From Rhetoric to Reality: Japanese Foreign-Policy Making Under The

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From Rhetoric to Reality

Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan

April 2012 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

From Rhetoric to Reality

Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan

April 2012 Weston S. Konishi

A publication of The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Contents

Introduction and Acknowledgments iii

Executive Summary v Main Findings v

From Rhetoric to Reality: Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan 1

Internal Challenges 4 Intra-party Divisions 4 The Complexities of Coalition Politics 7 Institutional Reforms: Toward Politician-Led Decision-Making 11

The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions 15 Realists 16 Pacifists 17 Centrists 17 Neo-Autonomists 18 Caveats 20

Prime Minister Hatoyama: An Agenda for Change 23 External Constraints on the Hatoyama Administration 27

The Kan Administration: Political Transition and Crisis Management 30

The Noda Administration: Shifting to the Center? 40

Findings and Implications 45 The Impact of Structural Obstacles on DPJ Foreign-Policy Making 45 Continuity versus Change 46 The DPJ: A Hawkish Party? 47 Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism 49 Competing Schools of Thought 51

Conclusion 54

APPENDIX A: Impact of Major Events on Cabinet Approval Ratings 56

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY i APPENDIX B: The 2010 NDPG Process 59

APPENDIX C: Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy Viewpoints 62

APPENDIX D: Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians 63

APPENDIX E: Chronology of Major Events under DPJ Governments 79

Bibliography 86

About the Author 103

ii FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Introduction and Acknowledgments

After more than fifty years of one-party dom- ister Kan Naoto, presided over Japan’s most chal- inance under the Liberal Democratic Par- lenging crisis since World War II—the March ty (LDP), Japan’s political landscape changed 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake—before dramatically with the victory of the Democratic succumbing to his own political fate as a result Party of Japan (DPJ) in parliamentary elections of his inconsistent leadership. Now Noda Yoshi- on August 30, 2009. As an opposition party, the hiko, the third DPJ prime minister in two years, DPJ had promised sweeping changes across a is facing equally daunting political challenges. broad range of domestic and foreign policy is- For observers of Japan’s foreign policy, the sues. On the domestic front, the DPJ called for diplomatic and strategic implications of the gov- the elimination of wasteful government spend- ernment changeover in 2009 have been difficult ing, greater government transparency, and re- to discern, especially given the backdrop of on- form of the bureaucrat-led decision-making going political turmoil in Tokyo. Before the DPJ process that had become entrenched under came to power, questions arose about whether LDP rule. On foreign policy, the party pledged the new government would institute significant to forge a more “equal” security alliance with changes to Japanese foreign and security poli- the United States, enhance ties with China and cies. Of primary concern, particularly to policy other Asian nations, and establish a more asser- makers in Washington, was whether the DPJ- tive and independent foreign policy agenda for led government might tilt Japan away from its the nation. As the newly elected prime minister, traditional emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance Hatoyama Yukio, prepared to take office in Sep- (bilateralism) and toward a closer strategic re- tember 2009, there was a sense that Japan was in lationship with the Asian mainland (multilat- the midst of a quiet revolution of sorts. eralism). Based on previous statements by DPJ Over two years later, the dramatic change leaders, as well as party manifestos, it seemed promised by the DPJ has not entirely come to reasonable to assume that the DPJ would carry fruition. As a ruling party, the DPJ has failed to out this shift. Yet some argued that, once in pow- turn much of its lofty rhetoric into reality. Its do- er, the DPJ government would ultimately come mestic agenda has largely stalled, while some of to see the limitations of alternative security ar- its more grandiose foreign policy proposals, such rangements and would fall back into the status as creating an East Asian Community (EAC), quo strategic partnership with the United States. have been back-shelved or abandoned. The over- So far, the latter prediction appears more ac- whelming priority of party leaders has been to curate. The DPJ-led government has not fun- keep the DPJ from splintering into its many fac- damentally altered Japan’s foreign policy. The tions and to maintain its position as the ruling “big change” in diplomatic and strategic direc- party. It has been forced to form coalitions with tion that some speculated would accompany the ill-fitting political partners in order to maintain new government in Tokyo has failed to materi- a majority of seats in the Diet (parliament). alize. Despite the rhetoric, particularly by for- After just nine months in office, Prime Minis- mer Prime Minister Hatoyama, Japan has not ter Hatoyama resigned, taking responsibility for developed closer strategic ties with Asia nor, in his floundering government and his mismanage- any real sense, moved away from the alliance ment of relocation plans for U.S. military bases with the United States. And yet, the U.S.-Japan on Okinawa. Hatoyama’s successor, Prime Min- security relationship has changed—if not as a

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY iii result of a concerted policy shift, then at least es and data as well as the author’s background in- through a series of missteps and mixed signals terviews with numerous DPJ and opposition party that marked the first year of the DPJ’s rule. The lawmakers, parliamentary staff, government of- bilateral alliance has since appeared to be adrift ficials, journalists, and researchers on both sides at times, as alliance management difficulties of the Pacific. have undermined momentum toward enhanced Many people provided invaluable knowledge bilateral strategic relations. and input throughout the course of this under- What explains the present state of affairs, as taking. Not all can be named here, but the au- well as the DPJ’s inability to follow through on thor would especially like to thank Akita Hiroyu- its promise to reorient Japanese foreign policy? Is ki, Amiya Kosuke, Aoba Hiroo, John Brandon, it the result of a fierce internal debate over com- Emma Chanlett-Avery, Gordon Flake, Michael peting visions of Japan’s grand strategy? Did one Green, Haku Shinkun, Hayashi Yoshimasa, Hira- school of thought within the DPJ or ruling co- oka Hideo, Jeffrey Hornung, Ishiba Shigeru, Kato alition win out over another? There seems lit- Yoichi, Kinoshita Hideyomi, Kobayashi Yutaka, tle doubt that the answer to these questions lies Kojima Hiroshi, Nakayama Toshihiro, Mark more in the general state of confusion and polit- Manyin, Mizuno Takaaki, Nagashima Akihisa, ical dysfunction that marked the first year of the Nodomi Mitsuru, Ono Hikariko, Ono Keiichi, DPJ-led government than in a more compelling Osawa Jun, Charles Perry, Saiki Akitaka, Sakamo- story of an internal struggle over grand strategy. to Takashi, Sato Ken, Richard Samuels, Michael Yet despite the dysfunction and lack of coordi- Schiffer, Sheila Smith, Sugawa Kiyoshi, Suzuki nation, the new government has actually taken Atsuo, Takahashi Sugio, Tanaka Hitoshi, Toya- steps to advance Japan’s diplomatic and strate- ma Kiyohiko, Uchida Yuka, Yamaguchi Nobo- gic interests in some important ways. Indeed, far ru, Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, and Yamanouchi Kan- from a total breakdown of policy making, there ji for their insights and encouragement. have been surprising areas of active diplomacy The project was initially the brainchild of and security policy. Indeed, a broader analysis is the former IFPA director of Asia-Pacific studies, required to fully understand how and why some James Schoff, who kept it on track even as he initiatives of the DPJ’s foreign-policy making suc- transitioned to the Pentagon as a senior adviser ceeded and how others failed. on Asia policy. Kawakami Takeshi of Takushoku In order to shed more light on these points, University helped consult on the project, gener- the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), ously opening doors to normally inaccessible in- with generous support from the Smith Richard- terview subjects and sharing his own prescient son Foundation, embarked on a research proj- insights along the way. IFPA staff who contrib- ect to examine the DPJ’s foreign-policy making uted their skills and expertise to the final prod- since it took power in 2009. The project exam- uct include Adelaide Ketchum (editing), Chris- ines the key people, policies, and processes that tian Hoffman (graphic design and publishing), have come to underlie the DPJ’s foreign-policy Charles McClean (research) and, most of all, Na- making as a ruling party, and it includes an at- kai Aki, whose tireless research and analysis were tempt to define and categorize four main foreign indispensable to the completion of this project. policy strains within the party. Rather than focus The entire IFPA team is grateful to Allan Song on the current state of U.S.-Japan relations, this of the Smith Richardson Foundation for making study examines Japan’s broader diplomatic and SRF’s financial support possible. It goes without strategic activity beyond the bilateral relationship saying that the author alone bears full responsibil- while considering how these actions might im- ity for whatever flaws remain in the report. One pact the U.S.-Japan relationship in the future. final note is that Japanese names appear with the This report draws on research findings based family name first and the given name second, as on Japanese and English-language primary sourc- is the Japanese custom.

iv FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Executive Summary

This report surveys the past two years of Japanese have, in particular, forced the new ruling par- foreign and defense policy making, since the ty to modify its original foreign policy goals. Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) overthrew the • The party’s initial attempts to implement Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to become sweeping reforms to Japan’s decision-making Japan’s main ruling party in September 2009. system severely complicated the policy-mak- In its campaign rhetoric before taking power, ing process, leading to major complications the DPJ promised major changes to Japanese in alliance relations with the United States. diplomacy, including a more “equal” alliance Mixed signals and the lack of policy coordi- with the United States, closer ties to China and nation under the first DPJ prime minister, other Asian nations, and a more “proactive” Hatoyama Yukio, set off tensions in the U.S.- diplomacy under UN-mandated international Japan alliance, especially over the politically operations. However, the DPJ’s track record sensitive 2006 bilateral agreement to relocate over the past two years shows that many of these the U.S. Marine Air Station Futenma on Oki- goals have been left unfulfilled. This report nawa. details some of the internal structural obstacles • Efforts to improve diplomatic ties with China that impeded the DPJ’s ability to accomplish and South Korea, particularly through histor- its vision of a revamped foreign policy and ical reconciliation, have not been as easy to shows how external factors have influenced accomplish as the DPJ envisioned. The dis- the direction of the party’s foreign and security pute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in policies over the past few years. The DPJ’s September 2010 was a particular setback that diplomatic behavior has had major implications continues to hamper Sino-Japan relations, for the alliance with the United States as well and more recent historical and territorial disas for Japan’s role in regional and global affairs. putes with Seoul have hampered progress in ROK-Japan ties. Main Findings • The DPJ appears to have abandoned attempts at regional institution-building, such as devel- • The “big change” in Japanese foreign policy oping a new East Asian Community, in favor following the DPJ’s takeover in 2009 did not of pursuing deeper trilateral strategic partner- transpire according to some expectations. On ships (i.e., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Japan- the contrary, the DPJ’s foreign policy increas- South Korea, and U.S.-Japan-India strategic ingly resembles the status quo—emphasizing dialogues) and remaining active in existing the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance— regional institutions such as Asia-Pacific Eco- rather than a dramatic rebalancing of diplo- nomic Cooperation (APEC) and the East matic and strategic engagement toward Asia. Asian Summit. • Several key structural factors have impeded • The DPJ includes adherents to at least four the DPJ’s ability to make good on its vision of main foreign policy schools of thought that a revamped foreign policy. Intense intra-party are identified in this report: realists (those rivalries, complex coalition dynamics, a resur- who favor a strengthened defense policy and gent LDP-led opposition, and external devel- U.S.-Japan alliance), pacifists (those who opments in the regional security environment want to maintain constitutional restrictions on security policy and do away with the U.S.-

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY v Japan alliance), centrists (those who do not of LDP strategic planning with the United have deep foreign policy convictions but who States. tend to lean toward the realist school by de- • The trend toward increasingly pragmatic and fault), and neo-autonomists (those who want realistic leadership in Tokyo, particularly un- a strong defense policy in order to gain great- der Prime Minister Noda, has improved the er strategic independence from the United overall tone of the U.S.-Japan alliance rela- States). The DPJ is in some ways rooted in tionship. However, structural challenges in- the pacifist tradition, but no one school of herent in the Japanese political system leave thought dominates the party, and the neo-au- in question the prime minister’s ability to de- tonomists, centrists, and realists have wielded liver on key initiatives such as the Futenma varying degrees of influence at different times relocation plan and Japan’s participation in over the past two years. the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Fur- • The DPJ’s security policy has shown a hawk- ther, Japanese leaders face a range of domes- ish streak, particularly when it has come to tic issues, including the reconstruction of the protecting Japanese sovereign territory and Tohoku region and the revitalization of the domestic economy, that will take priority over Structural challenges inherent in the many foreign policy matters. • As the Obama administration orchestrates a Japanese political system leave in strategic pivot toward Asia, Japan should be a key partner of the United States in this en- question the prime minister’s ability deavor. Washington should consult with To- kyo and encourage Japan’s involvement in to deliver on key policy initiatives. every aspect of America’s regional diplomacy, but should be aware that Japanese leaders direct national interests, such as shipping are limited in their ability to commit to ma- lanes in the Gulf of Aden. The ruling party’s jor regional and global initiatives that require adoption of the 2010 National Defense Pro- significant amounts of domestic political cap- gram Guidelines (NDPG) makes important ital to implement. improvements to Japan’s security policy, notably shifting from the traditional “basic defense force” posture to a more operationally oriented “dynamic defense” posture. • Despite the unresolved impasse over Futen- ma and initial attempts by the DPJ to strike a less deferential dynamic vis-a-vis Washing- ton, realists and centrists in the ruling party have been able to quietly pave the way for enhanced defense cooperation with the United States. These steps include a recent decision to relax arms export regulations, improve cyber security cooperation, and other areas of interoperability between the two allies. Nev- ertheless, proponents of the bilateral alliance within the DPJ have not been able to make significant progress to date in pursuing the kind of “global alliance” that was the thrust

vi FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY From Rhetoric to Reality Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan

In the two years since the Democratic Party of its superpower ally. Instead, the bilateral alliance Japan (DPJ) took control from the Liberal Dem- has at times appeared adrift amid ongoing prob- ocratic Party (LDP) as the main ruling party of lems with the planned relocation of the Futen- Japan in September 2009, its foreign policy has ma U.S. Marine air station on Okinawa, par- been episodic and difficult to define. In many ticularly after Prime Minister Hatoyama’s early ways, the DPJ’s foreign policy can be charac- decision to reexamine relocation options.2 As for terized more by its prominent missteps than by closer ties to Asia, the new government in Tokyo any achievements stemming from its ambitious has made some progress toward improving dip- campaign manifestos. As an opposition party, lomatic and strategic relations with the Repub- the DPJ long criticized the LDP for an exces- lic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and other sive reliance on U.S. strategic leadership, which likeminded nations such as Australia and India. the DPJ claimed to come at the expense of clos- But efforts to enhance political ties with the Peo- er ties with Asia and a more “independent” for- ple’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) have eign policy.1 In contrast, the DPJ promised to been set back by territorial disputes and geopolit- forge a more “equal” and “mature” alliance with ical tension between the two countries. The flag- the United State and revamp political and eco- ship initiative to deepen Japan’s engagement in nomic ties with Asia, primarily through the cre- the region, an East Asian Community, has been ation of an East Asian Community. The party back-shelved, along with a more “proactive” UN- also pledged to pursue a more “proactive” role centered diplomacy. Instead, Japan’s foreign pol- in global affairs under the auspices of UN-char- icy has at times appeared more reactive, as the tered international activities. Finally, in addi- new government has struggled to coordinate its tion to a range of populist domestic proposals, policies in response to a string of external diplo- the DPJ promised to reform the LDP’s bureau- matic challenges. crat-led decision-making process with a system Nonetheless, the policy picture has not been that would give greater decision-making author- entirely bleak. After a tumultuous nine months ity to politicians. The DPJ’s historic victory over under the fledgling administration of Prime Min- the LDP in lower house elections on August ister Hatoyama Yukio, successive DPJ leaders 30, 2009, presented the party with an unprece- have made some gradual—if not inconsistent— dented opportunity to make good on all of these improvements to their governing approach. campaign promises. Along with this shift has come some progress in However, over the course of three succes- strengthening Japan’s foreign and defense poli- sive DPJ prime ministers—Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko—the new rul- 2 In 2006, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to a “roadmap” ing party has not been able to fulfill many of its for relocating the U.S. Marine Air Station Futenma from a heavily populated area in Naha, Okinawa, to Camp Schwab, in a less populated lofty campaign goals. Although the DPJ vague- area on the north part of the island. The new air station would include ly defined what it meant by an “equal” alliance a landing strip to be built partly offshore in Henoko Bay. Local op- with the United States, few would argue that Ja- position groups have fiercely resisted the Futenma relocation facility pan has gained any kind of strategic parity with (FRF), citing environmental concerns and the burden of continuing to host a large U.S. military presence on Okinawa. The U.S. government 1 Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies,” April 1998, http://www. has studied and rejected alternative relocation plans, such as a possi- dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html (accessed October 27, 2011); Dem- ble consolidation of Marine and Air Force units on the Kadena U.S. Air ocratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.” Force base.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 1 cies. Following Hatoyama’s mishandling of the mestic supply chain, and energy output affecting Okinawa base realignment issue with the Unit- Tokyo and the nation’s economy as a whole. In ed States, the Kan administration signaled a re- a statement made soon after the earthquake hit, newed effort to strike a more conciliatory tone Prime Minister Kan called the March 11 “triple toward Washington and to shore up the alliance disaster” the worst crisis to hit Japan since the in the face of rising security concerns over Chi- end of World War II.3 na and North Korea. Similarly, Tokyo has dem- Although the disaster put off the legislative onstrated close solidarity with South Korea in showdown over the budget, thus giving the Kan the face of North Korean provocations, paving government a new lease on life, it was also to be the way for unprecedented negotiations between the cause of its downfall nearly six months later. Tokyo and Seoul on enhancing bilateral defense To his credit, Prime Minister Kan was relative- ties. Complementing these moves was the De- ly quick to accept foreign offers of disaster as- cember 2010 release of the revised National sistance, including a massive humanitarian aid Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which and disaster relief effort by U.S. military forc- outline shifts in Japan’s defense plans, most no- es based in Japan, dubbed Operation Tomoda- tably toward a more operationally oriented “dy- chi (Friend). However, the central government namic defense” posture. also seemed confused about the correct course As the DPJ passed the two-year mark of its of action to deal with the nuclear crisis at Fuku- rule, however, it faced major domestic polit- shima and to rehabilitate the devastated Tohoku ical challenges that threatened the survival of region, estimated to cost some $300 billion. the DPJ-led administration as well as the rul- Doubts about the government’s competence ing party itself. Indeed, party survival has argu- and ability to manage the crisis quickly deep- ably been the singular preoccupation of the DPJ ened among the public. Capitalizing on these since coming to power, distracting party leaders mistakes, the LDP-led opposition introduced a from a sustained focus on foreign and security parliamentary no-confidence vote against Kan in policy or achieving any cohesion on these issues June. The prime minister narrowly survived the within the ruling camp. Exploiting a power split vote, but with his approval ratings sliding into in the Diet (parliament), the LDP-led opposition the high teens, he finally stepped down on Au- was gearing up for a showdown over budget-re- gust 26 after passing a set of disaster-related bills lated legislation in the spring of 2011, aiming to in the Diet. Following a short intra-party contest bring down Prime Minister Kan along with the for party leader (a position that by default would ruling party. Kan’s fate seemed all but sealed as decide the next prime minister), Noda Yoshihiko the looming budget showdown approached. emerged as the victor, and he formed his cabinet Then, on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9 on September 2, 2011. earthquake struck off the coast of Japan’s Mi- Now the third DPJ prime minister to lead Ja- yagi prefecture, unleashing a massive tsunami pan since the party took over in 2009, Noda faces which left some twenty thousand people dead a daunting array of challenges. First and fore- or missing, demolished entire towns, and heavi- most, of course, is the rehabilitation of the To- ly disrupted communication and transportation hoku region and the containment of the nuclear networks vital to first responders. Damage from crisis at Fukushima which, although improved the tsunami also led to the failure of reactor-cool- from the initial emergency situation, remains ing systems at the Daiichi Fukushima nuclear “very serious,” according to the International power plant, triggering fears of widespread radiation contamination and a complete nuclear meltdown. The damage to the Tohoku region 3 BBC News, “Japan Quake: Worst Crisis since WWII, Says PM,” March 13, further disrupted key economic sectors, the do- 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12726297 (accessed October 27, 2011).

2 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).4 Thousands of Thus, in its second year as Japan’s ruling par- displaced residents remain in the area and the ty, the DPJ has already faced a range of challeng- public health concerns associated with the leak- es that have forced it to roll back some of its most age of radioactive material from the Daiichi Fu- ambitious plans for reshaping the nation’s foreign kushima plant continue to be a major problem. and strategic policy approaches. As many experts A second priority is the revitalization of the na- predicted, the DPJ faced a steep learning curve tional economy that, even before the disaster, as it transitioned from opposition to ruling party. was struggling to cope with a rising yen, balloon- The past few years are more a story of how the ing public debt, stagnant domestic growth, and DPJ progressed along that learning curve than the threat of a global recession. Prime Minis- about how it brought about a fundamental shift ter Noda’s attempt to tackle the debt problem in Japanese foreign policy, as its campaign rheto- through a 10 percent raise in the consumption ric had promised. Along the way, a complex mix tax has triggered fierce political resistance, both of factors—from internal power struggles within inside and outside the ruling coaltion. the domestic political landscape to external pres- The magnitude of domestic challenges ex- sures from international actors—has influenced acerbated by the March 11 disaster left the im- the decision-making and policy options that DPJ pression that foreign policy, almost by necessity, leaders eventually settled on. Although a com- might be put on the back burner by the Noda plete analysis of these factors requires a more ex- government. Yet Japan’s foreign and national se- haustive work, this report attempts to provide a curity policies face enormous challenges as well. comprehensive overview of the key players, pro- High on the priority list, as the new prime min- cesses, and policies that helped shape and color ister and his top foreign policy advisers came to office, was strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance In its second year as Japan’s ruling following the period of drift that resulted from the Futenma base realignment problems.5 An- party, the DPJ has faced a range of other issue of particular importance to Wash- ington has been whether Japan will join the challenges that have forced it to roll U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade initiative. Noda decided to join ear- back its most ambitious plans for ly trade negotiations in November 2011, but the issue of TPP membership has been an extremely divisive one within the DPJ, and it is an open reshaping the nation’s foreign policy. question whether the new prime minister can the DPJ’s foreign and security policies since the overcome domestic opposition to formal mem- party came to power. Such a survey can, perhaps, bership in the multilateral trade agreement. Oth- paint a more accurate picture of the confusing er foreign policy challenges include deepening twists and turns taken by the new government strategic concerns about China’s increasing as- and where potential trends are likely to take Ja- sertiveness on the global stage as well as ongoing pan’s foreign policy under the DPJ. anxieties about North Korea’s nuclear development and potential instability.

4 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko to the 178th Session of the Diet,” Sep- tember 13, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/ statement/201109/13syosin_e.html (accessed October 27, 2011). 5 Nagashima Akihisa, special advisor to Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko for foreign and security policy, in discussion with the author, October 5, 2011.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 3 Internal Challenges

In retrospect, it is possible to see that several fac- these internal divisions were glossed over for the tors have helped shape the DPJ’s foreign-policy sake of party cohesion and to present a unified making since 2009, providing some explanation front against the LDP. However, since the DPJ for its diplomatic setbacks as well as its modest came to power in September 2009, intra-party successes in improving Japan’s foreign and de- divisions have been exacerbated by growing dif- fense policies. Some of these factors have been ferences over policy and by intensifying rivalries internal structural and political dynamics, while among party leaders with increasingly polarized others derive primarily from responses to exter- political positions. Rifts within the party have re- nal developments and events. On the internal peatedly threatened to splinter the DPJ along its side, the DPJ’s grandiose foreign policy vision multiple factions, while the party leadership has ran into structural and political realities almost struggled to fend off staunch opposition from as soon as the party took control of government. the LDP-led opposition parties. The implementation of policies requires con- The DPJ was originally established in 1996 by sensus-building among key stakeholders and a a consolidation of reformist New Party Sakigake realistic assessment of what can or cannot be members (mainly LDP defectors) and moder- accomplished given existing political realities. ate Socialist Party members. The DPJ expanded However, the DPJ leadership initially set out to in 1998 through a merger of four smaller parties enact sweeping reforms and changes to Japan’s seeking to create a solid opposition force to the policy-making process with seemingly little re- LDP, and it was later joined in 2003 by the Lib- gard for how those changes might complicate eral Party led by Ozawa Ichiro. Most of the party policy implementation or coordination. Fur- leadership has been drawn from former centrist ther, the DPJ’s policy agenda faced significant or center-right LDP lawmakers, but the rank and challenges due to intra-party divisions, the com- file have had a left-of-center political orientation plex machinations of coalition politics, and the that includes a number of former Socialist Party immaturity of the DPJ’s own decision-making members. The diversity of ideological positions practices. These internal structural challeng- within the DPJ has led to significant internal di- es have undermined the DPJ’s capacity to im- visions, primarily between the party’s conserva- plement policies that were promised during the tive and liberal wings. In particular, issues such 2009 lower house election campaign. Internal as the overseas deployment of Japan Self-De- domestic factors have had such an impact on fense Forces, the U.S.-Japan alliance, social se- the DPJ’s foreign-policy making process that di- curity and tax reform, and international trade vorcing one from the other would paint an in- agreements have generated considerable inter- complete picture of the ruling party’s diplomatic nal debate. As a result, for much of its history, the behavior since coming to power two years ago. DPJ has struggled to agree on coherent alterna- tives to LDP policies, and since the DPJ came to Intra-party Divisions power, that dilemma has only worsened. The DPJ’s internal divisions have been ex- The DPJ has struggled, almost since its incep- acerbated by the influence of powerful figures tion, to maintain cohesion despite numerous within the party, particularly Ozawa Ichiro. A competing groups of varying ideological posi- former LDP power broker and one of the prin- tions within the party. As an opposition party, cipal figures in the political rise of the DPJ, Oza-

4 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY wa has been the leader of the largest internal generally supported Japan’s participation in the party faction, with over one hundred members Trans-Pacific Partnership, the implementation (including the so-called Ozawa Children, or of the May 2010 U.S.-Japan joint statement on first-term lawmakers). Known as a master polit- the Futenma relocation facility (FRF), the in- ical strategist and campaigner, Ozawa is large- crease in the consumption tax, a balanced bud- ly credited with orchestrating the DPJ’s historic get, and a review of the 2009 DPJ manifesto to victory in the 2009 lower house election, after reset the party agenda.7 On the other hand, Oza- which he was appointed party secretary general wa supporters generally opposed most of these by Prime Minister Hatoyama. In this role, Oza- measures. The growing divergence over major wa took the lead in orchestrating the new ruling policy issues increasingly undermined the Kan party’s overall political strategy while the prime administration’s ability to implement policies minister oversaw government policies—a tacit and to negotiate with opposition parties on leg- arrangement that contradicted the DPJ’s rheto- islative agendas. ric on open and transparent decision making.6 Although the September 2010 showdown be- But Ozawa’s ongoing legal problems surround- tween Kan and Ozawa supporters highlighted ing a political funds scandal have severely tar- the increasing bipolarization of the DPJ, there nished his public image and left him something are still numerous other factions within the DPJ. of a party outcast. These groups originally grew out of their mem- The abrupt resignation of Prime Minister bers’ former party affiliations and were loose- Hatoyama and the subsequent succession in ly organized, allowing lawmakers to have dual June 2010 of Kan Naoto as the DPJ’s second memberships with other factions. As new mem- prime minister raised the possibility that Ozawa bers continued to fill the party rank and file, might be marginalized under the new regime, factions came to be based more on personal affil- made up of an anti-Ozawa coalition among par- iations rather than on policy preferences or ide- ty faction leaders such as Prime Minister Kan, ological leanings.8 Based on data from surveys Maehara Seiji, and Noda Yoshihiko. However, of DPJ lawmakers taken before the 2009 lower that September, Ozawa decided to challenge house election, for instance, it is clear that most Kan for the party presidency, a post that would DPJ factions embrace very broad policy prefer- simultaneously make him prime minister. The ences, even on normally polarizing issues such showdown between Ozawa and Prime Minis- as whether to emphasize the United States, the ter Kan highlighted—and in many ways deep- UN, or Asia in Japan’s foreign policy.9 The data ened—the rifts within the DPJ. Although Kan also show that in most cases, faction leaders and ultimately defeated Ozawa and retained his pre- faction rank-and-file members often do not share miership, the outcome of that battle did not re- the same preference on matters of foreign or se- solve or heal the intra-party divisions or, for that curity policy. As a result, it is generally difficult matter, settle Ozawa’s political fate—despite the to determine what particular party factions stand suspension of Ozawa’s party membership until for or to distinguish one from another based on the resolution of his legal problems. ideological positions. In fact, the internal power struggle between the Kan supporters (the Kan-Maehara-Noda 7 Jiji Press, “Minshu Daihyosen 2010: Kan, Ozawa ryoshi no seisaku factional coalition) and Ozawa supporters (the hikaku [The DPJ presidential election 2010: Policy comparison between Ozawa-Hatoyama factional alliance) only grew Kan and Ozawa],” August 26, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/v?p=ve_ in intensity, sparking increasingly heated policy pol_seitou-minsyu-leader20100827j-09-w350 (accessed October 27, debates between the two sides. Kan’s supporters 2011). 8 For further details on policy differences between faction leaders and faction followers, see appendix C, “Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy 6 Steven Vogel, “Japan’s Long Road to Competitive Politics,” Current His- Viewpoints.” tory 109, no. 728 (September 2010): 232–36. 9 Ibid.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 5 However, since the party leadership contest no-confidence motion against Kan in the lower between Kan and Ozawa in September 2010, house of the Diet. However, Kan narrowly sur- DPJ factions have begun to jell into more co- vived the no-confidence vote by teaming with the hesive policy-oriented groups. The key issue of Maehara and Noda factions to defeat the mea- the summer 2010 DPJ presidential election was sure. whether to strictly follow the 2009 DPJ campaign Yet once Kan’s allies successfully fought off manifesto and its populist-oriented spending pro- the challenge from the Ozawa-Hatoyama camp, grams, including a controversial child allowance, they began to turn against the prime minister, or to abandon it in favor of fiscal austerity mea- hoping that his resignation would be a quid pro sures aimed at balancing the budget. The man- quo for greater legislative cooperation from the ifesto therefore became a wedge issue, splitting LDP-led opposition.14 This would be crucial, as the party between those who wanted to adhere Kan promised to resign on the condition that to it and those who wanted to reshape the party the Diet pass three key pieces of legislation: 1) a agenda.10 This split also served to deepen mem- second supplementary budget for reconstruction, bers’ loyalty to particular factions, and many fac- 2) a deficit bond bill, and 3) a renewable energy tions have since banned dual membership in ri- bill. Thus, the ruling party split into three main val groups.11 competing camps through the summer of 2011: The March 11 earthquake also began to those who still supported the prime minister change the dynamics of factional competition (the Kan group), those who had tried to unseat within the DPJ. At first, the Kan and Ozawa him through a no-confidence vote (the Ozawa- camps split over how to pay for the five-year re- Hatoyama alliance), and those who were actively construction plan for the devastated Tohoku re- working with the opposition to compel the prime gion, estimated to be some �19 trillion (or close minister to resign (the Okada-Maehara-Sengoku to $300 billion).12 The prime minister and his coalition). The last group eventually prevailed supporters favored a consumption tax while the and, with the passage of the deficit bond bill and Ozawa group argued that such a broad tax in- renewable energy bill in late August 2011, Kan crease would unfairly hit families affected by the announced his resignation on August 26. disaster.13 As the prime minister struggled to man- Kan’s resignation was immediately followed age the triple crisis amid falling public approv- by the DPJ presidential election, which would al ratings, the Ozawa-Hatoyama alliance joined decide the next prime minister of Japan. Once the LDP-Komeito opposition in introducing a again, the party split into two main camps, 10 “Manifesto taiketsu, shusei no Shusho vs kaiki no Ozawa shi [Man- with the Ozawa, Hatoyama, and Yokomichi ifesto confrontation: Kan for reshape vs. Ozawa for return],” groups backing Kaieda Banri for prime minister Yomiuri Shimbun, August 29, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/fea- and the Noda and Kan groups backing Noda ture/20100806-849918/news/20100829-OYT1T00410.htm (accessed Yoshihiko. After securing the additional support October 27, 2011). 11 “Minshu de habatsuka kasoku?, kakemochi giin ni fumie” [Accelerat- of the Kano group in the runoff election, Noda ing factionalization in the DPJ? A litmus test to dual membership], emerged as the victor and as Japan’s next prime October 21, 2010, Yomiuri Shimbun, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/fea- minister. In an effort to bridge the divide within ture/20100806-849918/news/20101021-OYT1T00942.htm (accessed the ruling party, Noda immediately appointed October 27, 2011). two Ozawa supporters to his cabinet and made 12 Inoue Yuko, “Analysis: Japan’s Reconstruction Steel Demand to Fall Short,” Reuters, August 11, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2011/08/11/us-japan-steel-reconstruction-idUSTRE- 14 Hakuraku, “Maboroshi to kashita Kan Ozawa nuki dairenritsu” [Failed 77A0S920110811 (accessed October 27, 2011). attempt to form a grand coalition without Kan and Ozawa], Nihon 13 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Gemba naikakufu tokumei tanto Keizai Shimbun, June 10, 2011, http://www.nikkei.com/news/topic/ daijin kishakaiken yoshi heisei niju san nen shi gatsu juku nichi [Press article/g=96958A9C93819697E2EBE2E2938DE2EBE2E4E0E2E3E3E2E conference by the Minister of State for National Policy Gemba Koichi- 2E2E2E2E2;q=9694E2EBE2E4E0E2E3E3E5E3E3E5;p=9694E2EBE2E4E ro],” April 19, 2011, http://www.cao.go.jp/minister/1101_k_genba/ 0E2E3E3E5E3E3E4;n=9694E2E3E2E6E0E2E3E2E5E5E1E3;o=9694E2E kaiken/2011/0419kaiken.html (accessed December 1, 2011). 3E2E6E0E2E3E2E5E5E1E0 (accessed June 10, 2011).

6 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Koshiishi Azuma, a top DPJ Intra-party Groups Ozawa ally, secretary general DPJ Intra-party groups in summer 2009 DPJ intra-party groups established after 2009 of the DPJ. Name members Name members Noda’s attempts to unify Ozawa Ichiro Group 120 Tarutoko Group 20 the party through his multi- Hatoyama Group 30 Ozawa Sakihito Group 10 factional cabinet lineup ini- Kan Group 40 Gemba Group 30 tially appeared to be success- Maehara Group 50 Kano Group 30 ful. In the early months after Noda Group 25 his election as prime minis- Yokomichi Group 20 SOURCES: Jiji Press, Mainichi ter, the DPJ arguably seemed Kawabata Group 30 Shimbun, and Asahi Shimbun more unified than at any time Hata Group 20 Society of Liberals 15 since becoming the ruling party. However, as the prime minister pursued con- (House of Representatives) parliamentary elec- troversial policies, such as Japan’s participation in tion, it still required a coalition with the leftist the TPP negotiations and the proposed consump- Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the conser- tion tax increase, the party once again began to vative People’s New Party (PNP) to maintain splinter among various competing factions, with control of the upper house ( House of Coun- some lawmakers even deciding to split from the cillors). This awkward political arrangement party. In January 2012, Noda reshuffled his cab- may have been necessary to sustain the DPJ’s inet lineup in the hope of strengthening his pub- position as the main ruling party, but it further lic support rate, which had slipped from the high stretched the already fragmented DPJ in polar 50s to the 30s by the end of 2011. opposite ideological directions. Lacking suffi- If anything, Noda’s calculated selection cient majorities in both houses of the Diet, the of cabinet members and senior party officials DPJ has subsequently been forced to make ma- underscores the complex factional dynamics jor compromises to its policy agenda in order that DPJ leaders have had to grapple with since to accommodate coalition partners and pressure coming to power. Indeed, the numerous power from opposition forces. struggles for party leadership highlight the fact This dilemma had major consequences for that no one party figure enjoys broad-based Prime Minister Hatoyama, especially after his support across the various party factions. Not decision to reexamine the 2006 base realignment only does this make policy making extremely agreement with the United States. The SDP has difficult, as the prime minister cannot guarantee long opposed the U.S. military presence in Japan party-wide support on any significant piece and, as a member of the ruling coalition, it now of legislation, but it also means that he must had an opportunity to exert considerable influ- fight a two-front war—both internally among ence on the direction of the base realignment the various intra-party factions and externally review. As the Hatoyama government launched with opposition parties, as will be seen in the the review process, SDP party chief Fukushima following section. Mizuho threatened to leave the coalition unless the Futenma Marine air station were relocat- The Complexities of Coalition Politics ed off Okinawa entirely, preferably to Guam.15 15 “Fukushima toshu, Futenma genko an nara renritsu ridatsu shisa” [SDP A major difficulty for the DPJ has been manag- President Fukushima suggests departure from the ruling coalition if the ing its disparate coalition partners while fending current Henoko option is taken], Yomiuri Shimbun, December 3, 2009, off challenges from the opposition, including a http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20091203-OYT1T00347.htm (accessed December 3, 2009); “Shamin kichi mondai de PT tachiage, resurgent LDP. Although the DPJ won a ma- ichigatsu ni Guam shisatsu” [SDP establishes project team on the jority of seats in the August 2009 lower house Futenma Relocation Facility, to send research delegation to Guam in January], Sankei Shimbun, December 24, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 7 When Hatoyama finally announced his decision In light of these difficulties, Prime Minister to stick to the 2006 realignment agreement, Fu- Kan attempted to woo the opposition New kushima was deposed from her cabinet post, thus Komeito Party into an alliance by emphasizing shattering the fragile coalition government and the ideological overlap between the two parties. forcing Hatoyama to resign soon thereafter. However, as support for the Kan cabinet The DPJ’s difficulties in managing the coali- continued to slide, the Komeito leadership saw tion government have only deepened over time. no advantage in cooperating with the unpopular A poor showing in the July 2010 upper house government.19 Further, since the Komeito-LDP election, due mainly to Kan’s mishandling of coalition was established in 1999, both parties consumption tax reform, resulted in a “twist- have deepened their cooperation in local ed Diet” (nejire kokkai) in which the opposition electoral campaigns, giving the parties little controls the upper house and can block impor- incentive to abandon each other. Instead, the tant budget-related measures. Under these cir- Komeito took an increasingly confrontational cumstances, Kan was again forced to cooperate stance toward the DPJ by criticizing Prime with the SDP, along with the coalition partner Minister Kan’s mishandling of the March 11 PNP, in order to pass legislation through the disaster and his reconstruction plans.20 When Diet and avoid a budget crisis. the no-confidence motion against Kan came up But, as before, this meant tradeoffs on pol- in June, the Komeito was more eager to submit icy-related issues. When the Kan administra- the motion in the lower house than the LDP tion raised the possibility of loosening Japan’s leadership.21 arms export ban the SDP balked, thus forcing After its resounding defeat in the 2009 lower the government to maintain the status quo pol- house election, the LDP seemed on the verge icy.16 The SDP also demanded the elimination of obsolescence, struggling to rebuild itself as a of expenditures in the annual budget related to viable challenger to the new ruling party. The the proposed Futenma relocation plan—a con- DPJ government’s various missteps since coming cession that the Kan government ultimately did to power, however, have provided the LDP with not make.17 The PNP has, of course, also exert- a large target for attack and a new lease on life. ed influence on DPJ policy making. Ideological- From the outset, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s ly opposed to neoliberal economic reforms such handling of the Futenma issue led the public as deregulation and more open trade policy, the to question the DPJ’s ability to manage national PNP has complicated the DPJ’s policy debates security matters with Japan’s all-important on such issues as postal privatization and partic- ally, the United States. Other major problems ipation in the TPP.18 included Ozawa’s political money scandal, which discredited the image of the DPJ as a relatively clean political party, and Prime Minister Kan’s com/politics/situation/091224/stt0912241259006-n1.htm (accessed December 24, 2009). 19 “Komei ni shusenron, soki kaisan de tozei kaifukkatsu nerau” [The Ko- 16 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime meito seeks an early dissolution of lower house to recover lost seats Minister Kan Naoto,” December 6, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/for- in 2009], Toonippo, February 22, 2011, http://www2.toonippo.co.jp/ eign/kan/statement/201012/06kaiken_e.html (accessed December 1, tokushuu/seikyoku/20110222.html (accessed October 27, 2011). 2011). 20 “Komeito nai de hiromaru mudo, soreha kenKan” [Anti-Kan mood is 17 “Henoko yosan sakujo wo kyohi, Minshu Shamin ni tsuchi” [DPJ rejects spreading inside the Komeito], Yomiuri Shimbun, April 16, 2011, http:// SDP’s demand to eliminate Futenma relocation expenses from annu- www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20110416-OYT1T00587.htm (ac- al budget], Okinawa Times, February 15, 2011, http://www.okinawa- cessed April 16, 2011). times.co.jp/article/2011-02-15_14573/ (accessed October 27, 2011). 21 Sasaki Mie, “Niekiranu Tanigaki shi ni iradatsu Komei, hajo kogeki, ki 18 Asahi Hiroyuki, “Kokuminshinto: Minshu ni irakame!? TPP kosho ni no- wo issureba mo chansu nashi” [Toward the submission of the no-con- boseruna” [PNP President Kamei is upset with the DPJ’s plans for TPP fidence motion: the Komeito gets frustrated with hesitant LDP Presi- negotiations], Mainichi Shimbun, January 27, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/ dent Tanigaki], Sankei Shimbun, May 28, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn. select/seiji/news/20110127k0000m010125000c.html (accessed Janu- com/politics/news/110528/stt11052801310002-n1.htm (accessed Oc- ary 27, 2011). tober 27, 2011).

