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No. 213 Strategic Forum November 2004 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss ’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era? by Rust Deming

Japan’s postwar defense policy was set by (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace Key Points the 1947 constitution. Early in the occupation, based on justice and order, the Japanese people hanges in the security environment and General Douglas MacArthur and his staff con- forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the th the rise of a new generation have cluded that the 19 -century constitution nation and the threat or use of force as a means of Cended Japan’s taboo on discussion of needed to be revised or entirely replaced if settling international disputes. amending the 1947 “peace constitution.” Japan were to become a true democracy, with (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the pre- While many wish to maintain the current the Emperor removed from any political role. ceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as document, the center of gravity in the debate In January 1946, convinced that the elitist and well as other war potential, will never be main- has shifted. authoritarian Japanese establishment was tained. The right of belligerency of the state will The movement to amend the constitu- incapable of producing a democratic constitu- not be recognized. tion is connected to and stimulated by a tion, MacArthur ordered his staff to produce a draft. One week later, an entirely rewritten Ashida later testified that the new phrase parallel debate on defense policy. The at the beginning of the second paragraph Japanese government’s third National De- constitution emerged and was presented to the Japanese. Included in the draft was Article IX: preserved Japan’s inherent right of self-defense fense Program Outline is due in late 2004, and “clearly recognizes that (the article) does and its recommendations will affect the War as a sovereign right of the nation is abol- not constitute the unconditional renunciation ongoing constitutional debate. ished. The threat or use of force is forever re- of military force.”2 This interpretation was far Few Japanese leaders suggest that the nounced as a means of settling disputes with any from universally accepted in Japan, and a nation should become an independent strate- other nation. No Army, Navy, Air Force, or other Talmudic debate developed over the meaning gic actor, and the vast majority of the public war potential will ever be authorized and no of Article IX that continues to this day. supports a nonthreatening posture dedicated right of belligerency will ever be conferred upon to cooperation. Thus, the philosophy behind the state.1 Interpreting Article IX Article IX—that Japan forswears the threat or War and defeat had produced strong When Japan regained sovereignty in 1952, use of force to settle international disputes— pacifist sentiment in Japan, and there had been several attempts were made to amend the is not seriously at issue. Rather, the focus is previous discussion between MacArthur and constitution, including Article IX, but the on the need to legitimize the existing Self- senior Japanese leaders about the possibility of a debate became frozen by the Cold War polar- Defense Forces fully and their right to self- “no war” clause in the constitution, along the ization of Japanese politics. defense; the issue of collective self-defense; lines of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Nevertheless, The Political Setting. The Liberal Democ- and the future direction of defense policy. some Japanese were shocked by the American ratic Party (LDP), representing conservative However this debate plays out, the al- version, which went beyond their intentions. business, agricultural, and bureaucratic inter- liance with the United States almost certainly During the course of Diet deliberations over ests, controlled the Diet and dominated the will retain a central place in Japan’s defense the draft, , chairman of the Lower policy process. The LDP argued that the best policy. At the same time, the emerging policy House Committee on the Constitution, proposed course for Japan was to focus on economic will likely emphasize expanding Japan’s the addition of two clauses. The clauses, ac- recovery and to align itself strategically with capacity for a more autonomous defense as cepted by both MacArthur and the Diet, have the United States. This meant relying on Amer- well as its wherewithal to participate fully in provided the basis for the argument that the ican extended deterrence (the nuclear um- internationally sanctioned operations. article does not impinge upon Japan’s inherent brella) implicit in the U.S.-Japan Security right of self-defense. Article IX as it now exists Treaty, supporting the basing of American (with Ashida’s changes in italics) reads:

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Positions of Political Parties on Article IX acknowledges that Japan’s self-declared three (based on position papers for the July 2004 upper house election) nonnuclear principles and its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty forbid Japan from Liberal Democratic Party Democratic Party of Japan Komeito Social Democrats developing such weapons. Authorize military Stipulate a limited right Uphold Article IX, with Maintain Japan’s OVERSEAS SDF DISPATCH. When the Self- capability for self- to self-defense based possible additional independence by up- Defense Forces were established in 1954, the defense purposes on Japan’s strictly defense- clarifying language holding Article IX; law did not provide for units to be sent abroad, oriented policy oppose any amend- although the government maintained that the ment to the constitution constitution permitted overseas dispatch for Define the right of Specify Japan’s right to missions that did not involve the use of force. collective self-defense* join collective security In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Diet operations based on a passed specific legislation in 1992 to allow SDF United Nations Resolution units to participate in peacekeeping operations *In a June 27, 2004, television debate, Prime Minister was more explicit. He said he would like to amend the constitution “so that Japan will in Cambodia, basing its decision on language be able to take joint action with the U.S. in the event of an armed attack against Japan.” in the preamble of the constitution calling for Japan to achieve “an honored place in an international society” and by the obligations forces in Japan, and responding cautiously to Masashi suggested the oxymoronic formula