Why Culture, Not Economics, Drives American Politics

The National Populist Illusion: Why Culture, Not Economics, Drives American Politics

George Hawley* and Richard Hanania+

Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology

Report No. 1

November 30, 2020

* Associate Professor, University of Alabama; Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology. + President, Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology.

Summary

During the Trump presidency, some of the most interesting and innovative thinking on the center right has come from writers and politicians sometimes called “national populists.” This group challenges Republican orthodoxy on questions of economics and suggests that a new policy agenda, focused more on working-class concerns, could realign the U.S. electorate. We consider the plausibility of their claims, examining the relevant scholarly literature and recent trends among voters. The data show that most voters who supported Trump were overwhelmingly driven by cultural rather than economic concerns. This implies that the national populist vision is unlikely to provide major electoral gains for the Republican Party. Trump’s popularity among his supporters suffered very little due to his governing mostly as a conventional Republican politician, and those of his party who have adopted more redistributive voting patterns in Congress in recent years have not realized resulting gains at the ballot box. In fact, the American public gave Trump higher marks on the economy than any other major issue, contradicting the claim that more free market economic policies create an electoral cost. We also note that continuity with previous trends, rather than electoral realignment, was the norm in recent election cycles, meaning that the idea that there has been a major shift towards Republicans becoming the “working class party” is mostly a myth. Republican success in the future will depend on the party speaking to the cultural, rather than economic, concerns of its voters, whether symbolically or in more tangible terms. This can mean championing issues that Republicans have ignored in recent years like opposition to affirmative action, in addition to facilitating the kind of backlash politics towards cultural liberalism among non-white voters that has worked so well among whites in recent decades. Economic policies that seek to address working-class concerns but hinder overall growth can alienate both voters and donors for little gain.

Following President Trump’s victory could only be successful if he pursued in the 2016 presidential primaries, many populist policies.2 voices on the American right began arguing With Trump’s loss in 2020, some that the Republican Party, and the conservatives may be tempted to view the conservative movement that provides its last four years as an aberration, and ideas, had lost their way. Trump handily conclude that, given the president’s defeat at defeated a large and seemingly formidable the ballot box, Trumpism is dead, and the field in the primaries, and subsequently center right can and should return to its defied expectations by triumphing over previous talking points and policy agenda. Hillary Clinton, winning many states long Other conservatives, however, remain thought to be solidly Democratic. Trump convinced that there are elements of won these victories while rejecting key Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign that aspects of the conservative movement’s remain viable and should be incorporated policy program, especially those related to into a new, forward-thinking agenda for the economics. Trump’s impressive showing center right. In particular, they want to among non-Hispanic whites without college revive those aspects of Trump’s successful degrees provided some credibility to former presidential run that broke with conservative Trump advisor Steve Bannon’s claim that economic orthodoxy. From this perspective, the 2016 campaign “turned the Republican Trump won the 2016 election precisely Party into a working-class party.”1 because of his populist economic agenda: This led to some soul-searching by trade protectionism, a promise of new conservative intellectuals, journalists, and infrastructure projects, and assurances that political leaders. Most leading conservatives he would safeguard entitlement programs were quick to distance themselves from the like Medicare and Social Security. This most lowbrow elements of “Trumpism.” view also suggests Trump lost his reelection Some, however, also believed that the bid because he did not follow through on candidate was tapping into something those promises, but other Republicans could important that previous Republicans had pick up the populist banner and carry it to missed. Perhaps a GOP more invested in future victories.3 alleviating working-class anxieties really This new ideology on the right, could enjoy a major electoral windfall. which some call “national populism,” has After Trump’s victory, as these many seemingly attractive features. Most conservatives sought to reverse engineer an notably, it offers the possibility of intellectually coherent political philosophy maintaining the Trump electoral coalition, that could provide support for the Trump and perhaps even expanding it, while administration, many focused on economic jettisoning the more controversial and concerns, concluding that populism polarizing elements of Trump’s presidency. represented a viable path forward for the Some intellectuals and journalists on the right. One of this report’s co-authors was political right have always disliked what among the voices claiming that Trump’s they see as President Trump’s nativism, victory represented a repudiation of the bullying, lies, and eagerness to encourage conservative movement’s economic agenda, the paranoid fixations and rude behavior of and explicitly argued in 2017 that Trump his followers. They did, however, think that the mainstream conservative movement had

