What Is Compulsory Voting?

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SEPTEM B ER/ O CTO B ER: RESO LV ED : I N A D EM O CRA CY, V O T I N G O U GH T T O BE CO M PU LSO RY.

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Table of Contents

TOPIC ANALYSIS – BY BRETT BOELKENS, MATT SLENCSAK, AND KATIE HUMPHRIES ...... 5 AFFIRMATIVE

TURNOUT ...... 12

COMPULSORY VOTING IS THE BEST WAY TO BOOST VOTER TURNOUT ...... 12 LOW VOTER TURNOUT WRECKS ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY ...... 13 NON-VOTERS DON’T VOTE SINCE THEY DON’T BELIEVE THEIR VOTE MATTERS– THE AFF SOLVES BY BOOSTING MOBILIZATION CAMPAIGNS AND REDUCING OPPORTUNITY COSTS ...... 14 MANDATORY VOTING IS THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE TURNOUT REDUCING BARRIERS FAILS SINCE THEY DON’T SERVE AS PRE- COMMITMENT DEVICES ...... 15

AT TURNOUT ...... 16

TURNOUT IS ALREADY HIGH – IT’LL BE HIGHER THAN THE PAST 100 YEARS THIS ELECTION...... 16 MAIL-IN VOTING BOOSTS TURNOUT TOO - STATES ARE RELAXING RESTRICTIONS BEFORE NOVEMBER ...... 17 VOTER INTEGRITY ...... 18

COMPULSORY VOTING SOLVES VOTER FRAUD ...... 18 THE AFFIRMATIVE SOLVES VOTE BUYING ...... 19

DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY ...... 21

COMPULSORY VOTING STIFLES POPULISM – IT COUNTERBALANCES POPULISTS BY MOBILIZING EVERYONE AND PREVENTS OVERREPRESENTATION WITHIN GOVERNMENT ...... 21 COMPULSORY VOTING LIMITS POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND STRENGTHENS DEMOCRACY ...... 22 US DEMOCRACY IS KEY TO MITIGATE A LAUNDRY LIST OF EXISTENTIAL THREATS AND PREVENT GREAT POWER WAR - BACKSLIDING CAUSES THOSE SYSTEMS TO UNRAVEL ...... 24 COMPULSORY VOTING MOTIVATES POLITICIANS TO MAKE THE SYSTEM VOTER-FRIENDLY ...... 26

AT: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY ...... 27

COMPULSORY VOTING ONLY WORKS UNDER THE THREAT OF PUNISHMENT - ALSO MEANS NON-ENFORCEMENT WRECKS SOLVENCY .. 27 ITS VIRTUALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM VOLUNTARY VOTING WITHOUT ENFORCEMENT OR PUNISHMENT ...... 28 INVALID VOTES CANCEL OUT ANY BENEFITS FROM COMPULSORY VOTING AND IT CAUSES RESENTMENT AMONGST VOTERS ...... 29

COMPULSORY VOTING ENCOURAGES EXTREMISM ...... 30

MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES ...... 31

TRADITIONALLY IGNORED GROUPS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE POLITICALLY ENGAGED BECAUSE THEY KNOW OTHERS IN THEIR

COMMUNITY WILL TOO ...... 31 COMPULSORY VOTING REDUCES THE ELECTORAL GENDER GAP ...... 32 COMPULSORY VOTING HAS TANGIBLE EFFECTS ON PUBLICLY POLICY IN FAVOR OF DISADVANTAGED WORKING-CLASS CITIZENS ...... 33 CAMPAIGN FINANCE ...... 34

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COMPULSORY VOTING LOWERS THE BENEFITS OF MONEY IN POLITICS AND CURBS BAD CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS ...... 34 COMPULSORY VOTING COUNTERBALANCES LOBBYING ...... 35 MANDATORY VOTING CHECKS THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE DONORS IN CITIZENS UNITED AND BOLSTERS POVERTY ALLEVIATION EFFORTS ...... 36 CITIZENS UNITED PREVENTS POLITICAL ACTION AGAINST A LAUNDRY LIST OF EXISTENTIAL CRISES – SPECIFICALLY, CLIMATE CHANGE... 37 CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION IS STIFLED BY CITIZENS UNITED – DONOR MONEY INCENTIVIZES THE GOP TO STOP IT TO ENSURE RE- ELECTION ...... 38 CLIMATE CHANGE CAUSES EXTINCTION – ERR AFFIRMATIVE DUE TO COGNITIVE BIAS ...... 39 CORPORATE INFLUENCE IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE UNDERMINES THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY ...... 42 MAINTAINING THE CORPORATE PERSONHOOD DISTINCTION ESTABLISHED IN CITIZENS UNITED IS KEY TO THE ECONOMY AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY – THE PLAN PROVIDES TAILORED REFORMS THAT REMOVES THE HARMS OF THE DECISION ...... 44

AT: CAMPAIGN FINANCE ...... 45

CITIZENS UNITED IS IRRELEVANT TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLITICAL ACTION – THERE’S NO WILL TO ACTION AND IT’S A SCAPEGOAT FOR POLITICIANS ...... 45 EVEN IF CITIZENS UNITED WAS OVERTURNED, CORPORATIONS WILL MAINTAIN THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE ELECTIONS ...... 46 AND THE COURT WILL NEVER STOP THE PROTECTION OF CORPORATE INTERESTS – FIRST AMENDMENT DEFERENCE MEANS THEY’LL DEFAULT TO PROTECTING SPEECH ...... 47 CITIZENS UNITED AND UNFETTERED CORPORATE SPEECH IS HERE TO STAY ...... 49 NEGATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS ...... 51

THERE’S A 90% CHANCE TRUMP WINS NOW – BEST MODELS, PREVIOUS ELECTIONS, AND BIDEN / DEM PRIMARY FAILURES, ELECTORAL COLLEGE ALL PROVE ...... 51 CV MASSIVELY BOOSTS TURNOUT AMONGST LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS, THEREBY INCREASING SUPPORT FOR LEFTIST POLICY ...... 53 CONGRESS WILL DECIDE THE 2020 ELECTION DUE TO MAIL-IN-BALLOTS ...... 55 CONGRESS DECIDING THE 2020 ELECTION SPARKS A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND UNDERMINES US DEMOCRACY ...... 57 AND THEY WILL DECIDE IN TRUMP’S FAVOR DUE TO THE GOP’S EDGE IN STATE LEGISLATURE COMPOSITIONS ...... 58 DEMS WILL CONCEDE IF BIDEN LOSES, BUT TRUMP WON’T IF HE DOES – THAT MEANS THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO TRUMP THEREBY PREVENTING ANY CHALLENGES TO THE RACE POST-ELECTION ...... 59 BUSH V GORE AND SENATE POLARIZATION HAVE PUSHED COURT LEGITIMACY TO THE BRINK – DECIDING THE ELECTION IS THE FINAL STRAW...... 61 LITIGATION IS INEVITABLE – IT’S THE HIGHEST IT’S BEEN IN MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS...... 63 CORONAVIRUS MEANS MULTIPLE LAWSUITS OVER MAIL-IN BALLOTS ...... 64 NO OFFENSE – TRUMP IS A LAME DUCK ...... 66 THE VP PICK DOESN’T MATTER ...... 67

AT: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS ...... 68

TURNOUT HASN’T FLIPPED ANY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION – BEST AND MOST RECENT STUDIES PROVE ...... 68 EVEN WITH UNIVERSAL TURNOUT, ELECTIONS WOULDN’T BE FLIPPED – HARDLY ANY OF THEM ARE COMPETITIVE ENOUGH FOR HIGHER TURNOUT TO MATTER ...... 69 3 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

TRUMP WILL LOSE THE ELECTION AND CONCEDE...... 70 CAN’T PREDICT – TRUMP WILL DO ANYTHING TO WIN...... 71 THE ELECTION IS WILD – ANYTHING COULD SWING IT ...... 72 TRUMP BLOCKS THE 2020 ELECTION ...... 73 DEJOY IS THE WORST MAILMAN – MILLIONS OF BALLOTS WON’T BE DELIVERED OR RETURNED DUE TO HIM DELIBERATELY UNDERMINING THE POST OFFICE...... 75 USPS WILL DISENFRANCHISE MILLIONS AND ENSURE POST-ELECTION CONTROVERSIES ...... 76 BIDEN WINS NOW BUT THE PLAN’S LARGE-SCALE TURNOUT IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRATS IS ENOUGH TO FORCE TRUMP TO BACK OFF AND LEAVE OFFICE ...... 78 BIDEN WINS NOW – POLLING AND THE ECONOMY ...... 80 COERCION...... 81

VOTING ISN’T A MORAL OBLIGATION - STATE ENFORCEMENT IS PATERNALISTIC COERCION AND VIOLATES RIGHTS ...... 81 BECAUSE OF THE UNFAIRNESS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, VOTING SUPPORTS AND UNJUST SYSTEM AND BOOSTS ITS LEGITIMACY .... 83 CV LAWS IMPLY THAT NOT ALL CITIZENS ARE OF EQUAL WORTH-- NON-VOTERS ARE SEEN AS VALUELESS PARASITES WHO MUST BE COERCED INTO DOING THE RIGHT THING...... 84 THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR COERCION – IT IS UNLIKE ANY OTHER LEGITIMATE LAW ...... 85 IT UNDERMINES THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS BY VIOLATING THE RIGHT NOT TO VOTE ...... 86 AND COVID-19 MEANS COMPULSORY VOTING IS FORCED ENDANGERMENT ...... 87 COMPULSORY VOTING SPURS RESENTMENT THROUGH FORCED PARTICIPATION THEREBY LOWERING PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY ...... 88 VOTERS WILL BE MORE DISINFORMED WITH COMPULSORY VOTING BECAUSE OF ITS COERCIVE NATURE – THAT DECREASES THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THEIR VOTE AND CAUSES POLITICAL EXTREMISM ...... 89 UNENTHUSIASTIC VOTERS WILL SEE THROUGH THE SMOKE AND MIRRORS – THAT ONLY FURTHERS RESENTMENT...... 90

AT: COERCION ...... 91

COMPULSORY VOTING DOESN’T VIOLATE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS LIKE THE RIGHT TO NOT VOTE BECAUSE OF IT BEING A DUTY RIGHT – PEOPLE ARE OBLIGED TO DO SO ...... 91 AND IT PREVENTS RESENTMENT AGAINST DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT ...... 94

VOTER IGNORANCE ...... 95

MOST VOTERS ARE IGNORANT, MISINFORMED, IRRATIONAL, AND BIASED ABOUT POLITICAL ISSUES – IT’S IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE THEM INFORMED...... 95 INVOLUNTARY VOTING MEANS POLITICALLY UNAWARE PEOPLE VOTE AGAINST THEIR OWN INTEREST ...... 96 VOLUNTARY VOTING LETS INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE AWARE OF THEIR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OPT-OUT ...... 97

AT: VOTER IGNORANCE ...... 98

VOTERS AREN’T UNINFORMED SINCE THEY’RE INCENTIVIZED TO LEARN WITH COMPULSORY VOTING – SUNK COSTS AND INCREASED NON-VOTERS AREN’T UNINFORMED AND CV INCENTIVIZES MORE PEOPLE TO BECOME POLITICALLY INFORMED ...... 98

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Topic Analysis By: Brett Boelkens, Matt Slencsak & Katie Humphries

Resolved: In a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory. In order to fully understand a resolution, it’s important to think through the definitions of key terms in the resolution. To that end, I’ll start this topic analysis by going through key terms in the resolution in the order that they appear.

What is a democracy? The term democracy answers a few important questions, while creating many more. First it tells us that the actors in the resolution are democratic nations (a single democratic nation). Second, it tells us that the resolution is not US specific, which can create a lot of interesting ground. Finally, it presupposes that democracy is good or valuable. Of course, it also raises the questions of what is a democracy, what countries are currently considered democracies, and are semi-democracies included in the resolution? So, what is a democracy? This is a surprisingly difficult to answer question, especially if we start research different definitions of democracy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a good starting place and reads “democracy,” as I will use it in this article, refers very generally to a method of group decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the collective decision making”. The most interesting aspect of this definition is that it doesn’t exclusively refer to governments, which could lead to some really interesting case not focused on government, and rather, for example, a work place democracy. For less broad definitions that also answer the 2nd question, we can look towards the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index. Which separates countries into different categories based on how democratic they are. Specifically, they categorize governments as either Full-Democracies, Flawed Democracies, Hybrid Regimes, and Authoritarian regimes. This is useful, as it gives you a concrete list of democracies to look towards, while offering different definitions for each of their categories. It’s also important for debaters to understand the distinction between Liberal Democracies (democracies in which individual rights are protected) and Illiberal democracies (democracies that do not necessarily protect individual rights). Finally, the term Semi-democracy will also likely be brought up quite a bit on this topic, as there’s plenty of literature about why semi-democracies are actually worse than authoritarian regimes.

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What is compulsory voting?

According to International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) (n.d), compulsory voting is defined as: Most democratic governments consider participating in national elections a right of citizenship. Some consider that participation at elections is also a citizen's civic responsibility. In some countries, where voting is considered a duty, voting at elections has been made compulsory and has been regulated in the national constitutions and electoral laws. Some countries go as far as to impose sanctions on non-voters.

Compulsory voting laws have been in effect in countries across the world for over a century. For example, Belgium established their compulsory voting laws in 1892 and Australia in 1924. The International IDEA outlines exactly which countries have compulsory voting, with details such as what sanctions the country imposes, whether they are enforced, when the compulsory voting law was implemented, and more.

A list of the countries with compulsory voting laws includes: Argentina, Australia, Austria (Tyrol, Voralberg and Styria), Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, France (for the senate only), Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nauru, Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, USA (Georgia), and Venezuela.

How does (and should they even) a country enforce compulsory voting? Though many nations do not enforce compulsory voting, a key aspect of its effectiveness (and thus the affirmatives solvency) is an enforcement mechanism. One of the pieces of evidence we highlight in our brief, Panagopoulos 08 explains that compulsory voting is virtually indistinguishable from voluntary voting unless there is an enforcement mechanism: Panagopoulos 8 [Costas Panagopoulos, professor of political science at Northwestern with a PhD in politics from NYU, 12-2008, “The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems,” Political Behavior, https://www-jstor- org.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/stable/pdf/40213328.pdf]/Triumph Debate

between the degree of enforcement of compulsory voting sanctions and turnout. Table 2 reports average turnout rates in voluntary voting systems and in compulsory voting systems, categorized by the degree of enforcement (No/Low, Weak, Strict). The findings reveal support for several of the propositions developed above. First, turnout is lowest amongst compulsory voting systems that routinely fail to prosecute defections. In these systems, mean levels of turnout in elections is virtually indistinguishable from turnout in voluntary systems (the difference of means tests is not significant at conventional levels). Second, the data reveal support for the expectation that turnout rises as the likelihood of sanction enforcement rises. Mean turnout in compulsory voting systems that enforce sanctions for nonvoting strictly is 13.1 percentage points higher on average than in compulsory voting systems that punish defectors less routinely, a difference that is significant at the p < .01 level. The patterns also suggest mean turnout in countries with No/Low enforcement is higher than in systems with weak enforcement, but this difference is not significant at conventional levels. When compulsory voting systems impose no formal penalties for abstention or when defection is not prosecuted (q = 0), the strategic decision-making calculus of participation in elections is effectively unaltered. The empirical evidence presented above supports this contention. I observe no differences in turnout between voluntary systems and systems with only token sanctions for abstention or no real enforcement mechanisms. I conclude from this finding that sanctions and enforcement affect primarily the C term (costs of voting) in the strategic calculus of voting and not the D term that is meant to capture the intrinsic value of the benefit of voting (civic duty, etc.). An empirical analysis by Blais et.al 03 confirms this: Blais et. al 03 [André Blais is Professor in the department of political science at the University of Montreal, March 2003, "Why is Turnout Higher in Some Countries than in Others?," Elections Canada https://www.elections.ca/res/rec/part/tuh/TurnoutHigher.pdf /Triumph Debate

The most important variable is legislation imposing compulsory voting. Its influence has been seen in all the studies analyzing the effects of institutional factors on turnout. All other things being equal, turnout as a function of the number of registered electors is 13 percent higher in countries where voting is compulsory and penalties are imposed for failure to comply (Table 2A). However, turnout does not seem to be affected by the obligation to vote when there are no penalties for failure to comply. The results are quite divergent when looking at turnout in comparison with the population of voting age (Table 2B). In this case, compulsory voting does not seem to have any effect, whether enforced by penalties or not. This result does not seem very credible to us, in view of the fact that all previous studies have found that compulsory voting increases turnout and the fact that the abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands in the early 1970s effectively reduced turnout there by about 10 percentage points. We have more confidence in the results when turnout is calculated on the basis of registered electors (Table 2A). What our study shows, and what has never been shown by any previous research, is that compulsory voting does not really have any effect unless penalties are stipulated for electors who decide to abstain. A merely symbolic obligation is not sufficient.

Thus, it may be pretty difficult for debaters to try to defend compulsory voting laws with no penalty in place for those who don’t vote, as the tangible benefits of such a law would not materialize without some mechanism to encourage citizens to vote. In addition, the lack of any material enforcement mechanism brings up questions as to whether or not voting is even compulsory if there is no punishment for not voting. The distinction here is often referred to as compulsory voting vs compulsory turnout. This is explained by:

Elliot 17 [Kevin J. Elliott, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Murray State University with a PhD in Political Science from Columbia, 2-9-2017, “Aid for Our Purposes: Mandatory Voting as Precommitment and Nudge,” Journal of Politics, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/690711?journalCode=jop] /Triumph Debate First, we must dispense with the terminology of mandatory voting in favor of mandatory turnout, because the former is not accurate and invites misunderstanding. It is widely recognized that mandatory voting is a misnomer because there is no way to enforce a legal obligation to mark a ballot paper without violating the secrecy of the ballot (Brennan and Hill 2014, 116). The most that any system of mandatory voting can require of citizens is that they attend the polls and accept a ballot paper or accept an absentee ballot through the mail. Mandatory turnout is a more accurate name for this practice. It is, moreover, impossible to coerce a meaningful vote. This point has not been sufficiently understood in the mandatory voting literature, and it 7 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

serves to render moot disputes about an alleged right not to vote (Hill 2015; Lardy 2004). When we speak of citizens voting, we mean the casting of ballots that meaningfully reflect citizens’ political judgment. Mechanically attending the polls or physically depositing ballot papers does not count as voting in this sense. Any alleged duty to vote is for this reason essentially uncoercible since no one can force individuals to register their judgment in the required way. Because of the secret ballot, and since meaningful voting cannot be coerced, regimes of mandatory voting are more accurately called regimes of mandatory turnout, and this terminology is used in what follows. This terminological change begins to bury a central line of objection to mandatory turnout regimes, which is that they coerce political speech in violation of the freedom of expression as well as of the right not to vote. Because all that is required of citizens is that they attend the polls, and perhaps accept a ballot, they remain free to either refuse to take a ballot or to cast a blank one (Hill 2010, 433). The right to avoid political expression has thereby been protected, as well as the right not to register an electoral preference. Thus, according to this piece of evidence, for a compulsory voting law to actually have teeth and be effective, as well as be legitimately classified as “compulsory voting”, it must have some sort of enforcement mechanism that binds people to voting. Luckily, there are plenty of different options, including ones that have literature and data specifically about their effectiveness. Some of those options include: • Using other government mandated services as templates. For example, an enforce compulsory voting system could mirror the US’ Selective Service System’s (SSS) which makes it a crime for a specific portion of the population to not register with the SSS. It could also reflect other government mandated services such as the census or TIN requirements. • An additional enforcement mechanism could be applying a small fine to individuals who do not vote • Another approach is advocating that compulsory voting enforcement should be directly tied to government benefits. This would mean that in order for citizens to receive programs like SNAP, Social Security, or public housing assistance, that citizen must vote. • Finally, nations can offer “incentives” to motivate people to vote, such as cash payouts or tax credits. By voting, the citizen receives a positive direct benefit from the government.

From a framing perspective In this portion, we are going to break down some of what we believe to be the most advantageous framing arguments and authors. We specifically explain why each area is strong on this topic. We recommend you utilize the Triumph Debate Framework Vault for guidance on framing, located here.

General framing (applicable to either side): • Utilitarianism / Consequentialism – Both sides have access to consequential ground, however, the way either side gains access to those consequential impacts are really different. Affirmatives have access to a lot of data and analysis on the benefits of compulsory voting, regarding policy implementation, voter turnout, etc. Negatives, on the other hand, have less broad consequential 8 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

ground. We think it is particularly advantageous for negative debaters to get more specific. There’s less data on why compulsory voting, as a concept, is materially bad. Rather, you’re going to want specific pockets - which is especially dependent on the affirmatives plan. We think impact scenarios specifically tied to the actor (i.e. the country the affirmative includes in their plan text, or if they defend whole res then focusing on PICs) and tied to the enforcement mechanism is the most lucrative consequential ground for negative debaters. Finally, negatives being prepared with impact turns for generic affirmative impacts – like increased voter turnout – is another really good strategy.

• Legitimacy – For affirmatives, they can argue that increasing voter participation increases the legitimacy of democratic governments because more people consent to governmental action. On the other hand, negatives can argue that forcing folks to participate politically undermines the legitimacy of a government both for consequential reasons (we include a few cards that discuss how) as well as from a conceptual perspective as people aren’t actually consenting if their vote is by force. How compulsory voting occurs in a flawed or semi-democracy, especially with incredibly unappealing leadership, can create really advantageous impact scenarios for the negative.

• Rights – Both sides have access to rights, just through different routes. A strong approach for affirmatives may be to argue rights from an interest-theory or consequential perspective (many authors contextual rights as being weighed consequentially – we recommend utilizing our framework vault for specific cards under our consequential section). This allows the affirmative to essentially hijack the negative narrative while still winning on the consequential debate. For the negative, they have a lot of access to deontic rights discussions, primarily in regard to liberty and autonomy. There is a lot of literature on the relationship between citizens’ freedom of choice and compulsory voting. The key for both sides is to be prepared to address the other sides framing approach on rights.

• Democracy – Both affirmatives and negatives have access to framing regarding democracy. The key importance is how either side contextualizes the obligations and responsibilities of a government (specifically a democracy). Affirmatives can argue that democracies are meant to maximize expected outcomes for its citizens via policy (something like Woller would be very fitting here). Or, even something as simple as democratic governments are obligated to improve societal welfare. On the flip side, negatives can argue a conception of democracy that is heavily based in rights (from a deontic perspective – i.e. governments ought not violate them, if at all possible). This really boils down to two questions: what is the purpose of a democracy, and what obligations are derived from said purpose? Answering these two questions helps you set up your conception of democracy to frame the round. Even if you don’t run a framework specific to democratic concepts,

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we recommend still choosing your vision of what a democracy looks like in your affirmative/negative world so you can be prepared for questions and argumentation on the framing level.

For affirmative framing, besides the aforementioned frameworks, we believe that the strongest way a debater can take the topic is through a framework of structural violence. There is a lot of literature on the topic that analyzes the effects compulsory voting has on disadvantaged groups – some of which we include in this brief.

For negative framing, besides the aforementioned frameworks, we believe that the strongest way a debater can take the topic is through a framework of liberty/autonomy. There is a lot of literature on the topic that discusses how compulsory voting violates people’s freedom of choice, democratic autonomy, and is coercive. We provide some evidence on this argument.

Overall, we think that this topic is actually incredibly interesting, as it has a-typical ground distribution (typically, negative debaters have access to a lot more consequential ground, and affirmatives tend to have access to more deontic ground). We believe that the best debaters will be prepared to have a strong debate on framing and/or be prepared to do impact turns/weighing.

Lastly, if you have any questions about the evidence presented in this brief, or about our topic analysis, feel free to reach out to us at [email protected] and we would be happy to discuss further. Good luck and happy debating!

