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India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation (1999-2009) : a Report PANNEERSELVAM, Prakash Guest Researcher “A Strong India Is I

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India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation (1999-2009) : a Report PANNEERSELVAM, Prakash Guest Researcher “A Strong India Is I JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation (1999-2009) : A Report PANNEERSELVAM, Prakash Guest Researcher “A Strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” Former Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe Speech at the Indian parliament, 22 August 2007 Introduction India-Japan interactions have been marked by goodwill and singularly free from any structural impediments. However, the bilateral relationship between the two started to take centre stage only after the end of Cold War. However, both countries refrained from discussing defence and security matters, until Prime Minister Mori visit to India in 2000. The brief talk between two Prime Ministers in New Delhi removed many deadlocks in the bilateral relationship. Since then, India-Japan relationship maintained steady course and attained the stature of “Strategic Partnership” in 2005. The remarkable change in Indo-Japan relationship in the post-Cold War dramatically changed the security perspective of Asia-pacific region. Notably, maritime security cooperation between the two countries captured global attention. At the same time, the growing interaction between two naval forces in the recent years raised some serious questions about the intention and objectives of India-Japan maritime security cooperation. A preliminary literature survey on this topic reveals that, not too many research works has been done on this subject. Most of literature on India-Japan relationship largely focuses on complicated relationship that existed between two countries during post-world war era or bilateral relationship in Post-Cold War. This policy analysis is important because it focuses exclusively on India-Japan maritime security cooperation to identify the key factor to strengthen the strategic cooperation. In the pragmatic international system, it is crucially important to 67 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) analysis and identifies weakness and strength in the strategic cooperation. This paper will critically analyse India-Japan maritime security cooperation. Since, after Alondra Rainbow incident in 1999, both India-Japan seriously pushed cooperation in maritime field. Therefore, this research will focus on the time period of 1999-2009. Brief History India-Japan relationship is deeply rooted in historical and cultural interaction. Osamu Kondo says, Japanese thought that the world consisted of three countries, namely Japan, China and India.1 As a neighboring country, Japanese were well aware of Chinese tradition and culture, as Buddhism become popular among Japanese, India came to be known as the country of Buddha. Many Japanese Buddhist monks tried to visit India, after many attempts few succeeded to reach India. Konga Zammai is one of the monks entered mainland of India in 818. From India sub-continent, a Buddhist priest called Bodhisen third son of Tamil Pallavan King travelled to Japan from China in 735. But, sea-route is not explored until 1548 when three Japanese Christians visited Goa, first Japanese to travel across Indian Ocean to reach India.2 Apart from those rare incidents, India remained almost inaccessible to Japanese. Further, a national seclusion order in 1635 and 1639 severely restricted all foreign ships to enter Japan and prohibits Japanese to visit abroad. The self-imposed isolation policy severely restrained Japanese interaction with the international community. Despite the restriction, British East India Company sent their ships Return to Japan in 1674 to reopen direct trade, but the ship was not allowed to enter Japan and sent back to India.3 Otherwise, British East Indian Company had great desire for Japan could have established deep economic relationship. Japan isolation policy came to an end in 1854 after Commodore Perry order to open the Japanese port to the US merchant ships. Japanese never 1 Osamu Kondo, Japan and the Indian Ocean at the Times of the Mughal Empire, with Special reference to Gujarat, Satish Chandran (ed.). The Indian Ocean: Exploration in History, Commerce and Politics (New Delhi 1987) 2 Ibid 3 Edward Maunde Thompson(eds), Diary of Richard Cooks: cape merchant in the English factory in Japan, 1615-1622, with correspondence, (New York: 1964) 68 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) seen steam boat realized the importance of industrialization to match itself with foreign power. The spur in thinking rapidly changed Japan into modern industrial nation in the late 19th century. Indians under the British colonial rule saw Japan as a role model for development. Many Indian