance in the role she ascribes to history–producing scholars: to reflect upon objectively and “therapeutically accompany” subjective social and political memories (2002: 45, op. cit. in Erll, 2017: 14). This universal ‘‘history in general” is reconfigured into an emotionally charged version of ‘‘our history,’’ and absorbed as part of collective identity or identities (ibidem). On the other hand, Assmann describes the process of transformation of social memory into collective (Assmann A., 2006: 215), which suggests that the authentic individual experiencing predates the creation of collective memory, located in the present. In that case, it seems dubious that the mediated collective top–down memory may be completely “engrafted into the hearts and minds of individuals” (Assmann A., 2006: 216), ready to accept it for their own (Pieper, 2010: 195). Power of individual experiences is underestimated in final effect. e) Finally, if we think of the collective memory of a state: who gets to tell its story? (Radonic and Uhl, 2016: 36 – 37). So far, being German was marked by “distancing oneself from the Nazi past”, which might be difficult to internalise for many German citizens of Turkish origin, for example (Diner, 1998, op. cit. in ibidem). Assmann admits that political memory as defined in her account tends to be „stronger in ethnically homogeneous groups and nations” (2006: 216), and it is true that nation–states – as imagined communities – do try to enforce one seemingly universal narrative of history. In liberal democratic states, which foster plurality, this might not go uncontested, and thus, combined with the critique in the previous paragraph, this brings us to the assertion that the account is overly structuralist.

Naturally, we are not first to criticise the theory of collective memory as presented above. Some scholars adopted the theory to weaken its structuralist underpinning. Astrid Erll, for example, understands collective memory as an overarching, socially constructed matrix (discourse, in fact) for individual remembering as well as forgetting (2017: 6):

FIGURE 1.1: PROCESS OF REMEMBERING WITHIN THE MATRIX OF MEMORY. BASED ON ERLL (2017). OWN

PRESENTATION.

Reinhard Koselleck (2001: 21) presented a similar argumentation and substituted the notion of collective memory with the “in the collective (socially) determined circumstances possible individual memory”, which Harald Welzer (2001: 11 – 19) described as social memory. Similarly, Siegfried Schmidt (2008) claimed that the to an extent socially determined memory is traceable in the deeds of individuals: their remembering and forgetting, the “well–structured semiotic events, which can be used … for the production of meaning, knowledge, or evaluation in [individuals’] respective biographical situation” (Schmidt, 2008: 199).

This brings us to the second account, which we have called process–oriented. It focuses on interactions with the past – processes of remembering, memorialising, and forgetting – taking place under the discourse–resembling socially determined condition - the culture of remembrance (Erinnerungskultur). Encouraging us to make this step is the remark made by Erll, that “while the collective memory is central to the curiosity of researchers, it is the culture of remembrance that shall be their object of investigation” (2017: 6). 20

1.3.3 PROCESS ORIENTED APPROACH The constructivist approach9 to memory and remembering, used for instance in writings of Matthias Maier (2015) or Austrian philosopher Oliver Marchart (2016), focuses neither on demarcations between individual and collective, the authentic experiencing in the past and intentional interpretation in the present (Erll, 2017: 107), nor the divide between collective memory and history, which are understood instead to be formed intersubjectively (Müller, 2004: 23).

It begins with an assertion that the past, never accessible to us in its “dull facticity10” (Marchart, 2016: 52), but through constructed images of history, situated in the present (ibidem: 46), must be assessed not only by its content, but also by changing cultural, political and technological landscapes that shape it (Maurantonio, 2017: 219). By tracing processes and actors rather than content, we can also account for the role of historical arguments within these landscapes.

Let us first focus on the process of interacting with the past, which has following characteristics:

1. It flows both ways. Not only do discourses pre–form the act or remembering on both individual and collective level, but at the same time, individual experiences inform these discourses. Both ways are subjective: remembering is always constrained by meanings and interpretations available to us; memorialisation “is always at the same time moralisation” (Müller, 2004: 19). 2. It is not egalitarian in the sense of giving each interpretation or experience the same weight (resembling the selectivity of collective memory in the previous account, but with more focus on unequal distribution of power and access to speech). Also, in this approach, the existence of competing versions of memory is acknowledged. 3. It has a meaning–giving potential. An individual or an institution, when recalling something from the past, draws from the existing structures of collective memory (Buschmann and Carl, 2001 op. cit. in Erll, 2017: 106 – 107) as well as her individual experiences11. With changing conditions, interpretations change too, influencing the repertoire of possible (recall Fischer’s conditions of coherence, integrity, credibility) historically grounded narrations, which on the state level may serve constructing of

9 See Kratochwil (2008) for a good explication of what is (not) constructivism. 10 The existence of which is not denied. 11 The limit of individual influence being that only that can be convincingly presented, what respective collectively shared reference frames of each epoch can reconstruct (Pethes and Ruchatz, 2001: 247). 21

sentiments of identity (Marchart, 2016: 46), belonging, and legitimacy (Kohlstruck, 2004: 177; Schwelling, 2008: 115).

Under such circumstances, it indeed seems more suitable to speak of the already mentioned “in the collective (socially) determined circumstances possible individual memory” (Koselleck, 2001), which acknowledges both heterogeneity of such modes of remembering, as well as the fact that the content of what is remembered is always the “past which takes place in the present” (Marchart, 2016: 46), the present past. What are, however, the collectively determined circumstances of the process?

As an answer to this question, the theory comes up with a notion of a culture of remembrance (Erinnerungskultur)12, which entered the research on memory concurrently with growing significance of post–positivist paradigms and variables such as speech and symbols (Lipinski, 2013). Let us now have a look at this notion in greater detail.

1.3.4 THE CULTURE OF REMEMBRANCE AS A DISCOURSE There are multiple available definitions of a culture of remembrance. It is either, in a narrower sense, the “scientific usage of history for the public” (Hockerts, 2002: 41, op. cit. in Troebst, 2013: 27), or, in a broader sense, the “formal and overarching notion for all thinkable forms of conscious remembering of historical events, persons and processes […] of esthetical, political and cognitive nature” (Cornelissen, 2003: para. 1; see also Schmidt, 2008: 196 and Maier, 2015: 102.

The notion was forged by social scientists from the so–called Collaborative Research Centre 434 at the Justus–Liebig–Universität Gießen, whose commitment was to “engage critically with the influential concept of cultural memory of Jan and Aleida Assmann” by understanding “the dynamics of remembering as a result of plurality of simultaneous areas of remembering, which compete for sovereignty in interpretation in a society” (Gießener Sonderforschungsbereich 434; 2018).

We may, therefore, argue that culture of remembrance are “public uses of history” (notion by Habermas, 1988, op. cit. in Müller, 2004: 25) which, in turn, guided and motivated by present conditions or future challenges, serve to specific interests (Pethes and Ruchatz, 2001: 221).

12 It exists not only in the singular word-form (as the general notion) but also in plural, to describe the multiplicity of interactions (Berek, 2008: 36). 22

1.3.5 POLITICS OF/WITH HISTORY One facet of the culture of remembrance is history politics, or Geschichtspolitik13. We will focus on it in more detail because it will allow us to account for historical argumentation within political discourses.

Geschichtspolitik is a neologism that came to existence as a negatively–laden term in the argumentation of Christian Meier (1987 [1986]: 204, op. cit. in Troebst, 2013: 15 – 17) during the so–called Historian’s Dispute14. The negative sound survived in an account of historian Heinrich August Winkler who put it into opposition to non–ideological historical science (2007).

Peter Steinbach (1994, op. cit. in Troebst, 2013: 18) was the first one to use it as an analytical concept. Other scholars followed suit and provided roughly two different understandings of the notion, one narrower and one broader.

The narrower definition was applied notably by Edgar Wolfrum (1999: 25). He defined politics of history as a separate “field of acting and policy–making within which various actors access and use history with regard to their specific political interests” (1999:26). Similarly, Peter Reichel claimed it was the “for an entire state relevant and conflictual policy field15” (1995: 13). Both definitions suggest the existence of an independent policy–making space (Geschichtspolitik), focused on intentional acts of remembering and explicit thematisation of the past. In the majority of scholarly writings, Geschichtspolitik is understood in this narrow sense (Schwelling, 2008: 13 – 14), focusing on “shaping the events of commemoration, setting up memorials, and accentuating through public speeches” (Steinbach, 2008). An example of such research is the analysis of Geschichtspolitik of the BRD (Wolfrum, 1999) or the symbolical usage of the past in the DDR (Reichel, 1995).

13 In the existing literature, number of overlapping terms can be traced, both in English and German. In German, the notions include politics of remembering (Erinnerungspolitik), politics with the past (Vergangenheitspolitik) (Troebst, 2013: 15) or memory politics (Gedächtnispolitik). Schmid (2008) analysed the frequency of their use and discovered that the politics of history (Geschichtspolitik) is used most frequently. In this thesis we have been so far using the would-be neutral English version history politics. Its refinement in the subsequent paragraph will connote a change in its meaning, too. 14 However, the adjective form (geschichtspolitisch) is much older, and was used – also in condemning way - in the right-wing journalism already before 1933 (Troebst, 2013: 17). The whole idea is in fact inherently German-centrist, and other national traditions of research depend on it as their “role model” (2013: 16). More on Historians’ Dispute itself follows in the next sub-chapter. 15 Policy field is a direct translation of the German Politikfeld, meaning roughly “politics by issue”. 23

Somewhere in between the two approaches stands a research of Leggewie and Meyer (2005), who still considered politics of history to be an independent field of policy, however, for which the traditional methods of policy analysis may and should be applied. They claimed that remembering is “embedded in the material, collectively binding decisions […] in processes of administration and legislation, regulation as well as financing” (2005: 18).

Harald Schmid took a different, broader approach. He claimed that “politics with history should describe any discourses and actions, with which the interpretation of history is used for political goals as a contemporary and public representation of the collectively relevant past” (2008: 78). This definition inspired a small number of analyses, which relied on Geschichtspolitik not as a specific policy field but as a “perspective for posing a question, which can range from politically relevant penetration of history by politics to very explicit and strategic thematization of history in political contexts” (Heinrich and Kohlstruck, 2008: 9, see for example Becker, 2013 or Langenbacher and Shain, 2010). In this an account, which we adopt as well, it makes sense to focus on instances, in which the politics with history (the change of preposition is intentional, to better capture the altered understanding of the concept) penetrates general policy issues. Instruments of such penetration are historical arguments.

1.3.6 HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS Politics with history has “image–building” and “meaning–building” (Schwelling, 2008) capacity, precisely because it flows into the collective memory, among others on occasions of using historical arguments. In turn, this political collective memory influences those, who use these arguments: while politicians have power over memory, memory also has power over them” (Müller, 2004: 30). At this point, we have completed a full circle and arrived back to the general theory of argumentation in politics, outlined at the very beginning of this chapter.

When a politician uses historical argument, she transports the past to the present, re–presents it16. Usage of history as a reference in general political argumentation rests on the above– justified conviction (of both us, analysts, and likely also of those who resort to it) that history may serve as a powerful source for mobilization, legitimacy acquiring and defending or condemning political decisions and positions (Müller, 2004: 2; Heinrich and Kohlstruck, 2008: 9; Wang, 2018: 64).

16 German language uses the verb vergegenwärtigen, literally to make present 24

In the existing literature, there are many accounts of how recourse to the past can guide the present, and knowing them will help us in with the interpretation of our findings. A “political– instrumental” usage of history (Leggewie and Meyer, 2005: 13) in a speech can legitimize policies by recalling lessons from past experiences – good and bad (Wang, 2018: 64), policy– makers have the possibility to use historical analogies when deciding policies (Müller, 2004: 26 – 27). It circumscribes the acceptable, the must–dos and taboos (Markovits and Reich, 1997: 9), provides vocabulary for defining situations and roles (Yaacov, 1986, op. cit. in Lipinski, 2013: 260) and political actors may gain or lose credibility due to their positioning towards past events (Steinbach, 2012: 19). Historical Arguments in German Politics

The significance of above outlined argumentative recourses for policy making differs from one country to another, but Germany is an emblematic case. National myths were important for Bismarck as well as in the Weimar Republic, and after their complete de–legitimisation in 1945 (Münkler, 2017: 12 – 13), the images of the Nazi past took a prominent place in shaping the political reality (Olick, 2007: 37). In the post–war period, Olick argues, “every institutional arrangement and substantive policy is a response, in some sense, to Germany’s memory of those years. The Holocaust, moreover, has long been the standard for evaluating Germany’s political activity” (ibidem). Some authors went further and asserted that memory is “the biggest factor mitigating the exercise of German power” and “major ingredient of the political arena, the public discourse and the policy setting” (Markovits and Reich, 1997: 9).

At the same time, it is an ingredient avoided by political scientists for it is “impossible to quantify, hard to measure with methods of survey research, yet very real” (Markovits and Reich, 1997: 9). There some empirical studies but given the immense size of literature dedicated to history and memory in general, we may agree with Manuel Becker that examining history as an argument within the broader politics with history is a “niche strand of research” (2013: 161).

Existing studies may guide our analysis in the argument–strategy building. To name the most relevant ones: there is the first ever (Becker, 2013: 161) typology of historical argumentation by Karl–Georg Faber (1975), complex categorisation presented in Christoph Steinbach’s article (1979), and a didactical contribution by Jörg Calließ (1985).

Faber focused on mentions of historical events and identified three rather loose types of strategies: 1) presenting events as positive or negative examples in an instrumental or normative sense, 2) using historical facts as source for deriving concrete legal claims or moral obligations, and 3) taking the value–laden events as general value measures (1975: 277).

Steinbach expanded the scope of analysis by also focusing on media editorials. He identified seven rhetorical approaches to history: 1) simply introducing its lessons, 2) deriving the lessons from broader context, 3) appellation on importance of knowledge of historical circumstances for finding an appropriate solution, 4) the support for challenging the status quo and looking for alternatives, 5) comparative outlook on similarities and differences of the historical situation with the present, 6) comparative outlook on the consequences of the past for today, 7) critique of the present development as historical “normalcy” (1977: 245 – 257).

Jörg Calließ some years later summarized these findings and formulated four ideal–typical patterns of history as an argument: 1) introduction of historical examples, 2) construction of analogies, 3) describing trends and developments that led to the genesis of the current reality, and 4) the use of effect–and meaning–linkages for constituting history as a process (1985: 55 – 59).

Also relevant is the contribution of Katharina Oehler (1989), in which she examined history as a source of legitimacy in the Bundestag argumentation between 1949 and 1979. Dieter Langewiesche (1992) focused on speeches of German federal presidents and showed that they, in addition to making ceremonial statements, “casually” interpret history in general political argumentation (1992: 48). Matthias Rensing followed up on this research but focused more on a personal level and presented political biographies of five German presidents, based on history–related arguments they deployed in their speeches (1996). Harald Schmid described the relationship between political reforms and history–political argumentation of the first grand coalition (1966 – 1969) and concluded that its leaders attempted to avoid history as a source for the (then) present (2010).

As far as we are aware, there is no research mapping relevance and form of historical argumentation in the very recent German political history in general. To fill this gap is the aim of this thesis.

We have now come to an end of the simplified presentation of approaches to study of history and memory. We ended up with a detailed account of the two overarching concepts: the discourse–resembling culture of remembrance, and its sub–unit, the politics of/with history, within which we located and described the notion of historical argument, as a tool of penetration of history to general policy topics in a political unit.

Before getting to the how of the thesis – methodology – we need at least a rough idea of how politics of history and with history has been done in Germany in the past, and to explain what

it is, and why it makes sense to focus on a period known as “Berliner Republic”. Both are the goals of the next subchapter.

1.4 EXCURSION TO THE SECOND HISTORY OF NAZISM “Coming to terms with Nazism has in Germany become its second history”, asserts Peter Reichel (2001: 199). This second history is already much longer than the original twelve years of Nazi totalitarianism. Its end is constantly “forecasted, either feared or vehemently demanded” (ibidem), yet, it does not come. Nazism continues to be thematised and instrumentalised politically (Steinbach, 2012: 9).

Following paragraphs aim at laying out concisely and chronologically developments in interpretations of the national socialist (NS) period of 1933 – 1945 in the post–1945 Germany(s).

Although it will be a departure from our core topic (arguments in politics with history, not of history), the lack of scholarly accounts of the former combined with the necessity to account for narratives that inform arguments we will be searching for – as well as their political affiliation – we made a conscious decision to include this overview; despite the fact that it will inflate the (already extensive) theoretical chapter.

Let us thus begin with an overview, guided primarily by Edgar Wolfrum (1999; 2001), Manuel Becker (2013) and Herfried Münkler (2017). The period of Berliner Republic will be addressed towards the end of the subchapter.

History, as has been already illustrated, is always disputed, especially in democratic and pluralistic societies. Such disputes are often politically motivated (Steinbach, 2008). Germany, however, is a special case in that “1945 marked the end of [its] national history” (Winkler, 2007: 106). The immediate aftermath of the World War II., known as the zero hour (Stunde Null), was not only a moment of political, but also historical vacuum: to which reference points in the past can Germans now relate? What are the founding narratives of whatever political entity will come after Hitler’s ‘Thousand Year’ Reich? What stance ought it take on crimes committed by Germans, how to deal with inhumanity unprecedented in history?

Before Germans could even start to think about these issues, the country was split along geopolitical lines of a new conflict, the Cold War. As a result, questions were resolved differently in the BRD (West Germany) and the DDR (East Germany). Nazi heritage was also approached differently in both successor states, under the influence of political ideologies and

in opposition to one another. Such ideologization was apparent not only between the two units but also within. Inter–state tensions were much more visible in the West, roughly corresponding with the conservative–liberal axis, while in the non–democratic East the interpretation of history was immediately subordinated to state control (Münkler, 2017: 360). The politics of history of contemporary Germany is informed more by the tradition of the BRD, than the DDR17. We will thus focus on the former in greater detail.

1.4.1 THE OLD BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND Dealing with the national socialist past began in the BRD under control of Western Allied powers. The Nuremberg and some other less known Nazi trials took place before the new republic was founded. The Allies (both in the West and East) made sure the sites associated with Nazi power disappeared, to prevent them from becoming pilgrimage destinations (Evans, 2018)18. Surveys of public opinion from that time showed a majority of the Germans as “passive, resigned, more and more characterised by feeling as victims: of Hitler and the Allies. Antisemitism was common” (Wolfrum, 2001: 106). Nazism was perceived as orchestrated by “satanic Führer” who demonised “irrational masses” (Wolfrum, 2001: 109), and by the end of 1940s half of the Western German population still saw National Socialism as “a good idea, badly carried out” (Evans, 2018).

Gradually, the trauma faded, and, put with Rainer Lepsius; the BRD internalised the NS memory (1989, op. cit. in Münkler, 2017: 334). The post–war politicians did not deny that the BRD was a legal successor state of Nazi Germany, even though there was no symbolical continuity imaginable. Christian democratic chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU) thought it impossible to rebuild the state on Western democratic and Christian values and at the same time to conduct thorough denazification (Wolfrum, 2001. Nazi officials and supporters were thus integrated into the society.

The memory of Holocaust did not play a key role at first. Although the Social democratic party (SPD), led at that time by Kurt Schumacher (a victim of Nazi prosecution himself), did bring the narrative of “extermination of six million Jewish humans” by “Hitler’s barbarism” to the

17 Whose parts have survived embodied in the world view of the PDS / Linke political party. 18 Other, however, were simply too big or too useful to be removed (such as the 1936 Olympics Stadium or the Tempelhof Airport in Berlin), some stood as a reminder of the evil (the NSDAP rally grounds in Nuremberg, on request of local citizens) and some escaped destruction for no apparent reason (the 1936 memorial to German soldiers in Hamburg, which until today shows the inscription ‘Germany must live even if we must die’). 28

public discourse in the immediate aftermath of the War (Wolfrum, 2001: 107), after Schumacher’s death in 1952 the narrative largely disappeared. High–ranking Nazis were of course excluded from the public life, but the Wehrmacht (armed forces) was rehabilitated, and many perpetrators imprisoned earlier under the Allies were set free (Wolfrum, 2001). The memory of German suffering in the post–war expulsions dominated.

An important aspect of the BRD’s collective identity was its temporality. Western Germany never acknowledged secession of its eastern counterpart. Levels of self–recognition were low, and despite improvements in the 1960s – related to economic success and political stability – the notion of incompleteness and non–normality remained enshrined in the BRD’s core and only disappeared after the reunification in 199019.

Pacifism and anti–militarism were other key aspects of the identity of the BRD, even under the conditions of the Cold War and NATO membership (BRD joined the bloc in 1954, the Bundeswehr – army – was established in 1955, conscription was reintroduced in 1956). Atrocities committed in Germany by the Red Army were commemorated to support the population’s commitment to the defence of the Western Bloc (Münkler, 2017: 280).

It was only at the end of the 1950s that the memory of the Holocaust was publicly thematised. Edgar Wolfrum, for example, argues that compensations to the victims and state Israel were paid without zeal, motivated largely by attempts to improve the reputation of the BRD in the eyes of its Western Allies, relatively to the DDR (2001: 110). First commemorative exhibition on the grounds of the former concentration camps opened only in 1955, in Dachau (Evans, 2018).

Things started to change more profoundly in the 1960s, mainly because of a generational change. Children of the NS–era adults started to question how it was possible that their parents had failed to prevent the atrocities (Bude, 2001; Wolfrum, 2001: 112; Münkler, 2017: 335). Holocaust entered public discourse along with reports from the Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem (1961 – 62) and Auschwitz and Birkenau death and concentration camps trials (1965). Research of the Nazi period began after the documents seized by the Allies had been returned to German archives (Evans, 2018) and National Socialism was introduced to the general curriculum as a special topic for the first time in the mid–1960s (Wolfrum, 2001: 110).

19 Compare Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2018 [1949]: Preamble and Article 23 with Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2018 [1990]: Preamble). 29

Breakthrough amendment of the German Basic Law in 1968, marking a shift from the strict pacifist course and fear of failure of democracy, enabled the deployment of Bundeswehr within Germany’s territory in case of emergency, as well as suspension of the powers of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, and restriction of some citizens’ fundamental rights. It also led to the abolishment of shared sovereignty with the body of Allied High Commission, which had been supervising developments in the BRD since after the war. Herfried Münkler considers this constitutional change to be the second founding moment of the BRD (2017: 353): it was finally proven that Western Germany would not repeat the fallacies of the first German republic20, that Bonn is not Weimar21.

The political leadership of the country changed towards the end of the 1960s, too. Chancellorship went over to social democrat Willy Brand (he spent Nazi era in exile), which gave way to more honest and open confrontations with the past as well as more confident policies. For example, Brandt proclaimed himself the chancellor of “not defeated but liberated Germany” (1994: 186, op. cit. in Wolfrum, 2001: 111). This was criticised by the conservative opposition, who continued to assert that “one cannot celebrate defeat and capitulation” (ibidem).

In the 1970s, the social–liberal (SPD – FDP) coalition government was facing crises ranging from economic issues to confrontations with left–wing terrorism (Wolfrum, 2001). Criticism of the conservative opposition that without “solid historical anchoring, the BRD was only democracy for the nice times” (ibidem: 113), resulted in a public identity–debate, in which the conservative parties (CDU/CSU) proposed drawing a line behind Nazism (Schlußstrich), “decriminalization of the German history and new patriotism” (ibidem: 114).

This clash of narratives regarding German coming to terms with its past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) culminated in the political discourse during the chancellorships of conservative Helmut Kohl in the 1980s, and in the academic and media discourse in the so– called Historians’ Dispute that unfolded in 1986 and 1987. The topic of German suffering under

20 Such fears were not unfounded: as Edgar Wolfrum points out, the narrative of betrayal, not dissimilar to the stab-in-the-back (Dolchstoßlegende) myth of the Weimar Republic, now in relation to the attempted coup by the Wehrmacht and assassination of Hitler on 20th July 1944, was strongly present in the post-war Bundeswehr, in which many former Hitler’s soldiers served (2001: 109). It took until the 1980s to completely eradicate and only since the 1990s the 20th of July became a day of commemoration in the Bundeswehr. 21 These two capitals gave aliases to the two states: Bonner Republic and Weimar Republic. More about this follows in section 1.4.4 below. 30

Hitler was publicly emphasised and politicised for the first time, combined with the memory of German expellees (Vertriebene). This was criticised by the then social democratic and liberal opposition (representing the narrative of Holocaust–memory) as an attempt to relativize the suffering of Hitler’s victims (Niven, 2005: 4; Schmitz, 2005: 103, 108; Assmann A., 2008).

An important contribution to the German remembrance culture in the 1980s was the speech of the BRD president Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU) on the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. He simultaneously acknowledged the singularity of Holocaust as “unprecedented in history” but also asked for commemorating all victims of the inhuman national–socialist dictatorship, including Germans (Hammerstein and Hofmann, 2015). German suffering thus received much more attention than before, eradicating the idea of collective guilt for Nazi crimes (ibidem). Third post–war generation, which had “nothing to do with national–socialism, except being German” (Wolfrum, 2001: 115) appraised this.

However, the limits of the conservative/revisionist position materialised in 1988 when Bundestag president Philipp Jenniger (CDU) was forced to resign after delivering an awkward speech in the Bundestag plenary (including a quote of SS–chief Heinrich Himmler). The narrative of empathy with Germans who had to endure the horrible “every day history” of the NS (Schmitz, 2005: 96, 99–100) was (mis)understood by many as a vindication of the 1938 Jewish pogroms (Schmid, 2001).

The attempt to normalise German present by drawing a line behind its past was thus not successful. The imperative of self–critical working through the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), primarily the memory of the Holocaust, enforced both by the parliamentary opposition (SPD and the Greens) and civil society movements, remained at the core of West German identity.