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Turnout

Compulsory voting is the best way to boost voter turnout Hill 13 [Lisa Hill, professor of Politics at the University of Adelaide with a Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford, 2013, “Deliberative Democracy and Compulsory Voting,” ELECTION LAW JOURNAL, https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2013.0204?journalCode=elj] /Triumph Debate But exactly how effective is compulsory voting at raising turnout? The Australian case is a good place to start in answering this question. Compulsory voting was introduced at the federal level in Australia, in 1924,11 to correct the problem of low voter turnout. It proved to be an extremely effective and well- tolerated remedy. At the last federal election immediately prior to the introduction of compulsory voting (in 1922) the average turnout of registered voters was 58.7% (RV) whereas turnout at the first federal election after 1924 (i.e., in 1925) surged dramatically to an average of 91.4% (RV). Since then turnout rates in Australia have remained consistently high (at around 95% RV) and against the global trend of steadily declining voter participation in advanced democracies (e.g., Blais et al., 2004; Blais, 2010). Other well-administered systems in established democratic settings have experienced similar results. For the period 1946–2010, Belgium has had an exemplary turnout rate of around 92% (RV) (IDEA, 2012). Similarly, in the Netherlands, for the 53 years that compulsory voting was in force (1917–1970), turnout among registered voters was consistently above the 90% mark. Significantly, this figure applied to all socio-demographic groups. With the introduction of voluntary voting in 1970 an immediate consequence was an increased variation in voting participation between socio-economic and demographic subgroups (Irwin, 1974: 294). This points to the long-asserted social ‘‘levelling’’ effect of compulsory voting whereby all, rather than just the privileged and well-established sectors of society, are enabled to have their preferences registered at election time (Lijphart, 1997; Hill, 2002). When it is well-administered and where sanctions are routinely applied (Louth and Hill, 2005; Panagopolous, 2008; Singh, 2011), compulsory voting is the most efficient and effective means for raising and maintaining high and socially even turnout. This tends to be true, not just in prosperous, wellresourced settings but in most compulsory voting settings (Birch, 2009; Louth and Hill, 2005). It is true that there are some voluntary-voting regimes that continue to enjoy very high turnout rates, and critics of compulsory voting often point to high turnout in places like Austria, Luxembourg, Iceland, New Zealand, Denmark, and Malta as evidence that compulsory voting is not required in order to maintain high turnout. But, anecdotal evidence like this can be misleading because such settings tend to be characterized by an unusually large coincidence of factors known to enhance turnout. The case of Malta, for example, is particularly problematic because it is far from representative. Although it regularly achieves very high turnout rates (92% of RV at the last national election) this is due to the atypical co-existence of a range of features known to be congenial to high turnout: a small, urbanized and geographically concentrated population (Siaroff and Merer, 2002: 917); unitary, concentrated government; high levels of partisanship; proportional representation (PR); ‘‘highly competitive elections resulting in one-party governments despite P.R.’’; extremely intense election campaigns and a polarized electorate of partisan, committed voters (Hirczy, 1995: 255). New Zealand is another setting that happens to enjoy reasonably high turnout levels. Yet, eccentrically,12 although New Zealand is a voluntary voting system, enrollment is effectively compulsory in New Zealand. Further, New Zealand elections are especially salient to the electorate because of the unitary and unicameral structure of government there (Jackman, 1999). Finally, any optimism about comparable turnouts with New Zealand should be dampened by the fact that its own turnout rate is currently in decline. At the last national election in 2011 it had slid to 74.2 percent (RV). This is much lower than the turnout figure achieved by its near-neighbor, Australia, in 2010 of 93 percent (RV). Therefore, despite anecdotal evidence from settings where conditions would be near-impossible to replicate, in general, compulsory voting is the most decisive means by which to raise voting levels (Panagopoulos, 2008: 458. See also Louth and Hill, 2005; Hirczy, 1995). In fact it is the only institutional mechanism that can achieve turnout rates of 90% and above on its own (Lijphart, 2001: 74).All this enthusiasm for the turnout-enhancing effect of compulsory voting assumes that there is something wrong with low turnout. Yet, many argue that it is neither necessary nor desirable for everyone to vote and that low turnout presents no problems for democratic authenticity or legitimacy. The thinking here is that the failure of many to vote is at best benign and at worst neutral in terms of the decision process, the protection of interests, and the general functioning of democracies. In responding to such claims, the case for compulsory voting as a mechanism for delivering high turnout, political equality of influence, and electoral authenticity and legitimacy will be made.

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Low voter turnout wrecks electoral democracy Hill 13 [Lisa Hill, professor of Politics at the University of Adelaide with a Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford, 2013, “Deliberative Democracy and Compulsory Voting,” ELECTION LAW JOURNAL, https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2013.0204?journalCode=elj] /Triumph Debate An important reason why actual voting is preferable to the opportunity to vote lies in the value of complete information. High to universal participation provides a much higher level of information about citizens’ preferences than low participation. This might seem like an obvious, even banal, claim but, for some, it is controversial because they question whether higher turnout delivers more authoritative information about voters’ preferences; does obtaining more information yield any qualitatively new or different information? The mere opportunity to vote is insufficient to make a system fully democratic (at least from a procedural and aggregative point of view) because, in practice, low turnout invariably means low and socially uneven turnout. Low-turnout elections therefore aggregate the preferences of an unrepresentative sample of the voting population. Many defenders of low turnout gloss rather easily over the fact that turnout in most industrialized democracies is not only low and unequal but declining and becoming ever more unequal as time passes.16 In other words, because declining turnout is steepest among the disadvantaged as well as the young, it is an escalating problem signifying the gradual erosion of electoral democracy and, especially, democratic equality. In industrial democracies worldwide, failure to vote is generally concentrated among groups already experiencing one or more forms of exclusion or deprivation, namely:the poor, the unemployed, the homeless, indigenous peoples, remote citizens, new citizens, prisoners, the young, and people with low literacy, numeracy, and majority language competence (Lijphart, 1997; Hooghe and Pelleriaux, 1998; Beramendi and Anderson, 2008; Hill, 2002; Brady et al., 1995; Fowler, 2013). Low and socially uneven voting levels operate as the functional equivalent of weighted votes for the well-off (Lijphart, 1997: 7) thereby undermining two fundamental ideals of aggregative democracy: equality of political influence 17 and democratic inclusiveness; both also happen to be key desiderata for deliberative democrats (notwithstanding their divergent interpretation of these principles. See e.g., Benhabib, 1996: 68; Dryzek, 2001: 651; Knight and Johnson, 1997).18 This, in turn, affects the legitimacy of the democracy in question. Contrary to the claim that low turnout is self-equilibrating,19 in fact, when turnout is low, the voting power of the poor and marginal is directly translated into greater voting power for the better off. Formal equality, the legal entitlement to vote, is not enough to provide equality of political influence, just as formal equality of economic opportunity is not enough to ensure substantive economic equality. An opportunity to vote is not the same as actually voting, as the empirical studies on the effects of voting canvassed above demonstrate. So, while the formal opportunity to vote is certainly a necessary condition of democracy, whether it is a sufficient one is debatable. Like most aggregative democrats, some deliberative democrats only insist upon the ‘‘right to participate, not the compulsion to do so’’ (Dryzek, 2000: 172–3. See also Knight and James, 1997). However, having a formal right does not seem to be enough. When the right to vote goes unexercised, it only has ‘‘formal’’ existence. But it acquires ‘‘material’’ existence when it is actually exercised.20

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Non-voters don’t vote since they don’t believe their vote matters – the aff solves by boosting mobilization campaigns and reducing opportunity costs Hill 13 [Lisa Hill, professor of Politics at the University of Adelaide with a Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford, 2013, “Deliberative Democracy and Compulsory Voting,” ELECTION LAW JOURNAL, https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2013.0204?journalCode=elj]/Triumph Debate Are habitual abstainers really choosing not to vote as a means to ‘‘self-government’’ or because they feel contented or unaffected? This view seems to be based on a rather simplistic model of political quiescence. It is doubtless true that there are some who do abstain from voting for these kinds of reasons; but it is also true that, generally speaking, the more socially and economically marginalized a person is, the less likely s/he is to vote. We should therefore be suspicious of any explanation for low turnout that relies on the assumption that disadvantage is correlated with satisfaction; in fact, survey data consistently indicate that abstainers are less satisfied with the state of democracy than are voters. We know, for example, that young American non-voters tend to be considerably less satisfied than voters about the state of their democracy (Wattenberg, 2008) while alienated all-age Americans are ‘‘less likely to vote, even after controlling for all of the other demographic factors that affect voter turnout’’ (Southwell, 2008: 135. See also Brody and Page, 1973; Pettersen, 1989; Nownes, 1992, Teixeira 1992; Ragsdale and Rusk, 1993). Similar results are found in studies undertaken in Britain (Henn et al., 2005, 573), Canada (Pammet and Le Duc, 2003: 6), and Norway (Pettersen, 1989: 354–5). Aggregate level studies yield the same sorts of results: Gro¨nlund and Seta¨la¨’s (2007) cross national study of the effect of political trust on election turnout in 22 European democracies found that perceived legitimacy or ‘‘diffuse support’’ for the democratic system (i.e., trust in parliament and satisfaction with the democratic system) has a significant positive effect on turnout (see also Lundell, 2012).23 It might be said that abstention is an individual decision, and consistent with democracy even if it runs counter to an individual’s best interests; ‘‘since democracy is grounded in self-government, in individual liberty, the freedom to make mistakes would seem to be part of a democratic society’’ (Dowding et al., 2004: 9).24 Indeed, this is just the sort of thing a deliberative democrat might say. But is abstention—and its selfdefeating consequences—really a positive choice? If it is, why is it a ‘‘choice’’ favored predominantly by the disadvantaged? The answer to this question seems to have little to do with self-government and contentment with the political status quo. In voluntary voting systems the disadvantaged are subject to a significant and paralyzing co-ordination problem at election time. This is because the norm of voting that prevails among educated, prosperous, and older populations has failed to become firmly established among poorer, less well-educated, and younger populations. Here it is normal not to vote. Where social norms discourage a particular form of behavior, it may be irrational to conflict with the norm, even where it has maladaptive, long-term consequences for members of the non-voting group.25 Members of such groups may indeed make the quite reasonable calculation that it would be irrational to be the only member of their social group to bother voting and even if they do not make this calculation, it would still be true. The co-ordination problem that besets habitual nonvoters is exacerbated by the fact that they are less likely to be targeted by the mobilization efforts of parties (Wielhouwer, 1995; Highton and Wolfinger, 2001; Wielhouwer, 2000). For example, parties are more likely to contact citizens from higher socioeconomic status (SES) groups (Gershtenson, 2003) and less likely to contact the young (Wattenberg, 2008: 13–15). Political advertising at election times is also ‘‘overwhelmingly’’ targeted at older audiences (Wattenberg, 2002: 99). However, under a compulsory regime, co-ordination among the disadvantaged is assured; it will no longer be irrational for them to vote and each vote will now be rendered more consequential. Compulsion removes the problem of insufficient information simply by virtue of its existence; knowing that other voters with similar interests to mine are going to vote overcomes any uncertainty about the value of my vote and frees me from having to weigh ‘‘opportunity costs’’ against benefits in an environment where resources and information are scarce. Rather than perceiving the compulsion as yet another unwelcome form of state coercion, compulsory voting may be better understood as a co-ordination solution for mass societies of individuated strangers unable to communicate and coordinate their preferences and intentions. The single votes of traditional non-voters are no longer isolated drops in oceans; they now have much greater value because such voters are already organized into meaningful blocs of electoral power.

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Mandatory voting is the only way to ensure turnout – reducing barriers fails since they don’t serve as pre-commitment devices Elliot 17 [Kevin J. Elliott, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Murray State University with a PhD in Political Science from Columbia, 2-9-2017, “Aid for Our Purposes: Mandatory Voting as Precommitment and Nudge,” Journal of Politics, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/690711?journalCode=jop] /Triumph Debate ***pre-commitment device: strategy for forcing yourself to do something you think you should do but you don't actually want to do

But why, we might ask, should we not simply enact costlowering measures and call it a day, having taken steps to help citizens do what they think they have reason to do? Why do we need to go so far as to make turnout mandatory? After all, lowering the costs of voting and requiring turnout are in some sense theoretically equivalent since they are both means to help people do what they think they should, and we might think it illegitimate to mandate turnout before less drastic means have been exhausted. The main reason these cost-cutting measures are not sufficient is that no set of measures that excludes mandatory turnout is likely to achieve turnout that approaches the level consistent with US attitudes toward voting—that is, on the order of 90%. Comparative evidence suggests that all of the other reforms combined are probably not sufficient to reach this turnout level without including mandatory turnout (Lijphart 1997). This is in part because mandatory turnout is the single most powerful way to promote turnout. Regardless of differences in the estimated magnitude of the effect of mandatory turnout on turnout rates, most comparative analyses of electoral institutions agree that mandatory turnout has the largest single effect in promoting turnout compared to other interventions.3 Moreover, the size of the effect appears to be magnified by a lower baseline of participation, meaning that mandatory turnout has a larger effect where turnout is lowest, as it is by international peer comparison in the United States (Hirczy 1994). Without mandatory turnout, in other words, turnout is unlikely to match the level of expressed desire to vote, and the United States context provides ideal conditions for it to have its greatest possible effect. Another reason to see mandatory turnout as a precommitment device can be found if we consider other reasons for not voting reported in the Census data. Nonvoters who report being too busy to vote or that they forgot to do so (3.9% in 2012, and fully 8% in 2010; US Census 2011, table 10) may in fact have failed to vote due to volitional problems, such as weakness of will, being overcome by passions, temporary preference changes, or time discounting. Elster cites these factors, among others, as being strong reasons to deploy precommitment devices (Elster 2000, chap. 1). When these problems arise, they prevent us from doing at time t + 1 what we would have wanted ourselves to do then at time t. Precommitment devices are extremely useful in these circumstances because they remind us of our considered preference at time t and help us to act in accordance with that preference rather than the often ephemeral effects of a weak will, passions, preference changes, or time discounting. The reasons cited in the Census data provide some indication that such volitional problems operate in the context of voting, as we would expect given the prevalence of these problems, as well as because of the sometimes weak intrinsic pull the self-affirmed duty to vote has on many citizens. This suggests that mandatory turnout would indeed function as a precommitment device for citizens afflicted with such distracting influences. These influences also further illustrate why mandatory turnout is needed and not just cost-lowering mechanisms like automatic registration. Insofar as we are subject to motivational problems like weakness of will, passions, and so forth, making voting easier will not be enough for most people to overcome them. The pervasiveness and strength of these motivational problems require a stronger intervention—in particular one that cannot be ignored. Yet all nonmandatory turnout mechanisms for promoting turnout can be ignored by default. Only mandatory turnout intervenes in the binding way needed to help citizens overcome motivational problems like weakness of will.

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AT: Turnout

Turnout is already high – it’ll be higher than the past 100 years this election Brownstein 19 [Ronald Brownstein, senior editor at the Atlantic with a BA in literature from Binghamton 6-13-2019, "Brace for a Voter-Turnout Tsunami," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/2020-election- voter-turnout-could-be-record-breaking/591607/]/Triumph Debate

Signs are growing that voter turnout in 2020 could reach the highest levels in decades—if not the highest in the past century—with a surge of new voters potentially producing the most diverse electorate in American history. But paradoxically, that surge may not dislodge the central role of the predominantly white and heavily working-class voters who tipped the three Rust Belt states that decided 2016: Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Even amid a tide of new participation, those same voters could remain the tipping point of the 2020 election. With Donald Trump’s tumultuous presidency stirring such strong emotions among both supporters and opponents, strategists in both parties and academic experts are now bracing for what Michael McDonald, a University of Florida political scientist who specializes in voting behavior, recently called “a voter turnout storm of a century in 2020.” “I think we are heading for a record presidential turnout at least in the modern era, and by that I mean since the franchise went to 18-year-olds,” in 1972, says Glen Bolger, a partner at Public Opinion Strategies. “And I mean not only in total numbers [but also] in terms of the percentage of eligible voters [who turn out]. The emotion behind politics … is sky-high, and I don’t think it’s just on one side. I think it’s on both sides.” McDonald thinks the turnout surge in 2020 could shatter even older records, estimating that as many as two-thirds of eligible voters may vote next year. If that happens, it would represent the highest presidential-year turnout since 1908, when 65.7 percent of eligible Americans cast a ballot, according to McDonald’s figures. Since 18-year-olds were granted the vote, the highest showing was the 61.6 percent of eligible voters who showed up in 2008, leading to Barack Obama’s victory. And since World War II, the highest turnout level came in 1960, with John F. Kennedy’s win, when 63.8 percent of voters participated. Experts on both sides point to an array of indicators that signal turnout may reach new heights next year. Signs of political interest, from the number of small-donor contributions made to presidential candidates to the viewership for cable news, are all spiking. In polls, very high shares of Americans already say they are paying a lot of attention to the 2020 presidential race. But the clearest sign that high turnout may be approaching in 2020 is that it already arrived in 2018. In last year’s midterm, nearly 120 million people voted, about 35 million more than in the previous midterm, in 2014, with 51 percent of eligible voters participating—a huge increase over the previous three midterms. The 2018 level represented the largest share of eligible voters to turn out in a midterm year since 1914, according to McDonald’s figures. Catalist estimated that about 14 million new voters who had not participated in 2016 turned out two years later, and they preferred Democrats by a roughly 20-percentage-point margin.

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Mail-in voting boosts turnout too - states are relaxing restrictions before November Greenwood 6-7 [Max Greenwood, reporter for the Hill with a degree from Northwestern in journalism, 6-7-2020, "Turnout surges after states expand mail-in voting," The Hill, https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/501384-turnout- surges-after-states-expand-mail-in-voting] /Triumph Debate

States that moved to rapidly expand mail-in balloting amid the coronavirus pandemic are seeing some of their highest levels of voter turnout in years, even as President Trump looks to clamp down on such efforts. In at least four of the eight states that held primaries on Tuesday, turnout surpassed 2016 levels, with most of the votes being cast via mail, according to an analysis of election returns by The Hill. Each of those states took steps earlier this year to send absentee ballot applications to all of their registered voters. In Iowa, for instance, total turnout reached 24 percent, up from about 15 percent in the state’s 2016 primaries and its highest ever turnout for a primary. But more strikingly, of the roughly 524,000 votes cast, some 411,000 of them came from absentee ballots – a nearly 1,000 percent increase over 2016 levels. The high turnout could encourage more states to take similar steps ahead of the November general elections. Trump has resisted such efforts, even threatening last month to hold up federal funding to Michigan and Nevada over state election officials’ decisions to send mail-in ballot applications to registered voters. The president’s argument against expanding mail-in voting is two-fold: he has claimed that it not only increases the risk of voter fraud, but it gives a structural advantage to Democrats. Elections experts have knocked down those claims, noting that fraud is exceedingly rare in all instances and that there’s little to no evidence that widespread mail-in voting benefits one party over another. In the states that held primaries on Tuesday, however, the decision to expand mail-in voting was largely nonpartisan, with both Democratic and Republican officials throwing their support behind more robust vote-by-mail efforts. In Montana, where the governor is a Democrat and the secretary of state is a Republican, Tuesday’s primaries were conducted entirely by mail, and every registered voter was sent a ballot ahead of June 2. As of noon on Friday, turnout hovered near 55 percent, up from about 45 percent in 2016, setting an all-time record for a primary election in the state. In South Dakota, where Republicans dominate the state government, turnout rose to 28 percent from 22 percent in 2016. Of the more than 154,000 votes cast, absentee ballots accounted for about 89,000, according to the Secretary of State’s Office. By comparison, far more than the roughly 19,000 were requested in the lead up to the 2016 primary. And in New Mexico, voter turnout in the June 2 primary stood at 40 percent, up from about 34 percent in 2016. Of the nearly 400,000 votes cast, more than 270,000 came from absentee ballots, according to Secretary of State Maggie Toulouse Oliver (D). As of Friday, votes were still being tallied in parts of the state. For mail-in voting advocates, the surge in turnout on Tuesday was a major victory in the biggest test for vote-by-mail since the outset of the coronavirus pandemic. “The June 2 primaries proved what we already knew – access to absentee ballots increases voter turnout,” said Tom Ridge, a Republican former Homeland Security Secretary and governor of Pennsylvania, who co-chairs the bipartisan group VoteSafe. “That's especially good news for someone like me who does not believe voting is a privilege, but rather a responsibility of citizenship,” he added. “Voters should have options to demonstrate that responsibility safely and securely during this pandemic.” Mail-in voting isn’t a new phenomenon in the U.S. Five states – Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah and Washington – already conduct their elections entirely by mail. California and Montana also rely heavily on mail-in voting, while 27 other states already offered so-called “no-excuse” absentee voting before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. In the 2018 midterm elections, nearly one in four votes was cast by mail. But since the pandemic took hold in the U.S. in March, a dozen other states that require voters to provide an excuse in order to cast an absentee ballot have relaxed restrictions to allow any registered voter to vote by mail due to concerns about the coronavirus. The latest state to join that list was Missouri, where Republican Gov. Mike Parson signed a measure on Thursday allowing all of the state’s registered voters to request a mail-in ballot for the August primary and November general election. Most voters will still have to have their mail-in ballots notarized for them to be accepted.

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Voter Integrity

Compulsory voting solves voter fraud Lund 13 [Eric Lund, JD candidate at the University of Wisconsin, 2013, “COMPULSORY VOTING: A POSSIBLE CURE FOR PARTISANSHIP AND APATHY IN U.S. POLITICS,” University of Wisconsin, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/wisint31&div=8&id=&page= ] /Triumph Debate Another important concern compulsory voting addresses is voter fraud. Much of recent electoral legislation on the state level purports to address increasing instances of voter fraud. ""^ Although it is unclear whether this drastic increase in voter fraud is even real,"*' compulsory voting could almost completely eradicate the problem if administered effectively. If every citizen is obligated either to vote or at least register attendance at the polls on Election Day, fraudulent voters are unlikely to be successful short of stealing someone's identity.

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The affirmative solves vote buying Singh 18 [Shane P. Singh, professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia with a PhD in political science from MSU, 2018, “Compulsory Voting and Parties’ Vote-Seeking Strategies,” American Journal of Political Science, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12386] /Triumph Debate A number of studies find evidence of a positive link between mandatory voting and political sophistication (e.g., Cordova and Rangel 2017; Gordon and Segura 1997; ´ Sheppard 2015; Shineman 2018), and compulsory voting is further shown to increase the extent to which individuals identify with political parties (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Singh and Thornton 2013). Still, others find little or no evidence of a positive effect of compulsory voting on political sophistication (e.g., Birch 2009, chap. 4; de Leon and Rizzi 2014; Leon 2017; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2008; Selb and Lachat 2009, 575, fn. 1). Thus, while it is clear that compulsory voting increases turnout and thereby irons out socioeconomic disparities in the voting population, evidence regarding the effect of compulsory voting on political sophistication is mixed. How then will compulsory voting shape parties’ voteseeking strategies? First, as compulsory voting reliably boosts turnout, especially where sanctions are strong and enforced (e.g., Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011), parties will see relatively little utility in voter mobilization. As individuals will already have external incentive to vote, parties will instead focus on persuasion. Second, parties’ perceptions of the character of the voting population will shape the nature of such persuasion efforts. Where turning out is mandatory, voting populations will contain a comparatively high proportion of individuals of low socioeconomic status. This wider array of voters should increase for parties the utility of broad, catchall policy programs. At the same time, it should decrease the utility of subgroup-targeted appeals. This is borne out in a formal model of electoral competition by Bugarin and Portugal (2015), who show that mandatory voting incentivizes parties to take into consideration the preferences of the whole electorate. In addition, as parties can expect the electorate to be more engaged with political parties where voting is mandatory, they will stand to gain more by promoting their “brands” (Singh and Thornton 2013, 193). Parties will also take into account the degree of political sophistication in the voting population. This is consequential because political sophisticates are more likely to alter their vote choices in response to policy-based and issue- relevant information (e.g., Kam 2005; Lau and Redlawsk 2001), to conceive of politics with reference to left–right ideological structure (Harbers, de Vries, and Steenbergen 2013), and to vote based on ideological considerations (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Federico and Hunt 2013; Jacoby 2009; Stubager, Seeberg, and So 2018). Although, as discussed above, empirical evidence is mixed with regard to the relationship between compulsory voting and sophistication, parties are likely to operate under the supposition that the link is positive. Democratic political elites tend to hold sanguine views of status quo electoral institutions (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1997). In Australia, for example, national politicians favor maintaining its mandatory voting law by a ratio of nearly four to one, and this affinity is not due solely to its impact on their electoral fortunes (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2006). Records of debates over the implementation of compulsory voting confirm that elected leaders often see it as a way to reinforce civic duty and engender political awareness (Hughes 1968; Maldonado 2015; Malkopoulou 2011). For example, in deliberations over the introduction of compulsory voting in Belgium, the country’s prime minister argued that it would serve to educate voters about the competing candidates (Malkopoulou 2011, 157). Perceiving a relatively sophisticated electorate, political parties will thus see utility in playing up their policy stances and ideological positions where turnout is mandatory. Implications: Programmatic Vote Seeking and Vote Buying Increased emphasis on policy and ideology among political parties implies the adoption of programmatic voteseeking strategies. Programmatic strategies involve noncontingent policy bundles aimed at large groups (e.g., lower classes, social conservatives), which are reflected in parties’ left–right ideologies (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Clientelistic strategies, alternatively, are characterized by the targeting of specific groups with offers of quid pro quo exchanges. While programmatic and clientelistic vote-seeking strategies are not mutually exclusive, parties that behave programmatically are less likely to also behave clientelistically (Hicken 2011, 305). Thus, compulsory voting should lead parties to favor programmatism over clientelism, especially where the compulsory rules have “teeth” and are thus more likely to be effective. This first observable implication is expressed in hypothesis form as: H1: Compulsory voting increases the extent to which parties are programmatic, rather than clientelistic, in their vote-seeking efforts, especially where rules are routinely enforced and penalties for abstention are substantial. A balancing toward programmatism and away from clientelism implies that parties will be less likely to employ common clientelistic methods. Here, I focus on vote buying, a widespread strategy (Schaffer 2007) that can be classified as clientelistic (Hicken 2011; Stokes 2009). There are further reasons to expect a negative relationship between mandatory voting and vote buying beyond the shift toward programmatism associated with compulsory voting, and the mechanisms behind this expectation differ conditional on the type of vote buying. I consider three of the vote-buying varieties addressed by Gans-Morse,Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014): “negative vote buying,” “turnout buying,” and “positive vote buying.”1 Respectively, parties may bribe individuals who are indifferent or in opposition not to vote, they may give money or favors to supporters who are unlikely to turn out in exchange for their participation, or they may purchase support from those likely to vote against them. Negative vote buying should decrease under compulsory voting because it gives individuals added incentive to turn out; one’s participation allows him or her to avoid a monetary or nonmonetary sanction. This, in turn, makes negative vote buying more expensive for parties. Turnout buying should also decrease where voting is compulsory, as individuals are already mobilized by the threat of a penalty for abstention. That is, it is unnecessary for parties to purchase their supporters’ participation where they are already likely to turn out. The

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predictions of the formal model of Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014) align with this logic. Turning to positive vote buying, on the one hand, Abraham (1955, 9) notes that individuals who turn out against their free will are likely to feel that they “ought to be recompensed” (see Birch 2009, 105), which could increase opportunities for positive vote buying. This was noted very early on by Blackstone (1753/1893, 165) and is also present in more recent work (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014). On the other hand, if parties expect compulsory voting to increase political sophistication, they will see less utility in positive vote buying due to an expectation that relatively sophisticated voters will be less susceptible to their efforts. Compulsory voting should have an unambiguously downward impact on negative vote buying and turnout buying. I also expect that the shift toward programmatism, coupled with parties’ perceptions of a relatively sophisticated electorate under compulsory voting, will lessen the prevalence of positive vote-buying efforts.2 The mechanisms through which compulsory rules decrease vote buying should operate most forcefully where such rules are sharply sanctioned and reliably enforced. This set of observable implications is expressed in hypothesis form as: H2: Compulsory voting decreases negative vote buying, turnout buying, and positive vote buying, especially where rules are routinely enforced and penalties for abstention are substantial.

