Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty. China's Lessons for Bakumatsu Japan Author(S): Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi Source: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol

Home , Bakumatsu, Watanabe Kazan, Yang Fang (general)

Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty. China's Lessons for Bakumatsu Japan Author(s): Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi Source: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp. 1-25 Published by: Sophia University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2385356 . Accessed: 27/10/2013 08:12

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This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty China's Lessonsfor Bakumatsu Japan

BOB TADASHI WAKABAYASHI

T%HE foreigninvasions and massiveinternal rebellions that wracked Ch'ing-dynastyChina in themid-decades of thenineteenth century had seriousramifications for Japan and the Tokugawa regime.To giveone example,in June 1858 China signedthe Treatyof T'ientsinthat temporarily halted the Second Opium War.' And in the followingmonth, U.S. Consul Townsend Harris forcedthe Edo bakufu to granthim a treatythat formally permittedforeign trade and residencein Japan. By grantingHarris's treaty,bakufu leaders revokednational isolation, or sakoku , a hallowed state law then generally,although mistakenly, pre- sumed to date fromthe startof Tokugawa rule. Moreover,they flouted the emperor'swill that called forjoi 1, or 'expulsionof Westernbarbarians'. To a large extent,Consul Harris achieved his diplomaticcoup by forcefully stressingthat Japan, like China, would sufferthe evils of opium trafficking and war if Edo did not consent.2 Thus, the bakufu and its supporters pledged themselvesto kaikokurJ, or 'opening the country'-at least to the Westerners. Eventson the Asian mainlandloomed largein the mindsof late-Tokugawa thinkersand leaders, whetherpro- or anti-bakufu.They construedChina's misfortunesas a 'mirrorfor Yin'-a warningof whatto be on guard against. As theyphrased it, 'The overturnedcart left tracks' for all to see. But just how clearwere those tracks? Edo's prohibitionof foreigntravel, the key element in sakoku,remained in effectthroughout the 1850s; so Japanesenationals could

THE AUTHORis an associate professorin the Departmentof History,York University.He wishes to thank Professors Watanabe Hiroshi '9U, Oyama Kyohei ALL: , Kitaoka Shin'ichi LfEL1K-, Yoshida Toshizumi f MartinCollcutt, and Joshua Fogel for their usefulcomments and for helpingto obtain source materials. 1 This is also knownas the Anglo-FrenchWar withChina, 1856-1860. 2 Masuda Wataru El,+ Seigaku Tozen to Chugoku Jijo k , Iwanami, 1979, pp. 59-65 & pp. 269-79. This work introducesnumerous primary sources related to the topic of China's impact on late Tokugawa and Meiji Japan throughthe mediumof books. JoshuaFogel has translatedportions of Masuda in Sino-JapaneseStudies, 2:2 (May 1990), pp. 20-46, and 3:1 (November1990), pp. 36-59.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 not personallygo abroad to verifyfact fromrumor in reportsthey received about theturmoil in China. How reliablewere Chinese, as opposed to Dutch, accounts of that turmoil?How did Japaneseperceptions of China based on those Chinese accounts affectbakumatsu strategicthinking, especially the fiercedebates over kaikoku,sakoku, and joi? To myknowledge, R. H. van Gulick's 'Kakkaron: A JapaneseEcho of the Opium War' is the only English-languagestudy devoted exclusivelyto these questions,and it appeared in 1939.3Here, I tryto redressour long-standing neglectof thisimportant historical issue by focusingon KaigaiShinwa 0*r=FM, a workpublished in 1849by MinetaFuiko p iI 1817-1883,4and tracingthe impactthat it and otheraccounts based on Chinesesources had on bakumatsu thinkerssuch as Yoshida Shoin 1 1830-1859. The First Opium War, fromNovember 1839 to August 1842, drastically alteredlong-held Japanese perceptions of Japan's place in internationalpower relations.Until 1839,informed Japanese students of theworld scene had view- ed it as an arena of 'rival states'in whichChina was thegreatest power in East Asia, Westerncountries were middle-classpowers, and Japan was relatively small and weak. An earlyexample of such thinkingis foundin BokaisakuP iZ, writtenby Sato Nobuhiro {,,{Xif, 1769-1850,in 1806: The GreatCh'ing Empireis mightyand close at hand. Shouldsome crafty emperorcome to powerwith designs on us, theresulting disasters would be far worsethan [attack by] Russia. We nowshould exhaust all theself-effacing words and diplomaticgrace at our commandto allywith China and reapgreat profits throughtrade with her.5 Tokugawa thinkersemployed the classical Chinese metaphorof 'teethand lips' to describerelations between China and Japan. In 1825,the joi advocate Aizawa Seishisai E wrote: 'If the lips [Japan] crumble,the teeth [China] are naked and exposed.'6 This metaphorimplied interdependence, if not formalalliance, between the two nations.When Watanabe Kazan Z U, 1793-1841,used it in his GaikokuJijosho * , writtenon the eve of the First Opium War in 1839, he argued that Russia and Britainboth harbored designson China, and if eitherstarted a war with Japan, the otherwould immediatelyexploit that opportunityto attack the Ch'ing.7 But Watanabe perceivedthe Japanese lips to be far weaker than the Chinese teeth.As he

3 MonumentaSerica, 4 (1939), pp. 478-545. 4 I used the edition in Harvard-YenchingLibrary, but do not cite page numbersbecause paginationis not consecutivethroughout the work. 5 Sato Kenji tM P, ed., Sato NobuhiroBugaku-sha, jo fi At I, Iwanami, 1942, p. 322. 6 See B. T. Wakabayashi,Anti-Foreignism and WesternLearning in Early-ModernJapan, Harvard U.P., 1986, p. 199. 7 Sato Shosuke AE et al., ed., Watanabe Kazan, Takano Choei, Sakuma Shozan, Yokoi Shonan, Hashimoto Sanai 'if%FIi,1jf71*U, , MThJ4, ASPF, Nihon Shiso Taikei 55, Iwanami, 1971, p. 50.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WAKABAYASHI: Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty 3 admitted,'One European [Russian]warship would sufficeto annihilatea large Japanese army.'8 Or, as the Mito daimyo Tokugawa Nariaki f%JIIAHRalso wrotein 1839: Say what you will, the Ch'ing Empireis a greatpower; so the [Western] barbarianswill not undertakeany attack on it lightly.Ryukyu and Korea are poor,weak little countries not worth bothering about. That means Russia most probablywill decide to invadeJapan first and thengo aboutconquering China. Thisis a fearful,hateful situation.9 Thus, informedJapanese strategistsup to 1839 tended to believe that Westernstates wished to conquer both China and Japan,but werenot strong enoughto do so at the same time.So theyfirst would attackJapan, which was easierto conquer,and thentake on themuch more formidable Ch'ing Empire. This worldview changedradically when officialand non-officialChinese and Dutch reportsof the FirstOpium War became available in Japan.'o Reactions tendedto varydepending on whichset of accounts,the Dutch or the Chinese, a thinkeraccepted as more reliable. And later, when Chinese reportsof the Taiping Rebellion enteredJapan, Japanese perceptionsonce again changed radically. Below, I introduceone influentialsource of informationabout the First Opium War derived from Chinese sources: Mineta Fuiko's Kaigai Shinwa, 1849. Its impacton bakumatsustrategic thinking warrants careful scrutiny, for the Britishvictory it describesis far less decisive than the one we modern historiansare used to telling.

Mineta Fuko and His Work MinetaFuko was bornin 1817in Edo as thesecond son in a samuraifamily serv- ing the Makino $; daimyo of Tanabe domain in Tango province,now part of Kyoto prefecture.Mineta's education largelycame under two Confucian scholarswho held officialbakufu posts in Edo. One was SatO Issai -K, 1779-1852,ostensibly a Chu Hsi scholarbut withclear leaningstoward Wang Yang-ming.The otherwas Hayashi Fukusai ' 1800-1859,who headed the officialBakufu academy in Edo and was a son of the more renowned Hayashi Jussai Thv, 1768-1841. Mineta's academic training,then, was in Chu Hsi studies.He gave lectureson a stand-inbasis for his mentorand received honorariafrom various daimyo; so he musthave had solid academic credentials.Mineta also studied Chinese poetryunder the loyalistthinker, Yanagawa Seigan 9111VX, 1789-1858, and won fame as one of the 'Four Giants of the Yanagawa School'.

