From Rhetoric to Reality Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan April 2012 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis From Rhetoric to Reality Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan April 2012 Weston S. Konishi A publication of The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Contents Introduction and Acknowledgments iii Executive Summary v Main Findings v From Rhetoric to Reality: Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan 1 Internal Challenges 4 Intra-party Divisions 4 The Complexities of Coalition Politics 7 Institutional Reforms: Toward Politician-Led Decision-Making 11 The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions 15 Realists 16 Pacifists 17 Centrists 17 Neo-Autonomists 18 Caveats 20 Prime Minister Hatoyama: An Agenda for Change 23 External Constraints on the Hatoyama Administration 27 The Kan Administration: Political Transition and Crisis Management 30 The Noda Administration: Shifting to the Center? 40 Findings and Implications 45 The Impact of Structural Obstacles on DPJ Foreign-Policy Making 45 Continuity versus Change 46 The DPJ: A Hawkish Party? 47 Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism 49 Competing Schools of Thought 51 Conclusion 54 APPENDIX A: Impact of Major Events on Cabinet Approval Ratings 56 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY I APPENDIX B: The 2010 NDPG Process 59 APPENDIX C: Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy Viewpoints 62 APPENDIX D: Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians 63 APPENDIX E: Chronology of Major Events under DPJ Governments 79 Bibliography 86 About the Author 103 II FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Introduction and Acknowledgments After more than fifty years of one-party dom- ister Kan Naoto, presided over Japan’s most chal- inance under the Liberal Democratic Par- lenging crisis since World War II—the March ty (LDP), Japan’s political landscape changed 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake—before dramatically with the victory of the Democratic succumbing to his own political fate as a result Party of Japan (DPJ) in parliamentary elections of his inconsistent leadership. Now Noda Yoshi- on August 30, 2009. As an opposition party, the hiko, the third DPJ prime minister in two years, DPJ had promised sweeping changes across a is facing equally daunting political challenges. broad range of domestic and foreign policy is- For observers of Japan’s foreign policy, the sues. On the domestic front, the DPJ called for diplomatic and strategic implications of the gov- the elimination of wasteful government spend- ernment changeover in 2009 have been difficult ing, greater government transparency, and re- to discern, especially given the backdrop of on- form of the bureaucrat-led decision-making going political turmoil in Tokyo. Before the DPJ process that had become entrenched under came to power, questions arose about whether LDP rule. On foreign policy, the party pledged the new government would institute significant to forge a more “equal” security alliance with changes to Japanese foreign and security poli- the United States, enhance ties with China and cies. Of primary concern, particularly to policy other Asian nations, and establish a more asser- makers in Washington, was whether the DPJ- tive and independent foreign policy agenda for led government might tilt Japan away from its the nation. As the newly elected prime minister, traditional emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance Hatoyama Yukio, prepared to take office in Sep- (bilateralism) and toward a closer strategic re- tember 2009, there was a sense that Japan was in lationship with the Asian mainland (multilat- the midst of a quiet revolution of sorts. eralism). Based on previous statements by DPJ Over two years later, the dramatic change leaders, as well as party manifestos, it seemed promised by the DPJ has not entirely come to reasonable to assume that the DPJ would carry fruition. As a ruling party, the DPJ has failed to out this shift. Yet some argued that, once in pow- turn much of its lofty rhetoric into reality. Its do- er, the DPJ government would ultimately come mestic agenda has largely stalled, while some of to see the limitations of alternative security ar- its more grandiose foreign policy proposals, such rangements and would fall back into the status as creating an East Asian Community (EAC), quo strategic partnership with the United States. have been back-shelved or abandoned. The over- So far, the latter prediction appears more ac- whelming priority of party leaders has been to curate. The DPJ-led government has not fun- keep the DPJ from splintering into its many fac- damentally altered Japan’s foreign policy. The tions and to maintain its position as the ruling “big change” in diplomatic and strategic direc- party. It has been forced to form coalitions with tion that some speculated would accompany the ill-fitting political partners in order to maintain new government in Tokyo has failed to materi- a majority of seats in the Diet (parliament). alize. Despite the rhetoric, particularly by for- After just nine months in office, Prime Minis- mer Prime Minister Hatoyama, Japan has not ter Hatoyama resigned, taking responsibility for developed closer strategic ties with Asia nor, in his floundering government and his mismanage- any real sense, moved away from the alliance ment of relocation plans for U.S. military bases with the United States. And yet, the U.S.