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Democratic Legitimacy

Compulsory voting stifles populism – it counterbalances populists by mobilizing everyone and prevents overrepresentation within government

Malkopoulou 6-8 [Anthoula Malkopoulou, Associate Professor in Political Theory at Lund University specialized in democratic theory with a PhD in Political Thought from the University of Jyväskylä 6-8-2020, "Compulsory voting and right-wing populism: mobilisation, representation and socioeconomic inequalities," Taylor & Francis, https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2020.1774507] /Triumph Debate

The solution: universal voter mobilisation Does compulsory voting represent a non-populist alternative to inclusive mobilisation? In what follows, I argue that compulsory voting impedes right-wing populist mobilisation and prompts a more inclusive form of voter participation. The most crucial advantage with regard to voter mobilisation is that compulsory voting brings out the vote of all members of the electorate. This includes (1) the disaffected parts of the population that populists appeal to, but also (2) the disaffected parts not captured by populist mobilisation, as well as (3) habitual voters. Indeed, the universal mobilisation produced by compulsory voting has two crucial addon effects in comparison to populist mobilisation: that of mobilising the most disaffected voters, and of inclusively and evenly mobilising the entire electorate. In the first case, a distinction must be made between the disaffected voters mobilised by right-wing populist parties, and the most disaffected voters not mobilised by them. In practice, disaffected voters include blue-collar workers and lower-level employees, especially young, less educated, white males (Norris 2005; Betz and Meret 2013); right-wing populism is often lauded as ‘democratic’ or ‘inclusivist’ because it brings these disaffected voters back into the voting game. Yet, the working-class and under-class constituency does not solely consist of male white voters. It also includes the most disaffected voters, namely female, non-white and immigrant voters – to the extent that the latter are enfranchised (Mondon 2017). These voters are particularly vulnerable to intersectional layers of disempowerment that add to working-class resentment. We already know that the worse off a person is – in terms of socioeconomic and educational attainment – the more likely she is to abstain (Birch 2009; Hill 2014). Thus, female, non-white and (enfranchised) immigrant voters from low-income groups would be particularly disinclined to vote. Women and immigrants are indeed in general less inclined to support right-wing populist parties (Spierings and Zaslove 2015; Pietsch 2017). Thus, mobilising these voters may counter-balance the over-mobilisation of other disaffected parts of the population. Yet, the most crucial difference between populist and mandatory mobilisation is that, while the former is inclusive of some excluded parts of the voting population, the latter is inclusive of all parts of the voting population. This distinction matters both empirically and normatively. Empirically, the higher the abstention rates of the overall registered voter population, the more inflated the percentage of elected parties (including right-wing populist parties) will be. This creates a mismatch between party support and actual voter shares in the population or within particular social groups. Mondon underlines how the propensity of working-class voters to abstain in both France and the UK has created the wrong impression that the majority of working-class voters support right-wing populist parties, when in reality only the majority of those working-class voters who make the journey to the polling station have supported such parties (Mondon 2017); this is less than half of the overall working-class voter population. 3 In a system where all registered voters would be required to cast a ballot, such artificial increase in right-wing populist parties’ voting percentages that does not correspond to an increase in absolute numbers of voters that support them would disappear. This does not only matter in terms of misguided perceptions about the popularity of right-wing populist parties; it also has direct institutional consequences as voting percentages translate to parliamentary seats and, as such, into real political decision-making power. In addition, the difference between mobilising a demobilised subset of the electorate and mobilising all members of the electorate highlights a crucial normative quality. True, populist mobilisation supports the inclusion of formerly excluded parts of the voting population (at least some of them); but while doing so it advocates and promotes the exclusion of other parts of the population, the so-called ‘elite’ and – in the case of right-wing populist parties – ethnic and religious minorities. Put differently, populist mobilisation is from a rhetorical and normative viewpoint by definition exclusivist; it defines the people, i.e. the legitimate source of popular sovereignty, in terms that do not include the entire population. By contrast, mandatory mobilisation is by definition, empirically and normatively, inclusivist and universal.

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Compulsory voting limits political polarization and voter disenfranchisement and strengthens democracy Che 19 [Chang Che, Editor of the Oxford Review with a master’s philosophy in political theory political theory at Oxford, 11-29-2019, "The Case for Compulsory Voting," Quillette, https://quillette.com/2019/11/29/the-case-for-compulsoryvoting]/Triumph Debate

The right to vote is under relentless assault in the United States today. In 2013, the Supreme Court nullified a pivotal provision of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder, which required states to secure approval from the government before changing their election laws. The consequences of the ruling were swift. North Carolina immediately proposed a voter suppression bill that eliminated same-day voter registration. In 2016, 14 states implemented new voting restrictions for the first time in a presidential election. Five years since the ruling, the number of polling closures has doubled. During a town hall event in Cleveland, Ohio, in 2015, Barack Obama commented on America’s disappointing culture of voter suppression: “We shouldn’t be making it harder to vote, we should be making it easier to vote.” He also considered the radical potential of a mandatory voting law. “It would be transformative if everybody voted— that would counteract money [in politics] more than anything.” The former president’s comments were immediately met with heavy conservative criticism. “Forcing people to vote violates their freedom of speech, because freedom to speak includes the right not to speak,” wrote Hans von Spakovsky of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank. “Why should the rest of us have to suffer the possible consequences of [voter] ignorance?” wrote Trevor Burrus of the Cato Institute. “Just let the dart throwers stay home.” For decades, conservatives and libertarians have colonized the political space of liberty, arguing that any compulsion by law— whether relinquishing one’s assault weapons or being moderated on speech platforms—is both morally and constitutionally indefensible from the perspective of freedom. Meanwhile, civil rights advocates have largely conceded this territory, clinging to the hard-won legal battles of the Civil Rights Movement, rather than producing new and compelling political arguments in favor of meaningful electoral reform. Now, as the conservative majority in the Supreme Court threatens to chip away at the last substantive provision of the Voting Rights Act, they cannot afford to be complacent any longer. Civil rights advocates must usher in a new vision of political freedom: one that combines the value of full participation with the equal protection of the law. A compulsory voting law—practiced in a number of democracies around the world, including Australia and Belgium—makes voting a civic requirement for all citizens. It would incentivize state and local legislatures to lower, not raise, the procedural hurdles to full participation for every citizen over the age of 18, no matter their race or class. This new American democracy would finally represent all the people, rather than the most radical, the wealthiest, and the most well-connected. Practically, such a reform would also curb the culture of voter suppression that has historically barred less powerful groups from the political system. In the US, citizens with lower levels of income and education are less likely to vote. This story is often perceived as one of individual choice: non-voters are simply uninterested in the vote as an instrument of political influence. In reality, there are a host of formal and informal disenfranchisement mechanisms that bar citizens from associating the vote with an instrument of political influence at all. Apart from formal constraints on voting—such as voter ID laws—many citizens do not vote because they do not perceive the government as responsive to their needs even if they did vote. Public officials reinforce this perception by prioritizing the concerns of likely voters over non-voters. Political scientists Martin Gilens and Ben Page have demonstrated that the government is highly responsive to the attitudes of economic elites, but less so to the views of average voters. In addition to real or perceived government unresponsiveness, communities without strong norms of voting also face a problem of collective action. By creating the expectation that everyone will vote, compulsory voting remedies the collective action problem that plagues disadvantaged communities. A near-universal turnout would then reorient the political system to be responsive to the most vulnerable groups in society—it would, in the most meaningful sense, secure the “equal protection of the laws” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Compulsory voting is not a novel idea. In Australia, it has existed since 1924, after voter turnout fell to 60 per cent. The law also established permissible reasons for not voting, such as illness and foreign travel, and procedures allowing citizens facing fines to challenge them in court. The year after the new law, voter turnout skyrocketed to 91 per cent. In subsequent years, voter turnout in Australia has averaged 95 per cent. The Australia case provides an example of how a compulsory voting law might affect voter turnout. It also suggests how laws can transform a political culture for the better. In a 1996 survey, for example, 87 per cent of Australians (significantly higher than in 1924) said they would “probably” or “definitely” still vote even if it wasn’t mandatory. This suggests that a significant portion of Australian voters found genuine reasons to vote thanks to a new culture of voting made possible by the law. The political culture of the United States is desperately in need of change. Voter turnout in the 2016 elections was a meager 55 per cent and turnout hasn’t climbed above 60 per cent since 1968. When citizens have an obligation to vote, state and local legislatures have an obligation to make voting as easy as possible. The erosion of the Voting Rights Act under the Supreme Court has allowed states to impose new requirements on voters, reinforcing a culture of indifference. Making voting a civic duty would change the presumptions in favor of broad access to voting, encouraging many states to reverse a decades-long trend. American politics has also never been more divisive. A Pew Research Study found that the overall share of Americans

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who express ideological views has doubled over the past two decades. The state of polarization in the United States has increasingly incentivized politicians to choose party over country—most notably today through gerrymandering and soliciting interference from foreign countries. By affecting the fairness of our elections, these actions threaten the health of our democracy. “If one thing is clear from studying breakdowns throughout history,” write political scientists Steven Levittsky and Daniel Ziblatt in How Democracies Die, “it’s that extreme polarization can kill democracies.” There is ample evidence that compulsory voting could reverse the polarization trend. In a 2017 poll, approximately six out of 10 Americans believe that both the Democratic and Republican parties are out of touch with the concerns of most people. According to political scientist Morris Fiorina, this is because most of the current non-voting electorate in the US is more moderate than present-day voters. Compulsory voting could add more than a quarter of the American population to the voting electorate, permanently depolarizing American politics.

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US democracy is key to mitigate a laundry list of existential threats and prevent great power war - backsliding causes those systems to unravel Kendall-Taylor 16 [Andrea Kendall-Taylor, deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council and a nonresident senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the CSIS, “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” 7-15-16, CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how- democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order] /Triumph Debate It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising. The norms, values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are the ascent of China and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the specter of widespread democratic decline. Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system, but they receive far less attention in discussions of the shifting world order. In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. A 2015 Freedom House report stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.” Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of key trends that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global order. Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad. Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system. Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing. Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations. A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become fragmented and less effective. Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. International relations literature tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within

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countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows. Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics.

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Compulsory voting motivates politicians to make the system voter-friendly Engelen 07 [Bart Engelen, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tilburg University, 4-2007, “Why Compulsory Voting Can Enhance Democracy,” Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248874800_Why_Compulsory_Voting_Can_Enhance_Democracy]/Triumph Debate

Proponents of compulsory voting argue that it motivates politicians ‘to make the system voter friendly’ (MacKerras and McAllister, 1999, 223). This means that voting procedures will be facilitated: ‘wherever voting is compulsory it is reasonable to expect the state to make voting a relatively painless experience (y) in order to ensure a high rate of compliance’ (Hill, 2002a, 2). This includes all kinds of measures that minimize the effort needed to vote, resulting in even higher turnout levels (Hill, 2002b, 90–91; Jackman, 2001, 16317; Keaney and Rogers, 2006, 21–25; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978, 288). Compulsory voting and other turnout-increasing measures thus function in a mutually reinforcing way. More importantly, voter-friendliness must be understood as a raised responsiveness of the government to its citizens’ needs. As you only count if you vote, you should do so in order to make sure the government looks after your concerns. Compulsory voting thus ‘encourages incumbent governments to protect everybody’s interests’ (Hill, 2002b, 88).

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AT: Democratic Legitimacy

Compulsory voting only works under the threat of punishment (also means non- enforcement wrecks solvency) Panagopoulos 8 [Costas Panagopoulos, professor of political science at Northwestern with a PhD in politics from NYU, 12-2008, “The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems,” Political Behavior, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40213328] /Triumph Debate To illustrate the substantive impact of penalty and enforcement levels, Table 5 presents predicted turnout rates (with the corresponding standard errors of the predictions) for combinations of penalty severity and enforcement levels (for a typical parliamentary, proportional system; other variables held at mean levels), based on the estimates obtained in model 3. The results corroborate the overall findings discussed above. All else equal, the expected voting rate with maximum penalties and enforcement is estimated to be nearly 25 percentage points higher than turnout given the scenario of only token penalties and enforcement (67.81% compared to 43.12%, respectively). Discussion A reasonable explanation for nonvoting in compulsory systems where abstention is more costly that participation is that voters calculate the probability of sanction enforcement to be low. This suggests abstention may be a rational decision in these systems, and this study provides some evidence that voters behave as such in countries that mandate voting. Voters in these systems abstain least when both the penalties and the likelihood of enforcement are high, and abstain most when neither penalties nor enforcement levels are meaningful. From a public policy point of view, this study suggests that compulsory voting countries that seriously wish to deter abstention should impose high sanctions for non- compliance and enforce these sanctions strictly. Sanctions that are largely symbolic and enforcement that is effectively non-existent are unlikely to yield enhanced turnout. From a scholarly perspective, it is useful to adapt standard voting models to incorporate features unique to compulsory voting systems. This study provides evidence that strategic calculations about voting in compulsory voting systems are more accurately characterized and analyzed by including elements to capture how voters assess both the severity of the sanctions for abstention and the likelihood of enforcement.

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Its virtually indistinguishable from voluntary voting without enforcement or punishment Panagopoulos 8 [Costas Panagopoulos, professor of political science at Northwestern with a PhD in politics from NYU, 12-2008, “The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems,” Political Behavior, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40213328] /Triumph Debate

Consistent with the discussion above, I also expect that the interaction between severity of the sanction and the likelihood of enforcement will be related to the rate of electoral participation. I hypothesize that turnout will be highest in systems in which sanctions are most severe and the likelihood of enforcement is strongest. The analyses that follow incorporate an interaction term to examine such a relationship Empirical Results Table 2 presents average turnout rates in voluntary voting systems and in compulsory voting systems, categorized by the severity of the penalties (No/Low, Moderate, High). The data presented in Table 2 reveal support for several hypotheses developed above. First, I find that turnout in compulsory voting systems that impose no formal sanctions for non-compliance is lower on average that in other compulsory voting systems. It is also virtually indistinguishable, statistically, from average turnout rates in voluntary voting systems (the difference of means tests is not significant at conventional levels). The finding lends support for Hypothesis 1 described above and suggests that voters in compulsory voting systems that do not impose formal penalties for non-voting behave similarly to voters in voluntary voting systems with respect to turnout. The empirical evidence presented in Table 2 also demonstrates that turnout increases as the severity of the penalty increases. Turnout in compulsory voting systems that impose the most severe penalties for abstention is 6.0 percentage points higher, on average, than average turnout in systems that impose lower penalties for non-compliance. A difference of means tests reveals this difference is significant at the p < .05 level. The data in Table 2 also provides empirical evidence about the relationship between the degree of enforcement of compulsory voting sanctions and turnout. Table 2 reports average turnout rates in voluntary voting systems and in compulsory voting systems, categorized by the degree of enforcement (No/Low, Weak, Strict). The findings reveal support for several of the propositions developed above. First, turnout is lowest amongst compulsory voting systems that routinely fail to prosecute defections. In these systems, mean levels of turnout in elections is virtually indistinguishable from turnout in voluntary systems (the difference of means tests is not significant at conventional levels). Second, the data reveal support for the expectation that turnout rises as the likelihood of sanction enforcement rises. Mean turnout in compulsory voting systems that enforce sanctions for nonvoting strictly is 13.1 percentage points higher on average than in compulsory voting systems that punish defectors less routinely, a difference that is significant at the p < .01 level. The patterns also suggest mean turnout in countries with No/Low enforcement is higher than in systems with weak enforcement, but this difference is not significant at conventional levels. When compulsory voting systems impose no formal penalties for abstention or when defection is not prosecuted (q = 0), the strategic decision-making calculus of participation in elections is effectively unaltered. The empirical evidence presented above supports this contention. I observe no differences in turnout between voluntary systems and systems with only token sanctions for abstention or no real enforcement mechanisms. I conclude from this finding that sanctions and enforcement affect primarily the C term (costs of voting) in the strategic calculus of voting and not the D term that is meant to capture the intrinsic value of the benefit of voting (civic duty, etc.).

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Invalid votes cancel out any benefits from compulsory voting and it causes resentment amongst voters Kouba and Mysicka 19 [Karel Kouba, assistant professor of political science at the University of Hradec Kralove and Stanislav Mysicka, assistant professor of political science at the University of Hradec Kralove, January -March 2019, “Should and Does Compulsory Voting Reduce Inequality?,” Sage Pub, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244018817141] /Triumph Debate

There is also significant evidence for the second association that is crucial to our argument, namely, that compulsory voting also substantially increases the rate of invalid voting. This has been the unequivocal finding of cross-national comparative studies on invalid voting (Power & Garand, 2007; Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006; Uggla, 2008), although the relationship appears to be strongly conditioned by voter efficacy with compulsory voting exercising the strongest effects, when the stakes of the electoral competition are diminished (Kouba & Lysek, 2016). Although the strong correlation between compulsory voting and high rates of invalid ballots is rarely disputed, there is no consensus over the nature and meaning of such invalid ballots. Invalid votes could still signify a meaningful response of politically engaged voters to a deficient political offer (Driscoll & Nelson, 2014). However, there is also substantial evidence from the study based on the cross-national survey data that invalid voting induced by compulsory voting laws is driven by a lack of information and interest, political distrust and negative attitudes toward democracy (Singh, 2017). In Latin America, invalid voting is often most frequent among those with less education and levels of political knowledge (Katz & Levin, 2016). At the same time, it increases turnout among those voters who are less engaged in politics, and who are at the same time more likely to cast an invalid ballot (Cohen, 2018). This is consistent with other problematic attitudinal effects of compulsory voting identified by recent research. Although compulsory voting (substantively or slightly) increases trust in political institutions, yet at the same time, it negatively affects forms of societal engagement other than turnout, suggesting that the participatory effects of mandatory voting cancel each other out (Lundell, 2012). Concomitant evidence from subjective reactions among young British voters suggests that the introduction of compulsory voting might be counterproductive and serves to reinforce existing feelings of resentment (Henn & Oldfield, 2016). Such reinforcing effects of compulsory voting on the negative orientations toward democracy and system legitimacy are amply documented in another comparative study (Singh, 2018). We, therefore, view invalid voting as a product of compulsory voting through which politically disinterested, less educated, less informed, and unengaged voters express the lack of interest in the political choice, or the elections themselves. Moreover, self-reported invalid voting—from which such inferences are drawn— underestimates the extent of invalid votes due to voting compulsion because invalid votes are also likely to arise from an unintentional voting error, which the voter cannot communicate in surveys (Hill & Young, 2007; Kouba & Lysek, 2016; McAllister & Makkai, 1993; Power & Garand, 2007; Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006). Such votes—that appear in the aggregate-level figures of the overall voting results, but not in individual-level survey responses—in turn are likely to be handed out by the less educated (Hill & Young, 2007; McAllister & Makkai, 1993; Power & Garand, 2007; Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006) and less politically informed citizens. This only aggravates the problem. Invalid ballots induced by compulsory voting systems not only do not decide representation, but also generally fail to represent specific political interests.

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Compulsory voting encourages extremism Singh 2014. [Shane P. Singh, professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia with a PhD in political science from MSU, 2016, “Beyond Turnout: The Consequences of Compulsory Voting. Political Insight”, 5(2), 22–25. doi:10.1111/2041-9066.12058] / Triumph Debate

Compulsory rules alter the character of the voting population, so it is reasonable to suspect that political outcomes will also vary across countries with compulsory and voluntary voting. First, party system characteristics may be affected by compulsory voting. By motivating participation among typically disadvantaged groups, compulsory voting can benefit parties of the left. In Australia, for example, compulsory voting is generally thought to advantage the Labor Party over the Liberal-National Coalition. Further, party systems may become more fragmented where voting is required: where politically apathetic individuals are forced to vote, they often choose extremist or ‘anti-system’ parties. While this dynamic could, in theory, benefit parties on both ideological extremes, it appears that the far right profits more from compulsory voting than the far left. Differences in the makeup of governments in compulsory and voluntary systems, can, in turn, affect societal outcomes. For example, outside of Latin America at least, income inequality tends to be lower where voting is mandated, likely because socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals participate more where voting is not optional, selecting politicians of the left and others with policy positions that cater to their needs. Further, compulsory voting has been linked to reduced political corruption, potentially because it incentivises disillusioned voters, many of whom would otherwise stay home, to go to the polls and vote against improbity. Anecdotal evidence for this is found in Australia, which is considered by Transparency International to be one of the least corrupt countries in the world – and less corrupt than the United Kingdom and the United States. While few other empirical links between compulsory voting and country-level outcomes have been established, compulsory voting’s societal consequences are likely much more broad than our current understanding suggests. As research on compulsory voting’s effects continues to grow, many of these consequences should come to light.

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Marginalized Communities

Traditionally ignore groups are more likely to be politically engaged because they know their community will be too Chapman 19 [Emilee Booth Chapman, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, 1-2019, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12393] /Triumph Debate Many scholars have pointed to compulsory voting as an important step in counteracting this cycle of disengagement in marginalized communities (Birch 2009, 53–54; L. Hill 2010, 919–21; Lijphart 1997). Numerous studies have shown that compulsory voting effectively and often dramatically increases turnout rates—by 15 percentage points or more (e.g., Birch 2009, 79–97; Hirczy 1994)—and electoral participation is distributed more evenly across society (Fowler 2013, 72; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998, 421–22). By promoting reliable compliance with the expectation of universal electoral participation, effectively enforced compulsory voting remedies the collective action problem that plagues vulnerable communities with chronically low turnout rates. Members of politically alienated groups have more reason to regard their vote as an instrument of political influence if they know that others like them will also vote.