eminent scholars visited Japan during this period to study the transformation in the society. Then, Japan military victory over Russia, thrilled Indian freedom struggle movement in the Sub-continent. In many ways, historical and cultural events influenced each other principles and ideas in different ways. But, in political terms the relationship failed to gain momentum because of Japan policy in Cold War is largely governed by two factors, the legacies of the Second World War and the compulsion of the Cold War.4 During World War II, Japanese Imperial Army’s aggression over East Asia and Southeast Asian strained Japanese image abroad. As the result, Japan’s Post-World War external policies are largely governed to make over Japan’s image in Asia. Interestingly, India did not claim war reparations from Japan. At the same time, Indian Justice Radha Bindo Pal’s dissentient judgment in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East caught Japanese attention on Judge Pal and on India. In 1952, Japan regained sovereignty and India signed peace treaty with Japan in the same year. Before the bilateral relationship reaches its potential, Cold War politics strained the relationship. Japan skeptical about India’s non-alignment policy limits Tokyo ties with New Delhi to trade and development assistance. The relationships seemingly become active only after the end of Cold War. The importances of non-military threats and issues like terrorism, piracy, proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) have assumed new importance.5 The change in the security environment in the post-cold war and the emergence of non-traditional security threat subsequently changed the dynamics of security relations between the two nations. India-Japan has also realized the importance to rejuvenate the diplomatic ties to sustain peace and security of Asia. The bilateral relationship stagnated during Cold War assumed new position in the post-Cold War. As a maritime nation, two countries understood the importance of 4 K.V Kesavan, India and Japan Changing Dimension of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period, ORF Occasional Paper#14 (New Delhi: 2010) 5 Ibid 69 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) security of Sea-lane have also shown great willingness to work hand-in-hand to combat non-traditional security threats to safeguard safety and security of maritime space. Building Maritime Security Cooperation: Glimpse on Joint Statements Any study on India-Japan maritime security cooperation could thus be incomplete without analyzing the Joint Statements. The Joint Statements, the visit of high dignitaries from both the sides signifies the importance of the bilateral relationship in the new millennium. Therefore, the study made an attempt to explain in detail about the various Joint Statements issued between 1999-2009, to understand the nature of bilateral relationship and the importance of maritime security cooperation. Prime Minister Mori landmark visit to India in August 2000, signifies both Japan and India resolve to take their bilateral relations to a qualitatively new level. During the discussion Prime Minister Mori and Indian counter part Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed to establish the “Global Partnership in the 21st century.”6 Prime Minister Mori visit to India reflects a major strategic change in Japanese regional diplomacy. Nevertheless, Mori was the first Prime Minister from Japan to institutionalize high level dialogue, comprehensive security dialogue, cooperation in anti-piracy operation and security dialogue between Japan and India. During this period, Indian Defence minister travelled to Japan and hold discussion on exchange of ship visit and bilateral security dialogue with Foreign Minister Yohei Kono and Japanese Defence Agency Director General, T. Kawara.7 By July, both Japan and India started first session on Comprehensive Security Dialogue and military-to-military talk to discuss ways and means to further enhance bilateral defence cooperation. As the bilateral relation compounds into new form, Japan government on 26 October 2001 announces to discontinue the measure on India, which the Japanese government had taken in response to the nuclear tests conducted by Indian in 6 C. Raja Mohan, India, Japan unveil new global partnership, The Hindu, 24 August 2000, http://www.hindu.com/2000/08/24/stories/01240001.htm 7 Minister of External Affair India, Annual Report 2000-2001. 70 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) May 1998.8 Followed by Yoshiro Mori former prime minister three day visit to India as a special envoy of Japanese premier Junichiro Koizumi to discuss about “Japan-India global partnership” and regional issues like Afghanistan, terrorism, which helped to uplift bilateral relationship, strained by 1998 pokharan nuclear test. Commenting on the new development in the bilateral relationship,
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