8 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY inconsistent handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai impression of a ruling party that was slowly be- Islands incident with China in September 2010, ing picked apart by the opposition. which further shook public confidence in the The March 11 disaster overwhelmed an al- ruling party’s leadership (the Senkaku/Diaoyutai ready embattled Kan administration. In the im- incident is described in greater detail later in mediate aftermath of the disaster, there was a this report). sense that some form of bipartisan coopera- The LDP-led opposition has capitalized on tion between the ruling and opposition camps these mistakes to mount a formidable resurgence would emerge for the sake of the nation and to against the ruling coalition. In particular, the begin the arduous process of reconstructing the LDP and its partners have taken advantage of devastated Tohoku region. Speculation of an the “twisted Diet” to block legislation introduced “emergency cabinet” (kyukoku naikaku) bring- by the ruling coalition, including legislation for ing together a coalition of ruling and opposition budget-related measures, and have censured parties rose. But Prime Minister Kan fumbled ef- or threatened to censure key members of the forts to reach out to the LDP and Komeito and, DPJ cabinets as punishment for their missteps.22 This latter strategy forced the resignation of key The DPJ has been forced to make major players in the Kan administration, such as former Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito (for compromises to its policy agenda to his response to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands dispute) and former Foreign Minister Maehara accommodate coalition partners and Seiji (for his acceptance of campaign funds from a foreign national). pressure from opposition forces. The sudden departure of key ministers in the DPJ cabinets had a direct impact on the Kan with his approval ratings sliding, the LDP deter- cabinet’s decision-making process. The resigna- mined there were few incentives to cooperate tion of Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku ended with his administration, even over basic recon- the DPJ’s efforts to seek a more cooperative dy- struction measures. Yet even as the prime min- namic between politicians and the bureaucracy. ister struggled to cooperate with the opposition, Maehara’s removal from the cabinet also rep- the Okada-Maehara-Sengoku group in the DPJ resented a major setback for those in the party was working out a deal with the LDP and Ko- who advocated a stronger alliance with the Unit- meito leaders to depose Kan once his conditions ed States. Maehara is considered a rising star in for resignation were met, namely passage of the the party and a potential future prime minister, three post-disaster bills. but his resignation from the cabinet added to the The arrival of the Noda administration in September 2011 coincided with a slight change 22 “Housho zokuto hyomei ni yato hanpatsu, niju ni nichi ni monseki in tone in the inter-party dynamics of the Diet, ketsugian teishutsu” [Justice Minister’s stay provokes a backlash. The at least initially. The LDP and Komeito showed opposition submits a censure motion], Asahi Shimbun, November 22, some early signs of flexibility, in part due to the 2010, http://www.asahi.com/special/minshu/TKY201011210443. relatively high approval rating at the outset of the html (accessed October 27, 2011); “Sengoku shi no monseki kaketsu, first Noda cabinet.23 However, this minor truce shintai ron ga fujo, Mabuchi shi mo mimeini kaketsu” [Censure motions against Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and Transport Minister Ma- did not last long, and as the Noda government buchi passed], Asahi Shimbun, November 27, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/special/minshu/TKY201011260538.html (accessed October 27, 23 Nakata Takuji and Okazaki Daisuke, “Noda naikaku hassoku, Jimin kai- 2011); Jiji Press, “Yoyato kobo, sangatsu yamaba, yosan kanren hoan san yokyu kaezu, Komei ha kyoryoku shisei ni katamuku” [Noda admin- ga shoten” [Battle between ruling and opposition parties comes to istration launched, LDP still seeks lower house dissolution, but Komeito a boil in March, budget related-measures bills are key], January 23, leans on a cooperative posture], Mainichi Shimbun, September 3, 2011, 2011, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2011012300128 (ac- http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/nodaseiken/archive/news/2011/09/20 cessed January 23, 2011). 110903ddm005010147000c.html (accessed October 27, 2011).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 9 took on increasingly controversial issues, includ- various government ministries and agencies. A ing a proposed sales tax increase and social se- cornerstone of this effort was the abolition of the curity reform, its popularity began to slip. On administrative vice ministers’ meeting (jimujik- January 13, 2012, Noda replaced five members anto kaigi), previously the most senior-level pol- of his original cabinet in a bid to boost support icy coordinating meeting in the government for his government. Among those replaced in the bureaucracy. Hatoyama also abolished the DPJ cabinet reshuffle was former Defense Minister policy research council (or seichokai), a policy Ichikawa Yasuo, who was censured by the oppo- coordinating body similar to one that the LDP sition for claiming that he knew nothing about had used to build consensus among bureau- the infamous 1995 rape of an Okinawan school- crats, party members, and interest groups. girl by three U.S. service members—an astonish- In place of these mechanisms, Prime ing admission for a defense chief charged with Minister Hatoyama elevated the decision- overseeing sensitive base realignment plans. making authority of the top three political figures As of this writing, Prime Minister Noda is in each ministry (seimu sanyaku). This had gearing up for a battle in the current Diet, as he the effect of excluding bureaucrats from a key seeks passage of the controversial consumption decision-making body and allowing the seimu tax increase and a special government bonds bill. sanyaku to take greater initiative in developing Noda’s political survival hinges on his ability to and promoting government policies.24 Another unite his party around his policy initiatives. Yet institutional change, promised during the 2009 several DPJ lawmakers have defected from the election campaign, was to establish the National party in recent months in opposition to Noda’s Strategy Bureau (kokka senryaku kyoku, or consumption tax hike. The LDP-led opposition, NSB), loosely modeled after the U.S. National meanwhile, has debated whether to push for dis- Security Council (NSC). The NSB was to be solving the Diet in order to make way for a gen- based in the prime minister’s office and would eral election or whether to cooperate with Noda be charged with setting the strategic direction of to introduce the consumption tax hike. Already key foreign and domestic policies. A preliminary the sixth prime minister in five years, Noda may version of the NSB, the National Policy Unit face the same political fate as his two DPJ pre- (kokka senryaku shitsu, or NPU) was established decessors if he is not able to reestablish support by Prime Minister Hatoyama pending Diet for his government in time for the proposed gen- approval of a more institutionally powerful NSB. eral elections. Despite these major changes, many of Hatoyama’s initial institutional reforms back- Institutional Reforms: Toward fired, or at least failed to produce an effective Politician-Led Decision Making top-down decision-making process. A major problem was the lack of governing experience The DPJ’s initial effort to implement sweeping among many DPJ lawmakers now charged with reforms to the government decision-making pro- developing their own policies. Without guid- cess has had a significant impact on its policy- ance from experienced bureaucrats, the seimu making behavior over the past two years. After sanyaku struggled to master the intricate details coming to office, the Hatoyama administration of their agency portfolios.25 Further, the abo- immediately embarked on an effort to give cab- 24 Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.” inet ministers and other political leaders greater 25 “Seiji shudo nante ukatsunakoto itta, Edano shi” [Edano admits the DPJ authority over bureaucrats and the policy-mak- said such a thoughtless thing as politician-led decision making], Yomi- ing process. In particular, the prime minister uri Shimbun, November 14, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/ news/20101114-OYT1T00509.htm (accessed October 27, 2011); Sei- moved to replace bureaucrats with politicians fu internet terebi [Government Internet TV], “Press Conference by Chief in formulating and coordinating policies across Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito,” http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/ prg4226.html (accessed December 1, 2011); “Seiji shudo, hansei ikisu-

10 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY DPJ Cabinet Changes and Key Resignations (As of January 30, 2012)

Name Ministry Term Reason Fukushima Mizuho Consumer Affairs 9/16/2009 – PM Hatoyama deposed Fukushima after her refusal and Food Safety 5/28/2010 to accept the Futenma relocation plan. Kamei Shizuka Financial Services/ 6/8/2010 – Kamei resigned to protest the DPJ’s Postal Reform 6/11/2010 inability to pass postal reform bill. Arai Satoshi National Policy 6/8/2010 – PM Kan replaced Arai in the first reshuffled cabinet 9/17/2010 because of his political fund mishandling issues. Yanagida Minoru Justice 9/17/2010 – Yanagida resigned because his remarks were 11/22/2010 criticized as contempt for the Diet. Sengoku Yoshito Chief Cabinet Secretary 9/17/2010 – PM Kan replaced Sengoku in the second cabinet reshuffling 1/14/2011 after the passage of an upper house censure motion, claiming his mishandling of the Senkaku incident. Mabuchi Sumio Land, Infrastructure, 9/17/2010 – Mabuchi was also replaced after being censured Transport and Tourism 1/14/2011 in the Diet for the Senkaku incident. Okazaki Tomiko National Public Safety 9/17/2010 – PM Kan replaced Okazaki in the second cabinet reshuffling Commission 1/14/2011 because of the criticism against her crisis management during the Yeonpyeong-do shelling incident. Maehara Seiji Foreign Affairs 1/14/2011 – Maehara resigned to take responsibility for accepting 3/7/2011 political donations from a Korean national living in Japan. Matsumoto Ryu Reconstruction in 6/27/2011 – Matsumoto resigned because of his comments Response to the Great 7/5/2011 to the governors in the disaster areas. East Japan Earthquake Hachiro Yoshio Economy, Trade, and Industry 9/2/2011 – Hachiro resigned after making insensitive comments about 9/11/2011 the radiation leakage at the Fukushima power plant. Ichikawa Yasuo Defense 9/2/2011 – PM Noda replaced Ichikawa in the first cabinet 1/13/2012 reshuffle after he was censured in the upper house for being unqualified to be defense minister. Yamaoka Kenji Consumer Affairs 9/2/2011 – Yamaoka was replaced after being censured in 1/13/2012 the Diet for being unqualified for his post. Hiraoka Hideo Justice 9/2/2011 – PM Noda replaced Hiraoka in the first cabinet reshuffle after 1/13/2012 learning of his staff secretary’s previous conviction for fraud. Renho Murata Government Revitalization 9/2/2011 – PM Noda replaced Renho in the first cabinet reshuffle because 1/13/2012 of her ties to someone arrested on tax evasion charges. Note: Prime Minister Kan reshuffled his cabinet twice. The first reshuffle, on September 17, 2010, followed the DPJ’s loss in the upper house election and his victory over Ozawa Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election. The second reshuffle, on January 14, 2011, aimed to address the censure motions against his ministers and declining approval ratings. Prime Minister Noda reshuffled five members of his cabinet for similar reasons on January 13, 2012.

lition of the seichokai and the inability of the messaging and, at times, a highly dysfunctional ruling party to create a full-fledged NSB under- decision-making process. mined the ability of the prime minister to take This pattern of dysfunction has had direct the lead in the policy-making process and to ef- consequences for Japanese national interests. fectively coordinate policies across various cabi- Tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship net ministers.26 The result was confused top-level since the DPJ came to power stemmed as much gi, Kan shusho datsu datsu kanryo sengen” [Prime Minister Kan admits from mixed signals sent to Washington as from the excess of politician-led decision making, and declares de-de-bu- any concerted policy shift by the new government reaucratization], Asahi Shimbun, January 21, 2011, http://www.asa- in Tokyo. Particularly in the early days of the hi.com/politics/update/0121/TKY201101210126.html?ref=reca Hatoyama administration, various members (accessed October 27, 2011). 26 “Motto shidoryoku ga areba, Hatoyama zen shusho, Futenma mondai de hansei no ben” [Former Prime Minister Hatoyama wished a Asahi Shimbun, June 12, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/up- full-fledged NSB could have given him more leadership capacity], date/0611/TKY201006110502.html (accessed June 12, 2010).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 11 of the cabinet voiced conflicting views on the Ozawa) in the decision-making process, Kan potential options for relocating the Futenma reestablished the seichokai—although he gave Marine air station on Okinawa, raising concerns the committee much less influence over policy on the other side of the Pacific that the new making than it traditionally had enjoyed under government in Tokyo was carelessly mishandling the LDP. The prime minister also attempted to the bilateral alliance.27 The developing fiasco give the NPU a clearer mandate, charging it over the Futenma relocation plan highlighted with oversight of economic growth policy, free the tortured decision-making process that trade agreements (FTAs), economic partnership plagued the Hatoyama administration and that agreements (EPAs), and the proposed TPP. led to its eventual downfall in June 2010, just However, lacking sufficient institutional clout, nine months after winning office in the historic the NPU was marginalized in the budget-making 2009 election. process and never evolved into a full-fledged After succeeding Hatoyama as prime minister agency with greater institutional authority. In its in June 2010, Kan Naoto, perhaps for several current incarnation, the NPU remains a far less major reasons, did not pursue institutional central policy-making organ than was originally reforms as vigorously as his predecessor had.28 envisioned under previous DPJ plans. As the DPJ’s second premier, Kan could not Most importantly, Chief Cabinet Secretary claim as strong a mandate for change as had Sengoku was instrumental in convincing Prime Hatoyama. Further, the Kan government no Minister Kan to bring bureaucrats back into the doubt learned from some of the mistakes of policy-making fold.29 Unlike under the Hatoya- the Hatoyama administration, notably the ma administration, bureaucrats were encour- consequences of introducing dramatic reforms aged to participate in the so-called top-three at the expense of policy coordination. Kan’s politicians’ meeting (seimu sanyaku kaigi), an cabinet ministers initially took a less adversarial official ministry decision-making entity, and to stance vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, for the most part coordinate policies amongst themselves without relying on bureaucratic input more readily than excessive oversight from politicians. In a some- under the Hatoyama cabinet, although with what symbolic move, Prime Minister Kan re- some important exceptions. Indeed, over time, placed Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare the Kan government appeared to revert to the Nagatsuma Akira, a notorious bureaucrat-bash- party’s traditional distrust of the bureaucracy, a er, after his first cabinet reshuffle. In a departure trend that became manifestly clear during the from long-held DPJ tenets, Kan even loosened Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis with China and in restrictions on the practice of amakudari (or “de- the central government’s fitful handling of the scent from heaven”), in which bureaucrats are March 11 disaster. permitted to retire to lush private sector jobs.30 Prime Minister Kan’s initial rollback of While Kan’s initial scaling back of institutional institutional reforms led to some incremental reforms led to some improvement in policy improvements in the DPJ’s decision-making process. In order to include more party 29 “Seimu sanyaku kaigi ni jikan mo, Kanbochokan, datsu kanryo wo backbenchers (particularly those who opposed shusei” [Administrative vice-ministers attend the three top politicians meeting, Chief Cabinet Secretary changes a policy of de-bureaucrati- 27 Jeffrey Bader, “U.S.-Japan Alliance at 50: Toward a Reenergized Part- zation], Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/ nership,” keynote speech, event at the Henry S. Stimson Center, Wash- politics/update/1228/TKY201012280218.html (accessed October 27, ington, D.C., June 7, 2010. 2011). 28 For example, Prime Minister Kan decided to downgrade the Nation- 30 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Cabinet Answer to the Ques- al Policy Unit, from a decision-making entity to a think tank-like pro- tion Delivered by Member of the House of Representatives Nakaga- posal-making entity. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press wa Hidenao on the Kan Administration’s Policy to amakudari,” official Conference by Prime Minister Kan Naoto,” July 30, 2010, http://www. blog of Representative Nakagawa Hidenao’s office, February 22, 2011, kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201007/30kaiken_e.html (ac- http://nakagawahidenao.jp/n_media/228_kaitou.pdf (accessed De- cessed December 1, 2011). cember 1, 2011).

12 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY coordination, gaps remained and the government The eventual appointment of a reconstruction still struggled to find an effective policy-making minister clarified some of these problems, system that would be different from the LDP’s but there is no doubt that in the months after system. Obama administration officials noted the disaster hit a breakdown of coordination (with some relief) that the first Kan cabinet was occurred at nearly every level of the Japanese far more consistent in its message to Washington decision-making system.34 than the previous administration.31 This led to Cognizant of these systemic flaws and their smoother bilateral relations, despite ongoing political ramifications, Prime Minister Noda problems over the base realignment process. has appeared to make some attempt to improve Bureaucrats in various ministries in Tokyo also the policy-making process and to develop indicated that the adversarial dynamic between DPJ politicians and government officials Tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance have subsided significantly under Kan.32 However, considerable structural obstacles remained in stemmed as much from mixed signals the way of smooth policy implementation. The “twisted Diet,” deteriorating support from within from Tokyo than from any concerted the party, and plummeting public approval ratings all severely undermined Prime Minister policy shift by the DPJ government. Kan’s ability to effectively implement policies. The March 11 disaster, however, seemed to a functioning institutional framework for revive bad habits in the DPJ’s decision-making implementing strategic plans and policies. One process, raising the question of whether Kan’s of his first acts was to appoint the policy-savvy leadership style was as pragmatic as it had Maehara Seiji to be chairman of a revamped initially appeared to be. With Sengoku no Policy Research Committee (seichokaicho). longer serving as chief cabinet secretary, the Kan Under this system, the seichokaicho is authorized administration reverted to old form, sidelining to pre-approve any bills, budgets, or treaties that bureaucrats in the early crisis management the cabinet submits to the Diet. The main goals phase in favor of unofficial outside advisers and of this change are reportedly: 1) to incorporate a cadre of ruling party politicians. Approximately more voices (especially party backbenchers’) twenty ad hoc advisory councils and meetings into the seichokai deliberations, thus ostensibly were established to advise the prime minister, developing greater consensus within the party on but they lacked clear mandates or coordination certain policy issues; 2) to give the seichokaicho with relevant ministries and officials.33 Further, more power to negotiate bills with opposition they tended to duplicate each other in many parties; and 3) to effectively implement policies aspects of the disaster management plans. once they are decided.35 31 Interview with senior Defense Department official, August 13, 2010. Yet Noda also added another layer to the 32 Interviews with senior Japanese bureaucrats, August 5–17, 2010. decision-making process, ostensibly to enhance 33 For example, there were at least six headquarters for emergency di- top-down decision making, through the saster measures, assistance for evacuees, nuclear disaster measures, establishment of the cabinet and DPJ top-three Fukushima power plant disaster measurers, economic damage due to lack of nuclear power generation, and energy demand and supply 34 “Kokunan norikoeru seiken wa, daishinsai to Kan naikaku” [Adminis- emergency measures as of April 19, 2011. In addition to these head- tration capable of overcoming national crisis? Great disaster and Kan quarters, the Kan administration established one standing meeting, administration], Tokyo Shimbun, editorial, April 30, 2011, http://www. five regular meetings, and seven ad hoc meetings regarding the re- tokyo-np.co.jp/article/column/editorial/CK2011043002000068.html covery and reconstruction efforts. “Taiou no soshiki ranritsu minao- (accessed December 1, 2011). su, Kan shusho” [Prime Minister Kan reorganizes too many meetings], 35 Minshuto Yakuin Kai [Democratic Party of Japan Standing Officers Mainichi Shimbun, April 19, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/weath- Council], “Seisaku ni kakawaru togi no kettei ni tsuite” [DPJ’s policy ernews/20110311/archive/news/2011/04/19/20110420k0000m010 decision making], September 13, 2011, http://www.dpj.or.jp/down- 109000c.html (accessed October 27, 2011). load/4861.pdf (accessed October 27, 2011).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 13 leaders’ meeting (seifu minshu sanyaku kaigi). chief cabinet secretary as representatives of the This new entity initially consisted of six senior legislative branch.37 party leaders, including Prime Minister Noda, Whether Prime Minister Noda’s institution- Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu, al changes will improve his government’s overall Secretary General Koshiishi Azuma (also chair decision-making process is still an open ques- of the DPJ upper house caucus), Policy Research tion. DPJ leaders have learned hard lessons Council chair Maehara Seiji, Diet Affairs about hastily introducing institutional reforms Committee chair Hirano Hirofumi, and Acting at the expense of adequate policy coordination Secretary General Tarutoko Shinji. The cabinet and implementation (see appendix A for a graph and leaders’ meeting was established as a final of DPJ cabinet approval ratings in response to decision-making body, with policies then being major events). Noda’s moves suggest that these officially authorized by the cabinet.36 lessons have been taken to heart, and that he has The Noda government also announced plans chosen to modify rather than completely elim- to form two new executive offices that would inate many of the LDP-era governing practic- ostensibly enhance top-down decision making. es, most importantly, the use of the seichokai. The Council on National Strategy and Policy Indeed, whether the seichokai under Maeha- (kokka senryaku kaigi) is a public/private sector ra’s leadership can successfully embody a top- policy-making body that is charged with taking down policy-making mechanism while at the the lead in developing long-term strategies for same time generating greater consensus within economic growth, as well as addressing budget the ruling party is likely to be an important bell- issues, tax and social security reform, currency wether of success for the Noda government as a issues, EPA/FTAs, and other matters. Another whole. As the seichokai has been charged with office that is currently under consideration is handling the controversial question of member- a proposed National Security Council (kokka ship in the TPP, its actions will have significant anzenhosho kaigi) modeled after the U.S. policy ramifications for Japan and its future di- National Security Council. This office would rection under the DPJ-led government. be charged with setting key foreign and national security policies. It remains to be seen how these policy-making entities will function vis-à-vis existing government agencies and whether they will be effective in establishing greater top-down decision-making authority. To date, Noda has also shown a greater willingness to work with bureaucrats and to restore their involvement in top-level decision making. The administrative vice ministerial meetings (jimujikanto kaigi) that were abolished by Prime Minister Hatoyama, and then briefly reinstated by Prime Minister Kan to deal with the March 11 disaster, have now been fully restored and expanded to address a wider range of policy 37 “Jimujikan kaigi fukkatsu he, seijishudo wazuka ni nen” [Two years af- issues. Now called inter-ministerial coordination ter government change, the administrative vice-ministers meeting is meetings (kakufusho renraku kaigi), they are to virtually revived], Asahi Shimbun, September 10, 2011, http://www. include the chief cabinet secretary and deputy asahi.com/politics/update/0910/TKY201109090741.html (accessed October 27, 2011); Seifu internet terebi [Government Internet TV], “Press Conference by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu,” Sep- tember 6, 2011, http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg5258.html (ac- 36 Ibid. cessed December 1, 2011).

14 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions

In 1998, the DPJ drafted its “Basic Policies” as might cause further ideological splits within the a basis for the party’s policy platform. The “Ba- party.40 It was far easier for the party to reach a sic Policies” identified two main foreign policy basic consensus on proposals that were the oppo- goals: 1) to achieve more independence (shy- site of LDP policies, an approach that had direct utaisei or jiritsu) in its diplomatic activities; consequences for foreign and security policy. Al- and 2) to strengthen national security (kuni no though the DPJ acknowledged the U.S.-Japan anzen).38 In order to achieve these two goals, alliance as the cornerstone of Japan’s diploma- subsequent campaign manifestos proposed three key objectives: 1) to establish a more “equal” al- The success of the seichokai (Policy liance partnership with the United States while maintaining the centrality of the U.S.-Japan al- Research Committee) is likely to liance in Japanese security policy; 2) to forge deeper political and economic ties with Asia be an important bellwether of the (primarily through the creation of an East Asian Community, which aims to make interstate con- DPJ’s ability to implement a top- flicts less likely through regional interdependence); and 3) to implement a more “proactive” UN-centric diplomatic agenda.39 While these down policy-making mechanism. foreign policy strategies were routinely men- cy, the DPJ criticized the LDP’s foreign policy tioned in DPJ campaign manifestos and other as overly reliant on the United States and com- policy platforms, DPJ leaders offered only am- ing at the expense of closer diplomatic ties with biguous (and often contradictory) details about Asia. The DPJ also favored a more conciliatory these goals and objectives and how they planned approach to historic problems with China and to achieve them once the party came to power. South Korea than the right-of-center LDP. Yet This ambiguity was the result of DPJ leaders’ concrete plans for achieving these objectives re- concerns that more detailed policy prescriptions mained vague. Making matters worse was the 38 Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies.” sometimes lofty rhetoric of DPJ leaders, such as 39 The following manifestos were issued between April 2001 and Au- Hatoyama Yukio’s frequent mention of yuai (fra- gust 2009: Democratic Party of Japan, “Policies for the 19th House of ternity) as a guiding principle of his diplomat- Councillors Elections: A Fair Deal for All,” April 17, 2001, http://www. ic vision.41 dpj.or.jp/english/policy/19hc-elec.html#a_01 (accessed November 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “The DPJ Manifesto: Creating a Dy- 40 The Sankei Shimbun article cites a mid-ranking DPJ member’s com- namic Japan: Towards a Secure Society,” October 2003, http://www. ment as follows: “If the DPJ begins to discuss policy principles, the DPJ dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto_eng/images/fullmanifesto.pdf (accessed will be broken up. The DPJ members did not gather in terms of poli- November 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “Manifesto 2004: Di- cy identity, so the DPJ is a party that cannot be made head or tail of. rectly and Single-Mindedly,” June 24, 2004, http://www.dpj.or.jp/eng- That is why it is better not to have a party line.” “Minshuto kaibo: Dai lish/manifesto4/pdf/manifesto_2004_a4.pdf (accessed November 3, ichi bu Seiken no katachi (2) Koryo naki seito” [DPJ anatomy: volume 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 House 1: Governance posture (2): Party without party line], Sankei Shimbun, of Representatives Election: Nippon Sasshin: Toward a Change of Gov- March 3, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090303/ ernment,” August 30, 2005, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/ stt0903030003000-n1.htm; http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situa- pdf/manifesto_05.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011); Democratic Par- tion/090303/stt0903030003000-n2.htm; and http://sankei.jp.msn. ty of Japan, “Manifesto: The Democratic Party of Japan’s Platform for com/politics/situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n3.htm (accessed Government: Putting People’s Lives First,” July 2007, http://www.dpj. March 3, 2009). or.jp/english/manifesto/DPJManifesto2007.pdf (accessed November 41 Hatoyama Yukio defined “yuai” as the principle of “independence and 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.” coexistence.” In further detail, Hatoyama described “yuai” as “a princi-

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 15 The DPJ’s vague foreign policy prescrip- ture of the DPJ’s foreign-policy making is indications became an increasing source of concern tive of the ideological strains that have competed as the party prepared to take the reins of pow- for influence since the party took control in 2009. er after its election victory over the LDP in Au- No formal or official breakdown exists of DPJ gust 2009. Some observers speculated at the time foreign policy schools of thought. Further, in- that the DPJ’s calls for a more “equal” or “ma- tra-party groups generally do not ascribe to any ture” alliance with the United States was code particular foreign policy viewpoint, and individ- for a fundamental shift away from the U.S.-Ja- ual members typically do not label themselves pan alliance and toward closer strategic ties with in conventional terms such as “realists” or “ideal- China.42 Other experts argued that the DPJ’s in- ists.” In an effort to create a framework in which tentions were less about distancing Japan strate- to describe the foreign-policy making within gically from the United States than about chang- the party, this study has devised a classification ing the deferential dynamic between Tokyo and of the various and competing foreign policy vi- Washington in strategic decision making.43 Still sions within the DPJ. Four major foreign policy other experts predicted that the new DPJ-led gov- schools of thought have been identified, draw- ernment would run into structural obstacles (in- ing on a number of background interviews with cluding both internal factors described above and DPJ members as well as empirical data. While external factors described below) that would im- the categorization is inherently subjective, every pede its ability to follow through on its more am- effort has been made to rely on objective data bitious foreign policy promises and that the new and primary sources, such as policy statements government would ultimately accede to the status by groups and individual lawmakers. Following quo.44 The DPJ’s diplomatic track record over the are the four main schools of thought identified past two years indicates that the last two scenarios in this study, as well as further descriptions of played out more than the first, although often in their adherents and viewpoints on certain for- confusing ways. The seemingly schizophrenic na- eign and security policy issues.45

ple that aims to adjust to the excesses of the current globalized brand of capitalism and make adjustments to accommodate the local eco- Realists nomic practices that have been fostered through our traditions.” To Hatoyama, “yuai” is “the compass that determines our political direc- Realists in the DPJ hail from the conservative tion” and “a yardstick for deciding our policies.” Hatoyama Yukio, “My wing of the party and are strongly in favor of Political Philosophy,” official website of Hatoyama Yukio, http://www. strengthening Japan’s security and defense pol- hatoyama.gr.jp/profile/fraternitye.html (accessed November 3, 2011). 42 Bruce Klingner, “Japanese Election Poses Challenges for U.S. Alli- icies. Their first priority is to revise Article 9 of ance,” Web Memo, no. 2600, Heritage Foundation, August 31, 2009, the constitution to allow Japan to have a more http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/wm_2600.pdf (ac- normal defense posture and to exercise the right cessed November 3, 2011); Mark Landler and Martin Fackler, “U.S. of collective self-defense.46 Realists have a high Is Seeing Policy Thorns in Japan Shift,” New York Times, September 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/02/world/asia/02diplo. threat perception, particularly with regard to html?scp=3&sq=Japan&st=nyt (accessed November 3, 2011); 45 Richard J. Samuels provides a thorough examination of various Japa- “Shake-Up in Japan: Two Parties Are Better Than One,” Washington nese foreign policy ideologies in his book, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Post, September 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Universi- content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083103044_pf.html (accessed ty Press, 2007). This report borrows some of Samuels’ labels for various November 3, 2011); Jim Hoagland, “Shockwaves from Japan’s Elec- foreign policy ideologies in Japan, particularly the pacifists and neo- tion,” Washington Post, September 6, 2009, http://www.washington- autonomists, although this study examines these groups solely with- post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/04/AR2009090402969. in the context of the DPJ, not across other political parties. html?nav=emailpage (accessed November 3, 2011). 46 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounces war as a sovereign 43 Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, “Electing a New Japanese right of the nation and prohibits the “threat or use of force as a means Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democrat- of settling international disputes.” The Japanese government has in- ic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy, no. 9 (January 2010): 45–66. terpreted Article 9 as a restriction on exercising the right of collective 44 Easley, Kotani, and Mori (January 2010) predict that the DPJ will take self-defense, thus constitutionally limiting Japan’s contributions to in- the status quo policy line. ternational security operations.

16 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY China and North Korea, and they see the alli- Pacifists ance with the United States as the best security option for Japan given these threats. It follows Pacifists in the DPJ strongly support maintaining that realists fear abandonment by the United Japan’s postwar peace constitution and severely States and therefore are committed to maintain- restricting the country’s security policy. They oping the U.S. force presence in Japan, although pose any revision to Article 9 of the constitution they may not always agree with U.S. preferenc- and any relaxation of the restrictions on collective es for base realignment plans on Okinawa.47 Re- self-defense.49 Pacifists have a low threat percep- alists appear to be the most “pro-U.S.,” but that tion, believing that if Japan does not pose a threat does not mean they prefer to follow Washing- to others, others will not pose a threat to Japan. ton’s lead in all matters. Realists are skeptical Given their low threat perception, pacifists do not of the usefulness of the UN and regional insti- fear abandonment by the United States; rather, tutions, but they do not fundamentally oppose they fear entrapment in U.S.-led military oper- them. As the more conservative wing of the par- ations. They oppose U.S. bases and any Futen- ty, realists are skeptical about the need to rec- ma relocation plan that does not include a more oncile historical grievances with neighboring comprehensive withdrawal of U.S. forces. Adher- countries.48 In general, realists are younger par- ents to this school of thought support the UN, al- ty members, and their numbers are relative- though not necessarily expanded Japanese partic- ly small. However, when allied with centrists ipation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). in the DPJ and with likeminded lawmakers in They also support Asian regionalism, believing the LDP, this group can be effective in carry- that deeper economic integration will enhance ing out important improvements in defense- stability. Pacifists make up a large part of the old related policies. Prominent realists in the DPJ guard party members, particularly those former- include Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, Policy ly belonging to the Socialist Party. They may not Research Committee chairman Maehara Seiji, represent the future of the party, but they repre- and the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime sent its ideological foundations. DPJ pacifists gen- minister, Nagashima Akihisa. erally belong to the Society of Liberals (riberaru no kai), an intra-party group of twenty to forty lawmakers who hold these views.50 Hiraoka Hideo, the minister of justice during the first Noda cabinet, is a leading member of the Society of Lib- 47 Maehara Seiji, a prominent realist, initially opposed the plan to relocate erals. Other prominent pacifists are Yokomichi the U.S. Marine air station at Futenma to Henoko Bay, as the Obama Takahiro, currently the speaker of the House of administration has demanded. “Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku” [Ask- Representatives, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Sec- ing DPJ Vice President Maehara], “Minshuto do miru do kataru “ [How retary Saito Tsuyoshi. should we see and talk about the DPJ], Asahi Shimbun Globe, June 8, 2009, http://globe.asahi.com/feature/090608/side/05.html (accessed January 5, 2012). Centrists 48 Prime Minister Noda, another realist, angered China and South Korea when he said that the fourteen Class-A war criminals interred at the Centrists in the DPJ are lawmakers who do Yasukuni Shrine should no longer be considered war criminals. See, not have particularly strong foreign policy for instance, Deng Shasha, “Japan’s New PM Needs to Respect China’s Core Interests, Development Demands,” Xinhua News Agency, Au- gust 29, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011- 49 See, for instance, the profile for Hiraoka Hideo, a prominent pacifist, in 08/29/c_131082001.htm (accessed January 5, 2012); for the ROK appendix D, “Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians.” Foreign Ministry’s statement, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 50 For further details of the Society of Liberals’ foreign policy positions, Republic of Korea, “Official Commentary on a Japanese Minister’s Re- see “Riberal no Kai Seisaku Teigen: Omoiyari no kuni Nihon wo meza- marks Regarding Class A War Criminals,” August 16, 2011, http://www. shite” [Society of Liberals’ policy proposal: Toward thoughtful Nation mofat.go.kr/ENG/press/pressreleases/index.jsp?menu=m_10_20 (ac- Japan], official website of Hiraoka Hideo, July 16, 2008, http://www. cessed January 5, 2012). hiraoka-hideo.jp/ (accessed November 3, 2011).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 17 convictions but whose positions tilt toward States as a declining power and therefore fear en- the realist school, particularly when faced trapment, both with regard to U.S.-led foreign with real-world foreign policy challenges. military operations and by what they see as a sink- Although they may not be as ideologically ing ship (the United States).53 It is easy to assume polarized as realists or pacifists, centrists may that this group is anti-American but its views are still have strong beliefs about specific policy more nuanced, and its members often consider ideas, promoting, for example, non-nuclear themselves friends of the United States. Some principles and Japan’s active engagement in UN might also assume that this group would want to PKOs. Centrists understand that the security fall in with a rising power like China. However, challenges confronting Japan call for policies this would contradict their independent streak. that do not necessarily align with the DPJ’s On the contrary, neo-autonomists believe Japan idealistic vision. Because of this, their default should stand on its own two feet, whether it is vis- position is to maintain the status quo and their à-vis China or the United States. They are neo- ultimate policy choices tend to resemble LDP nationalists in the sense that they have an almost policies. A subset of the centrist school is made chauvinistic confidence in Japan, especially in re- up of pragmatists, in this case DPJ lawmakers lation to the United States, although they are not who have shifted from their original ideological at all xenophobic. Many of these lawmakers were or policy positions since becoming ruling born in the last days of World War II and have party members in 2009. Often, these members vivid memories of impoverished Japanese chil- come from a left-of-center background, and dren calling out “give me chocolate” to occupa- may still hold those views on a personal basis, tion GIs. They believe that Japan, as a nation, has but have gradually adopted a more realist fallen into a similar mindset of dependency on approach as governing lawmakers.51 They tend the United States and are committed to ending to be seasoned political veterans. Prominent that deferential dynamic.54 Neo-autonomists are pragmatists include former Prime Minister Kan similar to neoliberals in international relations Naoto and many former members of his cabinet, theory, in that they cope with potential threats by such as former Defense Minister Kitazawa United States that it has been in a state of ‘auto pilot.’ For a sovereign Toshimi (a dovish former LDP member), nation, however, one-sided dependence for one’s security on the other Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio, Deputy country is nothing but the abdication of political responsibility.” Demo- Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito, and cratic Party of Japan, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National In- Foreign Minister Matsumoto Takeaki. terest – Living Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” May 18, 2005, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/vision/03.html#05. 53 Ibid. Neo-autonomists 54 For an example of neo-autonomist views toward the United States, see Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi’s interview in Naoya Fujiwara et al., Kokka kino wo The DPJ’s neo-autonomist school is perhaps the takenaosu – Wakate seijika ga mezasu atarashii nihon no katachi [Re- forming the state function: A new form of Japan that younger politicians most fascinating of the four groups and is unique seek] (Tokyo: First Press, 2009). Yamaguchi argued: “The most important to Japanese politics. Neo-autonomists overtly re- problem in Japanese diplomacy is the loss of a mentality of indepen- sent Japan’s strategic dependence on the United dence. Before World War II, Japan had its own vision, whether good or States and seek a more independent and self-em- bad, and followed it. But after the end of the war, Japan held on tight- powering foreign policy.52 They see the United ly to a view that Japan would benefit most if Japan listened to whatever the United States says. During the war, it was taught that the Amer- 51 Former Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi has, for instance, admitted icans were evil, but once we got to know them, they looked so friendly. that his personal views on defense policy differed from his official posi- When asking [American GIs] “give me chocolate,” they gave us delicious tion as defense chief. Jun Hongo, “Kitazawa Vague on Support Options chocolate. In the end, Japanese held onto the view that they would ben- for Global Antiterror Role,” Japan Times, September 25, 2009, http:// efit as long as they had good relations with the Americans. In terms of www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20090925a6.html (accessed January 5, diplomacy, they thought, Japan would benefit as long as Japan listens 2012). to whatever the United States says. For its own good, Japan should not 52 While serving as DPJ president in 2005, Okada Katsuya, for instance, think for itself. Japan has wound up having such a socio-political com- stated that: “… Japan’s security policy has been so dependent on the plex” (p. 96).