8 Sato, WatanabeKazan, p. 30. 9 Mito-hanShiryo Bekki, jo 71P g 94MJ=9 n, I, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1970, p. 98. 10 An analysisof the differencesbetween the officialChinese and Dutch accounts,that is, the fusetsugakiVqk $ tenderedto thebakufu by Chineseand Dutch officialsin Nagasaki, is givenin Kato Yuizo b4Xi3, KurofuneZengo no Sekai kIjAJO)tt, Iwanami, 1985, pp. 247-304.

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In early1839, beforethe FirstOpium War broke out, Mineta also began to tackle Dutch studies under MitsukuriGempo Af},R 1799-1863. Mineta's tutelagewould last untilearly 1841. The timingwas fortunatebecause Gempo and his son Shogo ?E werethen compiling Kon'yo Zushiki 4MA, a com- prehensivegazetteer of the world's nations. Later, MitsukuriGempo and Shionoya Thin , 1809-1867,the subject of van Gulick's 1939 study, would compile a Japaneseedition of Hai-kuot'u-chih X by Wei Yuan RM9 1794-1857."1 Under Mitsukuri,Mineta learned a great deal about recentworld history and geographythat would go into writingKaigai Shinwa. Mineta's careerin- cluded a tripfrom Oshui to Ezo undertakento observecoastal defenses,and he was fondof debatingaffairs of the day withprominent loyalist friends such as Rai Mikisaburo6 5, 1825-1859,and Umeda UmpinW 1815-1859. Mineta composedKaigai Shinwa in 1849,so it was not the earliestJapanese account of the Opium War. But he based it on the followingChinese sources citedin his work. His mostimportant was clearlyI-fei-fan-ching-lu L!Rt,. This documentis no longerextant in China and is knownto have enteredJa- pan sometimebetween 1844 and 1847,after which it was officiallyproscribed. Other importantsources cited by Mineta were: (1) Chapu chih-yung'wv ar, a collectionof odes composedby residentsof Chapu duringthe war, which arrivedin Japanin manuscriptform in 1846; (2) Sheng-wuchi , compiled by Wei Yuan in 1842, whichreached Japan in 1844; (3) Yin-yulu M.; and (4) Ching-shihwen-pien tiz.12 In writingKaigai Shinwa, Mineta combinedinformation gained fromthese Chinesesources with Japanese accounts of theOpium War by Sato Nobuhiro. Mineta also probablyread Ahen ShimatsuJAtMaN by Saito Chikudo Mffkt i, 1815-1852. These works by Sato and Saito derivedlargely from similar Chinese documentsof the 1830s and 1840s. Mineta's Preface says thathe embellishedhis work in the languageof, and in a stylepatterned after, medieval war tales such as GempeiSeisuiki RT and Taiheikit'T. His avowed aim was to enable as manypeople as possible, 'even unletteredchildren', to read the work withpleasure and profit.Kaigai Shinwawas published as a yomihon

11 On Wei Yuan, see Peter M. Mitchell,'The Limits of Reformism',and Susan Barnett, 'ProtestantExpansion and Chinese Views of the West', both in Modern Asian Studies, 6:2 (April 1972). Also see Peter M. Mitchell,'Wei Yuan (1794-1857) and the Early Modernization Movementin China and Japan', doctoral dissertation,Indiana University,1970; and Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscoveryof theMaritime World, Harvard U P., 1984. 12 For informationon the arrivalof theseworks in Japan,see Oba Osamu ?fIt, Edo Jidai ni okeru Tosen Mochiwatarishono Kenkyui 4IPWA f Gs7tiU' f 4 0f, F Kansai Daigaku Shuppanbu, Osaka, 1967, pp. 156-99.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WAKABAYASHI: Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty 5 found himselfin prison from 1849 to 1851. On his release,the bakufu pro- hibitedhim for life from entering Edo, Osaka, or Kyoto,and he was disowned by his family.Mineta then spent several years studying coastal defenseson the Boso Peninsula, whichformed part of Edo Bay. But by 1864 he managed to turnhis fortunesaround, re-establishhimself in Tanabe domain, and serveit as an advisor on coastal defenses. The illustratorwho collaboratedwith Mineta in publishingKaigai Shinwa meta harsherfate; he wentto prisonand died there.This severepunishment in- dicateshow sensitivethe bakufuwas about Mineta's subjectmatter-contem- porarymilitary and politicalaffairs in a neighboringland thathad dangerous implicationsfor Tokugawa rule in Japan. Mineta lived to see the new Meiji governmentestablished, and it consideredhim enough of a loyalistto grant him the honor of fifthcourt rank.13 Kaigai Shinwa seemsto have enjoyeda broad circulationin late Tokugawa times,although exact figuresare impossibleto come by. As well, it helped create a whole genre of fictionalizedor semi-fictionalizedaccounts of the Opium Wars and Taiping Rebellionin late Tokugawa and earlyMeiji Japan. Some works in this genre,such as Iwagaki Gesshu's Wffiiq) Saisei Kaishin Hen ?ig>,P,, werefantastic forms of escapistliterature. Iwagaki, forexam- ple, has Tokugawa Nariaki leadingan armyoverseas to chastisethe British.14 On the other hand, many works in this genre were serious writingsthat depictedrecent events with some degreeof accuracy.But howeveraccurate or inaccurate,they did muchto shape popular Japaneseimages of keyhistorical eventsand personages. AlthoughKaigai Shinwa was semi-fictional,bakufu prosecutorsconvicted Mineta of translatingthe proscribedChinese work, I-fei-fan-ching-lu,into Japanese.15This leads us to inferthat his accountswere reasonably faithful to those found in that originalChinese source. Mineta's impliedproposals on how theEdo bakufumight reform and strengthenitself, publicly expressed as these were in Kaigai Shinwa, were far more controversialthan Hayashi Shihei's 41I-?, 1738-1793,more celebratedproposals in Kaikoku Heidan Om efi writtenbut not publishedhalf a centurybefore. Mineta did not verifydates, people, places, and eventsin his narrative;but to be fair,that was not easy in his circumstances.For instance,when recount- ing the Battleof Canton foughtin the springof 1841,he used originalsources for the firstBattle of Tinghai foughtin June-July1840. In many cases, however,he took such libertiesin orderto improvethe popular literaryappeal of his work. The followingtwo episodes underscorethis point. The firstinvolves the seventeen-year-olddaughter of a Tinghai literati,

13 Biographicalinformation on Mineta is fromMasuda, pp. 100-07, and Nihon Jimmei Daijiten EtRkt , Heibonsha, 1979, 6, p. 100. 14 I have used the copy held by the Kyoto UniversityLibrary. 15 Masuda, p. 103.

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Ch'en Chih-hsienRtt. Unable to deliversupplies of rice demandedby the pillagingEnglish, Ch'en offeredher as a concubineto CommodoreBremer Yi pX. But she soon caughtthe eye of a Colonel BurrellR?{fA and sufferedyet anotheroutrage; and so, distraught,she threwherself into a well.16 A similarly hideous fateawaited Chinese men who failedto hand over rice stocks: 'They weremade barbariancitizens, had theirheads shaved,forced to drinka concoc- tion that leftthem dumb, and requiredto toil like black barbarians.'17 The sectionsin Mineta's Kaigai Shinwathat I summarizebelow provide distortedaccounts of the battlesof Canton and San-yuan-li_ ET, and by ex- tension,the FirstOpium War as a whole. But forhistorians trying to discover how late-TokugawaJapanese misperceived current events in China and how thesemisperceptions affected their thought and actions,Mineta's documentis of highvalue. Indeed, it is arguablymore significantthan the Dutch reports, whichwere more accuratebut lackingin detail. If nothingelse, semi-fictional works such as Kaigai Shinwawere published. So even if proscribed,as this workwas, theywere accessibleto far more readersthan the top-secretDutch reports,which few aside fromhigh bakufu officialscould obtain. Moreover,factual veracity was not somethingthat the Chinesethemselves were noted for in those days. ArthurWaley remarksabout the manyofficial Ch'ing reportsof lopsided Chinese victoriesin the FirstOpium War: 'Their truthfulnesswas not thenand has neversince been doubted in China, except by historianswriting under direct Western influence.'18 Mineta's KaigaiShin- wa,then, is a valuable primarysource because it accuratelyconveys distorted Chinese accountsof the war thatwere widely believed but impossibleto con- firmor disproveowing to bakufu bans on foreigntravel.