Japan undertook in joining the United Nations. U.S. requests that Japan build up its own self- that while the forces were unconstitutional, In response to September 11, the Diet author- defense capabilities. they were legal since the law establishing the ized, by specific legislation, the dispatch of The (JSP), represent- SDF went through the legislative process. units to Afghanistan and, later, to Iraq for ing labor and the intellectual left, countered But the LDP and its supporters argued noncombat support operations. The Japanese that alliance with the United States and the that while the constitution prohibited “wars of government plans to submit to the Diet in 2005 existence of American bases in Japan were aggression,” the concept of defensive wars was generic legislation to allow the SDF to partici- lightning rods that would only drag Japan constitutional. To assuage pacifist sentiment in pate in similar missions. further into the Cold War and endanger Japan- Japan, however, the LDP adopted the position RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE. The ese security. The JSP advocated unarmed neu- in 1954 that maintaining “war potential,” even Cabinet Legislative Bureau, which has the trality centered on the United Nations (UN)— for the purposes of self-defense, was not per- responsibility for interpreting the constitution, a stance that appealed to the strong pacifist missible. Thus, it concluded that the Self- maintains that Japan possesses the sovereign sentiment in postwar Japan. Defense Forces are constitutional, but their right to engage in collective self-defense (the The JSP leadership recognized that its armaments must be restricted to “the mini- right to respond to an attack against an ally or party had little chance of winning a majority of mum requirement for self-defense.” against a partner in a UN operation) but that lower house seats and forming a government. The debate between the left and the right under Article IX the exercise of this right ex- Thus the only way it could have any influence has focused on the definition of war potential ceeds “the minimum needs of self-defense” on defense policy was to be the guardian of the and the minimum needs for self-defense. and is therefore unconstitutional. The use of peace constitution by blocking attempts to alter Specific issues have included: the right of self-defense is only permissible if it it and by challenging the constitutionality of WEAPON SYSTEMS. There has been broad involves defending Japan itself. This principle the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) themselves and agreement that Japan cannot possess offensive has proved one of the most inflexible of all the specific defense programs as they developed. capability, but the definition of such capability limitations on Japan’s defense activities, prima- Pacifism versus Pragmatism. The fun- has steadily evolved. For example, F–4 fighters rily because the left in Japan has seen this damental position of the JSP and the intellec- acquired in the 1960s were not equipped with constraint as essential to preventing Japan from tual left has been that Article IX prohibits even air-refueling capability, which was seen as being pressured by the United States into de- defensive wars and the maintenance of defen- potentially “offensive.” When the next-genera- fending American interests. sive war potential on the grounds that it is tion F–15 was acquired in the 1980s, however, RIGHT OF PREEMPTION. The Japanese gov- difficult to distinguish between wars of aggres- refueling equipment was included without ernment has maintained since 1956 that in the sion and wars of defense. Thus, they conclude, much debate. Now Japan is acquiring long- event of an imminent missile attack upon the Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional. range tankers. While strategic bombers, aircraft Japan and with no other recourse, it would be In the 1960s, when faced with the reality carriers, and long-range missiles are still con- an act of self-defense and thus permissible to of the Self-Defense Forces and the fact that 80 sidered out-of-bounds, the government has attack the missile base before launch. Defense percent of the Japanese public supported their argued that the constitution does not ban Minister recently reiterated this existence, then-JSP Chairman Ishibashi defensive nuclear weapons, although it right in the context of the North Korean threat. The question that has been debated is how Japan could be certain that the threat was Ambassador Rust Deming recently completed a tour as distinguished visiting fellow in the Institute for directed at it and not a third party. National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Questions and comments may be sent to the Institute at [email protected].

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Over the last 57 years, Japan has criticized Japan for failing to make a “human history card” as a tool to stimulate nationalism stretched the interpretation of Article IX to contribution” to the coalition that responded to at home. The effect has been to increase appre- allow it to develop a small (240,000) but Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. This criticism ciation in Japan for the strategic importance of highly capable military, with a navy (Mar- had a profound effect on the way Japanese the alliance with the United States. itime Self-Defense Force) that may rank regarded their role in the world, with a consen- Efforts to Redefine the U.S.-Japan Secu- behind only those of the United States and sus quickly developing that Japan could no rity Relationship. Three documents over the United Kingdom in size and proficiency. Its longer limit itself to financial contributions. In last 8 years have played an important role in defense budget ($40 billion) ranks fourth in 1992, the Diet passed the Peace Keeping Opera- stimulating and shaping the debate in Japan the world (behind France and ahead of Ger- tions Law that allowed Japan to send SDF units about defense policy. The first was the 1996 many), although personnel costs consume to Cambodia as part of UN peacekeeping opera- U.S.-Japan Security Declaration, issued at a more than half of defense expenditures. tions. The SDF subsequently carried out suc- summit meeting in between President In the last 5 years, however, there has cessful peacekeeping missions in Mozambique, Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro been a growing feeling in Japan that to meet the Golan Heights, and East Timor, building Hashimoto. The declaration set forth a the challenges of the post–Cold War world, public support for such deployments. post–Cold War rationale for the alliance based Japan needs greater flexibility in its defense Changing Attitudes toward North Korea. on providing the regional stability necessary for policy that may require not only further rein- During the post–Korean War period, the left in economic growth and political development terpretation of the constitution but also its Japan supported North Korea, while the conser- and helped reaffirm public support in Japan for formal amendment. vative establishment supported South Korea, the continuing relevance of the U.S.