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Compulsory voting reduces the electoral gender gap

Córdova and Rangel 17 [Abby Córdova, associate professor of political science at the University of Kentucky with a PhD from Vanderbilt University, and Gabriela Rangel, Assistant Professor of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute with a PhD in political science from the University of Kentucky, 2017, “Addressing the Gender Gap: The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Women’s Electoral Engagement,” Comparative Political Studies, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414016655537] /Triumph Debate

Our theoretical framework suggests that women in enforced CV systems in particular engage with the electoral process to avoid wasting their vote. Consequently, it is implied that mandatory voting should be more strongly associated with smaller gender gaps in electoral than non- electoral forms of political involvement. In this section, we examine the effect of CV on three variables available in the CSES survey that are expected not to be as strongly associated with the electoral process: contacting a public official, participation in protests, and factual knowledge on domestic politics and foreign affairs. First, when we look at the correlations of these three variables with voting behavior, we find that they are indeed not as strongly correlated with voting compared to the four dependent variables in our main analyses, indicating a weaker association with the electoral process. Our additional statistical analyses show that CV does not result in significantly smaller gender gaps in these three proxies of non-electoral engagement. Taken together, these analyses indicate that compulsory voting has a stronger effect on the gender gap in electoral than non-electoral political engagement. Another implicit assumption in our theory is that the outcomes we examine should be observed in tandem in countries with enforced CV. In these countries, a woman, for instance, will be more likely to report participation in multiple forms of electoral engagement. To confirm that the average effects we present above are not simply capturing scattered patterns of electoral engagement, we re- estimate our models using a count index as a dependent variable, which reflects the total number of positive responses provided by the same individual across different modes of electoral engagement. Our results lend strong support to the theoretical notion that CV increases the chances for a given individual to engage in multiple aspects of the electoral process, particularly for women. The gender gap in the probability of reporting involvement in multiple forms of electoral engagement is considerably smaller in countries with enforced CV. Additionally, we perform a series of tests to check the robustness of our results to alternative measures of our CV Index, and to the inclusion of other control variables. If we simply recode the CV Index as a binary variable (coded 1 for compulsory voting and 0 for voluntary), we also find a declining gender gap in all forms of electoral engagement, but this measure tends to underestimate the effect of CV on the gender gap, highlighting the importance of considering sanctions and enforcement levels. We also measure CV as a categorical rather a continuous variable. To increase the number of cases in a given category and be able to perform this test with a higher level of precision, we recode the original 5-point CV Index into three categories and conduct the analyses for the dependent variables included in at least two waves of the CSES. In these models, we also observe that predicted probabilities increase at higher rate for women than men, resulting in smaller gender gaps at higher levels of enforcement. Our results also remain substantially unchanged after we control for several individual level variables, including membership in a civic group, urban or rural residence, marital status, and attitudes toward the political system as measured by satisfaction with democracy and political efficacy. Given that first round and run-off elections might motivate different political behavior patterns, we also conduct a robustness test to account for this likely effect by controlling for surveys conducted after the first round or runoff elections and find similar results. Moreover, because simply controlling for other country-level variables might underestimate the effect of such variables on the gender gap, we interact all aggregate-level control variables in our models with female. We find that accounting for the impact of GDP per capita, the level of democracy, and ENP on the gender gap does not alter our conclusions on the effect of CV. Our results are also robust when outlier countries, showing the smallest or largest gender gap on a given dependent variable, are excluded from our main analysis. All in all, the empirical evidence confirms that enforced CV is a strong and robust predictor of a smaller gender gap in several forms of electoral engagement.

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Compulsory voting has tangible effects on publicly policy in favor of disadvantaged working-class citizens

Fowler 13 [Anthony Fowler, Anthony Fowler is Associate Professor in the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, 2013, "Electoral and Policy Consequences of Voter Turnout: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8: 159–182 https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/westminster_model_democracy/files/fowler_compulsoryvoting.pdf /Triumph Debate

‘‘Democracy’s unresolved dilemma’’ is that elections do not accurately reflect the preferences of the citizenry (Lijphart, 1997). Systematic turnout inequality means that some citizens will be better represented than others. In this study, I exploit a rare opportunity to test the extent of this dilemma. Before the introduction of compulsory voting in Australia, election results and public policy were drastically different from the preferences of the citizens. When near-universal turnout was achieved, elections and policy shifted in favor of the working-class citizens who had previously failed to participate. While Australia has largely resolved the problem, inequalities in voter turnout remain in most advanced democracies. Increased turnout has tangible effects on partisan election results and public policies, and those effects will benefit the disadvantaged subset of citizens who otherwise would have abstained from the political process.

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Campaign Finance

Compulsory voting lowers the benefits of money in politics and curbs bad campaign finance laws See 7 [M See, 12-2007, “THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY VOTING IN THE UNITED STATES,” Harvard Law Review, https://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/compulsory_voting.pdf]/Triumph Debate

In addition to the direct effect of compulsory voting on turnout, there are also several indirect benefits. First, compulsory voting would reduce the role of money in politics.35 Political parties would not spend as much money on their get-out-the-vote efforts since high turnout would already be ensured and would be fairly inelastic.36 Some of the get-out-the-vote money could be shifted to other forms of campaign spending, but not all of it. A significant amount of spending on getting out the vote comes from groups known as 527s (a reference to the tax code) and nonpartisan groups that are not subject to campaign finance laws.37 These groups are limited in their abilities to campaign expressly in favor of candidates.38 Presumably, these organizations would shift some funds from getting out the vote to issue ads (which are permissible), but the diminishing marginal effectiveness of those ads would limit this. With this implicit limit on spending, politicians and parties might focus somewhat less on fundraising and be less beholden to donors.39

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Compulsory voting counterbalances lobbying

Bugarin and Portugal 14 [Mauricio Bugarin is a Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Brasília. Adriana Portugal is an employee in the Court of Auditors of the Federal District, Brazil, June 2014, "Should Voting Be Mandatory? The Effect of Compulsory Voting Rules on Candidates' Political Platforms," Journal of Applied Economics. Vol XVIII, No. 1 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/S1514-0326%2815%2930001-5 /Triumph Debate

The present article brings a new light to the theoretic debate on the voluntary versus compulsory voting dilemma by focusing on an important friction of real world elections: politics aim at redistributing resources between social groups. Therefore, elections are mechanisms to aggregate somewhat opposing preferences. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that different social groups tend to have distinct rates of voter turnout. More precisely, there is evidence that the poorer, less educated social classes are also the ones with lower political participation. When these two elements are included in a model of electoral competition, we find that voluntary voting creates a bias in the equilibrium political platform chosen by the candidates. This bias favors the classes that have higher voter turnout. As a consequence, if one believes that the optimal policy is the one that maximizes all citizens’ utilities aggregated in a Benthamite fashion, one must conclude that compulsory voting is a superior electoral rule, as suggested by Lijphart (1997) and others. This article aimed at presenting the simplest possible modeling of the effect of differential political participation on the competitive equilibrium platforms. The base model can be easily extended in several different ways. First, interest lobby groups can be introduced in a very simple way. Lobbyists can contribute to parties’ electoral campaigns and parties can use lobbyists’ contributions in order to influence voters and win elections. Such a friction would introduc[ing]e an additional bias in the equilibrium platform, towards the preferred policies of interest groups. Suppose interest groups are also the rich classes, which are also the ones with higher voter turnout. Then the voluntary voting rules bring about two reinforcing biases towards the policy preferred by the rich citizens. In that case, although the mandatory voting rule does not offset the interest group bias, it counterbalances it by reducing the higher turnout class bias. Second, parties can be made more distinct by including a political ideology to their utility function, in addition to their goal of winning the elections. Voters may also have ex-ante political biases towards one or the other party, as discussed, for example, in Ferejohn (1986), Bugarin (1999) and Bugarin (2003). In that case there will be full party differentiation, interest groups will actively participate in the electoral process by contributing to one or the other party and voters will see divergent platforms in equilibrium. However, the class bias will remain an important equilibrium result of the model, suggesting again a superiority of compulsory over voluntary voting.

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Mandatory voting checks the influence of corporate donors in Citizens United and bolsters poverty alleviation efforts Iheukumere 15 [Kanu Iheukumere, Chief Policy & Research Officer at Bethel New Life (a non-profit intent on eliminating poverty) with a masters degree in Urban planning and policy from the University of Illinois, 8-1-2015, "To end American poverty, we must make voting mandatory for everyone," Quartz, https://qz.com/469522/to-end- american-poverty-we-must-make-voting-mandatory-for-everyone/]/Triumph Debate

Despite years of business development, public policy squabbles and private money injections, a tradition of systemic poverty persists. Fixing it will require a monumental and multi-pronged effort, including raising the living wage, better job training programs and initiatives that better allow Americans earn and accumulate assets. Currently, this may not be possible. The US Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling has allowed a few rich voices to drown out the working class and impoverished, resulting in unintentional voter suppression disguised as free speech. The Supreme Court’s decision regarding campaign spending and contributions grants the well-to-do an unfair advantage over the not-doing-so-well at election time. Meanwhile, the increasing influence of corporate and special-interest money casts a shadow of corruption across the democratic landscape. Decreasing systemic poverty requires all eligible citizens to vote—by law. While mandating suffrage is not a novel concept, neither is compelling citizens to act in ways considered fruitful for the betterment of society. According to the Associated Press, more than 20 countries maintain some form of mandatory voting system. In the United States, childhood education, taxes, jury duty, and healthcare are all mandated activities considered fulfilling one’s civic duty. President Obama told a Cleveland crowd in March, “It would be completely transformative if everybody voted. If everyone voted, it would completely change the political map in this country.” He’s not wrong. As we being to rev up up for a new presidential election cycle, why shouldn’t voting, a US citizen’s most precious right, be legislatively mandated as a civic duty as well? Consider: National voter turnout over the past 12 years has averaged below 60%. During the recent Chicago mayoral election, less than 35 percent of registered voters went to the polls. Voter abstention is fuel for a fire of oppression, a fire that leaves a path of destroyed social and economic aspirations in its wake. Citizen’s United provides even more gasoline for this fire, further impeding our ability to choose our own destiny. Now more than ever, we, as citizens, must do our part to hold elected officials accountable, but we can’t do this if we stay home. Mandatory voting would: Compel political campaigns to appeal to a broader spectrum of the electorate, including the poor Minimize the influence of PACs and Super PACS Allow a candidate’s platform to drive special interests, rather than special interests drive a candidate’s platform Render expensive “attack ads” irrelevant Decrease the costs of running for office Decrease the role of money in elections It is no coincidence that poverty rates are often highest where voter turnout is low. In 2014, only 35.6% of Baltimore City’s voters turned out to vote in the gubernatorial general election. The Atlantic’s Daniel Weeks noted that “a slew of practical barriers continue to stand in the way of full and equal exercise of the franchise.” The truth is, the right to vote has been compromised for those whose income doesn’t afford reciprocal access to elected officials. Mandatory voting would serve as a powerful counterpunch to the court’s decisions on campaign contributions resulting in a more focused, and sincere effort to mitigate poverty and provide viable solutions to systemic systems of inequality and oppression.

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Citizens United prevents political action against a laundry list of existential crises – specifically, climate change.

Clements 19 [Jeffrey Clements, Assistant AG and Chief of the Public Protection Bureau in the Massachusetts AG’s Office with a JD from Cornell “But It Will Happen”: A Constitutional Amendment to Secure Political Equality in Election Spending and Representation, Harvard Law Review, https://harvardlpr.com/wp- content/uploads/sites/20/2019/07/Clements.pdf] /Triumph Debate

The Court Is Responsible for Vast Inequality of Influence and Representation The ever-more powerful elite donor class arises directly from the active, constant Supreme Court intervention against Americans’ attempts to address the problem. The large contributions and massive spending occur because the Supreme Court refuses to recognize political equality in the First Amendment and fails to distinguish between human beings and state-created entities such as corporations. Money certainly bears some relationship to speech; more money spent usually means more amplification and wider distribution of the views of the spender. But if “one accepts the proposition that money enables campaign related speech, its corollary is that those without money lack the ability to speak.”232 In our current dysfunctional system, money is not just speech—it is access and representation. Because money reigns, most Americans cannot participate meaningfully in determining candidates and election results. Accordingly, the vast majority of Americans lack power and real representation.233 Wealthy interests have “privileged access [to] and influence” with candidates and decisionmakers.234 “There [is] an indisputable link between generous political donations and opportunity after opportunity to make one’s case directly to a Member of Congress.”235 Wealthy Americans and corporate interests have wildly disproportionate influence, but they also typically have different policy preferences than many Americans who have far less money and influence.236 By excluding political equality from its First Amendment analysis of election spending, the Supreme Court has enabled concentrated power to achieve self-serving policy outcomes. With political decisions, or indecision, about energy and the global climate crisis, public health, food and water systems, deficits and debt, war and peace, this literally can be a matter of life or death for Americans without that power. The consequences of the experiment in a completely deregulated election spending regime increasingly are severe and grave. For example, if an election issue pits the interests of a handful of coal corporations against the death of thousands of Americans, are we really prepared to say that the greater wealth of a coal company owner gives him a “right” to have far more opportunity to persuade, far more ways to control the outcome, than the individuals without wealth who will die once the election is complete and the decision settled? This is not a hypothetical question.237 Humanity is running out of time to stop a global climate catastrophe due to fossil fuel consumption; yet our political system, with massive influence from fossil fuel companies and those who control them,238 fails to act— except to increase subsidies and incentives for fossil fuel consumption.239 Amidst run-away health care spending and failing public health infrastructure, American life-spans are declining240 and an opioid crisis is killing tens of thousands of Americans each year; our political system, with massive influence from the pharmaceutical, hospital system and health insurance industries,241 blocks action.242 With a rapid escalation to $21 trillion in national debt243 and nearly one trillion dollars in annual deficits, our political system, with massive influence from super-wealthy people and global corporations, enacts massive tax cuts for super-wealthy people and global corporations, making no provision for who will pay the bill.244 Will we allow Americans to consider methods to give all citizens an equal opportunity to be heard and to be represented in policy questions and candidates? Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the answer is no, we will not allow Americans or our courts to consider the equal rights of citizens in such circumstances. Under the Twenty-Eighth Amendment, the answer will be yes.

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Climate change action is stifled by Citizens United – donor money incentivizes the GOP to stop it to ensure re-election Jones 15 [Caroline Jones, Agriculture and Climate Change Research Consultant for the World Bank with a MS in environmental change and science from Oxford, 11-8-2015, "Green Power: How Citizens United Changed the Climate Change Conversation," Brown Political Review, https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/11/green-power-how-citizens- united-changed-the-climate-change-conversation/]/Triumph Debate

“Climate change was once a bipartisan issue,” according to Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) in an email interview with BPR. In the 2000s, senators on both sides of the aisle sponsored cap-and-trade bills, vocally emphasizing the importance of reducing our greenhouse gas emissions, and working on what no one could claim to be a partisan issue: climate change. But in 2010, something changed: Senators who once supported green reforms refused to even discuss climate change on the floor of the Senate, and some began denying its existence altogether. Yet, during that time, there were no revelatory scientific studies disproving climate change or the impact of human behavior on the environment. Instead, something much more influential happened: In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and — among many other things — changed the way the country talked (or rather, didn’t talk) about climate change. The Citizens United ruling opened the floodgates for special interests and lobbyists looking to dominate American politics. It discarded the ban on corporations and unions making independent expenditures and financing electioneering communications, giving them the green light to spend as much as they want to convince citizens to vote for or against any candidate. The colossal financial influence of the super-wealthy has given groups like fossil fuel companies the ability to indicate to some congressmen the types of climate change legislation they should and shouldn’t be supporting if they want their support. The financial sway of the oil industry is inescapable: In 2011-2012 alone, fossil fuel companies gave more than $300 million in campaign finance contributions (contributions which were acceptable only after the Citizens United ruling) and lobbying efforts. Their expenditures proved successful, with fossil fuel industries receiving $33 billion in federal subsidies in those same two years. In a similar vein, the Koch brothers have been key players in this campaign against climate change. Since 1997, they’ve spent $61.3 million to support organizations that oppose climate science and environmental legislation addressing climate change, even going so far as to subsidize scientists’ research. Their strategies are highly effective, riddling public discourse on the subject with misinformation and skewed scientific data. None of these strategies are new to politics, as corporations have been using their financial influence to buy scientific opinion since the 1960s, but ever since the Court ruled “no holds barred” and gave corporations and unions the go-ahead on unlimited political spending, corporate and union power over legislators has grown dramatically. "The guarantee of political consequences for action on climate change, courtesy of the Koch brothers, is a sure incentive for Republicans in Congress to resist taking action. " Senator Whitehouse wrote to BPR about the goals of the Koch brothers in their campaign spending: “Their message was best summed up by Tim Phillips, president of the Koch-funded Americans for Prosperity. In a 2014 interview, he said that any Republicans who support pro-climate policies ‘would be at a severe disadvantage.’ Coming from the head of a group whose financial backers have pledged to spend $750 million leading up to the 2016 elections, that’s a serious threat. The results have been sadly predictable: whereas there was a steady heartbeat of Republican action on climate change before Citizens United, their activity has virtually flatlined ever since.” Senator Whitehouse’s description is sadly accurate: in 2011, the year following the Citizens United ruling, Congress introduced half as many bills about climate change as they had in the year before.

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Climate change causes extinction – err aff due to cognitive bias Wallace-Wells 17 [David Wallace-Wells, journalist with New York Magazine, 6-19-2017, “The Uninhabitable Earth Famine, economic collapse, a sun that cooks us: What climate change could wreak — sooner than you think.” New York Magazine, nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html] /Triumph Debate

It is, I promise, worse than you think. If your anxiety about global warming is dominated by fears of sea-level rise, you are barely scratching the surface of what terrors are possible, even within the lifetime of a teenager today. And yet the swelling seas — and the cities they will drown — have so dominated the picture of global warming, and so overwhelmed our capacity for climate panic, that they have occluded our perception of other threats, many much closer at hand. Rising oceans are bad, in fact very bad; but fleeing the coastline will not be enough. Indeed, absent a significant adjustment to how billions of humans conduct their lives, parts of the Earth will likely become close to uninhabitable, and other parts horrifically inhospitable, as soon as the end of this century. Even when we train our eyes on climate change, we are unable to comprehend its scope. This past winter, a string of days 60 and 70 degrees warmer than normal baked the North Pole, melting the permafrost that encased Norway’s Svalbard seed vault — a global food bank nicknamed “Doomsday,” designed to ensure that our agriculture survives any catastrophe, and which appeared to have been flooded by climate change less than ten years after being built. The Doomsday vault is fine, for now: The structure has been secured and the seeds are safe. But treating the episode as a parable of impending flooding missed the more important news. Until recently, permafrost was not a major concern of climate scientists, because, as the name suggests, it was soil that stayed permanently frozen. But Arctic permafrost contains 1.8 trillion tons of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in the Earth’s atmosphere. When it thaws and is released, that carbon may evaporate as methane, which is 34 times as powerful a greenhouse-gas warming blanket as carbon dioxide when judged on the timescale of a century; when judged on the timescale of two decades, it is 86 times as powerful. In other words, we have, trapped in Arctic permafrost, twice as much carbon as is currently wrecking the atmosphere of the planet, all of it scheduled to be released at a date that keeps getting moved up, partially in the form of a gas that multiplies its warming power 86 times over. Maybe you know that already — there are alarming stories in the news every day, like those, last month, that seemed to suggest satellite data showed the globe warming since 1998 more than twice as fast as scientists had thought (in fact, the underlying story was considerably less alarming than the headlines). Or the news from Antarctica this past May, when a crack in an ice shelf grew 11 miles in six days, then kept going; the break now has just three miles to go — by the time you read this, it may already have met the open water, where it will drop into the sea one of the biggest icebergs ever, a process known poetically as “calving.” But no matter how well-informed you are, you are surely not alarmed enough. Over the past decades, our culture has gone apocalyptic with zombie movies and Mad Max dystopias, perhaps the collective result of displaced climate anxiety, and yet when it comes to contemplating real-world warming dangers, we suffer from an incredible failure of imagination. The reasons for that are many: the timid language of scientific probabilities, which the climatologist James Hansen once called “scientific reticence” in a paper chastising scientists for editing their own observations so conscientiously that they failed to communicate how dire the threat really was; the fact that the country is dominated by a group of technocrats who believe any problem can be solved and an opposing culture that doesn’t even see warming as a problem worth addressing; the way that climate denialism has made scientists even more cautious in offering speculative warnings; the simple speed of change and, also, its slowness, such that we are only seeing effects now of warming from decades past; our uncertainty about uncertainty, which the climate writer Naomi Oreskes in particular has suggested stops us from preparing as though anything worse than a median outcome were even possible; the way we assume climate change will hit hardest elsewhere, not everywhere; the smallness (two degrees) and largeness (1.8 trillion tons) and abstractness (400 parts per million) of the numbers; the discomfort of considering a problem that is very difficult, if not impossible, to solve; the altogether incomprehensible scale of that problem, which amounts to the prospect of our own annihilation; simple fear. But aversion arising from fear is a form of denial, too. In between scientific reticence and science fiction is science itself. This article is the result of dozens of interviews and exchanges with climatologists and researchers in related fields and reflects hundreds of scientific papers on the subject of climate change. What follows is not a series of predictions of what will happen — that will be determined in large part by the much-less-certain science of human response. Instead, it is a portrait of our best understanding of where the planet is heading absent aggressive action. It is unlikely that all of these warming scenarios will be fully realized, largely because the devastation along the way will shake our complacency. But those scenarios, and not the present climate, are the baseline. In fact, they are our schedule. The present tense of climate change — the destruction we’ve already baked into our future — is horrifying enough. Most people talk as if Miami and Bangladesh still have a chance of surviving; most of the scientists I spoke with assume we’ll lose them within the century, even if we stop burning fossil fuel in the next decade. Two degrees of warming used to be considered the threshold of catastrophe: tens of millions of climate refugees unleashed upon an unprepared world. Now two degrees is our goal, per the Paris climate accords, and experts give us only slim odds of hitting it. The U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issues serial reports, often called the “gold standard” of climate research; the most recent one projects us to hit four degrees of warming by the beginning of the next century, should we stay the present course. But that’s just a median projection. The upper end of the probability curve runs as high as eight degrees — and the authors still haven’t figured out how to deal with that permafrost melt. The IPCC reports also don’t fully account for the albedo effect (less ice means less reflected and more absorbed sunlight, hence more warming); more cloud cover (which traps heat); or the dieback of forests and other flora (which extract carbon from the atmosphere). Each of these promises to accelerate warming, and the history of the planet shows that temperature can shift as much as five degrees Celsius within thirteen years. … The End of Food Praying for cornfields in the tundra. Climates differ and plants vary, but the basic rule for staple cereal crops grown at optimal temperature is that for every degree of warming, yields decline by 10 percent. Some 39 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

estimates run as high as 15 or even 17 percent. Which means that if the planet is five degrees warmer at the end of the century, we may have as many as 50 percent more people to feed and 50 percent less grain to give them. And proteins are worse: It takes 16 calories of grain to produce just a single calorie of hamburger meat, butchered from a cow that spent its life polluting the climate with methane farts. Pollyannaish plant physiologists will point out that the cereal-crop math applies only to those regions already at peak growing temperature, and they are right — theoretically, a warmer climate will make it easier to grow corn in Greenland. But as the pathbreaking work by Rosamond Naylor and David Battisti has shown, the tropics are already too hot to efficiently grow grain, and those places where grain is produced today are already at optimal growing temperature — which means even a small warming will push them down the slope of declining productivity. And you can’t easily move croplands north a few hundred miles, because yields in places like remote Canada and Russia are limited by the quality of soil there; it takes many centuries for the planet to produce optimally fertile dirt. Drought might be an even bigger problem than heat, with some of the world’s most arable land turning quickly to desert. Precipitation is notoriously hard to model, yet predictions for later this century are basically unanimous: unprecedented droughts nearly everywhere food is today produced. By 2080, without dramatic reductions in emissions, southern Europe will be in permanent extreme drought, much worse than the American dust bowl ever was. The same will be true in Iraq and Syria and much of the rest of the Middle East; some of the most densely populated parts of Australia, Africa, and South America; and the breadbasket regions of China. None of these places, which today supply much of the world’s food, will be reliable sources of any. As for the original dust bowl: The droughts in the American plains and Southwest would not just be worse than in the 1930s, a 2015 NASA study predicted, but worse than any droughts in a thousand years — and that includes those that struck between 1100 and 1300, which “dried up all the rivers East of the Sierra Nevada mountains” and may have been responsible for the death of the Anasazi civilization. Remember, we do not live in a world without hunger as it is. Far from it: Most estimates put the number of undernourished at 800 million globally. In case you haven’t heard, this spring has already brought an unprecedented quadruple famine to Africa and the Middle East; the U.N. has warned that separate starvation events in Somalia, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Yemen could kill 20 million this year alone. IV. Climate Plagues What happens when the bubonic ice melts? Rock, in the right spot, is a record of planetary history, eras as long as millions of years flattened by the forces of geological time into strata with amplitudes of just inches, or just an inch, or even less. Ice works that way, too, as a climate ledger, but it is also frozen history, some of which can be reanimated when unfrozen. There are now, trapped in Arctic ice, diseases that have not circulated in the air for millions of years — in some cases, since before humans were around to encounter them. Which means our immune systems would have no idea how to fight back when those prehistoric plagues emerge from the ice. The Arctic also stores terrifying bugs from more recent times. In Alaska, already, researchers have discovered remnants of the 1918 flu that infected as many as 500 million and killed as many as 100 million — about 5 percent of the world’s population and almost six times as many as had died in the world war for which the pandemic served as a kind of gruesome capstone. As the BBC reported in May, scientists suspect smallpox and the bubonic plague are trapped in Siberian ice, too — an abridged history of devastating human sickness, left out like egg salad in the Arctic sun. Experts caution that many of these organisms won’t actually survive the thaw and point to the fastidious lab conditions under which they have already reanimated several of them — the 32,000-year-old “extremophile” bacteria revived in 2005, an 8 million- year-old bug brought back to life in 2007, the 3.5 million–year–old one a Russian scientist self-injected just out of curiosity — to suggest that those are necessary conditions for the return of such ancient plagues. But already last year, a boy was killed and 20 others infected by anthrax released when retreating permafrost exposed the frozen carcass of a reindeer killed by the bacteria at least 75 years earlier; 2,000 present-day reindeer were infected, too, carrying and spreading the disease beyond the tundra. What concerns epidemiologists more than ancient diseases are existing scourges relocated, rewired, or even re-evolved by warming. The first effect is geographical. Before the early-modern period, when adventuring sailboats accelerated the mixing of peoples and their bugs, human provinciality was a guard against pandemic. Today, even with globalization and the enormous intermingling of human populations, our ecosystems are mostly stable, and this functions as another limit, but global warming will scramble those ecosystems and help disease trespass those limits as surely as Cortés did. You don’t worry much about dengue or malaria if you are living in Maine or France. But as the tropics creep northward and mosquitoes migrate with them, you will. You didn’t much worry about Zika a couple of years ago, either. As it happens, Zika may also be a good model of the second worrying effect — disease mutation. One reason you hadn’t heard about Zika until recently is that it had been trapped in Uganda; another is that it did not, until recently, appear to cause birth defects. Scientists still don’t entirely understand what happened, or what they missed. But there are things we do know for sure about how climate affects some diseases: Malaria, for instance, thrives in hotter regions not just because the mosquitoes that carry it do, too, but because for every degree increase in temperature, the parasite reproduces ten times faster. Which is one reason that the World Bank estimates that by 2050, 5.2 billion people will be reckoning with it. V. Unbreathable Air A rolling death smog that suffocates millions. Our lungs need oxygen, but that is only a fraction of what we breathe. The fraction of carbon dioxide is growing: It just crossed 400 parts per million, and high-end estimates extrapolating from current trends suggest it will hit 1,000 ppm by 2100. At that concentration, compared to the air we breathe now, human cognitive ability declines by 21 percent. Other stuff in the hotter air is even scarier, with small increases in pollution capable of shortening life spans by ten years. The warmer the planet gets, the more ozone forms, and by mid-century, Americans will likely suffer a 70 percent increase in unhealthy ozone smog, the National Center for Atmospheric Research has projected. By 2090, as many as 2 billion people globally will be breathing air above the WHO “safe” level; one paper last month showed that, among other effects, a pregnant mother’s exposure to ozone raises the child’s risk of autism (as much as tenfold, combined with other environmental factors). Which does make you think again about the autism epidemic in West Hollywood. 40 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

