LEARNING HOW TO SWEAT: EXPLAINING THE DISPATCH OF ’S SELF- DEFENSE FORCES IN THE GULF WAR AND IRAQ WAR

By Jeffrey Wayne Hornung

A Dissertation Submitted To

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences Of the George Washington University In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2009

Dissertation directed by

Mike Mochizuki Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Jeffrey Wayne Hornung has passed the Final Examination for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy as of July 13, 2009. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

LEARNING HOW TO SWEAT: EXPLAINING THE DISPATCH OF JAPAN’S SELF- DEFENSE FORCES IN THE GULF WAR AND IRAQ WAR

Jeffrey Wayne Hornung

Dissertation Research Committee:

Mike Mochizuki , Associate Professor of Political Science and International

Affairs

Dissertation Director

James Goldgeier , Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

Committee Member

Deborah Avant , Professor of Political Science, University of California-Irvine

Committee Member

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© Copyright 2009 by Jeffrey Wayne Hornung All rights reserved

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To Maki

Without your tireless support and understanding, this project would not have happened.

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Acknowledgements

This work is the product of four years of research, writing and revisions. Its completion would not have been possible without the intellectual and emotional support of many individuals. There are several groups of people in particular that I would like to mention. First and foremost are two individuals who have had the greatest impact on my intellect regarding Japan: Nat Thayer and Mike Mochizuki. It is rare to have the opportunity to study under an individual who is considered a giant in his/her respective field of expertise. It is virtually unheard of to be fortunate enough to study under two. My knowledge of Japan and my research has benefited from their mentoring and sharp intellect. I am particularly indebted to Mike who, as my committee Chair, read over so many drafts that pages can be counted in thousands. He pushed me harder than I sometimes wanted to be, and my dissertation is stronger for it.

My gratitude goes out as well to committee members Jim Goldgeier and Debbi

Avant, and reviewers Mike Green and Andy Bennett. Jim’s help on operationalizing schema theory and beliefs will always be appreciated. And I am grateful for Debbie’s decision to stay on my committee despite leaving GWU for University of California-

Irvine.

My research in Japan was facilitated by a number of individuals who went above and beyond anything they needed to do out of a shared commitment to U.S.-Japan relations. This includes and Takashi Kawakami of Takushoku

University, Representative Akihisa Nagashima of the Democratic Party of Japan,

Governor of Iwate Takuya Tasso, Noriyuki Shikata and Osamu Izawa of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Rear Admiral Umio Otsuka of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces,

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Satoshi Maeda and Sugio Takashi of the Ministry of Defense, of the

Liberal Democratic Party, Tsuyoshi Sunohara of Nihon Keizai Shimbun, and David

Satterwhite of the Fulbright Commission Japan. I would also like to thank Atsushi Ishida for supervising my stay at University as a visiting scholar, of

Tokyo University for giving me key research advice, Jinko Brinkman at the Japan-U.S.

Educational Commission for constantly making sure things were going well in both my research and personal life, Geri Rypkema of George Washington University for helping with the grant application process, and Ikuko Turner of George Washington University just for being a Superwoman.

I received generous assistance in obtaining information about my two cases from a large number of individuals throughout the Japanese government and political parties.

While most of these individual are listed in my appendices, many are not either because they requested anonymity or because I did not interview them but they helped me obtain unpublished materials. I offer my collective thanks to them. Additionally, the staff at the

National Diet Library and the Japan Newspaper Museum in Yokohama was always helpful and quick to assist me with my research. Although I never learned their names, our light conversations and their gracious hello’s helped make the weeks researching my cases from morning until night easy to bear.

This research would not have been possible without generous grants from the

Fulbright Foundation, the Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Program, George

Washington University, and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington

University. I would also like to thank Tokyo University for its institutional support during my research and Nanzan University in , Japan for inviting me to attend the July

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2008 NASSS Graduate Students Seminar but allowing me to conduct research in Tokyo prior to attending.

Most important, I would like to thank my friends and family for all the little things that only friends and family can do. This includes my two best friends Jimmy

Mathia and Chad Schomburg who shared in my research and supported me both emotionally and intellectually. Also, Logan Sturm and Gary Noguchi who began our study of Japan together at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and later gave me places to stay in Tokyo when I needed them. To my mother Maureen, father William and step-mother Ginger, as well as brothers Jamie and Jon, thank you for all the understanding and support for what must have seemed like a project that never was going to end. You can rest assured, after

34 years, I am finally going to get a job. Likewise, to my in-laws Akio and Nobuko

Katayama, thank you for your support and understanding during this process.

My special thanks to Maki, my wife and best friend, for her patience, support, understanding, and love. You supported me when I was frustrated, cheered me up when I was down, constantly gave me pointers on how to improve my Japanese for interviews, took notes on books and articles that I did not have the time to read, listened to over 50 hours of Japanese interviews to check my English translations, and married me during this process. This project is yours as much as it is mine.

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Abstract

Learning How to Sweat: Explaining the Dispatch of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in the Gulf War and Iraq War

Until the Gulf War, no Japanese politician could seriously hope to dispatch the

Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas. It was off-limits. But contrary to what is commonly believed, Japanese decision-makers did not feel comfortable providing only money while the economy grew. Knowing they could not ‘bleed’ like other states, a number of decision-makers wanted badly to ‘sweat,’ meaning provide human contributions in some capacity. But ‘sweating’ proved problematic because there was no consensus as to what

‘sweating’ entailed. When the Gulf War occurred, the first serious attempts were made to dispatch the SDF as ‘sweat,’ but the Kaifu Administration encountered innumerable problems in these efforts. Unable to dispatch, the government instead provided over $13 billion and only after the war had finished sent naval minesweepers to the Gulf. Twelve years later, during the Iraq War, the Koizumi Administration had little problem dispatching all three SDF branches to Iraq on a reconstruction mission. My research question is this: Why was Japan unable to dispatch the SDF in the first Gulf War while it successfully did so in the second?

Drawing on theories and concepts from the foreign policy literature and political psychology, I argue the answer is to be found in the nature of the opposition parties and the beliefs of decision-makers. Specifically, changes in the nature of the main opposition party from an ideological party to a pragmatic party widened the parameters of viable policy options while a convergence on shared beliefs prioritizing the importance of

Japan’s international obligations amongst bureaucrats and lawmakers led to consideration

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of policies that included SDF dispatch. To explain the cognitive shift, I point to the clear feedback from international society criticizing Japan’s efforts to the Gulf War in what became known as the Gulf War Trauma.

The research is a comparative analysis of the policy-making process during the

1990-91 Gulf Crisis and War and the 2003 Iraq War. Utilizing data collected from 102 interviews with Japanese bureaucrats and lawmakers active in the decision-making process in both periods, parliamentary records, materials obtained from ministries and political parties, and other primary and secondary sources, I conduct contextual analysis of the policy processes to analyze the beliefs behind policy preferences, why policy preferences succeeded or failed during the process, and how effective opposition parties were in vetoing policies from the government agenda.

Although this dissertation demonstrates that a consensus has been reached amongst Japanese decision-makers on the importance of making visible international contributions as a way for Japan to fulfill its international obligations, it calls into question recent scholarship that Japan is ‘normalizing,’ creating a new grand foreign policy strategy, or crossing the Rubicon in the use of its military. In addition, it illustrates how opposition parties, despite numerically inferior to parties holding government, can exercise veto power over policies when their message resonates among government decision-makers and the public. Also, it questions the argument that states cannot control their reputation. Finally, the research confirms that unexpected failures impart lessons, affecting cognitive structures of decision-makers through their inherent trauma. However, the lessons learned do not translate into quick policy changes because the public

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constrains rapid change due to the fact that it learns lessons at a slower pace than those who experienced the trauma first-hand.

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Table of Contents

Dedication……………………………………………………………….….. iv

Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………… v

Abstract……………………………………………………………………… viii

Table of Contents……………………………………………………………. xi

List of Figures……………………………………………………………… .. xii

List of Tables………………………………………………………………… xiii

List of Acronyms…………………………………………………………….. xiv

Chapter 1: Introduction..…………………………………………………….. 1

Chapter 2: Why Foreign Policies Change…………………………………… 41

Chapter 3: Changes in Japan: The Nature of the Opposition Parties and Decision-Makers’ Beliefs……………………………………………………. 80

Chapter 4: The Gulf War…………………………………………………….. 131

Chapter 5: The Iraq War…………………………………………………… ... 201

Chapter 6: Conclusion ……………………………………………………….. 266

Bibliography………………………………………………………………….. 310

Appendices…………………………………………………………………… 335

Appendix 1: Methodology and Materials Used …………………….... 336 Appendix 2: Administrative Reforms Prior to 1990………………….. 344 Appendix 3: Administrative Reforms After 1990 and Prior to 2001…. 348 Appendix 4: Electoral Reforms of 1994……………………………… 354 Appendix 5: Important U.S.-Japan Alliance Agreements…………..… 357 Appendix 6: Aggregate Defense Expenditures (1953-2007)…………. 361 Appendix 7: Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (1953-2007)……………………………………………... 361 Appendix 8: SDF Personnel (1971-2008)…………………………….. 361 Appendix 9: PMO Poll Data on Public Opinion Concerning SDF Participation in PKOs…………………………………... 362 Appendix 10: PMO Poll Data on Public Opinion Concerning Japan’s Role in the World……………………………………. 362

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List of Figures

Figure 3.1: Lower House Composition, 1958-1993………………………….. 85

Figure 3.2: Upper House Composition, 1956-1995………………………….. 86

Figure 3.3: Lower House Composition, 1996-Present……………………….. 95

Figure 3.4: Upper House Composition, 1998-Present………………………... 95

Figure 6.1: America’s Trust in Japan…………………………………………. 287

Figure 6.2: Views About SDF Participation in PKOs………………………… 301

Figure 6.3: Japan’s Role in International Society……………………………… 302

Figure 6.4: Future Responsibility of SDF……………………………………… 307

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List of Tables

Table 1.1: Self-Imposed Constraints on Japanese SDF………………………… 4

Table 3.1: Percentage of Seats Won by Both JSP and LDP in Lower House, 1958-2005……………………………………. 86

Table 3.2: Percentage of Seats Won by Both JSP and LDP in Upper House, 1956-2007…………………………………….. 86

Table 3.3: Percentage of Seats Won by Both DPJ and LDP in Lower House, 1996-Present………………………………….. 95

Table 3.4: Percentage of Seats Won by Both DPJ and LDP in Upper House, 1998-Present………………………………….. 96

Table 3.5: Lower House Seats for SDPJ/SDP, 1996-Present…………………... 103

Table 3.6: Upper House Seats for SDPJ/SDP, 1996-Present…………………... 103

Table 3.7: Support-Opposition to SDF Dispatch………………………………. 111

Table 3.8: Support-Opposition to SDF Dispatch to Iraq……………………….. 112

Table 3.9: Main Reason for Support-Opposition of SDF Dispatch to Iraq…….. 113

Table 3.10: Should Japan Be Involved in Iraqi Reconstruction?...... 113

Table 4.1: Flights Chartered by Private Japanese Entities……………………… 184

Table 5.1: Support Measures……………………………………………………. 227

Table 5.2: Support-Opposition to US Attack on Iraq…………………………… 230

Table 5.3: Support-Opposition of Japan Cooperation/Support of US Attack on Iraq……………………………………………….. 231

Table 5.4: Support-Opposition to SDF Dispatch to Iraq………………………… 245

Table 5.5: Main Reason for Support-Opposition of SDF Dispatch to Iraq……… 245

Table 5.6: Should Japan Be Involved in Iraq Reconstruction?...... 246

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List of Acronyms

ANA………………..……………All Nippon Airlines

ASDF……………………………Air Self-Defense Force

CCS……………………..……….

CLB……………………………...Cabinet Legislative Bureau

DCCS-Adm……………………...Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administrative

Affairs

DCCS-Parl……………………….Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries for Parliamentary

Affairs

DG……………………….………Director General (of Bureaus)

DPJ………………………………Democratic Party of Japan

DSP……..……………………….Democratic Socialist Party

GSDF…………...……………….Ground Self-Defense Force

IOM…………...…………………International Organization of Migration

JAL………………………………

JCP….…………………………...Japan Communist Party

JDA………..…………………….Japan Defense Agency

JNP………………………………

JRP…….………………………...Japan Renewal Party

JSP………………………………

LDP………...…………………...Liberal Democratic Party

LP……………………………….Liberal Party

METI…………………………...Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

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MEXT………………………….Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and

Technology

MG……..……………………….Maritime Guard

MHW……………….………….Ministry of Health and Welfare

MITI……………………………Ministry of International Trade and Industry

MOD…………………………...Ministry of Defense

MOE……………………………Ministry of Education

MOF……………………………Ministry of Finance

MOFA……………..…………...Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOT……………………………Ministry of Transportation

MP………….…………………..Member of Parliament

MSDF….……………………….Maritime Self-Defense Forces

NDPO…………………………..National Defense Program Outline

NFP……………………………..New Frontier Party

NLC…………………………….

NCA…………………………….Nippon Cargo Airlines

NPR……………………………..National Police Reserve

NSF……………………………..National Safety Force

PARC…………………………...Policy Affairs Research Council

PKO……………………………..Peacekeeping Operation

PM………………………………Prime Minister

PMO…………………………….Prime Minister’s Office

PR……...………………………..Proportional Representation

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SDF……………………………..Self-Defense Forces

SDP……………………………..Social Democratic Party

SDPJ…………………………….Social Democratic Party of Japan

SMD…………………………….Single Member Districts

UNHCR…………………………Office of the High Commissioner for

Refugees

WFP……………………………..World Food Program

WMD……………………………Weapons of Mass Destruction

NOTE : Japanese names are presented in Western style—family names last. Also, although the Japan Socialist Party changed its English name to the Social Democratic

Party of Japan in 1991 and both its English and Japanese name to the Social Democratic

Party in 1996, for the sake of simplicity I refer to the party throughout as the Japan

Socialist Party, unless otherwise noted.

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I. Introduction

Graham Allison, in his study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, observed that “when we are puzzled by a happening in foreign affairs, the source of our puzzlement is a particular outcome .” 1 My research begins with this insight. Until the Gulf War, no Japanese politician could seriously hope to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas. It was off-limits. But contrary to what is commonly believed, Japanese decision-makers did not feel comfortable providing only money while the economy grew. Knowing they could not ‘bleed’ like other militaries, a number of decision-makers wanted badly to

‘sweat,’ meaning providing human contributions in some capacity. But ‘sweating’ proved problematic because there was no consensus as to what ‘sweating’ entailed. Did it mean military or non-military contributions? When the Gulf War occurred, the first serious attempts were made to dispatch the SDF as ‘sweat.’ As expected, the Kaifu

Administration encountered innumerable problems. Unable to do so, the government instead provided over $13 billion to the Gulf efforts. Only after the war had finished and the possibility of being ensnared in conflict had disappeared did Japan dispatch naval minesweepers to the Gulf. Twelve years later, during the Iraq War, the Koizumi

Administration ‘sweat’ easily, dispatching all three SDF branches to Iraq on a postwar reconstruction mission amidst an ongoing insurgency. My research question is this: Why was Japan unable to dispatch the SDF in the first Gulf War while it successfully did so in the second? In other words, how did the Japanese learn to ‘sweat?’

I argue that the change in the use of the SDF is not explained by a number of prevailing theories in both IR and comparative politics: Neorealism, Constructivism, and

1 Allison, 1971, 2. 1

theories of leadership. Drawing on theories and concepts from the foreign policy literature and political psychology, I argue the focus needs to be on the nature of the opposition parties and the beliefs of decision-makers. Specifically, changes in the nature of the main opposition party affected the parameters of viable policy options and changes in the beliefs of decision-makers concerning SDF dispatch affected what policy options were considered and chosen. The change in Japan’s use of its SDF is the result of changes in these two variables.

Historical Background Although it may be increasingly forgotten today, until the end of the Cold War it was impossible for Japan to send its military overseas. Initially, this was simply because

Japan did not have a military. Japan’s postwar constitution, promulgated on November 3,

1946 (effective May 3, 1947), contained Article 9, stating “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” 2 And yet, under the terms of the

September 8, 1951 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed with the US, Japan committed itself to assume some degree of responsibility for its own defense. In preparation for this, on August 10, 1950, a para-military was established under pressure from General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers occupying

Japan. 3 Called the National Police Reserve (NPR; 警察予備隊), former colonels and soldiers from the defunct Imperial Army were reactivated to help establish the 75,000 member unit. Although its creation caused controversy because it was seen as violating

Article 9, Prime Minister (PM) interpreted the Article as not prohibiting self-defense, for which the NPR was responsible. On April 26, 1952, the Maritime Guard

2 Japanese Constitution, Article 9 3 For a good history of this process of rearmament, see Maki, 1955. 2

(MG) was established within the newly created Japan Coast Guard. 4 Less than six

months later, a National Safety Force (NSF) that included both the NPR and the MG was

inaugurated on October 15, 1952. This culminated with the establishment of the three

branches of today’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) on July 1, 1954: Ground Self-Defense

Forces (GSDF), Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) and the Maritime Self-Defense Forces

(MSDF). 5 Although not legally defined as such, Japan technically had a military once

again.

And yet, the SDF could not be dispatched overseas in any capacity beyond

training missions or operational support for icebreakers on scientific expeditions to the

South Pole. 6 Over the following years, when proposals arose that suggested revisions of

Japan’s defense strategies or policies that had implications for SDF usage, budgets or equipment procurement, significant problems ensued. For example, Revision of the

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960 7 led to massive protests by students, unions, and opposition parties against the government and eventually the resignation of

PM . In 1976, after the passage of the National Defense Program Outline

(NDPO), rising criticism from opposition parties influenced PM to set a ceiling for defense expenditures at no more than 1% of GDP. And yet, throughout the entire postwar period, despite increasing defense budgets, the SDF was not able to be sent

4 The Japan Coast Guard was established with the promulgation of the Japan Coast Guard Law on April 27, 1948. 5 Toward this end, on June 9, 1954, the government promulgated the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law. On the same day the SDF was established, so too was the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), which upgraded National Safety Agency (NSA; 保安庁) that was created on July 31, 1952 under the National Safety Agency Law. The NPR became the GSDF, the MG became the MSDF, and the ASDF were newly created. 6 Under Article 100.4 of the SDF Law, Japan began training missions in 1965 with the Seventh Antarctic expedition. Defense of Japan 2007 , 430. 7 Signed on January 19, 1960, passed by the House of Representatives on May 20, 1960, passed by default on June 19, 1960 when House of Councillors failed to vote on it within the Constitutionally required thirty- days after the House of Representatives passage) 3

on missions outside of Japanese territory. On the contrary, administrations have continuously set constraints on both the SDF and its security-related policies (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: Self-Imposed Constraints on Japanese SDF Article 9 renounces war as a sovereign right. Because it has been interpreted to allow forces for Government interpretation of Article 9 self-defense, SDF are limited to a strict self-defense activity known as defensive defense ( 専守防衛) Japan, as a sovereign state, has the right to Ban on participating in collective self-defense collective self-defense under Chapter 7 of Article 51 of the UN Charter, but it cannot exercise that right. Illegal to conduct activities that in any way integrate Non-integration with the use of force doctrine with activities that engage in the use of force Introduced initially as a ban on exporting arms to Communist countries, countries involved in a conflict, and countries that the UN prohibits arms exports to. In 1976, the ban was expanded to cover Prohibition on arms exports (1967) all countries and included a ban on technological agreements on weapons development. The ban was partly lifted in 1983 to permit technological cooperation with the US Japan would not produce, possess or introduce 3 Non-Nuclear Principles (1967) nuclear weapons into Japan 8 Not a law, but a general policy. Governments will 1% GDP ceiling on defense pending (1976) not spend more than 1% of its GDP on defense expenditures. This has been broken, but not often. 1) Agreement on cease fire reached among parties to the conflict; 2) The parties to the conflict have given their consent to deployment of PKO and Japan’s participation; 3) Peacekeeping force maintains impartiality in the conflict; 4) Should any PKO Law’s of these conditions cease to be, Japan can withdraw 5 Rules of Participation in UN PKOs (1992) SDF; and 5) Use of weapons limited strictly to minimum necessary to protect lives of personnel. Limits number of personnel dispatched to 2000, requires Diet approval before any mission, some missions like supervising the collection and disposal of weapons have been suspended.

Other than the frozen waters of the Antarctic on scientific missions, sending the SDF overseas in any capacity was simply off-limits. The same year that the SDF was established, the House of Councilors even passed a resolution prohibiting the dispatch of

8 While the first two principles were strengthened by Japan signing the NPT in 1976, the third principle is widely believed to have been broken by US naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons making port call in Japan. 4

SDF overseas. 9 From the SDF’s establishment “until the Persian Gulf War broke out in

August, 1990, no postwar Japanese politician had ever proposed sending Japan’s [SDF]

overseas.” 10

The reason for the reticence in sending the SDF overseas had much to do with the

experience of defeat in war. But it was not the memory of defeat that kept politicians in

the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from dispatching SDF overseas because there

was no general consensus on what defeat meant for such policies in the Cold War

environment. While some LDP lawmakers supported the idea of dispatch, they were

greatly outnumbered by a large number of LDP and Japan Socialist Party (JSP)

lawmakers holding memories of pre-World War II (WWII) Japan and the suspicions and

fear of what a post-WWII Japan would do with a military. This fear was not just shared

by the greater Japanese public, but Koreans and Chinese as well. Any changes in SDF

usage or policies relating to the military were interpreted as an ominous sign that Japan

was remilitarizing. In other words, one hole in the pacifist dike was feared to give way to

a flood of Japanese military power. In recent years, this image of a remilitarizing Japan

became captured in the phrase “normal country.” Coined by Ichiro Ozawa (1994), it

means having an independent military able to be used like other states’ militaries. 11 Until the early 1990s, the reason why it was impossible for any politician to seriously consider

SDF dispatch was due to the aforementioned lack of consensus in the ruling class

9 The government interpreted overseas dispatch very narrowly, to mean the dispatch of troops with the intent to exercise the right of belligerency. But because Article 9 already prohibited this, in actuality the Resolution had little real significance and was more symbolic. 10 Los Angeles Times , June 9, 1992, A1. 11 Ozawa defined a ‘normal nation’ to mean first, “a nation that willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community,” including security responsibilities, and second, a nation that “cooperate[s] fully with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people” (Ozawa, 1994, 94-95). The main vehicle by which Japan’s SDF participates is the United Nations (Ozawa, 1994, 109-112). 5

concerning SDF dispatch as well as a large domestic constituency that feared remilitarization and advocated a pacifist Japan serving as a model to the rest of the world.

For Neorealist scholars in political science, this inability or unwillingness to act like a

“normal country” and deploy its military abroad appeared odd because Japan had one of the largest defense budgets in the world. 12

But as difficult as it once was to dispatch the SDF overseas, after the end of the

Cold War, this changed. Beginning with the Kaifu Administration’s 1991 MSDF dispatch following the Gulf War, Japan began to dispatch the SDF overseas. Japanese governments gradually expanded SDF usage overseas from International Peace

Cooperation Activities (Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Golan Heights, East Timor) to

International Disaster Relief Activities (Honduras, Turkey, , Iran, Thailand,

Indonesia) and most recently to relying on a ‘special measures’ dispatch to the Indian

Ocean. After more than a decade of these changes, by 2004 it was possible for the

Koizumi Administration to even dispatch ground units to Iraq amidst an ongoing insurgency for reconstruction support. In the span of 12 years, what once was impossible became possible. The question is why?

The answer matters for many reasons. For Japan scholars, it clarifies the state of

Japan’s postwar foreign strategy, called the Yoshida Doctrine. It also gets to the heart of current debates on whether Japan is ‘normalizing’ and answers the question of whether

Japan has crossed the Rubicon in the use of its military. Finally, it provides US policymakers with a better understanding as to what they can expect from their ally in areas outside of Japan. For political scientists, it is equally significant. The answer helps

12 Japan’s ranking in military spending compared to other countries worldwide from 1988 to 2007 is: 1988- 1992: 6th; 1993-1995: 5th; 1996-2004: 4th; 2005-2007: 5th. Data from SIPRI, various years. Military expenditure measured in constant (2005) US$ million, 1988-2007. 6

clarify how best to explain when and why foreign policies change by focusing attention on the linkages between veto players and individual beliefs. In doing so, it helps us understand not only how opposition parties affect policy, but also the relationship between cognitive factors and policies. Importantly, the answer also provides confirming evidence on the importance of ‘big events’ for changing individuals’ beliefs. Finally, it addresses whether elites can alter the reputation others hold of their state.

The puzzle therefore generates a number of interesting questions as well as draws important implications for both Japan and its neighbors. Although it may be easy to dismiss the policy differences on the grounds that the Gulf War and Iraq War are two different wars, a deeper consideration of the situation surrounding these two conflicts highlights why it merits an examination. First consider Japan’s contributions juxtaposed against international society. Japan’s actions defy international trends. During the 1990

Gulf Crisis, multinational efforts were rapidly forthcoming after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Against the backdrop of 34 countries contributing military forces 13 and international society viewing the conflict in black-and-white terms, Japan was presented with a clear option. Given that throughout the entire postwar period political leaders of all parties had emphasized the importance of UN-centrism, the fact that the multinational forces’ efforts in the Persian Gulf were under the mantra of UN Resolutions made the situation appear to be a slam-dunk case for Japanese participation. This was not to be, leading to criticism from international society. In 2003, in both the lead up to America’s invasion of Iraq and the invasion itself, international society was split. Because countries

13 Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, , Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. 7

like Germany, France, Russia, and publicly opposed US and UK efforts, Japan was faced with two very different options, either of which was sure to lead to international criticism. There was no clear ‘script’ of how to act. Given the efforts by the ‘coalition of the willing’ 14 were not UN sanctioned (as interpreted by some) and the fact that conflict was ongoing, the situation appeared to be a good case for Japan to sit out. Yet this too was not the case.

Second, there was no elite turnover. In both time periods the LDP was the party in power. PM was the leader of the LDP in 1990, which was the sole ruling party in the Diet. Despite his party’s majority, Kaifu was restricted in what policies he could pursue, even forced to withdraw a bill from Diet proceedings that would have enabled the SDF to be dispatched to the Gulf. Instead, he dispersed over $13 billion, necessitating a tax increase on the Japanese. PM , on the other hand, was the LDP leader of a three-party coalition in 2003. One of the coalition members, the

New (hereafter Komeito), had deep ties with its Buddhist lay organization called the Soka Gakkai and had traditionally been considered a party with pacifist tendencies. Despite this coalition, Koizumi was only mildly constrained in terms of what policies he could pursue, but still able to succeed in rapidly passing the dispatch of

Japan’s SDF for postwar reconstruction.

Understanding that a puzzle does exist, it then becomes necessary to find the right tools to understand and explain it. In political science, explaining why a state chooses to

14 On March 27, 2003, the Coalition included: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, , Spain, Tonga, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Uzbekistan. 8

pursue a particular policy has three possible explanations at the levels of system, state,

and individual (Waltz, 1954; Singer, 1961; Jervis, 1976; 15 Gourevitch, 1978; Putnam,

1988). Because the puzzle that inspired this research includes elements common to both

the comparative politics and international relations sub-fields, it is useful to examine

explanations lodged at each of these levels and test their ability to explain the research

puzzle.

Alternative Explanations 1) Neorealism a) Balance of Power Although Structural Realism (hereafter referred to as Neorealism) claims to be a

theory of international relations rather than a theory of foreign policy, it is a useful

starting point because its dominance in political science forces scholars to show why they

are not utilizing it. In addition, scholars have directly referred to Japan in terms of the theory (Friedman and Lenard, 1991; Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993; Betts, 1993/94 16 ) and a

number of Japan specialists have utilized the theory in various forms (Green, 2001;

Higginbotham and Samuels, 1998; Kawasaki, 2001; Lind, 2004; Pyle, 2007). Despite the

attempt to explain Japanese behavior by Neorealism, these latter scholars are mistaken

because the theory is limited in its usage.

To explain its limitations, it helps by offering a cursory explanation of what

Neorealist ‘theory’ is. While Neorealism has many variants, there are basic assumptions.

First, because there is no hegemon ordering the system, the ordering principle in the

international system is one of anarchy. Second, the main units that exist within this

system are rational, unitary states. Third, because of the anarchy, states’ highest priority

will be maximizing security (Waltz) or maximizing power (Mearsheimer). Fourth, states

15 Jervis, 1976, Chapter 1 16 Betts, 1993-94, 60. 9

have to rely on themselves to obtain this security and/or power, so the rule for states is one of self-help. Fifth, this effort to obtain security/power leads to a security dilemma that leads states into conflict. Sixth, because of this, the final arbiter becomes the material capabilities of states, which are a function of a state’s economic capabilities. 17 Finally, the key to whether states go to war is the distribution of these material capabilities, making ‘balancing’ the key to war or peace.

There are two main variants of Neorealism. Kenneth Waltz argues that states maximize their security 18 and to do so, states build up their own independent military capabilities because they want to avoid “uncomfortable dependencies and perceived vulnerabilities.” 19 This is because “the great powers of the world must expect to take care of themselves.” 20 Different from Waltz, John Mearsheimer argues that because states fear each other, this will lead them to maximize power .21 Mearsheimer’s states are insatiable in their search for power. 22 Despite their differences, Waltz and Mearsheimer both focus on ‘great powers.’ For example, Mearsheimer states his focus is explicitly on those states that are not satisfied until they are hegemons, seeking “…opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power position.” 23 Given that both Waltz and Mearsheimer focus solely on ‘great powers,’ it should be evident why employing

Neorealism to explain Japanese behavior is inappropriate. Japan is not a great power.

Would the outcome of the Gulf War or Iraq War have been different had Japan dispatched its military in 1991 or had not dispatched its military in 2003? The clear

17 Gilpin, 1981. 18 See, for example, Waltz, 1993, 49. 19 Waltz, 2001, 63. 20 Ibid, 64. 21 Mearsheimer (1990, 2001). Another in a similar vein, Wohlforth (1999). 22 Mearsheimer, 2001, 21. 23 Mearsheimer, 1990, 12. 10

answer is no. Additionally, Waltz and Mearsheimer focus on military behavior and

balancing between powers. 24 Japan’s support policies involving its Ground Self-Defense

Forces in Iraq starting in 2004 consisted of repairing bridges and purifying water. These are far from the ‘balancing’ activities as argued by Waltz and Mearsheimer. Given these two points, and the fact that Neorealism is not designed to explain foreign policy behavior, we should not be surprised that Neorealism does not provide analytical leverage to explain the research question because Neorealism is not designed to answer this question. Neorealism is limited in its focus and the current research does not fall within these bounds. Any attempt to explain Japan’s postwar behavior by Neorealism will inevitably prove insufficient, the proverbial straw man. Therefore, we should discard this ‘traditional’ version of Neorealism. b) Balance of Threat Instead of states balancing against more powerful states, another Neorealist variant is that states balance against threats. This is the argument made by Stephen Walt in what has become known as the ‘balance of threat theory.’ 25 Assuming we can apply

Walt’s logic to Japan, the logic would be that Japan did not perceive Iraq as a threat in

1991 whereas in 2003 it did. 26 But the problem comes in identifying what threat Iraq could pose to Japan given the geographical distance. This is especially interesting because the threat had to not have existed in 1990 but had existed by 2003. Because Iraqi

SCUDs did not have the potential of reaching Japan, nor did Iraq possess a military that could transmit its power to threaten Japan, the greatest possibility is oil because Japan

24 For examples of this, see Waltz, 2001, 126; Waltz, 1993, 75; and Mearsheimer, 1990, 15. 25 See Walt, 1985 and 1988 (281). 26 I ‘assume’ because Walt’s logic presupposes Japan fought against Iraq in 2003, but it did not. As stated elsewhere in this chapter, the SDF dispatch was a postwar reconstruction mission. So for the application of the logic to work, we have to assume Japan’s SDF dispatch is comparable. Thank you to Mike Mochizuki for pointing this out. 11

depends entirely on imports for its oil supply. This is especially appealing considering

that Iraq’s launch of an unprovoked attack in 1990 and the suspicion that it was harboring

WMDs in 2003 suggest intentions that Japan could interpret as threatening. But upon

closer examination, Walt’s theory too falls flat.

First, if we look at Japan’s oil imports from the Middle East, we find that imports

from Iraq made up a very small portion of total imports. In 1990, oil imports from Iraq

totaled 2.77% of Japan’s total Middle Eastern imports. 27 In 2003, these shrank to

1.53%. 28 The idea that threats to Japan’s oil imports from Iraq were a leading factor in

Japan deciding to assist in 2003, as opposed to 1990/91 is therefore not supported by the

evidence. Given that Japan relied on Iraqi imports more in 1990, we would expect it

would have felt more threatened than 2003 and thus should have sent the SDF in 1990 as

opposed to 2003 when its reliance on Iraq was reduced.

Because its imports from Iraq make up such a small portion of its oil imports from

the Middle East, it is perhaps more realistic to examine its oil imports from the Middle

East vis-à-vis its imports from other regions in the world. Unlike the previous data, what

we find is that Japan’s imports from the Middle East did increase over time. In 1990 it

relied on the Middle East for 71.52% for its imports, this rose to 88.48% in 2003. 29

Given this, Walt’s theory seems to provide an explanation for Japan’s actions as it had increased its dependency on Middle Eastern oil in 2003. And yet, I would argue that this is not a suitable explanation for Japan’s behavior because the 2003 war had a less destabilizing influence on Persian Gulf trade flows than 1990. In 1990-91, Iraq laid mines in the Persian Gulf, endangering ships transporting oil. In 2003, Iraq did not lay mines.

27 Petroleum Association of Japan. 28 Petroleum Association of Japan. 29 Petroleum Association of Japan. 12

Therefore, despite Japan’s increased reliance on Middle Eastern oil, its oil was not

threatened. Instead, it was more threatened in 1990-91. Because Japan actions are counter

to those that we would expect from Walt’s theory, the theory offers little help.

c) Alliance Management Given how much the rise of China and a nuclear have prompted journalists and scholars to claim that Japan has become increasingly more threatened, it would appear that Walt’s argument remains relevant. However, if it is true that Japan is more threatened in Northeast Asia, how does this explain its behavior in the Middle East?

The answer is combining Walt’s argument with Glenn Snyder’s theory on alliance management, another neorealist variant.

Glenn Snyder (1984) focuses on the security dilemma between allies . He argues

that states face a security dilemma both in forming alliances and in maintaining them.

States have to choose how firmly to commit themselves. But in making this choice, states

are faced with either entrapment or abandonment. Abandonment does not have one

meaning but rather different forms, such as your alliance partner realigning with your

opponent; de-aligning; abrogating the alliance; failing to make good on explicit

commitments; or failure to provide support in contingencies where support is expected. 30

Entrapment, on the other hand, means “being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s

interests that one does not share, or shares only partially.” 31 It occurs when one values the

alliance more than the cost of fighting for the ally’s interests.

The reason why this forms a dilemma is because the two are inversely related.

Choosing to stand firm with one’s ally reduces abandonment fears and enhances ally

loyalty, but increases risks of entrapment with the ally. Similarly, choosing to withhold

30 Snyder, 1984, 466. 31 Ibid , 467. 13

support from one’s ally reduces entrapment fears but increases abandonment fears. The choice a state makes is a function of the relative dependence of the alliance partners, degree of strategic interest that the parties have in defending each other, degree of explicitness in the alliance agreement, degree to which the allies’ interests that are in conflict with the adversary are shared, and by one’s own and others’ behavior. 32 Overall, it is assumed that the greater the perceived threat, the more a state will make efforts to maintain its alliance relationship. The lesser the perceived threat, the less that state will make efforts.

This is where Walt becomes necessary. The logic would argue that China and

North Korea are military threats to Japan. Because Japan cannot face these threats alone, it depends on its US ally. This means that it needs to maintain the goodwill of the US. In other words, it has to avoid abandonment by the US to face these threats. In 1990-91, not only were China and North Korea not threatening, but the Cold War had finished and the

Soviet threat had disappeared. This meant Japan did not have to worry about possible US abandonment. Instead, when the US went to war in the Gulf, precisely because Japan faced a relatively unthreatening region, it was more fearful of becoming entrapped in the

US war if it committed the SDF to the Gulf. As such, there was no compelling reason to commit its military to the multinational forces. This was different in 2003. Japan faced an economically and militarily rising power in China and a nuclear North Korea that had launched a missile over Japan in 1998. Given these threats, Japan needed to find ways to avoid US abandonment, especially given the history of ‘Japan passing’ that had occurred during the Bill Clinton Administration. Therefore, when the US went to war in Iraq,

32 Ibid , 471-474. Snyder argues that ‘dependence’ is a compound of a lot of factors, such as the need for assistance in war, its partner’s capacity to supply the needed assistance, the state’s degree of conflict and tension with the adversary, and the state’s realignment alternatives. See page 472. 14

because of the threats from China and North Korea, it was compelled to commit to the

Iraq War effort for the sake of securing the US commitment in Northeast Asia.

This combination of Walt and Snyder appears a very strong case for explaining

Japan’s policies. In Chapters Four and Five, I will show why this alternative explanation

is insufficient. Briefly stated, in looking at the deliberations during the Gulf War and

trying to explain the lack of SDF dispatch, at no time do decision-makers voice

entrapment fears as reasons for why Japan should not dispatch the SDF. And when

looking at deliberations during the Iraq War and trying to explain SDF dispatch, we find

lawmakers did voice abandonment fears in the face of a North Korean threat, but this

logic was not used by decision-makers formulating policy out of the public sphere.

Instead, these decision-makers based their decisions on a desire to make an international

contribution as a responsible member of international society. Given this disconnect

between what was being said in the public and non-public spheres, I argue that it is likely

the abandonment logic was used by politicians to ‘sell’ SDF dispatch to the Japanese

public.

2) Norm of Anti-Militarism Moving beyond international system-level explanations, we focus next on a lower level of analysis, the state level. At this level, the relevant explanation is a constructivist theory of anti-militarist norms. What is meant by anti-militarism differs by author. Hook argues that anti-militarism is opposition to “military’s ‘excessive’ influence on society’ 33 which manifests itself as opposition to the use of the SDF as a military instrument of state policy and “continued resistance to the SDF becoming a regular military force.” 34 Berger

defines it via the lesson drawn from the war, “the military is a dangerous institution that

33 Hook, 1996, 15. 34 Hook, 1996, xiii. 15

must be constantly restrained and monitored.” 35 Katzenstein defines it as opposition “to

enhance the status of the military and to develop a more active defense policy.” 36

Combining these, I define the anti-militarist norm to mean an aversion to using the SDF

as an active instrument of state policy . This social norm is powerful by itself, but

becomes even more powerful when it intertwines with norms of pacifism (aversion to

war, reluctance to use violence 37 ) and legal norms (most notably in the Constitution’s

Article 9), thereby institutionalizing it. Scholars differ on this relationship (below), but all see some combination of social and legal norms as the bulwark for Japanese anti- militaristic identity.

In a state where this norm is strong, it is expected that “proposals to expand military capabilities or roles will confront opposition from the general public and political groups, and will run up against institutional or legal restraints; these factors will obstruct proposals for military activism.” 38 Although advocates of this argument essentially begin with WWII, they differ dramatically on whether and how the norm has weakened and when and how anti-militarism took root. We can classify these differences into two variants. a) Pure Variant The ‘pure variant’ argues the root of the norm is defeat in WWII and the outlaw of all armed force as written in Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution (Hamura and Shiu,

1995; Royer, 1993; Sasaki, 1993; Yamauchi, 1992). These scholars believe the norm of anti-militarism emerged organically out of the ashes of Japan’s defeat in war, permeated

35 Berger, 1993, 120. 36 Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, 100. 37 Katzenstein, 1996. 38 Lind, 2004, 101. 16

throughout Japanese society and was thereafter reflected in laws/policies, the most important of which is Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution. Article 9 stipulates:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air- forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 39

Article 9 therefore “…reflects a consensus among the Japanese, as a people who suffered the horrors of war, to renounce war and the military.” 40 The accuracy of their interpretation of the Article is evidenced, they argue, by PM Yoshida’s statement on

March 10, 1952 in the Budget Committee of the House of Councilors that “…to maintain war potential, even for the purpose of self-defense, would mean rearmament. This would necessitate revision of the Constitution.” 41 The legal institutionalization of the social norm was further strengthened with subsequent policies and statements. These include, among others: the House of Councilors 1954 decision to prohibit the dispatch of the newly formed SDF abroad; the declaration of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the

Three Principles of Arms Exports in 1967; the House of Representatives adoption of a formal resolution that expressed support of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles on

November 24, 1971; the ratification of the NPT in 1976; and the 1976 formal commitment by the Miki Administration to keep military spending at no more than 1% of the GDP. The strongest display of these norms is said to have been the massive protests

39 Article 9, Japanese Constitution 40 Yamauchi, 1992, 160. 41 Auer, 1990, 177. 17

involving half a million people against PM Nobusuke Kishi’s attempt to revise the

security treaty in 1960, a move that “challenged head-on the norm of anti-militarism.” 42

But beginning in the late 1980s, they argue, events led to a weakening of the spirit of Article 9 and hence, an emasculation of the norm. That said, these Pure Variant scholars are not in agreement as to what evidence demonstrates the norm has weakened or has been weakening. Glenn Hook emphasizes increases in Japan’s military spending and the build-up of its military forces starting with the 1978 Defense Guideline review and then rapidly progressing throughout the 1980s, facilitated by American pressure, the

Soviet military buildup, and declining Asian criticism. 43 Kendrick Royer argues that it began during the Gulf War as a combination of international pressure, a desire among elites for international prestige, and a softening of Japanese public opinion against military action. 44 Toshihiro Yamauchi points to a more gradual erosion over the postwar period with particular focus on the decision to keep the US-Japan alliance after the end of the Cold War, Japan’s participation in the Gulf War, and transitioning to allowing SDF to join UN PKOs. 45 Yoshitaka Sasaki points to one specific time, namely PM Miyazawa

‘railroading’ the Law on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and

Related Activities in June 1992 and the dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia under the

‘pretext’ of contributing to international society. 46 Essentially, the scholars agree that the norm was rooted strong and early in Japan’s postwar history and subsequently supported by various legal manifestations, but the norm gradually weakened due to any number of exogenous shocks.

42 Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson, 2001, 127. 43 Hook, 1988; 1996. 44 Royer, 1993. 45 Yamauchi, 1992. 46 Sasaki, 1993. 18

b) Nuanced Variant A more Nuanced Variant agrees that anti-militarism is rooted in the Japanese

peoples’ experience with war, but argues that the transition to and adoption of the norm

did not suddenly emerge from the ashes of defeat. Both Katzenstein and Berger argue

that norm formation took time, but was generally institutionalized by the end of the

1950s. Through nearly a decade of debate against the backdrop of the collective memory

of the militarist takeover, war defeat, and having two cities destroyed by nuclear

weapons, the Japanese populace became “very reluctant to use violence.” 47 This, in

addition to other values, such as strict civilian control of the military, a subordinated role

of the military in domestic and foreign affairs, a “…profound distrust of its own

military,” 48 and “…anxiety that over-involvement in the U.S. alliance might drag Japan

into a land war in Asia.” 49 The reasons for these associated values is due to the lessons they drew from the war; namely, that “the military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored.” 50 While the Nuanced scholars therefore differ from the Pure Variant scholars by arguing the norm’s origin occurred over a longer period of time, they also differ in their opinion that the norm became legally institutionalized beginning with Article 9. They do agree that social norms have causal power, but more in interpreting legal norms. They emphasize the interaction between legal and social norms and how, over time, they reinforced one another and defined Japan’s military security policy. 51 This means social norms affect interests and behavior of political actors by designating appropriate behavior, making reinterpretation of legal norms fit an evolving

47 Katzenstein, 1996, 1. 48 Berger, 1993, 136. 49 Ibid , 140. 50 Ibid , 120. 51 Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, 103. 19

public consensus on what they deem as appropriate behavior. As such, these scholars

provide more room for changed attitudes as well as changed policies. Changes occur, but

always incrementally, “subject to the constraints of the domestic political situation.” 52 It is not as simple as the norm rooting early and weakening over time as the Pure Variant.

In fact, unlike Pure Variant scholars, these scholars do not see the norm as having weakened. Katzenstein states that “Japan’s anti-militarist social norms have been remarkably stable” despite the end of the Cold War. 53 This is largely because of their emphasis on the interaction between social and legal norms. This has meant that while the public still opposes the use of force, revision of Article 9, nuclear weapons, and the use of the SDF in combat roles abroad, “the outright hostility of the Japanese public has moderated to an abiding skepticism toward the SDF. The proportion of Japanese that supports a minimal defense posture has increased considerably, in line with the government’s reinterpretation of the meaning of Article 9.” 54 In other words, Japanese

remain opposed to the government allowing the SDF to use force in any situation other

than Japan’s self defense. New security policies in the 1990s are not a reflection of an

erosion of anti-militarist norms because there have been no major breaks in Japan’s

policies. Every SDF mission is still limited to non-use of force. When changes do occur,

such as the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law, new safeguards are installed on

the SDF that continue to limit it. 55 This reflects a changing consensus amongst the

Japanese. If dramatic change were tried, it would not be successful because of the

52 Berger, 1993, 142. 53 Katzenstein, 1996, 116. 54 Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, 102. 55 Berger, 1993, 142. 20

strength of the norms that continue to “act as a social restraint on national security policy.” 56

How good is either of these variants at explaining Japan’s changed policies? If we use the Pure Variant to explain Japan’s policy differences, it is necessary to argue that because the norm was strong in 1990-91, the public and decision-makers were opposed to policies that included overseas SDF dispatch. This forced PM Kaifu and his government to forgo options that would have enabled SDF dispatch and instead concentrate on huge monetary support packages. In 2003, the norm had eroded to such an extent that both the public and decision-makers did not oppose policies that included overseas SDF dispatch.

This allowed PM Koizumi to dispatch the SDF to Iraq during an ongoing insurgency. If we use the Nuanced Variant to explain the differences, it is necessary to argue that a robust norm remained constant throughout the two periods that opposed the SDF using force in any mission beyond the defense of Japan. When SDF missions in 1990 appeared to possibly involve the use of force, the public and decision-makers opposed. Only after war had finished and all possibilities of using force had disappeared was PM Kaifu able to dispatch minesweepers. In 2003, both successful attempts to dispatch the SDF were for humanitarian missions. Because these missions did not entail the use of force or integration with the use of force, the public and decision-makers did not oppose. This allowed PM Koizumi to dispatch the SDF during an ongoing insurgency.

Both variants appear to provide strong explanations for Japan’s differing policy responses. I show in Chapters Four and Five why both variants are insufficient. Briefly stated, while the non-dispatch outcomes in August and November 1990 and both the

ASDF dispatch and Iraq Special Measures Law in 2003 appear consistent with the logic

56 Katzenstein, 1996, 116. 21

of the Pure Variant, it has difficulty explaining the January 1991 push for ASDF dispatch

and the April 1991 MSDF dispatch outcome. This is because the Variant is unable to

explain how the norm was strong as late as November and suddenly so weak. But even if

we believe that sudden change is possible, if we agree that opposition to dispatch by

decision-makers, lawmakers and the public in 1990 represent the norm’s strength, then

we need to question 2003 because while decision-makers and lawmakers supported SDF

dispatch, the public did not.

While I reject the Pure Variant, I cannot do the same for the Nuanced Variant.

Given the logic of the Nuanced Variant is an aversion to using force beyond the defense

of Japan, it provides a reasonable explanation to virtually all sub-cases examined because

policies failed when they appeared to put the SDF in a dangerous position that may

necessitate the use of force. When no such possibility existed, successful SDF dispatch

occurred. However, this Variant has problems explaining how policies changed against the backdrop of unchanging norms. Additionally, it cannot answer why SDF dispatch began in 1991 or the gradually changing missions of the SDF. I argue that I am refining this Variant, not totally rejecting it.

3) Differences in Leadership Despite the fact that scholars have answered the question of ‘who governs’ Japan

(Johnson, 1995) with answers ranging from no one (Wolferen, 1989), to the bureaucracy

(Johnson, 1982), to the premier (Shinoda, 2004, 2005, 2007) to simply pointing out that the Japanese premier is too institutionally weak to lead (Calder, 1997; Hayao, 1993;

Mulgan, 2000; Noda, 1991; Shinoda, 1996), focusing on the importance of leadership or individual leaders has a rich legacy in political science (Bunce, 1980; Burns, 1978;

Byman and Pollack, 2001; Hargrove, 1966; Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw, 2001;

22

Kaarbo, 1997; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998; Lasswell, 1948). Although not part of the dominant trend to describe Japan, there are important studies emphasizing the importance of the premier as a person (Edstrom, 1996; Edstrom, 1999; Gaunder, 2007; Samuels,

2003; Tanaka, 1990; Takenaka, 2006) 57 and as an institution (Shinoda, 2000). Given this, it appears that there are conflicting views of the Japanese premier. It therefore justifies an examination of whether or not differences of premiers or the institution of executive power, captured in its name Kantei ( 官邸), can explain the research question. Depending on which variant is used emphasizes a different component of leadership: desire or institutional. a) Desire Variant The Desire Variant would argue that the reason policies changed was because

Koizumi and Kaifu wanted different things. And what they desired mattered because their desires are received as signals by bureaucrats. Because bureaucrats are implementers of elected leaders’ policies, they look for signals of what premiers want.

When Toshiki Kaifu became premier on August 9, 1989, he was a two-time former Education Minister from the smallest LDP faction. In his Komoto faction, Kaifu was considered third in the hierarchy after Toshio Komoto and Misoji Sakamoto. He was an unlikely candidate for premier given that he had not held any important party or government posts nor was he the head of his own faction. He became premier because the

LDP was struggling from the Recruit (stocks for favors) scandal, the unpopularity of a new , his predecessor Sosuke Uno’s geisha sex scandal, and the effects all these had on the LDPs popularity, leading to a huge Upper House defeat in July 1989.

But youthful (58) Kaifu was known to be a dovish, non-confrontational, congenial person,

57 Although not focusing on Japanese premiers, Weinstein (1989) provides a unique focus on 12 politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen. 23

untainted by any of the scandals. LDP elites had hoped Kaifu would play a ‘Mr. Clean’

role similar to his mentor, former PM Takeo Miki. That is to say, be a non-scandalous

premier to guide the LDP through its time in the wilderness. Because he was relatively

unknown and powerless, LDP elites expected that Kaifu would not have any policy

agenda and only be a caretaker premier, serving until the LDPs tarnished image faded

from public memory and the ‘real’ elites in the LDP could serve once again. Although he

was from the small faction, Kaifu was backed by the largest Takeshita faction, home of

former PM , former Deputy PM Shin Kanemaru, and former Deputy

Chief Cabinet Secretary Ichiro Ozawa. Precisely because Kaifu obtained the Takeshita

faction’s support, Kaifu could become LDP President and other heavyweights tarnished from the like , , and kept their criticisms of Kaifu to a minimum.

Despite what was supposed to be a short-term caretaker government, Kaifu survived and thrived, leading many to switch their tone. Titles from articles reflect the mood of the time, “The puppet who cut his strings,” 58 “From Puppet to Statesman,” 59 and

“Political Rookie of the Year.” 60 He led the LDP to a lopsided House of Representatives

victory in February 1990, 61 helped conclude the SII talks with President Bush against

bureaucratic opposition, promoted Japanese interests at the 1990 G7 Houston Summit,

gained a personal friend in President George Bush, made efforts at electoral reform and

by all these feats, became the most popular prime minister in post-war Japan up until that

time. His ability to do so was perhaps partly because of his skillful eloquence and public-

58 The Economist . April 14, 1990, 23. 59 Newsweek . May 7, 1990. 60 Time , August 6, 1990, 14. 61 The LDP won 275 out of 512 seats. The next closest was the JSP at 136. 24

conscious media relations (he was a former debating champion) but mostly because he utilized his underdog image, his sincerity and honesty, and his non- confrontational style to survive. In any event, because he lacked his own factional base in the LDP, Kaifu utilized his public image to his advantage. His strength came from his public support, which the LDP dared not oppose when its leaders were reeling from scandals. It was at this high point in Kaifu’s career that the Gulf War broke out.

Despite his successes, responding to the Gulf War was a challenge for Kaifu given his dovish preferences. While other politicians pushed for utilizing the SDF, Kaifu either staunchly opposed or waffled. And because Kaifu sometimes sent mixed signals or worse, no signals, policies were driven by a mix of bureaucrats and lawmakers. The crisis exposed limitations to Kaifu’s power and therefore further weakened him, not so much with the people but within the LDP. He was vulnerable and the LDP elites who had hoped he was a caretaker premier smelled blood. Facing backroom maneuverings to bring him down, Kaifu stepped down as LDP President when his term expired in October

1991.

Although the comparison has never been made, when Junichiro Koizumi became premier on April 26, 2001, he and Kaifu had much in common. 62 Like Kaifu, Koizumi was considered young (60) and was an unlikely candidate for premier given that he had not held any other important party or government posts that are usually considered a stepping-stone for the premiership. Instead, he had served as Health and Welfare Minister under three different premiers, Minister of Post and Telecommunications once and Chief

Deputy Secretary General once. Also like Kaifu, he was not the head of any faction.

62 For a background on Koizumi’s successful 2001 LDP Presidential election and some of the problems he faced in the first year of office, see Hornung, 2002. 25

Although his Mori faction was not the smallest, it was not the largest. Finally, like 1989 conditions, the LDP was in need of repairing its image. While Kaifu became premier because the LDP wanted to overcome its scandal-tarnished image, Koizumi became premier because the party was saddled with an extremely unpopular and gaffe-prone premier, Yoshiro Mori, prior to Upper House elections in July 2001. To avoid assured defeat if Mori remained, they needed to rejuvenate the party’s chance for success. A new premier seemed the proper course, convincing Mori in April 2001 to step down. But unlike Kaifu, who was largely picked and backed by LDP powerbrokers, Koizumi’s victory in the LDP presidential election was his own. He fought hard in what was his third underdog attempt (1995, 1998). But precisely because of his underdog image and desire for change, he appealed to rank-and-file LDP members who were given more weight in the election. The result was Koizumi beating heavily favorite and head of the largest faction, . 63

Despite the fact that Koizumi was relatively conservative, he was different from anything Japanese politics had ever seen. Not only was he an unconventional politician

(even his hair was considered unconventional, leading to his nickname Lionheart), what made Koizumi so attractive to the electorate and the LDP rank-and-file was his clear, straight-talk and charisma, campaigning on a platform of political and economic reform, including a promise to destroy his own LDP. His campaign slogans were “Reform without sacred cows” and “Change the LDP, Change Japan.” In this way, Koizumi was confrontational, riling many within the LDP and therefore making it difficult to find political allies. Because he lacked a large factional base, to survive (like Kaifu) Koizumi

63 The results were considered a landslide victory for Koizumi. He won a combined total of 298 votes out of a possible 487. He only needed 244 votes to win. Hashimoto won 155 votes. The remaining votes were split between two other candidates: Taro Aso and . 26

utilized his maverick image to appeal to the electorate via the media. Koizumi was known for being decisive in his decisions and making his decisions clearly known. To the public, he was known for his clear, short phrases that made good sound bites, resonating with voters who for years had grown tired of politicians speaking in convoluted sentences.

And it worked, making Koizumi (like Kaifu) the most popular premier in history.

With a reform agenda, after becoming premier Koizumi set to work on a host of economic-related reforms (reduce public spending, eliminate or privatize public corporations, reduce non-performing loans, limit new government bond issuance) and led the LDP to a huge victory in the June Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election and the

July Upper House election (best since 1992). These victories strengthened Koizumi and quieted the voices of resistance within the LDP. When the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred,

Koizumi pushed hard for SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean. It was shortly after this that

Koizumi had to confront an open feud that had erupted between Foreign Minister Makiko

Tanaka (popular with the electorate) and MOFA due to Tanaka’s penchant for controversy, tendencies for gaffes, and lack of diplomatic skill. To resolve the issue,

Koizumi fired her, causing his support to plummet. But Koizumi survived and his support returned to respectable levels. It was at this time that the Iraq War occurred.

Given his push for SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean, it was expected Koizumi would also want to support the US in Iraq. And he did, unwaveringly. With the success of his government’s policies, the Iraq War bolstered the image of Koizumi’s power.

Koizumi encountered little trouble passing policies despite them not being popular. For the remainder of Koizumi’s term as LDP President, he utilized his popularity to survive against those who plotted against him. Additionally, in what would become his trademark,

27

he would continuously succeed at extremely risky moves (secret visit to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il, kicking those who opposed his postal reform plan out of the LDP and calling a snap-election), making him ever more popular with the electorate and more difficult for his opponents to move against him. Koizumi stepped down on his own terms on September 20, 2006. b) Institutional Variant When Kaifu became premier, he inherited a weak Kantei. A weak Kantei is what was considered the norm, due to a variety of institutional problems (Hayao, 1993).

Although there are examples of the Kantei setting policy agendas or pushing unpopular decisions, during most of the post-war period the decision-making processes was described as ‘bureaucratic dominance.’ 64 While this ‘bureaucratic dominance’ led to attempts by politicians to try to strengthen the power of the Kantei, neither of the two major reforms succeeded in dramatically altering its power vis-à-vis the bureaucrats

(Appendix 2). The limited institutional power of the Kantei resulted from problems in the

Cabinet Secretariat. These included: small number of staff; staff seconded from other ministries represented the policy stances and interests of their home ministries; 65 sectionalism; lack of a framework to narrow down information and synthesize policy options from ministries/agencies; ministries/agencies would only release information to officials in the Cabinet Secretariat who were seconded from their own ministry/agency; 66 and related, a lack of ability to collect and analyze information independent from what

64 Examples of prime ministers who did set policy or push unpopular decisions include Nobusuke Kishi passing the revised US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, setting the agenda of normalization with China, and Eisaku Sato concluding the revision of Okinawa. 65 This led former personal executive secretary to PM Ryutaro Hashimoto, Kenji Eda, to call this arrangement a “partitioned joint sales company,” where although a merger has taken place, it is not integrated. Narita and Eda, 2002, 16. 66 Eda and Ryuzaki, 2002, 98. 28

ministries/agencies provide. 67 Because of these problems, the PM was generally unable to

create policies, coordinate the policy-making process, or impose his thinking on the

ministries/agencies that made up the central government. Together, this enabled the

bureaucrats to exercise their power. The decision-making process was said to be ‘bottom-

up.’ The premier could not lead.

When Koizumi became premier, he inherited a stronger Kantei due to

administrative reforms successfully implemented by PM Ryutaro Hashimoto prior to

Koizumi becoming premier (Appendix 3). Different from Kaifu’s Kantei, Koizumi’s

Kantei included: a larger number of staff; a reorganized Cabinet Secretariat meant to

reduce sectionalism amongst seconded officials; stronger legal standing of the premier to

propose policies at Cabinet meetings as a way to increase his authority; formal

strengthening of the Cabinet Secretariat’s authority to enable it to plan and draft

policies; 68 a set of guidelines instructing the ministries to recognize the Cabinet

Secretariat as the highest and final organ for policy coordination within the Cabinet; and

an increase in the number of special advisors ( 内閣総理大臣補佐官) that the PM can appoint from three to five. 69 Because of the changes, scholars argued that a transformation of decision-making occurred, leading to a strengthening of prime ministerial capabilities (Eda and Ryuzaki, 2002, Chapters 2-3). The most persistent in this argument has been Tomohito Shinoda, arguing that these changes have meant the creation of a core executive (2005), ‘top down’ decision-making, (2003, 2006), and

‘Kantei-led’ foreign policy (2004; 2007).

67 This meant the premier had no leverage over information, said by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda to be the most important thing for the government when responding to events. Gotoda and Uchida, 1991, 66. 68 Shinoda, 2005, 813. 69 In June 1996 the ‘up to 3 advisors’ rule was officially established. 29

How good are these variants at explaining Japan’s changed policies? If we use the

Desire Variant, Japan’s policy differences would be explained as follows. Kaifu was a dove who did not want to get involved in international events and was hesitant about using the SDF. Worse, he waffled at times during decision-making sending unclear signals to bureaucrats. Koizumi, on the other hand, was considered a conservative who wanted to get involved internationally by sending the SDF abroad. He never wavered in his commitment. Given Koizumi’s clarity and conservative reputation, he signaled a clear desire to bureaucrats who knew what policies to prepare for the premier before he directed them. Given Kaifu’s waffling and dovish reputation, his signals to bureaucrats were either opposition to SDF dispatch or confusion over what he wanted, inviting confusion and conflict into the decision-making process. If we use the Institutional

Variant, Japan’s policy differences would be explained as follows. PM Koizumi could send the SDF overseas because the power of the Kantei was strong. This enabled him to successfully push these policies. PM Kaifu, on the other hand, was unsuccessful because the Kantei was weak.

On the surface, both variants seem to explain Japan’s different policies. In

Chapters Four and Five I argue that neither of these are adequate. Briefly stated, although there are times during the Gulf War when we see either logic at work (Desire: January

1991, April 1991; Institutional: August 1990), both variants struggle to explain the

November 1990 non-SDF outcome and both 2003 dispatch outcomes. In November

1990, the UN Peace Cooperation Bill failed because of a charged ideological opposition whose message resonated with the public and decision-makers, not because of the strength of the Kantei or prime minister’s signaling. Even if the prime minister signaled

30

he wanted dispatch or if we concede the possibility that a strong Kantei could have forced unanimity amongst the bureaucrats, it is difficult to dismiss the strength of the JSP and its ability to arouse opposition to force the bill from deliberations. And in looking at both

2003 sub-cases, bureaucrats were responsible for policy formulation. Because of widespread agreement on SDF dispatch amongst them, signaling by Koizumi was not necessary. Had Koizumi’s desire not been known, or had he signaled his opposition, it is unlikely the result would have been different given support for dispatch at every other level. And despite these decision-makers working on measures before Kantei involvement, bureaucrats were not divided. The strength of the Kantei would not have changed their consensus or SDF inclusion.

Argument 70 The dependent variable of this research is Japan’s overseas SDF dispatches.

Specifically, I want to know why Japan was unable to dispatch the SDF to the Persian

Gulf in 1990-91 but was able to do so to Iraq in 2003. The answer to this question will help us understand how the Japanese have learned to ‘sweat.’

The formulation of policies regarding SDF dispatch is a joint venture, shared by bureaucratic entities and political parties. But bureaucratic entities and political parties are not units in and of themselves. They are composed of individual decision-makers and lawmakers who bring with them personal beliefs. To explain the changes in Japan’s use of its SDF, I examine two variables, opposition parties and the decision-makers throughout government and in the political parties. Specifically, I focus on the nature of the opposition party (ideological versus pragmatic) and the beliefs of decision-makers

(pro-SDF dispatch versus anti-SDF dispatch).

70 Methodology is covered in Appendix 1. 31

I argue that the nature of the opposition parties and the beliefs of decision-makers are equally important to explaining why Japan’s policies regarding SDF dispatch have changed. Opposition parties can exercise veto power if their message resonates amongst the public and amongst government decision-makers. But this veto player “do[es] not determine the specific content or direction of policies.” 71 Decision-makers do. And decision-makers hold different beliefs for how to respond to new events. But, to borrow a phrase from Risse-Kappen, “ideas do not float freely.” 72 In the context of this research, beliefs do not float freely. The process by which one belief wins out and becomes policy over others is due to veto players. It is the case that “individual learning has little impact unless those who learn are in a position to implement their preferred policies or to influence others to do so.” 73 Similarly, if there is an opposition party whose message resonates in both public and amongst government decision-makers, it will be difficult to implement policies with which it disagrees. Veto players therefore determine whose learning matters and which beliefs get selected (Checkel, 1993; Mendelson, 1993; Nye,

1987 74 ).

Changes that occurred in both of these variables explain why Japanese policies could and did change. Although common sense tells us that minority opposition parties should be marginalized in the decision-making process, as mentioned above, they are able to constrict the parameters of debate when their message resonates. Understanding the veto power that opposition parties can play, we can argue that without a change in the nature of the opposition party from an ideological one to a pragmatic one, the parameters

71 Risse-Kappen, 1991, 485. 72 Risse-Kappen, 1994. 73 Levy, 1994, 300. 74 Nye, 1987, 381. 32

of foreign policy debate would have remained severely constricted, making policies that

involve the SDF difficult to even discuss. Such policies would not have been considered

and/or chosen by decision-makers without changes of decision-makers’ beliefs: moving

from a point of opposing coalitions of individuals holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs and

pro-SDF dispatch beliefs to a point where there is a general convergence on pro-SDF

dispatch beliefs.

Why Policies Changed in Japan

Dissonance of Decision-Makers’ Beliefs Convergence of Decision-Makers’ Beliefs

Ideological Opposition Party Pragmatic Opposition Party

Nature of Opposition Parties In Japan, from 1955 to the early-1990s, the two major political parties consisted

of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The defining

characteristic of this alignment was that the JSP and the LDP were ideologically poles

apart from one another, deeply divided over fundamentally core issues. Regarding

security policies, the JSP’s primary platform was anti-military, anti-war, and protection

of the ‘peace constitution’ at all costs. It saw the SDF and the US-Japan alliance as

unconstitutional, the need for all activity to be conducted through the UN and centered on

pacifist ideals. This was in sharp contrast to the LDP which supported the SDF, supported

the alliance, relied on the US (not UN), and did not center their policies on pacifism.

These were fundamental disagreements over fundamental principles that had clear zero-

sum implications. This meant that little commonality existed and the parameters for

finding viable policy options that would satisfy both were severely limited.

Given its position as the perennial opposition party, the JSP did not have the

numerical ability to block LDP policies. But it had a successful record of blocking

33

security-related policies with which it disagreed, especially those that included the SDF.

The JSP was able to do this in two ways. First, given its ideological zeal to block anything that included the SDF, the JSP would rely on extraordinary measures to make its voice heard in the legislative process, utilizing any number of parliamentary and extra- parliamentary procedures. These included: physically blocking votes, utilizing parliamentary deliberations to ask questions as a means to expose flaws in government proposals or plans not fully thought-out, filibustering bills, eating up precious parliamentary time to kill bills, urging popular protest, and sometimes throwing punches.

It was willing to do whatever it took to achieve its goal.

Second, its message resonated with the public and with decision-makers in the government. Like the JSP, the public strongly opposed SDF dispatch, as did a large number of decision-makers in government. Rather than engage the LDP head-on in policy-driven debates, the JSP relied on emotional and theological discussions on the constitution as well as the pacifist nature of the Japanese people. At the same time it advocated that Japan’s pacifist principles become a model for the world, it kept a fearful lookout for possible signs of Japanese remilitarization. Because both the public and officials in government shared remilitarization concerns and agreed with the idea of

Japan’s pacifist principles serving as a model for the rest of the world, the JSP could

‘push these buttons’ whenever the government made a new proposal. With the JSP’s message amplified both in and outside of government, this put a pincer move on LDP governments, constraining them from acting too boldly, if at all, in the field of security

(even policies that did not require legislative approval). Therefore, despite lacking a numerical ability to block LDP proposals, the JSP was able to act as a veto player. The

34

result was an inability of LDP-led governments to utilize or expand the SDF in any role

other than strictly self-defense of Japan. With the JSP reaching its denouement in 1990

and falling into virtual non-existence over the subsequent years, this veto player

disappeared. This meant that the ideological message that successfully limited the policy

parameters of viable foreign policy options vanished.

In its place rose a non-ideological opposition party called the Democratic Party of

Japan (DPJ). Unlike the JSP, the DPJ was a more pragmatic party. The DPJ and the LDP

were not deeply divided over fundamentally core issues. Regarding foreign policy

specifically relating to security, the DPJ saw both the SDF and the alliance as

constitutional and did not place pacifism as its core platform or policy objective.

Although it too pushed for a strong role of the UN, this was not a principle, it was a

policy issue. With agreement on fundamentals, the two sides were able to talk to each

other and discuss policy , not dogmatic, differences. The DPJ has not resorted to ideological or theological debates concerning Japan’s pacifist nature or the ‘sacrosanct’ constitution. What is more, it has not resorted to the extraordinary measures to block legislation with which it disagreed. It instead has chosen to negotiate differences and introduce counter policies to government proposals. If negotiations fail and counter proposals are rejected, the DPJ does not urge popular protest, physically block voting, or throw punches. It either abstains from voting or votes against proposals. The result of having a pragmatic opposition party has meant a widening of the parameters of viable policy options. And with this widening parameter, proposals that include the SDF have been able to be raised as ‘acceptable’ in policy discussions.

35

However, the DPJ has not been able to veto policies like the JSP because its

message does not resonate with the public or with decision-makers in the government.

The JSP could exercise its veto power because not only did the public strongly oppose

SDF dispatch, but a large number of decision-makers in government. Argued below,

beliefs that have implications for SDF dispatch have changed amongst bureaucrats and

decision-makers, converging on support for SDF dispatch. This has meant that the DPJ’s message of opposition, when it does oppose, does not resonate within government and therefore lacks the divisions it can exploit to veto policies. Additionally, the public has come to support the notion that Japan has a necessary role to play in international society and this role might sometimes include the SDF, albeit limited to non-force, non-combat, post-war, and humanitarian missions. This change has meant the DPJ’s message of opposition, when it does oppose, does not resonate with the public. The combined effect is the DPJ no longer has the ‘buttons’ to push to oppose SDF dispatch and therefore a reduced ability to exercise veto power over government policies.

Decision-Makers’ Beliefs Japanese decision-makers can be classified broadly into two types, bureaucrats and politicians. The important difference between 1990 and 2003 is what bureaucrats and politicians believed and what this meant for policy preferences regarding SDF dispatch.

Different beliefs meant different policy options considered and chosen.

Until the Gulf War, Japanese decision-makers were divided between those who held beliefs that supported SDF dispatch policies and those who held beliefs that opposed

SDF dispatch policies. But nuance existed within each camp, with decision-makers emphasizing different beliefs. In the anti-SDF dispatch coalition, there were three different beliefs that resulted in decision-makers opposing SDF dispatch: 1) sensitivity to

36

Asian neighbors, 2) anti-militarist beliefs, and 3) strict constitutional beliefs. Likewise, in

the pro-SDF dispatch coalition, there were two different beliefs that resulted in decision-

makers supporting dispatch: 1) belief in the importance of Japan fulfilling its

international obligations and 2) belief in the importance of the US-Japan alliance. The

two coalitions were in constant opposition.

Generally speaking, the anti-SDF dispatch coalition was larger, led by the

ideological JSP. But it was never as simple as the coalitions being clearly demarcated by

who was in government and who was not. The division amongst decision-makers did

certainly exist across political parties, as expected by the ideological division between

the JSP and LDP. This was perhaps the most visible representation of the divide. But the division existed across bureaucratic organs in government and within bureaucratic organs

and political parties, including MOFA and the LDP. This meant that when responding to

new international events, different beliefs led decision-makers to call for different

policies. Because of the widespread dispersion of these different beliefs throughout

government and the political parties, conflict ensued over the policies they proposed. And

it was precisely this conflict that the JSP was able to exploit to enflame opposition to

proposals from within government.

When the Iraq War occurred in 2003, this division no longer existed. Decision-

makers across government and generally across political parties now approached

international events largely with the same belief. Instead of the widespread differences

among decision-makers across bureaucratic entities and political parties and within these

entities and parties, a convergence had occurred on the belief in the importance of Japan

fulfilling its international obligations. This is not to suggest that total convergence had

37

occurred. DPJ lawmakers were divided among those who held beliefs that opposed SDF dispatch and those who held beliefs that supported SDF dispatch. But reflecting the pragmatic nature of the DPJ, unlike JSP lawmakers who held strong sensitivity to Asian neighbors’ fears and anti-militarist beliefs, DPJ lawmakers held primarily constitutionalist beliefs. The result of the general convergence meant that decision- makers and lawmakers had come to agree on policy options. This, in turn, has meant a sharp fall in inner-governmental conflict which traditionally was a prominent characteristic of the decision-making process. Additionally, this convergence has meant difficulty for the DPJ to enflame opposition to proposals from within the government.

The explanation for the change in decision-makers’ beliefs is rooted in the traumatic experience of the Gulf War. Decision-makers involved in the debates and policy deliberations during the Gulf War proactively made efforts to respond to Saddam

Hussein’s invasion of Iraq. While some decision-makers’ beliefs led them to advocate

SDF dispatch as a means for Japan to ‘sweat,’ the majority of decision-makers held beliefs that led them to oppose SDF dispatch and were in institutional positions to veto these proposals. The JSP too opposed these proposals and because its message resonated with the public and amongst government decision-makers, it was able to exercise veto power. The result was a series of policies that relied heavily on monetary contributions that came to total over $13 billion but no SDF contributions.

