History, Background, Context
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
42 History, Background, Context The history of the Qing dynasty is of course the history of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of people. The volume, density, and complexity of the information contained in this history--"history" in the sense of the totality of what really happened and why--even if it were available would be beyond the capacity of any single individual to comprehend. Thus what follows is "history" in another sense--a selective recreation of the past in written form--in this case a sketch of basic facts about major episodes and events drawn from secondary sources which hopefully will provide a little historical background and allow the reader to place Pi Xirui and Jingxue lishi within a historical context. While the history of the Qing dynasty proper begins in 1644, history is continuous. The Jurchen (who would later call themselves Manchus), a northeastern tribal people, had fought together with the Chinese against the Japanese in the 1590s when the Japanese invaded Korea. However in 1609, after a decade of increasing military strength, their position towards the Chinese changed, becoming one of antagonism. Nurhaci1 努爾哈赤 (1559-1626), a leader who had united the Jurchen tribes, proclaimed himself to be their chieftain or Khan in 1616 and also proclaimed the 1See: ECCP, p.594-9, for his biography. 43 founding of a new dynasty, the Jin 金 (also Hou Jin 後金 or Later Jin), signifying that it was a continuation of the earlier Jurchen dynasty which ruled from 1115-1234. In 1618, Nurhaci led an army of 10,000 with the intent of invading China. He seized control of Fushun 撫順 along with other cities in his advance to the Chinese border. His army was victorious over Chinese troops in several head to head battles, with many prisoners taken. In 1619, Emperor Shenzong 神宗 (reg.1573- 1620) sent the general Yang Hao 楊鎬 (ob. 1629) and a large force to engage Nurhaci and his army, but Yang's forces were decisively defeated. In May 1621, Nurhaci captured Shenyang 瀋陽 and Liaoyang 遼陽, and in 1625, changed the name of the former to Mukden and established it as the capital. In early 1626 he attacked Ningyuan 寧原, but this time was defeated by forces under the Chinese general Yuan Chonghuan2 袁崇煥 (1584-1630). He was wounded in the fighting, although not seriously. However, he died on September 30 of the same year. There is no documented evidence that Nurhaci named a specific successor. It has been suggested that he hoped that a group of eight princes, each in charge of one of the primary military units or "banners," would equally share power, while naming one of their own to serve as Khan. 2See: ECCP, p.954-5, for his biography. 44 Nurhaci's second son, Daisan 代善 (1583-1648), and two of Daisan's sons decided to name Abahai3 阿巴亥 (1592-1642; officially known as Huang taiji 皇太極), who was Nurhaci's eighth son, to the position of Kahn. It does not appear that Abahai ever intended to equally share power, and by the early 1630s he had gradually consolidated personal control of power and authority, his successes in the realm of government owing to his outstanding ability as a leader of the military. In 1635, Abahai forbid the use of the names Jurchen and Jianzhou 建州 and issued a decree that the name Manchu (Manzhou 滿洲) should be used instead. On May 14, 1636, he changed the name of the dynasty to Qing 清, and proclaimed himself emperor.4 Over the next several years, the Manchus under his leadership gained control of the entire Amur region, subjugated Korea, and carried out successive invasions of northern China. To a certain degree, successes during his reign were owing to the Chinese who surrendered to him, and who later came to surround the leader and serve the government in the capacity of advisors and administrators. It has been said that the Manchu leadership organized their state on the structure of the Chinese model.5 3See: ECCP, p.1-3, for his biography. 4See: ECCP, p.2. 5See: Cambridge History of China (CHC), V.7, p.558. 45 In September 1643, Abahai died and was succeeded by Fulin6 福臨 (1638-1661), who was his ninth son. As he was only six sui at the time, Jirgalang7 濟爾哈郎 (1599-1655) and Dorgon8 多爾袞 (1612-1650) served as regents. Later, Jirgalang was lowered in rank and eventually discharged as regent while Dorgon was elevated to the position of Imperial Father Regent (皇父攝政王), which reflected the power he commanded. From the 1590s through the 1640s events occurred in China which set the stage for the Manchu takeover. To paraphrase William Atwell's astute comments, to have the simplistic view that the last years of Ming were just another version of the final phase of another Chinese dynastic cycle would be to ignore the important, unique, and specific features of this period of Chinese history.9Nevertheless, this was a period that can accurately be described in general terms as one of deterioration. While the Wanli 萬曆 emperor (reg. 1573-1620) was a minor, the country was effectively governed by Zhang Juzheng10 張居正 (1525-1582), but when he died in 1582 control was regained by the eunuchs. Although 6See: ECCP, p.255-9, for his biography. 