A DifferentEcho of theOpium War To aid his readers'understanding, Mineta prefaces Kaigai Shinwa with a short 'factual' account of England. Then comes the main body of his work,divided into fivechapters. Chapter One is titled'The Poison of Opium Spreads, and

Huang Chueh-tzu's X Memorial on Banning the Drug.' The saga ends with Chapter Five, 'The Armies Make Peace, and a Text of the Treaty.' Mineta's readers,then, could examinefor themselves the humiliating results of China's surrenderin 1842. Here I summarizekey accounts fromchapters 1 through3. Mineta beginshis saga by outliningthe historyof opium use in China. The poisonous opiate had firstarrived from Arabia and India about threehundred

16 Bremerwas a stock figurein Chinese accounts of the war; apparentlythere were several 'Bremers'.See ArthurWaley, The Opium War ThroughChinese Eyes, StanfordU.P., 1958,pp. 112-13. It seemsthat the kanji Mineta used to transcribe'Burrell' were also widelyemployed to represent'Bremer'. So, in sum, correctidentification is not possible. 17 Waley,pp. 163-64,cites both of theseepisodes, derived from Chinese sources, with minor variations. 18 Waley, p. 130.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WAKABAYASHI: Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty 7 yearsago. At thattime, only people on the Canton coast used the narcotic;so it was not a widespreadsocial evil. Soon, however,all social stratain China weretaking the drug, fromimperial princes to commoners;and the Western barbarians quickly exploitedthis situation. They broughtvast amounts of opium to Canton, whereforeign trade was legal, and sold it forChinese gold and silver,thus garneringhuge profits. The narcotichad been strictlybanned as earlyas the Ch'ien-lungrzi era, 1736-1795,and for a time, fear of the severepenalties shut down the trade. But aftera while, governmentofficials stopped enforcingthese laws rigor- ously, and the evil sprang up again. In 1815, Ch'ing officialsconfiscated and destroyedthree thousand chests in an attemptto crackdown on violators. But by then,the habit was so ingrainedamong Chinesethat trafficking could not be stopped. Why was this? The main reason was that nefariousChinese merchantskept barteringwith the Westernbarbarians at sea to obtain the illicitdrug, and thensold it to people who smokedit secretlyin dens all over the empire. In 1827-1828,the English barbarianshad fearedthat the Ch'ing emperor would issue anotheredict prohibiting the drugtrade. They bribedgreedy and corruptCanton officialsinto ignoring the existing bans so thattrafficking could go on. Opium became China's most importantimport, running to 60 million cattiesper year. This promptedDirector of State CeremonialHuang Chueh- tzu to petitionthe throne in thesummer of 1838. Minetaquotes that document in part: The opiumepidemic has recentlydepleted gold and silverin China,to say nothingof causingpopular distress. Before, it was only the wealthywho squanderedmoney on thisdrug. Now, the poorestof the poor also become addictedto it,often to thepoint of sellingtheir homes and fieldsto purchaseit; and so theyend up losingtheir livelihood. This producesbandits and other rovingoutlaws in the land, whose ever-increasing numbers cannot be controlled. Unlesswe stopthis evil, all of China'swealth will end up in foreignclutches .... We mustact now, beforea greatcalamity befalls us. Mineta then relates how the Tao-kuang iX emperor,r. 1821-1850, re- sponded to this crisis, how Lin Tse-hsii 1tHvjj, 1785-1850, became High Commissionerat Canton, and how Lin's valiant actions thereprovoked the tragic war. The Tao-kuang emperorand his ministersproclaimed Huang's hard-lineproposal into law as part of the pao-chia fV systemof collective responsibility.'9They also institutedthe deathpenalty for anyone caught with opium or opium pipes. Huang thencommanded the English merchants to take home all opium storedon theirships or in theirfactories; and he warnedthem not to bringany more. The Englishgrieved over their lost lucrativetrade, but

19 On thepao-chia systemused as a possibleinstitutional mechanism through which the ban on opium mightbe enforced,see Waley, p. 23; also, Hsin-pao Chang, CommissionerLin and the Opium War,Norton, New York, 1970, p. 129.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 8 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 could not protest.'In a fewdays, scoresof [English]merchant ships set sail to leave Canton harbor.' This happy solution to the crisis proved short-lived.As Mineta explains, nefariousCanton merchantscontinued selling their illegal hoards of the narcotic,and Chineseoutlaws in coastal areas keptviolating the law. The emperor and his ministersconcluded that it was pointlessto confiscatethe opium stocks held by Chinesemerchants. The barbarianskept smuggling opium into China throughthe foreigntrade at Canton, so the drug'sinflow had to be shutoff at its source. Courtofficials then chose Lin Tse-hsuas theman bestsuited for this task and grantedhim plenipotentiarypowers at Canton. In 1839, Lin assumed his post thereas the emperor'sHigh Commissioner. Touringthe Englishfactories on shore,Lin foundthat all the barbarianmer- chantshad returnedto Canton afterhaving departed only the year before, and that Cantonese merchantsfrequented the English factoriesto do a brisk business in opium. Realizing how hard it would be to stamp out the illicit trade,he and his colleague,Governor-General Teng T'ing-chenRI 9. M, decided firstto admonishthe Chinese people: Englishmenknow about the poisonous nature of opiumand so theyforbid their own peopleto smokeit at home.Yet theycheat Chinese people out of their moneyand entice them into ruining their health. You arebeing deceived by them and do notknow it. You throwaway your lives, just like insects attracted to a flame.... Then Lin and Teng turnedtheir attention to theEnglish merchants and gave themthree days to surrenderall opium stocks. The Englishwere so terrified that theyfailed to respond withinthe time allowed. This enragedLin, who threatenedthem with death if they did not comply, and he sent several hundredarmed men to surroundthe factories.In thisway, he hoped to make an example of the English, in case the Dutch, French, and Americanbar- barians should attemptto bringopium to China as well. In consternation,the Englishsurrendered 1,317 chestsof the drugto Lin.20 Aware thatthey were hidingmore, he evictedChinese servantsfrom the factoriesand seized all small craftin the harborin orderto cut offthe merchants fromtheir ships anchored offshore.Then he orderedthat no provisionsbe broughtto theEnglish either by land or sea. Afterhunger and thirsthad driven themto the brink,Lin proposed a deal: theirChinese servants could returnif theysurrendered one-quarter of the remainingopium stocks,food would be allowed in ifthey surrendered one-half, and regulartrade would resumeif they surrenderedthree-quarters.21

20 Chang, p. 147, citesa figureof 1,036 chestssurrendered on 21 March 1839. But thiswas only a small part of the opium that would be destroyedin Juneof that year. Chang's figure is based on John Slade, Notices on the British Trade to the Port of Canton, with Some Translationsof Chinese OfficialPapers Relative to That Trade, 1830. 21 Based on a Russell & Company document,Chang, pp. 156-57, cites the same blockade