Japan’s policies were criticized by the international community as being ‘too little, too late’ and not appropriate for a country as wealthy as Japan. Decision-makers across government and political parties were shocked by the international community’s response, learning the lesson that it is necessary for Japan to provide visible support to international

38

problems as a responsible member of international society. And because other states contribute with their militaries, Japan should fulfill its international obligations with the

SDF. The result was a new cognitive script for how to respond to international problems.

They had learned how to ‘sweat.’ Importantly, the lesson was institutionalized in the decision-making process.

Outline of Dissertation My dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter Two examines two theories explaining why foreign policies change. I combine these to provide what I believe is a more thorough and convincing explanation that focuses on decision-makers and the bureaucratic entities and political parties within which they reside. In Chapter Three, I examine the specific case of Japan vis-à-vis the theoretical construct developed in

Chapter Two.

Chapters Four and Five provide detailed accounts of decision-making during the

Gulf Crisis and War in 1990-1991 and the Iraq War in 2003. Specifically, Chapter Four examines four sub-cases, three where SDF dispatch attempts failed and one when it succeeded. The former are the August 29, 1990 policy package, the UN Peace

Cooperation Bill, and the January 1991 ASDF dispatch plan. The latter is the April 1991 minesweeper dispatch. Chapter Five examines two sub-cases, both where SDF dispatch succeeded. This includes the dispatch of ASDF planes in March and July 2003 and the

Iraq Special Measures Law passed in July 2003. After each sub-case, I engage the three alternative explanations introduced in this chapter. I demonstrate why each of the alternative explanations-Neorealism, Norms, and Leadership-cannot provide consistent explanations within cases and across the two time periods.

39

Chapter Six is my conclusion. I argue that Japan’s policies are not the result of

‘normalizing’ tendencies, not part of a new grand strategy, and Japan has not crossed the

Rubicon. That said, consensus on making visible international contributions means it is

likely that Japan will continue to dispatch the SDF overseas, though not in combat roles.

For political science, I show how opposition parties, despite numerically inferior to

parties holding government, can exercise veto power. Additionally, I argue that my

research is a confirming case of traumatic experiences imparting lessons from which

decision-makers learn. These big events affect the cognitive structures of decision-

makers, which in turn affect what policies Japan pursues. However, the lessons learned

by decision-makers in 1990 and the institutionalization of these lessons did not translate into quick policy changes. Instead, policies have incrementally changed due to gradual changes in public opinion. Just as public opinion played an important role in amplifying the anti-dispatch message of the JSP until the early 1990s, it has continued to constrain government policies. Finally, I argue that in order to understand why foreign policies change (or any policies) we need a more holistic framework that considers the beliefs of decision-makers and the veto players that exist in a particular state.

40

II. Why Foreign Policies Change

In the previous chapter, I presented the puzzle regarding Japanese policies in 1990 and 2003. In this chapter, I present the theoretical background for how and why foreign policies change. In efforts to explain foreign policy change, some scholars have emphasized cognitive explanations while others have emphasized institutional explanations. While not disagreeing with these scholars, I argue that their efforts are incomplete when the emphasis remains on one explanation. Instead, what is needed is a combination of their efforts. I argue that changes in veto players are significant for making changed policies possible . But new policies become a commonly chosen option due to cognitive changes among decision-makers.

Why Do Foreign Policies Change? While the study of international politics has enjoyed a dominant influence in political science under the mantels of Neorealism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism,

Walter Carlsnaes is correct that the study of foreign policy does not enjoy an undisputed professional domicile within IR. 1 Similarly, theory development at the level of foreign policy has not received much attention. 2 The necessary first step toward a program of studying foreign policy decision-making began with publications by Waltz (1959) and

Singer (1961) who questioned what constituted the proper level of analysis in the study of international politics. These works provided arguments that sub-system levels exist, thereby focusing attention on the need to look at domestic processes to explain policy differences among states. 3

1 Carlsnaes, 2003, 331. 2 Rose, 1998, 145. 3 Singer, 1961; Waltz, 1959. A much later work in the same vein was Jervis, 1976, Chapters 1-2. 41

Building upon these efforts of disaggregation, and setting the foundation for the study of foreign policy decision-making, Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin published their seminal work on Foreign Policy Decision-Making (1962). The study of foreign policy decision-making has since grown to include a wide array of theoretical programs that include, but are not limited to, studies on bureaucratic politics (Allison,

1971; Allison and Halperin, 1972; Halperin, 1974; and Allison and Zelikow, 1999), groupthink (Janis, 1972), leadership and political personalities (Bunce, 1980; Burns,

1978; Byman and Pollack, 2001; George, 1980a; Hargrove, 1966; M. Hermann, 1974;

Kaarbo, 1997; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998; Lasswell, 1948); and how cognitive factors affect decision-making (Axelrod, 1973, 1976; George, 1969; Holsti, 1970; Jervis, 1976;

Khong, 1992; Simon, 1957, 1982; Tetlock, 1999). In the process, scholars have drawn on concepts from other disciplines, most notably psychology. This interdisciplinary nature has become a “mixed blessing, providing productive cross-fertilization of ideas on the one hand but creating confusion over concepts and basic theoretical constructs on the other.” 4 Despite their wide ranging theories, the common program tying these diverse works together has been the prying open of the ‘black box’ of the state to show the dynamism of the foreign policy decision-making process. In doing so, they have demonstrated, if not anything else, that the state is far from being a unitary rational actor.

This eclectic nature of the study of foreign policy decision-making has been criticized as a detriment because the sub-field lacks parsimonious theories. 5 But this criticism is mistaken. Understanding the various participants involved in decision- making, what their ideas are, how these ideas are formed, and what constraints or

4 Ripley, 1993, 404. 5 For a brief examination of some of these criticisms, see Holsti, 1976. 42

enablers exist in the process provide scholars a more detailed insight into the challenges

facing decision-makers and the difficulties involved in not only creating policies, but

changing policies once they are made. This is important because history shows us that

changing foreign policies are a consistent part of international relations. And change

sometimes has powerful consequences. Examples include Japan’s withdrawal from the

League of Nations, the US and Soviet Union’s shift to détente, America’s engagement

with Communist China, Egypt’s decision to normalize relations with Israel, the Soviet

Union’s changes under Gorbachev, and the countries of Europe committing to economic

and monetary integration. Understanding why such changes occur enables scholars to

better explain past actions as well as understand the future direction a country’s foreign

policy is likely to take.

Foreign policies can change for a variety of reasons that do not have to be the

result of an explicit decision to change course (but in most cases it probably is). My

research assumes that foreign policy change is deliberate. As such, it is my responsibility

to determine how new ideas or information/feedback on failure/potential failure enters

the decision-making process to motivate the change. 6 Additionally, foreign policies can

change due to regime change (Malcolm and Pravda, 1996; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a;

Mansfield and Snyder, 1995b). The logic is that changes in foreign policy occur when a

state democratizes, turns authoritarian, or moves between types somewhere in between.

Iran’s sharp turn from the West in 1979 stands out as the best empirical example. While

interesting, this too is not the focus of my research. Instead, my focus is on why a state

with the same government-type initiates and/or continues Foreign Policy A in Time 1 but

decides to change to Foreign Policy B in Time 2. Finally, foreign policies can change

6 C. Hermann, 1990, 13. 43

“slowly and haltingly by small and usually tentative steps, a process of trial and error in which policy zigs and zags, reverses itself, and then moves forward in a series of incremental steps.” 7 While incremental change (Lindblom, 1959) does explain some policy change, the focus in this research is on more abrupt changes. Understanding these three caveats, we can move on to understanding the two dominant arguments in the literature on policy change.

Many scholars who theorize on foreign policy change concentrate on the Soviet

Union and the dramatic changes that occurred in its foreign policy in the late 1980s

(Blum, 1993; Breslauer, 1987; R. Hermann, 1991; Legvold, 1991; Stein, 1994; Valkenier,

1987). The common argument that emerges is treating new beliefs or ideas as analytically consequential to explaining outcomes. We see a similar theme in Pastor’s work (1984) on the role of values, interests, and strategies in American foreign policy from Carter to

Reagan and in Goldstein and Keohane’s edited volume (1993) on the role of ideas in foreign policy. Simply put, new ideas equal new policies. For example, Blum (1993) argues that the prevailing Soviet belief systems were so stable that no change was possible until the 1980s. Only after failures in domestic and international performance were old beliefs delegitimized, allowing new ideas under Gorbachev to emerge, which then translated into changed policies.

But Blum’s account, like most who emphasize ideas as the engine for change, raises many questions. For example, exogenous shocks play a large role, but what is the mechanism by which they work domestically? External shocks (i.e. financial meltdown, war, etc) are indeed important, but it is how shocks are interpreted and filtered domestically that leads to change. This needs to be examined. Additionally, it is likely

7 Hilsman, 1967, 5. 44

that external shocks have implications for prevailing domestic coalitions and/or institutions in the policy-making process. These too need to be examined. And if scholars like Stein (1994) are correct that Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ was “politically contested” and there was “serious division” within Soviet leadership concerning it, then we also need to consider other ideas. And because there are innumerable ideas in circulation at any one time, we need to understand why the idea that resulted in policy achieved prominence at that particular moment while others did not. 8 Answering this involves answering why those individuals/institutions who opposed, lost, or at least stopped opposing, and why other ideas became influential. New ideas alone do not create opportunities for action and not all holders of new ideas act on them. 9 Without addressing other ideas and the process by which the policy-backed idea won, these accounts are nothing more than functionalist arguments. What they are missing then is a focus on the context in which these ideas are deliberated and chosen.

Another approach to explaining foreign policy change is to focus on the domestic political structure and/or access to decision-making that enable new ideas to be put on the agenda (Barnett, 1999; Checkel, 1993; Hagan, 1993; Ikenberry, 1988; Rosati, Hagan, and

Sampson, 1994 10 ). 11 Like the previous scholars, ideas play an important role in explaining change. But it is not the ideas so much as the factors that help particular ideas to take hold and grow. 12 A particular state’s “…structures are important in setting the framework that facilitates or inhibits access to political resources and the policymaking

8 Berman, 2001, 233. 9 Lieberman, 2002, 698. 10 Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson focus largely on domestic structural variables but also consider global/regional structures and the state’s position in these structures as well. 11 Somewhat related is an article by Mintz, 1993. 12 Kingdon, 1984, 75-77. 45

apparatus.” 13 It is the political and institutional entities that filter ideas, facilitating some ideas to become policy while hindering others. It focuses on the capacities and resources of the various organizations that comprise the state (legislature, executive, bureaucracy, courts, etc), the balance of power among them and the centralization and coherency of each. The logic is that a new idea does not have a role to play until changes in the relationship amongst these units occur, thereby altering the filter and creating a window of opportunity through which new ideas can pass. And the idea passes through freely, resulting in changed policy. For example, Checkel argues that the ‘new thinking’ in the

1980s in the Soviet Union was really around since the 1960s. It was only when these ideas had access to top Soviet leadership that policies changed.

Explanations like Checkel’s answer the ‘why now’ question, but it raises questions. While arguments like Checkel’s show that ideas had a particular institutional backing, more often than not they fail to address the existence of other opposing institutions that backed alternative ideas. Similarly, arguing that the ideas that became new policy had existed for almost 25 years and became policy once access was gained to the decision-making agenda raises the prior-question of what caused the institutional changes? Assuming that other institutions exist, explanations need to explain the changed power relationships from Time A to Time B that allowed one idea to move forward. Most importantly, these explanations cannot account for the substantive content of new policy or the new ideas. Instead, they take the beliefs of individuals as a given and treat new ideas as secondary to the mode of analysis. Changes in the power relationships of different units that make up a government are important, but scholars need to not only

13 Ikenberry, 1988, 221. 46

explain a more complete version of why some institutions/groups lose power vis-à-vis others but also connect these institutions/groups with the particular idea they supported.

What should be clear is not only how similar both arguments are, but how complementary. Both focus on cognitive factors and the institutional and political units that comprise a particular state. Their difference lies in how much emphasis they place on the two variables. My research acknowledges that both matter. But in an attempt to emphasize both variables explicitly, I argue they matter equally . New ideas are necessary,

but new ideas alone cannot explain foreign policy change. If new ideas represent new

solutions to problems, and problems and policy-making are resolved through politics

(Hagan, 1993; Hilsman, 1967), then new ideas must be understood in terms of the

political and bureaucratic entities in which they exist, are debated, and chosen. This

means we need to consider those units that have the ability to promote and oppose these

ideas. Consideration of how they interact means focusing on the policy-making process.

In this process, the two are inextricably intertwined and therefore need to be weighed

with equal analytical importance.

I am not the first to emphasize the importance of both variables (Farnham, 1990;

Goldstein, 1988; 1989; Lieberman, 2002; Mendelson, 1993; Snyder, 1987-1988; 14 ), but I

am the first to analyze Japanese foreign policy in this manner. 15 Risse-Kappen (1994) has

been the most explicit in conceptually joining the two. State structures, he argues, “do not

determine the specific content or direction of policies.” 16 Decision-makers do. And

14 Snyder presents an ‘institution-heavy’ explanation, but he weaves this with the role of ideas, albeit the ideas both support new policies and support the institutions that provide an opportunity for these new ideas to rise. Importantly, he establishes the crucial link between particular ideas and the coalitions that supported them in the political system. 15 In psychology, there are also those who emphasize a need to view individual cognitive efforts within the societal environment they exist. See Levine, Resnick and Higgens (1993). 16 Risse-Kappen, 1991, 485. 47

decision-makers hold different interpretations of issues and how to deal with them. New

ideas mean new interpretations of current problems. But, “ideas do not float freely.” 17

The process by which one idea wins and becomes policy is determined by the interaction amongst bureaucratic and political units. This is because in the policy process, these units constrain or enable policies. Having essentially veto power over ideas-becoming-policies is important because they can determine whose learning matters and which ideas get selected (Checkel, 1993; Mendelson, 1993; Nye, 1987 18 ). Ideas alone are not powerful

unless they can be acted upon. Therefore, the people who have the ideas need to be “in a

position to implement their preferred policies or to influence others to do so.” 19 A

decision-making approach that is sincere in treating both these bureaucratic and political

units and ideas equally needs to answer a number of key questions regarding the process

of policy change. These questions include:

1. Where did the idea for the new policy originate? 2. What were the competing ideas? 3. Why did Idea X succeed/fail in becoming New Policy A as opposed to Idea Y or Z? 4. Why did Idea X succeed/fail in Time A versus Time B

Understanding that both ideas and political and bureaucratic units matter is absolutely

necessary because it will “shed light on points of friction, irregularities, and

discontinuities that drive political change.” 20 This is the policy-making process. I turn

next to analyzing both variables in more depth to understand their underlying mechanics

regarding policy change.

17 Risse-Kappen, 1994. 18 Nye, 1987, 381. 19 Levy, 1994, 300. 20 Lieberman, 2002, 698. 48

Bureaucratic and Political Veto Players Focusing on a state’s bureaucratic and political entities that have an ability to

block or facilitate policy means looking at a state’s veto players. It is intuitive if some

idea was prevented from reaching the policy agenda in Time A due to alignment Y, then realignment of these units may enable that idea from reaching the policy agenda in Time

B. Examining the impact of alignment on state behavior has its roots in New

Institutionalism (Goldstein, 1988; March and Olsen, 1984; Skocpol, 1980; Steinmo,

1989). The focus is on “how leaders, groups, and coalitions of actors can affect the way foreign policy programs are framed, the options that are selected, the choices that are made, and what gets implemented.” 21

Veto Players The vehicle by which I will conceptualize this is through Tsebelis’ concept of

‘veto player.’ According to Tsebelis (1995), there exists in any government ‘veto players’

which are “an individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a policy

decision.” 22 Veto players can be institutional (courts, houses of legislature, interest

groups, referendums) or partisan (coalition parties). Although not explicit, Tsebelis also

acknowledges that institutional veto players can include bureaucracies. 23 Generally

speaking, for Tsebelis veto players are part of government. But as I will show below, this

needs to be amended. Three characteristics of veto players matter: their number, their

congruence (difference of veto players’ political positions), and their cohesion (cohesion

is similarity of policy positions of the constituent units of each veto player). For Tsebelis,

policies are likely to change the fewer the number of veto players, the more congruence

and the less cohesion. Every state is composed of various veto players whose acceptance

21 M. Hermann, 2001. 22 Tsebelis, 1995, 293. 23 Ibid , 323-324. 49

of a policy is required for it to succeed. And as Hagan (1993) is correct to point out, veto

players exist both in the government and outside of the government. 24

Veto Players in One-Party Governments / Predominant Party Systems: Executive Consider first democratic one-party governments or predominant party systems.

In this situation, veto players tend to be limited to the leader of the party/government, the members of the ruling party, and the bureaucracy which is responsible for formulating and implementing policies. For those who study leaders (Bunce, 1980; Burns, 1978;

Byman and Pollack, 2001; Hargrove, 1966; Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw, 2001;

Kaarbo, 1997; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998; Lasswell, 1948; Paige, 1977), the theme that emerges is the importance of executives in the decision-making process. The logic is,

“when a single, powerful leader is interested in foreign policy, he or she generally seeks to control the foreign policy agenda and shape what happens.” 25 And “once the leader’s

position is known, those with different points of view generally stop public expression of

their own alternative positions out of respect for the leader or fear of reprisals.” 26

Therefore, in theory, the leader is the ultimate veto player where the ‘buck’ stops. If he/she does not agree with the idea, it dies. If he/she does agree, it becomes policy. It can be argued that the focus on the executive as the top veto player can be expanded to include the small group of advisors that the executive confides in and keeps close. As

Janis (1972) has shown, this is an important element in the decision-making process because of the potential to create “groupthink,” pressures that force members into consensus-seeking behavior to the point where toleration for dissent is minimized. The

24 Hagan is not writing about veto players nor does he use this terminology. Instead, he focuses on political opposition that constrains policies. I do not find any difference with the idea I am presenting about veto players. 25 M. Hermann et al., 2001, 85. 26 Ibid , 84. 50

result is not only a limitation on the group’s ability to make good judgments, leading to

suboptimal policy choices, but could lead to a reduced ability of the executive to act as a

veto player if opposition becomes watered-down.

Veto Players in One-Party Governments / Predominant Party Systems: Party As important executives are as veto players, the party that the executive leads also

plays a crucial veto player role. While studies on the U.K. downplay the constraints

placed on the government (Clark, 1988; Vital, 1968; Wallace, 1976) by members of the

party in power in the foreign policy-making process, examples do exist where the

breakdown of party solidarity did have consequence on policy, such as the political

disarray that surrounded the 1956 Suez Crisis (Christoph, 1965; Epstein, 1964; Thomas,

1966). Much more explicitly, literature on Japan and the long rule of the Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) has shown even predominant party systems have important veto

players within the party. Significant veto players exist in the form of factions (Fukui,

1970, 1978; Richardson and Flanagan, 1984; Thayer, 1969). These factions act like

separate political parties. Any LDP-led government had to deal with factions because in

order to maintain government, the premier of the day had to retain the support of

potential rival factions. This gave factions veto power, making any LDP President (hence

premier) “…who dares to deal with any controversial policy issue run the risk of arousing

all the destructive passions of his opponents in the dissident factions and even some of

his fair-weather allies.” 27

Veto Players in One-Party Governments / Predominant Party Systems: Bureaucracy In addition to requiring the agreement of the executive and the party he/she leads for policies to succeed, it is also necessary to have the agreement of the bureaucracy. This is because the bureaucracy is responsible for not only formulating the policies, but

27 Fukui, 1970, 136. 51

implementing policies. Allison (1971) has shown that individuals exist within a government’s agencies that have diverse goals, beliefs, and motives and this leads to competition for influence with one another. Because this influence is not equal, the agencies are forced to bargain if they hope to resolve outstanding problems. The result is foreign policy by ‘bureaucratic politics.’ In other words, foreign policy is the result of pulling-and-hauling between agencies that hold veto power. If a policy threatens any of these veto players’ interests, they will oppose that policy. This results in the policy dying, being watered-down via the implementation process, or finding other regulations to limit the policy’s effectiveness.

Veto Players in Coalition Governments: Ruling Parties If we expand our consideration to coalition governments, then in addition to the aforementioned veto players we must also include coalition members.28 What is clear is that scholars are not in agreement as to how coalition members influence policy. One argument emphasizes the veto power ability of coalition members, suggesting that coalition cabinets are more likely to engage in more peaceful, less aggressive foreign policy behavior (Maoz and Russett, 1993). This is because the multiple parties provide constraint from any one party taking aggressive, militant actions. A second argument emphasizes the facilitating ability of coalition members, arguing that coalitions engage in more extreme or aggressive foreign policies (Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Kaarbo, Beasley, and McGuire, 2004). This is because responsibility is shared among parties and therefore less accountable to the electorate. Additionally, it could stem from junior parties being

28 Although these works do not explicitly address policy ‘change’ or ‘continuity’ (some focus on the democratic peace), the mixed results they provide are important and allow us to implicitly draw conclusions relevant to this research. There is a divide between whether coalition governments or single- party governments are more apt to be extreme in their foreign policies (often aggressive behavior). The conclusion we can draw is when governments change between coalitions and single-parties, the foreign policies are likely to change as well. 52

able to ‘hijack’ the coalition and push it to the extreme. Other scholars have found mixed results (Kaarbo and Beasley, 2005; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004; Reiter and

Tillman, 2002) or found coalition governments do not differ from majority governments

(Ireland and Gartner, 2001). 29

Non-Government Veto Players: Opposition Parties The above considerations of the veto players in one-party/predominant party or

coalition governments are empirical examples that coincide with Tsebelis’ conceptual

definition. These veto players are all the government, broadly defined. However, it is

necessary to amend this to include a veto player external to the government: opposition

parties. 30 Although Tsebelis does not address why he omits opposition parties, one can

imagine it is because opposition parties have a minority status in government. Given this

status, their agreement for policies is not required. But this belief is due to a strictly

numerical view of opposition parties. Despite numerical minorities, opposition parties

can and do influence policies and the decision-making process. Take for example

Daniels’ (1998) examination of the dramatic change of the British Labour party over the

course of the 1980s from hostilely opposing European integration for ideological reasons

to a party of positively accepting Europe. The opposition-turned-support placed the

Conservative Party in a pinch and helped lead to more British involvement with Europe.

The same pattern was at work in Germany. Rathbun (2006) shows that due to the pacifist

29 Although not examining conflict, an excellent article on the mixed effect coalition governments have on decision-making is one by Hagan et al., 2001. 30 Including opposition parties helps explain an anomaly in Tsebelis’ work. According to Tsebelis, Japan has only one veto player, the LDP (314). But under his theory, “systems with multiple incongruent and cohesive veto players will present higher levels of stability in policy making than systems with one veto player or a small number of incohesive and congruent veto players.” (317) Because Japan has one veto player, there should be low levels of policy stability. But looking at Japan’s foreign policy until 1990, this is not the case. Despite years of LDP single-party governments, Japan’s foreign policies did not change. And even applying this argument to Japan in 2003, with a 3-party coalition, it still cannot explain why foreign policies did change. What Tsebelis is missing in the Japan case are therefore considerations of bureaucratic and opposition parties as veto players. 53

ideological principles held by the opposition Social Democrats and Greens, they fiercely contested Christian Democrat’s security policies. Although out of power, the parties were able to limit changes to these policies. In other words, exercise veto power vis-à-vis the government.

In predominant party systems, like Japan, it appears illogical to consign opposition parties the moniker veto player. And yet, studies have shown that the opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was successful vis-à-vis the predominant Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) throughout the LDP’s dominant days (Mochizuki, 1982;

Pempel, 1975). The reason for the opposition’s veto power is twofold. First, the predominant party has to incorporate opposition views in order to survive as the ruling party. Despite an inability to win an electoral victory to propel them to power, minority opposition parties are capable of obtaining substantial electoral support. 31 And if the predominant party wishes to continue to win a majority (i.e. retain power), it needs to incorporate the opposition parties’ legitimate demands to prevent it from expanding its electoral base. Second, “if domination is prolonged the opposition is reduced to impotence...It sometimes happens that the opposition, being kept long out of office, assumes a more violent and extravagant attitude.” 32 In order to prevent the possibility of the opposition becoming an anti-system party, the predominant party must permit the opposition parties some policy victories.

Because opposition parties are a minority and therefore cannot directly block legislation with votes, what veto power role can opposition parties exercise? The strategy is indirect, pressuring the government to adopt or change a policy through the limited

31 Mochizuki, 1982, 321. 32 Duverger, 1959, 417. 54

means available. In Mochizuki’s (1982) examination of Japan, he outlines three strategies

(pre-parliamentary, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) as means “to alter or block the government’s legislative program as well as to get legislation which the opposition supports enacted.” 33 Pre-parliamentary means include direct contact with bureaucrats drafting legislation and participation in councils attached to various ministries/agencies.

Parliamentary means include participation in parliamentary interpellations, passing committee resolutions and supplementary resolutions, submitting opposition-sponsored bills, alter legislation (via negotiations), or block legislation. For bills it opposes,

Mochizuki argues the JSP can employ a variety of tactics to delay the legislation: prevent the assignment of bills to committee, prolong committee deliberations, boycott, no- confidence motions, and physical obstruction. Extra-parliamentary means include mobilizing groups to oppose government proposals. Given these various means to influence policy and set parameters on government, it is difficult to deny that opposition parties can be a ‘veto player’ even in predominant party systems.

What this means is that when making foreign policy, decision-makers need to be mindful of the context within which they act (Farnham, 1990, 2004). Opposition parties, bureaucrats, and ruling coalition parties all have the potential to exercise veto power and therefore set parameters on policy because of the pervasive concern decision-makers have with acceptability (Farnham, 1990, 97; 2004; George, 1980a, 1; Hilsman, 1967,

561). When decision-makers decide policies, “effective action normally requires a

‘sufficient consensus’ in support of proposed policies and that depends on acceptability.

To be effective…a policy must be acceptable to some minimum number of relevant

33 Mochizuki, 1982, 321. For a detailed explanation of what each of these strategies entail, see Chapter 6. 55

groups and individuals.” 34 This includes government decision-makers and legislators. 35

That means those in charge of foreign policies need to be aware of what is acceptable to

those most immediate to them in government (i.e. leaders, bureaucrats, ruling

party/parties) and also those less-immediate, external opposition parties.

Non-Government Veto Players: Public If that were not enough, there is one final veto player that needs to be considered

in a democracy: the public. This is true for one-party governments, two-party

governments or coalition governments. Presidents/prime ministers must care about

whether their policies are popular. Popular opinion therefore acts as a constraint and an

enabler on the policies decision-makers choose (Lippmann, 1955; Russett, 1990; George,

1980; Page and Shapiro, 1983). 36 But the influence popular opinion plays is not direct.

Leaders must worry about their next election or their party’s next election. This makes

public image important and the government’s response to public opinion necessary.

Democratic leaders must care about public opinion and this opinion may be gained or lost

as a result of policies taken. But it is not always the case that the mechanics of the public

veto player will be as direct as: if the public agrees with something, it enables a policy; if

the public disagrees with something, it constrains policy. Instead, different from the veto

players described above, public opinion’s ability to exercise veto power is intertwined

with the opposition parties’ ability to exercise its veto power. If opposition parties want

to affect policies, “having the support of vocal and persistent extra-parliamentary groups

becomes a major factor.” 37 So opposition parties use the public’s attention on legislative

34 Farnham, 2004, 443. 35 George, 1980a; Hilsman, 1967, 561. 36 For a good article questioning the role that public opinion plays, see Risse-Kappen, 1991. 37 Mochizuki, 1982, 331. 56

proceedings to criticize the government and win electoral support for the next election. 38

If opposition parties’ message resonates with the public, this audience effect limits what the government can pursue, sending a message of ‘unacceptability’ to the government. In this situation, we can expect that the partisanship “should only exacerbate the difficulties governments face in arriving at and implementing government policies and programs.” 39

The resonance therefore forces even predominant party governments to give-in to opposition resistance. If opposition parties’ message does not resonate, the government faces a situation of more acceptability and therefore, less constrained in passing the proposed policies.

Considering all the possible players that can exercise veto power--leaders, parties in government, bureaucracy, opposition parties, public opinion--it is reasonable to assume that each country is composed of a different combination of veto players. Richard

Neustadt notes, governments are composed of separated institutions sharing powers. 40 In some countries, executives will have to share veto power with legislatures. In others, it is solely the parties that make up a ruling coalition. Or sometimes public opinion will play a severely restricting role on the government. Yet in others, various bureaucracies hold veto power along with the legislature, including opposition parties. In the end, differences depend on the particular country. And while veto power varies across countries, it can also vary across time for one country. Changes therefore affect what bureaucratic or political unit has veto power in the decision-making process. In Chapter Three, I will examine the veto players specific to Japan.

38 Mochizuki, 1982, 319-320. 39 Prins and Sprecher, 1999, 275. 40 Neustadt, 1960, 33. Neustadt was talking about the US Constitution that was supposed to create a separation of powers but really created a government of separated institutions sharing powers. 57

In closing, veto players frame the deliberation of policies and are responsible for which are passed. This explains how different alignments shift the parameters of viable policy options. If realignment reduces the number of veto players, then this means a fewer number of units whose ‘signature’ is necessary for the proposal to go through.

Likewise, if the nature of the veto players change, this would mean different interests in supporting or opposing policies. While changes in the number or nature of veto players help us understand why policies may change, it does not help us understand why new policy ideas emerge or why they are chosen. For that, we need to focus on the thousands of decision-makers that exist within a state and understand the cognitive structure of decision-makers themselves.

Cognitive Structure Ideas “define the universe of possibilities for action.” 41 These ideas exist within

decision-makers who work in the political and bureaucratic entities described above as

veto players. Individuals have different ideas that lead them to interpret events differently

and advocate different solutions to problems. Similar to the veto players that determine

who has a voice in the decision-making process, ideas form cognitive structures within

the minds of decision-makers. These cognitive structures act as a framework for how

decision-makers view and interpret events and what action they believe is necessary

(based on their interpretation). For foreign policy decision-makers, this means policy

options. It follows that changes in cognitive structures mean changes in what policies are

considered and chosen.

Consideration of cognitive attributes of individuals has a rich history in the

political psychology literature. Individuals are treated as ‘cognitive misers’ (Fiske and

41 Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a, 8. 58

Taylor, 1984 42 ) or actors with limited or bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1956, 1985).

In other words, limitations of knowledge and calculation are assumed. Because agents are not perfectly rational, the way they process information and make decisions matter.

Political psychology teaches us that humans have to “rely on some sort of simplifying mechanism to cope and to process-to code, store, and recall-the massive amount of information they encounter in their daily lives.” 43 Decision-makers

must somehow comprehend complex situations in order to decide how best to deal with them. In doing so, the actor typically engages in a ‘definition of the situation,’ i.e., a cognitive structuring of the situation that will clarify for him the nature of the problem, relate it to his previous experience, and make it amenable to appropriate problem-solving activities. 44

The way humans do this are through the use of cognitive knowledge structures stored in memory, which are referred to as schema (Axelrod, 1973). Schemata are abstract, generic cognitive frames that are created from generalizing across one’s experiences. They

“represent knowledge about a concept, person, role, group, or event to organize their interpretation of their environment and develop scripts for action.” 45 Schemata lend order to an otherwise incomprehensible amount of information encountered on a daily basis.

Based on this, individuals can then simplify the information, interpret it, understand choice, and act.

Schemata work automatically, subconsciously. People store experiences in schemata to make sense of the world. They function by lending structure to incoming information, helping an individual determine what information will be retrieved from

42 Fiske and Taylor, 1984, 13. 43 Khong, 1992, 25. 44 George, 1969, 200. 45 Stein, 1994, 163. 59

memory, affect the speed of cognition, and facilitate problem solving. 46 If an individual experiences New Experience A, his memory mines past experiences for A-Like-

Experiences so as to understand New Experience A. Once his memory finds the schema storing A-Like-Experiences, he understands New Experience A. If faced with problems in New Experience A that were encountered in a prior A-Like-Experience, the schema facilitates how to solve the problem because he can extract from memory how the problem was solved before, providing expectations for what succeeds. In this way, by matching new instances with past instances, schemas help individuals deal with uncertainty. As such, schemas help individuals organize information in a top-down manner without having to resort to inductive reasoning for every new experience.

All individuals possess multiple schemata. Although not using the vocabulary of schema theory, Kelley and Michela (1980) have in fact categorized three broad types of schemata that individuals access when experiencing new information. 47 To analyze foreign policy decision-making, we are interested in the schema of foreign policy decision-makers. When these decision-makers confront a new, uncertain event, in an attempt to make sense out of it they access a schema that has worked in the past in dealing with similar situations. For example, when a decision-maker faces New Foreign

Event A and knows that in the past A-Like-Foreign-Events have been dealt with by

Policy Y, then the individual will access the schema of ‘When A, Y.’ This serves as a basis for learning of ‘what works’ and therefore reinforces the viability of the schema ‘A-

46 Reiter, 1996, 21. 47 Although they do not use the word schema, they argue that there are different types of beliefs about suppositions of causes and expectations of effects. Given these suppositions and expectations, explanations can often be given for events without fully analyzing information. From their description, it is easy to classify these into schema. 1) Outcome Schema: suppositions of causes of success and failure; 2) Other Person Schema: expectations about other persons/groups of people; and 3) Situation Schema: expectations of the likelihood of a behavior in certain situations. 60

Like-Foreign-Events are able to be dealt with by Policy Y.’ Success breeds expectations of what works. Over time, more A-Like-Foreign-Events dealt with by Policy Y strengthens the validity of this schema by which to address new events and is recalled whenever faced with a new A-Like-Foreign-Event.

Schema versus Analogy Unlike schema, which are generic cognitive frames, there is a similar cognitive structure that is derived directly from an experience with a specific past event (Read,

1983). This is commonly referred to as a historical analogy. An analogy works the same way as a schema by providing a useful shortcut to rationality, but the difference is that an analogy accesses a specific event and a specific cause-effect relationship. Analogies are stored and later accessed when this cause-effect relationship underlying a specific behavior is simple (Read, 1983; Khong, 1992). When an individual faces a new situation in which some aspects of the new experience are similar to a specific past event, the cause-and-effect of that specific analogy are accessed. But often the use of such an analogy “obscure[s] aspects of the present case that are different from the past one.” 48 In any event, the past experience is used as insight into the new event and provides the individual with a script for how to react given this situation no matter how right or wrong it is. The most notorious example is the use of the analogy of Munich by decision-makers.

For example, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, it was easier for US decision-makers to understand the situation through an analogous comparison with Hitler, leading to the conclusion that if Hussein was not stopped, he would only become more aggressive and expansionist. 49 To appease would be dangerous. It should be clear from this example that unlike uncovering abstract schema, it is easier to ‘see’ analogies simply

48 Jervis, 1976, 220. 49 See an interesting article on this point. Spellman and Holyoak, 1992. 61

by their usage. If a decision-maker refers to a specific past event to understand the new

event, or refers to some specific lessons of a specific past event that helped equip them to

deal with the new event, then an analogy has been accessed.

As Khong (1992) argued, the difference between schema and analogies is slight,

but it is real. Khong’s attempt at highlighting the difference between the two via the use

of an example helps us. Khong argues that, “…if Truman reasoned that failure to stop

North Korea would have the same consequences as Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, he

would be reasoning by analogy. If he abstracted from the specifics of Manchuria to form

the axiom that aggression unchecked means general war later, the axiom would be a

schema.” 50 I would correct this last sentence to clarify the point even further, if Truman had abstracted from the specifics of Manchuria, Munich, Korea, and other historical cases of aggression to form the axiom that aggression unchecked means general war later, this would be a schema. While Khong is correct to highlight their difference, he is mistaken by using the two interchangeably in his argument. The two are both knowledge structures by which individuals understand new information, but they should not be treated interchangeably. Reasoning by relying on schema and relying on specific historical analogy are two types of reasoning that need to be kept distinct. The former rely more on numerous iterations and the generic lessons learned from across a large number of experiences. The latter relies on one iteration and the specific lesson learned. It would seem more probable that on a daily basis, decision-makers reason more by what worked or did not work any number of times before rather than by historical analogy alone.

50 Khong, 1992, 26. 62

Decision-makers, when faced with a new situation, will understand it via the

schemata he/she holds, leading to expectations of what works. When a multitude of

schemata exist amongst a large number of decision-makers who have equal influence in

the decision-making process, the country’s adaptive capacity to new events is

weakened. 51 This is because there will be little agreement concerning both ends and/or means among the decision-makers. If these decision-makers have veto power at different stages of the policy process, conflict will exist throughout the decision-making process.

This is especially true if schemata are mutually exclusive. In a situation where the political structure allows relative equality of participants in the policy-making process in which competing schemata exist, the possibility for gridlock is high because policies will result from power struggles and negotiated settlements. This will prevent the government from committing the country to a substantively meaningful course of action in its foreign policy. 52 When decision-makers converge on similar schema, on the other hand, general agreement on both means and ends results. Even if the political structure allowed relative equality of participation in the policy-making process, the result is that decision-making becomes more of a cooperative endeavor.

Schema Change The crux of explaining change in cognitive structures is being able to explain

changes in schemata. Political psychology tells us that when new information does not fit

well with existing schemata, individuals may use the same schema but largely discount

the new information that does not fit well with existing schemata (Jervis, 1976; Tetlock,

1999). This is the tendency of persistence. Scholars, mostly in the field of psychology,

51 A good article examining the breakdown of consensus of belief systems and the result: Rosenau and Holsti, 1983. 52 Hagan, 1993, 69. 63

have found that when one’s perceptions have been discredited by new information, they

still persevere (Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard, 1975; Lord, Ross, and Lepper, 1979;

Anderson, Lepper, and Ross, 1980). This tendency to persevere means that once formed,

schemata are difficult to change, making schema stability the default position. “People do

not change their minds as much as a good Bayesian would.” 53

But change does occur. Under what conditions do individuals’ schemata change?

The most common way is gradual change. As individuals receive and consider

“…information inconsistent with previous knowledge, they incorporate into their schema

the conditions under which the schema does not hold.” 54 Individuals try to accommodate

this new information “…by minimizing the number of related cognitions that must be

changed in the process of incorporating the new evidence.” 55 This means that in the face

of increasing amount of discrepant information, the piling up of increasing dissonance

between new information and existing schema exposes problems that make individuals

adjust only portions of their schema (Higgens and Bargh, 1987; 56 Stein, 1994; Tetlock,

1991). The adjustments therefore are “…most likely to occur at the periphery and

incrementally. People will…make the smallest possible change; they will change their

schemata incrementally, allow a large number of exceptions and special cases, and make

superficial alterations rather than reject existing schemata.” 57 This process of change is

therefore gradual.

Dramatic and far-reaching change rarely occurs, but it does occur. When a new

event is interpreted through existing schema and the new information is unambiguously

53 Tetlock, 1999, 358. 54 Stein, 1994, 164. 55 Tetlock, 1991, 30. 56 Higgins and Bargh, 1987, 386. 57 Stein, 1994, 164. 64

discrepant, it highlights large-scale problems with existing schema. The schema comes to

be seen as failing to provide an adequate cognitive structure to interpret events and act.

“Even the strongest schema cannot withstand the challenge of strongly incongruent

information or a competing schema that fits the data better.” 58 This failure therefore

stimulates a complete overhaul of existing schema because the traumatic experience

exposes problems in existing schema. This type of change occurs when individuals have

a high-impact emotional experience, such as unexpected catastrophes or unanticipated

failures (Kuklick, 1970; Reiter, 1996; Rosenau and Holsti, 1983; Roskin, 1974; Russett,

1975; Stein, 1994). These events become formative events for individuals (Kuklick,

1970; Roskin, 1974; Russett, 1975), or vivid events (Reiter, 1996). The event makes even

more of an impression if it is experienced firsthand (Jervis, 1976; 59 Reiter, 1996).

Examples include Pearl Harbor and September 11 th . These events are considered

formative or vivid because of their emotional impact. The emotional tidal wave is the

mechanism by which the existing schemata that are believed to have led to the

unexpected catastrophe or failure are discredited and collapse. The lesson learned forms

the basis of a new schema.

From ‘Schema’ to ‘Belief’ In both success and failure, learning is the mechanism by which individuals maintain or discard schema. But before examining learning in more detail, it is necessary to make one significant change to the discussion I have presented thus far. Until now, my discussion has utilized the concept of schema. This is because schemata provide the

58 Ibid, 164. 59 Jervis, 1976, 239-271. Jervis argues that there are four variables that influence the degree to which an event affects later perceptual dispositions. In addition to the importance of experiencing an event firsthand, he also includes whether it occurred early in adult life or career, whether it had important consequences for one’s nation, and whether the person is familiar with a range of international events that facilitate alternative perceptions. 65

conceptual shorthand for what I am arguing: ideas act as cognitive structures that

influence how individuals will interpret events and what action they believe is necessary

based on this interpretation. But this is not a dissertation about schema or political

psychology. The utilization of the term schema as a variable invites unnecessary

confusion because of unfamiliarity with schema as a concept. Therefore, because the

conceptual foundation of schema has been presented, it is now possible to step away from

this term while maintaining the theoretical element of schema that is important: individuals hold cognitive structures that influence how they interpret events and what action they believe is necessary based on this. In its place, I choose to instead utilize the term ‘belief.’

I understand there are arguments differentiating the two concepts (Larson, 1994).

But I do not believe that this differentiating is fair given that Larson’s argument focuses on belief systems as a set of concentric circles and the root of her argument focuses on the very center of these circles from which other beliefs are derived. These central beliefs, which I will refer to as Beliefs with a capital-B, are worldviews, not issue specific. For example, these Beliefs concern human nature, the nature of freedom and equality, and whether the nature of politics is one of conflict or harmony. For Larson, these Beliefs are associated with collective bodies of thought, such as ideologies. Given this, it is understandable why Larson finds beliefs and schema to be different. But understanding that both beliefs and schema vary in complexity, the beliefs that I equate with schema are those beliefs farther out on Larson’s concentric circles (beliefs with a small-b). It is here that schema and beliefs can be used interchangeably because they both consist of interrelated knowledge about issues and situations, both simplify information

66

and help define situations, both help individuals search and analyze options and suggest

standards and guidelines on action, and both vary with experience. Given this, I believe it

makes sense to move forward utilizing more recognizable parlance (i.e. belief) while

keeping the theoretical construct of what schemata are so as to avoid unnecessary

obstacles to accessing my argument and examination. Hereafter, I therefore will use the

word ‘belief’ in place of ‘schema.’

Learning Returning to the issue of learning, we know that individuals either learn what works and maintain beliefs or they learn what does not work and change beliefs. When the individuals we are referring to are the decision-makers for a country’s foreign policy, in discussing success and failure we are referring to foreign policies. Learning is translated into new policy ideas. Whether these ideas become policies depends on the structure within which they are debated. We move next to examine how decision-makers learn (Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Kuklick, 1970; Levy, 1994; Reiter, 1996; Stein,

1994; Thomas, 1999).

‘Learning’ is a soft concept. It is easy to say that someone learned, but it is an entirely different thing to define it, isolate it, and measure it. 60 In other words, it is

difficult to show that learning occurred. Let us therefore begin with a definition. Reiter

defines learning as “the application of information derived from past experiences to

facilitate understanding of a particular policy question.” 61 But this definition

unnecessarily defines learning as somehow connected to policy. Although we are

interested in policy changes, the definition of learning need not be defined by its relation

to policies. Therefore, Levy’s definition is more appropriate. Namely, “a change of

60 Levy, 1994, 280. 61 Reiter, 1996, 19-20. 67

beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs,

skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.” 62 In

other words, a reassessment of beliefs. Mendelson (1993), Stein (1994), Levy (1994),

Nye (1987), and Legvold (1991) make important distinctions to this definition,

delineating between simple and complex learning. Simple learning, or ‘adaptation’

according to Haas (1991), is “where behavior may change while basic aims and values

remain the same.” 63 In other words, the goals remain the same but the means to achieve

them change. This type of learning is identified with individuals gradually adjusting their

beliefs. Complex learning, on the other hand, “involves recognition of conflicts among

means and goals in causally complicated situations, and leads to new priorities and trade-

offs.” 64 In other words, not only do means change, but more importantly the goals change. This involves the construction of new representations of the problem, definitions of the situation, revision of what constrains and enables, development of new solutions, and a new organization of knowledge relevant to the given problem. 65 This type of

learning is identified with individuals undergoing more wide-sweeping change in their

beliefs. Noted above, this type of learning is associated with unexpected failure or

traumatic events.

Learning, even from traumatic events, is not a passive activity. When an event

occurs, actors approach the situation via a particular belief. Therefore, lessons learned are

informed by the particular belief with which the event is interpreted. Depending on the

belief, it is possible that what others see as failure they could see as success. As such,

62 Levy, 1994, 283. 63 Mendelson, 1993, 332. 64 Nye, 1987, 380. 65 This definition draws heavily on Stein, 1994, 172 . 68

while some may discard an existing belief, others will have their belief reinforced via the mechanism explained above (i.e. success breeds reinforcement). Therefore, even lessons drawn from similar experiences will be different. This is not surprising. Individuals interpret history differently and draw different conclusions. But for those individuals who did access a belief that was interpreted to have led to the unexpected catastrophe or failure, the event delegitimizes that belief and provides an opportunity for rethinking past practices. The event then destabilizes the prevailing wisdom and opens the way for change. 66 And if an alternative belief (Belief Z) existed that opposed the original belief

(Belief A) that is seen to have led to the policy failure, then the failure could confirm the value of alternative Belief Z.

Organizational Learning The ‘learning’ described above is that of individual learning. But learning does not matter in a foreign policy context unless it is translated into policy. And although policies are the work of individuals, “lessons learned by one bureaucrat do not necessarily become the collective wisdom of that unit.” 67 Thousands of individuals are involved in crafting foreign policy in political parties and bureaucratic entities and these individuals all learn their own lessons. But there is no one-to-one relationship between an individual’s belief and a state’s foreign policy. If all human beings were perfectly rational, then the scripts for action based on individuals’ beliefs would be identical, leading directly to new policy innovation. But humans are not perfectly rational, so beliefs act as the lens to process the information of a new event and give it meaning. Because of these two factors, what is important in understanding foreign policy decision-making then are the organizational units within which individuals exist. It is these units that have veto

66 Avant, 2000, 42. 67 Haas, 1991, 74. 69

power to pass/block policies and are responsible for implementing policies that are eventually passed. Therefore, it is necessary to consider how individual learning by bureaucrats and politicians translates into organizational learning. 68 In states where one person has autocratic authority, such an examination is probably not necessary. But in democracies, this is not the case.

Bureaucratic and political organizations are not entities that have goals or learn

(Cyert and March, 1964a; Etheredge, 1981, 1985; Lebovic, 1995; Lovell, 1984). Instead, they consist of “a coalition of individuals, some of them organized into subcoalitions.” 69

It is these individuals who learn. But just because an individual learns or group of individuals learn does not mean that an organization changes.70 The ability of one individual to modify the policies of an organization is extremely low (Lindblom, 1979).

Even if a large number of individuals within an organization learn a similar lesson this does not automatically mean that an organization learns. This is because rules and organizational norms exist that suppress dissent or prescribe solutions to problems, thereby limiting challenges to existing practices (Argyris and Schon, 1978). Therefore, organizational learning is not simply a task of aggregating individual learning. Instead, there is a reexamination of beliefs that occurs that begins with a questioning of the cause and effect, means and ends held by decision-makers. Problems and heretofore held solutions are disaggregated. It is at this point of disaggregation that the first step in organizational learning occurs. Haas argues,

68 When politicians learn, they take their individually learned lessons directly with them when they vote or debate policies. They can always disagree with their party and vote directly with their own beliefs. But because of modern party organizations that work to ensure party members vote in line with party line, we can say that parties function in similar ways like bureaucratic organizations. Parties too are a group of individuals who have different ideas and arrive at a policy for the party. 69 Cyert and March, 1964b, 27. 70 Levy, 1994, 288-89. 70

Learning…implies that the organization’s members are induced to question earlier beliefs about the appropriateness of ends of action, and to think about the selection of new ones, to revalue themselves. And as the members of the organization go through this process, it is likely that they will arrive at a common understanding of what causes the particular problems of concern. A common understanding of causes is likely to trigger a shared understanding of solutions, and the new chain implies a set of larger meanings about life and nature not previously held in common by the participants. 71

Having individuals within an organization go through this process and arrive at a shared understanding is a necessary first step, but to say that an organization ‘learned’ it is necessary for the lessons learned to be institutionalized. Institutionalization of the lessons can take many forms, as a number of examples suggest. These include:

• An organization has learned “to the extent that policy experiences become assimilated into organizational doctrine, structure, decision-making procedures, personnel systems, and organizational commitments.” 72 • If institutions are created, dismantled, or reorganized with the objective of avoiding mistakes or repeating successes of the past, this is evidence of collective learning. 73 • If new principles of action are developed along with administrative practices that are designed to improve the performance of the polity/organization in the wake of some major disappointment with an earlier performance, 74 this is evidence of organizational learning. • Institutionalization of lessons into organizational routines, rules, or norms. 75

These different examples of evidence that an organization has learned can be summarized by saying past failures “are reflected in changes in organizational routines and guidelines.” 76 Through the organizational changes that take place, the lessons automatically become the new baseline for future decision-making activities. The idea’s

71 Haas, 1991, 73 72 Lovell, 1984, 135. 73 Tetlock, 1991, 41. Tetlock also lists evidence of collective learning as attempts to institutionalize access of knowledge from epistemic communities to the decision-making process and the setting in motion of cultural, political, and intellectual forces that decision-makers lose the ability to control. 74 Haas, 1991, 89. 75 Levy, 1994, 287-289; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a, 20-24; Krasner, 1993; Katzenstein, 1993; and Levitt and March, 1988, 320. 76 Jervis, 1976, 238. 71

influence “will be reflected in the incentives of those in the organization and those whose

interests are served by it.” 77

Nature of Lessons Learned and the Clarity of Feedback We know that success reinforces current beliefs and failure leads to change, either

gradual or rapid. But how do we explain the particular nature of the lessons learned from

failure? When looking back at an event with 20/20 hindsight, it may appear that lessons

from certain events are unambiguous, but this is rarely the case. Instead, because of the

ambiguity of information concerning both the causes and implications of events, and

considering how many decision-makers exist in a state, it is undeniable that multiple

lessons are drawn from an event. For example, why did American policy-makers learn

from Manchuria, Ethiopia, Munich, and North Korea that failure to stop aggression

encourages more aggression? Were there alternative lessons available, such as the need to

engage in more diplomacy so as to avert aggression?

Scholars have attempted to address this issue with limited success. For Haas,

epistemic communities play the important role in learning by providing decision-makers

with “new ways of thinking, of defining problems, of anticipating new problems and

possibilities.” 78 Although he does not address the nature of lessons learned, he suggests

the definitions provided by the epistemic communities lead bureaucrats to reach the

conclusions that they do. But this does little more than explain that the lessons learned

were those pushed forward by the epistemic communities. It is agnostic on the nature of

the lessons. Jervis too falls short. 79 Jervis provides four explanations, but of these four, three are not able to explain why someone would learn a lesson that is not a dominant

77 Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a, 20. 78 Haas, 1991, 69. 79 Jervis, 1976, 271-281. 72

belief of the day. 80 In other words, he is unable to explain why someone would learn a new lesson not already believed to be true. The closest Jervis comes is a fourth explanation he calls ‘reactions to failure.’ Due to failure, decision-makers will learn the lesson to avoid policies that have failed in the immediate past. And yet, this does not help us explain why one lesson is chosen over another because the unacceptable policies “may lead either to more international collaboration or to more national self-sufficiency and isolation, to more complex international dependencies or to simpler patterns.” 81 For example, when American decision-makers look at the lessons of the Vietnam War, they have the option to cite the difficulty of fighting a guerrilla war with conventional forces, the need to use more force from the beginning of a conflict, or the necessity of maintaining continued funding.

As shown in this example, there are multiple lessons that are possible. This reinforces the idea that history does not provide unambiguous lessons. But what happens when unambiguous feedback exists regarding the failure of one’s policies? For example, the feedback from the Franco-Prussian War was the failure of the doctrine of the offensive. Military strategy based on this doctrine led to military failure. The lesson learned was therefore to stop relying on an offensive posture. With the feedback so clearly pointing to the failure of the doctrine of the offensive, it is not surprising that

French military thinkers advocated a defensive posture prior to WWI. Compare this with an event that resulted in ambiguous feedback concerning one’s policies. The US lost in

Vietnam, but did this demonstrate that guerilla wars cannot be won? Or that third-party states should not get involved in civil wars? Or the importance of continued funding?

80 These three include the impact of constant factors, lessons about specific actors, and the effect of success. 81 Haas, 1991, 62. 73

There were several options and while the feedback was all undesirable, they were not

clear in terms of what failed.

The difference is therefore the clarity of the feedback concerning one’s failed policies. Feedback implies that one’s policy output is returned as future policy input. For decision-makers, “effective learning requires accurate, reliable feedback about the relationship between situational conditions and the most appropriate response.” 82 The simpler the connections between cause and effect that exist in this feedback, the more predictable the nature of the lesson will be. For example, a child learns simple and clear feedback if it touches a hot stove: touch the hot stove, get burned. There is no ambiguity in the feedback. Compare this with a situation in which feedback includes a variety of complex cause and effect connections. In this situation, the lesson will not be clear, enabling decision-makers to choose from a host of possible lessons.

I fully understand that feedback concerning one’s policies is rarely simple and unambiguous. Therefore, the likelihood of having such clear feedback presented to decision-makers from which to draw lessons will remain limited to a small number of cases. All other cases will remain firmly in the grasp of the tyranny of Fortuna, with decision-makers having to choose what lesson they think is appropriate. And understanding that decision-makers do not always use history correctly (May, 1973;

Neustadt and May, 1986), the potential for learning the wrong lessons remain high. That said, I am providing a necessary first-cut at attempting to explain the nature of the lessons learned. Future scholars should conduct research aiming to clarify the relationship between the clarity of feedback and the nature of the lessons learned.

82 Larson, 1991, 352. 74

Reputation Assuming that I am correct that the clarity of feedback matters in determining the

nature of the lesson learned, the important next-question is why does feedback matter?

Most theories of international relations stress the importance of material concerns, such

as military security or economic gain, but feedback is non-material. Why would a state be

concerned with non-material matters? The reason why is because of the importance of

reputation in international relations (Markey, 2000; 83 Mercer, 1996). Concerns with

reputation is not new. The deterrence literature argues that a reputation for resolve is

necessary for preventing war (Schelling, 1966; George and Smoke, 1974; Morgan, 1977)

and some have argued it matters for choosing one’s allies (Miller, 2003). Additionally,

states have shown time and again that they act out of concern for their reputation. 84 And

scholars arguing in the Neoliberalism school (Keohane, 1984; Milgrom, North, and

Weingast, 1990; Tomz, 2007) place reputation at the heart of their theory because

reputation is the underpinning of effective decentralized cooperation. States are

concerned with their reputation as reliable partners. The argument, in its simplest form, is

that states fear that if they display any sign of unreliability, this will damage their current

relationships, leading other states to become more unwilling to cooperate in the future.

This concern therefore helps ensure states maintain their agreements. Keohane argues,

In the absence of specific retaliation, governments may still have incentives to comply with regime rules and principles if they … believe that their reputations are at stake… [T]he costs of acquiring a bad reputation as a result of rule- violations are imposed specifically on the transgressor. As long as a continuing series of issues is expected to arise in the future, and as long as actors monitor each others’ behavior and discount the value of agreements on the basis of past compliance, having a good reputation is valuable even to the egoist whose role in

83 Although Markey uses the term ‘prestige’ he is referring to the same idea as reputation. 84 Mercer, 19. US decision-makers have used reputation both in the design of nuclear strategy and as a reason for intervening or not intervening in foreign conflicts. The US has acted out of concern for its reputation in Korea, Strait Crises, Vietnam, Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. 75

collective activity is so small that she would bear few of the costs of her own malefactions. 85

In the realm of international relations, a reputation can be defined as a judgment about a state’s current and past behavior that is used to make a prediction about that state’s future behavior. Because there is a tendency to perceive correspondence between disposition and act, 86 a behavior that other states view as wrong will be attributed to the

character of one’s state. I assume that non-revisionist states desire to have a good

reputation. And good reputations matter in one of two ways. States desire a good

reputation either as a means to a material end or as an end in itself. In the former, the goal

is to achieve a good reputation so as to improve one’s chances to obtain a different goal,

such as economic development or the avoidance of war. In the latter, the goal is to

achieve a good reputation because reputation (or prestige) “is the everyday currency of

international relations.” 87 For this latter type, if other states form negative reputations

about a state, then that state will be trusted less. And this matters because reputations are

sticky and affect all future interactions with other states. Unless a state is revisionist,

negative reputations act as a powerful mechanism for decision-makers to bear

responsibilities that they would otherwise be accused of shirking. Therefore, the desire

for a good reputation motivates decision-makers to avoid criticism of their efforts. But if

Mercer (1996) is correct, then states have no control over efforts to try to control their

reputation.

Taken together, I have argued that beliefs held by decision-makers lead them to

pursue policies that they expect will lead to a successful outcome given the event at hand.

85 Keohane, 1984, 105. 86 Mercer, 1996, 49-50. 87 Gilpin, 1981, 31. 76

When the feedback that decision-makers receive in response to their policies points to

unambiguous and unexpected failure of the policies, the lesson learned from the event

leads to a change in beliefs that framed the policy. The reason why this feedback matters

is because reputation matters. This is essentially the same argument Jeffrey Legro makes

in his explanation of how policy ideas change (2000, 2005). For Legro, when events

generate consequences that were unexpected and these consequences were undesirable,

the components necessary for change become likely. But unlike Legro, as I argued above,

we must view these decision-makers in the institutional and political entities within

which they act.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that in order to understand how and why foreign policies change, we need to consider both decision-makers’ beliefs and the veto players within which they exist and make policies. We understand that struggles over policy take place amongst veto players. If an entity exists within a state’s governmental structure that opposes alternative policy options and exercises veto power, then policy change is constrained because the range of policy alternatives will remain limited. Likewise, decision-makers hold beliefs. These beliefs form cognitive restraints on individuals by limiting the range of policy alternatives they consider. To understand why policies change, we need to equally consider decision-makers’ beliefs and the veto players of a state. Changes in veto power come by deliberate reform efforts, gradual changes that shift balances of authority over time, or changes in the interests of the entities. Changes in beliefs are caused by learning brought on by feedback.

Fitting all these moving parts together is difficult, but not impossible. Recalling the argument by Hilsman (1967) and Hagan (1993) that decision-making is a political

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process is a useful way to conceptualize this interaction. When looking at how foreign

policies are made, we should keep in mind that this is a political process. By admitting as

much, we admit this involves a diversity of goals and beliefs on the best way to fulfill

goals. These alternative goals, and the policies best suited to achieve them, are identified

with and advocated by different coalitions of decision-makers throughout government.

But it is not always the case that these decision-makers all have an equal voice in the

process. Instead, it is acknowledged that these groupings have different institutional

power vis-à-vis one another. This makes policy outcomes to be the result of conflict and consensus-building. 88 Once a policy emerges from this process, decision-makers eventually learn of the ‘success’ of their policy via feedback from the international community, which can (but not necessarily) lead to a redefinition of goals and beliefs that these decision-makers bring with them to the table the next time around.

This process of decision-making, policy output, and learning is best captured in

March and Olsen’s (1976, 1988 89 ) description of the learning cycle as a stimulus- response system. Individual actions lead to organizational actions which evoke environmental responses. These responses, in turn, are reported back to the organization where they affect individual cognitions and preference and therefore influence future organizational actions. Individuals act and learn from acting and these experiences modify organizations’ behavior. 90 The past behavior that is institutionalized in the

organization affects new members of the organization.

88 Hilsman, 1967, 546. 89 March and Olsen, 1976 and March and Olsen, 1988. 90 March and Olsen emphasize trial-and-error sequences. I am suggesting that trauma can act as a sudden shock that leads to the same changes. 78

Understanding the conceptual background underlying this research enables us to move next to the case of Japan to examine what veto players mattered and what coalitions of beliefs existed in 1990 and 2003. I trace the effects of changes in the nature of veto players and the beliefs of decision-makers to demonstrate how different conditions changed both what policy options were possible and which ones were chosen.

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III. Changes in Japan: The Nature of the Opposition Parties and Decision-Makers’ Beliefs

Chapter Two presented the theoretical arguments for why policies change. From it,

I derive the argument that both veto players and decision-makers’ beliefs matter for explaining foreign policy change. In this chapter, I move from theory to specifics. I focus on the importance of Japan’s opposition parties as veto players and specifically on changes in the nature of the parties from the ideological Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to the pragmatic Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). This change transformed what policies were possible, thereby widening the parameters of viable policy options. Additionally, I argue

the beliefs of decision-makers inhabiting government veto players changed. In 1990, the

predominant beliefs amongst decision-makers led them to oppose policies that included

SDF dispatch. By 2003, this had changed, with the predominant belief leading decision-

makers to support policies that included SDF dispatch. The result was transforming what

policies were chosen . To explain the shift, I point to the shock of the Gulf War

experience and the lessons learned from it that were institutionalized.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly compare Japan’s veto players in

1990 and 2003 and explain my reasoning for focusing primarily on opposition parties. I

then examine in detail the change in the nature of opposition parties from the JSP to DPJ.

After this examination, I move on to examine in detail the beliefs of decision-makers in

the two periods. Using data collected from interviews with 102 Japanese decision-

makers, published interviews, parliamentary minutes, and other materials, I identify two

broad coalitions of beliefs that can be associated with either supporting SDF dispatch

policies or opposing SDF dispatch policies. Finally, I argue that the Gulf War was a

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traumatic event for decision-makers and the lessons learned from it explain why a shift in

beliefs occurs between the two time periods.

Veto Players in Japan (1990 and 2003) Recalling from Chapter Two that each country is composed of a different

combination of veto players, defined by Tsebelis as “an individual or collective actors

whose agreement is required for a policy decision,”1 it is necessary to ask what were the

relevant veto player (s) in Japan in both 1990 and 2003 for the research question posed in

Chapter One.

When considering the veto players concerning the SDF in 1990, this includes the

Kantei (i.e. institutional power of the premier), Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB),

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and Japan Defense Agency (JDA). 2 With the

exception of the JDA, the Kantei was relatively weak vis-à-vis these entities because it

did not hold any superior legal authority over them, among other things, and therefore

unable to force compliance with Kantei demands. The result was a number of potential veto players in the form of these bureaucratic entities. Because these entities exercised their veto power, this gave rise to a decision-making process fraught with intra- governmental conflict and negotiated compromises. In 2001, reforms clarified the legal standing of the Kantei as superior vis-à-vis these entities but did nothing to reduce the number of veto players or the potential veto power of MOFA, JDA, or CLB because the

Kantei still relied heavily on these entities for information, policy formulation, and

staffing. The Kantei, MOFA, JDA, and CLB remained veto players for SDF policies.

And yet, by 2003, conflict among these entities disappeared because they did not exercise

1 Tsebelis, 1995, 293. 2 Other bureaucratic entities were involved in foreign policies in general, this included Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Ministry of Transportation (MOT), Ministry of Education (MOE), and Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW). 81

their veto power. In other words, while the number of potential veto players did not change, the exercise of veto power decreased.

At the same time, the political structure was dominated by the Liberal Democratic

Party (LDP) and Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in 1990 and by the LDP and the Democratic

Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2003. All these parties were potential veto players. Interestingly, whereas the LDP and JSP were potential veto players that exercised their veto power in

1990, the LDP no longer exercised its veto power in 2003 (nor did its coalition member

Komeito). Surprisingly, although the DPJ continued to oppose the government policies, unlike the JSP it was not able to exercise its potential veto power in 2003.

In my examination of Japan in 1990, when we look at the empirical referents that would fall under Tsebelis’ conceptual definition of veto player (i.e. bureaucratic and ruling party entities), it appears that potential veto players did not change between the two time periods. If anything, an additional ruling party member increased the number veto players by one. In 1990, veto players included the Kantei, MOFA, JDA, CLB, LDP, and main opposition party (i.e. JSP) while in 2003 it included the same bureaucratic actors but included Komeito and a different main opposition party, the DPJ. Unlike 1990 when all potential veto players exercised their veto power, in 2003 potential government veto players no longer exercised their veto power and the main opposition party could not exercise its potential veto power. Why the difference?

Covered below, the reason why potential government veto players (MOFA, JDA,

CLB, Kantei, LDP) exercised veto power in 1990 was due to different beliefs held by the individuals that comprised them. Different beliefs meant they advocated different policy preferences regarding the SDF. This led decision-makers to exercise the potential veto

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power of one’s party or bureaucracy. In 2003, potential government veto players (MOFA,

JDA, CLB, Kantei, LDP, Komeito) did not exercise veto power because their composite

decision-makers shared similar beliefs. Because of similar beliefs, they supported similar

policy preferences regarding the SDF. Thus, the potential veto power of the bureaucratic

entities or ruling parties was not exercised .

As I noted in Chapter Two, we need to consider opposition parties as a potential

veto player. This point will be further fleshed out in this chapter. In 1990, the JSP

advocated different policy preferences and exercised veto power. In 2003, on the other

hand, the DPJ advocated different policy preferences yet it could not exercise veto power.

Two different parties had different abilities to exercise veto power. I argue below the

ability of the main opposition party to exercise its veto power is conditioned on the

ability of its message to resonate amongst decision-makers in bureaucratic entities and

lawmakers in the ruling parties. When government decision-makers hold divided beliefs

and the opposition party’s message resonates with them, the opposition party can exploit

the divisions amongst government decision-makers. When the message simultaneously

resonates with the public, the veto power of this minority power is strengthened. When

divisions do not exist in government, the opposition party cannot exercise its potential

veto power because it has nothing to exploit (even if the public opposes).

Because the number of potential government veto players did not change, we need to focus on the changes in their exercising veto power. Introduced above, this

change in ability to exercise veto power was due to changes in the beliefs of decision-

makers between 1990 and 2003. As such, we need to focus on decision-makers’ beliefs.

And because changes in the ability of the opposition party to exercise its potential veto

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power coincided with changes in the nature of the opposition party between the two time

periods, it is necessary to examine changes in the main opposition party. This leads me to

conclude that the most important variables to study for Japan are the main opposition

party and the beliefs of government decision-makers. Below, I will examine the changes

in decision-makers’ beliefs and the change of opposition parties from the JSP to DPJ. I

begin with the latter first.

I. Changes in Opposition Parties From 1955 until 1994, Japanese politics was dominated by ‘the .’

The 1955 System was a description of the political landscape, dominated by the Japan

Social Party (JSP; 日本社会党) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP; 自由民主党).

The name came from the fact that both parties formed in 1955 (October 13: JSP;

November 15: LDP). Two major characteristics are identified with the 1955 System. First, in form, national politics was largely a contest between these two parties. Second, in substance, they had fundamental ideological differences. Because of their differences, when it came to deliberations on security-related foreign policies there was, at best, a very narrow parameter for what were considered a viable option. Over the course of nearly four decades, both of the pillars eroded. Because the JSPs appeal waned after the

Soviet Union’s dissolution, its numerical strength suffered. Electoral reforms enacted in

1994 hurt the JSPs chances for revival. When the JSP formed a with their rival the LDP in 1994, the 1955 System collapsed. Shortly thereafter, a new situation arose in which the LDP faced off against a large, albeit potpourri, opposition party called the New Frontier Party (NFP; 新進党). Despite spectacular electoral results and an ability to compete with the LDP, the party collapsed. This collapse led to the rise of another large, non-ideological party called the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ;

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民主党). Because it wa s more pragmatic than the former JSP, the parameters for what were considered viable policy options in foreign policy debates widened. This was the situation in 2003 and has remained until the present.

Form: From LDP vs. JSP to LDP vs. DPJ A cursory glance at the composition of the Lower and Upper Houses from 1955 until

1993 (Figure 3.1and 3.2) show that politics in both the House of Representatives 3 and the

House of Councillors 4 was largely dominated by the LDP and JSP. Until the LDP split in

1993, the two parties held at least 69% of all seats in the Lower House (Table 3.1) and

71% in the Upper House (Table 3. 2). The highest point of the 1955 System came in the elections held shortly after its ‘founding.’ After the 1958 Lower House election , 97% of all Lower House seats were held by one of the two parties and after the 1959 Upper

House election, 87.6%. And yet, d espite this high mark, the 1955 System was not stable.

In fact, it gradually eroded over time, albeit the two parties maintained their domination over Japanese politics.

Figure 3.1: Lower House Composition, 1958 -1993 100% Other 80% Komeito JSP / SDPJ / SDP 60%

40% LDP 20%

0% Composition Composition ofLower House by Party

Lower House Elections

3 Source: www.geocities.co.jp/WallStreet -Stock/7643/sosenkyo.html 4 Data presented are seats held when the Upper House opened after the election. Sour ce: www.sangiin.go.jp 85

Figure 3.2: Upper House Composition, 1956 -1995 100% Other 80% Komeito JSP/SDPJ/SDP 60%

40% LDP 20%

0% Composition Composition ofUpper House Party by

Upper House Elections

Table 3. 1: Percentage of Seats Won by Both JSP and LDP in Lower House , 1958-2005 5/22/1958 11/20/1960 11/21/1963 1/29/1967 12/8/1969 12/10/1972 97% 94% 91% 86% 78% 79% 12/5/1976 10/7/1979 6/22/1980 12/18/1983 7/6/1986 2/18/1990 73% 69% 77% 71% 75% 80% 7/18/1993 10/22/1996 6/25/2000 11/9/2003 9/11/2005 57% 51% 53% 51% 63% *Although from 1996 the % is above 50%, this is predominately the LDP as the SDPJ/SDP's seat totals remain increasingly below 20 over each election: 1996 (15), 2000 (19), 2003 (6), 2005 (7).

Table 3. 2: Percentage of Seats Won by Both JSP and LDP in Upper House , 1956-2007 7/8/1956 6/2/1959 7/1/1962 7/4/1965 7/7/1968 6/27/1971 82% 87.6% 83.6% 85.6% 80.8% 80.2% 7/7/1974 7/10/1977 6/22/1980 6/26/1983 7/6/1986 7/23/1989 75% 71.8% 72.6% 71% 72.6% 71.8% 7/26/1992 7/23/1995 7/12/1998 7/29/2001 7/11/2004 7/29/2007 71% 59.5% 47.2% 50.2% 49.1% 36.7% *From 1995 the % is predominately the LDP as the SDPJ/SDP's seat totals fall consecutively over each election: 1995 (39), 1998 (14), 2001 (8), 2004 (5), 2007 (5).

The first change in the 1955 System began shortly after it was established. 5 After less-radical JSP members, led by Suehiro Nishio, tried to moderate the JSP on issues such as the security treaty, the Marxist left attacked. Disgruntled, Nishio took 52 members on

January 24, 1960 to form the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP; 民主社会党) modeled

5 The JSP was actually established in October 1945and held government from February 1948 until October 1948 under the Cabinet and the Cabinet. It split in 1951 over the peace treaty and security treaty th at Japan signed with the US. It stayed divided until these two wings reunited in 1955. 86

after parties in Europe that advocated the creation of a democratic socialist welfare state.

Shortly thereafter, the center-left, pacifist Komeito ( 公明党) formed in 1964. 6 Newly

established (i.e. did not draw on existing parties) by and affiliated with the lay

organization of believers from the Nichiren Sho Sect of Buddhism called the Soka

Gakkai, Komeito explicitly sought to build an ideal society through fusing religion and

politics. 7 This political alignment remained until the mid-1970s when more splits

occurred. Upset with the Lockheed Scandal and the LDP’s inability to deal with

corruption, in July 1976, 5 Lower House members and 1 Upper House member led by

Yohei Kono split from the LDP to form the New Liberal Club (NLC; 新自由クラブ).

This was followed on March 26, 1977 with former Secretary General Saburo Eda leaving

the JSP out of concerns that the party was too leftist and formed the Social Citizen’s

League ( 社会市民連合). More JSP members left on September 26 to form the Shakai

Club ( 社会クラブ). On March 26, 1978, the two groups joined to became the Social

Democratic League (Shaminren; 社会民主連合). All these parties enjoyed electoral

success in the 1970s by latching on to problems created by LDP policies that generated

high speed growth, such as pollution, housing shortages and health care.

Although the basic contours of the 1955 System remained intact, the splits had

three important implications. First, the JSP suffered because the majority of the splits

were happening on the opposition side, sapping the party not only of its members but its

base of electoral support. This was because the JSP drew from the same pool of voters

that these parties drew from. Second, this proliferation of parties made it difficult, if not

6 Some books on Japanese politics refer to the Komeito as the Clean Government Party (CGP). I do not. Throughout this research, they are referred to by their Japanese name. 7 Abe, Shindo, and Kawato, 1994, 131. 87

impossible, for all the opposition parties to act together against LDP governments because, over time, they agreed on less and less. This situation benefited LDP governments. But this is not to say that the LDP was enjoying only benefits. The third implication was that while opposition splits helped the LDP maintain their hold on government, the stability of this hold diminished over time because more voters were turning to the DSP and Komeito. After the NLC was formed, the LDP was threatened from within. To strengthen its position, it reached out to the NLC, forming parliamentary coalitions with it after the 1976, 1979, and 1983 Lower House elections. Due to inner-

NLC problems and an inability to grow, the party dissolved in August 1986 and its members rejoined the LDP.

