Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty. China's Lessons for Bakumatsu Japan Author(s): Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi Source: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp. 1-25 Published by: Sophia University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2385356 . Accessed: 27/10/2013 08:12 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Sophia University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Monumenta Nipponica. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty China's Lessonsfor Bakumatsu Japan BOB TADASHI WAKABAYASHI T%HE foreigninvasions and massiveinternal rebellions that wracked Ch'ing-dynastyChina in themid-decades of thenineteenth century had seriousramifications for Japan and the Tokugawa regime.To giveone example,in June 1858 China signedthe Treatyof T'ientsinthat temporarily halted the Second Opium War.' And in the followingmonth, U.S. Consul Townsend Harris forcedthe Edo bakufu to granthim a treatythat formally permittedforeign trade and residencein Japan. By grantingHarris's treaty,bakufu leaders revokednational isolation, or sakoku , a hallowed state law then generally,although mistakenly, pre- sumed to date fromthe startof Tokugawa rule. Moreover,they flouted the emperor'swill that called forjoi 1, or 'expulsionof Westernbarbarians'. To a large extent,Consul Harris achieved his diplomaticcoup by forcefully stressingthat Japan, like China, would sufferthe evils of opium trafficking and war if Edo did not consent.2 Thus, the bakufu and its supporters pledged themselvesto kaikokurJ, or 'opening the country'-at least to the Westerners. Eventson the Asian mainlandloomed largein the mindsof late-Tokugawa thinkersand leaders, whetherpro- or anti-bakufu.They construedChina's misfortunesas a 'mirrorfor Yin'-a warningof whatto be on guard against. As theyphrased it, 'The overturnedcart left tracks' for all to see. But just how clearwere those tracks? Edo's prohibitionof foreigntravel, the key element in sakoku,remained in effectthroughout the 1850s; so Japanesenationals could THE AUTHORis an associate professorin the Departmentof History,York University.He wishes to thank Professors Watanabe Hiroshi '9U, Oyama Kyohei ALL: , Kitaoka Shin'ichi LfEL1K-, Yoshida Toshizumi f MartinCollcutt, and Joshua Fogel for their usefulcomments and for helpingto obtain source materials. 1 This is also knownas the Anglo-FrenchWar withChina, 1856-1860. 2 Masuda Wataru El,+ Seigaku Tozen to Chugoku Jijo k , Iwanami, 1979, pp. 59-65 & pp. 269-79. This work introducesnumerous primary sources related to the topic of China's impact on late Tokugawa and Meiji Japan throughthe mediumof books. JoshuaFogel has translatedportions of Masuda in Sino-JapaneseStudies, 2:2 (May 1990), pp. 20-46, and 3:1 (November1990), pp. 36-59. This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 not personallygo abroad to verifyfact fromrumor in reportsthey received about the turmoilin China. How reliablewere Chinese, as opposed to Dutch, accounts of that turmoil?How did Japaneseperceptions of China based on those Chinese accounts affectbakumatsu strategicthinking, especially the fiercedebates over kaikoku,sakoku, and joi? To myknowledge, R. H. van Gulick's 'Kakkaron: A JapaneseEcho of the Opium War' is the only English-languagestudy devoted exclusivelyto these questions,and it appeared in 1939.3Here, I tryto redressour long-standing neglectof thisimportant historical issue by focusingon KaigaiShinwa 0*r=FM, a workpublished in 1849by MinetaFuiko p iI 1817-1883,4and tracingthe impactthat it and otheraccounts based on Chinesesources had on bakumatsu thinkerssuch as Yoshida Shoin 1 1830-1859. The First Opium War, fromNovember 1839 to August 1842, drastically alteredlong-held Japanese perceptions of Japan's place in internationalpower relations.Until 1839,informed Japanese students of theworld scene had view- ed it as an arena of 'rival states'in whichChina was thegreatest power in East Asia, Westerncountries were middle-classpowers, and Japan was relatively small and weak. An earlyexample of such thinkingis foundin BokaisakuP iZ, writtenby Sato Nobuhiro {,,{Xif, 1769-1850,in 1806: The GreatCh'ing Empireis mightyand close at hand. Shouldsome crafty emperorcome to powerwith designs on us, theresulting disasters would be far worsethan [attack by] Russia. We nowshould exhaust all theself-effacing words and diplomaticgrace at our commandto allywith China and reapgreat profits throughtrade