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The Englishmerchants apologized deeplyfor their crimes and relinquished all theiropium. Lin promptlyburned it, mixedthe ashes withsalt and lime, and discardedthis mixture into the sea to preventcommoners from consuming it.22 The English merchantsbitterly resented Lin's harsh treatment,even thoughthey admitted being in the wrong. Several hundredof themleft the factoriesand reportedthis incidentto Britishmilitary officials stationed in theirvarious Indian colonial outposts.From there, these reports went to Queen Victoria. Mineta observesthat Lin's destructionof the Englishopium stocksat Can- ton became the casus belli thatled to Ch'ing calamities.But long beforeLin's 'opium-burning',Mineta takes pains to note, a Ch'ing governmentofficial named Ch'eng Han-chang , d. 1832, had prescientlywarned: Ifwe really want to cutoff the opium at itssource, we must stop the English from comingby refusing to tradewith them. If wetry to eradicatethe problem after it becomesentrenched, war and catastrophewill result. Within a fewshort years, nefariouscommoners in coastal regions-greedyas theyare forprofit-will collaboratewith the barbariansin secret.The strategistmust deal withboth victoryand defeat.Should we allow China to suffereven one smalldefeat, lewdcreatures will soon arrivein packsto attackus. Mineta exclaims,'What clear vision he had long beforeall of this actually took place!' It seemed to Mineta that enlightenedChinese leaders such as Ch'eng recognizedthe virtuesof national isolation, even thoughthat policy was impossiblefor the Ch'ing Empireto implement. In the meantime,Ch'ing officialsin Fukien were busy tryingto tightenup coastal defenses.Their main problemwas thatevil Chinesemerchants ignored the ban on opium, and kept rowingtheir smuggling skiffs out to the English shipsanchored offshore in orderto obtainthe drug. So the Ch'ing generalsde- cided to attackand burn one such Englishship thatwas operatingin the port fairlyclose to shore. A local officialrecruited 380 'waterbraves' (shui-yung7J( *) at his own expense, and entrustedthem to a commanderwho devised a highlyunusual strategy.He recruitedanother three hundred local bravesand put his total of 680 men aboard Chinese merchantships. They hid their weapons in the fold of each ship and disguisedthemselves as merchantsout to buy opium. This ruseduped theEnglish, a battleensued, and theChinese won by usingexplosives and boardingthe enemycraft to fighthand-to-hand. The enemy's mast and sails were destroyedby fire,and eight Bengal and ten English crewmendied. The Chinese braves, by contrast,suffered only eight killed and wounded. A Ch'ing governmentofficial arrived at the scene, but measuresby Lin and a similardeal, but withslightly different conditions. Servants could return afterone-quarter, boat servicewould resumeafter one-half, guards would leave afterthree- quarters,and trade would reopen afterall the opium had been surrendered. 22 ActuallyLin dissolvedthe opium by mixingit withsalt and lime,and thendiscarded it in the sea. Chang, pp. 173-74.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 10 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 only as the English ship was reelingtoward the open sea. The lesson to be learnedfrom this first battle was thatthe Englishwere vulnerable to unortho- dox tacticsby irregularunits. Back in England, Queen Victoria devised a cleverwar plan. She decided rightfrom the startnot to tryto conquerthe whole Ch'ing empire,and not to use nativeEnglish forces any morethan need be, sinceshe could alwaysrecruit fightingmen in her colonies. And above all, she vowed to meetEnglish war costs by makingChina pay an indemnity.A fleetof warshipssoon leftLon- don, poweredmore by sail than by steam. It firstwent to the Canary Islands, cruised down the west coast of Africa, and went on to the Cape of Good Hope, an Englishcolony. There, followingVictoria's war plan, the squadron recruitedseveral thousand fierce native soldiers. It thensailed to the island of Chi-ning-pu(Ceylon?) and to thecountry of Chen-la,or Cambodia.23In those areas, too, thenatives were destitute and lackedthe means to sustainlife. These men, whom Mineta denigratedas 'blackies' (kurombo-Lj,i) eagerlysought to enlistin England's armywhen theyheard about the pay to be received.24 As well, Chinese fugitiveswho had fledto Chi-ning-puoffered to sell their skillsas guides and interpreters;and the Englishgladly accepted because they themselveswere ignorantof the Chinese terrainand language. Fortifiedby theserecruits, English forces numbered 'in thetens of thousands'. By theFifth Month of 1840, their assault force of 'fiftylarge warshipsand an untold numberof smallerones' headed forTinghai, located on Chushan Island, just offChekiang province. Aftereasily capturing Tinghai, the English used it as a base forfurther opera- tions: the Bogue leading to Canton, and Amoy. Perturbedby these defeats, Tao-kuang suddenlydismissed Lin Tse-hsuiin favorof Ch'i-shan?Ll I and I-li- pu f#t. English Commander(Captain Charles) Elliot A at Tinghai was delightedto hear the news. As Mineta explains,Lin had alwaysbeen a tough nut forElliot to crack-the onlyChinese who had everproved a matchfor the doughtyEnglish commander. Elliot immediatelywent to T'ientsin,perilously close to the imperialcourt in Peking,where he presentedI-li-pu with a letter forthe emperor that offered to returnthe conqueredterritories of Tinghai,the Bogue, and Amoy in returnfor an imperialpledge to restoreAnglo-Chinese trade underthe old arrangements. I-li-puknew what catastropheswould resultif he allowed Elliot to staythis close to the imperialcapital, or worse still,if Elliot should actuallyenter it. Massive disorder,uprisings, and a grievousloss of dynasticprestige would surelyensue. So I-li-pu quicklyinformed Elliot that a hallowed law forbade

23 See Numata JiroiF tR13 et al., ed., Yogaku,jo i, I, Nihon Shiso Taikei 64, Iwanami, 1976, pp. 524-25, headnote, for 'Cambodia'. The correctdesignation should be -fl%;Mineta citesit as t+J. I cannot identifyChi-ning-pu RMLOWl:%. 24 ThroughoutKaigai Shinwa, Mineta follows Chinese accounts when referringto Bengal troops as 'black barbarians'.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WAKABAYASHI: Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty 11 foreignersto remainin the area. He suggestedthat Elliot returnto Canton, and promisedthat he, I-li-pu,would go to Pekingand persuadethe emperor to granta favorablereply, which C'hi-shan would relaylater on. Tao-kuang's responsewas not whatI-li-pu and Ch'i-shanhad hoped for.In a rage,he orderedthe barbarians expelled from China and roaredthat no truce was permissible.Elliot should be taken captive and sent to Peking, and any foreignerswho got in theway shoulddie. Ch'i-shantrembled at thethought of having to face Elliot with this imperialedict. When the Englishmanfinally managedto confronthim, Ch'i-shan meekly granted all thatElliot demanded. And afterseeing just how distraughtCh'i-shan was, Elliot decidedto extracta fewmore spoils, such as Hong Kong.

Thus, Mineta describesthe signingof what historianslater would call the Chuenpi Conventionof January1841, the firstof China's unequal treaties withthe West. A woodblock printof thescene shows Ch'i-shan concluding his unauthorizedpeace withElliot and would catchYoshida Shoin's eyein thecon- textof bakufunegotiations with Perry. Mineta's less-than-flatteringportrayal of the Ch'ing envoydoes not stop there.Ch'i-shan soon held a lavish feastto curryfavor with the English.He invitedElliot and 'severalhundred white and black [Bengal] barbarians'to attendthis banquet. Wine flowedfrom numer- ous fountains,and Chinesemaidens, 'with the purest skin and loveliestfaces', providedentertainment. But for Mineta's readers, the war raged on. Chinese commoners in Kwangtungand Fukien were in an uproar, eagerlyawaiting the government

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1 Li -I

troopswhom they knew would come to theirrescue. The people greetedthese men and the generalsleading them 'as if theywere clouds duringa drought.' GeneralYang Fang 1 who in truthwas seventyyears old and stone-deaf- led tenthousand Manchu and Hunanese troops.25General Lung-wen L and General I-shan L, the emperor'scousin, arrivedwith twenty thousand im- perialtroops from Honan, Kweichou,Kiangsi, and Kwangsi.Other provinces also contributedmen, for a total of over fiftythousand strong. Led by these threegenerals, the Chinese forcessupposedly attacked and drove the English fromCanton. When theyreturned shortly in threesteam- shipsand forty-fivemore warships, the Chineseagain used unorthodoxtactics to defeatthis great naval squadron. They attackedwith fire rafts and fishing boats loaded withburning piles of straw.That destroyedmany English men- of-war and drew the enemy fleetclose to shore, withinrange of coastal batteries.The English lost two steamshipsand seven large warships,but Elliot escaped on the one remainingsteamship. Survivors from the sinking English men-of-war-both white and black troops-swam to shore, only to be cut down by local braves. The crewson the twentyor so Britishships still afloat sufferedmany casualties, and could renderno assistance. Thus Mineta describeshow the Chinese supposedlyscored two impressivevictories over the English at Canton, one on land and one at sea, when in fact the Chinese lost seventy-onewar junks and sixtyshore batteries. Ch'i-shan's diplomatictreachery did not go undetectedfor long in Peking.