Despite all these splits, by 1986 when the NLC rejoined the LDP, the LDP was back in a position of stable dominant party vis-à-vis the JSP. And with it, the 1955

System enjoyed a renaissance with the two parties back to sharing 75% (1986) and 80%

(1990) of Lower House seats. Connecting with voter displeasure with the increased consumption tax and a host of scandals involving the LDP, the JSP made huge gains in both the 1989 Upper House and 1990 Lower House elections, resulting in 72 seats (up from 42) in the former 8 and 136 (up from 85) in the latter. 9 It appeared that with the LDP back to a stable majority and the JSP obtaining larger numbers of seats that the clock had been reset on the 1955 System. This was the situation when the Gulf Crisis occurred in

1990. But it was precisely at this time of resetting the clock that the beginning of the end of the 1955 System began, this time from within the ranks of the LDP.

8 Source: www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/san60/s60_shiryou/giinsuu_kaiha.htm 9 Source: www.geocities.co.jp/WallStreet-Stock/7643/sosenkyo.html 88

1993 will forever be viewed as a turning point in postwar politics due to the

magnitude of the event. In 1993, the LDP was booted from power for the first time since

its establishment, but not due to the electorate. The primary factor leading to its downfall

was the bolting of two groups from its ranks. The first of these groups originated in the

Reform Forum 21 group in the Takeshita faction. Led by and Ichiro

Ozawa, they bolted when PM Kiichi Miyazawa could not get political reforms passed.

Taking 36 Lower House members and 8 Upper House members with them, they formed

the Japan Renewal Party (JRP; 新生党) which was conservative. The second group was led by and consisted of 10 Lower House members, forming the

New Party Sakigake (Sakigake, 新党さきがけ). This party was not conservative, opposing things like Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council and greater Japanese contributions in international affairs out of the belief that it was a

disguised attempt to remake Japan as a military power.

Supporting the LDP rebels in their efforts was the formation of the Japan New

Party (JNP; 日本新党) by discontented conservatives in May 1992 by former of

Kumamoto . Like the NLC in 1976, it had the support of the public for its advocacy of political reform. Because of its increasing popularity, it acted as a motivation for LDP lawmakers to bolt the LDP. Although the JNP won only 35 seats in the 1993 election that occurred after Miyazawa lost a vote of no-confidence, Hosokawa and his JNP had become popular enough to lead an 8-party coalition in the first non-LDP government since 1955 on August 9, 1993. Yet, within months after attaining the premiership, Hosokawa and the JNP’s popularity quickly faded, mostly due to a scandal

89

that forced Hosokawa out of office in April 1994. Before leaving office, PM Hosokawa

was successful in passing electoral reforms (Appendix 4).

Despite the break-up of the LDP and the formation of a host of non-LDP parties,

the JSP, now called the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ; JSP changed their

English in 1991) was unable to enjoy similar success. Given the large number of parties, the SDPJ was unable to claim it alone was the alternative to the LDP. Similar to the late

1960s and 1970s, the SDPJ had to compete for the same pool of voters. But given the

now larger number of parties, this meant an even smaller pool of voters, which had a

disastrous effect on the party. In the 1993 election alone, the SDPJ saw its 136 seats

dissolve into 70. One pillar of the 1955 System was on the verge of collapse. If things

had remained the same it is difficult to know whether the SDPJ could have been able to

claw its way back to numerical success as it did in the late 1980s. But given the fact that

the electoral system was reformed on January 29, 1994, it meant even more bad news for

the shrunken SDPJ. The SDPJ was unhappy about the new system because it meant a

change from multi-member districts that essentially acted as PR districts (which they

benefited from) to a mixture of SMD and PR districts. 10 The SDPJ had pushed for a

proposal that incorporated more PR districts and less SMD because a large party like the

LDP would naturally benefit from more SMD. By incorporating more SMD, the SDPJ

was sure to suffer electorally.

And suffer they did. In the 1996 Lower House election, the first under the new

system, the now Social Democratic Party (SDP; 社会民主党-changed its Japanese and

English name in 1996) was demolished. The SDP saw its 70 seats evaporate to just 15.

10 Under their plan, each voter would receive two ballots, one for the single seat district system and one for the PR system, and 250 seats would be allotted to each. This version failed in the Upper House in November 1993. See Nonaka, 2000, 106-107. 90

There are three reasons for this. First, which will be covered below, the party abandoned

its core principles. This angered voters and pushed them to other parties. Second, at the

time of the election, the SDP (and Sakigake) was fraught with internal problems. The

problems came to a boiling point in the fall of 1996 when members split from both

parties (dissolving Sakigake) to form the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in September

1996. The DPJ went on to win a total of 52 seats. While the split helps explain the SDPs

small numbers, it does not explain the long-term inability to regain its momentum after

this election or ever since. This is explained by the abandonment of the core principles

but also by the third reason, the new electoral system punished smaller parties. Given that

the SDP went into the election in a shrunken state, it is not surprising it lost.

Despite the SDPs inability to successfully compete under the SMD electoral

system, other politicians understood the consequence of the new electoral system.

Toward this end, moves were underway among other non-SDP coalition members to

consolidate a number of the smaller parties that had emerged out of 1993 by merging 4

parties into one large party capable of running a national campaign against the LDP. 11

This culminated in the establishment of the New Frontier Party (NFP; 新進党) on

December 10, 1994, headed by former PM Toshiki Kaifu.12 Some of these parties had a

long history (Komeito, DSP) while others were relatively new, such as the JRP, JNP, and

11 This includes JRP, JNP, DSP, Komeito. 12 You can trace the efforts toward this as beginning after Tsutomu Hata became prime minister after Hosokawa stepped down. The parties were still separate but understood that to compete under the new electoral rules, small parties were at a disadvantage. Three parties formed the core of what would become the NFP: JRP, JNP, and DSP. These three parties formed an inner-coalition faction called the Kaishin (改 新). Another main reason for the formation of this faction was to counter the influence of the SDPJ which was the largest coalition member and often at odds with the other members. After the SDPJ and Sakigake left the coalition government and formed a new coalition government with their arch rival the LDP, these three parties and the Komeito began cooperating together in Diet voting. They also reached across to other parties as well. These parties formed a parliamentary faction called ‘Reform.’ Preparation for the new party snowballed from here. See Takenaka, 2006, 20-32. 91

Liberal Reform League ( 自由改革連合). The result was a party devoid of central

principles. Instead, it was a party that ranged from the far left to the far right. And yet, the

strategy of consolidation paid off. In the same 1996 election that the SDP was

demolished, the NFP fared extremely well, winning 156 seats. With their win, the NFP

stood as the second largest party to the LDP, followed by the DPJ, the Japan Communist

Party (JCP), and finally the SDP, now a fourth-rate opposition party. The result of the

NFPs victory was hope that the electoral reform was actually leading to a 2-party system.

It was, but this did not include the NFP.

Given the diversity of parties that formed the NFP, it is not surprising that the

party collapsed. But an additional factor that is often cited in its collapse is the assertive

leadership by Ichiro Ozawa and his neoconservative tendencies. He upset NFP members,

ran against his former-LDP ally Tsutomu Hata for leadership that caused intra-NFP

divisions, and all this led to dissention that only exacerbated the diversity of opinions that

already existed. 13 One by one parties splintered off from the NFP until its final collapse

on December 31, 1997. The dissolution of the NFP resulted in a situation similar to

before the NFP was formed, leading to six separate political parties: Liberal Party (LP,

自由党), Reform Club ( 改革クラブ), New Peace Party ( 新党平和), New Fraternity

Party ( 新党友愛), Dawn Club (黎明クラブ), and People’s Voice (国民の声). Out of these, the New Peace Party and Dawn Club went on to reestablish the former Komeito party by creating the New Komeito. The Reform Club, New Fraternity Party, and

People’s Voice folded into the DPJ. Only the LP continued as an independent entity, consisting of Ozawa’s core followers. It went on to join the LDP in a coalition

13 For a good history of this time in NFP, see Takenaka, 2006, Chapter Three. 92

government in 1998 and, after being ousted from the coalition, eventually folded into the

DPJ in October 2003.

The DPJ emerged out of the ashes of the SDP and Sakigake in the fall of 1996,

but it was not until the NFP’s dissolution that it was able to thrive. 14 In this sense, luck

played an important factor for the DPJ. Reconstituting itself as the New DPJ in March

1998, a large number of former NFP members entered the DPJ. This led to the DPJ to

grow, which was exactly what it needed to successfully compete with the LDP under the

new electoral system. But this also meant a strange mix of bedfellows. To avoid the same

fate as the NFP, the ability of the DPJ to survive and grow was conditioned on the ability

of its leaders and members to avoid in-fighting. This possibility for infighting grew to

arguably its highest point after Ichiro Ozawa’s LP merged with the DPJ in October 2003

(during the time of the Iraq War that this research examines). This merger effectively

meant conservative views entering the party. More importantly, it meant bringing in Mr.

Ozawa, which had the possibility of evoking strong dislike among DPJ members.

But it was precisely the merger of these parties that proved beneficial for the DPJ as it

prevented its members from losing in SMD elections. 15 The now larger DPJ could reap

the benefits that come to a large party under the new system. Further, by merging, the

opposition became more consolidated. This created a situation in which the LDP no

14 Takenaka (2006) argues that the movement originally began by a few Rightists who remained in the SDPJ, Sadao Yamahana and in January 1995. They had planned on leaving the party and forming a brand new party. But because of the Kobe earthquake on January 17, 1995, they did not (89-90). It is from here that the well-known story picks up of and making plans to create a new party while still members of the Sakigake out of fears of not being able to survive in the new electoral system. Kan stayed with Sakigake for a short while even after Hatoyama had left. 15 Kitaoka, 2004, 82. 93

longer faced a disparate opposition. 16 By being united under the DPJ banner, a clear non-

LDP choice emerged for voters. And it has paid off. The DPJ has not only maintained its

support in the urban areas but stripped away at the LDP support base in the rural areas.

This is especially true in the PR districts where the now bigger DPJ can benefit from the

PR system (at the expense of smaller parties). The LDP, on the other hand, have been

forced to rely on electoral cooperation with the Komeito in the SMD. 17 But this is an

incredibly important point. “The LDP’s dependence on the Komeito in single-seat

constituencies is a product of the rise in the number of votes being collected by the DPJ

in these traditional LDP bastions.” 18 Because of their large (and increasingly growing)

size, the DPJ has fared well under the new electoral system, giving the LDP increasingly

severe competition since 1998 even in their traditional rural strongholds. 19 Figures 3.3

and 3.4 show composition of both houses. 20 It is clear that the DPJ has replaced the JSP

as the second largest party. While not close to the 97% of seats shared between the LDP

and JSP in 1958, the LDP and DPJ find themselves sharing no less than 75% of Lower

House seats (Table 3.3) and 71% of Upper House (Table 3.4) seats since 2000 and 2001,

respectively. This has led some scholars to declare that Japan is now a two party system.

Kitaoka argues as such due to three reasons. 21 First, similar to the argument made here,

the two parties’ share of seats in the Diet is overwhelming and a candidate not related to

one of these two parties will find it impossible to win in an SMD. Second, there is no

16 For example, in 1998, the LDP faced off against a host of parties ranging from the SDP and JCP on the left, the Liberal Party on the right, and the Komeito and DPJ in the middle. The LDP can easily win by divide-and-conquer tactics since these parties all have to compete with one another for non-LDP votes. 17 Kabashima, 2000; Kabashima, 2004, 98-99; and Sugawara and Kabashima, 2004. 18 Sugawara and Kabashima, 2004, 21. 19 Ibid . 20 Lower House source: www.geocities.co.jp/WallStreet-Stock/7643/sosenkyo.html. Data presented for Upper House are seats held on the first day after the election. Source: www.sangiin.go.jp 21 Kitaoka, 2004, 82-84. 94

Figure 3.3: Lower House Composition, 1996 to Present 100% Other 80% DPJ

60% Komeito 40% SDPJ/SDP LDP 20%

0% 10/22/1996 6/25/2000 11/9/2003 9/11/2005

Composition Composition ofLower House by Party Lower House Elections

Figure 3.4: Upper House Composition, 1998 -Present 100% Other 80% DPJ 60% Komeito 40% SDP LDP 20%

0% 7/12/1998 7/29/2001 7/11/2004 7/29/2007

Composition Composition ofUpper House Party by Upper House Elections

longer no hope concerning the electoral gap between the two parties. If the Komeito quits its coalition with the LDP, there is a real possibility for the DPJ to capture government.

Finally, unlike the lack of cohesion that brought down the NFP, efforts in the opposition are increasingly revolving around the DPJ, especially after 2000.

Table 3. 3:Percentage of Seats Won by Both DPJ and LDP in Lower House , 1996 -Present 10/22/1996 6/25/2000 11/9/2003 9/11/2005 58% 75% 86% 85%

95

Table 3.4: Percentage of Seats Won by Both DPJ and LDP in Upper House, 1998-Present 7/12/1998 7/29/2001 7/11/2004 7/29/2007 63.1% 71.3% 81.4% 81%

If Kitaoka is correct, the electoral reforms succeeded in creating a two-party

system. But this is an overstatement, at least at this time. 22 The reason why is Komeito.

Japan is not a two-party system because the Komeito retains an extremely important

centrist position that both the DPJ and LDP can use to their advantage. Since 1999, the

LDP heavily depends on the Komeito, not only as a coalition member that enables the

LDP to maintain power, but on its supporters’ votes in SMD. 23 Since 2005, the LDP has had a one-party majority in the Lower House, but because the Komeito has indicated willingness to form a coalition with the DPJ if they win close to a majority or an outright majority in an election, the LDP has deepened relations with Komeito in order to maintain them a coalition partner. Over recent years, this relationship has taken on increased importance for the LDP because the DPJ obtained a majority in the Upper

House in the 2007 elections, thereby requiring that the LDP to have 2/3 seats in the

Lower House to override DPJ-blocked legislation in the Upper House. With Komeito’s support, they cross the 2/3 seat Rubicon. Thus, even though the DPJ has replaced the

Socialists as the major opposition party, the Komeito has emerged as a crucial centrist

‘swing’ party that, demonstrated in Chapter Five, acts as an important ‘brake’ on security policies. As long as the LDP-Komeito coalition remains, it is unlikely that the DPJ can

22 Japan will not become a pure two party system largely because the system remains a mixed-electoral system, so there are no incentives for smaller parties to join one party as would occur under a pure SMD. Because aspects of PR still remain, small parties still have a chance to win seats in niche districts. Plus, because there are two separate ballots, voters can utilize one ballot as a protest vote. A second reason for my skepticism has to do with the fact that pure policy oriented elections have yet to occur. While the parties do release election manifestos, elections are still dominated by personalities, not policies, and Japanese voters vote based on local popularity (not issue-oriented). 23 Kabashima, 2004. 96

attain power. 24 If the coalition fails, the DPJ may be able to form a coalition with the centrist Komeito. In this way, given the fact that whichever party the Komeito chooses to form a coalition that party will likely form the government, it is more accurate to say that

Japan is a two-and-a-half party system. Understanding the ‘form’ aspect of the 1955

System, we can now move on to examine the ‘substance’ aspect.

Substance: From Ideological to Pragmatic In America, the scale on which parties and voters are placed ranges from liberal to conservative. In Japan, it is slightly different. The usual scale on which parties and voters are placed ranges from progressive ( 革新) to conservative ( 保守). 25 I would like to offer

a slightly different classification based on Gunther and Diamond’s terminology. 26

Because the JSP’s salient issues did not change from election to election but instead

tended to revolve around how to maintain the principles and tenets of the party’s

ideological program, we can classify the JSP as a mass-based ideological party. Because

the DPJ, on the other hand, lacked an ideological component and made appeals regarding

specific issues that were more diffuse and eclectic than a mass-based ideological party,

we can classify the DPJ as a programmatic electoralist party. 27 This is similar to the LDP

because both make pragmatic appeals to the electorate based on issues and policies. As

such, we can say that both the LDP and DPJ are pragmatic parties seeking to gain votes

24 Ibid , 98. Kabashima also argues that if the DPJ can acquire votes going to the JCP, it may be able to obtain power. Given the fact that the DPJs ability to acquire power depends on the LDP-Komeito coalition falling apart or JCP supporters to vote for the DPJ, he is pessimistic that there will be a chance of parties any time soon. 25 Kabashima, 1999, 9. 26 Gunther and Diamond, 2001, 26-27. 27 The LDP too is considered an electoralist party, but differs in that LDP is considered a catch-all party. Unlike the DPJ, the LDP tries to capture the median voter by appearing moderate in behavior. Policy orientations shifts with the public mood and they tend to emphasize the attractive personal attributes of their candidates. The DPJ’s issue appeals are less diffuse and eclectic than what we would see in a catch-all party. 97

not by adherence to an ideological program, but through appealing to voters with policies and issues. The JSP, on the other hand, was an ideological party.

As shown above, the 1955 System was never stable. The reason this system was not stable was precisely because parties were split internally. The first split that led to the emergence of the DSP was important due to the effect it had on ideological unity within the JSP. The right and left wings that came together to establish the JSP in 1955 remained divided after the party was formed, continuing in the form of factions identified as

Leftists and Rightists. 28 The factions were split over two issues. The first was whether the

JSP should be class-oriented (Leftists) or mass-oriented (Rightists). The second was over defense-security issues. While the Leftists argued for pacifism and unarmed neutrality, the Rightists felt the reality of the Cold War needed to be accepted, or in the very least, acknowledged and policies developed to address this. This internal division came to a head in 1960 when Rightists broke from the party and formed the DSP. The split created a unified JSP with clear ideological differences from the LDP. But this also meant that

Leftist thinking became party dogma because nothing was left to moderate it.

The division between the JSP and the LDP was rooted in deep ideological differences over principles, not policies. The LDP saw the SDF as constitutional and was pro-American, pro-security alliance, anti-Communist, anti-Soviet Union, pro-business, open to Constitutional revision, and supported the emperor. This led consecutive LDP governments to, for example, push for policies that aligned Japan closer with the US. The

JSP, on the other hand, saw the SDF as unconstitutional and was anti-American, anti- alliance/pro-unarmed neutrality and pacifism, pro-Communist, pro-Soviet Union, pro- labor, anti-Constitutional revision, and anti-emperor. This led the party to consistently

28 Shinkawa, 2000, 155. 98

oppose LDP governments on all fronts, arguing that everything the LDP proposed ran counter to the pacifism that was enshrined in Japan’s constitution. The two parties had no common fundamental principles between them, leading them to talk past each other rather than to each other on all security-related issues.

This meant that Diet discussions between the two parties were always at odds because they had no common foundation on which to deliberate security-related foreign policies. As a result, discussions of viable policy options remained bounded within extremely narrow parameters. This meant that every time an LDP government proposed a new policy that included the SDF, its merits were not discussed. Rather, the constitutional basis for the proposal were probed and when something came to vote, the JSP would take whatever measure it could to oppose it, kill it, or embarrass the government. It did this by pointing out problems, drawing public attention to government actions, filibustering or disrupting proceedings, and most famously, frustrating Diet schedules by casting votes via the excruciatingly slow ‘ox walk.’ 29 The moves consistently frustrated LDP governments. Examples include:

• Because of JSP-led opposition to the creation of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954, to avoid excessive opposition and the appearance of a revival in militarism, LDP governments have been forced to emphasize civilian control over the SDF throughout the entire postwar period. This led to efforts to ensure the SDF is constrained by civilian authorities, including not allowing the bureaucracy charged with managing the SDF to become a full ministry but limited to an agency (Japan Defense Agency: JDA 30 ), maintaining seconded officials from other ministries to populate the JDA, and limiting the mission of the SDF to ‘exclusive self defense.’ • Despite a 1958 MOFA proposal to send personnel to participate in the UN Observation Group in in response to a request by the UN to send SDF personnel, JSP-led opposition forced the government to abandon the proposal and reject the request. 31

29 For the influence that the JSP had on policy debates during the 1955, see Mochizuki, 1982, Chapter 6. 30 In 2007, the JDA became the Ministry of Defense (MOD). 31 Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 1999, 8-10. 99

• During the summer of 1960 when the Nobusuke Kishi government attempted to revise the US-Japan Security Treaty, the JSP-led opposition brought normal Diet operations to a standstill and forced Kishi to resign as premier (July 19) shortly after the revision was passed (June 20-ratified, June 23-entered into law) (Packard, 1966). • In referring to the crisis in the Congo, UN Ambassador Koto Matsudaira on February 21, 1961 made comments that Japan should be able to take a more positive action in the UN to cooperate with Afro-Asian members. Because of JSP- led opposition, he was forced to retract his statement, say he was speaking as a private citizen of Japan, and state MOFA policy was to oppose SDF dispatch abroad. 32 • Fear of nuclear weapons led the JSP to push the government to commit itself to always deny any prior consultation related to the introduction of such weapons into Japan. 33 This ultimately led to PM Eisaku Sato proposing the Three Non- Nuclear Principles on December 11, 1967 (Diet resolution formally adopted them in 1971). 34 • In response to rising criticisms from the JSP and other opposition parties that the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976 would lead to unleashing militaristic tendencies, the Takeo Miki administration decided on setting a ceiling for defense expenditures at no more than 1% of GDP to appease rising opposition. • A government report under former UN Ambassador Shigeru Kozai delivered to the UN in September 1982 included a section on Japanese personnel contributions to the UN. The JSP attacked the report as a means of trying to dispatch SDF abroad by circumventing the Japanese Diet and public opinion. The opposition forced MOFA to resubmit the report with the section on personnel contributions excluded. 35

In these examples, the JSP successfully exercised veto power despite being an opposition party. The reason why it could effectively limit what the government could propose as policies was because the government was concerned with both public opinion and opinions of government officials, both bureaucratic and political. Successive governments could only propose policies that did not veer too far from the parameters of

what was considered acceptable by both. The more ‘different’ a new policy was from

previous policies, the more certain it was to draw the ire of the JSP. And because the

32 Ibid , 11-13. 33 Togo, 2005, 63. 34 The three principles are: non-production, non-possession and non-introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. 35 Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 1999, 15-16. 100

message of the JSP resonated both in and out of government (below), once the JSP marshaled its resources it was capable of assembling allies both in and outside of parliament. The result was that the LDP could only change policies incrementally, at best.

By the late 1960s, there were concerted efforts by JSP Secretary General Saburo

Eda to shed the party of its dogmatism. Despite being harshly criticized and forced to resign, Eda’s actions did initiate some reforms that occurred in the late 1970s, such as a reduced emphasis on revolution, radical union activists, allowing in more moderate party

MPs, and approval of a three-party coalition strategy (JSP-Komeito-DSP). But accepting this strategy meant the JSP would need to reconsider its basic stance on issues like the

SDF and Security Treaty, issues that its members were reluctant to change. Despite attempts by Chairman Masashi Ishibashi to do so, no changes on security policies were made. 36 Chairwoman , who took over in September 1986, continued the dogmatic policy line, even after the 1990 Soviet Union dissolution effectively meant that the ideological backing of the JSP had disappeared.

And yet, the collapse of the Soviet Union was disastrous for the JSP for this very reason. Their continued reliance on a now failed ideology meant that it was ideologically bankrupt. The increasingly irrelevance of the archaic principles that it clung to meant that the 1955 System’s ideological pillar was collapsing. Its ability to constrain the LDPs policy efforts during the Gulf War (Chapter Four) demonstrated its ability to still utilize a message that resonated with individuals both in government and in the public, but its

36 Ishibashi tried to revive the party under his New Socialist Party Line which entailed actually putting forward policies, showing the electorate that the JSP could competently and sensibly deal with current issues, and stopping to rely so heavily on rhetoric. (Abe, Shindo, and Kawato, 1994, 129). While change came with the adoption of a new 1986 party manifesto that moved the JSP away from dogmatic Marxism by abandoning the goal of socialism, defining the party as a national party (as opposed to class based), and implicitly supporting Western-style social democracy, no changes were made in the party’s stance in regards to security-defense issues. 101

inability to produce any meaningful policy alternatives demonstrated its reliance on out- dated arguments. Voters noticed. In the April 1991 local elections, giant losses forced

Doi to step down, giving way to the more moderate Makoto Tanabe who tried to change the JSPs fortunes by changing the party’s English name to the Social Democratic Party of

Japan (SDPJ) in 1991. Although a name change did not work, it was essentially at this point of the party trying to reconnect with voters that the SDPJ began its permanent and unrecoverable downward spiral.

Prior to entering the non-LDP coalition government under Morihiro Hosokawa,

SDPJ leaders signed an agreement on July 29, 1993 indicating acceptance of the fundamental policies of prior LDP governments (i.e. SDF, US-Japan Security Treaty), which the party endorsed at the national convention in September 1993. 37 But the real impact of this was not felt until June 1994 when , for the sake of attaining the premiership for the first time since Socialist premier Tetsu Katayama

(05/24/47-03/10/48), entered into a coalition government with long-time rival LDP (also

Sakigake). During his first policy speech as premier on July eighteenth, Murayama relinquished the SDPJ’s stance of ‘constitutional pacifism’ and unarmed neutrality, declaring that the SDF were constitutional and that he supported the US-Japan Security

Treaty as the basis of Japan’s security policy. Changes were also made concerning stances on PKOs, the national anthem, national flag, and nuclear power plants, accepting them. The party ratified the policy changes on September 3, 1994 at the party convention.

But this politically expedient about-face on ideological principles that had guided the party for four decades meant political suicide, as reflected in the numerical decline in the

Diet (Table 3.5 and 3.6). Murayama’s acceptance of these principles and the formation of

37 Shinkawa, 2000, 152, 168. 102

a coalition government with rival LDP meant that the second pillar of the 1955 System came crashing down. The 1955 System was no more.

Table 3.5: Lower House Seats for SDPJ/SDP: 1996-Present 10/22/1996 6/25/2000 11/9/2003 9/11/2005 15 19 6 7

Table 3.6: Upper House Seats for SDPJ/SDP, 1996-Present 7/12/1998 7/29/2001 7/11/2004 7/29/2007 14 8 5 5

The NFP came into prominence simultaneously with the demise of the Socialists.

Above, it was argued it was successful partly because of its large numbers and the demands that the new electoral system put on parties. Remembering that the NFP was essentially a broad mix of members across the political spectrum, it is not surprising that there were differences. But the problem was these differences persisted. The NFP fell apart because it lacked cohesion. 38 When the NFP collapsed, former members of the

Komeito reestablished the New Komeito, essentially the same party. Ichiro Ozawa, the original architect of the LDPs collapse in 1993, went on to form the conservative (albeit misnamed) Liberal Party. The other members who were left without a party either returned to the LDP or joined the now largest opposition party, the DPJ.

At first, with a variety of views entering the party, it appeared the DPJ would suffer the same fate as the NFP. But it did not. The explanation for this cohesion is open for interpretation. One possibility could be there is no longer the option for ex-LDP members to return to the LDP because they no longer have access to privileged positions in the party. 39 Without any prospects for leaving the party and utter certainty of losing an election without party support, the electoral system stemmed possible splits. Another possibility concerns the introduction of manifestos into Japanese politics. The creation of

38 Kitaoka, 2004, 84; Fukushima, 1996, 68. 39 Kitaoka, 2002, 44. 103

manifestos is a way for “parties [to] reconcile their internal differences before the

election.” 40 Over time, this custom of creating manifestoes means working out internal disagreements, which has a positive effect on party unity. As interesting as it is, explaining the DPJs non-collapse is beyond the scope of this research. Rather, what is important is that the DPJ moved from a party lacking cohesion in 1998 (divided widely from progressive groups all the way to extreme conservative groups) to one more cohesive with a centrist, albeit slightly progressive, agenda. 41 More importantly, it did so

without dependence on ideology.

Despite the fact that the DPJ appeared similar to the NFP in its initial years, after

the 2000 Lower House election it appeared the party became more cohesive and the

threat for large splits decreased. 42 This is not to say that differences do not exist. They do,

but they are no longer existential. They are manageable, similar to differences in the LDP.

What is important is how fundamentally different the DPJ is from the JSP. The JSP was

firmly attached to its ideological convictions, leading it to oppose anything related to

constitutional revision, security treaty, SDF, etc. Unlike the JSP, the DPJ has never been

a party defined by an ideology, despite the fact that it is a party composed of former

Socialists. Rather, it has been more pragmatic and defined by policies it hopes will appeal

to the electorate so as to become the governing party. The once strong ideological

confrontation that defined the 1955 System no longer exists.

What is surprising is how different the DPJ is as the main opposition party. For

example, in an article written by DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama in the October 1999

Bungei Shunju , Hatoyama argues against a plan by LP head Ichiro Ozawa (in September

40 Sasaki, 2003, 30. 41 Kabashima, 1999. 42 Kitaoka, 2004, 84. 104

1999 Bungei Shunju ) concerning constitutional revision and the role of the UN. 43 But

Hatoyama argues against Ozawa by saying he is misguided or does not go far enough.

Hatoyama wants constitutional revision to clearly recognize the SDF as armed forces and

how they should be used, that the UN is not an omnipotent organization upon which

Japan should always depend, that Japan should look after its own interests, and that while

pro-market, social policies need to rein in extremes of market liberalism. These

arguments are unimaginable during the 1955 System. What we see is that even in

Hatoyama’s opposition to Ozawa, both begin at common principles (SDF existence, US-

Japan Security Treaty, ability to use SDF, etc). These beliefs remain in the DPJ today, enabling the party to confront the LDP with a more pragmatic stance, not ideological.

To indicate how much of a non-issue 1955 System-issues have become, and how pragmatic the DPJ has become, in an effort to secure DPJ agreement with the Anti-Terror

Special Measures Law in October 2001, Hatoyama negotiated compromises with PM

Junichiro Koizumi but due to political maneuvering by coalition partner Komeito, ultimately disapproved, but it not because of a disagreement over the policy. 44 Similarly,

the DPJ helped the LDP pass a revision of the PKO Law in December 2001 and a set of

three contingency-related laws in June 2003. Given that the LP merged with the DPJ in

October 2003, and the fact that LP members were found to be even right of the LDP on

some defense issues, 45 their inclusion into the DPJ may help explain shifts away from the left and toward a more centrist, pragmatic opposition.

As the extinction of dinosaurs gave way to the rise of mammals, so too the demise of the JSP gave rise to a new political creature, the DPJ. Both the LDP and DPJ are in

43 Hatoyama, 1999. 44 Shinoda, 2007, 97. 45 Kabashima, 1999 and Kabashima and Steel, 2006. 105

agreement as to the basic foundations on which political discussions begin. Additionally,

they are closer in agreement (than the JSP-LDP) in regards to security-related foreign

policies. 46 This is supported by studies on Lower House legislators conducted by

Kabashima (1999) and Kabashima and Steel (2006). 47 What this means is ideological

chains no longer define policy debate, pragmatism does. Because of political realignment,

the parameters of what are considered viable policy options have widened, as evidence by

the fact that the two parties today discuss SDF dispatch as policy, not principle. No

longer is discussion hampered by having to repeat theological debates over the

constitutionality of the alliance or the SDF. Discussion begins with what is in the best

interest for Japan, why, and what policy would best get Japan from Point A to Point B.

II. Changing Beliefs Amongst Japanese Decision-Makers Japanese foreign policy decision-making is an endeavor that involves a large

number of decision-makers. For any foreign policy decision, there are an undefined

number of decision-makers in the Kantei, bureaucracy, and political parties that will be

active in the foreign policy decision-making process. The reason is because decision-

making teams are both formal and ad hoc. 48 This will be seen in the subsequent chapters

examining the Gulf War and Iraq War. In terms of the decision-makers within the foreign

policy decision-making structure who are generally involved, these include: the prime minister (PM), Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS), Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for

Administrative Affairs (DCCS-Adm.), Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries for

Parliamentary Affairs (DCCS-Parl.), Director General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau

46 Kitaoka, 2004, 85. 47 Kabashima, 1999 and Kabashima and Steel, 2006. 48 Roberts, 1988, 111. 106

(CLB DG),49 bureaucratic actors that include Ministers, Vice Ministers, Deputy Ministers,

Director Generals of Bureaus (DG), Division Directors, and political actors that include not only the head of the party and top leadership, 50 but all elected members of a party. 51

To understand how decision-makers responded to the Gulf War and the Iraq War, it is necessary to examine how decision-makers in both cases approached the events. In other words, when conflict broke out, how these decision-makers respond cognitively .

From my examination of the decision-making processes in both periods, I found two opposing coalitions of decision-makers holding different beliefs regarding the dispatch of the SDF abroad. When looking at the two time periods, there is a dramatic difference in the balance between the coalition of decision-makers who advocated dispatch (pro-SDF dispatch coalition) and the coalition of decision-makers who opposed dispatch (anti-SDF dispatch coalition). In 1990, the anti-SDF dispatch coalition greatly outnumbered the pro-

49 The CLB DG is a career bureaucrat appointed by the PM to head the CLB (he has always come from MOF, MOJ, MITI/METI, or Ministry of Local Affairs). The CLB is an advisory organ to the PM and his Cabinet. Beyond checking for errors, the CLB is responsible for two primary duties. First, to ensure that new legislation or policy proposals do not contradict existing legislation. It fulfills this duty by providing the Cabinet with legal advice. Although this advice is not legally binding, it is accepted as authoritative. Second, it wants to ensure that new legislation or policy proposals do not violate the Constitution or interpretations of the Constitution and existing laws. With special pertinence to foreign policy, this means Article 9. Given these responsibilities, the CLB became one of the most powerful institutions in the decision-making process and the CLB DG one of the most powerful people. 50 While all parties in have a Chairman/woman or President (LDP) and a Secretary General ( 幹事長), attention on the LDP is also given to Chairman of the Executive Committee (総務会長) and the Chairman of the Political Affairs Research Committee (PARC) ( 政策調査会長). No matter the party, the Secretary General is responsible for planning party strategy and operations (especially at election time) as well as making sure that the party is unified. He also conducts negotiations with other parties. For the other two LDP positions, the PARC Chairman is responsible for studying specific policy issues as well as discussing/negotiating legislation that the Cabinet plans on submitting to the Diet (when the LDP holds government). The Chairman of the Executive Committee is responsible for making general party decisions, such as selecting candidates to endorse and party administration, and serving as coordinator within the party. When referring to the LDP’s top three executives ( 党三役), I am referring to the positions of Secretary General, PARC Chairman, and Chairman of the Executive Committee. 51 It may not always be the case that the party leadership represents the views of the party. If severe disagreements occur between leadership and members occur, party unity could be threatened. Therefore, there are times that party leadership responds to members’ views. Internal party disagreements can have broader political/policy implications. It is for this reason that I consider not only the top party leadership, but all elected officials in the party. 107

SDF dispatch coalition. In 2003, this was reversed. The pro-SDF dispatch coalition greatly outnumbered the anti-SDF dispatch coalition.

The pro-SDF dispatch coalition in 1990 was small and dispersed, with few members occupying key institutional posts in the decision-making process. This coalition, located mostly in the JDA, DG level in MOFA, and LDP leadership (Ichiro Ozawa,

Takeo Nishioka, and Mutsuki Kato), were united in their desire to dispatch the SDF overseas, albeit based on different beliefs. One group held a belief that prioritized the US-

Japan alliance above other imperatives. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, these decision- makers viewed the crisis through the lens of the alliance. Their main concern was how the crisis would affect the alliance. Because the US pushed for a visible role, and specifically requested non-combat SDF for various duties, these decision-makers viewed the Gulf crisis as an opportunity to strengthen relations by fulfilling US requests, or risk damaging trans-pacific relations. Given this belief, the script of action invoked was one of advocating SDF dispatch. It is this belief that is best known in the literature that describes Japan as caving to American pressure ( 米圧) as a ‘reactive state’ (Calder, 1988).

A second group held a belief that prioritized Japan’s international obligations above other imperatives. Decision-makers holding this believed Japan had obligations as a member of international society. When the Gulf crisis occurred, these decision-makers viewed the crisis through the lens of how it would affect international stability and principles of national sovereignty and, importantly, what Japan needed to do as a member of international society to contribute. Because other states participated with their militaries, they felt Japan needed to make similar contributions. As such, the script invoked was also one of advocating SDF dispatch.

108

The anti-SDF dispatch coalition, on the other hand, was large and outnumbered the pro-SDF dispatch coalition. The largest and most vocal opponents were the opposition parties, led by the JSP. But the opposition parties were joined by a large number of decision-makers in both the ruling party and the central bureaucracy who occupied key institutional positions. This includes PM Toshiki Kaifu, top MOFA leadership (Takakazu Kuriyama, Hisashi Owada), powerful elder statesmen in the LDP

(Masaharu Gotoda, ) and many rank-and-file LDP lawmakers. This coalition was opposed to dispatching the SDF, albeit based on three different beliefs. The first was anti-militarist beliefs that prioritized Japan’s pacifist identity above other imperatives. Based on the negative memory and/or perception of the history of pre-war

Japan and the disastrous results of WWII, these individuals viewed other countries’ responses (i.e. military) to the Gulf crisis and US pressure on Japan to provide visible support as setting up a slippery slope toward Japanese remilitarization. The script of action invoked was one of avoiding this slippery slope by opposing personnel contributions of any kind.

A second belief prioritized strict constitutionalism over other imperatives. For some individuals, this belief emphasized the pacifist nature of Japan’s constitution as a model for other countries. For other individuals, this ‘pacifist’ element was missing and instead had a more ‘legalist’ characteristic. However, all individuals holding this belief viewed Iraq’s invasion through Japan’s constitution, particularly Article 9. Because they interpreted the constitution as prohibiting overseas dispatch of the SDF as well as most participation in overseas activities, the script of action invoked was one of opposing SDF dispatch.

109

A third belief can more accurately be called an acute sensitivity to Asian states,

particularly China and South Korea. These decision-makers prioritized Japan’s relations

with its neighbors above other imperatives, making them sensitive to anxiety towards

Japan. The lens through which they viewed Iraq’s invasion was how Japan’s response

would be interpreted by its neighbors. Because these states were anxious about any

personnel dispatch, the script of action invoked was one of opposing SDF dispatch.

Despite not holding a majority, the JSP was effective in vetoing policies because its anti-SDF dispatch message resonated with the large number of decision-makers in both the ruling party and the central bureaucracy who occupied key institutional positions.

This meant that the JSP was able to veto policies every time the smaller pro-SDF dispatch coalition advocated policies that included the SDF. Enhancing the JSP’s power was public opinion. The public too feared remilitarization, held strict constitutionalist beliefs, and was sensitive to the anxiety of Japan’s Asian neighbors. This meant that JSP opposition to SDF dispatch resonated with the public. Table 3.7 shows that throughout the Gulf Crisis, the public remained opposed to Japan participating via SDF dispatch.

Only after the war finished and countries began returning home did support for dispatch reach a majority. But even then, 46% viewed post-war dispatch of MSDF minesweepers as problematic from a constitutional standpoint. 52 With public opinion strongly against

dispatch, in combination with the anti-dispatch beliefs spread throughout the government

and parties, it was impossible for SDF dispatch to be chosen as a policy option.

52 Asahi Shimbun , April 24, 1991 (1, 3). 46% thought it was constitutionally problematic, 33% did not. 110

Table 3.7 (Asahi): Support-Opposition to SDF Dispatch 53 Support Oppose October 1990 19% 67% November 1990 15% 78% February 1991 33% 55% April 1991 56% 30%

In 2003, the situation was different. The pro-SDF dispatch coalition greatly outnumbered the anti-SDF dispatch coalition. Unlike 1990, the pro-SDF dispatch coalition was now widespread throughout the ruling parties (LDP, Komeito, New

Conservative Party) and the bureaucracies responsible for security policy (MOFA, JDA,

Kantei, CLB). The unifying factor was the belief in the importance of Japan fulfilling its international obligations. These decision-makers viewed the US-led efforts to disarm Iraq through the lens of how it would affect international stability and security and, most importantly, what Japan needed to do as a member of international society to contribute.

Because other states were participating with their militaries, they believed Japan too needed to make similar visible contributions. Given this belief, the script of action invoked was one of advocating SDF dispatch. Unlike 1990, a small group of these lawmakers existed in the main opposition party. DPJ MP Akihisa Nagashima explains, one group of DPJ lawmakers believed,

…we have to take care of Iraqi people and instability and do something to help with this. We don’t want to see insurgents and spill over into other countries….Some members in DPJ including myself, started to think of some rationale to support the operations in Iraq….We don’t endorse what the US-UK did but we should face this new reality and change our policy to be more realistic. 54

The anti-SDF dispatch coalition, on the other hand, was small and concentrated in the opposition parties. While this coalition was not motivated by anti-militarist beliefs or

53 No polls were taken in August concerning the public’s view. Poll data from Asahi Shimbun : October 1, 1990 (1, 3), November 6, 1990 (1, 3), February 5, 1991 (1, 3), and April 24, 1991 (1, 3). 54 Akihisa Nagashima, Interview, May 31, 2006. 111

sensitivity to Asian neighbors, lawmakers did hold strong constitutionalist beliefs. Like

1990 decision-makers, these lawmakers viewed events in Iraq through a lens that

prioritized Japan’s constitution. Because they interpreted Japan’s participation in the war

as violating different constitutional interpretations, the script of action invoked was one

of opposing SDF dispatch. Unlike 1990, very few members of this coalition were in the

ruling parties (exceptions include LDP elder statesmen Masaharu Gotoda, Hiromu

Nonaka, and Yohei Kono).

Similar to the JSP, the DPJ did not have the numerical ability to stop policies.

Mentioned above (and demonstrated in Chapter Four), the JSP could effectively constrain policies because its message resonated with government decision-makers and with the public. These decision-makers with whom such a message resonated had disappeared in

2003. Worse, the ability of the DPJ’s anti-dispatch message to resonate with the public had dramatically decreased. While the public opposed SDF dispatch (Table 3.8), it no longer opposed because of sensitivity to Asian neighbors, fears of remilitarization, or strict constitutionalist beliefs. Instead, it opposed because Iraq was seen as simply too dangerous (Table 3.9). For those who agreed with SDF dispatch, like the majority of

Table 3.8 (Asahi): Support-Opposition to SDF Dispatch to Iraq 55 Support Oppose June 2003 46% 43% July 2003 33% 55% August 2003 31% 58% October 2003 32% 55% December 2003 34% 55% January 2004 40% 48% February 2004 44% 48% March 2004 42% 41% decision-makers, the main reason for supporting dispatch was because of the belief in the

necessity of Japan making an international contribution (Table 3.9). Understanding this

55 Data from Asahi Shimbun , various dates: (2003) June 30, 1; July 1, 4; July 22, 1; July 23, 4; August 25, 2; October 24, 4; December 12, 1; December 13, 4; (2004) January 19, 1; and March 16, 1. 112

nuance explains why despite an overwhelming desire to be involved in reconstruction

(Table 3.10), they opposed dispatch. Additionally, because their views changed since

1990, arguments about remilitarization, sensitivity to Asian neighbors, or strict

constitutionalism no longer could resonate with the public even if the DPJ tried. The

result was the inability of any DPJ message to resonate, depriving the DPJ of being able

to mobilize public opinion to constrain the government.

Table 3.9 (Asahi): Main Reason for Support-Opposition of SDF Dispatch to Iraq 56 Support Oppose (Iraq is Dangerous) (International Contribution) June 2003 29% 16% July 2003 17% 25% December 2003 20% 26% January 2004 24% 21% March 2004 24% 15%

Table 3.10 (Asahi): Should Japan Be Involved in Iraqi Reconstruction? 57 Yes No June 2003 68% 23% August 2003 56% 32% December 2003 64% 28%

The Gulf War Trauma as Instigator of Cognitive Shift Critical to explaining this cognitive shift from anti-SDF dispatch beliefs to pro-

SDF dispatch beliefs is being able to identify the event that caused the cognitive shift to

occur. There is strong evidence to conclude that this event was the Gulf War experience

itself. The Kaifu Administration dealt with the Gulf Crisis by dispersing increasing

amounts of money (August: $1 billion; September: $3 billion, January: $9 billion) but

unable to send the SDF until after the war finished. The international community

criticized the policies as insufficient and having virtually no ability to respond to what the

multinational forces required and the crisis demanded. While other countries rallied to the

56 Data from Asahi Shimbun : (2003) June 30, 1; July 1, 4; July 22, 1; July 23, 4; December 12, 1; December 13, 4; (2004) January 19, 1; and March 16, 1. 57 Data from Asahi Shimbun : (2003) June 30, 1; July 1, 4; August 25, 2; December 12, 1; and December 13, 4. 113

international cause of turning back a flagrant violation of Kuwait’s sovereignty, Japan was accused of passing-the-buck and being no more than a floating ATM engaged in checkbook diplomacy. Argued in Chapter Two, individuals learn lessons via feedback.

For Japanese decision-makers, the feedback from the international community was numerous, consistent, and clear: Japanese responses were insufficient. This feedback included:

• King Saud asked Foreign Minister for a contribution more than money, such as transportation support. 58 This message was consistently given to Japan by Saudi officials. 59 This was reinforced by other Middle Eastern states (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, etc.) that viewed Japan as nothing more than the multinational forces’ ‘sponsor.’ 60 • A large number of polls on Japan indicated that Americans did not view Japan’s response favorably: An August 1990 Gallup-Newsweek poll indicated that 59% thought Japan’s response was insufficient;61 an August 1990 Time-CNN poll indicated that 61% felt Japan had not done its ‘fair share, increasing to 68% in September;’62 a September 1990 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll indicated that 62% believed Japan did not do its ‘fair share’ in the Gulf; 63 an October 1990 Asahi poll indicated that 77% thought the Japanese government’s response to the Gulf crisis was inadequate, 64 a January 1991 Gallup poll indicated that 72% do not believe Japan was doing as much as it could; 65 an April 1991 Business Week-

58 Asahi Shimbun , August 20, 1990, 2. 59 Asahi Shimbun , September 11, 1990, 6. 60 Asahi Shimbun , February 3, 1991, 3. 61 Newsweek and Gallup Organization, August 23-August 24, 1990 . Retrieved April 10, 2009 from the iPOLL Databank, . Question : Are the following countries doing as much as they can to help solve the crisis in the Middle East)?)... Japan Results : Not doing as much as they can-59%, Doing enough / Don’t know-41% 62 Time, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, August 23, 1990. Question : In your view, have each of the following done their fair share in the crisis with Iraq?... Japan: Results : Has-19%, Has Not Done-61%, Not Sure-20%. Survey by Time, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, September 13, 1990. Question : In your view, have each of the following done their fair share in the crisis with Iraq?...Japan: Results : Has Done-15%, Has Not Done-68%, Not Sure-17%. Both retrieved April 10, 2009 from the iPOLL Databank, . 63 NBC News, Wall Street Journal and Hart and Teeter Research Companies , September 15-September 18, 1990. Retrieved April 10, 2009 from the iPOLL Databank, . Question : Do you feel...Japan... has or has not done its fair share in contributing to our efforts in the Middle East? Results : Has done its fair share- 22%, Has not done its fair share-62%, Not sure-16%. 64 Asahi Shimbun , October 1, 1990, 1. 65 Gallup Organization, January 11-January 13, 1991 . Retrieved April 10, 2009 from the iPOLL Databank, . Question : Please tell me whether or not you feel each of the following countries and groups of countries are doing as much as they can to help to 114

Harris poll indicated that 73% believed that Japan ‘got away without contributing its fair share,’ 66 the same Business Week-Harris poll indicated that 56% had a more negative view of Japan because of the Gulf War and that because of their behavior, 64% were less likely to buy Japanese products, 67 and a November 1991 CBS News/New York Times poll indicated that 65% thought Japan should have done more.68 • Throughout the crisis, Japan was barraged with messages from the US government of its desire to have a visible Japanese presence in the Middle East. These messages came from President George H. W. Bush, Vice President Dan Quayle, National Security Advisor Brent Scrowcroft, Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State Bob Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for and Pacific Desaix Anderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford, and Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia at the National Security Council Karl Jackson. • Upset by what the US Congress saw as free-riding by Germany, Japan and others, on September 10, 1990 the Senate passed an amendment (S.AMDT.2620 to H.R. 5241) introduced by Dennis DeConcini requesting the President to submit by November 30 a report outlining the contributions of US allies and friends. Angry by Japan providing too little money and refusing to go beyond financial assistance, on September 12 the House passed (370-53) an amendment (H.AMDT.712) introduced by David Bonior to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991 (H.R.4739). The amendment required Japan to pay for all deployment costs for all US forces in Japan. If Japan refused, the US would begin removing 5,000 troops a year. During a House-Senate conference in October, the amendment was dropped, but the memory remained.69 • At a meeting at the State Department on August 27, 1990, an official from the DOD laid out a satellite picture of the Persian Gulf and confronted visiting North American Affairs Bureau Councilor Minoru Tanba by asking him if he knew what

support the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf.)... Japan: Results : Yes-8%, No-72%, No Opinion-20%. 66 Business Week/Harris Poll , April 1, 1991. Retrieved April 9, 2009 from the Polling the Nations Database . Question : Japan gets 60% of its oil from the Persian Gulf. It pledged $13 billion to help cover costs, but sent no troops or military equipment to support the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf. Do you think this was a sufficient contribution, or did the Japanese get away without contributing their fair share? Results: sufficient contribution-22%, got away without contributing fair share-73%, not sure-5%. 67 Business Week/Harris Poll , April 1, 1991. Retrieved April 9, 2009 from the Polling the Nations Database . Question : Did what happened in the Persian Gulf cause you to think more positively or more negatively about Japan? Results: more positively-11%, more negatively-56%, no change-28%, not sure-5%. Question : Considering the behavior of Japan, are you more or less likely to buy products made in Japan? Results: more likely-7%, less likely-64%, no change-27%, not sure-2%. 68 CBS News/New York Times, November 18-November 22, 1991 . Retrieved April 10, 2009 from the iPOLL Databank, . Question : Do you think Japan should have done more to help during the war to defeat Iraq, should have done less, or did Japan do as much as was appropriate? Results : Should have done more-65%, Should have done less-2%, Appropriate-20%, Don’t know/No Answer-13%. 69 See Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov 115

the twenty dots were in the picture. The dots, it turned out, were Japanese tankers. The point of the confrontation was to deliver a message of discontent over Japanese tankers enjoying the security the multinational forces were providing without any significant Japanese support. • European countries consistently questioned Japan’s efforts. This includes British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stating publically that “Japan has made a good start, but I shall be encouraging it to do more.” 70 This ‘something’ more included minesweepers. Italians criticized Japan as cowardly because it only gave money while Italy sent troops and there were deaths. 71 Finally, after Germany dispatched 5 minesweepers and 2 supply ships, both US and Europe began comparing Japan to it, asking why Germany could do it but Japan could not. The inability of Japan to do like Germany motivated US Speaker of the House Thomas Foley to remark that ‘even more than before, Japan is isolationist.” 72 • Despite providing over $13 billion that necessitated a tax increase on the Japanese people, Kuwait did not list Japan in its March 11, 1991 Washington Post full-page advertisement thanking America and its coalition partners. 73 • Prior to the June 8, 1991 Victory Parade in Washington, the seat for Japan’s Ambassador to the US. Ryohei Murata was not included amongst ambassadors’ seats representing the multinational forces but instead amongst seats for general ambassadors. Nor was the Japanese flag to be included in the parade. Only after Ambassador Murata opposed did his seat change (the day of the parade) and the Japanese flag included in the parade. 74

Despite the fact that Japanese decision-makers expected their efforts would be

appreciated by international society, the feedback was consistent that Japan’s reliance on

money was not appreciated. A March 2003 Lower House document refers to this

experience as “the government’s Gulf Trauma,” explaining that despite providing large

sums of money, minesweepers and other items, the international community did not

appreciate Japan’s response and criticized it as ‘too little, too late” and as providing only

money but not sweating or bleeding. 75 Clearly, the feedback from international society

shocked decision-makers because it was unexpected, especially after essentially

70 Financial Times , September 10, 1990, 2. 71 Motoo Shiina, Interview, July 6, 2006. 72 Asahi Shimbun , March 16, 1991, 4. 73 Washington Post , March 11, 1991, A7. Many people often cite this ad as appearing in the New York Times, but it did not. The closest thing that did appear in the New York Times was a March 4, 1991 full- page ad (A15) taken by Kuwait’s Ministry of Information that directly thanked “the people of the United States of America.” 74 Murata, 2008, 121. 75 Shuugiin Chousakyoku Gaimu Chousashitsu, 2003, 60. 116

bankrolling the Gulf War. Given the uniformity and clarity of feedback, decision-makers came to see their efforts as a failure. A 1991 MOFA Blue Paper concluded that the reason was because of its minimal presence in international efforts. 76 Deputy Foreign Minister

Koji Watanabe explains what he and others of the time felt,

It was the frustration, humiliation, and regret and never shall we commit this mistake again…It is not just in MOFA that bureaucrats feel like this, it is in other ministries too because the most traumatic verdict of our failure to come up with any tangible, substantial support measure to the coalition forces was the request from the United States to pay an exorbitant amount of money; $13 billion…when the war ended the Kuwaiti government made a one page advertisement for expressing gratitude to the coalition forces, but not a single word mentioned about Japan. So that was humiliation. 77 This humiliation was immediate and felt throughout the bureaucracy. MP Akihisa

Nagashima, an assistant to an LDP MP at the time, argues that the mood amongst LDP lawmakers was similar. Nagashima says, “We felt that we didn’t do anything, our contribution is hollow, just economic aid. We were so embarrassed. We tend to believe that we are a peaceful, pacifist nation but that constitutional ideal turned out to be hollow, impotent. That lesson was a major shock.” 78

Given the shock and clarity of the feedback, decision-makers’ beliefs changed.

And this change manifested itself in two ways. First and foremost, a majority of decision- makers holding anti-SDF beliefs shifted to the pro-dispatch belief of the importance of

Japan fulfilling its international obligations. Second, amongst those with pro-SDF dispatch beliefs there was a disappearance of those prioritizing the US-Japan alliance.

The result was the majority of decision-makers and lawmakers came to share the same belief. A few examples illustrate the strength of the shock in changing decision-makers’ beliefs who held anti-SDF dispatch beliefs during the Gulf War.

76 Gaimusho, 1991, 23. 77 Koji Watanabe, Interview, June 15, 2006. 78 Akihisa Nagashima, Interview, May 31, 2006. 117

• PM Toshiki Kaifu opposed SDF dispatch until April 1991 when he approved dispatching MSDF minesweepers. It was at this point that he stated Japan has to cooperate with SDF dispatch out of his belief that Japan has to “respond to requests for a humanitarian contribution made by international society.” 79 On October 27, 1991, PM Kaifu made a speech telling SDF officials that he hoped the SDF would bear an important part of Japan’s contribution to international society. He said that if Japan was to effectively take part in UN PKOs and other international aid activities, the “SDF’s role is extremely important.” 80 And despite his opposition to including SDF personnel in a bill in November 1990, thirteen years later in an Asahi Shimbun poll of lawmakers, Kaifu indicated his support of the 2003 Iraq Bill (to dispatch SDF to Iraq) as-is. 81 His reasoning is identical to what other decision-makers holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs say: “as one member of international society, [should] support the activities of America and others.” • LDP MP and Kaifu’s Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama opposed SDF dispatch in 1990 because of his strict constitutionalist beliefs. 82 And yet, in the same Asahi Shimbun poll of lawmakers concerning the 2003 Iraq Bill, Nakayama too indicates his support of the bill as-is. 83 Unlike Kaifu, he does not provide a reason. But Nakayama has stated his reason the SDF could be dispatched in 2003 was “because of the experience of the Gulf War.” 84 • LDP MP and Kaifu’s Health and Welfare Minister Yuji Tsushima opposed SDF dispatch in 1990 because of strict constitutionalist beliefs, calling the “pacifist constitution…an important treasure for us. We should make it functional in the international community.” 85 In 2003, Tsushima did not oppose SDF dispatch to Iraq. This is because, “…international cooperation is the basis for keeping our security. Japan alone cannot guarantee the peace and stability. Even if the constitution asks us to be entirely no military potential allowed, it is not realistic, so we have no alternative than cooperate with countries that share the same values and which also have a free economic system.” 86 • In 1990, Vice Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama opposed SDF dispatch because they were a ‘military.’ Instead, he advocated a Corps composed of civilians. 87 Yet one year later, in a November 1991 Chuo Koron article, he argued that the lesson from the Gulf War experience was that “Japan is now expected to assume the responsibility of a major power to protect the international order.” 88 Although he does not mention the SDF by name, at a time when debate was raging over SDF participation in UN PKOs, he goes on to argue that “I would like

79 New York Times , April 25, 1991, A11. 80 Japan Economic Newswire, Kaifu Says SDF Has Major Part in Japan’s Int’l Role,” October 27, 1991. 81 Asahi Shimbun , June 28, 2003, 4. 82 Taro Nakayama, Interview, November 27, 2007. 83 Asahi Shimbun , June 28, 2003, 4. 84 Taro Nakayama, Interview, November 27, 2007. 85 Asahi Shimbun , October 16, 1990, evening edition, 2. 86 Yuji Tsushima, Interview, June 27, 2006. 87 Kuriyama explicitly makes this distinction between ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ in Kuriyama, 1997, 40. 88 Kuriyama, 1991, 119. 118

to see Japan…to clear the way for full-fledged participation in U.N. PKOs.” 89 By March 2003, he responded to a question regarding what still needs to be done in Japan concerning the SDF, “What does Japan’s pacifism mean now? Japanese themselves should think it over. There is no hope for getting the international community to accept the position that Japan will never use military force under any circumstances. After all, even the U.N. Charter sanctions the use of military force.” 90 And in a January 2004 interview with , he argues, “SDF dispatch is necessary” to Iraq. 91 • During debates on the UN Peace Cooperation Bill to dispatch the SDF to the Middle East in 1990, Komeito’s Chairman of Foreign Policy Tetsuzo Fuyushiba believed that SDF dispatch meant “scrap[ping] the national consensus on the ban on military operations overseas, which has deterred Japan from becoming a military power.” 92 And yet, in 2003, then-Secretary General Fuyushiba defended the plan to dispatch the SDF to Iraq. He argued that Japan “should be proactive in doing reconstruction support as a member of international society.” 93 Criticizing DPJ President Naoto Kan for advocating sending private individuals to conduct this support, Fuyushiba argued the best way was via the SDF. 94 In the same interview, he argued that his will for Japan to make an “appropriate contribution to international society’s fight to eradicate terrorism” has not changed at all.

These examples of individuals who opposed SDF dispatch during the Gulf War

but later supported SDF dispatch are notable precisely because of their opposition-turned-

support. While the quotes do not draw explicit lines from the lessons of the Gulf War to

new beliefs that support SDF dispatch, some of them occurred relatively quickly after the

Gulf War (i.e. Kaifu, Kuriyama). Others, like Nakayama, specifically mention the Gulf

War experience as the reason why the SDF could be dispatched in 2003. This leads me

believe that even though I do not have the explicit connections of Belief A Gulf War

Trauma Belief B, there is circumstantial evidence to support the argument of the

importance of the Gulf War Trauma.

89 Ibid , 121. 90 Herald Asahi , March 8-9, 2003. 91 Yomiuri Shimbun , January 27, 2004, 4. 92 Japan Economic Journal , October 20, 1990, 3. 93 A June 14, 2003 interview on Tetsuzo Fuyushiba’s website: 94 Asahi Shimbun , December 4, 2003, 4. 119

Similarly, while there is nothing in Fuyushiba’s comments to connect his changed beliefs to the Gulf War Trauma, there is other evidence to support my argument that it was. Throughout the Gulf experience, Fuyushiba’s Komeito opposed SDF dispatch (even for rescuing refugees). As demonstrated in Chapter Four, this opposition was based on a mixture of all three anti-SDF beliefs. But international criticism leveled at Japan’s inability to dispatch personnel stung, leading Komeito lawmakers to learn that “it is hard for Japan to gain international understanding, with…contributions limited in money and materials alone.” 95 Given the sting, and with discussions taking place in the LDP on creating a bill to dispatch personnel to UN PKOs, Chairman Koshiro Ishida called on party members to debate SDF usage in UN PKOs in May 1991. 96 According to a

Komeito lawmaker holding office during this time, it was the lack of appreciation that instigated Komeito lawmakers to change their beliefs, “Despite giving $13.5 billion in support, the international response was cool towards Japan…I think that the biggest

[lesson] was the cool international response to the Japanese belief that because the economy is good and because we are rich, it is OK to just give money.” 97 Because of this feedback, Komeito lawmakers changed their beliefs. This same lawmaker argues that for

Komeito, the belief became “…we thought that it was no longer good to follow ‘one- country pacifism.’ We had to get away from it. We thought about what role for Japan to play in the world for continuing to maintain peace.” 98 In other words, Japan fulfilling its international obligations. The result was the party approving SDF participation in UN

95 Quote of Secretary General Yuichi Ichikawa, Daily Yomiuri , October 25, 1990, 3. 96 Japan Economic Newswire, Komeito Head Calls for Debate on SDF Peacekeeping Role, May 28, 1991. 97 Komeito MP, Interview, December 6, 2006. 98 Ibid . 120

PKOs on July 2, 1991, just months after they had opposed SDF dispatch. 99 By late

August, Komeito also agreed to allow SDF dispatch for disaster relief operations. Despite

Komeito’s staunch opposition prior to the Gulf War, on June 15, 1992 it approved the passage of the UN PKO Law which allowed SDF personnel to join UN PKO missions, albeit under the condition that participation in UN PKFs be temporarily frozen. 100

The shadow of the Gulf Trauma remains. Demonstrating its lasting impact, 2003 decision-makers throughout the government and lawmakers in the LDP, Komeito and

DPJ cite the lesson learned from the Gulf War as their underlying motivation during the

2003 Iraq War. As will be shown in Chapter Five, the belief these decision-makers held is one emphasizing Japan’s international obligations. Despite twelve years separating them from the humiliation felt in 1991 by other decision-makers, the Gulf Trauma remains fresh in their minds. If there is one representative phrase that summarizes this lesson, it would be the English -phrase “too-little, too-late.” ‘Too-little’ refers to the

contribution lacking in substance (i.e. money) while ‘too-late’ refers to the slowness of

the response. A number of representative examples from 2003 decision-makers suffice to

demonstrate the lasting shadow of the Gulf Trauma.

• Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka says, “…at the end of the day the SDF dispatch was considered as a necessary contribution on the part of Japan because we had the first Gulf War very much on our minds, and that was, in a sense, humiliation on the part of Japan because Japan gave $13 billion but Japan was not even put on the list of contributors to whom Kuwait expressed their appreciation. That was humiliation…I think that humiliation was very much on our minds when we discussed what contribution we would be able to make in the case of the Iraq War.” 101

99 Their approval was conditioned, including UN request required, Diet approval of dispatch, and PKO must not be for use or threat of use of force. Japan Economic Newswire, Komeito to Approve SDF Participation in Peace Corps, July 2, 1991. 100 This freeze was lifted on December 7, 2001. 101 Hitoshi Tanaka, Interview, September 5, 2006. 121

• MOFA official Noriyuki Shikata says, “…we didn’t want to repeat the mistakes we had made in the first Gulf War. That is probably very simplistic, but maybe a perception shared by many.” 102 He adds, “No doubt among many of us was the lessons learned from the Gulf Crisis, we didn’t want to repeat the similar failure to obtain appreciation from the international community including the US for what we do as government. Financial contribution alone would not gain international credibility. Being characterized as checkbook diplomacy or the too- little, too-late argument, we didn’t want to repeat that.” 103 • MOFA Vice Minister Shotaro Yachi, when asked what lesson were decision- makers drawing from in 2003, answers, “The Gulf War experience. At that time, although Japan gave $13 billion in economic contributions, it didn’t provide a human contribution. Well, afterwards it sent the minesweepers but it didn’t do it during the war. Concerning that, there was lots of criticism from allied countries, led by the US. There was the criticism of “too little, too late” concerning that economic support. Also, “Japan contributes money but not people” or “Japan is a country that doesn’t sweat or bleed.” In Japanese you say a country without a vision. We were extremely criticized at that time. Then the Kuwaiti government put in the New York Times an advertisement thanking those countries that helped it but Japan’s name was not included in it. For those people who were involved in the Iraq War policy process, looking at the Gulf War experience, they had the feeling that only money is not enough, that a human contribution has to be made by Japan.” 104 • CLB DG Osamu Akiyama says of the decision-making in the CLB in 2003, “…there was a huge trauma over not being able to make a new law during the Gulf War…so you could say that the government and the Diet and the people have learned lessons.” 105 • An SDF official, in speaking about what was on the minds of SDF officials, states, “the memory of the Gulf War, “too little, too late.” Probably no matter who you interview you get the same answer.” He adds, “From the perspective of the SDF, although at that time that the minesweepers were dispatched with difficulty they were not really appreciated and despite the fact that we gave quite a lot of money, $13 billion right, I thought, ‘why isn’t international society appreciating this? For this part, well, I don’t know if the word ‘trauma’ is appropriate or not but it was painful.” 106 • A JDA Official describes the thinking in the JDA during the crafting of the Iraq Special Measures Law, “There is no mistake that the trauma from the Gulf War was one [lesson]…I thought that we didn’t do things we could have done. So for this time, we thought of what we could do.” 107 • An LDP MP states, “…everybody knows that Japan paid so much money, made such a huge financial contribution to the Gulf War but was not very much

102 Noriyuki Shikata, Interview, August 17, 2006. 103 Noriyuki Shikata, Interview, June 6, 2006. 104 Shotaro Yachi, Interview, October 17, 2006. 105 Osamu Akiyama, Interview, December 20, 2006. 106 Anonymous, Interview. 107 JDA Official, Interview, October 6, 2006. 122

appreciated by the world. So we learned a lesson from this event. In order to appeal that the role which Japan played, in order to maintain the kind of peace in this region, we have to act in addition to making financial contributions. That is to say, a financial contribution is not enough to appeal that Japan is very much willing to play a major role in order to maintain peace in the world community.”108 • DPJ MP Akihisa Nagashima states “We learned tremendous lessons from the Gulf War. We did nothing and we got serious criticism from international society so we need to do more and we need to do more with human contributions, not only economic and diplomatic support. Show the flag and boots on the ground, as Armitage said.” 109 • DPJ MP Nobuhiko Suto says, “For Japan not to be isolated by international cooperation, like what happened in the 1990 Gulf War, the DPJ decided to do some degree of cooperation.” 110 • Komeito MP Hiroshi Takano says, “…when we decided to approve of the war, it was the lessons of the Gulf War. For the point of human contributions, we were criticized as dispersing only money, well I guess we also dispatched minesweepers. We learned that we should dispatch the SDF, a visible contribution.” 111

Japan’s Reputation As evident in the comments, the root of the Gulf Trauma was the feedback from

international society that Japan’s ability to provide only money was insufficient. The

reason why this mattered was because decision-makers cared what international society

thought because it was a judgment of Japan. According to Atsuyuki Sassa, “the

criticism…from the world was not just of the Japanese government. It was of the

Japanese.” 112 Vice Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama draws out the implication,

arguing that the 7-months of the Gulf experience left a “deep scar on Japan’s

international image.” 113 Japanese decision-makers across the board agreed, concerned by what they saw as a lack of appreciation:

108 LDP MP, Interview, December 4, 2006. 109 Akihisa Nagashima, Interview, May 31, 2006. 110 Nobuhiko Suto, Interview, May 25, 2006. 111 Hiroshi Takano, Interview, November 29, 2006. 112 Roundtable Discussion, May 1991, 13. 113 Kuriyama, 1997, 41. 123

• MOFA Senior Official: “Many MOFA bureaucrats and government-related people are still affected by this Gulf War experience. There were some people who appreciated what Japan did but despite the huge tax increase to disperse $13 billion, it wasn’t appreciated in the international community, which taught us the lesson that money is not enough.” 114 • Anonymous states, “…the trauma of the Gulf War experience comes perhaps first in the list [of lessons learned]. At that time, it was believed that despite our great contribution it wasn’t appreciated, it was a monetary contribution. Even though it was a very vital contribution, it was not appreciated widely. So this time, we should not repeat that.” 115 • MOFA Official states, “…in the 1990/91 Gulf War, the response for Japan was insufficient. From the international standard, it was greatly insufficient. Although we dispersed lots of money, in terms of human support the cooperation was insufficient.” 116 • MOFA Official states, “…we regretted that during the Gulf War our actions were insufficient. First, Japan’s response was slow. Second, Japan gave only money, there was no human participation. There was plenty of awareness that if we don’t learn well from these two points…there was the fear that Japan would not receive sufficient international appreciation.” 117 • JDA Official says “…the Japanese government contributed a lot of money but without any gratitude or explicit thanks from Kuwait. That has been a sort of trauma I think, for the Japanese government, for Japanese journalism, and for the Japanese people.” He adds, “I got the impression that the Japanese government contributed so much money without virtually any restrictions or conditions, but it ended up useless I say. Well, not useless, but not valued a lot internationally.” 118 • LDP MP Shinzo Abe says upon seeing Japan not listed as a country thanked by Kuwait that “it was then that Japan learned the reality that international society does not at all appreciate [contributions] that lack human contributions.” 119 • DPJ MP argues, “…there is the trauma of the Gulf War for the Japanese. That is to say, despite providing a huge amount of money, $13 billion, it wasn’t appreciated. We had the awareness that if you think about international contributions, the necessity of dispatching people is important.” 120

Nature in Lesson Learned Arguably, Japanese decision-makers could have retreated into isolation due to anger over the lack of appreciation for $13 billion, they could have turned to advocate

SDF human contributions or they could have turned to advocate non-SDF human

114 MOFA Official, Interview, May 23, 2006. 115 Anonymous, Interview. 116 MOFA Official, Interview, June 15, 2006. 117 MOFA Official, Interview, July 28, 2006. 118 JDA Official, Interview, October 24, 2006. 119 Abe, 2006, 136. 120 Seiji Maehara, Interview, November 16, 2006. 124

contributions. Essentially, there were three alternative lessons they could have learned.

But because the feedback clearly pushed for more than money (and various American opinion polls indicating a desire for Japan to do more with its military 121 ) the option of isolation was sure to bring more negative feedback. Because decision-makers wanted to obtain appreciation for their efforts, the lesson of isolation was not the lesson learned.

Instead, according to a 1991 MOFA Blue Paper, the lesson learned from the Gulf War was that “for world peace and stability, we cannot stop at monetary cooperation, we need human cooperation in the form of Japanese participation.” 122 This is reflected by a government official, “...because of the trauma of the Gulf War, we have to now make an active, human contribution; [we] don’t want to be accused again of too-little, too late so let’s make an active contribution.” 123 Decision-makers learned that visible, human contributions to protect international peace and stability were required to be

121 Examples include a June 1991 Harris Poll indicating that 51% of Americans believed constitutional restrictions should be removed so that Japan could participate in future wars. Additionally, 74% believed that the SDF should be sent overseas in some capacity. See Harris Poll , June 23, 1991. Retrieved April 9, 2009 from the Polling the Nations Database . Question: During the Gulf War, Japanese troops did not participate in the coalition forces because of the constitutional restriction Japan has had since the Second World War. Do you think that this constitutional restriction should be removed so that Japan can participate in future wars like the Gulf War, or not? Results: should be removed-51%, should not be removed-32%, not sure-17%. Question : Which one of the following statements is the closest to your own opinion about Japan's sending its Self Defense Forces overseas? Japan should not send its Self Defense Forces overseas at all, Japan should manage to send them overseas only when their missions are limited to non-military activities, such as rescues in a disaster area, Japan should permit them to serve in military roles under the command of the United Nations, such as participating in the UN peacekeeping forces, Japan's Self Defense Forces should serve overseas in a military capacity much as the armed forces of other nations did in the Gulf War. Results : should not send at all-21%, should send but limit to nonmilitary activities-46%, should permit to serve in military roles under UN-23%, should serve like other nations in military capacity-5%, not sure-5%. A November 1991 CBS News/New York Times Poll reinforces this, with 62% agreeing that Japan has a responsibility to take military action in trouble spots around the world. CBS News/New York Times, November 18-November 22, 1991 . Retrieved April 10, 2009 from the iPOLL Databank, . Question : These days, do you think Japan has a responsibility to take military action in trouble spots around the world when it is asked by its allies, or don't you think that Japan has that responsibility? Results : Reponsibility-62%, No-27%, Don’t Know/No Answer-11%. 122 Gaimusho, 1991, 23. 123 Anonymous, Interview. 125

appreciated. 124 According to a March 2003 Lower House document, there remains in

government (particularly MOFA-JDA) a strong feeling to “not repeat the same mistakes”

of being unable to show Japan’s presence. 125 But learning how to ‘sweat’ did not specify

SDF or non-SDF human contributions. Or did it?