-Japan on Okinawa. Hatoyama’s successor, Prime Min- security relationship has changed—if not as a FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY III result of a concerted policy shift, then at least es and data as well as the author’s background in- through a series of missteps and mixed signals terviews with numerous DPJ and opposition party that marked the first year of the DPJ’s rule. The lawmakers, parliamentary staff, government of- bilateral alliance has since appeared to be adrift ficials, journalists, and researchers on both sides at times, as alliance management difficulties of the Pacific. have undermined momentum toward enhanced Many people provided invaluable knowledge bilateral strategic relations. and input throughout the course of this under- What explains the present state of affairs, as taking. Not all can be named here, but the au- well as the DPJ’s inability to follow through on thor would especially like to thank Akita Hiroyu- its promise to reorient Japanese foreign policy? Is ki, Amiya Kosuke, Aoba Hiroo, John Brandon, it the result of a fierce internal debate over com- Emma Chanlett-Avery, Gordon Flake, Michael peting visions of Japan’s grand strategy? Did one Green, Haku Shinkun, Hayashi Yoshimasa, Hira- school of thought within the DPJ or ruling co- oka Hideo, Jeffrey Hornung, Ishiba Shigeru, Kato alition win out over another? There seems lit- Yoichi, Kinoshita Hideyomi, Kobayashi Yutaka, tle doubt that the answer to these questions lies Kojima Hiroshi, Nakayama Toshihiro, Mark more in the general state of confusion and polit- Manyin, Mizuno Takaaki, Nagashima Akihisa, ical dysfunction that marked the first year of the Nodomi Mitsuru, Ono Hikariko, Ono Keiichi, DPJ-led government than in a more compelling Osawa Jun, Charles Perry, Saiki Akitaka, Sakamo- story of an internal struggle over grand strategy. to Takashi, Sato Ken, Richard Samuels, Michael Yet despite the dysfunction and lack of coordi- Schiffer, Sheila Smith, Sugawa Kiyoshi, Suzuki nation, the new government has actually taken Atsuo, Takahashi Sugio, Tanaka Hitoshi, Toya- steps to advance Japan’s diplomatic and strate- ma Kiyohiko, Uchida Yuka, Yamaguchi Nobo- gic interests in some important ways. Indeed, far ru, Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, and Yamanouchi Kan- from a total breakdown of policy making, there ji for their insights and encouragement. have been surprising areas of active diplomacy The project was initially the brainchild of and security policy. Indeed, a broader analysis is the former IFPA director of Asia-Pacific studies, required to fully understand how and why some James Schoff, who kept it on track even as he initiatives of the DPJ’s foreign-policy making suc- transitioned to the Pentagon as a senior adviser ceeded and how others failed. on Asia policy. Kawakami Takeshi of Takushoku In order to shed more light on these points, University helped consult on the project, gener- the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), ously opening doors to normally inaccessible in- with generous support from the Smith Richard- terview subjects and sharing his own prescient son Foundation, embarked on a research proj- insights along the way. IFPA staff who contrib- ect to examine the DPJ’s foreign-policy making uted their skills and expertise to the final prod- since it took power in 2009. The project exam- uct include Adelaide Ketchum (editing), Chris- ines the key people, policies, and processes that tian Hoffman (graphic design and publishing), have come to underlie the DPJ’s foreign-policy Charles McClean (research) and, most of all, Na- making as a ruling party, and it includes an at- kai Aki, whose tireless research and analysis were tempt to define and categorize four main foreign indispensable to the completion of this project. policy strains within the party. Rather than focus The entire IFPA team is grateful to Allan Song on the current state of U.S.-Japan relations, this of the Smith Richardson Foundation for making study examines Japan’s broader diplomatic and SRF’s financial support possible. It goes without strategic activity beyond the bilateral relationship saying that the author alone bears full responsibil- while considering how these actions might im- ity for whatever flaws remain in the report. One pact the U.S.-Japan relationship in the future. final note is that Japanese names appear with the This report draws on research findings based family name first and the given name second, as on Japanese and English-language primary sourc- is the Japanese custom. IV FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Executive Summary This report surveys the past two years of Japanese have, in particular, forced the new ruling par- foreign and defense policy making, since the ty to modify its original foreign policy goals.