18 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY DPJ Foreign Policy Schools of Thought

Realists Pacifists Centrists Neo-autonomists National Security Hawkish Dovish Originally moderate Hawkish on or dovish but have homeland security become more but idealistic on hawkish as ruling international order party members Article 9 of Revise Article 9 to Maintain Article 9 Flexible on Article 9, Revise Article 9 the Japanese become more normal to restrict Japan’s revise if necessary to allow greater Constitution nation and enhance international security autonomy vis à vis international security involvement and the United States role, including alliance with the contributions to United States alliance with the United States Threat Perception High Low Rising Low Abandonment vs. Fear of abandonment Fear of entrapment Rising fear of Fear of entrapment Entrapment by U.S. (hedge with U.S.) (hedge against abandonment (hedge against U.S. decline) (hedge with U.S.) U.S. decline) Alliances & Enhance ties with Seek friendly Enhance ties with Enhance ties with Partnerships likeminded nations; relations with likeminded nations; Asian nations to hedge against China all nations, seek stable ties counterbalance U.S. including China with China and seek closer ties with China U.S. Bases Maintain Eliminate Maintain Reduce, seek alternative security options Collective Self- Support Oppose Flexible Flexible Defense SDF Overseas Support, in support Oppose, including Flexible Support, particularly Deployments of coalition and for most UN PKO under UN PKO UN mandates auspices JSDF Capabilities Enhance Restrict Enhance as Enhance necessary UN and Regional Support UN and High support for UN, Moderate support High support for Institutions Asian regionalism but although not UN for UN and Asian Asian regionalism, not as substitute to PKO missions for regionalism moderate U.S.-Japan alliance SDF, and support for support for UN Asian regionalism Historical Reluctant Support Support Support Reconciliation

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 19 seeking to integrate them into the international retary general in 2009. Ozawa, who has wielded system through free trade and multilateral insti- enormous influence within the party, is himself tution building. They are particularly interested difficult to classify as subscribing to any particu- in regional institutions such as the proposed East lar school of thought. Many observers remember Asian Community, which they also see as a coun- his behind-the-scenes work as an LDP lawmaker terbalance to Japan’s strategic dependence on the in enabling Japan’s security contributions to the United States. Of the various schools, neo-auton- allied coalition during the first Gulf War. Oza- omists are probably most ardently “Asianist” in wa has also been a vocal proponent of Japan’s their vision of Japan’s regional position. They are becoming a “normal” nation, thus earning him a relatively small group within the DPJ but they some identification with the realist camp.58 How- have influential leaders and their call for a more ever, Ozawa has also grown increasingly critical assertive foreign policy may appeal to a young- of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement, includ- er generation of Japanese. The most prominent ing the large presence of forward-deployed U.S. neo-autonomist is former Prime Minister Hatoya- forces on Okinawa59—a position that suggests ma Yukio. Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, a former diplo- neo-autonomist leanings. Since Ozawa is diffi- mat and current parliamentary vice minister of cult to pin down in any one camp he is, in some foreign affairs, is another outspoken member of ways, in a category by himself. this group, and the current deputy prime minis- Similarly, it would be misleading to suggest ter and former foreign minister, Okada Katsuya, that the above schools of thought represent coher- has expressed views that are consonant with this ent or widespread ideological strains within the school of thought. DPJ. The DPJ’s more formal intra-party groups, for instance, generally are comprised of members Caveats who unite around particular leaders, not ideologies. One notable exception is the Society of Lib- While survey data suggests that members of the erals, which is one of the few formal factions in ideological extremes—that is, the realists and the DPJ with a core ideological identity, although the pacifists—are fairly consistent in their view- it is perhaps more concerned with domestic than points and do not drift from camp to camp,55 foreign affairs.60 With the exception of the pac- centrists and neo-autonomists are less easily de- ifist school of thought, the other foreign policy finable and show inconsistencies across multiple schools have a limited number of followers. The indicators.56 Their positions tend to vacillate be- realists and neo-autonomists, for instance, have tween realist and pacifist positions, often in con- relatively few solid members but, in a party with tradictory ways, such as by supporting a more active overseas role for the SDF while oppos- 58 Ozawa Ichiro, Nihon Kaizo Keikaku [Blueprint for a new Japan: The re- ing looser restrictions on collective self-defense. thinking of a nation] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993). 59 “Nihon no boei wa Nihon ga sekinin wo, Minshu Ozawa shi ga hatsu- Further, according to one policy-savvy Diet gen” [Japan should take more responsibility for its own defense, DPJ member, as many as 60 percent of party mem- President Ozawa said], Asahi Shimbun, February 25, 2009, http:// bers are “indifferent” to foreign policy issues and www.asahi.com/politics/update/0225/TKY200902250292.html therefore do not subscribe to any particular for- (accessed February 25, 2009); “Ozawa shi no Dai Nana Kantai de eign policy school of thought.57 jubun hatsugen, yoyato ni hamon” [Ozawa’s Seventh Fleet remark causes controversy between ruling and opposition parties], Nihon Many of these “indifferent” lawmakers are Keizai Shimbun, February 26, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/ “Ozawa Children,” relative newcomers to the seiji/20090226AT3S2502525022009.html (accessed February 26, party who were recruited by the former DPJ sec- 2009). 60 Riberaru no Kai [Society of Liberals], “Riberal no Kai Seisaku Teigen: 55 For further details of the key DPJ politicians’ survey data and the past Omoiyari no kuni Nihon wo mezashite” [Society of Liberals’ policy pro- remarks on foreign and security policies, see appendixes C and D. posal: Toward thoughtful Nation Japan], official website of Hiraoka 56 Ibid. Hideo, July 16, 2008, http://www.hiraoka-hideo.jp/ (accessed No- 57 Interview with senior DPJ lawmaker, August 12, 2010. vember 3, 2011).

20 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY shallow foreign policy expertise, their leaders can idea, few, if any, could persuasively describe how be influential out of sheer force of intellect. it might be implemented and what would differ- Another caveat is that it is difficult to gauge entiate it from other regional institutions. There which schools of thought are most influential at was, in fact, no agreement on the membership any given time or are representative of the DPJ of the EAC, including the crucial question of as a whole. The party is in some respects rooted in the pacifist tradition, but (as further discussed Rhetoric from leading DPJ lawmakers later in this report) the other schools of thought have exerted greater influence on policy making has shaped and colored Japan’s since the DJP became the ruling party in 2009. An even more difficult factor to quantify is diplomatic behavior since the how deeply DPJ lawmakers actually believe in their stated foreign policy positions. Taken at face value, DPJ leaders can be convincing- party came to power in 2009. ly outspoken about their foreign policy beliefs, whether or not the United States would be al- but their policy-making behavior as ruling law- lowed to join. Prime Minister Hatoyama and his makers suggests that their rhetoric often outstrips foreign minister, Okada Katsuya, made contra- reality—stated goals are often unmet, not just be- dictory public statements on this matter, indicat- cause of the aforementioned structural obstacles, ing a lack of consensus at the highest levels of but also as a result of an apparent lack of follow- the party.61 Further, the two men differed over through or realistic planning. whether the EAC should have a security com- The most glaring example of this tendency ponent to it or whether it should focus primari- is the party’s approach to the idea of creating an ly on regional economic integration.62 To date, East Asian Community (or EAC), a goal repeatedly included in DPJ manifestos. The formation 61 Hatoyama Yukio did not necessarily intend to exclude U.S. membership of an EAC was arguably the flagship foreign pol- in an EAC, while Okada Katsuya preferred the exclusion of the United icy goal of the Hatoyama administration—ele- States from membership. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated in a press conference on September 16, 2009, “As you know, the spirit of frater- mental in the neo-autonomist vision of achieving nity in one sense serves as a starting line. In the case of the EU this has more diplomatic equilibrium between Asia and extended as far as a common currency, the euro. I feel that to envisage the United States—and the prime minister him- a regional community in Asia, particularly in East Asia in the medium self gave considerable rhetorical emphasis to the to long term is the correct path to take, even though in a sense there are major differences in our countries’ systems. This idea certainly is idea until the very last days of his premiership. At not intended to exclude the U.S. dollar or the United States. Quite the face value, then, promoting regional institution- contrary, as a step beyond this initiative I believe we should envisage alism was undeniably a core priority of the new an Asia-Pacific community, and I do not think that this could readily be administration. Yet, beyond the rhetoric, there achieved without the United States,” http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ hatoyama/statement/200909/16kaiken_e.html (accessed November is little evidence that the Hatoyama cabinet in- 3, 2011). Foreign Minister Okada made a foreign policy speech in the vested anything more than lip service to the cre- Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on October 7, 2009: “I would like ation of the EAC or any other new multilateral to think the membership of an EAC includes Japan, China, South Korea, forum. The Foreign Ministry, for instance, was ASEAN, India, Australia, and New Zealand,” and, “an EAC will begin with not given marching orders to implement a plan economic cooperation. Then I would like to expand the cooperation in energy, environment, health, and so on,” and, “a common currency is for regional institution building, or even to lay a long term agenda.” in “Higashi Ajia Kyodotai koso ni Amerika kuwa- the diplomatic groundwork for recruiting poten- ezu, Okada gaisho” [Foreign Minister Okada says an East Asian Com- tial member nations. munity excludes the United States], Sankei Shimbun, October 7, 2009, Nor was there a consensus among party lead- http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/091007/plc0910072045012- n1.htm (accessed October 7, 2009). ers on the conceptual dimensions of the EAC. 62 Hatoyama Yukio envisioned an EAC for a possible regional collective Although numerous DPJ members espoused the security mechanism in the future, while Okada focused on an EAC as a vehicle mainly for regional economic interdependence. Hatoyama

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 21 there has been no discernible push to create the EAC and the concept has been all but dropped from the party leadership’s talking points. Nonetheless, rhetoric does matter in international statecraft, and even if the DPJ has struggled to implement much of its foreign policy agenda, statements by party leaders reflecting varying foreign policy positions have shaped and colored Japan’s diplomatic behavior since the fall of 2009. Perhaps for this reason, the style of leadership and policy making under the DPJ’s first three prime ministers—Hatoyama, Kan, and now Noda—has been noticeably different, with direct implications for Japan’s foreign relations. While the Hatoyama cabinet exhibited the neo-autonomist tendencies outlined above, the Kan administration largely presented a more pragmatic and centrist streak in its foreign-policy making. The former approach led to tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance and a domestic political crisis, while the latter approach restored a degree of stability in the bilateral alliance. Prime Minister Noda appears to be the most realist-oriented of the new prime ministers, thus far signaling a conservative diplomatic approach as Japan faces major challenges both at home and abroad.

said, “We, recognizing the importance of human dignity, seek to en- joy, together with the peoples of the world, the benefits of peace, freedom and democracy, and commit ourselves to work continually and unceasingly towards the goal of establishing a system of permanent and universal economic and social cooperation and a system of collective national security in the international community, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.” Hatoyama Yukio,Shin Kenpo Shian: Songen aru Nihon wo tsukuru [New constitutional draft: Toward a respectable Japan] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2005), quoted in Hatoyama Yukio, “Shin Kenpo Shian” [New constitutional draft], official website of Hatoyama Yukio, http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/tentative_plan/ (accessed Novem- ber 3, 2011). Okada’s version of an EAC does not include a traditional security role because he believes the U.S.-Japan alliance plays such a role: “On security issues, my assumption is that there is no peace and stability in Asia without the U.S.-Japan alliance. I do not think that an Asian version of NATO including the United States and China would ex- ist in 2015. My version of EAC excludes the traditional security roles.” Okada Katsuya and Hashimoto Goro, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto daihyo, gaiko bijon wo kataru” [DPJ President Katsuya Okada discusses his foreign policy vision], Chuokoron 120, no. 7 (July 2005), quoted in Okada Katsuya, “Hatsugen Hodo [Comments and reports],” official website of Okada Katsuya, July 8, 2005, http://www.katsuya.net/opinion/2005/07/post-103.html (accessed November 3, 2011).

22 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Prime Minister Hatoyama: An Agenda for Change

As the DPJ’s first prime minister, Hatoyama bases on Okinawa in the lead-up to the August Yukio entered office with unique expectations 2009 parliamentary elections, was appointed sec- that his new government would represent a stark retary general of the party. Further, as the new contrast from previous LDP regimes. A top pri- leadership sought to distance bureaucrats from ority of this agenda for change, particularly in the policy-making process, the Kantei (the offi- the foreign policy arena, was to carry out the par- cial residence of the Japanese prime minister) ty’s vision of a more “equal” alliance relation- appeared to turn to unofficial outside advisers ship with the United States. The prime minister for policy expertise. Terashima Jitsuro, a former himself was especially eager to take on this task, business executive and confidant of the prime as a leading proponent of a more assertive and minister, was particularly prominent in the early autonomous Japanese diplomacy that would days of the Hatoyama administration. In numer- hedge against gradual U.S. decline. In a now fa- ous articles and media appearances, Terashima mous op/ed published in the New York Times railed against the status quo U.S.-Japan security shortly before he took office, Hatoyama argued arrangement, which he criticized as subjugating that Japan must counterbalance U.S.-led “mar- Japan to U.S. strategic objectives.65 ket fundamentalism” through economic inte- Thus, armed with a mandate for change and gration with Asia63—a line of thinking that is a team of relatively likeminded cabinet officials emblematic of the neo-autonomist school in the and advisers, Prime Minister Hatoyama em- ruling party. barked on an attempt to forge a new, post-LDP As Hatoyama formulated his new govern- diplomacy, including a recalibrated strategic dy- ment, he appointed a number of party mem- namic with the United States. Almost as soon bers and outside advisers who reflected his basic as it started, though, the Hatoyama government worldview. (This is not to suggest that other fac- ran into difficulties executing its neo-autonomist tors such as party rank and factional membership vision of a more independent foreign policy— were not primarily considered in the cabinet due not just to the aforementioned internal chal- lineup.) Okada Katsuya, who had been criti- lenges, including its own problems with effective cal of Japan’s deferential treatment of the Unit- policy implementation, but also to external chal- ed States, was made foreign minister.64 Ozawa lenges and obstacles that it faced in the interna- Ichiro, who was ramping up criticism of U.S. tional arena. This is not to say that the Hatoyama cabinet failed to implement foreign and security 63 Hatoyama Yukio, “A New Path for Japan,” New York Times, August 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edha- policies across the board. Most notably, the new toyama.html (accessed November 3, 2011). government made advancements in some key bi- 64 After Okada publicized his foreign policy vision as DPJ president in lateral relationships and in Japan’s contribution 2005, he told an interviewer, “Although the former Deputy State Sec- to anti-piracy operations. But the subsequent retary Armitage expressed his concern on an EAC, I would like to say track record of accomplishments underscores let Japan take care of the Asian issues by its own to some degree. Why does not the U.S. trust Japan more?… . In U.S.-Japan relations, it is the difficulties that the new ruling party faced necessary to reach a FTA with the U.S. and to harmonize the markets of the U.S. and Japan. To the U.S., an EAC is behind Japan. Japan will ing Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” http://www.dpj.or.jp/eng- become a connector between the U.S. and East Asia.” Okada Katsuya lish/vision/summary.html (accessed November 3, 2011). and Hashimoto Goro, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto daihyo, gaiko bijon wo 65 Terashima Jitsuro, “Joshiki ni kaeru ishi to koso: Nichibei Domei no saik- kataru” [DPJ President Okada Katsuya discusses his foreign policy vi- ouchiku ni mukete” [Will and initiative to return to a common sense: sion]. For Okada’s foreign policy vision in 2005, see Democratic Party Reconstructing the Japan-U.S. alliance], Sekai [The World] 801 (Feb- of Japan, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National Interest – Liv- ruary 2010): 118–25.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 23 in executing its overall vision of a revamped dip- proposal that was floated in the 2009 manifesto, lomatic and strategic agenda. and that was meant to offset Washington’s While the new government talked of the concerns about the DPJ’s commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance as the center of Japan’s bilateral relationship, was to launch a bilateral security policy, the Hatoyama administration U.S.-Japan FTA (to date, a bilateral FTA has not immediately began taking steps to redefine the been seriously pursued by either government). bilateral dynamic. Among the first steps was to In its attempt to rebalance Japan’s ties with withdraw the SDF from refueling missions in the the United States and Asia, the new government Indian Ocean, aimed at supporting U.S.-led anti- in Tokyo took steps to improve bilateral ties with terror operations in Afghanistan, and to review its regional neighbors, in particular China and the 2006 U.S.-Japan agreement to relocate the South Korea. The Hatoyama government was Futenma Marine air station on Okinawa. The aware of the many difficult issues between Chi- DPJ also considered placing Japan’s Host Nation na and Japan, from historical grievances to ter- Support (HNS) to the United States in its budget ritorial disputes, but the DPJ was hopeful that screening process in order to lay the groundwork by setting a friendlier tone in bilateral relations for a potential reduction of HNS in upcoming both nations would be able to move beyond their budgets. Finally, the new government in Tokyo differences. announced that it would launch an investigation However, Prime Minister Hatoyama went a of a Cold War-era secret deal between previous step further by, at first, signaling a greater em- LDP governments and Washington to allow the phasis on Sino-Japan ties over U.S.-Japan ties. transit of U.S. nuclear-armed vessels through its Days after his appointment as prime minister, ports, in violation of Japan’s so-called three non- Hatoyama traveled to New York for a UN Gener- nuclear principles.66 al Assembly meeting and chose to meet Chinese The new government—perhaps naively— President Hu Jintao before meeting with U.S. appeared to believe that it was cautiously President Barack Obama—an unusual change proceeding with these steps, although it was not of protocol for a sitting Japanese prime minis- taken that way by Washington. For example, ter. At a later trilateral summit with South Korea, the withdrawal of the SDF refueling mission Hatoyama reportedly told his Chinese counter- was phased in and the review of the 2006 base part that Japan was overly dependent on the Unit- relocation plans did not affect the existing ed States.68 Other leading DPJ figures made sim- agreement to relocate the Futenma airbase to an alternative policy option to support the Afghanistan reconstruc- Henoko Bay, a less-populated area on Okinawa. tion efforts. While South Korea decided to re-deploy the South Korean The issue of the Status of Forces Agreement military to Afghanistan, the Hatoyama administration examined var- (SOFA) revision was postponed until the ious options including a possible SDF dispatch to Afghanistan. In the Futenma review was concluded. The DPJ also end, the Hatoyama administration decided not to dispatch the SDF but to increase the financial assistance to Afghanistan to $5 billion in recognized the importance that the United the following five years, from $2 billion under past LDP administra- States placed in stabilizing Afghanistan, deciding tions. “Jieitai no Afugan haken, Shusho shosu demo nozomasikunai” to commit $5 billion for Afghan reconstruction [Prime Minister Hatoyama is against the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan, aid over the following five years.67 Another not even a few], Asahi Shimbun, November 5, 2009, http://www.asahi. com/politics/update/1104/TKY200911040461.html (accessed Novem- 66 The three non-nuclear principles state that Japan will neither possess ber 5, 2009); Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Kanbo chokan nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor will it permit their introduction kasha happyo heisei niju ichi nen juichi gatsu toka gozen” [Press confer- into Japanese territory. The principles were first clarified by Prime Min- ence by Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi], November 10, 2009, ister Sato Eisaku in a speech to the Lower House Budget Committee on http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2009/11/10_a.html December 11, 1967. The principles have been publicly recognized as a (accessed December 1, 2011). national principle, but they do not constitute a formal law. 68 Arima Hiroki, Higashioka Toru, and Hakota Tetsuya, “Kitachosen 67 The 2009 DPJ manifesto promised the withdrawal of Maritime Self- tainichi kaizen nozomu, On shusho setsumei, Nicchukan shunou kai- Defense Force operations from the Indian Ocean. While the Hatoyama gi” [North Korea hopes a better relation with Japan, Chinese Premier administration attempted to keep this promise, it began to search for Wen explained at the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit],

24 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY ilar gestures toward China. Most famously, DPJ cooperation and the ROK-Japan FTA were con- Secretary General Ozawa led a delegation of 140 sidered requisite steps toward the creation of an ruling party lawmakers to Beijing for a courtesy East Asian Community. The importance placed visit in December 2009. It was not lost on U.S. on South Korea was symbolized by Prime Minis- officials that a similar DPJ delegation visit was ter Hatoyama’s decision to go to Seoul as his first not being planned to Washington. official bilateral visit, in October 2009. The 2009 DPJ manifesto policy index also The Hatoyama government took steps to im- called on improving ties with South Korea as a prove bilateral ties with other nations as well. top diplomatic priority.69 As with China, Japan’s In a carryover from LDP policies, the new gov- relations with South Korea have been hampered ernment sought to deepen diplomatic and stra- by ongoing territorial disputes and historical grievances. In particular, the Dokdo/Takeshi- While calling the U.S.-Japan alliance ma Islands dispute and the ongoing controversy over Japanese history textbooks have repeatedly the center of Japan’s security policy, derailed progress toward improved bilateral relations. Again, the Hatoyama administration of- the new Hatoyama government fered conciliatory gestures toward Seoul from the outset. In contrast to past practices, for in- immediately attempted to redefine stance, the Hatoyama administration dropped direct references to the Dokdo/Takeshima terri- the bilateral alliance dynamic. torial dispute in the government’s guidelines for high school textbooks.70 tegic ties with India and Australia. Although More concretely, the new government sig- the DPJ planned to differentiate itself from the naled renewed interest in restarting negotia- LDP, the opportunity to diversify Japan’s strate- tions with Seoul over a bilateral FTA, an idea gic partners beyond the United States resonated that had been proposed by previous LDP govern- with the party’s neo-autonomist ambitions. At a ments but never finalized with a formal agree- summit meeting in New Delhi, Prime Minister ment.71 The DPJ hoped that a strengthened Hatoyama and Indian Prime Minister Manmo- ROK-Japan relationship, underpinned by a new han Singh agreed to enhance security coopera- bilateral FTA, would lead to greater trilateral co- tion between the two countries, including the operation including China.72 Both the trilateral regularization of a bilateral defense ministers’ Asahi Shimbun, October 10, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/ meeting, the establishment of an annual “2+2” update/1010/TKY200910100165.html (accessed October 10, 2009). foreign and defense administrative vice minis- 69 Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Pol- ters’ meeting, a maritime security dialogue on icy Index 2009], July 23, 2009, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifes- sea lanes of communication, and joint exercis- to/seisaku2009/img/INDEX2009.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011). 70 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) es for anti-piracy operations. The Hatoyama ad- of Japan, “Daijin kisha kaikenroku (heisei niju ichi nen juni gatsu it- ministration also agreed to an acquisition and suka)” [Press conference by the MEXT minister], December 25, 2009, cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) with Australia http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/daijin/detail/1288500.htm (ac- for peacetime security cooperation. In his meet- cessed December 1, 2011). ings with Australian counterparts, Foreign Min- 71 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Nikkan gaisho kaidan no gaiyo” [South Korea-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting summary], January 16, ister Okada advanced bilateral dialogue on the 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/korea/kaidan/sk_1001_ issue of nuclear arms reduction and nonprolif- gai.html (accessed December 1, 2011). eration.73 72 The DPJ Policy Index 2009 states, “In order to contribute to stability and peace in East Asia and the world, the DPJ will strengthen the South Ko- solve the Takeshima issue.” Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Sei- rea-Japan bilateral relations, and then construct a strong, trustworthy, sakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Policy Index 2009], July 23, 2009, 15. and cooperative relation among China, South Korea, and Japan. The DPJ 73 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Submission by the Governments will make efforts to conclude a South Korea-Japan bilateral FTA and to of Japan and Australia of a “New Package of Practical Nuclear Disar-

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 25 Another pillar of the DPJ’s foreign policy Party leaders considered relaxing the current agenda as it took over the government was to PKO law, which prohibits SDF missions in have a more “proactive” UN-oriented diploma- ongoing military conflicts. Although many DPJ cy. The DPJ manifestos mention three policy lawmakers generally support more proactive areas regarding UN-related security operations: Japanese participation in UN PKO missions, 1) anti-piracy operations, 2) peacekeeping oper- internal debates over the PKO law revealed sharp ations, and 3) peace-building operations.74 Al- differences within the party. Foreign Minister though as an opposition party the DPJ opposed Okada, for instance, was in support of looser the SDF anti-piracy operations bill, the party PKO restrictions, but the prime minister favored manifesto in principle supports anti-piracy op- maintaining the current restrictions.76 Defense erations on the condition that they be led pri- Minister Kitazawa was also eager to dispatch the marily by the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and that SDF, but primarily in support of U.S.-led overseas MSDF activities come under more strict civil- operations, such as the deployment of P-3Cs to ian control. The 2009 DPJ manifesto also em- the Indian Ocean and SDF missions in support of phasizes Japan’s more active participation in UN the International Security and Assistance Force peacekeeping operations, including the use of (ISAF) in Afghanistan.77 Okada, on the other force if certain conditions are met. Finally, the hand, was more eager to dispatch the SDF in 2009 manifesto supports Japan’s active role in UN PKO missions outside the scope of U.S.-led peacebuilding operations, including financial operations, such as a potential mission to Sudan. aid, support for the development of central gov- In the end, the Hatoyama administration failed ernments (such as training for rule-of-law initia- to reach a consensus on these policies, instead tives), medical aid, and support for infrastructure approving the less controversial deployment of projects. SDF personnel for humanitarian aid and disaster Given the emphasis on the United Nations in relief (HA/DR) operations following the January DPJ policy platforms some observers speculated 2010 earthquake in Haiti.78 that the Hatoyama government might reorient The new ruling government also explored Japan’s diplomacy toward a UN-centric model. how it might enhance Japan’s role in Afghan re- Instead, the new government grappled with construction and anti-piracy operations in ex- internal divisions over UN policy and, somewhat change for greater flexibility from the United ironically, sought ways to leverage Japan’s global security engagements in strategic negotiations 76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Press Conference by Minister of 75 Foreign Affairs Okada Katsuya,” October 23, 2009, http://www.mofa. with the United States. go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_0910.html#5 (accessed December The issue of Japan’s participation in UN PKO 1, 2011); Jiji Press, “Buki shiyo kijun kanwa ni hiteiteki, Okada gaisho missions proved to be divisive from the start. no shini kakunin, Hatoyama shusho” [Prime Minister Hatoyama is negative to loosening the rules of engagement, and will confirm Foreign mament and Non-Proliferation Measures for the 2010 Review Confer- Minister Okada’s true intention], March 17, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/ ence of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2010031700240 (accessed March 17, 2010). Weapons (NPT),” March 23, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ 77 Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi expressed his concern regarding the announce/2010/3/0323_01.html (accessed December 1, 2011). deteriorating security situation in Sudan. “Sudan PKO ni heri butai hak- 74 Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Pol- en wo kento, yoka kara genchi chosa” [Helicopter unit dispatch to Su- icy Index 2009], 15–17; Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisaku dan PKO is considered, research delegation scheduled for May 8], Asahi Index 2005” [DPJ Policy Index 2005], August 2005, http://www1.dpj. Shimbun, May 7, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0506/ or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2005/ (accessed November 3, 2011). TKY201005060325.html (accessed May 7, 2010). 75 Sengoku Yasushi, “PKO haken, taibei kaizen nerau” [PKO dispatch, 78 Japan dispatched 190 engineering personnel and 160 support person- seeking to improve relations with the United States], Mainichi Shim- nel to Haiti, for a total of approximately 350 SDF personnel. The SDF bun, January 26, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/ mission includes the clean-up of debris; the flattening of the evacuees’ news/20100126ddm002030097000c.html (accessed January 26, camp construction land; the repairing of the roads; and the construc- 2010); Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the De- tion of a minor facility. The initial term of the mission was from Feb- fense Minister,” January 26, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/ki- ruary 5, 2010, to November 30, 2010. The Kan cabinet extended the sha/2010/01/26.html (accessed December 1, 2011). mission to January 31, 2012.

26 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY States in base realignment talks. In particular, the vamp diplomatic relations on a bilateral basis. DPJ hoped that expanding Japan’s involvement The combination of internal and external fac- in the Afghan reconstruction effort would lead tors working against the new government’s plans to U.S. concessions in the Futenma relocation ultimately led to its demise just nine months af- plan.79 However, by linking Japan’s internation- ter taking office. al engagement to the basing issue, the Hatoya- Initially, the Obama administration signaled ma government was, in effect, undermining its that it was willing to be patient as the new promise to conduct foreign policy independent- government in Tokyo found its footing, despite ly from U.S. strategic interests. And it soon be- being eager to make progress on the 2006 base came clear that Washington was unwilling to se- realignment plan.81 The Hatoyama government’s riously entertain alternative options to the 2006 early mixed signals about the relocation plans agreement on the Futenma relocation, despite quickly frustrated U.S. officials and, by October, any tacit quid pro quos offered by the Hatoya- then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was ma cabinet.80 calling on Tokyo to move forward on the plan by the end of 2009.82 However, the new DPJ- External Constraints on the led government appeared optimistic that it could Hatoyama Administration work out a deal with the Obama administration to seek alternative options for the Futenma While the Hatoyama cabinet struggled to settle relocation plan.83 The prime minister’s decision in as the new ruling government, it soon con- to reexamine other relocation options further fronted both internal and external obstacles to its vision of greater diplomatic autonomy from 81 Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said that American officials the United States. In particular, the effort to re- will “take great care” as they work with the DPJ, and, “this is a whole balance Japan’s diplomatic orientation between new generation of people who are experiencing this together for the the United States and Asia met with significant first time,” and, “it may take time for them to be able to fully enunci- structural challenges beyond the domestic polit- ate.” Campbell also added, “In terms of the basics, we are very comfort- ical arena. The United States reacted negatively able.” Foster Klug, “US Diplomats Say US-Japan Alliance to Stay Strong,” Associated Press, September 2, 2009, from the Seattle Times, http://se- to the Hatoyama administration’s mixed signals attletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009794683_apususja- on base realignment plans, leading to major ten- pan.html (accessed November 3, 2011). sions in bilateral alliance relations. China and 82 In a visit to Japan in October 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Robert other neighboring countries in Asia also proved Gates stated in a joint press conference with Defense Minister Kitaza- wa Toshimi: “Our view is clear. The Futenma relocation facility is the unreceptive to Tokyo’s entreaties to form a new lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenma realign- regional community, or even to significantly re- ment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces 79 “Maehara Kokkosho, Shusho ni Nichibei kankei wo sinan, naiyo wa and the return of land in Okinawa. Our view is this may not be the per- naisho” [Land and Transport Minister Maehara gives Prime Minister fect alternative for anyone, but it is the best alternative for everyone, Hatoyama a lecture about Japan-U.S. relations, the content is secret], and it is time to move on… . We have investigated all of the alterna- Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/ tives in great detail and believe that they are both politically untenable update/1117/TKY200911170457.html (accessed November 17, 2009); and operationally unworkable. With respect to a time limit, we have “Okada gaisho wa Amerika ga Kadena togo wo ukeireru to rikai, Ameri- not talked in terms of a time limit, but rather the need to progress as ka koden yaku” [Foreign Minister Okada thinks the U.S. would accept quickly as possible.” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assis- the Kadena merger option, U.S. diplomatic cable translation], Asahi tant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Joint Press Conference with Shimbun, May 13, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0512/ Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense TKY201105120499.html (accessed May 13, 2011). Robert Gates,” October 21, 2009, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ 80 Murayama Yusuke and Ito Hiroshi, “Amerika kokan, Futenma no transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4501 (accessed November 3, 2011). minaoshi shinai iko, Minshu no koyaku meguri hatsugen” [U.S. officials 83 Tera Kotaro and Higashioka Toru, “Futenma kyogi, Shusho, Nichibei goi made it clear that the U.S. will not renegotiate the Futenma reloca- wa zentei denai” [On the Futenma working group consultation, Prime tion issue associated with the DPJ’s manifesto], Asahi Shimbun, Sep- Minister Hatoyama says the Henoko option is not the premise], Asa- tember 3, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/international/update/0903/ hi Shimbun, November 14, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/up- TKY200909030141.html (accessed September 3, 2009). date/1114/TKY200911140370.html (accessed November 14, 2009).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 27 exacerbated an already tense climate in bilateral as well.86 As time went on, other contentious relations. issues flared up in the bilateral relationship, such U.S. concerns were also heightened by as Chinese naval activities in contested waters the increasingly obvious confusion in the and squabbles over the joint development of new government’s decision-making process. gas fields in the East China Sea.87 Territorial As described earlier in this report, consensus disputes with China would only intensify in the building among the three parties in the ruling coming months. coalition proved highly problematic for the Some observers have called the DPJ’s relations new government, particularly reconciling the with South Korea its only foreign policy success,88 staunch anti-base position of the SDP. This was but here, again, improvements in the overall compounded by Hatoyama’s erratic leadership bilateral relationship did not necessarily translate style and conflicting public statements on the into a vastly different dynamic between the two relocation issue made by cabinet ministers countries. Despite the relative calm in bilateral and key party figures. Further, under the relations under the Hatoyama administration, DPJ’s politician-led decision-making process, the two governments did not make a serious bureaucrats were sidelined from deliberations push to finalize a bilateral FTA, instead allowing over the highly complex and delicate base negotiations to remain in limbo. Further, Tokyo’s realignment plans. Lacking a depth of knowledge conciliatory gestures on historical issues did not in this area, the new ruling cabinet appeared lead to tangible progress in resolving the ongoing increasingly amateurish in its handling of the dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. In bilateral alliance.84 April 2010, South Korea decided to conduct Much has been made of Prime Minister maritime geological surveys near the disputed Hatoyama’s mishandling of the base realignment islands, testing the DPJ government’s resolve process and U.S.-Japan relations in general. in the dispute. Tokyo protested the move but However, his administration’s approach to remained vague about its official policy toward China also proved to be less than successful. In essence, Tokyo’s efforts to improve the 86 Jiji Press, “Kyuna kyodotai suishin ni hantai, Chugoku shusho” [Chi- nese Premier Wen opposes the hasty promotion of an EAC], October atmospherics in Sino-Japan ties did not lead to 24, 2009, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2009102400287 improvements in more substantive areas of the (accessed October 24, 2009). bilateral relationship, as the novice ruling party 87 Japan and China agreed to a joint gas field development in the East may have expected. Despite the DPJ leadership’s China Sea in August 2008, but since then bilateral negotiations to realize this agreement have stalled. In March 2010, the People’s Libera- diplomatic overtures to China, for instance, tion Army Navy (PLAN) fleet passed through the Miyako Strait, a key Beijing ignored Tokyo’s concerns about its point between the East China Sea and the Western Pacific. In early nuclear weapons stockpiles, pointedly refusing April, a PLAN helicopter had a near collision with a MSDF vessel in the to buy into Foreign Minister Okada’s calls for a East China Sea. Two days after this incident, the PLAN fleet, including 85 eight surface ships and two submarines, passed through the Miyako nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia. Strait. In late April, there was another near collision incident between Although the DPJ initially expected China the PLAN helicopter and the MSDF vessel. “Chugoku no kansai heri, to be more enthusiastic about an East Asian mata Kaiji goeikan ni ijosekkin, Boeisho happyo” [Defense Ministry an- Community, Beijing reacted coolly to that idea nounced the PLAN helicopter had a near collision with the MSDF vessel again], Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/ update/0421/TKY201004210494.html (accessed April 21, 2010). 84 Kyodo News, “Futenma kyogi, gaimu kanryo no haijo hoshin, sei- 88 Sheila A. Smith points out, “Stating openly that he [Noda] will not vis- ji shudo he Hatoyama naikaku” [Hatoyama administration excludes it the shrine as Japan’s prime minister will be a positive contribution the MOFA bureaucrats from the Futenma relocation consultation to Japan’s relations with South Korea, which have been relatively good with the U.S.], March 11, 2010, http://www.47news.jp/CN/201003/ under the DPJ government.” Sheila A. Smith, “Is Japan’s New PM a ‘Na- CN2010031001001099.html (accessed November 3, 2011). tionalist’ or a ‘Moderate’?” Asia Unbound, Council of Foreign Relations 85 Agence France-Presse, “Japan, China in Spat over Nuclear Arsenal,” blog, September 1, 2011, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/09/01/is-ja- May 16, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALe- pans-new-pm-a-nationalist-or-a-moderate/#more-5370 (accessed qM5iZ7Bv_WhCWbUhd9XNzSgISgfhlcw (accessed November 3, 2011). November 3, 2011).