-Japan with the majority of the one-million-member security relationship. Pressures for Change Korean community in Japan sympathetic to the The Revised Guidelines for Defense Coop- North. Japanese of all political persuasions eration that followed in 1997 established the A number of factors have ended the taboo feared the implications of a renewed conflict on framework for U.S.-Japan cooperation in re- on advocating constitutional change: the peninsula because of the polarizing effect it sponse to “situations in areas surrounding Generational Change. The generation would have on Japanese politics and the likely Japan,” not only improving the alliance’s that experienced war, defeat, and occupation outflow of refugees toward Japan, but did not ability to plan for and respond to a crisis, but has all but disappeared from the political view North Korea as a direct threat. also stimulating a debate in Japan about the scene, taking with it the reflexive pacifism and All of this has changed over the last 10 appropriate limits of its defense activities in the risk avoidance that has colored Japan’s interna- years. The revelations about the North Korean post–Cold War world. tional posture for the last 50 years. The new nuclear program in the early 1990s, the testing The Armitage-Nye Report5 may have generation is much less encumbered by history, of long-range missiles over Japan in 1998, and played an even more important role in stimu- more overtly nationalistic, and more willing to the acknowledgment by Kim Jong-Il in 2003 lating debate on amending the constitution. see Japan play an assertive international role. that North Korea had in fact kidnapped a The report, compiled in October 2000 by a The End of the Cold War. The collapse of number of Japanese have combined to change bipartisan study group, held up the U.S.–U.K. the Soviet Union was less profound in East Asia Japanese attitudes. Even the North’s traditional relationship as the model for the United States than in Europe, but the repercussions under- friends on the left have distanced themselves and Japan and called for enhancing bilateral mined the Japan Socialist Party and ended the from the regime.3 In addition, the North Ko- defense cooperation in East Asia and globally. ideological split in Japanese politics. When the rean missile and nuclear programs have in- In addition, the report stated unequivo- LDP persuaded JSP chairman Tomiichi Mu- creased Japanese public support for ballistic cally that “Japan’s prohibition against collec- rayama in 1994 to endorse the U.S.-Japan Secu- missile defense (BMD) cooperation with the tive self-defense is a constraint on the alliance. rity Treaty as the price of becoming prime min- United States. Some senior Japanese have Lifting this constraint would allow for closer ister of a , the left in Japan linked growing public support for revising the and more efficient security cooperation.” was fatally compromised. Over the last decade, constitution directly to North Korean provoca- Several LDP Diet members have said that they Japanese politics has evolved toward two large tions.4 In any event, Pyongyang’s behavior has saw this statement as a clear signal of biparti- groupings, one center-right (the LDP), and one stimulated the reexamination of Japanese san support in the United States for amending center-left (the Democratic Party of Japan), with defense policies. Article IX, removing lingering doubts among one potential swing party (the Komeito) and China’s Growing Power. Official relations Japanese leaders about American attitudes, and several fringe elements, including the Japan between Beijing and Tokyo are correct, and opening the door within the LDP to all-out Communist Party. Divisions on national security economic ties are booming to the extent that advocacy of constitutional reform. policy remain, but the debate now crosses party China is on the verge of replacing the United September 11 and Iraq. Prime Minister lines and is more pragmatic than ideological. States as Japan’s largest economic partner. At Junichiro Koizumi, determined not to repeat More fundamental, there is no longer a “block- the same time, while reluctant to characterize the mistakes of the Gulf War, was among the ing one-third” in the Diet committed to preserv- China as a threat, Japanese leaders watch with first foreign leaders to voice total support for ing the 1947 constitution intact. misgivings the rise of China’s economic and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and he moved The Gulf War. Notwithstanding Japan’s military power and political influence in East $13 billion donation to the effort, the United Asia. There is also a growing backlash in Japan States and the international community broadly to Chinese leaders’ perceived use of the “Japan

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Defense Policy Reform Winter 2004 Government issues new NDPO, Spring 2005 Fall 2004 setting policy objectives on Generic legislation is Advisory Commission on the ballistic missile defense Winter 2004–2005 submitted to Diet authorizing National Defense Policy Outline deployment, weapons, exports, New Mid-Term Defense Plan security defense forces to 2005–2010 (NDPO) submits report to the force structure, international is developed, incorporating engage in international Budgeting implements Mid- government of Japan cooperation, and so forth NDPO recommendations peacekeeping Term Defense Plan

Constitutional Winter–Spring 2005 Spring 2005 Fall 2005 Fall 2005–Spring 2006 (?) Legislation submitted to Diet Lower and Upper House Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Democratic Party of Japan Reform establishes procedures for Committees issue reports on Committee issues report on (DPJ) issues reports on referendum on constitutional recommendations for constitu- recommendations for recommendations for amendments tional reform constitutional reform constitutional reform