long been on the wrong track when it came defeated by a moderate Democrat, the policy to policy, and believed that Trump’s agendas for both major parties are up for movement could be a catalyst for readjusting grabs. More traditional Republicans, who the Republican Party’s domestic policy never supported President Trump, view his agenda. defeat as a vindication, and believe the Several important thinkers have Republican Party can return to its previous sought to create a governing philosophy and agenda. Republican supporters of economic policy agenda designed to alleviate middle- populism, on the other hand, can argue that America’s many problems. Julius Krein the president’s failure to implement his 2016 founded the highbrow journal American campaign promises sunk his reelection Affairs, which has published some of the prospects. Proponents of both positions have most interesting work of the Trump era. reasonable arguments, and both sides still Krein has explicitly stated that he has little deserve a fair hearing. interest in culture war issues, and his vision Leaving aside the merits of different for a populist agenda largely entails economic policy packages, our question is technocratic issues such as strengthening the whether any of these arguments are industrial base of the U.S.4 Oren Cass, the congruent with the public opinion literature founder of American Compass, has been and empirical evidence. To learn the answer, similarly energetic during the Trump years, we must know whether Trumpism was ever promoting an industrial policy that goes really about economics. We conclude that beyond the conservative movement’s talk of a Republican populist coalition supposed doctrinaire obsession with free dominated by working-class voters is markets. Cass is also a long-time political premature. The data do not indicate a new advisor who has worked with Republicans class-based electoral realignment. Racial, such as Senator Marco Rubio of Florida.5 ethnic, geographic, and religious cleavages Other prominent voices have argued in the electorate remain more politically that the Democrats have suffered declining significant than economic divisions. support because they abandoned bread-and- butter, working-class economic concerns in Economic Explanations for Trump’s 2016 favor of boutique identity issues that do not Victory resonate with ordinary voters. Tucker Carlson of Fox News, for example, has After 2016, there were several made arguments along these lines.6 Senator quantitative studies suggesting there was an Josh Hawley has similarly said that the economic dimension to Trump’s political Republican economic agenda must success. Most of their conclusions have champion the working classes, and break the turned out to be misleading. For example, “arrogant aristocracy” with a hold on both after analyzing the geographic distribution parties.7 Senator Rubio urges fellow of Trump’s support in the 2016 Iowa Republicans to reject “market caucuses, Jeff Guo noted in The Washington fundamentalism” and adopt more populist Post that Trump had stronger support in stances on issues such as trade lest they lose poorer counties that were losing population. Trump’s voters.8 Trump had particularly strong showings in With the Trump Administration counties where the death rate for middle- coming to an end after a single term, aged whites was high.9 After Super Tuesday,

Guo showed that this trend was not limited has the average productivity of American to Iowa. He found the same tendency in all workers, but that growth has not translated states that provided county-level primary into wages that have kept pace for most election data. Guo concluded, “We still don't Americans.13 Trump’s strong performance know what exactly is causing middle-aged among whites without a college degree white death rates to rise, but it seems that seems to further reinforce the claim that Donald Trump has adeptly channeled this economic anxiety drove his popularity. white suffering into political support.”10 Measuring changes in economic Political commentator Andrew well-being over the course of several Sullivan similarly wrote, after the decades is challenging, as conclusions will Republicans seemed to overperform in differ according to the measure used.14 November’s elections, that while “Trump” Academic debates about how well-off was gone, “Trumpism” lived on in the GOP Americans are today compared to the distant and as a political force.11 According to past are largely beside the point. Perceptions Charles Murray, a fellow at the American matter more than objective reality. Enterprise Institute and a critic of Trump, Regardless of which measure of living economic social trends were a main cause of standards is most reflective of real economic Trump’s unexpected rise. He suggested that well-being, large percentages of Americans while racism and xenophobia may have feel that the days of consistent upward motivated many Trump voters, this was not mobility are over. This is especially true for the entire story: young people. A 2016 poll of Millennials asked whether the “American Dream” was But the central truth of Trumpism as alive or dead for them personally.15 Among a phenomenon is that the entire Americans between the ages of 18 and 29, American working class has 48 percent declared that it was “dead,” legitimate reasons to be angry at the including 61 percent of that group that ruling class. During the past half- supported Trump. century of economic growth, As further evidence that it was virtually none of the rewards have economic anxiety rather than cultural issues gone to the working class. The driving Trumpism, one could note that economists can supply caveats and Trump’s victory was, in part, explained by refinements to that statement, but the new Republican voters who had previously bottom line is stark: The real family supported Democrats – including President income of people in the bottom half Obama. The fact that these voters had of the income distribution hasn’t recently voted for the nation’s first African increased since the late 1960s.12 American president provided prima facie evidence that their votes were not This point about stagnating incomes predominantly inspired by racial anxieties. is potentially important. Although many Furthermore, in contrast to doomsayers who aggregate numbers for the U.S. economy insisted that Trump’s victory represented a suggest that the nation has been generally sharp turn toward racial prejudice in the well off, other data demonstrate real American electorate, polling data indicated economic problems. The U.S. economy has that white Americans had been becoming, grown enormously over recent decades, as