The reason why they learned that human contributions meant SDF contributions, as opposed to non-SDF human contributions, is best captured by JDA official Kohei

Masuda arguing that “In Iraq, the foreign militaries, like the British, they see the SDF but what they really see is Japan through the SDF…if they see a great SDF, they see a great

Japan…that is how the people in the world see things. They see countries by seeing their militaries.” 126 Militaries are a symbolic, visible representations of states, complete with the national flag. The lesson learned from the Gulf Trauma was the need to make a human contribution similar to other states. Because other states contribute by their militaries, Japanese decision-makers interpreted that if Japan was to be appreciated, it too needed to contribute with its military. 127 This precluded non-SDF human contributions. It was a lesson reflected by decision-makers throughout government.

Understanding the lesson learned by the majority of decision-makers was that in order for Japan to be appreciated by international society there is a need to make a visible, human contribution with one’s military explains why we see the growth of the pro-SDF dispatch coalition. Those who had responded to the Gulf Crisis by opposing SDF dispatch in 1990 (i.e. pushing monetary policies, advocated private ships/planes to

124 Gaimusho, 1991, 24. 125 Shuugiin Chousakyoku Gaimu Chousashitsu, 2003, 61. 126 Kohei Masuda, Interview, October 16, 2006. 127 This is not to suggest there is a global norm about using a state’s military for human contributions. Rather, I am pointing out how Japanese government decisions-makers interpreted the criticism and lesson learned. 126

transport non-military cargo, fears of militarism, etc) were seen as the source for Japan’s

unexpected failure. In order to avoid future failure, the lesson learned was to advocate

SDF dispatch, not non-SDF human contributions.

Institutionalization of the Lesson Remembering that lessons learned by individuals mean little unless they are

institutionalized into the entities within which they exist, it is necessary to demonstrate

how the Gulf War lessons have become institutionalized. Three types of evidence support

this.

First, based on perceived failures during the Gulf War, in August 1993 MOFA

conducted an internal reform. The result was abolishing the United Nations Bureau and,

in its place, creating the Foreign Policy Bureau ( 総合外交政策局), albeit with less UN-

focus than its predecessor. The main reason for its creation stemmed directly from

overcoming the failures of the Gulf War. Noriyuki Shikata explains that “…during the

Gulf War, it was very difficult to coordinate MOFA’s position for what was happening in

Iraq and Kuwait” because of the different views being expressed from various internal bureaus. He adds, “that's the main reason for the ministry's organizational reform that was carried out in the mid 1990's, creating [the] Foreign Policy Bureau which coordinates inter-bureau issues.”128 The hope was that by creating this entity, it would “enable Japan to embark on a more proactive ‘strategic diplomacy’ in the post-Cold War era” 129 by

providing more comprehensive middle- or long-term planning, short-term crisis

management, and policy coordination across bureaus, assisting the Minister’s Secretariat.

It is not surprise that in the years since its establishment it has risen to become the most

powerful influence within MOFA, diminishing the importance of the America-focus that

128 Noriyuki Shikata, Interview, June 6, 2006. 129 Shinn, 1996, 16. 127

dominated the North American Affairs Bureau and reducing “the ‘clientitis’ that led to

huge clashes between the North American Affairs and Asian bureaus.” 130

Second, when analyzing the Gulf War, a MOFA official says one of the problems

that led to Japan’s failure to dispatch personnel was “legally, [Japan] couldn’t respond,

systemically and organizationally it couldn’t respond…We can’t remain like this, this

was strongly felt. So Japan progressed with the legal framework.” 131 The lesson learned from the Gulf War promoted subsequent developments in the legal framework, which was the Law on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Related

Activities (i.e. PKO Law) in June 1992. After Kaifu stepped down as premier in October

1991, Kiichi Miyazawa succeeded him. Miyazawa pushed legislation that would enable

SDF dispatch in PKO activities. The motivating factor for this legislation was “to change the way the world sees Japan and the way Japanese see their country’s role in the world.

Participation in PKO would permit Japan to graduate from ‘checkbook diplomacy’ to a fuller role in international affairs.” 132 An MSDF Official says that “…when the PKO Law was made, it wasn’t made out of the blue. It was the result of our experience in not being regarded highly by our monetary contributions, of our failed attempt at the bill, and the attempt to transport human beings having failed.” 133 Other MOFA decision-makers, including Shunji Yanai who was responsible for drafting the PKO Law, agree on the connection between the Gulf War and the creation of the PKO Law. 134

130 Green, 2001, 59. 131 MOFA Official, Interview, June 15, 2006. 132 A Japanese government official is reported to have told this to U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering in August 1991. See US Department of State, 1991, 2. 133 MSDF Official, Interview, October 5, 2006. 134 See then North American Affairs Bureau DG Kouichiro Matsuura (2001), 24; then Treaties Bureau DG Shunji Yanai (2003); and Japan’s UN Ambassador Shizuo Saito (1991). 128

Finally, during the Cold War and until the Gulf War, MOFA enjoyed an abnormal

situation of exercising relative autonomy in crafting Japan’s defense and security policies.

An MSDF official says that during the Gulf War, “the JDA didn’t really have a chance to

be involved in the policy decisions. Even if they had a chance, they didn’t play a main

role.” 135 The JDA played a subordinated role in the decision-making process, but this

quickly changed. The lesson of the Gulf War was that human contributions are necessary.

Because this meant SDF dispatch in some capacity, it necessarily meant that MOFA would lose its autonomy if the lesson learned was taken seriously. Since the signing of the PKO Law, the JDA’s role has increased vis-à-vis MOFA even though no formal institutional changes were made to enable this. In terms of security policies, defense budget allocation, or policies that involve the use of the SDF, decision-making is now shared by MOFA and the JDA in a cooperative relationship. Additionally, until the Gulf

War, there were a few JDA personnel working in the Cabinet Secretariat while MOFA had a few dozen personnel. After the Gulf War, the number of JDA personnel has increased.

Conclusion The argument in this chapter has been that changes that occurred in both veto players and decision-makers’ beliefs explain why Japanese security-related foreign policies could and did change. Without change in the nature of the opposition parties, foreign policies that involve greater utilization of the SDF would not have been possible.

This is because until the mid-1990s, the ideological JSP exercised veto power, constraining the government in what policy options it could pursue. In 2003, the pragmatic DPJ provided less constraint on the government, leading to the emergence of

135 MSDF Official, Interview, October 5, 2006. 129

SDF dispatch as a viable policy option. Without cognitive changes among decision- makers, such policies would not have been considered and chosen. In 1990-91, decision- makers with anti-SDF dispatch beliefs largely outnumbered those with pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. In 2003, this changed to a situation where those with the pro-SDF dispatch belief dominated. The factor leading to this change was the experience of the Gulf War and the lessons decision-makers drew from this experience.

We turn next to examine these two variables in the empirical cases. Through these cases, we can examine their interaction and the consequence for policies deliberated and chosen.

130

IV. The Gulf War

Japan’s response to the Gulf War has been described as “ad hoc, equivocating, and reactive.” 1 The general view is that Japan simply reacted to US demands but because of strong dovish tendencies by PM Toshiki Kaifu, Japan chose money over personnel dispatches. In actuality, Japanese decision-makers were far from unified in a reticence to

SDF usage. Despite differences, decision-makers were proactive in their struggle to formulate policies that included personnel dispatch. Their inability to do so had more to do with divergent beliefs amongst decision-makers and the ability of the JSP to take advantage of these differences.

The sudden outbreak of the Gulf Crisis on August 2, 1990 came “like a bolt from out of the blue to the Japanese government,” 2 laying bare divergent beliefs amongst decision-makers concerning SDF dispatch. Decision-makers who opposed dispatch did so because they held one or more of the following beliefs: 1) sensitivity to Asian neighbors,

2) anti-militarist beliefs and 3) strict constitutionalist beliefs. We can call these anti-SDF dispatch beliefs and the individuals holding them as the coalition holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs. Likewise, decision-makers who supported dispatch did so because they held one or both of the following beliefs: 1) importance of Japan’s international obligations and 2) importance of the US-Japan alliance. We can call these pro-SDF dispatch beliefs and the individuals holding them as the coalition holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. While individuals within each coalition held any number of beliefs,

1 Purrington and A.K., 1991, 307. 2 Inoguchi, 1991, 257. 131

rarely did they share beliefs across coalitions. 3 This meant the two coalitions were in

opposition.

Despite its numerical status, the JSP could limit the SDF from proposals because

its message resonated both with the public and government bureaucrats and lawmakers.

This meant the JSP could stoke opposition against these proposals both in and out of

government. Because the government was concerned with the acceptability of its

proposals with both officials and the public, the JSP’s ability to stoke opposition in and

out of government meant it could exercise veto power in decision-making.

In this chapter, I present three unsuccessful attempts at dispatching the SDF in

1990-1991: 1) August Twenty-Ninth Package; 2) UN Peace Cooperation Bill; and 3)

ASDF plane dispatch and one successful attempt: 4) MSDF minesweeper dispatch.

Tracing each, I address my two independent variables: beliefs held by decision-makers

and the main opposition party. In doing so, the outcomes highlight the salience of the

variables at different times.

• The August Package was an executive order that failed. It failed not because of the JSP but because of divisions amongst government decision-makers holding different beliefs. These divisions manifested themselves as bureaucratic entities vetoing each other. • The UN Peace Cooperation Bill was Diet legislation that failed. This failed for two reasons. First, divisions amongst decision-makers holding different beliefs fragmented the government. These divisions manifested themselves as bureaucratic entities vetoing each other. Second, the JSP was able to exploit these differences to enflame opposition to the bill from within government. At the same time, because its message resonated with the public, it was able to amplify opposition to the bill by enflaming public opposition. • The ASDF dispatch was an executive order that failed, but the ‘failure’ was in its implementation, not passage. Similar to August, decision-makers were divided. And like the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, the JSP was able to enflame public opposition. Despite this opposition, the government passed the proposal but it

3 I say rarely because as will be evident, there were some ‘fence sitters’ like Vice Minister Takakazu Kuriyama. 132

failed because of continuing divisions amongst decision-makers, leading Kaifu to set strict conditions on the dispatch. • The MSDF minesweeper dispatch is an executive order that succeeds. With increasing criticism against Japanese policies, decision-makers were eager to show Japan was a reliable country to both America and international society. With the war’s closure dissipating legal concerns and decision-makers framing dispatch as assistance that would benefit Japan’s economy, decision-makers and LDP lawmakers united in support. While opposition parties opposed, national elections weakened the JSP. Given its weakened state, a more supportive public and the business community behind the proposal, the government dispatched with little resistance.

After each proposal, I engage the three alternative explanations from Chapter

One. Alliance management does not explain Japan’s policy choices because decision- makers were never concerned with entrapment. And while some evidence suggests a few were concerned about abandonment, these concerns have trouble explaining non-dispatch outcomes. Given that the logic of the Pure Variant of anti-militarist norms argues such norms were strong in 1990, it explains the rejection of policies in the fall but has problems accounting for a shift to support amongst decision-makers and public opinion shortly thereafter. The Nuanced Variant argument that anti-militarist norms remain robust and dispatch is allowed only if use of force is not included provides a strong explanation for all sub-cases except for the August 1990 package. Finally, while both Variants of the leadership argument explain the January non-ASDF dispatch, April MSDF dispatch and possibly the August package, neither can explain the failure of the UN Peace Cooperation

Bill. Because no alternative consistently explains Japan’s policy responses, I conclude that we should have confidence in the argument I present.

August 29, 1990 Policy Package: The First Policy Package The government’s attempt at formulating a first response that included the SDF represents an executive order that failed. Divisions amongst government decision-makers

133

holding different beliefs fragmented the government. These divisions manifested themselves as bureaucratic conflicts between veto players.

MOFA was in charge of responding to the crisis when it broke out on August second. After an initial focus on economic sanctions, MOFA began considering other policies on August eighth. 4 But because the crisis crossed bureau jurisdictions, MOFA handled it via ad hoc meetings. 5 While Vice Minister Takakazu Kuriyama met daily with his Deputy Ministers (Hisashi Owada, Koji Watanabe), held meetings with Bureau

Director Generals (DG), and briefed PM Toshiki Kaifu and Deputy Chief Cabinet

Secretary (DCCS-Adm.) Nobuo Ishihara, the central policymaking meeting was a task force chaired by Deputy Minister Koji Watanabe, which he called “ the most frustrating work I ever did in the MOFA.” 6 While decision-makers in the Watanabe group generally shared similar beliefs, they faced opposition from their bosses in MOFA and from their colleagues throughout the government who held different beliefs.

The Watanabe group, responsible for formulating Japan’s response, was composed of about 10 decision-makers from six MOFA bureaus 7 who shared pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. Some, notably those in the North American Affairs Bureau, wanted to dispatch the SDF because they prioritized the US alliance. And given that the US was

4 Miyake, 2001, 55. 5 The establishment of ad hoc headquarters and task forces are normal. During situations that require a lot of information that needs to be collected and examined, these meetings provide an opportunity to recruit the best and the brightest within one’s ministry. Shunji Yanai explains why many bureaus were involved. “The area in which the Gulf War occurred was the Gulf, so in MOFA the Middle East and African Bureau was the geographic office that was dealing with the issues geographically. And of course the United Nations Bureau was another section. The question of how to implement the Japan-US alliance was also an issue, so the North American Bureau was involved. As to the economic support, the Economic Cooperation Bureau was involved. And there were also legal aspects, so my bureau [Treaties Bureau] was involved. And the Consular Bureau, which was in charge of the protection of citizens abroad. So there were so many bureaus that were relevant and actually involved.” December 22, 2006. 6 Koji Watanabe, Interview, June 15, 2006 7 These included Middle East African Affairs Bureau, North American Affairs Bureau, UN Bureau, Consular Migration Bureau, Treaties Bureau, and Economic Bureau. Satoshi Morimoto, Interview, August 15, 2006. 134

pushing for visible, non-combat support (below), these decision-makers felt they needed

to fulfill such requests. Looking at the Gulf crisis through the lens of the alliance, they

believed, “how can we maintain the alliance without sending troops, or signals that we are ready to bleed in wartime?” 8 Others, largely those in the Treaties Bureau and UN

Bureau, prioritized Japan’s international obligations. Looking at the Gulf, these decision-

makers prioritized Japan’s responsibilities to the international community, “this is not

simply an issue that can be solved by money. America and Europe dispatched militaries

and were making sacrifices…we should solve problems by dispatching the SDF to play

Japan’s international role.” 9 Although the beliefs were different, they led to similar policy

preferences. Despite the fact that it was “common practice in the past to solve issues with

money only,” 10 from the onset “everything was on the table,” 11 even the ‘sexy’ policies considered taboo until that time. 12 It was an environment where “a lot of ideas were

floated” and “everyone spoke out.” 13 Given these beliefs, they included the SDF in the

policy considerations.

Formulated on August sixteenth, their first proposal included monetary support,

MSDF minesweepers, a medical team (composition undecided; non-combat, medical

SDF personnel considered ) to assist both wounded soldiers and refugees, in-kind material

assistance, rear-area communications and transportation support (both non-combat SDF

and private sector considered ) for items including those of a military nature (i.e.

ammunition, weapons, soldiers), and providing construction materials for hospitals and

8 Anonymous, Interview. North American Affairs Bureau DG Kouichiro Matsuura also clearly shows his motivations for action were considerations of the alliance relationship and doing what America wanted. See Roundtable Discussion, November 1991, 27-40. 9 Nobutoshi Akao, Interview, June 7, 2006 10 Nobutoshi Akao, Interview, June 7, 2006. 11 Koji Watanabe, Interview, June 15, 2006. 12 Anonymous, Interview. 13 Yukio Satoh, Interview, June 13, 2006. 135

emergency shelters. 14 The proposal included plans to revise the 1987 Law Regarding the

Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team to include SDF personnel and situations beyond natural disasters and include ‘conflict areas.’ 15

The proposal was supported by the US government, which was pushing for non- combat military support. US officials (Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt and

Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz) began contacting MOFA shortly after Iraq’s invasion, requesting minesweepers and ships/planes for transporting materials, soldiers, weapons, and ammunition to Saudi Arabia.16 This was accompanied by an inter-agency team (State, DoD, and NSC) sent to Tokyo “to encourage, influence, and accelerate

Japanese decisions,”17 a number of US officials requesting SDF participation in rear-area support activities, 18 and the US Navy commander at Yokosuka phoning MSDF commanders for minesweepers and fuel ships. 19 Ambassador Armacost pushed LDP

Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa on numerous occasions for logistical support and a contribution that ‘puts the Hinomaru in the Middle East.’ 20 He also pressed Vice Foreign

Minister Takakazu Kuriyama to transport soldiers and equipment to Saudi Arabia and

14 Asahi Shimbun , August 17, 1; SDF personnel was being considered during the process between August 10-17 but after this, in its place arose financial support for the multinational forces, dispatch of a medical team, and private ships and planes to transport soldiers and materials. See Miyake, 2001, 55-59. 15 In Japanese, the law is 国際緊急援助隊の派遣に関する法律. Asahi Shimbun , August 20, evening edition, 1. Revision was necessary because the Law only allowed dispatch of non-SDF personnel to areas stricken by natural disasters. Because it allowed dispatch for manmade disasters like nuclear accidents or gas explosions, MOFA wanted to revise dispatch targets to include countries surrounding a conflict and duties to include communications and transport. They also wanted to expand participation to include non- combat SDF. 16 Okamoto, 2001, 13; Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 55, 81,83. 17 This team was led by Desaix Anderson, Karl Jackson, and Carl Ford but also included uniformed officers. Armacost, 1996, 104. 18 Matsuura and Kondo, 2001, 22. 19 Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 137. 20 The Hinomaru is the name of the Japanese national flag. Asahi Shimbun , October 18, 1990, p.1 136

assist with the anticipated large numbers of refugees. 21 Even President Bush called PM

Kaifu on August fourteenth to press for rear-area support and transportation support of troops and equipment. Washington’s desire was to have a “Japanese ship manned by

Japanese personnel and bearing a Japanese flag as a symbol of Tokyo’s involvement in a common effort.” 22 While those MOFA decision-makers who held beliefs that prioritized the alliance were sensitive to these US requests, those who prioritized Japan’s international obligations were less sensitive.

The pro-SDF dispatch coalition was opposed by a much larger coalition of decision-makers holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs. They were not only holding the top positions in MOFA (Vice Minister Takakazu Kuriyama, Deputy Ministers Koji

Watanabe and Hisashi Owada) and the premiership (Toshiki Kaifu), but held positions throughout the government and dominated the opposition parties, led by the JSP. Like the pro-dispatch coalition whose policy preferences were based on different beliefs, the policy preferences of this anti-dispatch coalition were based on different beliefs. We see strict constitutionalism forming the basis of the opposition to the first policy proposal forced from consideration: minesweeping. 23

After rumors of the minesweeper proposal leaked, DCCS-Adm. Ishihara acknowledged government consideration of it and that it “was not legally a problem.”24

Immediately, JSP Policy Affairs Chief Shigeru Ito JSP attacked the proposal, backed by

JCP, Komeito, and Shaminren, because of the belief that minesweeper dispatch “clearly

21 Armacost, 1996, 102. In addition to transportation support Armacost requested financial support for the multinational forces; economic assistance for Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan; additional host nation support; personnel contributions to back up the multinational forces, such as medical volunteers; and minesweepers. 22 Ibid , 102. 23 During a meeting of top MOFA officials in Kuriyama’s office on the fifteenth, minesweepers was still included, but by the twentieth it was no longer being considered. (Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 82). 24 Asahi Shimbun , August 18, 1990, 2. 137

was a violation of the constitution. It is beyond debate.” 25 Their opposition resonated

with bureaucratic decision-makers. This included Vice Minister Kuriyama, whose

approval was necessary. Given his belief that minesweeper dispatch would cross

constitutional limits, and thus enflame the opposition parties and public, Kuriyama

blocked the proposal, telling US Ambassador Mike Armacost “in no case are we going to

send minesweepers, so don’t count on it.” 26 The result of his veto was the minesweeper

option being dropped from policy deliberations.

With the minesweeper option discarded, decision-makers in the Watanabe group

promoted transportation support and medical cooperation that included consideration of

non-combat SDF personnel. Yukio Satoh explains, “From the start, we seriously wanted

to send personnel if it would be at all possible.” 27 Specifically, they considered planes for

transportation support and SDF medical personnel under the Emergency Assistance Law

for medical support to Jordan. Similar to the minesweeper proposal, both were wiped

from consideration by August twenty-second due to divisions amongst decision-makers

manifested as institutional battles.28

Out of the belief that Japan should provide meaningful assistance to the

international effort, the proposal for revising the Disaster Relief Team Law to include

SDF medical personnel in a medical team was proposed by officials in the North

American Affairs Bureau and UN Bureau, including Kunihiko Miyake, Yukio Okamoto,

25 Asahi Shimbun , August 18, 1990, evening edition, 1; and August 22, 1990, 2. 26 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. This is supported by Armacost, 1996, 102. 27 Yukio Satoh, Interview, June 13, 2006. 28 MOFA and Kantei officials discussed specifics on August 22, which included economic aid to Egypt, Turkey and Jordan, sending medical supplies and communications equipment to these countries, chartering private ships and planes for transportation support, and dispatching a 200-person ‘medical cooperation team’ ( 医療協力団) composed of doctors, nurses, and medical engineers ( 医療技師) to non-combat areas to assist with refugees, possibly others. The dispatch would take place under the existing Law Regarding the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team. 138

and Yukio Satoh. 29 They were supported by individuals in the LDP and the JDA because

“it seemed obvious for Japan to do something.”30 This included LDP Executives (Ichiro

Ozawa, Takeo Nishioka, Mutsuki Kato) and defense zoku (Taku Yamazaki). The

proposal was opposed by decision-makers holding key institutional posts in the decision-

making process: PM Kaifu, Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, and CLB officials. The

cause for their opposition was once again strict constitutionalist beliefs. Specifically, they

feared dispatch to a potentially volatile area meant that if they came under attack, issues

of collective self-defense would arise. Additionally, they opposed revising the Disaster

Relief Team Law to include SDF personnel. The opposition bolstered other key decision-

makers. For example, after the CLB opposition, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama began

pushing for civilian doctors due to his constitutional beliefs. 31 Given these veto players

opposed, the proposal died.

Out of the belief that Japan needed to provide meaningful assistance to the US,

the proposal to use the SDF to assist in transportation was also initially proposed by

officials in the North American Affairs Bureau and UN Bureau. However, once again the

idea was opposed by top MOFA officials (Kuriyama, Owada, Watanabe) 32 and CLB

officials. Different from the strict constitutionalist beliefs, Kuriyama and his deputies

opposed based on all three beliefs: fear of a resurgence of militarism, 33 fear of opposition

29 Anonymous, Interview. See also Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 112-117. 30 Yukio Satoh, Interview, June 13, 2006. 31 Anonymous, Interview. Nakayama does not recall specifics about each decision but admits while others pushed for dispatch, he opposed due to constitutional considerations. Taro Nakayama, Interview, November 27, 2007 32 Then Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa recalls how Vice Minister Kuriyama and his two Deputy Ministers Owada and Watanabe came to his office to present a joint paper opposing the use of the MSDF to provide logistical support. To try to convince Ozawa to oppose, they told him that they represented the unanimous opinion of MOFA. Ozawa disagreed with their opposition, citing the need to help the US. Oka, 2008, 98- 99. 33 Anonymous, Interview. 139

from Japan’s East Asian neighbors, 34 and because they felt “the law governing the SDF was such that the SDF could not be used for such purposes, so therefore that option was out from the very beginning, unless you change the law.” 35 CLB decision-makers agreed with them due to strict constitutionalist beliefs, believing that assistance would violate the constitutional prohibition of becoming one with the use of force. Again, given veto player opposition, the idea to include SDF in transportation support died.

These governmental divisions mattered because it amplified external opposition.

The JSP repeatedly attacked the proposals based on lawmakers’ beliefs that it was unconstitutional and that it would begin a slippery slope to remilitarization. As inner- governmental disagreement over the medical and transportation cooperation intensified, so did JSP attacks. This culminated on August twenty-second with the JSP announcing its opposition to not only any form of SDF dispatch, but any revision of the Disaster Relief

Team Law. 36 Both proposals were not included in a MOFA draft circulated that same day. Continuing the attack, the next day JSP Chairwoman Takako Doi urged Kaifu to remain within the framework of the Constitution and adhere to UN-centrism. She told

Kaifu that monetary support alone was ‘big sweating’ and that Japan should contribute money via the WHO and establish a Peace Security Fund in the UN. 37

In the course of a few weeks, the initial proposals that those decision-makers with pro-dispatch beliefs had proposed were taken out of consideration due to opposition from decision-makers with anti-dispatch beliefs. The result was the ‘X-rated’ policies of the

34 Oka, 2008, 99. 35 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. 36 Materials obtained from the SDP 37 Asahi Shimbun , August 23, 1990, 2. 140

Watanabe group had to be given up in favor of ‘mediocre PG-13 policies.’ 38 “With the possibility of Japan militarily supporting the multinational forces gone, all that remained was private persons dispatch and cooperation by money and things.” 39 However, even within these tight parameters, members of the Watanabe group continued to advocate military-related duties. But because non-SDF options were being pursued, other ministries entered the process: Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW), Ministry of

Education (MOE) and Ministry of Transportation (MOT). The result was even the military-related duties being reduced to non-military: dispatching civilian doctors to assist solely with refugees and relying on private commercial aviation and shipping companies to transport anything but soldiers, weapons, or ammunition. 40 We turn to this next.

Not able to include SDF personnel in a medical team, MOFA decision-makers were forced to approach doctors and nurses in hospitals. This meant both MHW and

MOE became involved. Despite no longer having SDF options, Watanabe group members continued to hope the target of a medical dispatch would be the multinational forces. But they were opposed by CLB decision-makers who believed any medical mission to frontline areas to assist soldiers was unconstitutional. 41 They believed even volunteers in field hospitals would violate the becoming one with the use of force interpretation. This bolstered opposition in MHW and MOE, which were responsible for recruiting private volunteers for the medical team. MHW and MOE decision-makers

38 Anonymous, Interview. 39 The quote is from Miyake, 56. In addition to the transportation cooperation and medical cooperation examined here, the Watanabe team also came up with financial support and in-kind cooperation. Together, they made up “4-pillars” of cooperation. See Okamoto, 2001. 40 Koji Watanabe, Interview, June 15, 2006; Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. 41 Nobuo Ishihara, Interview, June 1, 2006. 141

opposed for two reasons. The first reason was largely practical. The doctors and nurses they represented opposed, unwilling to go to dangerous areas. 42 If they went, they did not want to go to battle zone field hospitals to assist soldiers. The second reason was based off of strict constitutional beliefs. Like the CLB, officials in the MHW and MOE believed that anything but civilians would violate the constitution. The unions that represented the doctors and nurses, which had close ties with the JSP, agreed. This meant the JSP’s message of opposition resonated. Because the support of the CLB, MHW and MOE was necessary for the proposal to proceed, their opposition meant the idea of allowing private medical personnel to assist soldiers in frontline areas died. The result was an agreement that medical dispatch under existing legislation would be purely humanitarian assistance

(i.e. medical aid for refugees) in non-conflict areas. 43

The same occurred with transportation support. Given that SDF inclusion was not possible, decision-makers in the Watanabe group proposed that the private aviation/shipping companies would transport military-related items (soldiers, weapons, ammunition). This was first publically announced on August twentieth. 44 But again, because CLB decision-makers believed that transportation of military items by even private companies would violate constitutional prohibitions of becoming one with the use of force and the exercise of collective self-defense, they opposed. This bolstered the opposition of decision-makers in the Ministry of Transportation (MOT), which was responsible for negotiating with the shipping and airline companies. Unlike the opposition seen elsewhere, there is no evidence MOT decision-makers opposed due to any of the three beliefs. Instead, MOT decision-makers opposed because the companies

42 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. 43 Asahi Shimbun , August 26, 1990, 2. 44 Yamaguchi, 1991, 74. 142

did not want to transport military-related items and felt it was unfair to assume risk the government was unwilling to assume. Their opposition emboldened affiliated unions to set up obstacles. 45 Neither MOT nor the companies (first private airline companies: Japan

Airlines (JAL), All Nippon Airlines (ANA), and Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) 46 and then private shipping companies: Nippon Yusen, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, and Kawasaki

Kisen) were ready to send their vessels to the Gulf because “just to join the war effort scared them.” 47 But, once again, because the unions had close ties with the JSP (senior

JSP lawmaker Makoto Tanabe was said to have especially close ties with the Seaman’s

Union 48 ), its message of opposition resonated. The result was a decision to assist with only non-military related items and calling into question the constitutionality of assisting with any transportation.

By the time the government held meetings on August twenty-fifth and twenty- sixth to finalize a policy package, 49 decision-makers holding anti-SDF beliefs had succeeded in erasing all SDF options and any remaining remnant of military-related duties. Despite a last push by Secretary General Ozawa on August twenty-sixth urging

Kaifu to dispatch unarmed SDF personnel for rear-area support out of his belief that it was necessary for Japan to maintain its commitment to international society,50 Kaifu did not budge. He was backed by a majority of LDP members (Kaifu’s faction called the

45 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. 46 Mikuriya and Watanabe, 1998, 76; Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 89-90. MOFA included MOT officials as part of policy discussions early on. Unofficial requests by MOT officials to private airline companies began as early as August ninth when MOT asked JAL to send a special flight to Kuwait to rescue 276 Japanese nationals stranded there since the Iraq invasion. FBIS-EAS-90-155, August 10, 1990, 1. 47 Koji Watanabe, Interview, June 15, 2006. 48 Armacost, 1996, 106. 49 The meetings included officials from all ministries involved, including the Kantei: MHW, MOE, MOFA, MOF, MOT, and MITI. Asahi Shimbun , August 27, 1990, 1. 50 Asahi Shimbun , August 31, 1990, 2; Asahi Shimbun , September 3, 1990, 2. 143

argument a “jump of logic,” supported by the Miyazawa faction that called it “an

argument ignoring the weight of postwar peace diplomacy” 51 ). On the twenty-eighth, the

LDP held a series of meetings to hear DCCS-Parl. present the official

package. While there were criticisms, because the package was wiped clean of SDF or

military-related duties, LDP members passed it.

After meetings with Cabinet Secretariat, MOFA, Cabinet ministers and LDP

executives throughout the morning and afternoon of August twenty-ninth, Kaifu gave his

final approval after 6 P.M. From 6:45 to 6:58 Kaifu received formal LDP

acknowledgment followed by Cabinet approval. At 8 P.M. local time, Kaifu called

President Bush to inform him of the package, followed by a press conference at 9 P.M. to

announce what officials emphasized was the first time Japan would take part in a military

confrontation in a distant region since WWII: ‘Our Country’s Contributory Policy

Relating to Peace Restoration Operations in the Middle East.’ 52

The package was divided into two parts: cooperation to the multinational forces in

their efforts to restore peace and support for Middle Eastern countries neighboring Iraq.

For the former, this included: 1) material cooperation; 2) transportation cooperation; 3) a

medical team; and 4) financial support to countries chartering planes and ships. For the

latter, this included: 1) financial assistance to affected countries in the Middle East region

and 2) financial assistance for Jordanian refugees. Additionally, Kaifu announced his

intention to create a law to further contribute to Middle East efforts (covered in next

section).

51 Asahi Shimbun , September 3, 1990, 2. 52 In Japanese: 中東における平和回復活動にかかわる我が国の貢献策. See Asahi Shimbun , August 30, 1990, 1 for policy package details and The Wall Street Journal , August 30, 1990, A5 for comment on ‘first time.’ For a full English translation of the news conference, please see FBIS-EAS-90-169, August 30, 1990, 3-4. 144

MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE • Government would ask private aviation and shipping companies to charter planes/ships to transport food, water, and medical supplies to the multinational forces and the Medical Cooperation Corps.53 These would be under the management of the government. Because the chartered aircraft and ships would not carry military materials, the government would provide economic assistance to states which could transport these items to Saudi Arabia. • Government will provide materials and equipment for clean water supply and protection from the heat. Kaifu said they would provide countries with a list of all the equipment available in Japan (and which it can legally provide) and pay for it. After exhausting Japan’s supplies, the government would buy similar items in other countries.54

MEDICAL TEAM • Government will recruit a 100-volunteer medical team consisting of doctors and nurses with experience of being dispatched overseas to disaster areas (i.e. former members of the Japan Disaster Relief Team) as well as others from national hospitals or university hospitals. The team will be dispatched to states surrounding the conflict, their dispatch status would be that of MOFA employees, and their duties would include providing humanitarian medical assistance to those affected by the crisis ( 被災者) and those who are sick or hurt by the war ( 戦傷病 者),55 but not soldiers.

UN PEACE COOPERATION CORPS (below) • Government will prepare a new law based on UN-centrism to allow Japan to support emergency situations overseas. Kaifu stated he was “not thinking about dispatch of the SDF overseas.”56

Despite the fact that SDF and military-related support was removed largely due to

inner-governmental divisions, the JSP continued to attack based on the strict

constitutionalist beliefs of its lawmakers. Secretary General Tsuruo Yamaguchi criticized

the package as “rear-support for the multinational forces’ military actions” and said that

the JSP “cannot accept it from the standpoint of UN-centrism and the spirit of the

constitution.” 57 He urged the government to reconsider policies centered on the UN and

53 A charter flight from Japan to the Middle East was about $650,000 plus insurance. See The Wall Street Journal , August 30, 1990, A5. 54 The Wall Street Journal , August 30, 1990, A5. 55 Yomiuri Shimbun , August 30, 1990, 1-3. 56 Asahi Shimbun , August 30, 1990, 1. 57 Materials obtained from SDP. 145

establish a UN Peace Security Fund. This opposition mattered because implementation

remained. With the JSP message continuing to resonate within government and, more

importantly, unions responsible for implementing the package, disagreements continued

to flare throughout, resulting in an even more watered-down package.

For the medical team, although Kaifu announced a 100-member team, this never

materialized. After the passage of the package, the MHW formed an investigatory group

to send to the region to inspect what equipment and medicine was necessary. But because of ongoing disagreement between MOFA and MHW over items like the team’s budget, it was not until September seventh that the dispatch guidelines were completed. Despite efforts by MHW and MOE to recruit volunteers, because of ongoing union opposition, recruitment was difficult. 58 On September twelfth, MHW and MOFA announced that

they had succeeded in recruiting 17 doctors, nurses, coordinators for medical equipment

and translators from national hospitals and university hospitals. On the nineteenth, the 17-

member team was dispatched to Riyadh, instantly inviting criticism that Japan’s

contribution amounted to providing 1 medical personnel per 10,000 American soldiers.

Worse, because the team did not receive concrete mission orders, did not have a large

budget, and the Saudis wondered what they came to do, 59 the team spent most of its time

at the Japanese embassy.

The same watering-down occurred for transportation support. Although decision-

makers from MOT had been sounding out the companies unofficially for about one week,

it was not until the evening of the twenty-eighth that they officially asked. And even

though the companies were included in the package announced on the twenty-ninth, the

58 Like the JSP, the Private Universities Teachers Union Alliance said dispatch had a military aspect and thus opposed. Asahi Shimbun , September 12, 1990, 3. 59 Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 116. 146

companies did not agree until that morning because of differences of opinions with the

government over what could legally be transported. 60 Because of fears of sending

members to a possible war zone, unions remained opposed while the companies pushed

strict conditions of non-military related items, departure restricted to Narita Airport, and

the necessity of keeping the planes under Japanese government control. This meant that

the US military would have to send personnel and equipment to Japan. But because

Narita does not allow military planes, the Americans would have to arrive by a private

airline. Also, the companies insisted that they would only fly to western Saudi Arabia

because the risk of combat there was low since US forces in Saudi Arabia were

assembling on the eastern side. This meant the US military would have to transport its

forces via land a couple hundred of kilometers. What takes about 8 hours from the US to

their Saudi Arabian base would take nearly one week. Worse, the unions requested that

every flight be inspected for military-related items. 61 Because of all of this, the US

military never accepted Japan’s proposal and therefore it too never materialized. 62 The best the government could do was charter a plane from a US company (Evergreen) and

Saudi Arabian Airlines to help with transportation support required by the multinational forces. 63

Similarly, for shipping transportation cooperation, conditions made prior to the

twenty-ninth announcement worked to water down the policy. The first was a

compromise made between MOT officials and the three companies to create a dummy

60 Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 93; Yamaguchi, 1991, 104-111. Some Kantei and MOFA decision-makers made statements that that soldiers, weapons and ammunition could be transported, the companies and MOT staunchly opposed and would not agree until this consideration was out of consideration completely. 61 Asahi Shimbun , September 6, 1990, 1. 62 See Okamoto, 2008, 257-259. 63 Asahi Shimbun , September 15, 1990, 3. 147

shipping company into which the companies would provide ships to be chartered by the

government. So as to avoid negative business, they set the condition that any

participating ship’s name would be painted over. Eventually, Sato Kuni Kisen, affiliated with Nihon Yusen, gave a Panamanian-flagged ship called the Hirato Maru ( 平戸丸) to

the dummy corporation under the condition that the ‘SA’ be painted over on its stack. But

in order for the contribution to be seen as ‘Japanese,’ they needed a Japanese crew.

Because the Seaman’s Union remained opposed to transportation cooperation,

recruitment became problematic. One day before the policy announcement, the Union

agreed to allow Japanese crew as long as they had the right to opt-out and there was a

guarantee the ship would not enter dangerous waters. Despite the fact that the US needed

between 10-20 ships for military transport cooperation (i.e. roll-on, roll-off capability,

military equipment, soldiers), the boat departed for Los Angeles to pick up 5,000 tons of

tents, construction equipment, food, etc.

Given that the Hirato Maru dispatch was expected to underwhelm US officials,

MOFA’s North American Affairs Bureau First Division Director Yukio Okamoto made

efforts to provide 800 off-road vehicles to America without consulting the Seaman’s

Union. His efforts, backed by MITI, were primarily motivated by his alliance beliefs.

Due to rising anti-Japanese sentiment in the US and the threat that American dock

workers would refuse to unload Japanese ships making port calls if Japan did not send a

ship to the Middle East, he acted. 64 But on September third, the New York Times disclosed his plans and that the ship carrying these vehicles was scheduled to leave

Nagoya on the fifth. The article was reported in Japan on the fifth, stating that it was the

64 Tejima, 1994, 128. 148

first part of the government’s transportation cooperation package. 65 Even though the

Panamanian-flag, Kawasaki-owned ‘Sea Venus’ departed in the afternoon, the Union was

outraged by the secrecy, worried about ship/crew’s safety, and opposed to transportation

cooperation. Because 4 crewmen were Japanese, 66 the Union forced the ship to stop.

Okamoto went to the Union to negotiate with International Shipping Bureau Chief Shigeo

Nomura. Okamoto was forced to frame the dispatch not as transport ships with the

Japanese flag but as private material support: an automobile cargo ship with 800 off-road

vehicles from private companies. 67 In other words, not transportation cooperation but a

private agreement between the automakers and Kawasaki. The Union did not release the

ship until the government agreed to take responsibility in case something happened to the

ship/crew. After a 6-point agreement was made between MOFA-MOT-Union-Kawasaki,

the Union stepped down sometime after 12:30 AM on the sixth. 68 The Sea Venus, stripped of any notion as being part of the government’s transportation cooperation and it too having the “K” painted over, left port at 4 AM on the sixth.

Looking at the August policy process, the outcome was devoid of SDF despite attempts by decision-makers holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. Each time decision- makers proposed including the SDF or military-related duties, the policies were opposed by a coalition of decision-makers holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs. The divisions amongst decision-makers mattered because they manifested themselves as institutional

65 Asahi Shimbun , September 5, 1990, 1. 66 Asahi Shimbun , September 6, 1990, 31. 67 Although the 12,000 ton ship could handle about 3000 cars, they only were loaded with 800 four- wheeled vehicles from Toyota (Land Cruisers) and Mitsubishi (Pajero). Additionally, although the destination was Saudi Arabia on each windshield of each car “USA” was written. I have found no explanation for this. 68 Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 101. 149

battles between veto players. While the JSP’s message of opposition resonated with

government decision-makers, the proposals died primarily due to governmental divisions.

Alliance Management : Had this logic guided the policy outcome, we would

expect decision-makers choosing non-SDF dispatch because of entrapment fears in the

US efforts in the Middle East. But what is evident is that while a coalition of government

decision-makers pushed for SDF involvement, a number of these were motivated precisely by alliance beliefs. Whether or not they feared US abandonment is unknown, but it is certain that US requests for non-combat support resonated amongst these decision-makers. Amongst those who opposed SDF dispatch largely did so due to strict constitutionalist beliefs, not entrapment fears. There is no evidence that SDF dispatch did not materialize because of entrapment fears.

Anti-Militarist Norms : Had the logic of the Pure Variant guided the outcome, we

would expect non-dispatch to be explained by the strength of such norms. Given that

decision-makers who opposed dispatch rooted their opposition in constitutional problems

and remilitarization fears, there is evidence to support this logic. Had the logic of the

Nuanced Variant guided the outcome, we would expect the non-dispatch to be explained

by concerns that dispatch would transgress the use of force beyond the defense of Japan.

Because the initial SDF proposal included medical staff and transportation support, there was virtually no possibility of SDF using force. But if we concede that decision-makers were worried about whether war would break out during dispatch, thereby necessitating possible use of force while in the Persian Gulf, then the logic of this Variant would explain the outcome. Because I cannot completely dismiss this possibility, I cannot fully dismiss the Nuanced Variant.

150

Leadership : We would expect non-dispatch to be explained by either an

institutionally weak premier unable to force decision-makers to agree or by a premier

who did not want to dispatch the SDF (or waffled). Because Kaifu did signal his desire to

dispatch, the Desire Variant does tend to support the non-dispatch outcome. Likewise, it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that the outcome would have been different had

Kaifu signaled a desire to dispatch the SDF. And although it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that the SDF would have been included in the policy package had he the institutional ability to quiet bureaucratic divisions (Institutional Variant), I am reluctant to conclude that this Variant’s logic can explain the outcome. This is because the JSP’s message resonated amongst decision-makers. A strong Kantei would not have changed this. At most, I would admit that the institutionally weak Kantei exacerbated inner- governmental divisions. This is supported by Ambassador Michael Armacost who also believes that stronger political will may not have been able to overcome resistance.69

The United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill 70 The government’s attempt to create a bill to dispatch the SDF overseas represents

Diet legislation that failed. It failed for two reasons. First, divisions amongst government decision-makers holding different beliefs fragmented the government. These divisions manifested themselves as bureaucratic conflicts between veto players. Second, the JSP was able to exploit these differences to enflame opposition to the bill from within government. Simultaneously, because its message resonated with the public, it was able to arouse external opposition.

At the press conference on August twenty-ninth, PM Kaifu announced his intention to create a volunteer organization called the UN Peace Cooperation Corps that

69 Armacost, 1996, 104. 70 For a good outline of major events concerning the bill, see Asahi Shimbun , November 9, 1990, 2. 151

would conduct humanitarian support modeled after the Japan Overseas Cooperation

Volunteers ( 青年海外協力隊). Kaifu, holding strong anti-militarism beliefs, “did not even think of or imagine using the SDF overseas [because] he was against such an idea.” 71 As such, he announced that the Corps would be purely civilian because he was

“not thinking about the dispatch of the SDF overseas.” 72

In reality, the idea did not begin with Kaifu or with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It began in MOFA before Iraq invaded Kuwait. 73 Decision-makers in the UN Bureau and

Treaties Bureau believed Japan needed to make contributions to international society

similar to other states. They viewed events like Cambodia and Nicaragua and were

dismayed that Japan was unable to assist in efforts toward creating or keeping peace like

other countries, even under the mantel of the UN. Out of the belief that Japan had to

fulfill its international obligations, they believed that if Japan could not shed blood like

others, if it was going to be respected it had to at least ‘sweat.’ Therefore, UN Bureau DG

Nobutoshi Akao ordered his Bureau to consider ways to contribute not only money, but

also SDF personnel to UN PKOs. 74 The outbreak of the Gulf Crisis accelerated these

efforts. After an August fifth decision on economic sanctions, Akao told Kaifu of this

work and the need for a new law to send personnel of any kind abroad.75 Kaifu agreed.

While Akao’s UN Bureau led the efforts, Treaties Bureau DG Shunji Yanai

headed the writing of the legislation. These officials, and a majority of MOFA officials, 76

shared the belief that Japan needed to contribute to international events as a responsible

71 Nobuo Ishihara, Interview, June 1, 2006. In the book-length interview with Nobuo Ishihara by Mikuriya and Watanabe (1998), Ishihara makes a similar statement. See 85-86. 72 Asahi Shimbun , August 30, 1990, 1. 73 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. 74 Nobutoshi Akao, Interview, June 7, 2006. 75 Kunimasa, 1999, 80. 76 Shunji Yanai, Interview, December 22, 2006; Iokibe et al., 2007, 52-53. 152

member of international society. The Gulf crisis presented itself as an opportunity. This led Akao and Yanai to advocate the inclusion of SDF personnel along with non-SDF personnel (i.e. police, firemen). The same belief was shared by the LDP executives, who believed that Japan needed to provide more than money if it was to fulfill its international obligations and be a respected member of the international community. 77 Or, as Chairman of the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee Koji Kakizawa argued, if Japan continues with responding to events as it has done in the past, “the international community would not listen to us.” 78 Other LDP heavyweights shared these beliefs, including former PM Noboru Takeshita, faction leader Michio Watanabe, former JDA

DGs Taku Yamazaki and Tadashi Kuranari, and Chairman Masahiko Takamura and

Vice-Chairman of the LDPs National Defense Committee. 79

Similar to the August policy, the proposal was opposed by a coalition of government decision-makers holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs and being in key institutional positions to veto it. At a meeting held with Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama on August sixteenth,80 the new legislation encountered its first obstacle as Kuriyama

(whose agreement was necessary for it to proceed out of MOFA) adamantly opposed it based on all three beliefs. While Kuriyama agreed that money alone was insufficient and that MOFA cannot let the world think Japan is a country that buys peace,81 he believed if the SDF were included and had to use force, this would violate the constitution. 82

77 At a gathering of LDP lawmakers held on September 8-9, Executive Council Chairman Takeo Nishioka pushed his fellow LDP lawmakers that money alone would never be enough as a contribution and that all efforts should be made to make a personnel contribution. Ozawa followed Nishioka by saying if they contribute only money, Japan will be isolated in international society. Yamaguchi, 1991, 131-32. 78 Japan Economic Journal , September 22, 1990, A4. 79 Purrington and A.K.,1991, 316. 80 Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 136. 81 Kunimasa, 1999, 97. 82 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006 153

Additionally, he held anti-war beliefs 83 combined with a belief that Japan needed to strongly consider the fears and anxiety of other Asian countries regarding any SDF dispatch. Given these beliefs, he advocated purely civilian volunteers (i.e. fire, police).84

His beliefs were shared by a large number of decision-makers across government, including Deputy Minister Hisashi Owada, 85 CLB decision-makers, and LDP politicians, like former CCS Masaharu Gotoda, Shin Kanemaru and Hyosuke Kujiraoka.86 While

CLB decision-makers opposed largely due to strict constitutionalist beliefs (i.e. becoming one with the use of force violation), the majority of these decision-makers opposed the bill largely due to anti-militarist beliefs. One government official admits,

Some of us feared the resurgence of militarism at that time. So when discussions were taking place, there were people talking about the lessons of WWII. The argument was that the SDF at that stage should not be entrusted with that type of world because there is, as remote as it may be, a possibility of resurgence.87

High ranking LDP members, such as Shin Kanemaru too shared this belief, citing the danger of getting involved in a conflict and the desire to avoid the hardships WWII brought to Japan. 88

Most importantly, Kuriyama’s beliefs were shared by Foreign Minister Taro

Nakayama and PM Kaifu. 89 PM Kaifu, holding anti-militarist beliefs, was said to have

“had an extreme dislike to using the SDF” 90 and was considered a “dove faction within

83 Yanai (Iokibe et al, 2007, 54) argues that these beliefs were influenced from his father’s experience in WWII. 84 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006; Iokibe et al, 2007, 52-53. Kuriyama also considered the JSP’s strong opposition, thinking that anything that included the SDF would never pass the Diet. 85 Although not directly involved in the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, many former MOFA officials I interviewed cited Owada as a top ranking official who actively sided with Kuriyama in opposing SDF participation. 86 Yanai (Iokibe et al., 2007, 48) refers to all these individuals as having an ‘allergy’ to dispatching SDF overseas. 87 Anonymous, Interview. 88 Asahi Shimbun , September 4, 1990, 1. 89 Armacost, 1996, 115. 90 Former High-Ranking MOFA Official, Interview, September 8, 2006. 154

the dove faction.”91 Given his belief, when shown the initial proposal that stipulated revisions of the Law Regarding the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team or the

SDF Law to enable the SDF to participate with UN PKO activities, Kaifu became upset, yelling “There is no way that I will dispatch the SDF under the UN umbrella. This is completely despicable. As long as I live, I don’t want to see the SDF dispatched overseas.” 92 Also similar to Kuriyama, Nakayama and Kaifu advocated civilians out of concern that permitting SDF units to be dispatched abroad “would trigger adverse reactions in neighboring Asian countries while providing new and unwelcome authority and prestige to the Defense Agency and SDF.”93

Given the opposing beliefs and different policies being advocated, decision- makers throughout government once again faced off over SDF inclusion. A break for the pro-dispatch coalition came when the leading government advocate of the anti-dispatch coalition revised his stance. With efforts to obtain private transportation cooperation faltering, Vice Minister Kuriyama understood it would be difficult to obtain volunteers for the new Corps and train them. Shocked by Japan’s efforts being criticized as “too little, too late” 94 and movements in the US Congress threatening troop withdrawals if

Japan did not provide more, Kuriyama believed that in order for Japan to fulfill its international obligations, only the SDF could do what was needed. But he was conflicted over allowing SDF inclusion due to his constitutionalist beliefs and sensitivity to Asian neighbors’ fears. His conflict was mirrored in his Deputy Ministers Owada and

91 Kunimasa, 1999, 84. 92 Nobutoshi Akao, Interview, June 7, 2006. 93 Armacost, 1996, 115. The quote refers to Nakayama and Kaifu, not Kuriyama, though Kuriyama was also concerned about the reactions of Asian neighbors. 94 Matsuura and Kondo, 2001, 24. 155

Watanabe, who also felt Japan needed to fulfill its international obligations but were

concerned about SDF inclusion out of concern not to “repeat history.”

The strict constitutionalist beliefs and sensitivity toward Asia ‘won’ out. Citing

practical concerns, Kuriyama pushed for using the SDF with conditions. 95 If the SDF

were necessary, he argued their ‘SDF-ness’ had to be neutralized. This meant temporarily

suspending ( 休職) SDF personnel as active SDF members and transferring ( 出向) them

to the Corps as civilians. 96 If SDF personnel chose to retire ( 退職) prior to transferring, this too would be acceptable. This meant participating personnel would have the proper training to handle dangerous situations but they would be civilians, negating calls for revision in the SDF Law.97

Kuriyama’s compromise pleased no one. Akao and other top MOFA decision- makers who felt the SDF were required to fulfill Japan’s international obligations, such as

Minister Secretariat DG Yoshiyasu Sato and Councilor Minoru Tanba, advocated SDF inclusion because it was seen as the appropriate way to bear responsibility in international society. 98 But because Kuriyama and his Deputy Ministers held the top institutional positions in MOFA, they held veto power over policies within MOFA. A draft leaked on September twelfth showed that the Kuriyama-line was being pursued. 99

95 Tejima, 1994, 150. 96 Asahi Shimbun , September 26, 1990, 2; Nobutoshi Akao, Interview, June 7, 2006. 97 Because they would lose all connection with SDF (i.e. status and duties), their new status would be ‘Administrative Public Official” ( 一般職公務員). Once temporarily suspended SDF personnel left the Corps, they would be able to return to their full, former status. 98 Kunimasa, 1999, 84-85. 99 See Asahi Shimbun , September 12, 1990, 1; FBIS-EAS-90-179, September 14, 1990, 1-2. The purpose of the Corps was to cooperate with UN peace recovery and peace maintenance activities. Missions envisioned include medical care, transportation, communication, and election monitoring. While it specified that Corps members could come from SDF and would be Administrative Public Officials, it was undecided whether they would be under the auspices of the MOFA, PMO, or Management and Coordination Agency. Because no active SDF members would be sent, it specified that no SDF Law revision was necessary. In addition to SDF personnel, it stipulated that members will be recruited from police, firefighters, local 地方自治体職員

156

While Kuriyama succeeded in neutralizing the SDF-ness in the Corps, PM Kaifu opposed the idea because of his anti-militarist beliefs. This forced Kuriyama to visit

Kaifu on the fourteenth to convince him. Kuriyama presented Kaifu with three options: 1) a new organization with no SDF; 2) revise the SDF law and dispatch SDF as-is; or 3) let

SDF participate in a different form. Kuriyama told Kaifu that while #1 was ideal, it was too costly and impractical. 100 And #2 would not only ignite fears in Asia, but it was impossible given that the opposition had control of the Upper House. Given this,

Kuriyama concluded that #3 was best, a way to use the SDF without dispatching the

SDF. Kaifu was convinced and the plan to remove the SDF-ness from the Corps by forcing participating SDF personnel to lose their SDF status moved forward.

The coalition of decision-makers holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs was infuriated.

Because they believed Japan needed to fulfill its international obligations like other states, they believed the plan diluted the presence of the SDF by forcing personnel to be separated from their SDF status prior to entering the Corps. JDA officials, led by Vice

Minister Tomoharu Yoda, former Vice Minister Seiki Nishihiro, and JDA DG Youzou

Ishikawa were especially adamant in their opposition. 101 But because the coalition of pro- dispatch decision-makers was small and dispersed throughout MOFA, JDA, and the LDP, they did not have the institutional leverage to force their case against the anti-dispatch coalition who held key institutional posts in the executive, MOFA, and CLB. Instead, in

, and private sector people who have received training in fields like transportation, communications, and emergency medicine. 100 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. 101 They were also motivate by concerns that the compromise would lower SDF morale and the SDF’s reputation in Japanese society. Vice Minister Yoda also feared that the creation of a second, non-SDF organization would be equal to creating two militaries, thereby creating confusion over roles each organization was expected to play and minimizing the importance of the SDF. 157

their pursuit of SDF inclusion, they exercised their veto power by relying on legal

arguments that only SDF personnel could operate SDF equipment. 102

No compromise could be found. Although the coalition of decision-makers

holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs were not unified behind Kuriyama, he was a veto

player in MOFA and his policy carried. Therefore, it was left to JDA decision-makers to

continue opposition to the compromise. Seeking to settle their differences, a series of

meetings between MOFA Vice Minister Kuriyama and JDA Vice Minister Yoda

followed, but no conclusions were reached. Attempting to forge a solution through the

power of the Kantei, DCCS-Adm. Ishihara crafted what came to be known as the

‘Ishihara Memo.’103 The memo was sent to JDA Vice Minister Yoda. The JDA

deliberated and met with lawmakers sharing pro-SDF dispatch beliefs knowing that the

JDA needed political muscle to advocate the case against the much larger anti-dispatch

coalition. The result was a reply by Yoda to Ishihara on September nineteenth countering

Kuriyama’s idea of how the SDF should be included. Based on the belief that Japan needed to fulfill its international obligations, Yoda’s idea was to allow SDF to be included as SDF as well as Corps members. In other words, dual status ( 併任). 104 Upon becoming a Corps member, SDF personnel would take-on an additional status as a Corps

member, effectively acquiring two hats.

102 Although the anti-SDF dispatch was larger, the agreement of the JDA was required because the Kuriyama-line meant a radical change in the status of SDF personnel. The agreement of top LDP executives was required because of the necessity to obtain LDP approval for the hard battle expected in the Diet. 103 Tejima, 1994, 152; Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 136-7; For example, Ishihara advocated SDF involvement because of the know-how of the SDF was necessary (Kunimasa, 1999, 102). 104 Because SDF personnel would remain SDF personnel, this meant continued insistence on revising the SDF Law. 158

Although a draft that circulated on the nineteenth did not include SDF Law revision or the dual status option, 105 by the next day the dual status option was announced at a press conference by CCS Misoji Sakamoto. The shift away from the Kuriyama compromise angered Vice Minister Kuriyama and solidified the anti-SDF dispatch coalition out of fear that it would mean the Corps would become a number of small heterogeneous units that would not only cause confusion as to the nature of the Corps but also would mean the Director General of the JDA would be in the Corps’ chain of command, a notion that Kuriyama, Kaifu, and other top MOFA officials made efforts to avoid (instead, wanted PM to be the sole chain of command).

Given that dual-status enabled SDF to be dispatched overseas, decision-makers within MOFA that were sensitive to Asian countries’ fears moved to scrap the dual-status option on September twenty-fifth and return to the Kuriyama-line. 106 Although nothing was officially decided, the bill temporarily reverted back to the Kuriyama-line.

Understanding that key bureaucratic decision-makers and LDP lawmakers whose approval was needed to guide the bill through the Diet opposed, DCCS-Adm. Ishihara asked UN Bureau DG Akao to compromise. The compromise was to allow SDF personnel to keep their status but lose duties associated with that status. CCS Sakamoto presented the idea to each LDP faction on the twenty-sixth, followed by PM Kaifu

105 Asahi Shimbun , September 20, 1990; September 20, 1990, evening edition, 1. Duties remained limited to non-military: medical, communications, transport and election monitoring. The draft specified a 1000-member Corps under the direct supervision of the PMO and within that, roughly 100 would be allotted to former SDF personnel. The rest would be private citizens and professionals, like police officers and fire fighters. It also specified situations for dispatch: UN PKO rear-area support for a UN Army or multinational force army based on UN Resolutions; ceasefire monitoring; election observance; and economic reconstruction support. 106 Asahi Shimbun , September 26, 1990, 2. 159

meeting with top LDP executives that same evening. 107 LDP executives and defense zoku continued their opposition, arguing that if SDF personnel could keep their status, they should retain the duties associated with it.

With decision-makers at odds, the bill could not progress. With Kaifu’s departure to the US on September twenty-eighth, over the subsequent week the draft continued to shift back and forth between the Kuriyama-line and the dual status option. On October third, DCCS-Adm. Ishihara tried once again to use the power of the Kantei to mediate a compromise between MOFA officials (Kuriyama, Akao, Yanai) and JDA officials (Yoda,

Defense Bureau DG Kazuo Fujii, Director General Secretary Akira Hiyoshi). Even after four hours of discussion, nothing was resolved. This prompted Ishihara to call back the two Vice Ministers at 10 that evening where they deliberated until 2 A.M. Knowing

Corps personnel needed SDF status to operate SDF planes and ships (the sole leverage the JDA had), Kuriyama agreed he could allow ASDF and MSDF units retain their status and assist with supplies and transportation, but would not allow GSDF personnel to participate with their status intact. 108 In other words, individual GSDF members would enter as individual civilians. Out of determination to resolve the issue, he threatened to completely forgo SDF inclusion if the JDA refused the compromise. 109

The threat worked. At 7 P.M. on the fourth, JDA officials and top uniform SDF officers agreed out of fear of being completely shut out. They decided to give up on the dual status option and instead entrust ( 業務委託) ASDF and MSDF units with air and sea transportation duties but force GSDF personnel to retire or temporarily be suspended

107 For a copy of both drafts, entitled 国連平和協力法案要綱素案( Sakamoto) and 国連平和協力法の考 え方 (Kaifu), see Asahi Shimbun , September 27, 1990, 2. 108 Yomiuri Shimbun , October 5, 1990. 109 Asahi Shimbun , October 4, 1990, evening edition, 1; October 6, 1990, 3; and Yomiuri Shimbun , October 5, 1990. 160

from their status and transfer into the Corps as civilians under the PMO chain of

command, becoming Administrative Public Officials.110 The Kantei received the JDA-

MOFA compromise plan the next day and work immediately began to gain LDP approval.

With a tentative compromise, DCCS Ishihara and Oshima met with Secretary

General Ozawa and General Council Chairman Nishioka to convince them. Having strong beliefs on the necessity of Japan fulfilling its international obligations and the SDF playing an important role in this, both Ozawa and Nishioka opposed, criticizing the logic of making distinctions amongst the three SDF branches and treating personnel differently. On October sixth, LDP PARC Chairman Mutsuki Kato met with Cabinet

Councilors’ Office on External Affairs Chair Tatsuo Arima and Treaties Bureau DG

Yanai with similar opposition.

Despite the LDP executives’ dissatisfaction, MOFA pursued the option. ASDF and MSDF transportation support would be made possible by the addition of a ‘special duty’ to SDF Law Article 100 of ‘cooperation with the Peace cooperation Corps.’ 111

Because Kaifu maintained strong anti-militarist beliefs, he agreed to the compromise under the strict condition that commercial planes and ships would be used in normal circumstances and only in rare circumstances would SDF be used to rescue Japanese or refugees caught in a conflict. MOFA moved forward, though not necessarily under the

110 High-Ranking JDA Official, Interview, October 5, 2006. The official said ASDF and MSDF were extremely strong and vocal in their opposition to the creation of a separate organization and putting personnel from their branches in the new organization but not allowing them to keep their status. The GSDF, on the other hand, did not put up a similar fight and felt that separate treatment for the GSDF was “inevitable.” 111 Asahi Shimbun , October 6, evening edition, 1. 161

same pretenses as Kaifu as evident by a draft on October eighth 112 and Kaifu’s reaction upon his return to Japan the next day. 113

Given their beliefs on the importance of Japan fulfilling its international obligations like other states, it is no surprise that the LDP executives continued to oppose the unequal treatment of the SDF branches. They pushed full SDF inclusion because this, they believed, was the only way Japan could fulfill its international obligations. What is surprising is that despite Kaifu’s beliefs, and despite his recent change to approve the compromise that angered the LDP executives, he changed his mind once more to agree with the LDP executives. In other words, returning to dual status for all SDF personnel who enter the Corps. While Kaifu did agree it was unfair treatment of the three SDF branches, his change had everything to do with tremendous pressure from the LDP executives and other political heavyweights upon whom his administration relied. Not surprisingly, when Kaifu’s change was told to Kuriyama, Yoda, and CLB Vice Minister

Oide, who were waiting in an adjacent room during his meeting with the LDP executives, they were all surprised.114 Grudgingly accepting the premier’s final decision, Kuriyama returned to MOFA where revision work began with JDA and CLB decision-makers.

While Kaifu’s decision moved the bill along, it did nothing to eliminate the deep divisions emanating from individuals’ beliefs. Mirroring the bureaucratic divisions, the

LDP was divided between those who held pro-SDF dispatch beliefs and those who held anti-SDF dispatch beliefs. While Ozawa, Nishioka and Kato were supported by fellow

112 See Asahi Shimbun , October 9, 1-2 and Kunimasa, 1999, 121. The outline included the entrusting of transportation duties to MSDF and ASDF and the GSDF transferring in as civilians after retiring or temporarily being suspended. 113 Upon seeing an evening edition of a newspaper on the ninth explaining not only that the ASDF and MSDF would be entrusted with transportation duties, but would also carry weapons and that it would be possible for them to fight back if attacked, Kaifu reportedly was so shocked and angry that DCCS-Pol. Oshima was forced to apologize. Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, 1991, 151. 114 See Asahi Shimbun , October 10, 1990, 1 for these changes. 162

lawmakers like Koji Kakizawa and Kazuo Aichi, a large group of lawmakers who held

anti-militarist beliefs opposed. After the bill was submitted to the LDP for party approval

on the fifteenth, 115 these lawmakers attacked the bill. Powerful elder statesman and

former CCS Masaharu Gotoda raised concerns about SDF dispatch, especially the

haphazard manner in which the government was pushing it.116 He was concerned about

“Japan’s ability to sustain effective civilian control over” the SDF. 117 Others, like Hiromu

Nonaka, argued that trying to dispatch the SDF “seemed that [Japan] was once again continuing down a dangerous road.” 118

But because lawmakers with pro-dispatch beliefs held top posts in the party, the

General Council approved the bill. The Cabinet met on the morning of the sixteenth to approve and submit it to the Diet. The contents of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill included:

1. While volunteers from the public were welcome, the Corps would consist primarily of government officials who, when they join, maintain their status and duties of their original post but take on an additional status of Corps member. About 1,000 people from both the public and private sector were envisioned. 2. The duties for the Corps would be peacekeeping activities based on UN resolutions and initiatives by UN organizations. This included monitoring ceasefires, monitoring and supervising elections, transportation, communications, repair of equipment, medical services, and relief activities. 3. A UN Peace Cooperation Headquarters would be established within the PMO and the UN Peace Cooperation Corps Council would be established within the Cabinet.

115 For a full copy of the bill, see Asahi Shimbun , October 15, 1990 evening edition, 2. Minor changes were that the UN Peace Cooperation Council, headed by the PM, will be the body that decides dispatch while specific missions, scale, duration, and equipment will be determined by the Cabinet. Moreover, a Peace Cooperation HQ that implements any dispatch will be established in the PMO. 116 Gotoda stated 4 concerns/conditions: 1) UN Peace Cooperation Corps dispatch is not the overseas deployment of troops; 2) to respond within Japan’s constitutional framework; 3) to not use force; and 4) do not expand interpretations of the constitution. See Asahi Shimbun , October 12, 1990, 1 and Asahi Shimbun , October 16, 1990, 2. 117 Armacost, 1996, 116. Armacost writes of a mid-October discussion with Gotoda who expressed his doubts through a Chinese proverb: “The dike crumbles from a single ant hole.” 118 Hiromu Nonaka, Interview, August 7, 2006. 163

4. The PM commands and supervises the UN Peace Cooperation HQ and is the head of the Cooperation Corps. While the Corps would remain under the authority and command of the PM, the dispatch order of the Corps would come from the JDA DG after receiving the order from the PM. 119 The JDA DG would also retain authority to command the ASDF and MSDF units engaging in transportation and supply activities. 5. The Corps would be allowed to carry small arms them only in very limited situations, such as being attacked. They cannot resort to threat of force. 6. Everyone will wear the same uniform in the Corps no matter where they originate from.

From the bill’s origin until Diet submission, the proposal to include SDF proved difficult because of the different beliefs of government decision-makers. Similar to

August, the divisions amongst government decision-makers manifested themselves as institutional battles between government veto players. Not only was MOFA and the LDP divided internally, but MOFA and JDA opposed each other and PM Kaifu was at odds with the top leadership of his own party. These divisions mattered because after Diet submission, the bill entered the realm of a charged JSP whose message resonated not only with the decision-makers who opposed dispatch, but with the public. Because of this resonance, the JSP was able to kill the bill. It is to this we now turn.

From the very beginning, the JSP, Shaminren, and JCP took a strict line that no

SDF personnel would be acceptable in any form because lawmakers within these parties held strict constitutionalist beliefs and anti-militarist beliefs, fearing that SDF dispatch would lead to a slippery slope of remilitarization. Because PM Kaifu unveiled an outline of the bill on September twenty-seventh, even before Diet submission these parties knew its contents and argued that even unarmed SDF dispatch would pave the way for deploying troops overseas, which is prohibited by the war-renouncing constitution. 120

119 Asahi Shimbun , October 11, 1990, evening edition, 1. 120 Japan Economic Newswire, “JSP, JCP Oppose Dispatch of SDF Personnel to Gulf,” September 27, 1990. 164

When Chairwoman Doi met PM Kaifu on the same day, she told him that “the government should not dispatch SDF forces overseas in any form” due to constitutional problems 121 and demanded that his government delete all reference to SDF participation in the Corps. 122 And despite the fact that Komeito was slower to oppose, it too eventually opposed the bill in its entirety. 123 The same day as Doi’s meeting with Kaifu, Komeito

Chairman Koshiro Ishida announced that Komeito would oppose the bill. 124 United, the parties opposed on the grounds that it violated the constitutional ban on the use of force.

To signal their united opposition, the JSP led the parties in announcing a boycott to the scheduling of question time once the government submitted the bill. The JSP also announced a rival proposal on October fifteenth that was based on pacifism and international cooperation-ism. 125 After receiving a full draft of the bill on the twelfth 126 and sensing the mood of a divided government, LDP, and a public strongly against the bill, the JSP agreed to schedule the three-day question time (beginning on the sixteenth 127 ) to attack the bill. JSP Secretary General Yamaguchi promised resistance akin to that during the revised US-Japan security treaty in 1960. 128

Setting the tone for what was to follow, at the Lower House Plenary Session on the sixteenth, the JSP attacked the bill. Instead of debating the significance of the Gulf

121 Japan Economic Newswire, “JSP Objects to Gov’t Dispatch of SDF to Gulf,” September 27, 1990. 122 Japan Economic Newswire, “JSP Opposes SDF Involvement in U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps,” October 7, 1990. 123 The Komeito initially differed in that it advocated the Kuriyama-line with strict conditions that any former-SDF personnel would be unarmed, limited to medical, and not be sent as a unit. 124 Japan Economic Newswire, “JSP Objects to Gov’t Dispatch of SDF to Gulf,” September 27, 1990. 125 Their proposal was called the 国連平和協力機構設置大網. Asahi Shimbun , October 16, 1990, 2. 126 For a copy of the draft, see Asahi Shimbun , October 13, 1990, 2. Compared to the outline shown to the LDP on the eleventh, there were no significant differences except that a new Article (100.6) of the SDF Law would be added to indicate participation in the Peace Cooperation Corps as part of the SDF’s mandate. See also FBIS-EAS-90-199, October 15, 1990, 5. 127 This is the day the bill was submitted to the Diet and a Special Committee in the Lower House to discuss the bill was established (with debate to begin on the eighteenth). 128 Unger, 1997, 153. 165

crisis and what kind of response Japan should make, JSP Chairwoman Takako Doi lashed

out, asking why the government was submitting a bill that went against Japan’s peace

constitution by deploying the SDF overseas and why pacifist Japan had to go the same

path as military superpowers. 129 The bill, she argued, placed ‘beautiful clothing’ called

‘Peace Cooperation Corps’ on the SDF and through the makeshift measure of ‘dual status,’ deploy them overseas. 130 In the Lower and Upper House Plenary Sessions and in committee meetings, the JSP continued, ad nauseam, questioning not what Japan could do, but what it could not do. It claimed the bill 1) was unconstitutional and brought on a constitutional crisis; 2) was a plot to use the Corps as a veil to deploy armed Japanese soldiers overseas; 3) was a reversal from Kaifu’s earlier statement of not intending to dispatch SDF; and 4) would cause anxiety amongst Asian countries. Sensing the public mood, their attacks were made to achieve maximum public attention and pull the heartstrings of the Japanese. For example, it established an “Objection to the Overseas

Deployment of the SDF Headquarters” on the eighteenth which had the sole purpose of raising public opposition against the bill. Their charges resonated with the public. A poll taken in early October showed 67% of Japanese wanted the government to make non- military contributions while only 19% supported SDF dispatch. 131 Another poll later that month showed 53% opposed the bill. 132

As important as the JSP attacks were in stoking public opposition, they were just as important for exposing divisions in government. After two days of plenary session, a

129 Parliamentary minutes: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 130 Parliamentary minutes: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 131 Asahi Shimbun , October 1, 1990: Do you think it is OK to do as Japan has always done up until now and make a non-military contribution? Or do you think it is OK to revise the constitution or SDF Law and dispatch the SDF? Wish for non-military (i.e. non-SDF) contribution: 67%, Wish to amend to enable SDF to be dispatched: 19% 132 Mainichi Shimbun , October 23, 1990: What do you think of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill? Agree: 13%, Oppose: 53%, Cannot say either one: 33%. 166

Special Committee Regarding U.N. Peace Cooperation was established in the Lower

House on the eighteenth chaired by Koichi Kato (similar committee in Upper House established the twenty-fourth and chaired by Takenori Kato). Debate initially took place in the Lower House Budget Committee on October nineteenth and was expected to follow thereafter in the Special Committee, but was delayed due to the JSP once again refusing to discuss Committee scheduling in the Steering Committee.133 It continued their boycott until the twenty-fourth. Once resumed, the JSP utilized the forum to attack. And the attacks mattered because they increasingly exposed divisions in government, demonstrating that decision-makers were not unified both in their understanding of the contents as well as their opinions. North American Affairs Bureau DG Kouichiro

Matsuura admits that only a portion of MOFA studied the bill and there was no deliberation in the process between MOFA and the political level. 134 Foreign Minister

Taro Nakayama too admits “when I explained it, I didn’t fully understand the contents of the bill because we didn’t do the preparatory work ( 打ち合わせ). It was not a situation where I could fully explain the contents.”135 Knowing this, the opposition asked questions to expose problems to the public. And it worked. Some of these problems include the following.