28 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY the islands until May, when both sides agreed goal of creating a stronger Sino-Japan-ROK to manage the dispute diplomatically in order to triangle grew more distant. prevent further tensions in the overall bilateral The Cheonan incident also served as a wake- relationship.89 up call of sorts to the Hatoyama administration One event that proved to be catalytic in in dealing with real regional security crises. It helping to improve Japan-ROK ties was North was, in fact, the first serious regional security Korea’s sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan crisis to occur on the new government’s watch, in March 2010, which provided an opportunity and while it did not directly involve Japan, North for the Hatoyama government to demonstrate Korea’s act of aggression sent ripples across the its support for South Korea in the wake of region. For the first time as a ruling party, the Pyongyang’s act of aggression. Japan was among DPJ was confronted with a security crisis that the first nations to condemn North Korea for demanded some response from Tokyo. To its the sinking, earning the appreciation of the credit, the Hatoyama government erred on the South Korean government.90 The Cheonan side of allied solidarity, rather than using the incident also led to enhanced trilateral defense incident as a pretext for distancing itself from cooperation among the United States, Japan, the United States. and South Korea, with Japan sending observers Yet as the regional security environment grew to joint U.S.-ROK military exercises in the more tense in the wake of the Cheonan incident wake of the incident.91 Yet, as Japan-ROK ties it seemed an increasingly inopportune time for improved under the auspices of trilateral defense Tokyo and Washington to be at odds with each cooperation with the United States, the DPJ’s other over base realignment plans. This, coupled with the ruling party’s myriad domestic problems 89 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Okada gaimu daijin no hokan no and ongoing political scandals, created a crisis gaiyo” [Summary of Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya’s visit to South Ko- of confidence in the Hatoyama cabinet. After rea], May 16, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/jck/g_kaigi/ having raised expectations on Okinawa for a jkorea_1005_gai.html (accessed December 1, 2011). more favorable deal on relocating Futenma, 90 Prime Minister Hatoyama issued the statement that “Japan strongly Hatoyama finally conceded that he would stick supports the ROK. North Korea’s action cannot be condoned by any means, and Japan together with the international community strong- to the 2006 agreement on relocating the air ly condemns North Korea. In handling this matter, Japan will continue station to Henoko Bay. With his approval ratings its close coordination and cooperation for regional peace and stabil- plummeting, and the SDP leaving the ruling ity with the countries concerned, including the ROK and the United coalition in protest, Hatoyama announced his States.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Comment by the Jap- anese Prime Minister on the Announcement by the Republic of Korea decision to resign as prime minister on June 2, of the Results of the Investigation into the Sinking of a Military Patrol 2010. Vessel,” May 20, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/ statement/201005/20comment_souri_e.html (accessed November 3, 2011). 91 After South Korea officially issued a report holding North Korea responsible for the Cheonan incident in May, the United States and South Korea planned a joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan in July 2010, inviting Maritime SDF officers as observers. In return, the United States and Japan invited South Korean military officers to a U.S.-Japan joint military exercise in December 2010. Maritime Staff Office, “Bei- kan godo gunji enshu heno kaijo jieikan no obuzaber haken ni tsuite” [Maritime SDF officers’ observer dispatch to the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise], Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, July 23, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/info/news/201007/072301.pdf (accessed December 1, 2011); Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Con- ference by the Defense Minister,” December 3, 2010, http://www. mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2010/12/101203.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 29 The Kan Administration Political Transition and Crisis Management

The succession of Kan Naoto as prime minister overall tone of bilateral alliance relations.92 Fi- in June 2010 marked a noticeable transition in nally, by refocusing attention on the domestic governing style in the nine-month period since economic agenda—which included a proposed the DPJ became Japan’s main ruling party. After consumption tax increase, social welfare reform, the debacle over Futenma, Prime Minister Kan and more open trade policy—the Kan adminis- moved quickly to restore some degree of stability tration deflected some of the intense media at- in the U.S.-Japan alliance and defuse the tension tention away from the Futenma issue and the bi- in bilateral ties that had peaked during his prede- lateral alliance as a whole. Another noticeable difference in governing The Cheonan incident served as a wake- was in the new prime minister’s foreign policy rhetoric and diplomatic outreach, with the Kan up call to the Hatoyama administration administration appearing to reemphasize the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Gone was which, until then, had not confronted much mention of an East Asian Community or the imperative to create a more “equal” alliance a serious regional security crisis. with the United States. Soon after taking office, Kan was invited to visit China as his first official cessor’s tenure. The change in leadership from overseas visit; rather than making the visit him- Hatoyama to Kan went hand-in-hand with a more self, he sent Hatoyama on his behalf.93 Kan also pragmatic approach to policy making, at least at made an early statement calling for the Futen- the beginning of the new administration. To be ma problem to be resolved within the context of fair, as the DPJ’s second prime minister, Kan did a strong bilateral alliance.94 not face the same expectations for change that Kan’s cabinet picks also indicated a move away his predecessor had coming into office, and the from a neo-autonomist vision of Japanese diplo- Kan cabinet had the benefit of hindsight to ap- macy toward a more centrist and even realist ori- preciate how an overly aggressive reform agenda could have dire political consequences. 92 Interview with senior Pentagon official, June 3, 2010. The Kan administration therefore initially got 93 Yamada Muru, “Kan shusho: Hochu miokuri Hatoyama shi dairi kento,” off to a promising start. As mentioned earlier, the [Prime Minister Kan passes his visit to China, and instead sends Hatoya- ma as his deputy], Mainichi Shimbun, June 7, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/ Kan administration, particularly under the initial select/seiji/news/20100607dde001010038000c.html (accessed June direction of Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yo- 7, 2010). shito, scaled back some of the DPJ’s institutional 94 Prime Minister Kan stated, “The Japan-U.S. alliance has served as reforms by reincorporating the bureaucracy into the cornerstone of our foreign policy. This principle should continue the policy-making process, although it still ulti- to be upheld firmly today… . We caused anxiety among the Japa- nese public over the issue of Futenma… . We have reached an agree- mately aimed for a politician-led decision-making ment with the United States, and we must proceed on the basis of system. Alliance managers in Washington were this accord, but at the same time, as is mentioned in the Cabinet de- relieved to encounter more consistent messaging cision we took, we must make a sincere and all-out effort to reduce from the Kan cabinet than had been the norm the burden on Okinawa. This is a very difficult issue, but it is one that I hope to address with firm resolve and a clear sense of direction.” Prime under Hatoyama, thus helping to improve the Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minis- ter Kan Naoto,” June 8, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/ statement/201006/08kaiken_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

30 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY entation. His selection of Maehara Seiji, a foreign ty that had courted closer diplomatic ties with policy realist and staunch supporter of the U.S.- Beijing, the DPJ leadership in Tokyo initially Japan alliance, as foreign minister sent a reassur- took a hawkish approach to the incident by ar- ing signal to Washington that the new cabinet resting and detaining the Chinese fishing boat would work more cooperatively than had the pre- crew, a measure that the LDP-led government vious administration. Kitazawa, who had earned had not taken when a similar incident occurred the respect of defense ministry bureaucrats and in 2004.96 Although this initial response was ro- alliance managers in Washington, was retained bust, the Kan cabinet came under strong criti- as defense minister in the new cabinet. Nagashi- cism by the Japanese media for its subsequently ma Akihisa, a long-time proponent of the U.S.- indecisive handling of the crisis and for eventu- Japan alliance and expert on defense policy, was ally seeming to cave in to China’s heavy-hand- retained as parliamentary secretary (seimukan) of ed diplomatic pressure. By January 2011, Chief defense. Together, this foreign and defense poli- Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, who had tried to cy team would prove to be particularly effective orchestrate back-channel negotiations with Bei- in implementing some notable advancements in jing, was forced to resign to take responsibility for Japan’s diplomatic and national security policies. Tokyo’s mishandling of the crisis. Prime Minis- Just as the Cheonan incident in March 2010 ter Kan, already reeling from the DPJ leadership spurred the Hatoyama government to address re- challenge from Ozawa Ichiro, never recovered gional security concerns, two other events in the his political standing after the crisis (which was regional security environment challenged the just the first of more to come). Kan administration, spurring certain advance- However damaging the Senkaku/Diaoyutai ments in Japan’s foreign and defense policies un- crisis was to the Kan cabinet, it did serve to bol- der the DPJ-led government. The first event— ster the credibility and importance of the U.S.- and by far the more serious incident for Japanese Japan strategic partnership at a time when the security interests—was the September 2010 col- alliance was still struggling to recover from the lision between a Chinese fishing vessel and two Futenma impasse. The Obama administration Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats in waters off registered its support for Japan in the dispute, re- the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. In an portedly pledging to honor its security commit- unprecedented move, Japanese authorities arrest- ment to protect Japanese administrative territory ed and temporarily detained the Chinese fishing as Japan’s close strategic ally.97 Tokyo responded vessel’s captain and crew, leading to a bitter dip- 96 On March 24, 2004, seven Chinese civil activists landed on the Sen- lomatic spat with Beijing. After several weeks of kaku/Diaoyutai Islands and were arrested by Japanese police. This was heightened diplomatic tensions, including Chi- the first landing by foreigners on the islands since October 1996, and na’s de facto ban on rare earth exports to Japan, the first time that foreigners landing on the islands were arrested. Two Japanese prosecutors reportedly decided to re- days after the arrest, Japan decided to force the Chinese activists to leave Japan. Tokyo and Beijing dealt with this case very deliberately. lease the Chinese fishing captain out of consid- Although Beijing protested against Tokyo and claimed Chinese sover- eration for broader diplomatic ties between the eignty over the islands, China clarified that Beijing has consistently in- two countries.95 sisted on a dialogue to resolve this issue. Tokyo also emphasized that The Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident was a tell- Japan would not allow this incident to disrupt overall bilateral rela- ing display of the DPJ-led government’s response tions. “Senkaku shoto, Uotsurijima ni Chugokujin nana nin ga joriku, Okinawa Kenkei ga taiho,” [Seven Chinese landed on the Senkaku Is- to a direct national security challenge from Chi- lands, and Okinawa Police arrested them], Asahi Shimbun, March 25, na. As may not have been expected from a par- 2004, http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/OSK200403240036. html (accessed November 8, 2011). 95 “Senkaku oki no shototsu jiken, Chugokujin sencho wo shakuho, Nic- 97 After the U.S.-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting on September 23, 2010, chu kankei koryo” [Senkaku incident: Naha prosecutor released Chinese Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji told the media that Secretary of State captain in consideration of Sino-Japanese relations], Asahi Shim- Hillary Clinton had reiterated to him that the Senkakus are subject to bun, September 25, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/international/up- Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty, which authorizes the United date/0924/TKY201009240180.html (accessed September 25, 2010). States to protect Japan in the event of an armed attack on territories

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 31 in kind, sending renewed signals of its willing- posture vis-à-vis China, primarily through clos- ness to deepen and enhance bilateral defense er strategic cooperation with the United States, cooperation.98 In the following months, the Kan but also through a revamped national security cabinet floated the idea of revising Japan’s three policy. This group exerted considerable behind- arms export principles to allow for greater de- the-scenes influence during the development of fense technology exchanges with the United Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guide- States.99 Further, the Kan cabinet decided not lines, a five-year plan of the nation’s basic de- to reduce the budget for Host Nation Support fense posture. Before resigning in January 2011, for U.S. forces based in Japan.100 Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku along with The Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident also gave Maehara, Noda, and Kitazawa formed a core momentum to the realist wing of the ruling team of cabinet-level ministers that helped to party, which hoped for a more robust defense shepherd the revised NDPG draft through several deliberating bodies and ad hoc parliamenta- under the administration of Japan.” Kyodo News, “Clinton Tells Maehara Senkakus Subject to Bilateral Security Treaty,” reported at Nikkei.com, ry committees that competed to shape the final September 24, 2010, http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20100923D- document (see appendix B for more on the pro- 23NY148.htm (accessed November 8, 2011). cess of developing the 2010 NDPG). 98 At the U.S.-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting in Honolulu on October The final result of the NDPG process turned 27, 2010, Secretary Clinton restated that “the Senkakus fall within out to be a set of recommendations for increased the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Coop- eration and Security. This is part of the larger commitment that the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in areas such as United States has made to Japan’s security. We consider the Japa- joint weapons development and intelligence nese-U.S. alliance one of the most important alliance partnerships sharing. Most significantly, the new NDPG par- we have anywhere in the world and we are committed to our obli- allels aspects of the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial De- gations to protect the Japanese people.” Foreign Minister Maehara replied that “we should like to engage in deeper consultations in order fense Review (QDR), which emphasizes a joint to realize a smooth bilateral cooperation for the defense of Japan and AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC) as a counter to in the case of contingencies in areas surrounding Japan.” U.S. Depart- China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) ment of State, “Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minis- capabilities.101 Japan’s version of this concept is ter Seiji Maehara,” October 27, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/ to enhance the nation’s air and sea defense ca- rm/2010/10/150110.htm (accessed November 8, 2011). 99 Prime Minister Sato Eisaku clarified the existing guidelines of arms ex- pabilities while shifting to a “dynamic defense” port as the Three Principles on Arms Export (buki yushutsu san gensoku) posture that focuses on operational capabili- in the Diet in 1967. The principles banned the arms export to 1) the ties.102 The NDPG also calls for a repositioning communist-bloc countries; 2) those countries subject to embargos on of Japanese defenses from the northern sections arms exports under the UN Security Council’s resolutions; and 3) those countries engaged or likely to be engaged in international conflicts. In of the archipelago to the southwest, in order to 1976, Prime Minister Miki Takeo expanded the principles to a total ban deter potential threats to Japan’s sovereign inter- on the export of arms and arms-related equipment to all countries. In ests in the Sea of Japan.103 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro relaxed the principles to ex- All of these moves effectively ended any empt the transfer of arms-related technologies to the United States, and in 2004 Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro exempted arms exports relat- speculation that the DPJ-led government under ed to ballistic missile defense (BMD) joint development and production Prime Minister Kan might fundamentally with the United States. The revision of the principles has been debat- reorient Japan’s strategic position away from ed since the 1960s, but recently the debate has focused on these two the United States and toward China. Not only issues: 1) deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance; and 2) maintaining Jap- did the new NDPG signal deeper defense ties anese defense industrial foundations. Tomita Keiichiro, “Buki yushutsu san gensoku: sono genkyo to minaoshi rongi” [Three Principles of Arms Export: Current situations and reviews], Chosa to Joho [Issue Brief], no. 101 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 726 (National Diet Library, November 1, 2011), http://www.ndl.go.jp/ February 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_ jp/data/publication/issue/pdf/0726.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011). of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011). 100 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Outcomes of the Comprehensive Re- 102 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY view of Host Nation Support (HNS) and the New Special Measures Agree- 2011 and Beyond, December 17, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_ ment (SMA),” December 14, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n- act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011). america/us/security/hns_sma1012.html (accessed December 1, 2011). 103 Ibid.

32 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY with Washington, it also called attention to that year, the Yeonpyeong Island shelling spurred Japan’s heightened concerns about Chinese closer trilateral defense ties among Japan, South strategic ambitions in the wake of the Senkaku/ Korea, and the United States. In an unprecedent- Diaoyutai crisis and other territorial disputes in ed meeting of the foreign ministers from each the South China Sea. In a January 2011 foreign country, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, policy speech, Prime Minister Kan articulated ROK Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, and Jap- a policy message that some Japanese experts anese Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji issued a took as an affirmation of the status quo and joint statement condemning North Korea for the a relinquishment of the DPJ’s aspirations to unprovoked attack and outlining further steps to rebalance Japan’s diplomatic relations between deepen trilateral strategic cooperation.106 This the United States and Asia.104 was followed by a joint ROK-Japan defense min- Another regional security crisis that helped isterial meeting where the participants agreed to sharpen the DPJ’s attention on strategic deci- examine the possibility of a bilateral acquisition sion making was North Korea’s shelling of Yeon- and cross-servicing agreement, or ACSA, to en- pyeong Island on November 23, 2010, one of hance peacetime security cooperation between the most violent clashes on the Korean Peninsu- the two countries.107 la since the end of the Korean War. Once again, ROK-Japan relations were already on the up- the incident called for an appropriate response swing, thanks in large part to the Kan adminis- from South Korea’s neighbors, and the Kan ad- tration’s efforts to reconcile historical grievances ministration unequivocally stated its support for with South Korea. Marking the one-hundred- Seoul.105 As with the Cheonan incident earlier year anniversary of Japan’s annexation of Korea, Kan issued a statement of remorse on August 10, 104 Prime Minister Kan Naoto made a foreign policy speech on January 20, 2011, in which he said that “regardless of the change in government, 2010, that went further than any previous Jap- this relationship must, in my view, continue to be maintained and rein- anese statement to address that episode in his- forced.” Prime Minister Kan also laid out his thinking with regard to for- tory.108 The statement also included a concrete eign policy and national security, presenting five main pillars: 1) the Ja- pan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy; 2) new 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/20101123_chief_ development of foreign relations with Asia; 3) promotion of econom- cabinet_secretary_e.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011). ic diplomacy; 4) addressing global issues; and 5) Japan itself respond- 106 The joint statement mentioned that “the Ministers recognized that ing with precision to the security environment surrounding it. Prime the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK Alliances and Japan-ROK partnership Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Japanese Diplomacy at a Historic are essential to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia. All Watershed: Lecture Presentation on Foreign Policy by Prime Minister three reaffirmed their mutual bilateral responsibilities and steadfast Kan Naoto,” January 20, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/ commitments under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security statement/201101/20speech_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011). between Japan and the United States of America and the ROK-U.S. 105 Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito stated at a press conference on Mutual Defense Treaty, which serve as the foundations for the two November 23, 2010, “As to the position of the Government regarding this alliance relationships.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trilateral situation, [first,] this incident of shelling by the DPRK cannot be toler- Statement: Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States of Ameri- ated and Japan strongly condemns the DPRK. [Second,] Japan extends ca,” December 6, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/ its condolences to the government and the people of the ROK regard- juk_js1012.html (accessed November 8, 2011). ing the human cost of this shelling, and Japan supports the position of 107 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense the government of the ROK. Third, insofar as this act of provocation by Minister,” January 10, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press- means of the shelling by the DPRK undermines the peace and security conf/2011/01/110110.html (accessed December 1, 2011). of not only the ROK but the entirety of Northeast Asia, including Japan, 108 Prime Minister Kan Naoto mentioned in the statement that “I would like we demand an immediate cessation of all such acts. Fourth, in line with to face history with sincerity. I would like to have courage to squarely the instructions given by the Prime Minister at the ministerial meeting, confront the facts of history and humility to accept them, as well as to Japan will address future developments in close coordination with the be honest to reflect upon the errors of our own,” and, “to the tremen- ROK, the United States, and other relevant countries. In addition, the dous damage and sufferings that this colonial rule caused, I express here Japanese government will work together to engage in the collection of once again my feelings of deep remorse and my heartfelt apology,” and, information and we will take appropriate measures in preparation for “our relationship is not confined to our bilateral relations, but rather it is contingencies.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Excerpt from a partnership where we cooperate and exercise leadership for the peace the Press Conference of Mr. Sengoku Yoshito, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and prosperity of the region and the world by encompassing a broad Held on the Afternoon of Tuesday, November 23, 2010,” November 23, spectrum of agenda: the peace and stability of this region envisioning,

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 33 promise to return Korean documents and arti- the sense of momentum in bilateral security co- facts taken by Japanese authorities during the operation after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Is- annexation period.109 On November 16, 2010, land incidents. Prime Minister Kan and ROK President Lee The range of regional security challenges fac- Myung-bak signed a bilateral accord confirming ing the Kan government in the fall of 2010 pro- the repatriation of these documents. The Diet vided further impetus for enhancing Japan’s dip- ratified an agreement to return stolen cultural lomatic and strategic relations with India and artifacts in June 2011, scheduling the actual re- Australia as well. Although this approach built turn of the Korean cultural assets to take place on some of the progress made under Prime Min- over the following six months. ister Hatoyama, it also led to a significant rever- Despite these improvements, historical and sal of at least one established DPJ policy. In the territorial disputes between Tokyo and Seoul party’s 2009 policy index, the DPJ criticized the have not been completely resolved, a reality that 2007 U.S.-India nuclear deal as evidence of a has prevented both sides from elevating their se- double standard, claiming that it was inconsis- curity cooperation to the next level. In March tent with U.S. nuclear policy toward North Ko- 2011, the Kan government authorized a junior rea and Iran.112 But, eager to deepen strategic ties high school textbook citing Japanese sovereign- with India while also gaining lucrative contracts ty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands while, that for Japanese firms, the Kan administration decid- May, three ROK opposition party lawmakers vis- ed to launch negotiations on civilian nuclear co- ited the Kuril Islands, touching a sore spot in operation with New Delhi.113 This was followed Japan’s territorial dispute with Russia over the is- by the signing of an economic partnership agree- land chain.110 That was followed by a June visit ment (EPA) with India in October 2010, the first by two ROK ministers to the Dokdo/Takeshima such trade agreement reached by a DPJ-led gov- Islands. Seoul and Tokyo protested each other’s ernment. moves through diplomatic channels,111 offsetting Similarly, the Kan administration took steps to continue deepening Japan’s strategic ties with among others, the future establishment of an East Asia community.” Australia. Symbolizing this effort, Foreign Minis- Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Statement by Prime Minis- ter Kan Naoto,” August 10, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/ ter Maehara chose a visit to Canberra in Novem- statement/201008/10danwa_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011). ber 2010 as his first overseas bilateral meeting. 109 Ibid. 110 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Minister for Foreign Affairs Mat- ple, Foreign Minister Matsumoto stated on May 25, 2011, that “the visit sumoto Takeaki Lodges a Protest against Dr. Kwon Chul-hyun, Ambas- to Dokdo/Takeshima by Ms. Paik Hee-young, Minister of Gender Equal- sador of the Republic of Korea to Japan,” May 25, 2011, http://www. ity and Family, was unacceptable from the perspective of Japan’s terri- mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2011/5/0525_02.html (accessed De- torial rights over the island, and thus it was highly regrettable.” Hana- cember 1, 2011). no Yuta, “Takeshima, Senkaku Keisai ga oohabazo, chugaku kyokasho 111 On March 30, 2011, Japan’s Ministry of Education announced the results juninen haru kara” [Junior high school textbooks mention Takeshima of a junior high school textbook examination process showing that ten and Senkaku more from spring 2012], Asahi Shimbun, March 31, 2011, geography and civics textbooks mentioned the Dokdo/Takeshima dis- http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0330/TKY201103300362.html pute in comparison with three textbooks in 2004. South Korean For- (accessed November 8, 2011); “Kankoku kyoikusho ga Takeshima ho- eign Minister Kim Sung-hwan summoned the Japanese ambassador and mon kyokasho mondai de taikosochi ka” [South Korean Minister of Ed- protested. Furthermore, the South Korean ambassador to Japan visited ucation visited Takeshima as a countermeasure against the textbook Foreign Minister Matsumoto Takeaki and protested, and South Korean issue?], Tokyo Shimbun, April 1, 2011, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/ President Lee expressed his dissatisfaction in the press conference. On article/2011040101001023.html (accessed April 1, 2011); Ministry of the same day (April 1, 2011) of President Lee’s press conference, South Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsumoto Takeaki Korean Minister of Education Lee Ju-Ho visited Dokdo/Takeshima. After Lodges a Protest against Dr. Kwon Chul-hyun.” this visit, the following South Korean ministers visited Dokdo/Takeshi- 112 Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Pol- ma: Special Affairs Minister Lee Jae-Oh (April 12, 2011), Gender Equal- icy Index 2009], 16. ity and Family Minister Paik hee-young (May 25, 2011), and Public Ad- 113 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Press Conference by Minister for ministration and Security Minister Maeng Hyung-kyu (June 15, 2011). Foreign Affairs Okada Katsuya,” June 25, 2010, http://www.mofa. On the Japanese side, Foreign Minister Matsumoto administrative vice go.jp/announce/fm_press/2010/6/0625_01.html (accessed Decem- ministers lodged a few protests with the Korean ambassador. For exam- ber 1, 2011).

34 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY At the meeting, the two states agreed to accel- inside Japan.115 Australian Prime Minister Julia erate negotiations over the General Security of Gillard was also the first foreign leader to vis- Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), to it the disaster-torn areas, in April 2011. Austra- plan for a Japan-Australia “2+2” meeting some- lia’s disaster relief operation, however, was initial- time in 2011, and to consider a possible U.S.- ly limited by the fact that the bilateral ACSA had Japan-Australia minister-level trilateral strategic not yet been ratified by the Diet. (Although the dialogue on the sidelines of the July 2011 East Asian Summit Foreign Ministers meeting (the The range of regional security challenges last trilateral strategic dialogue had been held in September 2009). The meeting ultimate- facing the Kan government in the ly did not take place but working-level defense cooperation proceeded nonetheless. The three fall of 2010 provided further impetus countries held a director-general-level trilateral security and defense cooperation forum (SDCF) for enhancing Japan’s strategic in January 2011 (the last SDCF had been held in November 2009) and a bilateral Japan-Aus- ties with India and Australia. tralia director-general-level foreign and defense meeting in April 2011. ACSA was finally ratified in April 2011, the Japa- In addition to these steps, U.S., Japanese, and nese government still needs to revise the current Australian naval forces conducted a joint exercise MOD law in order to authorize the SDF’s coop- in June 2010 (this joint trilateral naval exercise eration with Australia under the bilateral agree- was the third since 2007, the last having been ment. The revision of the MOD law passed in held in September 2009), and the Australian air the lower house of the Diet in May 2011, but force participated as an observer in a U.S.-Japan it was defeated in the upper house in Decem- joint air force exercise in Guam in January 2011 ber 2011.)116 (the first-ever trilateral air force exercise). Tokyo Under Prime Minister Kan, Japan’s UN pol- and Canberra also took steps to promote nuclear icy struggled to find a consistent course, falling nonproliferation, jointly launching a new non- far short of the 2009 DPJ manifesto’s call for a proliferation group in August 2010 with other non-nuclear-armed countries such as Canada, 115 Australia dispatched one of its four C-17 transport aircraft and provid- Germany, and Turkey.114 ed transport for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 15th Brigade (Naha, Okinawa) from March 14 to March 25, 2011. Australia used two The March 11 disaster in Japan provided fur- more C-17s for the emergency transport of high-pressure water pumps ther opportunities to deepen cooperation and from Australia to Yokota Air Base in response to the nuclear power sta- trust between Tokyo and Canberra. Australia was tion accident. Australia was the only country other than the United the only country other than the United States al- States to provide support to the SDF. South Korea, Thailand, Israel, and France used their military transport aircraft to deliver relief supplies, a lowed to conduct a military transport operation medical team, a rescue unit, and the other equipment from their home countries to Japan. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2011 (annual white paper), August 2, 2011, 22, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/ publ/w_paper/2011.html (accessed November 8, 2011). 114 To follow up the action plans agreed at the NPT Review Conference, Ja- 116 A bill to revise current Defense Ministry law was delivered to the upper pan and Australia agreed to try launching a non-nuclear-armed states house Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on August 30, 2011. Since group including Germany, Canada, and South Korea. In September then, the bill has been stalled. When Australia supported the transport 2010, this new group held its first meeting in New York and includ- of the GSDF during the Great East Japan Earthquake, the SDF could not ed Australia, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, provide food or fuel to the Australian military because this bill had not Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. South Korea is not a member passed in the Diet. Jiji Press, “Boeisho Secchiho, seiritsu muzukasiku, yet. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Meetings on Nuclear Disar- kanbujinji, Nichigo kankei ni eikyo” [A revision of Ministry of Defense mament and Non-proliferation: Japan and Australia Launch a New Ini- law is difficult to pass in the Diet, affecting the MOD personnel reshuf- tiative, etc.,” September 24, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/ fling and Australia-Japan relations], July 24, 2011, http://www.jiji.com/ disarmament/npt/upt_un65.html (accessed December 1, 2011). jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2011072400089 (accessed July 24, 2011).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 35 more proactive diplomacy under the UN ban- peacekeeping operation. During the Kan admin- ner. Following up on Prime Minister Hatoya- istration, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and ma’s postponed review of the existing PKO law, Foreign Minister Okada were particularly sup- the Kan administration launched an interagen- portive of a mission to Sudan, while Defense cy vice-ministerial panel in October 2010 to ex- Minister Kitazawa opposed such a plan, citing amine Japanese policies regarding the UN PKO. the dangerous security situation in that coun- After ten months of studying the issue, the panel try and a preference for deploying the SDF for released an interim report in July 2011.117 The anti-piracy operations.119 In the end, Kan sided report provided an overview of Japan’s current with Kitazawa, deciding not to dispatch the SDF UN-related policies but failed to raise substan- to Sudan because of logistical complications.120 As an alternative to UN-led missions, Prime In response to the March 11 disaster, Minister Kan explored contributions to other global engagements, particularly those that gen- Operation Tomodachi demonstrated erally supported U.S.-led initiatives. However, the administration once again ran into structur- a remarkable degree of coordination al obstacles that limited its policy options. Soon after the decision to forgo the JSDF mission to and interoperability between U.S. Sudan, for instance, the government began examining a possible MSDF refueling operation in the waters off the coast of Somalia. Defense and Japanese military forces. Minister Kitazawa was particularly supportive of tive recommendations about revitalizing Japan’s this idea in light of requests by NATO, the EU, UN policy, presumably shying away from bring- the ROK, India, and other countries for Japan ing up policy proposals that might stir further de- to take part in such operations.121 However, the bate and controversy within the ruling party.118 Kan administration soon realized that a revised Another key challenge for the Kan adminis- special measures anti-piracy law would not like- tration was finding an appropriate peacekeeping ly pass the so-called twisted Diet, thus abandon- mission for the JSDF—one that would provide a ing the mission before it was ever launched.122 meaningful contribution to international security while also assuring that the mission would 119 “Sudan PKO Boeisho matta de haken dannen, chisetsu na chosei, meet Japan’s strict constitutional limitations on kokusai shinyo teika ni kikikan” [Defense Minister stopped the Sudan PKO, immature policy coordination, declining international prestige], use of military force. Much attention initially fo- Sankei Shimbun, July 13, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/pol- cused on Sudan as a potential area for a Japanese icy/100713/plc1007132034021-n1.htm (accessed July 13, 2010). 120 Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito emphasized the difficulty of 117 Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cab- inland transport operations and the lack of support systems for the he- inet Office, “Interim Report of the Study Group on Japan’s Engagement licopter unit as the main reasons for the decision. “Sudan PKO heno Ri- in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” July 4, 2011, http://www.pko.go.jp/ kuji heri butai, haken miokuri” [The Kan administration decided not to PKO_E/info/pdf/20110711_report.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011). dispatch the GSDF helicopter unit to the Sudan PKO], Yomiuri Shimbun, 118 When Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio received this report he July 13, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20100713- said, “It is necessary to make a decision after holding a political-level OYT1T00743.htm (accessed July 13, 2010). meeting this fall.” However, after the no-confidence motion impasse 121 Defense Minister Kitazawa at a press conference on July 16, 2010, stat- in June, it was uncertain who would be the prime minister in the next ed, “We have been requested to dispatch a replenishment vessel. How- few months. The senior vice minister of the cabinet office in charge ever, as this requires legislative preparations, we are going to study of peacekeeping operations, Azuma Shozo, told the media, “I wish I the issue from various viewpoints in the days ahead.” Japan Ministry could have shown more specific direction in the report, but I did not of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” July 16, 2010, do so because political leadership is necessary to take such a direc- http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2010/07/100716.html (accessed tion.” “PKO go gensoku minaoshi ketsuron sakiokuri” [Conclusion on November 8, 2011). the revision of the PKO Five Principles was postponed], Sankei Shim- 122 Defense Minister Kitazawa said at the press conference on July 23, 2010, bun, July 5, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/110705/ “We have been considering various options for the SDF to play an active plc11070501140006-n1.htm (accessed July 5, 2011). role in overseas and international cooperation activities, including PKO.

36 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY The Kan government also examined opportu- to affected communities, dubbed Operation To- nities to assist the United States and the ISAF in modachi, presented an opportunity for the Unit- Afghanistan. During their November 2010 sum- ed States to come to Japan’s aid at a time of great mit in Tokyo, Prime Minister Kan told President distress, demonstrating to the Japanese public the Obama that his administration was considering a depth of commitment inherent in the bilateral al- possible dispatch of SDF medical officers to pro- liance and proving the range of interoperability vide medical training to the Afghan military.123 between U.S. and Japanese forces during a full- Initially, the Kan administration hoped to dis- fledged crisis.126 The rescue relief operations con- patch the medical officers without going through ducted by Australia, South Korea, and China also the legislative process of revising or drafting a established a general sense of goodwill between new special measures law to allow the mission.124 Japan and its neighbors after what had been a tur- However, this proved to be wishful thinking. As bulent year in regional diplomacy. with the Sudan PKO mission, the Kan govern- Yet the March 11 disaster, of course, also ment concluded that a new law would not be pos- unleashed a series of other daunting challenges sible under the prevailing political conditions in for the Kan government, from the radioactive the Diet.125 The targeting of Afghan military hos- leakage at the Fukushima nuclear power plant pitals by pro-Taliban forces further discouraged to the devastation of the Tohoku region and any attempt by Kan to champion a medical dis- its resulting impact on the national economy. patch bill through the legislative process. Adding to these problems was the Kan cabinet’s More than any other single event, the March own struggle to stay on top of events and to 11 disaster had profound implications for the deal with Japan’s greatest crisis since the end Kan government and its foreign-policy making. of World War II—all in the face of staunch In some ways, the disaster, as tragic as it was, trig- political resistance from the LDP-led opposition gered a deepening of Japan’s ties with several na- and increasingly bitter infighting within the tions that came to its assistance in the wake of the ruling party ranks. Given the range of domestic disaster. The massive U.S. military effort to pro- challenges set off by the March 11 earthquake, vide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief it seemed clear that foreign policy would not be

The replenishment activity by the MSDF is one of these options… . We haven’t decided whether or not we would dispatch the MSDF for that 126 At the maximum, approximately twenty-four thousand U.S. troops, purpose. It is rather near-sighted to stop important international con- 189 aircraft, and twenty-four naval vessels were involved in the hu- tribution just because the Diet has been in an incongruous situation. manitarian assistance and relief efforts. Operation Tomodachi was the If the activity serves Japan’s interest in making international contribu- first time that SDF helicopters used U.S. aircraft carriers to respond to a tion, I think we could find out a means of solution even in the incon- crisis. Other U.S. vessels transported SDF troops and equipment to the gruous situation of the Diet by calling on other parties to join in con- disaster areas. Also for the first time, U.S. military units operated un- structive discussions.” Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by der Japanese command in actual operations. Specifically dedicated li- the Defense Minister,” July 23, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press- aison officers helped to smooth communication. One area in which U.S. conf/2010/07/100723.html (accessed November 8, 2011). troops played a key role was the reopening of airfields (Sendai airport, 123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting,” for instance) and ports in order to allow more supplies to be delivered November 13, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/ to the disaster areas. The United States also stepped up efforts to assist meet_pm_1011.html (accessed December 1, 2011). the Japanese government to control the damaged reactors at the Fu- 124 “Afugan he boei ikan ra ju nin haken kyoiku kunren de nennai kushima Daiichi facility. The Marines’ Chemical and Biological Incident nimo” [The Kan administration considers the dispatch of ten SDF Response Force (C-BIRF) was deployed from the United States to pro- medical officers to Afghanistan for training purpose this year],To - vide training to the SDF operating in the area of the damaged reactor. kyo Shimbun, October 15, 2010, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/arti- The Global Hawk drone flew over the reactor site in order to collect data cle/2010101401000959.html (accessed October 15, 2010). and imagery for the Japanese government. For further details of the 125 “Afugan ikan haken sakiokuri Shusho, ketsudan sakeru” [Prime Min- U.S. military operations at the event, see Andrew Feickert and Emma ister Kan postpones his decision to dispatch the SDF medical officers Chanlett-Avery, “Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense to Afghanistan], Sankei Shimbun, January 12, 2011, http://sankei. (DOD) Response,” Congressional Research Service report for Congress, jp.msn.com/politics/policy/110112/plc1101120115001-n1.htm (ac- R41690, June 2, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41690.pdf cessed January 12, 2011). (accessed November 8, 2011).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 37 the government’s primary focus of attention in Prime Minister Kan also moved to sustain the immediate aftermath of the disaster. diplomatic engagement with China and South Nonetheless, the Kan administration did Korea through trilateral dialogue. In May 2011, its best immediately following the disaster to just two months after the earthquake, Kan invit- maintain momentum in two key areas of its ed the leaders of both countries to visit the disas- diplomatic agenda: the bilateral U.S.-Japan ter-hit areas in the Tohoku region, followed by a alliance relationship and trilateral relations trilateral summit meeting in Tokyo. At the sum- with Japan’s most important regional neighbors, mit, the three leaders discussed nuclear safety is- China and South Korea. In June 2011, just three sues and a deepening of trilateral cooperation on months after the Great East Japan Earthquake, renewable energy policy, disaster management, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee and other issues.128 Importantly, they also agreed (also known as the 2+2 meeting) issued a to meet in a similar trilateral format on a regu- joint strategic objectives statement outlining a lar basis, with a secretariat for the trilateral meet- host of proposed policies aimed at deepening ings permanently based in Seoul. While the May cooperation in the bilateral alliance from the meeting did not produce major strategic initia- near to long term.127 Reflecting the extraordinary tives, it can be viewed as an important first step degree of joint cooperation between the U.S. in outlining further confidence-building mea- and Japanese militaries in response to the sures at the trilateral level.129 March 11 disaster, both allies emphasized plans Despite these efforts to remain engaged in crit- to enhance bilateral HA/DR operations. Other ical diplomatic relations with the United States, points included: China, and South Korea, the Kan government • Strengthening U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.- was unable to accomplish much else of note in Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation the foreign policy arena in the six months be- • Encouraging China’s responsible and con- tween the Tohoku earthquake and the prime structive role at both the regional and global minister’s resignation in August—somewhat un- levels, while building trust among the Unit- derstandable given the magnitude of domestic ed States, Japan, and China challenges facing the government after March • Encouraging India’s growing regional en- 11. Perhaps more notable was what Kan was un- gagement and promoting U.S.-Japan-India able to accomplish during his fifteen-month ten- trilateral dialogue ure as a whole. Although he had entered office • Maintaining maritime security by defending with renewed promises to make progress on the the principle of freedom of navigation Futenma relocation plan his administration was • Establishing a regular bilateral extended de- unable to claim much headway on the issue in terrence dialogue to promote a near- and the face of continued opposition from local com- long-term nuclear strategy munities on Okinawa as well as his own waning • Pursuing closer cooperation in technology political clout in Tokyo. and equipment sharing, with Japan prom- Another major piece of unfinished business ising to pursue its ongoing study of interna- was Prime Minister Kan’s push to join the tional joint development and production of Trans-Pacific Partnership. Kan’s failure to unite defense-related systems his party and the ruling coalition in support of

128 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit 127 Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister of For- Declaration, May 22, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/ eign Affairs Matsumoto, Minister of Defense Kitazawa,Joint State- jck/summit1105/declaration.html (accessed November 8, 2011). ment of the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a Deeper and 129 See-Won Byun, “The China-South Korea-Japan Triangle: The Shape of Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership, June Things to Come,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 115, June 6, 2011, http://asia- 21, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/ foundation.org/resources/pdfs/ByunChinaROKJapanJune2011.pdf (ac- joint1106_01.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011). cessed November 8, 2011).

38 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY the proposed agreement left in some doubt the prospect of joining TPP talks at the November 2011 APEC meeting in Honolulu. Failure to join the TPP would likely be a major setback for Japan’s commercial trade interests and would leave Japan on the sidelines of the Obama administration’s banner regional trade initiative for the Pacific Rim.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 39 The Noda Administration Shifting to the Center?