Already, more than 10,000 people die each day from the small particles emitted from fossil-fuel burning; each year, 339,000 people die from wildfire smoke, in part because climate change has extended forest-fire season (in the U.S., it’s increased by 78 days since 1970). By 2050, according to the U.S. Forest Service, wildfires will be twice as destructive as they are today; in some places, the area burned could grow fivefold. What worries people even more is the effect that would have on emissions, especially when the fires ravage forests arising out of peat. Peatland fires in Indonesia in 1997, for instance, added to the global CO2 release by up to 40 percent, and more burning only means more warming only means more burning. There is also the terrifying possibility that rain forests like the Amazon, which in 2010 suffered its second “hundred-year drought” in the space of five years, could dry out enough to become vulnerable to these kinds of devastating, rolling forest fires — which would not only expel enormous amounts of carbon into the atmosphere but also shrink the size of the forest. That is especially bad because the Amazon alone provides 20 percent of our oxygen. Then there are the more familiar forms of pollution. In 2013, melting Arctic ice remodeled Asian weather patterns, depriving industrial China of the natural ventilation systems it had come to depend on, which blanketed much of the country’s north in an unbreathable smog. Literally unbreathable. A metric called the Air Quality Index categorizes the risks and tops out at the 301-to-500 range, warning of “serious aggravation of heart or lung disease and premature mortality in persons with cardiopulmonary disease and the elderly” and, for all others, “serious risk of respiratory effects”; at that level, “everyone should avoid all outdoor exertion.” The Chinese “airpocalypse” of 2013 peaked at what would have been an Air Quality Index of over 800. That year, smog was responsible for a third of all deaths in the country. VI. Perpetual War The violence baked into heat. Climatologists are very careful when talking about Syria. They want you to know that while climate change did produce a drought that contributed to civil war, it is not exactly fair to saythat the conflict is the result of warming; next door, for instance, Lebanon suffered the same crop failures. But researchers like Marshall Burke and Solomon Hsiang have managed to quantify some of the non-obvious relationships between temperature and violence: For every half-degree of warming, they say, societies will see between a 10 and 20 percent increase in the likelihood of armed conflict. In climate science, nothing is simple, but the arithmetic is harrowing: A planet five degrees warmer would have at least half again as many wars as we do today. Overall, social conflict could more than double this century. This is one reason that, as nearly every climate scientist I spoke to pointed out, the U.S. military is obsessed with climate change: The drowning of all American Navy bases by sea-level rise is trouble enough, but being the world’s policeman is quite a bit harder when the crime rate doubles. Of course, it’s not just Syria where climate has contributed to conflict. Some speculate that the elevated level of strife across the Middle East over the past generation reflects the pressures of global warming — a hypothesis all the more cruel considering that warming began accelerating when the industrialized world extracted and then burned the region’s oil. What accounts for the relationship between climate and conflict? Some of it comes down to agriculture and economics; a lot has to do with forced migration, already at a record high, with at least 65 million displaced people wandering the planet right now. But there is also the simple fact of individual irritability. Heat increases municipal crime rates, and swearing on social media, and the likelihood that a major-league pitcher, coming to the mound after his teammate has been hit by a pitch, will hit an opposing batter in retaliation. And the arrival of air-conditioning in the developed world, in the middle of the past century, did little to solve the problem of the summer crime wave. … VIII. Poisoned Oceans Sulfide burps off the skeleton coast. That the sea will become a killer is a given. Barring a radical reduction of emissions, we will see at least four feet of sea-level rise and possibly ten by the end of the century. A third of the world’s major cities are on the coast, not to mention its power plants, ports, navy bases, farmlands, fisheries, river deltas, marshlands, and rice-paddy empires, and even those above ten feet will flood much more easily, and much more regularly, if the water gets that high. At least 600 million people live within ten meters of sea level today. But the drowning of those homelands is just the start. At present, more than a third of the world’s carbon is sucked up by the oceans — thank God, or else we’d have that much more warming already. But the result is what’s called “ocean acidification,” which, on its own, may add a half a degree to warming this century. It is also already burning through the planet’s water basins — you may remember these as the place where life arose in the first place. You have probably heard of “coral bleaching” — that is, coral dying — which is very bad news, because reefs support as much as a quarter of all marine life and supply food for half a billion people. Ocean acidification will fry fish populations directly, too, though scientists aren’t yet sure how to predict the effects on the stuff we haul out of the ocean to eat; they do know that in acid waters, oysters and mussels will struggle to grow their shells, and that when the pH of human blood drops as much as the oceans’ pH has over the past generation, it induces seizures, comas, and sudden death. That isn’t all that ocean acidification can do. Carbon absorption can initiate a feedback loop in which underoxygenated waters breed different kinds of microbes that turn the water still more “anoxic,” first in deep ocean “dead zones,” then gradually up toward the surface. There, the small fish die out, unable to breathe, which means oxygen-eating bacteria thrive, and the feedback loop doubles back. This process, in which dead zones grow like cancers, choking off marine life and wiping out fisheries, is already quite advanced in parts of the Gulf of Mexico and just off Namibia, where hydrogen sulfide is bubbling out of the sea along a thousand-mile stretch of land known as the “Skeleton Coast.” The name originally referred to the detritus of the whaling industry, but today it’s more apt than ever. Hydrogen sulfide is so toxic that evolution has trained us to recognize the tiniest, safest traces of it, which is why our noses are so exquisitely skilled at registering flatulence. Hydrogen sulfide is also the thing that finally did us in that time 97 percent of all life on Earth died, once all the feedback loops had been triggered and the circulating jet streams of a warmed ocean ground to a halt — it’s the planet’s preferred gas for a natural holocaust. Gradually, the ocean’s dead zones spread, killing off marine species that had dominated the oceans for hundreds of millions of years, and the gas the inert waters gave off into the atmosphere [will] poisoned everything on land. Plants, too. It was millions of years before the oceans recovered.

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Corporate influence in campaign finance undermines the healthcare industry Wiist 11 [William H. Wiist, Courtesy Faculty member for the College of Public Health and Human Sciences at Oregon State University, with a doctorate in health sciences from Loma Linda University, 06-2011, "Citizens United, Public Health, and Democracy: The Supreme Court Ruling, Its Implications, and Proposed Action," PubMed Central, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3110222/] /Triumph Debate

PUBLIC HEALTH AND CITIZENS UNITED Concerns about the disproportionate influence of corporate wealth on elections apply equally to support of or opposition to public health measures and to candidates across the political spectrum. The ruling could exacerbate—or create new—challenges for public health through more election campaign funding, front groups, political appointments of corporate officials or lobbyists to government positions (“revolving door”), and research or program funding streams. The Citizens United decision may inhibit or influence individuals campaigning for political office because of corporate pressure applied through advocacy advertising for or against them or promotion of positions during the critical weeks just prior to an election. Candidates who might otherwise publicly espouse a public health position on personal health risks, environmental hazards, or occupational safety issues could choose to remain silent or align themselves with corporations that oppose health protections. A candidate could be particularly vulnerable if an industry within the candidate's district is responsible for a health hazard and the candidate supports public health measures. Incumbents’ voting records could make them especially vulnerable. Although not all corporations or industries oppose public health measures or candidates who favor public health positions, Citizens United expands the means for them to exert such influence. Tobacco industry documents show that the industry's campaign contributions influenced individual legislators to be more favorable toward their industry.17,18 Corporate contributions to elections could similarly influence proposed or existing health policies concerning restrictions on taxation of unhealthful foods and beverages; advertising of unhealthful products such as sugar-sweetened drinks, high-fat foods, or alcohol to children or vulnerable communities; requirements for restaurant menu labeling; or issues of reproductive rights, air quality standards, global climate change, comprehensive school health education, worker health and safety, gun show background checks, and others. Expanded corporate campaign advertisement funding could exert greater influence on government research funding streams. In the past political pressure was used to try to end funding for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for Injury Prevention and Control to stop its firearm-related injury research.19 The tobacco industry tried to stop federal funding for tobacco policy research.20 Increased corporate election campaign funding could also lead to public health advocacy groups competing for corporate financial contributions and to conflicts of interest and co-optation of public health organizations. Expanded corporate campaign advertising funding could increase pressure on candidates to make political appointments of corporate or industry officials or lobbyists to decision-making positions in regulatory agencies, advisory boards, or committees, with authority over their own industry and with consequences for health.4,8 For example, a corporate vice president, a member of a family that contributes to political causes, received a 2004 presidential appointment to the Cancer Advisory Board of the National Cancer Institute.21,22 One of the family's companies produces formaldehyde and lobbied against its classification as a carcinogen by a federal agency.22 Debates about public issues can be influenced during election campaigns by corporate contributions to front groups, which purport to take one position but actually have a different agenda not apparent from their name.23 The Coalition to Protect Patient's Rights opposed the health care reform legislation of 2010.24 These groups may be nonprofit 501(c)(4) social welfare or 501(c)(6) business league organizations under Internal Revenue Service regulations; these classifications differ in permissible political activities and reporting requirements. Since Citizens United, front groups have proliferated, and they played a large role in the 2010 election campaign. Contributions to such groups are growing, with much of the money coming from corporations; there is little federal agency oversight,25 and fewer groups are reporting donor's identities than in past elections.26 Corporate campaign contributions related to the health insurance reform debate of 2009 to 2010 illustrated some types of corporate influence on health policy (see the box on this page). Corporate campaign contributions targeted members of Congress who had direct influence over health care legislation, and health industries may have received special consideration of their positions and access to policymakers.33,34 Corporate Campaign Contributions Related to US Health Care Reform Debate, 2009–2010 During the 111th Congress's 2010 election cycle (as of October 2009), the health care industry sector was the third largest contributor to members of the Senate Finance Committee (whose bill served as the basis for the new law): political action committees gave $7 832 512 and individuals gave $6 643 626.27 From 2005 to 2010, the chairman of the Finance Committee (at the time bill became law) received $390 500 from health professions political action committees.28 During the 2008 election cycle, the president received $18–$20 million from the health care industry, including more than $700 000 from the insurance industry.29,30 House of Representative opponents of the reform bill received 15% more in contributions from the health and insurance industries

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during the past 20 years than did supporters.31 Pharmaceutical manufacturer's organization contributed $2 553 986 to the 2 major parties and their candidates in federal and state campaigns.32

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Maintaining the corporate personhood distinction established in Citizens United is key to the economy and corporate accountability – the plan provides tailored reforms that removes the harms of the decision Greenfield 15 [Kent Greenfield, Professor of Law at Boston College Law School with a JD from the University of Chicago and an AB from Brown University in economics and history, 7-09-2015, "In Defense of Corporate Persons," Constitutional Commentary, https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/570] /Triumph Debate

This separateness means, among other things, that shareholders are not held liable for the debts of the corporation. That makes it possible for people to invest in corporate stock without overseeing the day-to-day activities of companies in which they invest and without risking every penny they own in case the corporation goes bankrupt. This separateness thus makes capital markets possible. And capital markets are essential for the development of a vibrant national economy. Separateness also means that corporations can exist long after the life of any individual that invests in, or works for, them. As Lynn Stout has pointed out, corporations in this way provide a mechanism for society to make long-term, intergenerational investments that are not linked to government or a specific family.20 In this light, it is not an overstatement to say that corporate separateness has been one of the legal innovations most important to the development of national wealth. The professors argued that separateness meant the Greens should not be able to attach their own religious beliefs to the corporation. The reason the Greens had chosen to form a corporation was to be able to operate the business without running the risk of losing their personal assets if the corporation went belly up. For purposes of liability, the Greens wanted separateness; they wanted “personhood” for the corporation. They should not then be able to stand in the shoes of the corporation for purposes of religion. The Greens’ argument was cursed with an internal inconsistency: to be a religious “person” with religious beliefs cognizable under RFRA, the company had to borrow the religious beliefs of the Greens. That is, to disregard the company’s personhood. The Supreme Court did not notice the inconsistency. It held, 5–4, that the Greens could project their religious beliefs onto the corporation and refuse to provide their employees the required contraceptive-care benefits. Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion is evidence of the Court’s much-discussed pro-business tilt, to be sure.21 But it is also evidence that the Court did not understand the basics of corporate law. Its mistake was not an embrace of corporate personhood but a rejection of it. An additional aspect of corporate personhood is to create a mechanism in law to hold corporations accountable. Consider the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster. For three months in 2010, Americans woke to the news of another 50,000 barrels of crude oil spewing into the coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico.22 We were justifiably outraged. In a legal system without corporate personhood, the channel for that outrage would be limited to lawsuits and criminal inquiries against individual human beings responsible—managers, workers, and contractors. That is important, of course. In any legal jurisdiction worth its salt, the search for culpable individuals has to be part of the settling-up of any man- made disaster. But it should not be all. Few human beings would have enough money to compensate those harmed by such a massive disaster. Because a corporate entity is also on the hook, there’s a chance for something approaching real compensation or real responsibility. Corporate personhood is thus not only a mechanism for the creation of wealth (by encouraging investment), it is a mechanism for enforcing accountability (by providing a deep pocket to sue). All this is to say that the political rhetoric of “corporations are not people” is just that, and should not be used to guide our legal analysis. Corporate separateness is a crucial analytical tool in corporate law, both in encouraging investment and providing accountability. A corporation may have “no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked,”23 but corporate personhood is a valuable legal fiction that should not be jettisoned.

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Campaign Finance

Citizens United is irrelevant to climate change and political action – there’s no will to action and it’s a scapegoat for politicians Baiocco 20 [Alex Baiocco, writer with posts appearing in outlets like the Washington Examiner and New York Daily with a BS in political science and corporate strategy from Vanderbilt University, 1-31-2020, "Why Citizens United should not be blamed for climate policy failures," The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/480917-why-citizens-united- should-not-be-blamed-for-climate-policy-failures] /Triumph Debate ***Citizen’s United was decided in 2010

While some lawmakers will blame their inability to achieve just about any part of their agendas on Citizens United, legislation to address climate change is commonly cited. Senator Tom Udall and Representative John Sarbanes recently asserted that, due to the decision, Congress has failed to address the climate crisis. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse is very fond of claiming that Citizens United derailed bipartisan support for legislative action with climate change. “As 2010 dawned, there was every reason to think a bipartisan climate bill could pass,” he had declared. “Suddenly, at once, it all fell apart.” He said the reason was the ruling in Citizens United. It is true that, before 2010, some climate legislation received votes from Republicans and Democrats. But both Republicans and Democrats also opposed those bills. In fact, more Democrats voted no than Republicans voted yes. When Senator John McCain and Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced legislation in 2003 to limit carbon emissions, that bill was defeated with 10 Democrats voting no and six Republicans voting yes. The same duo introduced a similar bill in 2005. It was again defeated with 11 Democrats voting no and with six Republicans voting yes. In 2007, when Democrats controlled both chambers, an amended version of the bill died in committee, as did the Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act. In that same Congress, the Climate Security Act failed to overcome a Republican filibuster with four Democrats voting not to invoke cloture. The 2009 bill that Whitehouse noted passed the House with 44 Democrats voting no and eight Republicans voting yes but never went to a vote in the Senate. No fair analysis of this history could blame a Supreme Court decision a decade ago for a sudden lack of bipartisan consensus on climate policy. Indeed, there was more bipartisan opposition than support for climate legislation in the run up to 2010. A similar history of partisan divide exists for the other hot button issues that politicians blame Citizens United for thwarting action on issues from gun control to health care to tax policy. The theory advocated by Whitehouse and some opponents of Citizens United is that other lawmakers would support their views if not for this ruling. The decision supposedly allowed speech that made it harder for their views to become law. History shows this theory is wrong. However, their outlook also demonstrates a dim view of voters. Would Whitehouse oppose action on climate change to appease a politically active group and not worry about the voters during his next election? Of course not. Yet he and others like him appear to believe lawmakers can consistently take positions that voters oppose and still win reelection. If a majority of constituents feel strongly about the need for new laws on climate change, they can vote their representative out for blocking climate action. That is how representative democracy works. The theory of Whitehouse relies on the belief that decisions by voters are a direct result of their exposure to advertising. You would think elected officials trust voters more than that.

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Even if Citizens United was overturned, corporations will maintain their ability to influence elections El-Haj 16 [Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Associate Professor of Law at Drexel University, 9-28-2016, “Beyond Campaign Finance Reform,” Boston College Law Review, https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3523&context=bclr] /Triumph Debate

Chasing after effective campaign finance reforms, however, is not the solution. Money tends to find its way into the political process through regulatory loopholes. While Citizens United has unquestionably multiplied and expanded the loopholes available, constitutional protections for some loopholes go well beyond the Court’s current conservative majority.70 As such, changing the composition of the Supreme Court may make certain campaign finance reforms more possible, but it will do little to significantly undermine the political influence of those with money to spend on politics. The First Amendment tradition, with its liberal commitment to individual autonomy and government neutrality, poses a formidable barrier to effective legislative efforts to rein in the electoral influence of moneyed elites.71 Equally important, it protects the many other avenues for exercising political influence. A. Avenues of Political Influence As we all know, the squeaky wheel gets the grease, and the wealthy— particularly, the super-wealthy—squeak in all sorts of ways.72 If wealthier, better-educated Americans are more likely to be politically active than ordinary Americans, this is even truer for the super-wealthy.73A recent pilot study of the top 1% of wealthy Americans found that 99% of the respondents reported voting.74 More critically, they also regularly contact officials directly and attend campaign speeches and events.75 Campaign contributions are perhaps the most important way wealthy Americans seek to influence elections.76 In 2000, 95% of the contributions over $1,000 to politicians came from households with annual incomes greater than $100,000 even though only about 13% of American households reported incomes over $100,000.77 In 2008, “incumbent members of the House of Rep- resentatives received only 6% of their money from individuals who contributed $200 or less.”78 Among the wealthy, it is the super- wealthy who are particularly well positioned to exploit candidates’ and political parties’ need for campaign funds.79A recent pilot study of individuals with an average wealth of $14 million (median of $7.5 million) found that 60% of them had made a political contribution, compared to 18% of the public at large.80 The vast majority, moreover, had made an average campaign contribution of $4,633, and a substantial minority were involved in bundling financial contributions to political campaigns.81 In 2014, “the 100 biggest donors to all types of political committees together gave $323 million, almost matching the $356 million in small donations that came from an estimated 4.75 million people.”82 The full extent of spending by super-wealthy individuals, however, is unknown because much of it is undertaken outside formal reporting and disclosure requirements.83 There is little question that election contributions are made in the hopes of securing access to officials and, ultimately, favorable policies.84 As Justice Kennedy noted, “It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason . . . to make a contribution to[] one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.”85c Election spending, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. The superwealthy, as individuals and as corporate directors, spend billions every year to influence politics through lobbying.86 In 2008, more money was spent on federal lobbying than on the 2008 election, which was, at the time, the most expensive election in history.87 By some estimates, “over half a billion dollars was spent on health-care lobbying” while the Affordable Care Act was being debated.88 Lobbyists are hired because of their personal ties to elected officials.89 They leverage the trust these relationships create to stall proposed legislation in committee90 or to influence legislative details that fall below the electorate’s radar.91 Corporations, in particular, much prefer lobbying to campaign spending as a mechanism of political influence.92 The attention paid by legislatures to the interests of economic elites as a result of campaign spending and legislative lobbying significantly buttress the outsized political influence of the wealthy. Solicitousness to the interests of the wealthy based on electoral strength, by contrast, reflects basic democratic attentiveness. It is the attention that one foregoes when one chooses not to vote.