on average, progressively less prejudiced in was unquestionably a stronger predictor of the years leading up to 2016. support for the president.20 The fact that Trump performed well among whites of The Triumph of Cultural Explanations lower social status may also be misleading, as this group also had a very low turnout Since the 2016 election, social rate in 2016. According to some measures, a scientists have devoted an extraordinary majority of Trump’s support came from amount of effort towards explaining whites in the class distribution’s top half.21 President Trump’s surprise victory. They The question of whether economic anxiety have consistently found that racial or prompted support for Trump is also more cultural explanations for Trump’s win are complicated than many national populists supported by more evidence than the suggest. Many Trump supporters were alternatives. primarily motivated by the fear of declining It is true that white racial attitudes group status resulting from demographic have become more progressive on most change, rather than more conventional issues over the last decade.16 However, the pocketbook concerns.22 The idea that voters movement has been primarily among white supported Trump’s immigration Democrats; although Republicans have not restrictionist agenda for cultural or racial become more progressive, they have not reasons, rather than economic insecurity, is become, on average, more prejudiced.17 The reinforced by similar research on right-wing claim that racial attitudes could not have populism in Europe.23 been the motivation of Obama voters that The data showing that Trump switched to Trump may nonetheless be performed especially well in many places incorrect. Racial attitudes were just less suffering economic decline were also salient in 2012 than in 2016.18 In other correct. However, the fact that poorer words, the people who switched support counties disproportionately supported from Democrat to Republican did have more Trump is not proof that Trump’s supporters conservative racial attitudes than other were disproportionately poor. It may be Democrats in 2012, but those attitudes were inappropriate to use a single, nationwide less relevant to their vote choice that year. measure of income to determine a person’s In the 2016 election, racial attitudes were relative affluence, as different cities, states, more activated and relevant to vote choice, and regions vary wildly in their cost of likely due to Trump’s taking up the living.24 A six-figure income in San immigration issue and running as an Francisco will lead to a very different unapologetic opponent of political standard of living than a similar income in correctness. rural Missouri. Although Trump supporters Other scholars have thus confirmed did not tend to be wealthy by national that racial and immigration attitudes, rather standards in 2016, they were typically the than economic views, explained some more affluent people living in their ZIP Obama voters backing Trump in 2016.19 codes. Furthermore, although Trump Although economic insecurity may have performed well among the white working played some role in President Trump’s class, this was simply a continuation of success, it was a small part of the story; trends that predated his entry into politics. In skepticism about large-scale immigration

other words, this is a group that Republicans elections. President Trump increased his have been consolidating for decades.25 share of the minority vote compared to There is an additional problem with 2016, but lost support from non-Hispanic the claim that Trump’s support was driven whites. Furthermore, as had been the case in by his economic populist promises. As 2016, President Trump performed very well pointed out by Aaron Sibarium, writing for among white voters without a college the American Compass, Trump largely degree, suggesting the generalization of the failed to implement the policy agenda he Republicans as the party of the rich and promoted during the 2016 campaign, yet white was no longer valid. An examination most of his voters maintained their high of the 2020 exit polls conducted by CNN, level of support.26 During the first two years however, does not provide strong evidence of his term, President Trump largely of a class-based realignment in voting.30 deferred to the Republican-controlled Trump carried voters without a college Congress on matters of domestic policy.27 degree by only two points. Biden won a His most significant domestic legislative majority of the votes from people making accomplishment created tax cuts for less than $100,000 per year; Trump won a individuals and corporations that majority of those making more. The disproportionately favored the rich. The relationship between income and Trump administration supported an presidential vote choice furthermore does attempted rollback of the Affordable Care not appear linear. Biden beat Trump in the Act that would have made major cuts in lowest income group, but performed slightly Medicaid, significantly gutting the social better among those making between $50,000 safety net without putting forward anything and $100,000 per year. to replace it. These failures to follow The biggest divides in vote choice in through on economic populism did not the U.S. remain between demographic apparently hinder the president’s approval groups not defined exclusively by with his base. Shortly before the 2020 economics–that is by race, ethnicity, and general election, polling indicated that a religion instead, in addition to those of majority of Americans either strongly or differing cultural attitudes. Whereas 58 somewhat approved of Trump’s handling of percent of non-Hispanic white voters the economy.28 There are many possible supported Trump in 2020, he only earned 26 explanations for Trump’s loss, but the percent of the minority vote. Although the evidence that his economic policy latter represents an improvement for Trump commitments were the culprit appears weak. compared to 2016, it still indicates high Following the 2020 presidential levels of racial polarization in voting. election, Senator Rubio was repeating what Religion also remains a major cleavage. had become a kind of conventional wisdom Sixty percent of Protestants supported on the right when he declared that the Trump, compared to just 31% of those with Republicans could become “a multiethnic, no religious affiliation. Cultural differences multiracial, working-class party.”29 The therefore remain a crucial fault line in 2020 election seemed to show the American politics. Furthermore, if there is emergence of new political cleavages one party presently situated to be the long- because the electorate was less racially term home of working-class voters, it is the polarized than it was in previous presidential Democrats. We have witnessed some