As the Noda government took over from the Kan to the U.S.-Japan alliance and arguing that the cabinet in September 2011, the fate of these key idea of an East Asian Community “need not be initiatives—the Futenma relocation plan and developed” until greater political stability emerg- participation in the TPP—remained in limbo es in the region.132 amid several other pressing domestic concerns. Noda, in turn, chose several prominent real- But early signs suggested that the new prime ists for key positions in his first cabinet. These minister might be a different kind of leader from include Maehara Seiji for the important post as his predecessors and is more committed to mak- seichokaicho (chairman of the Policy Research ing concrete progress on both fronts. Indeed, if Committee), Nagashima Akihisa as the prime Hatoyama represented a tilt toward a neo-auton- minister’s top foreign policy adviser, and Gem- omous direction for Japan, and Kan represented ba Koichiro as foreign minister. Ichikawa Yas- an incremental recalibration toward the status uo stood out as the least policy-savvy member quo, Noda so far appears poised to make even of the Noda foreign and security policy team, more concrete progress toward a realist vision of openly admitting his lack of experience in se- Japan’s foreign and defense policies. curity matters in a press interview shortly after Unlike Hatoyama and Kan, Noda comes from his appointment as defense minister.133 In Janu- the conservative wing of the ruling party, and ary 2012, Ichikawa was replaced as defense chief his past record of policy positions suggests fair- by Tanaka Naoki, another relative newcomer to ly consistent leanings toward the realist school defense-related issues. (Soon after assuming his of thought on foreign and defense issues.130 In a new position, Tanaka was harshly criticized by book that he wrote before the DPJ won the 2009 the LDP for making impolitic comments about elections, for instance, Noda articulated his be- the potential timetable for implementing the lief in the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance Futenma relocation plan.) and in the need for a more proactive defense pol- It remains to be seen whether this team can icy.131 Soon after his election as prime minister, effectively implement its vision of a more real- Noda outlined his political philosophy in a Voice ist-oriented foreign and defense policy. In a visit magazine article, proclaiming his “adherence” to Washington in September, Maehara publicly called for loosening the rules of engagement for 130 For further details of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko’s preference and Self-Defense Forces and lifting Japan’s ban on his past remarks on foreign and security policy, see appendixes C and 134 D. weapons exports. However, his statements did 131 On relations with the United States, Noda writes that “there is no question that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the cornerstone in the 132 Noda Yoshihiko, “Waga Seiji Tetsugaku: kono kuni ni umarete yokatta postwar Japanese diplomacy,” and, “at the present there is no posi- to omoeru kuni wo ikani tsukuruka” [My political philosophy: How to tive reason to dissolve the alliance with the U.S… . My basic stance construct a state where we can feel happy to be born], Voice 406 (Oc- is that the alliance should be evolved in the future.” Noda also states, tober 2011), 44–53. “While maintaining relations with the U.S. as a cornerstone, Japan 133 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense should make efforts for economic diplomacy toward the emerging Minister” September 5, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press- states such as the BRICs. The twenty-first-century agenda for Japan conf/2011/09/110905.html (accessed December 1, 2011). is to develop an independent strategic diplomacy while achieving the 134 Maehara Seiji, “Japan-US Alliance in the Multilateral Cooperation” (Key- balance.” Noda Yoshihiko, Minshu no Teki: Seiken Kotai ni Taigi ari [En- note speech, the inaugural session of the Tokyo-Washington Dialogue, emies of Democracy: Great Cause in the Government Change] (Tokyo: “The US-Japan Alliance after 3-11” in Washington, D.C., at the Stimson Shinchosha, 2009), especially chapter 4, “On Foreign and Security Pol- Center, September 7, 2011, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/ icy as the Son of an SDF Officer.” research-pdfs/Maehara_speech.pdf (accessed November 17, 2011).

40 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY not appear to have been vetted in advance by par- tition, particularly vis-à-vis China.139 Opponents, ty leaders, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimu- headed by former agriculture minister Yamada ra Osamu promptly emphasized that Maehara’s Masahiko, see the TPP as a threat to the domes- opinions did not reflect the official position of the tic agriculture sector while other lobbying inter- Noda government.135 The incident was a telling ests have claimed that the trade agreement could example of the governing party’s ongoing mes- undermine Japan’s food safety standards and in- sage coordination problems and the resistance surance industry.140 to any “unilateral” attempts by Maehara and oth- The intra-party Economic Partnership er likeminded lawmakers to revamp Japan’s for- Project Team was established to study the TPP eign and defense policies without broader intra- and to develop some consensus within the party support. ruling party about Japan’s commitment to the Still, the new prime minister has tried to con- talks. However, the project team was unable vey a more resolute policy agenda. In his first to bridge the divide within the party, instead policy speech before the Diet on September 13, warning Prime Minister Noda to proceed Noda promised to make the recovery and recon- cautiously in his approach to the agreement.141 struction from the Great East Japan Earthquake After some delay, Noda announced in advance the top priority of his cabinet, along with revi- of the APEC meetings in Honolulu that Japan talizing domestic economic growth and fiscal would enter into preliminary TPP talks with the health.136 But the prime minister also signaled aim of making a final decision on participation a renewed commitment to the Futenma reloca- based on a consideration of Japan’s national tion plan as well as Japan’s participation in TPP interests.142 talks. Calling the U.S.-Japan alliance the “cor- 139 “TPP jiku ni Nichibei renkei kyoka, Shushohosakan ga igi kyocho” [Ad- nerstone” of Japan’s diplomacy and national se- visor to the Prime Minister emphasizes the importance of the TPP to curity, Noda underscored the need to relocate strengthen the U.S.-Japan cooperation], Yomiuri Shimbun, Novem- Futenma in line with the 2006 bilateral agree- ber 1, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20111101- ment while considering the burden on local OYT1T00999.htm (accessed November 1, 2011). Okinawan communities.137 Noda also promised 140 After Prime Minister Kan announced that his administration would consider Japan’s participation in the TPP, some DPJ members launched to “conduct thorough discussions” on whether an anti-TPP group called TPP wo Shincho ni Kangaeru Kai (Group for or not to participate in early rounds of the TPP considering the TPP deliberately) with approximately 110 DPJ and PNP trade talks and to make a final decision by the Diet members in October 2010. During intra-party discussions, approx- November APEC meetings in Hawaii.138 imately 120 DPJ and PNP Diet members attended the anti-TPP rally on October 21, 2011. See, for example, “Noda oroshi ni naranai? TPP shin- Noda has subsequently become more invest- choha ni ondosa” [Difference inside the anti-TPP group prevents the ed in the idea of joining the TPP, despite hard- anti-Noda movement?], Yomiuri Shimbun, October 22, 2011, http:// ening opposition to the agreement from within www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20111022-OYT1T00190.htm (ac- the DPJ as well as from the main opposition par- cessed October 22, 2011). 141 Minshuto Keizai Renkei Purojekuto chimu [DPJ Economic Partnership ties. Proponents of the agreement, who appear Project Team], “Keizai Renkei Piti Teigen: APEC ni mukete” [Economic to be the majority of cabinet ministers, believe Partnership PT proposal: Toward the APEC], November 9, 2011, http:// that Japan cannot afford to pass over the TPP in www.dpj.or.jp/article/100477/%E7%B5%8C%E6%B8%88%E9%80% the face of rising economic and strategic compe- A3%E6%90%BA%EF%BC%B0%EF%BC%B4%E6%8F%90%E8%A8% 80%E3%82%92%E6%94%BF%E8%AA%BF%E5%BD%B9%E5%93% A1%E4%BC%9A%E3%81%8C%E4%BA%86%E6%89%BF (accessed 135 Seifu internet terebi [Government Internet TV], “Press Conference by November 17, 2011). Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu,” September 8, 2011, http:// 142 At the press conference, Prime Minister Noda said, “I have decided nettv.gov-online.go.jp/eng/prg/prg2340.html (accessed December 1, to enter into consultations toward participating in the TPP nego- 2011). tiations with the countries concerned, on the occasion of the Asia- 136 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech by Prime Min- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting ister Noda Yoshihiko to the 178th Session of the Diet.” in Honolulu, Hawaii, which I will be attending from tomorrow. To 137 Ibid. be sure, I am fully aware that while the TPP offers significant ben- 138 Ibid. efits, numerous concerns have also been spelled out.” Prime Min-

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 41 Despite the tentative language, Noda’s an- hancing joint defense planning and operations nouncement caused an uproar among oppo- and “widening” bilateral cooperation in such ar- nents of the agreement both within the ruling eas as free trade and energy cooperation.144 This party and the opposition, with LDP leader Tan- approach has led to recent measures to enhance igaki Sadakazu threatening to censure Noda in bilateral cooperation in cyber security, missile de- the Diet for “prematurely” committing Japan to fense, maritime security, and other key aspects of the alliance relationship. With the DPJ deeply divided over the Although the complexities of the Futenma issue continue to bedevil alliance managers, the TPP, Prime Minister Noda will need Noda government has made a concerted effort to make progress on the relocation plans. In De- to marshal considerable political cember 2011, Tokyo submitted an environmental impact study to Okinawa Governor Nakaima support in order to make further Hirokazu, marking a crucial step toward implementing the relocation plan.145 And on Febru- commitments to the trade talks. ary 8, 2012, Tokyo and Washington announced a decision to “delink” the relocation of Futen- the TPP talks.143 Although this threat was not ma from the proposed transfer of eight thousand carried out, enormous political obstacles remain Okinawa-based U.S. Marines to new facilities on in the way of Japan’s full participation in the Guam. This decision, in other words, would no TPP, including the potential Diet debate over longer make the transfer of U.S. Marines on Oki- ratification of the trade agreement once negoti- nawa contingent on progress on Futenma—an ations are completed. With the DPJ deeply di- approach that could help diffuse tensions on the vided over the issue, Prime Minister Noda will island and allow for construction of the new run- need to marshal considerable political support way at Camp Schwab to proceed as planned. De- in order to take further steps toward joining the spite this latest move, the final implementation TPP regime. of the FRF is still a long way off and by no means On the security side, the Noda government a foregone conclusion, given the considerable has made efforts to shore up the U.S.-Japan al- political opposition that continues to complicate liance relationship and to make at least some base realignment plans. progress on the Futenma relocation plan, despite The Noda administration has made some ongoing technical and political complications re- headway in other security issues as well. Per- lating to the move. In order to work around the haps most surprising has been the Noda govern- Futenma problem, Noda’s foreign policy advis- ment’s early engagement of global and regional er, Nagashima Akihisa, has advocated “deepen- issues, particularly in overseas peacekeeping oping” the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship by en- erations and in efforts to check China’s maritime and territorial ambitions in concert with other ister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko,” November 11, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/for- 144 Nagashima Akihisa (special advisor to Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko eign/noda/statement/201111/11kaiken_e.html (accessed Novem- for foreign and security policy), in discussion with the author, October ber 17, 2011). 5, 2011. 143 When members of the press told LDP President Tanigaki that some 145 The Henoko Bay relocation plan calls for the construction of a new air- LDP members were asking for a no-confidence motion in the lower craft runway, part of which would be built on landfill. In order to be- house against the Noda cabinet or a censure motion in the upper house gin construction of the landfill site, however, the central government against Prime Minister Noda, Tanigaki replied, “We will not lose that must submit an environmental impact study to the governor of Okina- out of our sight in the future consideration.” Liberal Democratic Party of wa. After the environmental impact process has been completed, the Japan, “Press Conference by LDP President Tanigaki Sadakazu,” Novem- central government will then be allowed to submit a formal request ber 14, 2011, http://www.jimin.jp/activity/press/president/114490. to the governor for final approval of the runway project. Koyu Suimen html (accessed November 17, 2011). Umetate Ho [Public Water Body Reclamation Act of Japan], Article 42.

42 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY regional partners. Unlike previous DPJ adminis- gagement, Japanese peacekeepers are prohibited trations, the Noda cabinet moved almost imme- from using their weapons except when under di- diately to commit SDF troops to international rect attack, and peacekeeping missions can only peacekeeping operations, in part to convey the be undertaken after the close of hostilities in the nation’s gratitude to the international commu- host nation.150 Both of these standards may be nity for assisting in the March 11 disaster relief difficult to meet in a country that is still strug- operations.146 The prime minister announced gling to contain violence and instability. A re- his pledge to contribute to peacekeeping opera- vision of the PKO rules of engagement would tions in South Sudan at a UN General Assembly likely lead to a clash between the Noda govern- meeting in late September 2011 and sent survey ment and the SDP, which has firmly opposed teams almost immediately in order to assess the any changes to Japan’s PKO principles.151 current situation in the newly established Afri- The Noda government has also embarked on can state.147 By October, plans were underway to an effort to enlist India and other Asian countries dispatch a GSDF engineering unit to South Su- in developing a common maritime security strat- dan for stabilization and infrastructure-building egy, in part to check China’s rising assertiveness operations over the next five years.148 in the South China and East China Seas. At the Although the South Sudan mission in itself November 19, 2011, East Asia Summit in In- did not trigger significant political opposition, donesia, Noda proposed a joint paper outlining controversy has been sparked by suggestions three main principles for maritime security in that the Noda administration might call for re- East Asia: the freedom of navigation, the obser- vising the rules of engagement for the GSDF vance of international rules and norms, and the dispatch.149 Under Japan’s current rules of en- peaceful reconciliation of territorial disputes.152 146 Prime Minister Noda said, “We received support from over 160 coun- 150 The International Peace Cooperation Law sets the five conditions to tries and forty international organizations following the Great East the SDF dispatch to the UNPKO as follows: 1) a cease-fire must be in Japan Earthquake. At the General Assembly of the United Nations place; 2) the parties to the conflict must have given their consent to some time ago, I expressed our gratitude and communicated to the the operation; 3) the activities must be conducted in a strictly impar- world our resolve to return the favors we received. Part of efforts to tial manner; 4) participation may be suspended or terminated if any do this will be international peace cooperation activities… . We are of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied; and 5) use of weapons now in the final stages of a study into whether we can contribute to shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the situation in South Sudan.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cab- the SDF personnel. The law was revised in 2001, and the use of weap- inet, “Address by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko at the 2011 Air Re- ons is allowed to protect persons under SDF supervision and SDF weap- view,” October 16, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/ ons and equipment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Current Issues statement/201110/16kunji_e.html (accessed November 17, 2011). Surrounding UN Peace-keeping Operations and Japanese Perspective,” 147 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Address by H.E. Mr. Noda January 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html (ac- Yoshihiko, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Sixty-Sixth Session of the cessed November 17, 2011). United Nations General Assembly,” September 23, 2011, http://www. 151 A typical SDP argument on this issue is that the missions that the SDF kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201109/23enzetu_e.html (ac- assumes in South Sudan can be sufficiently assumed by NGOs and pri- cessed November 17, 2011). vate companies, and therefore it is not necessary to dispatch the SDF 148 For further details on the recent status of preparing the SDF engineer- to South Sudan. For example, see SDF lower-house member Teruya ing unit to South Sudan, see Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Confer- Kantoku’s blog post on November 2, 2011, http://terukan.blog44.fc2. ence by the Defense Minister,” November 1, 2011, http://www.mod. com/blog-entry-917.html (accessed November 17, 2011). go.jp/e/pressconf/2011/11/111101.html (accessed November 17, 152 Prime Minister Noda proposed an East Asian Maritime Forum initia- 2011). tive, which aims to expand the current ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) 149 While Prime Minister Noda denied loosening the rules of engagement among the ASEAN members in the ASEAN-Japan Summit and the East in order to consider the SDF dispatch to South Sudan, DPJ Policy Re- Asian Summit. Although the ASEAN summit made an initial draft of search Committee Chair Maehara ordered a joint Cabinet Office-Foreign the ASEAN chair’s statement, asserting, “We agreed to explore the pos- Affairs-Defense divisions meeting to review the current Five Princi- sibility of convening an expanded AMF, back-to-back with the future ples of UNPKO, including the rules of engagement. Jiji Press, “PKO ho meetings of the AMF, to include countries in the wider East Asia region,” minaoshi honnkaku rongi, buki shiyokijun no kanwa shoten, Minshu” the statement that was finally issued toned it down as follows: “We [DPJ begins to review the UN PKO Law and focuses on the loosening of note with interest the proposal of convening an expanded AMF, back- the rules of engagement], November 5, 2011, http://www.jiji.com/jc/ to-back with future meetings of the AMF, to include countries in the c?g=pol_30&k=2011110500197 (accessed November 5, 2011). wider East Asia region.” Kyodo News, “ASEAN Leaders Agree to Study

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 43 The proposal was preceded by several recent to join TPP, are likely to deepen rifts within agreements between Japan and other regional the DPJ and to galvanize the opposition. The partners—most of whom have existing maritime prime minister started off with fairly high public territorial disputes with China—to enhance mar- approval ratings (at or above 50 percent), but itime security cooperation. These include a No- these have slumped as he has begun pushing vember agreement between Japan and India to for an unpopular consumption tax. Other conduct joint naval exercises in 2012 as well as contentious issues, such as the Futenma new agreements with Vietnam and the Philip- relocation plan and continuing problems with pines to enhance strategic cooperation.153 the recovery of the Tohoku region, present Thus, at this early stage, the Noda formidable challenges for the government that administration has made some impressive first may use up much of the new prime minister’s steps to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, already limited political capital. Japan, under the bolster Japan’s commitment to regional trade and Noda government, may finally be on the cusp of security institutions, and increase contributions achieving a more “proactive” diplomacy—one to UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. that is more grounded in the realist vision than The question is whether his government will the DPJ initially intended—but this will depend be able to follow through and sustain these on the prime minister’s ability to navigate the commitments over the mid- to long term in the complex political landscape that has bedeviled face of ongoing political challenges. Indeed, his two predecessors. several of Noda’s proposals, such as the decision

‘Expanded’ ASEAN Maritime Forum,” November 18, 2011, as reported at the Mainichi Shimbun website, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/ international/archive/news/2011/11/18/20111118p2g00m0in04700 0c.html (accessed November 18, 2011); “Joint Declaration for Enhanc- ing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (Bali Declaration),” Bali, Indonesia, November 18, 2011, http://www.ase- ansec.org/documents/19th%20summit/JP-JD.pdf (accessed Novem- ber 19, 2011); Hanzawa Naohisa “Nihon no Chugoku hoimo ha fuhatsu, shin kaiyo foramu sakiokuri, Noda shusho no koso minorazu” [Japan’s effort to encircle China failed, new maritime forum was postponed, Prime Minister Noda’s initiative did not launch], Sankei Shimbun, No- vember 19, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/111119/ plc11111923490008-n1.htm; and http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ news/111119/plc11111923490008-n2.htm (accessed November 19, 2011). 153 Although China has claimed that its rise is peaceful and different from the rise of past great powers, China’s assertive behavior in the South China and East China Seas in 2010 began to cause its neighbors to question this avowal. In addition to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands incident in September 2010, Chinese maritime activities in the South China Sea led to tense relations with ASEAN states, especially the Phil- ippines and Vietnam. Since then, maritime cooperation among ASE- AN states has expanded, and in the face of direct territorial disputes with China the ASEAN states have sought stronger ties with non-ASEAN states, such as the United States and India. Also, various trilateral strategic partnerships (for example, U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.-Japan- India) have been strengthened. At the bilateral level, Japan and the Philippines agreed to the further promotion of a strategic partnership along with the upgrade of vice-ministerial policy dialogue to vice-ministerial strategic dialogue in September 2011. In October 2011, Japan also agreed to strengthen the strategic partnership and promote strategic dialogue with Vietnam.

44 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Findings and Implications

In many ways, the past two years of DPJ foreign- Although the DPJ may not have achieved policy making have played out far differently its lofty campaign goals, the party’s actions than either the party’s supporters or detractors during its years of governing have provided might have expected. For those who supported sufficient material for empirical observations the DPJ’s soaring rhetoric of a revamped Jap- and conclusions about the DPJ’s foreign-policy anese diplomacy with closer ties to Asia and a making, some of which challenge widely held more equal partnership with the United States, assumptions that were made prior to the party’s the track record of achievements over the past coming to power in 2009. The ruling party’s two to three years must be something of a disap- behavioral trends may, in turn, have implications pointment. The DPJ has largely failed to live up for Japan’s future diplomatic and strategic to many of its ambitious promises. For critics of direction under the DPJ, as well as for the U.S.- the party, however, the DPJ has not been the un- Japan alliance, as outlined below. mitigated disaster that some predicted. The DPJ has not fundamentally tilted Japan away from The Impact of Structural Obstacles the United States toward a more accommodat- on DPJ Foreign-Policy Making ing strategic relationship with China and the Asian mainland. In short, the big change that Although some analysts predicted that the DPJ’s some anticipated after the DPJ’s takeover of the grandiose foreign policy proposals would be government in 2009 did not materialize accord- tempered by structural limitations, the extent ing to expectations. to which this would influence the DPJ’s foreign Instead, the DPJ’s policy-making track policy could only be determined after the par- record shows that its rhetoric has often ty had had a chance to govern. As seen over the outstripped reality, both in terms of what past two years, these structural factors—both in- the new government was prepared to do to ternal and external—have had a significant ef- implement its vision and the structural obstacles fect on the DPJ’s foreign policy, both limiting that limited its policy options. Time and again, the new ruling party’s policy options and at Prime Minister Hatoyama evoked the idea times forcing it to be far more reactive vis à vis of an East Asian Community, but his efforts external events than its “proactive” campaign to achieve that goal were perfunctory at best. rhetoric may have suggested. Similarly, the DPJ’s rhetoric of a “proactive” Almost from the outset, the new ruling UN-centered diplomacy far exceeded what the party faced a two-front war: attempting to keep DPJ-led government actually committed to UN- the party together despite deepening intra- mandated operations, which, on the whole, has party divisions (particularly between pro- and been minimal. Party leaders never clarified what anti-Ozawa groups) and managing a complex was meant by the DPJ’s vague calls for a more combination of coalition partners in the face of “equal” or “mature” alliance with the United a resurgent LDP-led opposition. These internal States, so it is difficult to determine categorically domestic factors have repeatedly stymied the whether this goal was unmet. Nonetheless, it is DPJ’s ability to follow through on bold campaign safe to conclude that the U.S.-Japan alliance has promises and to dramatically transform not been transformed by a vastly more assertive Japan’s foreign policy, and they are likely to Japanese diplomacy over the past several years. further complicate the government’s ability to implement policies that are of importance to the

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 45 United States, such as full participation in the Continuity versus Change TPP and looser restrictions on exercising the right of collective self-defense. Since coming to power, the DPJ has grappled External obstacles have proved just as with the imperative to differentiate itself from formidable. On one hand, the DPJ found that its the LDP. In general, the more it has tried an attempts to change the decision-making dynamic anything-but-LDP approach, the more it has in the U.S.-Japan alliance met with considerable seemed to create problems for itself. This has resistance from the Obama administration, been the case with the DPJ’s attempts to reform which was eager to move forward on the 2006 both Japan’s policies and its policy-making pro- base realignment roadmap and other bilateral cess. As the first DPJ prime minister, Hatoyama security initiatives. On the other hand, the new Yukio tried to accomplish these two objectives government in Tokyo found that its diplomatic simultaneously, leading to a near breakdown in overtures to Beijing did not pay off in terms of a the delicate decision-making equilibrium be- noticeably improved Sino-Japanese relationship. tween politicians and bureaucrats and to major alliance management problems with the Unit- The DPJ’s track record shows that its ed States. Having learned from these hard lessons, rhetoric has often outstripped the Prime Minister Hatoyama’s two successors gradually toned down the ruling party’s reform reality of its policy implementation. agenda. Prime Minister Kan, a far less visionary leader than his predecessor, initially took a more Further, no Asian country appeared eager to pragmatic approach to governing, ratcheting rally behind Hatoyama’s call for a new East down lofty foreign policy statements and rolling Asian Community. In the end, the international back some of the institutional reforms that had community proved unwilling partners in the hampered the previous administration’s decision- DPJ’s grand design for transforming Japanese making process. However, when faced with the diplomacy in the post-LDP era. two serious crises of his administration—the By the same token, tensions in the regional Senkaku/Diaoyutai Island dispute and the March security environment have compelled the 11 triple disaster—Kan reverted to some of the DPJ to cooperate more closely with the DPJ’s old habits, such as keeping bureaucrats United States despite its initial attempts at a out of the prime minister’s immediate decision- more “independent” foreign policy. North making circle. This no doubt contributed to some Korea’s provocations in 2010, coupled with the of the confusion that plagued his administration Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute with China, have after the March 11 disaster and that eventually highlighted to DPJ leaders the importance of led to his downfall. the U.S.-Japan alliance—a point that was further Prime Minister Noda has so far shown reinforced by the U.S. military’s critical role in a willingness to forgo the DPJ’s agenda for carrying out disaster relief operations following change in favor of more coordinated policy the March 11 earthquake. Thus, as much as the implementation. One symbol of this shift DPJ has attempted to reduce Japan’s strategic is the role of the seichokai (Policy Research dependence on the United States, external Committee), which Prime Minister Hatoyama events have forced the new ruling party to abolished as part of his initial reform measures. rethink its aspirations for a new dynamic in the Recognizing the need for a consensus-building bilateral relationship. mechanism, Prime Minister Kan reinstated the seichokai, albeit with a limited mandate. Prime Minister Noda has now arguably strengthened

46 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY the committee under the leadership of Maehara of its world vision are beyond reach, at least for Seiji, giving it a broader mandate to address a the time being. Prime Minister Noda’s recent range of priority issues. This, along with the comments about putting off the pursuit of an Noda government’s reintroduction of top-level East Asian Community, for instance, illustrate bureaucratic policy coordination, suggests that the relinquishment of one of the DPJ’s long- his administration has to some degree come to held diplomatic goals.155 This trend should help terms with the DPJ’s long-held aversion to LDP- ease anxieties in Washington of further drift in era governing practices. the bilateral alliance and restore some degree of It remains to be seen whether this trend predictability to the DPJ’s overall foreign policy continues beyond the Noda cabinet. But it seems approach, including its diplomatic engagement clear that with each successive DPJ government toward China. the imperative to differentiate itself from the LDP The DPJ’s toned-down foreign policy agenda diminishes—a point that is reinforced by the also creates opportunities for greater overlap increasingly obvious demand by Japanese voters with LDP policy priorities, such as loosening for a government that places a higher priority Japan’s arms export bans and reconsidering SDF on competence over change, particularly as the restrictions on the use of force in international nation continues to grapple with the aftereffects peacekeeping operations. Although the ruling of the March 11 disaster.154 That is not to say and opposition camps are at loggerheads on that the slide toward LDP-style governing will virtually every domestic legislative item, a go hand-in-hand with improved policy making nascent bipartisanship has emerged on some per se. The LDP system certainly had its flaws, aspects of Japanese foreign and defense policy. including a weak top-down decision-making Still, the anti-LDP strain runs deep in the party’s structure and an overreliance on bureaucrats self-image and it seems optimistic to assume that for policy-making initiative. Thus the question this aversion has run its course after just a few is whether the DPJ can decide on which LDP years in power. In all likelihood, the tension institutions and practices work best and which between continuity and change will remain an should be eliminated or improved upon given undercurrent in DPJ internal debates for the Japan’s current political and administrative foreseeable future, leaving it far from a foregone system (the seichokai’s ultimate role in the DPJ’s conclusion that the DPJ will continue to adhere policy-making process will be one indication of to the status quo ad infinitum. how the ruling party confronts this issue over time). The DPJ: A Hawkish Party? As to how the change agenda applies to foreign policy, it appears that the DPJ is The DPJ’s initial emphasis on change and re- increasingly comfortable embracing the status form belies the fact that some of its policies and quo and accepting the fact that some aspects initiatives have been carried over from previous LDP governments. The DPJ has actually adopt- 154 For example, according to a November 2011 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 76 ed a handful of initiatives that were launched by percent of the Japanese public believes the state of Japanese politics the LDP but never fully implemented or com- has deteriorated. The three main reasons for this decline were given pleted. This trend has occurred most notably in as: 1) politicians being out of touch with public concerns; 2) slow decision making; and 3) the inability of politicians to present a future vision the defense realm, where the DPJ has shown a for the country. Respondents also indicated their desire for politicians hawkish streak when it has come to protecting to have the following three characteristics: 1) resolve; 2) leadership; Japan’s sovereign territory and direct national in- and 3) common sense. “Seiji: Nisen juichi nen juichi gatsu mensetu ze- terests. In retrospect, this may not have been so nkoku yoron chosa” [Politics: November 2011 national public poll by interview], Yomiuri Shimbun, November 12–13, 2011, http://www. 155 Noda Yoshihiko, “Waga Seiji Tetsugaku: kono kuni ni umarete yokatta yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20111125.htm (accessed De- to omoeru kuni wo ikani tsukuruka” [My political philosophy: How to cember 16, 2011). construct a state where we can feel happy to be born].

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 47 surprising given the party’s past legislative be- Although Tokyo eventually released the fishing havior but, because of its label as a left-of-cen- boat captain under intense diplomatic pressure, ter party, it may have been assumed that the DPJ the Kan government’s initial reaction to the inci- would be dovish on security issues once it came dent appeared to signal a more robust response to to power. China’s territorial challenges. The 2010 NDPG As some experts have pointed out, even while plan to shift military assets from the northeast end in the opposition, the DPJ occasionally support- of the Japanese archipelago to the southeastern ed LDP initiatives to bolster Japan’s ability to de- islands is another indication of the DPJ govern- fend its national interests from outside threats.156 ment’s interest in fending off China’s perceived In 2007 and 2008, for instance, the DPJ cooperat- territorial encroachment. ed with the LDP to pass the Basic Acts on Ocean Yet, there are limits to how far the DPJ has Policy and Space, which strengthen Japan’s de- been willing to extend the boundaries of Ja- fenses on the high seas and in outer space.157 And pan’s security commitments, especially when it key figures in the DPJ were supportive of the has come to security issues that are less tangi- LDP’s efforts to engage in anti-piracy operations bly linked to Japan’s national interests. One area to protect shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden.158 where the DPJ has fallen short of its campaign Indeed, once in power, the Hatoyama govern- pledges is in Japan’s contributions to UN-mandat- ment moved expeditiously to complete Japan’s ed international peacekeeping operations. The first overseas military facility, in Djibouti, which party had long argued for UN-centered diploma- was a carry-over of former LDP Prime Minister cy and a more “proactive” engagement of peace- Aso Taro’s initiative to protect critical shipping keeping operations. However, once in power, the lanes off the Somali coast. Another example is DPJ’s commitment to these operations was less in the 2010 NDPG, which built on many of the than impressive. Although the Hatoyama govern- recommendations made by the LDP’s Katsuma- ment was quick to dispatch SDF troops to Haiti ta Commission in August 2009, including the to assist in reconstruction efforts in the wake of notion of a “dynamic defense” policy that would that nation’s earthquake in January 2010, the rul- strengthen the JSDF’s ability to prevent threats ing party until recently prevaricated on a more from directly reaching Japan. In some cases, the dangerous peacekeeping mission to South Su- DPJ has exceeded the LDP’s standard operating dan. Some 258 SDF personnel are currently de- procedures for protecting Japan’s territorial in- ployed on UN peacekeeping operations, a far cry terests. The Kan government’s detention of the from the “proactive” contribution that the DPJ Chinese fishing boat captain during the Septem- promised while campaigning against the LDP.160 ber 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis was an un- The DPJ’s reluctance to expand overseas SDF precedented response to such an incident, raising deployments has had implications for the U.S.-Ja- complaints from Beijing that Tokyo was violating pan alliance, particularly in the context of broad- a tacit agreement on handling such disputes.159 ening the scope of the alliance beyond region- 156 Easley, Kotani, and Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?” al security concerns. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s 157 Ibid. 158 Political support for the anti-piracy operations was made all the eas- www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_date1&k=2010102600988 (accessed Oc- ier by the fact that the operations were relatively uncontroversial— tober 26, 2010). The South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong-based indeed, popular—among Japanese voters. An Asahi Shimbun public newspaper, reported that China was becoming more aggressive on the opinion poll taken in 2009 found that 61 percent of respondents sup- territorial disputes. Cary Huang, “Diaoyus Row Marks Shift in Beijing’s ported the SDF anti-piracy mission, compared to just 26 percent who Diplomatic Posture; Growing Power Emboldens China to Be More Ag- opposed them. Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll, April 20, 2009, gressive,” South China Morning Post, October 2, 2010, LexisNexis Aca- http://www.asahi.com/special/08003/TKY200904200328.html (ac- demic. cessed January 30, 2012). 160 United Nations Peacekeeping, The Ranking of Military and Police Con- 159 Jiji Press, “Senkaku tanaage goi hitei wo hihan, Chugoku gaimusho” tributions to UN Operations: Monthly Report, October 31, 2011, http:// [Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the Japanese denial to the past www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/oct11_2.pdf (ac- Senkaku/Diaoyutai back-shelf agreement], October 26, 2010, http:// cessed December 16, 2011).

48 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY withdrawal of the JMSDF’s refueling mission in To be sure, these measures benefit both allies, the Indian Ocean in 2009 signaled an abrupt end but the DPJ’s willingness to deepen military to Japan’s contributions to coalition forces en- cooperation with the United States suggests that gaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). the party has for the time being placed national As an alternative, Tokyo pledged $5 billion in fi- security interests above its pursuit of greater nancial support for the stabilization and recon- “independence” from its long-time security struction of Afghanistan but it has held off putting guarantor. “boots on the ground” in any U.S.-led military activities in Central Asia and the Middle East. As Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism some experts have surmised, the DPJ has been less enthusiastic about pursuing a “global alli- The DPJ’s increased concern for national secu- ance” with the United States, as was the thrust rity since becoming the main ruling party has of recent LDP defense policies.161 also had implications for Japan’s diplomatic re- Instead, the DPJ has arguably been more will- lations with its Asian neighbors. As the ruling ing to strengthen the bilateral alliance in areas party has confronted several security challeng- that have a direct bearing on the defense of Ja- es since taking power, the DPJ appears to have pan and its national interests than on matters be- modified its aspirations for regional multilater- yond the strict purview of the bilateral security alism. Given its past rhetoric, some observers treaty. The impasse over Futenma aside, Tokyo wondered if the new DPJ government would has made steady progress on a range of initia- fundamentally shift its strategic diplomacy away tives to enhance bilateral cooperation in ways from a U.S.-centric model (bilateralism) toward that improve the allies’ ability to defend the Jap- a broader regional approach (multilateralism). anese homeland from potential external threats. Prime Minister Hatoyama fed this impression These include, for instance: with his repeated calls for an East Asian Com- • The joint production and deployment of the munity but, as argued, this vision never evolved SM-3 Block IIA missile defense program that can protect against missile attacks from the The DPJ has been more willing to Asian mainland • The Noda government’s decision in Decem- strengthen the bilateral alliance ber 2011 to relax Japan’s arms export rules to allow for greater joint development of weap- to protect direct national interests ons systems • New bilateral measures to improve cyber-se- than to expand its role in a “global curity cooperation in the wake of recent hack- ing incidents targeting Japanese government alliance” with the United States. agencies and defense contractors • The launch of a regular bilateral extended into actual policy. Aside from a somewhat per- deterrence dialogue to address North Korea’s functory effort at regional institution-building, nuclear threat two other main factors appear to have impeded • The recent announcement that Japan will the DPJ’s attempts at forging a new multilateral purchase approximately forty Lockheed Mar- framework for Asia. tin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters as its next-gen- First, the DPJ appeared to put great stock eration fighter jet162 in using historical reconciliation as a means of improving overall diplomatic relations with 161 Easley, Kotani, and Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?” 162 “Delivery Concerns Cloud F-35 Jet Pick / Fears U.S. Deadline Vow Could bun, December 15, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/ Be Scuttled by Production Delays, Impact of Euro Crisis,” Yomiuri Shim- T111214004545.htm (accessed December 16, 2011).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 49 other Asian nations that had long been skeptical that are yet to be revealed.) Additionally, China’s of Japan’s strategic intentions. To its credit, the recent display of geopolitical assertiveness, DPJ has, on the whole, been more forthright in including its heavy-handed response to the dealing with lingering historical problems than Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident, has put Japan and the LDP. The fact that no sitting DPJ cabinet other Asia-Pacific nations on the alert regarding minister has visited the controversial Yasukuni Beijing’s ultimate strategic intentions. As anxiety Shrine has eliminated at least one source of over Beijing’s actions has risen, DPJ leaders have tension between Japan and its key neighbors, appeared more concerned about coping with China and South Korea. And the DPJ’s concrete China rather than cooperating with it in the efforts to atone for Imperial Japan’s annexation context of creating a new regional order. of Korea must be acknowledged as an important Even if the DPJ has, for the time being, step forward in the overall improvement in ROK- given up on the idea of building an overarching Japan ties. regional institution, it has remained active in Nevertheless, these gestures did not produce existing multilateral institutions and in other the diplomatic breakthrough that the party may efforts to diversify its network of strategic have expected when it pledged to “establish partners. Japan, for instance, has continued to mutual relations of trust with China, South be actively engaged in a range of multilateral Korea and other Asian countries as a step towards forums and institutions, from its hosting of the creating an ‘East Asian Community.’”163 Almost APEC summit in 2010 to its leadership role from the start, Beijing responded tepidly to in promoting maritime rules and norms at Tokyo’s call for an EAC. And while Seoul has the recent ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in appreciated Japan’s renewed commitment to Bali. And Tokyo has eagerly pursued a series of address the history problem, inconsistencies strategic dialogues and partnerships, including in Japan’s efforts to resolve lingering historical the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue held disputes have also led to mounting frustration in late 2011. Yet none of these activities in the in South Korea.164 In the end, historical multilateral arena appears aimed at loosening reconciliation has proved to be neither a panacea Japan’s strategic ties to the United States. On for Japan’s regional diplomatic challenges nor a the contrary, as the set of trilateral dialogues rallying point for the creation of a new Japan-led with South Korea and Australia suggest, Japan regional order. is strengthening and diversifying its strategic A second impediment has been the recent partnerships largely within the framework of series of regional crises and tensions that have set the U.S. alliance system.165 In sum, the DPJ has back momentum toward region-wide strategic not seriously attempted to shift from bilateralism cooperation in Northeast Asia. Although North to multilateralism, at least in any form that Korea’s provocations over the past few years would indicate a radical departure from Japan’s have deepened trilateral cooperation among traditional diplomatic and strategic posture. Japan, South Korea, and the United States, That is not to say, however, that the DPJ has they have also appeared to further bifurcate the completely abandoned its attempts to improve region between the U.S.-led camp and China, ties with Asia through regional integration. Many Russia, and North Korea. (The succession of party leaders still seek to redefine Japan’s regional North Korean leadership from Kim Jung-il to diplomacy as a means of coping with China’s rise his son, Kim Jung-un, in December 2011 may and, in part, to hedge against a perceived decline have further implications for regional diplomacy of U.S. strategic engagement in Northeast Asia.

163 Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.” 165 One notable exception is the new Japan-ROK-China trilateral dialogue. 164 The DPJ government’s authorization of controversial Japanese history However, the thrust of this dialogue has so far been aimed at enhanc- textbooks, for instance, has rekindled a public backlash in South Ko- ing confidence-building measures rather than pursuing alternative se- rea. curity arrangements to replace the U.S. alliance network in Asia.