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And the Court will never stop the protection of corporate interests – first amendment deference means they’ll default to protecting speech El-Haj 16 [Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Associate Professor of Law at Drexel University, 9-28-2016, “Beyond Campaign Finance Reform,” Boston College Law Review, https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3523&context=bclr] /Triumph Debate

B. The Regressive Effects of First Amendment Protections for Political Influence Each of these avenues of political influence—those in the domain of elections as well as those in the domain of public discourse—is afforded robust First Amendment protection. In a capitalist economy, where wealth is not equally distributed, as a practical matter, this favors those who possess the resources to exercise their rights. The right to vote lacks this side effect only because the law prohibits a market in votes. The First Amendment’s tendency to exacerbate the tension between capitalism and democracy manifests doctrinally in Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny. In 1976, the Supreme Court held that money constituted speech under the First Amendment.93 In an ultimately misguided effort to mitigate the effects of this holding, the Court struck down Congress’s attempt to limit the amount of money that could be spent on an election campaign while simultaneously upholding the caps Congress had placed on the contributions that individuals and groups could make to election campaigns.94 The result was a regulatory catastrophe. As Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan explain: Buckley . . . produced a system in which candidates face an unlimited demand for campaign funds (because expenditures generally cannot be capped) but a constricted supply (because there is often a ceiling on the amount each contributor can give). As in all markets in which demand runs high but supply is limited, the value of the good rises.95 What emerged was a convoluted regulatory regime which distinguishes between campaign contributions to elected officials and political parties (which can be regulated), campaign expenditures (which cannot be limited unless there is coordination with the campaign and, thus, the expenditure functions as the equivalent of a contribution), and issue advocacy, which is distinguished from express advocacy or electioneering communication (which cannot be restricted).96 To make matters worse, Buckley instituted this convoluted regulatory regime just as campaigning became more expensive.97 It is the basic entitlement established by Buckley to spend money to influence the outcome of an election that secures political influence to those who have money to spare. Since 1976, those with wealth have had a First Amendment right (like everyone else) to spend as much money as they desire to influ-v ence elections. The precise form such spending could take has varied as statutory law, administrative interpretations, and judicial doctrine fluctuated, but the basic entitlement has been clear. Citizens United merely gilded the lily. It certainly and significantly increased the ease with which the super-wealthy can translate their money into political influence98 by defining the only acceptable justification for campaign finance laws—the prevention of corruption—narrowly as quid pro quo corruption and by concluding that independent expenditures can never give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.99 In particular, it facilitated the rise of Super PACs and a variety of similar political entities.100 The Buckley entitlement and its perverse consequences for American democratic institutions, however, are a product of core First Amendment principles.101 For fifty years, legal academics have lamented Buckley. Among progressives, the arguments made include that the Court should reconsider its view that money is speech in the campaign finance context102 and its position that the First Amendment prohibits the government from seeking to equalize the opportunities to speak during elections in order to prevent distortion of the political.103 Liberals have called for a broader conception of what constitutes corruption.104 The fundamental problem, however, is neither Buckley nor Citizens United. Take, for a start, the question of whether money is speech. The slogan is an unfortunately sloppy formulation of a very important question: whether money spent to influence elections (electioneering and issue advocacy) is covered by the First Amendment’s speech clause.105 Once rephrased, it is extremely difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court, whatever its composition, would reverse the central holding of Buckley that such money comes within the ambit of the First Amendment. It takes money to run an election—to run advertisements and print flyers but also to register voters, canvas neighborhoods, and get people to the polls on Election Day.106 It even takes money to get the requisite permits to use public spaces for campaign meet-and-greets. The bottom line is that the foundational holding that money is a form of protected speech in the context of elections is solid, and the economics of campaigns today make it extremely difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court, whatever its composition, would reverse that.107 If the ability to spend money to influence elections were not covered by the First Amendment, there would be no constitutional bar against Congress banning all spending by individuals or candidates in federal elections, including to obtain permits for public gatherings or to canvas neighborhoods to get out the vote. That there should be some First Amendment protection for money spent during an election, of course, does not answer the second-order question of how much protection should be afforded.108 As such, the second objection to Buckley is much stronger: Unlimited private spending distorts political debate and undermines the political equality that is central to democracy.109 Unfortunately, recognizing a compelling government interest in fostering political equality or rectifying the political distortion flies in the face of core First Amendment principles that predate both Buckley and the Court’s current conservative majority.110 Campaign finance laws that level down are too easily cast as efforts “to mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections.”111 As such, much like hate speech regulation, campaign finance laws squarely run up against the traditional liberal commitment to government neutrality between citizens exercising their rights of expression.112As Kathleen Sullivan explains: Under virtually any theory of the justification for free speech, legislative restrictions on political speech may not be predicated on the ground that the political speaker will have too great a communicative impact, or his competitor too little. Conventional First Amendment norms of 47 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

individualism, relativism, and antipaternalism preclude any such affirmative equality of influence—not only as an end-state but even as an aspiration.113 A constitutional commitment to government neutrality in the public sphere makes good sense; there are very good reasons to be skeptical of government regulation of political speech and political action. It is this skepticism about legislative purpose that explains the Court’s reluctance to accept regulation of campaign speech in the name of political equality, as Justice (then Professor) Elena Kagan famously argued.114 The equality principle also fails because, for better or worse, the United States has a judicially enforced Constitution, and the judiciary has thus far proved incapable of vindicating a positive, substantive conception of equality. Many in the civil rights movement learned this lesson only too well in their failed efforts to achieve material equality under the Equal Protection Clause.115 It is a question of institutional competence. Finding a doctrinally administrable, conceptually satisfying measure of political equality or distortion is too difficult a task.116 Courts would have to commit to a theory of democracy, which they are unlikely to do, nor is it clear that they should given that any vision of democracy they would come up with would be politically contestable. Unfortunately, in a capitalist world of unequal economic resources, formal equality translates into political inequality.117 The most recent round of criticism of the Court’s campaign finance doctrine has involved an array of efforts to re-think the concept of corruption.118 Although this is certainly the most plausible litigation strategy, its success is unlikely to significantly curtail the political influence money can buy. The problem is that the First Amendment requires that there be some unregulated sphere for electoral speech. So long as some aspect of electoral debate will be subject to the robust First Amendment prohibition on regulating speech because of the speaker or viewpoints, moneyed interests will have a hannel through which money can flow to create influence.119 This First Amendment loophole explains why campaign finance legislation has never worked all that well at limiting the political influence of moneyed elites. As Heather K. Gerken aptly remarked shortly after Citizens United, “[W]e should admit that the results of the ‘take money out of politics’ approach have been underwhelming. . . . Donors simply find new, less transparent ways to gain influence in the process.”120 The prognosis looks only worse when one remembers that campaign finance is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to explaining the influence of moneyed elites on American politics. The First Amendment protects those forms of political influence that operate squarely in the public political domain even more strongly. It is difficult, for example, to imagine the Supreme Court, whatever its ideological composition, accepting anything beyond disclosure and transparency requirements for lobbying.121 Equally important, it is not clear that it is desirable to incentivize moneyed elites to spend the money they currently spend on elections in these other realms. The further out one goes the more insidious the influence of money. Wouldn’t we rather have super-wealthy individuals spending their money on activities that are relatively easy to monitor (electioneering and lobbying) than diverting it to fund ideologically driven research that will form the justifications for policies offered by foundations, universities, and courts?122

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Citizens United and unfettered corporate speech is here to stay Casleton 18 [Scott Casleton, writer for vox and a PhD student at UC Berkeley who holds a degree in philosophy from Yale, 5-7-2018, "It’s time for liberals to get over Citizens United," Vox, https://www.vox.com/the-big- idea/2018/5/7/17325486/citizens-united-money-politics-dark-money-vouchers-primaries] /Triumph Debate

Citizens didn’t upend our campaign finance system. It was a logical next step, given past court decisions. Let’s put the hated decision into context. The inundation of elections with private cash is not the result of Citizens but rather was facilitated by the 1976 decision Buckley v. Valeo. That case established the legal framework sanctioning billions of dollars of independent private campaign spending. In it, the Court ruled that limits on campaign donations — direct donations to candidates — are constitutional but said it was unconstitutional to limit non-donation expenditures, such as independently funded advertisements. Such independent spending — which cannot be coordinated with candidates, according to the Court — was protected under the First Amendment as not just speech but political speech. The idea is that money is a necessary instrument for supporting a political candidate, whether it’s paying for yard signs or taking out an ad in the newspaper. Not unreasonably, the Court ruled that limitations on independent expenditures would constitute limitations on one’s ability to support a candidate through any number of media. Placing a dollar limit on such expenditures would arbitrarily prevent certain kinds of campaign support simply by the fact of how expensive they are. Our inability to trace campaign donations to their source — the dark money issue — is the result of the lack of federal regulations to make disclosure mandatory. And such regulations are legal; the Court said as much in Citizens, with eight of nine justices agreeing on that point! The only thing standing in the way of transparency is congressional stonewalling. In 2010, Republican senators defeated a disclosure law 59 to 39, which would have made it more difficult for donors to use legal loopholes to hide their identities. Citizens simply has not had the seismic legal impact that many think. Since Buckley protected money as speech, the only question was whether corporations were legitimate speakers. It may surprise some to hear, but the Court had already answered this question in 1978. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court recognized a corporate right to free speech, concluding that the value of speech in the course of political debate does not depend on the identity of the speaker. Citizens simply followed the precedent of these two cases. So when liberals intone that “corporations aren’t people,” thinking they are making a knock-down argument against Citizens, they miss the point. Citizens did not make corporations persons. And corporations do not need to be persons to receive First Amendment protections. Citizens upheld the liberty, provided by Bellotti, of corporations to speak, and they speak under the rules provided by Buckley. The details were debated by expert lawyer Floyd Abrams and First Amendment scholar Burt Neuborne not long after Citizens came down. Abrams noted that even the liberal Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting, recognized that the Court has “long since held that Corporations are covered by the First Amendment.” Neuborne, in response, argued that corporations lack dignity and a conscience, which he thinks underpin the human right to free speech. But Justice Kennedy, writing for the slim five-justice majority, cited the long history of First Amendment protections for corporations. The Court had sided heavily with the Abrams view.

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50 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

Constitutional Crisis

There’s a 90% chance Trump wins now – best models, previous elections, and Biden / dem primary failures, electoral college all prove Emproto 8-3 [Robert Emproto, writer for Stony Brook University News citing the work of Helmut Norpoth, a professor of political science at Stony Brook University with a PhD from the University of Michigan, 8-3-2020, "Maverick Modeller Helmut Norpoth Predicts Another Win for Trump," Stony Brook University News, https://news.stonybrook.edu/facultystaff/maverick-modeller-helmut-norpoth-predicts-another-win-for- trump/]/Triumph Debate

Political scientist Helmut Norpoth fields media calls every week seeking comment on the upcoming presidential election. Why the interest? In 2016, he was one of a handful of experts who correctly predicted the outcome of the U.S. Presidential election. Norpoth, a professor in Stony Brook’s Department of Political Science, has enjoyed notable success forecasting elections based on his Primary Model, a statistical representation of U.S. presidential races based on data going back more than a century. In 2020, his model once again projects a Trump victory, giving the incumbent President a 90-percent chance of being re-elected in a landslide — a controversial call that runs contrary to current polls. The Primary Model has correctly predicted five of the past six presidential elections, and when applied to previous elections, correctly predicts an impressive 25 of the last 27, missing only the 2000 election in which George W. Bush defeated Al Gore and the 1960 election in which John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon — two extremely close and contested votes marred by allegations of voting inaccuracies. Norpoth began working on his model after the 1992 presidential election, putting it to the test for the first time in 1996. “My first forecast was the 1996 election, the one where Bill Clinton was re-elected for a second term,” he said. “Predicting a Clinton win was considered a stretch at the time because he was pretty bad in his first term.” Norpoth, who has been at Stony Brook since 1979, correctly predicted Clinton’s win using a very simple early version of his model. He would expand the model in the years to come, an ongoing evolution that continues to this day. But one key metric that was apparent to Norpoth even in the early stages — the importance of early presidential primaries — remains a critical part of the Primary Model. After the 2008 election, in which Barack Obama won the nomination and then the election despite failing to win the New Hampshire primary, Norpoth expanded the range of primaries to include the South Carolina primary as well. “But that’s it,” said Norpoth. “I focus on early primaries and the way the candidates perform in those early contests. It’s a very good predictor, and a leading indicator of what’s going to happen in November.” He described the focus on primaries as the key difference between his model and others. “It’s all about primary elections, which are real electoral contests and the votes are counted and tabulated,” he said. “I also use real numbers, such as the results of previous elections, which indicate whether the pendulum is swinging away from or toward the White House party. This is something that also relies on real election results and not any kind of an opinion poll.” Unlike many other projections, Norpoth’s equation ignores approval ratings. “That’s a poll number,” he said, “and I don’t use those. I think the primary performance of a sitting president is usually a proxy for that. But I don’t use any polling data or data related to opinions.” In light of this information, Norpoth said he wasn’t surprised that his model gave Trump a very strong chance at a second term. “When I looked at New Hampshire and I saw that Donald Trump got 85 percent of the votes, and the closest challenger was Bill Weld at 10 percent, I was pretty sure what the model was going to predict,” he said. “If Trump had gotten only 55 percent and an opponent had gotten 40 percent, I may not have predicted that Donald Trump would have a chance to win. Maybe. It would depend on the other side as well.” As for the Democrats, Norpoth said that the sheer number of candidates and the inability of any one of them to get off to a fast start may have doomed the party from the start. “People have forgotten how Joe Biden did in New Hampshire,” said Norpoth. “He was terrible. He got 8.4 percent of the vote, which is unbelievable for a candidate with any aspirations of being president.” So was there anything any of the Democrats could have done this year to get in a better position, or was it Donald Trump’s election to win or lose? “What the Democrats should have done if they were really serious about beating Trump would have been to rally around one candidate right from the start and not have a protracted battle in which people get wounded,” Norpoth said. “They needed to pick one person and have everybody else take a pass. That’s the only way I could see that my model would have worked in their favor.” Norpoth, who has studied election primaries going back to 1912, is confident of the math behind his model. While some might suspect that unusual circumstances — e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic and the civil unrest in the wake of the George Floyd killing — might have an unpredictable effect on the election results, Norpoth said those crises have no bearing on his projection. “My prediction is what I call ‘unconditional final,’” he said. “It does not change. It’s a mathematical model based on things that have happened. The presidential election of 2016 has happened, the primary results are in. I can add in the results of more primaries, but even those numbers have happened and can’t change either.” Norpoth also scoffed when asked to comment on the argument that the Trump presidency has been widely described as being “unlike any previous presidency.” “Every president is unique, and I think people get a little carried away with that description,” he said. “Obama was the first Black 51 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

president. Is that not unique? If Hillary Clinton had won in 2016, she would have been the first woman president. Is that not unique? I grant that Trump is in many ways a very special kind of character, but I think we also tend to exaggerate that.” One model change Norpoth has made for the upcoming election has been to focus on the Electoral College. “Now I predict straight to the Electoral College,” he said. “I’ve never done that before, but I made an adjustment because of the mismatch we had in 2016, and I’m prepared to see Trump lose the popular vote again. So this prediction is entirely about the electoral votes.” Norpoth said that while he manages not to get emotionally connected to these projections, the reactions to his projections sometimes do take an emotional toll. “I get a lot of reactions, and I get a lot of mail,” he said. “Some of the comments are unprintable. I do get backlash, and I get it from people whose opinions I value, people who are friends. And I can tell that some people find it difficult. So there is an emotional part that goes on.” But at the core, said Norpoth, it’s just math. “Everybody thinks Trump is going to go down in flames, and here I am predicting with almost total certainty that he’s going to win,” he concluded. “It seems crazy. But it’s not.” Twenty-five of the last 27 U.S presidential elections can vouch for that.

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Compulsory voting massively boosts turnout amongst low-income individuals, thereby increasing support for leftist policy Bechtel et al. 16 [Michael M. Bechtel, Research Professor of Political Science at the University of St. Gallen, Dominik Hangartner, Associate Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Lukas Schmid, Senior Research Associate at the University of St. Gallen, July 2016, “Does Compulsory Voting Increase Support for Leftist Policy?,” American Journal of Political Science, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12224]/Triumph Debate

One of the fundamental objectives of democracy is to ensure that public policy responds to citizens’ needs. A large literature has demonstrated, however, that there exist significant differences in civic engagement across politically relevant, sociodemographic divides: Low income earners, the less educated, the less urban, the young, and those belonging to ethnicminorities have a significantly lower propensity to vote (Armingeon and Schadel 2015; Kasara and Suryanarayan ¨ 2015; Mueller and Stratmann 2003; Nevitte et al. 2009; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).1 From this perspective, low turnout may reduce or even destroy the positive welfare effects of government responsiveness through electoral accountability (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009; Stromberg 2004), a phenomenon that Lijphart (1997) ¨ has called the “democratic dilemma.” To the extent that public policy systematically benefits voters over nonvoters, those who abstain may “become locked into a self-fulfilling cycle of quiescence, alienation and government neglect” (Hill 2006, 216). To preserve the welfare-enhancing effect of electoral accountability, Lijphart (1997) and others (Dahl 1989; Hill 2006) have pointed out that compulsory voting may reduce representational inequality by mobilizing those citizens who would otherwise remain politically inactive. This incentivizes policy makers to enact policies that better serve the needs of those who had previously been underrepresented. Others, however, worry that compulsory voting reduces the quality of electoral choice and creates inefficiencies because sociodemographic turnout differences may simply reflect differences in affectedness or information (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1999; Saunders 2011). For example, compulsory voting could increase the share of less informed voters, which may reduce the quality of electoral choice. Moreover, to the extent that compulsory voting remains inconsequential for electoral outcomes, low turnout would actually be preferable from an efficiency perspective. So far, there exists overwhelming evidence that turnout in elections tends to be higher in countries that practice compulsory voting (Jackman 2001; Mueller and Stratmann 2003) and that turnout affects the distribution of votes across parties and candidates (Brunell and DiNardo 2004; Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Hansford and Gomez 2010; Kohler and Rose 2010). Some have found that turnout tends to benefit the Democrats in the United States (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Erikson 1995) and the Labor Party in Australia (Fowler 2013). Others document that the Republican Party realizes higher vote shares in high-turnout elections (Nagel and McNulty 1996; Tucker, Vedlitz, and DeNardo 1986). This previous work has provided insights into the effects of turnout on elections in which parties and candidates offer entire packages of multidimensional policy bundles. So far, however, we lack knowledge about how turnout affects direct-democratic policy decisions. We explore the public policy effects of turnout by examining how sanctioned compulsory voting affects referendum outcomes. We argue that imposing a fine for abstention increases turnout among those at the bottom of the income distribution. This is because a monetary sanction imposes the highest relative costs on those who have the least financial resources available, and, as is well documented in the literature, low-income individuals generally have a low probability of participating in elections under voluntary voting (Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1991; Husted and Kenny 1997). Thus, the set of citizens who can be mobilized by electoral institutions such as compulsory voting is particularly large. Since low-income voters favor more redistribution than high-income individuals (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Lipset 1959; Meltzer and Richard 1981), differential mobilization should result in more electoral support for leftist policies, that is, policies that aim to lower income inequality, increase welfare spending, enhance workers’ employment conditions, and strengthen pension systems (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Mahler 2008; Mueller and Stratmann 2003). Our evidence is based on an analysis of direct legislation in Switzerland and consists of two parts. The first and major part is a causal evaluation of the effects of sanctioned compulsory voting in the Swiss canton Vaud. This analysis enables us to estimate the causal effect of compulsory voting on leftist policy support in referendums. The second component of our empirical evidence is a correlational study of the relationship between compulsory voting and support for leftist policy proposals in referendums in all Swiss cantons from 1908 to 1970, which allows us to explore the generalizability of our main findings. We first estimate the effects of a sanctioned compulsory voting law in the Swiss canton Vaud that aimed to mobilize citizens to participate in direct legislation. Vaud practiced compulsory voting for more than 20 years (1925–48). Abstention triggered a fine that local police authorities collected by visiting nonvoters’ homes in person. Such a focus on federal referendum outcomes in one out of many cantons in a multilevel system provides us with a design in which it is plausible to assume that federal referendum issues are exogenous to policy preferences within this single subnational jurisdiction (Bechtel 2012). This circumvents some of the methodological issues that arise when examining national election outcomes where parties’ and candidates’ policy positions tend to form endogenously. Moreover, studying this period promises insights into the role of electoral institutions and political participation for the evolution of the welfare state: In many of the federal referendums, citizens voted on the fundamental components of the modern welfare state, such as income taxation, the health system, the right to work, pension schemes, and job security regulations (Emmenegger 2009; Linder 1994). The results of our study of federal referendum outcomes in Vaud suggest that sanctioned compulsory voting has a massive effect on turnout, increasing participation in direct legislation by almost 30 percentage points, which implies that turnout was close to universal. Moreover, we find that this massive turnout differentially strengthens electoral support for leftist policy positions by about 80% over the baseline level. These results remain robust when using different model specifications, applying permutation tests, and employing multi-way clustered standard

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errors. Based on our findings, we also report point predictions for important welfare and social policy proposals of the left. The results suggest that compulsory voting also had a considerable impact on support for specific referendums on important redistributive policy issues. We then explore the external validity of our main findings by analyzing referendums in all Swiss cantons from 1908 to 1970. These correlational results suggest that our estimates generalize to other cantons and time periods.

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Congress will decide the 2020 election due to mail-in-ballots Ruger 6-1 [Todd Ruger, Legal Affairs Staff Writer at Roll Call with a BA in journalism from Drake, 6-1-2020, "Old law could leave 2020 presidential race in stalemate," Roll Call, https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/01/old-law-could-leave- 2020-presidential-race-in-stalemate/] /Triumph Debate

The nation’s 133-year-old law for picking a president has a provision that has never been needed to settle a disputed election, since it deals with a situation that would only happen after a cascade of seemingly improbable events. Then again, this is 2020, a year that feels cursed with historic worsts. And election law experts warn that Congress would be wise to clarify the provision before the country potentially faces this worst-case scenario: A full-fledged constitutional crisis if there is no clear Electoral College winner on Inauguration Day on Jan. 20. “If you’re asking the question what should Congress do to prepare for November, that would be on the top of the list,” said Edward Foley, a constitutional law professor and director of Ohio State University’s election law program, who has written on the provision and hosted a recent online expert roundtable discussion on it. The situation calls more for a dose of procedural preparation than panic. The odds of that worst-case scenario seem incredibly low. Yet this year has already seen the third presidential impeachment trial in United States history, the worst pandemic in more than a century, and deep partisan divisions about the country’s future. President Donald Trump has more than foreshadowed possible disputes to the legitimacy of the November election results because of a heavy shift to mail-in ballots during the health crisis. It’s a swirl of ingredients that some election law experts fear could — as unlikely as it may seem — make Section 15 of the Electoral Count Act of 1887 relevant again. 'Almost unintelligible' That provision — a paragraph a political scientist called “almost unintelligible” in the year after it was passed — spells out how Congress should count Electoral College votes. The problems start if a state submits two different election results and the House and Senate clash on which results should be tallied. More later on all the dominoes that would have to fall for that to happen in 2020. But if that does happen, there are conflicting interpretations of what the law requires Congress to do, Foley said. It’s an ambiguity that he calls the Achilles’ heel of the Electoral College system and Congress’ role in counting votes. In one reading backed by a legal analysis in 2004, Congress would count the electoral slate backed by the governor of the state. In the other reading, backed by a Congressional Research Service report from 2001, the state’s electoral votes would not be counted at all. The unused provision remains untested. “It’s not crazy,” Foley said, to imagine two different electoral results from a state that is critical to the outcome of the presidential election, or a group of states that are critical to the outcome. And he says the law lacks full clarity and “does not address the situation.” Picture the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore, except it’s Congress that has to decide which of two competing slates of electoral votes from Florida to count. It might have happened: The Republican-dominated Florida Legislature signaled during the uncertainty of a recount and legal fights that it probably would take the unusual step of appointing a slate of electors pledged to Bush. The court rulings might have led to Gore overtaking Bush in a recount and prompted a competing slate of Gore electors. But the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore ruling and the subsequent Gore concession made it moot. When Michael Stern spun out the dueling Florida scenarios in 2016, the former lawyer in the House counsel’s office and for House committees concluded that the Electoral Count Act had no method to resolve which slate Congress would count and “the end result of this scenario would also appear to be a standoff with no clear path to resolution.” Having not addressed it yet, Congress, amid a deepening economic fallout from the pandemic and ongoing health risks associated with conducting congressional business, may not have an appetite for fixing it now, either. Seeking clarity Derek Muller, a law professor at the University of Iowa who focuses on election law, said it would be nice for Congress to clarify the provision. That’s particularly true because neither party would know ahead of time whether the clarification would help or hurt them in the upcoming election. On the other hand, there are a lot of election issues Congress could clarify, Muller said. And only one state has ever submitted more than one slate of presidential electors since the Electoral Count Act was passed. That was Hawaii in the 1960 election, and that state’s votes didn't determine the outcome, anyway. An election “happens every four years and you haven’t had a major problem in over 130 years,” Muller said. “It’s tough for Congress to get too bent out of shape about it.” An ad hoc group of 25 legal experts, spearheaded by the law school at the University of California, Irvine, included concerns about the Section 15 ambiguities in an April report about keeping the public’s confidence in the November presidential election. The group, which included Foley, assumed Congress would fail to clarify the Electoral Count Act ahead of time. So instead, it recommended that election law scholars establish a strong consensus on the law ahead of the election to “help reduce the extent to which such congressional contestation could spin out of control.” The scenario In what situation might a state send Congress two different slates of electors, and when might that even matter? Or spin things out of control? Foley points to a swing state such as Michigan as a ready example that seems more likely because of Trump’s reelection effort and the pandemic. It takes a few steps to get there. Imagine the vote in Michigan comes in on Election Day with Trump ahead, but there are still a lot of uncounted absentee ballots that either came in that day, were postmarked that day but still beat the deadline, or there was a change because of COVID-19 to allow them to arrive in the days following Election Day. There could be a historic number of mail-in ballots because of the pandemic. More states are expanding vote-by-mail opportunities for those who want to avoid crowded polling locations on Election Day, and lawsuits across

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the country are addressing the timing of counting absentee ballots. Let’s say most of those absentee ballots are from urban centers such as Detroit with heavy Democratic contingents. Trump could start claiming victory in Michigan based on his lead in the results from polling places, and raise questions about the legitimacy of the absentee ballots and the potential for fraud. Trump already raised unsubstantiated claims of mail-in ballot fraud during the 2018 Florida governor election, and tweeted Wednesday that “large scale Mail-In Ballots” would be “a free for all on cheating, forgery and the theft of Ballots. Whoever cheated the most would win.” Then let’s say, in the Michigan example, that the counting of absentee ballots after Election Day puts Democratic candidate Joe Biden ahead. A similar shift happened in the Senate race in 2018 in Arizona — where mail-in ballots, which can take longer to tally than machine votes, are valid if they are dropped off up until the polls close on Election Day. Republican Martha McSally was ahead after Election Day, but Democrat Kyrsten Sinema pulled ahead in the next days of counting ballots. In the Michigan scenario, all of that could lead to a contested election if the results are close enough. The University of California, Irvine report states that “because many more ballots are likely to be cast by mail, and because mailed ballots are much more prone to disputation, basic math indicates that there is now an even greater chance that vote tallies will be contested.” Michigan’s Democratic secretary of state and governor would assign electors based on the popular vote that Biden won. But the Republican-led Legislature, if it grabs on to arguments that the popular vote was fraudulent or otherwise problematic, might claim it has the authority to assign its own slate of electors. While no legislature has ever tried to seize that authority after an election takes place, Foley points out that the Florida Legislature tossed around the idea in the 2000 election aftermath. In the Michigan example then, both sets of electors meet and send the results for Congress to tally. That’s when the muddled language of Section 15 might kick in. The Senate and House would then have to split over which of the two counts to accept. This could happen, in theory, if Republicans retain control of the Senate in the election and Democrats do the same in the House. After all of that, there’s still one more precondition that would make any of it matter. The electoral votes from Michigan would have to make the difference in the outcome of the presidential race. Or, it could be a combination of Michigan and other states where this could happen, such as Pennsylvania. At that point, the law’s language is unclear about whether Congress would tally the Michigan governor’s electoral slate, or whether Congress would not add Michigan to the tally at all. The law was created in the years after a different type of national upheaval, one with racial conflict. During the post- Civil War Reconstruction period, several Southern states had conflicting and often competing state governmental authorities with unresolved and unclear lines of jurisdiction, according to a CRS report from 2001. “Several states forwarded to Congress in 1876 different and competing slates of electors, which threw the presidential election into confusion and partisan turmoil,” the CRS report states. Past is prologue? That era seems to be in the distant past. The only time a state has sent two different electoral results since then doesn’t provide any guidance. The Hawaii governor after the 1960 election first certified the appointment of electors for Republican Richard Nixon. Then, after a recount that determined Democrat John F. Kennedy had won the Hawaii vote, the governor certified Kennedy as the winner. But those votes didn’t matter in the outcome and so were counted without controversy, a CRS report from 2016 notes. When it came time for Congress to count Hawaii’s electoral votes, Nixon, acting as vice president and therefore president of the Senate and presiding officer over the counting of electoral votes, suggested “without the intent of establishing a precedent” that the Kennedy certification be accepted so as “not to delay the further count of electoral votes.” Still, Foley contends that Congress could settle a nonpartisan issue: “Let’s just be responsible, and let’s just clear up these ambiguities and have tiebreakers, some sort of tiebreaker, for these situations.” Even that might not be enough to avoid an electoral count showdown in a close presidential election. In the 131-page law review article from 2004, “The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887,” law professor Stephen A. Siegel concluded that partisanship will, uh, find a way. The more fundamental problem with the electoral count system is that Congress already knows the results of each state so any structure can be manipulated by partisans, he wrote. “No matter what substantive criteria and processes Congress adopts for judging the propriety of each state’s electoral vote, in a close presidential election, when each state’s vote is known beforehand, partisans on every side will usually be able to game the system to figure out grounds to reach the result they want,” Siegel wrote.