1. Because officials in the Treaties and UN Bureau viewed the multinational forces as a UN Force, they interpreted the constitution as permitting the SDF (in the Corps) to participate with the multinational forces. This led Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama to answer in the affirmative when asked at an October nineteenth Lower House Budget Committee by JSP Secretary General Tsuruo Yamaguchi whether the government was considering sending the Corps to assist the multinational forces in Saudi Arabia. This answer was in direct contradiction with

133 Party spokesmen said their reason was because the bill stated that ‘government ordinances’ ( 政令) would explain the Corps’ activities but because the government had not clarified the contents, the parties refused to deliberate. 134 Matsuura and Kondou, 2001, 22. 135 Taro Nakayama, Interview, November 27, 2007. 167

CLB DG Atsuo Kudo who earlier stated that the CLB was still considering whether such participation was constitutional and that problems remain for SDF participation in a UN Force not responsible for Japan’s defense.136 2. Against questions from Komeito’s Natsuo Yamaguchi on where the boundary was on ‘becoming one with the use of force’ (prohibited by the constitution) at the Lower House Special Committee on the twenty-ninth, both Treaty Bureau DG Yanai and CLB Director General Kudo could not provide specific standards. Instead, they answered it would be something the government decided on a case by case basis, leaving Yamaguchi to question how the government would determine these activities on a case by case basis if it was unable to provide general boundaries prior to their occurrences. 137 3. In response to a question from JCP Koichiro Ueda at the Upper House Budget Committee on the twenty-second concerning what would the Corps do if the multinational forces have to confront the Iraqi army without a UN Resolution specifying use of force, Treaty Bureau DG Yanai and CLB DG Kudo gave contradicting answers. Yanai said the Corps could cooperate under Resolutions 660 and 661, UN Charter 51, and as long as they did not act together with multinational forces. Kudo said the Corps could not respond. 138 4. At the Lower House Special Committee on October twenty-fourth, in response to a question from JSP Hiroshi Kawasaki on what the government was considering transporting under the bill, Foreign Minister Nakayama answered that “in principle there will be no transportation of arms or ammunition.” But Treaties Bureau DG Yanai corrected Nakayama, arguing that “there are many different things to carry. There is no limit to the contents.” Nakayama then corrected himself, saying that “as long as the Corps would not be part of the use of force, it can transport arms and ammunition.” 139 Although it did not arise at the Committee, this was in clear disagreement with the CLB, which stuck close to a 1959 interpretation of the US-Japan Security Treaty by then-CLB DG Shuzo Hayashi that read: it is unconstitutional to carry out supply missions by acting together with US forces dispatched for the peace and safety of the Far East.

The government’s inability to provide uniform answers emboldened the JSP and

led to an increase in public opposition. A November Asahi poll showed that opposition

had increased to 58%. 140 The JSP’s message was resonating. Like the JSP, the public

opposed sending the SDF overseas. The same November Asahi poll showed that 78% of

Japanese were opposed to allowing the SDF to be dispatched, even if conditions were

136 Parliamentary minutes: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 137 Parliamentary minutes: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 138 Parliamentary minutes: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 139 Parliamentary minutes: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 140 Asahi Shimbun , November 6, 1990: Do you agree with or oppose the UN Peace Cooperation bill that is being discussed in the Diet? Agree: 21% Oppose: 58% 168

attached. 141 Similarly, 67% viewed any dispatch as defined by the pending Bill to be

unconstitutional. 142 Even if such an organization was composed entirely of private

citizens, 54% opposed sending any personnel overseas to a conflict region. 143 With its message resonating, the JSP continued to stoke public opinion by running an ad in the major dailies opposing the bill and announcing public rallies against it. 144 Entitled,

“Japan’s weapon is its peace constitution,” the ad reflects on Japan’s WWII ‘war of aggression’ ( 侵略戦争) and emphasizes that Japan’s constitution “that vowed to reject war is now facing its greatest crisis since the end of the war” because of “the path to deploy SDF overseas is being opened under the beautiful name UN Peace Cooperation

Bill.” It ends by calling on the Japanese public. “Raise your voices with us. Help us put a stop to those who would trample on our no-war constitution by deploying the SDF overseas.”

While the JSP’s efforts raised public opposition against the bill and exposed inner-government divisions, it also emboldened those in the LDP who opposed the bill.

One poll showed that while opposition lawmakers from JSP, Komeito, JCP, and

Shaminren were 100% opposed to the bill, only 33% of DSP and 77% of LDP lawmakers supported it. 145 Another poll found that 56.2% of all Lower House lawmakers opposed

141 Asahi Shimbun , November 6, 1990: When an international conflict like the Middle East conflict occurs, do you think it is OK to dispatch the SDF even with some kind of conditions attached? Or do you think that the SDF shouldn’t be dispatched abroad like it has been until now? Make it so they can be dispatched: 15% Should not be dispatched: 78% 142 Asahi Shimbun , November 6, 1990: Do you think that it overseas dispatch of the SDF that is defined by the UN Peace Cooperation bill, is unconstitutional or not unconstitutional? Unconstitutional: 67% Not unconstitutional: 15% 143 Asahi Shimbun , November 6, 1990: In the event that the UN Peace Cooperation bill does not pass, would you agree with or oppose the creation of a private peace cooperation organization with no SDF participation that can be dispatched to conflict regions? Agree: 30% Oppose: 54% 144 Asahi Shimbun , October 25, 1990, evening edition, 4; Yomiuri Shimbun , October 25, 1990, evening edition, 14; Mainichi Shimbun , October 26, 1990, 19. 145 Inoguchi, 1990, 45. 169

the bill. 146 Again, while all opposition parties (minus the DSP) opposed, only 63.5% of

LDP lawmakers supported it. A third poll showed that while opposition party lawmakers were uniform in their belief that the bill’s ‘face’ was one of unconstitutional dispatch that may lead to remilitarization, LDP lawmakers were split among a variety of responses, with the lead response being the importance of cooperation for Japan to revise its standing in the world. 147 All polls point to the fact that the LDP was split. Toward the end of October, each faction began to hold study groups of the bill to resolve criticisms arising from faction members. Instead of resolving the issues, these groups proved to be breeding grounds of dissonance. Surprisingly, the Abe Faction, known to have strong ties to national security and defense issues, was the first to show its hesitance. This view was echoed thereafter by members of the Miyazawa Faction, Watanabe Faction, Takeshita

Faction and even PM Kaifu’s own Komoto faction, which held anti-SDF beliefs. These lawmakers began pushing for revisions to be made via talks with the opposition parties.

But the JSP, JCP, Shaminren, and Komeito, which all were determined to kill the bill, refused. The future of the bill grew bleak when LDP strongman Shin Kanemaru came out publically against the bill, arguing that it would be best to think of a bill that did not include the dispatch of the SDF. 148

Given the JSP’s attacks resonated with the public, LDP and the bureaucracy,

Kaifu had to decide whether to ram the bill through the Diet or withdraw it from proceedings. The JSP-led opposition proved to be too much. On November second the

LDP executives acknowledged the possibility of the bill failing. The possibility turned to

146 Asahi Shimbun , November 1, 1990: (Poll of Lower House members) Do you agree with or oppose the UN Peace Cooperation bill? Agree: 29%, Oppose: 56.2% (Of this number, 63.5% of LDP agreed, all opposition opposed) 147 Inoguchi, 1990. 148 Asahi Shimbun , October 31, 1990, 1. 170

certainty on November third when the heretofore supporter of the bill, the DSP,

announced that it was time to rethink the bill from scratch.149 Facing a charged opposition

whose message was resonating with the public and across government, the LDP

executives met on the morning of the fifth where they decided the bill could not pass.

Later that evening, Kaifu and Ozawa agreed that passage was too difficult due to the

opposition parties’ strong opposition, increasing objection by the public, and the falling

approval rate of Kaifu. 150 Importantly, they agreed not to use the LDPs numerical majority to pass the bill. The UN Peace Cooperation Bill was dead. On November eighth, the LDP, JSP, Komeito, and DSP Secretaries General met and Ozawa announced the bill’s withdrawal. With the bill withdrawn, the 119 th Extraordinary Session of the Diet 151

closed on the ninth.

Looking at the process, the bill failed because of divisions amongst government

decision-makers and the fact that the JSP’s message resonated with both decision-makers

and the public. Initially, decision-makers with opposing beliefs clashed over SDF

inclusion. While political pressures forced SDF inclusion into the final draft, lingering

divisions among decision-makers and LDP lawmakers enabled the JSP to kill the bill

because its message resonated in government, the LDP, and with the public. In every

direction, the government was constrained.

Alliance Management : Had the logic guided the policy outcome, we would expect

the outcome to be explained by entrapment fears. This is because with the bill’s passage,

it would be certain that Japan would dispatch the SDF to the Middle East to assist in the

149 Asahi Shimbun , November 4 1990, 2. The party officially decided to reject the bill on November 6, 1990. 150 Asahi Shimbun , November 6, 1990, 1-2. 151 The session ran from October 12 until November 9. Due to the issue of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, only 1 piece of legislation was passed during the session. 171

US efforts. But while a coalition of decision-makers pushed hard for SDF involvement, those who were against eventually nuanced their argument to allow former SDF personnel to join. In either version, Japan would be sending personnel to assist the US.

No one argued that they were fearful of entrapment. And similar to the August proposal, those who opposed were motivated by constitutional concerns, remilitarization fears, or concerns of East Asian neighbors, not entrapment. There is no evidence that the bill’s failure can be explained by entrapment fears.

Anti-Militarist Norms : Had the Pure Variant’s logic guided the outcome, we

would expect the bill’s failure to be explained by the strength of such norms. Given that

decision-makers, public, and opposition parties who opposed rooted their opposition in

constitutional problems, sensitivity toward Asia, and remilitarization fears, there is strong

evidence to support this logic. Had the Nuanced Variant’s logic guided the outcome, we

would expect the bill’s failure to be explained by concerns the SDF would be put in a

position to use force beyond the defense of Japan. Given the uncertainty of what the bill

did and did not allow, and the more explicit fear it would lead to remilitarization, there is

strong evidence to support this logic.

Leadership : We would expect the bill’s failure to be explained by an

institutionally weak premier or a premier who did not signal a desire to dispatch the SDF.

Again, both Variants appear plausible because Kaifu was against SDF dispatch (Desire

Variant) and the Kantei was not institutionally powerful enough to silence bureaucratic

divisions (Institutional Variant). However, there are two problems. First, there were times

that DCCS-Adm. Ishihara used the Kantei to mediate divisions. Also, Kaifu’s final

decision on dual status forced the bureaucrats to fall in line. These events show that once

172

the Kantei stepped in, bureaucrats fell in line. But these are only two, arguably weak,

examples. More convincing, and questioning the validity of this argument, is the fact that

the bill failed not because of a weak Kantei or Kaifu’s personal beliefs but because the

JSP’s message resonated with the public and amongst decision-makers. Even if we

concede the possibility that a strong Kantei could have forced unanimity amongst the

bureaucrats, there was enough resistance from LDP lawmakers, opposition lawmakers

and the public that even if the premier was hawkish , the bill would

not have passed. There was too much resistance in the system. Even if we consider the possibility that Kaifu signaled early his support for dispatch, I do not think it would have been sufficient to isolate the JSP given the public’s opposition. As such, there is no evidence that had the Kantei been stronger or had a hawkish individual been premier the result would have been different.

Attempt at ASDF Humanitarian Dispatch The government’s attempt to dispatch ASDF planes represents an executive order

that failed. But the ‘failure’ was in the implementation stage, not in its passage. Similar to

August, decision-makers were divided. And like October and November, the JSP was

able to enflame public opposition. Yet despite this opposition, the government passed the

proposal. But because of continuing divisions amongst decision-makers and his own

strong non-dispatch beliefs, PM Kaifu set strict conditions on the dispatch that ultimately

led to its non-materialization.

On January 14, 1991 Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, in Washington to meet

with President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady,

and Presidential Advisor Brent Scrowcroft, was told that the US had decided on war.152

152 Taro Nakayama, Interview, November 27, 2007. 173

Nakayama reported this to Tokyo along with a message that “Japan should be prepared.”

Throughout the fifteenth, Kaifu met with MOFA officials and that evening, called a

meeting attended by the LDP executives, CCS Sakamoto, Finance Minister Ryutaro

Hashimoto, MITI Minister Eichi Nakao, and MOT Minister Kanezo Muraoka to discuss

measures in the event of war. The result was a 5-point plan that included monetary

support for the multinational forces, protection of Japanese nationals in states

surrounding Iraq, measures to deal with Iraqi terrorism, energy measures, and rescue

refugees. Despite a growing consensus amongst MOFA decision-makers on the need for

Japan to fulfill its international obligations (driven by the growing international criticism

of Japan), the sting of being seen as responsible for the failed UN Peace Cooperation Bill

constrained them from actively speaking up.

This meant that for an idea to rescue refugees, MOFA decision-makers holding

non-SDF dispatch beliefs dominated. Based on strict constitutionalist beliefs and with the

expectation of over 400,000 refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Iran, this group of

MOFA decision-makers proposed offering emergency aid (materials and $38 million to

Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator: UNDRO), a medical team comprised of

private doctors/nurses but also recruit volunteers from the Japan Emergency Disaster

Relief Team, and the use of ANA/JAL to transport Asian refugees out of the region. 153

All were non-SDF human contributions.

The LDP executives saw another looming failure because they believed Japan

needed to contribute to the Gulf efforts like other countries if Japan was to shoulder its

153 For an outline, see Asahi Shimbun , January 17, 1991, 2. It is for the 16 th , but the MOFA proposals did not change from the 15 th to the 16 th . 174

international responsibilities. 154 During the afternoon on the sixteenth, the LDP Board met. Having consulted with JDA officials who shared the same beliefs and who had studied using the SDF for transportation purposes in the fall, the Board came to unanimous agreement on a proposal to dispatch ASDF C-130 transport planes to rescue the refugees. 155 Given their beliefs, according to General Council Chairman Nishioka, the executives thought this was a “natural proposal.”156

Once again, the LDP executives and MOFA leadership clashed over policy preferences. On the evening of January sixteenth, and into the early morning of the seventeenth, deliberations took place between the government and the LDP. MOFA decision-makers continued to push their non-SDF proposal. While focusing solely on

Asian refugees who wanted to return to their homelands, they proposed an international organization run flights for refugees from Amman or Damascus to Cairo, where Japanese commercial airliners would pick them up. The LDP executives disagreed. Not only were they skeptical of relying on an international organization for refugee transport, but having seen the problems of relying on private companies in August they felt commercial airlines would be reluctant to fly to the Gulf with war on the horizon. Therefore, the LDP executives proposed keeping the commercial airline idea only for routes from Cairo to

Asia but to utilize ASDF transport planes between Amman and Cairo. Additionally, instead of relying on private medical personnel, they proposed the dispatch of SDF medical personnel.

154 Purrington, 1992, 166. 155 Asahi Shimbun , January 17, 1991, 1. Citing SDF Law Article 100 and its Implementation Statute 121, JDA officials believed that ASDF dispatch as a training exercise was legally feasible. Article 100 stipulates action corresponding to the objectives of training and Article 121 are implementation rules of Article 100. Fundamentally what matters then is Article 100. Because an SDF cargo ship and airplane carried cash to Okinawa in 1972 on the basis of Article 100, prior to its return to Japan, JDA officials believed that this set a precedent of ‘overseas mission’ under Article 100 156 Takeo Nishioka, Interview, July 18, 2006. 175

Not only did the LDP executives face opposition from these MOFA decision- makers, but also a larger coalition of LDP lawmakers and CLB decision-makers. In the

LDP, PM Kaifu led the opposition, supported by powerful lawmakers former CCS

Masaharu Gotoda 157 and Kaifu’s successor Kiichi Miyazawa. 158 Their reason was largely based on strict constitutionalist beliefs. CLB decision-makers shared these beliefs, citing that nothing was stipulated in the SDF Law that allowed overseas dispatch. This was supported by Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, who was worried about constitutional problems if ASDF aircraft came under attack. As such, he argued that the LDP executive’s proposal “was not a very good thing to do,” 159 questioning the need for

ASDF planes and, if there was a need, pushed the less problematic idea of using civilian aircraft. Knowing both MOFA leadership and the CLB opposed dispatch, Foreign

Minister Nakayama, holding strict constitutionalist beliefs, was empowered to tell the

LDP executives that MOFA would consider dispatch only after the CLB considered the legalities of using SDF Law 100. 160 The LDP executives disagreed. No decision was reached.

But the outbreak of war changed this in favor of the LDP Executives. The

Japanese government learned of the US attack on January seventeenth at 8:30 A.M. (JPN time) when Secretary of State Baker contacted Japanese Ambassador Ryohei Murata in

Washington. With this news, Kaifu called his National Security Council, an

Extraordinary Cabinet meeting, and the first meeting of a Gulf Crisis Measures

Headquarters where they decided on emergency measures. Looking eerily similar to

157 Nobuo Ishihara, Interview, June 1, 2006. 158 Purrington, 1992, 166. 159 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. 160 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , January 17, 1991, 1. 176

August, they agreed on: diplomatic support; requesting commercial airlines to dispatch

planes to rescue refugees and Japanese nationals out of the countries bordering Iraq;

sending a private sector medical team to Saudi Arabia; and financial assistance to the

multinational forces and to UNDRO. With the inclusion of civilian aircraft and private doctors, it appeared that MOFA had won, but Kaifu met next with the LDP executives where they pushed him to use ASDF transport planes to assist refugees 161 and SDF

medical personnel. In direct contrast to the previous meetings, and similar to Kaifu’s

about-face in October, it is reported that Kaifu caved to the LDP Executives’ pressure

and agreed he would consider using the ASDF if it became necessary. 162 Following the

meeting, Kaifu held a press conference where he announced his ‘solid support’ of the

US-led efforts and that he would consider using SDF transport planes, if necessary, for

transporting refugees.

Despite his anti-militarist beliefs, Kaifu changed once again because of pressure

from the LDP executives. But there was a deeper reason. According to DCCS-Adm.

Nobuo Ishihara, due to increasing US criticism, Kaifu began to be deeply concerned

about changing American public opinion and atmosphere thinking negatively about Japan

not sending its SDF. 163 Similar to what was happening in MOFA and elsewhere in

government, the feedback from international society criticizing Japan’s inability to

‘sweat’ like other countries began to change decision-makers’ beliefs. What is interesting

is that like Kuriyama in September, because of strong anti-militarist beliefs competing

161 Asahi Shimbun , January 18, 1991, 2. 162 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , January 18, 1991, 2. 163 Nobuo Ishihara, Interview, June 1, 2006; An article in Nihon Keizai Shimbun , January 18, 1991, 2 makes a similar argument. And in defending his $9 billion to the multinational forces in late January, Kaifu also argues that “refusal to fulfill [Japan’s] obligation…would mean the road to international isolation.” See The Associated Press , “Fears of Isolation Prodded Contribution From Japan, Kaifu Says,” January 25, 1991. 177

with an emerging pro-SDF dispatch belief, Kaifu set the first of two conditions on the

ASDF dispatch that would ultimately make it difficult to implement. He stated he would request commercial airliners to transport refugees (government chartered) and only after they rejected would he consider ASDF planes. In other words, ASDF dispatch was a policy of last resort. Similarly, he prioritized the creation of a private-sector medical dispatch to assist refugees but if the situation arose where SDF medical personnel became necessary, they would be called upon. Another policy of last resort.

Although the proposal did not require opposition party approval, Kaifu wanted it.

That evening, he met with his counterparts but the opposition parties (except DSP) strongly pushed back. The heads of JSP (Takako Doi), JCP (Tetsuzo Fuwa), Komeito

(Koshiro Ishida) and Shaminren (Satsuki Eda) argued that not only were there no legal grounds for sending ASDF planes to the Middle East to help refugees fleeing a war, but such a dispatch was unconstitutional and would open the dangerous path to sending SDF personnel overseas. They also emphasized that the elected Diet had killed a similar idea in November. 164 Taking advantage of the opening of the Diet on the eighteenth, these parties utilized the public forum to criticize Kaifu’s plan as opening the road for further overseas military deployment. In particular, at the Lower House Plenary Session, JSP

Chairwoman Takako Doi criticized Kaifu’s extralegal ‘deployment of armed troops’ plan as an act that would lose the trust of Japan’s Asian neighbors and call into question whether Japan could be called a constitutional state. 165

JDA decision-makers framed SDF Law Article 100 as the basis for dispatch, which defined emergency drill training missions for the SDF and entrusted the SDF with

164 Japan Economic Newswire, January 17, 1991, “Opposition Against Possible Use of SDF planes in Gulf.” 165 Parliamentary minutes: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 178

duties such as transportation operations. 166 For this case, JDA decision-makers proposed dispatching the SDF under this statute and add refugees as a target for the transportation training mission. They supported their interpretation by citing the fact that Article 100 was used to send ASDF aircraft to Okinawa prior to its reversion to Japan in 1972 to ferry yen to replace dollars. 167 The logic appeared to carry because at the third meeting of the Kantei’s Gulf Crisis Measures HQ on the twenty-first, it was agreed no legal issues existed if the ASDF planes were used to transport refugees between Amman and Cairo under the interpretation of a training mission. DCCS-Adm. Ishihara held a press conference following this meeting to officially state this for the first time. 168

But decision-makers in the CLB holding strict constitutionalist beliefs disagreed with the JDA interpretation, led by CLB DG Atsuo Kudo. First, they questioned whether transporting refugees could be considered a training exercise. Second, they worried sending transport planes to a conflict zone could be considered collective self-defense.

Finally, they worried that no brake on future dispatches existed if this interpretation of the SDF Law was allowed. Their opposition amplified the opposition parties’ message in government. Simultaneously, it made the CLB the target of Secretary General Ozawa who told them not to interfere with the ASDF dispatch like they did in refusing to expand constitutional interpretations in October and November. 169

Ozawa’s pressure appeared to work because despite CLB opposition, the JDA and

ASDF completed the dispatch plan on the twenty-first based on their interpretation of

SDF Law Article 100. The plan consisted of relying on JAL or ANA to make flights from

166 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , January 18, 1991, 1; January 22, 1991, 1. 167 Japan Economic Newswire, “Japan May Send SDF Planes to Gulf as ‘Emergency Drill’,” January 19, 1991. 168 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , January 21, 1991, evening edition, 1. 169 Asahi Shimbun , January 23, 1991, 3. 179

Cairo and to utilize up to 5 C-130s and 245 SDF personnel (45 pilots, 200 ground

arrangements) to conduct refugee transport operations between Amman, Jordan or

Damascus, Syria and Cairo, where operations would be based. 170 Although Kaifu agreed

that the SDF would only be used as a last resort, the plan contained the SDF as an

integral part that worked simultaneously with the commercial airliners. Working close

with MOFA, the same day MOT Minister Muraoka officially requested the CEOs of

ANA and JAL for their support in transporting refugees as government charters, to which

the CEOs agreed under the condition the government would ensure the planes’ safety.

With plans completed, the government waited for the best time to officially

announce its decision. 171 The timing appeared set for January twenty-third when Kaifu was scheduled to announce both a $9 billion contribution. But due to remaining opposition by the CLB over the legal interpretation, the scheduled press conference was cancelled. 172 Instead, deliberations took place to resolve governmental divisions. Facing the CLB and a charged JSP leading the opposition parties in rallying public opinion against the proposal, there was a strong push (most likely DCCS-Adm. Ishihara) to change the legal basis to SDF Law Article 100.5, which outlined use of ASDF planes for the transportation of state guests (国賓). But it was not simply changing Articles, it was a decision to revise Implementation Statute 126.16 based on Article 100.5 to include

‘refugees’ as a target of transportation. 173 The CLB opposed this because CLB DG Kudo

opposed dispatching the SDF abroad for missions not specified in the SDF Law without

revising the SDF Law itself. But this decision to revise the Implementation Statute and

170 Asahi Shimbun , January 20, 1991, 2; Nihon Keizai Shimbun , January 22, 1991, 1. 171 The Wall Street Journal Europe , January 22, 1991. 172 The New York Times , January 24, 1991, Late Edition, 10. 173 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , January 23, 1991, 1; January 24, 1991, 1; January 24, 1991, evening edition, 1. 180

not the SDF Law itself is important because revisions to the SDF Law required Diet passage. Given that the JSP had successfully killed the UN Peace Cooperation Bill in

November, government decision-makers once again feared that the JSP’s message could rally public opinion against SDF Law revision. A revision of the Implementation Statute required no such Diet passage.

That evening, at a government-LDP leaders meeting, the decision on the new legal basis was formally approved. More importantly, because his anti-militarist belief still dominated, Kaifu decided on a second condition that would make ASDF dispatch difficult to implement. Recalling that he originally set the condition that ASDF would be used only as a last resort, but that this had disappeared in the plan drawn up by the JDA,

Kaifu’s constraint on SDF dispatch no longer existed. Whether or not this was part of the reasoning is uncertain, but it was now agreed that dispatch would occur only after an official request came from an international organization, such as the International

Organization of Migration (IOM). In agreement, MOT officially asked ANA and JAL to dispatch. JAL promised 3 flights, ANA promised 1 flight, and they set a schedule for 2 flights on the twenty-seventh and 2 on the twenty-ninth. 174

Government-LDP leaders conducted final coordination the next morning, only to find CLB opposition remained. They decided a policy package was to include: $9 billion for the multinational forces, proceed with preparations to dispatch the ASDF for refugee rescue under SDF Law Article 100 Section 5.1 while revising this law’s Implementation

Statute by adding ’affected persons’ (被災民) as a state guest, and charter commercial aircraft to transport refugees, starting with Vietnamese refugees and flights between

174 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , January 25, 1991, 3. 181

Cairo and Ho Chi Min City. But at the Gulf Crisis Measures HQ meeting and National

Security Council meeting that evening, CLB DG Kudo once again opposed. The problem remained based on his constitutionalist beliefs. Wh ile Article 100 Section 5.1 allowed

SDF planes to carry ‘state guests’ like national VIPs and the PM, it did not allow the transportation of foreign refugees. 175 Therefore, carrying foreign refugees would be illegal under the statute unless the SDF Law was revised. Additionally, other CLB decision-makers were still concerned that such a revision would leave open the door to unchecked future SDF dispatches. Once again, the CLB’s opposition angered Secretary

General Ozawa. Because the CLB had veto power, Ozawa suggested that the changes be made by a special government ordinance limited to the current situation only to stipulate refugees as a state guest. Doing so would mean no changes to the SDF Law. And because the current dispatch would be a limited, temporary mission and not regarded as an ordinary SDF mission, CLB DG Kudo backed down and Kaifu agreed. 176 The package was passed by the Cabinet on the morning of the twenty-fifth and announced as a dispatch of ASDF transport planes to help “those who are refugees due to the Gulf Crisis and requested by international organizations to be transported.” 177

The decision to dispatch the ASDF by special government ordinance charged the opposition parties. JSP Secretary General Yamaguchi led the attack, arguing it was

“attempting to carry out SDF deployment beyond the law, and thus goes against the people’s wishes.” 178 Given that the dispatch was not to be deliberated in the Diet, the opposition parties worked to mobilize mass opposition in and out of the Diet. This

175 Nobuo Ishihara, Interview, June 1, 2006. 176 Jiji Press Ticker Service, “No Legal Change Needed for SDF Plane Dispatch,” February 4, 1991. 177 For a copy of the special government ordinance, see Asahi Shimbun , January 25, 1991, evening edition, 2. 178 Asahi Shimbun , January 24, 1991, evening edition, 2. 182

included using Diet deliberation time of the $9 billion to attack the ASDF transport plan

and by urging public protests. The strategy worked. Polls showed the public opposed. An

Asahi poll showed that not only were 55% against ASDF plane dispatch, but 76%

opposed Kaifu’s use of special government ordinance. 179 Like the opposition parties,

58% of the public feared that such a dispatch would lead to the future deployment of

troops overseas. 180 Given their opposition, over 15,000 people demonstrated in

Park in Tokyo as well as several thousand others at eight different locations around

Tokyo on January twenty-fifth. 181 In the days that followed, more protests erupted in

Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Tokyo. On February sixth, at a protest of over 10,000 people in

the Hibiya Outside Theater, JSP Chairwoman Doi was the main speaker, arguing that

Japan’s $9 billion and SDF transports were unconstitutional because they were part of the

use of force against Iraq.

Having set the condition that a request from an international organization was

required for dispatch, the government could not dispatch the planes despite the issuance

of the special government ordinance. And given the rising public opposition, Kaifu could

not break the condition despite the hopes of some LDP lawmakers. They had to wait for a

request. Crushing the hopes of those decision-makers holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs,

on January twenty-ninth the IOM admitted that because no mass exodus of refugees

materialized, their calls for transport planes were premature. As such, they withheld a

request for ASDF planes. Worse, the Jordanian government announced they did not want

179 Asahi Shimbun , February 5, 1991, 1, 3: SDF Plane Dispatch: 33% support, 55% oppose. Concerning government decision by special government ordinance: 14% support; 76% oppose. 180 Asahi Shimbun , February 5, 1991: There is the fear that the current SDF plane dispatch will lead to the future deployment of troops overseas. Do you think so or do you not have this worry? I think so: 58%, No worry: 30% 181 Reuters News, “Japan’s Gulf War Pledge Under New Pressure,” January 26, 1991. 183

to accept SDF planes on their soil. 182 Constrained by the condition the government set

upon itself, while JAL and ANA did fulfill their promise to transport Vietnamese and

Thai refugees from Cairo back to their home countries beginning on the twenty-seventh,

the government could not dispatch any planes. Instead, much to the dismay of those

decision-makers holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs, private Japanese entities fulfilled this

role by chartering flights (Table 4.1).183 While the government waited, Kaifu repeated his

pledge during Diet testimony on February sixth that he would wait for a request from the

IOM. 184 But with the ground war lasting only four days, no request ever came. On April

sixteenth the government decided to rescind the special government ordinance which,

after receiving LDP approval, officially occurred on April nineteenth. No ASDF planes

were ever dispatched.

Table 4.1: Flights Chartered by Private Japanese Entities Entity or Individual Name (s) Number of Planes/Flights 1) Gulf Refugees Rescue Implementation Committee 1 plane (Royal Jordanian Airlines) for up to 2) Committee that Supports Doi Takako about 10 flights from Jordan to Cairo 3) Jujin Hospital Two lawyers: 1 Royal Jordanian Airlines flight from Jordan Masanobu Inoue ( 井上正信) and Yuken Hattori ( 服部融憲) to Cairo Catholic Bishop Conference’s Persian Gulf Refugee Rescue 1 Royal Jordanian Airlines flight from Jordan Implementation Committee (Nagoya) to Sudan Japan Teachers Union 10 flights 1 Royal Jordanian Airlines flight from Jordan Cosmetic Surgery Hospital (Shimbashi, Tokyo) to Cairo 1) Japan’s Christianity Cooperation Council Up to 25 flights 2) Catholic Central Cooperation Council

Looking at the process, the dispatch failed because of strict conditions set on its

implementation. Initially, because of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill’s failure, decision-

makers in MOFA who held pro-SDF dispatch beliefs stayed silent. This allowed

182 The LDP sent a Gulf Crisis Measures Headquarters Investigatory Group led by Tsuruo Yamaguchi on January 26 to explain the ASDF plane policy to Jordan and other countries. It was not until February 2 that Jordan finally accepted, under the condition that the UN or another international organization requests it. 183 Information from various sources: Asahi Shimbun , February 6, 1991, 31; February 7, 1991, 31; February 9, 1991 evening edition, 14; February 13, 1991, 30; and February 20, 1991, 2. 184 Parliamentary minutes: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 184

decision-makers holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs to propose a plan to rescue refugees using non-SDF human contributions. But once again due to pressure from the LDP executives, the proposal eventually included plans to dispatch ASDF planes. While the opposition parties opposed the plans due to both anti-militarist and constitutional beliefs,

CLB decision-makers emphasized only the latter. The decision to issue a special government ordinance limited to the current situation silenced internal government opposition, but not the opposition parties. And because the JSP continued its opposition, and because its message resonated with the public, the condition to wait for a request from an international organization could not be ignored.

Alliance Management : Had this logic guided the outcome, we would expect non-

ASDF dispatch to be due to entrapment fears. This is because with the proposal’s passage, it would send ASDF planes to the Middle East. But two points should be evident as to why this logic does not explain the outcome. First, government decision-makers who opposed did so due to legal concerns, not entrapment fears. Because the mission was to be a purely humanitarian mission, no arguments arose over the content of the mission or fears that Japan would get entrapped in US activities. Second, and most importantly, the proposal passed by a special government ordinance. The non-dispatch outcome is because of a constraint that was set on the proposal. Had a request come from an international organization, the government would have dispatched the ASDF.

Anti-Militarist Norms : Had the Pure Variant logic guided the outcome, we would expect the failure to dispatch to be explained by the strength of such norms. While the public and opposition parties opposed dispatch due to both legal concerns and remilitarization fears, government decision-makers who opposed the dispatch did so for

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legal reasons. While the logic of the Variant would explain both opposition parties’ and

public fears, it is of limited applicability to government opposition. Worse, the proposal passed. This Variant has trouble explaining the sudden shift amongst decision-makers who just a few months prior opposed SDF dispatch for reasons supported by this

Variant’s logic. Had the Nuanced Variant logic explained the outcome, we would expect its failure to be due to the proposed dispatch falling outside of the use of force for the defense of Japan. But because the proposed dispatch was a humanitarian mission and supported by decision-makers, it is supported by the logic of this Variant. Additionally, it failed precisely because Kaifu set strict conditions on the dispatch to ensure it remained strictly humanitarian. As such, there is evidence to support this Variant.

Leadership : Had the logic of the Institutional Variant guided the outcome, we

would expect non-dispatch to be explained by an institutionally weak premier. Evidence is agnostic on this point. While it is true that once Kaifu made the decision to use an extremely unpopular special government ordinance to pass the proposal the CLB stepped down (therefore demonstrating that once the institutional power of the Kantei was engaged, it ended internal divisions), the non-dispatch had little to do with the institutional power of the Kantei. The Desire Variant would expect that non-dispatch be due to a premier who did not signal his desire to dispatch the SDF. Because the non- dispatch outcome is essentially due to the condition set by Kaifu, it is undeniable that had an individual holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs been premier the outcome would have been different. As such, there is strong evidence to support this.

MSDF Minesweeper Dispatch The government’s effort to dispatch MSDF minesweepers is representative of an executive order that succeeded. With increasing criticism of Japan, decision-makers were

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eager to provide a human contribution. With the war’s closure dissipating legal concerns and the opportunity to frame the dispatch as assistance that would benefit Japan’s economy, bureaucrats and lawmakers supported the proposal. Simultaneously, this made it difficult for the JSP to make the argument of anti-militarism. Given the JSPs weakened state after two elections, its message not resonating, and the business community backing dispatch, the government passed the dispatch with little resistance.

With war finished on February twenty-eighth, decision-makers wasted no time to begin postwar considerations. Because of increasing criticism from countries participating in the Gulf War, especially the US, that Japan had not provided support commensurate with its economic power, decision-makers felt it their responsibility to make one final attempt to make a visible, human contribution. Immediately, the idea of sending minesweepers reemerged, largely because the option never went away, at least in the JDA.185 The idea also remained popular amongst LDP lawmakers holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. The most vocal, faction leader Michio Watanabe, advocated dispatch

185 Prior to Iraq’s invasion, the MSDF had studied dispatch options to the Middle East. With Iraq’s invasion, the MSDF Chief of Staff Makoto Sakuma led considerations based on these studies. Kouichi Furusho, Interview, September 28, 2006; High-ranking JDA Official, Interview, October 5, 2006; Taosa Ochiai, Interview, October 12, 2006. Other options considered were supply ships and escort ships ( 護衛 艦). Despite sensational media coverage, sending minesweepers was not without precedent. During the Korean War, the Japanese Coast Guard, at the request of the US Far East Naval Command, created a Special Minesweeping Group to clear mines in the Sea of Japan and around the Korean Peninsula. Once the MSDF was established, clearing these mines became a duty as stipulated by Article 99 of the SDF Law. By the end of 1988, over 10,500 mines had been cleared. Based off this experience, in September 1987 PM Yasuhiro Nakasone argued that dispatching MSDF minesweepers to the Gulf was not legally a problem because it was a defensive act to protect Japanese ships from the ongoing Iran-Iraq War. The CLB backed him, arguing that if abandoned mines were a hindrance to safe navigation of Japanese ships in international waters it would be possible. Despite this, he did not send minesweepers, partly because of tertiary issues (what to do if a tanker the minesweepers were escorting is attacked?) and partly because his CCS Masaharu Gotoda opposed it. See Asahi Shimbun , August 19, 1990, 2 and Nakasone, 1990, 9-10. 187

because he worried of international isolation if Japan continued to depend on other states

for their military efforts while Japan relied so heavily on Middle Eastern oil. 186

During the fall and into spring 1991, debate took place amongst MOFA, JDA, and

SDF concerning minesweepers. Once again, this largely meant JDA Vice Minister Yoda,

representing the pro-SDF dispatch coalition, working to convince Vice Minister

Kuriyama, representing the anti-SDF dispatch coalition. 187 As other opportunities to

provide visible contribution continued to fail, Yoda and other JDA officials believed that

minesweeper dispatch was the ‘final card’ for Japan to make an international

contribution. But Kuriyama opposed minesweepers due to strict constitutionalist beliefs.

As long as the war continued, he believed constitutional problems kept the minesweeper

option from serious consideration. 188 The problem was wartime dispatch would fall under

the category of the use of force against the country which laid the mines. Only after the

country abandons its mines (which occurs with a ceasefire) would this legal hurdle

disappear. By the time the war ended, because discussions took place since the fall,

“everybody knew what others were thinking. So there was almost a consensus that if it

would be at all possible, it would be ideal for the MSDF to send minesweepers.” 189 Stung

by endless criticism concerning Japanese contributions, “key Foreign Ministry officials

were now more receptive to the request.” 190 Adding to this was the shock when Germany

decided to dispatch minesweepers on March sixth, pushing decision-makers like

Kuriyama toward accepting SDF dispatch. 191 The final straw came when Kuwait

186 Asahi Shimbun , August 26, 1990, 2. 187 High-Ranking JDA Official, Interview, October 5, 2006. 188 Takakazu Kuriyama, Interview, July 12, 2006. 189 Yukio Satoh, Interview, June 13, 2006. 190 Armacost, 1996, 124. 191 Sotooka et al, 2001, 437-438. 188

published a ‘thank you’ to coalition partners in on March eleventh, leaving off Japan but including Germany. Decision-makers throughout government believed it was crucial Japan provide a SDF contribution to fulfill its international obligation.

Although the MSDF and JDA began selecting personnel and installing equipment when Desert Storm started on January seventeenth in preparation for sudden dispatch orders, 192 it was not until after the end of combat on February twenty-eighth that concrete considerations began and after the March second ceasefire that decision-makers in both

MOFA and JDA agreed that all constitutional problems had been cleared.193 With war over, the possibility of SDF dispatch being interpreted as an act that could become one with the use of force had diminished. But to detach dispatch justification from such a possibility, JDA decision-makers publically advocated dispatch as a concern for the safe navigation of Japanese commercial ships. 194 A high-ranking JDA official states that they advocated the importance of “the oil road” for Japan. 195

LDP lawmakers supported dispatch also due to the belief that the ceasefire provided one last opportunity to give human contributions to the international effort, thereby fulfilling Japan’s international obligations. These lawmakers too advocated the need to protect Japanese ships and trade routes. This included Chairman of the National

Defense Committee Koji Kakizawa, Chair of the Security Research Committee Tadashi

Kuranari, former Foreign Minister and faction leader Shintaro Abe, and former PM

192 Kouchi Furusho, Interview, September 28, 2006; confirmed by High-Ranking JDA Official, Interview, October 5, 2006. 193 Yukio Satoh, Interview, June 13, 2006. Kouchi Furusho says the trigger for considerations within the JDA was the decision by Germany to dispatch minesweepers on March 6. Kouchi Furusho, Interview, September 28, 2006. 194 Kouchi Furusho, Interview, September 28, 2006; Noboru Yamaguchi, Interview, October 2, 2006. 195 High-Ranking JDA Official, Interview, October 5, 2006. 189

Noburo Takeshita. 196 Even doves like Kiichi Miyazawa and Shin Kanemaru who had opposed previous efforts for overseas SDF dispatch now agreed, with Kanemaru arguing that “if a tanker runs into a mine, it will be a loss of Japanese energy and the lives of crewmen. It is only natural to dispatch.” 197

This is not to suggest that the anti-SDF dispatch coalition within the LDP had suddenly disappeared. A number of influential lawmakers remained opposed due to strict constitutionalist beliefs as well as anti-militarist beliefs. First and foremost was PM

Kaifu. Upon hearing rising calls for dispatch, DCCS-Adm. Ishihara says that Kaifu

“showed disgust.” 198 Kaifu’s opposition was based on his belief that mines in the Gulf might not be considered abandoned simply because a ceasefire was in place and therefore disposing of them may violate constitutional prohibitions on the use of force. But Kaifu also worried about the JSP’s anti-militarist message resonating with the public and the affect this would have on LDP candidates in local elections in April. Kaifu was cautious about backing a policy that was sure to benefit the JSP. Kaifu’s opposition was backed by other influential lawmakers, including Koichi Kato, Yohei Kono, and Masaharu Gotoda who cautioned that overseas mine removal is not a duty of the SDF and that deliberations should not be rushed so as to avoid “making a mistake.” 199

With decision-makers throughout government tending to agree, LDP lawmakers

Taku Yamazaki and Koji Kakizawa urged PARC Chairman Mutsuki Kato on March

thirteenth to discuss the dispatch with his opposition party counterparts. 200 Given that

196 Woolley, 1996, 810-811. 197 Asahi Shimbun , April 12, 1991, evening edition, 2. 198 Nobuo Ishihara, Interview, June 1, 2006; Kouchi Furuosho, Interview, September 28, 2006 also tells of Kaifu’s opposition to the idea. 199 Motoo Shiina, Interview, July 6, 2006; Gotoda quote from Asahi Shimbun , March 15, evening edition, 2. 200 Asahi Shimbun , March 14, 1991, 1. 190

anti-dispatch beliefs still dominated, it is not surprising that the JSP, JCP, Komeito, and

Shaminren sharply opposed the idea due to strong anti-militarist beliefs and strict

constitutionalist beliefs of their lawmakers. The JSP was especially adamant. This

included an argument that removing mines in international waters was not part of MSDF

duties and therefore a mission to the Gulf was a backdoor illegal enlargement of the

MSDFs theater of operations. Also, because removing mines required cooperation with

other vessels, it would violate the prohibition against the exercise of collective self-

defense. Out of fear that it would open the door to overseas troop deployment, and much

to the government’s frustration, JSP lawmakers traveled to Asian countries attempting to

rally foreign opposition against the government. 201 LDP General Council Chief Takeo

Nishioka says that while the LDP tried to obtain their cooperation, “it was not the condition in which you could get their agreement, we couldn’t negotiate…there wasn’t any point in it.” 202

The first significant push toward dispatch came when the business community voiced its support. In a first for the business community, Gaishi Hiraiwa, Chairman of the

Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), officially announced his support for minesweeper dispatch on April eighth to ensure the safety of Japanese navigation. 203

Unofficially, he worried about rising anti-Japanese criticism and the possibility that no personnel contribution would have negative ramifications on US-Japan trade. Hiraiwa’s announcement was followed by similar ones from Japan’s Chamber of Commerce and

201 Motoo Shiina, Interview, July 6, 2006. 202 Takeo Nishioka, Interview, July 18, 2006. 203 Asahi Shimbun , April 9, 1991, 3. When looking at the Gulf Crisis in its entirety, this statement is even more surprising given statements by business community leaders in the fall of 1990: September 17, 1990- Nikkeiren president Eiji Suzuki declares his opposition to minesweeper dispatch; November 6, 1990-Keizai Doyukai Chairman Takashi Ishihara says it would be wrong to dispatch SDF unless the constitution is amended. 191

Industry (Nissho), Japan Federation of Employer’s Associations (Nikkeiren), Arabia Oil

Company, All Japan Seaman’s Union, Oil Federation, and Japan Ship-owners

Association. 204 Similar to Keidanren, their support was unofficially driven by their desire

to avoid negative ramifications on Japanese trade with the US. In framing the dispatch as

an economic one where no legal problems remained, opposition party lawmakers and

decision-makers in government who held anti-SDF dispatch beliefs were losing means by

which to oppose. In contrast, the support from the business community (driven largely by

material concerns) strengthened the position of decision-makers advocating SDF

dispatch.

The second significant event was an exogenous shock that crippled the JSP’s

power to oppose. During this time when minesweeper dispatch was seriously being

deliberated by an increasingly growing coalition of decision-makers holding pro-SDF

dispatch beliefs, the first round of local elections were held on April seventh. The results

had a catastrophic effect on the JSP because it was a landslide defeat. The LDP won the

most prefectural assembly seats since 1967. 205 Worse, in the Tokyo governor election, the

JSP’s candidate Mitsunori Ohara came in an unimaginable fourth, behind the JCP

candidate Shigeo Hatada. Although the question of someone resigning to take

responsibility was postponed until after the second round of local elections (mayors and

assemblies of cities, towns, and villages) on April twenty-first, JSP leadership was

severely weakened. 206 Against the backdrop of a weakened JSP, the JDA completed their

204 A good article detailing the Japanese business community’s response to the minesweeping idea and the entire Gulf Crisis is Abe, 1991. 205 The LDP’s prefectural assembly seats increased from 1,382 to 1,543. The JSP’s seats decreased from 443 to 345. 206 The LDP did not escape unscathed. Secretary General Ozawa backed rival candidate Hisanori Isomura against the incumbent LDP-backed governor Shunichi Suzuki in the Tokyo governor election. (The national-level LDP and DSP parties and the national and local levels of the Komeito backed former NHK 192

dispatch outline on April eleventh. Officials explained they would dispatch about 500

personnel and 4 minesweepers, 1 flagship, and 1 supply ship. 207

With a weakened opposition, MOFA and JDA decision-makers in agreement

backed by the business community, and a growing number of LDP lawmakers who

agreed with dispatch, all that was left was convincing PM Kaifu. This duty fell on Taku

Yamazaki, who led a group of defense zoku to the Kantei to press Kaifu. Similar to

Kaifu’s bowing to political pressure in October and January, Yamazaki left the meeting

with Kaifu’s agreement because a ceasefire was in place and no legal problems

remained. 208 Kaifu agreed because he believed “we have to respond to requests for a

humanitarian contribution made by international society.” 209

Similar to Kaifu’s attempts in August and January to reach out to the opposition,

he reached out to the JSP only to be rejected. Despite some JSP lawmakers arguing that

dispatch should be considered in light of their electoral losses, JSP leadership decided on

April twelfth that they could not accept any dispatch under current laws. While the party

continued to deliberate dispatch under SDF Law revision or temporary legislation,

because the party leadership was severely weakened, it was unable to come to a

conclusion different from the status quo. Worse, the party’s message did not resonate

with the public. A March poll conducted by the PMO found that 62% supported the post-

news caster Hisanori Isomura. The Tokyo municipal level LDP and DSP parties backed incumbent Shunichi Suzuki.) Ozawa’s action split the party along local-national lines and because Suzuki won, Ozawa resigned to take responsibility. His successor was former CCS Keizo Obuchi who also was from the Takeshita faction. 207 Commander of the minesweeper dispatch, Taosa Ochiai, explains that this was the plan that the Nakasone Administration had discussed. Taosa Ochiai, Interview, October 12, 2006. 208 Kaifu conditioned his agreement on waiting until the April twenty-second elections and to make concerted efforts at obtaining JSP support. 209 New York Times , April 25, 1991, A11. 193

war dispatch. 210 An April Asahi poll found similar results, with 56% supporting the dispatch. 211 Given that its message did not resonate, the JSP could not attack the government. The best it could muster was asking for clarification of legal reasoning, which was smart given that despite the public’s support for the dispatch, 46% still felt the dispatch was problematic from a constitutional standpoint. 212 But after another resounding defeat on April twenty-first, the party was demoralized, leading again to some questioning whether to accept a dispatch with conditions. But JSP lawmaker Osamu

Yatabe stifled these attempts by arguing that dispatch cannot be permitted because that would contradict the most fundamental stance of the JSP, which is the existence of the

SDF is unconstitutional. 213

The demoralized and weakened JSP gave Kaifu the necessary window of opportunity to act. One day after the election, Kaifu announced he would dispatch the minesweepers. In addition to citing the legal conditions for dispatch being fulfilled, he stated that dispatch was required to protect Japanese ships that navigate Gulf waters. 214

The LDP Executive meeting and General Council met on the twenty-third where CCS

Sakamoto presented the proposal for the purpose of protecting Japanese ships based on

SDF Law Article 99, thereby securing oil transport routes and protecting the stability of

Japanese lifestyles. While the Board quickly passed the proposal, it encountered some resistance by lawmakers in General Council. These included future PM Junichiro

Koizumi and former CCS Gotoda who questioned the applicability of current SDF Law

210 PMO poll reported in Asahi Shimbun , April 16, 1991, 2. 62% agreed with a minesweeper dispatch, 29% opposed. 211 Asahi Shimbun , April 24, 1991: The government plans on dispatching the MSDF minesweepers to clear mines laid in the Persian Gulf by Iraq in the Gulf War. Do you agree or oppose the dispatch of minesweepers? Agree: 56%, Oppose: 30% 212 Asahi Shimbun , April 24, 1991 (1, 3). 46% thought it was constitutionally problematic, 33% did not. 213 Asahi Shimbun , April, 23, 1991, 7. 214 Asahi Shimbun , April 22, 1991, evening edition, 1. 194

to the proposed dispatch in international waters in the Gulf. 215 Because the resistance was

a minority, the proposal passed.

Against the continued opposition of the JSP, JCP, Komeito and Shaminren (which

continued to voice fear that it will open the door to overseas dispatch of troops and that it

violates the constitution and Article 99 of the SDF Law), the National Security Council

and Cabinet met on the evening of the twenty-fourth officially deciding on dispatch.

Kaifu followed this by holding a news conference to announce the dispatch, asking for

the understanding of the Japanese people as it is a request from international society but

also important to secure the transport of oil imports. Two days later, on April twenty-

sixth, under the command of Taosa Ochiai, for the first time since WWII 6 ships (4

minesweepers, 1 flagship, 1 supply ship) and 511 MSDF personnel left to conduct

operations in international waters far from Japan. 216 Not surprisingly, a June Asahi poll showed public support increased to 65%. 217

Looking at the process to dispatch MSDF minesweepers, clearing all legal hurdles made it difficult for decision-makers holding anti-dispatch beliefs in MOFA and the LDP to oppose. This neutralized those who held strict constitutionalist beliefs. And framing the dispatch as a way to protect Japanese shipping lanes further detached dispatch from

215 Asahi Shimbun , April, 23, 1991, 7. 216 From Kure port: flagship Hayase, minesweeper Yurishima. From Yokosuka: supply ship Tokiwa and minesweepers Awashima and Sakushima. From Sasebo: minesweeper Hikoshima. They left separate ports on the twenty-sixth and joined together on April twenty-eighth in Kassari Bay. They dispatched as a fleet the next day. They made port calls at: Subic (May 4), Singapore (May 9), Penang (May 12), Sri Lanka (May 17), Karachi (May 22), and Dubai (May 27). They left Dubai for the Persian Gulf on May 31. Minesweeping operations began on June 5. They joined minesweepers from America, England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Saudi Arabia. The first mine was cleared at 10:01 A.M. on June 19. Operations finished on September 11. They leave Dubai on September 23 and make port calls at: Muscat (September 25), Sri Lanka (October 4), Singapore (October 13), and Subic (October 21). They enter Japanese waters on October 30. During their 188 day mission, they cleared 34 mines. Information from commander of minesweeper flotilla, Taosa Ochiai, Interview, October 12, 2006. 217 Asahi Shimbun , June 19, 1991: Japan dispatched MSDF minesweepers to clear mines in the Persian Gulf. Do you think this was good or do you not think so? Good: 65%, Don’t think so: 24% 195

military assistance, thereby neutralizing some anti-militarist beliefs as well as further

neutralizing those who believed such an operation would become one with the use of

force. The business community’s support solidified this. All this made it difficult for the

JSP’s message of opposition to resonate. Equally important was the weakening of the

JSP. With a demoralized and weakened party and its message not resonating, the JSP was unable to exercise its veto as it had done previously. With the government facing a weakened opposition, a favorable public opinion, and decision-makers in agreement, the government passed the dispatch with little resistance.

Alliance Management : Because Japan dispatched minesweepers, it is necessary to

employ a slightly different logic. Had the logic guided the outcome, we would expect

dispatch to be due to fears of abandonment (as opposed to entrapment). This is because

an inability to dispatch would prompt the US to withdraw its security commitments.

While lawmakers were concerned about anti-Japanese sentiment, there is some evidence

to support this logic as some policymakers were sensitive to US criticism and felt that

dispatch was the final opportunity for Japan to provide the human contributions that

America had been requesting since August (however there is no evidence they feared US

abandonment).

Anti-Militarist Norms : Had the Pure Variant logic guided the outcome, we would

expect dispatch to be explained by a weakening of such norms. Given that decision-

makers, lawmakers, and the public supported the dispatch, there is evidence to support

this. But this is problematic. Similar to January, if strong norms explain the non-dispatch

in August and November, what accounts for this shift to pro-dispatch? Had the logic of

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the Nuanced Variant guided the outcome, the postwar dispatch framed as securing oil routes would support this logic.

Leadership : Because Kaifu was a known opponent to SDF dispatch, we cannot

use the Desire Variant logic to explain the outcome. This is because dispatch occurred

despite his signals. The logic of the Institutional Variant, on the other hand, does fit with

the evidence. The logic of this Variant would explain dispatch due to a strong Kantei able

to push dispatch or a weak Kantei unable to stop the policy drive by a stronger

bureaucracy. Because the Kantei did not push dispatch, the test is whether the

bureaucracy pushed the policy against a weak Kantei. Because we see bureaucrats and

LDP lawmakers pushing the dispatch plan while the Kantei remained uninvolved and

even opposed, there is strong evidence to support this logic.

Conclusion This chapter examined the three unsuccessful attempts at dispatching the SDF overseas during the 1990-1991 Gulf War: 1) August Twenty-Ninth Package; 2) UN

Peace Cooperation Bill; and 3) ASDF dispatch and the one successful attempt: 4) MSDF minesweeper dispatch. Tracing each, I have shown that the variables that mattered in explaining dispatch failure or success proved to be the beliefs held by decision-makers and veto power of the JSP. But each sub-case highlights the salience of these two variables at different times. The August Package was an executive order that failed because of divisions amongst decision-makers with different beliefs. The UN Peace

Cooperation Bill was legislation that failed because of divisions amongst decision-makers with different beliefs and the JSP able to exploit these differences and rally public opposition. ASDF dispatch was an executive order that passed but failed to be implemented due to lingering divisions amongst decision-makers and desire to avoid

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breaking a condition set by Kaifu (due to JSP and public opposition). Finally, MSDF minesweeper dispatch is an executive order that succeeded because decision-makers agreed on SDF dispatch after legal concerns disappeared and because the JSP was weakened by elections. After tracing each proposal, I engaged the three alternative explanations of alliance management, anti-militarist norms, and leadership. I found problems in the consistency of these explanations.

The alliance management explanation was the least supported. During deliberations in August, October/November, and January, decision-makers who opposed dispatch did not base their opposition on entrapment fears. Instead, opposition both inside and outside of government was based off legal fears, anti-militarist sentiment, and concerns of East Asian neighbors. Additionally, the MSDF dispatch succeeded. While lawmakers were motivated by rising anti-Japanese sentiment in the US, there is no evidence it was due to fear of US abandonment.

Had the logic of the Pure Variant of anti-militarist norms guided policy outcomes, we would expect non-dispatch to be explained by the strength of such norms. The non- dispatch cases in August and November appeared consistent with this logic as decision- makers and the public alike rooted their opposition in constitutional problems, remilitarization fears, and concerns of how a military dispatch would be interpreted by

Asian neighbors. And yet, as strong as these norms were to stop dispatch, by January decision-makers were pushing for ASDF dispatch, which passed but failed to be implemented due to constraints set by PM Kaifu. In April, the MSDF dispatch was fully supported by not only decision-makers but by the public. The problem with the Norm explanation is explaining this sudden shift amongst decision-makers from the fall to

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January and amongst the public from January to April. I do not believe this Variant offers us any possible explanation for this sudden shift. The logic of the Nuanced Variant, on the other hand, has strong support in the October-November, January, and April sub- cases. When possible SDF dispatch was seen as stepping over the boundary of use of force beyond the defense of Japan, the outcome was no dispatch. When dispatch was within the bounds of a non-use of force mission, such as postwar minesweeping or humanitarian airlifts, it was supported. Although the August policy failed, we cannot dismiss the possibility that this was because of the uncertainty of possible war and SDF units being caught in conflict.

Finally, we turn to the leadership explanation. Both scholars 218 and decision- makers during the Gulf War 219 point the finger of blame at the paucity of leadership as the main culprit for no SDF dispatch. Given the divisions amongst decision-makers, it would seem that a strong coordinating institution at the top could have overcome these divisions (Institutional Variant). Or, had the premier signaled his desires this could have forced the bureaucrats to fall into place (Desire Variant). There is evidence to support the

Desire Variant during January (as non-dispatch was essentially due to Kaifu) and the

Institutional Variant during April (as bureaucratic plans proceeded despite Kaifu resistance). Likewise, because it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that the August outcome would have been different had Kaifu signaled his desire to dispatch and/or had the institutional ability to silence bureaucratic divisions, we cannot completely dismiss either Variant. However, because the JSP’s message resonated with decision-makers and therefore enabled it to water-down implementation, I am reluctant to agree that a strong

218 Kishii, 1991; Purrington and A.K., 1991, 314-316. 219 Ishihara, 2001. 199

Kantei would have resulted in SDF inclusion. Where the leadership argument provides little help is in explaining the UN Peace Cooperation Bill outcome. It is impossible to ignore the fact that the bill failed not because of a weak Kantei or Kaifu’s signaling but because of an opposition whose message resonated with the public and decision-makers.

No matter if the prime minister was a hawk or if we concede the possibility that a strong

Kantei could have forced unanimity amongst the bureaucrats, it is difficult to dismiss the strength of the JSP and its ability to arouse public opposition, thereby becoming the veto player responsible for killing the bill.

Given that none of the alternative explanations provide consistent explanations, I conclude that Japan’s policy responses during the Gulf War are best explained by the differing beliefs among decision-makers and the ability of the ideological JSP to exercise veto power.

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V. The Iraq War

Japan’s response to the Iraq War was different than its Gulf War response.

Instead of being dominated by financial contributions, the main pillar of support was SDF dispatch for postwar reconstruction. Media opinion was Japan could do this because of the leadership of PM Junichiro Koizumi. In actuality, policy making was driven by a much larger number of decision-makers than Koizumi alone. Despite the large number, they were near unanimous in the belief that it was necessary for Japan to fulfill its international obligations as a responsible member of international society. As such, they proactively worked to formulate policies that included the SDF. Their ability to achieve their goal was due in part to their shared belief, resulting in no veto players exercising veto power. But it was also due to the pragmatic nature of the DPJ that did not immediately oppose proposals that included the SDF. Because decision-makers converged on a common belief and the public showed a willingness to provide an international contribution, the DPJ’s late-coming opposition did not resonate. As such, it could not exercise its veto power.

Unlike 1990-91, decision-makers generally shared a pro-SDF dispatch belief.

Specifically, they believed it was necessary to assist international efforts as a responsible member of international society. While this belief was found throughout government and the ruling parties, it was also shared by a small group of lawmakers in the DPJ. This meant the party was less likely to immediately oppose policies that included the SDF.

While the coalition of decision-makers holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs was widespread, this is not to say an anti-SDF dispatch coalition did not exist. It did, but it was small and concentrated in the opposition parties. But unlike the JSP, DPJ lawmakers held only

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constitutionalist beliefs. This resulted in the party relying less on ideological arguments

concerning remilitarization or Asian neighbors’ fears.

Being pragmatic, the DPJ did not oppose policies without examining them. But

once it did oppose, because government decision-makers shared a similar pro-SDF

dispatch belief, there were no differences the DPJ could exploit. Worse, while public

opinion shared the DPJ’s opposition to war and SDF dispatch to Iraq, it did not do so for

the same reason. Given that no divisions existed amongst government bureaucrats and

coalition lawmakers and the fact that the public shared different beliefs than the DPJ, the

DPJ’s message of opposition did not resonate. Although the DPJ was similar to the

former-JSP in that both were minority parties, the DPJ could not veto policies because its

message did not resonate and it was unwilling to take extraordinary measures to oppose.

This meant that by the time the DPJ did come to actively oppose policies that included the SDF, it had no means by which to veto.

In this chapter, I present two successful attempts at dispatching the SDF in 2003:

1) ASDF dispatch and 2) the Iraq Special Measures Law. Tracing each, I address my two independent variables: beliefs held by decision-makers and the opposition party. In doing so, the outcomes highlight the salience of the variables at different times.

• The ASDF dispatch was an executive order that succeeded. Decision-makers across government were pro-SDF dispatch, holding the belief of the importance of Japan contributing as a responsible member of international society. United, the government proposed dispatching ASDF cargo planes on two separate humanitarian missions. Although its support was not required, the DPJ supported the proposal. Given the widespread support, the government dispatched with no resistance. • The Iraq Special Measures Law was Diet legislation that succeeded. It succeeded for two reasons. First, government bureaucrats and coalition lawmakers shared a pro-SDF dispatch belief. Second, although the DPJ did not oppose at first, once it decided to oppose it was not able to veto it because there were no differences amongst decision-makers that the DPJ could exploit to enflame opposition to the

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bill from within the government. Simultaneously, because its message did not resonate with the public, it could not amplify its opposition by enflaming public opposition.

After both, I engage the three alternative explanations from Chapter One. Alliance

management does not explain Japan’s policies because decision-makers were not

concerned with abandonment, contrary to popular belief. Likewise, while the Pure

Variant of the anti-militarist norm argument can explain ASDF dispatch, it has difficulty

explaining the passage of the Iraq Law given public opposition. However, the logic of the

Nuanced Variant provides a plausible explanation for both sub-cases given their

humanitarian or reconstruction objective. Finally, while both variants of the leadership

argument are appealing in their simplicity, they provide little traction in explaining why

bureaucrats moved so quickly, substantially, and without division before Kantei

involvement or premier-signaling. Because none consistently explain Japan’s policies, I

conclude we should have confidence in my argument.

Two ASDF Dispatches The government’s ASDF dispatches to assist with humanitarian activities represent two executive orders that succeeded. Government bureaucrats and coalition lawmakers shared a belief in the importance of Japan fulfilling its international obligations and were thus united in advocating ASDF cargo planes as a policy preference.

Although it did not require Diet approval, the DPJ also supported. Given widespread support, the government encountered no resistance.

The handling of pre-war policies was left to MOFA. Similar to 1990, activities were centered on Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi and ad hoc meetings he held with the Director Generals of various bureaus: Middle Eastern and African Affairs,

Economic Cooperation, North American Affairs, Foreign Policy, and the Minister’s

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Secretariat. 1 Unlike the Gulf period, these decision-makers all shared the belief of Japan

needing to contribute as a responsible member of international society like other states.

Given their shared belief, when UNHCR Ruud Lubbers stated on October fourth

that the Office of the UNHCR was preparing for “between the tens of thousands and a

million” refugees if military action is taken against Iraq but lacked the funds and

materials to meet this, 2 these decision-makers responded without argument. This began

with a November twenty-first plan to provide funding to the UNHCR to purchase tents

and blankets, money to NGOs involved in humanitarian measures, and grant cooperation

to the countries surrounding Iraq. 3 Two days later, they decided an outline of support

measures including financial assistance to surrounding countries, refugee rescue, and

other non-military support.4 This was included in the government’s early-December

contingency plans outlining Japan’s response to a possible US attack on Iraq. 5 After a

December thirteenth plea from the UN for $37.4 million for refugee preparedness

measures, including 2000 tents,6 to meet an estimated minimum of 600,000-maximum of

1.45 million refugees expected to flee Iraq, these MOFA decision-makers began

considering further measures. 7 These included the dispatch of the ASDF to assist with

expected humanitarian efforts, 8 which meant JDA decision-makers became involved in

policy deliberations. Because such a proposal necessitated more specific planning,

discussions shifted out of the Takeuchi ad hoc meetings. In MOFA, they occurred under

1 MOFA Official, Interview, June 14, 2006. 2 Agence France Presse (English), October 4, 2002 Friday, “UNHCR prepares for possible military strike against Iraq” 3 Shuugiin Chousa Kyoku Gaimu Chousashitsu, 2003, 45. 4 See footnote 75 in Ibid , 35. 5 Daily Yomiuri , December 6, 2002, 1. 6 United Press International, January 27, 2003, “U.N.: Relief aid for Iraq war lacking;” www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article804939.ece 7 The UN expected a budget of $154 million would be necessary. 8 Anonymous, Interview. 204

International Peace Cooperation Room Director Takahisa Kawakami (Foreign Policy

Bureau). In the JDA it was Operations Division Director Nobuki Kawamura (Operations

Bureau). 9

Like their MOFA counterparts, JDA decision-makers shared the same belief in the necessity of Japan contributing to international society similar to other states. This meant all decision-makers involved shared the same belief. According to the March 2003

Iraq Refugee Rescue International Peace Cooperation Implementation Plan (イラク難民

救援国際平和協力業務実施計画), the motivation behind the dispatch was the need to bear responsibility for global peace and security. 10 In other words, fulfill Japan’s

international obligations. Despite the fact that these decision-makers believed that “it is

better if we could get into Iraq,” 11 they agreed that without a new law, the SDF could not

enter Iraq. However, they wanted to act quickly and tie their efforts closely with events in

Iraq. As such, they decided to use existing legislation to conduct humanitarian operations

“very close, right next to the border with Iraq.” 12 Because the UNHCR was requesting

help, the consensus was to dispatch the SDF under the UN Peacekeeping Activities

Cooperation Law.

By the beginning of February, MOFA and JDA compiled a humanitarian

assistance package to respond to UNHCR’s requests. 13 This included providing financial

support via international organizations to NGOs and medical groups in the region and the

9 Anonymous, Interview. Because both Kawakami and Kawamura were only Directors, any plans needed to have the authorization of their Bureau DGs as well as Vice Minister Takeuchi (MOFA) and Vice Minister Yasunari Ito (JDA). 10 Source: www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/data/pdf/02/data02_16.pdf 11 Anonymous, Interview. 12 Anonymous, Interview. 13 UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Kenzo Oshima revised this figure on February 10, 2003. In addition to humanitarian supplies, the new estimate became $120 million. See: www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2003/OshimaBriefing.doc.htm. 205

provision of materials (tents, blankets, medical supplies) by ASDF C-130 transport

planes. 14 Possible target countries included Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt.

When compared to the Gulf Crisis, it is surprising that there was an absolute lack of an anti-SDF dispatch coalition. Not only was this true of the bureaucrats and lawmakers in the ruling parties (LDP, Komeito, New Conservative Party), but even the

DPJ. Whereas the JSP consistently opposed government plans, even for humanitarian purposes, the DPJ did not oppose nor make efforts to rally public opposition. Instead, it released a statement saying that diplomacy must be conducted that attaches importance to humanitarian aid such as refugee measures, food supplies, cooperation toward the stabilization of surrounding countries (i.e. Jordan, Turkey), minimizing the effects of war, and support for postwar reconstruction. 15

And yet, despite the DPJ’s support of humanitarian assistance, the party’s lawmakers did not share similar pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. While a small group of lawmakers did, most held anti-SDF dispatch beliefs (more on this in next section). But the reason why the party did not oppose is because of a sophistication in the DPJ’s stance. Former ‘Next Cabinet’ Foreign Minister argues that the party knew it had “to differentiate that opposing the war and helping people is different.” 16

Demonstrated below, DPJ lawmakers’ anti-SDF dispatch preferences were motivated by

constitutionalist beliefs rather than anti-militarism beliefs or sensitivity to Asian

neighbors. Because the dispatch of ASDF planes to provide humanitarian supplies under

the UN Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Law based on a request from the UNHCR

14 Yomiuri Shimbun , February 7, 2003, 1. 15 See DPJ, Iraku mondai ni kansuru minshutou no genjiten do no kangaekata , February 14, 2003. 16 Keiichiro Asao, Interview, September 21, 2006. 206

was legal, there was no reason to oppose. 17 Had fears of remilitarization or sensitivity to

Asian neighbors still dominated DPJ lawmakers’ beliefs, it is likely they would have opposed.

Although the policy formulation was being driven by MOFA and JDA decision- makers, because war seemed certain these considerations moved to the Kantei in

December under a team headed by Asst.CCS Keiji Omori (more below). Because Kantei officials shared the same belief on the importance of Japan making an international contribution as a responsible member of international society, they had no concerns with the direction MOFA and JDA decision-makers had gone. With no internal opposition, based off the MOFA and JDA deliberations, Omori’s team decided on an Action Plan on

February sixth outlining what Japan could do immediately in the case of an attack.18

While the Action Plan included a host of domestic measures, the main pillar of international measures was the refugee support measures (including the dispatch of

ASDF transport planes) created by MOFA and JDA decision-makers.19 Again, DPJ

President Naoto Kan said reconstruction support for Iraqis from a humanitarian standpoint was “natural.” 20

Because all decision-makers involved in formulating Japan’s response measures shared the same pro-SDF dispatch belief, the decision-making process proceeded without

17 Thank you to Akihisa Nagashima for clarifying this point about the DPJ’s stance. 18 Shuugiin Chousakyoku Gaimu Chousashitsu, 2003, 39; Yomiuri Shimbun , February 7, 2003, 1. 19 The Action Plan included: 1) refugee support measures (provide tents/blankets by ASDF transport planes and support to NGOs or medical personnel doing work in the region); 2) financial assistance via an international organization to countries accepting refugees; 3) anti-terrorism measures (strengthen security of important facilities in Japan, escort activities by SDF for US base security, and strengthen immigration controls); 4) measures to avoid confusion in economic system (in cooperation with IEA, stabilize oil supply by using national oil reserves); 5) protection of Japanese in Iraq and surrounding countries (in the event that private aircraft cannot be used, dispatch ASDF transport planes or government-use aircraft or use MSDF boats active in the Indian Ocean); 6) protection of Japanese tankers carrying oil from the Middle East; and 7) provision of appropriate information to the Japanese. 20 Asahi Shimbun , March 14, 2003, 4. 207

trouble. The one issue that arose demonstrates that while agreeing on the necessity of

Japan fulfilling its international obligations via SDF dispatch, decision-makers could disagree on specifics. In early March, the idea to use ASDF C-130 planes changed to rely instead on ASDF-operated B747-400 Jumbo Jets exclusively used by government officials and VIPs and, depending on conditions in the region, possibly using ASDF C-

130s. 21 While it is unclear where the opposition came from, the ASDF C-130 proposal drew opposition not because they were SDF, but because C-130s required numerous refueling operations during the 4000 km journey whereas jumbo jets would not. 22 In other words, they simply disagreed over which planes were best suited for the mission.