quickly to pass special legislation allowing Thus, over the last 14 years, changes in the LDP, DPJ, and Komeito. To obtain the two- Japan to send Maritime Self-Defense Forces to the external setting, combined with genera- thirds vote in both houses necessary for an the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area support tional and political evolution within Japan, amendment, the LDP will need the support of for coalition forces in Afghanistan. Koizumi have created the environment for the most not only its coalition partner, the Komeito, but also used the heightened security awareness in fundamental review of Japan’s constitution and also the DPJ, so there will need to be consensus Japan to move forward with long-stalled de- defense policy since the end of World War II. before a specific text is submitted to the Diet for fense-related issues, including legislation to ratification. The LDP and DPJ are also working give the government emergency powers in a Focal Points of Debate on legislation to establish the procedures for crisis and deployment of a BMD system in the national referendum called for in the cooperation with the United States. The most The Japanese decisions to cooperate with constitution as the final step in the ratification dramatic step taken by the prime minister was the United States on BMD and to dispatch SDF process, and this legislation is likely to be his decision in 2003, in the face of strong units to Iraq have brought the constitutional submitted to the Diet next year. domestic opposition, to obtain Diet approval for issue to the fore. Defense planners, conservative While Article IX is not the only element of the deployment of Ground Self-Defense Force politicians, journalists, and other right-of- the constitution open for amendment, it is the Units to southern Iraq to engage in humanitar- center opinion leaders argue that if Japan is to focus of attention. Suggestions on specific ian and reconstruction activities, putting be able to cooperate effectively with the United language have yet to emerge, but the outline of Japanese forces into a “semi-combat zone” for States on BMD and in other areas, as well as to the debate is forming, with particular focus on the first time since World War II. participate fully in international peacekeeping several issues.9 In response to charges from then-Democ- and humanitarian operations, Article IX needs Whether to Rewrite or Amend the Consti- to be adjusted to clarify the nation’s right to ratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader 7 tution. Although there are proponents of com- and others that sending SDF units to Iraq was engage in collective self-defense. pletely rewriting the constitution (former unconstitutional, Koizumi, in a December 9, Within the Japanese political world, there Prime Minister is in the are still many, including some members of the 2003, press conference, argued that sending 8 process of writing his own draft), a consensus units to Iraq to engage in humanitarian activi- LDP, who argue against amending the consti- appears to be emerging that it would prove ties and reconstruction was in accord with the tution. Some express concern that tampering extremely difficult to gain ratification of a ideals of the constitution, citing language from with Article IX will end Japan’s “exceptional- completely new text and that the only practical the preamble pledging Japan to international ism” and open the door to the nation becom- route is to amend the current document. cooperation in pursuit of peace.6 ing a major military power. Others fear that How to Handle Paragraph One of Koizumi’s argument apparently struck a amendments will not be limited to Article IX Article IX. While some on the political right chord with the Japanese: public support for the and may include provisions that erode civil want to change or scrap this paragraph, there dispatch of SDF forces has increased to over 50 liberties. However, even some staunch defenders is a consensus in the LDP, DPJ, and Komeito to percent. Public support for amending the of the current constitution, faced with the maintain at least the spirit and probably the constitution has also increased, reaching on possibility of amendments that could remove language that renounces war as a sovereign April 2, 2004, a record high 65 percent, 11 all constraints on the role of the Japanese right and the threat or use of force to settle points higher than the year before. The most military, are now considering proposing their international disputes. This is seen as neces- common reason given (52 percent) for amend- own revisions in order to lock in Japan’s de- sary to maintain Japan’s postwar legacy as a ing the constitution was “Japan is expected to fense-only policy by spelling out more specifi- nonthreatening nation and to respond to the make international contributions, and there cally what Japan can and cannot do. strong pacifist sentiment that still exists. are various challenges that Japan cannot meet Both houses of the Diet have established under its current constitution.” committees on constitutional reform, as have

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Wildcard possibilities New constitutional interpretation and/or legislation to authorize/ redefine collective self-defense

2006 (?) Fall 2006–2007 2007 (?) 2007–2010 (?) 2008–2012 (?) Joint Diet committee LDP, DPJ, and Komeito put Winning party attempts to put Diet approves constitutional National referendum established and consolidates forward their respective texts together a “grand coalition” to amendments approves constitutional recommendations as basis for lower house gain required two-thirds amendments election majority, possibly provoking a fundamental realignment of Japanese political parties

The Need to Legitimize Military Forces chairman and former vice focus on building up Japan’s autonomous and to Clarify the Right of Self-Defense. The chairman Ichiro Ozawa, want a distinction defense capabilities.12 These groups are not LDP and DPJ proponents of constitutional drawn between Japan’s right to engage in “col- necessarily mutually exclusive. Some neo- revision agree that the second paragraph of lective security” under a UN mandate and the nationalists, for example, advocate increased Article IX needs to acknowledge current reality ban on “collective self-defense” (for example, cooperation with the United States in the and to give Japan greater flexibility in the defending the United States), which should midterm as a path to greater Japanese long- future. The LDP is considering proposing continue to be prohibited.11 term independence. language that would authorize “war potential” for self-defense and international cooperation. Defense Policy Debate Alliance Nationalists The Komeito wants to keep the existing lan- guage but add a clarifying third paragraph. While the debate on altering the constitu- Led by former ambassador Hisahiko Whether to Specify Japan’s Right to En- tion is not likely to come to fruition for many Okazaki, the alliance nationalists argue that gage in Collective Self-Defense. This is the years, a parallel discussion (see above) on the Japan’s future security policy should remain heart of the debate, and there is no consensus. direction of defense policy is moving much centered on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and This issue is being driven by Japan’s decision to faster. Tokyo is preparing its third National that the boundaries of U.S.