movement in a handful of demographic probability of voting Trump in 2016 groups when it comes to vote choice, but for changed based on income and attitudes the last several election cycles we have seen towards immigration among white more continuity than drastic change.31 Americans. Among those who were most Two figures below show what accepting of immigration, fewer than 10% happens when we compare theories of were Trump voters, compared to over 80% voting based on socio-economic status to among whites most opposed to immigration. those based on identity and demographic The impacts of income are barely noticeable variables in determining support for in the data. President Trump.32 Figure 1 shows how the

Figure 1

Figure 2 shows how white Americans variables, that is, an individual’s sex, age, responded to a question about how warmly and religion. Finally, there is education, and they felt about then-candidate Trump, given then income, which has for all practical during the 2016 Republican primaries, based purposes zero discernible effect. on a regression that included variables related to various attitudes, identity categories, and socio-economic status. As can be seen, cultural attitudes in the form of feelings towards political correctness, immigration, and white identity, have the largest effects. Next come demographic

Figure 2

Economic Theories of Voting economics assumed that voters were fundamentally self-interested, making Political scientists have long debated decisions according to their own economic the role of economic evaluations in vote portfolios. However, empirical studies of choice and party identification. No scholars voter behavior have found only modest question whether economic indicators evidence for this claim.37 It appears that influence election outcomes–they obviously perceptions about the overall health of the do. The question is how voters are swayed economy are stronger predictors of vote by macroeconomic conditions and economic choice. policies. Do voters decide based on changes If voters respond to macroeconomic to their own economic circumstances trends, which measures do they use to make (“pocketbook” or “egotropic” voting),33 or their decisions? Income inequality, though are they looking at the nation’s overall an important subject, does not appear to economic trajectory, regardless of their have a strong effect on elections or to be a personal financial situation (“sociotropic” primary cause of political polarization.38 voting).34 Are economic voters making There is some evidence that inflation can decisions based on the most recent economic influence election outcomes, but this may developments, punishing or rewarding vary by which party is in office.39 There is incumbents based on economic also evidence that unemployment can performance,35 or are they looking toward influence elections, but only Republicans the future, voting for the candidate or party suffer when unemployment is high. In other they think is most likely to boost the words, such results are not consistent across economy?36 Early scholarship on voting and studies, and one should not put too much

stock in such measures as fundamentally voter can follow. They may notice if their driving election results. The overall level of tax burden goes down, or if they start growth, however, has important benefiting from a new government program. consequences for an incumbent’s chances of Specific groups with a concentrated interest winning reelection, both in the U.S. and in a policy debate will notice if they are abroad.40 helped or harmed by policies–farmers are a Trump’s strength on the economy in notable example of this. However, the kinds 2020 can be tied to strong fundamentals, of technocratic, byzantine policies promoted with a majority of Americans saying that by the smartest national populists are not their economic situation improved under his likely to garner much interest from the presidency.41 It is less obvious that specific electorate. Their policy proposals may be policies matter, aside from their relationship sound, but they will probably not inspire a to subsequent economic developments. Do mass movement or change electoral voters make decisions based on economic outcomes. policy? There is some debate about whether This is not to say that politicians can most issues matter much at all when it implement any policies they want without comes to vote choice. Most political fear of reprisals. There is a broad consensus scientists agree that issues do matter for at in the American electorate about what kinds least some voters.42 However, voters are also of economic policies are acceptable. Among strongly influenced by their partisan both Republicans and Democrats, there is identities.43 Partisan attachments have such a overwhelming support for a system we can strong influence on voters that some will call “welfare capitalism.”46 A typical actually change their policy preferences to Republican or Democrat supports a align them with their party.44 Economic regulated free market, combined with a policies, as such, may not have much robust welfare state and longstanding influence on vote choice. entitlement programs such as Social The degree to which issues shape Security and Medicare. This means that both vote choice is largely dependent upon the socialism and economic libertarianism are degree to which voters know about and political non-starters. Within that understand the issues involved. Some framework, however, policymakers have a aspects of government are easier for lot of leeway. Voters mostly do not ordinary voters to make sense of than others. understand the specifics of economic policy, When considering the possibility of issue nor are they likely to realize it when a voting, it is important to distinguish between member of Congress breaks with the party “easy” and “hard” issues.45 Easy issues, the line on an issue, and this is even true of kind that can determine vote choice, are voters with above-average levels of political typically symbolic, rather than technical. knowledge.47 They are especially unlikely to They are also usually about the ends of a understand or care about trade policy,48 policy, rather than the means. Abortion is an arguably the national populists’ signature example of an easy issue that can determine issue. Voters do, however, keep tabs on vote choice. Desegregation was another, economic results, and will punish incumbent back when it was part of the political debate. parties that fail to deliver prosperity. Most aspects of economic policy, however, tend to be more complex than the typical