1.4.2 THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC In the DDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) the Nazi past was not internalised but universalised. Fascism22 was interpreted as an extreme form of capitalism (Lepsius, 1989, op. cit. in Münkler, 2017: 334). Communist anti–fascist resistance (real but exaggerated by the political leadership) became the founding myth of the state, combined with the Marxist worker’s movement of the 19th century and German Peasants’ War, (Bauernkrieg), of the 16th century (Münkler, 2017: 324–325). Such position allowed for guilt cleansing of the working

22 Term National Socialism was suppressed in the DDR. 31

class (who actively supported Hitler) and for acquiring historical foundations for the newly established collective identity. The memory of the Battle of Stalingrad was highlighted as a cornerstone of friendship between the Soviets and “morally superior” Germans (Wolfrum, 2001: 108).

Delayed and limited denazification in the BRD was a source of self–esteem in the DDR, where “systematic confrontation [with the NS] and system–change [into communism]” took place (Wolfrum, 2011: 118, see also Münkler, 2017: 336). With completed denazification, NS legacy was with final effect left to the West, and Hitler became a Westdeutsche, Westerner (Wolfrum, 2001: 118).

Similarly, Holocaust (as well as the Nuremberg and other trials) did not find much resonance in the DDR, where – albeit silently – the Jews still embodied the capitalist enemy (ibidem). The realm of memory (Pierre Nora) of the Buchenwald concentration camp focused on commemorating communist resistance (Münkler, 2017: 331).

DDR politicians, on the other hand, instrumentalised the “scars” on German cities caused by Allied bombings (Münkler, 2017: 279). Ruins were often left on display until long after the war, as a reminder of the suffering of German civilians. In addition to Buchenwald, the second realm of DDR’s memory became the New Guardhouse (Neue Wache) in Berlin, a memorial dedicated to the victims of fascism and militarism and commemorating resistance fighters, World War II soldiers and concentration camp victims (ibidem: 346).

In the 1980s, changes in the official remembrance politics occurred in the East as well. In 1988 the first secretary of the Central Committee of the SED party Erich Honecker was so desperate for acknowledgements from abroad that he was willing to trade payments of compensations to Jewish Nazi victims for the state visit in Washington (Wolfrum, 2001: 122). October 9, 1988 (50th anniversary of anti–Jewish pogroms, Kristallnacht) was commemorated with a “giant public campaign that even the celebrations of the 1918 socialist revolution fell short” (ibidem). Such “descending from the heights of the war–victors and joining the BRD as the successor state of Hitler’s Reich” (Bender, 1996: 54, op. cit. in ibidem) was the final blow to the erosion of the anti–fascist substance of the East German state23. One of the first acts of the ephemeral

23 As Wolfrum points out, the anti-fascist narrative could have never been truly internalized, because simply not enough Germans took part in the resistance (2001: 119). It was thus from the very beginning missing in the communicative memory. 32

non–communist DDR was acknowledging responsibility for the Nazi past and offering reparations, despite factual fiscal collapse (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 559).

1.4.3 REUNIFIED GERMANY The culture of remembrance of the BRD dominates in the reunified Germany. Following its tradition, post–1990 Germany lacks a historical founding myth. Its collective identity is pragmatic, technical, and structurally rigid (Münkler, 2017: 6 – 9)24.

The fall of the Iron Curtain came concurrently with another generational change in the German society. Most senior professionals who started their careers during Nazism retired (Evans, 2018). It enabled “unfreezing” of Nazi–related memories (Müller, 2004: 6), and both in the former West and East, new research started, exposing the “role of doctors in the killing of mental patients, of academics in planning the extermination … of civil servants … judges and lawyers” (Evans, 2018). In our dataset, this was visible in initiatives to examine the potential Nazi–past of post–war state servants (for example plenary minutes no. 17/65).

In the course of 1990s, focus on victim’s memories intensified: responsibility for Holocaust translated into plans to build a central memorial (Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe; Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas), erected in the very centre of Berlin, on premises until then divided by the Berlin Wall. The Neue Wache was soon rebuilt to commemorate victims of both world wars. However, a Christian symbol of pieta was chosen for it, effectively omitting the Jewish victims. This has immediately become a subject of criticism (see for example Koselleck, 1998).

The Wehrmacht Exhibition (Wehrmachtausstellung) focusing on crimes committed by the Wehrmacht during the World War II divided the political spectrum, with conservatives opposing it. The CDU and CSU members of parliament argued that it was “propagandist” and

24 An interesting example of this are the struggles that accompanied planning of official celebrations of the fall of the Berlin Wall (Berliner Mauer). The date (9th of November) was burdened with so many negative connotations (the declaration of the Weimar Republic in 1918, the failed 1923 Hitler’s Putsch in Munich or the anti-Jewish pogrom known as the 1938 Kristallnacht) it was impossible to celebrate it. 3rd of October was thus chosen instead, the day on which the DDR ceased to exist (Münkler, 2017: 369).

had no moral or scientific foundations, attacking, at the same time, its curators (see, for example, Deutscher Bundestag, 1997: 14710)25.

German writer Martin Walser called for abandoning this politically correct memory, “owned by the Jews” (Schmitz, 2 005: 100) which in his opinion ruled out mourning of German victims of Nazism26. This argumentation became known as the “double victimhood discourse”: of Germans as victims of the horrors of war and post–war expulsions as well as of the post–war pressure to come to terms with the past (ibidem). The speech was immediately criticized by the Chairman of the Central Jewish Council in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, who responded in the media and accused Walser of opening the opportunity for right–wing radicals, who at that time were committing many violent attacks, especially in the territory of the former East Germany (Funke, 2004: 16), disrupting the desired violence–free image of German society (ibidem).

To sum up: until the very end of the Bonner Republic (1999), a self–critical stance towards Nazi history survived repeated revisionist efforts, and the memory of Holocaust remained dominant. On the other hand, in such strong Germans–as–perpetrators centred narrative, the perspectives of victims themselves find resonance only with difficulty (Wolfrum, 2001: 122).

A new aspect in the identity of reunified Bundesrepublik was its normalcy – a contrast so sharp to the extra–ordinary character of both divided German states that it scared some. For example, philosopher Jürgen Habermas expressed concerns that this new self–esteem, which materialised in a nickname the country acquired after 1999 – Berliner Republic –, would contribute to the normalisation of nationalist or militarist sentiments (Habermas, 1995 op. cit. in Becker, 2013: 25). If and in what ways has this new German normalcy demonstrated itself, can help answer this thesis.

1.4.4 WEIMAR, (BERLIN), BONN, BERLIN We have mentioned more than once the notion Berliner Republic, without, however, explaining it. It is fair, to begin with asserting that it is, in fact, an artificial label for a period starting with

25 There was also a second, revised version of the exhibition, which aimed at correcting factual incorrectness of some exhibited materials. It was launched in 2001, and eventually moved to the German Historical Museum in Berlin. 26 There were roughly 4 to 5 million German military victims of the war, about half a million of German civilians died during the Allied carpet bombings and estimated 11 million ethnic Germans were expulsed from the Central and Eastern Europe after the war (Evans, 2018).

no fundamental political–legal transformation27. Nevertheless, the name Berliner Republic is laden with symbolic, it is politically motivated, and it covers changes in the German political sphere and its society. That is why it deserves our attention and why it may be used as an analytical category, too.

The Berliner Republic is a younger sibling of the much better known (and infamous) Weimar, and the Bonner Republic. The first German republic received its name after a city, in which its constitution was drafted in 191928 (Becker, 2013: 15). The notion Bonner Republic originated in the 1950s and entered public discourse through a book of a Swiss author Fritz René Allemann Bonn is not Weimar, Bonn ist nicht Weimar (ibidem). It had three symbolical connotations: a) the (unprecedented) economic prosperity and party–politics stability of post–war Western Germany; b) the foreign policy of the new state: small–town city of Bonn on the Rhein river is an analogy for zero power claims. Such modesty materialised in sober governmental buildings in Bonn and new German embassies all over the world (ibidem: 16). Finally, c) it was an outcome of the coming to terms with the past: symbolical distancing from the in Berlin residing Hitler and other perpetrators (ibidem: 16).

Berliner Republic is difficult to define. There is no prevailing consensus on when it was founded. The minority opinion is that it was simultaneously with the reunification and Berlin becoming the capital city again in 1990. The second possible date is June 20, 1991, when the Bundestag voted in favour of moving its seat back to Berlin29. Finally, and this is the view we decided to adopt in this thesis, its begin may coincide with physical move of both German

27 The nickname is an analogy, whose development was nonetheless far from self-evident. Alternative suggestions that emerged throughout 1990s included for example the Third Republic. The trouble is that no third (after Weimar in 1920 and BRD and DDR in 1949) republic has ever come to an existence. Former Eastern German states (Bundesländer) were in the reunification process added to the existing Western state. The process unfolded according to Article 23 of the German Basic Law, Grundgesetz, which from its adoption presupposed extending its jurisdiction to former DDR Bundesländer after their accession (Beitritt). New constitution – embodiment of a true state founding act - as foreseen in Article 146, has never been adopted. However, the Article regulating this has remained in force, see Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2018 (1990)). 28 Whether the constitution was indeed written in Weimar was questioned immediately in 1920s, however, the narration of it was powerful enough to give birth to a name of the whole state. See Münkler, 2017 for more detailed account of symbolical meaning of the city of Weimar in German history in general. 29 The decision is known as Hauptstadtbeschluss, a decision about the capital. That is, however, misleading, since Berlin had already been the capital since the reunification. True substance of the decision was indeed only moving of the institutions of supreme state power from Bonn. CDU, FDP, B90 and the PDS voted predominantly for Berlin, while the CSU and SPD for Bonn (Deutscher Bundestag, 1991: 12034). 35

government and parliament back to Berlin (on October 17, 1998, and September 6, 1999, respectively). The more logical starting point for analysis is the takeover of government by social democrats (SPD) and the Green Party (B90/G) under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder on October 26, 1998, which marked a rupture after 22 years of Christian democratic leadership.

The notion first occurred in the media already in 1991 (Becker, 2013: 18), from where it entered the domains of politics and scholarly writing. Schröder and his cabinet identified themselves with it very quickly. The chancellor spoke publicly about the “transition to the Berliner Republic” which he understood as “his” (Schröder, 1999, op. cit. in Becker, 2013: 19), and it was the Green foreign minister Joseph “Joschka” Fischer who quasi–proclaimed it in Bundestag on September 27, 1998 (ibidem: 25). The opposition was much less enthusiastic: Helmut Kohl described the term as made–up nonsense and Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) as a word behemoth (Wortungetum). The notion was politicised, and it is likely that Schröder’s cabinet used it to an extent as a slogan to distance themselves from Kohl’s politics. On the other hand, it is fair to say that the government’s policy preferences indeed changed substantially in 1998.

What is the justification, however, for the use of Berliner Republic as an analytical category?

The return of the capital city of the reunified Germany to Berlin was not an obvious choice, and it required taking (political) stance towards the past (Münkler, 2017): leaving the “modest Rhineland city of Bonn, with its traditions of stability, peace, and Western integration” (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 557) and returning to Berlin, “with all its historical associations with Prussian militarism, Nazi Power and Central Europe” (ibidem). A capital city is a place, in which the central state institutions are located, and which becomes one of the state’s symbols. The key historical sites tend to be located here, representing “the existing as well as past self– image of a nation or a state” (Pethes and Ruchatz, 2001: 250). The relocation of state power back to Berlin resulted into the physical alteration of the city space, and debates accompanying the transition have influenced, by entering the public discourse, the collective memory of the whole reunified Germany (ibidem).

Additionally, another generational change took place by the end of the 20th century. Sociologist Heinz Bude speaks in this case about the so–called Berlin Generation (2001). He describes people, born between 1960 and 1965, as highly pragmatic and future–oriented, relying less on linkages to the past, who lived through an era in German history which was more or less happy.

It is exactly this generation, which has since the beginning of the 21st century constituted the majority in the German population (Statista, 2018).

Societal changes affected country’s political leadership as well. As has been already mentioned, Germany entered this period under the leadership of social democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder. His government was composed mostly of younger politicians, the 1968–ers30, who introduced their conception of the culture of remembrance. For the first time, Germany had a chancellor without direct personal memory of Nazism. Emphasis on (double) victimhood weakened, and instead, criticism of CDU/CSU’S politicised instrumentalisation of the topic unfolded (Niven, 2005: 7 – 8).

Nonetheless, the era of National Socialism has continued to serve as a major source of controversy in German historiography and politics (Kleßman, 2008), and to shape the “commemorative landscape dominated by the Third Reich and Holocaust” (Beatie, 2005: 148). By 2005, more people than ever found it necessary to know about the Holocaust: 38 % in 2005, compared to 18 % in 1994 (Langenbacher, 2010a: 26).

Eric Langenbacher (2010a; 2010b, see also Langenbacher and Shain, 2010) and Manuel Becker (2013) depart from this presupposition of the sustained importance of memory of National Socialism in the Berliner Republik, and formulate two possible paths of development:

Langenbacher (2010b: 35 – 37) claims that despite the fact that Holocaust–centred memory “remains the imperative for German political culture”, and discussions continue in many areas, “the policy–making appears much more rational, even self–interested”. The Berliner Republic, he argues may “find it challenging to identify with the community of perpetrators and their crimes”. Referring to the previously described theory of memory, he suggests that “the country has moved well beyond a transitional phase or ‘floating gap’”, and “Nazi–era memories may be transmogrifying necessarily into … simply history” (ibidem)31.

On the other hand, Manuel Becker (2013: 493–522) expects the significance of politics with history to increase. Thanks to its high emotional capacity, he claims, it can – when injected into other policy areas such as economic, monetary, or social – even help to win the elections. Inherent selectivity of remembering may be exploited in the world marked by increased

30 A generation that insisted on facing the Nazi past and the Vergangenheitsbewältigung, see page 29. 31 In the article, Langenbacher presents outcomes of his analysis in the German National Library, which show that interest of the public in topics such as World War (Weltkrieg), Holocaust, or Nationalsozialismus has been on sharp decline (2010b). 37

uncertainty as powerful, albeit possibly populist tool. Becker asserts that it is the DDR memory that now plays a key role, but that, at the same time, remembering of the Nazi–era remains the most potent source of analogies, comparisons and moralising. He concludes with inviting political scientists to “in the future more than before taking account of the history in political matters” (ibidem).

Both accounts are plausible and encourage empirical analysis. The questions guiding ours are the following ones: with what intensity and within which topics have been historical arguments employed in the political discourse of the Berliner Republic? What was the strategy of these arguments? Who made them?

1.5 CONCLUSION OF THE THEORETICAL PART This long theoretical chapter aimed at step–by–step answering the questions of what is the thematical matter of this thesis. We began with showing that arguments in politics can be depicted as powerful narratives, with the power to (re)construct and (de) legitimise. That directed us towards the constructivist paradigm in the theory of politics and memory, oriented on the process of how memory and remembrance are created in public discourses, political and media.

We outlined how the Nazi era was thematised and contested in the past, both in the former West and East Germany and after the reunification. With the support of Eric Langenbacher and Manuel Becker, we presented two predictions regarding future developments of historical argumentation referring to the National Socialism in the Berliner Republic, which should assist us with navigating through the outcomes of analysis, whose methodology will be described in the following chapter.

It is worth noting that despite our focus on collective memory and culture of remembrance of one particular nation–state, as defined and described on the last nearly 30 pages, the 12 years between 1933 and 1945 do not belong exclusively to the German national history. Experience of Holocaust is of global importance in questions of genocide (Holocaust Remembrance, 2018); politics of human rights; fight against weapons of mass destruction; as well as for development aid in many countries. Nazi totalitarianism remains one of the most determining phases of European and world history.

2 METHODS In the previous chapter, we summed up what is the general topic of interest of this thesis, what is understood under key terms and concepts, and what foundations does offer the existing research. In other words, we showed what and why will be examined in this thesis.

Now it is time to address the question of how it will be examined. We will explain here our research model, introduce the research questions, and describe in detail where the data for the analysis will come from and how we will approach them.

This chapter will thus be structured as follows: first, we will link together the theoretical foundations of the thesis with methods used, to show, how the two co–constitute the outlined research plan. Then, we will move on to describe the data, their collecting and sampling. Subsequently, the methods of analysis will be presented in detail. Finally, we will address the thesis’ methodological limitations, deal with the question of our reflexivity as well as of the quality of the analysis.

2.1 PARADIGMATIC ANCHORING To connect the theoretical and empirical part of the thesis coherently, we deem it necessary to anchor the research in a certain paradigm – a perspective from which we approach reality, as well as our methods and data. In this case, the constructivist process–oriented approach to studying memory and remembering converges with the conviction of the researcher that (political) reality is constructed discursively, in specific linguistic and historical contexts. In this case, historical arguments form a crucial part of meaning production within such discourse, that realises itself in text (cf. Wodak, 2008).

2.2 AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS To put it with words of classical research methods textbooks (see Punch, 2015): aims of this thesis are descriptive and interpretative. In our own words, its essence is mapping. We will attempt to locate, describe, and with the knowledge of socio–historical context, as outlined in the theoretical chapter, also to interpret and categorise historical arguments.

We will address following research questions:

General research question:

In what ways are arguments drawing from National Socialism used in the political discourse of the Berliner Republic?

Specific research questions: a. With what intensity does the topic of National Socialism appear in the Bundestag plenary debates? b. What are the topics within which historical arguments related to the NS era are used? c. What strategies32 do these arguments use? d. Who uses these arguments?

The outcomes of the analysis will be presented in two ways: first, in a narrative format. Each research question will be addressed in detailed and summative manner and illustrated using quotations. Raw data and background of analysis will be presented for the sake of transparency. Numerical results will be provided in “reader–friendly” ways, making use of tables, diagrams, graphs.

2.3 RESEARCH PLAN This thesis will present outcomes of a case study, focusing on political discourse in the Berliner Republic. The logic of the research is qualitative, despite making use of computer–assisted data mining from a large corpus of text, and thus combining more analytical approaches: corpus linguistics and non–dogmatic discourse analysis. These two are linked in a developing sequence: one method providing the guidance and outcomes for another.

Political Discourse

↓ … corpus lexicometry (QUAN)

a) Frequencies, node–forms, collocations, keywords in context → results presented (tables, diagrams) as Interpretation 1. b) Reduction of the corpus

↓ … discourse analysis (QUAL)

c) A smaller sample of text sections for close reading. d) Annotating arguments with topic, strategy, speaker + narrative description → Interpretation 2.

32 We use the notion “strategy” in accordance with Ruth Wodak (2009: 31 - 32), who in turn draws on Pierre Bourdieu. More detailed account follows in section 2.4.2 of the thesis. 40

2.3.1 TIME SPAN The begin of the Berliner Republic is marked with the first session of the 14th Bundestag (October 26, 1998), the endpoint for analysis will be the last session of the 18th Bundestag (October 24, 2017).

2.3.2 DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION Literature review presented in the theoretical chapter demonstrated that there are two relevant options when locating the source of political discourse. They differ in their orientation on the practical, or the symbolical; on the Bundestag plenary discussions (where practical politics is discussed), or on the speeches of ceremonial persons, the “living symbol[s] of the state” or “historical teacher[s] of the nation” (Langewiesche, 1992). In line with the aim to locate argumentation in ordinary, not symbolical politics, we have decided for the Bundestag plenary meeting transcripts (minutes, Plenarprotokolle). Parliament is a central institution of the German political system, where in addition to all the MPs also the chancellor (Bundeskanzler*in) and her/his government (the executive branch), make speeches and debate policies. Another (besides practicalities explained below) benefit of locating the political discourse in the Bundestag is the fact that politicians who speak on the parliament’s floor do so from the pre–negotiated position of their respective parties (fractions). They articulate here the political interests and positions of consent or dissent, aiming at “shaping various political areas … such as domestic affairs, foreign policy, economic policy, social policy and so on” (Reisigl, 2008: 98). Acquiring the data is not complicated. The total of 1.171 stenographic minutes of the Bundestag plenary sessions of the relevant period is available to download in XML format from the Bundestag website under the open data clause (Deutscher Bundestag, 2018). For analysis, these data will be uploaded to the Sketch Engine online tool in their original formatting, compiled into one set for each legislative period.

2.3.3 SAMPLING The default dataset (for lexicometry analysis) will be representative, including all existing

transcripts from the given time span. See FIGURE 2.1 for an overview.

N OF PLENARY MINUTES AND WORDS IN THE CORPUS AND SUB–CORPORA N of Period and Government Dates % Wordcount % Transcripts 14. Legislative Period 26. 10. 1998 – 253 21,6 19.799.843 19,9 (Schröder I.) 16. 10. 2002 15. Legislative Period 17. 10. 2002 – 187 16,0 13.780.590 13,8 (Schröder II.) 17. 10. 2005 16. Legislative Period 18. 10. 2005 – 233 19,9 21.141.572 21,2 (Merkel I.) 26. 10. 2009 17. Legislative Period 27. 10. 2009 – 253 21,6 25.551.538 25,7 (Merkel II.) 21.10. 2013 18. Legislative Period 22. 10. 2013 – 245 20,9 19.338.736 19,4 (Merkel III.) 24. 10. 2017 TOTAL 1.171 100 99.612.279 100

FIGURE 2.1: POLITICAL DISCOURSE. SOURCE OF DATA: DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG (2018). Subsequent sampling for the discourse analysis will comprise of a number of steps. First, it will follow a purposeful, criterion–based logic (Patton, 1990: 169 op. cit. in Hendl, 2005: 154), informed by frequency patterns: all transcripts with at least one keyword surrounded by context suggesting the presence of argumentative patterns (see section Keyword in context analysis below) will be read through. Then, we will sample on the level of sections (because all plenary minutes comprise of more thematically distinct agenda sections, Tagesordnungpunkte), eliminating those dealing with symbolical politics of history. Final sampling will take place I interpretation – the most relevant arguments will be quoted.

2.4 ANALYTICAL APPROACHES As indicated in the previous part, our research design rests on a combination of more methods –corpus lexicometry, CL (or text mining or corpus linguistics33) and non–dogmatic discourse analysis.

Examples of researches combining these two methods34 include the RASIM project – an analysis of discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the British press (Baker et al., 2008); number of studies of media conducted by Gerlinde Mautner (2008: 52 – 53); or the large ePol

33 All of these notions appear in the literature, denoting roughly the same. We will stick to corpus lexicometry (CL), to stress out that the analysis will not delve deeper than to the level of content words (lexis in Latin) but will at the same time draw from a large dataset. 34 For a convincing argumentation in favour of their compatibility see Duchastel and Leberge (2014). 42

project dedicated to study of neoliberal argumentation in Germany (Wiedemann, Lemke and Niekler, 2013).

The benefit of such approach is that it allows us to begin with a large corpus of data and work all the way through to in–depth interpretation. Hence the advantages of both the so–called distant reading and close reading (Lemke and Stulpe, 2015) merge in a blended reading approach (Moretti, 2000 op. cit. in ibidem: 77).

Unit of analysis will be a word (character35) and plenary minutes for the lexicometry analysis, and one agenda item, a thematically delimited part of plenary minutes, in the subsequent part.

Since the default data corpus is very large, it is necessary to use the computer–assisted data mining first, to reduce the scope of the analysis.

2.4.1 CORPUS LEXICOMETRY Lexicometry is a method of discovering emerging patterns (such as frequencies, collocations, concordances etc.) in a corpus, a “large body of … language data stored on computer” (Baker, 2006: 1). Software used for this part of the analysis will be the Sketch Engine36 online tool. The overall approach will involve a combination of corpus–driven and corpus–based approaches, to both guide the analysis by whatever is salient in the data, and to allow us to answer the outlined research questions (see Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013: 259).

In general, lexicometry offers following analytical tools:

Frequencies, as one of the central concepts and a good starting point for an analysis of corpora (Baker, 2006). Its utility for discourse analysis lies in the fact that the choice of words it uncovers, expresses position or intention, conscious or not. Comparing the counts across dimensions, e.g. time, can help us locate spikes in debates.

Concordances, which focus more in detail on how the words in a text are used and present the analyst with immediate co–text of a word. It shows the occurrences of a term of interest (keyword or query, generally called a node) surrounded by an equal amount of text to the left

35 Character in Sketch Engine is a sequence of characters (letters) inside of a token. Tokens in linguistics are all occurences of (usually) a word, but also punctuation, not spaces. In this case, we are choosing the character search instead of word search to account for a large number of compounds present in the German language. For example, if we run a word search instead of character search for the character sequence ‘Hitler’ we would not be able to discover the compound ‘Hitlerjugend’. 36 Developed in cooperation with the Natural Language Processing Centre, Masaryk University in Brno. I am grateful to Tereza Olšanová and Vít Baisa from Sketch Engine for their complaisance. 43

and right. For example, the concordance of the node “text” from the first sentence of this paragraph would be “more – in – detail – how – the – words – in – a – text – are – used”.

Node–Forms, showing various forms of each keyword and their frequencies. For example, for the node “word” the outcomes may be words, wording, and wordiness.

Collocations, the co–occurrences of two (or more) words: of a node (keyword, generally any term we are interested in) and its collocate. Collocations appear in a given text “more often than expected by chance”, which makes their linkage (statistically) significant (Sketch Engine User Guide 2018; Baker, 2006: 96). Collocates contribute to the meaning of the node. For example, when looking for collocations of the node analysis in the text of this research proposal, we would likely discover the collocate discourse.