25 On Yang Fang, see Waley, p. 137.

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Tao-kuang indictedthis culpriton eightcounts of 'besmirchingthe nation's honor' (kokutai HI) throughhis secretpeace deal. These were: 1. Doingnothing to opposethe foreigners despite his position as commander of defenses. 2. SlanderingLin Tse-hsuand TengT'ing-chen. 3. Holdingthe lavishfeast for Elliot and conspiringwith him against the Chinesepeople. 4. Employingstreet criminals in his administrationand in negotiationswith theEnglish. 5. SurrenderingHong Kong, the Bogue, and Amoy to Englanddespite having promisedto defendthese at anycost. 6. Communicatingsecretly with Elliot instead of turning over all documentsto theimperial court. 7. Violatingthe ban on providingfood and fuelto foreignships. 8. Embezzlingpublic funds allocated for casting new cannon to defendCan- ton. In theFifth Month of 1841,English forces attacked Canton again, thistime in fortywarships. The city'sdefenders beat themoff at first,but thetenacious invaderssoon landed two thousandtroops. Aided by one hundredor so Can- toneseoutlaws hired as mercenaries,they later managed to land at yetanother spot on the coast. Szechwanesetroops tried to counterattackoutside the city, but Chinesecannon firefell short of the markand ended up killingthem, not theEnglish. This mishapled to a humiliatingChinese defeat, for which Mineta ridiculesthem. The Chinese dispatchedone thousandelite government troops frominside Canton to repulse the English attack. But their heroic deeds aroused the jealousy of Hunanese troops,who began to fireon the governmentforces. At thatpoint, local peasantbraves roused themselves to defeatthe Hunanese turn- coats, and this allowed loyal Chinese troopsto continuetheir valiant defense outsidethe Canton citywalls. But othergovernment troops meekly remained inside. Except for Commander Tuan Yung-fu's 7xi- regiment,they just looked on, refusingeven to firetheir eight-thousand-catty cannon.26 Com- manderTuan and his unit stormedand destroyedan English steamshipthat had run aground. But then,those Chinesegenerals inside the citybecame en- vious of Tuan's successand conspiredto relievehim of his command.Quick to exploitthis break, the Englishpressed their attack on Tuan's ineptsuccessor, who fledfor his life. Mineta says of Tuan's dismissal,'The people of Canton shed tears of vexation.' Soon ten thousand freshEnglish troops attackedCanton's northerngate, and thedefenders fled. Having capturedthe Chinese artillery emplacements on all four sides of the city's outer walls, the Englishturned these guns inward

26 On the 'eight-thousand-cattycannon' neverfired, see FredrickWakeman, Jr., Strangers at the Gate, Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1966, p. 54.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 14 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 and began a devastatingrocket and artilleryattack. When I-shan and Yang Fang tried to flee, General Wang T'ing-lan TE9M remonstratedwith them, insistingthat Chinese troops still outnumberedthe enemyand pleadingthat he would recapturethe gun emplacementsif grantedcommand of all forces. But I-shan was set on deserting,and no othergenerals backed Wang. The English pressed their attack, and Canton sufferedtremendous slaughter. Generals I-shan, Yang Fang, and Lung Wen promptlyfetched two comp- rador-rogues:Yu Pao-jen Afz and Wu Shao-jung ffiIj, betterknown to historyby his alias, 'Howqua'.27 The Chinesegenerals urged Howqua to pro- pose peace talks and arrange a surrenderbecause he was Captain Elliot's friend.At first,Elliot showed no interest.He argued that the Chinese had violated theirearlier peace agreement(the Chuenpi Convention?)and killed two Englishmerchants; so theywere in the wrong.But the compradors,Yu Pao-jen and Howqua, beggedfor a truceand Elliot finallyagreed, under two conditions:payment of six milliondollars and the safe returnof an English princess,Queen Victoria's sister,whom Chinese forceshad capturedat Yu- yao in the previousyear.28 Minetaportrays the aged and deaf Yang Fang as a valiantcommander turn- ed dissolute.At first,Yang foughthard in Canton's defense.But aftersuffer- ing defeatin the second English attack,he lost his stomachfor militarylife; and on top of that, Yu Pao-jen depraved him with six beautifulwomen. So, while the English were capturingCanton, Yang and I-shan indulgedin debaucherousrevelry. This earnedfor Yang thecontempt of his own men,and also that of the English troops, who occupied the city and foragedin the surroundingcountryside. 'White and black barbarians', Mineta emphasizes, wenton orgiesof rape and pillage: 'Everynight, five- to six-hundredwomen, theirlives ruined,would end theirmiserable lives.' Hunanese troops, followingthe example of CommanderYang, suffereda total breakdownin discipline.Some cut offtheir queues and desertedto the British,eager to serve as paid informersand guides; some practicedcan- nibalismin broad daylight,believing that would curethe venereal diseases they had contracted.29All thiscaused immensesuffering to the people of Canton, so theydrafted petitions and manifestosto theemperor and governmentoutlin- ing theirplight and pleading for help.

27 Mineta,however, reverses the order of thekanji in his givenname, citing him as 'Wu Jung- shao'. He cites a figurenamed 1VE; thismay be one of the renditionsof 'Howqua'. 28 The woman was Mrs Anne Noble, capturedfrom the Kite in 1843. Because her surname implied aristocraticbirth, her identitybecame garbled in the Chinese accounts and so she comesout as an Englishprincess. See Kato, p. 277. Minetaprobably got thisaccount of herfrom Saito Chikudo's Ahen Shimatsu, 1843, whichin turnwas based on Chinese sources. See van Gulick,p. 506. The storywould be popularizedin Kaigai Yowa = whichKato incorrectly citesas Kaigai Shinwa. KurofuneZengo, p. 304. 29 Wakeman, p. 56, describessimilar rumors circulated by xenophobic Cantonese about troops fromHunan-their alleged propensityto rape and contractvenereal disease.

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Mineta then describes San-yuan-li and the great Chinese victorythat putativelytook place there,although he does not actuallyrefer to the battle by name.30Basing himselfon contemporaryChinese sources, he corroborates for his Japanese readersthe stab-in-the-backmyth that Chinese universally acceptedthen, and stillwidely believe today.3'

The local Cantonese finallycame to realize, Mineta writes,that Ch'ing- governmentcommanders and troops were as much of a scourgeas the bar- barianinvaders. So theytook mattersinto their own hands by forming'bands to subduethe English'. These militiaof 'local braves', hsiang-yungVE5fi as they werecalled, numberedonly five thousand. But theyimmediately attacked the English regularsstationed at. coastal batteriesthat the Ch'ing government troopshad abandoned. Victoryat firstseemed doubtful, but anothertwo thousand bravesconcealed in woods nearbyjoined the attackand helpedsurround the enemy. Justwhen the beleagueredEnglish troops were beggingfor mercy,Yang Fang ordered the local braves to stop their attack and disband because Chi'shan had already concluded peace, and he also let the trapped English troops retreatto safety.The braves grudginglydid as told, but insistedthat

30 For an excellentshort account, see Wakeman,pp. 11-58, but thedetails in Kaigai Shinwa differ. 31 As Wakeman writes,p. 21, for Chinese historianson the mainland today, San-yuan-li remains 'a great popular victory,blemished only by the cowardice of Ch'ing officials.... a BunkerHill and an Alamo, rolled into one.'

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 16 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 two conditionsbe met: the Englishmust surrenderthe Canton citybatteries and board theirwarships, never to return. All English troops ended up leaving Canton and were afraid to return. Minetanotes with satisfaction: 'The generalsin the cityhad tensof thousands of troopsand mountainsof splendidweapons undertheir imperial command but could not matchthe exploitsachieved by masses of righteouslocal braves. Indeed, those generalswere no morethan fawningservants of the rebel-chief, Elliot.' Thus, the local Cantonese braves expelled barbariansin accordance with theiremperor's will-only to be betrayedby Ch'ing governmentleaders. The war went badly for China thereafter,and Mineta concludes Kaigai Shinwa witha textof the Treatyof Nanking,which put a temporaryend to Chinese humiliations.

What conclusionsabout China's performancein the FirstOpium War might Tokugawa readershave drawnfrom Kaigai Shinwa?Mineta's workshows that England did not win the war as muchas China lost it. At Canton, the Chinese are portrayedas havingachieved victory on land and at sea; theyproved they could win whenthey had a mindto. Moreover,China did not lose any battles because of vastlysuperior English military technology in the formof cannon and warships.If anything,the Ch'ing commandershad morefirepower at their disposal and certainlymore men. Ratherthan technological inferiority, more mundane tactical factors explain Ch'ing defeats. Personal and regional rivalriesspawned insubordination. Generalsand field-gradeofficers were cowardly in battle.Morale and discipline degeneratedamong the rank and file. Deserters and bandits victimized civilians.Commanders refused to use the militiaunits and unorthodoxtactics that were effectiveearly in the conflictand would have greatlyenhanced China's chances to attainfinal victory. But socio-politicalfactors were even more devastating to China: theinternal weakness that stemmed from a deficientsense of national unity and patriotism.Kaigai Shinwamakes it appear that han-chienjf4{,32 or Chinese traitors,abounded at all levelsof society.Above, weak-kneednegotiators such as Ch'i-shan and I-li-pusurrendered Chinese sovereignrights and territoryin directviolation of imperialorders. At the middle level, sleazy compradors such as Howqua and Yu Pao-jen cut lucrativedeals withthe Englishinvaders and depravedChinese generalssuch as Yang Fang. Finally,at the level of the masses, povertyand desperationhad drivenChinese commonersto become renegadesor outlawswho eagerlyaided and abettedthe Britishas mercenaries or as paid guides, interpreters,and informers.Much of this povertyand weaknessstemmed directly or indirectlyfrom opium and its attendantevils,

32 Mineta himselfuses the derogatoryterm.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WAKABAYASHI: Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty 17 and these in turn had derived from trade with Westerners.If China had prohibitedthis foreign trade to startwith, or if China had controlledit strictly at Canton, opium traffickingwould neverhave occurred.