7See: ECCP, p.397-8, for his biography. 8See: ECCP, p.215-9, for his biography. 9See: CHC, V.7, p.585. 10See: Dictionary of Ming Biography, V.1, p.53-61. 46 Zhang had been able to keep the emperor's spending habits under control, no one stepped in to fill this role and the state's finances quickly fell into decline. In addition to the court's undisciplined expenditures, military actions such as the war in Korea took their toll on the empire's financial reserves. The support paid in the form of allowances to family members was excessive, and the taxes levied on commerce and the peasants were extremely burdensome. Political problems existed as well. Jacques Gernet summarizes the years 1615-1627 as "marked by the serious conflict between a group of upright civil servants and loyalist intellectuals on the one hand and the insolent power of the eunuchs on the other, a power based on their familiarity with the emperor, on complicities gained inside and outside the palace, and on the passivity of an administration rendered docile by corruption and fear."11The nexus around which the officials and intellectuals centered themselves were Confucian moral and political ideals. In addition, they were associated with the Donglin Academy 東林書 院 in Wuxi 無錫, Jiangsu, which originally had been established in the twelfth century.12 It was reestablished in 1604 and after its revival, 11See: Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.432. 12On the Donglin 東林, see: Heinrich Busch, "The Tung-lin Academy and Its 47 although there was the hope of its partisans regaining power at the court, it also became a place for local study and lecture groups to meet.13 While members of the Donglin Academy were part of the "movement," anyone with shared ideals could be considered affiliated. In essence, the officials and other intellectuals aligned with the Donglin stood in opposition to the corrupt practices at the court and many paid dearly for it. During this period, the person history has deemed most responsible for problems at the court is the eunuch Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢 (1568-1627).14 The center of corruption and abuse, he used whatever means were at his disposal to nullify those who opposed him. It was only after the death of the Tianqi 天啟 emperor (reg. 1621-1627) in September of 1627 and the subsequent installation of his successor, the Chongzhen 崇禎 emperor (reg. 1628-1643) in early October, that Wei Zhongxian's world began to unravel. Numerous memorials were submitted criticizing Wei and his supporters. He was ordered to assume a minor post in Bei Zhili 北直隸. Once there, he learned that he was going to be arrested and interrogated about various crimes named in the memorials and as a result, committed suicide in early Political and Philosophical Significance," MS, 16.1, p.1-163. 13Pi Xirui mentions the Donglin group or "party" in his first Nan xuehui lecture. 14See: ECCP, p.846-7, for his biography. 48 December. Members of Wei's group were purged from the government and members of the Donglin group were appointed to important positions. Yet the hope for a government without factional conflicts was not to be realized, as while one set of problems disappeared, another set, albeit not as severe, arose to take their place. Economic hardships and resulting discontent led to rebellion in the northwest during the years 1628-31. There was rebellion in the northeast as well, with Ming military leaders Kong Youde15 孔有德 (ob. 1652) and Geng Zhongming16耿仲明 (ob. 1649) eventually defecting to the Manchus. During the years 1632-36 there was drought, famine, and rebellion in northern and central China.17 Overall, Ming forces were able to defeat the rebels or contain their activities, but they were not able to completely suppress or defeat them. 1634 through 1638 was a period of economic stagnation and social instability in the southeast.18 The gulf between the wealthy and those lacking adequate resources was exacerbated by tax increases which were driven in part by rising military expenditures. Corruption on the local level added to the tension. In the capital the situation was unstable, with some 15See: ECCP, p.435-6, for his biography. 16See: ECCP, p.416-7, for his biography.