In this thesis, we apply lexicometry with two main aims: first to extract basic quantitative information about corpus representing political discourse, and second, to “pinpoint areas of interest” (Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008: 6), which will be in the centre of focus of the subsequent in–depth analysis. Specifically, we will conduct:

1. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS: we will assume here that keywords open topics (Hájek, 2014: 39); hence, if a keyword appears in a text, it is plausible to assume that the related topic is present, too. We will count frequencies of keywords with the “Query” command, searching for characters. The more frequently any word appears, the stronger the intensity of the topic (ibidem). Six keywords for analysis in this thesis have been chosen deductively37, based on a literature review. Each noun represents an important topic of debate about National Socialism 1933 – 45 in German context38:

37 Inductive selection of keywords using the Sketch Engine would have been possible (extracting them by conducting a keyness analysis - comparing all the datasets with the corpus of general German), but impossible due to technical limitations as well as limitations of diploma thesis research. 38 All keywords are (personal) nouns thus written with a capital letter in German. Nevertheless, a check for their appearance with lower case first letter will be included, too, to account for spelling mistakes, hyphenated words, and de-nominalized adjectives (for example „hitlersch“, meaning Hitler’s). 44

SALIENT NARRATIVES IN THE BERLINER REPUBLIC Hitler x the national socialist era in general Nationalsozialismus National Socialism Holocaust x victims’ narrative and the question of Auschwitz x centrality of the Shoah Unified armed forces Wehrmacht narrative of Germans as perpetrators of Nazi Germany Vertreibung Forced displacement narrative of Germans as victims

FIGURE 2.2: KEYWORDS FOR ANALYSIS. BASED ON PETHES AND RUCHATZ, 2001; NIVEN, 2005; WITTLINGER AND LAROSE, 2007; LANGENBACHER 2010B; BECKER, 2013. 2. COUNTING THE NODE–FORM FREQUENCIES: since we were originally looking for the keywords as characters, more word–forms will be included in the result. We will write down these multiple forms, show their frequencies and explain the context, when relevant. 3. KEYWORD COLLOCATIONS: subsequently, we will search the concordance of five words on each side from every node and display the most significant bigrams (collocations of two words39). We will sort them using the logDice measure, which marks the strength, or salience of the collocation (Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013: 261). Reason for choosing this measure is that it is calculated based on a frequency of the node, of the collocate, and the bigram, and it is thus not affected by the size of a corpus (which differs for each legislative period). The value of logDice varies from −∞ 푡표 + 14 (see Statistics used in Sketch Engine, 2018 for more details); and it is widely shared that logDice values of 10 and greater reveal particularly strong discursive relationships (Varas–Díaz and Scott, 2016: 135). Top collocations and their logDice value will be shown, with more detailed elaboration – when relevant. 4. KEYWORDS IN CONTEXT ANALYSIS: finally, frequencies will be counted again, and the corpus will be reduced, by activating the context option. We will now be looking for occurrences of the keywords in the context of any of 124 reason and consequence markers of the German language (acc. to Breindl and Walter, 2009, adapted by Dumm and

39 We will focus only on the so-called content words, which name objects of reality and their qualities (nouns, lexical verbs, adjectives). Function words (prepositions, pronouns etc.) will be ignored.

Lemke, 201340). This will allow us to spot the argumentative content more precisely41, and hence to downsize the data set. Frequencies of keywords in context will be processed numerically, presented, and will inform sampling for the upcoming discourse analysis, details of which follow.

Interpretation 1: Frequencies of words, words in argumentative context, and affected plenary minutes will be noted down, in total, for legislative periods and separately for each month, to locate peaks in thematisation of the topic. Numerical results will be presented graphically, in a reader–friendly way.

2.4.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS Discourse analysis can be understood as a method and theory of examining the language used in a given social context (Beneš, 2008: 92). For this thesis, out of many varieties of discourse analysis, we selected the one proposed and described by Ruth Wodak et al. in their seminal work, The Discursive Construction of National Identity (2009 [1999]). Reasons for this are multiple: first, these authors share the “soft” level of determinism outlined in our theoretical chapter, asserting that although the actions of individuals are conditioned by their belonging to social collectives, the individual choices and preferences are not to be neglected (Wodak, 2009:8). Second, within their complex examination, they also focus on the construction of political past and future through language, which converges with our goal. Finally, Wodak et al. introduce the concept and typology of constructive strategies in language (2009: 31), which can be utilised in our categorisation of arguments, too42.

One of the main goals of this thesis is to discover topics, in which historical arguments are applied, to describe how, and by whom. In the theoretical chapter, we defined arguments as “claims advanced in an attempt to influence others” and “reasons offered in support of the claims” (Zarefsky, 2014: 2). This implicates that arguments can be presented in just one sentence as well as in a lengthy rhetorical exercise. We will assume that if a keyword in context

40 Dumm and Lemke (2013) adjusted Breindl and Walter’s original list to include 129 argumentation markers (they mistakenly claim they have 127 markers). We have removed 5 multi word markers, already represented by their single-word parts, thus our list comprises of 129 – 5 = 124 argumentation markers in total. The context filter uses lemmas (basic word forms, case sensitive), not words, so in effect, it will be 2x 124 lemmas, with capital and with lower case first letter. Full list of the markers is available as Attachment 1 of this thesis. 41 This will be checked manually on a section of data. 42 Out of three levels of analysis, introduced by Wodak (2009: 30) - contents, strategies, linguistical means and forms, our analysis rests of first two. 46

is present in any section of the text, it is so for a reason and that it thus makes sense to examine that section to discover potential arguments.

It is also necessary to keep in mind that we are interested in argumentation applied in general policy topics, thus debates surrounding politics of history will not be interpreted. Each decision whether the definition of argument has been indeed fulfilled will inevitably remain subjective. To support the validity of such decision making, an account of all topics with a significant presence of our selected keywords within an argumentative context will be provided, to offer a full picture of the data (see section 3.2).

To answer our outlined research questions, we will focus on topics, within which arguments are used, strategies they apply, and political affiliation and/or position (if relevant) of speakers who used them.

Annotating topics will be conducted on two levels. First, we will follow inductive, data– grounded logic, which according to some authors (Drisko and Maschi, 2016) is a defining feature of a qualitative approach. Topics of debates will emerge from a close reading of the plenary transcripts, and they will be subsequently clustered into broader policy fields (Politikfelder)43.

By argumentation strategies we mean the way in which speakers “constitute objects of knowledge, situations and social roles as well as identities and interpersonal relations between different social groups and those who interact with them” (Wodak, 2009: 8). To help us with the analysis at the beginning, we adapted the typology presented by Wodak et al. (2009: 33) and complemented it with accounts of historical argumentation in the German context (section 1.3.7). We might discover some of the following strategies:

A. Construction (presenting the past as a value measure for new situations; deducing new legal or moral obligations; appellation on the importance of knowledge of history for finding an appropriate solution for a new situation); B. Identity building a. unification (emphasising unity and solidarity) b. differentiation (dissimilarity and heterogeneity);

43 Most agenda sections are related to individual motions (Antrag), classified in the Bundestag database under subject areas (Sachgebiet), which may be used as a hint.

C. Perpetuation (describing history as a process; interpreting present as a consequence of the past; comparative outlook on the past and the present and comparisons of various histories with one another) D. Transformation (criticising alleged “historical normalcy” of the present status quo, past as a source for challenging it and finding alternatives).

Political affiliation – party/fraction – of each speaker will be indicated.

Interpretation 2: will have a narrative form describing in detail the topics in which historical arguments were used, provided with accounts of strategy and speaker. Possible are comparisons across time, indicating general developments, or changes within individual topics or political parties.

2.5 QUALITY AND LIMITS OF ANALYSIS The prerequisite for any research to contribute meaningfully to the body of scholarly literature is its high quality. This part is thus dedicated to the question of limits and quality criteria of qualitative research in general, and of procedures used in this thesis.

There are multiple approaches to how to assess findings of qualitative analyses (Flick, 2007). Some authors demand that traditional conditions of validity, reliability and objectivity be applied to the qualitative research as well. Others argue for their reformulation, for example, to replace reliability with thorough documentation of processes of data collection and evaluation (ibidem). The third position supports formulating an entirely new set of criteria.

Lincoln a Guba (1985: 290, op. cit. in: Hendl, 2005: 338–339) choose the last possibility, and formulate criteria of credibility (as confidence in the “truthfulness” of the findings), transferability (applicability of findings in other contexts), dependability (consistency of the findings) and confirmability (degree of independence of findings on researchers’ bias, motivation and interest).

Credibility will be increased by triangulating methods – not relying only on numerical outcomes but subjecting the data to qualitative close reading, informed by a thorough literature review.

Transferability will be attempted by providing a thick description of analytical processes, providing sufficient raw data. Translations into English will be included.

Dependability: Lincoln and Guba suggest acquiring supervision of an external auditor as a guarantee of the maximal possible level of accuracy of interpretations and conclusions. In the

case of diploma thesis, the official supervisor naturally plays the role of such an auditor. Because of the specific focus of this thesis, Prof. Dr Dieter Ohr from the Freie Universität in Berlin was asked for help.

Confirmability: since no researcher can be independent of her background and position when choosing what and how to examine, the only way to increase the confirmability of the research is to be reflexive of such limitations. The advantage of this thesis is the distance of the researcher from the research subject (discourse), as she was socialised relatively free from its influence.

2.6 CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER ON METHODS The methodological chapter complemented preceding theoretical one by answering the question of how we will proceed in finding answers to the outlined research questions. We provided accounts of where and how we will acquire the necessary data, and how they will be analysed. We made clear that we are aware of limitations stemming from the size and nature of the data corpus and the chosen methods. Final remark to be made is that in this case, an absence of evidence is an evidence in itself, and needs to be interpreted. The analysis itself follows in the next chapter.

3 MAPPING THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE

3.1 INTERPRETATION 1: DISCOURSE IN NUMBERS This section is linked to the first specific research question (With what intensity does the topic of National Socialism appear in the Bundestag plenary debates?) and rests on presuppositions made above that a) keywords open topics, and b) their frequency indicates the intensity of the discussion. It is important to point out that these outcomes will also include argumentation within politics of history. Sampling follows subsequently.

We analysed 1.171 PMs comprising of 99.612.279 words in total. The corpus spans 19 years or 228 months, an average number of PMs per month being 5,14. Bundestag had most sessions in November and June (7,7 and 7,2 on average), August being on the other end of the scale, with an average of only 0,2 sessions.

At least one keyword was used in more than a half of all plenary sessions, 637 or 54,4 %. In 439 of them (37,5 %), the keywords were surrounded by argumentation indicating context. The share of PMs featuring keywords in context on all was highest in LP14, 1998 – 2002 (46,3 % of all plenary meetings), followed by LP18, 2013 – 2017 (42 %). That indicates that in these two periods, usage of historical arguments came up more frequently, in more plenary sessions.

FIGURE 1 below depicts shares in individual legislative periods, and FIGURE 3.2 shares in the entire data set.

PMs (Keywords PMs PMs PMs (No % without % (Keywords % Total Keywords) Context) with Context) LP 14 253 80 31,6 % 56 22,1 % 117 46,3 % LP 15 187 110 58,8 % 23 12,3 % 54 28,9 % LP 16 233 121 52,0 % 35 15,0 % 77 33,0 % LP 17 253 128 50,6 % 37 14,6 % 88 34,8 % LP 18 245 95 38,8 % 47 19,2 % 103 42,0 % FIGURE 3.1: SHARES OF PMS WITH KEYWORDS. TOTAL AND IN CONTEXT. PER LP.

N = 198 16,9% N = 439 37,5%

N = 534 45,6%

Keywords in Context No Keywords Keywords without Context

FIGURE 3.2: SHARES OF PMS WITH KEYWORDS. TOTAL AND IN CONTEXT. 100 % = 1.171. In total, the six keywords appeared 3685 times, 1599 times in context. Absolute counts of 44 keywords and keywords in context in individual LPs depicts the graph in FIGURE 3.3 . As we can see, in contrast to a number of plenary minutes (FIGURE 3.1), after LP 14, our keywords were most often used in LP17, 2009 – 2013. According to both measures, historical argumentation dropped in LP 15 and LP 16. On the other hand, in these years (2002 – 2005 and 2005 – 2009), the proportion of occurrences of keywords in context vs in total was highest (approximately 47 %), thus once these words were used, it was more likely to be in argumentative context.

1200 1281

1000 833 800 643 600 534 Keywords (Total) 585 394 400 Keywords (in 200 Context) 251 297 280 186 0 LP 14 LP 15 LP 16 LP 17 LP 18

FIGURE 3.3: OCCURRENCES OF KEYWORDS IN INDIVIDUAL LPS.

Most frequently used was VERTREIBUNG (1762 times; 709 in context), followed by HOLOCAUST

(558; 276 in context) and NATIONALSOZIALISMUS (529; 250 in context). Shares of occurrences

44 It must be kept in mind that the 15th Legislative Period only lasted three years, instead of four. In 2002, Gerhard Schröder called forth a confidence vote, knowingly expecting negative outcome, to be able to call preliminary federal elections, after which he lost the chancellorship. Number of existing plenary minutes is thus naturally lower in this period. 51

of keywords in context on occurrences in total were roughly the same for all terms, between 40

% to 50 % (see FIGURE 3.3 for a complete account), which means that no keyword was used in argumentation exceptionally rarely or often.

Hitler NS Holocaust Auschwitz Wehrmacht Vertreibung

Keywords (N) 398 529 558 219 219 1762

Keywords 181 250 276 95 88 709 In Context (N)

In Context / Total (%) 45,4 % 47,3 % 49,5 % 43,4 % 40,2 % 40,2 %

FIGURE 3.4: SHARES OF KEYWORDS. TOTAL AND IN CONTEXT.

If we compare the keywords with one another, we find out that keyword VERTREIBUNG was also thematised in the greatest number of plenary sessions (N = 387, or 33,3 % of all). However, we need to be careful with interpreting this as salience of the narrative of Germans as victims, because VERTREIBUNG, in contrast to other keywords, and despite being strongly linked to the World War II, may also be used in more general meanings. It also corresponds with its relatively lower usage in argumentative context. The subsequent in–depth analysis should clarify this.

HOLOCAUST was surrounded by the argumentative context in nearly 70 % of PMs in which it occurred, which is the highest share of all searched terms, which corresponds with the fact that the term is strongly morally loaded. For the rest, the share varied between approximately 53 % and 63 % (see FIGURE 3.4 for a visual indication as well). The second most frequent were PMs in which terms NATIONALSOZIALISMUS (N = 233; 19,9 % of all PMs) and HITLER (N = 199; 17 %) appeared.

Hitler NS Holocaust Auschwitz Wehrmacht Vertreibung

PMs with Keywords (N) 199 233 185 101 94 387

PMs with Keywords 110 144 129 57 50 244 in Context (N) PM with Keywords in Context / 55,3 % 61,8 % 69,7 % 56,4 % 53,1 % 63,0 % PM with Keywords (%)

FIGURE 3.5: SHARES OF PLENARY MINUTES. TOTAL AND IN CONTEXT We can break down the data even more and answer the question of how strongly represented were individual keywords in each legislative period. We use the count of average occurrence per million (of words), to compare frequencies over time.

In the six graphs depicted in FIGURE 3.6 below, frequencies per million are always shown for all periods combined, and separately. Each graph represents one keyword, with (darker colour), and without (lighter colour) argumentative context.

NS/ns Hitler/hitler (N per million words) (N per million words)

9 9 8 8 7 7 5,89 5,64 6 6 5 4,14 4,05 5 3,51 3,6 3,51 4 2,61 4 3,12 3,28 3,23 3 2,09 2,47 1,96 1,89 1,67 1,63 3 2,22 2 1,42 1,81 1,82 2 1,04 0,94 1,36 1 1 0 0 All LP 14 LP 15 LP 16 LP 17 LP 18 All LP 14 LP 15 LP 16 LP 17 LP 18 Periods Periods

Holocaust/holocaust (N per million words) Auschwitz (N per million words) 9 8,19 9 8 8 7 7 6 4,87 6 5 4,37 3,99 3,82 5 4 3,27 4 3,32 3 2,16 2,43 2,43 3 2,19 2,04 1,95 1,71 2 2 1,31 0,85 0,96 0,74 1 1 0,74 1,86 0,51 0,26 0,43 0,72 0 0 All LP 14 LP 15 LP 16 LP 17 LP 18 All LP 14 LP 15 LP 16 LP 17 LP 18 Periods Periods Wehrmacht/wehrmacht Vertreibung/vertreibung (N per million words) (N per million words)

9 27 25,47 8 24 7 21 6 18 13,78 14,09 5 15 4 11,24 10,59 2,69 2,67 12 8,77 8,54 3 9 1,72 5,54 4,72 2 1,23 1,3 1 1,04 6 3,51 3,67 0,69 0,91 0,52 1 0,17 0,43 3 1,47 0 0 All LP 14 LP 15 LP 16 LP 17 LP 18 All LP 14 LP 15 LP 16 LP 17 LP 18 Periods Periods

FIGURE 3.6: CHARACTERS PER MILLION WORDS OVER TIME, PER LEGISLATIVE PERIOD. All keywords occurred more frequently in the LP 14 than an average, most notably

VERTREIBUNG, which was also more strongly represented in the LP 17. A quick reading of concordances shows us that between 1998 and 2002, this keyword was used in debates related to the war in Yugoslavia (node–forms Vertreibungskrieg, the expulsion war, and

Vetreibungspolitik, the politics of expulsions, were used to describe strategy of the then Serbian/Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic, as well as collocation Vertreibung – Milosevic or Vertreibung – Kosovo–Albaner), to the Czech–German relations (strong collocation of Vertreibung – Enteignung, expropriation, confiscation, appeared in debates about the WWII–related Beneš Decrees, a heated topic preceding the Czech accession to the European Union in 2004).

In LP14, the proposal to open a Centre against Expulsions (Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen, commemorating primarily German victims of post–war expulsions), was extensively discussed, mainly because the idea (in the Bundestag supported by MPs of the CDU/CSU) caused a rift in German–Polish relations at the turn of the century. German side bowed and abandoned the original conception, clear departure from Walser’s double–victimhood narrative45.

In the latter period (2009 – 2013) this topic returned, VERTREIBUNG now connected in many cases to the Foundation for Flight, Expulsion and Reconciliation (Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung; strong collocations with words Flucht; Versöhnung; Stiftung), a project under auspice of the CDU/CSU and SPD grand coalition government, substituting the Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen. Once the project was removed from under the direct influence of the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen) lobby and its representative (CDU MP) Erika Steinbach, who bothered especially the Polish political representation, the topic lost its contentious load and disappeared from our dataset. The substitute foundation is authorised to build a documentation centre in the Berliner city–part Kreuzberg, scheduled to open in 2020. It would be interesting to follow potential discussions and tensions resulting from its opening, especially given recent developments of Polish state politics of history.

The (above–average) peaks of keywords AUSCHWITZ and WEHRMACHT in the most recent LP 18 (2013 – 2017) after a decade of lower intensity of their appearance are also of interest. In the case of AUSCHWITZ, the peak seems to be connected predominantly to talks surrounding the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the camp (nevertheless, in the period covering its 60th anniversary in January 2015, hence the LP 15, no increase was discovered). As far as

WEHRMACHT is concerned, the issue of right–wing extremism in the German army

45 This thesis was written in the Czech city Brno (Brünn), so it is worth noting that such double- victimhood narrative naturally generates, for example, also the narrative of Czechs as perpetrators. For accounts of civic initiatives which deal with the issue on the Czech side in Teplice (Teplitz), Ústí nad Labem (Aussig) or in Brno, see, for example Antikomplex (2018) or Rok smíření (2018). 54

(Bundeswehr) emerged, accompanied with references to WEHRMACHT. The richness of node– forms also exceeds preceding periods: souvenirs, devotional objects, symbols, names and uniforms (Wehrmachtdevotionalien, Wehrmachtandenken, Wehrmachtsymbole, Wehrmachnamen, Wehrmachtuniform) were all denotations that occurred for the first time, and

WEHRMACHT often collocated with the word Kaserne: (today’s) military barracks.

As far as intensity is concerned, no clear trend seems to be emerging. After the more intense usage of the keywords in the first analysed LP, occurrences of each one followed a little different trajectory. NATIONALSOZIALISMUS, for example, kept appearing with relatively stable intensity, while HITLER, HOLOCAUST, and AUSCHWITZ intensified between 2013 and 2017. None of the keywords seems to be diminishing. Node–form frequencies, except the already mentioned cases, occurred in stable numbers too. For example, the appearance of word Faschismus (Fascism) to describe Hitler’s regime, strongly linked to the culture of memory in the former DDR (recall page 31), has not diminished since the end of the 1990s.

Complete lists of all manually corrected node–forms (because sometimes, the same word appeared as a fragment, or separately in its singular, plural, or declined forms) and a full list of all collocations, whose salience as a logDice value exceeds 8, is available in ATTACHMENT 2. In cases where no particularly strong collocations where discovered, we simply provided the weaker ones.

The list of node–forms immediately draws attention to keyword NATIONALSOZIALISMUS, which occurred exclusively in this form, and only once in the whole corpus (in LP 14) as Neonationalsozialismus, referring to the neo–nazi NPD party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) A question arises, whether the term might perhaps be too static to reach to all relevant thematisations. To answer it, we have conducted a check, by searching for an abbreviation “NS” instead, the universal German connector for Nazi–related subjects and objects. It had been rejected previously as a keyword for analysis since it would provide us with too many irrelevant results (such as NSA, National Security Agency of the United States of America, the NSU, Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, far–right terrorist group; ENSI, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, etc.). By selecting five random PMs from each LP including any node–form of “NS” (in argumentation context), we checked, whether these appear in same sections of PMs as the word NATIONALSOZIALISMUS (and will thus be included in our analysis nonetheless), or not. Out of 25 (5 x 5) cases checked, there was only one case,

in which the relevant NS node was discovered, and the section escaped our attention. We deem that to be a satisfactory outcome. An overview is provided in ATTACHMENT 3.

One more check has been conducted before proceeding with the sampling: of the automated method of locating argumentative content with the list of German reason and consequence markers. We picked ten random plenary minutes from each legislative period featuring keywords without context, and went through them manually to check, whether or not we are neglecting relevant information. The result was also satisfactory: left out plenary sessions had either commemorative purpose (thus the historical references had rather descriptive than argumentative character), or the keywords were simply used to demarcate one in many historical epochs, or they were used in relevant context (politics with history), but they couldn’t be evaluated as an argument. In general, we may assert that the selected sampling method has met the expectations.

3.2 PLENARY MINUTES SAMPLING: PEAKS IN DEBATES As foreseen in the chapter on methodology, we use our account of keywords in context to localise relevant argumentation. We first create a timeline of the keyword in context appearances and affected plenary sessions, to spot any peaks in debates (still including politics of history). Due to a different number of PMs in each month as well as a different number of PMs in individual LPs, we extracted the number of keywords in context per month. We found out that in each month between October 1998 and October 2017, nearly seven (6,98) keywords in context were used on average, in an average of two (1,92) PMs.

FIGURE 3.7 shows monthly distributions of both counts across the entire time span of the analysis. To make the peaks stand out, we located baselines of the two mirrored graphs into an average value of each indicator. Above average counts were found in 50 months (out of 228, thus in 21,9 %) in the case of keywords and 80 months (35 %) in the case of affected PMs.

The purpose of looking at both measures is to account for all the following situations: a) only one or few topics, but strongly laden with historical arguments (peak in count of keywords, but not PMs); b) longer–lasting or multiple discussions with high–intensity argumentation (peaks in both counts); c) longer lasting or multiple debates with only anectodal usage of historical arguments (peak in PMs, not keywords). The share of affected plenary minutes on their total number was also considered when selecting the peaks to describe (albeit it is not graphically presented).

An overview indicates that most intense usage of historical arguments, logically, surrounds debates about politics of history. We include a concise summary of these debates, too, to create a link to the theoretical chapter and to render a context for the interpretation of argumentation within politics with history. Plenary sessions are referenced with their numbers, first two digits referring to LP number, the latter to session number.

67 62

57 54 7

48 47

38 37 35 32

24 26 26 25 25 25 25 26 27 23 24 22 20 19 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 0 16 16 15 16 17 14 14 14 13 13 13 12 12 12 11 1212 11 11 10 11 11 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 7 8 8 8 1 7 7 8

I . 9 9 I . 0 0 I . 0 1 I . 0 2 I . 0 3 I . 0 4 I . 0 5 I . 0 6 I . 0 7 I . 0 8 I . 0 9 I . 1 0 I . 1 1 I . 1 2 I . 1 3 I . 1 4 I . 1 5 I . 1 6 I . 1 7

X . 9 8 X . 0 4 X . 1 0 X . 9 9 X . 0 0 X . 0 1 X . 0 2 X . 0 3 X . 0 5 X . 0 6 X . 0 7 X . 0 8 X . 0 9 X . 1 1 X . 1 2 X . 1 3 X . 1 4 X . 1 5 X . 1 6 X . 1 7

I V . 9 9 I V . 0 0 I V . 0 1 I V . 0 2 I V . 0 3 I V . 0 4 I V . 0 5 I V . 0 6 I V . 0 7 I V . 0 8 I V . 0 9 I V . 1 0 I V . 1 1 I V . 1 2 I V . 1 3 I V . 1 4 I V . 1 5 I V . 1 6 I V . 1 7

V I I . 0 9 V I I . 1 5 V I I . 9 9 V I I . 0 0 V I I . 0 1 V I I . 0 2 V I I . 0 3 V I I . 0 4 V I I . 0 5 V I I . 0 6 V I I . 0 7 V I I . 0 8 V I I . 1 0 V I I . 1 1 V I I . 1 2 V I I . 1 3 V I I . 1 4 V I I . 1 6 V I I . 1 7 2

FIGURE 3.7: N OF KEYWORDS IN CONTEXT PER MONTH (ABOVE) AND N OF PMS PER MONTH (BELOW). THE SCALE OF

THE BOTTOM GRAPH = 10 % OF THE ABOVE.

3.2.1 LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 14 The very first peak, in January 1999, appears only in the keyword graph. It is logical, given the fact that a mistake causes it – a section featuring commemorative speeches on the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of National–Socialism was erroneously included twice (14/17). By reading through the plenary minutes, we also discovered that commemorative sessions (Gedenkstunden) have been since 1999 often left out from the official transcripts, which may distort the quantitative outcomes of the analysis.