50 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY This “new Asianism” could, over time, take viewpoints were reflected in the DPJ’s “Basic Pol- the form of a new regional security structure icies,” which promised a foreign and national se- (including South Korea, Australia, India, and curity policy held “in accordance with the [Japa- Vietnam) that would seek to manage China’s nese] Constitution’s pacifism.”167 When the DPJ rise in a cooperative regional framework.166 But was an opposition party to the ruling right-of- achieving this goal would require the kind of center LDP, the pacifist line was a useful coun- persistent diplomatic effort and attention that terpoint to the LDP’s more hawkish position on DPJ leaders have so far failed to exhibit, either military activities. Thus, the pacifist vision be- as a result of their own leadership deficiencies came amplified in the DPJ’s political message or the aforementioned internal and external as it sought to overthrow the LDP government. structural obstacles that have inhibited the DPJ But the DPJ is not a monolithic ideological from achieving many of its previously stated entity and, once it came to power, leaders from foreign policy objectives. Further, given the the other schools of thought began to influence party’s ongoing political challenges at home, the tone, if not the direction, of Japan’s diplomat- it remains to be seen whether its position as a ic endeavors. Indeed, each of the last three DPJ ruling party will last long enough even to attempt prime ministers has left his own distinct stamp on such an ambitious diplomatic goal. Japan’s diplomatic and strategic approach based, in part, on his particular worldview. Competing Schools of Thought Prime Minister Hatoyama, for instance, pursued the neo-autonomist vision of a less de- Should the DPJ manage to survive as a ruling pendent and deferential relationship with the party, Japan’s future diplomatic direction will United States. But his vague notions of an alter- likely be shaped and colored by one or another native, yuai (fraternity), diplomacy proved unre- of the foreign policy schools of thought within alistic amid rising regional security challenges the party. This report has asserted that four main and tensions with Washington over the Futen- foreign policy schools of thought have emerged ma relocation plan. His successor, Kan Naoto, as influential forces within the party: realists largely abandoned the attempt to change the sta- (those who want a strengthened defense poli- tus quo by recasting the U.S.-Japan alliance on cy and U.S.-Japan alliance), pacifists (those who a more “equal” footing, choosing instead to take want to maintain constitutional restrictions on a centrist approach. Prime Minister Noda now security policy and do away with the U.S.-Japan espouses the most overtly realist vision of any alliance), centrists (those who do not have deep DPJ leader to date, effectively abandoning the foreign policy convictions but who lean toward idea of an East Asian Community and seeking the realist school by default), and neo-autono- broader and deeper strategic ties with the Unit- mists (those who want a strong defense policy ed States and other likeminded nations in order in order to gain greater strategic independence to cope with China’s rising clout in regional and from the United States). global affairs. In some ways, the DPJ’s learning curve on for- It may appear that with each succession of eign policy has followed the trajectory of these leaders the DPJ has shifted toward an increasing- four schools of thought as it has transitioned from ly realist-oriented foreign policy. While this may an opposition party to a ruling party. The DPJ be true thus far, the question is whether it rep- is, to some degree, rooted in the pacifist school, resents a long-term trend or a temporary swing as many old guard party members formerly be- of the ideological pendulum. As mentioned, no longed to the left-of-center Socialist Party. Their one school of thought dominates the others, nor do their members tend to coalesce into formal 166 Daniel Sneider, “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy, no. 12 (July 2011): 99–129. 167 Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies.”

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 51 party factions based on foreign policy positions That is not to say that everything that realists per se. This suggests that Japan’s foreign policy hope to change will necessarily be in line with approach could be subject to continued fluctua- U.S. priorities or policy preferences. Even the tions, as leaders of various groups rise and fall in staunchest supporters of the U.S.-Japan alliance the party hierarchy and as Japan’s political land- have, at times, differed with Washington on key scape continues to be in flux. policy issues, such as the Futenma relocation On the other hand, generational change plan. Nor should U.S. alliance managers assume within the DPJ leadership may turn out to play that they have more to fear from neo-autono- some role in shaping a more consistent foreign mists than from realists. Both groups ultimate- and security policy over the long run. Although ly share a desire for a stronger Japan that can the DPJ may be grounded in the pacifist tradi- stand on its own two feet more or less indepen- tion by its old-guard members, many younger- dently from the United States169—the main dif- generation DPJ lawmakers are either neutral on ference being that neo-autonomists aim to reach that goal far sooner than their counterparts in the Each DPJ prime minister has realist camp.170 The fact that the realists and neo-autono- left his own distinct stamp on mists—perhaps the two most aspirational foreign policy groups within the ruling party—both ulti- Japan’s diplomacy based, in part, mately seek greater independence from the Unit- ed States poses unique challenges for U.S. policy on his particular worldview. makers. On one hand, the task for U.S. officials is to reassure realists (who fear a sudden aban- foreign policy matters or lean toward the more donment by the United States) that Washington assertive foreign policy positions favored by the will remain committed to its security commit- realist and neo-autonomist camps.168 This may ments in the Asia-Pacific well into the future. On be a reflection of the broader generational shift the other hand, they must convince neo-auton- occurring in Japan, as the pacifist values of the omists (who fear entrapment in a U.S.-led glob- older postwar generation give way to a young- al order that they perceive to be in decline) that er cohort of Japanese that has fewer inhibitions the United States is still a global leader and a re- about national power and Japan’s role on the liable force for peace and prosperity around the world stage. world. Although by no means mutually exclu- Indeed, it has been a relatively young cohort sive, these two tasks will require consistent lead- of DPJ lawmakers, such as Maehara Seiji, Na- gashima Akihisa, and Noda Yoshihiko, who have 169 In response to Ozawa Ichiro’s comment that the United States military largely spearheaded recent improvements to Ja- should, with the exception of the Seventh Fleet, withdraw from Japan, Maehara stated, “The direction [of Ozawa’s idea] is correct but he did pan’s security policy, such as the 2010 NDPG not mention the time schedule. When North Korea launches a missile, and the relaxation of Japan’s arms export rules. Japan has no ability to deal with it on its own. It is important to build As this cohort of lawmakers continues to fill the trustworthy relations with the U.S.” “Ozawa shi, hikeshini yakki beigun top ranks of the party leadership it may gradually shukusho hatsugen de tonaigai, anpo rongi kasoku” [Ozawa tries to outweigh the influence of old-guard party mem- negate impact of his remarks on USFJ reduction, but only heightens security debate inside and outside the DPJ], Sankei Shimbun, Febru- bers who maintain Japan’s pacifist norms. When ary 27, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090227/ allied with centrists in the ruling party, members stt0902272129008-n1.htm] (accessed February 27, 2009). The com- of the realist camp could continue to improve ment suggests some sympathy for the idea of reducing Japan’s strate- Japan’s foreign and defense policies over time. gic dependence on the United States. 170 According to a top DPJ foreign policy aide, realists in the party are more willing to cooperate with the United States until the time comes when Japan can stand on its own militarily. Author interview, November 15, 168 Interview with DPJ Diet member, August 12, 2010. 2011.

52 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY ership from Washington and careful diplomacy question America’s continued relevance and by U.S. policy makers and officials charged with leadership in the international community. managing bilateral relations with Japan. In particular, as has been frequently mentioned since the DPJ rose to power, U.S. officials need to diversify and broaden their contacts within the party. Familiarity between U.S. officials and members of the DPJ, although much improved since the DPJ’s ascension to power, is still relatively thin compared to the close working relationships that were developed across the Pacific during the LDP’s half-century of ruling- party dominance. Not only must U.S. officials deal with a relatively new cast of counterparts in Tokyo, but they must also reach out to the ideologically diffuse intra-party groups that make up the ruling party. It is especially important for U.S. officials to expand their outreach to DPJ lawmakers who are most skeptical of U.S. policies, such as those who belong to the pacifist and neo-autonomist camps. Convincing these groups to become more supportive of U.S. policies will not be easy, but a more hands-off approach precludes the possibility of developing stronger working relationships with key elements of the ruling party down the road. Ultimately, though, it is the purpose and va- lidity of U.S. policies that stand the best chance of persuading detractors in the DPJ that the U.S.- Japan partnership is worthy of their support. The United States must earn the respect of Japanese leaders and others who may doubt its relevance as a global leader or a force for good on the world stage. Getting America’s own house in order— both in terms of its domestic political situation and its economic regeneration—is a fundamental element in winning the respect of those who doubt its leadership. Further, the United States must continue to honor its commitments to regional and global norms and institutions that support the common good as well as international peace and stability. A perceived withdrawal from these basic commitments would severely harm U.S. credibility and lend greater confidence to critics in Japan and elsewhere who

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 53 Conclusion

All this is to say that the DPJ’s policy outlook is tion of the seemingly intractable Futenma prob- by no means static, and another challenge for lem. Although the Noda government has taken U.S. officials will be to keep the bilateral alli- important steps to move the relocation process ance on a steady course through what is like- along, many more hurdles remain in the way of ly to be a prolonged period of political change implementing the FRF plans, not least of which and uncertainty in Tokyo. After a promising is the hardening local opposition on Okinawa. start, Prime Minister Noda is already beginning Nor is this entirely a Japanese problem. In light to suffer from some of the domestic political dif- of the impasse over the FRF, as well as mount- ficulties that weakened his two predecessors. ing budgetary concerns, the U.S. Congress sus- At this writing, his public approval ratings have pended funding for the transfer of some Marine slipped to the high 30s, amid widespread criti- units from Okinawa to Guam in the 2012 de- cism that the prime minister has not clearly ar- fense appropriations bill. The decision to delink ticulated his policy vision, including plans to the Guam transfer from the Futenma relocation raise the domestic consumption tax, boost do- process may provide some flexibility around the mestic economic growth, and rebuild the dev- problem, but a full resolution of the Futenma is- astated Tohoku region. With the Noda cabinet sue still appears well beyond the immediate ho- opposing the consumption tax increase in late rizon, if it is to be achieved at all. March 2012, the prime minister appears to be Should the Futenma relocation plan eventu- preparing for a major legislative battle in the ally break down without a viable alternative in Diet and a possible general election in the com- place, serious questions would arise about the ing months. That could lead to either the revi- strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of the talization or the demise of his administration, sustainability of forward-deployed U.S. forces not to mention his party. in Japan. In a broader context, the failure to re- Despite the continuing political uncertain- solve a relatively mundane, if complex, alliance ty in Tokyo, the U.S.-Japan alliance appears on management issue such as Futenma would cast more stable ground than it did two years ago a dark shadow over the credibility of the bilateral when the DPJ first came to power. To its cred- alliance as the cornerstone of the U.S. strategic it, the Noda administration has made impressive presence in the Asia-Pacific, in turn triggering a progress of late to enhance bilateral defense co- ripple of anxiety from Seoul to Canberra. Few operation with Washington, agreeing to purchase in the ruling camp in Tokyo appear to have con- the U.S.-built next-generation F-35 fighter, to ex- sidered the consequences of such an outcome, pand bilateral cooperation in cyber-security mea- including what that would mean for Japan’s se- sures, and to relax Japan’s long-held restrictions curity outlook. on arms exports to allies. The extraordinary bilat- Another important test on the horizon is the eral cooperation following the March 11 disaster question of Japan’s formal participation in the has also demonstrated the depth of interopera- TPP, the Obama administration’s flagship eco- bility and coordination that now exists between nomic initiative for the Asia-Pacific region. Al- the two allies. though mainly a regional trade mechanism, the But while these are important improvements TPP would also underpin America’s strategic in bilateral relations, two key tests for the alliance engagement in the region, particularly among await a final outcome. The first is a final resolu- close allies and partners such as Japan. The trade

54 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY agreement could serve as the foundation of a re- of the United States. The bilateral alliance vamped alliance between Japan and the Unit- has been the linchpin of security in the Asia- ed States, both broadening and deepening the Pacific for the better part of the last half-century, scope of their bilateral engagement. Failure to providing a foundation for regional peace and join the TPP would therefore represent a major prosperity. For the most part, the two allies see setback for U.S.-Japan cooperation in regional eye-to-eye on a broad range of international rules economic and strategic affairs. and norms, from climate change to economic Indeed, the TPP figures to be a significant development and nuclear nonproliferation. And economic component of the Obama adminis- the two governments have been close partners tration’s Asia policy, and should Japan succumb in international forums and institutions such to domestic opposition and fail to join it, more as the United Nations, APEC, and the ASEAN doubts are likely to arise about the long-term sa- Regional Forum. lience of the U.S.-Japan partnership. Even at this All of these factors point to a bilateral part- early stage of the TPP debate, the agreement is nership that is fundamentally solid and that has an extremely divisive issue within the DPJ, pit- a potential to deepen and expand much further. ting anti-reform forces against free-trade advo- Two years ago, as the DPJ first came to power, cates such as Prime Minister Noda. Assuming this partnership was in question as some feared the TPP talks eventually reach the signing and Japan’s potential tilt away from the United ratification phase, the issue could reach a polit- States. Today, those fears of a fundamental stra- ical boiling point that could well tear the party tegic shift have subsided, but new questions have apart once and for all. The stakes are all the higher since the Obama Despite continuing political uncertainty administration’s announcement in late 2011 of a strategic “rebalance” toward the Asia-Pacific rein Tokyo, the U.S.-Japan alliance gion. 171 After years of involvement in the Middle East, the administration is hoping to refocus U.S. appears more stable than it did two engagement in a region that it considers to be of vital long-term national interest. The Asia-Pacif- ic is also home to more immediate security con- years ago—although major challenges cerns such as potential instability on the Korean Peninsula and China’s rapidly growing military face both allies over the future. muscle. The refocus on Asia does not just call arisen about the DPJ leadership’s ability to over- for a unilateral expansion of U.S. strategic com- come domestic political hurdles—including its mitments but for a broader level of cooperation own budgetary problems—in order to enhance with friends and allies throughout the region. and deepen bilateral cooperation. Complicating And as the United States government grapples matters, of course, are the internecine political with mounting budgetary challenges, it is like- battles that continue to threaten the ruling par- ly to seek greater burden-sharing arrangements ty’s political survival and to inhibit consensus- with these nations. building toward a coherent foreign policy vision As America’s foremost ally in Asia, Japan for Japan. Until these obstacles are overcome, bears an implicit expectation that it will be a the DPJ will likely fall short of its most ambi- key partner in this endeavor. Japan, after all, is tious foreign policy aspirations and continue to still home to the largest U.S. military presence frustrate U.S. attempts to elevate bilateral coop- in the region and remains a major trade partner eration to higher levels of regional and global 171 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priori- engagement. ties for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/ news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed February 3, 2012).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 55 APPENDIX A: Impact of Major Events on Cabinet Approval Ratings

Cabinet Approval Ratings % 80 DPJ takes power DPJ Presidential Election PM Noda takes o ce

70 PM Kan takes o ce 60

Cabinet Reshue 50 No-condence vote fails 40 PM Hatoyama delays 30 Futenma decision Consumption tax, UH election Tense intra-party debate on TPP and 20 PM Hatoyama resigns Senkaku Incident March 11 Disaster consumption tax

2/5/10 6/2/106/8/10 7/3/108/7/109/4/10 6/5/11 7/9/118/6/119/2/11 9/16/0910/11/0911/14/0912/19/091/16/10 2/20/103/13/104/17/105/15/105/31/10 6/12/106/19/106/26/10 11/13/1012/11/101/15/112/19/114/16/115/16/11 6/11/11 10/15/1111/12/1112/10/111/13/12

Yomiuri Shimbun Asahi Shimbun

% Combined Yomiuri and Asahi Cabinet Approval/Disapproval Ratings 80

1/8/10 2/5/103/5/104/2/105/7/10 6/8/10 7/2/10 8/6/10 9/3/10 2/1/113/4/114/1/11 6/3/117/1/118/5/119/2/11 9/16/0910/2/0911/6/0912/4/0912/18/09 1/16/10 5/29/10 6/12/106/18/106/25/10 7/12/10 8/28/10 9/17/1010/1/1011/5/1012/3/101/14/11 5/13/11 10/7/1111/12/1112/10/111/13/12

disapproval approval

56 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Which party would you vote for in the next election?

% 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

1/16/10 2/16/10 3/16/10 4/16/10 5/16/10 6/16/10 7/16/10 8/16/10 9/16/1010/16/1011/16/1012/16/10 1/16/11 2/16/11 3/16/11 4/16/11 5/16/11 6/16/11 7/16/11 8/16/11

Which party do you support? % 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

9/16/0910/16/0911/16/0912/16/091/16/102/16/103/16/104/16/105/16/106/16/107/16/108/16/109/16/1010/16/1011/16/1012/16/101/16/112/16/113/16/114/16/115/16/116/16/117/16/118/16/119/16/11

DPJ LDP SOURCE: Asahi Shimbun

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 57 APPENDIX B: The 2010 NDPG Process

The Kan administration adopted the new Na- Matsuda Yasuhiro (an expert in Sino-Taiwanese tional Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) on relations) reportedly wrote the initial draft, Kyo- December 17, 2010, with the main purpose of to University Professor Nakanishi Hiroshi (a re- publicly presenting Japan’s basic national secu- alist scholar of international politics) revised the rity policy, the role of the Self-Defense Forces draft, and Shiraishi Takashi, president of IDE- (SDF), the SDF’s structure, and the procure- JETRO (Institute of Developing Economics - Ja- ment target for defense capabilities over the pan External Trade Organization) and an expert next five years. The previous NDPG, adopted on international relations in Asia, finalized the in 2004, stipulated that a revision be issued in draft.174 Of the Sato Commission, only Nakan- 2009, and the Aso Taro LDP-led administration ishi and Kato Ryozo (former ambassador to the did receive the Council on Security and Defense United States) had also been members of the Capabilities Report (the Katsumata report) in 2009 Katsumata Commission. While the Kat- August 2009.172 However, following the DPJ’s sumata Commission had been led by realist-ori- electoral victory, the Hatoyama administration ented scholars (University of Tokyo Professors decided to postpone issuing a new NDPG until Kitaoka Shinichi and Tanaka Akihiko), the Sato December 2010, and it launched the Sato Com- Commission included several regional-studies mission, a panel of experts, in February 2010 to scholars; middle-power diplomacy advocate So- kick off the process. eya Yoshihide also served on the commission.175 After six months of discussion, the Sato Com- The Sato Commission’s report differed from mission submitted the report Japan’s Visions for the Katsumata Report in terms of the commis- Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the sion’s makeup, the more regional focus of the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation (the policy recommendations, and the more explic- Sato Report), in August 2010.173 In September, it departure from the Basic Defense Force Con- the Kan administration authorized the Securi- cept (BDF Concept), but it also had much in ty Council of Japan (SCJ, or anzenhosho kaigi), common with the Katsumata Report.176 For ex- an official government body of nine ministers, ample, the Katsumata Report did not complete- to begin drafting the guidelines to present to ly rule out the possibility of a massive invasion the cabinet. In a separate effort, an unofficial threatening Japan’s survival, but the Sato Report body of four ministers involved with national se- made it clear that such a situation is unlikely to curity also worked on the NDPG. At the party occur in the foreseeable future. The Sato Re- level, the DPJ Foreign Relations and Security port also added to the Katsumata Report’s list Research Committee under the DPJ Policy Re- of contingencies addressed by the SDF, such as search Committee (the seichokai) initiated intra-party discussions in October 2010 to develop 174 Mainichi Shimbun, December 4, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/sei- the party’s policy proposals for inclusion in the ji/archive/news/2010/12/04/20101204ddm003030185000c.html; http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/archive/news/2010/12/04/20101204 new NDPG. ddm001030183000c.html. During the process of creating the Sato Com- 175 Kaneko Masafumi, “Tekikakuna Shishin Shimeshita Shinanpokon Hoku- mission’s report, University of Tokyo Professor kusho” [The new security expert panel report that provided the effective guidelines], PHP Policy Review 4, no. 35, September 10, 2010, 172 The full final report is available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ http://research.php.co.jp/policyreview/pdf/policy_v4_n35.pdf. ampobouei2/090928houkoku_e.pdf. 176 Jinbo Ken, “Shinboeitaiko to Aratana boeiryoku no koso” [New NDPG 173 The full final report is available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ and new defense force initiative], Gaiko [Diplomacy] 5 (January shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf. 2011):109–18.

58 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY cyber attacks, cruise missile strikes, emergen- on the new NDPG, and the unofficial group of cy evacuation operations of Japanese nationals, four national-security-related ministers (Chief contingencies in areas surrounding Japan, and Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, Finance Minister pandemics. Although there are these differenc- Noda, Foreign Minister Maehara, and Defense es, both reports more or less overlapped in such Minister Kitazawa) held seven meetings.181 areas as abandoning the BDF Concept, trans- This group of four was the first to produce a forming the defense structure to deal with com- draft NDPG, aided by scholars such as Kitaoka plex contingencies (by adopting the dynamic Shinichi (a leading member of the Katsumata deterrence concept), expanding overseas SDF Commission) in cooperation with bureaucrats deployments, reconsidering the traditional con- from the Cabinet Secretariat and the Ministry stitutional interpretation on exercising the right of Defense. One of the drafts written by Kitaoka of collective self-defense, and revising the five during these meetings reportedly included the principles of the PKO Law. loosening of arms export bans. In the past, the Sato Commission members also reported- SCJ was often criticized for rubber-stamping ly paid significant attention to the 2010Qua - drafts of the NDPG prepared for by bureaucrats. drennial Defense Review Report, a report of U.S. But this time, the NDPG process was reportedly Department of Defense’s long-term strategy and politician-led, particularly under the auspices of priorities, released in February 2010.177 In the the four ministers’ meetings. 182 2010 QDR report, the joint AirSea Battle Con- In the party-wide debate on the new NDPG, cept (ASBC) was emphasized as a way to coun- key members on the DPJ Foreign Relations ter growing Chinese military’s anti-access/area and Security Research Committee included denial capabilities.178 The dynamic deterrence Nakagawa Masaharu, Nagashima Akihisa, Kira concept in the Sato Report also focuses on the Shuji, Oono Motohiro, and Mimura Kazuya.183 build-up of naval and air operational capabili- Although it was difficult to reach a consensus ties, and it reportedly reflects the ASBC concept because of opposition by the party’s pacifist in the 2010 QDR.179 members, the Research Committee was able The Kan administration’s SCJ started work on to submit a proposal to the Kan administration the new NDPG in September 2010, on the same (including, for example, the loosening of arms day that Prime Minister Kan defeated Ozawa export bans) by agreeing to attach a separate Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election. Kan document spelling out the opinions of the presided over the SCJ, which was made up of 180 eight ministers. The SCJ held nine meetings hara Seiji, Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, Chairman of the Nation- al Public Safety Commission Okazaki Tomiko, Minister of Internal Affairs 177 The full final report is available at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/im- and Communications Katayama Yoshihiro, Minister of Economy, Trade, ages/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. and Industry Ohata Akihiro, and Minister of Land, Transport, Infrastruc- 178 For China, anti-access/area denial would seek to deny U.S. force-pro- ture, and Tourism Mabuchi Sumio. jection capabilities in the event of a conflict. For the United States, the 181 Lawmaking and Research, Research Unit Report of the Upper House AirSeaBattle Concept entails integrating all U.S. military assets to es- Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, February 2011, http:// tablish and maintain force-projection capabilities. A key component www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/ of this strategy is dispersing U.S. military assets around the region and backnumber/2011pdf/20110201062.pdf. enhancing base defense measures. For more details for the ASBC, see 182 Toonippo, December 17, 2010, http://www.toonippo.co.jp/tokushuu/ the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments website, http:// danmen/danmen2010/1217.html; Foreign Minister Maehara’s press www.csbaonline.org/2006-1/index.shtml, and Jose Carreno, Thom- conference, December 17, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ as Culora, Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Thom- fm_press/2010/12/1217_01.html; Nagashima Akihisa blog, January as Hone, “What’s New about the AirSea Battle Concept?” Proceedings 11, 2011, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/nagashima21/e/9ef59a2d26e771a3c 135, no. 8 (August 2010), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceed- 1422e0595eeb7a1. ings/2010-08/whats-new-about-airsea-battle-concept. 183 Official blog of Oono Motohiro, December 10, 2010, http://ameblo.jp/ 179 Mainichi Shimbun, December 4, 2010. oonomotohiro/entry-10732223618.html; Policy Research Committee, 180 The eight ministers on the SCJ were Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku final proposal, http://ameblo.jp/oonomotohiro/entry-10732220381. Yoshito, then-Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko, Foreign Minister Mae- html and http://ameblo.jp/oonomotohiro/entry-10732221791.html.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 59 Society of Liberals (Riberal no Kai, a liberal intra-party group). While emphasizing deeper cooperation with the United States and its allies, the final product of the new NDPG presented the following key Japanese national security policy directions: 1) the adoption of a dynamic defense force concept; 2) the strengthening of SDF capabilities in Japan’s southwestern islands; 3) the establishment of an organization in the Prime Minister’s Office for inter-ministerial national security policy coordination and advisory function to the prime minister; 4) review of an appropriate defense equipment procurement policy to deal with international changes (i.e., loosening of the arms export ban principles); and 5) the review of an appropriate Japanese participation at the UN PKO.184 While it can be pointed out that the core proposals outlined in the Sato Report (and presumably the Kitaoka draft) are basically in line with the realist school of thought, there are still some important differences between the Sato Report and the new NDPG. For example, the Sato Report’s policy recommendations in favor of revising the arms export ban and participating in joint international weapons development, revising the interpretation of the constitutional right of collective self-defense, and the future revision of Japan’s three non-nuclear principles were greatly toned down or excluded in the final draft of the new NDPG.185 These changes diluted some of the improvements to Japan’s defense policy that the realist camp in the party hoped to achieve.

184 The full NDPG is available at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/index.html. 185 Matsuda Yasuhiro, a member of the Sato Commission, also makes a similar point in his article, “Yasuhiro Matsuda, Japan’s National Se- curity Policy: New Directions, Old Restrictions,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no.95, February 23, 2011, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb095.pdf.

60 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY APPENDIX C: Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy Viewpoints

Empirical data illustrating individual DPJ changed their positions on certain policy issues. members’ foreign policy viewpoints is hard to However, when combined with more recent come by in open source materials. However, comments and statements, it may be possible to two sets of surveys were taken of DPJ members gain some impression of how each Diet member prior to recent general elections that shed some stands (or once stood) on particular policies, and light on the various foreign and security policy which schools of thought they might belong to positions held by individual party members. according to this analysis. (The table begins The table below includes survey data of on the next page. A blank entry indicate sno policy viewpoints taken from twenty-nine DPJ response to the question; “N/A” indicates that politicians identified in this study as having the Diet member was not up for reelection at relatively senior and/or influential positions the time of the survey.) within the party. The first three questions were part of a Mainichi Shimbun survey taken of election candidates at the time of the 2009 lower house election186 and the 2010 upper house election.187 The last five questions were asked by the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey at the time of 2009 lower house election.188 The questions, such as whether or not to revise Article 9 of Japan’s “peace constitution” and whether Japan should have a more active military, provide some indication of whether certain DPJ members are hawkish or dovish on these issues. Since similar surveys have not been conducted since the 2010 upper house election it is possible that some Diet members have subsequently

186 Mainichi Shimbun, 2009 lower house election special, http://mainichi. jp/select/seiji/09shuinsen/area/. All DPJ lawmakers except for Kitaza- wa Toshimi and Ichikawa Yasuo were surveyed in this poll. 187 Mainichi Shimbun, 2010 upper house election special, http://mainichi. jp/select/seiji/10saninsen/. 188 Website of the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo joint survey, http:// www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html .

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 61 Mainichi Shimbun Survey Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey Do you Japan’s diplomatic Should Japan Should Japan Should Japan Should Japan Should the SDF Japan’s diplomatic Likely foreign support the posture: U.S.- dispatch strengthen not hesitate to exercise the right be more active posture: U.S.-Japan policy school revision of Japan Alliance- the SDF to its defense pre-emptively of collective in UN activities? Alliance-oriented of thought Article 9 of the oriented or Afghanistan? capabilities? attack when an self-defense? or UN-centric Constitution? Asia- oriented enemy attack is imminent? Edano Yukio Cannot tell Should hesitate No Cannot tell Cannot tell Centrist Fujimura Osamu Asia- oriented No Basically no Basically should Cannot tell Basically yes Basically UN- Centrist hesitate centric Gemba Koichiro Yes Alliance-oriented No Basically yes Basically should Basically yes Basically yes U.S.-Japan Alliance Realist not hesitate Hata Tsutomu No Alliance-oriented No Cannot tell Basically should Cannot tell Cannot tell UN-centric Pacifist hesitate Hatoyama Yukio Cannot tell Should hesitate Basically no Cannot tell Basically U.S.- Neo- Japan Alliance Autonomist Haraguchi Basically yes Cannot tell No Basically no U.S.-Japan Alliance Centrist Kazuhiro Hirano Hirofumi Yes Alliance-oriented No Cannot tell Basically should Cannot tell Basically yes Cannot tell Centrist hesitate Hiraoka Hideo No Asia-oriented No No Should hesitate No Basically no Basically UN- Pacifist centric Hosono Goshi (multiple No Yes Basically should Cannot tell Cannot tell Cannot tell Realist answers) hesitate Ichikawa Yasuo N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Centrist Kaieda Banri Asia-oriented No Centrist Kan Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically no Cannot tell U.S.-Japan Alliance Centrist Naoto Kano Michihiko No Alliance-oriented No Cannot tell Basically should Basically no Cannot tell U.S.-Japan Alliance Centrist hesitate Kawabata Tatsuo No Asia-oriented No Basically yes Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically yes Basically U.S.- Neo- Japan Alliance autonomist or Centrist Kitazawa Toshimi No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Centrist Kondo Shoichi No Asia-oriented No Basically no Should hesitate No Cannot tell Basically UN- Pacifist centric Koshiishi No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Pacifist Azuma Mabuchi Sumio Yes Yes Yes Basically should Basically yes Basically yes Basically U.S.- Realist not hesitate Japan Alliance Maehara Seiji Yes Alliance-oriented Yes Yes Should not Yes Basically yes U.S.-Japan Alliance Realist hesitate Matsumoto Yes No Basically yes Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically yes Cannot tell Centrist Takeaki Nagashima Yes Basically yes Basically should Yes Cannot tell U.S.-Japan Alliance Realist Akihisa not hesitate Nakagawa Yes Asian-oriented Yes Basically no Basically should Cannot tell Neo- Masaharu hesitate Autonomist Noda Yoshihiko Yes Alliance-oriented No Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically yes Basically yes Basically U.S.- Realist Japan Alliance Okada Katsuya Yes No Cannot tell Basically should No Yes Basically U.S.- Neo- hesitate Japan Alliance Autonomist Ozawa Ichiro No Alliance-oriented No No Should hesitate Yes Cannot tell Neo- Autonomist Ozawa Sakihito Cannot tell Basically should Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically U.S.- Neo- hesitate Japan Alliance Autonomist

62 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Mainichi Shimbun Survey Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey Do you Japan’s diplomatic Should Japan Should Japan Should Japan Should Japan Should the SDF Japan’s diplomatic Likely foreign support the posture: U.S.- dispatch strengthen not hesitate to exercise the right be more active posture: U.S.-Japan policy school revision of Japan Alliance- the SDF to its defense pre-emptively of collective in UN activities? Alliance-oriented of thought Article 9 of the oriented or Afghanistan? capabilities? attack when an self-defense? or UN-centric Constitution? Asia- oriented enemy attack is imminent? Saito Tsuyoshi No Asia-oriented No Basically UN- Pacifist centric Sengoku Yes Asia-oriented No Basically no Basically should Basically no Basically yes Centrist Yoshito hesitate Tarutoko Yes (multiple Basically yes Basically should Basically yes Basically yes Basically U.S.- Neo- Shinji answers) not hesitate Japan Alliance autonomist Yamaguchi No Asia-oriented No No Basically should Basically no Cannot tell U.S.-Japan Alliance Neo- Tsuyoshi hesitate Autonomist Yokomichi No Asia-oriented No No Should hesitate No Basically no Basically UN- Pacifist Takahiro centric

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 63 APPENDIX D: Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians

The following analysis provides brief foreign pol- Mainichi Shimbun survey provide a snapshot icy profiles of twenty key DPJ lawmakers associ- of how individual DPJ lawmakers view certain ated with the first and second Noda cabinets. foreign and security policies at the time of the The profiles include Diet member respons- 2009 and 2010 national elections, asking, for ines to survey questionnaires on foreign and na- stance, whether lawmakers prefer a U.S.-Japan tional security policies as well as relevant public alliance-centric, UN-centric, or Asia-centric di- statements and comments made to the media plomacy for Japan. Responses to questions about and posted on official member websites. Based revising constitutional restrictions on the right on this combination of information, each pro- of collective self-defense, and whether Japan file concludes with a “best guess” assessment of should preemptively strike enemy bases in the what foreign policy school of thought that partic- event of an imminent attack, provide a sense of ular lawmaker appears to identify with the most how hawkish or dovish each lawmaker is on se- (realist, pacifist, centrist, or neo-autonomist).189 curity issues (see appendix C for a list of the sur- Three sets of surveys are cited in this study: 1) vey questions). a questionnaire conducted by the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative “Clear and Present Danger” sur- Edano Yukio vey in October 2001;190 2) an Asahi Shimbun/ University of Tokyo survey conducted at the (Minister of economy, trade, and industry, sixth time of the 2009 lower house election;191 and term, lower house, born in 1964, a leading 3) two Mainichi Shimbun surveys conducted member of the Maehara group) during the 2009 lower house election192 and the Edano’s political stock rose after the March 11 2010 upper house election.193 The Koso Nippon disaster, in which he became the lead spokes- Japan Initiative survey, although somewhat dat- man for the Kan administration’s response to ed, provides some indication of DPJ members’ the crisis. Since then, his popularity has risen attitude toward the United States by asking how and he has been mentioned as a potential future Japan should have responded to the September prime minister.194 However, his public views on 11 terrorist attacks (i.e., whether Japan should foreign and security policies remain unclear. cooperate with the United States, whether Japan According to the 2001 Koso Nippon Japan Ini- should deploy SDF troops to Afghanistan, what tiative survey, Edano basically supported the long-term value the U.S.-Japan alliance has to idea of providing military support to the United Japanese interests, and how Japan should man- States in the wake of the September 11 terrorist age the alliance in the future). Both the Asa- attacks. On the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Eda- hi Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey and the no acknowledged its role in providing for regional stability, although he expressed concern that 189 See “The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions,” earlier in this report, it came at the cost of Japan’s diplomatic and stra- for a description of each foreign policy school of thought. tegic independence. Edano also expressed his 190 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” survey, Octo- support for the revision or dismantlement of the ber 2001, http://db.kosonippon.org/question/data.php?id=7#cts. 191 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo joint survey website, http:// www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html. 194 For example, “Naikaku seito shiji to kanren mondai: nisen juichi nen 192 Mainichi Shimbun, 2009 lower house election special, http://mainichi. hachi gatsu denwa zenkoku yoron chosa” [Cabinet and political parties’ jp/select/seiji/09shuinsen/area/. approval ratings and related issues: August 2011 national public poll], 193 Mainichi Shimbun, 2010 upper house election special, http://mainichi. Yomiuri Shimbun, August 8, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/ jp/select/seiji/10saninsen/. fe6100/koumoku/20110808.htm (accessed January 17, 2012).