The Transformationin 'Joi' These Chinese lessons were not lost on contemporaryJapanese who found themselvesin similarfrightening circumstances when Commodore Matthew C. Perry's Black Ships landed a small armed contingentat Uraga near Edo in 1853. At Kurihama he presenteddiplomatic messages to the bakufu's Uraga magistrates;and the followingqueer Chinese poem, completewith instruc- tions to decipherit, appeared in the shogun's capital. [Readeach groupof kanjiin thenumerical order shown and] readthe middle character four times:

X %;Stk A X _Y + \

Ikokusentogoku ni kitaru chikokuhenjite rangoku to naru shokokuodoroki ikoku tsuyoshi jikokuureu wakoku sawagu

Shipsof a foreigncountry came to our easternland, And a well-orderedstate fell to disarray. Daimyodomains are takenaback; the foreign land is mighty. Our nationis in distress;Japan is in an uproar.33 This unknownpundit summed up thebakufu's predicament quite nicely; for the firsttime in its illustrioushistory it knuckledunder in shame before a militarypower strongerthan itself.Yoshida Shoin and his teacherSakuma Shozan tWtU, 1811-1864, were in Edo at the time; and Shoin noted a strikingsimilarity between bakufu and Ch'ing negotiators: The way they [bakufumagistrates] accepted the barbarian'smessage con- stitutesa nationaldisgrace of the greatestproportions. It was just like Ch'i- shan'sencounter with the rebel-chief Elliot as shownin theillustration found in KaigaiShinwa. Just to mentionthat scene pains me deeply.34 Perryreturned in the followingyear and forcedthe bakufu to signa 'Provi- sional Treatyof Amity'.Although it opened portsto sell coal and provisions to Westernships, it was not a formalcommercial pact, and thereforedid not

33 Only the firsttwo stanzas of a long poem are quoted here. For the original,see Sakuragi Akira , ed., SokumenkanBakumatsu-shi j Keiseisha, 1905, p. 12. - 34 Yamaguchi-kenKyoikukai, ed., Yoshida Shoin Zenshui .T' [Ysz], Iwanami, 1939, 8, pp. 178-79.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 18 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 provide for regularforeign trade and residencewithout express bakufu consent-or so shogunalofficials protested. But suchdetails notwithstanding, Con- sul TownsendHarris arrived in Japantwo yearslater. His aim was to extracta truecommercial treaty from the bakufuthat would open portsto unregulated trade. In 1858,he lecturedroju rtrpHotta MasayoshitfHEII, 1810-1864,for two hours on the dangersthat opium posed, and transcriptsof his harangue soon leaked to the daimyo.35Harris argued that Westernpowers otherthan America were eager to sell the drug in Japan, especiallyBritain and France, who werethen fighting the Second Opium War. But, he assuredHotta, if Edo firstsigned a formaltrade agreementwith him that explicitlybanned opium importsand permittedcommercial agents to residein Japan, the othermore dangerouspowers would have to observethis precedent-setting U.S. treaty.36 Tairo yk Ii Naosuke : 1815-1860, ignored the wishes of Emperor Komei *M and capitulatedto Westerndemands for an unequal treatyin 1858-much as Ch'i-shan had disobeyedTao-kuang in 1841. Even so, some informedJapanese leaders and thinkersby thelate 1850shad come to realizethat sakoku was no longertenable in the sense of prohibiting trade and diplomaticrelations with Western nations. The question was how to open Japan withoutforfeiting territorial integrity or sufferingthe evils of foreigntrade and residence; and as seen from China's recentexperience, opium was among the foremostof those evils. Sakuma Shozan, for example, would have bakufu negotiatorshonor the emperor'swish to revokePerry's treaty because Japanhad signedit under coer- cion. Moreover, Shozan claimed that Harris's speech to Hotta requestinga trade pact 'seeminglytook the formof friendlyadvice to Japan but in truth was repletewith lies and threats.'37The bakufushould confrontHarris boldly and expose his duplicity,especially on the issue of opium: You [Harris]say that once trade starts, England plans to sellopium in Japanjust as in China.Even the great power China could do nothingto stopthe English, whoviolated the Chinese ban on opiumand traffickedto their heart's content. How is a smallpower like Japan supposed to stopEngland with a simpletreaty outlawingopium? You say that if Americawrites this provisioninto your treaty,the English will be unableto deleteit in theirseven though they wish to. Butthey violate all suchprohibitions. So whatdifference would it make? Either way,our peoplewould suffer great harm.38 The bakufu should abrogate the originalPerry treaty, reject Harris's trade pact as unjust, and send its own envoy to the United States with ordersto renegotiatefair treaties from a positionof equality.

35 Japaneseaccounts say thatHarris's lecturelasted six hours. See FukuchiGen'ichiro rfu*2MP -RN, Bakufu Suibo Ron rgelfRLf, Toyo Bunko, 1967, p. 59. 36 Part of Harris's speech to Hotta is translatedin W. G. Beasley, Select Documents on JapaneseForeign Policy, 1853-1868, OxfordU.P., 1955, pp. 159-65. For the original,I con- sultedEto JunJI4i4, ed., Katsu Kaishu7 Zenshiu * 4ji4-?, Kodansha, 1973, 16, pp. 128-44. 37 Sato, WatanabeKazan, p. 294. 38 Sato, WatanabeKazan, p. 297.

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Yoshida Shoin wentbeyond his mentorin layingbare Harris'sdeceit. Harris claimedthat the U.S., unlikeother powers, sought no coloniesin theFar East and had neverannexed any territoryby forceof arms. To this,Shoin replied, 'When you annexedNew Mexico, wasn't thatby forceof arms?' Americahad neveracquired colonies in the Far East because it lacked the power to do so, not because it lacked the will; it would behave just like the otherWestern powersif it werestronger. 'You tryto pass offyour weakness as virtue.How detestable!'Shoin also saw throughHarris's calculateddefamation of Britain: 'This is to play up the Opium War and portraythe Englishas rapacious; it is to scare us into embracingAmerica as a friend.'39 Shoin was especiallyincisive about thecrucial problem of opiumunder Har- ris's proposed trade pact. Justhaving a commercialagent stationedin China would not have avertedthe Opium War as Harrisclaimed. That war brokeout because theEnglish were bent on makingprofit by sellingnarcotics; they cared nothingabout Chinese law or the well-beingof Chinese people. Treatypro- visions outlawingthe sale of opium in Japan as well would mean nothing, particularlybecause Harris insisted on 'free trade'. This meant that the bakufu could not regulatetrade as withthe Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki. Shoin also pointed out, 'According to Wei Yuan's Ch'ou-hai p'ien Pr,` [in Hai-kuo t'u-chih],English barbarians are not the onlyones sellingopium. Americansare too, and not to a small extent.'40 So Americanmerchants would tryto smuggleopium into Japan despiteall assurancesto the contrary: You Americanswill not burn the opium yourselves while it is on yourships; you willlet us burnit after unloading it in Japaneseports, thus creating an excusefor war.Moreover, you want free trade at portsthroughout our land; but under such 'free'trade, smuggling would be impossibleto stop.Stipulate as manyprohibi- tionsas youwish in thetreaty. How willthat prevent the spread of opium?4' Shoin's thinkingclearly owed much to his perceptionof China's misfor- tunes: 'The war over opium shows that the greatdisasters that befellCh'ing China were broughton by Chinese traitors[Han chien] fromwithin.'42 As earlyas 1848, Shoin composed a laudatoryafterword to a certain'Manifesto by the Righteousand Brave in Eastern Kwangtung',one of the many anti- Britishproclamations that appeared in Canton in the 1840s.43He wrote: The Ch'ing shouldbe concernedabout theirpeople within,not barbarians from without.... Although the Ch'ing are weak, their land is vast and its

39 Ysz 5, pp. 278-79 & 284-85. 40 Ysz 5, p. 286. On the Americanopium tradein China, see Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship,Columbia U.P., 1983, pp. 7-8. This draws on Jacques M. Downs, 'AmericanMerchants and the China Opium Trade, 1800-1840',in BusinessHistory Review, 42 (Winter 1968). 41 YSZ 5, p. 286. 42 Ysz 2, p. 107 43 For two examples,see Nishi Junzo6YiW i, ed., GentenKindai ChulgokuShisoshi YRr @S1,*t Iwanami, 1976, 1, pp. 93-103.