Major peak surrounds months of April – June 1999 (in both graphs), when the keywords in context were used in vast majority of sessions. It corresponds with the first Bundestag meeting in the Reichstag building (the sessions returned to Bonn again for a short period after that; 14/33) and a debate about a new culture of remembrance, and the way memorials should be managed in the Berliner Republic (14/35). The question of what symbolical meaning the new name has for Germany’s role abroad appeared on occasion of NATO anniversary (14/35). The already mentioned Holocaust Memorial in Berlin became a heated topic in June 1999, when the Bundestag voted on its final design, inflicting a defeat on Gerhard Schröder, whose proposal (much smaller in scale) was outvoted (14/48). A commemorative, very last meeting of the parliament in Bonn took place on July 1, 1999 (14/50).

Another peak in both keywords and PMs appeared around April – June 2000, marking the commemorations of the 55th anniversary of the end of World War II (14/99) and discussions about opening a Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility, Future (Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft) which ought to commemorate and indemnify Nazi forced labourers (14/100), another step in the process of recognising previously neglected victim groups. Companies such as Volkswagen, Bosch, Lufthansa, Porsche or Siemens participated in indemnifications.

A longer period of higher intensity spans from October 2000 until May 2001 culminated in March 2001, when two–thirds of PMs featured some keyword in context. Topics, discussed in this period covered the War in Kosovo (14/153; 154; 155), as well as Holocaust Memorial in Berlin (14/159), ignited by neo–Nazi demonstrations taking place near the construction site.

Another major peak comes in mid–2002, combining both measures, and including a variety of topics: SPD and B90/G party proposal on introduction of referendum on federal level (declined, 14/240), ban on human cloning (14/240), further discussions on Israel and Palestine (14/245) as well as prospects of changing (simplifying) the procedure of deploying of Bundeswehr

soldiers, face to face of international terrorism after attacks in the US in September 2011 and the subsequent invasion to Afghanistan – declined (14/246).

3.2.2 LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 15 The peak on the axis of keywords that appears in June and July 2003 marks the debate on Eastern EU Enlargement, and Germany’s relation with acceding states (15/48; 56), problems with antisemitism in Germany (15/82) and proposals on indemnification of gay victims of the NS–Regime (15/83). The efforts to differentiate individual victim–groups of Nazi terror (part of the German Wiedergutmachungspolitik, literally politics of “making it good again”, usually translated as reparation or restitution politics) were encouraged as part of Schröder’s broader orientation on culture in general – his cabinet was the first to include the de facto federal culture minister – since the Third Reich. Such efforts then continued throughout all examined legislative periods, with emphasis on members of the Sinti and Roma ethnic minority, forced labourers, homosexuals and persons with handicap, and (unsuccessfully, from the political left) also of Soviet war prisoners.

3.2.3 LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 16 A major peak on both axes appears in September 2006, when the Bundestag met after a summer break, during which the Israeli–Lebanese and Israel–Iran Proxy War broke out, prompting varying proposals on what Germany’s reaction and involvement should be (16/46; 49; 50).

In May 2007, some sessions were dedicated to discussions on changes in the criminal justice system, necessary formal step to repeal unjust convictions of the NS–Era, again in line with the Wiedergutmachung (16/97). It was one of the few adopted proposals of the Linke party.

A lengthy period of higher intensity of keywords as well as PMs between March and October 2008 included some topics related to Israel and Jewish population in Germany. Measures to address anti–Semitism were discussed (16/185), as well as a federal ban on Collegium Humanum, movement, which started as an environmental club in the 1960s, but evolved into far–right, Holocaust–denying political organisation (16/148). 60 Years Anniversary of Israel was celebrated (16/163).

Finally, between March and May 2009, the issue of remembrance in Germany returned, in proposals demanding more support for the commemoration of NS homosexual victims, and victims of Sinti and Roma ethnicity, likely in the aftermath of publishing a new study by Martin Holler (2009). The construction of the intended memorial was postponed few times due to

disagreements about its form. Eventually, it opened only in 2012, instead of 2009 (16/211; 214; 222). The difficulty with which official commemoration of these groups found support in the Bundestag serves as a demonstration of the unrelenting “competition” between victim groups, and the question of the singularity of Jewish victimhood, respectively.

3.2.4 LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 17 In May 2010, two narratives found their way into discussions: first the narrative of Germans as victims, in renewed debates about the Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung, whose board of trustees had to be expanded, as well as number of researchers, to enable for opening the already mentioned documentation centre in Berlin – Kreuzberg (17/37; 43). Second, the from the DDR inherited (and embodied in the Linke party) narrative of the German–Soviet/Russian friendship stemming from the 1945 Red Army liberation of Germany materialised in (unsuccessful) proposals to introduce May 8 as a national holiday (17/41).

October 2010 (both axes) was marked with demands to deal with the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) of potentially Nazi–affiliated of post–war employees of German federal ministries, especially the Foreign Department (recall the influence of post–reunification generational change, page 36), a demonstration of the centre–left Germans–perpetrators narrative.

Period of higher intensity between November 2010 and February 2011 visible as a peak in both measures originated in discussions on some foreign policy topics (German–Russian relations, German role in the global financial and Eurozone crisis).

In January 2012, the increase was caused by discussions preceding the establishment of special parliamentary enquiry committee (Untersuchungsausschuss) following uncovering a right– wing extremist group National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund) and doubts regarding the role of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) in the case. Proposals for a renewed effort to ban the neo– Nazi NPD party followed (and failed), put forth especially by the SPD, Greens, and Linke, but also by the CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel.

In this thesis, any debate about right–wing extremism, which appeared in the corpus, will be interpreted only, if it rests on historical arguments as defined in the theoretical chapter. These debates naturally feature a great N of occurrences of our keywords, but in most cases, the arguments lack the purpose of re–presenting the past. For example, the argument “we must ban the NPD, because in 1933 we did not, and it ended up badly” (LP 17, PM 220, paraphrased) 60

would be included and interpreted as an analogy. On the other hand, if the argument says, “we must ban the NPD because it glorifies Hitler, which is bad,” there is no direct linkage to 1933 – 1945: the fact that Hitler is bad holds without direct references of the past as well.

The prominent peak in the number of keywords in context in June 2013 was caused by commemorating of victims of expulsions (17/246) as well as by another unsuccessful proposal (of the SPD and Green fraction) to condemn injustices committed on former Soviet prisoners of war, and their financial indemnification (17/244, 250).

3.2.5 LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 18 The relatively stable above–average values on the bottom axis indicate that the last period was marked with a greater number of distinct topics with lesser intensity argumentation.

In May 2014 and 2015, as well as April 2016 (both axes) the debate on the meaning of the May 8 in Germany appeared again (18/33). In November 2014 (Crimea was annexed in spring that year), CDU/CSU and SPD government criticised Russian president Vladimir Putin who recalled the Hitler–Stalin–Pact as an example of “Soviet peace politics” (18/66).

September 2015 meant a re–emergence of the topic of historical responsibility of Germans to help refugees fleeing (mostly) from the war in Syria (122; 185). Similar line of argumentation appeared for the first time already in the 1990s, when many citizens of former Yugoslavia were seeking refuge in Germany.

June 2016 marked the 65th anniversary of Nazi German attack on the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa began on June 22, 1941), which proved to be an opportunity to re–open the discussion on special recognition of Soviet soldiers (Linke, 18/173), and questioning the German NATO membership (18/178), a stable component of the left–wing German pacifism.

May and June 2017, in addition to the continued debate on NATO and Russia (18/235) and indemnification of the Nazi homosexual victims (18/232) introduced two new topics. First, in 18/233, the issue of right–wing extremism in the Bundeswehr was discussed. Second, in 18/237, the rigid Bundestag parliamentary procedure was altered, (explicitly) with an outlook on the right–wing populist Alternative for Germany political party entering the Bundestag: the ceremony of the opening session of the 19th legislative period in Autumn 2017 ought not have been chaired by the oldest member of parliament by age (which would have likely been the AfD candidate from Lower Saxony Wilhelm von Gottberg), but instead the longest serving MP

(CDU’s Wolfgang Schäuble). The proposal was introduced and supported by the CDU/CSU and SPD and opposed by B90/G and Linke.

To provide the above–outlined overview, we went at least twice through all plenary minutes containing any keyword in argumentative context. By doing so, we were able to complete the sampling process and identify relevant agenda sections, Tageosrdnungpunkte. We eliminated all agenda dealing with politics of history in the narrow sense (state politics of culture of remembrance, memorial politics, commemorative speeches, etc.), and ended up with a final number of sections to be interpreted in detail. An overview is provided in FIGURE 3.8 bellow; arrows depict the process of reduction of the dataset:

N of PMs with N of Relevant Legislative Period N of PMs (Total) Keywords in Context Sections 14: 1998 – 2002 253 117 39 15: 2002 – 2005 187 54 11 16: 2005 – 2009 233 77 11 17: 2009 – 2013 253 88 11 18: 2013 – 2017 245 103 19 TOTAL 1.171 439 91

FIGURE 3.8: FINAL REDUCTION OF THE DATA CORPUS: NUMBER OF RELEVANT SECTIONS.

3.3 INTERPRETATION 2: TOPICS, STRATEGIES, SPEAKERS

As FIGURE 3.8 suggests, the intensity of historical argumentation in politics with history followed an imaginary U–shape, which corresponds with outcomes of the quantitative part (N of PMs, FIGURE 3.1). We can also link together the finding that keyword VERTREIBUNG, used with above–average frequency in the LP 17, is indeed a relatively weak carrier of historical arguments (especially in this latter period), because its frequent occurrence, which resulted in

LP17 being the second most affected by occurrences of individual keywords (FIGURE 3.3), did not translate into more historical arguments.

We will now focus on the argumentation in more detail, paying attention to the three outlined areas: topic, strategy, and speaker, in order to answer the remaining research questions: What are the topics within which historical arguments related to the NS era are used? Who uses these arguments? What strategies do these arguments use? To link our findings with description of the “second history of Nazism” (provided in subchapter 1.4), we will also include underlying narratives that intertwine the corpus.

Then, we will summarize a typology of identified strategies of argumentation and compare it with the default one. Finally, we will confront our interpretation of the political discourse with underlying theories of memory and remembering.

3.3.1 FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY Topics identified: War on Terror (Iraq) Czech – German Relations War on Terror (Syria) Kosovo War German–Israeli Relations EU Enlargement 2006 Lebanon War NATO Expansion 2008 Gaza War Bundeswehr Deployment German–Russian Relations International Force East Timor Eurozone and Greek Crisis German–Turkish Relations Israel and Palestine German – Austrian Relations Arms Exports German – Belorussian Relations War in Ukraine German – Polish Relations Brexit War on Terror (Afghanistan) UN Mali Mission

In this first and major identified cluster of topics, historical arguments were used with overwhelming dominance in comparison to all other clusters. Berliner Republic coincided with an era of intensified international interdependencies, as well as tensions. Germany had to deal with issues including the EU Eastern Enlargement, global economic crisis, crisis of the Eurozone, migration crisis, the return of war on everyday agenda in Europe with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the War on Terror, and conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.

The foreign policy of the Bonner Republic relied on three main facets, all resulting from the experience of National Socialism: westward orientation, firmly anchored by participation in structures of international cooperation (Westbindung, Bündnistreue), and refusal to the depart from a trajectory demarcated by these structures by taking a special path (Sonderweg). Second, multilateralism, a taming power of German nationalism and exceptionalism, the manifesting itself in superiority of international over national law and support of the European integration, which is not only an economical project but also a community of values. Finally, a particular version of anti–militarism, which can be described as hold–back maxim (Zurückhalten), which circumscribes possible utilization of the German Bundeswehr.

Usage of historical arguments within the cluster of foreign and defence policy suggests that underlying normative presuppositions of German foreign policy remained in principle unchanged. However, we identified significant changes in priorities given to individual historical narratives, as well as in measure, to which these underlying principles relied on references to the Nazi era.

Disappearance of the German Victimhood Narrative

Discussions surrounding the Czech and Polish accession to the EU were dominated by a clash between perpetuation of the narrative of Germans as victims46 on hand, indicated by keyword

VERTREIBUNG47 and represented predominantly by the CDU/CSU MPs, often from the bordering states of Bavaria and Saxony; and something we called the reconciliation (Versöhnung) imperative, stemming from the memories of German wrongdoings on the other. The latter was articulated by the SPD and B90/G government.

CDU/CSU demanded that the topic of expulsions and expropriation of the property of the Sudeten Germans be incorporated into EU accession talks and that they remain authoritative in bilateral Czech–German relations. German federal authorities should guarantee individual’s rights to ask for compensations for the confiscated property. The SPD and B90/G government rejected this, by criticizing those, who “still want to fight the lost battles of the past” (immer mal wieder die verlorenen Schlachten von gestern schlagen wollen, Ludger Volmer, secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14/26) and insisting on separation of state and private interests as well as “the past from the present” – thus suppressing the relevance of Nazi history.

In the Polish case, the narrative materialized in by debates about the by CDU’s politicians (Erika Steinbach being the most dominant figure) proposed – and already mentioned – Centre against Expulsions. CDU/CSU emphasized that Poland has yet to deal with the difficult legacy of post– war expulsions and that Germany should continue to articulate a request for it in official relations. SPD argued, on the other hand, that while Polish EU accession is not an act of

46 And downplaying the victimhood of the Czechs: “People could do excellent shopping there, there was everything. Czechoslovakia was a posterchild of Hitler.” (Man hat während des Krieges dort hervorragend einkaufen können, weil es alles gab. Die Tschechoslowakei war das Aushängeschild Hitlers, Erika Reinhardt, 14/26). 47 Accompanied by articulating the “need to resolve the “open Sudeten German question” and making an implicit rhetorical analogy with an issue known as an open German question concerning the legitimate borders of Germany between 1806 and 1990; or using the word Tschechei, which has strong negative connotations originating in the NS period (Hans-Peter Uhl, CSU, 15/56 and Erika Steinbach, CDU, ibidem). 64

Germany “compensating for the suffered injustices and sorrow”, that it sill rests upon “recognition of such sorrows and injustices” (Es geht nicht um Entschädigung für erlittenes Unrecht und erlittenes Leid, sondern um Anerkennung dieses Leids und dieses Unrechts, Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister, 14/176). Germany’s primary responsibility is thus to promote reconciliation with Central and Eastern European countries, in the form of emphasis of multilateralism as partnership of equals, and integration (bringing back together, zurückzuführen), both in the EU and in NATO. Chancellor Schröder called this the „Germans’ special obligation” (Uns Deutschen war die Aufnahme dieser drei neuen Mitglieder eine besondere Verpflichtung, 14/35) and an “order we were given by our mothers and fathers who had to live through horrors of wars”, e.g. following roughly the in 1969 starting reconciling Ostpolitik strategy of the social democratic chancellor Willy Brandt.

At the latest towards the end of the 15th Legislative period the CDU/CSU started to give up on the Germans–as–victims narrative, with CDU’s Wolfgang Schäuble (proponent of the Centre against Expulsions) moving towards multilateralism and arguing that historical responsibility of Germany towards Poland lies predominantly in treating it as an equally important partner in negotiations with another WWII aggressor: Russia (15/122).

Thus, while the perpetuating and revisionist narrative slowly disappeared (when the keyword

VERTREIBUNG returned in 2009 – 2013 it was not within foreign policy discussions), the latter, by the Holocaust–centred memory motivated reconciliation imperative found exceptional resonance during the Schröder – Fischer’s era. Fischer understood the EU Eastern Enlargement as a German duty stemming from war crimes. The reconciliatory link was established even to issues, which had no direct connection to Nazism: for example, the debate on potential Turkey’s accession to the EU was framed by the SPD as an opportunity to help the Turks come to terms with Armenian genocide and reconcile with the Armenians. When the CDU/CSU opposed granting Turkey a candidate status because of different “cultures”, SPD denounced this as an attempt to exclude “otherness” from Europe – such as when Hitler wanted to get rid of all European Jews (14/79).

From “Never War Again” to Values and Interests

It was already in 1994 when the defence policy position of Germany as “civilian power” conducting “chequebook diplomacy” (Wittlinger and Larose, 2007: 484) started to change. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr soldiers would be acceptable under particular circumstances and with the approval of the Bundestag.

The narrative shift from “never war again” to “never Auschwitz again”, which accompanied the deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers to Kosovo in 1999 (a full–scale NATO military campaign, not backed by the UN Security Council resolution, aiming at termination of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo) as well as German participation in War on Terror (2001 International Security Assistance Force to Afghanistan ) was interpreted by many as a breakup of one of the big German taboos, and an attempt of chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to normalise Germany (Decker, 2004: 140).

We found two underlying story lines, accompanying these unprecedented decisions: first, both Kosovo and Afghanistan were framed as a test of Germany’s belonging to the community of western democracies (its raison d’état), and of its commitment to participate in processes analogical to those, which “brought reconciliation, friendship, peace and wellbeing to Germany” after the “devastating experience of fascism and second world war”. In the case of Kosovo, it was predominantly the belonging to the western European community, in the Afghanistan case, it was the special bond of Germany and the US, which massively contributed to Germany’s post–war recovery. the

Second, it provided an opportunity to demonstrate historically generated special German qualities of reliability, determination and firmness (Vor dem Hintergrund unserer deutschen Geschichte darf es an unserer Verläßlichkeit, an unserer Entschlossenheit und an unserer Festigkeit keine Zweifel geben, Gerhar Schröder, 14/32) to prevent another “Auschwitz, Treblinka, Oradour, Kragujevac…” from happening. This commitment was not considered to be standing independently, but only firmly embedded into the first one.

Special German pledge to determination and firmness demonstrated itself in the strict response of the SPD and B90/G government to political success of Austria’s right–wing politician Jörg Haider (his stances on Holocaust were vague, at best) in 2000: while the CDU/CSU considered EU sanctions, which Germany supported, to be biased (against right–wing and omitting the left–wing radicalism), Joschka Fisher opposed to such accusations by arguing that Germany’s European partners (this word appeared with high frequency throughout his argumentation) expect Germany, because of historical reasons, not to act in a “business as usual” manner.

Overall, the participation in Kosovo War was in stark contrast to the tradition of the Bonner Republic: Wehrmacht operated in the Balkans during the WWII, and the commitment to never again allow German soldiers onto these territories was known as the Kohl’s Doctrine.

Practical consequences were visible the most in abandoning of some of the traditional, from Nazi–era stemming limitations and regulations of the Bundeswehr: after Kosovo, soldiers received special protection from denigration, “because today’s Bundeswehr differs completely from what Wehrmacht had done 58 years ago in the Balkans” (Damit unterscheiden sie sich in der Tat um 180 Grad von dem, was zum Beispiel die Wehrmacht vor 58 Jahren auf dem Balkan getan hat, Winfried Nachtwei, 14/45), and they “must therefore not be called murderers”. Women were allowed to hold combat positions because the “experiences of National Socialism and Second World War expressed in the Basic Law increasingly lose legitimacy. At some point, reality demands its right (Die im Grundgesetz zum Ausdruck kommenden Erfahrungen aus der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus und des Zweiten Weltkrieges verlieren zunehmend an Legitimationskraft. Irgendwann verlangt die Wirklichkeit ihr Recht, Imgard Karwatzki, CDU, 14/52). Finally, discussions about abandoning conscription started, accompanied by similar suppressive argumentation (in 2011 it was put into abeyance).

Nonetheless, for the SPD and B90/G and until the end of the Schröder’s chancellorship, the heritage of Kosovo and Afghanistan was not normalisation. The Afghanistan decision had to be connected to a vote of confidence of the Red–Green government, an instrument beyond margins of standard democratic procedures, especially in Germany. Schröder supported his argument by expressing allegiance to multilateralism (NATO) and the US, while the majority of B90/G MPs reasoned with commitments to morality, principles, and values, forcing them to stop international terror even by means previously unthought of in their pacifist political party. There was no enthusiasm in the decision.

Gradually, the change in government’s reasoning was internalised by the then opposition parties CDU/CSU and FDP, by re–framing Kosovo and Afghanistan as a “not–war” in the traditional sense, instead of instances of departure from the German anti–militarist maxim. The “never again war” imperative could thus be perpetuated and the proactive stance to combating international terrorism at the same time sustained.

How anything but normalised was the German stance to military engagement, showed the 2002 Bundestag elections, which coincided with debates on German participation in the invasion to Iraq. Schröder’s retreat to pacifism, by the resolute rejection of participation, even before UN Security Council refused to legitimize it, probably won him re–election: 80 % of Germans were against the involvement of Bundeswehr in the war. The CDU “criticised Schröder for his

position on Iraq and then narrowly lost the election after leading by more than eight percentage points for much of the year before the ballot” (Reuters, 2002).

After reassuming his mandate in October 2002, chancellor Schröder strengthened the emphasis on multilateralism: in the case of Iraq this meant a continued no to direct participation in the invasion and therefrom resulting deterioration of relations with the US. Historical reasoning weakened on the government’s part, being substituted with support for values. For example, in 15/25 Schröder explicitly claimed that “Germans and Americans are since long time ago united not only by gratitude … for liberating us from the Nazi dictatorship… We are united by our cultural togetherness that reaches far into the everyday lives of our peoples” (Deutsche und Amerikaner verbindet längst nicht mehr nur die Dankbarkeit … für die Befreiung von der Nazidiktatur … Nein, uns verbindet mehr. Uns verbindet eine kulturelle Zusammengehörigkeit, die weit in den Alltag unserer Völker hineinreicht).

It was the CDU/CSU who insisted on the transformed course of foreign policy, based at the same time on historically motivated German commitments: comparing Saddam Hussein with Hitler, considering international terrorism to be analogical with National Socialism (15/08) and declaring historically conditioned allegiance to the USA. Before the elections, CDU/CSU criticised SPD for an „anti–American” campaign. Angela Merkel (then CDU chairwomen) said „if we want to take the lessons of Auschwitz seriously, we have to conduct responsible politics today” which for her meant „to prevent the Iraqi dictator from threatening Jews in Israel”, by military invasion, if necessary (das heißt für mich sehr konkret: Wenn wir die Lehre von Auschwitz ernst nehmen und aus der Vernichtung der Juden in Deutschland und der Welt eine Lehre ziehen, dann müssen wir dies mit Blick auf die Zukunft, auf verantwortliche Politik heute tun, 14/253).

From Reconciliation to Responsible Protection and Return of History

Starting from the 16th Legislative period onwards, relevance of history for potential deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers was suppressed by almost all parties, with two exceptions: argumentation of the Linke party – which will be dealt with in one of the subsequent sections – and German Israeli relations – also described in more detail below. EU Enlargement was not anymore primary Germany’s historical responsibility, but also in its interest (Einigung Europas liegt aber gerade im Interesse Deutschlands, Gunter Gloser, SPD, 16/37). The “not–war” framing gave way to “war in the case it contributes to our multilateral interests of democracy

and peace promotion, and in defence of our shared values” and in all other cases “never war again.”

With the change of government in the aftermath of the 2005 elections, the dual German responsibility – multilateral and special German – of Schröder’s cabinet disappeared. Although the decision not to participate in Iraqi War did break the tradition of alliance with the USA, it was not an isolated one - Germany’s close European ally – France – also held back. In the case of UN intervention to Libya in 2011, this changed: Germany decided in isolation, siding with Russia and China, on abstention from the key UN resolution establishing a no–fly zone in Libya. No historical arguments surrounded the decision, a hint that German foreign policy making was becoming less dependent on historical analogies.

Under SPD and B90/G prevailing imperative of reconciliation gradually evolved into something we may call the responsible protection imperative, marked by a shift from using vocabularies such as recognition (Annerkennung) and compensation (Entschädigung) to describe Germany’s responsibilities, to a concept of networked security (vernetzte Sicherheit), resting on a comprehensive approach combining military missions with sine qua non attributes of peacebuilding and democracy fostering, anchored in the military strategy document, Weißbuch (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006).

The premise that the German special commitment is a firm part of the multilateral one faded as well, and proportionally, the Germanocentrism of any (albeit fewer) underlying historical arguments increased. We must remember here one crucial variable the in context: after traditionally more restrained, and by internal tensions inhibited government of chancellor Schröder and foreign minister Fischer, a long period of governments dominated by conservative parties with a powerful person in the leading position – chancellor Angela Merkel –followed. Merkel had a strong mandate and presided to either ideologically coherent (with the FDP) or consensual grand coalition governments, forced, by an absence of possibility to form other coalition, to consensual decision making. The space for more confident, by domestic political issues unencumbered foreign policy decision making opened up, and Germany used its second try on normalisation.

Both the FDP and CDU/CSU were proponents of the more proactive role of Germany within NATO, whose original purpose – to keep the Germans down – has changed (die Detuschen niederzuhalten – dann zeigt sich doch, wie sehr sich die NATO Gott sein Dank verändert hat, Eckart von Klaeden, 16/214). Germany acted with confidence also in response to the global

financial and economic crisis (this topic proved, at least in our data, to be containing historical references – it appeared in the overview of the peaks of debates – but not historical argumentation).

However, with a repeated increase of international tensions in Europe and elsewhere, the usage of arguments perpetuating the relevance of Nazi history intensified again. For example, within the responsible protection imperative, arguments perpetuating the lessons of Holocaust appeared. Arms exports and protection of the Kurdish Peshmerga, Israel, Ukraine, or people in Mali were justified and B90/G proposal to introduce Arms Export Control Act was declined by claims such as “In January, we all remembered the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. The liberation was not carried through using ploughshares, or what do I know, but by a powerful army”, Wir alle miteinander haben im Januar des 70. Jahrestages der Befreiung von Auschwitz gedacht. Auch diese Befreiung ist nicht mit Pflugscharen oder was weiß ich was durchgeführt worden, sondern von einer kampfkräftigen Armee, CDU, Klaus–Peter Willsch, 18/86) or references to the success story of how American arms exports to the Soviet Union “helped to stop Hitler’s aggression army” (18/155) appeared as well

Germany’s leading role in response to European migration crisis was also motivated by perpetuating historical commitments (stemming from the experience of Germans suffering as refugees and expellees, but without the underlying Germans–as–victims narrative), especially by the CDU/CSU: We help out of Christian charity. We also help because we have made the terrible experiences of flight and expulsion in our past, Wir helfen aus christlicher Nächstenliebe. Wir helfen auch, weil wir aus unserer eigenen Vergangenheit heraus schreckliche Erfahrungen mit Flucht und Vertreibung gemacht haben, CDU Olav Gutting, (even) when rejecting the proposal to simplify the procedure of opening a bank account for refugees, 18/26).