64 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY current U.S.-Japan security treaty in the future, ment with the United States to count him as but did not present his idea of an alternative se- an archetypal neo-autonomist. Therefore, it ap- curity arrangement.195 In the Asahi Shimbun/ pears that Edano can best be considered a mem- University of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun sur- ber of the centrist camp. veys in 2009, Edano was vague about whether Japan’s diplomatic stance should be U.S.-Japan Fujimura Osamu alliance-centric, UN-centric, or Asia-oriented. While he opposed Japan’s use of preemptive at- (Chief cabinet secretary, sixth term, lower tacks and the revision of the traditional consti- house, born in 1949, a leading member of the tutional interpretation on the right of collective Noda group) self-defense, he did not clearly express his stance Fujimura is known as a close aide to Prime Min- on the revision of Article 9, the SDF dispatch to ister Noda Yoshihiko. Although Fujimura’s pol- Afghanistan, the increase of Japan’s defense ca- icy interests include education, health, labor, pabilities, or SDF participation in UN activities. and welfare, his own views on foreign and secu- In his public statements, Edano has acknowl- rity policies remain relatively obscure. Accord- edged the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance ing to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo but has advocated a strict interpretation of the and the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, bilateral security treaty in order to avoid entan- Fujimura favored an Asian-oriented diploma- glement in U.S.-led military activities.196 Edano cy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal is also known for his tough stance on China. diplomatic posture, while basically supporting As chairman of the bipartisan Diet Members’ a UN-centric approach over the U.S.-Japan al- Group for Considering the Tibet Problem, Eda- liance. Fujimura basically supported the poten- no drafted a statement condemning Beijing’s tial revision of the Japanese constitution, but did crackdown on Tibetan demonstrators in 2008, not express his position on the revision of Article saying that his group would not welcome Chi- 9 per se. Although Fujimura supported a revi- nese President Hu Jintao to Japan if the situa- sion of the traditional constitutional restrictions tion in Tibet were to continue to deteriorate.197 on the right of collective self-defense, he was op- After the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands incident in posed to the idea of an SDF deployment to Af- September 2010, Edano severely criticized Chi- ghanistan. On his official website, Fujimura has na, calling it “a menacing neighbor” that could made few remarks on foreign and security policy not be trusted in the same way that Japan trusts issues, and he describes himself as primarily an the United States and South Korea.198 Based on education policy expert.199 Based on this infor- the above information, it appears that Edano has mation, it appears that Fujimura can best be de- relatively conservative foreign policy views, al- scribed as a centrist, with occasional indications though these are not well formulated enough to of pacifist or neo-autonomist leanings. classify him as a classic realist. Nor has he been vocal enough about his concerns about entrap- Gemba Koichiro 195 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative. “Clear and Present Danger” sur- (Minister of foreign affairs, sixth term, low- vey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer. er house, born in 1964, leader of the Gemba php?eid=7&sid=1101. 200 196 Open meeting with Edano Yukio, April 24, 1999, http://www.edano. group ) gr.jp/archive/om/9904om.html. 197 Edano Yukio Email Newsletter 192, March 19, 2008, http://www.eda- 199 Official website of Fujimura Osamu, http://www.o-fujimura.com. no.gr.jp/enews/e-news192.html. 200 Asahi Shimbun, “Gemba shi ni chikai giin sanju nin benkyokai, guru- 198 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Chugoku wa ashiki rinjin, hochishugi nashi” [Chi- pu hassoku tono kansoku mo” [Approximately 30 DPJ members close na is a menacing neighbor and lacks rule of law], October 2, 2010, to Gemba launch a study group and expectedly become his own fac- http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20101002-OYT1T00660.htm tion], March 9, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0309/ (accessed October 2, 2010). TKY201103090475.html (accessed January 17, 2012).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 65 Gemba had a relatively low profile before his Hirano Hirofumi stint as foreign minister, but media polls typically include his name on the list of possible next (Minister of education, culture, sports, science, prime ministers.201 While Gemba’s policy exper- and technology and former chief cabinet sec- tise includes financial affairs and internal affairs, retary, fifth term, lower house, born in 1949, a his views on foreign and security policies are not leader of the Hirano group204 as well as a leading widely known. According to the Koso Nippon member of the Hatoyama group) Japan Initiative survey in 2001, Gemba strong- Hirano became prominent under the Hatoyama ly supported Japan’s assistance to U.S. military administration, when he was made chief cabinet actions following the September 11 terrorist at- secretary and the point man for reviewing the tacks. Gemba acknowledged that the U.S.-Japan Futenma relocation plan. Under the Noda ad- security alliance has several benefits, such as ministration, Hirano initially served as chair of limiting Japan’s defense expenditures and pro- the DPJ Diet Affairs Committee and a member viding regional stability and support for free and of the cabinet and DPJ top-three leaders’ meet- open economic activity. Gemba indicated sol- ing (seifu minshu sanyaku kaigi), the key policy id support for maintaining the current U.S.-Ja- decision-making entity in the Noda administra- pan security treaty. His views on security policy tion. When Noda reshuffled his cabinet in Jan- have generally been hawkish, as he has support- uary 2012, Hirano was appointed education ed constitutional revisions to assure Japan’s right minister and was removed from the cabinet and to preemptively counter imminent threats and DPJ top-three leaders’ meeting. Despite his se- to exercise the right of collective self-defense.202 niority, his views on foreign and security policies In the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and are relatively unknown. According to the Asa- the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Gem- hi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and Mainichi ba chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over both UN Shimbun surveys in 2009, Hirano chose the centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy as Ja- U.S.-Japan alliance over Asia-oriented diploma- pan’s ideal diplomatic posture. Although basi- cy as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture; howev- cally supporting an increase in Japan’s defense er, he did not state his preference between the capabilities, as well as expanded SDF peace- U.S.-Japan alliance and UN centrism. In the keeping missions, he was opposed to dispatch- surveys, he supported the revision of Article 9, ing SDF troops to Afghanistan. As a relatively but opposed the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan conservative lawmaker, Gemba has expressed and preemptive attack of enemy bases. While he some reluctance to apologize for Japan’s annex- basically supported UN-related SDF dispatches, ation of Korea, although he has acknowledged he did not express his opinion on the increase of the need to improve Japan-ROK strategic ties to Japan’s defense capabilities. Hirano seemed to cope with regional security threats.203 Given his take issue with former Foreign Minister Okada’s fairly hawkish and conservative viewpoints, it ap- remark that an East Asian Community should pears that Gemba belongs to the realist school exclude the United States, suggesting that the of thought. U.S.-Japan alliance be “the cornerstone” of any regional order.205 Hirano recently stated that 201 For example, “Naikaku seito shiji to kanren mondai: nisen juichi nen “Hatoyama’s idea of an East Asian Community hachi gatsu denwa zenkoku yoron chosa” [Cabinet and political parties’ approval ratings and related issues: August 2011 national public 204 “Hirano zen kanbo chokan ga shin guru-pu setsuritsu, niju san nin poll], Yomiuri Shimbun, August 8, 2011. sanka, Yushi-kai” [Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano launches a 202 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” sur- new group “Yushi-kai” with 23 DPJ members], Sankei Shimbun, De- vey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer. cember 1, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/101201/ php?eid=7&sid=1241. stt1012012359015-n1.htm (accessed December 1, 2010). 203 Press conference by Minister Gemba, Cabinet Office, Government of Ja- 205 “Nichibei kankei kijiku ga zentei, Kanbochokan, gaisho hatsugen nit pan, August 10, 2010, http://www.cao.go.jp/minister/1006_k_gen- suite” [On foreign minister’s remarks, chief cabinet secretary says Japan- ba/kaiken/2010/0810kaiken.html (accessed January 17, 2012). U.S. relations are the linchpin], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 8, 2009,

66 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY was a politician-led attempt to overcome friction plomacy and UN centrism over the U.S.-Japan with neighboring countries and to embrace ec- alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. He onomically dynamic Asia as a source for Japan’s opposed the revision of Article 9, the revision of own economic growth.”206 Hirano’s comments traditional constitutional interpretations on col- suggest that he is mainly a centrist, although lective self-defense, the SDF dispatch to Afghan- his close association with Hatoyama may align istan, enhancing Japan’s defense capabilities, some of his positions with the neo-autonomist preempting enemy attacks, and expanding JSDF camp. participation in UN activities. Hiraoka is a leading member of the Society of Liberals, which Hiraoka Hideo insists on maintaining Article 9 and current restrictions on exercising the right of collective (Chairman of the DPJ Administration Com- self-defense.209 Hiraoka and Kondo Shoichi, a mittee and former minister of justice in the first colleague in the Society of Liberals, co-authored Noda cabinet, fifth term, lower house, born in a 2006 article criticizing Maehara Seiji’s call for 1954, a member of the Kan group and a lead- strengthening Japan’s defense policy. The ar- ing member of Riberal no Kai (the Society of ticle recommended the following policies: 1) Liberals)207) Japan should maintain a “defensive defense pos- Hiraoka served as justice minister in the first ture” without exercising the right of collective Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet self-defense; 2) Japan should seek to establish reshuffle in January 2012. Hiraoka is widely con- a regional collective security mechanism with sidered a member of the left wing of the DPJ Asian neighbors; and 3) Japan should promote although, in the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative mutual understanding with China in order to survey, Hiraoka basically agreed with Japan’s prevent China from becoming a threat.210 The support for U.S. military action in response to Society of Liberals also published a policy pro- the September 11 terrorist attacks (he also sup- posal in 2008 that advocates: 1) an emphasis on ported deploying the JSDF to assist the United human security; 2) the creation of a new unit States in this regard). Hiraoka’s survey response separate from the JSDF that would be dedicat- indicated his recognition of the role that the ed to participating in UN activities; 3) limiting U.S.-Japan alliance plays in providing for re- the scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty to pro- gional stability, although he cautioned against moting regional stability and defending the Jap- the bilateral alliance getting entangled in inter- anese homeland; and 4) the creation of an East national conflicts. Hiraoka stated his support for Asian Community that would serve as a region- keeping the JSDF at a minimal level of strength al collective security mechanism (and including necessary to defend the nation from attack, but the United States as a member).211 In a recent he did not indicate his opinion on revising Ja- interview, Hiraoka emphasized the importance pan’s restrictions on exercising the right of col- of maintaining good relations with the United lective self-defense.208 In the 2009 newspaper States and cooperation with the entire Asian re- surveys, Hiraoka chose both Asia-oriented di- gion, and he expressed his hope that economic interdependence through an East Asian Com- http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20091008AT3S0800J08102009. munity would lead to a regional collective se- html (accessed October 8, 2009). 206 Hirano Style 17, December 2010, http://www.hhirano.jp/pdf/style-17. pdf. 209 Official website of Kondo Shoichi, http://www.kon-chan.org/contents/ 207 “Minshuto tonai jinmyaku zu” [Map of the DPJ intra-party human net- omoiyari.html. works], Mainichi Shimbun, January 2012, http://mainichi.jp/select/sei- 210 Kondo Shoichi, “The Security Policy That the DPJ Should Aim For,” ji/graph/minsyujinmyaku/14.html, (accessed January 17, 2012). March 3, 2006, http://www.kon-chan.org/contents/diary_cont. 208 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” sur- php?month=3&year=2006#689. vey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer. 211 Official website of Hiraoka Hideo, http://ameblo.jp/hideoh29/en- php?eid=7&sid=1545. try-10117708724.html.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 67 curity mechanism.212 Based on his consistent dicate whether Japan should be U.S.-, UN-, or position on maintaining strict constitutional Asia-centric in its diplomatic posture. Howev- limits on Japan’s defense policy, Hiraoka may er, he supported the increase of Japan’s defense be considered a fairly solid member of the pac- capabilities, while opposing sending the JSDF ifist camp. to Afghanistan and preemptively attacking enemy bases. Hosono did not express his stance on Hosono Goshi the revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations on the right of (Minister of environment and minister for the collective self-defense, or the deployment of the restoration from and prevention of nuclear acci- JSDF for UN-related activities. On the idea of dents, fourth term, lower house, born in 1971, an East Asian Community, Hosono wrote on his former active member of the Maehara group official blog that he thought this should not be but currently not strongly affiliated with any fac- an exclusive multilateral institution, but he ex- tions) pressed some doubt that the United States was Although many DPJ politicians are often catego- a natural member of East Asia, saying, “There rized as either pro- or anti-Ozawa, Hosono is a is no way that East Asia as a geographical con- unique figure in that he has managed to main- cept includes the United States.”214 Hosono vis- tain good relations with both camps. Hosono ited the United States soon after the collapse of often expresses realist views on foreign and se- the Hatoyama government and expressed his curity affairs but there may be nuances to his support for enhancing the SDF’s cooperation position. In the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative with the U.S. military in maritime security op- survey, Hosono basically supported Japan’s as- erations, missile defense, and intelligence, sur- sistance (including potential SDF support) for veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).215 Based on U.S. military actions in response to the Septem- his survey responses and past statements, Hoso- ber 11 terrorist attacks. On the U.S.-Japan se- no appears most closely aligned with the realist curity treaty, Hosono indicated that he saw the school of thought, although he may also be con- U.S.-Japan alliance as benefiting Japan’s energy sidered something of a centrist. and food security interests and helping to sustain open economic activities and regional stability. Ichikawa Yasuo He also suggested that the bilateral alliance limited Japan’s capacity to have a more indepen- (Secretary general of the DPJ upper house cau- dent diplomacy. Although Hosono supported cus and former minister of defense in the first maintaining the U.S.-Japan security treaty, he Noda cabinet, first term, upper house after serv- also supported a reduction of the U.S. military ing three terms in the lower house, born in presence in Japan as well as increasing Japan’s 1942, a member of the Ozawa group) defense burden. Hosono supported amending the Japanese constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense.213 In 214 Hosono Goshi’s blog, November 14, 2009, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/ the two newspaper surveys, Hosono did not in- mhrgh2005/s/%C5%EC%A5%A2%A5%B8%A5%A2%B6%A6%C6% B1%C2%CE. 212 Okada Kohei, “Tairon Nagata-cho: Gaiko Anpo: Hiraoka Hideo 215 Ogawa Satoshi, “Shirein anzen kakuho, kokyuho de, Minshu Hosono shi/Hayashi Yoshimasa zen zosho” [Nagata-cho debate on for- shi” [DPJ Hosono urges a new permanent SDF overseas dispatch bill eign and defense policies between Hiraoka Hideo and former Fi- for sea lane security], Yomiuri Shimbun, June 19, 2010, http://www. nance Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa], Chugoku Shimbun, March 7, yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20100619-OYT1T00456.htm (accessed 2011, http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article. June 19, 2010); Jiji Press, “Shirein boei wo kyoka, nichibei domei no php?story=20110307105146417_ja (accessed January 17, 2012). kinouteki kakudai mezasu, Minshu Hosono shi” [DPJ Hosono urges 213 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” sur- the strengthening of sea lane defense and seeks functional expan- vey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer. sion of U.S.-Japan alliance], June 19, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/ php?eid=7&sid=1579. c?g=pol_30&k=2010061900196 (accessed June 19, 2010).

68 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Ichikawa served as defense minister in the first der the Kan administration as deputy chair of Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet re- the DPJ Policy Research Committee and be- shuffle in January 2012, mainly because of the cause of his personal networks with Komeito passage of a censure motion against him in the party members. According to the Asahi Shim- upper house. Ichikawa is a relative newcomer to bun and Mainichi Shimbun surveys, Jojima op- defense policy and, in his first press conference posed the revision of Article 9, the revision of as defense minister, he admitted to being “an traditional constitutional interpretations of the amateur in national security affairs,” a remark right of collective self-defense, and the dispatch that drew intense criticism from LDP lawmak- of the SDF to Afghanistan. In the surveys, Joji- ers and the media.216 While he did not respond ma basically supported the U.S.-Japan alliance to the Asahi Shimbun or Mainichi Shimbun sur- over UN centrism but did not indicate his pref- veys, his response to the Koso Nippon Japan Ini- erence between the U.S.-Japan alliance and tiative survey indicated his opposition to Japan’s Asia-oriented diplomacy. Jojima has made few assistance to the United States after the Septem- remarks on foreign and security affairs, except ber 11 attacks, arguing that the U.S. response to express his positive stance with regard to the was not authorized by the United Nations and TPP.217 Based on the above information, that Jo- that the terrorist problem could not be resolved jima appears to be a centrist. by military force alone. Ichikawa did, on the other hand, acknowledge the U.S.-Japan secu- Kano Michihiko rity alliance’s role in allowing Japan to maintain a limited defense budget. On the right of (Minister of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, collective self-defense issue, Ichikawa support- eleventh term, lower house, born in 1942, lead- ed revising the Japanese constitution in order to er of the Kano group218) exercise the right of collective self-defense. Al- Until his candidacy in the DPJ presidential elec- though Ichikawa’s background is thin on foreign tion in September 2011, Kano appeared to keep and security policy, his responses to past surveys a low profile in DPJ intra-party politics. But since and his other remarks seem to suggest that he is then, he launched his own faction and, as minis- a centrist, with some degree of support for exter of agriculture, plays an influential role in the panding Japan’s defense policies. decision-making process regarding the TPP. Al- though Kano is an expert in agriculture policy, Jojima Koriki his views on foreign and security policies are not widely known. In the two newspaper surveys in (Chairman of the DPJ Diet Affairs Committee, fourth term, lower house, born in 1947, a mem- 217 Official blog of Jojima Koriki, November 5, 2011, http://jojima.weblogs. ber of the Kawabata group) jp/blog/2011/11/%EF%BC%91%EF%BC%91%E6%9C%88%EF%BC% 93%E6%97%A5%E7%88%B6%E3%81%AE%EF%BC%92%EF%BC% Since joining the DPJ in 1998, Jojima has 93%E5%9B%9E%E5%BF%8C%E3%81%AE%E6%B3%95%E8%A6% gained expertise in agriculture and labor poli- 81%E3%81%AE%E7%82%BA%E3%81%AB%E6%9F%B3%E5%B7% cies and in party and Diet affairs. When Noda 9D%E3%81%AB%E5%B8%B0%E3%81%A3%E3%81%9F%E6%97% reshuffled his cabinet and party leadership, Joji- A9%E3%81%84%E3%82%82%E3%81%AE%E3%81%A7%E3%81% ma was promoted from deputy secretary general 82%E3%82%8B%E7%88%B6%E3%81%8C%E4%BA%A1%E3%81% 8F%E3%81%AA%E3%81%A3%E3%81%9F%E6%97%A5.html. to his current position because of his experience 218 “Minshuto: Kano guru-pu hassoku” [DPJ: Kano group launches], with DPJ-LDP-Komeito policy coordination un- Mainichi Shimbun, August 31, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/ news/20110901k0000m010054000c.html (accessed August 31, 2011); 216 “Boeisho, anpo wa shirouto, korega hontou no bunmin tosei” [Defense “Kano guru-pu, meisho wa Soko-kai, kayo ni teiteikai, yakuin mo sei- minister says he is an amateur in national security affairs but this is true shiki kettei” [Kano group named ‘Soko-kai,’ holds a regular meeting on civilian control over the military], Mainichi Shimbun, September 2, 2011, Tuesdays, and decided directors], Yamagata Shimbun, September 16, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20110903k0000m010099000c. 2011, http://yamagata-np.jp/news/201109/16/kj_2011091601567. html (accessed September 2, 2011). php (accessed January 17, 2012).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 69 2009, Kano chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over formation, Kawabata appears to belong to the both UN centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy neo-autonomist or centrist camp. as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. But he opposed the revision of Article 9, the revision of tra- Koshiishi Azuma ditional constitutional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense, the proposed SDF dis- (Secretary general of the DPJ and chair of patch to Afghanistan, and Japan’s preemption of the DPJ upper house caucus, third term, up- enemy attacks. Kano has made few remarks on per house, after serving two terms in the low- foreign and security policy, except to express his er house, born in 1936, a member of Yokomichi reluctance to sign FTAs or EPAs out of consider- group221) ation for domestic agriculture interests. Based on After working as an elementary school teacher, the above information, it seems that Kano most Koshiishi was first elected to the lower house in closely identifies with the centrist school and that 1990 as a member of the Japan Socialist Party he is somewhat dubious about drastic changes (JSP). Following the “twisted Diet” situation in to the status quo in Japan’s foreign and securi- the post-2007 upper house election, his political ty policies. influence began to rise as the DPJ upper house leader and close ally of Ozawa Ichiro. Since Kawabata Tatsuo 2006 Koshiishi has maintained the position of DPJ upper house caucus chair. Although Koshi- (Minister for internal affairs and communica- ishi continued to support Ozawa Ichiro during tions, eighth term, lower house, born in 1945, the intra-party battle between the pro-and anti- leader of the Kawabata group219) Ozawa camps, Prime Minister Noda appointed Kawabata is basically known for his policy exper- Koshiishi as the DPJ secretary general in August tise in education, internal affairs, and commu- 2011, a move that was interpreted as an attempt nications, as well as for his experience in party to unify the party. In the Asahi Shimbun/Univer- and Diet affairs. In the 2009 newspaper sur- sity of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in veys, Kawabata chose an Asia-oriented diploma- 2010, Koshiishi basically opposed the Futenma cy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal relocation plan inside Okinawa, the revision of diplomatic posture. He opposed the revision of Article 9, and the revision of traditional consti- Article 9, the revision of traditional constitution- tutional interpretations of the right of collective al interpretations of the right of collective self- self-defense. Koshiishi has made few remarks on defense, and the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan. foreign and security affairs but reportedly made In the surveys, he basically registered his sup- one notable comment, stating that “we talk port for increasing Japan’s defense capabilities as about the U.S.-Japan alliance all the time, but well as expanding SDF dispatches for UN-relat- Japan should move forward in an equilateral/tried activities. Kawabata has made few remarks on angular manner with the United States and Chi- foreign and security policy, but one of his basic na from now on.”222 Koshiishi reconfirmed his stances on policy is “to contribute to the world support for such an equilateral-triangular rela- by independent diplomacy.”220 Based on this in-

219 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugo- 221 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu” [DPJ ki kyu” [DPJ faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the factions urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presiden- DPJ presidential election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011, tial election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011. http://www.nikkei.com/news/category/article/g=96958A9C938 222 “Nichibeichu wa seisankakukei de, Koshiishi shi” [Koshiishi says US- 19481E3E3E2E0858DE3E3E2EAE0E2E3E38297EAE2E2E2;at=DGXZ Japan-China relations should be equilateral/triangular], Sankei ZO0195166008122009000000 (accessed August 11, 2011). Shimbun, February 17, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/sit- 220 Official website of Kawabata Tatsuo, http://www.kawa-bata.net/sei- uation/100217/stt1002171923007-n1.htm (accessed February 17, saku/index.html. 2010).

70 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY tionship in October 2010.223 Based on the above jitsu no Kyoui”) at a Washington conference in information, Koshiishi’s foreign policy views ap- 2005,226 he has been concerned about other re- pear to fit with aspects of both the pacifist and gional diplomatic issues as chairman of the DPJ neo-autonomist camps. members’ group for building strategic relations with South Korea.227 While Maehara initially op- Maehara Seiji posed the Henoko option for the relocation of the Futenma U.S. Marine air station,228 he has sub- (Chairman of the Policy Research Committee sequently changed his position and now appears and former minister of foreign affairs, sixth term, to support the plan, according to news reports.229 lower house, born in 1962, leader of the Mae- Based on his fairly consistent statements through- hara group224) out the years, Maehara is one of the leading real- Maehara is well known for his expertise in for- ist members in the ruling party. eign and security policies and his close network of policy elites in the United States. He is wide- Nagashima Akihisa ly recognized as a realistic foreign and security policy advocate, and the following data and (Special advisor to the prime minister in charge information basically confirms this reputation. of foreign and security policy, third term, low- In the two newspaper surveys in 2009, Maeha- er house, born in 1962, a member of the Noda ra chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over both UN group) centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s Nagashima is also well known for his expertise ideal diplomatic posture. He also supported the in foreign and security policies and his close revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional ties with Washington. In the two newspaper sur- constitutional interpretations of the right of col- veys, Nagashima supported the U.S.-Japan al- lective self-defense, the SDF dispatch to Afghan- liance over the UN-centric model as Japan’s istan, the increase of Japan’s defense capabili- ideal diplomatic posture. Nagashima supported ties, and preemptive attacks on enemy bases. He the revision of Article 9 and the revision of tradi- registered somewhat reluctant support for UN- tional constitutional interpretations of the right mandated overseas SDF missions. In an interview of collective self-defense. Although he expressed conducted before the DPJ’s electoral victory in support for the increase of Japan’s defense ca- August 2009, Maehara expressed his intention to pabilities and Japan’s right to launch a preemp- differentiate from the LDP’s foreign and security tive attack on enemy bases, he did not register policy by emphasizing more independent diplo- his opinion on SDF dispatches to Afghanistan macy: “The LDP administrations have been an and UN-related activities. In an entry on his of- order-taker but the DPJ will propose what Japan ficial website in January 2011, Nagashima called wants to do…we need to discuss how we will infor more “equality” in the U.S.-Japan alliance, crease Japan’s independence while maintaining but he argued that the bilateral security treaty 225 relations with the United States.” While Mae- Asahi Globe, June 8, 2009, http://globe.asahi.com/feature/090608/ hara called China a very real concern (“Gen- side/05.html (accessed January 17, 2012). 226 Official DPJ website, December 15, 2005, http://www1.dpj.or.jp/eng- 223 “Minshu Koshiishi shi, Nichibeichu wa seisankakukei de” [DPJ Koshi- lish/news/051215/01.html. ishi says US-Japan-China relations should be equilateral/triangular], 227 For example, the other members are Hatoyama Yukio, Nagashima Aki- Sankei Shimbun, October 7, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/poli- hisa, Tamura Kenji, Kazama Naoki, and Ishizeki Takashi. tics/policy/101007/plc1010071942012-n1.html (accessed October 7, 228 “Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku: Minshuto do miru do kataru” [Asking DPJ 2010). Vice President Maehara: How should we see and talk about the DPJ], 224 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu [DPJ Asahi Globe, June 8, 2009. faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presidential 229 “Henoko isetsu, dokoga yoto demo suishin, Maehara shi ga kyocho” election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011. [Maehara says no matter which is a ruling party, Henoko plan should 225 “Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku: Minshuto do miru do kataru” [Asking DPJ be promoted], Ryukyu Shimpo, July 10, 2011, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/ Vice President Maehara: How should we see and talk about the DPJ], news/storyid-179167-storytopic-3.html (accessed January 17, 2012).

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 71 was crucial for maintaining Japan’s security and raised questions about the need to maintain the prosperity.230 In 2007, Nagashima also described current level of U.S. troops.233 In March 2006, his vision of an East Asian security communi- he wrote on his official website that “we are seek- ty (a so-called rimland maritime coalition) ing, to some degree, a more independent policy among Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, from the overly U.S.-dependent posture.”234 In and India in order to support U.S. regional en- November 2007, Nakagawa wrote on his web- gagement as a public good.231 On the Futenma site, “We should review the Host Nation Support relocation facility issue, Nagashima has support- and the expenses of the U.S. force realignment ed the Kadena merger option as an alternative to to transfer the marines. It is important to have a the current Henoko option.232 Based on his past strong will to become more independent in or- record, Nagashima is clearly a member of the der to decide Japan’s level of defense capabili- realist camp, although his emphasis on equal- ties by analyzing the information related to Chi- ity in the U.S.-Japan alliance and his calls for nese and North Korean threat by ourselves, not an East Asian security community also suggest blindly accepting the information from the Unit- a degree of sympathy for some core neo-auton- ed States”235 Based on the above information, it omists objectives. seems that Nakagawa identifies most closely with the neo-autonomist wing of the party, given his Nakagawa Masaharu emphasis on more independence in foreign and security policy. (Chairman of the DPJ research committee on administrative reform and former minister of Noda Yoshihiko education, culture, sports, science, and technology in the first Noda cabinet, fifth term, low- (Prime minister, fifth term, lower house, born in er house, born in 1950, a member of the Hata 1957, leader of the Noda group236) group) Since joining the DPJ in 1998, Noda has gained Nakagawa served as education minister in the first expertise in finance and in party and Diet af- Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet re- fairs, gradually working his way up the ladder shuffle in January 2012. Nakagawa is known for to his current position as prime minister. Noda his policy expertise in education and foreign af- is known as a conservative DPJ member, but he fairs. According to the Asahi Shimbun/Univer- has never held a senior position in foreign and sity of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in security affairs. Therefore, his views on foreign 2009, Nakagawa supported an Asia-oriented di- and security policies were not widely known plomacy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s until he ran in the DPJ presidential election in ideal diplomatic stance. He also supported the September 2011. According to the 2001 Koso revision of Article 9 and the SDF dispatch to Af- Nippon Japan Initiative survey in, Noda strongly ghanistan but opposed the revision of traditional supported Japan’s assistance in U.S. military ac- constitutional interpretations of collective self-de- tions to respond to the September 11 terrorist at- fense. Nakagawa has expressed his appreciation tacks. Survey results also showed that Noda did for the U.S. force presence in Japan but has also not see any negative impact of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in terms of Japanese international 230 Nagashima Akihisa’s blog, January 11, 2011, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/ nagashima21/e/97e77e8d3852d22ecb3bcef1fb9865c1. 231 Ibid., February 1, 2007, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/nagashima21/ 233 “A Word from Nakagawa Masaharu,” January 26, 2006, http://www. e/8810def5899d84490c62cb7a83cb3f03. masaharu.gr.jp/HP/hitokoto/2006.htm. 232 “Futenma genkoan, saikento teian wo, Nagashima shi ga minaoshi 234 Ibid., March 13, 2006. uttae” [Nagashima urges Japan should propose to the U.S. a review 235 Ibid., November 14, 2007. on Henoko plan again], Ryukyu Shimpo, May 22, 2011, http://ryuky- 236 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu [DPJ ushimpo.jp/news/storyid-177359-storytopic-3.html (accessed Janu- faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presidential ary 17, 2012). election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011.

72 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY economic activities, the degree of diplomatic au- tionism in Japan by establishing interdependent tonomy, alliance entanglement, and the promo- ties with China and the international communi- tion of friendlier relations with Asian countries. ty; and 4) proposing a Northeast Asian non-pre- Although Noda supported the revision or aboli- emption agreement among North Korea, China, tion of the current U.S.-Japan security treaty in South Korea, and Japan. In August 2011, Noda the future, he supported the future transforma- published an article describing his policy vision tion of the alliance into a more equal collec- and wrote that the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japan’s tive self-defense treaty with the United States, largest security asset.239 Noda has expressed rel- such as NATO or the Australia, New Zealand, atively conservative views on history issues, cast- United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Noda ing doubt on whether Japan should still be held has also supported revising the Japanese consti- responsible for its wartime actions.240 Based on tution in order to exercise the right of collective the above information, Noda seems to belong to self-defense.237 In the Asahi Shimbun/Universi- the realist camp, although he has shown some ty of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in enthusiasm for a more independent foreign pol- 2009, Noda chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over icy from the United States over the long term. Asia- and UN-centric diplomacy as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. He also supported the revi- Okada Katsuya sion of Article 9 and the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right of (Deputy prime minister and former minister of collective self-defense. While he basically sup- foreign affairs, seventh term, lower house, born ported SDF overseas dispatches for UN ac- in 1953, not affiliated with any factions) tivities, he did not express his opinion on the In terms of political experience, Okada, a sev- increase of Japan’s defense capabilities. In addi- enth-term lower house member, is a likely can- tion, he opposed the SDF dispatch to Afghani- didate to be a future DPJ prime minister. His stan. Noda published his foreign and security past remarks and behavior on foreign and secu- policy vision when he ran for party president in rity policies basically stress more autonomous September 2002.238 The first promise in his for- decision making while maintaining the alliance eign and security policy section was “to restore relationship with the United States. According independence in foreign and security policy” by to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and improving the quality of relations with the Unit- the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, while ed States. While Noda urged the strengthening basically supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance over of political, cultural, and technological ties with UN centrism, Okada did not indicate his pref- the United States, he also expressed his inten- erence between the U.S.-Japan alliance and tion to offset U.S. unilateralism by strengthening Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s primary dip- relations with Europe. In terms of Asia policy, lomatic posture. He supported the revision of Ar- Noda promised to end the so-called cold war in ticle 9, and the SDF dispatches to UN missions, Asia by implementing the following measures: but opposed the revision of traditional constitu- 1) establishing a collective self-defense securi- tional interpretations of the right of collective ty mechanism (shudanteki anzenhosho taisei) self-defense, dispatch of the SDF to Afghani- in the Asia-Pacific region; 2) strengthening re- stan, and the preemption of enemy attacks. Oka- lations with countries that share such values as 239 Koyama Yu, “Posuto Kan Shinjosho: Noda Yoshihiko zaimusho, kyoiku, freedom and democracy; 3) preventing isola- Yasukuni de hoshu kyocho” [Post-Kan profile: Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko, emphasizing his conservativeness by his positions on ed- 237 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” sur- ucation and Yasukuni Shrine], Mainichi Shimbun, August 18, 2011, vey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer. http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20110818ddm005010112000c. php?eid=7&sid=1497. html (accessed August 18, 2011). 238 Noda’s Vision for Diplomacy and Security 2, no.1, September 15, 2002, 240 Official website of Noda Yoshihiko, October 17, 2005, http://www.no- http://www.nodayoshi.gr.jp/report/fax/vol02.html. dayoshi.gr.jp/report/inpage/news_04.html.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 73 da did not express his stance on the increase of and South China Sea disputes.247 Based on the Japan’s defense capabilities. In his foreign policy above information, Okada basically belongs to vision, “Toward Realization of Enlightened Na- the neo-autonomist camp, although he could tional Interest – Living Harmoniously with Asia also be considered something of a centrist. and the World,” Okada supported the construction of an East Asian Community in 2005. His Ozawa Ichiro version of an EAC excludes the United States as a member but limits the role of an EAC to eco- (Former DPJ Secretary General, fourteenth nomic affairs and non-traditional security issues term, lower house, born in 1942, leader of the (traditional security issues, he believes, should Ozawa group, which includes approximately be handled by the U.S.-Japan alliance).241 In an 130 members248) interview following the publication of his foreign policy vision, Okada told an interviewer, Ozawa Ichiro was first elected to the lower house “Although former Deputy State Secretary Ar- as a member of the Liberal Democratic Par- mitage expressed his concern about an EAC, I ty in 1969. During the LDP era, Ozawa served would like to say let Japan take care of Asian as chairman of the lower house Committee on issues by its own to some degree. Why doesn’t Rules and Administration, minister of home af- the United States trust Japan more?… . Japan fairs (December 1985–July 1986), deputy chief should become a bridge between the United cabinet secretary (November 1987–December States and East Asia.”242 Okada also led the DPJ 1988), and LDP secretary general (August 1989– Diet Members’ League for Promoting Nuclear April 1991). After leaving the LDP in 1993, Oza- Arms Reduction and made a proposal to create wa Ichiro jumped to different parties, including a Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone with the prin- the New Frontier Party before joining the DPJ ciple of a non-first use of nuclear states against in 2003. Ozawa Ichiro served as the DPJ par- non-nuclear states.243 As foreign minister, Oka- ty president for approximately three years, from da struck a conciliatory tone toward South Ko- April 2006 to May 2009, and he has been in- rea on the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute244 strumental in delivering some of the DPJ’s ma- as well as history issues.245 However, he was fair- jor electoral victories, including the victory over ly outspoken in his talks with Chinese counter- the LDP in the August 2009 lower house elec- parts on issues such as nuclear arms reduction246 tions. As leader of the largest intra-party faction, Ozawa commands the loyalty of over a hun- 241 Okada Katsuya, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National Interest – dred lawmakers, including the so-called Oza- Living Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” http://www.dpj.or.jp/ wa Children (first-term Diet members). During english/vision/summary.html. the Hatoyama administration, Ozawa served as 242 Okada Katsuya and Goro Hashimoto, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto daihyo, the DPJ secretary general (September 2009– gaiko bijon wo kataru” [DPJ President Katsuya Okada discusses his foreign policy vision], Chuokoron 120, no.7 (July 2005), http://www.kat- June 2010) but was later indicted for a politi- suya.net/opinion/2005/07/post-103.html. 243 Official website of Okada Katsuya, November 9, 2006, http://www.kat- wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/25/AR2010052503244.html (ac- suya.net/upload/pdf/joyaku_honbun.pdf. cessed January 17, 2012). 244 Transcript of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Af- 247 Inukai Naoyuki et al., “Minami Shina Kai keneki, Chugoku tsuyoki, fairs, House of Representatives, March 26, 2010, http://www.shugiin. konan gaiko kappatsu ni” [China is aggressive to South China Sea in- go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_kaigiroku.htm. terests, and exercises both soft and hard diplomatic measures active- 245 Kyodo News, “Riso wa kyotsu no rekishi kyokasho, Okada gaisho ga ly], Mainichi Shimbun, July 4, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/opinion/ kankoku shi ni” [Foreign Minister Okada says to Korean media that closeup/news/20110704ddm003030199000c.html (accessed July 4, it is ideal that Japan and South Korea share history textbooks], in 2011). Sankei Shimbun, July 14, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/ko- 248 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011, http:// rea/100714/kor1007141241002-n1.htm (accessed July 14, 2010). www.nikkei.com/news/category/article/g=96958A9 246 John Pomfret, “U.S.-China Talks End without Accords on Key Issues,” C93819481E3E3E2E0858DE3E3E2EAE0E2E3E38297 Washington Post, May 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ EAE2E2E2;at=DGXZZO0195166008122009000000

74 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY cal funds scandal, which led to the suspension the United States by setting Japan’s strategy, clar- of his party membership and questions about ifying Japan’s position, and actively sharing roles his ability to remain a dominant power bro- and responsibilities with the United States; 2) to ker within the ruling party. However, in April strengthen relations with Asian neighbors, espe- 2012, Ozawa was found not guilty in the first tri- cially in the areas of energy and trade; 3) to pro- al over his funding scandal, leading to specula- mote trade and investment liberalization; 4) to tion that he may overcome his legal issues and maintain Japan’s defensive defense posture re- perhaps even run for the DPJ party presiden- gardless of Japan’s inherent right to exercise in- cy in September 2012. Ozawa’s foreign policy dividual self-defense or collective self-defense; views are difficult to categorize. Many remem- and 5) to participate in UN-related security ac- ber his behind-the-scenes role in orchestrating tivities.250 In February 2009, Ozawa sparked Japan’s military support for the U.S. and allied controversy when he commented that the Unit- coalition in the first Gulf War, but his more re- ed States should withdraw all of its forward-de- cent comments suggest profound skepticism to- ployed forces from Japan except for the Seventh ward the United States. In the Asahi Shimbun/ Fleet. He later justified his comment by say- University of Tokyo and the Mainichi Shimbun ing that Japan could rely less on the U.S. mil- surveys in 2009, Ozawa supported the U.S.-Ja- itary presence if it developed stronger defense pan alliance over Asia-centric diplomacy, but he capabilities.251 Based on an overall assessment did not choose between the U.S.-Japan alliance of Ozawa’s foreign policy views throughout the and a UN-centric approach. He opposed the re- years, it seems that his position has shifted from vision of Article 9, the SDF dispatch to Afghani- one in which he was relatively supportive of stan, an increase of Japan’s defense capabilities, close U.S.-Japan strategic ties to one that now and a hypothetical preemptive attack on enemy emphasizes greater autonomy with regard to the targets, but supported the revision of the tradi- United States. Despite this apparent shift, Oza- tional constitutional interpretation of the right wa has consistently advocated a more UN-cen- of collective self-defense and SDF participation tric foreign policy approach for Japan. In the in UN activities. In 2004, Ichiro Ozawa and Yo- 250 The official website of the DPJ, http://www1.dpj. komichi Takahiro (a leading pacifist lawmaker) or.jp/news/files/061031rinen.pdf signed an agreement on basic principles regard- 251 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 25, ing Japan’s national security and international 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/ contributions.249 This 2004 agreement empha- seiji/20090225AT3S2402Y24022009.html; Yo- miuri Shimbun, February 28, 2009, http:// sized the danger of entanglement in the alliance www.yomiuri.co.jp/editorial/news/20090227- with the United States and the important role OYT1T01147.htm; Asahi Shimbun, February of the UN as a collective security mechanism. 25, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/up- Additionally, they proposed the following poli- date/0225/TKY200902250292.html; Mainichi cy recommendations: 1) maintaining Article 9; Shimbun, February 25, 2009, http://mainichi.jp/ select/seiji/news/20090226k0000m010125000c. 2) promoting Japan’s more active participation html; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Febru- in UN activities; and 3) establishing a new SDF ary 27, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/ unit specifically mandated to engage in inter- seiji/20090227AT3S2703Q27022009.html]- national activities, such as UN peacekeeping ; Mainichi Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http:// mainichi.jp/select/seiji/archive/news/2009/ operations. In 2006, Ozawa, as the DPJ party 02/28/20090228ddm005010150000c.html; president, published his own policy vision rec- Sankei Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http:// ommending the following main points: 1) to es- sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090227/ tablish a truly “equal” alliance relationship with stt0902272129008-n1.htm; Tokyo Shimbun, Feb- ruary 27, 2009, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/politics/news/CK2009022802000105.html; Jiji 249 The official website of Yokomichi Takahiro, March Press, February 27, 2009, http://www.jiji.com/jc/ 19, 2004, http://www.yokomichi.com/ c?g=pol_30&k=2009022700905

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 75 final analysis, it may be that Ozawa belongs in a Tanaka Naoki category by himself—an opportunistic politician who knows how to stir up a foreign policy debate (Defense minister, third term, upper house af- for domestic political purposes. ter serving three terms in the lower house, born in 1940, chairman of Mokuyo Kai [DPJ upper Saito Tsuyoshi house members’ group supporting Ozawa Ich- iro]) (Deputy chief cabinet secretary, first term, low- Tanaka Naoki is well-known as the husband of er house after serving two terms in the upper Tanaka Makiko, former minister of foreign af- house, born in 1945, member of Riberal no Kai fairs under the LDP Koizumi administration. Al- [the Society of Liberals]) though Tanaka was originally elected to the Diet Saito began his political career as a member of as an LDP member, he joined the DPJ with his the Japan Socialist Party, subsequently gaining wife just before the 2009 lower house election. policy expertise as an upper house member on While he served as parliamentary vice-minister various foreign and defense policy committees. of foreign affairs (1989), director of the LDP for- In the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey in eign affairs division (1994), and chairman of the 2001, Saito opposed any Japanese assistance to upper house committee on foreign affairs and the U.S. military in the wake of the September defense (2009) in the past, Tanaka has made few 11 terrorist attacks, citing, among other reasons, public remarks on foreign and defense affairs. his doubts about the legitimacy of U.S. military Prime Minister Noda’s replacement of Ichikawa actions without a formal UN mandate. Regard- Yasuo with Tanaka Naoki in January 2012 was ing the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Saito replied surprising because it was expected that someone that he saw no benefit in the treaty to Japan at with greater policy expertise would take over all, stating that it limits Japan’s autonomy in di- from the novice policy maker Ichikawa. Shortly plomacy, entangles Japan in international con- after his appointment as defense minister, Tana- flicts, and disturbs Japan’s friendly relations with ka made comments that upset the delicate sit- its Asian neighbors. Saito stated his doubts about uation on Okinawa, suggesting that the Noda the necessity of the SDF for self-defense, even administration plans to begin construction of at a minimum level, and supported the review the Futenma relocation facility in Henoko Bay or abolition of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in sometime in 2012. His comment marked the the future. In addition, Saito stated his support first time a cabinet minister has publicly men- for Japan’s joining a regional collective security tioned the construction schedule for the facil- system with Asian neighbors after disbanding the ity.253 In addition, during a TV news program U.S.-Japan security system. Saito opposed the re- Tanaka appeared to misunderstand the differ- vision of the constitution to permit the exercise ence between the loosening of arms export bans of the right of collective self-defense.252 In the and a possible loosening of the SDF’s rules of two newspaper surveys in 2009, Saito supported engagement (ROE).254 According to the Asa- an Asia-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Japan alliance, and he supported UN centrism over 253 Sakaguchi Hirohiko, “Zainichi beigun saihen: Futenma isetsu, ri- the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplo- kai hete nennai chakko, Tanaka boeisho ga genkyu” [USFJ realignment: Defense Minister Tanaka says the Futenma relocation facility matic posture. Saito’s viewpoints clearly catego- construction begins this year by gaining Okinawa’s understanding], rize him as a member of the pacifist camp. Mainichi Shimbun, January 16, 2012, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20120116ddm001010082000c.html (accessed January 17, 2012). 254 Sakaguchi Hirohiko, “Tanaka boeisho: bukishiyo kijun to yushutsu san- 252 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” sur- gensoku kondo, tv bangumi hatsugen” [Defense Minister Tanaka convey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer. fused the SDF’s rules of engagement with the arms export ban in the php?eid=7&sid=1279. TV program], Mainichi Shimbun, January 15, 2012, http://mainichi.jp/

76 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY hi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in has also criticized Japan’s perceived subservi- 2010, Tanaka Naoki opposed the revision of Ar- ence to the United States. In his official blogs, ticle 9 and the revision of traditional constitu- Tarutoko has railed against Japan’s “flattery ditional interpretations of the right of collective plomacy” toward the United States,257 which he self-defense. He did not, however, express his says comes at the expense of Japan’s national in- positions on the U.S.-Japan security treaty or the terests.258 Based on the above information, Ta- Henoko relocation plan. Based on the above in- rutoko seems to identify most closely with the formation, Tanaka may best be categorized as a neo-autonomist camp. centrist. Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi Tarutoko Shinji (Senior vice minister of foreign affairs, third (DPJ acting secretary general, fifth term, lower term, lower house, born in 1954, a leading house, the twelfth district of Osaka Prefecture, member of the Gemba group) born in 1959, leader of the Tarutoko group255) As a former diplomat, Yamaguchi is known for Tarutoko’s foreign policy views are not widely his expertise in foreign affairs. According to the known, despite his being a seasoned politician. Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey in 2001, Ya- In the 2001 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative sur- maguchi basically approved of Japan’s support vey, Tarutoko strongly supported Japan’s assis- for U.S. military actions in response to the Sep- tance (including the deployment of SDF forces) tember 11 terrorist attacks, although he was op- to the U.S. military after the September 11 ter- posed to sending SDF troops to assist in such rorist attacks. On the U.S.-Japan security treaty, operations. Regarding the U.S.-Japan security Tarutoko acknowledged the treaty’s benefit to re- treaty, Yamaguchi recognized its contribution gional stability and stated his support for main- to maintaining regional stability. Although he taining the bilateral security framework in the supported the maintenance of the current U.S.- future. He supported the revision of constitu- Japan security treaty framework in the future, tional limitations on the right of collective self- he supported the reduction of the U.S. military defense.256 In the two newspaper surveys taken presence in Japan and the increase of Japan’s in 2009, Tarutoko basically supported the U.S.- role in security matters. Yamaguchi also sup- Japan alliance over UN centrism. Although he ported the revision of the constitutional inter- supported the increase of Japan’s defense capa- pretation of the right of collective self-defense.259 bilities, preemptive attacks on enemy bases, and In the newspaper surveys in 2009, Yamaguchi SDF dispatches for UN-related activities, he did chose Asia-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Ja- not give his opinion on the proposed SDF dis- pan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture, patch to Afghanistan. Despite his relatively sol- while supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance over id support for the bilateral alliance, Tarutoko the UN-centric model. Yamaguchi opposed the revision of Article 9, the proposed SDF dispatch select/seiji/news/20120116k0000m010036000c.html (accessed Janu- to Afghanistan, the increase of Japan’s defense ary 17, 2012). capabilities, and preemptive attacks on ene- 255 Sakai Hiroshi and Yamamoto Yuji, “Minshu hokai; kawaru tonai my bases, but he did not express his stance on rikigaku, jakusho habatsu itten, shuyo posuto kakutoku de ikioi, Taru- koto guru-pu” [DPJ collapse: Balance of factional power changes, small factions such as Tarutoko group secure important posts and gain mo- 257 Future Prime Ministers Mirai Sori [a young Diet members’ email maga- mentum], Sankei Shimbun, March 10, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/ zine] 7, October 14, 2002, http://www.rosetta.jp/mirai/m007.html. politics/news/110310/stt11031023350015-n1.htm (accessed March 258 Future Prime Ministers Mirai Sori 22, February 3, 2003, http://www.ro- 10, 2011). setta.jp/mirai/m022.html. 256 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” sur- 259 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” survey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer. vey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer. php?eid=7&sid=1406. php?eid=7&sid=1679.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 77 SDF dispatches for UN-related activities. Yama- guchi’s past comments on foreign policy have often been laced with criticism of Japan’s dependence on the United States, which he likens to postwar Japanese children asking for chocolate from Occupation GIs.260 Yamaguchi served as director-general of the Federation of DPJ Diet Members for Promoting an East Asian Com- munity, whose chairman is former Prime Min- ister Hatoyama Yukio.261 Based on his outspoken criticism of Japan’s “dependence” on the United States, Yamaguchi can be considered a member of the neo-autonomist camp.