with her.5 Tokugawa thinkersemployed the classical Chinese metaphorof 'teethand lips' to describerelations between China and Japan. In 1825,the joi advocate Aizawa Seishisai E wrote: 'If the lips [Japan] crumble,the teeth [China] are naked and exposed.'6 This metaphorimplied interdependence, if not formalalliance, between the two nations.When Watanabe Kazan Z U, 1793-1841,used it in his GaikokuJijosho * , writtenon the eve of the First Opium War in 1839, he argued that Russia and Britainboth harbored designson China, and if eitherstarted a war with Japan, the other would immediatelyexploit that opportunityto attack the Ch'ing.7 But Watanabe perceivedthe Japanese lips to be far weaker than the Chinese teeth.As he 3 MonumentaSerica, 4 (1939), pp. 478-545. 4 I used the edition in Harvard-YenchingLibrary, but do not cite page numbersbecause paginationis not consecutivethroughout the work. 5 Sato Kenji tM P, ed., Sato NobuhiroBugaku-sha, jo fi At I, Iwanami, 1942, p. 322. 6 See B. T. Wakabayashi,Anti-Foreignism and WesternLearning in Early-ModernJapan, Harvard U.P., 1986, p. 199. 7 Sato Shosuke AE et al., ed., Watanabe Kazan, Takano Choei, Sakuma Shozan, Yokoi Shonan, Hashimoto Sanai 'if%FIi,1jf71*U, , MThJ4, ASPF, Nihon Shiso Taikei 55, Iwanami, 1971, p. 50. This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WAKABAYASHI: Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty 3 admitted,'One European [Russian]warship would sufficeto annihilatea large Japanese army.'8 Or, as the Mito daimyo Tokugawa Nariaki f%JIIAHRalso wrotein 1839: Say what you will, the Ch'ing Empireis a greatpower; so the [Western] barbarianswill not undertakeany attack on it lightly.Ryukyu and Korea are poor,weak little countries not worth bothering about. That means Russia most probablywill decide to invadeJapan first and thengo aboutconquering China. Thisis a fearful,hateful situation.9 Thus, informedJapanese strategistsup to 1839 tended to believe that Westernstates wished to conquer both China and Japan,but werenot strong enoughto do so at the same time.So theyfirst would attackJapan, which was easierto conquer,and thentake on themuch more formidable Ch'ing Empire. This worldview changedradically when officialand non-officialChinese and Dutch reportsof the FirstOpium War became available in Japan.'o Reactions tendedto varydepending on whichset of accounts,the Dutch or the Chinese, a thinkeraccepted as more reliable. And later, when Chinese reportsof the Taiping Rebellion enteredJapan, Japanese perceptionsonce again changed radically. Below, I introduceone influentialsource of informationabout the First Opium War derived from Chinese sources: Mineta Fuiko's Kaigai Shinwa, 1849. Its impacton bakumatsustrategic thinking warrants careful scrutiny, for the Britishvictory it describesis far less decisive than the one we modern historiansare used to telling. Mineta Fuko and His Work MinetaFuko was bornin 1817in Edo as thesecond son in a samuraifamily serv- ing the Makino $; daimyo of Tanabe domain in Tango province,now part of Kyoto prefecture.Mineta's education largelycame under two Confucian scholarswho held officialbakufu posts in Edo. One was SatO Issai -K, 1779-1852,ostensibly a Chu Hsi scholarbut withclear leaningstoward Wang Yang-ming.The otherwas Hayashi Fukusai ' 1800-1859,who headed the officialBakufu academy in Edo and was a son of the more renowned Hayashi Jussai Thv, 1768-1841. Mineta's academic training,then, was in Chu Hsi studies.He gave lectureson a stand-inbasis for his mentorand re- ceived honorariafrom various daimyo; so he musthave had solid academic credentials.Mineta also studied Chinese poetryunder the loyalistthinker, Yanagawa Seigan 9111VX, 1789-1858, and won fame as one of the 'Four Giants of the Yanagawa School'. 8 Sato, WatanabeKazan, p. 30. 9 Mito-hanShiryo Bekki, jo 71P g 94MJ=9 n, I, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1970, p. 98. 10 An analysisof the differencesbetween the officialChinese and Dutch accounts,that is, the fusetsugakiVqk $ tenderedto thebakufu by Chineseand Dutch officialsin Nagasaki, is givenin Kato Yuizo b4Xi3, KurofuneZengo no Sekai kIjAJO)tt, Iwanami, 1985, pp. 247-304. This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Sun, 27 Oct 2013 08:12:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 MonumentaNipponica, 47:1 In early1839, beforethe FirstOpium War broke out, Mineta also began to tackle Dutch studies under MitsukuriGempo Af},R 1799-1863. Mineta's tutelagewould last