The outward looking orientation of German foreign and defence policy decreased, especially after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and the conflict with Ukraine started: local defence, not responsible protection reaching to the area all over the world came back to the fore (cf. the updated military strategy, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2016).

The memory of Nazi Germany contribution to atrocities that occurred in this geographical area was recalled more often (also represented by a strong collocation of Wehrmacht and Sowjetunion). In the last two examined plenary sessions, memories of Hitler–Stalin–Pact were evoked (occurrence of this node–form escalated between 2013 and 2017), as well as the

resulting special responsibility of Germany towards all countries, which once suffered under this coalition of two totalitarian regimes, especially Ukraine, to help them in their struggles for freedom and dignity (Historische Verantwortung ist nicht gleichzusetzen mit Schuld. Aber Scham über das, was der deutsche Stiefel auf ukrainischem Boden angerichtet hat … Wenn Geschichte etwas bedeutet, dann die Verpflichtung, der Ukraine heute in ihrem Streben nach Freiheit und Würde zur Seite zu stehen, Marieluise Beck, B90/G, 18/235).

Never Normal, Never Neutral: The Holocaust Narrative

The memory of Holocaust was perpatuated throughout the entire period in un unchangning manner. It appeared most often within debates about German–Israeli relations or more generally concerning the situation in the Middle East – especially in circumstances when Israel was potentionally under threat, such as during the 2006 war with Lebanon or the 2008 Gaza War. All German political parties understand the legacy of Holocaust for Germany as an undisputable commitment to its protection, because „the right to existence of the state of Israel is part of German raison d’état.” However, on the other hand, this special responsbility also confered the need for Germany to criticise Israel, because it is not bound with Israel as “any other nation state”, but with Israel, the state of Jews, who need their own state as a guarantee of existence, which Germany once threatened (CDU, Eckert von Klaeden, 16/163). In general, the shared and perpetuated view of all parties is that relations to Israel must and may never be normal.

SPD extends the historical responsibility of Germany to Arab states as well, because only peace in the region as a whole can secure Israel’s well being, however, it is only the Linke party, who goes as far as to argue that such special relationship to Israel is in fact bias, and that fair approach would be to acknowledge equality of Germany’s commitment to Israel and Palestine, because if it were not for Holocaust, there would not have been any conflict in the first place (Linke, Monika Knoche, 16/46). Linke interprets Germany’s historical responsibility („Hitler’s attempt to exterminate European Jews”) as an imperative to one–sided recognition of the State of Palestine (Gregor Gysi, 17/118).

Interesting facet of the Holocaust narrative, which is in relation to Israel exceptionally rigid, is the realisation of German politicians that the legitimizing and moralizing power of memory of atrocities of the Holocaust cannot survive forever: Both the SPD and FDP articulate the need to emphasize democratic values shared by Germany and Israel, to convey the idea of this never- normal relationship also to younger people. Such re-framing of the relationship might also contribute to combating antisemitism in German society, which is important because

“Auschwitz can be possible anytime again”, Weil Auschwitz immer möglich sein kann, Gert Weisskirschen, SPD, 16/163).

Protest Voice: Germany’s Radical Left

So far, we left out one actor almost completely from our interpretation: the left–wing party PDS and after 2007 its successor, Die Linke. The party was relatively weak prior to 2009, struggling to build a full–fledged parliamentary fraction. After consolidating itself in the 16th legislative period and onwards it became – through its outspoken chairman Gregor Gysi – a loud source of historical argumentation.

The PDS/Linke is rigid in its views: radical pacifist, supporting international disarmament, and very often using historical arguments, mostly with quasi–perpetuating strategy (quasi because the practical implications of such perpetuations are always in contrast to what other actors consider to be a suitable outcome – therefore we added the label of protest voice in our typology). It opposed to every military–related decisions of the Bundestag, including NATO enlargements and Bundeswehr deployments, but also deepening of EU integration.

During the Kosovo War, Linke turned down all analogies of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and Hitler, or Kosovo and Auschwitz as relativizing, and downplaying the “unique German crimes of the Holocaust.” The party considered most of the Bundeswehr deployments to be illegal and argued for diplomatic solutions instead.

For example, after the War on Terror had broken out, PDS MP Heinrich Funk, in an odd combination of strategies, compared contemporary international terrorism with National Socialism, arguing that in both „terror becomes a meaning of life.” According to Funk, an implication of this is that not war, but “culture” should be the primary interest of anti–terror alliance (14/212).

The party is also outspokenly pro–Russian and denounces international support for Ukraine (whose fascist political representation should Germany avoid supporting – due to historical reasons) as well as sanctions against Russia. The suggested solution is that instead of “isolating” Putin’s regime, “chancellor Merkel should celebrate the end of Nazi dictatorship in Moscow” (Gregor Gysi, 18/106).

The historical argumentation of the Linke stands in stark contrast to more or less consensual politics of all other parties, especially in the last few years. There is almost no overlap between (historically grounded) proposals of the Linke and actual policies. Especially with an

emergence of the new protest–voice actor in the last years, the right–wing populist Alternative for Germany, who introduced its own specific and often revisionist approach to history, it will be interesting to observe, whether the historically grounded protest voice is in the German context a potent political strategy.

Cluster Summary

As was indicated, the cluster of foreign and defence policy is so prevailing over all the others that we deem it useful to provide its summary: we may conclude that most changes, which occurred in the usage of historical arguments as tools of politics with history within Germany’s foreign policy were initiated by external developments. Domestic institutional setting – principally unchanged, when we compare the Bonner and Berliner Republic – was more or less adapting itself to these conditions, and once they diminished, transformative processes weakened, too.

All political parties utilized the whole spectrum of argumentation strategies. Initially, the bearer of the transformation strategy (utilizing references to the past to legitimize change) were social democrats, replaced during the 2002/2003 Iraq Invasion decisions by the conservatives. Construction strategy (deducing obligations for newly occurred situations) was more typical for the SPD, especially during the phase of extensive application of the reconciliation imperative. FDP and B90/G utilized suppression of relevance of historical references when opting for more value or interest is driven argumentation, which they deemed to be more efficient or strategic.

The prediction that Kosovo may represent a final stage of Germany’s normalisation, in the sense of becoming an international actor comfortable with its military power like France or the UK, did not stand, with the exception of the somewhat normalised position of the Bundeswehr48.

Combined with a change in government, and Angela Merkel becoming a chancellor, this contributed to establishing Germany as a leading European power, who may follow its normative goals – previously reconciliation, then outward looking protection, based on moral values - and since the outbreak of Ukrainian war more inward oriented protection, guided by perpetuating obligations of perpetrators of the National Socialist era. It is still an ultima ratio,

48 What influence on Bundeswehr image will have the discovery of culture of Wehrmacht admiration (described on pages 54 - 55 among soldiers is to be examined from a greater distance in the future. 73

yet not a taboo, to deploy Bundeswehr soldiers to support fulfilment of such obligations, even to areas such as the Baltic states. The narrative of Germans–as–perpetrators thereby lost part of its salience, surviving in a protest voice thematization of the German past by PDS/Linke.

3.3.2 DEMOCRACY Topics identified: Direct Democracy Domestic Security Public Media Extremism In the second cluster, we grouped topics pertaining to issues of the German system of government. In general, we distinguished three main trends, appearing in individual topics: first, proposed changes of the German Basic Law (sometimes successful, sometimes not), accompanied by arguments suppressing the relevance of historical experience (of Nazism and WWII) for contemporary society.

Second, perpetuated political lessons of Nazism to protect German democracy from any fringes, even marginal ones in international comparison.

Third, combining the first two, and transforming historical lessons, so that obligations stemming from experience with national socialism be applied in a way that is relevant for today.

For example, the B90/G and SPD, as well as Linke repeatedly attempted to introduce citizen law–making procedure (Volksinitiative, Volksbegehren, Volksentscheid) on a federal level. Their suppressing resp. transforming argumentation was twofold (14/240): a) 53 years after the end of National Socialism, it was on time to reconsider the absence of this instrument in the Basic Law, resulting from the conviction that the People (Volk) contributed to national socialist crimes – now we could leave it aside. An expression of normalcy of the German nation; b) that the introduction of the instrument would, in fact, only fulfil the idea stemming from the Basic Law, because it would grant the true democratic power to an individual, who during the NS had no power at all. CDU/CSU opposed such idea (18/37), by remembering a post–war opinion survey in which 42 % of (West) German population expressed their preference of the National Socialism, and that direct democracy might be dangerous. No such instruments have been introduced.

Second, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001 (14/189), introducing new domestic security measures (proposed by the CDU/CSU and FDP) was

discussed. B90/G and SPD turned the proposal down, by perpetuating historical warnings a) Volker Beck urged the FDP chairman Guido Westerwelle (whose party shortly before formed a coalition in Hamburg with right–wing Party for a Rule of Law Offensive), to be careful not to become “the Papen of the 21st century”, referring to the 1930s German chancellor Franz von Papen, who contributed to Hitler’s takeover of power; b) Beck quoted SPD interior minister Otto Schilly, who urged to proceed only carefully with prosecuting terrorist groups abroad (referring to Al–Qaeda in Afghanistan) in order to prevent that „some Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg would find himself under the criminal liability for attempted tyrannicide on Hitler” (…es dürfe nicht sein, dass sich ein Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg wegen des versuchten Tyrannenmordes a Hitler auch unter die Strafbarkeit einer solchen Bestimmung begeben hätte).

Within Gerhard Schröder’s emphasis on cultural politics, the reform of public German radio and television was discussed. Siegmar Mosdorf (SPD) of the Ministry for Economics and Technologies (it does not exist anymore) opposed the liberal’s proposal on deregulation of public radio and television (which would help raise the financial burden) by perpetuating the „experience we all made during the NS–times, that showed, how dangerous can monopolisation of media be for the democracy” (14/83).

Finally, a repeatedly discussed issue was the constitutional ban of the right–wing extremist NPD party, following a proposal of the Linke party, but also chancellor Merkel and SPD. Thomas Oppermannn, SPD fraction chairman, for example, recalled the day Adolf Hitler was named Reichschancellor, which resulted in tyranny and second world war. He criticised that “we allow that today, the NPD, with taxpayers’ money, pushes forward the national–socialist racial doctrine” (17/720). Ula Jelpke from the Linke party added (at another occasion, 17/237) that to remember Aucshwitz means to ban the NPD (Auschwitz gedenken heißt NPD verbieten). The proposal to ban the party was eventually turned down by German constitutional court, as the party was too marginal to pose a threat to democracy.

We can conclude our interpretation by arguing that memories of the 1933 Nazi coup were within this cluster perpetuated to pose a non–institutionalized barrier within the self–defence system of Germany’s fortified (streitbare) democracy, protecting the liberal democratic order, as anchored in the Basic Law.

3.3.3 CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY Topics identified: Citizenship legislation

2006 FIFA World Cup Racism and xenophobia We have already mentioned Germany’s historical imperative to have an open and compassionate foreign policy in relation to refugees and migrants. In the field of domestic policy, the perpetuating argumentation of historical responsibility prevailed in a comparable manner, this time shaping German identity into one that finds pride in emphasis on solidarity and compassion. Feeling of pride of being German increased from 69 % to 83 % between 1994 and 2017 (Bundesverband deutscher Banken, 2018).

We argue that two main shifts in the culture of remembrance occurred during the first 19 years of Berliner Republic that contributed to such developments: first, the perpetuation of memories of Germans–as–victims of post–war expulsions (VERTREIBUNG) was politically utilized to embed values of tolerance and openness to foreigners as central attributes of German identity. Second, the gradual dying out of the narrative of Germans–as–perpetrators, who are not allowed to feel national pride, materializes itself on occasions of football matches, which might have become one of the Germany’s realms of memory - canonically in the FIFA World Cup 2006.

The by the SPD led government adopted in 2000 breakthrough amendment of the citizenship law, which marked a shift from an ethnic conception of national identity, to one centred around strong, liberal democratic values. The reform was justified by perpetuating the memories of Germans–as–victims of the post–war expulsions (however not in a revisionist manner) on the one hand, and resulted in a strong institutionalized emphasis on values of tolerance and openness to foreigners on the other.

For example, CDU/CSU argued in favour of the reform in the following manner: „due to the crimes of the Nazi–times … German emigrants had to endure a terrible fate … just because they were German. Who is committed to active politics of human rights, they need must bear a special responsibility here. We stand with the emigrants.” (Ich will daran erinnern, daß gerade die Aussiedler wegen der Verbrechen in der Nazizeit, wegen der Verbrechen dieses Regimes ein furchtbares Schicksal haben erleiden müssen. Sie hatten am längsten unter den Folgen des Zweiten Weltkriegs zu leiden, nur weil sie Deutsche waren. Wer sich zur aktiven Menschenrechtspolitik bekennt, der muß hier eine besondere Verantwortung tragen. Wir stehen zu den Aussiedlern, meine Damen und Herren, CDU, Erwin Marchewski, 14/11).

It was not only ethnical heterogeneity, which was recognized during the period of the Belriner Republic: the Wiedergutmachung processes (described in the section outlining peaks in debates: especially oriented on the gay, handicapped, Roma and Sinti victims), translated themselves into acknowledgement of heterogeneity of German society in general (Levy and Dierkes, 2004). The introduction of same–sex civil partnerships in 2001 meant a sharp departure from the traditional family–centered German conservatism. Discussions accompanying the decision were indeed initially marked by arguments defending the “great importance of marriage and family” based on an “experience of Hitler’s era” (CSU, Norbert Geis, 14/67), however, the arguments criticizing discrimination of sexual minorities (which were not specifically enlisted in the no-discrimination clause in Article 3 of the German Basic Law) as the “last group of victims of the National Socialism” eventually dominated. The legalisation of same–sex marriage was then carried through by the CDU – SPD grand coalition government in 2017.

Gerhard Schröder even felt the need to distance himself from the (negative) experience of National Socialism when making a point for his proposal of family support, part of the Agenda 2010 reform. He defended his proposed method of money relocation by arguing that it is not going to be anything like the Nazi Mother’s Cross (Mutterkreuz), awarded to German women with many children. His policies should instead allow for life in freedom and self– determination, the proclaimed underlying idea of the entire reform, breaking with traditional German state paternalism in social and labour affairs (Hegelich, Knollmann, Kuhlmann, 2011).

Let us now look on the second profound shift, which is rather symbolic, but important. When the 2006 FIFA World Cup was planned, it was met with stark opposition from the more conservative MPs of the CDU and CSU fraction. They criticized the underlying idea of the championship (to celebrate Germany’s multiculturalism and commitment to multilateralism) summarized in a motto “A Time to Make Friends.” Some CDU/CSU MPs called it a „multi– kulti Spektakel” which would fail to contribute to a „self–confident relationship to own nation” (Norbert Barthle, CDU, 15/21). However, the event marked an unexpected beginning of a new German patriotism, measurable in opinion surveys: research of the Philipps University in Marburg showed that feeling of national pride increased among the population by 7 % - as the immediate consequence of the championship (Heitmeyer, 2006).

Much later, the German historical experiences were used to justify measures combating racism and xenophobia in the society during and in the aftermath of the peak in migration crisis in Europe in summer 2015. In 2016 for example, SPD justice minister introduced a proposal to sanction racist and xenophobic behaviour in the social media. He compared the situation when 77

the WWII started, causing hatred, suffering, and expulsions, with today, when Germany has become a place of hope and new opportunities, and should, therefore, prevent outbursts of sentiments of fear and rejection (Heiko Maas, 18/119). Maas thereby utilized and perpetuated the still functional collective memory inciting feelings of compassion and sympathy – without, however, specifically recalling either the Germans–as–victims nor the Holocaust–centred narrative. That might indicate that these imperatives are gradually becoming less historically grounded.

3.3.4 MEDICINE AND RESEARCH The last cluster of topics identified in the data set was closely related to German conception of human rights, which centres around the concept of inviolable human dignity (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2018 (1990)). In the German context, this meant that questions related to human–cell research, human subject testing, euthanasia, or even abortions were and still are potentially carrying a burden of the Nazi crimes.

We identified multiple occasions on which healthcare and research related questions were discussed in the light of the Holocaust–centred–memory. For example, the (otherwise relatively liberal) B90/G MPs strongly opposed to the idea of human cloning, by arguing that it is Germany’s special responsibility due to human rights crimes of the National Socialism to carry through an international ban on human cloning (14/242). CDU MP Rudolf Henke on other occasion justified his cautious approach to medical human subject testing with the memory of “experiments on concentration camp prisoners.”

3.4 TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIES Already in the previous, narrative part, we included in many cases the accounts of argumentation strategy. In this section, we will look at the original typology, presented in the chapter on methods, which served as default and guided the analysis, and we will compare it with the typology of arguments identified in the data corpus. Specific strategy of each argument is included in the overview of all arguments in ATTACHMENT 4.

A. Construction (presenting the past as a A. Construction (presenting the past as a value measure for new situations; deducing value measure for new situations; deducing new legal or moral obligations; appellation new legal or moral obligations; appellation on the importance of knowledge of history on the importance of knowledge of history

for finding an appropriate solution for a new for finding an appropriate solution for a new situation); situation); B. Identity building B. Perpetuation (describing history as a a. unification (emphasising unity process; interpreting present as a and solidarity) consequence of the past; comparative b. differentiation (dissimilarity and outlook on the past and the present); heterogeneity); C. Transformation (criticizing C. Perpetuation (describing history as a “historical normalcy” of the present status process; interpreting present as a quo, past as a source for challenging it and consequence of the past; comparative finding alternatives; expanding the scope of outlook on the past and the present and what belongs to “national history”, need for a comparisons of various histories with one positive narrative); another) D. Suppression (history as irrelevant for D. Transformation (criticising alleged the subject matter; turning down analogies as “historical normalcy” of the present status unacceptable; there are more relevant reasons quo, past as a source for challenging it and than history; it is not strategically useful to finding alternatives). argue with history); E. Protest voice; F. Personal Argument (experience, integrity).

FIGURE 3.9: ARGUMENT STRATEGY TYPOLOGY: BEFORE (LEFT) AND AFTER.

We had to complement the typology immediately after we started reading through the plenary minutes: the suppression strategy was missing, allowing us to account for instances in which the Nazi–related past was thematised only to be rejected as irrelevant, or to criticize someone else for using a wrong analogy. It is exactly this strategy, which informs the collective memory, not by process of remembering but forgetting (recall one of the critiques of Assmanns’ concept in the theoretical chapter).

Another issue was how to handle the strategy of transformation: at the very beginning of the examined time span, it marked a departure from the status quo of the Bonner Republic. Approaches in some topics however transformed more than just once (typically in the cluster of foreign and defence policy). We decided, for clarity, to maintain the Bonner Republic as referential: thus, when the CDU/CSU insisted in 2002 on the continuation of the more proactive

foreign policy, introduced by the Schröder’s government, it was also labelled as the transformation of the pre–1999 status quo.

As has been already mentioned, the special category of Protest voice had to be created, to prevent distortion of the meaning of other labels. On occasions when the PDS/Linke did use the arguments like other parties, it received the respective label.

On the other hand, we discarded the label of identity building: we did not discover any explicit attempts to (re)construct Germany’s identity with the help of historical arguments, except one, which was defined as a separate policy topic, because related to the citizenship legislation. At the same time, it became clear that any historical argument might be understood as at least implicitly informing the conception of German identity, either with unifying or differentiating emphasis. In the cluster of foreign policy, we thus accounted for this aspect by describing Germany’s shared and special responsibility (the first one is a demonstration of emphasis on unity, the latter on dissimilarity), and in other cases by always making notice when any attribute was framed as “special” for Germany or Germans.

Finally, we added the category of Personal argument, to cover cases in which personal affiliation and/or personal experience was thematized to either justify own argument, or to downgrade the opponent, as in the case of the CDU MP Erika Steinbach, who, albeit representing the interests of the expellees, was exposed as a daughter of Wehrmacht officer never actually being expelled by Ludger Volmer (B90/G; 15/78).

3.5 CULTURE OF REMEMBRANCE OF THE BERLINER REPUBLIC In the theoretical chapter, we introduced two predictions regarding the developments of the culture of remembrance and German collective memory in the Berliner Republic. Based on the outcomes of our analysis, it seems that Eric Lanchebacher was right to gues that (so far, at least) the “Nazi–era memories may be transmogrifying into … simply history”, but, at the same time, “remains the imperative for German political culture” (2010b: 25 - 37). We will now attempt to briefly confront the outcomes of our qualitative analysis with some of the presuppositions of the theory of memory and remembering.

Both underlying normative narratives of the Bonner Republic (German–victimhood–centred, and Holocaust–centred) found their way into the culture of remembrance of the Berliner Republic, which was an anticipable outcome, given the already mentioned continuity of the two entities.

Most frequently utilized strategy in the entire corpus was perpetuation (interpreting present as a consequence of the past and presenting a comparative outlook on the past and the present), which by itself suggests that the NS history was persistently considered to be important in the political discourse. Perpetuation was primarily used in connection with the Holocaust–centred narrative, which proved to be very stable, and potent to legitimize or moralize - both preserving and transforming the status quo.

On the other hand, Berliner Republic seems to be marking the dawn of political utilization of memories of German suffering, traditionally represented by German conservatives. If we look at our account of node–forms, we indeed find that towards the LP 18 the compound Vertreibungsopfer,–n (victim/s of expulsion) disappears completely from the data set, which created a stark contrast to the 1980s, when this narrative was both powerful and controversial. Nowadays, the revisionist form of the German victimhood narrative remains on margins of right–wing conservatism, while the thereby induced culture of remembrance remains a positive determining factor for country’s response to contemporary migration crisis (across the political spectrum).

Interesting is also the re-emergence of the topic of crimes committed by the Wehrmacht in the former Soviet Union. While in the 1990s this was vehemently rejected by conservative politicians, now it finds resonance as one of the justificatory arguments for Angela Merkel’s tougher position towards Russia (Wacket and Escritt, 2018).

To conclude with, we may offer following remarks to account for a way, in which penetration of historical arguments into political discourse influenced Germany’s culture of remembrance:

a) The Wiedergutmachung politics, which started already in Schröder’s era, and which focused on recognition of various, until then neglected groups of Nazi victims, resulted in musealisation of memories of these victims, mainly in the form of memorials and documentation centres. These memories were thus institutionalised in the culture of remembrance and are likely to find storage in the collective memory. It also seems that the premise of memories of various victim groups necessarily “competing” with one another does not hold any more. In turn, such institutionalization contributed to raising awareness of heterogeneity of German society and helped to carry through some societal reforms. b) The same happened to memories of post-war German expulsions and expropriations, which were before the Berliner Republic represented predominantly by associations and

families of direct participants. When the German government took over the Centre against Expulsions and turned it into an international project, the mobilizing and revanchist charge disappeared, probably also because of generational change both in Bundestag and in society. This topic is thus also likely to entering an institutionalized form the long-term collective memory: in a way planned and implemented by the state. Such “liberating” of the narrative allowed, in turn, for memories of such suffering to find resonance in attempts to formulate a positive conception of German identity, as a compassionate nation. c) Musealisation took mostly part in Berlin, which contributed to its re-construction as a centre of material representation of recognition of these victim groups. Image of Berlin as a capital city of militarist Prussia, Hitler’s Reich or as a symbol of Germany’s division might thus be overcome, and this new Berlin has the chance to become one of the realms of the collective memory of the Berliner Republic. d) Awareness of politicians of the ongoing generational changes resulted in demands to reconsider the form of arguments, which perpetuate the underlying normative narratives. Interestingly, these demands appeared in debates related to Holocaust and Israel (which, on the other hand, corresponds with its importance). Calls for suppression of historical argumentation in favour of value-based argumentation to convey the memory of Holocaust on future generations will be confronted with a situation in which majority of Germans (60% in 2012) are convinced that there is nothing like the special responsibility of Germany towards Israel (Stern, 2018). e) Germany’s (perhaps involuntary) evolution into European hegemon translated in the Berliner Republic into demands for de-nationalizing of collective memories and working on a common European Erinnerungskultur (the internationalization of the project of Centre against Expulsions is a good example). In the political discourse, arguments surrounding the debates about the United Kingdom leaving the European Union as well as on Russian aggression against Ukraine centred on the issue that „never war again” will not suffice anymore as a founding narrative of united Europe (18/181). f) The fact that the existing collective memories might be losing relevance seems to manifest itself in the political system of the Berliner Republic as well: the in 2013 emerged right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany articulated as one of its goals the “180-degree turn” in Germany’s culture of remembrance” (AfD, 2016). That such proposals might find resonance in the society motivated the Bundestag MPs in our last examined period to alter the rigid parliamentary procedure, with the aim to prevent

member of the AfD (the party was rightly anticipated to enter the parliament) to chair the ceremonial opening session of the new legislature.

CONCLUSION The aim of this diploma thesis was to map the political discourse of the Berliner Republic, and to try to fill a gap in existing research by providing an account of historical argumentation within general policy issues. Our default data corpus comprised 1.171 transcripts of Bundestag plenary sessions.

In order to find references to the era of National Socialism, we selected six keywords, each representing a facet of memory of Nazism: Hitler and Nationalsozialismus as general references; Holocaust and Auschwitz, representing the narrative of the Schoa, Wehrmacht, as a proxy for crimes committed by the Germans, and Vertreibung, representing the memory of German suffering.

To be able to locate these keywords in argumentative context, we used the existing list of “reason and consequence” markers of the German language. We were thus able to account not only for simple occurrences of keywords, but to reduce the corpus only to such cases, in which they served to argumentative purposes.