260 See, for instance, Yamaguchi’s interview in Naoya Fujiwara et al., Kokka kino wo takenaosu – Wakate seijika ga mezasu atarashii nihon no katachi [Reforming the state function: A new form of Japan that younger politicians seek]. 261 Official website of Yomaguchi Tsuyoshi, http://www.mission21.gr.jp/ archives/618.html.

78 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY APPENDIX E: Chronology of Major Events under DPJ Governments

2009 Aug. 30: The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) wins a landslide victory in the lower house election. Sept. 9: The DPJ, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the People’s New Party (PNP) reach agreement on forming a ruling coalition. Sept. 16: Hatoyama Yukio is nominated as prime minister in the Diet and launches his cabinet. Sept. 21: Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister (PM) Hatoyama meet in New York. Sept. 23: PM Hatoyama meets with U.S. President Barack Obama and South Korean (ROK) President Lee Myung-bak in New York. Sept. 28: China-ROK-Japan trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting held in Shanghai. Oct. 9: PM Hatoyama meets ROK President Lee in Seoul. Oct. 10: PM Hatoyama meets Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and ROK President Lee in Beijing for a trilateral summit. Oct. 20–21: U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visits Japan and pushes for progress on base realignment plans. Oct. 24: The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit is held in Thailand, and the East Asian Summit (EAS) is held the following day. Nov. 10: Japan announces a new financial aid package for Afghanistan of $5 billion over the next five years. Nov. 11: The Hatoyama administration begins the budget screening process. Nov. 13: President Obama and PM Hatoyama meet in Tokyo. Nov. 14: President Obama delivers a speech in Tokyo on U.S. policy toward Asia. Nov. 30: PM Hatoyama meets Okinawa Governor Nakaima Hirokazu in Tokyo. Dec. 3: SDP President Fukushima Mizuho says the SDP might leave the ruling coalition if the DPJ decides to accept the plan to relocate the Futenma U.S. Marine air station to Henoko Bay. Dec. 10: DPJ Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro visits China with over 140 DPJ Diet members and meets Chinese President Hu. Dec. 14: PM Hatoyama meets Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping in Tokyo. Dec. 15: The Hatoyama administration announces Japan will put off a decision on the Futenma relocation facility (FRF) for a few months. Dec. 18: Hatoyama meets Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in Copenhagen and explains his recent decision on the FRF. Dec. 24: Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office charges two of PM Hatoyama’s former aides with falsifying campaign donations. Dec. 25: Japan’s Ministry of Education issues a new high school textbook guideline, not mentioning the Dokdo/Takeshima issue. Dec. 27-29: PM Hatoyama meets Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi. 2010 Jan. 12: The mayor of Yonaguni Shima requests Defense Minister (DM) Kitazawa Toshimi to deploy Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) to the island; Kitazawa commits to studying a possible GSDF deployment.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 79 Jan. 12: Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister (FM) Okada Katsuya meet in Honolulu. Jan. 15: The Special Measures Law authorizing Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) refueling operations in the Indian Ocean expires. Jan. 15: Three current and former aides to DPJ Secretary General Ozawa are arrested and charged with falsifying political funding reports in connection with a land purchase in Tokyo. Jan. 17: FM Okada meets Chinese FM Yang Jiechi in Tokyo, focusing on East China Sea gas fields. Jan. 24: Inamine Susumu, an opponent of the current Henoko plan, wins Nago City mayoral election. Feb. 1: The U.S. Department of Defense publishes the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). Feb. 4: Tokyo district prosecutors announce a decision not to indict DPJ Secretary General Ozawa in connection with a funding scandal, but to indict his former aides. Feb. 5: The Hatoyama administration authorizes deployment of SDF troops for the UN PKO in Haiti. Feb. 11: FM Okada meets ROK FM Yu Myung-hwan in Seoul. Feb. 16: The Hatoyama administration announces the creation of the Council on National Security and Defense Capability to help develop the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Feb. 17: An LDP upper house member switches parties, giving the DPJ a majority in the upper house. March 9: An expert panel submits a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding confidential agreements between Japan and the United States in the 1960s on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. March 16: FM Okada reiterates Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku/Daioyutai Islands in response to a potential new law in China that would protect the islands from Japanese control. March 18: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s North Sea Fleet passes through the Miyako Strait. March 18: DM Kitazawa expresses support for early consideration of GSDF deployment to Yonaguni Island. March 26: North Korea allegedly sinks ROK Navy corvette Cheonan. April 8: A PLAN helicopter has a near collision with the MSDF ship in the East China Sea. April 10: PLAN East Sea Fleet vessels (eight surface ships and two submarines) pass the Miyako Strait. April 12: PM Hatoyama meets U.S. President Obama on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and also meets Chinese President Hu. April 18: The speaker of the South Korean House makes the first visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima. April 21: Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces Chinese helicopter approached a Japanese destroyer conducting surveillance activities. April 22: PM Hatoyama pledges to put his premiership on the line to resolve the FRF issue by May 31. April 27: A judicial review panel calls for DPJ Secretary General Ozawa to be indicted over a fundraising scandal, requiring prosecutors to revisit an earlier decision not to charge him. April 30: DM Kitazawa meets Indian DM A.K. Antony in New Delhi. May 3: A Chinese ship shadows a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) ship and demands that the JCG ship stop conducting oceanographic research near Omami Island. May 4: PM Hatoyama visits Okinawa and states that it would be difficult to relocate all Futenma base functions outside the island.

80 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY May 11: FM Okada announces the construction of the SDF base in Djibouti, for anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast. May 14: FM Okada says it is necessary to carefully monitor the development of China’s nuclear and naval power. May 15–16: The foreign ministers of Japan, China, and ROK meet in Gyeongju, Korea. During a bilateral Sino-Japanese foreign ministers’ meeting, Okada urges China’s further efforts at nuclear arms reduction. May 19: Japan and Australia sign the Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA). May 21: FM Okada and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton meet in Tokyo. May 23: PM Hatoyama makes his second visit to Okinawa and states his decision to accept the Futenma relocation agreement reached by Japan and the United States in 2006. May 25: DM Kitazawa meets Defense Secretary Robert Gates at the Pentagon. May 28: The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) issues a joint statement reiterating a commitment to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. May 28: PM Hatoyama dismisses Consumer Affairs Minister Fukushima from the cabinet for refusing to support his decision on the FRF. May 29-30: A Japan, China, and ROK summit is held in Jeju, ROK. May 30: The SDP leaves the ruling coalition with the DPJ. May 30–June 1: Chinese Premier Wen and PM Hatoyama meet in Tokyo, and Wen commits to early negotiations on East China Sea. June 2: PM Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary General Ozawa resign. June 4: Kan Naoto is nominated as prime minister in the Diet. June 8: PM Kan announces his cabinet. June 17: PM Kan announces his plan to increase the domestic consumption tax. June 23: PM Kan visits Okinawa and promises to reduce the burden of the U.S. troop presence there but reiterates a commitment to the May 28 agreement on the FRF. June 25: Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). June 27: PM Kan and President Obama meet during the G20 Summit in Toronto. June 28: Japan and India begin negotiations on a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. June 29: Russia begins the largest military exercise in the Far East, including in the disputed Northern Territories, in the post-Soviet era. July 3: PLAN ships pass through the Miyako Strait and head to the Western Pacific. July 6: Japan and India hold the first administrative vice foreign and defense ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. July 11: As a result of the upper house election, the DPJ loses a majority in the upper house. July 13: The Kan administration decides not to dispatch the SDF to the UN PKO in Sudan. July 16: The Kan administration decides to extend SDF participation in an anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia for one year. July 23: Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces it will send MSDF staff to observe U.S.-ROK joint military exercises scheduled for July 25–28. July 27: Japan and China hold negotiations in Tokyo to implement the June 2008 agreement on joint development in the East China Sea. Aug. 10: PM Kan issues a statement apologizing to South Korea for Japan’s colonial rule of Korea. Aug. 27: The Council on National Security and Defense Capabilities in a New Era submits a report to PM Kan featuring recommendations for the new NDPG.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 81 Sept. 7: A Chinese fishing boat collides with a JCG ship in waters near the disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyutai Islands. Japanese authorities arrest and detain the Chinese captain and crew. Sept. 14: PM Kan defeats Ozawa Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election and is reelected as the DPJ president. Sept. 17: PM Kan reshuffles his cabinet. Sept. 20: China detains four Japanese nationals employed by Fujita Construction for entering a restricted military area without permission in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province. Sept. 21: China rules out a Wen-Kan meeting during the UN General Assembly in New York. Sept. 21: China halts rare-earth exports to Japan Sept. 22: PM Kan announces the “Kan Commitment,” an $8.5 billion pledge over five years in the fields of health and education to support the Millennium Development Goals. Sept. 23: President Obama and PM Kan meet in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Sept. 23: Secretary of State Clinton affirms that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty extends to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands; Secretary of Defense Gates makes similar statements. Sept. 24: Naha Public Prosecutor’s Office releases the Chinese fishing boat captain. Oct. 4: PM Kan and Chinese Premier Wen meet at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Brussels. Nov. 11: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visits Kunashiri Island, one of the disputed islands between Japan and Russia. Nov. 13: PM Kan and U.S. President Obama meet on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Yokohama. Nov. 13: PM Kan and Chinese President Hu meet during the APEC meeting in Yokohama. Nov. 14: ROK President Lee and PM Kan meet on the sidelines of the APEC meeting and sign a treaty that confirms the return of 1,205 Korean cultural treasures taken during Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. Nov. 22: Justice Minister Yanagida Minoru resigns after criticism of his remarks about Diet deliberations. Nov. 23: North Korea (DPRK) fires artillery shells at South Korea’s Yeongpyeong Island. Nov. 26: The upper house passes non-binding censure motions against Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito and Transportation Minister Mabuchi Sumio for their handling of a collision between a Chinese fishing boat and two JCG vessels near the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in September. Nov. 28: Nakaima Hirokazu is reelected as Okinawa governor, promising the relocation of the Futenma base outside Okinawa. Dec. 3-10: The United States and Japan conduct the bilateral military exercise Keen Sword 2011. Dec. 6: PM Kan announces plans to strengthen ties with the SDP and the PNP before the next Diet session. Dec. 7: The Kan administration decides not to relax the three arms export ban principles in the new NDPG. Dec. 14: The U.S. and Japan reach an agreement on Host Nation Support (HNS) for the next five years. Dec. 17: The Kan administration releases the 2010 NDPG. Dec. 17: PM Kan visits Okinawa to discuss the FRF issue with Governor Nakaima. Dec. 25: PM Kan requests the Sunrise Party of Japan (SPJ) to join the ruling coalition, but the SPJ rejects the invitation. 2011

82 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Jan. 10: DM Kitazawa and South Korean DM Kim Kwan-jin meet in Seoul to discuss closer bilateral military cooperation. Jan. 14: PM Kan reshuffles his cabinet. Jan. 31: Former DPJ President Ozawa is indicted for alleged involvement in a political funding scandal. Feb. 15: Japan and India sign a comprehensive economic partnership agreement. Feb. 22: DPJ suspends Ozawa Ichiro’s party membership. March 6: FM Maehara Seiji resigns for accepting political donations from a Korean national. March 11: PM Kan ackowledges that his campaign office received donations from a Korean national. March 11: A magnitude-9.0 earthquake strikes off the Tohoku region in Japan. March 19: PM Kan asks the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president, Tanigaki Sadakazu, to join the cabinet and form a grand coalition government between the DPJ and LDP. March 29: The fiscal year 2011 budget passes in the Diet, but the related deficit bond bill is left up in the air. May 2: Japan’s Diet passes the first supplementary budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-earthquake reconstruction. May 6: PM Kan orders the suspension of operations at the Hamaoka nuclear power plant southwest of Tokyo. May 21-22: PM Kan hosts the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit. May 26: PM Kan and President Obama meet on the margins of the G8 Summit in Deauville, France. June 2: PM Kan survives a no-confidence vote in the lower house, presented jointly by the LDP, Komeito (Clean Government Party), and the SPJ. June 8–9: PLAN warships transit in international waters between Okinotorishima and Miyakojima for an exercise in the western Pacific. June 21: U.S.-Japan 2+2 SCC is held in Washington, D.C., and issues a joint statement reaffirming common strategic objectives for the alliance. July 5: Reconstruction Minister Matsumoto Ryu resigns because of gaffes he committed in meetings with local government officials during a visit to the Tohoku region. July 13: PM Kan suggests Japan should end its reliance on nuclear power. July 25: The Diet passes the second supplementary budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-disaster reconstruction. Aug. 9: The DPJ, LDP, and Komeito agree to review promises made in the 2009 DPJ election manifesto. Aug. 26: The Diet passes legislation authorizing the issuance of bonds to fund the fiscal year 2011 budget, and PM Kan announces his resignation. Aug. 29: Noda Yoshihiko defeats Kaieda Banri in a runoff election and is elected as the DPJ president. Aug. 30: The Diet nominates Noda as prime minister. Sept. 2: PM Noda announces his cabinet. Sept. 11: Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Hachiro Yoshio resigns because of his remarks on the Fukushima nuclear power plant incident. Sept. 21: PM Noda and President Obama meet during the UN General Assembly in New York. Sept. 22: PM Noda and ROK President Lee meet during the UN General Assembly in New York. Sept. 23: PM Noda and Indian PM Manmohan Singh meet during the UN General Assembly in New York.

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 83 Sept. 27: PM Noda meets Philippine President Benigno Aquino in Tokyo, and they issue a joint statement on their strategic partnership. Oct. 19: PM Noda visits the ROK as his first bilateral foreign visit and meets President Lee in Seoul. Oct. 25: PM Noda meets U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in Tokyo. Oct. 31: PM Noda meets Vietnamese PM Nguyen Tan Dung in Tokyo, and they issue a joint statement promoting a strategic partnership. Nov. 1: Defense Minister Ichikawa Yasuo orders the SDF to begin the dispatch of an engineering unit to aid in humanitarian operations in South Sudan. Nov. 2: Defense Minister Ichikawa meets Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony in Tokyo. Nov. 12: PM Noda meets President Obama during the APEC meeting in Hawaii and announces Japan’s initial involvement in consultations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Nov. 12: PM Noda meets Chinese President Hu during the APEC meeting in Hawaii. This is the first bilateral summit between the two leaders. Nov. 15: The Noda cabinet decides to dispatch two GSDF officers to the UN PKO in South Sudan. Nov. 16: U.S. President Obama meets Australian PM Julia Gillard in Canberra and announces plans to station twenty-five hundred U.S. Marines on a rotating basis in Darwin, Australia. Nov. 18–19: PM Noda attends ASEAN meetings in Bali, Indonesia, including the East Asian Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit, and the Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit. Nov. 21: The Diet passes the third supplemental budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-disaster reconstruction. Nov. 23: Foreign Minister Gemba Koichiro visits China and discusses PM Noda’s possible visit to China by the end of 2011. Nov. 29: Defense Minister Ichikawa dismisses the director general of Okinawa Defense Bureau over indiscreet remark in connection with the FRF plan. Dec. 9: The upper house of Diet passes censure motions against Defense Minister Ichikawa Yasuo and Consumer Affairs Minister Yamaoka Kenji. Dec. 14-16: Japan, China, and South Korea conclude a study calling for a trilateral FTA. Dec. 18: PM Noda meets with South Korean President Lee in Kyoto. Dec. 19: The Noda administration decides to purchase the F-35 as its next-generation fighter to replace the F-4. Dec. 19: North Korean media report that DPRK leader Kim Jong Il died on Dec. 17. Dec. 19: The United States hosts Japan and India for the first-ever trilateral dialogue. Dec. 19: FM Gemba meets U.S. Secretary of State Clinton in Washington, D.C., to discuss the FRF, North Korea, and Iran issues. Dec. 20: The Noda administration approves plans to dispatch GSDF to South Sudan for peacekeeping activities under the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Dec. 25–26: PM Noda visits China and meets Premier Wen and President Hu. Dec. 27: Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu announces revision of the three principles on arms exports. Dec. 27–29: PM Noda visits New Delhi to meet Indian PM Singh. Dec. 28: The Noda administration submits an environmental appraisal for the FRF plan to the Okinawa prefectural government. Dec. 28: Nine DPJ lawmakers submit resignations from the DPJ to protest a planned consumption tax hike.

84 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY Dec. 29: North Korea holds a memorial service for Kim Jong-il and declares Kim Jong-un as the DPRK’s “supreme leader.” 2012 Jan. 5: President Obama announces a new defense strategy, focusing more on the Asia-Pacific region. Jan.12: U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner meets Finance Minister Azumi Jun in Tokyo and seeks Japanese cooperation with additional economic sanctions against Iran. Jan. 13: PM Noda reshuffles his cabinet. Jan. 17-19: Japan holds preliminary talks with Vietnam and Brunei on the TPP. Jan. 24: FM Gemba mentions the Dokdo/Takeshima issue in his policy speech in the Diet, and the ROK foreign ministry issues a statement of protest against Japan. Jan. 24–25: Japan holds preliminary talks with Chile and Peru on the TPP. Jan. 26: U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announces plan for defense budget cuts. Feb. 7: Japan holds preliminary talks with the United States on the TPP. Feb. 8: The United States and Japan issue a joint statement announcing a review of the current USFJ realignment plan in order to delink the FRF relocation and the USMC transfer to Guam.

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FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 97 plan again]. May 22. http://ryukyushimpo. anpo rongi kasoku” [Ozawa tries to negate jp/news/storyid-177359-storytopic-3.html impact of his remarks on USFJ reduction, (accessed January 17, 2012). but only heightens security debate inside ______. 2011b. “Henoko isetsu, dokoga yoto and outside the DPJ]. February 27, demo suishin, Maehara shi ga kyocho” 2009. http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ [Maehara says no matter which is a ruling situation/090227/stt0902272129008-n1. party, Henoko plan should be promoted]. htm] (accessed February 27, 2009). July 10. http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid- http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ 179167-storytopic-3.html (accessed January situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n1. 17, 2012). htm; http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ Sakaguchi Hirohiko. 2012a. “Tanaka boeisho: situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n2. bukishiyo kijun to yushutsu sangensoku htm; and http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ kondo, tv bangumi hatsugen” [Defense situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n3.htm. Minister Tanaka confused the SDF’s rules ______. 2009b. “Minshuto kaibo: Dai ichi bu of engagement with the arms ban export Seiken no katachi (2) Koryo naki seito” in the TV program]. Mainichi Shimbun. [DPJ Anatomy: Volume 1: Governance January 15. http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/ posture (2): Party without party line]. news/20120116k0000m010036000c.html March 3. http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ (accessed January 17, 2012). situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n1. ______. 2012b. “Zainichi beigun saihen: htm; http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ Futenma isetsu, rikai hete nennai chakko, situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n2. Tanaka boeisho ga genkyu” [USFJ htm; and http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ realignment: Defense Minister Tanaka says situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n3.htm the Futenma relocation facility construction (accessed March 3, 2009). begins this year by gaining Okinawa’s ______. 2009c. “Higashi Ajia Kyodotai koso understanding]. Mainichi Shimbun. ni Amerika kuwaezu, Okada gaisho” January 16. http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/ [Foreign Minister Okada says an East Asian news/20120116ddm001010082000c.html Community excludes the United States]. (accessed January 17, 2012). October 7. http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ Sakai Hiroshi and Yamamoto Yuji. 2011. policy/091007/plc0910072045012-n1.htm “Minshu hokai; kawaru tonai rikigaku, (accessed October 7, 2009). jakusho habatsu itten, shuyo posuto ______. 2009d. “Shamin kichi mondai de kakutoku de ikioi, Tarukoto guru-pu” PT tachiage, ichigatsu ni Guam shisatsu” [DPJ collapse: Balance of factional power [SDP establishes project team on the changes, small factions such as Tarutoko Futenma relocation facility, to send research group secure important posts and gain delegation to Guam in January]. December momentum]. Sankei Shimbun. March 24. http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ 10. http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ situation/091224/stt0912241259006-n1.htm news/110310/stt11031023350015-n1.htm (accessed December 24, 2009). (accessed March 10, 2011). ______. 2010a. “Nichibeichu wa seisankakukei Samuels, Richard J. 2007. Securing Japan: de, Koshiishi shi” [Koshiishi says US-Japan- Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future China relations should be equilateral/ of East Asia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell triangular]. February 17. http://sankei. University Press. jp.msn.com/politics/situation/100217/ Sankei Shimbun. 2009a. “Ozawa shi, hikeshini stt1002171923007-n1.htm (accessed yakki beigun shukusho hatsugen de tonaigai, February 17, 2010).

98 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY ______. 2010b. “Sudan PKO Boeisho matta October 27, 2011). de haken dannen, chisetsu na chosei, Secretariat of the International Peace kokusai shinyo teika ni kikikan” [Defense Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Minister stopped the Sudan PKO, Office. 2011. “Interim Report of the Study immature policy coordination, declining Group on Japan’s Engagement in UN international prestige]. July 13. http:// Peacekeeping Operations.” July 4. http:// sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/100713/ www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/info/pdf/20110711_ plc1007132034021-n1.htm (accessed July report.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011). 13, 2010). Seifu internet terebi [Government Internet TV]. ______. 2010c. “Minshu Koshiishi shi, 2010. “Press Conference by Chief Cabinet Nichibeichu wa seisankakukei de” [DPJ Secretary Yoshito Sengoku.” December 28. Koshiishi says US-Japan-China relations http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg4226. should be equilateral/triangular]. October html (accessed December 1, 2011). 7. http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ ______. 2011a. “Press Conference by Chief policy/101007/plc1010071942012-n1.html Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura.” (accessed October 7, 2010). September 6. http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/ ______. 2010d. “Hirano zen kanbo chokan ga prg/prg5258.html (accessed December 1, shin guru-pu setsuritsu, niju san nin sanka, 2011). Yushi-kai” [Former Chief Cabinet Secretary ______. 2011b. “Press Conference by Chief Hirano launches a new group “Yushi- Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura.” kai” with 23 DPJ members]. December September 8. http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/ 1. http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ eng/prg/prg2340.html (accessed December situation/101201/stt1012012359015-n1.htm 1, 2011). (accessed December 1, 2010). Sengoku Yasushi. 2010. “PKO haken, taibei ______. 2011a. “Afugan ikan haken sakiokuri kaizen nerau” [PKO dispatch, seeking Shusho, ketsudan sakeru” [Prime Minister to improve relations with the United Kan postpones his decision to dispatch SDF States]. Mainichi Shimbun. January 26. medical officers to Afghanistan]. January http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/ 12. http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/ news/20100126ddm002030097000c.html policy/110112/plc1101120115001-n1.htm (accessed January 26, 2010). (accessed January 12, 2011). Shugiin Kaigiroku [Transcript of the House of ______. 2011b. “PKO go gensoku minaoshi Representatives]. 2010. “Shugiin Gaimu ketsuron sakiokuri” [Conclusion on Iinkai Kaigiroku” [Transcript of the House the revision of the PKO Five Principles of Representatives Committee on Foreign was postponed]. July 5. http://sankei. Affairs]. Official website of the House of jp.msn.com/politics/news/110705/ Representatives. March 26. http://www. plc11070501140006-n1.htm (accessed July shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_ 5, 2011). kaigiroku.htm (accessed February 6, 2012). Sasaki Mie. 2011. “Niekiranu Tanigaki shi ni Smith, Sheila A. 2011. “Is Japan’s New PM iradatsu Komei, hajo kogeki, ki wo issureba a ‘Nationalist’ or a ‘Moderate’?” Asia mo chansu nashi” [Toward the submission Unbound (blog of Council of Foreign of the no-confidence motion: The Komeito Relations). September 1. http://blogs.cfr. gets frustrated with hesitant LDP President org/asia/2011/09/01/is-japans-new-pm- Tanigaki]. Sankei Shimbun. May 28. http:// a-nationalist-or-a-moderate/#more-5370 sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/110528/ (accessed November 3, 2011). stt11052801310002-n1.htm (accessed

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 99 Sneider, Daniel. 2011. “The New Asianism: Afghanistan for training purposes this year]. Japanese Foreign Policy under the October 15. http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/ Democratic Party of Japan.” Asia Policy, no. article/2010101401000959.html (accessed 12 (July): 99–129. October 15, 2010). Tarutoko Shinji. 2002. Future Prime Ministers ______. 2011a. “Kankoku kyoikusho ga Mirai Sori [young Diet members’ email Takeshima homon kyokasho mondai de magazine] 7. October 14. http://www.rosetta. taikosochi ka” [South Korean minister jp/mirai/m007.html (accessed February 6, of education visited Takeshima as a 2012). countermeasure against the textbook ______. 2003. Future Prime Ministers Mirai Sori issue?]. April 1. http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/ 22. February 3. http://www.rosetta.jp/mirai/ article/2011040101001023.html (accessed m022.html (accessed February 6, 2012). April 1, 2011). Tera Kotaro and Toru Higashioka. 2009. ______. 2011b. “Kokunan norikoeru seiken wa, “Futenma kyogi, Shusho, Nichibei goi wa daishinsai to Kan naikaku” [Administration zentei denai” [On the Futenma working capable of overcoming national crisis? Great group consultation, Prime Minister disaster and Kan administration]. Editorial. Hatoyama says the Henoko option is not April 30. http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/ the premise]. Asahi Shimbun. November 14. column/editorial/CK2011043002000068. http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1114/ html (accessed December 1, 2011). TKY200911140370.html (accessed Tomita Keiichiro. 2011. “Buki yushutsu san November 14, 2009) gensoku: sono genkyo to minaoshi rongi” Terashima, Jitsuro. 2010. “Joshiki ni kaeru ishi [Three principles of arms export: Current to koso: Nichibei Domei no saikouchiku ni situations and reviews]. Chosa to Joho [Issue mukete” [Will and initiative to return to a Brief], no. 726 (National Diet Library). common sense: Reconstructing the Japan- November 1. http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/ U.S. alliance]. Sekai [The World] 801 publication/issue/pdf/0726.pdf (accessed (February): 118–25. November 8, 2011). Teruya Kantoku. 2011. Official blog of Toonippo. 2010. “Shin boeitaiko kettei, seiji Kantoku Teruya (Social Democratic Party). shudo, jittai wa meisou” [New NDPG November 2. http://terukan.blog44.fc2.com/ issued, politician-led decision making blog-entry-917.html (accessed November wandered in reality]. December 17. http:// 17, 2011). www.toonippo.co.jp/tokushuu/danmen/ Tokyo daigaku Taniguchi kenkyushitsu danmen2010/1217.html (accessed [University of Tokyo Taniguchi Laboratory] December 17, 2010). and Asahi Shimbun. 2009 and 2010. “Tokyo ______. 2011. “Komei ni shusenron, soki kaisan daigaku Taniguchi kenkyushitsu Asahi de tozei kaifukkatsu nerau” [The Komeito Shimbun kyodo (seijika or yoron) chosa” seeks an early dissolution of lower house [University of Tokyo Taniguchi Laboratory to recover lost seats in 2009]. February and Asahi Shimbun Joint Opinion Research 22. http://www2.toonippo.co.jp/tokushuu/ on Politicians and the Public]. http://www. seikyoku/20110222.html (accessed October masaki.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ats/atsindex.html 27, 2011). (accessed February 6, 2012). United Nations. 2011. The Ranking of Military Tokyo Shimbun. 2010. “Afugan he boei ikan and Police Contributions to UN Operations: ra ju nin haken kyoiku kunren de nennai Monthly Report. October 31. http://www. nimo” [The Kan administration considers un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/ the dispatch of ten SDF medical officers to oct11_2.pdf (accessed December 16, 2011).

100 FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Yamagata Shimbun. 2011. “Kano guru-pu, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public meisho wa Soko-kai, kayo ni teiteikai, Affairs). 2009. “Joint Press Conference yakuin mo seishiki kettei” [Kano group with Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi named ‘Soko-kai’ holds a regular meeting on Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Robert Tuesdays, and decided directors]. September Gates.” October 21. http://www.defense.gov/ 16. http://yamagata-np.jp/news/201109/16/ transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4501 kj_2011091601567.php (accessed January (accessed November 3, 2011). 17, 2012). U.S. Department of Defense. 2010. Yomiuri Shimbun. 2009. “Fukushima toshu, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Futenma genko an nara renritsu ridatsu February. http://www.defense.gov/qdr/ shisa” [SDP President Fukushima suggests images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf departure from the ruling coalition if (accessed November 8, 2011). the current Henoko option is taken]. ______. 2012. Sustaining U.S. Global December 3. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/ Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century politics/news/20091203-OYT1T00347.htm Defense. January. http://www.defense.gov/ (accessed December 3, 2009). news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf ______. 2010a. “Sudan PKO heno Rikuji (accessed February 3, 2012). heri butai, haken miokuri” [The Kan U.S. Department of State. 2010. “Joint Press administration decided not to dispatch Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister the GSDF helicopter unit to the Sudan Seiji Maehara.” October 27. http://www. PKO]. July 13. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/ state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150110.htm politics/news/20100713-OYT1T00743.htm (accessed November 8, 2011). (accessed July 13, 2010). Vogel, Steven. 2010. “Japan’s Long Road to ______. 2010b. “Manifesto taiketsu, shusei no Competitive Politics.” Current History 109, Shusho vs kaiki no Ozawa shi” [Manifesto no. 728 (September): 232–236. Confrontation: Kan for reshape vs. Washington Post. 2009. “Shake-Up in Ozawa for return]. August 29. http://www. Japan: Two parties are better than one.” yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20100806-849918/ September 1. http://www.washingtonpost. news/20100829-OYT1T00410.htm com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/ (accessed October 27, 2011). AR2009083103044_pf.html (accessed ______. 2010c. “Chugoku wa ashiki rinjin, November 3, 2011). hochishugi nashi” [China is a menacing Yamada Muru. 2010. “Kan shusho: Hochu neighbor and lacks rule of law]. October miokuri Hatoyama shi dairi kento” 2. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/ [Prime Minister Kan passes his visit to news/20101002-OYT1T00660.htm China, and instead sends Hatoyama (accessed October 2, 2010). as his deputy]. Mainichi Shimbun. ______. 2010d. “Minshu de habatsuka kasoku?, June 7. http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/ kakemochi giin ni fumie” [Accelerating news/20100607dde001010038000c.html factionalization in the DPJ?: A litmus test to (accessed June 7, 2010). dual membership]. October 21. http://www. Yomaguchi Tsuyoshi. 2010. “Katsudo houkoku” yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20100806-849918/ [Activity report]. Official website of news/20101021-OYT1T00942.htm Yomaguchi Tsuyoshi (Democratic Party (accessed October 27, 2011). of Japan). June 15. http://www.mission21. ______. 2010e. “Seiji shudo nante ukatsunakoto gr.jp/archives/618.html (accessed February itta, Edano shi” [Edano admits the DPJ 6, 2012). said such a thoughtless thing as politician- led decision making]. November 14. http://

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 101 www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20101114- Yoneyama Nobuo. 2011. “National Strategy OYT1T00509.htm (accessed October 27, Council to Be Launched.” Japan Digest, no. 2011). 67. October 14. ______. 2011a. “Komeito nai de hiromaru mudo, soreha kenKan” [Anti-Kan mood is spreading inside the Komeito]. April 16. http://www. yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20110416- OYT1T00587.htm (accessed April 16, 2011). ______. 2011b. “Naikaku seito shiji to kanren mondai: nisen juichi nen hachi gatsu denwa zenkoku yoron chosa” [Cabinet and political parties approval ratings and related issues: August 2011 national public poll]. August 8. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/ koumoku/20110808.htm (accessed January 17, 2012). ______. 2011c. “Noda oroshi ni naranai? TPP shinchoha ni ondosa” [Difference inside the anti-TPP group prevents the anti-Noda movement?]. October 22. http://www. yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20111022- OYT1T00190.htm (accessed October 22, 2011). ______. 2011d. “TPP jiku ni Nichibei renkei kyoka, Shushohosakan ga igi kyocho” [Advisor to the Prime Minister emphasizes the importance of the TPP to strengthen U.S.-Japan cooperation]. November 1. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/ politics/news/20111101-OYT1T00999.htm (accessed November 1, 2011). ______. 2011e. “Seiji: Nisen juichi nen juichi gatsu mensetu zenkoku yoron chosa” [Politics: November 2011 national public poll by interview]. November 12– 13, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/ fe6100/koumoku/20111125.htm (accessed December 16, 2011). ______. 2011f. “Delivery Concerns Cloud F-35 Jet Pick / Fears U.S. Deadline Vow Could Be Scuttled by Production Delays, Impact of Euro Crisis.” December 15. http://www. yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111214004545. htm (accessed December 16, 2011). About the Author

Weston S. Konishi is director of Asia-Pacif- ic studies at IFPA, where he specializes in Ja- pan and Asia policy issues. In 2009, he served as an analyst in Asian affairs at the Congressio- nal Research Service (CRS), authoring Japan’s Historic 2009 Elections: Implications for U.S. In- terests, the first report to Congress focusing on the Democratic Party of Japan. From 2007 to 2008, Weston was a Council on Foreign Rela- tions/Hitachi International Affairs fellow in Ja- pan, conducting research on Japanese foreign and defense policies at the Tokyo-based Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS). From 2004 to 2007, he served as director of pro- grams at the Mansfield Foundation, where he oversaw the foundation’s exchanges, policy dialogues, research projects, and development activities. From 2000 to 2008, Weston was a monthly contributing columnist on regional affairs for the Daily Yomiuri. He is a member of the United States Council for Security Coopera- tion in the Asia Pacific (USCSCAP) and a member of the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future. Weston received his BA and MA from the Inter- national Christian University in Mitaka, Tokyo, where he was awarded a Monbusho (Ministry of Education) Scholarship.

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