Do Republican Economic Moderates members). Economic ideology is measured Perform Better? by the ideological score of the first dimension of Nokken-Poole in the Proponents of the national populist congressional session before the relevant agenda argue that Republicans have been election, with a higher number indicating too dogmatic in their commitment to free- more of a free market orientation.49 We market solutions to economic challenges. carry out this analysis for every Senator and Tax cuts and further deregulation may not member of Congress who ran for reelection be the solution to every problem. Here we in 2016 or 2018, excluding districts in which do not argue the merits of any set of there was no GOP incumbent running, economic policies. We instead want to know where candidates ran unopposed or against a if Republicans that break with their party on main opponent who was third party, or in economic issues enjoy an electoral windfall. which district boundaries were changed. To consider this question, we look at the Figure 3 presents a visualization of the data. voting records of Republican members of The x-axis shows the Nokken-Poole first Congress. We then see whether those dimension score for each incumbent, and the members that deviate from the party line y-axis shows Trump’s vote share in the most frequently enjoy dividends at the ballot matching state or district.50 Color is the box. incumbent vote share. If breaking with GOP orthodoxy was a winning electoral strategy, we would expect Republican politicians who do so to achieve more political success than those who do not in their districts or state. Thus, we carried out a regression in which we investigated whether economic moderation predicts how a Senator or House Representative does in a reelection campaign, controlling for Trump 2016 share in the relevant geographic area (states for senators, districts for House

. Figure 3. Republican incumbent success based on economic ideology score, 2016 and 2018.

As can be seen, candidates running knowing how that politician voted on in states and districts where Trump did economic issues in the period before the better in 2016 themselves received a higher election had no predictive value at all once share of the vote in their reelection bids, the Trump 2016 margin was taken into which is why the colors of the datapoints are account. distinct near the top of the graph. The The non-existent link we find correlation between Trump margin and between legislator economic ideology and candidate margin is high, at 0.79 (p < .001). future electoral success is not surprising. Yet going from left to right shows no The typical American voter possesses relationship between ideological score and limited levels of political knowledge and is incumbent vote share in either direction. In not especially ideological.51 We would other words, if you know how a district or therefore not expect voters to be aware of state voted in the 2016 presidential election, how much a particular member of Congress you know something about how well a diverges from the party norm. The corollary representative or senator did in a reelection to this view is that adopting more bid in 2016 or 2018. At the same time, economically moderate positions is unlikely