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Congress deciding the 2020 election sparks a constitutional crisis and undermines US democracy Mark 19 [David Mark, former editor of Politico with an MS in journalism from Columbia, 7-31-2019, "The Electoral College could split evenly in 2020. That's good for Trump and bad for democracy.," NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/electoral-college-could-split-evenly-2020-s-good-trump-bad- ncna1036456]/Triumph Debate

The Democratic presidential candidates on stage Tuesday and Wednesday night are trying hard to woo primary voters so that, if they prevail, they can then make their case to the general population as the party’s nominee. But the ultimate deciders come 2020 might not be the ones who cast ballots in neighborhood polling stations. There is a very good chance that the Electoral College will split evenly on Election Day, throwing the race into the House of Representatives. And just as with the popular vote, the majority does not choose the winner. Though Democrats control the House and are likely to hold onto it in 2020, the system currently favors Republicans and all but guarantees Trump will be re-elected. An obscure constitutional provision spells out how an Electoral College tie is to be broken, with constitutional law professors and a small band of diehard political junkies just about the only ones versed in its details. An evenly split Electoral College between two major party nominees would be unprecedented in American history; the only times the House decided elections were in the case of Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams, when multiple parties competed and neither candidate got an Electoral College majority. If the Electoral College splits 269-269 in 2020, the 12th Amendment to the Constitution dictates that the House pick a president and the Senate a vice president. But unlike a vote on a piece of legislation in the House, winning the presidency requires the support of a majority of state delegations — whereby each state votes as a unit to decide a winner, with New York’s 27 House members and New Mexico’s three getting equal say. Though Democrats have more members in the House right now by a 235 to 197 margin, Republicans form the majority of 26 state delegations to the Democrats’ 22, and the GOP is likely to continue to hold most of those state delegations in 2020. With the Electoral College split, the 117th Congress — House and Senate members elected in 2020 — would undertake the task of choosing the next president and vice president on Wednesday, Jan. 6, 2021, according to federal statute. Assuming Trump is the Republican presidential nominee, he would all but certainly emerge as the winner. And assuming the 2020 Democratic nominee wins the popular vote, a likely outcome since 2016 standard-bearer Hillary Clinton did by nearly 3 million ballots, a Trump win via the House would represent the third presidential contest out of the last six where a Republican triumphs despite losing the popular vote. (Al Gore received some half-million more votes than George W. Bush in 2000.) The procedure in this case – a few hundred politicians in the House choosing the president not even by a straight majority – would seem even more undemocratic and unfair than the two races determined by the Electoral College. “It’s among the most egregious violations of democratic principles imaginable,” is how George Edwards III, a retired professor and author of “Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America,” put it. "There's simply no principle that can justify it.” With half of the presidential elections in the 21st century resulting in the popular vote loser becoming president, concerns about the nature of American electoral democracy would only intensify. And one of the main critiques of the Electoral College — that it favors small states — would only be more stinging: A state like Rhode Island, with two House members, would have the same say in the decision as Texas, with 36. Such an outcome would likely lead to drama and political strife beyond what we’ve already seen in the Trump years. To the point that it could be called a constitutional crisis — a conflict with no apparent solution that all sides could agree is legitimate — even though rules on how to proceed are laid out in the Constitution.

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And they will decide in Trump’s favor due to the GOP’s edge in state legislature compositions Ornstein 19 [Norm Ornstein, contributing writer for The Atlantic with a PhD in political science from the University of Michigan, 7-11-2019, "What Happens If the 2020 Election Is a Tie?," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/what-happens-if-2020-election-tie/593608/]/Triumph Debate

What happens if the 2020 presidential election is very close? Polls suggest that’s a real possibility. And it’s a question that should shape the strategy of the Democratic Party, not just at the top of the ticket, but in the down-ballot races that could ultimately determine who sits in the White House. If Donald Trump wins battleground states such as Wisconsin, Arizona, and Florida, he can lose Pennsylvania and Michigan, and lose the popular vote by 5 million or more, but still win the Electoral College by a single vote, as David Wasserman of “The Cook Political Report” has noted. If a congressional district in Nebraska or Maine were to vote for a Democrat, there could be a tie. Even if the result is not that close, it is possible to imagine a nightmare scenario in multiple states like what we saw in Florida in 2000—in this case, contests about electoral votes that might have a state legislature endorsing a different set of electors than the popular-vote count mandates, or contests about popular votes and provisional ballots stretching beyond the deadline for an official electoral count. With the stakes so high, with tribal identities overcoming norms of behavior, with many legislatures in states such as Wisconsin and North Carolina having already taken extraordinary, antidemocratic steps to cling to power, it is not fanciful to imagine such situations. What comes next under any of these scenarios? The certification of electoral votes has to be done by both the House and the Senate on January 6, after the new Congress is sworn in. If they disagree on one or more states, it’s possible that no candidate would have the 270 votes required to be president before the inauguration on January 20. So the Constitution gives the House of Representatives the authority to choose a president—but not by a simple majority vote. Rather, each state’s delegation casts a single vote. Support from a majority of the states—that is, 26—is needed to select the winner. Of course, each state’s delegation would have to calculate how to cast its vote, but it is a near-sure thing that the partisan identity of the legislators would be key. There’s the rub, and the key to the importance of a set of House races. Right now, despite the Democrats having a comfortable majority of seats in the House, the Republicans have a majority of states—26, to be exact. The delegations from two states are deadlocked. (One of those two deserves an asterisk: Michigan went from a 7–7 tie to 7–6–1 for Democrats with the move of Representative Justin Amash, who’s called for impeachment proceedings against President Trump, to independent status.) In several of the states, the majority is slim, and if a single congressional seat changes hands, it could change the majority or create a deadlock. That’s true of Republican states such as Florida, whose delegation splits 14–13, and Wisconsin, 5–3; it’s also true of Democratic ones such as Colorado, now 4–3; Arizona, 5–4; Minnesota, 5–3; and Iowa, 3–1. * Then there are states with a single member, such as Montana and Alaska, with one Republican apiece, and states with just two representatives, such as Hawaii, New Hampshire, and Maine, where one switch could create a deadlock.

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Dems will concede if Biden loses, but Trump won’t if he does – that means there is no alternative to Trump thereby preventing any challenges to the race post- election Kilgore 8-5 [Ed Kilgore, political columnist at New York Magazine and Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, 8-5-2020, "Would Biden Contest a Trump Electoral College Win?," Intelligencer, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/08/would-biden-contest-a-a-trump-electoral-college-win.html] /Triumph Debate ***inside straight: hand with four of the five cards needed for a straight, but missing one in the middle in a game of poker

We have a president running for reelection who (a) has never met an asinine right-wing “voter fraud” theory he didn’t embrace and promote; (b) wouldn’t completely accept the results of the election he won in 2016 on the 100 percent unsupported grounds that Hillary Clinton benefited from “millions of illegal votes”; (c) has specifically refused to say he’d accept a 2020 defeat; (d) has spent months demonizing the mail ballots that may represent over half the votes cast in November; (e) arrogates to himself vast extra-constitutional powers, including, perhaps, one to delay the 2020 election; and (f) has argued that any electoral decision not rendered on Election Night is illegitimate. So it’s not terribly surprising that a whole cottage industry of postelection scenario writing has sprung up with horror stories of how Trump might contest or ignore an adverse decision by the electorate. In an inspired bit of whataboutism, the Washington Examiner’s Byron York dives deep into one of these essays in political science fiction (this one based on some role-playing exercises conducted by former government officials) to pluck out a scenario where it’s Joe Biden and his supporters who defy a defeat, according to the prevailing constitutional rules of the road. Hang onto your butts for this wild ride, folks: Biden, like Hillary Clinton before him, won the popular vote (in this case, the margin was a decisive 52% to 47%). But Trump won the Electoral College victory with 286 electoral votes. In other words, Trump was the clear winner of the presidency. Biden conceded defeat on election night but then withdrew his concession as Democratic anger grew over another election in which the winner lost the popular vote but won the Electoral College. The Biden campaign pushed the Democratic governors of Michigan and Wisconsin to disregard Trump’s victory, overrule their state legislatures, and send Biden electors to Washington. House Democrats refused to recognize Trump’s Electoral College victory. The Biden campaign also came up with what appears to be a demand for concessions in exchange for recognition of Trump’s victory: Trump could take office if the Electoral College were eliminated, Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico were given statehood, and California was divided into five states to create more Democratic senators. Otherwise, California, Oregon, and Washington state would secede from the union. In the end, the standoff “remained unresolved,” and Inauguration Day “arrived without a single president-elect.” The scenario ended with: “It was unclear what the military would do in this situation.” Lord have mercy. Where to begin untangling this fantasy of revolutionary blue America and its Lenin, Joe Biden? Yes, it’s possible, though unlikely, that Trump will not only duplicate his Electoral College inside straight of 2016 but do so against an even larger Democratic popular vote advantage, as Democrats pile up wasted votes in places like California. And yes, that would enrage the Democratic rank and file and create momentum for some future effort (perhaps a consummation of the National Popular Vote Initiative which requires coordinated state action to give electoral votes to the popular vote winner, or admission of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico to the Union as states) to eliminate or neutralize the anti- democratic (and anti-Democratic) tendencies of the Electoral College. There would also likely be threats (assuming Democrats control Congress) to again impeach and this time remove Trump from office the first time he takes a wrong step. But getting from there to some real effort to thwart Trump’s election is really a reach. Under the scenario York quotes, Democratic governors in two states send lists of Biden electors to Washington as rivals to Trump electors selected by legislators (and presumably the voters). While there is an ancient argument as to whether state legislators have the sole constitutional power to choose electors (i.e., whether governors can veto legislative appointments), I know of no theory where governors can unilaterally name electors. And there’s something inherently screwy about the idea of Democratic governors (or for that matter, a Democratic Congress in a vote to certify electors) voiding the popular result in one or more states as a vindication of the election of presidents by popular vote. It would not pass any conceivable smell test, or for that matter, court challenge. And anyone who thinks the U.S. Supreme Court would stay out of such a controversy has somehow forgotten Bush v. Gore. The Biden Revolution scenario also suggests Democrats might make an outlandish series of demands and threats before “accepting” a clearly legitimate (from a constitutional, not moral point of view) Trump election: demanding outright abolition of the Electoral College (which would require passage and ratification of a constitutional amendment, taking years) or division of California (which would require a prior vote of Californians) and threatening state secession (we fought a war over that, remember?) if they didn’t get their way. None of these blandishments would get to square one, of course, without the consent and probably the leadership of Joe Biden — so firm an institutionalist that he won’t even squarely come out for Senate filibuster reform. As suggested above, angry Democrats might use any Trump Electoral College win–slash–popular vote loss to develop and promote an agenda for not letting it happen again, and perhaps make its enactment a big 2022 midterm election issue — an election which, as Trump’s second midterm, would very likely produce Democratic gains far larger than those in 2018 and create a far more comprehensive and progressive mandate for fundamental change than might come out of a contested presidential election. By 2024 Democrats 59 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

might well be in a position to nominate someone younger and more reform-minded than Biden and put Trumpism behind the country once and for all. That all seems a lot more plausible than a Biden-led effort to trigger a contested election and a constitutional crisis whose outcome could depend on “what the military would do in this situation.” No, Trump’s the only presidential candidate with sufficient contempt for the Constitution, the rule of law, and most important, any limitations on his own powers to plunge the country into chaos for the pure hell of it.

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Bush v Gore and senate polarization have pushed Court legitimacy to the brink – deciding the election is the final straw Lithwick 16 [Dahlia Lithwick, legal commentator and Slate writer for law and courts, 10-26-2016, "The Supreme Court Will Never Be Able to Settle Another Presidential Election. That’s a Bad Thing!," Slate Magazine, https://slate.com/news- and-politics/2016/10/why-bush-v-gore-cant-happen-again-and-why-thats-a-bad-thing.html] /Triumph Debate

The Supreme Court Will Never Be Able to Settle Another Presidential Election. That’s a Bad Thing! For many years after the Supreme Court ruled 5–4, along partisan lines, to resolve the 2000 election in a way that ensured George W. Bush would win the presidency, Justice Antonin Scalia would unerringly answer questions about Bush v. Gore and a potentially stolen election with a tart admonition to “get over it.” The late justice’s words drove liberals nuts—it was about as dismissive as he could be without resorting to his middle finger. But as we fret about the toxic—and possibly even violent—outcome of a presidential election seen by a great swath of the electorate as illegitimate, and as we worry about the impossibility of post-election repair, Justice Scalia’s seemingly snotty answer reveals just what has been lost between 2000 and 2016. Due to unprecedented GOP delegitimizing of the court, its ability to help Americans “get over it” in another disputed election now seems to have vanished. While it won’t likely be needed in this election, with Hillary Clinton evidently poised for a landslide win, the damage to the court will have lasting effects that will result in serious damage to the republic in any future potential electoral controversy. Ironically, it’s the court that’s served as a shining example for the other two branches during this season of hyper partisanship and it’s the partisan rancor around the court this season that is damaging its legitimacy from the outside. Despite the rank injustice of how the 2000 election was decided, and the staggering silliness of the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore, Americans tolerated the judicial decree that the election was over. As Justice Stephen Breyer has suggested, we got over it because the court holds a special place in the national consciousness. As Breyer has also been quick to note, this was not always the case. Public acceptance of the court as final arbiter took centuries to earn and the justices themselves fought hard to get here. Today, thanks to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley, that hard-fought public acceptance is in extreme peril. Having coughed up pretext after pretext for refusing to hold a hearing for Merrick Garland since President Obama nominated the judge to the court 223 days ago, Grassley now claims he’s withheld hearings because it’s too expensive. Senate Republicans have now clearly signaled that any nominee seated by a Democratic president will not be “their” justice and a court dominated by Democratic appointees is no longer a real court. Sorry Justice Breyer, that hard-earned appearance of legitimacy is gone. The justices, keenly aware of the problem, have worked very hard to make themselves all but invisible in recent months, even in the face of attacks by Grassley himself. With the exception of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s July attacks on Donald Trump, the court has successfully managed to keep itself out of the partisan fray throughout this election season. To do this, the shorthanded court has had to turn away important cases and slow-walk others through the term. And through it all, the justices have largely remained silent about the frustrations of deadlock. It’s easy to argue that the refusal of the chief justice, John Roberts, to step into the political boxing ring to talk about the diminished influence of court both this term and last, is a partisan move in and of itself. But Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor—the three justices who have quietly criticized the gridlock—have also been at tremendous pains to praise Roberts for fostering consensus and compromise since Scalia’s death. Now is as good a time as any to remark that despite what the Republican Party will have done to the court’s standing, we could actually learn an awful lot about collegiality and civility from the justices, who may call one another unspeakable names in dissent, but always manage to eat meals together the next week. And there are still reasons to believe that the court is unique in this way. It still benefits from institutional forces that have all but disappeared from the rest of Washington: At bottom they are colleagues and they mostly respect one another. They are a small group of repeat players who have learned to compromise even when they don’t like it. That sentiment was expressed by Sotomayor last week when she described her worry about the widespread delegitimization of government institutions, including the court, in the current election: The reason that we can continue to interact and actually like each other is because we respect each other. … We respect one fundamental truth: We know that each other has an equal amount of passion and love for the Constitution, for our system of government and for doing what’s right under the law. Even if you believe that’s just a lie justices tell themselves while flossing, never has the fiction that the court does law, not politics, been more attractive or necessary. To be sure: Nobody really the believes that the justices aren’t political. In his terrific new book, Supremely Partisan, James Zirin persuasively argues that the current court is as dangerously partisan as it can be. As he puts it, “the deep political divide of recent years is unprecedented.” He warns, probably correctly, that the current institution is “a court of law in many cases, and a political court in many others, with 5–4 decisions laced with ideology, a partisan divide, and diminished public confidence in the court’s legitimacy as the final interpreter of the law of the land.” But politics and ideology are not the only determinative factors at the court, and it’s precisely because the justices side against self-interest and personal preference, that we can tolerate the cases, like Citizens United or Bush v. Gore, in which they do. Also, as their silence in this election—even under siege— reflects, they understand the stakes. What has, over the long term, protected the court from claims of illegitimacy has been its ability to band together to put the institution before the players, because the consequences of losing the public trust are too high. That was exemplified by John Roberts voting with the liberals in the two Affordable Care Act challenges. It was exemplified by the decision to send Zubik—the

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contraception mandate case—back to the lower courts for a second look. This ability to play institutional possum is alternately maddening or inspiring, depending on one’s level of faith in the court. But whether it’s strategic, self-interested, or cynical, in the present election, any high official who spares a thought for the future of government institutions is a hero. It must freak the heck out of the justices when people like John McCain talk about blocking any future Hillary Clinton nominee. Or when outgoing Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid starts planning revenge against those who have blocked Judge Garland’s nomination to the court with the suggestion that Democrats should nuke the filibuster for Supreme Court nominees in the next term. But the justices just go on reading the blue briefs, and then the red briefs, and drafting their consensus opinions. Credit where it is due, if the Republic is indeed about to become a dumpster fire, the court will at least go down with its dignity. Throughout this election season I have been reminded of how different Supreme Court norms of dispassion and reason are from those of the other branches of government. You can write all that off as pointless theater, but even if it’s only for show, America could use a big dose of show-decency, now more than ever. It’s clear that the court did real and lasting damage to the country with its decision in Bush v. Gore. Whether we wanted to or not, we’ve largely recovered. It’s less clear to me that the court will get over the damage our elected officials in the Senate are doing today and the damage they will likely do in the future. And when the court lacks the legitimacy to settle the next crisis, it will be on us not them. Justice Scalia’s “get over it” was arrogant but probably necessary. The next time the court tells us to “get over it,” we need to hear them. But we probably won’t.

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Litigation is inevitable – it’s the highest it’s been in more than twenty years Hasen 20 [Richard L. Hasen, professor of law and political science at UC Irvine, 2-3-2020, "The Supreme Court May No Longer Have the Legitimacy to Resolve a Disputed Election," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/supreme-court-elections/605899/]/Triumph Debate

The Supreme Court already plays an outsize role in policing the American election process, compared with the role played by high courts in other advanced democracies in setting rules for political competition. Despite the Court’s decision last year in Rucho v. Common Cause to keep federal courts out of the business of limiting partisan gerrymanders, the Court has been enmeshed in the political thicket for decades. The U.S. Constitution, unlike newer constitutions from similar countries, does not contain many election ground rules. Instead, it has general language, such as in the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees “equal protection of the laws.” The Supreme Court and lower courts have used the constitutional text as a hook to decide some basic issues, such as whether election districts need to have roughly equal numbers of people to assure fairness in voting power, and whether the government can require people to disclose their identities when they spend money to influence how others vote in elections. Aside from these general rulings, the Supreme Court and lower courts have become more and more involved in disputes over election procedures, balloting, and vote counting. According to statistics I compiled for my new book, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy, the amount of election-related litigation keeps rising, and is now at nearly triple the rate of litigation in the period before the 2000 election. The 2018 election saw the largest number of election-related cases since at least 1996 (the first year for which I have been keeping records), which is all the more shocking given that litigation rates in midterm-election years tend to be lower than in presidential-election years. With Democrats bringing ever more lawsuits challenging restrictive voting practices put in place by Republican legislatures and elected officials, there’s every reason to believe that another record will be set in 2020, and that the most important of these cases will end up before the Supreme Court.

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Coronavirus means multiple lawsuits over mail-in ballots Beckwith and Larson 7-20 [Ryan Teague Beckwith, senior editor in the Washington bureau for TIME magazine with a master's degree in journalism from Columbia, and Erik Larson, writer for the WSJ and Atlantic with a masters in journalism from Columbia, 7-20-2020, "‘Everybody Is Suing’: Trump-Biden Election Sets Up Legal Logjam," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-20/2020-election-will-be-the-most-litigated-in-u-s- history]/Triumph Debate

The 2020 election between President Donald Trump and Joe Biden is shaping up to be the most litigated in U.S. history, as changes to balloting prompted by the coronavirus pandemic spur lawsuits that could leave the outcome in suspense for days or even weeks. A recent count by Loyola Marymount University law professor Justin Levitt found 154 cases already filed across 41 states and the District of Columbia. Many more are expected in the months ahead as Republicans, Democrats and advocacy groups battle over how to vote during a pandemic. “Everybody is suing about everything,” Levitt said. Many of the lawsuits center on the use of mail-in ballots, which is expected to surge to historic highs given concern about catching the virus while voting in person. Trump, who’s lagging Biden by double digits in some polls and reorganized his campaign staff last week, frequently claims without evidence that vote-by-mail is rife with fraud and vulnerable to foreign forgeries. These attacks have fueled a broader effort by some Republicans to prevent voting by mail, including millions of dollars earmarked for lawsuits and advertising. But lawsuits have also been filed seeking to halt other coronavirus-related voting measures that aim to consolidate polling places, ease signature requirements for those seeking to put initiatives or third-party candidates on the ballot, and allow more poll-watchers. Levitt said each decision could end up affecting thousands of voters, and the combined effect could be enough to swing a closely fought contest. Here’s a look at some of the major arguments in courtrooms across the country: Consolidating Polling Places What’s at stake: Elections officials say they need to reduce in- person voting, but voting-rights groups argue that could disenfranchise voters who don’t want to cast absentee ballots or can’t make it to early voting centers, the operation of which various from state to state. The coronavirus forced many states to dramatically limit polling places during recent primaries. In Wisconsin there were just five polling places in Milwaukee, a city of about 600,000 people, down from 182 in 2016. Louisville’s residents, who also number about 600,000, had just a single polling place in Kentucky’s primary. Lawsuits have already been filed in six states and in Washington D.C. that sought to limit precinct closures, and legal experts say more are likely to be filed. Requirements to Vote by Mail What’s at stake: Some states still require an excuse to vote by mail, and a handful aren’t accepting concern about infection as a legitimate one. Voting rights groups argue that fear of coronavirus should count. By law, 34 states plus Washington don’t require an excuse to vote by mail. Many others have temporarily relaxed their rules in response to the pandemic. Lawsuits have been filed in nine states seeking to permanently overturn those requirements or acknowledge that the coronavirus is a valid excuse. In Texas, the state Supreme Court upheld a law that allows people over 65 to vote absentee, but requires excuses from younger voters. A federal lawsuit is ongoing. Requiring a Witness What’s at stake: Some states want absentee ballots signed in front of a witness, but voting rights groups say that would be too risky for some voters if the virus is still spreading in the fall. A dozen states have laws requiring a mail-in ballot be either signed by a witness or notarized. Those requirements are being challenged in multiple lawsuits that argue the restriction is too high a barrier when voters are being told to stay at home or reduce social contact because of the coronavirus. Limits on Turning in Ballots What’s at stake: Some states limit so-called “ballot harvesting,” but Democratic-aligned lawyers are seeking to expand the practice in case of problems with the mail. In 10 states, voters can let a family member drop off their ballot, while in 26 states they can give it to someone else, such as a representative of a political party. Trump has argued without evidence that this practice, sometimes called “ballot harvesting,” allows widespread fraud. Republicans have sued in California and Pennsylvania to restrict ballot collection, while Democrats have sued in multiple states to expand it. Elections experts say more lawsuits may be coming. Ballot Drop-Off Sites What’s at stake: Pennsylvania allowed voters to drop off ballots at public libraries, but the Trump campaign argued that could lead to voter fraud. Mail-in voting surged in Pennsylvania’s recent primary, overwhelming local elections officials charged with collecting ballots. In response, some areas of the state set up drop boxes where voters could securely leave ballots in schools, libraries and community centers. The Trump campaign and the Republican National Committee sued, noting that state law required ballots be dropped off at elections offices and arguing that expanding drop box sites “exponentially enhanced” the risk of fraud. Deadlines for Mail-In Ballots What’s at stake: Most states require mail-in ballots be received by Election Day, which this year is Nov[ember]. 3, but Democratic-aligned lawyers say ballots postmarked by Election Day should count so voters aren’t disenfranchised by slow mail service. Most states require mail-in ballots be received by Election Day, although a few count them if they’re postmarked by Election Day but received as many as 14 days later. Voting rights groups and Democratic-aligned lawyers are suing states to switch to postmark deadlines, with lawsuits in more than a dozen states, including Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. 64 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

Experts say lawsuits could multiply after the election, especially if problems crop up with slow mail service. Fixing Rejected Mail-In Ballots What’s at stake: States don’t always make it easy to fix problems that lead to a mail-in ballot being rejected. Voting rights groups argue that disenfranchises voters. Many of the lawsuits filed by Democrats have demanded that election officials give voters a chance to fix any problems with mail-in ballots, particularly issues around their signatures on absentee-ballot envelopes. Research has shown that young, Black and Hispanic voters face a much greater risk of having their ballot rejected, and voting-rights groups have long sought to reform the practice of “curing” a rejected ballot.