-Japan defense cooperate with the United States on BMD and by Defense Program Outline (NDPO) that estab- cooperation should be steadily expanded, both the desire to give the SDF more flexibility as it lishes the framework of defense policy. The first in areas around Japan and globally. They engages in peacekeeping and humanitarian NDPO in 1976 focused on “the minimum level believe that Japan can best maximize its inter- activities. A number of conservatives argue that of defense capability” needed to maintain the ests through close association with the world’s this issue should be dealt with, at least initially, credibility of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. The only superpower and that it can better influ- either by another Cabinet Legislative Bureau second outline in 1995 pointed to the need for ence American positions by becoming its indis- reinterpretation or by special legislation, since Japan to rationalize its defense posture with the pensable partner. In the background is their full cooperation on BMD should not be held end of the Cold War and raised WMD and concern about China’s growing power, instabil- hostage to the drawn-out amendment process. international peacekeeping as new challenges. ity on the Korean Peninsula, and the need to Other defense hawks in the LDP and DPJ want Prime Minister Koizumi has just inaugurated ensure energy supplies from the Middle East. to use this issue as pressure to amend the con- the Advisory Committee on Japan’s Security and This group does not advocate an offensive stitution, arguing that it is important to gain Defense Capabilities, which submitted its report combat role for Japan or the modification of public support and understanding by “going in October on recommendations for the next the first paragraph of Article IX, but it does through the front door.” A third group—made NDPO to be completed by the government by support a broad interpretation of the right of up largely of doves in the DPJ, JSP, and LDP and the end of 2004. The defense policy that self-defense and collective self-defense, includ- many in the Komeito, and supported at this emerges from this process will in turn shape ing more active rear-area support for U.S. stage by a majority of the Japanese public— the ongoing constitutional debate. forces, full cooperation with the United States remains cautious about specifying in any form The development of a new defense policy on BMD, and the right of Japan to take pre- the right of collective self-defense unless it is will be shaped by interplay between adherents emptive action against missiles sites that are carefully circumscribed, out of concern that this of three broad schools of thought: the alliance preparing to launch. could prove to be a slippery slope that will lead nationalists, who argue that Japan should The alliance nationalists accept the need to Japan’s increasing military engagement place primary emphasis on expanding cooper- for Japan to participate more actively in UN abroad, particularly at the behest of the United ation under the framework of the U.S.-Japan peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities States.10 Some in the DPJ, including current Security Treaty; the internationalists, who give and indeed argue that the current constitution greater importance to cooperation with the United Nations; and the neo-nationalists, who

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places no limits on Japan’s ability to participate policy under a more international umbrella. These schools represent areas of emphasis fully in such activities, given the obligations that These include reassuring the international rather than mutually exclusive divisions. All Japan undertook in subsequently adhering to community that Japan is not becoming an three groups accept the importance of the the UN charter to support such operations.13 independent military power; continuing its alliance with the United States, particularly To accomplish these objectives, the al- legacy of contributing to human security in with respect to defense of Japan and areas liance nationalists urge removing the con- cooperation with the UN system; and serving as around Japan, and all advocate an active straints on collective self-defense, either by an obstacle to U.S. pressure for Japan to partici- Japanese role in UN peacekeeping operations. constitutional reinterpretation, amendment, pate in missions that do not have broad inter- The major difference between them is the legislation, or even a political declaration by national support, such as the Iraq venture. degree to which Japan should allow itself to the prime minister, and giving priority to With respect to amending Article IX of the participate in military activities unrelated to Japan’s obligations in the U.S.-Japan Security constitution, this group generally supports the defense of Japan that are not sanctioned by Treaty and the UN charter over the constraints language to legitimize the SDF and clarify the the UN Security Council. in its constitution. A few in this group argue right of self-defense but tends to be cautious that after the constitution is amended, the U.S.- with respect to specifying the right of collective Emerging LDP Vision Japan Security Treaty should also be revised to self-defense unless focused on operations in include a reciprocal obligation by Japan to “areas around Japan” or under a UN umbrella. The new NDPO will be shaped not only by come to the defense of the United States. the results of the work of the advisory commit- Most observers describe the alliance na- Neo-Nationalists tee appointed by Prime Minister Koizumi, but tionalists as an important but limited group. also by thinking within the LDP. The LDP Prime Minister Koizumi, JDA Minister Ishiba, The neo-nationalist school advocates that Policy Research Council Subcommittee of Transportation Minister Taro Aso, and former Japan become a “normal” country, with few Defense Studies issued a report on March 30, Prime Minister Hashimoto are sometimes legal constraints on defense policy. While few in 2004, entitled “Recommendations on Japan’s identified as fitting in this category.14 However, this group call for major change in Japan’s New Defense Policy.” To address both tradi- military posture or an abrupt rupture with the tional threats of state aggression, focused on many in the group appear to be older “Ameri- st can school” diplomats and LDP members, with United States, they do argue that Japan needs a North Korea and 21 -century threats by non- fewer adherents among the new generation of more independent security policy, both as a state actors, the LDP report argues that Japan bureaucrats and politicians. hedge against a weakening of the U.S. commit- needs to enhance the credibility of the U.S.