First, we focused on intensity (first specific research question), with which the topic of National Socialism appeared in our default data corpus. We used the Sketch Engine analytical tool to extract from the corpus frequencies of keywords, of node-forms in which these keywords appeared, and pairs of words (collocations) which appeared significantly often in the corpus. This gave as first impression of topics, in which the historical arguments occurred.

We discovered that the intensity of the topic of National Socialism in general was highest in the first legislative period (1998 – 2002), after which it decreased considerably, and re-emerged in the last period (2013 -2017). Keyword Holocaust was used in the highest number of plenary session as an argument, which suggested that the Holocaust-centred narrative was the most powerful source of historical arguments. This was subsequently confirmed in the qualitative analysis.

Subsequently, we went manually through all transcripts, in which keywords in argumentative context were discovered. By reducing the corpus further, discarding for us irrelevant accounts of argumentation in commemorative and symbolical politics of history, we finished with 91 cases of historical arguments being used in discussions about general policy topics. We provided their full list, including a name and political affiliation of the speaker, who articulated the argument (third specific research question).

Finally, by closed reading of the relevant thematical agenda sections of the Bundestag plenary meetings, we were able to identify four main general policy clusters, in which historical argumentation appeared: Foreign and Defence Policy, which was by far the most affected; cluster Democracy, comprising of issues such as media or domestic security; cluster of Citizenship and National Identity, and finally the smallest, rather anecdotally represented cluster of Research and Medicine.

We also annotated the argumentation with label of strategy, beginning with a default, deductively created typology of argumentation strategy, based on a combination of existing theoretical accounts. Gradually, we were able to transform the typology to include only strategies actually applied in the data corpus: construction, perpetuation, transformation, suppression, protest voice and personal argument.

When comparing the strategy and speaker categories, we found no clear linkage between the two, with the exception of the PDS/Linke party, which so often used arguments opposing to all other speakers that we had to construct a special type of strategy to account for it: the protest voice.

Combining answers to the three specific research questions, we were able to formulate the following conclusion: first, the memory of national socialism and especially the Holocaust- centred memory was perpetuated (perpetuation was the most often applied strategy) throughout the entire corpus and policy clusters. Memories of Holocaust and narratives of Germans as perpetrator thus provided the underlying normative orientation of political discourse in the Berliner Republic. Nevertheless, the Nazi past was not the ultima ratio limitation of German policy making anymore, which demonstrated something that might be called the emancipation of German foreign and defence policy.

Second, the narrative of Germans as perpetrators was in the course of the 19 years neutralized and deprived of its revisionist appeal. Instead, feelings of compassion and sympathy with refugees and migrants, which Germans should be able to feel precisely because of their own experience with expulsion, were framed as the potential source of positive conception of German identity, which also began to take shape in examined period.

Finally, we attempted to confront our results with theories of memory and remembering, as described in detail in the theoretical part, and to derive some general observations about culture of remembrance in the Berliner Republic. We discovered that memories of various victim groups of national socialism, as well as memories of German expellees were institutionalised

and musealised. That seems to have resulted in termination of the victimhood competition and acknowledgment of heterogeneity of German society, as well as the above described “liberalization” of the narrative of Germans as victims.

Throughout the whole corpus, remarks of politicians revealed their awareness of challenges, posed by generational and societal changes, as well as developments in international landscape. Strategies identified by politicians themselves as possible measures to prevent the important normative underpinnings of German culture of remembrance from disappearing, included proposals to use more value-oriented arguments and to work on constructing a European culture of remembrance.

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 3.1: PROCESS OF REMEMBERING WITHIN THE MATRIX OF MEMORY. BASED ON ERLL (2017). OWN

PRESENTATION.

FIGURE 3.1: POLITICAL DISCOURSE. SOURCE OF DATA: DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG (2018).

FIGURE 3.2: KEYWORDS FOR ANALYSIS. BASED ON PETHES AND RUCHATZ, 2001; NIVEN, 2006; WITTLINGER AND

LAROSE, 2007; LANGENBACHER 2010B; BECKER, 2013.

FIGURE 3.1: SHARES OF PMS WITH KEYWORDS. TOTAL AND IN CONTEXT. PER LP.

FIGURE 3.2: SHARES OF PMS WITH KEYWORDS. TOTAL AND IN CONTEXT. 100 % = 1.171.

FIGURE 3.3: OCCURRENCES OF KEYWORDS IN INDIVIDUAL LPS.

FIGURE 3.4: SHARES OF KEYWORDS. TOTAL AND IN CONTEXT.

FIGURE 3.5: SHARES OF PLENARY MINUTES. TOTAL AND IN CONTEXT

FIGURE 3.6: CHARACTERS PER MILLION WORDS OVER TIME, PER LEGISLATIVE PERIOD.

FIGURE 3.7: N OF KEYWORDS IN CONTEXT PER MONTH (ABOVE) AND N OF PMS PER MONTH (BELOW). THE SCALE

OF THE BOTTOM GRAPH = 10 % OF THE ABOVE.

FIGURE 3.8: FINAL REDUCTION OF THE DATA CORPUS: NUMBER OF RELEVANT SECTIONS.

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1: LIST OF REASON AND CONSEQUENCE MARKERS OF THE GERMAN LANGUAGE

(DUMM AND LEMKE, 2013; ADAPTED)

ATTACHMENT 2: NODE–FORM FREQUENCIES AND COLLOCATIONS IN EACH LP.

ATTACHMENT 3: CHECK OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN “NS” AND “NATIONALSOZIALISMUS”.

ATTACHMENT 4: OVERVIEW OF ALL ARGUMENTS WITHIN POLITICS WITH HISTORY

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1: LIST OF REASON AND CONSEQUENCE MARKERS OF THE GERMAN LANGUAGE

(DUMM AND LEMKE, 2013; ADAPTED)

1. aber 30. sodass 59. allerdings 2. alldieweil 31. sodaß 60. alsdann 3. als 32. somit 61. auseinander 4. also 33. trotzdem 62. bekanntermaßen 5. da 34. weil 63. bekanntlich 6. daher 35. wenn 64. besonders 7. damit 36. wo 65. dabei 8. darum 37. zumal 66. dadurch 9. dass 38. anlässlich 67. dagegen 10. daß 39. angesichts 68. danach 11. demnach 40. anläßlich 69. dann 12. demzufolge 41. aufgrund 70. darauf 13. denn 42. dank 71. daraufhin 14. dennoch 43. durch 72. davon 15. deshalb 44. entsprechend 73. demgemäß 16. deswegen 45. für 74. eigens 17. doch 46. gemäß 75. endlich 18. folglich 47. hinsichtlich 76. ergo 19. indessen 48. infolge 77. freilich 20. infolgedessen 49. je 78. genaugenommen 21. insofern 50. kraft 79. gewissermaßen 22. inwiefern 51. laut 80. halber 23. je 52. nach 81. hauptsächlich 24. jedoch 53. ob 82. her 25. nachdem 54. vermöge 83. heran 26. nämlich 55. wegen 84. herbei 27. ob 56. zufolge 85. hernach 28. sintemalen 57. zugunsten 86. herzu 29. so 58. zwecks 87. hieran

88. hierdurch 101. logischerweise 114. vorwiegend 89. hierher 102. mithin 115. vorzugsweise 90. hierhin 103. möglicherweise 116. wenigstens 91. hiermit 104. nachher 117. weshalb 92. hiernach 105. namentlich 118. weswegen 93. hinterher 106. pro 119. wieso 94. hinzu 107. rechtens 120. wozu 95. immerhin 108. schließlich 121. zu 96. insbesondere 109. sodann 122. zuletzt 97. jedenfalls 110. sozusagen 123. zuliebe 98. letztendlich 111. später 124. aufgrunddessen 99. letztens 112. speziell

100. letztlich 113. vornehmlich

ATTACHMENT 2: NODE–FORM FREQUENCIES AND COLLOCATIONS IN EACH LP.

LP 14 (1998 – 2002)

Hitler, Hitlers (111) Vertreibung, –en, s, (566) Vertreibungsplan (1) Anti–Hitler–Koalition (7) Vertreibungspolitik (15) Vertreibungsfantasien (1) Hitlerdeutschland (3) Massenvertreibung (10) Vertreibungserfahrung (1) Adolf–Hitler–Spende (2) Vertreibungsschicksal (8) Vertreibungsdekreten (1) Hitlerjugend (1) Vertreibungsgebiet (7) Judenvertreibung (1) Hitler–Stalin–Pakt (1) Vertreibungsopfer, –n (5) Nichtvertreibung (1) Hitler–Regime (1) Vertreibungskrieg (5) Konzernvertreibungsstrategie (1) Hitlerfaschismus (1) Vertreibungsgeschichte, geschehen Vertreibungswirtschaft (1) Hitler–Wehrmacht (1) (4) Vertreibungszahlen (1) hitlerschen (1) Vertreibungsproblematik (3) Vertreibungswelle (1) Vertreibungsmaßnahmen (2) Vertreibungsweg (1) Vertreibungskampagne (2) Vertreibungsverluste (1) Vertreibungsaktion (2) Vertreibungsunrecht (1) Vertreibungsverbot (1) Vertreibungstrauma (1) Holocaust, Holocausts (115) Auschwitz (81) Wehrmacht (39) Holocaust Mahnmal/Denkmal (71) Auschwitzlüge (2) Wehrmachtausstellung (12) Holocaust–Überlebenden, –opfern (4) Auschwitz–Komitee (1) Wehrmachtsdeserteure (6) Holocaust–Museum (3) Wehrmachtsangehörige (5) Holocaustforscher (2) Wehrmachtsgeneral (2) Holocaust–Serie (2) Wehrmachtsveteranen (1) Holocaust Gedenktag (2) Nationalsozialismus (148) Wehrmachtstraditionen (1) Holocaust – Ausstellung (2) Neonationalsozialismus (1) Wehrmachtssoldaten (1) Holocaust–Restitution (2) Hitler – Wehrmacht (1) Holocaust–Versicherungsschäden (1)

LP 15 (2002 – 2005)

Hitler, Hitlers (41) Vertreibung, –en, s, (116) Auschwitz (15) Hitler–Faschismus (6) Vertreibungsgebiet (12) Auschwitzlüge (2) Hitler–Stalin–Pakt (3) Vertreibungsdekrete (8) Hitler–Diktatur (3) Vertreibungsgesetze (5) Nationalsozialismus (62) Hitler–Zeit (2) Vertreibungsunrecht (3) Hitlertyrannei (1) Massenvertreibung (2) Hitlerjugend (1) Vertreibungsverbrechen (2) Hitler–Stellvertreter (1) Vertreibungsschicksal (1) Holocaust, Holocausts (57) Vertreibungsräume (1) Holocaust Mahnmal/Denkmal (25) Vertreibungsopfer (1) Holocaust Gedenktag (2) Vertreibungsaktion (1) Holocaust–Überlebenden (1) Kapitalvertreibung (1) Holocaust–Leugner (1) Binnenvertreibungs (1) Mittelstandvertreibungsprogramm Wehrmacht (10) (1) Wehrmachtsoffizier (3) Wehrmachtausstellung (2) Wehrmachtsgeneral, –en (1)

LP 16 (2005 – 2009)

Hitler, Hitlers (32) Vertreibung, –en, s, (218) Auschwitz (15) Hitlergruß (4) Vertreibungsdruck (2) Auschwitzleugner, –n (1) Hitler–Stalin–Pakt; –es (4) Massenvertreibung (2) Auschwitzkomitees (1) Hitlerjugend (2) Vertreibungsgebiet (1) Auschwitz–Vergleich (1) Hitler–Faschismus (2) Vertreibungssituationen (1) Hitlerdeutschland (1) Vertreibungspolitik (1) Nationalsozialismus (97) Hitler–Stellvertreter (1) Vertreibungsopfer, –n (1) Hitler–Regime (1) Binnenvertreibung (1) Hitler–Putsch (1) Zwangsvertreibung (1) Anti–Hitler–Koalition (1) Mietervertreibungs (1) Holocaust, Holocausts (73) Landvertreibung (1) Holocaustleugner, –leugnungs, lügner (13) Wehrmacht, –s (27) Holocaust Mahnmal/Denkmal (7) Wehrmachtsdesserteure (4) Holocaust Konferenz (4) Wehrmachtsverherrlichung (1) Nach–Holocaust–Deutschland (1ú Wehrmachtsverbrechen (1) Holocaustnachkommen (1) Wehrmachtsgefängnis (1) Holocaustbeauftragte (1) Wehrmachtausstellung (1) Holocaust–Opfer (1) Holocaust–Gedenktag (1)

LP 17 (2009 – 2013)

Hitler, Hitlers (50) Vertreibung, –en, s, (438) Holocaust, Holocausts (60) Hitler–Deutschland (11) Vertreibungsgebiete, regionen (4) Holocaust–Gedenktag (5) Hitler–Regime (5) Massenvertreibung, –en (3) Holocaustüberlebende, –n (5) Anti–Hitler–Koalition (4) Zwangsvertreibung, en (3) Holocaust–Mahnmal, Gedenkstätten (4) Hitlerdiktatur (3) Vertreibungsverbrechen (2) Holocaustorganisator (1) Hitlerfaschismus (2) Vertreibungsschicksal (2) Holocaustopfer (1) Hitlergruß (2) Vertreibungsopfer (2) Holocaustmahnmal (1) Hitlerreich (1) Vertreibungsgeschichte, –n (2) Holocaustleugner (1) Hitlerei (1) Vertreibungswahn (1) Holocaustfragen (1) Hitler–Stalin–Pakt (1) Vertreibungsumdeuteln (1) Holocausterziehung (1) Hitler–Bärtchen (1) Vertreibungsunrecht (1) Auschwitz (35) Vertreibungserfahrung (1) Wehrmacht, –s (26) Auschwitz–Birkenau (4) Vertreibungselend (1) Wehrmachtsoffiziere, –n (2) Auschwitz–Gedenktag (2) Osteuropa–Vertreibungsforscher Wehrmachtsdesserteure (1) Auschwitz–Überlebenden (1) (1) Wehrmachtssoldaten (1) Auschwitz–Prozess (1) Landvertreibung (1) Wehrmachtsgeschichte (1) Nationalsozialismus (133) Wehrmachtseinheiten (1) Wehrmachtsausstellung (1)

LP 18 (2013 – 2017)

Hitler, Hitlers (36) Vertreibung, –en, s, (260) Wehrmacht, –s (41) Hitler–Stalin–Pakt (15) Vertreibungsgeschichte (2) Wehrmachtsausstellung (4) Hitler–Deutschland (9) Landvertreibung (2) Wehrmachtgegenstände, –devotionalien, – Hitlergruß (7) Binnenvertreibung (2) andenken (3) Hitlerfaschismus (5) Massenvertreibung (1) Wehrmachtsoffiziere, –n (2) Hitler–Verehrer (3) Vertreibungsgebiete (1) Wehrmachtsuniform (2) Anti–Hitler–Koalition (2) Vertreibungspolitik (1) Wehrmachtstradition, en (2) Hitlerjunge (1) Vertreibungsbiografien (1) Wehrmachtssoldaten (2) Hitlerjugend (1) Wehrmachtsangehörigen (2) Hitler–Tagebücher (1) Wehrmachtsdeserteure, –n (2) Hitler–Herrschaft (1) Wehrmachtssymbole (1) Holocaust, Holocausts (50) Auschwitz (48) Wehrmachtspiloten (1) Holocaustüberlebende, –n (9) Auschwitz–Birkenau (4) Wehrmachtsnamen (1) Holocaust–Gedenktag, Gedenken (8) Auschwitz–Prozess (2) Wehrmachtslieder (1) Holocaust–Mahnmal (5) Auschwitz–Lüge (1) Wehrmachtsandenken (1) Holocaustleugnung, –leugner, –lüge (6) Wehrmachtfamilienbuchs (1) Nationalsozialismus (88) holocaustrelativierenden (2) wehrmachtsbezogen (1) Nazi–Holocaust (1) Bomben–Holocaust (1)

14 LP (1998 – 2002) 15 LP (2002 – 2005) 16 LP (2005 – 2009) HITLER Stalin 10,14 Adolf 11,42 Adolf 11,39 Machtergreifung 9,49 Filbinger 10,5 Attentat 10,14 Ermächtigungsgesetz 9,45 Befreiung 9,97 verbrecherisch 9,92 Jahrestag 8,60 Weimarer 8,88 Auschwitz 8,88 Sieg 8,65 Adolf 8,39 Milosevic 8,12 NS Gedenken 10,01 Homosexuelle 10,66 ermordet 10,49 Gedenktag 10,01 Homo– 10,4 Denkmal 10,43 Befreiung 9,30 verfolgt 10,00 Sinti 9,97 Gedenkstunde 9,29 Denkmal 9,80 Homosexuelle 9,86 verfolgt 8,36 Befreiung 9,62 Gleichsetzung 9,69 Verbrechen 8,35 Opfer 8,19 verfolgt 9,61 Opfer 8,34 Verbrechen 9,04 Würdigung 9,23 homosexuell 8,25 Roma 9,21 Gedenken 9,06 Opfer 8,13 HOLOCAUST Museum 9,22 Leugnung 10.08 Bestreiten 11,00 Mahnmal 9,21 Tor 9,90 Leugnung 10,73 Auschwitz 8,42 Neonazi 9,86 Verfolgte 10,42 jüdisch 8,37 Brandenburger 9.69 Rehabilitierung 9,83 Eröffnung 8,26 leugnen 9,50 Gedenken 8,08 AUSCHWITZ Vernichtungslager 10,08 Befreiung 9,66 passieren 5,43 Befreiung 10,05 wieder 2,60 Konzentrations 10,00 unsre 1,20

Auschwitz 9,63 Hitler 8,98 Holocaust 8,95 WEHRMACHT Weltkrieg 7,93 Angehörige 7,82 Rehabilitierung 9,78 Angehörige 7,12 Deutsch 1,70 Verbrechen 7,08 Jahr 1,09 VERTREIBUNG Zentrum 11,19 Flucht 10,10 Flucht 12, 51 Mord 10,49 ethnisch 10,02 Versöhnung 10,75 Flucht 9,88 Säuberung 9,95 unselbstständig 9,89 ethnisch 9,28 Massaker 9,69 Zentrum 9,55 Völkermord 9,20 Zentrum 9,52 Versöh– 9,41 Vertreibung 9,17 Mord 9,44 Stiftung 9,34 ausgerichtet 8,95 Kulturarbeit 9,34 Kleinbauer 9,28 Sudetendeutsche 8,72 Rechtfertigung 9,32 Ausstellung 9,24 Milosevic 8,66 Armenier 9,06 Vertreibung 9,21 Albaner 8,48 Kulturgut 9,02 ächten 8,91 Zen– 8,33 Tötung 8,96 Unrecht 8,90 Kosovo–Albaner 8,30 Unrecht 8,50 Raubbau 8,89 Enteignung 8,29 Gedenken 8,72 systematisch 8,09 Kleinbäuerin 8,69 Krieg 8,05 Massenmord 8,66 Kosovo 8,04 Mord 8,63 Herzstück 8,32 Elend 8,14 17 LP (1998 – 2002) 18 LP (2013 – 2017) HITLER Stalin 10,21 Stalin 11,15 Adolf 10,07 Adolf 10,54 Sieg 9,07 Sieg 9,27 gleichsetzen 8,68 Sowjetunion 8,40 Verbrechen 8,51 75 8,07 NS Gedenken 10,01 Gedenktag 10,08 ermordet 9,94 Befreiung 8,71 Gedenktag 9,23 Opfer 8,12 Denkmal 9,17 Opfer 8,63 Sinti 8,34 HOLOCAUST Weltkrieg 8,37 Überlebende 10,72 NS–Zeit 9,80 Überlebend 9,49 AUSCHWITZ Konzentrationslager 10,87 Vernichtungslager 12,08 Befreiung 9,57 Treblinka 11,09 Konzentrationslager 11,02 freiung 10,32 Befreiung 10,10 Jahrestag 8,80 befreien 8,08 WEHRMACHT Angehörige 6,25 SS 10,38 deutsch 2,04 Kaserne 9,38 Homosexuelle 9,09 Sowjetunion 8,48 VERTREIBUNG Flucht 12,81 Flucht 11,57 Versöhnung 11,90 Versöhnung 10,51 Stiftung 10,64 Stiftung 9,57 Versöh 10,23 Massaker 9,48 söhnung 9,25 ethnisch 9,20 Gedenktag 8,72 Ursache 8,93 Gedenken 8,41 Stiftungsrat 8,86 Unrecht 8,21 Elend 8,56 Stiftungsrat 8,16 Armenier 8,46 ächten 8,16 Verschleppung 8,39 lucht 8,14 Krieg 8,20 Ächtung 8,14 Hunger 8,04 Bevölkerungsgruppe 8,13 öhnung 8,13 Zentrum 8,06 Jahrhundert 8,13

ATTACHMENT 3: CHECK OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN “NS” AND “NATIONALSOZIALISMUS”.

Legislative Period and Check Random Result Number NS Node–Form Included 14/1 4 NS–Zwangsarbeitern NO 14/2 29 NS–Diktatur YES 14/3 228 NS–Euthanasie YES 14/4 48 NS Opfer YES

14/5 85 NS–Regime YES 15/1 44 NS–Verfolgten YES 15/2 35 NS–Zeit YES 15/3 42 DNS NO 15/4 41 NS–Geschichte YES 15/5 25 NS–Diktatur YES 16/1 201 NS–Justiz YES 16/2 129 NS–Regime YES 16/3 130 NSDAP YES 16/4 202 NS–Regime YES 16/5 15 ASCOBANS NO 17/1 183 NSU YES 17/2 120 NS–Vergangenheit YES 17/3 20 NS–Verbrechen YES 17/4 291 NSDAP YES 17/5 246 NSDAP–Mitglied YES 18/1 322 NSU YES 18/2 142 NSA YES 18/3 331 NSU–Komplex YES 18/4 444 NSU YES 18/5 203 NS–Zeit YES

ATTACHMENT 4: OVERVIEW OF ALL ARGUMENTS WITHIN POLITICS WITH HISTORY

LP 14 (1998 – 2002) PM Topic Strategy Speaker Perpetuation (legitimisation of the CDU, Erwin Marschewski Immigration status quo by comparing the present 1 14/11 (Expellees and Refugees policy with the past) and identity building Fraction Working Group) (emphasising unity). The FDP fraction proposes to regulate immigration with a quantitative upper limit, to „regard the legitimate interests of the BRD.” Erwin Marschewski from the CDU/CSU opposes that legislation while relying on the narrative of Germans as victims, by arguing that „due to the crimes of the Nazi– times … German emigrants had to endure a terrible fate … just because they were German. Who is committed to active politics of human rights, they need must bear a special responsibility here. We stand with the emigrants.” The proposal was not accepted. Foreign Construction (appellation on Policy, knowledge of history for finding an B90/G, Joschka Fischer 2 14/14 Human appropriate solution for a present (Foreign Minister) Rights situation). Foreign minister Joseph Fischer argues for enforcing the international criminal law (the Rome Statute that established International Criminal Court was adopted earlier that year), to „make dictators accountable of the world of today and tomorrow” and not let them „avoid accountability when they make their bloody business a standard of their politics.” He supports this demand by the claim „I do not understand why political criminals are always described as something better” when „the worst criminals of this century – Hitler in the first place, but also Stalin – were without doubt political criminals.” Perpetuation (CDU, history as a CSU, Hans Raidel, Hartmut Foreign process, thus impossibility to separate Koschyk, Christian Schmidt Policy; the past from the present). SPD, Ludger Volmer, 3 14/26 Czech Suppression (SPD, discontinuity secretary of the Ministry of German between past events and contemporary foreign Affairs Relations situation). CDU/CSU politicians insist on guiding the official relations with the Czech Republic by (unresolved) questions of compensations for the confiscated property of Germans expulsed from the territories of Sudetenland and thereby perpetuating the approach of former chancellor Helmut Kohl. Paradoxically, it was Kohl who in 1997 signed the German–Czech Declaration, in which the provision that „both parties claim that they do not wish to burden mutual relationship with a political and legal question

that originate in the past” was included – which in fact means suppression of the importance of historical argumentation. Instead, the CDU/CSU in 1998 argues that „the state should defend the private interests of its citizens, in foreign policy as well.” SPD’s Ludger Volmer (speaking on behalf of the foreign ministry) claims on the other hand that past and present should be separated, as well as civil law liabilities (request that the property be compensated) and state foreign policy, because the expulsions belong to a „closed historical epoch” and CDU/CSU should cease attempts to „fight the lost battles of the past”. The fact that the property confiscations were against international law (which both CDU/CSU and SPD acknowledge) should in Volmer’s words motivate Germany to foreign policy guided by reconciliation, not only towards the Czech Republic but in general. Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, present as a consequence of the past CSU, Hartmut Koschyk, impossibility and undesirability of Wolfgang Bötsch Foreign their separation). CDU, Erika Reinhardt, Policy; Transformation (SPD, past as a SPD, Gert Weisskirchen, 4 14/26 Czech source for challenging of the status Gernot Erler, Markus German quo, but also perpetuation of the Meckel; Relations present situation as a consequence of B90/G, Antje Vollmer, the past). Helmut Lippelt Suppression (B90/G, history as irrelevant for the subject matter). CDU/CSU perpetuates the narrative of Germans as victims, by insisting that chancellor Gerhard Schröder should consider more the interests of the German Association of expellees (Vertriebenenverbände) when conducting foreign policy. They expect him, just like Kohl, to include the Sudeten Germans in a dialogue, and „to demand that the [Beneš] decrees be withdrawn.” They suppress the image of German–perpetrators by arguing that „Czechokoslovakia was a poster child of Hitler” and the situation there was not at all that bad during the war. SPD’s Gert Weisskirchen opposes this and defends Schröder revised approach by recalling „how the NS–Dictatorship dealt with the Czechs,” remembering the Terezin Ghetto and Lidice Village Massacre. Markus Meckel (also SPD) compares Munich Agreement with Beneš Decrees to illustrate the difficulty of nullifying past legal documents. B90/G prefer the European perspective on Czech– German relations: foreign minister Fischer emphasizes German commitment to European integration, which is a must after all the history, which happened only because „our country signed a devil’s pact with Hitler in 1933”. Expulsions are according to Antje Vollmer a matter of domestic policy, and while at home „clear dealing with the past … condemnation of national–socialist Germany must remain constitutive for the Bundesrepublik” but the „assessment of the confiscations … is not at all of central importance in the relationship of the two states” (Helmut Lippelt). Construction (SPD, deducing new Foreign obligations originating in the past SPD, Gerhard Schröder Policy, events – EU), (Chancellor), Rudolf Kosovo War, Transformation (SPD, past as a 5 14/31 Scharping (Defence EU Policy – source for challenging status quo), Minister) Eastern Transformation (B90/G, past as a B90/G, Helmut Lippelt Enlargement source for alternatives for the existing status quo). SPD’s defence minister Scharping justifies Germany’s military involvement in the Balkans by dual and overlapping historical responsibility: of Europeans, to „create conditions for peace in the Balkans just like we had after the devastating experience of fascism and the second world war” and Germans, in particular, must „draw consequences from own experiences … and stay on track of the process that brought reconciliation, friendship, peace and wellbeing to Germany”. Both responsibilities are according to him „a test, but also with a look at [German] history a valuable experience of belonging – in such a difficult situation – to the consensus of Europe and of the western democracies.” B90/G (Helmut Lippelt) argues in favour of the change of long term tradition in the German foreign policy and defends participation in Kosovo bombing. He does so by presenting the following analogy: „I remembered August 1939 as Hitler let a tank division roll through Berlin to test the mood of the 95

population. And the people stood there, silent and frightened on the side of the road, not understanding what is happening to them. And thus, they were involved in crimes that bear names Auschwitz, Treblinka, but also Oradour, Lidice, Marzobotto, and Kragujevac – exactly that Kragujevac, whose population is now involved in crimes of Milosevic’s regime”.