to have much of an impact for most Republicans enjoyed this down-ballot politicians. success despite running mostly as conventional conservatives, rather than Conclusion national populists. We encourage innovative thinking The United States faces several when it comes to policy, and agree that economic challenges in the years ahead. We political parties and politicians should not be encourage policy makers to be creative and bound by ideological shibboleths. While the think beyond twentieth century conservative national populist wing of the conservative and liberal talking points and agenda items movement has exhibited energy and that may be increasingly anachronistic. creativity, a major realignment of working- However, we also believe in maintaining a class voters into the Republican ranks is sober and dispassionate mindset when unlikely in the near future, even if the party considering the political implications of a shifts its economic priorities to the center or policy agenda. Based on our analysis of the left. We furthermore suggest that, when it data and literature, we consider it comes to economics, the most politically implausible that the national populist advantageous policies for Republicans will economic agenda, especially one divorced be those that result in high levels of growth from the “culture war” aspects of Trumpism, and low levels of unemployment–whether or can provide a new surge in Republican not those policies can be reasonably support in future elections. described as “populist.” To the extent that Although he lost his reelection bid, economic policy specifics matter, it would President Trump performed unexpectedly make more sense to advocate simple well in 2020, given the deadly Covid-19 programs that clearly help people, such as pandemic that swept the U.S. in the final direct payments to families, than more year of his presidency. Trump lost the complicated plans that set out to redesign popular vote by a significant margin, but he the economy. and Joe Biden were extremely close in many For the most part, Republican voters important states, putting him within striking support their party not because of what it distance of another Electoral College can deliver economically, but for cultural victory. Because of the closeness of the race, reasons. To a large extent, the Republicans one can reasonably speculate that, in the may simply benefit from not being absence of the pandemic and the related Democrats, a party that has moved far to the economic contraction, Trump may have left in recent years on identity issues.52 One been the favorite in the election, despite recent study showed white Americans failing to live up to his populist promises. It turning against a Democratic candidate in is additionally notable that Republicans large numbers if she talked about white further down the ballot performed quite well privilege, with no impact based on whether in 2020. Democrats hoping for a “blue or not she presented herself as a moderate or wave” that would reinforce their majority in more extreme on economic issues.53 the House of Representatives, give them Many aspects of the liberal social firm control of the Senate, and deliver them agenda remain wildly unpopular. Even state legislatures in time for the next round voters in California rejected affirmative of redistricting, were disappointed. action by a decisive margin in a November

referendum, despite Republicans no longer political success than debating the nuances talking about or running on this issue, and of trade policy. the conservative side being significantly On the economy, the news for outspent.54 Some evidence suggests that the Republicans is more mixed; voters dislike Hispanic shift towards Trump in 2020 may many specific free market policy have been driven by resistance among that suggestions, but nonetheless reward community to Democratic attitudes towards politicians for the economic growth that gender politics. Polls indicated that the such policies can bring. This implies that “gender gap” in 2020 was larger among Republicans’ electoral success will be Hispanics than any other racial category.55 determined more by the extent to which they While a “gender gap” is usually seen as lean in on certain cultural issues than the more problematic for the side that is doing specifics of economic policy. National worse with women, increasing gender populists may still support redistributive polarization among Latinos worked to policies if they believe it is the right thing to Republicans’ advantage in 2020, as any do. Nonetheless, they should do so knowing losses among women were more than made that it may actually hurt the Republican up for by gains among men. Analyzing what party in elections if such policies hinder “went right” with regards to winning over economic growth, alienate donors or distract Hispanic men, and to a lesser extent women, from the cultural issues they are more likely can probably give a better guide to future to win on.

1 David Smith, “Steve Bannon: ‘We’ve Turned 5 James Hohmann, “The Daily 202: the Republicans into a Working-Class Party.’” Conservative Intellectuals Launch a New Group The Guardian. December 17, 2019, to Challenge Free-Market ‘Fundamentalism’ on https://www.theguardian.com/us- the Right.” The Washington Post. February 18, news/2019/dec/17/steve-bannon-working-class- 2020, republicans-labour. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpo 2 George Hawley, “How Trump Can Change st/paloma/daily-202/2020/02/18/daily-202- Conservatism.” The New York Times. January conservative-intellectuals-launch-a-new-group- 19, 2017, to-challenge-free-market-fundamentalism-on- https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/opinion/h the-right/5e4b751a602ff12f6a67164b/. ow-donald-trump-can-change- 6 This was Carlson’s response to Robin conservatism.html. DiAngelo’s best-selling book, White Fragility: 3 For one recent example, see “America Has “DiAngelo explains at one point, worrying about Serious Problems. It’s Time to Stop Blaming economic injustice is just another symptom of, Them on ‘Trumpism.’” Quillette. November 9, brace yourself here, racism, of ‘White Fragility. 2020, https://quillette.com/2020/11/09/america- Get it? Maybe you’re starting to understand why has-serious-problems-its-time-to-stop-blaming- corporate America absolutely loves this book. them-on-trumpism/. Why? Because Robin DiAngelo absolves them 4 Krein stated this explicitly in a recent interview of their crimes.” Tucker Carlson Tonight, June with Ezra Klein, “Trumpism Never Existed. It 24, 2020. http://cpa- was always just Trump.” Vox. October 22, 2020, connecticut.com/barefootaccountant/tucker- https://www.vox.com/21528267/the-ezra-klein- carlson-calls-robin-diangelos-book-white- show-trumpism-donald-trump-joe-biden-2020. fragility-an-utterly-ridiculous-book-poisonous- garbage-and-a-crackpot-race-tract/.