Because the Action Plan was complete, Koizumi could quickly pass policies once hostilities began, including ASDF dispatch. President Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum given at

8 PM on March seventeenth (10 AM, March eighteenth in Japan) made war appear inevitable. Because the Action Plan was decided, after Bush’s ultimatum and Koizumi’s announced support, bureaucrats presented the Action Plan to Koizumi. 23 After a series of many meetings with officials from MOFA, Kantei, economic-related ministries, and the coalition parties 24 that began at 11:32 AM, Koizumi opened a National Security Council meeting at 7:47 PM and an Economic Related Cabinet Ministers meeting at 8:10 PM

21 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , March 11, 2003, Evening edition, 2. For example, the PM and members of the Imperial family usually travel on the planes for overseas trips. 22 Asahi Shimbun , March 22, 2003, 4. 23 As early as March ninth, there were reports the government already ran simulations of a war many times, including the formulation of a schedule of events that was followed on the twentieth. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun , March 9,2003, 2. For specific list of the anti-terrorism measures, see Asahi Shimbun , March 20, 2003, 2. 24 From the coalition parties, he met with the LDP executives (Secretary General Taku Yamazaki, PARC Chairman Taro Aso, General Council Chairman Mitsuo Horiuchi), heads of Komeito (Takenori Kanzaki) and New Conservative Party (Hiroshi Kumagai), and the Secretaries General of the ruling coalition (Taku Yamazaki-LDP, Tetsuzo Fuyushiba-Komeito, and -New Conservative Party). 208

where the Action Plan measures were discussed. 25 Bureaucrats continued discussions

under the coordination of DCCS-Adm. Teijiro Furukawa until hostilities began on March

twentieth. Based off the bureaucratic decisions already made, Koizumi decided on the

Action Plan at a National Security Council meeting that gathered at 1:47 PM on the

twentieth. 26 Koizumi changed nothing. Following the meeting, an emergency Cabinet

meeting was held at 2:03 PM where the Action Plan was approved. Although not

necessary, despite its opposition to the war, the DPJ supported the humanitarian measures

in the Action Plan. This was because, from the standpoint of humanitarianism, it was

important to handle refugee issues and to contribute to the stabilization of surrounding

countries (Jordan, Turkey). 27

With decision-makers in widespread agreement, events moved quickly. On the

twenty-first, the UNHCR officially requested Japan to send planes and the same day the

government agreed to use the B747-400 Jumbo Jets. 28 On March twenty-sixth, the JDA decided on dispatching modified Boeing 747 government planes on the thirtieth. This decision, along with MOFA’s decision to provide 160 tents (each capable of holding 10 people) to Jordan for Iraqi refugees, was announced by Deputy Foreign Minister

Toshimitsu Motegi later that day. On March twenty-seventh, the National Security

25 For an idea of what was decided, see Anzen Hoshou Kaigi: www.mmz.kantei.go.jp/k/photo/mm/2003/03/18_3_m.html; Keizai-kinyuu kankei kakuryou nado ni yoru kaigou: www.mmz.kantei.go.jp/k/photo/mm/2003/03/18_4_m.html; Kanbou choukan kisha happyou: www.mmz.kantei.go.jp/k/new/back/mm/2003/03/18_m.html 26 The Action Guideline consisted of: 1) ensure safety of Japanese in Iraq and countries surrounding it; 2) protect key facilities, such as US bases in Japan and diplomatic establishments; 3) ensure the safety of the navigation of Japanese ships; 4) prevent confusion in the international economic system; and 5) provide emergency humanitarian assistance, including SDF planes to transport materials. The Action Plan was approved at the Cabinet meeting following the NSC. This can be found at Kantei, Kinkyuu taisho houshin ni tsuite, anzen hoshou kaigi shiryou, March 20, 2003 at www.mmz.kantei.go.jp/k/ira/mm/20_1.html. The more fleshed-out version can be found at Iraku mondai ni kansuru taisho houshin, kakugi kettei, March 20, 2003 at www.mmz.kantei.go.jp/k/iraq/mm/20_2.html. 27 DPJ, Tai Iraku buryoku koushi ni kansuru kangaekata , March 20, 2003. 28 Asahi Shimbun , March 21, 4. 209

Council heard reports by MOFA and JDA and approved the dispatch. 29 With CCS Yasuo

Fukuda announcing that the government “wants to actively contribute support for refugees,” 30 the Cabinet officially approved the plan the next day.

Because decision-makers throughout government shared the same belief, unlike the Gulf Crisis, implementation also encountered no problems. The ASDF created a special 50-person Iraq Refugee Rescue Air Transport Team ( イラク難民救援空輸隊) that was assembled at Chitose Air Base (). 31 On March thirtieth, the two B-747s left Chitose via Narita Airport (to pick up the tents) and (to refuel) and arrived in

Amman the next day. 32 After handing over the humanitarian materials to the UNHCR, the planes immediately returned to Japan, arriving back at Chitose on April second and the Team disbanded. The first ASDF dispatch was finished, completely trouble free.

In the middle of April, JDA decision-makers began pushing for ASDF transportation support to the countries surrounding Iraq under current laws. 33 President

Bush’s “end of major combat” announcement on May second led decision-makers to enter into deliberations toward this end. During deliberations of the Iraq Special

Measures bill (below), government decision-makers and ruling party lawmakers deliberated whether the SDF could be dispatched to Iraq within the framework of international emergency humanitarian support under the UN Peacekeeping Activities

Cooperation Law.34 Given the expected difficulty of passing a new law designed to dispatch the SDF to Iraq, decision-makers agreed on the need for a two-step dispatch in

29 Documents received by the JDA; A good brief explanation of this is found at the Kantei website: www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2003/03/28_a.html; Also see Asahi Shimbun , March 26, 2003, Evening edition, 2; March 27, 2003, 4. 30 www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2003/03/28_a.html 31 Materials obtained from the JDA. In addition to the Team, there were 6 crew members. 32 This marked the first time such planes were not to be used for strictly government VIP transport. 33 Kakitani and Kikuchi, 2005, 13. 34 Asahi Shimbun , May 8, 2003, 3. 210

order to make a visible contribution as quickly as possible. The strategy, described by

Koizumi on May twenty-first, was “first we will do what can be done within existing

laws…if it is a thing which we cannot do without a new law; we will make a decision

while looking at the conditions.” 35 Concretely, this meant activities possible under the

UN Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Law or Anti-Terror Special Measures Law and

then to pursue a new law to conduct reconstruction work. For the first-step, proposed

activities included minesweeping; sending experts to handle WMD cleanup;

reconstruction of railroad/port infrastructure; transportation and provision of medicine,

food, and other materials within Iraq; and provision of medicine, food, and other

materials to countries surrounding Iraq via an international organization. 36 Of these

possibilities, only the last option proved to have no outstanding legal issues connected to

it. 37

In the weeks following the start of the war, MOFA decided on a number of

humanitarian packages to be dispersed to international organizations and NGOs. One of

these was an April sixteenth 1.4 billion yen package of food assistance through the World

Food Program (WFP) for Iraqi refugees or affected people in Iraq. With the WFP

coordinating relief materials, it requested Japan to assist with transporting these

materials. Motivated by the need to bear their share of the international burden being

undertaken in Iraq, the same MOFA and JDA decision-makers were able to make a plan

to transport humanitarian assistance based on the WFP request under the UN

35 Asahi Shimbun , May 21, 2003, Evening edition, 3. 36 Asahi Shimbun , May 23, 2003, p2 37 Problems with minesweeping was that no demand for minesweepers; problems with WMD cleanup idea was that there was no demand for them and no WMDs had been found; problems with railroad and port infrastructure repairs as well as transporting materials in Iraq was that this would have to be based on the UN Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Law, but this meant that the 5 conditions needed to be fulfilled. 211

Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Law after UN Resolution 1483 passed on May

twenty-second (reconstruction support). Unlike March, this was not going to be a one-

time transport. Instead, the ASDF were going to run multiple transport missions between

the WFPs HQ in Italy and a country near Iraq. JDA decision-makers hoped that once new

legislation passed, it could be revised to change the mission to transportation flights

between Iraq and surrounding countries. This was because “our priority was Iraq.” 38

Based on their plan, during his visit with Bush in May, Koizumi was able to announce

“we are considering the dispatch of SDF airlift capabilities in the countries neighboring

Iraq for humanitarian purposes.” 39

Once again, because of the large coalition of decision-makers sharing the same belief, no resistance occurred during implementation. And once again, the DPJ did not oppose because the target was humanitarian assistance based on the UN Peacekeeping

Activities Cooperation Law. 40 Because no divisions existed, implementation again moved rapidly. The National Security Council unanimously agreed to the MOFA and JDA plan on July third and it was approved at a Cabinet meeting the next day, to be limited to three months. Having received preparation orders on June twenty-sixth, the ASDF was ready, creating another special 98-person team ( イラク被災民救援空輸隊)to use two C-130s.

On July tenth, the team assembled at Komaki Air Base (Aichi) and, identical to the

March dispatch, left for Amman where it transported supplies between Brindisi, Italy

(where the WFP had a base) and Amman, Jordan. 41 From Amman, Jordan, the JDA had

38 Anonymous, Interview. 39 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Japan to Study Sending Troops to Iraq, Premier Says to USA,” May 24, 2003. 40 DPJ, Tai Iraku fukkou shien oyobi chuutou heiwa ni kansuru genjiten no kangaekata , April 11, 2003. 41 Documents received from the JDA. In addition to the 98-person team, there were 24 crew members. 212

arranged trucks to transport the humanitarian materials to Baghdad. 42 Arriving on July

fourteenth, the team conducted operations from the seventeenth until August twelfth.

During this time, they operated 20 flights, transported 120 metric tons of foodstock,

pallets, and aluminum and 20 metric tons of grain. 43 Although the JDA initially hoped to

change the mission after the passage of the Iraq Special Measures Law, because of the

unstable security situation in Iraq and the fact that Jordan was not enthusiastic about the

JDA’s plan,44 it did not materialize. Instead, the ASDF left Amman on August fourteenth

and returned to Komaki on the eighteenth where, similar to April, the Team disbanded.

Looking at the two ASDF dispatch decisions, it is evident that the decision-

making process was devoid of opposition of any kind from a coalition of decision-makers

holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs. No one batted so much as an eyelash against the

dispatch proposals. This is surprising given the divisions that existed within government

and the attacks by the opposition parties over the January 1991 proposal to dispatch

ASDF planes. The DPJ never raised questions against the dispatch nor sought to fan the

flames of public opposition. The ASDF planes were dispatched trouble-free.

Alliance Management : Had this logic guided the outcome, we would expect

decision-makers choosing SDF dispatch because of abandonment fears. But what is

evident is that all decision-makers and lawmakers who pushed for ASDF dispatch did so

because of the motivation of Japan acting as a responsible member of international

society. The threat from North Korea did not arise in policy discussions nor did fears of

42 Anonymous, Interview. 43 Materials obtained from JDA. See also: www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/humane/i_japan_e.html; While no substantiating evidence exists to support the claim, one respondent with knowledge of the July flights says that while the government told the Japanese public it was humanitarian assistance, “actually the material was all US military goods.” Anonymous, Interview. 44 Daily Yomiuri , June 29, 2003. 213

US abandonment. There is no evidence that ASDF dispatch materialized because of

abandonment fears.

Anti-Militarist Norms : Had the Pure Variant logic guided the outcome, we would

expect dispatch to be explained by the weakness of such norms. Because the government decision-makers, coalition and DPJ lawmakers supported dispatch out of the desire for

Japan to play a responsible role as a member of international society, there is evidence to

support the logic that there was a decreased aversion to using the SDF as an instrument of

foreign policy. Because no polls were taken of the public’s views, we are unable to make

a wider statement about society as a whole. Had the logic of the Nuanced Variant guided

the outcome, we would expect support for the dispatches under the condition that they do

not transgress the use of force. Given that they were purely for humanitarian purposes,

the logic does explain the outcome.

Leadership : Had the logic of the leadership argument guided the outcome, we

would expect ASDF dispatch to be explained by either an institutionally strong Kantei

(Institutional Variant) or by a premier who signaled his desire to dispatch (Desire

Variant). Based on the evidence, neither the Kantei nor the premier had anything to do

with the formulation of these policies. It was MOFA and JDA. Because all bureaucrats

and lawmakers, including the DPJ, supported ASDF dispatch for humanitarian purposes,

it is unclear how necessary Koizumi’s signaling would be to explain the outcome. On the

contrary, dispatch was an over-determined outcome given the overwhelming support.

Even the DPJ supported it. Even if a premier had opposed, it is likely that pressure from the system would have isolated him into support. And precisely because there was no opposition, it is unclear how necessary the strength of the Kantei is to explain the

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outcome since it was only utilized to approve the dispatches. Here again, given that the proposal was supported by every actor, no potential veto players exercised their veto power, making Kantei power insignificant to the outcome.

The Iraq Special Measures Bill The government’s effort to pass the Iraq Special Measures Law represents Diet

legislation that succeeded. It succeeded for two reasons. First, government bureaucrats

and ruling party lawmakers shared the same belief prioritizing the importance of Japan

fulfilling its international obligations. This meant those in charge of formulating policies

were united in support of SDF as a policy preference. Second, although the DPJ did not

initially oppose, once it did it was not able to exercise veto power because there were no

divisions amongst decision-makers that it could exploit to enflame opposition from

within government. At the same time, because its message did not resonate with the

public, it could not enflame external opposition.

Unlike 1990, the attack on Iraq did not surprise decision-makers because of the

discussions over Iraqi WMDs. The months prior to March 2003 were “sort of preparation

time” for a possible war in Iraq and for exploring possible options that Japan wanted to

pursue. 45 Japanese decision-makers believed that Iraq had WMDs and Japan, being a

member of international society, needed to respond to the threat of WMDs. 46 Koizumi

explains, “…Iraq breached a number of UN resolutions over the past 12 years. We would

be faced with a dangerous situation if a dangerous dictator possesses WMDs. It is not

someone else’s affair.” 47 WMDs were thus an issue that the international community had

45 Noriyuki Shikata, Interview, August 17, 2006. 46 Asahi Shimbun interview with , March 5, 2003, 4. 47 Japan Times , March 24, 2003. See ‘Cabinetto’ Henshuu-bu (2006, 189-90) for a strong argument by Koizumi concerning the WMD threat on March 13, 2003. 215

to stand unified against to ensure their eradication in Iraq. 48 At a March twentieth press conference, PM Koizumi explained that WMDs threaten not just Japanese or Americans, but all the people of the world and how to eliminate the threat posed by them has been

“an important objective for international society.” 49 But Japan also faced its own WMD threat in Northeast Asia. As evident in Koizumi’s answer to DPJ lawmaker Masayuki

Naoshima in the Upper House Budget Committee on March fifth, the government was fearful of North Korean nuclear weapons. 50 Both North Korean WMDs and Iraqi WMDs posed a danger to Japan and international society. 51 For Japan to act as a responsible member of international society, it therefore needed to support efforts in Iraq and reconstruction efforts after any possible war.

Different from 1990, decision-makers supported involvement whole-heartedly because they shared beliefs. MOFA decision-makers thought “from the beginning that

[Japan] will be involved in the conflict” 52 because of “the importance of Japan being able to physically assist in the reconstruction of Iraq.” 53 This was, according to Foreign

Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, because of the importance of the international community

48 MOFA decision-makers had been pushing their US counterparts for months about avoiding a unilateral path and to stay within the UN framework. In early February 2003, Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi pressed Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to pursue a new resolution against Iraq. On February 24, 2003, the US, UK, and Spain introduced a new resolution proposal that stated “Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it by Resolution 1441” (see: www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/res-iraq-24feb03- en.pdf). Japan, represented by Ambassador Koichi Haraguchi, backed the draft and throughout all of February made efforts to pass the resolution while other countries called for continued and intensified UN weapons inspections. PM Koizumi, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, UN Ambassador Haraguchi, and a handful of special envoys dispatched by Koizumi made concerted diplomatic efforts to get non-permanent members of the Security Council to back the resolution. It failed. Japan also backed another proposal submitted on March 7 that set March 17 as the deadline by which Iraq had to demonstrate cooperation with disarmament under previous resolutions (www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/res-iraq-07mar03-en-rev.pdf). 49 Koizumi Soridaijin kishakaiken, “Iraku mondai ni kansuru taiou ni tsuite,” March 20, 2003, www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/03/20kaiken.html 50 See kokkai.ndl.go.jp 51 See Koizumi’s responses to DPJ head Naoto Kan at a Lower House Budget Committee on February 6, 2003: kokkai.ndl.go.jp. 52 MOFA official, Interview, July 28, 2006. 53 Noriyuki Shikata, Interview, June 6, 2006. 216

uniting and working together to help Iraq. 54 JDA officials agreed. Defense Bureau

Director Takemasa Moriya summarizes the belief amongst JDA officials as, “Japanese should not just be thinking about our own country…the international community should work towards reconstruction in Iraq.” 55 The same was found with SDF officers. Former

Chief of Staff of the MSDF Koichi Furusho argues it was in Japan’s national interest to participate because “the UN passed a resolution and the whole world was going in that direction having the same idea that the stability in the Middle East would lead to stability of the world.” 56 Importantly, this view was shared by Kantei officials, captured not only by CCS Fukuda’s belief that “Japan cannot sit on the sidelines alone” 57 but by the premier who, at his press conference on March twentieth, stated that cooperating with international society “as one member of international society, Japan has to bear responsibility” for the reconstruction of Iraq. 58 He repeated this message at a March twenty-eighth Upper House Budget Committee, stating that Japan needs to support reconstruction because “Japan needs to bear responsibility as a member of international society.” 59 Months later, he was clearer, stating “Japan prospered by getting help from many countries in the past, and now we need to consider what we can do to help rebuild

Iraq when other countries in the world are trying to offer assistance.” 60 In sharp contrast

54 Herald Asahi , March 25, 2003 55 Takemasa Moriya, Interview, December 13, 2006. 56 Koichi Furusho, Interview, September 28, 2006. 57 Herald Asahi , June 10, 2003. 58 Koizumi Soridaijin kishakaiken, “Iraku mondai ni kansuru taiou ni tsuite,” March 20, 2003, www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/03/20kaiken.html ; Koizumi was just as vocal in stating the US- Japan alliance as part of his dual track reasoning. He maintained a consistent message of “US-Japan alliance” and “international cooperation” that together drive his support. Out of all the decision-makers, Koizumi was the most vocal in elevating the alliance to an equal status as international cooperation as a reason for wanting to get involved. Koizumi’s legislative assistant, Isao Iijima says that Koizumi fully supported doing whatever Japan could do for Iraq based on the alliance as his guidance. Isao Iijima, Interview, December 26, 2006. 59 See kokkai.ndl.go.jp 60 Japan Times , June 6, 2003, 1, 3. 217

to 1990, there was widespread belief that as a member of international society, Japan had

international obligations it had to fulfill. In other words, it had to ‘sweat.’

But how was it to ‘sweat?’ Decision-makers supported SDF dispatch. Despite the

split in international society, there was widespread agreement that Japan “should make a

visible, substantial international contribution” because “Japan cannot just disperse

money, it should also contribute people.” 61 Because people “see countries by seeing their

militaries,”62 decision-makers felt that “if we can’t send the SDF, then we can’t make an

international contribution.” 63 It is understandable if SDF and JDA decision-makers held

this belief. Former MSDF Chief of Staff Koichi Furusho states, “the military has begun to

be used by other states. So it is natural that like other countries, for Japan as a country, I

think it is best for Japan to use the SDF as the national public asset in similar ways as

other countries are using their own military.” 64 This sentiment was shared amongst

MOFA decision-makers as well. Former Foreign Minister states that “MOFA thought that sending SDF was inevitable and necessary.” 65 Importantly, this prioritizing of SDF dispatch ran all the way to the top. CCS says “we didn’t have a choice not to send the SDF.” 66 According to Hitoshi Tanaka, PM Koizumi

“from the very beginning…had the dispatch of SDF in his mind.” 67 At a speech in

December 2003, Koizumi traces his judgment for SDF dispatch.

I think it is not the condition where Japan can only provide money. As one member of international society, in order to construct an environment for Iraqis to hope and make efforts to rebuild their own country, I judged it was necessary for

61 Anonymous, Interview. 62 Kohei Masuda, Interview, October 16, 2006. 63 Anonymous, Interview. 64 Koichi Furusho, Interview, September 28, 2006. 65 Nobutaka Machimura, Interview, August 9, 2006. 66 Yasuo Fukuda, Interview, January 9, 2007. 67 Hitoshi Tanaka, Interview, September 5, 2006. 218

Japan to bear the responsibility by not only financial support, but material support and human support, including the SDF. 68

Understanding that Japan was barraged with requests from the US in 1990, it is reasonable to ask whether decision-makers’ unanimity for SDF dispatch was the result of similar pressure. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage did meet Japanese officials in 2002 asking for support if the US attacks. 69 But Armitage counters that he “didn’t [go] to ask Japan to do something specifically on Iraq.” 70 When requests occurred, they were vague. In April 2003, a high-ranking US official requested “boots on the ground.” 71 On

June tenth, Armitage was quoted as saying that during the Gulf War, Japan paid to watch baseball from the stands but with Iraq, “I’m hoping [Japan] will decide to get out of the stands and onto the playing field.” 72 These were not specific requests. Importantly, even prior to these and America’s first formal request for support and cooperation (if it attacks

Iraq) on November twentieth, 73 Japanese decision-makers had already been considering support measures for months. These were shown to Armitage when he visited Japan on

December eighth and explained to the US at the 2+2 meeting held in D.C. on December sixteenth. 74 And even when Armitage specifically requested minesweepers in early April

68 ‘Cabinetto’ Henshuu-bu, 2006, 198. 69 It appears Armitage met with Secretaries General of the coalition parties on August 26, 2002 and was accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly in a meeting with MOFA Vice Minister Yukio Takeuchi and North American Affairs Bureau DG Ichiro Fujisaki on August 28, 2002. Other meetings described in the text. 70 Jiji Press Ticker Service, “Japan, U.S. Agree on Int’l Unity in Handling Iraq,” August 28, 2002. 71 Morimoto, 2004 (279) and Kakitani and Kikuchi, 2005 (12). See also Asahi Shimbun , June 7, 2003, 2; June 8, 2003, 4. A June 25 article says Paul Wolfowitz made the infamous request was Paul Wolfowitz. Asahi Shimbun , June 25, 2003, 1. Asahi Shimbun Jieitai 50 Nen Shuzai Han’ says it was Richard Lawless (2005, 70). After 9/11 and America’s commitment to Afghanistan began, Armitage is reported to have requested Japan to “show the flag.” 72 Herald Asahi , June 13, 2003. 73 Daily Yomiuri , November 22, 2002 According to the report, the US government officially asked Japan to announce its support for US military action against Iraq, study ways in which the nation could support US military operations against Iraq, and study possible diplomatic roles following an attack on Iraq, including assistance to rebuild Iraq. All of these had been under consideration prior to the request. 74 Shuugiin Chousakyoku Gaimu Chousashitsu, 2003, 35. 219

2003, Japanese decision-makers had already considered and dropped this option

(below). 75 There is little evidence that Japan’s policies were because of US pressure.

Understanding that Japanese decision-makers shared the same belief in Japan fulfilling its international obligations, it is necessary to go back and trace the policy process for the legislation to see how the shared belief interacted with the opposition

DPJ. While MOFA’s Middle East and African Affairs Bureau DG Hiroyasu Ando and

JDA’s Defense Bureau Director Takemasa Moriya say internal MOFA/JDA considerations of Japanese measures for a possible US strike on Iraq began right after

September eleventh, 76 it is unclear how concrete these were. Substantiated by a large number of bureaucrats in MOFA and JDA is considerations began from July/August

2002 when the US became more vocal about an Iraqi threat.

From July/August 2002, decision-makers in MOFA and JDA began deliberating possible response policies in the event of war. 77 Because they believed that it was necessary for Japan to make a meaningful contribution as a responsible member of international society, they supported the inclusion of SDF in policy proposals. This meant they did not have the tortuous debates that occurred in October 1990. In MOFA, considerations were led by DG Tsuneo Nishida’s Foreign Policy Bureau with a lot of the burden on the National Security Policy Division Director Koji Tomita and Deputy

Director Kimitake Nakamura. In the JDA, it was led by DG Takemasa Moriya’s Defense

Policy Bureau with the burden on Defense Policy Division Director Nobushige

Takamizawa and Deputy Director Manabu Mannami as well as Operations Bureau DG

75 Japan Times , April 5, 2003. 76 Takemasa Moriya, Interview, December 13, 2006; Hiroyasu Ando, Interview, December 20, 2006. 77 This is also substantiated by media reports about MOFA and JDA officials secretly discussing possible measures. See BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Japan Considering Logistical Support for US Attack on Iraq,” July 12, 2002. 220

Tetsuya Nishikawa, Deputy Director Koichiro Nakajima and the Staff Offices of each of

the SDF branches. 78 Frequent consultation with the CLB also took place. Contrary to

1990, both inner- and inter-MOFA and JDA deliberations were remarkable for their lack of conflict.

United in their beliefs, JDA and MOFA decision-makers considered both indirect and direct support policies. 79 Indirect support was a leading option because it was deemed

too difficult to provide direct cooperation to potential US military activities. 80 This was

because they thought it would take a lot of time to pass a new law to enable direct

cooperation, public opinion was opposed to a potential war, and members of Komeito

were cautious about legislation that would enable the SDF to be dispatched to support a

US attack. 81 So decision-makers, mostly JDA, pushed for indirect support. This consisted

of strengthening Japanese support in Afghanistan to free-up American and British forces

that could be redeployed to Iraq.

One idea of indirect support was to continue refueling operations of US vessels in

the Indian Ocean under the condition that the US pledge not to use the fuel for military

operations in Iraq. These operations were scheduled to expire in November 2002. As part

of this idea, JDA decision-makers pushed for the dispatch of Aegis destroyers and P-3C

patrol aircraft to the Indian Ocean. 82 This would include expanding the list of target

countries that the MSDF could refuel. Another idea, said to be that of Defense Policy

78 Noboru Yamaguchi, Interview, October 2, 2006; Takemasa Moriya, Interview, December 13, 2006; 2 Anonymous, Interview. 79 Japan Economic Newswire , July 12, 2002. 80 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , November 7, 2002, p.2 81 Daily Yomiuri , August 29, 2002. 82 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , November 7, 2002, 2. The law allowed up to five vessels to be engaged in the logistic support operations-2 supply ships and 3 destroyers. Sending Aegis ships would not require altering the law. The ASDF was using C-130s and U-4s. MSDF officers fully supported sending Aegis and P-3C because they would enhance the protection of MSDF vessels operating in the area. 221

Director Takemasa Moriya, was to revise the Anti-Terror Law so as to expand the SDF’s rear-area support activities to enable them to take on transportation duties in

Afghanistan. 83 While sending the GSDF to Afghanistan never materialized, the extension of the Anti-Terror Law did on November nineteenth and the dispatch of the 7,250 ton

Kirishima Aegis destroyer occurred on December sixteenth, thereby lowering patrol burdens placed on US and British naval forces during refueling operations. Additionally, on February twenty-eighth 2003, the scope of MSDF refueling operations was expanded beyond non-US and British vessels to include German, French, and New Zealand vessels. 84

Despite success with indirect support, MOFA and the JDA decision-makers came back to direct support because they knew indirect support did not provide the visible support that was necessary to demonstrate Japan’s contribution. One option, which

MOFA decision-makers advocated, was to do as much as possible under the UN

Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Law. This led to the quick dispatch of ASDF planes in March (above). But because the Law required host country agreement (and no government existed in Iraq) and the fact that security in Iraq was being maintained by multinational forces (i.e. not a UN PKO), it was inapplicable for dispatching the SDF to

Iraq. So consideration was given to what, if anything, the SDF could do under the 2001

Anti-Terror Special Measures Law. But because the Law was confined to operations involving Al Qaeda, and because the government did not think there was a direct link between Iraq and Al Qaeda (stated by Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi at a

83 Japan Economic Newswire , “Gov’t eyes steps to support U.S. attack on Iraq,” September 15, 2002; An article in Asahi supports this report. See Asahi Shimbun , September 10, 2002. 84 This was expanded on March 11 to include Italy, Holland, and Spain. See footnote 76 in Shuugiin Chousakyoku Gaimu Chousashitsu, 2003, 36. 222

November seventh Upper House Foreign Affairs-Security Committee), 85 this Law too

was inapplicable. The only option left to MOFA and JDA decision-makers was to

introduce new legislation that would enable the SDF to go to Iraq. But the big question,

at least in MOFA, was whether “it was going to be combat operations, or humanitarian

and reconstruction?” 86 Knowing that combat operations was constitutionally impossible, the focus became reconstruction and rear-area logistical support. Specifically, MOFA decision-makers wanted to send both the GSDF and ASDF to Iraq, with the GSDF dispatched first. 87 The idea hit an unexpected obstacle because decision-makers had to answer the question “what kind of support [was Japan] going to send. GSDF or not?” 88

Unlike the ASDF and MSDF which had experience with overseas operations,

GSDF did not. And it was this lack of experience coupled with a possible operation in a

hostile and unstable environment that made the GSDF reluctant to go to Iraq. 89 Because

they train for self-defense, they thought “Why tomorrow do I have to go to Iraq?”90 The

GSDF even went so far as creating a list of the reasons why they could not be dispatched

to Iraq. 91 The bottom line was, because of the risk of GSDF personnel lives, they were

“both nervous and hesitant.” 92 This is where the political direction of PM Koizumi

became important. Without his “strong policy direction” and explanation of “the reason,

the terms and conditions and what [the GSDF] should do, and what can [the GSDF]

85 See: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 86 Anonymous, Interview. 87 MOFA Official, Interview. 88 MOFA Official, Interview, August 23, 2006. 89 Akihisa Nagashima, Interview, June 8, 2006; Three Anonymous, Interviews. 90 Anonymous, Interview. 91 Anonymous, Interview. 92 Anonymous, Interview. 223

do…there [would be] no volunteer from the GSDF.” 93 Until Koizumi’s clear political will delivered on March twentieth, the issue was not resolved.

United in their beliefs, although the 2001 Anti-Terror Special Measures Law was inapplicable for dispatching the SDF to Iraq, MOFA and JDA decision-makers used it as a template in their considerations throughout fall 2002 (in turn, the 2001 Law was based on the laws relating to the Defense Guidelines). Lieutenant General Noboru Yamaguchi explains why the legislation pertaining to Iraq was based on these past laws, “all the parts-doing logistical support, non-combat areas, humanitarian relief, and the reconstruction things-all the parts were included in the Guideline related laws.” 94 Because potential issues in the new legislation were already vented and cleared by the CLB in previous deliberations, the CLB “was not asked to make any judgments” 95 and therefore had no cause to exercise its veto power. Instead, according to CLB DG Osamu Akiyama,

“MOFA was responsible for making the judgment” about whether the proposed law had any constitutional problems. 96

These efforts throughout the fall by MOFA and JDA decision-makers to formulate SDF dispatch measures were not unknown to the Kantei. Similar to 1990,

MOFA and JDA officials occupied key posts (Assistant CCS) in the Cabinet Secretariat, albeit the names had changed. Working under DCCS-Adm. Teijiro Furukawa, the

Assistant CCS responsible for security issues was Keiji Omori (JDA) and the Assistant

CCS responsible for foreign affairs was Shotaro Yachi (MOFA). The passage of UN

Resolution 1441 on November eighth gave Iraq a final chance to dismantle its WMDs or

93 Anonymous, Interview. 94 Noboru Yamaguchi, Interview, October 2, 2006. 95 Osamu Akiyama, Interview, December 20, 2006. 96 Ibid . 224

face “serious consequences” under Article VII of the UN Charter. 97 Coupled with the US

mid-year elections on November fifth, MOFA and JDA decision-makers assumed that

America would shift its focus to Iraq, thereby increasing the possibility of war. It was at

this point that considerations of measures and a possibly new law began in the Kantei. 98

DCCS-Adm. Furukawa ordered Omori to secretly consider what Japan could do in the event the US attacked Iraq, “even…when the PM had not yet given the green light.” 99

Omori assembled a team under him of bureaucrats seconded from MOFA and the

JDA. The team was led by Kohei Masuda (JDA) who worked closely with Councilor ( 参

事官) Yasushi Masaki (MOFA). Like Omori and Yachi, these two officials kept in regular and close communications with their ministry/agency of origin. Masuda acted as a coordinator of the team’s activities while the real work occurred under Masaki. In addition to Masuda and Masaki, the group consisted of about ten officials seconded from

MOFA and the JDA, including Hideshi Tokuchi, Tetsuro Kuroe (successor to Tokuchi), and Mikito Tomiyama.100 These members too worked in close cooperation with (MOFA)

Foreign Policy Bureau DG Tsuneo Nishida, National Security Policy Division Director

Koji Tomita, Deputy Director Kimitake Nakamura, (JDA) Defense Bureau DG Takemasa

Moriya, Defense Policy Division Director Nobushige Takamizawa, and Deputy Director

97 Resolution found at: daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement 98 Interview with Kohei Masuda, October 16, 2006; Supported by Nihon Keizai Shimbun , November 7, 2003, 2. 99 Anonymous, Interview. 100 The Deputy Directors studied compatibility with past laws and government positions, wrote the legalities of the new bill, and structured the bill. They answer to Directors, who are responsible for the general ideas and outline of the bill. They also coordinate with other ministries, acting largely as managers. The Director Generals are the ones who initiate the study, telling their Directors to begin work on a bill. They are also responsible for overall strategy and communicating with political leadership, including the PM and top executives of the ruling parties. 225

Manabu Mannami. Additionally, the team relied on the Plans and Program Division of

the Staff Office of the SDF for designing a basic dispatch outline. 101

Drawing off the work done by MOFA and JDA, by the beginning of December

2002, Omori’s team had created three general categorizations of SDF support

measures. 102 Categorized as ‘before an attack,’ ‘after the start of the attack,’ and ‘after the

conclusion of the attack,’ these measures were based on the ‘indirect support’ and ‘direct

support’ measures that MOFA and JDA officials had been pursuing since August.

• Before an attack measures : 1) dispatch Aegis ships under the Terror Special Measures Law with the duty to strengthen the collection of information in the Indian Ocean; and 2) expand the target countries receiving fuel (As noted above, this was soon implemented) • After the start of the attack measures : 1) refugee support under the PKO Law to transport goods and doctors to refugees flowing into countries surrounding Iraq; 2) dispatch patrol ships to conduct maritime patrol operations ( 海上警備行動) based on Article 82 of the SDF Law to protect Japanese tankers in the Gulf; and 3) dispatch transport planes to rescue Japanese nationals living in the countries surrounding Iraq based on Article 100.8 of the SDF Law • After the conclusion of the attack measures : 1) reconstruction support based on the PKO Law (if UN PKO is implemented) or a new law to enable cooperation with multinational forces; 2) refugee support based on PKO Law or a new law to dispatch inside Iraq; and 3) dispatching minesweepers to Persian Gulf based on SDF Law Article 99.

On December twenty-first, they also began considering sending GSDF (along with

private sector experts) under a new law to handle the cleanup of WMDs (not nuclear)

found in Iraq. 103 With the strong possibility that the US would attack Iraq without a new

UN resolution, decision-makers began to further differentiate ‘wartime’ and ‘after the

conclusion of the war’ options between those possible if the US unilaterally attacked or if

an attack was based on a new resolution. Based on this thinking, by the end of January,

decision-makers were able to create a more specific list of measures that were possible

101 Anonymous, Interview. 102 Shuugiin Chousakyoku Gaimu Chousashitsu, 2003, 35. 103 Mainichi Shimbun , December 22, 2002, 1. 226

Table 5.1: Support Measures Support Measures Unilateral US Use of Force Based on Attack Security Council Resolution Rear area support (transport of No No materials or supply fuel to front lines) During War Humanitarian support (tents, food, Yes Yes water) Reconstruction support by SDF No Possible 1) Repair of roads, facilities 2) Provide materials to US military 3) Handle of WMDs Participation in security maintenance No Possible troops Humanitarian Support Yes Yes After ODA assistance to surrounding Yes Yes Conclusion countries of War Dispatch patrol boats to protect Possible Yes Japanese tankers Dispatch minesweepers to Persian Gulf No Possible to clear mines Dispatch transport planes to protect Yes Yes Japanese living overseas Host an Iraq Reconstruction Support Possible Yes Conference depending on the situation at the time of the attack (Table 5.1).104 Because more limitations existed on measures if America unilaterally attacked, decision-makers pressed

America hard for a new resolution authorizing the use of force.

The Action Plan that was the basis for the March ASDF dispatch (above) did not provide the basis for dispatching the SDF to Iraq itself. Instead, as shown above, decision-makers had been simultaneously considering other SDF options for months, some which required a new law. As the possibility for war increased at the end of 2002 and after efforts moved into the Kantei, concrete consideration of new legislation began. 105 Like the decision-makers in MOFA and JDA, decision-makers in Omori’s team believed in the importance of Japan fulfilling its international obligations. “If America

104 Shuugiin Chousakyoku Gaimu Chousashitsu, 2003, 38. 105 Mainichi Shimbun , January 1, 2003, 1; Satoshi Morimoto says that considerations of a new law began at the beginning of December. See Morimoto, 2004, 261. 227

attacks Iraq, Japan can’t do nothing. If we do something, what should we do? If we don’t have a law, it probably can’t happen…So [a new law] was considered.” 106

While considerations proceeded under the assumption that Iraqi reconstruction would not be under the mantel of a UN PKO, 107 these decision-makers knew they could only do substantial support with a UN Resolution. Therefore, MOFA decision-makers pushed America for a UN resolution related to Iraqi reconstruction 108 and Omori’s team proceeded under the assumption of a new UN Resolution. 109 Initial considerations involved answering the questions: What is the precise sort of concept of the law? What should Japan be doing? Is it going to be a combat action? A humanitarian action? A reconstruction action? And how should the law look like? 110 Satoshi Morimoto argues the structure the new law took at this stage had three forms: 1) A Second Anti-Terror Special

Measures Law (indirect support of Iraqi activities via increasing/expanding operations in

Afghanistan), 2) An Iraq Special Measures Law (postwar reconstruction support and rear area support in the event of an attack on Iraq), and 3) Reconstruction Support New Law

(participate in postwar security activities). 111

106 Anonymous, Interview. 107 Morimoto, 2004, 261. 108 As early as February 2003, Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi proposed a new UN Resolution for post-Hussein Iraq humanitarian support and reconstruction under UN auspices ( Asahi Shimbun , March 8, 2003, 2; August 7, 2003, 3). He took this idea to Washington where MOFA and US officials began discussions over details of a postwar reconstruction resolution. He reiterated the need for this resolution on March seventeenth ( Asahi Shimbun , March 18, 2003, 4). The proposal, begun in 2002 by MOFA officials, included humanitarian aid activities, reformation of an Iraqi government, and other postwar reconstruction areas all under the auspices of the U.N. ( Herald Asahi , March 11, 2003). MOFA’s efforts found widespread support throughout the government, especially amongst LDP members (www.jimin.jp/jimin/daily/03_05/08/150508a.shtml). After the war began, the Secretaries General of the LDP and Komeito advocated the need for a new UN Resolution on a March twenty-third NHK talk show. By May eighth, there were strong voices advocating the need for a resolution from within the LDP (www.jimin.jp/jimin/daily/03_05/08/150508a.shtml). Even DPJ Secretary General announced that if a new resolution was adopted, Japan should cooperate in rebuilding Iraq ( Japan Times , March 24, 2003). 109 Mainichi Shimbun , January 1, 2003, 1; Asahi Shimbun , March 26, 2003, 2. 110 Hitoshi Tanaka, Interview, September 5, 2006. 111 Morimoto, 2004, 261. 228

Option 2 became the leading option. Because the indirect activities under Option

1 were already being pursued, and decision-makers never thought that indirect support

alone would be sufficient ‘sweat,’ this never became an attractive option. Similarly,

although decision-makers believed that war was going to be short, they thought it would

be difficult to obtain public understanding of supporting the US military during a combat

situation in Iraq, so the idea of participating in security maintenance activities in Option 3

died. Remaining was the option to focus on postwar activities. By late January, efforts in

Omori’s team were focused solely on postwar reconstruction support. 112 This included using the GSDF to dispose of WMDs in Iraq as well as rebuild and repair infrastructure. 113 By March twentieth, these ideas were incorporated into ‘measures that would be considered next’ in a more fleshed-out version of the Action Plan that was approved at the Cabinet meeting. Specifically, the handling of chemical WMDs in Iraq, handling of abandoned mines in the water, and reconstruction support (repairing roads and bridges) and humanitarian measures (medicine, food, etc) in Iraq.114 Although not included in the Action Plan, rear-area support activities for multinational forces conducting security operations in Iraq (transportation of materials, supplying water, food, and fuel, medical support, communications support) were also considered.115 The envisioned law would be temporary, similar to the 2001 Anti-Terror Special Measures

Law. 116 Knowing that SDF dispatch to assist in postwar reconstruction efforts would lack a sound legal basis if a new UN Resolution dealing with reconstruction was not passed,

112 Herald Asahi , January 30, 2003. 113 BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific , “Japan mulls deployment of troops in “post-Saddam” Iraq” December 5, 2002; Jiji Press Ticker Service , “Japan Mulling Aid Linked to Possible War Against Iraq,” December 7, 2002. 114 Kantei, Iraku mondai ni kansuru taisho houshin, kakugi kettei , March 20, 2003 at www.mmz.kantei.go.jp/k/iraq/mm/20_2.html 115 Nihon Keizai Shimbun , March 20, 2003, Evening edition, 4; Daily Yomiuri , March 20, 2003, 2. 116 Daily Yomiuri , March 20, 2003, 2. 229

considerations proceeded under the assumption of a new resolution 117 and MOFA making

diplomatic efforts toward the adoption of a new resolution.

Because both the DPJ and the public were against the war and Koizumi’s support of it,

decision-makers hoped that a new UN Resolution would make Diet deliberations go

smoothly and help with obtaining popular understanding. The DPJ opposed the war

because it believed the US attack violated the UN Charter and international law. 118 This

was based on its belief in the importance of peaceful resolution of problems without the

use of force 119 and its constant striving for a peaceful resolution of Iraq’s WMD problem

centered on the UN. 120 It also added that Koizumi’s support was “problematic from the

standpoint of national interests and an act that deviates from international cooperation-

ism and UN-centrism, which are the ideals of Japan’s constitution.” 121 The party’s

Table 5.2 (Asahi): Support-Opposition to US Attack on Iraq 122 Support Oppose September 2002 14% 77% December 2002 26% 65% January 2003 20% 69% February 2003 17% 78% March 2003 31% 59% April 2003 29% 63% June 2003 22% 67%

request was for Japan to withdraw its support of the US and push for a “peaceful solution

to the crisis through UN-centered international cooperation.” 123 Like the DPJ, the public

opposed the war (Table 5.2). Asahi recorded opposition to the war increase from 59% to

117 Daily Yomiuri , March 20, 2003, 2. 118 DPJ, Tai Iraku buryoku koushi ni kansuru kangaekata , March 20, 2003; Buryoku kougeki ni kougi shi, heiwateki kaiketsu no michi ni tachimodoru you motomeru , March 20, 2003. 119 DPJ, Tai Iraku buryoku koushi ni kansuru kangaekata , March 20, 2003. 120 DPJ, Tai Iraku buryoku koushi ni kansuru kangaekata , March 20, 2003; Buryoku kougeki ni kougi shi, heiwateki kaiketsu no michi ni tachimodoru you motomeru , March 20, 2003. 121 DPJ, Tai Iraku buryoku koushi ni kansuru kangaekata , March 20, 2003. 122 Data from Asahi Soken Report , May 2003, No. 161, 162; June 2003, No. 162, 5, 12, 30; Asahi Shimbun , December 16, 2002, 1; January 27, 2003, 3; June 30, 2003, 1; July 1, 2003, 4. 123 DPJ, Buryoku kougeki ni kougi shi, heiwateki kaiketsu no michi ni tachimodoru you motomeru , March 20, 2003. 230

65% in less than ten days in March alone (not included). 124 Not only did the public

oppose the war, but Japan cooperating with or supporting the war (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 (Asahi): Support-Opposition of Japan Cooperation/Support of US Attack on Iraq 125 Support Oppose September 2002 69% December 2002 29% 57% January 2003 27% 62% February 2003 37% 52% March 2003 36% 53% April 2003 40% 50% June 2003 36% 50%

The public was vocal in its opposition. Unlike 1990, PM Koizumi faced large

public demonstrations, but they were not the work of the DPJ or encouraged by them.

The demonstrations began in early 2003 when war seemed increasingly likely. Protests

began with a joint march (over 5,000 people) and concert staged by 33 NGOs in Tokyo

on January eighteenth, 126 a 5,000 person anti-war rally on February fifteenth in Miyashita

Park, 127 a 6,000 member rally in Hiroshima on March second, 128 and a 40,000 person rally on March eighth in Hibiya Park (an additional 10,000 peace activists conducted activities in 31 other prefectures). 129 This was followed on March fifteenth by 10,000 protestors in Tokyo’s Hibiya Park, 5,000 in , 4,000 in , 1,000 in Nagoya, and

750 in Fukuoka. 130 On the day before Hussein’s 48-hour deadline, a number of nationwide demonstrations occurred, the largest of which was roughly 10,000 people. 131

This was followed by a 48-hour hungry strike by student groups and labor unions outside

124 Asahi Shimbun , March 22, 2003, 1: Iraq War: Support: 31%; Non-support: 59%; Support for Koizumi’s decision to support war: Support: 39%; Oppose: 50%; Asahi Shimbun , March 31, 2003, 1: Iraq War: Support: 27%; non-support: 65%; Koizumi Support for war: support: 36%; oppose: 53%. 125 Data from Asahi Soken Report , May 2003, No. 161, 162; June 2003, No. 162, 5, 12, 30; Asahi Shim bun , September 4, 2002; December 16, 2002, p. 1; January 27, 2003, p. 3; June 30, 2003, p. 1; July 1, 2003, p. 4. 126 Japan Times , January 19, 2003. 127 Japan Times , March 9, 2003; Herald Asahi , March 20, 2004. 128 Japan Times , March 3, 2003. 129 Japan Times , March 9, 2003; Herald Asahi , March 20, 2004; Herald Asahi , March 11, 2003. 130 Herald Asahi , March 17, 2003. 131 Asahi Shimbun , March 16, 2003, 38 (Hibiya Park (Tokyo): 10,000; Osaka: 5,000; Kyoto: 4,000; Nagoya: 1,000; Fukuoka: 750; and Yokota Base (Tokyo): 30. 231

the US Embassy and a rare public outcry by famous Japanese over Bush’s ultimatum and

Koizumi’s support of it. 132 Additionally, there was a constant flow of resolutions and opinion letters opposing a possible war being passed by prefectures, metropolitan, and local assemblies. 133 Following the outbreak of the war, more protests occurred in front of the US Embassy and the A-Bomb memorial in Hiroshima. Other protests occurred in

Tokyo on March twenty-first, with more than 1,000 people protesting in Miyashita

Park 134 and over 50,000 people attending a peace rally in Minato Ward. 135 This was followed the next day by a demonstration of over 3,000 people in Miyashita Park. 136 On

April fifth, 18,000 rallied against the war in Yoyogi Park and on April nineteenth,

another 18,000 rallied against the war at Public Hall. 137

Despite DPJ opposition and the public’s strong opposition, Ass.CCS Omori and

his team of MOFA and JDA decision-makers continued to work on legislation.

According to CCS Yasuo Fukuda who oversaw these efforts, the opposition meant “we

could not proceed with policy making openly. We had to do it secretively, so it was

extremely difficult.” 138 This was because the government wanted to pass Contingency

Bills ( 有事法案) and if news that the government also wanted to pass SDF-enabling

legislation, it was feared that opposition could torpedo efforts at passing the Contingency

Bills. So Omori’s team worked secretly. Based off the considerations already done in

132 This included Academy Award winning, Grammy winning composer Ryuichi Sakamoto, Akutagawa Literary prize winner Hitonari Tsuji, soccer star Hidetoshi Nakata, and rock star Takuro of the band . 133 Since February 2003, the number of these had reached 516: 26 prefectural assemblies and 490 city, town, or village assemblies. Asahi Shimbun , March 19, 2003, Evening edition, 1. 134 Asahi Shimbun , March 22, 2003, 37. 135 Herald Asahi , March 22, 2003. 136 Asahi Shimbun , March 23, 2003, 38. 137 Herald Asahi , March 20, 2004. 138 Yasuo Fukuda, Interview, January 9, 2007. 232

MOFA and the JDA, they moved to decide how Japan could contribute specifically to the

operations. 139 By April ninth, these considerations became more specific.

SDF dispatch continued to be the base-line in considerations amongst these

decision-makers. While the idea of dispatching the SDF to conduct reconstruction

support, rear-area support for US-forces and handling WMDs remained, the latter

measure was conditioned with the option of dispatching private experts to do the same

duty. 140 Other options had fallen out of consideration by this time, including the

minesweeper option. This was not because of opposition by decision-makers holding

anti-SDF dispatch beliefs, but because they deemed there was no need for them (despite

Richard Armitage requesting them on April third). 141 However, it could have been because some MOFA officials felt that while “The experience in the Gulf War was minesweeping…this is not photogenic. We needed something more tangible.” 142

Unlike 1990-91, although the DPJ knew that legislation was being considered to dispatch the SDF to Iraq, it did not make efforts to oppose. Instead, its position was if

SDF dispatch was considered, “careful consideration is necessary.” 143 Not only did the

DPJ not oppose, but the party did not make extraordinary efforts to raise public opposition against the bill despite the public opposition to the war. With no strong protest from the DPJ or efforts to enflame public opposition, the Omori efforts proceeded unobstructed. These efforts continued into early to mid-May, when Omori’s team created

139 MOFA Official, Interview, July 28, 2006. 140 Asahi Shimbun , April 10, 2003, 5. 141 Asahi Shimbun , April 10, 2003, 5. 142 MOFA Official, Interview, August 23, 2006. 143 DPJ, Tai Iraku fukkou shien oyobi chuutou heiwa ni kansuru genjiten no kangaekata , April 11, 2003. 233

an outline that included three main areas: humanitarian reconstruction support, support

for security maintenance activities, and handling of WMDs. 144

On May twenty-second, Resolution 1483 was adopted by the Security Council,

removing sanctions against Iraq (in place since 1990) and calling on the international

community to help rebuild the country. 145 This was precisely what MOFA had been

making efforts to pass in the UN. The DPJ too welcomed it. 146 The timing could not have

been better. PM Koizumi left for a meeting with President Bush at his Crawford ranch the

same day. En route to America Koizumi told reporters officially for the first time that his

government was considering legislation for the SDF to assist in reconstruction efforts, but

said he would not decide whether a new bill was actually necessary until he spoke to

President Bush. 147 Because Resolution 1483 gave the government the UN basis that it had

sought, Koizumi was able to tell Bush on the twenty-third of his intention to send the

SDF to Iraq under a new law, including logistical support for US forces. In reality,

according to CCS Fukuda, the bill “was already pretty much done.” 148 Given the

pragmatic nature of the DPJ, it withheld opposition because it was “unclear what role was

being envisioned for the SDF.” 149 Instead, it asked to first consider support within

existing laws while cooperating with international society, NGOs, and NPOs and that

careful examination of the “appropriateness and necessity of an [SDF] dispatch” should

be determined. 150

144 Morimoto (2004, 263) argues mid-May while Kakitani and Kikuchi (2005, 14) argue early May. 145 daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement 146 DPJ, Iraku fukkou ni kansuru anpori ketsugi no saitaku wo ukete , May 23, 2003. 147 Herald Asahi , May 24, 2003. 148 Yasuo Fukuda, Interview, January 9, 2007. Fukuda is referring to the fact that by the time he gave the official order on May 30, 2003, the bill had already been completed. 149 DPJ, Nichibei shunou kaigi wo ukete , May 24, 2003. 150 DPJ, Iraku fukkou ni kansuru anpori ketsugi no saitaku wo ukete , May 23, 2003. 234

Upon Koizumi’s return on May twenty-sixth, he met the heads of the ruling parties to begin coordination on Diet submission. With combat over and a UN Resolution in-hand, LDP Secretary General Yamazaki wanted to submit the bill. But because of ongoing concern that introducing it would derail debates in the Upper House on

Contingency Bills, 151 LDP Secretary General of Upper House MPs, , pushed to postpone its introduction. 152 Aoki’s influence prevailed and the coalition Secretaries

General met on May twenty-eighth and agreed to postpone submission. Once again, the

DPJ maintained a non-opposing stance. On June third, DPJ President Kan announced that while the DPJ opposed the war, “it doesn’t mean we will take the position of not being obligated to cooperate in all reconstruction support.” 153 While he did not show opposition to SDF dispatch, he did indicate the party would withhold final judgment while monitoring the security situation in Iraq and waiting to see the contents of the new bill.

By the time the Contingency Legislation passed its Upper House committee on

June fifth, Omori’s team entered final coordination on the legislation. 154 With the

Contingency Legislation passing on the sixth with the support of the DPJ, the ruling parties moved to coordinate the strategy for Diet submission. Again, what was remarkable about the policy making process prior to this point was how unremarkable it was. Contrary to 1990, there were no inner-governmental divisions. As efforts shifted to

Diet submission, conditions were equally different. Unlike 1990 when the LDP knew it faced a charged JSP waiting to attack, because the Contingency Laws passed with DPJ

151 Three bills were included: 1) Bill handling armed attack situation; 2) Revision bill of the SDF Law; and 3) Revision bill for National Security Council Establishment Law. 152 Daily Yomiuri , May 31, 2003. 153 Asahi Shimbun , June 4, 2003, 4. 154 Asahi Shimbun , June 6, 2003, 2. 235

support and DPJ President Naoto Kan remained unclear as to whether the party would

support or oppose the bill, there was hope that the DPJ would support the Iraq bill. 155

The DPJ’s pragmatic approach to handling SDF dispatch clearly differed from the

JSP which was always quick to oppose anything that included the SDF. The reason why has a lot to do with the beliefs of its lawmakers and the resulting split in the party. One group, named after Seiji Maehara, was composed of lawmakers who believed that “for

Japan not to be isolated by international cooperation, like what happened in the 1990

Gulf War, the DPJ [needed] to do some degree of cooperation.” 156 They wanted to support postwar Iraqi reconstruction because it was Japan’s responsibility. 157 This group consisted of former DSP and LDP members. According to Akihisa Nagashima, who puts himself in this group, “we opposed the war but for the aftermath, we have to take care of

Iraqi people and instability and do something to help with this.” 158 Seiji Maehara, says that while he opposed the war, “we had to do something to cooperate” and so suggested that “Japan take responsibility for only transportation by only the ASDF.” 159 The other, larger coalition was composed of former Socialist members who held constitutionalist beliefs. 160 They were of the view that “looking at Japan’s Constitution and the US-Japan

Security Treaty, it is no surprise that SDF dispatch is unconstitutional.” 161 The result of having a party now composed of two coalitions of decision-makers holding different

155 For example, on June 7, 2003, Kan stated at a press conference that he wondered if the SDF dispatch was necessary and possible (in terms of security in Iraq) and after hearing the government’s explanation of these things, he would make his decision. He did not oppose the idea outright. 156 Nobuhiko Suto, Interview, May 25, 2006. 157 According to Akihisa Nagashima, there were about 20+ people at the core of this group. Besides Seiji Maehara it would also include Nagashima himself and . Akihisa Nagashima, Interview, May 31, 2006. 158 Akihisa Nagashima, Interview, May 31, 2006. 159 Seiji Maehara, Interview, November 2006. 160 According to Akihisa Nagashima, this group included Naoto Kan, , and Katsuya Okada. Akihisa Nagashima, Interview, May 31, 2006. 161 Nobuhiko Suto, Interview, May 25, 2006. 236

beliefs, but opposing only for legal reasons, meant that the DPJ no longer opposed SDF

policies in the knee-jerk reaction fashion as the JSP. Instead, the party wanted to

contribute to international efforts, but had legal hurdles that needed to be overcome for

the party to agree.

The last step before Diet submission was obtaining ruling party approval. On June

ninth, Omori presented the bill to the ruling parties’ Liaison Council for Iraq and North

Korean Affairs ( 与党イラク・北朝鮮問題連絡協議会). 162 The bill’s objective was to contribute “to the securing of peace and security in the international community through the reconstruction of Iraq” based on UN Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, 1441, and 1483. 163 The dispatch would be limited to 4 years, though a revision would make it possible to extend. The bill required that the Diet approve SDF dispatch within 20 days of the JDA dispatch order. Additionally, it stipulated the SDF would operate only in “areas where fighting is not under way and is not expected to take place throughout the entire period of activities” (i.e. non-combat zones) and, following the 2001 Antiterrorism Law, their weapons’ use would remain unchanged, “limited in cases of self-defense and defense of other people under their control.” Although the specifics of any mission (size, duration, weaponry, etc) would be described in a Basic Plan that would be created prior to dispatch, the three main specific SDF tasks in the bill were identified.

1) Humanitarian and Reconstruction Support : transport/distribute medicine and daily necessities (food, clothing, etc) and provide

162 Asahi Shimbun , June 10, 2003, 3; Japan Times , June 10, 2003; Daily Yomiuri , June 10, 2003. The bill represented the first time the SDF would be dispatched to a country without receiving that country’s prior consent, simply because no Iraqi government existed. Instead, the bill stated the SDF would operate in Iraq “with the consent of international organizations that govern Iraq in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1483.” 163 Resolution 678: authorized military action against Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait; Resolution 687: demanded that Iraq give up its WMDs; Resolution 1441: warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences if it failed to disarm; Resolution 1483: calls on the international community for support in Iraq regarding humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and maintaining security. 237

humanitarian aid (medical assistance, etc) to the Iraqi people; conduct reconstruction operations of Iraqi infrastructure (power and water facilities, schools, roads, bridges, etc) 2) Logistical : conduct rear-area logistical support (transportation, communications, supplies) for US and British forces which are working to restore and maintain public order 3) WMD Disposal : participate in activities to help collect, store, and dismantle biological, chemical, and other WMDs in Iraq as well as provide supply and transportation support for US and British forces engaged in the same activity.

In terms of what the SDF would transport, the bill stated that the SDF would

transport and supply materials to troops (i.e. medicine, food, water) but not supply

weapons and ammunition or supply fuel for aircraft preparing for combat operations.

This did not mean that transportation of weapons or ammunition was not permissible, it

only meant that the SDF would “ not supply” weapons and ammunition or “ not supply ”

fuel for aircraft preparing for combat. 164 Legally, the bill did not explicitly rule out

‘transportation’ of weapons or ammunition or even foreign soldiers who are carrying

weapons. 165 Although Komeito disapproved because they “judged that it would go

beyond the law,” 166 the duties remained because the activities were limited to non-combat

areas and because it was believed too inefficient to inspect the contents of every container

(unclear whose decision this was). Komeito head Takenori Kanzaki agreed that checking

every piece of cargo for weapons or ammunition was impractical. 167

Similar to the coalition of bureaucrats holding pro-SDF dispatch beliefs, the

dominant belief among lawmakers in the coalition parties was one of pro-SDF dispatch.

164 Japan Times , June 12, 2003. 165 Omori made this point on June tenth at the LDPs joint Cabinet-Defense-Foreign Policy Committee. See Asahi Shimbun , June 11, 2003, 1. The same issue was at stake in the 2001 Anti Terror Special Measures Law. In that case, despite Komeito complaints, the LDP kept the clause in the bill. In the course of Diet debate, the DPJ was adamant on its removal. Eventually, the bill was revised to exclude the transportation of weapons and ammunition and passed. 166 Komeito Lawmaker, Interview, December 6, 2006; Also see Asahi Shimbun , June 11, 2003, 1. 167 Asahi Shimbun , June 18, 2003, 4. 238

These lawmakers believed it was Japan’s duty as a member of international society to

assist in reconstruction. Komeito MP Isamu Ueda argues “…since Japan was a

responsible member of the UN and also a responsible member of the international

community, it was our responsibility that we should cooperate with the international

community.” 168 An LDP lawmaker agreed, arguing that the view in the LDP was one that

since Japan is “…the second largest economy in the world belonging to the freedom

camp, Japan was very much obliged to do something about Iraq, particularly in the field

of humanitarian assistance.” 169

Based on these beliefs, lawmakers felt that the best way for Japan to ‘sweat’ was

through SDF dispatch. The loudest proponent was LDP Secretary General Taku

Yamazaki, who was a strong advocate of using the SDF in postwar reconstruction

support in areas like medicine, transportation, civil engineering, and the handling of

chemical weapons. 170 Yamazaki argued “There is a need to participate in a form that is visible and to show the Japanese flag. There is nothing besides SDF dispatch.” 171 Another

LDP lawmaker agreed, “Even if a few private-sector individuals or government bureaucrats are sent, that act will not be acknowledged by the international community.” 172 In other words, a non-SDF human contribution was not deemed sufficient as ‘sweat.’ Komeito lawmakers agreed. Secretary General Tetsuzo Fuyushiba stated that only the SDF can do the necessary work as well as protect themselves if attacked, dispatches composed of private individuals cannot. 173 Other Komeito members

168 Isamu Ueda, Interview, November 16, 2006. 169 LDP Lawmaker, Interview, December 4, 2006. 170 Asahi Shimbun , March 13, 2003, 4. 171 Asahi Shimbun , May 8, 2003, 3. 172 Quote from LDP executive, Herald Asahi , May 9 2003. 173 Asahi Shimbun , December 4, 2003, 4. 239

shared this view. One Komeito MP argued that “Everyone didn’t like the dictatorship

under Hussein from a humanitarian perspective and had a common view…that we should

all cooperate in providing Iraq reconstruction support. It was natural that Japan dispatch

the SDF.” 174 Similarly, Komeito MP Isamu Ueda states “…it was necessary for all the international community involved, including Japan, to contribute economically for the reconstruction and recovery of the country and of course it was only natural that the SDF would be dispatched to do their duties.” 175 But because there was no “complete ceasefire” and it was “not completely based on international consensus,” Komeito remained “very cautious in dispatching the forces.” 176

Given the dominance of pro-SDF dispatch beliefs amongst lawmakers, the bill was rapidly approved by both the Komeito and Conservative parties (by June twelfth) but ran into difficulties in Koizumi’s own LDP from a minority coalition of lawmakers holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs.177 These included Hiromu Nonaka, former PM Kiichi

Miyazawa, and elder statesman Masaharu Gotoda. 178 Like the anti-SDF dispatch coalition in the DPJ, these lawmakers held strict constitutionalist beliefs. First, Taro Kono questioned whether a distinction could be made between non-combat and combat zones.

Second, given the chaotic situation in Iraq, there were concerns that weapons use standards were too strict. Third, there were concerns the government was rushing without learning all of the facts because it compiled the bill without waiting for its own

174 Komeito Lawmaker, Interview, December 6, 2006. 175 Isamu Ueda, Interview, November 16, 2006. 176 Isamu Ueda, Interview, November 16, 2006. 177 LDP discussions took place in a special Joint Subcommittee of Defense, Foreign Policy, and Cabinet Affairs. 178 Keizo Takemi, Interview, June 28, 2006; Taro Kono, Interview, December 12, 2006; Hiromu Nonaka, Interview, August 7, 2006. 240

Investigatory Team to return from Iraq. 179 Finally, because it was removed from the 2001

Antiterrorism Law, there were calls to remove the transport of weapons and ammunition.180 Because of these issues, which they believed posed constitutional problems, there was hesitance toward accepting the bill, leading to a rare delay in its passage until the next day. But the anti-SDF dispatch coalition could not veto the bill. It passed with conditions on the twelfth. These conditions included exhaustive research of local situation prior to dispatch, prior consultation with the LDP, and sufficient explanations of SDF activities to the public. 181 Additionally, to satisfy those who criticized the distinction between combat and non-combat zones, the Kantei agreed to specify the areas of the SDF activities in an action guideline submitted to the Diet prior to dispatch. 182

With its passage in the PARC, the bill moved to the General Council on June twelfth where again, it encountered opposition from a small coalition of lawmakers holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs. These lawmakers too did not rely on ideological arguments stressing sensitivity to Asian neighbors or concerns about remilitarization.

Instead, they focused on constitutional problems. And this opposition mattered because, in another rare occurrence, the issues that were raised forced the Council to withhold its endorsement. The first issue was the belief by former CCS Hiromu Nonaka that the government compiled the bill without sufficient research on an actual need for SDF. This

179 The government dispatched an Inspection Team composed of MOFA and JDA officials from June 3-11. The team visited Baghdad, Basra, and Umm Qasr Port. 180 The CLB interpretation of the Constitution as prohibiting the SDF from participating in any action that “becomes one with the use of force” motivated these discussions. Because even the provision of drinking water or medicine to foreign military forces deployed in combat areas is interpreted as violating this interpretation, the transportation of weapons/ammunition was seen as falling into this category. To avoid this, transportation of weapons/ammunition was to occur only in non-combat zones. (See Daily Yomiuri , June 13, 2003) 181 Shinoda, 2007, 120. 182 Shinoda, 2006, 79. 241

was because the government’s Investigatory Group that had gone to the region had not yet returned and issued its report. But for Nonaka, based off his experience in WWII, simply “preferred that [the SDF] should not go” because “if we are attacked, Japan has to use force…Accordingly, it will become Japan using force for the first time in the postwar.” 183 The second, more critical, was the questioning of WMD disposal as a duty.

Not only was there concern about the SDF’s capabilities, people like former JDA

Director General Yoshinari Norota argued that since WMDs had not been found in Iraq this should not be included. Hiromu Nonaka and Youichi Tani agreed, pressing for its removal because its inclusion justified the cause of war as stated by the US and UK without proof of their existence. 184 The third issue was the lingering problem of ‘non- combat’ zones and whether they existed. 185 This brought back the PARC concerns about what were seen as strict rules on the use of weapons. 186

On June thirteenth, in another rare occurrence, the General Council amended the

bill because of the problems that were raised by the lawmakers holding anti-SDF dispatch

beliefs. 187 The change was the deletion of SDF duties to dispose of WMDs. 188 With the change, the bill was submitted to an extraordinary Cabinet meeting the same afternoon

183 Hiromu Nonaka, Interview, August 7, 2006. 184 Hiromu Nonaka, Interview, August 7, 2006. Nonaka says that out of the 30 person gathering, they were the only 3 that pressed for this. 185 It was reported that former JDA Director General Yoshinari Norota pushed this point at General Council. 186 Japan Times , June 13, 2003; The weapons use standards were that SDF personnel could use weapons only to defend themselves and those under their protection, thereby preventing them from firing warning shots or using their weapons if their field operations are hindered in some manner. 187 Usually, bills agreed upon at the LDPs PARC are simply agreed upon at the General Council since they were already vetted and amended. 188 CCS Fukuda justified the removal as there was no current UN resolution seeking international support for efforts to dispose of WMDs. But when pressed as to why the government originally included it, he said they were anticipating such work. If the need and request for WMD disposal arises later, JDA Director General Ishiba said that they will consider ways to dispose of WMDs at that time. For an excellent English- language summary of the bill see Japan Times , June 14, 2003, 1-2. 242

where it received Cabinet approval and submitted to the Diet later that day. 189 The bill,

officially named the Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Support Special Measures Bill ( イ

ラク人道復興支援特別措置法案; hereafter Iraq Special Measures Bill) was submitted as follows: 190

1. Objective was “to secure the peace and security in the international community through the reconstruction of Iraq” based on UN Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, 1441, and 1483 2. SDF would operate only in non-combat areas 3. The law was to be limited to 4 years 4. Weapons’ use standards would remain unchanged 5. Diet approval of SDF dispatch required within 20 days of dispatch order 6. The two main SDF tasks included Humanitarian and Reconstruction Support and Rear-Area Logistical Support

Recalling pre-Diet deliberations in October 1990 when bureaucratic decision- makers and LDP lawmakers found themselves divided, the 2003 pre-Diet deliberations are remarkable for the general agreement on the need for Japan to contribute to Iraqi reconstruction and to do so via SDF dispatch. Whereas the most fundamental question in

1990 was whether the SDF could or should be sent overseas based on anti-militarist

beliefs, sensitivity to neighboring Asian states, and strict constitutional beliefs, in 2003

SDF dispatch itself was never seriously questioned, save for the minority of LDP

lawmakers holding constitutional beliefs.

Contrary to 1990 when the bill met immediate opposition by the JSP, in 2003 the

DPJ did not signal opposition. While the JCP, SDP, and LP were unwilling to

compromise on any bill, the DPJ remained cautious. Remaining practical, DPJ President

Kan stated, “I don’t say that (the SDF) should totally refrain from lending a hand in

humanitarian assistance to rebuild Iraq, but I doubt that such a bill is really necessary or

189 It was submitted along with a 2-year extension of the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law. 190 Asahi Shimbun , June 14, 2003, 4. 243

possible.” 191 Additionally, Secretary General Okada questioned the existence of any

specific need for the SDF, but withheld final judgment. 192 The reason for this practical stance was, according to DPJ lawmaker Satsuki Eda, there was a view amongst all DPJ lawmakers that “Japan cannot stand in the back and just pay money; rather, Japan should appropriately sweat and make efforts. The DPJ is not opposed to this…We had done our best at discussing [participating appropriately in collective measures].”193

Despite the DPJ’s initial cautiousness toward the bill, the internal-split dominated by former Socialists eventually led the DPJ’s cautiousness to turn to opposition. The beginning of this turning point came after a DPJ fact-finding mission returned to Iraq on

June ninth and submitted a report of its findings. 194 According to the report, submitted to the party on June eleventh, security conditions remained problematic, it was difficult to identify reconstruction support needs that would be fully welcomed by the Iraqis, and it was difficult to distinguish between combat zones and non-combat zones. 195

Additionally, according to the head of the fact-finding team Yoshinori Suematsu, the DPJ believed SDF dispatch to Iraq would be “a clear violation of our constitution.” 196 The

fundamental conclusion was the party had to carefully consider SDF dispatch. This

‘careful’ stance meant that any hope to participate in reconstruction efforts by the

Maehara Group was beginning to fade simply because they “couldn’t get the majority

within the party to agree.” 197 Instead, movement began on putting together an Iraqi

191 Japan Times , June 8, 2003. 192 Asahi Shimbun , June 11, 2003, 4; Japan Times , June 14, 2003, 1-2. 193 Satsuki Eda, Interview, August 7, 2006. 194 The fact-finding mission was made of up three members: Yoshinori Suematsu, Nobuhiko Suto, and Hideki Wakabayashi. They traveled to Jordan and Baghdad from June second to eighth. 195 DPJ, Minshutou Iraku chousadan houkoku no gairyaku , June 11, 2003. 196 Yoshinori Suematsu, Interview, August 29, 2006. 197 Seiji Maehara, Interview, November 16, 2006. 244

reconstruction support proposal centered on non-SDF support (below). The DPJs ‘Next

Cabinet’ approved the report on the nineteenth.

Unlike the DPJ’s cautiousness, the public opposed. Polls showed initial support

followed by opposition not regained until March 2004 (Table 5.4). But the public did not

oppose SDF dispatch for the same reason as the DPJ’s cautiousness. Whereas the DPJ’s

cautiousness was rooted in its lawmakers’ constitutionalist beliefs, the public opposed

because Iraq was too dangerous. Conversely, similar to decision-makers throughout

government and lawmakers in the coalition parties and the DPJ’s Maehara Group, the

public had a desire to make an international contribution (Table 5.5). Understanding the

Table 5.4 (Asahi): Support-Opposition to SDF Dispatch to Iraq 198 Support Oppose June 2003 46% 43% July 2003 33% 55% August 2003 31% 58% October 2003 32% 55% December 2003 34% 55% January 2004 40% 48% February 2004 44% 48% March 2004 42% 41%

public’s reasons for and against dispatch helps explain why despite a desire for Japan to

be involved in Iraq’s reconstruction, there was opposition to the dispatch (Table 5.6).

Table 5.5 (Asahi): Main Reason for Support-Opposition of SDF Dispatch to Iraq 199 Support (International Oppose (Iraq is Dangerous) Contribution) June 2003 29% 16% July 2003 17% 25% December 2003 20% 26% January 2004 24% 21% March 2004 24% 15%

198 Data from Asahi Shimbun , June 30, 2003, 1; July 1, 2003, 4; July 22, 2003, 1; July 23, 2003, 4; August 25, 2003, 2; October 24, 2003, 4; December 12, 2003, 1; December 13, 2003, 4; January 19, 2004, 1; and March 16, 2004, 1. 199 Data from Asahi Shimbun , June 30, 2003, 1; July 1, 2003, 4; July 22, 2003, 1; July 23, 2003, 4; December 12, 2003, 1; December 13, 2003, 4; January 19, 2004, 1; and March 16, 2004, 1. 245

More importantly, it helps us understand why despite sharing a common opposition to the

war, once the DPJ decided to oppose the bill it could not harness public opposition to

SDF dispatch as the JSP had done. This was because while the DPJ opposed based on

constitutional beliefs, the public wanted to be involved and make an international

contribution but simply opposed because of dangerous conditions. This is different from

1990 when 67% viewed any dispatch as defined by the UN Peace Cooperation Bill to be

200 201 unconstitutional and 78% opposed dispatch even if conditions were attached.