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populationis enormous.If theycould have unifiedthe heartsof high and low, promotedthe righteousand brave, and cut out the nefariousand fawning, encroachmentby foreignbarbarians would neverhave taken place.44 In 1855, Shoin translatedand adapted a Chinese account of events in China-from the First Opium War throughthe early stages of the Taiping Rebellion-which he titledShinkoku KampO Ranki WMAjlb-L&.45 Its section on the Battle of Canton reads: 'Peasants in various areas worked up their power, and all the righteousand brave proceeded to San-yuan-li.[But] the commandinggeneral fled the cityin terrorand gave the English six million dollars to withdraw.'46Shoin glossed this passage: 'He did not fear the barbarianmarauders; he fearedthose [Chinese]trying to annihilatethem. He gave no money to the righteousand brave; he gave it to the barbarians. That explains their loss at Canton.'47 Thus, Shoin expressedhigh esteem for the Cantonese braves who proved theycould beat the English,and utter contemptfor Ch'ing officialswho refusedto let them. For him, weaponry was not the crucial factorin wardingoff Western invaders: The barbariansdepend on stoutships and finecannon. These are machines.To relyon machinesshows that one longs to stay alive; to be righteousand brave showsthat one knowshe is sureto die. Those who knowthey are sureto die will always triumphover those who long to stay alive.... I greatlylament that the Ch'ing could not employ[those braves]. Both Sakuma Shozan and Yoshida Shoin knew that foreigntrade was inevitableand would even benefitJapan if managed properly.As Shoin admitted: You [Harris]talk of the advantagestrade will bring,and thereis much meritin whatyou say. I once discussedthis with my teacher, Shozan. He said, 'It is a bad idea to stayin Japan; we mustventure abroad to tradewith foreigners.' I replied, 'As long as Japanis strongenough to controlthem, there is nothingwrong with stayingat home to trade,and venturingabroad would be even better.But if we act just because we fearbarbarian power, even venturingabroad to tradewould be bad, and stayingat home would be stillworse.'49 Even if foreigntrade proved unprofitable, Shoin showedno desireto uphold national isolation-which he himselftried to violate in 1853-because it precluded foreignexpansion. In 1855, he held: '. . . we should fosternational strengthand conquerManchuland, Korea, and China, whichare easy to take. Whateverwe lose to Russia throughtrade, we should make up forin Korean and Manchu territory.'50This is noteworthybecause it shows how earlier appraisals of Ch'ing-dynastymilitary power had changed;51and because it

44 Ysz, 2, p. 51. 4 The originalis titledMan-Ch'ing chi-shih4&4 and is in Eto, 17, pp. 296-324. For a studyof its authorshipand transmissionto Japan, see Masuda, pp. 280-320. 46 Ysz 2, p. 220. 47 Ysz 2, p. 220. 48 Ysz 2, p. 52. 49 Ysz 5, p. 292. 50 Ysz 8, p. 423.

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foreshadowedJapan's imperialistaggression in Asia, whichwas not possible untilsakoku was revoked. The issue was not whetherto open thecountry or keep it closed; sovereignty was the cruxof the matter,and opium was a litmustest. This is whereproto- nationalistssuch as Shozan and Shoin parted company with premodern xenophobessuch as Aizawa Seishisai,who 'reveredthe emperor' only to theex- tentthat this did not harmthe shogun. Aizawa would have the bakufu open Japanunder Western threats, taking care onlyto securewritten promises that Westernerswould refrainfrom impairing Tokugawa supremacy.He chose to ignorethe possibilitythat Westerners might violate treaty agreements, as they indeed were doing in China; and he nevermentioned the danger of opium smugglingthat would likelyaccompany such violations.52 By contrast,Shozan and Shoin insistedthat Japan, not Westernnations, should dictatethe conditionsunder which foreign trade and residenceshould take place. Theirideas came close to themodern concept of a 'sovereignstate' that had the rightto controlinternal matters like customsand immigration. As Beasley suggests,sakoku and joi in this contextshould not be construed literallyas 'national isolation' and 'the expulsionof barbarians.'53Instead, these termstook on new connotations.Thus, in 1855, Shoin criticizedWei Yuan's 'loose rein' idea of tryingto 'use some barbariansto controlothers': Wei says, 'Russia, America,and France all hate England; so we should suborn [thosethree countries] into helping us fighton land and at sea.' . . . Wei's astute visionmakes him a giantamong Chinese, but evenhe succumbsto theirmistaken ideas.... The essenceof an independentstate is to make othernations reliant on us, not to make ourselvesreliant on them.54 Or, as Nakaoka Shintaro '1'kflP,1838-1867, put it: Joi is not peculiarto our ImperialRealm; all theworld's nations practice it when necessary.America was once subject to England, but the Englishking, greedy for profit,oppressed the Americanpeople. Washingtonappealed for reduced taxes, but the king refusedto listen. Then Washingtonled the people of the ThirteenColonies to expel the English. That was sakoku and joi.55

51 But the image of China and the Chinese people-as opposed to the Ch'ing regime-as a greatworld power remained, especially after reports of theTaiping Rebellion reached Japan. As Shoin wrotein thissame documentof FourthMonth, 1855, 'If [Hung] Hsiu-chuanshould conquer theCh'ing Empireunder false pretenses, he willsubjugate Korea and Manchuland.' YSZ 8, p. 424. Or, as Kusaka Genzui , 1840-1864,declared in 1862: 'England and France cannot unleashtheir power against our ImperialRealm because the long-haired[Taiping] rebels in China are fightingso ferociously.If the long-hairssurrender, England and France are sure to attackus.' FukumotoYoshisuke VAX,, ed., Kusaka Genzui Zenshi 7 Matsuno, Tokuyama, 1978, p. 431. 52 For the case of Aizawa Seishisai,see B. T. Wakabayashi,'Rival States on a Loose Rein', in James White, Michio Umegaki, and Thomas R. H. Havens, ed., The Ambivalence of Nationalism,University Press of America, 1990, pp. 11-37. 53 Beasley,pp. 3-18. 54 Ysz 4, pp. 51-52. 55 Kunaisho, ed., Shuho Junnan-rokuKo, kohen fM*XQ, Jf, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1933, p. 427.

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Thus, sakokuand joi took on a universalvalidity. Sakoku came to mean in- dependenceor autonomyfor the nation. Joimeant to preservethat autonomy in two ways. The firstmay be seen as a continuationof 'expulsion'in theliteral sense-as Nakaoka perceivedthe Thirteen Colonies to have done. Butjoi took on a second meaning:to controlthose foreignerswho wereadmitted to Japan by forcingthem to honor the treatiesthey had signed.Aizawa was at a dead- end once expulsionin the literalsense proved impossible.Shoin emphasized joi in the second sense; but he also believedit could be achievedliterally, as 'proven' by the Cantonese braves. For Shoin, expellingmilitarily superior Westerners would not be impossible if bakufu and han leaders did what Ch'ing leaders refusedto do: win the people's heartsand mindsthrough truly benevolent government. Lecturing on Menciusin the SeventhMonth of 1855, Shoin quoted passages from'articles about Ch'ing China writtenby Westerners',which he had probablyobtained 1 fromthe periodical,Hsia-erh kuan-chen 56 These articlesdescribed the wretchedlife of China's destitutemasses. In wintermonths, 'Sick menand old womenfreeze to death. People just . . . toss theircorpses under bridgesor nextto dikes at night;yet no officialasks any questions.' Or, 'A greatmany terminally ill or physicallydisabled people beg on theroadside from passers-by.' And, 'The shrewdestof all are motherswho gouge out theeyes of theirlittle girls . . . hopingto getmore money by appeal- ing for pity.... Some castrateand sell theirlittle boys into court service, schemingto bettertheir chances in life.' The articlessummed up: 'Such evil customsarise owing to a lack of hospitals.And because poor people cannot affordto raise theirsmall children,they abandon themby the roadside since thereare no orphanages.In Peking,no less than9,000 childrenare abandoned like this each year.'57 Here was the truecause of Ch'ing militaryimpotence as Shoin understood it. By refusingto succorthe poverty-strickenmasses, Ch'ing leaders failedin theirmoral obligation to providevirtuous government. But as well,they failed to fosterpatriotism in China; and in fact,they quashed the popular patriotic sentimentspontaneously manifested at Canton. That leftthem vulnerable to Westerninvaders who gladly paid money to win over the Chinese people. Giventhis bad example,Japanese rulers should knowbetter. Shoin's proposal on nationaldefense in 1853 ran: 'Everyonerants, "Defend our coasts, defend our coasts." But no one rants,"Administer our people." ,58 Two yearslater,

