The Paradox of Antimilitarism: Civil-Military Relations in Post World War II Japan Takako Hikotani Submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2014 Copyright 2014 Takako Hikotani All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT The Paradox of Antimilitarism: Civil-Military Relations in Post World War II Japan Takako Hikotani The changing security environment in Asia has led to a renewed interest in the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). However, the SDF itself remains a black box: assessed either in terms of its problematic legal standing or physical military capacity, but with limited understanding of the people within; who they are, what they do, and how they think. This dissertation opens up the black box and brings the SDF officers into the analysis of civil-military relations in post-war Japan. I present a theoretical framework inspired by principal-agent theory, in which I hypothesize that the type of control (ex-ante or ex-post) and preference divergence between the civilians and the military produces four different outcomes in civil-military relations: containment, auto pilot, conflictual, and cooperative (possibly excessive). I examine how civil-military relations in Japan evolved over time and across three realms of defense policy making, budget, personnel, and use of force; utilizing the findings from an opinion survey conducted among SDF officers and civilian elite addressing the “civil-military gap,” oral history records of former SDF leaders and civilian defense officials, and interviews with active duty SDF officers and civilian officials. My research shows that civil-military relations in Japan was generally calm, not because the ex-ante constraints were strong and suppressed the opposing views of the SDF, but because the policy preferences of SDF officers and civilian bureaucracy converged in support of the alliance relationship with the United States. Such preference convergence made it possible for the politicians to continue “auto-pilot control” of the SDF, which was convenient for politicians who preferred to avoid dealing with military matters in face of the anti-militaristic public. However, this led to two paradoxical outcomes: (1) the SDF came to enjoy their relative autonomy within the ex-ante constraints, and (2) the ex-ante constraints turned out to be self-binding for politicians, possibly hampering their ability to control the SDF ex-post. Institutional changes through the electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s along with the perceived changes in the security environment surrounding Japan enhanced both the incentive and capacity of politicians to release the ex-ante constraints and to control the SDF in their own hands. Re-interpretation of the constitution to allow for collective self defense is a step in the same direction. Looking towards the future, the shift from ex-ante to ex-post control may result in tension between the civilians and SDF officers, in cases where their preferences diverge. Table of Contents List of Tables and Figures ………………………………………………………………………ii Chapter One: Introduction ……………………..………………………………………….…1 Chapter Two: The Institutions of Civilian Control: From Ex-ante to Ex-post Control……..23 Chapter Three: Personnel …………………………………………………………………….61 Chapter Four: Budget……………………………...……………………………………….110 Chapter Five: Use of Force………………………………...………………………………131 Chapter Six: Is There a Civil-Military Gap in Japan? ………………...…………………164 Chapter Seven: Conclusion …………………………………………………………………191 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………….196 Appendix: Survey Questionnaire and Results of the 2004 Survey on the Japan Self Defense Forces and Society in the Post Cold-War Era (Submitted as a supplemental PDF file)………………………………………………………204 i List of Tables and Figures Table 1-1 Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Civilian Control Mechanisms …………………...…….5 Table 1-2 Civil-Military Preference Divergence…………………………………..……10 Table 1-3 Preference Divergence and Types of Control…………………………….….13 Table 1-4 Preference Divergence and Types of Control: Japan’s Case……………..…..17 Figure 2-1 Civilian Control: People, Money, or Law? .....................................................35 Figure 2-2 SDF and Defense in Diet Deliberations ……………………………………..37 Table 2-1 Profiles of the Japan Defense Agency Ministers………………………...