- ment and to give Japan more foreign policy Japan alliance, play a more active role in and strategic room for maneuver. Implicit here international organizations such as the United Internationalists is the position that Japan should keep open the Nations, and strengthen regional cooperation A large group in the center of Japanese possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, by utilizing the Association of Southeast Asian politics, including members of the LDP, although few publicly advocate that Japan Nations Regional Forum and Six-Party Talks. Komeito, and DPJ, wants to see defense policy move in this direction now. With respect to amending Article IX of the increasingly oriented toward cooperation under Members of this group generally advocate constitution, the report recommends: a UN or other multinational or regional frame- replacing the “MacArthur-imposed constitu- ■ a clear statement that Japan possesses the work. They recognize UN limitations and tion” as a matter of national pride and inde- right of individual and collective self-defense importance of the Security Treaty, particularly pendence. Some want to see not only the re- ■ a new definition of the SDF as a national with respect to a potential crisis in the Far East, moval of restrictions in Article IX but also other defense force that is tasked not only with the but argue that Japan’s defense activities beyond changes in the document, including reinstat- defense of Japan but also with participation in this area should be under some kind of an ing the emperor as head of state, allowing state activities for the maintenance and restoration of international umbrella. Some also would like support for the Shinto religion, and instilling international peace to develop a formal East Asian security frame- patriotic values (for example, reforming the ■ a delineation of emergency powers that the work, along the lines of the Six-Party Talks on education system and requiring respect for the prime minister may exercise in response to an internal or external crisis or a natural disaster, North Korea, to complement and perhaps national anthem and flag). subject to subsequent Diet approval. eventually supplant the U.S.-Japan bilateral By most accounts, the neo-nationalists security arrangements in the region around represent no more than 10 percent of the With respect to the exercise of the right of Japan. Internationalist leader Ichiro Ozawa, political spectrum and have little chance of collective self-defense, the report argues that the former deputy chief of the DPJ, advocates becoming the dominant voice in Japan, bar- the constitutionality of this “natural right to that Japan lift the restrictions on engaging in ring a catastrophic collapse of the U.S.-Japan which Japan is already entitled” can be made collective security under the United Nations, as alliance or a major conflict in the region. At clear through either an amendment to or opposed to “collective self-defense” under the the same time, a growing number of younger reinterpretation of the constitution, new legis- alliance with the United States, and that Japan politicians across the political spectrum are lation defining the constitutional boundaries, establish a separate force outside the SDF attracted by the theme of greater independence or parliamentary resolutions. dedicated to participation in UN-led operations. from the United States, and Ishihara himself Concerning the specifics of defense policy, Members of this group put forward vari- enjoys wide personal popularity.16 the LDP report recommends, inter alia: ous arguments for putting Japan’s defense

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■ enacting a general law governing interna- country. No committee member found the latter use process to catch up. The domestic political tional cooperation activities of the SDF to replace of force acceptable, but the group agreed that the balance of forces and the external security the ad hoc approach of passing specific legislation former needs further discussion. environment in turn will influence this. for each overseas mission Most commentators expect that, following the With respect to the domestic political ■ transforming SDF force structure with an lead of the Advisory Committee, the National scene, the impact of Koizumi’s weakened posi- orientation toward rapid-response units for ground tion on the substance of the NDPO is unclear. forces and increased maritime and air transport Defense Program Outline will also avoid ad- capability to support the new importance of Japan’s dressing directly the constitutional and collec- On the one hand, Tokyo may be reluctant to involvement in international activities tive self-defense issues. push the boundaries of existing constraints too ■ ensuring the smooth introduction of a BMD far in view of the strengthened position of the system by streamlining command and control The Road Ahead DPJ and Komeito. On the other hand, with the arrangements in view of the compressed decision- prospects fading for early amendment of the making timeframe, spelling out the operational The LDP’s poor showing in the July 11, constitution, the defense hawks will want to use arrangement with U.S. forces, and examining 2004, upper house election, coupled with the the NDPO process to advance on collective self- 17 whether Japan should develop the capability to gains of the DPJ and Komeito, has weakened defense as far as possible. Much will depend on 16 strike preemptively enemy missile bases Koizumi’s ability to take on major new initia- the priority that Koizumi gives to breaking new ■ deepening U.S.