millennials-american-dream- 7 “Senator Hawley Delivers Maiden Speech in 216632#ixzz417NX31xd. 16 the Senate.” Wednesday, May 15, 2019, Maria Krysan and Sarah Moberg, “A Portrait https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley- of African American and White Racial delivers-maiden-speech-senate. Attitudes.” University of Illinois Institute of 8 Alayna Treene. “Rubio Says the GOP Needs to Government and Public Affairs. September 9, Reset after 2020.” Axios. November 11, 2020, 2016, https://www.axios.com/rubio-gop-reset-trump- https://igpa.uillinois.edu/sites/igpa.uillinois.edu/f 872340a7-4c75-4c2b-9261-9612c590ee14.html. iles/reports/A-Portrait-of-Racial-Attitudes.pdf; 9 Jeff Guo, “The Places that Support Trump and Daniel J. Hopkins and Samantha Washington, Cruz are Suffering. But that’s not True of “The Rise of Trump, The Fall of Prejudice? Rubio.” The Washington Post. February 8, 2016, Tracking White Americans’ Racial Attitudes Via https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/w A Panel Survey, 2008–2018.” Public Opinion p/2016/02/08/the-places-that-support-trump- Quarterly 84 (2020): 119-140. and-cruz-are-suffering-but-thats-not-true-of- 17 John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn rubio/. Vavreck, Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential 10 Jeff Guo, “Death Predicts Whether People Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of Vote for Donald Trump.” The Washington Post. America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University March 4, 2016, Press, 2018). 18 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/w Ibid. p/2016/03/04/death-predicts-whether-people- 19 Tyler T. Reny, Loren Collingwood, and Ali A. vote-for-donald-trump/?tid=sm_tw. Valenzuela, “Vote Switching in the 2016 11 Andrew Sullivan, “Trump is Gone. Trumpism Election: How Racial and Immigration Has Arrived.” Substack. November 6, 2020, Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in https://andrewsullivan.substack.com/p/trump-is- White Voting.” Public Opinion Quarterly gone-trumpism-just-arrived-886. 83(2019): 91-113. 20 12 Charles Murray, “Trump’s America.” The Clifford Young, Katie Ziemer, and Chris Wall Street Journal. February 12, 2016, Jackson, “Explaining Trump’s Popular Support: http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps- Validation of a Nativism Index.” Social Science america-1455290458. Quarterly 28(2019): 412-418. 13 Josh Bivens and Lawrence Mishel, 21 Joshua N. Zingher, “On the Measurement of “Understanding the Historic Divergence Social Class and Its Role in Shaping White Vote Between Productivity and a Typical Worker’s Choice in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.” Pay.” Economic Policy Institute. September 2, Electoral Studies 64 (2020): 102119. 2015, 22 Diana C. Mutz, “Status Threat, not Economic http://www.epi.org/publication/understanding- Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote.” the-historic-divergence-between-productivity- PNAS 115(2018): E4330-E4339 and-a-typical-workers-pay-why-it-matters-and- 23 Geertje Lucassen, and Marcel Lubbers, why-its-real/. “Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and 14 Salim Furth, “Stagnant Wages: What the Data Economic Ethnic Threats.” Comparative Show.” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder Political Studies 45(2012): 547-574. #3074 on Labor, October 26, 2015, 24 Thomas Ogorzalek, Spencer Piston, and Luisa http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/1 GodinezPuig, “Nationally Poor, Locally Rich: 0/stagnant-wages-what-the-data-show. Income and Local Context in the 2016 15 Nick Gas, “Poll: Half of Millennials say the Presidential Election.” Electoral Studies American Dream is Dead.” Politico. December 67(2020). 25 10, 2015, Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu, “The White http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/poll- Working Class and the 2016 Election.”