In the same section, Chancellor Schröder also expresses his support for the EU Eastern Enlargement by calling it an „order we got from mothers and fathers who had to live through terrible wars.” SPD, Gerhard Schröder Transformation (SPD and B90/G, (Chancellor), Peter Struck both regarding German response). (Fraction Chairman), Foreign Perpetuation (CDU/CSU), regarding Joschka Fischer (Foreign 6 14/32 policy, the conflicting nature. Minister) Kosovo War Suppression (PDS, turning down any CDU, Wolfgang Schäuble, analogies as unacceptable PDS Gregor Gysi, (Fraction relativizing). Chairman). Two lines of argumentation unfold within debates about Kosovo: regarding the nature of the conflict, and regarding the adequate German response to it. Governmental SPD (Peter Struck) creates an analogy between atrocities committed in Germany and now in Yugoslavia. Struck says about Serbian president Milosevic that „once again a crazy, power–hungry dictator tries to annihilate an entire ethnic group and come closer to his racist goal of „ethnically pure” Serbia” while minister Fischer explicitly comparers „the plague of European history, the greater Serbian nationalism, like the one we had with greater German Nationalism”. Oppositional CDU/CSU (Wolfgang Schäuble) is more careful and warns of „comparing the incomparable” which might become self–justifying legitimation of „military escalation, total war, and unconditional surrender.” Interesting is a way, in which the CDU/CSU deals with this change in foreign policy, in contrast to previous Kohl’s government: Schäuble repeatedly argues that it is „not a war” what Germany and NATO are doing in Kosovo, so the old argument of „never war again” remains in fact valid. Reconciliation of the „never war again” with humanitarian „never genocide again” argument of the SPD offers the coalition partner B90/G: in the argumentation of Rezzo Schlauch, Slobodan Milosevic has with his deeds caused that the latter cannot be achieved without the former.

As far as the adequate German reaction is concerned, Chancellor Schröder legitimises military intervention in Kosovo by saying „do we Europeans really want to allow, after the two terrible wars of this century, dictators to rage unmolested in the centre of Europe?” He deduces a dual historical commitment: specific German (reliability, determination, firmness) on the one hand, and shared European responsibility on the other, claiming that the latter is a part of „German raison d’état.” He includes Yugoslavia into this European community as well, by likening it to post–1945 Germany, which could prosper not only because of the military defeat of Nazism, but also because of „democratisation, economic development and building of true civil society”, to which the European community should contribute (analogically) in the case of Kosovo and Serbia as well. Left wing PDS party strongly opposes to most of the argumentation. They turn down any analogies with „Hitler” or „Auschwitz” as relativizing and downgrading and accuse other parties of „using another vocabulary just to prove that German crimes are not unique.” In line with the party’s pacifism, PDS turns down any intervention, and Gregor Gysi flies in the midst of the conflict to Serbia to meet there with Milosevic and negotiate. Foreign Policy, Kosovo War, Transformation and Construction SPD, Gerhard Schröder 7 14/35 Defence (SPD, interpreting present as a (Chancellor) Policy, consequence of the past). NATO Expansion Schröder deduces two commitments for Germany, based on its history: to „in the framework of the community of democratic states stands up for peace and security and against oppression, expulsion, and use of force” (related to Kosovo intervention). Ex–post, he frames the German support for Czech, 96

Polish and Hungarian joining the NATO in 1999 as a „special obligation” stemming from the NS history. Transformation (B90/G, the Foreign legitimisation of the present decision B90/G, Joschka Fischer 8 14/43 Policy, by the comparative outlook on the (Foreign Minister). Kosovo War past and the present). German obligation to Yugoslavia is according to Fischer securing peace. He justifies the high price of such effort by making a comparison and urging to „look back to the time after 1945 in Europe”. According to Fischer, an active stance is the right reaction for Germany „as one of the decisive countries in the European union.” Defence Construction (B90/G, presenting the 9 14/45 Policy, past as a value measure for a new B90/G, Winfried Nachtwei Bundeswehr situation). Nachtwei expresses his support for the conservative proposal to grant Bundeswehr soldiers special level of protection of denigration, after attacks on them claiming they were „murderers.” Nachtwei compares the role of the Bundeswehr in Kosovo with deeds of the Wehrmacht in the Balkans, to conclude that there is no similarity at all and that there is, in fact, no „war” in the old sense. The situation is new because the issue emerged with first post–war combat deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers. Personal argument (FDP, Healthcare; 10 14/52 questioning the morality of argument FDP, Ina Lenke abortions sources). A group of CDU/CSU MPs proposes a law amendment, which would prohibit to prescribe and distribute medicaments capable of terminating a pregnancy (in this particular case the Mifegyne). One of the proponents, Norbert Geis, argues for the ban relying on a critique of the catholic church, especially Cardinal Meisner. The FDP turns this argumentation down and recalls that Cardinal Meisner „compared the medicine with the Nazi Zyklon B,” and thereby discredits the proponent side. The amendment was not adopted. Gender politics, Suppression (CDU/CSU, history as CDU/CSU, Irmgard 11 14/52 Defence irrelevant for the subject matter). Karwatzki policy, Bundeswehr The proposal to change the German basic law and to allow women are holding combat positions in the Bundeswehr is justified by the CDU/CSU MP, who argues that „experiences with National Socialism and Second World War which are expressed in the Basic Law are increasingly losing their legitimacy.” Instead, Irmgard Karwatzki claims „the reality demands its rights”. The proposal was discussed on more occasions, and the Basic Law was eventually changed (after the Court of Justice of the EU ruled in that sense) in 2000. Foreign Policy, Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, 12 14/61 International interpreting present as a consequence CSU, Wolfgang Bötsch Force East of the past). Timor Bötsch, while expressing his support to send medical troops as a part of international mission in East Timor, argued that providing help to countries with which „Germans have nothing to do”, is an obligation because of the „century of wars, expulsions, genocide and exterminations“ in which they participated, as well as because of the „common European responsibility“. Eventually, Germans did take part in the UN mission. Social and Family Construction (CDU/CSU, presenting 13 14/67 Policy, the past as a value measure for new CSU, Norbert Geis Registered situations). Partnership

Norbert Geis argues against the introduction of a civil partnership between same sex persons by claiming it would threaten the „great importance of marriage and family” as embedded in the Basic Law, based on „experience of Hitler’s era.” At this point, the law was not adopted, but the registered partnership was successfully introduced a year later. Gender politics, Suppression (CDU/CSU, history as CDU, Annette Widmann– 14 14/69 Defence irrelevant for the subject matter). Mauz policy, Bundeswehr Widmann–Mauz recalls the „terrible experiences with the second world war, which resulted in the fathers and mothers of our Basic Law seeing no cultural advantage to force women into defence,” which today is not the case anymore. Foreign Policy, Construction (FDP, deducing moral German– obligations from the past). FDP, Ulrich Irmer 15 14/79 Turkish Construction (SPD, presenting the SPD, Gert Weisskirchen Relations, past as a value measure for the new EU situation) Enlargement In the case of accession of Central and Eastern European states, FDP’s Ulrich Irmer supports his argument for the EU enlargement by saying that he sees a „historical or even moral responsibility of us, Germans, that we make good again what happened with the peoples as a consequence of the World War II. and the 40 years since”. The narrative of Wiedergutmachung and (potential) normalising is very strong, with Irmer saying „now we have the chance and we have to use it.” On the other hand, in a debate about granting the candidate status to Turkey, CDU/CSU opposes to it with arguments of „different culture.” SPD’s Weisskirchen reacts that this view is wrong because the EU stands exactly against such „excluding everything other than what we hold for European,” such as „when Hitler planned the genocide, end solution, and extermination of Jews. “ Defence Policy, Protest voice (PDS, demands for a Foreign return to the status quo). PDS, Winfried Wolf 16 14/82 Policy, Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, CDU, Anita Schäfer Kosovo War, legitimisation of the status quo). Conscription On the occasion of the publication of a yearly report on the situation in the Bundeswehr, which brought information about right–wing extremist and xenophobic behaviour, PDS politician claims that the „NATO war against Yugoslavia, which started just like the one in 1939 by breaking the international law” is to blame for such developments. In the same debate, Anita Schäfer of the CDU/CSU declines proposals to abolish conscription because „the mothers and fathers of our constitution have decided for it based on diverse and painful experiences from the German history”. Conscription was eventually put into abeyance roughly ten years later, in 2011. SPD, Siegmar Mosdorf, Perpetuation (SPD, comparative secretary of the Ministry of 17 14/83 Media Policy outlook on the past and the present). Economics and Technologies Siegmar Mosdorf of the Ministry for Economics and Technologies (it does not exist anymore) opposes the liberal’s proposal on deregulation of public radio and television (which would help raise the financial burden) because of the „experience we all made during the NS–times, that showed, how dangerous can monopolisation of media be for the democracy”. Foreign B90/G, Joschka Fischer Perpetuation (B90/G and SPD, Policy, CDU, Hartmut Schauerte interpreting present as a consequence 18 14/86 German SPD, Gernot Erler, Ludwig of the past, comparative outlook on Austrian Stiegler the past and the present) Relations

Minister Fischer justifies government support for EU stance towards Austria’s Jörg Haider with referencing the „very specific history … of the first half of the 20th century”. CDU/CSU Hartmut Schauerte criticizes the unequal stance towards right–radical vs. left–radical parties, and also reminds of other countries with much more radical politics towards foreigners (Denmark). Fischer accuses him of „blindness towards history” because the „position of the Danes in the times of Holocaust” makes it a completely different case. Germany, on the other hand „, is because of the historical reasons obliged … not to act in a „business as usual” manner,” which is also something the European partners expect. Gernot Erler (SPD) sums it up as „there has never in Germany been an „overreaction” to the right– wing radicalism and xenophobia. All wrongs have always come from the opposite”. He opposes CSU’s Edmund Stoiber by criticizing him for „acting as if …. there had never been the German history”. Ludwig Stiegler (SPD) criticizes the CDU/CSU by developing an argument on a personal level: „there is an example in the German history that a fleet of conservative sirs believed they could make use of brown boor. There has been the Mr. von Papen and others, who thought they could use the young Mr. H.[itler]”. He claims that conservatives are unable to learn from history because they always work with these „types.” Foreign Policy, Suppression (B90/G, history as 19 14/109 Czech– B90/G, Antje Volmer irrelevant for the subject matter) German Relations In a debate on Czech–German diplomatic relations, Green politician Antje Volmer turns down the demands of the CDU/CSU that Germany should incorporate in its foreign policy the question of post– war expulsions by arguing that „the topic of expulsion belongs to the museum of German history … to the hands of scholars, analysts and museum–people”. Foreign Policy, Transformation (PDS, criticizing 20 14/124 German– alleged normalcy of the present status PDS, Uwe Hiksch Belorussian quo). Relations SPD proposes a change in approach to Belarus, intending to offer dialogue instead of isolation. PDS criticizes the proposal by not going far enough: „Germany carries historical guilt towards Belarus … because of the by German fascism, and most atrocious brutality motivated second World War”. Because of this guilt, Germans „should see the development of relations between Belarus and Germany as a foundational task of German foreign and domestic … the economic and monetary policy”. Foreign 21 14/153 Policy, Personal experience (SPD) SPD, Gerhard Neumann Kosovo War Renewed debates about the German involvement in NATO intervention in Kosovo unfold with additional information regarding the situation of the Kosovo Albanian population (PDS renews its critique). SPD’s Gerhard Neumann (* 1939) continues to defend the decision to bomb by comparing the pictures of people expelled from Kosovo with his own experience and says, „I have lived through that, too.” EU Policy, SPD, Christoph Zöpel Construction (SPD, deducing new 22 14/155 EU Eastern (Secretary of the Foreign moral obligations) Enlargement Ministry) Zöpel argues in favour of the EU Enlargement but points out the necessity to popularize the project among populations of the new states. He argues: „to prevent people like Hitler or Milosevic from disturbing the responsible process of achieving sustainable and lasting peace in Europe is our moral obligation.” Foreign Construction (SPD, an appellation on 23 14/155 SPD, Lilo Friedrich Policy, the importance of knowledge of

Internally history for finding an appropriate displaced solution for a new situation) persons Lilo Friedrich (SPD) argues for political rights of refugees by suggesting a comparison with people who escaped to exile from the Nazis: „Imagine, if, during the National Socialism, Thomas Mann and others were not allowed to speak up against Hitler.” Foreign Policy, Transformation (B90/G, expanding German– the scope of what belongs to history), SPD, Joschka Fischer 24 14/176 Polish Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, (Foreign Minister), Relations, interpreting present as a consequence CDU, Erika Steinbach. EU Eastern of the past). Enlargement B90/G and the CDU/CSU differ in their argumentation about the state of current German–Polish relations. While Fischer stresses that the Polish EU accession is in no way an act of German „reparation for the injustices and suffering” but includes a recognition thereof, Erika Steinbach maintains that while Germany is dealing with the difficult NS past, Poland has yet to achieve the same, and also that these issues should be incorporated into the relationship. Social and Economic Transformation (PDS, expanding the PDS, Gregor Gysi (Fraction 25 14/180 Policy, scope of what belongs to „national Chairman) Solidarpakt history). II. The Solidarpakt is a (second) plan of the government to level former East and West Germany, mostly as financial and economic help. PDS criticizes the proposal for omitting „mental and cultural level,” and Gregor Gysi uses an example of former NVA (Nationale Volksarmee, the DDR army) soldier, who was denied burial service with military honours, but once he proved he also served in the Wehrmacht, it was granted to him. „The Wehrmacht belongs to the German history, while the NVA doesn’t. Only if the DDR history in its whole complexity becomes German history, the reunification will be complete”. Foreign Transformation (SPD, an alternative SPD, Gerhard Schröder 26 14/184 Policy, to the pre–existing status quo) (Chancellor) Kosovo War Schröder argues that especially older people, with direct memory of the WW2, must be explained what the Germans are doing in the Balkans. He claims „the Germans have own national interest on stability in the region” because instability can potentially harm Germany as well. Germany’s interest is a novel argumentation, which documents increased German self–confidence in foreign policy. Domestic Security, War B90/G, Volker Beck Perpetuation (B90/G, SPD, building 27 14/189 on Terror, SPD, Otto Schilly (op cit., analogies to defend the status quo). Foreign Minister of the Interior) Policy The discussion (taking place two weeks after the 9/11 USA terrorist attacks) follows the government vs. the opposition lines. While CDU/CSU and FDP propose tightening domestic security measures, also at the expense of individual freedoms (because providing security is the most important state function), and criticise the government for having failed to previously update legislation on demonstrations, crown witness protection legislation, prosecuting of Islamist organisations and organised crime, the B90/G and SPD turn this down: a) Volker Beck urges the FDP chairman Guido Westerwelle, who in the aftermath of local elections in Hamburg entered into coalition with CDU and right–wing Party for a Rule of Law Offensive, to rather focus on not becoming „the Papen of the 21st century”, referring to the 1930s German chancellor and Hitler’s vice–chancellor Franz von Papen, who contributed to Hitler’s takeover of power; b) Beck quotes SPD interior minister Otto Schilly, who argues for careful proceeding with prosecuting terrorist groups abroad (referring to Al–Qaeda in Afghanistan) to prevent that „some Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg finds himself under the criminal

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liability for attempted tyrannicide on Hitler”, making a comparison between two situations in which murder would have to be considered as right thing. Foreign Transformation (CDU/CSU, Policy, War CDU, Andreas 28 14/195 comparative outlook on the past and on Terror, Schockenhoff the present). Afghanistan PDS in line with its pacifism opposes the military intervention in Afghanistan, saying that war is not a solution. CDU/CSU MP opposes to this by arguing that „Auschwitz was also ended with the war, not pacifism.” It is the first example of how the CDU/CSU internalised the transformative argument of „never Auschwitz again”. Foreign Policy, War Perpetuation (B90/G, interpreting B90/G, Kerstin Müller, and 29 14/202 on Terror, present as a consequence of the past). Gerald Hafner Afghanistan This time, the discussion did not copy the government vs. opposition divide, as some MPs in the SPD and B90/G opposed Germany’s military participation in the war on terror. Schröder justified it by declaring allegiance to the US, and some MPs argued that „Germany is not free on its decision due to its history” and that while „power might change in democracies” (reaction to the fact that Schröder in fact forced the B90/G to agree with him by connecting the question with vote of the government), „morality is unchangeable” and to disregard such morality (and not fight terror) would mean to „denounce the men and women who learned from taking part in the catastrophic National Socialism and world war”. Foreign Policy, Suppression (FDP, history as 30 14/211 Czech– irrelevant). FDP, Ulrich Irmer German Relations During the discussion on Czech accession to the EU, Ulrich Irmer argues that „„ghosts of the past should not be effective and become obstacles for the Czechs joining the Union”. He also compares nullification of Beneš Decrees with nullification of the Munich Agreement (neither is possible) and points out that among the Sudeten Germans are not a collective unit (as presented by the CDU/CSU and their interest organisations), and that more attention should be paid to the fact that while some supported Konrad Henlein (and Hitler), others were ready to fight against Hitler’s Germany. Foreign Perpetuation and protest voice Policy, War (PDS, comparative outlook on the past 31 14/212 PDS, Heinrich Fink on Terror, and the present and at the same time Afghanistan critique) In an odd combination of strategies, Fink compares the contemporary terrorism with National Socialism, saying that in both „terror becomes a meaning of life”. In such condition, he argues, not military intervention, but „culture” should be the primary interest of the anti–terror alliance. Foreign Transformation (CDU/CSU, Policy, comparative outlook on the past and CDU, Friedbert Pflüger (EU Defence 32 14/219 the present), Perpetuation (B90/G, Committee Chairman) Policy, War comparative outlook on the past and B90/G, Joschka Fischer on Terror, the present). Iraq Both two major parties deduce justification for their decision from experience with National Socialism but end up with a different outcome. CDU/CSU defends the military participation of Bundeswehr in Iraq, by comparing Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler. B90/G on the other hand (and the government) remind that the success of the US in and after the WWII was not only composed of the military defeat of Nazism but also of the subsequent nation building. Germany should thus imagine Afghanistan as Germany after the war and focus on nation building there. Eventually, Germany did not participate in the Iraq invasion.

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Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, Foreign comparative outlook on the past and Policy, CDU, Heiner Geißler, 33 14/224 the present). Suppression (B90/G, German–US B90/G Joschka Fischer turning down the analogies as relations unacceptably relativizing). After reports about Guantanamo prison were published, CDU/CSU compares the practices there with Nazi prosecutions of the Jews and using the term „crusades” (by Bush) with the symbolical gravity of the term Holocaust. Therefore, Germany has the „moral authority” to criticise this, which is, however, only a demonstration of solidarity with the US. Foreign minister Fischer turns down these parallels because it covers the „uniqueness” (Einmaligkeit) of the Holocaust. Instead, it is in the interest of support of human rights, to address the case separately. Defence Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, Policy, CDU, Wolfgang Freiherr 34 14/233 interpreting present as a consequence NATO von Stetten of the past). expansion Von Stetten argues that Germany has a special responsibility for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania after „in 1939 they became a playball of the great powers participating in the Hitler–Stalin–Pact”. Support of the expansion is unanimous, with the exception of the PDS. Transformation and Suppression Basic Law, (B90/G, past as a source for 35 14/240 B90/G, Gerald Häfner Democracy alternatives, or history as not relevant anymore) B90/G and SPD MPs come with the proposal to change the Basic Law and introduce the citizen law– making procedure (Volksinitiative, Volksbegehren, Volksentscheid) on the federal level. Their argumentation was twofold, a) 53 years after the end of National Socialism, it was on time to reconsider the absence of this instrument in the Basic Law, a result of the idea that the Volk contributed to national socialist crimes, but that now it is time to leave such reasoning aside – again an expression of normalcy of the German nation; b) that the introduction of the instrument would, in fact, fulfil the idea stemming from the Basic Law, because, in the NS, individual had no power at all, an thus the way this idea is interpreted must be transformed. Healthcare, Research, Construction (B90/G, presenting the 36 14/242 and past as a value measure for new B90/G, Monika Knoche Technology, situations). Law The human rights breaches during the NS times give Germany special way of thinking. Concerning the human rights of the future, Germany has the responsibility to uphold the ban on human cloning within international law. Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, Healthcare, 37 14/245 interpreting present as a consequence CSU, Aribert Wolf Social Policy of the past). The moral responsibility to take care of people who had to carry the burden of the NS and WW2 as an argument for allocating more money to social security. Foreign Policy, Defence 38 14/246 Personal experience (SPD) SPD, Anni Brandt–Elsweier Policy, War on Terror, Bundestag Brandt–Elsweier tells her personal experience with World War II to make clear that she does not like wars, but that she nonetheless supports deployment of soldiers in Macedonia and also within War on Terror, which is „not a war” in the traditional sense. She opposes the FDP proposal to simplify the procedure of Bundeswehr deployment.

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Foreign Transformation (CDU/CSU, Policy, War 39 14/253 comparative outlook on the past and CDU/CSU, Angela Merkel on Terror, the present) Iraq CDU/CSU criticises SPD for „anti–American” election campaign. Merkel relies on a quote of the chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Paul Spiegel, who argues that „since 9/11, or in fact ever since Auschwitz, we know that people are capable of absolutely everything”. Merkel interprets it as „if we want to take the lessons of Auschwitz seriously, then we have to conduct responsible politics” which for her means „to prevent the Iraqi dictator from threatening Jews in Israel”.