…..50 Table 3-1 Colonization and Decolonalization of Japan Defense Agency / Ministry of Defense Part 1 ……………………………………………………………….61 Table 3-2 Colonization Decolonalization of Japan Defesen Agency / Ministry of Defense Part 2 ……………………………………………………………….64 Table 3-3 Percentage of Former Imperial Army / Navy Officers, by rank (1954) ……..87 Table 3-4 Educational Background of SDF Officers in Leadership Positions …………87 Table 3-5 Educational Background of SDF Leadership ……………………………….88 Figure 3-1 Number of Applicants to NDA and Officer Candidate Schools……………..92 Figure 3-2 Competitiveness of NDA according to College Preparatory School ………..93 Table 3-6 Percentage of NDA and Non-NDA Graduates: CGS Admission, Fast Track Promotion …………………………………………………………………..97 Table 3-7 National Safety Agency Ordinance 9 ………………………………………100 Figure 4-1 The National Defense Program Guidelines: The Conceptual Basis ……….119 Figure 4-2 The Supplemental List to the National Defense Program Guidelines……...120 Figure 4-3 Evolution of Defense Policy Making Strudture …………………………....121 Figure 4-4 Annual Budget Making Process ……………………………………………122 Table 5-1: Constitutional Intepretation / Enabling Legislation on the Use of Force ….135 Table 5-2: Casualty Aversion: Civil-Military Gap? …………………………………...153 Table 5-3: Casualty Aversion: Perceptions of Civilian Casualty Tolerance …………...154 Table 5-4: Casualty Aversion: Cross Services Differences? ………….. ……………..156 Table 5-5: Casualty Aversion: Difference by Rank? ………………………………….158 Table 5-6: Casualty Aversion: Likelihood of Overseas Deployment………………….159 Table 5-7: Casualty Aversion: US-Japanese Comparisons ………………..………...162 Table 6-1: 2004 Civil-Military Survey: Respondants ………………...……………..174 Table 6-2: What is the Japanese Public’s Impression of the SDF? ……………………174 ii Table 6-3: Mutual Image of Civilians and SDF Officers …………………….………..176 Table 6-4: Relationship between the SDF and Society ………………………………..177 Figure 6-1: How to Keep Japan Safe …………………………………………………...180 Figure 6-2: Does the US-Japan Alliance contribute to the security of Japan? …………181 Figure 6-3: The Role of SDF: Current ……………………………………………….…182 Figure 6-4: The Role of the SDF : Future …………………………….………………...182 Figure 6-5: Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations ………………………….….183 Figure 6-6: Factors for Sending SDF Abroad …………………………………………..184 Table 6-6: Role of SDF in Society, Relationship between SDF and Political Leaders ..186 Table 6-7: Roles SDF Leaders should play when SDF troops are to be deployed …....187 iii Chapter One Introduction The Self Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan is one of the most discussed yet the least understood actor in Japanese Politics. Just over a decade ago, a widely read book on Japanese security policy stated that “short of domestic revolution, it is virtually impossible for an autonomous military establishment to reemerge. (Katzenstein,1998)” The SDF was described to be “fenced in” by constitutional and legal constraints, an intrusive civilian bureaucracy and most importantly, by the anti-militaristic public. Now, the SDF seems to have jumped out of the fence and captured people’s attention, with its images shown on many recent books on the “rise” of Japan as a “military power.” Still, the SDF itself remains a black box: assessed either in terms of its problematic legal standing or physical military capacity, but very little discussion over who they are, what they do, and how they think. This dissertation aims to rectify such omission by bringing the Self Defense Force officers into the analysis of civil-military relations of post war Japan. I challenge the commonly held assumption that the SDF officers are always aggressive yet insignificant actors in the defense policy making process, and that the Japanese case is a unique case that requires a deep cultural explanation, mostly incomparable to other countries. Instead, I will first present a theoretical framework inspired by principal-agent theory that explains why “containing” the SDF was a politically cost-effective way for politicians to control the SDF in the short run, but has paradoxically led to the creation of a relatively autonomous SDF within its limits, and weakened the ability of politicians to control the SDF in the long run. 1 I will then turn to the military (SDF) side of the civil-military relationship. I will conduct an opinion survey among the elite SDF officers to examine the extent of civil-military convergence or divergence (gap) at three levels: (1) who they are: socio-demographic profile, political beliefs, confidence in the military and attitudes towards domestic and foreign policy issues, (2) policies they prefer: preference divergence or convergence over national security policy, in realms of threat assessment, defense resources, force maintenance and force employment, and (3) what they believe the role of the military (SDF) should be in the defense policy making process. My aim is to examine whether the apparent calm in civil-military relations in post-war Japan was due to successful “containment” of the SDF officers despite their differences in preferred policy, or because the preferred policies of the civilian elite and