56 Shoin citeshaving 'finished issue number1' of Hsia-erhkuan-chen in the TenthMonth of 1854: Ysz 11, p. 24. Hsia-erhkuan-chen, or ChineseSerial, whichnumbered thirty-three issues in all, was publishedin Chineseby Hong Kong-basedWestern missionaries under the editorship of H. D. Medhurstbetween August 1853 and May 1858. See JohnK. Fairbank& Kwang-ching Liu, ed., CambridgeHistory of China, 2, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, CambridgeU.P., 1976,pp. 169-70; and Masuda, pp. 305-06. In 1854,however, Shoin was also readingHai-kuo t'u-chihand a worktitled Igirisu Kiryaku rku-l=s, whichmay be Chinese;and so it is possible thatthe 'articles' he quotes may have been fromthese latter two sources. 57 Ysz 3, pp. 54-55. 58 Ysz 8, pp. 213-14.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WAKABAYASHI: Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty 23 he wrote:'We shouldcut expenseswasted on themilitary and use thosesavings to bestow blessingsto our people.... Even Westernbarbarians establish facilities for the poor, the sick, the orphaned, or the deaf....' 9 In another 1855 lectureon Mencius, Shoin compared Japan to the feeble stateof Wei and glossedthe followingpassage directedto itsKing Hui x, who fearedattack by powerfulenemies: 'Dispense benevolentgovernment to your people. That will make them, although armed with nothing but staves, triumphover the strongarmor and sharpweapons of Ch'in and Ch'u. Don't lack faith.'60 In thisway, Shoin defendedexpulsion in the literalsense againstthose who criticizedhim forbeing 'unrealistic'.Judged by conventionalmilitary factors, he held, Wei standingarmies were no match for Ch'in and Ch'u-just as regularbakufu and daimyo forces were now helpless against the Western powers. So in eithercase, spendingmoney on armswas futile.The onlytruly realisticway to defendJapan in the currentforeign crisis was to 'exploitthe tacticof constrictingoneself in orderto lunge forward,'and therebyachieve 'unorthodoxvictories'. 61 Bakufu and han leaders should conduct virtuous government,and therebyfoster in Japanesecommoners a love of countryand rulers;then, Shoin hoped, theywould fightlike the Cantonesebraves. In sum, he was calling for guerrillawarfare by the Japanesepeople. By 1858,this particular type of joi, informedby a visionof whatreportedly took place at San-yuan-li,developed into Shoin's idea of an 'uprisingof grassrootsheroes', which was needed because the bakufu, daimyo, and samuraicould no longerbe reliedon to defendthe country.After his death, thistype of joi inspiredthe creationof Choshua'skiheitai , or irregular militiarecruited from all strataof society.62Far frombeing just 'irregular', thesefighting units were revolutionary in thatthey ended the samuraimonop- oly on theright to bear armsand so eventuallypaved theway forconscription in the national armed forcesof Meiji Japan.

Conclusions In his classic,Sakoku: Nihon no Higeki, Watsuji Tetsurogrieved: 'Our defeat in thePacific War laid bare just how trulypathetic a race we Japaneseare.... What is it we are deficientin?' And he answered: 'The scientificspirit .... We detestrational thinking and act accordingto hidebound,biased beliefs.'63 Watsuji attributedthese putative mental defects to sakoku, whichhe believed

59 ysz 2, pp. 275-76. 60 Ysz 3, pp. 28-29. 61 Ysz 3, pp. 30-32 & 179-80. 62 In tracingthe developmentof Shoin's Somo Kukki Ron 0 Yoshida Toshizumi stressesthe influenceof Mitogaku and especiallythe role played by village schools in Mito. There,politicized peasants received military training and mobilizedthemselves in movementsto reverethe emperor and expelWesterners. See Yoshida, Koki MitogakuKenkyu7 Josetsu T7 P *f5F-, Hompo, 1986,pp. 101-07. I agree,but believethat attention should be givenas well to Shoin's appraisal of the Cantonese braves. 63 Watsuji Tetsuro ?0tPF, Sakoku: Nihon no Higeki iM H4zcD,LIJ, Chikuma, 1964,p. 1. The firstedition appeared in 1950.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 24 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 had cut Japan offfrom beneficial contact with Western culture just whenthe scientificand democraticrevolutions were about to take place in Europe and the New World.64 From such assumptions,many of us inferthat bakumatsu thinkers who ad- vocatedjoi did so to uphold sakokuin the literalsense. Hence theymust have 'detestedrational thinking' and embraced'hidebound, biased beliefs'in vary- ing degreesowing to a scant knowledgeof Westernscience and worldaffairs. Yoshida Shoin would seem to be a case in point. He wishedto pit the fleshof 'those who know theyare sure to die' againstnaked steel; and he arguedthat 'righteousand brave' peasants, 'although armed with nothingbut staves,' could triumphover the materialmight of vastlysuperior foreign invaders. Shoin's Yamato spiritof joi was later glorifiedby Japan's militarymasters, who sentinto combat navypilots incapable of landingplanes on aircraftcar- riers,65and who placed theirfaith in mass mobilizationplus 'bamboo spear' tacticsto defendemperor and homelandin a decisivelast battle.Thus, in June 1945, even women and adolescentswere placed in Japanese Righteousand Brave FightingUnits (Kokumingiyui sentotai MF

64 Some Japanese scholars,writing mainly in the prewarera, have argued that therewere also meritsto sakoku. But no one in the West examinedthe controversy,if even to rejectit as irrelevent,until Ronald P. Toby, 'Reopeningthe Question of Sakoku', in JJs3:2 (1977), pp. 323-63. He later published his detailed findingsas State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, PrincetonU.P., 1984. 65 At Leyte, 'most of our pilots were so deficientlytrained that, once theytook offfrom a carrier,they couldn't come back and land.' Yamamoto Chikao OjRA, Daihon'ei Kaigunbu t*9 -I, Asahi Sonorama Bunko, 1982, p. 180.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WAKABAYASHI: Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty 25 opium,he showedthat he was willingto let foreignersinto Japan but unwilling to make themhonor Japan's sovereignty.Although he parrotedstock Con- fucian phrases about the need for benevolentrule, he distrustedthe masses bitterly;and in 1858-1860,he urgedthat theybe ruthlesslysuppressed when theybanded together to implementjoi.66 Yoshida Shoin, by contrast,hated Russians and Americansnot so much because theywere 'barbarian' in Confucianterms, but because theysought to do harm.67He feltthat only strongand responsibleleadership would allow Japanto escape theperils of opium and war,perils that were crystal clear given Chinese accounts of recent Western actions in that land. For Shoin, joi ultimatelycame to mean two things.First, it meantcontrolling Westerners ad- mittedinto Japan by forcingthem to obey theirown treatiesthat outlawed opium imports;that is, by subjectingthem to Japaneseauthority in mattersof immigrationand customs. Second, it logicallyentailed armingcommoners in orderto expel any Westernerswho refusedto respectJapan's sovereignty if bakufu and han authoritiesproved unwillingto performthat task. But prerequisiteto all this was fosteringnational unityand a sense of patriotism by creatingthe kind of good governmentthat Japan's masses would want to die for. Perhaps it can be said that China's 'mirrorfor Yin' reflectedboth negative and positiveimages. Ch'ing governmentofficials and commanders,who abus- ed and betrayedtheir people, representedChina's 'bad' examplefor Japan. As timepassed, theseCh'ing leaderscame to resemblebakufu and daimyorulers who had to be repudiated.On the other hand, the local braves at Canton provideda 'good' lesson; theyexemplified what Yoshida Shoin hoped could be achievedin Japan.

66 See Wakabayashi, 'Rival States on a Loose Rein', pp. 28-33. 67 See his rebuttalof Yamagata Taika's LU,&tf criticismon thispoint in Ysz 3, p. 551.

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