LP 15 (2002 – 2005) PM Topic Strategy Speaker Transformation (comparative CDU, Friedbert Pflüger Foreign Policy, War 1 15/4 outlook on the past and the (EU Committee on Terror, Iraq present). Chairman) CDU/CSU criticizes the government for conducting „anti–American” foreign policy. Pflüger compares, quoting German poet Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler, arguing that it is Germany „highest priority to stop this lunatic.” Transformation (CDU, history CDU, Friedbert Pflüger Foreign Policy, War as a process, comparative 2 15/8 (EU Committee on Terror, Iraq outlook on the past and the Chairman) present) Pflüger defines international terrorism as the „third totalitarian movement” after Marxism–Leninism and National Socialism. Therefore, western democracies must fight, and „we [CDU/CSU] want to take part” (emphasis added, for the first time the verb expressing a will, not obligation appears). Pflüger also recalls the 1936 Olympic games in Berlin, arguing that „Germany should not underestimate Hussein” and „knuckle [alike] movements down, put them under pressure, not only once they are already too strong” – referring to reports that Hussein had ambitions to restart a chemical and nuclear weapons programmes (eventually proved not to be true). Perpetuation (SPD, history as a European Policy, EU SPD, Angelica Schwall– 3 15/16 process, comparative outlook on Reform Düren the past and the present). Germany must keep the promise, made at the very beginning of European integration: to re–unify Europe as a compensation for the „consequences of Hitler’s aggression war for people of Central and Eastern Europe, who suffered longest under Hitler’s armies.” Transformation (CDU/CSU, comparative outlook on the past and the present, interpreting CSU, Michael Glos Foreign Policy, War present as a consequence of the 4 15/25 SPD, Gerhard Schröder on Terror, Iraq past). (Chancellor) Suppression (SPD, there are more relevant reasons than history). CDU/CSU continues to argue for support of military intervention in Iraq, by perpetuating two narratives: the analogy between Hussein and Hitler, who needs to be stopped by military force; and emphasizing American contribution to the defeat of Nazism and subsequent development – Germany should help Americans in turn. Gerhard Schröder suppresses the importance of historical relations, arguing that both countries are linked with more than just a common history, which is why the mutual relations can manage differing stance on Iraq. Perpetuation (SPD, Media, past as a source for challenging 5 15/53 SPD, Monika Griefahn Deutsche Welle status quo and finding alternatives)

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Griefahn promotes the transformation of Deutsche Welle broadcasting abroad. She illustrates current unsatisfactory state by arguing that foreigners „often ask if there is still this Hitler in Germany. Face to face current developments (Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan); it is necessary to reform the broadcaster to be able to present a „differentiated picture of Germany.” Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, CDU, Wolfgang present as the consequence of Foreign policy, EU Schäuble, Erika 6 15/56 the past; &Transformation Enlargement Steinbach need for a positive narrative of CSU, Hans–Peter Uhl German national identity). In the debate about the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, CDU’s Schäuble immediately mentions the unresolved issue of Beneš Decrees (the fraction also presents a proposal to demand the CZ to nullify them). Steinbach criticizes the accession process for failing to deal with the fact that „some countries do not comply with human rights norms.” She points out that Beneš, who „carries responsibility for murder, forced labour and expulsion of millions of people” was at that time (2004) awarded with special recognition in Czech legal system (Lex Beneš). Steinbach uses the name Tschechei, which has negative connotations as it was most intensely during NS period. Hans–Peter Uhl talks in this regard about the need to solve the „open Sudeten German question,” making an implicit rhetorical analogy with an issue known as an open German question, that concerned legitimate borders of Germany between 1806 and 1990. Beneš Decrees should have not only symbolical, but also legally binding consequences. He adds that Germany needs a positive national identity. CDU, Friedbert Pflüger Personal argument (B90/G), Foreign Policy, (EU Committee Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, 7 15/78 German–Polish Chairman), Erika interpreting present as a Relations Steinbach consequence of the past) B90/G, Ludger Volmer In the debate about the budget of the foreign ministry, Ludger Volmer criticizes a group of MPs from the CDU/CSU party for straining relations with Poland by promoting the Centre against Expulsions. He attacks the most prominent proponent, Erika Steinbach (CDU and leader of the Federation of Expellees) by the argument that her father was a Wehrmacht soldier and that she speaks on behalf of the expellees, not being expelled herself. CDU/CSU replies that it is not at all this topic (that represents „a legitimate way of commemorating the suffering of Germans,” hence the Germans–victims narrative) which worsens the relations, but a disadvantageous position during EU meetings and Poland should accept that this narrative belongs to mutual relations. Foreign Policy, Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, German–Israeli CDU/CSU, Hermann 8 15/92 interpreting present as a Relations, Geneva Gröhe consequence of the past) Initiative In a debate that resulted in adopting a proposal (across fractions, except the PDS) to support the Geneva Initiative for permanent agreement between Israel and Palestine, the CDU/CSU formulates dual historical responsibility that Germany ought to continue to adhere to special responsibility to protect Israel (because of Holocaust), but the same historical responsibility bounds Germany to formulate criticism of Israel’s settlement policy (in the aftermath of constructing further sections of the West Bank Barrier). Gröhe also points out the necessity to confer this special historical responsibility on younger generations of German politicians. National population Construction (SPD, presenting SPD, Gerhard Schröder 9 15/100 politics the past as a negative value (Chancellor) (Bevolkerungskpolitik) measure for new situations). Schröder defends proposed policies on the support of families (within his Agenda 2010 plan) by arguing that these will be nothing like that under National Socialism, where mothers with many children were honoured with Mothers’ Cross (Mutterkreuz). It was according to him an opposite of life in freedom and self–determination, to which his policies should contribute. Budget, Cultural Suppression (CDU/CSU, 10 15/21 CDU, Norbert Barthle policy history as irrelevant for the

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subject matter, and Transformation – need for a positive narrative of German national identity). CDU/CSU criticizes the budget of the 2006 Football World Championship for being too big, which is according to them caused by two reasons: it includes an artistic exhibition dealing with the heritage of the 1936 Hitler’s Olympic games, and second, because it will be a „multi–kulti Spektakel” instead of creating a „self–confident relationship to own nation”. Foreign Policy, Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, CDU, Wolfgang 11 15/122 German Russian interpreting present as a Schäuble Relations consequence of the past). Because of the historical responsibility of Germany towards Poland based on the horrors of the WW2 and Hitler’s times, some conditions must be met in order for German–Russian relationship to be successful. Poland should be included in the discussions, just like the Weimar Triangle (Weimarer Dreieck) format between Poland, Germany and France, there should be one including France, Russia, Germany and Poland.

LP 16 (2005 – 2009) PM Topic Strategy Speaker Foreign Policy, Israel, 1 16/20 Protest voice (Linke). Linke, Oskar Lafontaine Iran, Palestine Linke criticizes governmental Middle East politics, and implicitly calls it biased in Israel’s favour. Lafontaine would consider fairer the politics in which no countries are encouraged to have nuclear weapons, and which would support Palestine’s right to self–determination with the same vigour as Israel’s right to existence because it is Germany’s historical responsibility as well. Foreign Policy, EU SPD, Gunter Gloser, Enlargement, Construction (SPD, deducing 2 16/37 (secretary for Europe at Bulgaria, and new moral obligations). Foreign Ministry) Romania German support of EU Enlargement is again presented as the historical responsibility of Germany for united Europe because its division was a direct consequence of the National Socialism. United Europe is also in the primary interest of Germany (emphasis added) because it is for the first time in its history that it is surrounded only by states with whom it has friendly relations. Foreign Policy, 3 16/46 Protest voice (Linke). Linke, Monika Knoche Israel–Lebanese War Knoche supports her party’s pacifism by claiming that „without Holocaust, there wouldn’t have been the Palestine Israel conflict.” Therefore, it is a German responsibility not to escalate in any further, by which she refers to German mission to the area (enforcing an embargo on Hezbollah). „There is no normalcy in the relationship between Israel and Germany, at Israel cannot talk us into it,” Knoche claims. Instead, she supports diplomatic solutions, by organizing an „OSCE” for the Middle East, which is the right task for Germany to do, due to its history. Additional critical argument shared both by the B90/G (Jürgen Trittin), and the FPD (Werner Hoyer) warns that under certain circumstances a confrontation between German and Israeli soldiers might occur – such an incident would be extremely difficult to handle – because of the history. Foreign Policy, Israel, Linke, Gregor Gysi 4 16/49 Protest voice (Linke). Iran, Defence (Fraction Chairman). Gradually, the debate about military deployment loses the historical imperatives in argumentation of some political parties (FDP argues with human rights protection and turn down any moral imperative forcing Germany to participate, because, from a practical perspective, it is not necessary; SPD says literally that „it should not be as much historical responsibility”). Linke goes on with radical pacifism as an obligation stemming from Germany’s past: in the conflict between Israel and Iran, German can never be neutral „because of the Holocaust, the unique and indescribable crime of humanity.” That is why it shouldn’t participate in the UN mission. Linke also maintain the narrative about Kosovo

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involvement being against international law. In its relations to Israel, „the government is not neutral, nobody here in Bundestag is neutral.” Gysi claims that „we had to stand on the side of the Jews when they were persecuted and suppressed. Now is Israel rather powerful, and suppresses Palestinians, on whose side we need to stand”. FDP, Wolfgang Gerhardt (Fraction Chairman), Guido Westerwelle (party chairman) 5 16/50 Foreign Policy, Israel Perpetuation (all parties). Linke, Lothar Bisky (party chairman), B90/G, Kerstin Müller CDU, Karl Lamers SPD, Rolf Kramer All Bundestag fractions agree on a need to act, but not on how: Linke argue for a purely diplomatic solution, B90/G for as little intervention as possible. SPD and FDP admit that the historical responsibility can be interpreted in two ways: not to intervene and to intervene. Most decisive argumentation in favour of military intervention based on history is presented by the CDU/CSU. Foreign policy, Perpetuation (FDP, SPD, FDP, Florian Toncar 6 16/106 Human Rights, Sinti Linke, interpreting present as a SPD, Johannes Jung and Roma consequence of the past). Linke, Michael Leutert All parties agree on a historical moral responsibility of Germans to care more substantively than before about the well–being of Roma and Sinti minority in the whole Europe. 7 16/142 Healthcare, Research Perpetuation (CDU/CSU). CDU, Peter Weiß CDU/CSU opposes lifting the ban on using the human material for stem cell research because it would be against human dignity, which is an inseparable part of human rights system in Germany – because of the experience with National Socialism. Protest voice (CDU/CSU, but 8 16/157 EU Reform not majority opinion of the CDU, Henry Nietzsche fraction). Nietzsche compares the Lisbon treaty, which Germany should adopt into its legislative, as the 1933 Enabling Act (Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich), and argues thereby for not supporting the EU integration („Especially here in Germany we should be very careful”). The majority opinion of the CDU/CSU party is in support of Lisbon, so this argument is an outlier. He left CDU for more radical parties in 2006. SPD, Peter Struck, Perpetuation (CDU/CSU; SPD, Frank–Walter Steinmeier B90/G – interpreting present as (Foreign Minister), Foreign Policy, a consequence of the past), Thomas Oppermannn 9 16/163 German–Israeli Suppression (FDP, SPD – FDP Guido Westerwelle, Relations there are more relevant reasons B90/G Fritz Kuhn than history) CSU Peter Ramsauer, CDU, Eckert von Klaeden All parties agree on the impossibility of normality of German–Israeli relationship. While CDU/CSU and B90/G maintains the predominantly historical argumentation („the right to existence of the state of Israel as part of German raison d’état”), FDP points out the importance of „shared democratic values”, not only history, which is an argument accessible also to younger people, who cannot truly feel the personal responsibility. For B90/G and SPD, except the existential right („it is part of German political identity”, „Auschwitz can happen anytime again”), the historical responsibility extends to Arab states as well, whose role in securing Israel’s wellbeing is crucial, and to the ability to criticize Israel. Suppression (FDP, SPD, there Foreign Policy, Israel, FDP, Werner Hoyer 10 16/198 are more relevant reasons than Gaza War 2008 – 9 SPD, Jürgen Trittin history)

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Arguments of both the FDP and SPD can be analysed as suppression of historical arguments, because albeit they both mention the traditional historical responsibility of Germany, for FDP greater imperative is to support two–states solution, because otherwise the Jews would lose majority in their own state (and that is German responsibility), and SPD supports the argumentation with shared democratic values (only then can be Israel fully emancipated, not when it exists only as a part of a reason d’état of another state – Germany, as CDU/CSU argue). It is also important for perception of Israel in Germany, and German society. Foreign Policy, CDU, Eckart von 11 16/214 Perpetuation (CDU/CSU). Defence, NATO Klaeden The discussion relates to future of NATO. While Linke and B90/G argue for demilitarization, FDP for more confident acting of Germany within the Alliance. CDU/CSU argues that „the second world war did not break out because it was not debated enough with Hitler, but because nobody resolutely opposed him” and that, luckily, one of the NATO’s original purposes (keep the Germans down) has become obsolete.

LP 17 (2009 – 2013) PM Topic Strategy Speaker Transformation (Linke, B90/G, Volker Beck Basic Law, sexual 1 17/20 B90/G, SPD, past as a source SPD, Christine identities for challenging the status quo) Lambrecht According to the B90/G and SPD, sexual minorities are the last group of victims of the National Socialism that still await recognition– The historical responsibility does not go backwards (responsibility for what happened) but to the future (making sure it never happens again). Therefore, it is necessary to literally ground the ban on discrimination of sexual minorities in the Basic Law, Article 3, whose wording originated in naming all the victim groups of Nazis. CDU/CSU opposes to this that according to the judicature of the German constitutional court, discrimination based on sexual orientation is already established in the Basic Law and there is thus no need to change it. Perpetuation (FDP, interpreting 2 17/70 Basic Law, civil rights present as a consequence of the FDP, Marco Buschmann past) The discussion is about the content of in the Basic Law anchored Right of revolution, or more substantially about the clash between two conceptions of democracy: purely representative and including elements of direct participation. B90/G and Linke appeal to that right in defence of their protests against nuclear waste disposal site, which Marco Buschmann opposes by arguing that such right is by no means „comparable with the protection of democracy against its abolition,” a reason deducted from the experience with National Socialism. Foreign Policy, Perpetuation (B90/G, Defence, Russia, 3 17/74 interpreting present as a B90/G, Marieluise Beck NATO, Central and consequence of the past) Eastern Europe It is Germany’s special responsibility to the small countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, who have suffered under Hitler (and Stalin), and we must make sure, they are protected under the NATO. For Germany’s politics against Russia, this means to oppose the concept of „near abroad.” Foreign Policy, Construction (Linke, past as a Linke, Gregor Gysi 4 17/84 Economic Policy, negative value measure for the (Fraction Chairman). Eurozone new situation). Gregor Gysi compares German politics within the Eurozone towards Greece as having the same consequences as the „Treaty of Versailles, which caused that the Nazis became so powerful.” Perpetuation (Linke, Foreign Policy, Linke, Gregor Gysi 5 17/118 CDU/CSU, interpreting present Palestine, Israel CSU, Thomas Silberhorn as a consequence of the past). Linke interprets the German historical responsibility („Hitler’s attempt to exterminate European Jews”) by arguing for one–sided recognition of the State of Palestine. It shall contribute to the well– being of Israel (who only in their own state can maintain the critical majority) and of Palestinians. 107

CDU/CSU opposes this by the idea of Israel belonging to the „raison d’état of Germany,” which would be in the case of recognition threatened. Perpetuation (Linke, Foreign Policy, FDP, Florian Toncar CDU/CSU – interpreting present 6 17/119 Defence, Arms trade, SPD, Johannes Jung as a consequence of the past, Arab Spring Linke, Michael Leutert different outcomes). For Linke, the historical consequence of WWII and Hitler is „never war again,” which translates into „no to arms exports.” Linke thereby perpetuates the strict pacifist narrative and opposes exporting of 200 Leopard–Panzer to Saudi Arabia (which counterbalances Iran and thereby provides protection to Israel). B90/G is also against arms exports but argues with „positioning oneself on the side of democracy and stability in the Middle East.” For CSU/CSU, the imperative is protecting Israel, which justifies the arms exports. Construction (CDU/CSU, Social policy, presenting the past as a negative 7s 17/153 CDU, Matthias Zimmer Economic policy value measure for new situations;). Zimmer describes the proposed minimum wage legislation as an „[1933] Enabling act for the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs”. The proposal was not adopted, CDU/CSU and SPD government introduced the minimum wage four years later, in 2015. Construction (Linke, past as a Foreign Policy, Linke, Gregor Gysi negative value measure for a 8 17/161 Economic Policy, (Fraction Chairman), new situation; SPD, deducing Eurozone SPD, Lothar Binding new legal or moral obligations). Linke labels the politics of German government against Greece as Versailles („the winners of the WW1 decided to humiliate Germany to the core, you are doing the same”), which led to Hitler and NSDAP getting powerful, while Greece, just like Germany after the war, would need „Marshall, for development”. SPD construes a moral obligation of Germans as well, by reminding that Greece was one of the states that forgave Germany its war debt. Germany should therefore „remember this history” when deciding about the prolongated financial help to Greece. Construction (CDU/CSU, past 9 17/219 Healthcare, Research as a negative value measure for CDU, Rudolf Henke new situation). The experience of experiments on concentration camp prisoners during the times of National Socialism means for Germany a moral imperative to approach any liberalisation of human subject testing with caution. SPD, Thomas Perpetuation (SPD, Democracy, Domestic Oppermannn (Fraction 10 17/220 comparative outlook on the past Security, NPD Chairman) and the present).

Thomas Oppermannn remembers the day Adolf Hitler was named Reichschancellor, which resulted in tyranny in Germany and second world war. He argues how wrong it is that “we allow it that today, the NPD, with taxpayers’ money, pushes forward the national–socialist racial doctrine”. Linke, Ulla Jelpke. Perpetuation (Linke, Democracy, Domestic SPD, Thomas 11 17/237 comparative outlook on the past Security, NPD Oppermannn (Fraction and the present). Chairman). Linke proposes to ban the NPD party, by arguing that historical lesson means also „never again National Socialism” and that „to remember Auschwitz means ban the NPD”. The proposal was rejected, and German constitutional court later decided against the ban, because the party was too marginal to meet the condition from the Basic Law, „introduced based on experiences with National Socialism” that the actor must pose a threat to democratic order.

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Transformation (CDU/CSU, 1 18/26 Immigration Policy past as a source for challenging CDU, Olav Gutting status quo). In a debate about expanding the scope of rights of refugees, mostly from Syria, CDU/CSU argues that „because of the Christian love and because of the German experience with flight and expulsions,” Germany is bound to help, which in this case means simplifying the procedure of opening a bank account. Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, Basic Law, 2 18/37 comparative outlook on the past CDU, Tim Ostermann Democracy and the present). Linke introduces again the proposal to implement direct democracy instruments. CDU/CSU opposes by quoting an early post–war survey of public opinion, in which „45 % of Germans preferred empire, 7 % Weimar, 42 % National Socialism, and only 2 % the BRD”, and thus implicitly saying that public is not to be trusted. CDU, Thomas de Maiziére (Interior Perpetuation Minister), Stephan Immigration Policy, 3 18/40 (all parties, interpreting present Mayer, Balkans as a consequence of the past). Linke, Ulla Jelpke B90/G, Luise Amtsberg, Claudia Roth The debate centres on the designation of the Balkan countries Serbia Macedonia and Bosnia and Hercegovina as safe countries of origin, which would mean that applications for asylum of their citizens would be more likely turned down. All politicians repeat the historical responsibility of Germany as a moral imperative for helping refugees. Linke point out the WWII destiny of Sinti and Roma minority, which constitute a large part of refugees from the Balkans, B90/G warn more general before discrimination, unacceptable after what had been done historically, but also simply because of the values of humanity. CDU/CSU defends the proposal by saying that in general, due to history, Germany has „humane, world–open and tolerant asylum legislation” (Stephan Mayer). Linke, Gregor Gysi Foreign Policy, Perpetuation (Linke, CDU/CSU Volker 4 18/48 Middle East, Iraq, CDU/CSU, comparative outlook Kauder (Fraction Syria, Islamic State on the past and the present). Chairman), CSU, Gerda Hasselfeldt Linke pursue their pacifist argumentation by „finding it inappropriate do debate this topic on the anniversary of the beginning of the WWII” because the lesson of Hitler Deutschland is never to want to earn money by war, which is happening now when Germany exports weapons to Kurds in Iraq. CDU/CSU, on the other hand, finds the occasion very appropriate, because „by genocide, by such horrors, we see there [Iraq], we must not look away, but we need to act, show responsibility” (Hasselfeldt). War in Ukraine, CDU, Klaus–Peter 5 18/86 Perpetuation (CDU/CSU). Russia, Arms exports Willsch CDU/CSU turns down arms–export banning proposal of Linke, by saying that „Auschwitz was not liberated with ploughshares and billhooks”, and in Ukraine, it will not be different – “other solutions are necessary”. He accuses Linke of being, just like in the past, the „fifth column of Moscow.” Foreign Policy, Linke, Gregor Gysi 6 18/106 Protest voice (Linke). Ukraine, Russia Linke opposes sanctions against Russia as well as „isolation” of Putin’s regime. Peace politics would, in Gysi’s opinion, mean improving the mutual relationship, such as that chancellor Merkel celebrates the end of Nazi dictatorship in Moscow, or that she invites Putin to come to Germany. Foreign Policy, War 7 18/112 Protest voice (Linke). Linke, Gregor Gysi in Ukraine, Russia

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Linke criticizes the government's politics, which is according to them biased against Russia, which is unacceptable due to „enormous performance of the Russian nation in the second world war and fights against Nazism.” Personal experience 8 18/115 Immigration Policy CDU, Heiko Schmelzle (CDU/CSU). Linke proposes an improvement of access to healthcare for refugees. CDU/CSU turns down the proposal as potentially enabling exploitation of the social system, but on the other hand, Schmelzle begins his speech with remembering his family history of expellees, which gives him a special responsibility. Construction (SPD, presenting SPD, Heiko Maas Immigration Policy 9 18/119 the past as a value measure for (Minister of Justice and Hate speech online new situations). Consumer Protection) Maas introduces his proposal to better chase cases of racist and xenophobic behaviour in social media. He compares the situation when world war II. started, which brought hatred, suffering, and expulsions, with nowadays, when Germany has become a place of hope and new opportunities, and Germany should, therefore, prevent reactions motivated by fear and rejection. Perpetuation (B90/G, 10 18/130 Immigration Policy interpreting present as a B90/G, Valerie Wilms consequence of the past). Germany has due to its history a special responsibility to help to persecuted and expelled people, as it has been anchored in the Basic Law. Perpetuation (Linke, 11 18/139 Immigration Policy interpreting present as a Linke, Dietmar Bartsch consequence of the past). Linke criticize CDU/CSU for warning against missuses of the German social system, by appellations to remember the special German responsibility towards refugees. Perpetuation (B90/G, Foreign Policy, 12 18/146 comparative outlook on the past B90/G, Marieluise Beck Afghanistan and the present). Beck distances herself from radical pacifism as the only possible response to the lessons of National Socialism. „the liberation from NS was possible thanks to the armed and legitimate resistance of the Poles, the French, the Belgians and also of the Red Army.” Therefore, she agrees with the proposal to support Afghani defence and security forces. EU–Turkey Refugee Construction (B90/G, 13 18/139 Agreement, presenting the past as a value B90/G, Volker Beck Immigration Policy measure for new situations). B90/G criticize the planned deal between the EU and Turkey on the return of refugees. While CDU/CSU relies on the belief that Turkey will adhere international norms, B90/G is sceptical in this regard, especially in case of refugees of Kurdish origin, and Volker Beck emphasizes this stance by saying „had Hitler signed the human rights conventions for you, you would have believed him too.” Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, CDU, Klaus Peter 14 18/155 Arms exports comparative outlook on the past Willsch and the present). CDU/CSU opposes the B90/G proposal to adopt Arms Export Control Act. Willsch argues that Germany needs to have the liberty to export arms for security reasons and uses an example of the US providing money and equipment to the Soviet Union, which helped to „to stop Hitler’s aggression army in Russia.” Protest voice, Perpetuation (Linke). Defence Policy, Linke, Gregor Gysi 15 18/178 Perpetuation (CDU/CSU, NATO, Ukraine SPD, Franz Thönnes interpreting present as a consequence of the past). Gysi acknowledges that Russian annexation of Crimea was a violation of international norms, but so was the NATO war in Yugoslavia and secession of Kosovo. While Russia responded to the latter two

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not with „clatter of arms,” the West responded with sanctions, sending NATO troops to the Russian border. It is therefore understandable, that Russia becomes nervous, argues Gysi, because „the surprise attack of Hitler’s Germany has not yet been forgotten.” According to Gysi the lesson of the past is that peace in Europe cannot be achieved without or despite Russia. SPD turns down the idea of „guilt of Germans today for the crimes of Nazism,” but instead, Germany has a responsibility, which in this particular case translates into support for peace in the Eastern European region, threatened by Russia’s deeds. Suppression (CDU/CSU, Foreign Policy, EU, CDU, Volker Kauder 16 18/181 history as irrelevant for the Brexit (Fraction Chairman) subject matter). The argument „never war again” does not suffice anymore as the grounding narrative of united Europe. Perpetuation (CDU/CSZ, SPD, interpreting present as a CDU, Ingo Gädechens Defence Policy, 17 18/183 consequence of the past; SPD, Fritz Felgentreu NATO, Russia comparative outlook on the past and the present). Both government parties argue in favour of active participation of Germany in the NATO exercises in the Baltic states. CDU/CSU argues with German raison d’état: never again choose special paths (Sonderweg), and thus always stand side by side with allies within NATO. SPD, on the other hand, reminds of consequences of Hitler–Stalin–Pact, which now prevents Germany from acting in a way resembling power alliance between Germany and Russia. Construction (SPD, presenting Defence Policy, SPD, Sigmar Gabriel 18 18/228 the past as a value measure for NATO, Mali (Foreign Minister) new situations). Gabriel builds an analogy: Auschwitz was only liberated because of military participation of other countries, the Red Army, and Americans. Therefore, Germany should participate in building and training of military forces in Mali. Perpetuation (B90/G, CDU, B90/G, Marieluise Beck Foreign Policy, CSU, Linke, describing history 19 18/235 CDU, Christoph Bergner Russia, Ukraine as a process; interpreting present Linke, Andrej Hunko as a consequence of the past). Today’s Germany is not guilty for crimes of the WW2 (thesis that Russia is instrumentalizing), but responsible for standing next to Ukraine on its way to freedom and dignity. It is not about Ukraine against Russia, because Ukraine (and other countries such as Poland, the Baltic states, etc) should never again stand in between the two powers (and the decisions shall not be made in Berlin). CDU/CSU emphasizes the responsibility towards Ukraine, to help it participate in the European peace community. Linke, on the other hand, emphasize the historical injustice of Germany towards Russia, and only then to Ukraine. The revolutionary movement in Ukraine relies on fascists movements, and Germany should – because of its history – in every way avoid supporting them. Both CDU/CSU and B90/G mention the need to update the European culture of remembering to overcome historical tensions.

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ANNOTATION AND KEYWORDS

ANNOTATION

This thesis is concerned with the question of usage of historical arguments within general policy topics in the so-called Berliner Republic (1998 – 2017). Its aim is to map the political discourse in which these arguments appear, and to describe the way in which they are used, with emphasis on categories of topic, strategy and speaker. Additional aim is to link these findings to theories of memory and remembering. It is a case study, and it combines quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches of corpus lexicometry and discourse analysis.

KEYWORDS

Germany, Berliner Republic, political discourse, history, politics with history

ANOTACE

Tato diplomová práce se zabývá užitím historických argumentů v obecných politických tématech takzvané německé Berlínské republiky (1998–2017). Jejím cílem je zmapovat politický diskurz, ve kterém se tyto argumenty objevují, a popsat způsob, jakým jsou užívány; s důrazem na kategorie tématu, strategie a mluvčího. Doplňkovým cílem je propojení získaných poznatků s teorií paměti a vzpomínání. Práce je jednopřípadovou studií, využívající kombinace kvantitativních a kvalitativních metodologických přístupů: korpusové lexikometrie a diskurzivní analýzy.

KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA

Německo, Berlínská republika, politický diskurz, historie, politika dějin

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