36 Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson and Perspectives on Politics (2020), DOI: James A. Stimson, “Peasants or Bankers? The https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720001267. American Electorate and the U.S. Economy.” 26 Aaron Sibarium, “The Limits of the American Political Science Review 86(1992): Realignment.” American Compass. November 557-611; Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. 23, 2020, https://americancompass.org/the- MacKuen, and James A. Stimson, “Peasants or commons/the-limits-of-the-realignment/. Bankers Revisited: Economic Expectations and 27 For a thorough, behind-the-scenes history of Presidential Approval.” Electoral Studies this period, see Tim Alberta, American 19(2000): 295-312. 37 Carnage: On the Front Lines of the Republican Stanley Feldman, “Economic Self-Interest and Civil War and the Rise of President Trump (New the Vote: Evidence and Meaning.” Political York: Harper, 2019). Behavior 6(1984): 229-251; Richard R. Lau, 28 The Economist/YouGov Poll, October 41- David O. Sears and Tom Jessor, “Fact or November 2, 2020, Artifact Revisited: Survey Instrument Effects https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/jsojry0vph/econTa and Pocketbook Politics.” Political Behavior bReport.pdf. 12(1990): 217-242. 38 29 Joseph Choi, “Rubio: GOP Must Rebrand as Andrew Gelman, Lane Kenworthy, and Yu- Party of 'Multiethnic, Multiracial, Working- Sung Su, “Income Inequality and Partisan Class' Voters.” The Hill. November 11, 2020, Voting in the United States.” Social Science https://thehill.com/homenews/news/525585- Quarterly 91(2020): 1203-1219; Bryan J. rubio-gop-must-rebrand-as-party-of-multiethnic- Dettrey and James E. Campbell, “Has Growing multiracial-working-class-voters. Income Inequality Polarized the American 30 See Exit Polls, Electorate? Class, Party, and Ideological https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit- Polarization.” Social Science Quarterly polls/president/national-results. 94(2013): 1062-1083. 31 Ezra Klein. Why We’re Polarized (New York: 39 Fredrik Carlsen. “Unemployment, Inflation Avid Reader Press, 2020), x-xii. and Government Popularity — Are there 32 For a fuller explanation of the analyses on Partisan Effects?” Electoral Studies 19(2000): which Figure 1 and Figure 2 are based, see Eric 141-150. 40 Kaufmann, Whiteshift (New York: Abrams Campello, Daniela, and Cesar Zucco Jr., Books, 2019): ch. 3. “Presidential Success and the World 33 Michael S. Lewis-Beck, “Pocketbook Voting Economy.” The Journal of Politics 78(2016): in U.S. National Election Studies: Fact or 589-602. 41 Artifact?” American Journal of Political Science Aaron Blake, “Trump’s Under-Performing 29(1985): 348-356. 2020 Campaign, in 2 Key Numbers.” 34 Gerald H. Kramer, “Short‐Term Fluctuations Washington Post. October 22, 2020, in U.S. Voting Behavior: 1896–1964.” American https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/ Political Science Review, 65(1971): 131-143; 10/22/trump-better-off-than-four-years-ago- Gerald H. Kramer, “The Ecological Fallacy question/. 42 Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-level Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden and Findings on Economics and Elections, and James M. Snyder, Jr., “The Strength of Issues: Sociotropic Voting.” American Political Science Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Review 77(1983): 92-111; Donald R. Kinder and Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue D. Roderick Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics: The Voting.” American Political Science Review American Case.” British Journal of Political 102(2008): 215-232; Stephen A. Jessee, Science 11(1981): 129-161. “Partisan Bias, Political Information and Spatial 35 Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in Voting in the 2008 Presidential Election.” American National Elections (New Haven, CT: Journal of Politics 72(2010): 327-340. Yale University Press, 1981).

50 Ibid. 43 Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric 51 Donald R. Kinder and Nathan P. Kalmoe, Schickley, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Parties and the Social Identities of Voters (New Innocence in the American Public (Chicago, IL: Haven, CT: Yale University Press). University of Chicago Press, 2017). 52 44 Gabriel S. Lenz, Follow the Leader? How Zach Goldberg, “How the Media Led the Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Great Racial Awokening.” Tablet. August 4, Performance (Chicago, IL: University of 2020, Chicago Press, 2012). https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articl 45 Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, es/media-great-racial-awakening. “The Two Faces of Issue Voting.” American 53 Richard Hanania, George Hawley, and Eric Political Science Review 74(1980): 78-91. Kaufmann. “Losing Elections, Winning the 46 Stephen Miller, “Conservatives and Liberals Debate: Progressive Racial Rhetoric and White on Economics: Expected Differences, Surprising Backlash.” PsyArXiv (2020), Similarities.” Critical Review 19(2007): 47-64. https://psyarxiv.com/uzkvf/. 47 Logan Dancey and Geoffrey Sheagley, 54 Janie Har, “Political Liberal California Rejects “Heuristics Behaving Badly: Party Cues and Affirmative Action.” Associated Press, Voter Knowledge.” American Journal of November 4, 2020, Political Science 57(2013): 312-325. https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity- 48 Alexandra Guisinger, “Determining Trade campaigns-san-francisco-college-admissions- Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians california- Accountable?” International Organization 4c56c600c86f37289e435be85695872a. 55 63(2009): 533-557. David Leonhardt, “The Latino Gender Gap.” 49 Nokken, Timothy P., and Keith T. Poole, New York Times. October 22, 2020, “Congressional Party Defection in American https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/briefing/p History.” Legislative Studies Quarterly opp-francis-russia-iran-purdue.html. 29(2004): 545-568.