-Japan defense cooperation tives and likely delayed substantial movement ground on defense policy in comparison to his by building on the 1997 Guidelines for Defense toward revision of the constitution until after domestic legislative priorities. Cooperation to allow SDF and U.S. forces, “when- the next lower house election, expected in late ever Japan deems necessary,” to work together 2006 or early 2007.18 The process, however, will beyond the treaty area of the Far East in such areas keep moving forward. External Influences? as international peace and stability operations and The future direction of debate on both the in response to other emerging threats. The next step will be the release of the reports by the various committees studying NDPO and the timing and substance of the Viewed in the context of the larger debate, constitutional reform. The Lower House Com- constitutional question will be influenced by a the views put forward by the LDP Defense mittee will issue its report in May 2005, fol- number of external factors. First, there is Iraq. Policy Subcommittee tilt toward the alliance lowed by the Upper House Committee. The If the Iraqi transition turns out well, both those nationalist and neo-nationalist schools by LDP Research Committee on the Constitution advocating a closer alliance with the United calling for a more activist Japanese role with is due to conclude its work in November States and a more active Japanese role in respect to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and 2005,19 and the DPJ will issue its report in late international peacekeeping activities will be reducing the constraints on Japan’s auton- 2005 or early 2006. Once these reports are out, strengthened. Conversely, if the Iraqi experience omous defense activities. However, the group the plan is to form a joint Diet committee to is widely seen as a mistake, both advocates of a also gives a nod to the internationalist school consolidate the findings and make specific more autonomous defense and of a more in supporting Japan’s expanded cooperation recommendations. explicit UN mandate for the future dispatch of with UN activities. Most observers believe that it will prove SDF units will gain strength. The Advisory Committee report issued in impossible to come up with a consolidated text Within the region, the Korean situation October is consistent with the LDP Defense and that the three major parties—the LDP, will loom large. A breakthrough on the kidnap- Policy Subcommittee views in that it emphasizes DPJ, and Komeito—will put forward their own ping issue and success in the Six-Party Talks the need to strengthen both the alliance with the proposals for amending the constitution as the would reduce the threat perception in Japan, United States and Japan’s ability to contribute to basis for their campaigns in the 2006–2007 thereby lessening pressure to strengthen the building a peaceful international environment. lower house election. The winning party will U.S. alliance. On the other hand, a crisis in The committee did not directly address the then use its text as the basis for trying to nego- North Korea would cement support for BMD issues of constitutional revision and collective tiate a “grand coalition” with the necessary cooperation and harden Japanese defense self-defense, arguing that while these questions two-thirds vote to pass amendments, a process policy. With respect to China, a Taiwan Strait were of great importance, no national consensus that some predict could provoke a major re- crisis, particularly if provoked by Beijing, would had yet been reached. However, in an adden- alignment of Japanese political parties. strengthen Japanese support for the alliance dum, the committee did make two important In the interim, the process of revising with the United States and for increasing de- comments stating that Japan needs to: Japan’s defense policy will gain momentum. fense capabilities and loosening legal and ■ distinguish between, and debate separately, The government’s new NDPO is due by the end policy constraints. But a breakthrough in cross- the right of collective self-defense by the nation of 2004. The next step will be to implement the strait dialogue, coupled with a softer Chinese itself, and collective actions undertaken by the report recommendations in the form of a new line toward Japan, could reduce pressure to United Nations (implicitly supporting the positions Mid-Term Defense Plan, followed by legislative strengthen Japan’s defense posture. of Okada and Ozawa of the DSP) and budget authorizations, a process that could Harder to gauge, but also influential, will ■ distinguish between the use of force to take years. A key question will be the degree to be the broader question of confidence in the protect U.S. troops that are in and around the which the NDPO makes policy recommenda- United States. The Bush administration’s em- nation to defend it from an armed attack, and to phasis on the importance of the alliance and help the United States expel invaders from a third tions that go beyond the current constitutional constraints on collective self-defense, without Japan’s support for the United States after waiting for the constitutional amendment

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September 11 and in Iraq have resulted in what developing the force structure, transportation 10 The April 8, 2004, Mainichi Shimbun reports that at an many on both sides of the Pacific call the “best capabilities, and policy flexibility it needs to April 7 meeting of the Upper House Research Commission on the Constitution, a number of LDP supporters of the right of collec- ever” U.S.-Japan relationship. There is growing participate more fully in UN and other peace- tive self-defense voiced concern that Japan will become involved criticism of Koizumi’s “lock-step” alignment keeping operations. in “America’s unilateralism” unless “limits are put in place.” with Washington, however, not only from the Indeed the biggest variable in the evolu- 11 Okada, in a July 29, 2004, address in the United States, opposition DPJ and the media, but also from tion of Japan’s defense policy will be the degree took the position that Japan could use force overseas only if the many in the bureaucracy and LDP. This objec- to which Japan continues to consider the constitution was revised and if there was a “clear UN Security Council resolution.” Ozawa argues that Japan can participate in tion relates to the American strategy in Iraq, United States a reliable partner that gives full UN-sanctioned military actions under the present constitution. but there are also those who question U.S. weight to Japan’s interests and international Both agree that Japan should not be permitted to join the United unilateralism and self-centeredness more norms as it carries out its responsibilities as States if it takes “unilateral” military action in the absence of a broadly. Perceived American missteps with the world’s only superpower. UN Security Council resolution. respect to a provocation on the Korean Penin- 12 This analysis is based upon the author’s interviews with sula or to a Taiwan Strait crisis, for example, Notes more than 50 political leaders, senior bureaucrats, academics, 1 “The Price of a Constitution,” Tetsuya Kataoka, 8. journalists, and other opinion leaders. 