Table 5.6 (Asahi): Should Japan Be Involved in Iraqi Reconstruction? 202 Yes No June 2003 68% 23% August 2003 56% 32% December 2003 64% 28%

Because a lengthy Diet debate was expected, and therefore hard to secure passage

by June eighteenth (scheduled-end to the Diet), Koizumi and Yamazaki coordinated a

Diet extension with the ruling coalition.203 A formal decision on a 40-day extension was made on June sixteenth at a meeting with Koizumi, Komeito head Takenori Kanzaki and

New Conservative head Hiroshi Kumagi.204 The DPJ opposed the extension, but the next day the ruling coalition forced the extension. Angered, the DPJ led the opposition parties in boycotting the Lower House plenary session beginning on the eighteenth. Talks between LDP Diet Affairs Chief and DPJ Diet Affairs Chief

200 Asahi Shimbun , November 6, 1990: Do you think that it overseas dispatch of the SDF that is defined by the UN Peace Cooperation bill, is unconstitutional or not unconstitutional? Unconstitutional: 67% Not unconstitutional: 15% 201 Asahi Shimbun , November 6, 1990: When an international conflict like the Middle East conflict occurs, do you think it is OK to dispatch the SDF even with some kind of conditions attached? Or do you think that the SDF shouldn’t be dispatched abroad like it has been until now? Make it so they can be dispatched: 15% Should not be dispatched: 78% 202 Data from Asahi Shimbun , June 30, 2003, 1; July 1, 2003, 4; August 25, 2003; 2; December 12, 2003, 1; and December 13, 2003, 4. 203 Yamazaki had other motives for Diet extension. It was widely reported that, as a key ally to Koizumi, he wanted to avoid a June end so as to avoid a political vacuum until the September LDP presidential election. By prolonging the Diet session, this vacuum grows shorter, thereby limiting the activities of forces plotting against Koizumi. 204 It was decided to extend the Diet session by 40 days, ending July twenty-eighth. 246

Yoshihiko Noda led to an agreement on the nineteenth to resume operations on the twenty-fourth. The Diet resumed with an explanation of the bill to Plenary Session and the establishment of a Special Committee Relating to Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction

Support and International Terrorism Prevention and Our Country’s Cooperation Support

Activities (イラク人道復興支援並びに国際テロリズムの防止及び我が国の協力支

援活動等に関する特別委員会; hereafter Special Committee) in the Lower House 205 chaired by former Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura. 206

By the time the Diet resumed, the DPJ’s cautiousness was increasingly turning to opposition. Initially, the DPJ pushed for revisions of four key issues: 207 1) deleting reference to UN Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441 as justification for the US-led war; 2) require ‘prior’ Diet consent for dispatch rather than ‘within 20 days after’ they are sent;

3) removal of the supply of weapons and ammunition clause, and 4) reducing the 4-year time limit to 2 years. DPJ remained rooted in legal concerns. During Plenary Session,

DPJ lawmaker Masaharu Nakagawa presented the DPJ’s thinking. The party remained cautious on the need for the SDF and questioned whether cooperating with CPA occupying forces violates the constitutional renunciation of the right to belligerency and whether transportation of weapons and ammunition would make SDF targets. 208

The biggest issue for the DPJ, and dogging the bill since its deliberations in the

LDP, was whether a non-combat zone existed distinguishable from a combat zone. This

205 Standing Committees hold sessions on fixed days, usually two or three times a week, unless it is agreed upon by both ruling and opposition parties to hold more sessions. Special Committees, by contrast, are set up via an agreement among all political parties and are not limited to fixed days. As such, these committee meetings can be held every day. This is the reason why the ruling coalition pushed for a Special Committee because they wanted to pass the bill as quickly as possible in the limited time they had. 206 It was reported that LDP Secretary General Taku Yamazaki originally wanted to appoint someone from the Hashimoto faction so as to smooth Diet deliberations, such as , but he refused and the faction in general was wary of SDF dispatch. 207 Morimoto, 2004, 266. 208 kokkai.ndl.go.jp 247

mattered because the DPJ’s stance was if it was not distinguishable sending the SDF

would violate the constitutional prohibition of ‘becoming one with the use of force.’ The

party began this attack from Masaharu Nakagawa’s opening speech at the Plenary

Session on June twenty-fourth 209 and listed it in its list of problems with the government’s

bill outlined on the twenty-fifth (below). It maintained this attack throughout the Lower

House deliberations and into the Upper House deliberations. Although a small coalition

of lawmakers in the LDP agreed, they were too few to matter. Worse, no bureaucrats

agreed. As such, the DPJ had no divisions to exploit.

DPJ lawmakers strongly believe that as the largest opposition party, it has a

responsibility to do more than just oppose policies like the JSP. 210 Based on this, the DPJ created a counter-proposal for Iraqi reconstruction to differentiate itself from the government. Two early items were introduced during Masaharu Nakagawa’s opening speech at the Plenary Session on June twenty-fourth: the creation of a Japanese koban police system and establishing an “Iraq Reconstruction, Japan Plan” that focused using unemployed Iraqis to rebuild the country. 211 Yoshinori Suematsu introduced more elements the following day at the first session of the Special Committee where he outlined 6 points relating to Iraq’s administration, security, unemployment, emergency humanitarian support, infrastructure, and the problems sending the SDF. 212 The party agreed to a plan the same day. The plan stated that the party should be actively involved in Iraq reconstruction support under UN Resolution 1483. Different from the government proposal, it did not require SDF dispatch. Instead, relying on NGOs, private experts,

209 Plenary Session, June 24, 2003: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 210 Asahi Shimbun , July 2, 2003, 3. 211 Plenary Session, June 24, 2003: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 212 Special Committee Relating to Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Support and International Terrorism Prevention and Our Country’s Cooperation Support Activities, June 25, 2003: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 248

private companies and unemployed trained Iraqis, the plan included, among other

things: 213

1. Transferring authority of CPA to the UN 2. Provide things like training and guidance by police officers and private security companies; introduce a koban police system 3. Help employ the unemployed through rebuilding damaged infrastructure (Japan would also provide financial support and technical cooperation) 4. Provide humanitarian assistance 5. Get countries to help with rebuilding the infrastructure.

The DPJ also indicated point-by-point problems with the government’s bill that its bill was meant to counter. 214 Included were DPJ points for compromise. The “Next Cabinet” formalized the Revision Bill on July first. According to DPJ MP Akihisa Nagashima, lawmakers sharing the pro-SDF dispatch belief pushed party leadership, saying that “we don’t endorse what the US-UK did but we should face this new reality and change our policy to be more realistic.”215 But they were outnumbered. Because of continuing constitutional concerns about the difficulty of distinguishing between combat and non- combat zones, lawmakers holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs ensured that the party line excluded the SDF. The bill was released the next day. 216

Although the DPJ’s intention behind its counter-proposal was to push for compromise in the government’s bill, the ruling coalition interpreted the DPJ’s counter- proposal as refusal to negotiate. The difference of opinions between the government and the DPJ regarding the bill’s purpose, necessity of SDF dispatch, existence of non-combat zones and other compromises was too big. Because the ruling coalition refused to

213 DPJ, Iraku fukkou shien no arikata ni taisuru kangaekata, June 25, 2003. 214 DPJ, “Iraku tokubetsu sochihouan” oyobi “tero taisaku tokubetsu sochi houan” no ronten , June 25, 2003. 215 Akihisa Nagashima, Interview, May 31, 2007. 216 See DPJ, Iraku ni okeru jindou fukkou shien katsudou oyobi anzenkakuho shien katsudou no jisshi ni kansuru tokubetsu sochihouan ni taisuru shuuseian , July 2, 2003. 249

compromise on SDF dispatch and the inclusion of past UN Resolutions as the basis for

the war, 217 negotiations with the DPJ broke down. The government’s bill passed the

Special Committee un-amended on July third and Plenary Session the next day. But

unlike the JSP, instead of boycotting, ox-walking, or attempting to raise public opposition

to the bill through extraordinary measures, the DPJ attended the sessions to vote for their

Revision Bill and vote against the government-bill. Because they were a numerical

minority and because their message did not resonate with government decision-makers

nor with the public, the bill passed relatively easily, but not without incident. To protest

the bill, three LDP lawmakers holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs left their seats during the

vote at Plenary Session (former LDP Secretaries General Hiromu Nonaka and Makoto

Koga and former Home Affairs Minister Mamoru Nishida) 218 while one voted against

(former MEXT Parliamentary Vice Minster Yamato Inaba). But this is notable given the

fact that polls taken prior to the UN Peace Cooperation Bill being withdrawn in 1990

showed that at least 1/3 of LDP lawmakers opposed it. The Bill passed and moved to the

Upper House where it was presented in Plenary Session on July seventh. Debate began

on July ninth at the Foreign Affairs-Defense Standing Committee.219

In Upper House discussions, the opposition parties continued their opposition,

now led by the DPJ. Because the DPJ’s message of opposition did not resonate with the

public, ruling coalition lawmakers, or bureaucrats, the DPJ could not exercise veto power

over the bill. While the DPJ continued to push on issues such as weapons’ use and

217 Asahi Shimbun , July 2, 2003, 1. 218 Both Nonaka and Koga left their seats in October 2001 during voting on the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law. 219 The reason why a Special Committee was not established in the Upper House was political. In the Upper House, Committee Chairs are distributed in accordance with the number of MPs. If a new Special Committee was to be established, it was the Communist Party’s turn at the Chair. In order to protect the right in leading discussion on the bill, the ruling parties decided to discuss the bill in the Standing Committee instead, which was chaired by the LDP. 250

scenarios of the SDF coming under attack or kidnapped, the DPJ was not registering any

hits. The most news deliberations made were comments by PM Koizumi. In a response to

a question by DPJ MP Toshikumi Kibata about the existence of WMDs, Koizumi said,

“you cannot say that President Hussein does not exist because we cannot find him in

Iraq...just as I think that we will find President Hussein, I think we will find WMDs, it

will just take some time.” 220 In a second comment, Koizumi was asked by DPJ head

Naoto Kan whether he could specify a non-combat zone, to which Koizumi could not,

saying that while he does not know the geography or regional names of Iraq, he knows

that non-combat zones exist. 221

With its back against the wall, the DPJ resorted to strategies employed by the former-JSP to stall Diet proceedings: 1) tabling a motion against State Minister in Charge of Economic and Fiscal Policy / Financial Services Minister Heizo Takenaka on July fifteenth, 2) tabling a censure motion against Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, JDA

Director General Ishiba, and CCS Fukuda on the twenty-fourth and 3) submitting a non- confidence vote against the Cabinet on the twenty-fifth. 222 But because the opposition parties lacked the numbers to stop the bill or pass any of these measures, the bill passed the Upper House Foreign Affairs Security Committee on the twenty-fifth and the Upper

House Plenary Session on the twenty-sixth (both one day later than the coalition planned).223 The Iraq Special Measures Law was promulgated on August first.

220 Gaikoubouei Iinkai, Naikaku Iinkai Rengou Shinsakai, July 9, 2003: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 221 Joint Houses, Kokka Kihonseisaku Iinkai Goudou Shinsakai, July 23, 2003: kokkai.ndl.go.jp 222 Their reasons for choosing these individual Cabinet members was because they wanted to point out the worsening situation of Japan’s economy and hold responsible those individuals who were responsible for the Iraq Law. The non-confidence vote was meant to sum-up both of these complaints against Koizumi’s government. 223 It passed without incident on the strength of the coalition’s numbers: 136 to 102. 251

Unlike the smooth implementation of ASDF dispatches, the implementation of

the Law encountered two difficulties, largely by coalition partner Komeito threatening to

exercise its veto power. The first of these had to do with the transportation of weapons

and ammunition that JDA decision-makers had put in the original bill. Recalling that

Komeito initially signaled its disapproval toward these duties prior to Diet submission,

followed by Kanzaki’s admission that every container cannot be checked, the problem

resurfaced. Based on constitutional beliefs that transportation inclusion “would go

beyond the law,” 224 on June sixteenth Komeito requested that the transportation not be a

‘main duty.’ 225 The government agreed, but when the outline of the Basic Plan was

shown on December eighth, the possibility of transportation remained, 226 angering

Komeito lawmakers. The JDA defended its position, with JDA DG Shigeru Ishiba

arguing the next day that “I do not acknowledge that it is legally impossible.” 227 But in

order to avoid Komeito exercising its veto power, PM Koizumi was forced to announce

at the press conference announcing the Basic Plan that while the possibility would remain

in the Basic Plan, the SDF would not transport weapons or ammunition. 228 Komeito had

successfully constrained one portion of the plan in exchange for not exercising its veto.

The second difficulty was the timing of the dispatch. It was expected by decision-

makers and coalition lawmakers that the SDF would be dispatched in October. 229 Right after the Law’s passage the October-plan was revised to after-November-but-before-the- end-of-the-year, largely so that the dispatch would not affect the ruling party in a fall

224 Komeito Lawmaker, Interview, December 6, 2006. 225 Asahi Shimbun , June 18, 2003, 4. 226 Asahi Shimbun , December 9, 2003, 1. 227 Asahi Shimbun , December 9, 2003, evening edition, 1. 228 Asahi Shimbun , December 10, 2003, 1. To ensure that no arms or ammunition were being transported, on February 3, 2004 the ASDF announced that it would carry out random inspections of materials the ASDF was responsible to transport from Kuwait to Iraq. 229 Asahi Shimbun , July 4, 2003, 1. 252

general election. 230 Following the bombing of the UN HQ in Baghdad on August

twentieth, the attack on Italian troops in Nasiriyah on November nineteenth

(approximately 100 km from the proposed dispatch area of Samawah), and the

assassination of two MOFA diplomats (Katsuhiko Oku and Masamori Inoue) on

November twenty-ninth, it became increasingly difficult for the JDA to find ‘non-combat

zones’ to which to dispatch the SDF. This jeopardized ‘within year’ dispatch. With the

need to act quickly once a dispatch order is made, the JDA worked on a Basic Plan

during this time, coordinated by Defense Policy Bureau DG Kazuki Iihara 231 and Defense

Policy Division Director Takamizawa in consultations with the Operations Division and the 3 branches of the SDF. 232 Because of the difficulty in finding a ‘non-combat zone,’ it was not until November that Samawah was chosen as the dispatch location 233 and not until December ninth that the Basic Plan was passed. 234 Ten days later, JDA DG Ishiba ordered all SDF branches to prepare for deployment. Leading the way, the ASDF dispatched an advance unit on December twenty-sixth, followed by the first part of a main contingent on January twenty-second.

But the impression that Iraq was unsafe mattered “…because the government’s interpretation of the dispatch location was that it was a non-combat zone” but given the ongoing hostilities, “there were questions on whether you could call the dispatch location a non-combat zone.” 235 This made Komeito’s main support group (Soka Gakkai) hesitant to endorse a GSDF dispatch, forcing Komeito lawmakers to show caution. Komeito

230 Asahi Shimbun , July 31, 2003, evening edition, 2. 231 Mr. Iihara was the Deputy Director DG for the Defense Policy Bureau until July. From August, he was promoted to the Defense Policy Bureau DG position, replacing Takemasa Moriya, who became the Vice Minister of JDA. 232 Anonymous, Interview. 233 For a discussion of this process, see Kakitani and Kikuchi, 2005, 23. 234 For Basic Plan, see Asahi Shimbun , December 10, 2003, 5. 235 Hiroshi Takano, Interview, November 29, 2006. 253

Chairman Kanzaki asked Koizumi in mid-November to examine the security condition in

Iraq before making the final decision to dispatch. Komeito PARC Chairman Kazuo

Kitagawa took this message to a talk show on November twenty-third 236 and Secretary

General Tetsuzo Fuyushiba stressed the need for a ‘very careful’ decision in an Asahi

interview on December fourth. 237 Even when Komeito agreed to the Basic Plan on the

eighth, Fuyushiba requested that the government carefully think about its plan to quickly

dispatch the GSDF, 238 leading Chairman Kanzaki to visit Samawah on December

twentieth to survey the security situation. Based on his visit, on January 4, 2004, Kanzaki

stated that “It will be fully possible that we’ll oppose [dispatch] if the security situation is

so bad that the area cannot be recognized as free of fighting.” 239

Given the need to have Komeito not exercise its veto, JDA and MOFA decision-

makers created a plan for dispatching a 30-member GSDF advance team to assess the

local security conditions before a main contingent be sent. Upon reaching a conclusion of

the security situation, the team would compile a report and present it to the government.

Senior JDA and MOFA decision-makers presented this plan to ruling coalition

Secretaries General on January sixth, with a planned departure for the advance team on

the sixteenth. 240 On the eighth, Komeito executives decided to back the plan out of a

concern that Komeito “had to demonstrate its proactive approach toward supporting the

reconstruction in Iraq.”241 Receiving Komeito’s approval, PM Koizumi ordered JDA DG

236 Asahi Shimbun , November 25, 2003, 2. 237 Asahi Shimbun , December 4, 2003, 4. 238 Asahi Shimbun , December 9, 2003, 1. 239 Japan Times , January 5, 2004. 240 Japan Times , January 7, 2004. 241 Daily Yomiuri , January 9, 2004; Even though Komeito agreed with the plan, there were significant numbers of Soka Gakkai members who remained opposed based on their belief that such a dispatch was a violation of the Constitution. They collected signatures from Soka Gakkai members as well as non- members and submitted these to Kanzaki and Koizumi in hopes that they would stop the dispatch. 254

Ishiba to issue GSDF advance team dispatch orders, which he did on the ninth. They left

on January sixteenth and under the command of Colonel Masahisa Sato, the unit became

the first Japanese ground units since WWII to enter a country with ongoing hostilities

three days later when it crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border at 12:50 PM.

Two members of the team returned on the twenty-third.242 Their conclusions were

positive, stating that Samawah was relatively stable. JDA and MOFA decision-makers

briefed LDP and Komeito representatives on January twenty-fourth while PM Koizumi

met personally with Komeito Chairman Kanzaki on the twenty-sixth. Although the report

was positive, Kanzaki conditioned his party’s support on three points that took into

consideration Soka Gakkai’s concerns. 243 With Komeito’s approval, GSDF dispatch

could move forward. Koizumi told JDA DG Ishiba to issue dispatch orders, which he

promptly did that day (along with MSDF dispatch orders to transport GSDF personnel

and equipment). 244 The first part of the core GSDF contingent was dispatched on

February third. On February fourteenth, the 4,550-ton MSDF destroyer Murasame left

Kure port and two days later the 8,900-ton Osumi-class Kunisaki MSDF transport left

Yokosuka. After meeting up, the two ships left Japanese territorial waters on February

twentieth. Together, it marked the first time all three branches of the SDF were engaged

in an overseas operation since the SDF were established. 245

242 Japan Times , January 24, 2004, 1-2. 243 Daily Yomiuri , January 27, 2004. 1) The government must take all measures to secure the safety of the GSDF personnel and closely monitor ongoing security conditions in Samawah. 2) Information about the GSDF’s activities must be given to the media so the Japanese know what the GSDF is doing and the government should create a PR system in Samawah. 3) There should be efforts made by the government to create jobs in Samawah for local people. 244 With this decision, Japan became the 39 th country to join the ‘coalition of the willing’ with forces. 245 Retroactive approval for the dispatch passed the Lower House on January 31, 2004 by the strength of the ruling coalition. The opposition parties boycotted. Former LDP Secretary Generals Koichi Kato and Makoto Koga and former LDP PARC Chairman Shizuka Kamei refused to vote. CCS Yasuo Fukuda also 255

Looking at the process behind the Law, it succeeded for two reasons. Before Diet submission, bureaucrats and ruling party lawmakers were united in pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. Wanting to contribute as a responsible member of international society, they agreed on a common policy preference to dispatch the SDF. This made the decision- making process conflict-free, which was important because of the second reason.

Although the DPJ did not initially oppose, once it did it could not veto the bill because there were no divisions amongst decision-makers it could exploit to enflame opposition from within government. Also, despite public opposition to the war and SDF dispatch, the DPJ’s message did not resonate with the public. This meant the DPJ could not use

failed to vote, but by mistake. It passed the Upper House on February ninth, again by the strength of the ruling coalition. The activities of the SDF focused largely on purification and supply of water in and around Baghdad and airlifting of food/other daily needs to Iraq from neighboring countries. Each GSDF water- purification vehicle can produce over 70 tons of clean water. On June 17, 2004 the government formally decided to allow the SDF join the multinational forces in Iraq (the first for the SDF) after the country regained its sovereignty on June 30 (decision passed at Cabinet on June 18). However, while this meant the SDF would communicate and coordinate with the multinational force’s unified command HQ, the government obtained verbal consent from the US and British governments that the SDF would remain under the command of Japan (because of constitutional constraints). Its conclusion also meant no change to the SDF’s mission or location. To ensure that violations of the Constitution does not occur, the government decided on 4 principles: 1) will not use military force; 2) will operate only in non-combat zones; 3) will work on the basis of an existing law for the SDF dispatch to Iraq; and 4) will keep its troops fully under Japan own chain of command and not the commander of the US-led multinational force ( Japan Times , June 18, 2004). To have legal backing to participate in the multinational force, the government managed to have “humanitarian and reconstruction assistance” listed as missions of the US-led force stated in UN Resolution 1546. Because the transfer of power to Iraq occurred on June 28, Japan entered the multinational force two days earlier than originally planned. From 2004 until March 2005, the GSDF remained under the protection of Dutch troops. This prompted Britain to agree to dispatch about 600 troops to provide for the GSDF’s security after the Dutch leave ( Herald Asahi , February 23, 2005). But in late February 2005, Australia announced it would take over this task by dispatching 450 additional troops to Samawah. From March until May, the GSDF were protected by the British, taken over by the Australians in May 2005. The GSDF stayed under their protection until the GSDF’s withdrawal. The GSDF began its withdrawal on June 25, 2006 and was completed on July 25, 2006. To assist them in the efforts, an additional 100-member GSDF unit was dispatched. The ASDF mission continued until December 12, 2008, completing 821 airlift operations and transporting about 46, 500 people and 673 tons of material (www.mod.go.jp/asdf/irsaw/). During this time, it even expanded to include UN employees and supplies (beyond personnel and supplies of GSDF and multinational forces) and destinations of ASDF transport services was expanded beyond Basra and Tallil to include Baghdad and Irbil. The Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait remained its base and it maintained 3 C- 130 transport planes. No SDF members were killed, although 3 GSDF were injured in a vehicle accident in June 2006 (not caused by an attack). 256

public opposition to pressure the government. Because its message did not resonate in or out of government, the DPJ was left only with extraordinary measures. But because it was unwilling to employ these until the very end, and those it employed were largely symbolic and depended on votes to succeed, meant that DPJ opposition was ‘too little, too late.’

Alliance Management : Had this logic guided the outcome, we would expect to see abandonment fears. Recalling the initial logic for supporting America was because of the danger WMDs posed, some have interpreted the linkage between Iraqi WMDs and North

Korean WMDs to mean that decision-makers’ determination to pursue SDF dispatch was because of the fear that if Japan failed to support America in Iraq, there was a danger that

America would abandon its security commitment in Northeast Asia if North Korea threatened Japan. 246 There is some evidence to support this logic. Generally interpreted as referring to North Korea as reason for his decision to support the US war on March twentieth, PM Koizumi stated that “the US is the only country that has committed itself to deeming any military strike against Japan as an attack on the US itself. We should always bear in mind that this constitutes a key deterrent to other countries considering the use of force against this country.” 247 The same day, LDP lawmaker Masahiko Komura spoke at the Upper House plenary session stating that America defends Japan from the threat of North Korea and when thinking about this and the action that America has taken against Iraq, “it is a natural response as an ally to understand and support it.” 248 The coalition parties’ internal deliberations on Iraq also support this when on March twelfth they held the first meeting of a newly created Ruling Parties Council for Iraq and North

246 Hara, 2004. 247 Koizumi Soridaijin kishakaiken: www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/03/20kaiken.html 248 See kokkai.ndl.go.jp 257

Korea where measures concerning both countries was to be deliberated. LDP lawmaker

Takeshi Iwaya says the logic used in these deliberations was “if we don’t help in supporting a fire in a faraway place, they won’t help if a fire breaks out right next to us.” 249 LDP lawmaker Keizo Takemi admits he was one, arguing that for the US-Japan alliance to operate on trust relations in Northeast Asia, Japan must support the US in

Iraq. 250

While some evidence exists to support the alliance management logic, closer examination shows the use of the North Korea threat is actually a political strategy by politicians to garner public support for SDF dispatch following a war the public opposed.

In other words, a strategy to sell SDF dispatch to the Japanese. While politicians emphasized the North Korean threat, bureaucrats and SDF officers did not. Vice Foreign

Minister Hitoshi Tanaka says, the use of North Korea in public discussions helped the public interpret “a logic for Japan to lend strong political support to the decision on the part of the US to launch military action against Iraq.” 251 Lieutenant General Noboru

Yamaguchi of the GSDF agrees, says the North Korean threat helped because “the North

Korea missile threat or kidnappings or low intensity threats were obvious to the Japanese public.” 252 JDA DG Shigeru Ishiba argues that it was known among decision-makers that

“logically there was no connection” between Iraq and North Korea and it was known that

“regardless of whether or not Japan supports or does not support the US in Iraq, the US

249 , Interview, December 15, 2006. 250 Keizo Takemi, Interview, June 28, 2006; Takemi used this logic in parliamentary discussions as well. In a March 24, 2003 Upper House Budget Committee, Takemi emphasized the importance of maintaining trust in the US-Japan alliance when talking about the WMD threat in both Iraq and North Korea. See kokkai.ndl.go.jp 251 Hitoshi Tanaka, Interview, September 5, 2006. 252 Noboru Yamaguchi, Interview, October 2, 2006. 258

will protect Japan if necessary.” 253 Even close friend of Koizumi, Hisahiko Okazaki

criticizes such reasoning as “not calculation” but only “an explanation that was

repeated.” 254

More damning is the fact that decision-makers involved in formulating the SDF

dispatch measures deny the logic was used in policy deliberations that were not

publically reported. A MOFA official said that despite the lawmakers’ use of the linkage,

“this issue linkage is not official.” 255 A JDA official agrees, stating that “there was no direct linkage between Iraq and North Korea.”256 Another MOFA official states that

“even if the North Korea threat was absent, [MOFA] wanted to have a stable Iraq anyway.” 257 Likewise, “at the JDA level there was virtually no influence” of the North

Korean threat on Iraq decision-making. 258 Another flatly denied the linkage, saying that

“it is not as simple as saying that if Japan didn’t do anything then America wouldn’t help

with North Korea.” 259 Even Ambassador Howard Baker, in an effort to dampen the view

that the alliance was based on conditionality, dismissed the idea that, depending on the

Japanese response to an attack on Iraq, there would be an impact on the alliance.260 In the

end, “It wasn’t the case that [Japan] dispatched the troops for that reason.” 261

Anti-Militarist Norms : Had the Pure Variant logic guided the outcome, we would

expect the bill’s success to be explained by the weakness of such norms. It is clear from

253 Shigeru Ishiba, Interview, August 24, 2006; Ishiba states a similar view in a March 3, 2003 Lower House Budget Committee in his response to a question from DPJ Seiji Maehara questioning this exact logic. See kokkai.ndl.go.jp. 254 Hisahiko Okazaki, Interview, June 29, 2006. 255 MOFA Official, Interview, August 23, 2006. 256 Anonymous, Interview. 257 MOFA Official, Interview, August 23, 2006. 258 Anonymous, Interview. 259 Anonymous, Interview. 260 Asahi Shimbun interview with Ambassador Howard Baker, March 14, 2003, 3-4. 261 Anonymous, Interview. 259

the evidence that coalition lawmakers and government bureaucrats pushed for dispatch.

Because they opposed dispatch in 1990, their support now for the SDF as an instrument

of state policy supports the Variant’s logic. But this is where a problem arises. The logic

would argue that the public too should share decreased aversion to using the SDF as an

instrument of state policy. After all, it cannot just be the beliefs of decision-makers and

ruling party lawmakers that define societal norms. If public opposition to SDF dispatch is

evidence of the strength of the Norm in 1990, then we should draw the same conclusion

in 2003 because polls show the public was against the dispatch. Despite the fact that the

public supported dispatch of MSDF minesweepers in 1991, the public opposed dispatch

in 2003. If logic of the Variant is correct, the outcome should be due to decreased

reluctance to using the SDF as an instrument of state policy. And yet, because the

outcome is despite public opposition, there is no evidence to support the Variant’s logic.

However, the outcome is what we would expect from the Nuanced Variant because the mission was specifically defined as reconstruction support in a non-combat zone. Despite an ongoing insurgency, the bill was not defined as a combat mission and formulated to purposely steer clear of use of force issues. Komeito’s last minute hesitance and efforts to ameliorate their concerns further confirms this Variant’s logic.

Leadership : Had the logic guided the outcome, we would expect the bill’s success

to be explained by a strong Kantei (Institutional Variant) or a premier who signaled his

desire to dispatch the SDF (Desire Variant). On the surface, both explanations appear

plausible because Koizumi was considered a strong leader who backed SDF dispatch and

the Kantei was institutionally more powerful than 1990. However, there are problems

with both. For the Institutional Variant, what should be evident is that bureaucrats began

260

work on measures long-before Kantei involvement. If we believe the outbreak of

hostilities was the time from which policies were considered, then the Kantei appears to

be a powerful institution able to formulate policies in crisis situations against public

opposition. But when we consider that MOFA and JDA decision-makers had been

working on measures for over six months prior to the start of hostilities and that these

were completed by the time war began, the power of the Kantei looks less impressive.

Given that the team assembled under Omori was responsible for crafting the legislation

based on deliberations taking place in MOFA and JDA, at most I would concede that that

Kantei played a coordinating role. But given that MOFA and JDA deliberations

proceeded smoothly without Kantei involvement for a number of months, it is hard to imagine that the bill would not have been formulated had the Kantei’s power been any different.

The same is true with the Desire Variant. While it is true that the argument over dispatching the GSDF was settled by Koizumi’s signaling, we cannot say the same for any other aspect of the bill. JDA and MOFA decision-makers were in agreement about the necessity of dispatching the SDF. No signaling by Koizumi was necessary. I would argue that this unanimity worked to Koizumi’s favor rather than vice-versa. Having the entire government apparatus in agreement over what policies needed to be pursued made

Koizumi look strong. But the limitations on his strength and signaling became evident as lawmakers from his ruling coalition forced significant changes to his bill. In other words, despite his signaling the bill changed. The onus of this explanation is whether the bill would have failed if an individual other than Koizumi was premier. Given that the coalition of decision-makers and ruling party lawmakers sharing pro-SDF dispatch

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beliefs dominated, as well as an opposition party whose anti-dispatch message did not

resonate, it is safe to argue the bill would have passed no matter who was premier. Again,

because of the overwhelming support, the outcome was over-determined. Given

overwhelming pressure from bureaucrats and lawmakers, even someone like Kaifu would

have supported the bill. The bill’s success did not require Koizumi. As such, there is no

evidence that had an individual other than Koizumi been premier the result would have

been different.

Conclusion This chapter examined the two successful attempts at dispatching the SDF overseas during the 2003 Iraq War: 1) two separate ASDF dispatches and 2) Iraq Special

Measures Law. Tracing each, I have shown that the variables that mattered in explaining dispatch success proved to be the beliefs held by decision-makers and the pragmatic DPJ.

But each sub-case highlights the salience of these two variables at different times. The

ASDF dispatches was an executive order that succeeded because bureaucrats and lawmakers in the coalition parties responsible for signing off on it shared pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. The Iraq Special Measures Law was Diet legislation that succeeded because of government decision-makers sharing pro-SDF dispatch beliefs and a pragmatic DPJ whose message was unable to resonate because there were no differences among decision-makers that it could exploit and because the public opposed for different reasons. After tracing each proposal, I engaged the three alternative explanations of alliance management, anti-militarist norms and leadership. I found problems in the ability of these explanations to provide consistent explanations.

Similar to 1990, the least supported of the alternative explanations was alliance management. Throughout deliberations for both ASDF dispatches and the making of the

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Iraq Special Measures Law, the number of times abandonment fears were used as a basis

for dispatch was “none whatsoever.” 262 Instead, decision-makers based their decisions off a desire for Japan to make international contributions as a responsible member of international society. While LDP lawmakers used the North Korean threat publically as justification for SDF participation in Iraq after the war had begun, the abandonment logic was never used by decision-makers outside of the public view. This leads me to conclude that the use of the North Korean threat as justification to help America was a way for politicians to ‘sell’ an unpopular policy to the public.

Had the Pure Variant logic of the anti-militarist norms argument guided the outcome, we would expect dispatch to be explained by the weakness of such norms. Both sub-cases appear consistent with this logic as far as decision-makers and lawmakers alike generally supported dispatching the SDF. In other words, they did not have an aversion to using the SDF as an instrument of state policy. And yet, public opposition to dispatching the SDF under the Iraq Special Measures Law questions the validity of this logic.

Because the strength of public opposition in 1990 was evidence of the strength of this

Variant, then similar opposition to SDF dispatch should be further evidence of its strength. Because we have this disconnect between decision-makers and lawmakers who show evidence that the norm has weakened, and the public which shows evidence that the norm is still strong, we are unable to conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support this Variant. Had the logic of the Nuanced Variant guided the outcomes, we would expect support for the dispatches under the condition that they do not transgress the use of force.

Given that both the ASDF dispatch and the Iraq Special Measures Law were purely for humanitarian/reconstruction purposes, there is evidence to support this Variant. This is

262 Yukio Okamoto, Interview, July 22, 2008. 263

reinforced by the fact that much effort was made to limit SDF dispatch to areas where no combat was occurring and thus, where the SDF would not have to use force.

Had the logic of the leadership explanation guided the outcomes, we would expect dispatches to be explained by either an institutionally strong Kantei (Institutional

Variant) or the signaling by the premier in favor of dispatch (Desire Variant). Given ongoing public opposition to SDF dispatch, and the success of passing SDF dispatch against this opposition, both Variants are hard alternative explanations to dispel. But looking at both ASDF dispatches and the Iraq Special Measures Law, we find that both

Variants are problematic.

In the case of the ASDF planes, bureaucrats led the process from start to finish.

The process was able to proceed smoothly because decision-makers who formulated the policies shared similar beliefs and because lawmakers in both ruling parties and the DPJ, who shared similar beliefs, did not exercise veto power. Kantei involvement was never an issue, thereby questioning what effect a stronger or weaker Kantei would have had on the outcome. And because of the virtual unanimous agreement on ASDF humanitarian dispatch by decision-makers and lawmakers, it is questionable how necessary Koizumi’s signaling was for the outcome.

The same is true in the case of the Special Measures Law. Bureaucratic decision- makers began work on measures long-before the Kantei became involved. Despite the non-involvement, decision-makers in MOFA and JDA bureaucrats shared similar beliefs.

Because they had no divisions, they agreed on common policy preferences. Again, it is questionable how the strength of the Kantei would have affected the outcome prior to

Diet submission. And when looking at its Diet passage, this too had more to do with

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shared beliefs amongst bureaucrats and lawmakers because the lack of divisions meant

the DPJ could not exploit them for the purposes of exercising its veto power as the JSP had done. A weak Kantei would not have changed the outcome.

The real test is whether the outcome would have been different had Koizumi not been premier. Decision-makers formulating policies were agreed on the necessity to dispatch the SDF, so signaling by Koizumi would have amounted to ‘preaching to the choir.’ Given that the Iraq Special Measures Law was widely supported amongst decision-makers, no veto players were willing to exercise their veto powers. In this environment, any premier would have succeeded. In the end, I would argue Koizumi benefited from having decision-makers share a consensus because it meant no divisions in government and made it impossible for the DPJ to veto the policies. There should be no surprise the policies succeeded.

Given that none of the alternative explanations provide consistent explanations for both sub-cases, I conclude that Japan’s policy responses during the Iraq War are best explained by the shared beliefs among decision-makers and the inability of the pragmatic

DPJ to exercise its veto power due to its message not resonating with decision-makers or the public.

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VI. Conclusion

Looking at Japan’s responses to the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, my

goal was to answer why Japan was unable to deploy its military, called the Self-Defense

Forces, in the former while it successfully did in the latter. Using the terminology of

Japanese decision-makers, I wanted to know how Japan has learned to ‘sweat.’ I argued

that the answer is found in equal consideration of two variables: the beliefs of decision-

makers and the nature of the opposition party. Changes that occurred in both of these variables explain why Japanese foreign policies could and did change.

Widening the Parameters of Debate: From Ideological Opposition to Pragmatic Opposition Without a change in the nature of the opposition party from an ideological one to a pragmatic one, the parameters of foreign policy debate would have remained severely constricted, making policies that involve utilization of the SDF difficult to even discuss.

From 1955 until the early-1990s, the two major political parties were the LDP and

JSP. The defining characteristic of this alignment was that they were ideologically poles apart from one another, deeply divided over fundamentally core issues. This meant that little commonality existed and the parameters for finding viable policy options that would satisfy both were severely limited. Although the JSP did not have the numerical ability to block LDP policies, it had a successful record of vetoing security-related policies by relying on two methods. First, it would rely on extraordinary measures to make its voice heard in the legislative process, utilizing any number of parliamentary and extra- parliamentary procedures that included, among other things, boycotting Diet debate and rallying the public against government policies. Second, because its message resonated with the public and with decision-makers in the government, the JSP relied on emotional

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and theological discussions on the constitution and pacifism. This enabled the JSP to fan

fears of remilitarization both in and out of government. With the JSP’s message amplified

both in and outside of government, LDP governments were constrained from acting too

boldly, if at all, in the field of security. The result was an inability of LDP governments to

utilize the SDF in any role other than the self-defense of Japan. With the JSP falling into

virtual non-existence over the course of the 1990s, this veto player to government

policies disappeared.

The non-ideological Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) replaced the JSP as the

opposition party veto player. Unlike the JSP, the DPJ is a pragmatic party. Additionally,

the DPJ and the LDP are not deeply divided over fundamentally core issues. With

agreement on fundamentals, the two sides are able to talk to each other and discuss policy differences, not dogmatic differences. What is more, the DPJ does not resort to the extraordinary parliamentary measures to block legislation. It instead negotiates differences and introduces counter-policies to government proposals. The result of having a pragmatic opposition has widened the parameters of viable policy options in the field of security-related foreign policies. But even when it does oppose, because its message does not resonate with the public as the JSP’s message once did, it is unable to rally opposition from outside of government. The combined result has meant an increasing ability by the government to raise proposals that include SDF dispatch.

Learning How to Sweat: From Dissonance of Beliefs to Convergence of Beliefs Policies that include SDF dispatch would not have been considered or chosen without important changes in decision-makers’ beliefs. The change that was necessary was a movement from a point of opposing coalitions of individuals holding anti-SDF

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dispatch beliefs and pro-SDF dispatch beliefs to a point where there is a general

convergence on pro-SDF dispatch beliefs.

Until the Gulf War, Japanese bureaucrats and lawmakers were divided between a

pro-SDF dispatch coalition and an anti-SDF dispatch coalition. In the anti-SDF dispatch

coalition, decision-makers opposed SDF dispatch based on three beliefs: 1) sensitivity to

Asian neighbors’ fears, 2) anti-militarist beliefs, and 3) strict constitutionalist beliefs. In the pro-SDF dispatch coalition, decision-makers supported dispatch based on two beliefs:

1) importance of Japan’s international obligations and 2) importance of the US-Japan alliance. Generally speaking, the anti-SDF dispatch coalition was larger, led by the ideological JSP. This division manifested itself as divisions among bureaucratic and political entities exercising their potential veto power. But while the division amongst decision-makers existed across political parties, the division also existed across

bureaucratic organs in government and within bureaucratic organs and political parties,

including the LDP and MOFA. Because of the widespread dispersion of dissonant beliefs,

there was often disagreement over policies. It was this disagreement that the JSP was able

to exploit to enflame opposition to proposals from within government.

When the Iraq War occurred in 2003, this division no longer existed. While it is

true that the DPJ remained divided by both coalitions and that a small group of

individuals holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs remained in the LDP, generally

government bureaucrats and lawmakers converged on pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. What is

more, convergence occurred on the belief of the importance of fulfilling Japan’s

international obligations. With convergence, decision-makers came to agree on policy

preferences, which meant a decline in inner-governmental conflict and veto players

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exercising their veto power. This, in turn, made it impossible for the DPJ to enflame opposition from within government. The result has been an increasing ability by decision-makers to not only consider policies that include SDF dispatch, but to choose them as well.

The key to the change in beliefs is rooted in the traumatic experience of the Gulf

War and the lessons learned from this experience. Chapter Four demonstrated the grueling debates and policy deliberations decision-makers were involved in as they struggled to respond to Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. It was not the case that decision- makers were content with providing only money. While some decision-makers advocated dispatching the SDF as a means for Japan to ‘sweat,’ the majority of decision-makers were opposed and were in institutional positions to veto these proposals. The JSP too opposed and because its message resonated with the public and government decision- makers, it exercised veto power over these proposals. The result was no SDF dispatch until after the war had finished and framed as a way to secure Japanese oil routes.

Chapter Three outlined the clear and widespread criticism of Japan by the international community for acting ‘too little, too late.’ Bureaucratic decision-makers and lawmakers were shocked by the international community’s response. What they had worked so hard to provide, and the monetary sacrifice asked of each Japanese citizen to provide $13 billion, was not appreciated by international society. Japan’s international reputation was threatened to become nothing more than a floating ATM. It was this shock of Japan’s response not being appreciated that traumatized decision-makers to learn the lesson that if it was to be a respected member of international society, it had necessary obligations it needed to fulfill. Specifically, Japan needed to provide visible human

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contributions like other states. Because other states contributed with their militaries,

Japan needed to do so as well. They learned how to ‘sweat.’ Sweating meant SDF

dispatch. Learning this lesson lead to a convergence on the belief of the importance for

Japan to fulfill its international obligations via SDF dispatch. Because this lesson was

institutionalized in the decision-making process, decision-makers since the Gulf War

have come to prioritize policies that utilize the SDF as well.

Alternative Arguments In Chapter One, I introduced three alternative explanations: alliance management,

antimilitarist norms (Pure and Nuanced), and leadership (Desire and Institutional). In

Chapters Four and Five, I showed how each one was inadequate to explain Japan’s

changed policies. I reiterate these arguments below with additional comments.

Alliance Management Looking at Japan during both the Gulf War and Iraq War and why its policies

changed, the alliance management explanation is the least supported. If the logic

explained the outcomes we would expect decision-makers voicing entrapment fears in

1990-91, leading to a no-dispatch outcome, while voicing abandonment fears in 2003,

leading to a dispatch outcome. Because the outcomes in both cases coincide with the outcome we would expect, the ‘proof’ of the explanation would be if the non-dispatch outcomes were due to decision-makers fear of entrapment and dispatch outcomes were due to decision-makers fear of abandonment. Looking at both cases, it is clear that at no time do we see either logic at work.

During the Gulf War, decision-makers never voiced entrapment fears as reasons to not dispatch the SDF. On the contrary, there was a very vocal minority pushing hard for the SDF out of fear that the US-Japan alliance would weaken if Japan did nothing.

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But given the outcome was non-dispatch, even abandonment logic fails to explain the outcome. For those decision-makers who did oppose, and whose opposition was responsible for the outcome, the reasons they opposed was based less on entrapment fears and more with fears of Japanese remilitarization, sensitivity to Japan’s Asian neighbors and concerns about constitutional violations.

During the Iraq War, it is clear that politicians voiced abandonment fears in the face of a North Korean threat for why Japan should dispatch the SDF to Iraq. However, I have shown that this logic was used by politicians only, not the decision-makers formulating the policy out of the public sphere. Decision-makers formulating the policy based their decisions off a belief to make an international contribution as a responsible member of international society. Given this disconnect between what was being said in the public and non-public spheres, I drew the conclusion that the abandonment logic was simply the smoke and mirrors being used to sell SDF dispatch to contribute to postwar reconstruction for a war that the public opposed. Because the dispatch was not driven by abandonment fears in the face of a North Korean or Chinese threat, the Neorealist logic fails to explain the outcome.

Because the alliance management explanation cannot explain policy outcomes at any point during either war, I dismiss its relevance in explaining why Japan’s policies changed.

Anti-Militarist Norms: Pure and Nuanced Variants The anti-militarist norm explanation is a strong alternative explanation.

Remembering that I combined various definitions of anti-militarism to define it as an aversion to using the SDF as an active instrument of state policy and that I classified the norm into two variants, if the anti-militarist norm logic is to explain Japan’s behavior in

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both time periods we would expect it to be explained by one of two logics. The Pure

Variant would argue that non-dispatch occurred in 1990 because the norm was strong.

Because the public and decision-makers, including PM Kaifu, were opposed to policies that included overseas SDF dispatch, the SDF option was forced out of considerations. In

2003, the norm had eroded to the extent that both decision-makers and the public, including PM Koizumi, did not hold an aversion to using the SDF as an instrument of state policy. This allowed Koizumi to dispatch the SDF to Iraq during an ongoing insurgency. If we use the Nuanced Variant, it is necessary to argue that a robust norm remained constant throughout the two periods that opposed the SDF using force in any mission beyond the defense of Japan. If an SDF mission appeared to go beyond this, the public and decision-makers opposed, leading to non-dispatch. If an SDF mission remained within these bounds, then it succeeded.

Let us first examine the Pure Variant. The non-dispatch outcomes in August and

November 1990 appear consistent with the Pure Variant because decision-makers and the public rooted their opposition in constitutional problems, remilitarization fears, and concerns of Asia sensitivity. Across the board, Japanese showed an aversion to using the

SDF as an instrument of state policy. Similarly, the ASDF dispatch and Iraq Special

Measures Law in 2003 appear consistent with the logic because decision-makers generally supported dispatching the SDF. In other words, they did not have an aversion to using the SDF as an instrument of state policy.

And yet, significant problems exist with this explanation. As strong as the norm was in the fall of 1990, thereby explaining two non-dispatch outcomes, by January 1991 decision-makers were pushing for ASDF dispatch. And by April, MSDF dispatch was

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fully supported by not only decision-makers but by the public. If the explanation is to work, it has to explain how the norm was strong as late as November (when its strength resulted in non-dispatch) and suddenly so weak to enable dispatch. Because the Pure

Variant relies on gradual change of the norm over time, and because there is no plausible mechanism to explain its weakening, its weakening over a matter of months begs for further explanation.

If we believe that this sudden erosion of the norm is possible, and plot this as the beginning of the trajectory of a weakening of the norm over the 1990s, then dispatch outcomes in 2003 are the expected result. But here we would encounter a second problem. If we agree that the opposition to dispatching the SDF by decision-makers and the public in 1990 confirm the strength of this norm, and therefore explain the non- dispatch outcomes, then we need to question the dispatch outcome in 2003 because while decision-makers supported SDF dispatch, the public did not. And if the strength of public opposition in 1990 was evidence of the strength of anti-militarism, then similar opposition to SDF dispatch should equally be evidence of the norm’s strength. Given these problems with the logic of the Pure Variant, I believe there is no evidence to support it as an alternative explanation.

The same cannot be said about the Nuanced Variant. Recall that the logic of the

Nuanced Variant is the norm is not transgressed as long as SDF does “not break with

Japan’s long-standing policy of avoiding any potential for entanglement in any armed conflict” 1 beyond Japanese self-defense. In other words, an aversion to using force beyond the defense of Japan. Given this definition, this Variant provides a reasonable explanation to virtually all sub-cases. Because of the fear of the SDF becoming involved

1 Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, 108. 273

in the use of force, the UN Peace Cooperation Bill died in November 1990. Because the

ASDF mission in January 1991 was a humanitarian mission, it was generally accepted by government decision-makers and lawmakers. The non-dispatch outcome was due to

Kaifu setting further conditions to ensure that the SDF would be strictly for a humanitarian mission. And the April 1991 minesweeper dispatch occurred after the war when there was no possibility to become involved in the use of force. While the two 2003

ASDF dispatches for humanitarian purposes clearly falls under this logic, I would argue so does the Iraq Special Measures Law that enabled all three SDF branches to be dispatched to Iraq during an insurgency. The key is that the mission was for postwar reconstruction. Although an insurgency was raging, the SDF was not dispatched to contribute to combat operations. The only question I would raise is this Variant’s ability to explain the August 1990 outcome. Because war had not started and dispatching the

SDF for medical or transportation help carried minimal risk of using force, I am not convinced the logic of this Variant can adequately explain the non-dispatch outcome.

Nevertheless, overall I would say the dispatch and non-dispatch outcomes are consistent with the logic of the Nuanced Variant.

But agreeing that the Nuanced Variant’s logic is consistent with the outcomes does not mean that this research concludes this alternative explanation explains the research question. If we agree that while Japan’s policies have changed, no change in norms has occurred (Berger, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996; Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993;

Oros, 2008), then we have to ask ourselves why was Japan unable to dispatch the SDF prior to 1991? Why is it that only after the Gulf War experience do we see SDF dispatch if the norm remains unchanged? The norm did not change, yet policies changed. Not only

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that, why did dispatch begin with MSDF dispatch in a postwar situation and then took 12

years before GSDF could be dispatched to country with an ongoing insurgency? In this

sense, I am questioning not only this Variant’s ability to explain why policies changed

when they did, but also the way they did. I believe my argument provides answers. In this sense, I am refining this Variant, not rejecting it.

First, I am defining the mechanism that accounts for the change of policies against the backdrop of a robust norm. In Chapter One, I noted that many scholars point to exogenous shocks to explain norm change. These shocks include external shocks, such as increased US pressure, Soviet military buildup, and declining Asian criticism. 2 But

Nuanced Variant scholars like Katzenstein and Berger do not argue that the norm changed. 3 To answer why policies have changed, I have pointed to the shock of the Gulf

War and how it was internalized by Japanese bureaucrats and lawmakers to change their beliefs concerning SDF dispatch. My argument has shown why the shock mattered

(reputation), what lessons were learned (need to provide human contributions), and how it was institutionalized (various reforms, both institutional and legal). Individuals changed their beliefs and these beliefs carried different policy preferences within the framework of a robust anti-militarist norm.

2 Hook, 1988. Hook also refers to US pressure in Hook, 1996. Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) argue that the norm consensus is affected by ‘waxing and waning of international tensions’ but conclude that no norm change took place. They do admit the possibility that “discontinuities in the international system…make it possible that Japan will choose to change its security policy in dramatic fashion” (117). In Hook (1996) he also points to changing public opinion, but his logic on changing public opinion tells us nothing because if the norm is rooted in the public’s resistance to the SDF, this does not clarify the mechanism for why the public opinion changed in the first place. 3 For example, while Berger (1993) argues that the norm has not changed, he argues that if any changes occur (weakening of the alliance, emergence of a new threat in East Asia), then the norm will not be able to survive. 275

A second refinement addresses the problem that norms are a pattern of behavior that “shape the interests political actors pursue,” 4 but do not determine nor predict specific policies. My research’s sole aim is to explain different policies. Even if we agree on the robustness of the Nuanced Variant, it cannot explain changes from no SDF dispatch in 1990 to postwar minesweeper dispatch in 1991 to ground-unit dispatch to Iraq in 2003 and all the incremental policy changes in between. All are SDF dispatches, but they differ in slight degrees while all staying within the boundaries of the norm. Norms do not pass or reject policies, people do. And this occurs in a process of decision-making.

Things are pushed forward as possible policies and pulled back when opposed. Over time, this push and pull dynamic gradually expands the scope of SDF missions, resulting in gradual change in the types of SDF missions (more below). My focus on the decision- making process brings this dynamic front-and-center.

Finally, my argument demonstrates that while the Nuanced Variant is robust, it has been adjusted. 5 Prior to 1990, the anti-militarist norm went hand-in-hand with policy preferences that eschewed SDF dispatch. Being anti-militarist meant being opposed to

SDF dispatch. The two were contradictory. You could not support SDF dispatch and be an anti-militarist. But this no longer is the case. While the Nuanced Variant of the norm is robust, my analysis has shown that decision-makers today are in favor of dispatching the

SDF to make an international contribution as long as it is firmly within the bounds of the

Nuanced Variant. Even lawmakers in the DPJ support this. No one is suggesting missions beyond the parameters of the norm. What this means is what was once contradictory now coexist. You can be an anti-militarist (Nuanced Variant) and support SDF dispatch. As

4 Katzenstein, 1996, 18. 5 Thank you to Mike Mochizuki for working out the logic of this point with me. 276

evident from the public opinion polls in Chapter Five, it appears even the public

demonstrates elements of this. While they opposed the war and SDF dispatch due to Iraq being dangerous (and therefore one can assume an increased possibility to use force), the main reason cited to support SDF dispatch was a desire to make an international contribution.

In the end, there is no evidence to support the logic of the Pure Variant to explain

Japan’s changed policies. However, while there is evidence to support the logic of the

Nuanced Variant as an alternative explanation, gaps in its logic lead me to conclude that while I do not reject it, it requires significant refinement, which my argument provides.

Leadership: Desire and Institutional Variants The leadership explanation also appears as a strong alternative to explaining most outcomes in 1990-1991 but struggles with 2003. If the leadership logic explained the outcomes in both time periods we would expect one of two logics at work. If it was the

Institutional Variant, a weak Kantei would mean an inability to coordinate the decision- making process. If a sizable number of entities opposed SDF dispatch, and the Kantei was unable to force its will, then even if the Kantei wanted to dispatch the SDF a non- dispatch would be the expected outcome. On the contrary, if it was a strong Kantei, then the executive would be able to force its will. Assuming this will is one of SDF dispatch, then dispatch would be the expected outcome. If it was a Desire Variant, we would expect non-dispatch if the premier signaled his desire as such or was unwilling to signal his desire as such. Conversely, we would expect dispatch if the premier signaled his desire for dispatch.

Looking at the Gulf War, there are times when we see either logic at work. The non-ASDF dispatch outcome in January 1991 and the MSDF dispatch outcome of April

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1991 appear consistent with the Desire Variant because the non-ASDF dispatch outcome was due to Kaifu’s signaling while the MSDF dispatch occurred once Kaifu signaled his approval. In both cases, the key to the outcome was Kaifu’s signaling. And because it is

impossible to completely dismiss the counter-factual possibility that the August 1990

non-dispatch outcome would have been different had the Kantei been stronger or if Kaifu had signaled his desire to dispatch, we cannot dismiss either the Institutional or Desire

Variant in explaining the outcome.

But the Leadership explanation struggles in explaining the November 1990 outcome and both 2003 outcomes. In November 1990, the UN Peace Cooperation Bill failed because of a charged ideological opposition whose message resonated with the public and decision-makers. Because it is difficult to dismiss the strength of the JSP and its ability to arouse opposition, thereby exercising veto power to kill the bill, neither variant provides analytical traction in explaining the non-dispatch outcome. For the

Desire Variant, no matter who was prime minister and no matter if he was a hawk, like a

Yasuhiro Nakasone, clear signaling would not have changed the outcome. And for the

Institutional Variant, even if we concede the possibility that a strong Kantei could have forced unanimity amongst the bureaucrats, this too would not have changed the outcome.

The outcome was due to the JSP and its message resonating amongst bureaucrats, lawmakers, and the public. It was these different beliefs that provided the JSP an opportunity to exploit divisions to oppose and ultimately veto the bill.

In both sub-cases in 2003, bureaucrats were responsible for policy formulation and implementation. In the case of ASDF dispatch, bureaucratic decision-makers led the process from start to finish. Kantei involvement was never an issue, so the logic of the

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Institutional Variant is difficult to apply. For the Desire Variant, because of widespread agreement on ASDF humanitarian dispatch by decision-makers and lawmakers, signaling by Koizumi is not necessary to explain the outcome. Had Koizumi’s desire not been known, it is unlikely the result would have been different given widespread support for the dispatch at every level. The same is true for the Special Measures Law. Bureaucrats began work on measures long-before the Kantei became involved, again making the logic of the Institutional Variant difficult to apply. Despite the non-involvement, bureaucrats in

MOFA and JDA were not divided. By the time it moved to the Kantei, much of the bill had already been completed. Again, weak or strong, the Kantei’s strength would not have changed SDF inclusion prior to Diet submission.

The real test is whether the outcome would have been different had a different individual been premier. This is the Desire Variant. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Koizumi supported the dispatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean to assist US-led forces in Afghanistan. Because of this, decision-makers had a clear signal that he supported SDF dispatch. But I have shown that bureaucrats and lawmakers held similar pro-SDF dispatch beliefs because of the Gulf War Trauma and the institutionalization of its lessons. These beliefs were internalized and institutionalized well before Koizumi. They did not need Koizumi’s signaling. While having a premier who held these beliefs surely made things go smoother in all deliberations and ensured quick implementation, the outcome would have been the same no matter who was premier.

In terms of the Institutional Variant, I agree with Shinoda that the Kantei as an institution is significantly stronger than 1990. But I disagree with him that it is because of

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this stronger Kantei that Koizumi was able to dispatch the SDF. What is evident is that in both 1990-91 and 2003, MOFA and JDA officials conceptualized dispatch options and implemented policies. This is unchanged. Also unchanged is the fact that the Kantei makes the final decision on policy proposals and bills and is responsible for taking political responsibility for these decisions. What did change is that whereas bureaucrats outside of the Kantei were in total control of formulating the UN Peace Cooperation Bill in 1990, bureaucrats in the Kantei led a collaborative effort with MOFA and JDA to formulate the Iraq Special Measures Law in 2003. What this means is that while bureaucrats are still very much in control of the process of formulating policies, the

Kantei does have a stronger coordinating role over the process. But this should not be interpreted to mean, as Shinoda does, the Kantei is in control and foreign policy has become a top-down effort.

Shinoda goes too far in his claim because bureaucrats still monopolize information collection, analysis, and dissemination, the fact that the Cabinet Secretariat is still populated by seconded officials, and the fact that sectionalism still plagues the

Cabinet Secretariat’s ability to formulate policies and project its authority vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. Instead, it is more plausible to believe that while significant institutional improvements in the authority and capabilities of the Kantei have been made, the extent to which the potential of its power can be utilized depends on the premier 6 and his relationship with the bureaucracy. When bureaucratic decision-makers share a consensus, they will be cohesive. The more the premier’s beliefs are in sync with these beliefs held by bureaucratic decision-makers, the more the Kantei will work effectively and the premier will be able to exercise tremendous policy initiative and leadership. When

6 Eda and Ryuzaki (2002, 51) make a similar argument concerning the crisis management system in place. 280

bureaucratic decision-makers are not cohesive, or if the premier does not share these

beliefs, then the power of the Kantei will be constrained.

So What? Understanding the reasons behind the changes in Japan’s use of the SDF is important for scholars of Japan as well as the discipline of political science. For political science, my research provides a convincing argument for how opposition parties can affect government policies. Additionally, it confirms conclusions in the political psychology literature that decision-makers learn from ‘big’ events but individuals who do not experience first-hand learn the lessons at a slower pace. Also, it questions the argument that states cannot control their reputation. Finally, my focus on veto players and decision-makers’ beliefs provides a plausible explanation for why foreign policies change. This is applicable to the study of foreign policy change in any country.

For scholars of Japan, my findings provide counter-arguments to some of the recent arguments dominating the study of Japan. Specifically, my findings question the conclusion that Japan’s behavior can be described as normalizing as well as the argument that Japan has ‘crossed the Rubicon.’ Similarly, it disagrees with the conclusion that the grand strategy that has guided Japanese foreign policy throughout the postwar era, known as the Yoshida Doctrine, is being re-considered. Finally, supporting Midford (2006), I argue that Japanese public opinion plays a vital role in constraining change in Japan’s security related policies.

Political Science Opposition Parties Can Affect Government Policies Although common sense tells us opposition parties holding a minority number of seats in a democracy should not be able to veto policies of a government that holds a majority, Chapter Two introduced examples where opposition parties have played an

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important role in Britain (Daniels, 1998), Germany (Rathbun, 2006) and Japan

(Mochizuki, 1982; Pempel, 1975). My research confirms that opposition parties do have

an important role to play in vetoing government policies. In 1990, despite the LDP

holding a one-party majority government, the JSP was able to veto policy proposals that included the SDF. Importantly, this influence was not limited to bills introduced in the legislature but extended to policy proposals that were executive orders. However, in 2003 the DPJ was unable to exercise the same veto power over policies. This difference in ability of the JSP and DPJ to exercise veto power highlights a more general question that

I believe this research provides a convincing answer: Under what conditions are opposition parties able to exercise veto power over government policies?

Based on my research, the main difference between the ability of the JSP and DPJ to constrain government foreign policy was the condition of division or consensus amongst decision-makers within government and lawmakers within the ruling party or parties. Common sense tells us that leaders of a government will face opposition parties that challenge the government’s policies. But in parliamentary systems, the party or parties that form governments generally tend to hold a majority of seats in parliament.

This means leaders should not have to be sensitive to opposition. But this research has highlighted that government leaders must consider possible opposition to their policies most immediate to them from within government. As evident in the Gulf War case, when divisions within central leadership existed, this significantly enhanced the influence of the JSP over policy. Under these conditions, the JSP was able to ‘align’ with important actors in the LDP and bureaucracy because their message of opposition resonated. The result was a government under siege both externally and internally and forced to respond

282

to the opposition. In 2003, a consensus existed amongst government decision-makers and ruling party lawmakers. Under these conditions, the DPJ’s message of opposition fell on deaf ears. The result was the government only faced external opposition. In this situation, what we would expect of an opposition holding a minority of seats occurred. This confirms Hagan (1993) and Hilsman (1967 7) that foreign policy decision-makers are most sensitive to challenges from within government. Government leaders have to be vigilant about possible opposition both internally and externally because if it exists in the former, the latter will matter.

Individuals Learn from Big Events In Chapter Two I argued that there are two ways individuals’ beliefs can change: gradual and sudden. I also argued that dramatic and far-reaching change rarely occurs, but it does occur. Many scholars have argued that such type of change occurs when individuals have a high-impact emotional experience, such as catastrophes, wars, or unanticipated failures (Kuklick, 1970; Rosenau and Holsti, 1983; Roskin, 1974; Russett,

1975; Stein, 1994). This is similar to Jervis’s (1976) observation that decision-makers learn the most from events if they had important consequences for one’s nation. 8 The emotional tidal wave of shock or failure is the mechanism by which existing beliefs that are believed to have led to the catastrophe or failure are discredited and collapse. The lesson learned forms the basis of a new belief. Although the Gulf War did not involve

Japan militarily, it was a high-impact emotional experience for Japan because of the trauma sparked by the unanticipated failure. The steady flow of criticism of Japan’s behavior called Japan’s reputation into question. If other states viewed Japan negatively, especially its ally the US, Japanese decision-makers believed the country risked being

7 Hilsman, 1967, 561. 8 Jervis, 1976, 239-271. 283

isolated. My findings that decision-makers’ beliefs changed due to the Gulf War Trauma, or the “Iraqi Shock” (Purrington, 1992), supports the argument that high-impact events matter for changing beliefs.

Additionally, my findings support the observations by Jervis (1976 9) and Reiter

(1996) that decision-makers learn the most from events if they are experienced first-hand.

My research found that while decision-makers and lawmakers involved in the policy- making process in 1990-91 experienced a rapid change in their beliefs concerning SDF dispatch as a direct result of the Gulf War experience, the public did not (below). Despite

Japan being criticized harshly and consistently, and therefore its reputation being called into question, it is interesting that all Japanese did not change their beliefs at the same speed. This supports the argument that first-hand experience affects learning compared to those who do not experience it first-hand.

While my findings support the argument that individuals learn lessons from big events, why did decision-makers learn the particular lesson on the need to provide visible, human contributions in the form of SDF dispatch? I noted in Chapter Two that the lesson decision-makers could have drawn was one of isolationism due to the harsh criticisms and their policies not being appreciated by the international community. But they did not.

Instead, they learned the lesson to avoid the policies that failed. This precluded isolationism as an option. But why did decision-makers not learn the lesson of non- military human contributions? Given its constitution, it would appear this option should have been over-determined. But it was not. Instead, they learned one lesson: the need to provide human contributions in the form of its SDF.

9 Ibid . 284

Theoretical explanations for why decision-makers learn the particular nature of a lesson is a glaring absence in the literature. Based on my findings, I offer a ‘first-cut’ at providing an explanation. I believe decision-makers learned the particular lesson they did due to the clear and consistent feedback they received. International society lambasted

Japan for giving $13 billion and postwar personnel support. As shown in Chapter Three, this criticism was not just from the US, it was global. Global . Because Japan’s reputation mattered for decision-makers, they listened. The feedback they received was consistent: if Japan was to be respected like other states, it had to act like other states and provide human contributions. But Japanese decision-makers interpreted that because other states make contributions with their militaries, Japan had to do the same. Anything less than the

SDF would not be appreciated. Understanding that Japan could not ‘bleed’ like others, the least it could do was ‘sweat’ in non-combat missions. Given the clear feedback, the lesson learned was the need to provide visible, human contributions in the form of the

SDF. This precluded non-SDF contributions. 10

Despite learning this lesson from one experience, Japan has since had multiple occasions to verify the appropriateness of the lesson learned. This began with Cambodia in 1992 and continued throughout the 1990s, culminating with the 2003 Iraq dispatch.

Because the feedback has continuously been positive, there have been no counter-lessons drawn to the Gulf War lesson. Therefore, the process outlined in Chapter Two of success reinforcing existing beliefs is occurring, reinforcing the lesson learned in 1991 on the need to contribute military personnel to international events if Japan is to be respected

10 To reiterate, Japanese decision-makers interpreted appropriate human contribution to mean military contribution. There was no global norm that existed pointing to the necessity to provide military contributions. 285

like other states in the international system. As this lesson is reinforced, slight changes in

the nature of these SDF dispatches occur (below).

Finally, if it is true that the trauma of WWII and all the suffering it entailed

created a wide ranging coalition of individuals holding non-SDF dispatch beliefs, then

my conclusion supports the argument that it took an equally dramatic event in 1990-91 to

displace the lessons learned from that previous war. Scholars writing about the

experience of the Gulf War for Japan have argued that the experience was traumatic and

that it mattered for the trajectory of Japan’s foreign policies. However, the ‘shock’ has

been assumed rather than examined. 11 And to my knowledge, the argument that the Gulf experience represents a displacement of a previous cognitive reference point has not been made. My work on the affects of the Gulf War on Japanese decision-makers’ beliefs and the implications for Japan’s security-related foreign policies therefore fills in that gap.

Reputation Matters I argued in Chapter Two that states care about their reputations. But Jonathan

Mercer (1996) argues that states can do nothing to change their reputations. This is because reputations are ‘owned’ by others. My findings showed that Japanese decision- makers cared that Japan’s efforts were not appreciated. They cared about Japan’s reputation in 1990 and it still matters today. But my findings challenge Mercer’s claims that states cannot control their reputations.

The Gulf War called Japan’s reputation into question. Criticism provided clear feedback on what Japan needed to do if it was to be respected. In the years since,

Japanese governments have made efforts to live up to the lessons it learned. Although not covered in this research, between the MSDF dispatch of 1991 and the SDF dispatch of

11 Examples include Purrington and A.K., 1991 and Purrington, 1992. 286

2003, the Japanese government dispatched the SDF to numerous locations on different

missions. This included International Peace Cooperation Activities (Cambodia,

Mozambique, Rwanda, Golan Heights, East Timor), International Disaster Relief

Activities (Honduras, Turkey, India, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia) and a ‘special measures’

dispatch to the Indian Ocean. Because demonstrating one’s reputation is difficult, we

have to be creative to demonstrate if a state has successfully improved its reputation. I

point to two examples (acknowledging that these do not necessarily demonstrate

causation). First, since Japan began to send its SDF overseas to participate in UN PKOs

and other non-UN activities, it has not experienced criticism as it did in 1990-91. Instead,

Figure 6.1: American's Trust in Japan 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20

% ofRespondents % 10 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year of Survey A lot of trust Somewhat trust Don't trust that much No trust at all

it has been praised for its efforts, even in countries where the Imperial Army once ruled

(i.e. Cambodia, Indonesia). Second, remembering polls showed a deepening distrust and

dislike for Japan during the Gulf War, when we look at subsequent polls to see what

Americans think of Japan we see that Japan’s stock has changed considerably. Figure 6.1

shows by 2000 over 70% of Americans trusted Japan. 12 If we can accept these as

evidence that Japan’s behavior has led to a reduction in criticism and an increase in what

12 Yomiuri Shimbun , December 29, 2000 (1, 24); November 30, 2001 (1, 26, 27); December 5, 2002 (2, 26, 27); December 12, 2003 (1, 14, 15). 287

others think of it, then we can draw a tentative conclusion that Japan has successfully improved its reputation. I stop at tentative because countries like China and Korea still hold a negative reputation of Japan despite repeated attempts to apologize and acknowledge past transgressions. More work needs to be done on this point.

Better Understanding Why Foreign Policies Change Because dominant approaches in IR and comparative politics failed to provide consistent explanations to understanding Japan’s changed foreign policies, I employed an approach that assumed “ideas alone cannot explain any outcome; they must be understood…in terms of the political process by which they are selected.” 13

Understanding this political process meant having to focus equally on the beliefs of decision-makers and the institutional entities that held veto power. Other scholars focusing on different geographical areas have had success in employing this approach to explaining foreign policy change (Farnham, 1990; Goldstein, 1988; 1989; Mendelson,

1993; Risse-Kappen, 1994; Snyder, 1987-1988), but no one has attempted to do so for

Japan. The general conclusion of my research is that when decision-makers holding new beliefs have access to the policy-making agenda and the new policy ideas that they advocate are not vetoed by bureaucratic or political entities, then policy change can and will occur. The approach proved capable of explaining the causal mechanism behind when, why and how Japan’s policies changed. For scholars who are not interested in

Japan but are interested in explaining why foreign policies change in other countries, this approach is useful. This is because it highlights the foreign policy-making process by focusing on the interaction of the beliefs of decision-makers and the institutional entities within which they exist.

13 Mendelson, 1993, 327. 288

There is a need to conceptualize the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ a country may choose to

change its foreign policy. A singular focus on institutional or political entities emphasizes

the ‘how;’ while a singular focus on the beliefs of decision-makers emphasizes the ‘why.’

Neither alone provides sufficient explanations because without the other, they miss the

dynamics of the policy-making process. It is this process that is important for studying

foreign policies because it is where policies are proposed based on one’s beliefs and

where policies are vetoed by entities. After all, beliefs do not equal policies. Politics is

the process by which beliefs become policy. And to do this, we have to seriously consider

the bureaucratic and political entities that have the ability to veto these policy ideas. Only

when we treat these equally can we answer important questions for foreign policy

change: Where did the idea for a new policy originate? What were the competing ideas?

Why did Idea X succeed/fail in becoming New Policy A as opposed to Idea Y or Z? Why

did Idea X succeed/fail in Time A versus Time B?

Japan Scholars The bursting of Japan’s bubble in 1990 and subsequent ‘lost decade’ coincided with the rise of China (militarily and economically) as well as an increasingly bellicose

North Korea. This combination led to a rapid shift of attention away from Japan. The shift mirrored closures of Japan-related desks in think tanks and government agencies as well as academic posts throughout the US. However, it would be a mistake to project

Japan’s past 20 years as an image of its future. As such, there are questions that, while important to Japan scholars, should also be considered important to scholars studying

East Asia and IR in general.

289

Is Japan ‘normalizing?’ I argued the logic of Neorealism does not help us understand Japan’s different policies. I also argued in Chapter One that more widely used variants of Neorealism, such as balance of power, are not applicable to explain Japan’s behavior because Japan is not a great power. Putting aside these arguments, it is necessary to address a growing body of literature that looks at Japan’s behavior over the past two decades and argues it is normalizing (Hughes, 2004a; Hughes, 2004b; Pyle, 2007; Samuels, 2007). The argument, simply stated, says that Japan is “…moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive or ‘normal’ military power”14 and “…is preparing to become a major player in the strategic struggles of the twenty-first century.” 15 This argument advocates the view that “Japan is intensifying its determination to carve out a more prominent military security role, both regionally and globally, to the extent that it may break with past domestic and international constraints.” 16 If true, then it is certain to alarm China and

Korea and lead to a potential arms race in the region and increase the chance for conflict.

If ‘normalizing’ means becoming more assertive or carving out regional and global security roles, then based on my findings, it is highly questionable that Japan is

‘normalizing.’ First, when we look at the duties and missions of the SDF, we see significant constraints. The SDF remain restricted to non-combat missions and remain limited to using force only for the defense of Japan or for individual self-defense.

Japanese troops cannot fight alongside foreign troops and they cannot participate in collective self-defense. These are all off limits. What they can do, and what they did in

Iraq, is purify water, help with refugee assistance and repair infrastructure damaged by

14 Hughes, 2004a, 18. 15 Pyle, 2007, 2. 16 Hughes, 2004a, 14-15. 290

war, such as schools, bridges, and roads. Yet, if this is the ‘best’ that the SDF can do it is far from a state becoming more assertive and it is doubtful how these activities will succeed at carving out a regional and global security role.

Similarly, for these missions to occur there is a continuing need to pass Special

Measures legislation or fulfill the 5 principles in the UN PKO Law. Because SDF dispatch remains dependent on separate laws or the fulfillment of principles, greater expansion of SDF activities are blocked by legal firewalls. And when we consider that constitutional interpretation still limits SDF missions to purely defensive activities, this legal firewall becomes an even greater obstacle for a more assertive role for the SDF. A significant break from these legal firewalls is necessary to begin changing the duties and missions of the SDF that would enable it to be more assertive.