13 could give further ammunition to both the 2 Ibid., 10. For example, Article 43 of the Charter which states, inter Japanese left and right advocating more inde- 3 In a recent poll, 80 percent of the Japanese public alia, “All member of the United Nations . . . undertake to make pendence from the United States. If Washing- supported placing sanctions on North Korea now. available to the Security Council...armed forces, ton is seen as fully consulting Tokyo and re- 4 The report, issued on October 11, 2000, by the Institute assistance...necessary for the purpose of maintaining interna- for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, tional peace and security.” newing its commitment to multilateral 14 is formally titled “The United States and Japan: Advancing The May 2004 edition of the monthly magazine cooperation and institutions, however, these Toward a Mature Partnership,” but it is universally known as the Shokun! produced a diagram purporting to show the orientation concerns in Japan are likely to dissipate. Armitage-Nye report, or, more often, as the “Armitage Report.” of Japanese political leaders on an axis of “reliance on the U.S.” 5 “We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, or “Independent Defense.” Japan is turning a historic corner toward but that the laws of political morality are universal; and that 15 In an April 24, 2004, Yomiuri Shimbun poll that posed amending Article IX of its constitution, but the obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would the question, “Who would you like to see as the next Prime sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relation- Minister?” Ishihara topped the list with 26.5 percent. process is likely to be protracted and the impli- ship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our 16 As noted above, the government of Japan has taken the cations for Japan’s defense policy evolutionary national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with position since 1956 that such action represents a constitutionally rather than revolutionary. Japan will almost all our resources.” permissible act of self-defense. 17 certainly maintain the spirit if not the letter of 6 One of the most straightforward statements in this regard The constitutional issue figured little in the election the first paragraph of Article IX, thereby preserv- was made by Prime Minister Koizumi in a June 27, 2004, NHK campaign. The poor LDP showing is attributed to unhappiness Television interview when he stated, “In order to defend Japan, with the handling of pension reform, continuing economic ing to some degree its unique status. At the same the U.S. has worked with Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty, stagnation at the local level, and Koizumi’s announcement at the time, the second paragraph of Article IX is likely but Japan cannot take joint action with U.S. forces and is not G–8 Summit, without prior consultation with the Diet, that to be amended to legitimize the Self-Defense allowed to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Such a Japan would put its forces in Iraq under the control of the situation is strange.” Asahi Shimbun, June 29, 2004. multinational force established after the transfer of sovereignty. Forces and clarify Japan’s right of self-defense. 18 A key question will be how Japan handles 7 Former LDP president Yohei Kono openly opposes In July 6, 2004, remarks at a Center for Strategic and amending the constitution; former LDP secretary general Koichi International Studies conference in Washington, DC, former LDP the issue of collective self-defense. There is a Kato is described by one monthly magazine as “hidden protector policy chief and defense expert Taku Yamazaki predicted that the near-consensus in the LDP and among the DPJ of the constitution.” next lower house election would be fought over specific recom- hawks that either by amendment, reinterpreta- 8 Article 96 of the current constitution stipulates that an mendations on constitutional reform. tion, or legislation in order to allow more amendment must receive a two-thirds affirmative vote of both 19 According to the May 10, 2004, Tokyo Shimbun, the LDP effective cooperation with the United States on houses of the Diet, followed by a majority of all votes cast in a Commission has already decided to maintain the first paragraph national referendum, but leaves to the Diet the specific arrange- of Article IX and to rewrite the second paragraph to stipulate BMD and to give Japan more flexibility with ments for the latter. Japan’s right of self-defense and to maintain armed forces. respect to international peacekeeping opera- 9 Analysis in this section is based upon Japanese press tions. Many in Japan remain concerned, how- reporting and the author’s conversations with Japanese politi- ever, that the removal of this constraint risks cians, scholars, bureaucrats, and journalists. Japan’s being drawn into adventures abroad, particularly at the behest of the United States. The most likely outcome is a compromise that The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members will establish the right of collective self-defense research and strategic gaming organization within the National of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security but, at least initially, restrict its application to Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, its affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, components, and interagency partners. The institute provides and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the areas noted above. senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Both the new NDPO and the later emer- events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal international security affairs and defense studies. Through an Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at gence of a revised constitution should provide active outreach program, including conferences and publications, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force the framework for strengthening the U.S.-Japan INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal alliance. Bilateral cooperation is likely to in- challenges and policy options. can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs. crease with respect to ballistic missile defense, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES support for contingencies on the Korean Penin- Stephen J. Flanagan sula and in the Taiwan Strait, and on sea line James A. Schear Director COL Debra Taylor, USA Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press protection. Japan also will likely emphasize

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