Second, the SDF have strict weapons’ use standards that prevent any activity beyond their defensive posture. This will prove problematic if the country wants to be more assertive and carve out a larger role for itself. Until the SDF were dispatched to the

Indian Ocean in 2001, SDF personnel were limited to using their weapons only to protect themselves. Since then, SDF have been allowed to use weapons to protect themselves as well as ‘those who have come under their control.’ This has been taken to mean refugees, not soldiers because of the risk of violating the prohibition of exercising collective self- defense. As long as this remains, it is unimaginable that the SDF will be able to be used as an instrument for Japan to be more assertive. Even more so when we consider that the weapons and equipment the SDF owns is useful for self-defense, not offensive missions.

For example, in Iraq the equipment included “…pistols, rifles and machine guns…[and] access to recoilless rifles, light anti-tank munitions, and wheeled armored personnel

291

carriers.” 17 Even Japan’s March 2009 commissioning of the DDH 181 Hyuga ‘Helicopter

Destroyer,’ capable of carrying 4 helicopters on deck, is limited given that Japan does not maintain a carrier battle group that would be necessary if it was to be used offensively.

While such purchases make headlines, they lack the provocative punch when examined further.

Finally, if Japan were normalizing, we would expect increases in military personnel as well as sizable increases in its military budget. And yet, this is not the case.

Appendix 6 shows that aggregate defense expenditures after the Cold War gradually increased until 1998, at which point decreased, stayed stagnant, and then spun into a free- fall that continues to this day. This is the exact opposite of what we should expect to see if Japan wanted to be more assertive and carve out a role for itself. When we look at defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Appendix 7), the same trend is apparent.

The amount of money the government is spending on defense continues to remain below

1% of GDP. Finally, Japan is not making efforts to bulk up its military. Appendix 8 shows that despite the end of the Cold War and an increasingly threatening Northeast

Asia, the number of Japanese under arms is actually decreasing. Again, exactly the opposite if Japan was attempting to carve out a bigger role for itself in the region or in the world.

In the end, I do not believe the changes in Japan’s policies between the Gulf and

Iraq is evidence that Japan is ‘normalizing.’ As such, China and Korea have less to worry about than some provocative journalists lead us to believe. That said, given the strengthening of China’s military accompanied by its diplomatic offensive globally, continuing provocation by North Korea and unresolved territorial issues between China-

17 Hughes, 2004b, 436. 292

Taiwan and ROK-DPRK, Japan does face a future of security threats and it is unlikely that it will passively sit and watch events unfold. While I disagree Japanese behavior overseas is evidence that Japan is ‘normalizing,’ I do accept that Japanese behavior in

Northeast Asia can be explained by balance of power neorealist logic. This includes

Japan’s decision to participate in BMD research, passing the August 1999 Shuhen Jitai

Law 18 and the three Contingency Laws in June 2003, revising defense guidelines with the

US in 1997, and reaching out to Australia for a security pact in March 2007. Given increasing threats in the region, Japan’s security policies have been adjusted to secure

Japan (Samuels, 2007). Japan . These are not ‘stepping stones’ to a normal Japan that wants to carve out a greater role for itself. As such, I think it is wrong to connect the logic behind Japan’s response to these regional threats to its SDF dispatches outside of

Northeast Asia. This is because the logic at work behind the two is different. In Northeast

Asia, it is security while elsewhere, it is fulfilling its international obligations as a responsible member of international society.

Has Japan Crossed the Rubicon? Even if we agree that Japan is not normalizing, do its actions signify enough of a break with past practice that forces us to declare that Japan has crossed the Rubicon?

Since Japan first discussed dispatching the SDF in the fall of 1990 and continuing into the present, anytime Japan designs a new mission for the SDF provocative journalists and scholars 19 in Japan, China, Korea, and even America raise the warning flag that Japan has

‘crossed the Rubicon.’ In April 1991 the South Korean Tong-a Ilbo evening daily

18 The Shuhen Jitai Law is short for the 周辺事態に際して我が国の平和及び安全を確保するための措 置に関する法律, which is Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. 19 For example, Royer (1993) argues that the debates during the Gulf War were such an event, enabling an expansion of Executive authority “to better accommodate Japan’s growing war-making potential” (752). 293

accused Japan of crossing the Rubicon with its minesweeper dispatch. 20 In recent years, the argument has been seen more frequently in response to the government’s dispatch to the Indian Ocean (Miller, 2002; Maeda, 2002) and its Iraqi dispatch. 21 While such statements are provocative, they are not true.

Asking whether Japan has crossed the Rubicon focuses on whether Japan has made a significant break with past practices. Implicit in this is the idea that once the break occurs, it sets a course that is not easily changed. Taking an extreme example,

Japan’s sneak attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 set Japan on the course to war with America and closed off the negotiations that were occurring in Washington. Once the attack began, there was no going back to peaceful relations. Defeat in a costly war and two atomic weapons was the price Japan had to pay to go back to the other side of the Rubicon and resume peaceful relations with the US. Once the Rubicon is crossed, it is not easy to go back.

For postwar Japanese behavior, ‘past practices’ has been defined incredibly low so nearly any change is interpreted as a sign of a radical leap. For example, setting the definition as Article 9’s restriction to not maintain ‘land, sea and air forces’ meant that the purchase of even one piece of military equipment crossed the Rubicon. Defining it as the pattern of relying on monetary contributions instead of military personnel meant that the 1991 minesweeper dispatch was the Rubicon crossing. Because of these ‘low bar’ definitions, Japan has been accused of crossing the Rubicon since the National Police

20 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Regional Reaction to Sending of Minesweepers; Mixed Reaction in South Korea to Japan’s Dispatch of Minesweepers,” April 27, 1991. 21 Herald Asahi , January 27, 2004, “Japan Crossing Rubicon with Iraqi Mission”; Richard Halloran, “Japan Crosses the Rubicon.” Japan Times , February 7, 2004. 294

Reserve was established in 1950 and has continued to the present. In its most provocative

form, Japan is accused of remilitarizing. 22

What needs to be made is an appropriate definition of Rubicon. Instead of

symbolic definitions of purchasing equipment or the SDF being dispatched abroad, the

definition should focus on content. Since its establishment in 1954, the SDF has

maintained a non-offensive mission. Japan cannot use force outside of its own defense.

This is the manifestation of the robustness of the Nuanced Variant of the anti-militarist

norm addressed above. In Japanese territory, this takes the form of a strict defensive-

defense mission (専守防衛). Overseas, this takes the form of humanitarian missions

(both UN and ‘special measures’) and UN operations. Despite the expansion of the

geographical area in which it operates, this key element of abiding strictly to non-offense

missions has not changed. If international contributions become a main component of the

SDF mission, this would not signify the crossing of the Rubicon if it stayed within the

non-offense scope. Even Japan’s refueling operations in the Indian Ocean to NATO

forces and its March 2009 dispatch of MSDF vessels to assist in anti-piracy operations

off the coast of Somalia remain non-offensive and firmly under the mantel of UN

legitimacy (further evidence of the strength of the Nuanced Variant of the anti-militarist

norm). What would be a sign that Japan has crossed the Rubicon would be turning the

TV on and seeing Japanese troops fighting side-by-side with American troops in combat

22 The Seoul Shinmun and Dong-A Ilbo both ran headlines in October 1990 claiming Japan was militarizing because of discussions in the Diet on the UN Peace Cooperation Bill. The former headline read “The rebirth of Japanese militarism” while the latter read “Framing the legal status for the remilitarization of Japan.” (Japan Economic Newswire, “Asian News; S. Korean Dailies Blast Japanese SDF Dispatch Bill,” October 17, 1990). And looking at the National Police Agency’s increased surveillance of facilities throughout Japan following the SDF’s dispatch to Iraq in 2004, Jong-Heon Lee interprets the move as part of Japan’s remilitarization efforts. Jong-Heon Lee, “Rising Prospect of Japan Remilitarization,” United Press International, March 5, 2004. 295

missions in a foreign land. This action would completely break with more than 50 years

of non-offense behavior.

Based off only what has been presented in this research, Japan’s dispatch of three branches of the SDF to wartime Iraq appears to be a huge deviation from past practices given its inability to do so during the Gulf Crisis. Given only these two cases, it is understandable for someone to draw the conclusion that Japan has crossed the Rubicon in

2003 because the differences between the two cases appear to be enormous. However, remembering that defining the Rubicon simply by a symbolic action, we set the definition too low. When the GSDF was dispatched to Iraq in 2004, its missions focused on three areas: medical services, water purification and supply, and reconstruction of public facilities. So even though an ongoing insurgency continued to destabilize Iraq, the mission of the GSDF remained firmly rooted in past practice. It was a postwar, humanitarian reconstruction mission, not a combat mission. Because the SDF continued to adhere tightly to non-offense missions, no Rubicon was crossed. Legal firewalls remain that prevent such a crossing from occurring: limited, albeit extendable, time regulated dispatches; dispatches require Diet approval; dispatches limited to non-combat zones and non-combat roles; special legislation required to dispatch if not dispatched under UN PKO Law; and if dispatched under UN PKO Law, 5 principles need to be fulfilled. Given these firewalls, the Rubicon is not bound to be crossed at any point in the near future.

Is the Yoshida Doctrine Still Japan’s Underlying Foreign Policy Strategy? The next question is what effect, if any, do Japan’s changing security-related foreign policies mean for the Yoshida Doctrine. The Yoshida Doctrine is named after PM

Shigeru Yoshida, who was premier during the time Japan regained its sovereignty after

296

WWII. In an effort to quickly recover after the war, Yoshida made a strategic bargain to place priority on economic development instead of Japan’s military profile. In exchange for allowing US bases in Japan, Japan would rely on the US alliance for military protection. This bargain of prioritizing Japanese economic considerations and eschewing military power in exchange for US security guarantees became the Yoshida Doctrine, though it was never an official doctrine like the Truman Doctrine. Nevertheless, the

Yoshida Doctrine shaped Japan’s foreign policy throughout the Cold War and became its de facto foreign policy grand strategy.

Despite arguments that Japan is “be[ing] forced to discard many of the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine,” 23 that the Yoshida Doctrine is “unraveling,” 24 or that Japanese leaders are searching for a new foreign policy doctrine (Nakanishi, 2003) or grand strategy (Samuels, 2007), evidence supports the conclusion that the Yoshida Doctrine remains essentially intact. This is supported by Green (2001 25 ) and Mochizuki (2007).

Even though Japan’s security-related foreign policies changed from no dispatches prior to

1991 to dispatch during an insurgency in 2003, these changes have not altered the fundamental tenets of the Doctrine. As evident from Appendix 6, Japan defense spending continues to remain low, demonstrating that it continues to eschew building up its own military power. Instead, it continues to rely on the US (nuclear) security umbrella in exchange for allowing the US to maintain bases throughout Japan. While the motivations of Japan’s elite are no longer focused on ‘economic development,’ Japan continues to prioritize economic interests over military interests, as evident by China’s prominent role in Japan’s economy despite concerns over its military threat. And even though Japan has

23 Hughes, 18. 24 Pyle, 2007, 290-299. 25 See Chapter 1. 297

increasingly dispatched the SDF beginning in 1991, this has never been as a means to

hedge against the US alliance. On the contrary, the alliance has been strengthened

through an array of agreements over the past decade (Appendix 5). Therefore, no matter

how active Japan is in its political and diplomatic agenda, it is not challenging the

Doctrine. The basic premise of allowing US bases in Japan and relying on its US ally for

its security remain, thereby allowing Japan to maintain minimum defense spending. This

is unchanged from Yoshida’s time.

My argument about decision-makers and lawmakers converging on a common

pro-SDF dispatch belief is not evidence of a new Grand Strategy in Japanese foreign

policy. The convergence of beliefs is an agreement on small-S strategy, not large-S

Grand Strategy. My research does not lead me to conclude that decision-makers are

rethinking how closely to ally with the US, whether to continue relying on the US

security umbrella, whether to inject increasingly larger amounts of money into the

military budget, or whether they should prioritize military concerns over economic ones.

Nor is there any evidence that any political leaders are attempting to build a base of

support for an alternative strategic vision to the Doctrine. 26 Instead, my research leads me

to conclude that decision-makers learned a lesson on the importance of making visible

international contributions. Taking Japan’s continued reliance on the US and Japan’s

minimal defense role as the baseline for Japanese security, decision-makers simply have sorted out what role Japan should play in events that do not directly affect its national interests.

26 Green, 2001, 270. 298

While it is obvious that change in Japanese security-related foreign policies has occurred, this change does not represent a “major reorientation of the nation.” 27 Instead, this change represents debate about the specifics of what is possible within the parameters set by the Yoshida Doctrine. It is not a debate about the parameters themselves. Taking the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine as a baseline and setting the use of force as prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution as the maximum constraint, Japanese decision-makers have spent the entire postwar period (including the present) fleshing out what is permissible between these two. It started with the establishment of the SDF itself and moved into debates over burden-sharing and modernizing the SDF. With the dispatch of MSDF minesweepers in a postwar operation, these debates progressed further on roles and missions, getting as far as wartime GSDF troops in 2004. Yet, the constant throughout is the fact that it still has not crossed the Article 9 constraint and until it does, all operations fall within the parameters set by the Doctrine. As such, this incremental movement on what the SDF can and cannot do or where they can or cannot be dispatched does not represent ‘slicing’ (Samuels, 2007) away at the Doctrine, it represents its continued durability. The question that is relevant is how much more ‘fleshing out’ is left? Tsuchiyama (2007) is correct that perhaps the constitution is stretched to its doctrinal limits.

Why Haven’t Policies Changed as Quickly as Decision-Makers’ Beliefs Have? What should be evident from my argument is that despite decision-makers and lawmakers converging on pro-SDF dispatch beliefs, we do not see a sudden ‘bursting out’ of SDF usage. Because those responsible for formulating SDF policies had converged on pro-SDF dispatch beliefs, we should expect to see a similarly rapid change

27 Pyle, 2007, 16-17. 299

in policies. Instead, it took roughly 12 years to dispatch ground units to a country with an

ongoing insurgency. And despite arguments in 1990 for the SDF to be responsible for

logistical support for US troops in the area of transportation, in 2003 this debate still

brewed. And despite its inclusion in the Basic Plan, the transportation of weapons and

ammunition is still not possible as a duty for the SDF. Why? Why have policies not

changed as rapidly as decision-makers’ beliefs?

Although I explicitly argue that the JSP was responsible for vetoing policies that

included the SDF, this argument holds true until the early 1990s. The Gulf War was

really the last great hurrah for the JSP. With electoral losses in the April 1991 local

elections, the JSP thereafter experienced gradual, then rapid, decline. What proved to be

such a potent veto player throughout all of postwar Japan was no longer able. And yet,

despite its decline and the chaos in Japanese politics that followed the LDP’s fall from

power in 1993, policies still did not rapidly shift to reflect decision-makers’ convergence

on pro-SDF dispatch beliefs.

The reason why, as well as why the JSP lost its power, was because of the

electorate. Because the Japanese public no longer agreed with the ideological message of

the JSP, the JSP’s message did not resonate, thereby making it impossible to enflame

opposition to government policies outside of the Diet. But this did not mean the public

arrived on the same convergence of pro-SDF dispatch beliefs as elites. While “the

experience of the Gulf War…was so humiliating in the eyes of the majority of

Japanese,”28 leading them to move away from uncompromising pacifist opposition, they did not change as quickly nor result in the same strong pro-SDF dispatch beliefs. Two polls conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun confirm that prior to the Gulf War, a majority of

28 Nakanishi, 2004, 106. 300

Japanese strongly opposed dispatching the SDF abroad to participate in PKOs. 29 But despite the Gulf War experience and rapid change in beliefs amongst decision-makers and lawmakers, polls conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office (Figure 6.2) show that it was not until 1997 that a majority of the public came to agree to the SDF participating in

PKOs. 30 Figure 6.3 shows that until 2000, the public did not believe Japan’s main role in the world was to help with the maintenance of world peace. Instead, they believed it was to deal with global issues, like environmental problems. 31

Figure 6.2: Views About SDF Participation in PKOs 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 % ofRespondents % 10 0 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003

Year of Survey

Agree If I had to choose, agree If I had to choose, oppose Oppose

29 Yomiuri Shimbun , December 24, 1984 (1, 4) and March 8, 1987 (2): Is it desirable to make it possible for the SDF to be dispatched abroad if it is for UN PKO activities? Or is it desirable to stay with the current situation of not allowing overseas dispatch at all? 1984: UN option: 23.3%; Current situation option: 63.6%; 1987: UN option: 22.5%; Current situation option: 62.5%. 30 Naikaku-fu, Jietai-boei mondai ni kansuru seron chosa , various years. See: www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index2.html For the poll’s full results, see Appendix 9. 31 Naikaku-fu, Gaiko ni kansuru seron chosa , various years. See: www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index2.html For the poll’s full results, including the other answers, see Appendix 10. 301

Figure 6.3: Japan's Role in International Society (Top 2 Answers) 60

50

40

30

20 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 % ofRespondents %

Year of Survey

Global environmental problems Maintenance of international peace

Because the Japanese public gradually began to accept the need to participate in the security realm and agreed to the SDF participating in PKOs, this made it difficult for the JSP to enflame opposition. But precisely because of this gradual movement, it also meant that decision-makers could not move as rapidly with policies as their beliefs. If decision-makers new beliefs represented the ‘push’ on policies to include new proposals for SDF dispatch, the public represented the ‘pull’ so that these changes did not proceed too rapidly. The result has meant the public being able to significantly constrain the speed of policy change, which has meant policies have changed gradually and incrementally.

This finding supports Midford (2006).

The public’s ‘pull’ is augmented by Komeito. Although my findings argue that

Komeito lawmakers also experienced the Gulf War Shock and, in turn, led to a convergence on pro-SDF dispatch beliefs amongst its members, the Komeito is more conditional in its support of SDF policies. This is because of having to consider its lay organization, Soka Gakkai, when deciding policy stances. The result of the Komeito go- slow approach has meant, according to Secretary General Fuyushiba, that Komeito plays

302

a role of “applying a break on the government from going too far, if not, there may be cases of [the government] pressing only the gas pedal.” 32

Understanding the role played by public opinion and Komeito in damping the

speed of policy change is crucial to understanding the gradual pace of change in the

nature of SDF dispatches. It is this process of push and pull that explains why it took 12

years to move from postwar MSDF minesweeper dispatch to GSDF dispatch during an

ongoing insurgency. Over the course of 12 years, government decision-makers would air

new proposals. Only after the public accepted these, do they become a new baseline from

which to air newer proposals. Unlike the change in beliefs, this process of change in the

nature of dispatches has been gradual. But despite the changing nature of dispatches, all

missions remain limited to not using force (evidence of the robustness of the Nuanced

Version of the anti-militarism norm).

It is also important to understand this role by public opinion and Komeito so as to

avoid drawing the wrong conclusion from outlier statements by Japanese bureaucrats or

lawmakers. On numerous occasions, comments have been interpreted as evidence that

Japan is normalizing or making its leap across the Rubicon. This includes JDA DG Hosei

Norota’s comment on March 3, 1999 that Japan could launch defensive air strikes against

North Korean missile sites without contravening constitutional prohibitions,

Parliamentary Defense Vice Minister Shingo Nishimura suggesting in October 1999 that

Japan’s failure to consider acquiring nuclear weapons left Japan vulnerable to ‘rape,’ 33 former LDP Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa stating in April 2002 that Japan could possess ‘thousands of nuclear warheads’ if it desired, then-Foreign Minister Taro Aso in

32 Asahi Shimbun , March 15, 2003, 4. 33 Hughes, 2004a, 93. 303

October 2006 saying it may be time to start discussions about nuclear armament, and

Shoichi Nakagawa’s comment in April 2009 that Japan should possess nuclear weapons as a deterrent against North Korea. Journalists have a tendency to focus on such comments and interpret them as fact. And yet, taking one outlier politician’s comment on nuclear weapons to extrapolate a “recent surging mood among the conservative politicians to lead Japan into nuclearization” or that “some Japanese politicians [are] trying to lead the nation into nuclearization” 34 completely ignores the role public opinion and Komeito play in moderating change, as well as all the legal firewalls outlined above.

As long as public opinion and Komeito continue to play this role, any comment involving rapid change of policy, no matter how technically or legally possible it may be, does not mean that the government can or will pursue it.

A Word to Policymakers Japanese decision-makers learned how to ‘sweat’ from the traumatic experience of the Gulf War. By 2003, it was evident that a coalition of decision-makers holding pro-

SDF dispatch dominated both the bureaucracy and the ruling parties. What this research does not cover is the intervening years. As noted above, it took 12 years to dispatch ground units to a country with an ongoing insurgency, albeit in a non-combat role. This could not have succeeded in 1991. What is more, the Iraq dispatch represented a dispatch not under a UN flag. This broke with the pattern set by dispatches under the 1992 PKO

Law. What happened in between 1991 and 2003 was a series of years of incremental movements, the filling in of the parameters of the Yoshida Doctrine argued above. While decision-makers pushed, the public and Komeito pulled back. Once a new mission succeeded, it became a new baseline for future missions. The 2003 attempt to transport

34 Yonhap, “Rising Militarism: Japan’s Talk of Nuclear Armament Fuels Crisis” October 20, 2006. 304

ammunition and weapons is the latest example of this push and pull dynamic. Japan

appears to be far from 1990. With the JSP no longer a veto player, the DPJ unable and, at

times, unwilling to veto policies, and decision-makers and lawmakers sharing pro-SDF

dispatch beliefs, it appears that Japan can and will continue to make substantial

international contributions. But it would be a mistake if policymakers in Asia and the US draw this conclusion.

It is true that Japanese decision-makers want to actively be involved as a responsible member of international society. They no longer want to sit on the sidelines,

as they have been accused of doing in the past. But the basic objective of Japanese

foreign policy remains, according to former Vice Foreign Minister Yutaka Kawashima,

ensuring the nation’s security and prosperity. 35 Japan will continue to dispatch its SDF

abroad because of the broad consensus reached amongst decision-makers to fulfill

Japan’s international obligations. But while Japan’s SDF dispatch to Iraq may be

interpreted as establishing a precedent of cooperation outside of the UN framework, it

does not mean that future dispatches will continue in this form. Nor does it represent a

“potentially radical precedent” for Japanese policies. 36

While Japanese policies have changed and the SDF is dispatched overseas,

decision-makers will continue to root SDF dispatches in some manner of UN legitimacy

because of the belief in the importance of Japan fulfilling its international obligations.

While critics can question the legitimacy of the resolutions for Iraq, the fact remains that

decision-makers made efforts for dispatches to be seen as having UN legitimacy. Given

the need to cloak missions in UN legitimacy, decision-makers are provided with “opt-out

35 Kawashima, 2003, 1. 36 Hughes, 2004b, 430. 305

clauses to escape involvement in US-led operations that it does not interpret as having a

strong UN mandate.” 37 If the US wants Japanese cooperation, it needs to focus on assembling some form of UN legitimacy. American decision-makers should also understand that as important Japan’s cooperation with the US-led operations in the Indian

Ocean and Iraq were to bilateral relations, they have simultaneously enhanced Japan’s voice and maneuverability in international affairs. 38 This means that the US should be prepared for Japan to say ‘no’ to a mission that it does not feel is an international obligation or in its national interest. Having said ‘yes’ to an increasing number of missions over the past two decades has given Japan the right to say ‘no’ if it chooses. 39

Nor should America expect rapid increases in the type of cooperation. It took

Japan roughly 12 years to move from postwar minesweeper dispatch to putting ‘boots on the ground,’ albeit a non-combat zone. Despite the convergence on pro-SDF dispatch beliefs amongst decision-makers, Japanese policies still require broad consensus from the public. Given the public’s continued emphasis on domestic security over international contributions (Figure 6.4 40 ), and that Figure 6.3 shows the public reverted back to seeing

Japan’s main role in the world as dealing with global issues (like environmental problems) in 2006, it is likely that new policies for expanded foreign involvement will be constrained by the public and Komeito, thereby continuing to temper the speed of change. This does not mean that Japan will not sweat but it is certainly not ready to bleed.

Instead, Japan’s contributions will remain the same: no use of force beyond the defense of Japan. Anything that falls outside the realm of using force to defend Japan is off limits.

37 Hughes, 2004b, 436. 38 Mochizuki, 2007, 12. 39 Mochizuki, 1997, 36. 40 Naikaku-fu, Jietai-boei mondai ni kansuru seron chosa , various years. See: www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index2.html 306

Figure 6.4: Future Responsibility of SDF 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 % ofRespondents % 10 0 1963 1965 1967 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009

Year of Survey National Defense Domestic Security International Contribution Domestic Disaster Relief Cooperation with Public Welfare

Japan will continue to limit the nature of its missions to humanitarian or reconstruction

missions. This helps explain why Japan refrains from a bigger footprint in Afghanistan.

Despite having international legitimacy, it is an ongoing conflict and involves the use of

force. Suggestions that the SDF be used for multilateral security missions that require

significant increases in Japan’s power projection capabilities are not likely to happen

(O’Hanlon, 2007). US policymakers need to understand that contrary to the often cited

“Armitage Report,” Japan is not likely to be the UK of Asia in any stretch of the

imagination. 41

Just as the US should not expect too much, Chinese and Korean policymakers

should not read too deeply into Japan’s actions. Japanese decision-makers want to

contribute to international society. They are doing this within the parameters of the

Yoshida Doctrine. While SDF dispatches are attempts to pursue a Japanese foreign policy, it is not a foreign policy independent of the US nor does it represent a ‘normal’

41 The report states, “we see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance ” (3-4). Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000. 307

Japan crossing the Rubicon. Considering all the constraints that bind dispatches, fears of a revival of a 1930’s Japan are far-fetched.

Research Limits, Problems and Where I Go Next Although it appears that Japan has travelled a lot of ground from 1990 to 2003, it should be evident that while much appears to have changed, much has in fact stayed the same. Japan continues to not use force, relies on strictly defensive-defense policies, and acts within the Yoshida Doctrine parameters. There are clear limits on what Japan can do with its SDF. The only thing that changed was the convergence on a common pro-SDF dispatch belief. Because of the Gulf War Trauma, Japanese decision-makers learned how to ‘sweat,’ leading them to advocate policies that included SDF dispatch within strict limitations.

As noted throughout this chapter, the cases covered in this research represent

‘book-ends.’ In this sense, a reader unfamiliar with Japan may come away with a false impression of the change that has occurred. After the 1991 MSDF minesweeper dispatch,

Japan passed legislation enabling participation in UN PKOs, followed by a number of

UN PKO missions, and refueling operations in the Indian Ocean to assist NATO forces in their fight against the Taliban. Thus, a glaring weakness of this research is the structure.

It is not the case that Japan went from no dispatch to ground units without anything in- between; instead, the in-between cases represent gradual, incremental changes. The way I will remedy this is by focusing on key cases that fall between the two cases in this research. Specifically, I will choose Cambodia (1992), East Timor (2002), and the Indian

Ocean (2002). By addressing more cases, I will be able to flesh out the push-pull dynamic argued above and demonstrate why changes in beliefs did not result in rapid changes in policies but instead how each case built upon the previous. I will also be able

308

to bolster my argument by showing whether decision-makers were motivated by the Gulf

War lessons in other cases and whether the JSP/DPJ played similar roles in other cases.

Addressing these in-between cases also enables me address a possible criticism of

my research as it presently stands. I argue that the beliefs of decision-makers changed.

But given the 12 year time difference between my two cases, a legitimate criticism is that

a large number of bureaucrats and politicians had retired by 2003. Given this, policy

differences had less to do with changed beliefs and more to do with a new set of decision-

makers with different beliefs. Examining more cases enables me to show that individuals

who opposed SDF dispatch in 1990-91 later supported it, similar to the representative

examples I presented in Chapter Three. In so doing, this will bolster my argument that

beliefs changed and not just the individuals.

Finally, I realize that my argument about beliefs changing involves not only a

convergence on pro-SDF dispatch beliefs from those holding anti-SDF dispatch beliefs

but also a convergence on the belief of the importance of Japan fulfilling its international obligations. While my research has found little evidence of decision-makers retaining the belief that prioritizes the US-Japan alliance, I do not have a conceptual explanation for why this is the case. One possible explanation is that decision-makers learned that fulfilling international obligations does not equate with US interests. Another possible explanation is that they want Japan’s policies to be seen as independent. As such, while

they still maintain this belief, they simply do not want to vocalize it.

These issues will be addressed as I move forward. Regardless of these outstanding

issues, I have full confidence that the underlying argument presented in this research

accurately explains Japan’s changed policies from the Gulf War to the Iraq War.

309

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Appendices

Appendix 1 : Methodology and Materials Used

Appendix 2 : Administrative Reforms Prior to 1990

Appendix 3 : Administrative Reforms After 1990 and Prior to 2001

Appendix 4 : Electoral Reforms of 1994

Appendix 5 : Important U.S.-Japan Alliance Agreements

Appendix 6: Aggregate Defense Expenditures (1953-2007)

Appendix 7: Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (1953- 2007)

Appendix 8: SDF Personnel (1971-2008)

Appendix 9: PMO Poll on Public Opinion Concerning SDF Participation in PKOs

Appendix 10: PMO Poll on Public Opinion Concerning Japan’s Role in the World

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Appendix 1: Methodology and Materials Used

The research is a comparative static of two Japanese cases across time: the 1990-

91 Gulf Crisis and War and the 2003 Iraq War. Examining both cases, I conducted

process tracing of the decision-making processes over contribution measures. The

purpose of choosing process tracing was to uncover the political-bureaucratic interaction

that determined what options were discussed at each stage, why and when some options

were discarded and why the final policy was chosen. Additionally, it allowed me to

examine how beliefs influenced behavior at each intervening step in the policy process.

Before examining each case, I examined both primary materials concerning the

formal decision-making process (i.e. bureaucratic and organizational charts, laws) and

secondary materials of Japanese foreign policy in general (i.e. journal articles and area-

expert writings on the formal legislative and administrative structures) to understand

where informal power existed during policy proceedings. 1 This helped me understand the

general structure framing decisions for both of my cases. When examining each of my

cases, I was equipped to understand where the veto points existed each step of the way

for a specific policy or bill. This enabled me to follow a bill’s/policy’s origin, where it

changed in the process, why it changed, what motivations and reasoning were used for

supporting and opposing policies, and ultimately the outcome.

Process-tracing seeks to establish the ways in which decision-makers’ beliefs

influenced behavior. To uncover these beliefs throughout each step in this process, I

conducted contextual analysis of decision-makers’ motivations behind their policy

1 Research conducted on LDP, opposition parties, and political realignment include: Park (2001) and Shinoda (1998). Preliminary research conducted on the bureaucracy and its related functions, as well as administrative reform, include: Ahn (1997, 1998); Keehn (1990); Kyogoku (1997); Mishima (1998); and Nakano (1998). 336

preferences. The purpose of contextual analysis was to search for what decision-makers’

thought when considering the event (i.e. Gulf War or Iraq War), what they thought was the best measure with which Japan should respond, and the reason behind this.

Specifically, I searched for decision-makers’ opinions regarding SDF dispatch and their justifications why. Because finding beliefs of individuals requires examining discourse during the decision-making process, I utilized the same sources that Khong (1992) relied on in his work on analogies: public and private records supplemented and confirmed via interviews with participants. The primary materials that I used included: 1) Diet testimony; 2) documents from Diet committees; 3) documents from political parties; 4) documents from MOFA and JDA; and 5) 102 open-ended interviews with decision- makers. Diet testimony was able to be used only when a bill was submitted to the Diet and its contents were being discussed. This primarily meant October and November 1990 for discussions on the UN Peace Cooperation Corps Bill and June and July 2003 for discussions on the Iraq Special Measures Law. The documents I received from the other sources are not openly available to the public and were obtained through various means.

And because public speeches and reports are sometimes intended for public image, I put greater weight on transcripts of private proceedings and intra-/inter-ministerial documents.

Because transcriptions of debates or meetings more often than not detail the formal policy outcomes rather than the process leading to the results, and therefore not always reveal decision-makers’ opinions regarding best policy and why, the main portion of my research relied on 102 open-ended interviews I conducted with decision-makers

and lawmakers who were active in the decision-making process during the Kaifu and

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Koizumi administrations. Similarly, because speeches in parliament are sometimes

intended for public image, I put greater weight on private interviews because I assume

that policymakers have less of an incentive to ‘grandstand,’ thereby more honestly

reflecting the policymakers’ beliefs. My interviews included, but is not limited to, former

prime ministers, ambassadors, Cabinet ministers, senior bureaucrats, party officials,

uniformed SDF officers, and Kantei officials. The complete list of who I interviewed,

how I secured interviews, and what language was used is presented below.

For the same reason I relied on interviews, I supplemented my interviews with

information from Japan’s national newspapers. Japanese newspapers provide detailed

explanations of policymaking, including the discourse that is being used during debates

of specific policies. Not only do these newspapers closely report the opinions and reasons

being used by decision-makers and lawmakers throughout the policy-making process, but they provide detailed coverage of Parliamentary debate, committee meetings in parties and government, and elite interviews conducted by the newspaper. Understanding that

Japanese newspapers are identified with political stances ( Asahi being liberal, Yomiuri being conservative), I corroborated information found in one newspaper against many different newspapers, when possible. However, because I had the best access to past editions of , I utilized this source the most. When reports in the Asahi

were completely against anything else I found elsewhere, I either did not include it or I

tried to confirm the information in subsequent interviews. In my footnotes, I tried to

provide page numbers for newspaper sources. However, most of the English-language,

Japanese newspapers I cite do not have page numbers. This is because the archives from

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which I obtained these sources (Foreign Press Club in Hibiya, Tokyo) did not record page numbers, only dates.

The other secondary source I used was accounts of the two cases in both English and Japanese. This includes both scholarly works and journalist accounts. Similar to cross-checking information I found in newspapers, I integrated questionable elements of these secondary materials into subsequent interviews to confirm or disconfirm its validity before utilizing it in my research. However, if a decision-maker is quoted directly through an interview or through a primary document, I worry less about confirming its validity.

The bulk of my research was conducted during an 18 month period in Japan from

June 2006 to January 2007. From June 2006 until August 2006, I studied Japanese at the

Inter-University Center for Japanese Studies in Yokohama under a FLAS Fellowship.

Although the FLAS is a language fellowship, during this time I took advantage of the

Newspaper Museum to research their archives of past Japanese newspaper publications.

From October 2005 until January 2007, I was a visiting Fulbright Fellow at the

University of Tokyo. It was during this time that I conducted the bulk of my research, utilizing not only the University’s extensive library system but also the National Diet

Library and my location to conduct interviews and obtain materials regarding my cases. I returned to Japan for one week in November 2007 and for three weeks in July 2008 to conduct follow-up research including final interviews.

Case Selection I initially chose to compare the Gulf War and Iraq War due to the constants (i.e.

Iraq, US involvement, percent oil imports) but different outcomes. However, after more than 7 months into my research, I came to realize that perhaps a better comparison would

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have been Japan’s response to the Gulf War and the war against Afghanistan in 2002.

This is because like the Gulf Crisis of 1990, the event came as a surprise to Japanese decision-makers who then had to scramble to respond. Additionally, it also had US involvement and a different outcome compared to the 1990 Gulf Crisis. Even though this comparison would have opened my research up to the criticism that Iraq and Afghanistan are different, I believe that the fundamental condition of surprise would form a solid basis of comparison. Understanding this, the next stage of my research is to broaden the number of cases to include Japan’s response to Cambodia (1992), East Timor (2002) and

Afghanistan (2002). Not only will I better track the gradual changes in the nature of SDF dispatches and the change from the ideological JSP to the pragmatic DPJ, but it will also include Japan’s response to the case that I feel is more similar to the Gulf War in terms of the taking decision-makers off-guard.

Interviews I began the process of interviewing by establishing first, via newspaper accounts, primary materials, and secondary materials what ministries/committees/bureaus played active roles in the policy process for the sub-cases I examined in both of my cases. I then searched these sources to determine what persons in different ministries/parties/institutions were actively involved in the policy process. From this, I created a list of potential interviewees. This list expanded as I continued with my research. It further expanded as I began conducting interviews and interviewees recommended/introduced me to additional people.

I obtained access to interview via two principle methods. The first method, and the method I employed when I first began, was utilizing existing contacts for introductions. This meant Satoshi Morimoto and Takashi Kawakami of Takushoku

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University and Representatives Takuya Tasso (now Governor of Iwate) and Akihisa

Nagashima of the Democratic Party of Japan. As my interviewing progressed, I made

further contacts who I similarly relied on for further introductions. The individuals who

played extremely important roles in expanding my pool of interviewees included

Noriyuki Shikata and Osamu Izawa of MOFA, Rear Admiral Umio Otsuka of the MSDF,

Satoshi Maeda and Sugio Takashi of the MOD, Shigeru Ishiba of the LDP, and David

Satterwhite of the Fulbright Commission Japan. The second method I employed was

‘cold calling.’ Utilizing my institutional base at the University of Tokyo and my position

as a Fulbright Fellow, I wrote and sent formal letters and emails requesting interviews.

Surprisingly, I received a large number of positive replies from decision-makers which,

similar to the process above, led to further introductions that expanded my pool of

interviewees.

When interviewing, I took every means possible to respect the privacy of the

interviewee following the IRB guidelines under which my research was conducted. I

offered all interviewees the option of being either on-record or off-record. For those who

volunteered to be on-record, below is a list of their names, when I interviewed them, and

the language that was used. For those who were interviewed off-record, I note only how

many of them there were. When citing an interview in my text, I provided the date of the

interview for those who volunteered to be on-record and for those who are off-record but

allowed me to quote them by the agency / ministry / party they represent. For off-record

interviews, I simply quote ‘anonymous.’

I conducted all 102 interviewed by myself. Because I am not a native speaker of

Japanese but my research relies heavily on decision-makers’ beliefs, I took measures to

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ensure that my translations of interviews were accurate. I taped each of the 102 interviews, but because of IRB regulations I could not keep the taped records. However, I obtained permission from each interviewee to keep transcribed copies of the interviews.

As such, after each interview I transcribed the interview word-for-word into English. To confirm my translations were correct, a native speaker of Japanese and fluent English speaker listened to each interview and corrected my translations when mistakes were found in content or nuance.

List of Interviewees (*Indicates Cabinet member during case; **Indicates prime minister)

Name Ministry/Agency/Party Date Interviewed Language Used Abe, Tomoko Socialist 7.11.08 Japanese Akao, Nobutoshi MOFA 6.07.06 Japanese Akiyama, Osamu CLB 12.20.06 Japanese Ando, Hiroyasu Kantei (MOFA) 12.20.06 English Asao, Keiichiro DPJ 9.21.06 English Eda, Kenji DPJ 11.27.07 Japanese Eda, Satsuki Shaminren, DPJ 8.07.06 Japanese **Fukuda, Yasuo LDP 1.09.07 Japanese Furusho, Kouichi MSDF 9.28.06 Japanese Furukawa, Teijiro Kantei 11.20.06 Japanese Gen, Nakatani LDP 7.15.08 Japanese Hagiwara, Seiji LDP 9.21.06 Japanese Hatakeyama, Noboru MITI/METI 7.18.06 Japanese Hatoyama, Yukio DPJ 11.27.06 Japanese Himori, Fumihiro Socialist 12.14.06 Japanese Hironaka, Wakako Komeito, DPJ 6.16.06 Japanese Iijima, Isao Secretary of PM Koizumi 12.26.06 Japanese *Ishiba, Shigeru LDP 8.24.06 Japanese Ishihara, Nobuo Kantei 6.01.06 / 7.14.08 Japanese Iwaya, Takeshi LDP 12.15.06 Japanese Katakura, Kunio MOFA 10.25.06 English Kono, Akira MOFA 8.25.06 Japanese Kono, Futoshi MITI/METI 9.08.06 English Kono, Taro LDP 12.12.06 English Kuriyama, Takakazu MOFA 7.12.06 English *Kyuma, Fumio LDP 12.26.06 Japanese *Machimura, LDP 8.09.06 English Nobutaka Maehara, Seiji DPJ 11.16.06 Japanese Masuda, Kohei Kantei (JDA) 10.16.06 Japanese

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Mataichi, Seiji Socialist 12.11.06 Japanese Morimoto, Satoshi JDA, MOFA 8.15.06 /10.03.06 English Moriya, Takemasa JDA 12.13.06 Japanese Motegi, Toshimitsu LDP 7.03.06 Japanese Murakami, Keisuke MITI/METI 11.20.06 English **Nakasone, LDP 7.24.08 Japanese Yasuhiro *Nakayama, Taro LDP 11.27.07 Japanese Nagashima, Akihisa DPJ 5.31.06 / 6.08.06 English Nishioka, Takeo LDP, Liberal Party, DPJ 7.18.06 Japanese Nonaka, Hiromu LDP 8.07.06 Japanese *Nukaga, Fukushiro LDP 12.20.06 Japanese Ochiai, Taosa MSDF 10.12.06 Japanese Okamoto, Yukio MOFA 7.22.08 English MOFA,Friend of Okazaki, Hisahiko 6.29.06 English Koizumi *Ono, Yoshinori LDP 6.20.06 Japanese *Oshima, Tadamori LDP 6.28.06 Japanese Ota, Masahide Socialist 12.08.06 Japanese Otsuka, Umio MSDF 7.07.06 English Ouchi, Keigo DSP 10.18.06 Japanese Saito, Kunihiko MOFA 9.07.06 Japanese Sakata, Masahiro CLB 12.19.06 Japanese Satoh, Yukio MOFA 6.13.06 English Shiina, Moto Independent 7.06.06 Japanese Shikata, Noryuki MOFA 5.24.06 / 8.17.06 English Suematsu, Yoshiki DPJ 8.29.06 English Suto, Nobuhiko DPJ 5.25.06 Japanese Suzuki, Hideo Kantei (MOFA) 10.04.06 English Tasso, Takuya Liberal Party, DPJ 5.24.06 Japanese Takano Hiroshi Komeito 11.29.06 Japanese Takemi, Keizo LDP 6.28.06 Japanese Tanaka, Hitoshi MOFA 9.05.06 English Toyama, Kiyohiko Komeito 7.23.08 English Tsujimoto, Kiyomi Socialist 12.12.06 Japanese *Tsushima, Yuji LDP 6.27.06 English Ueda, Isamu Komeito 11.15.06 English Utsumi, Makoto MOF 7.26.06 Japanese Watanabe, Koji MOFA 6.15.06 English Yachi, Shotaro MOFA 10.17.06 Japanese Yamaguchi, Noboru GSDF 10.02.06 English Yanagisawa, Kyoji Kantei (JDA) 11.16.06 English Yanai, Shunji MOFA 12.22.06 English Yoda, Tomoharu JDA 10.20.06 Japanese 31 anonymous individuals from MOFA, JDA, Kantei, MITI/METI, CLB, LDP, Komeito, GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF

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Appendix 2: Administrative Reforms Prior to 1990

The first reform attempt occurred between February 1962 and September 1964 in

what was called the First Ad Hoc Commission for Administrative Reform (First Rincho ).

The 16 recommendations that emerged from the First Rincho included enhancing the

authority of the Cabinet and Cabinet Secretariat and reforming the civil service and the

ministries. 2 Despite the recommendations, very few of the reforms were implemented due

to strong bureaucratic resistance. 3 This meant that bureaucratic power and dominance

over the policy-making process continued relatively unaltered.

A second attempt was tried in the 1980s. PM Zenko Suzuki appointed Yasuhiro

Nakasone as Director General for the Administrative Management Agency (AMA) who,

in turn, opened a Second Ad Hoc Advisory Commission on Administrative Reform

(Second Rincho )4 on March 16, 1981. Nakasone named prominent Toshiba businessman

and former Chairman of Keidanren, Toshio Doko, as its Chairman and established a 9-

member Second Rincho (21 experts also included to handle specific plans 5) with the

AMA serving as the Secretariat.

The purpose of the Second Rincho varied, depending on the person, but was

fundamentally driven by the desire to cut budget deficits instead of relying on tax

2 Furukawa, 2000, 6. 3 Examples of reforms implemented were the reduction of the size of the central bureaucracy and the elimination of one bureau in each ministry and the merger of several public corporations. See Ibid , 6. 4 Shinoda, 2000, 128. For more on Nakasone reforms see Angel (1988-89), Shinoda (1996, Ch. 3; 2000, Ch. 5). 5 This included Chairman Toshio Doko, Jiro Enjyoji (advisor to Nihon Keizai Shimbun), Keizo Hayashi (President of Japan Red Cross Society and Chairman of Local Government System Research Council), Kagayaki Miyazaki (President of Asahi Kasei Kogyo), Ryuzo Sejima (Vice President of Commerce Association of Tokyo), Kiyoaki Tsuji (professor at International Christian University), Yutaka Tanimura (former MOF vice minister, Tokyo Stock Market Chairman of board of trustees), Hidenobu Kanesugi (vice president of Japanese Confederation of Labor), and Yasuo Murayama (vice president of General Council of Trade Unions of Japan). Kato, 1994, 266-footnote 64. 344

increases. 6 A major part of the reform effort therefore focused entirely on efforts toward

this end. But reflecting the criticisms of the power of the Kantei, Nakasone had different

motives, stressing the need to reorganize the government to improve its efficiency under

central leadership. 7 After PM Suzuki decided not to run for re-election as LDP President in November 1982, Nakasone ran and won, becoming prime minister on November 24,

1982.

With the conclusion of the Second Rincho in March 1983, Nakasone pursued his goal of centralizing leadership by establishing a successor to the Second Rincho entitled the Advisory Council for the Promotion of Administration Reform chaired again by

Toshio Doko. 8 The 7-member Council met for the first time on July 8, 1983, focusing solely on the importance of prime minister-led crisis management during disasters and other emergencies. Nakasone wanted to improve the ability of the Kantei to coordinate various branches of government and, in so doing, create a ‘presidential’ prime minister with control over the decision-making process. This was supposed to happen by creating an institutional framework that would narrow down policy options from the various ministries/agencies via coordination and synthesis. The Council submitted a report on

June 17, 1985 entitled “The Appropriate Comprehensive Coordinating Functions of the

6 It was widely known that both PM Suzuki as well as MOF bureaucrats wanted to decrease the government’s burgeoning debt that had accumulated after the 1970’s oil shocks and the pork-barrel spending that had become synonymous with the Kakuei Tanaka Administration (1972-1974). They hoped that the Second Rincho could streamline the government to cut expenditures. Chairman Doko was more fiscal in his orientation, wanting to use the Rincho to find ways to avoid tax increases. All actors involved aimed at limiting the size of the government by reducing expenditures and public debt, lowering tax burdens, and deregulating economic activities (Kato, 1994, 132). 7 Ibid , 134. 8 The implementation of the Second Rincho recommendations occurred under both the Suzuki and Nakasone administrations. Nakasone faced extremely tough bureaucratic resistance, but was eventually successful in a number of high profile economic battles, such as privatizing Japan Tobacco (enacted August 3, 1983), Japan National Railways (enacted November 28, 1985), and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT). 345

Cabinet ( 内閣の総合調整機能のあり方) which served as a blueprint for the restructuring of the Cabinet Secretariat the following year. 9 This report made three recommendations. First, improve the administrative support structure of the Cabinet and the PM. Second, improve the collection, analysis, and distribution structure of intelligence. Third, review personnel policy to enable more inter-ministerial and inter- agency tasks. The recommendations were accepted in September 1985 and changes were announced on December 15, 1985. The Cabinet ordinance implementing these changes was made on July 1, 1986.

The Reforms targeted an internal reorganization of the Cabinet Secretariat (and

PMO) with the purpose meant to strengthen the executive’s ability to integrate the operations and policy coordination of the government ministries in a top-down, premier- led manner. Expected to provide the PM with institutional power vis-à-vis the bureaucrats to enable the Kantei to conduct policy-making and inter-ministerial coordination were three offices: the Cabinet Councilors’ Office on External Affairs (内閣

外政審議室), the Cabinet Security Affairs Office and the Security Council. Three other offices created by these reforms- the Cabinet Councilor’s Office for Internal Affairs, the

Cabinet Office of the Director General of Public Relations, and the Cabinet Information

Research Office-were not relevant to foreign policy decision-making.

Despite the changes, the Cabinet Secretariat never functioned as it was envisioned.

Not only was this a problem of small staff size, but the heads of the Cabinet Councilors’

Office on External Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Cabinet Security Affairs Office were seconded officials from MOFA, MOF, and JDA, respectively. This practice of seconding

9 Angel, 1988-89, 596. 346

officials from other ministries was the practice to fill posts for the entire Cabinet

Secretariat. The result was sectionalism occurring frequently and intensely. This meant inter-ministerial disputes were carried into the Cabinet Secretariat and internal cohesion proved problematic. Worse, because seconded bureaucrats will finish their careers in their home ministries, these officials remained reluctant to supply information that other bureaucrats may use to assist their home ministries. This meant that either the PM received biased ‘second opinions’ or, worse, bureaucrats were hesitant to provide the

Cabinet Secretariat with quality, classified information. 10

10 Eda and Ryuzaki, 2002, 100. 347

Appendix 3: Administrative Reforms After 1990 and Prior to 2001 11

The Gulf War experience, followed by a series of exogenous shocks, motivated lawmakers to push for another round of reform efforts to create a crisis management system led by a strong executive. While not all foreign policy related, these shocks included North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993 and its May 29-30, 1993 test of the Nodong missile; the January 17, 1995 Great Hanshin-

Awaji Earthquake that killed 6,400 people; 12 and the March 20, 1995 sarin gas attack on

the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinrikyo cult that killed 12 people and injured

thousands. Each of these events highlighted problems of crisis management and the

executive’s inability to lead decision-making and inter-ministerial coordination. 13

PM Ryutaro Hashimoto set about another round of administrative reforms after

becoming premier in January 1996. Like Nakasone, his motivation was to shift decision-

making power away from the bureaucrats by strengthening the authority of the prime

minister via strengthening of the Cabinet Secretariat. PM Hashimoto formed an

Administrative Reform Council in November 1996 with the purpose of passing ‘six great

reforms’: administrative, fiscal, economic, financial, social security, and educational.

Despite the wide ranging scope, the main focus was administrative, “without which the

11 For details on these reforms, see Mishima (1998) and Shinoda (2000, Chapter 7). 12 Many articles have been written about the Japanese government’s response to the Great Hanshin Earthquake. These include: Furukawa (2000); Nakamura (2000); Noda (1995); Sassa (1995); and Tanaka (1996). 13 Two other events further emphasized the need for reform once the Hashimoto reforms were underway: North Korea’s development and successful launch of the Taepodong-1 missile over northern Japan in August 31, 1998 and the Tokaimura nuclear power plant accident on September 30, 1999. 348

other aspects of reform cannot be expected to succeed since they are predicated on a

reduction and reorganization of bureaucratic power.” 14

Hashimoto announced his ‘Hashimoto Reform Vision’ on May 10, 1996 and a

detailed plan on August 10, 1996. Unlike Nakasone’s Reforms, Hashimoto’s vision was

more ambitious. The main thrust was a grand restructuring of the entire central

government, including a strengthening of the Cabinet Secretariat and reducing the

number of ministries from 22 to 14, organized along functional lines with policy planning

and implementation separated. Hashimoto originally planned to establish a Third Rincho

but abandoned this idea because of the likelihood that it would require special legislation

and thus, a lot of time. Hashimoto instead established the Administrative Reform Council

(ARC) in November 1996 with himself as Chairman, Kabun Muto (Minister for the

Management and Coordination Agency) as Deputy Chairman, Mizuno Kiyoshi as the

head of its Secretariat (located in the PMO), and 12 other members backed by a deputy

secretary general and 3 executives in the Secretariat and 28 researchers. 15 While

bureaucrats had a role to play in the Secretariat and research positions, none of the main

members were from the bureaucracy. The ARC held its first meeting on November 28,

14 Bevacqua, 1997, 1. 15 See Shinoda (1999, 2000-Chapter Seven) for this information. The 12 main members were (business leaders)Iida Yotaro of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Toyota Shoichiro of Toyota Motors and Moroi Ken of Chichibu Onoda Cement Company; (scholars) Arima Akito of Tokyo University, Inoguchi Kuniko of , Kawai Hayao of the International Center for Japanese Culture, Sato Koji of , Shionoya Yuichi of and Fujita Tokiyasu of Tohoku University; (media) Kawaguchi Mikio of NHK and Watanabe Tsuneo of Yomiuri Shimbun; and (labor) Ashida Jinnosuke of Rengo. Deputy Secretary General was Yagi Toshimichi (former Deputy Director General of the Management and Coordination Agency). The three executive members were Sakano Yasuharu of the Management and Coordination Agency, Koyama Yutaka of the PMO, and Ofuji Toshiyuki of MOF. Finally, the 12 researchers not from the bureaucracy were from Asahi Beer, Nippon Steel, Toyota Motors, Tokyo Electric Power, Toshiba, Nissan Motors, NEC, Mitsui Company, Mitsubishi Electrics, IBM Japan, Keidanren, and Rengo. 349

1996, 16 released its interim report on September 3, 1997, 17 and a bill based on its recommendations was submitted to the Diet in February 1998 entitled the Bill for Basic

Law for the Reform of Central Government Ministries and Agencies, which passed on

June 9, 1998 and implemented on January 6, 2001. The reforms were said to be the biggest since the 1868 Meiji Reformation. 18

Picking up at essentially where the Nakasone Reforms left off, the Hashimoto

Reforms focused on strengthening the capabilities of the prime minister to lead the policy-making process. While the realignment of the central government (from 21 ministries/agencies to 12 ministries/agencies) was a drastic change, it was a superficial change at best. Concerning the foreign policy decision making process, the attention needs to again be placed on the internal components of the Cabinet Secretariat, which was reorganized and given an expanded role.

The first change was the establishment of a Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for

Crisis Management ( 内閣危機管理監). Although not part of the Hashimoto Reforms, on

April 1, 1998 PM Hashimoto established the position within the Cabinet Secretariat out of recognition that the Office of Security Affairs lacked real power, if not ability, to respond to crises in light of the January 1995 Kobe earthquake, March 1995 Aum

Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, and the 1996-97 Peru hostage crisis. The person who obtains this post has been an NPA seconded official who is an expert in crisis management and his staff is seconded from various bureaucracies. He

16 The ARC moved discussions to the Subcommittee on Plans and Institutions (dealing with reinforcing the role of the Cabinet) and the Subcommittee on Organizational Issues (dealing with reorganization of the bureaucracy) (Shinoda, 1999, 4). 17 This report included measures to reinforce the strength of the Cabinet, decrease the number of government agencies from 22 to 13, create a PM support organ called the Cabinet Office, and privatize the postal saving and insurance services. The recommendations upset bureaucrats and LDP zoku who saw their interests being threatened. 18 Eda and Ryuzaki, 2002, 74. 350

does not formulate policies or make decisions. He coordinates and provides judgment. Its establishment was followed by a shakeup of duties for and renaming of the Security

Affairs Office ( 安全保障室) to the National Security and Crisis Management Office ( 内

閣安全保障・危機管理室) on April 9. While both the National Security and Crisis

Management Offices and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management were responsible for crisis management, the former post deals with national security issues while the later focuses on disasters, such as earthquakes. 19 (The National Security and Crisis Management Office was abolished on January 5, 2001 and replaced by the newly established Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis

Management-内閣官房副長官補--内閣安全保障・危機管理担当).

Because the three Offices that the Nakasone Reforms established were criticized as bringing bureaucratic rivalry into the Cabinet Secretariat, Hashimoto abolished them and replaced them with three new positions of Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary ( 官房副

長官補): Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for Internal Affairs ( 国内担当), Assistant

Chief Cabinet Secretary for External Affairs ( 国外担当), and Assistant Chief Cabinet

Secretary for Security Affairs and Crisis Management ( 安全保障・危機管理担当). As evident from their titles, the Assistant CCS are divided along the same lines as their predecessors. Similarly, the External Affairs Asst. CCS is seconded from MOFA, the

Security Affairs and Crisis Management Asst. CCS from JDA, and the Internal Affairs

Asst. CCS from MOF. Additionally, while the number of staff that assist them has increased (and therefore overall Kantei staff), the staff continues to be seconded from

19 Kyoji Yanagisawa, Interview, November 16, 2006. 351

various ministries, such as MOFA, JDA, MEXT, METI, MOF, and others. 20 What was meant to reduce sectionalism and inter-agency rivalry being brought into the Kantei as well as provide greater coordination and executive leverage has not occurred. 21 Instead, the result has been “…simply put[ting] old wine in a new bottle.” 22

In addition to the internal reorganization, the Hashimoto Reforms also legally strengthened the Cabinet Secretariat. Prior to 2001, although legally possible in Cabinet

Law Article 4, premiers had rarely taken it upon themselves to propose policies at

Cabinet meetings. This was believed to stem from ambiguity in the Cabinet Law which simply stated that “The Prime Minister shall preside over Cabinet Meetings” (former

Article 4.2), which did not clearly state exactly what power the PM had. 23 But with the

2001 reforms, Cabinet Law Article 4.2 was changed to clarify the PM’s right to “propose items including the basic principals concerning the important policies of the Cabinet.”

This revision clearly stated the PM’s authority, expected to empower the PM and enable him to interject his own thinking and policies into Cabinet level meetings. In so doing, it would provide more political involvement in the decision-making process that had heretofore been missing after the Administrative Vice Minister meeting (which decided issues prior to Cabinet meetings). 24

In addition to the clarification of the premier’s authority, the Cabinet Secretariat’s authority was formally strengthened to enable it to plan and draft policies. 25 This formal change came by revising Cabinet Law Article 12. Whereas under the former Article 12

20 See chart by Shinoda (2005), 810. 21 Hideo Suzuki, Interview, October 4, 2006. 22 Narita and Eda, 2002, 16. 23 Eda and Ryuzaki, 2002, 74-75. 24 Ibid , 75. 25 Shinoda, 2005, 813. 352

the Cabinet Secretariat’s duties focused on arranging Cabinet meetings, coordinating integrated policies, and collecting and researching information, the new Article 12 stipulated duties of planning and framing concerning important Cabinet policies and important matters for decision by the Cabinet, as well as the affairs related to this coordination. It was hoped that by these revisions, the Cabinet Secretariat would develop concrete plans under the direction of the Cabinet and the premier, present policy direction for the government, and coordinate policy. 26 A separate set of guidelines were passed that instructed Japan’s ministries to recognize the Cabinet Secretariat as being the highest and final organ for policy coordination within the Cabinet.

26 Ibid , 813. 353

Appendix 4: Electoral Reforms of 1994

Prior to 1994, Japan had two separate electoral systems for its two Houses. In the

Upper House, there were 252 members who served staggered 6-year terms. The electoral districts were composed of a combination of 152 prefectural SMDs (1-4 seats) and 100 national-constituency PR districts (since 1983). In elections, voters would cast 2 ballots,

1 for the candidate representing one’s prefectural district and 1 for the party in the national district. In the Lower House, there were 130 multi-member districts represented by 2 to 6 people, though most contained 3-4 members. This meant a 511 member house since 1976, increased by 1 in 1986. Voters had one, single non-transferable vote (SNTV), casting a ballot for one candidate in their district. Winners were those candidates who won the largest number of votes to cross a numerical threshold, but small shares of the vote could win seats. 27 This system favored the LDP because under such a system, large parties could run multiple candidates in the same districts, ensuring that the party would always win a majority of seats. The effect on smaller parties was mixed. Because multiple candidates could run in each district, it was essentially a PR system, thereby making it relatively easy for small parties to run and establish niche districts. This helped not only the JSP but the DSP, Komeito, and NLC emerge and maintain their numbers. 28

However, in terms of winning nationally or enough seats to win government, these same parties naturally suffered because even if a smaller party won the majority of the votes

27 This numerical threshold was calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes cast by the number of seats allocated to a district and then dividing the resulting number by the number of members representing that district (i.e. 1-6). This threshold therefore varies across districts and across elections. 28 Prior to the 1996 Lower House election, candidates could win an election with a relatively low proportion of the vote. For instance, in a 2-seat district under the old system, a candidate needed to secure 33.4% of the vote while in a 6-seat district, a candidate only needed 16.7% to win. See Shinkawa (2000), 154. This system was beneficial to the JSP (and other minor parties) because of the low proportion that was required to win. 354

and its candidate came in first in each of the 130 districts, the LDP only had to come in third or fourth to end up with just as many seats. To compete with a large party like the

LDP then, a party had to be just as large (if not larger) and field just as many candidates.

This was difficult, even for the JSP. 29 Smaller parties were simply outmanned, this was why the LDP continued to win. But the JSP prospered under this system despite never being able to win enough seats to take government.

The 1994 electoral reform changed this. 30 In the Upper House, the number of seats was reduced by 10 to 242 who still serve staggered 6-year terms with half of the seats up for election every three years. The biggest change under the new electoral system is that it eliminated the national-constituency PR districts in favor of 47 electoral districts corresponding to a single prefecture (from which 146 members are elected) and

11 PR-elected regional blocs (from which 96 are elected). Voters still cast 2 ballots, one for a candidate and one for the party. In the Lower House, the number of seats was reduced to 500 and the multi-member districts were abolished, replaced with 300-single seat districts and 200 seats distributed in 11-regional PR districts (the PR seats were reduced to 180 in 2000). 31 Voters are presented with two separate ballots. On one ballot, voters vote for the individual candidate who will represent them from the single-seat district. On the second ballot, voters vote for a party (who will then choose a candidate based on a list system) who will represent them from the PR district. Candidates can run in both the SMD and on the PR list, making it possible for a candidate to lose in the SMD but still gain a seat via PR. This new system meant that in the PR districts the image of

29 For instance, even in the JSP’s large Lower House victory in February 1990 in which they won 136 seats, they fielded only 149 candidates. Even if their candidates had all won, this still was not enough to gain a majority in the Lower House made up of 512 MPs. 30 Good works on electoral reform include: Wolfe (1992); Christensen (1994); and Seligmann (1997). 31 This was essentially the electoral reform package PM Toshiki Kaifu had advocated in 1990. 355

the party head (as symbol of the party) became paramount while in SMD the image of the politician became paramount. 32

32 An interesting article examining the effect of PM Koizumi in the 2003 Lower House election examines the effect the PM has in both SMD and PR districts. See Kabashima (2004). 356

Appendix 5: Important US-Japan Alliance Agreements

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security In an effort to regain Japan’s sovereignty, PM Yoshida signed the Treaty of

Mutual Cooperation and Security with Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles on

September 8, 1951. The Security Treaty’s purpose was for the US to “maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.” But it was a

Cold War agreement that was in the American interest of keeping US forces in the Asian theater to stem both the Soviet military threat in Asia as well as the possibility of a

Communist uprising in Japan, as evident in Article 1 of the Treaty that states US forces

“may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance…to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.” At the same time, it was in Japan’s interest because securing the US security commitment meant Japan could focus on economic recovery instead of defense.

Revision of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Because of the unequal nature of the Treaty, it was revised on January 19, 1960

(implemented June 23) amidst massive protests in Japan. To make the treaty more than a vague defense declaration, the Revision created a more balanced alliance relationship via strengthening mutual obligations.33 While the ability of the US to put down internal unrest was omitted, the Revision stated explicitly that the US was granted continued access to bases in Japan “for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” (Article 6). The result

33 Article 3 states that both are responsible to maintain and develop capacities to resist armed attack. Article 4 states that both are responsible for prior consultation. Article 5 states that both are responsible to respond to armed attack on the other if it occurs within Japanese territories. 357

was twofold, a more specific US commitment to defend Japan as well as continued US access to bases in Asia as part of its global strategy (as seen in use of the phrase ‘Far

East’).

Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation Due to worries that the Nixon Doctrine signaled a US withdrawal from Asia amidst a time of a Soviet buildup, Japanese leaders passed the 1976 NDPO that made explicit the role of Japan’s SDF to handle ‘limited and small-scale aggression’ backed by the US. This NDPO set the backdrop for a further revision of the US-Japan relationship on November 27, 1978 with the adoption of the Guidelines. The Guidelines are notable due to the fact that a few important changes occurred. First, based off the NDPO, Japan’s defense role was made explicit (Section 1.1; Section 2.2.1) and tied Japan’s SDF in closer cooperation with the US forces (Section 1.2; Section 2.1), transforming the relationship to something more akin to a mutual security agreement. Second, it established nuclear deterrence as a foundation of their security cooperation (Section 1.1). Finally, the scope of the relationship was widened. While the Guidelines made explicit that US-Japan activities would be conducted “in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace” (Section 2.2.2.i), it extended their cooperation to “the case of situations in the

Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of

Japan” (Section 2.2.2.v.d).

Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security With the end of the Cold War and new fears that the US was disengaging from the region during a time of fears of a rising China and an unpredictable North Korea, Japan set about redefining the relationship. This redefinition of the alliance came on April 17,

1996 with the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security. With the Soviet threat gone, the

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focus of the alliance shifted away from the Far East. Instead, it was stated that the alliance would not only strive “to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region” (Section 7) but cooperate on global issues as well, such as UN PKOs, humanitarian operations, arms control and disarmament, UN-

APEC cooperation, North Korean nuclear problem, Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation in the former Yugoslavia (Section 8). In this regard, the relationship became more expansive and global. And the reason for the regional orientation is made explicit, “instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability” (Section 3). Given the dangers of the region and the new focus, it was agreed that while the US would still defend Japan, use bases in Japan, and

Japan would continue to utilize its defense capabilities, the purpose of the alliance was to promote “stability in this region and deal with the security challenges facing both countries” (Section 4).

New Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation These efforts to redefine the alliance occurred in September 1997 when the 1996 agreement was made into the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. While these

New Guidelines still retained mutual obligations by both countries and a dependence on the American nuclear deterrence for the defense of Japan, the New Guidelines were significant in two ways. First, reflecting the two countries’ view of an unstable international situation (especially region), the New Guidelines expanded the scope of US-

Japan cooperation by inserting a phrase where their cooperation will occur, “in situations

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in areas surrounding Japan (Article 1). Because the phrase was vague, it was left open for

interpretation, which the government interpreted it as situational, not geographical. This

situational interpretation is important because it insitutionzlies the expanded scope of the

alliance as agreed upon in the 1996 agreement. Second, the New Guidelines expanded the

activities that the alliance partners would jointly conduct. Relief activities to deal with

refugees (Article 5.2.1.a), search and rescue (Article 5.2.1.b), evacuation of non-

combatants from a third country (Article 5.2.1.c), ensuring effectiveness of economic

sanctions (Article 5.2.1.d), and Japan conducting rear-area logistical support for the US

(Article 5.2.2.b) were now included. Together, the alliance was transformed to mutually

address a host of new joint activities in an expanded area as part of the alliance’s interest.

Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee Since 9/11, the alliance has continued this shift in focus to respond to changing

threats. On February 19, 2005 the two countries’ foreign affairs and defense

representatives released a Joint Statement that explicitly stated that the alliance plays “a

vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan as

well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability” (Section 2). Some of the

threats listed include international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs (Section 6).

These threats, as stated, exist not only in the Asia-Pacific region but globally.

Additionally, the Statement names North Korea (Section 8, Section 10), China (Section

10), Taiwan Straits (Section 10), Russia (Section 10), and Southeast Asia (Section 10) as having issues that pertain to common regional strategic objectives of the US and Japan.

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Appendix 6: Aggregate Defense Expenditures (1953-2007)

Aggregate Defense Expenditures 1953 1,257 1962 2,085 1971 6,709 1980 22,302 1989 39,198 1998 49,290 1954 1,396 1963 2,412 1972 8,002 1981 24,000 1990 41,593 1999 49,201 1955 1,349 1964 2,751 1973 9,355 1982 25,861 1991 43,860 2000 49,218 1956 1,429 1965 3,014 1974 10,930 1983 27,542 1992 45,518 2001 49,388 1957 1,435 1966 3,407 1975 13,273 1984 29,346 1993 46,406 2002 49,395 1958 1,485 1967 3,809 1976 15,124 1985 31,371 1994* 46,835 2003 49,265 1959 1,560 1968 4,221 1977 16,906 1986 33,435 1995 47,236 2004 48,764 1960 1,569 1969 4,838 1978 19,010 1987 35,174 1996 48,455 2005 48,301 1961 1,803 1970 5,695 1979 20,945 1988 37,003 1997^ 49,414 2006 47,906 In 100 million yen ( 億円) 2007 47,818 *In 1994 the calculation switches from GNP to GDP ^Defense costs begin to include SACO and costs related to US base transfers. Costs shown do not include these. Data from Nihon no Boei , Boei Hakusho , Defense of Japan , and Embassy Officials in DC.

Appendix 7: Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (1953-2007)

Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP/GDP 1953 1.67 1962 1.18 1971 0.8 1980 0.9 1989 1.006 1998 0.948 1954 1.78 1963 1.18 1972 0.88 1981 0.91 1990 0.997 1999 0.991 1955 1.78 1964 1.14 1973 0.85 1982 0.93 1991 0.954 2000 0.987 1956 1.73 1965 1.07 1974 0.83 1983 0.98 1992 0.941 2001 0.952 1957 1.46 1966 1.1 1975 0.84 1984 0.99 1993 0.937 2002 0.995 1958 1.45 1967 0.93 1976 0.9 1985 0.997 1994* 0.959 2003 0.988 1959 1.45 1968 0.88 1977 0.88 1986 0.993 1995 0.959 2004 0.974 1960 1.23 1969 0.84 1978 0.9 1987 1.004 1996 0.977 2005 0.944 1961 1.15 1970 0.79 1979 0.9 1988 1.013 1997^ 0.958 2006 0.932 *In 1994 the calculation switches from GNP to GDP 2007 0.916 ^Defense costs begin to include SACO and costs related to US base transfers. Costs shown do not include these. Data from Nihon no Boei , Boei Hakusho , Defense of Japan , and Embassy Officials in DC.

Appendix 8: SDF Personnel (1971-2008)

Number of Self-Defense Force Personnel (F.Y.1971--2008) 1971 234,301 1979 240,096 1987 245,270 1995 242,693 2003 239,806 1972 232,903 1980 241,957 1988 247,191 1996 242,709 2004 238,579 1973 233,080 1981 242,762 1989 246,544 1997 242,640 2005 239,430 1974 237,130 1982 241,529 1990 234,177 1998 236,368 2006 240,812 1975 237,920 1983 244,977 1991 240,266 1999 236,315 2007 240,970 1976 236,061 1984 244,285 1992 237,557 2000 239,807 2008 230,291 1977 239,982 1985 245,421 1993 233,818 2001 239,839 1978 239,193 1986 244,422 1994 239,637 2002 239,806 Data from Nihon no Boei , Boei Hakusho , Defense of Japan , and Embassy Officials in DC.

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Appendix 9: PMO Poll on Public Opinion Concerning SDF Participation in PKOs

1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 Agree 20.6 17.1 24.1 40.5 29.4 If I had to choose, agree 24.9 31.3 39.9 39 40.8 If I had to choose, oppose 19.1 19.8 10.5 6 8.7 Oppose 18.8 10.8 3.1 2.7 4.3 I can't generalize 10.9 14.3 8.2 5.5 7.5 Don't know 5.7 6.7 14.2 6.4 9.4 Source: Naikaku-fu, Jietai-boei mondai ni kansuru seron chosa, various years, www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index2.html

Appendix 10: PMO Poll on Public Opinion Concerning What Role Japan Should Play in the World

Contribute Contribute Contribute Contribute Contribute International Humanitarian to solving to the to the to the to contribution support global maintenance wholesome development international for environ- of development of cultural spreading mental international of the world developing exchange universal problems peace economy countries values 1991 49.7 37.5 34.4 29.2 11.6 1992 49.7 31.4 28.9 27.5 8.1 22 1993 48.4 28.8 28.9 21 9 26.1 1994 42.9 35.2 25.9 23.5 7.1 20.7 1995 43.1 38 23.7 22.1 8.6 25 1996 44.2 37.5 25.3 23.6 9.8 22.5 1997 43.3 33.8 20.3 16.6 5.9 18.1 26.9 1998 40.2 40 20.3 17.6 5.2 18.6 28.8 1999 46.8 42.2 17 15 6.2 18.1 30.6 2000 40.2 41.8 19 16.2 6.4 18.2 28.1 2001 38.2 50.3 19.6 13.3 5.3 16.5 30.9 2002 41.7 52.8 17 13.6 5.8 16.7 24.6 2003 39.1 51.5 19.1 13.1 5.7 19.7 25 2004 38.4 51.9 19.9 15 5.5 16.1 25 2005 42.8 49.3 19.7 14.5 6 15.3 25.1 2006 45.4 44 16.8 14.3 5.3 20 26.8 2007 58 44.6 17.8 11.9 4.7 19.1 25.6 Source: Naikaku-fu, Gaiko ni kansuru seron chosa, various years, www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index2.html

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