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No offense – Trump is a lame duck Kamarck 7-27 [Elaine Kamarck, Senior Fellow for Governance Studies at Brookings and lecturer in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government with a PhD from UC Berkley, 7-27-2020, "Is President Trump already a lame duck president?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/07/27/is-president-trump-already-a-lame- duck-president/] /Triumph Debate

In politics, a “lame duck” usually refers to a president in that period of time after an election and before the inauguration of a successor. But rarely does “lame duck” refer to a sitting president about to go into a re-election campaign. Nonetheless, President Trump’s tenure seems to be slipping into a premature lame duck period. The most important characteristic of lame duck-ness is that even your friends and supporters stop paying attention to your wishes and defy you in acts if not just in words. There’s an awful lot of that going on in Trumpworld lately. Signs of a lame duck presidency arose around Congress’s summer to-do list. The first was passage of the behemoth NDAA (National Defense Appropriations Act) which funds our military. This bill was moving along in its typical bipartisan fashion until it acquired a provision that would remove the names of Confederate military leaders from American military bases. Senate Republicans were the first to balk, signaling very clearly that they opposed vetoing the bill over that provision. Then, last week, the House voted on the bill in spite of the fact that Trump had threatened to veto it just hours before. It passed 295 to 125, including enough Republicans to make it veto-proof. Days later, the Senate approved a similar bill (with the military base-name change provision included) by a lopsided vote of 86-14, a second veto-proof vote—with only four Republicans voting no. Trump’s lame duck status also showed up in the debate over what kind of stimulus bill should be passed. His first idea was to lower the payroll tax. That tax funds Social Security payments, and a cut is sometimes proposed but it is rarely taken seriously. It wasn’t this time, either. Even as it became apparent that Senate Republicans were lukewarm at best, the White House kept on. The White House has since dropped the idea. Even more bizarre was Trump’s opposition to $25 billion in funding for federal health agencies and for coronavirus testing. Senate Republicans proposed this funding and the lack of White House support was reported to have “infuriated” them. On another front, throughout this summer Trump has been insisting that schools open in the fall and he has been threatening [to] withhold federal funding if they don’t. He forced the CDC to go back to the drawing board because he didn’t like their initial guidelines about school reopening. But the little secret here is that presidents have very little to do with school policy. Even if Trump could cut off funds, federal funding is a miniscule portion of funding for schools: 8.3% to be exact. Most school funding is from state and local sources. School districts around the country are wrestling with the health concerns around opening but they are pretty much ignoring the president. Even the private school his son Barron attends has announced that it will either open up online only or in some sort of hybrid fashion. So much for Trump’s influence over schools. Trump has also been waging a campaign against mail-in ballots, contending without evidence that elections held by mail are at risk for corruption. But like education, the president has very little to say about voting methods. Those are left up to the states. And in spite of the president’s protests, states are moving towards easing up restrictions on absentee ballots and more and more states plan to send out applications for absentee ballots to all voters. This is not a Democratic plot to steal the election as Trump would have us believe. In Kentucky, for instance, the Republican Secretary of State Mike Adams encouraged voters to vote by mail for its June 23 primary. And Republican Secretary of State of Ohio Frank La Rose just announced that he will be sending absentee ballot applications to all voters in the state come November. It seems that, in typical fashion, Trump has forgotten that there are other Republicans on the ballot besides himself. So, Trump can’t get what he wants out of Republicans in Congress and he can’t get what he wants out of state and local school boards and state election boards. But he can’t even get what he wants from his own national party organization. For months he insisted that he would have a huge, in-person convention in Charlotte, North Carolina. But as the Democratic governor and others expressed alarm at their ability to host that many people during a pandemic, Trump abruptly pulled the convention (or at least the exciting parts of it) out of Charlotte. He soon found a more hospitable venue in Jacksonville, Florida. But as the virus grew in Florida, officials there grew increasingly worried and Trump opted to cancel the convention. The Republican mayor expressed his gratitude to Trump for staying away from their city. Now the Republican National Committee is in chaos trying to figure out how to re-nominate their president in the midst of a pandemic.

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The VP pick doesn’t matter Milligan 20 [Susan Milligan, senior politics writer for US news, 7-24-2020, "Biden’s Biggest Decision (That Doesn’t Much Matter) ," US News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2020-07-24/bidens-vice- president-choice-wont-likely-help-him-win]/Triumph Debate

IT'S CAST AS THE FIRST executive decision by a candidate hoping to become the nation's chief executive, an indicator of judgment, inclusion and strategic thinking. But really, a presidential nominee's choice of a running mate doesn't ultimately have that much impact on the outcome of the presidential election, scholars say. While different constituencies in the party might clamor to be represented in the second-in-command spot, the choice of a vice president does not typically flip votes or states. "A running mate is not going to change the game, at least not with a positive effect," says University of Dayton political science professor Christopher Devine, author, with Kyle Kopco, of the book "Do Running Mates Matter? The Influence of Vice Presidential Candidates in Presidential Elections." "A running mate can change things at the margins. But it's more likely to hurt than help," he adds. The question of a vice presidential pick weighs heavily on Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden, who is set to announce a decision in early August. Biden has committed to picking a female nominee, and said this week his campaign is in the process of vetting semi-finalists, four of whom are African American. He will then conduct one-on-one interviews with finalists and make his decision, the former vice president said on MSNBC's "The ReidOut" with host Joy Reid. Choosing a vice president is an unusual exercise, in that outside interest groups and party factions believe they should have a say in choosing the person who essentially would be the president's work spouse in office. And that adds a wrinkle to his selection process: if he selects someone who appeases a certain part of the base, or represents a key state, that may satisfy a perceived strategic need. But if he does not feel an affinity with that individual, would she have any real influence in a potential Biden White House? The vice presidency "has often been mocked and ridiculed as an unimportant institution," Devine says. Its occupant dismissed as a ribbon-cutter or non-entity whose only purpose is to have a pulse if for some reason the sitting president stops having one. But vice presidents can be real partners as well, and have real power. Vice President Mike Pence, for example, became the first vice president in history to cast the tie-breaking vote on a cabinet nomination (ensuring Education Secretary Betsy DeVos's confirmation). And since Biden would be the oldest person inaugurated as president (he'd be 78 by Jan. 20, 2021), his choice of a running mate has more importance. Progressives have been pushing for a like-minded person as running mate, meaningful because it's quite possible that individual would seek the nomination in 2024. "Biden is going to be under pressure from (various) groups," especially the progressive wing of the party, still smarting after their preferred candidate, Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont, lost the primary to Biden, says Julia Azari, a political science professor at Marquette University. Indivisible, a progressive group, polled its members and found a preference for Sen. Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts. A recent Hill-Harris poll found that Democrats overall like Sen. Kamala Harris of California and Warren. Since the outrage over police brutality against African Americans has grown and has resulted in civil unrest, there is increasing pressure on Biden to select an African American woman. But that gets complicated for Biden, Azari notes, since by definition that is a smaller group, and one whose members may not have extensive experience or an established relationship with Biden. But for all the hand-wringing over finding the winning veep selection, the calculations rarely result in a pivotal advantage for the ticket, Devine says, citing research detailed in his book. There is no evidence, for example, that choosing someone from an under-represented group in politics (such as women) increases either support or turnout among that group, he says. Sen. John McCain's selection of former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin as his running mate in 2008, for example, did not lead women to vote for the ticket. That's partly because women in general tend to vote for Democrats, but even 1984 Democratic nominee Walter Mondale didn't benefit when he chose Rep. Gerladine Ferraro as his running mate (Mondale only won his home state of Minnesota and the heavily-Democratic District of Columbia). Selecting someone from a social or ideological group isn't a lock on that group either, Devine says. Hillary Clinton chose a Roman Catholic, Sen. Tim Kaine of Virginia, as her running mate in 2016, but Catholics still favored President Donald Trump, 50% to 46%, according to exit polls. Trump, meanwhile, chose former Rep. Mike Pence of Indiana, a social conservative who was thought to be popular among evangelical Christians. But Devine's research shows that evangelicals were ready to vote for Trump anyway, despite his personal history as a thrice-married casino owner. Nor do vice presidential picks bring much help in securing their home states in the general election. Ferraro couldn't deliver her home state of New York in 1984; Sen. Lloyd Bentsen could not put his home state of Texas on the Democratic side in 1988 when he ran with Massachusetts Gov. Micahel Dukakis (though the GOP nominee that year, George H.W. Bush, was also a Texan); former Buffalo Bill and Rep. Jack Kemp didn't; bring New York to Republican nominee Sen. Bob Dole in 1996; former Sen. John Edwards of North Carolina couldn't help out 2004 Democratic nominee John Kerry, and Rep. Paul Ryan did not secure his home, swing-state Wisconsin, for GOP nominee Mitt Romney in 2012. The only vice presidential nominee to help bring a swing state on board was Al Gore in 1992, when Bill Clinton and Gore won Tennessee. Notably, Gore lost his home state when he ran for president in 2000. What about balance? It sounds good on paper, but also isn't necessarily the best way to go, history shows. Clinton's choice of fellow Southern moderate (and young) Gore, for example, startled political operatives who thought Clinton missed a chance to broaden his appeal. Instead, it fortified Clinton's message of change, resulting in a win for the ticket. Meanwhile, McCain's selection of Palin – younger, from a vastly different region and hewing more to the ultra-conservative wing of the party – ended up being a negative for the late Arizona lawmaker, as people questioned Palin's readiness to be president, should something happen to the septuagenarian senator. "That hurt perceptions of McCain's judgment," Devine says, citing polling information he details in his book. Former President Barack Obama found some balance in Biden, in that the senator from Delaware had more experience and relationships on Capitol Hill that Obama lacked. But the two were ideologically in sync, and had a strong personal bond. When Biden announces his decision, it will inevitably lead to excitement among some and disappointment among others, experts say. And then people move on to the general election. "I think there are many different paths he can take that would be good ones here, a lot of candidates he can pick from who would be perfectly fine," Devine says. But "we see very little evidence that people change their vote because they like the vice presidential candidate," he adds.

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AT: Constitutional Crisis

Turnout hasn’t flipped any presidential election – best and most recent studies prove Shaw and Petrocik 20 [Daron R. Shaw, Professor of Politics at UT Austin with a PhD in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles, and John R. Petrocik, Professor of political science at the University of Missouri with a PhD from the University of Chicago, 1-27-2020, “The Turnout Myth Voting Rates and Partisan Outcomes in American National Elections,” Oxford University Press, https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190089450.001.0001/oso- 9780190089450]/Triumph Debate National Results: Presidential and House Elections We begin at the most obvious starting point. Figure 4.1 plots turnout and the Democratic vote for presidential elections from 1948 through 2016; the joint distribution is essentially a cloud of points, with no indication of a higher Democratic vote with greater turnout. The figure seems to show a slight correlation (the slope of the line estimating the relationship is 0.23) if one includes the 1964 election, where turnout was high and the Republican vote was exceptionally low. However, the 1964 election is clearly an outlier. The slope without the 1964 data point is indistinguishable from zero. Even if the 1964 point is treated as probative and left in the analysis, the data do not lend much support to the bias thesis. With or without the 1964 election, the spread around the slope is so great that the ability to predict the vote share with turnout is effectively zero (the correlation is 0.11). The deletion of the 1964 election flattens the slope and generates a correlation of 0.07 between turnout and the Democratic presidential vote. The finding is clear with or without 1964: turnout and the vote share are substantially independent. Democratic candidates won elections with a turnout rate in the low 50s, and won and lost elections with turnout in the 60s. [figure omitted] Figure 4.2 sorts presidential elections into those when an incumbent was seeking reelection in contrast to elections when the race was open. The figure makes the distinction because it is possible that an incumbent president’s reelection prospects are known to voters (seventeen of twenty-four incumbent presidents have been reelected since the Civil War), resulting in a lower turnout rate since the incumbent’s near certainty of success may marginally reduce enthusiasm about the election and therefore turnout.1 The historical success of reelection bids might also have depressed get-out-the-vote efforts by the campaigns; candidates regarded as certain to win (or lose) may have produced less intense GOTV activity. However, as the two data panels demonstrate, the evidence does not support an incumbent effect on the relationship: turnout and the vote are uncorrelated in incumbent and open elections (1964 is the outlier in the “Incumbent Running” panel).

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Even with universal turnout, elections wouldn’t be flipped – hardly any of them are competitive enough for higher turnout to matter Citrin et al. 3 [Jack Citrin, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkley, Eric Schickler, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkley and John Sides, PhD candidate at UC Berkley, 1-2003, “What If Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of Increased Turnout in Senate Elections,” Midwest Political Science Association, http://www.jstor.com/stable/3186094] /Triumph Debate ***CPS: Current Population Survey, a survey by the Census Bureau that asks whether and who voters voted for

The next question is whether these shifts in the distribution of the vote under universal turnout are sufficient to change actual election outcomes. The answer is only rarely. In this simulation, four of the 91 races would have had a different winner if everyone eligible had voted. Table 2 presents data regarding these four races, including the actual outcome, the estimated preference of CPS voters and nonvoters, and the simulated outcome under full turnout. Three races would have switched from the Republican to the Democratic column: the 1994 race in Washington between Republican Slade Gorton and Democrat Ron Sims; the 1994 race in Delaware between Republican William Roth and Democrat Charles Oberly; and the 1998 race in Kentucky between Democrat Scotty Baesler and Republican Jim Bunning.17 The race that flips in the opposite direction is the 1994 Virginia contest between Democrat Charles Robb and Republican Oliver North. North's victory in this simulation likely derives from the unusually strong positive impact of education on Democratic vote choice. Education routinely predicts turnout but not necessarily vote choice. In this case, virtually all of the best demographic predictors of high turnout-education, age, and income-were positively related to Democratic vote choice (see Table 1). As a result, full turnout would in essence have mobilized a substantial number of North supporters.18 The reason full turnout changes so few election outcomes is that, like elections for the House of Representatives, most Senate elections also are subject to vanishing (or at least scarce) marginals (see Mayhew 1974).19 If one defines "competitive," somewhat arbitrarily but generously, as a race where the two-party division of the vote is 55-45 or closer, only 31 percent of Senate races in 1994, 1996, and 1998 qualify (33 of 104). While candidates and their campaign managers always run scared and worry about how surges in turnout might cause an upset, in reality many races are so lopsided that even the most thorough mobilization of nonvoters would probably not change the outcome. For example, in 1998 Republican Frank Murkowski of Alaska won nearly 80 percent of the vote. Even if every man, woman, child, and caribou from Juneau to Prudhoe Bay had voted, his victory would have remained a fait accompli. Skeptics of the supposed partisan effects of higher turnout tend to focus on similarities among voters and nonvoters, but the structure of electoral competition is arguably equally important. Indeed, even if nonvoters and voters were quite politically distinct, increased turnout will rarely flip the outcome of one-sided races.

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Trump will lose the election and concede Marcos 6-5 [Cristina Marcos, congressional reporter for the Hill, 6-25-2020, "Pelosi predicts Trump would accept election results if he loses, but says 'be prepared for everything'," The Hill, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/504601-pelosi-predicts-trump-would-accept-election-results-if-he-loses-but-says- be]/Triumph Debate

Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) said Thursday that she believes President Trump would accept the election results if he loses to former Vice President Joe Biden in November, but added that Democrats should "be prepared for everything." Pelosi said that the ideal situation for Democrats would be to win the presidential election by a wide margin that would make it more difficult to contest. When asked during a livestreamed interview with The Washington Post's Robert Costa if she is concerned President Trump will challenge the results of the presidential election and refuse to concede if he loses, Pelosi replied, “No. I don’t think so. But just to be prepared, I would say just win big because he will try to question the certification of this or that." "I think that he would respect the results of an election. And even if he didn't, then the henchmen around him would understand that he would have to respect the results of the election," Pelosi continued. At the same time, Pelosi didn't completely rule out the possibility that Democrats could encounter such a scenario of the incumbent president refusing to leave office. "I believe that he would understand the office that he holds requires him to step aside. Having said that, be prepared for everything. Hope for the best, be prepared for the worst," Pelosi said. Biden acknowledged earlier this month during an interview on "The Daily Show with Trevor Noah" that he has considered the possibility of Trump refusing to concede. But he said that he is "absolutely convinced" that military officers would "escort him from the White House with great dispatch" if that happened. A Trump campaign spokesman said at the time that "President Trump has been clear that he will accept the results of the 2020 election." Trump has been trailing Biden by double digits in recent polls amid voter disapproval of his handling of the coronavirus pandemic and nationwide protests over police brutality and racial injustice.

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Can’t predict – Trump will do anything to win Boot 8-4 [Max Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security CFR and a contributor to the Washington Post with a master’s degree in history from Yale, 8-4-2020, " What will Trump do to win? Here are nine possible October surprises — and one November surprise.," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/04/what-will-trump-do- win-here-are-nine-possible-october-surprises-one-november-surprise/] /Triumph Debate *** legerdemain: slight of hand

If the presidential election were held 91 days early (i.e., today), Joe Biden probably would amass 297 electoral votes — 27 more than he needs to win. No wonder Trump suggested that the vote be delayed. He’s desperate to avoid an ego-crushing defeat. He can’t postpone the election, but there are many other October surprises he could pull off. There’s only one thing he almost certainly won’t do: Admit that he made a lot of mistakes because he was unprepared for the job, plead for forgiveness and promise to do better in a second term. That would be almost as much of a shock as if he were to unveil an actual plan to fight the novel coronavirus. It’s much easier to imagine Trump approving a coronavirus vaccine before the conclusion of Phase 3 trials, thereby exposing innocent people to potentially fatal side effects for his own political gain. Trump could also try to pull some kind of foreign policy legerdemain. He is desperate to bring U.S. troops home from somewhere. He just announced the withdrawal of nearly 12,000 troops from Germany, but that won’t satisfy him. The most likely spot for a total pullout is Afghanistan, where we still have 8,600 personnel. A preelection exit would leave that country vulnerable to a Taliban takeover but would allow Trump to boast that he’s delivering on his “America First” agenda. South Korea is another possible spot for a troop reduction, because Seoul won’t give in to Trump’s extortionate demand for $5 billion a year in troop subsidies. Trump could hold a fourth summit with Kim Jong Un, even though the previous three haven’t achieved anything. He might be desperate enough now to do what he didn’t do at their meeting in Hanoi: Agree to give North Korea sanctions relief, and even a drawdown of U.S. forces in South Korea, in return for partial and reversible cutbacks in its nuclear program. This would be a defeat for the United States and its allies but a win for Kim and Trump. Iran is another country where Trump could try to pull off a grand gesture — either a nuclear deal that would reprise the one he tore up (recall how he transformed the hated North American Free Trade Agreement into his beloved U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement) or air strikes against its expanding nuclear program. He might figure that either peace or war would give him a boost, although neither possibility is all that likely. Trump is more likely to deploy troops to fight domestic protesters than foreign foes. Portland, Ore., offered a preview. It was counterproductive from the standpoint of “law and order” (the chaos ended as soon as the federal agents left), but it gave Trump the violent images he seeks to scare White voters. Imagine larger-scale federal deployments to Democratic-controlled cities before Election Day, or even the declaration of martial law — which, not coincidentally, would make it harder for Biden supporters to vote. Or imagine postal delivery breaking down, preventing mail-in ballots from being delivered in Democratic strongholds. The U.S. Postal Service is already experiencing delivery delays under the leadership of a Trump donor who is either incompetent or malign — maybe both. The Justice Department is another likely source of preelection misconduct. Attorney General William P. Barr, an unscrupulous partisan, has unleashed U.S. Attorney John Durham to investigate the investigators who probed the Trump campaign’s ties with Russia — and has said that he won’t abide by Justice Department guidelines that prohibit the release of politically sensitive findings before an election. Even without any evidence, Barr could announce on election eve that he had uncovered an immense conspiracy to frame Trump of collusion with Russia involving former president Barack Obama, former national security adviser Susan Rice (a possible vice-presidential candidate), former CIA director John Brennan, and, naturally, former vice president Biden. Some of those individuals might even be indicted, because the point wouldn’t be to win a conviction but to win the election. Ironically, this could occur while the Russians are again helping Trump’s campaign. One potential wild card is a Supreme Court vacancy. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) would have no compunction about filling that seat in this election year — something he refused to do in 2016. Nothing would energize Trump partisans as much as a court fight. This year, a November surprise might be even nastier than an October surprise. If the election is close, Trump would pull out all the stops to prevent Biden from being certified the winner. This could include disqualifying Biden ballots, urging Republican state legislatures to send competing slates of electors, or seeking a Supreme Court ruling in his favor. We don’t know exactly what Trump will do. But we do know he won’t respect any legal or ethical limits. A president capable of falsifying a weather map, extorting a foreign country, accusing a popular TV anchor of murder, maligning his own public heath advisers or locking children in cages is capable of anything. Our democracy will be in maximal danger until January, as an unprincipled incumbent with the vast powers of the presidency at his command fights to stay in office at any cost.

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The election is wild – anything could swing it Meek 20 [Andy Meek, senior reporter for Business Insider and writer for the Guardian, 7-10-2020, "Let’s talk about some ‘October surprises’ for the 2020 election," BGR, https://bgr.com/2020/07/10/trump-vs-biden-2020-election- predictions-coronavirus-impact/]/Triumph Debate

Let the predictions about whether Donald Trump or Joe Biden will win the 2020 election this fall begin. There have been so many unconventional surprises that have dominated the arc of Trump’s presidency thus far, from the coronavirus pandemic to lockdown measures and the issuance of stimulus checks to Americans, that it makes predicting what will happen in November — well, more of an art than a science, to say the least. And yet all that uncertainty hasn’t stopped one political science professor (who not only correctly forecast Trump’s 2016 win but also 25 out of 27 elections) from going ahead and predicting a Trump win in November. Make of that what you will, however — because, in our view, there’s so little in the way of normalcy attached to this presidential election, partly because of all the things we’ve been covering over the last several months. And any single one of these possibilities could upend everybody’s election calculus, from a big drop or asurge in coronavirus cases to a Fauci endorsement to who knows what else. In no particular order, here are some possible events we could see happening and having a profound impact on the presidential race. Let’s start with the coronavirus. Both Trump and Biden fall squarely within the demographic that’s regarded as most vulnerable to the COVID-19 virus (both men are in their 70s). What happens if either one contracts the virus? One of those two men is resistant to wearing masks in public, and he also likes to be in public, so it’s not outside of the realm of possibility to imagine this scenario. Additionally, forget about a direct impact on either man. Could this year’s so-called October surprise be a huge surge or massive drop in coronavirus cases? The latter would, of course, become a centerpiece of Trump’s campaign message and a basis for his reelection strategy. In fact, that’s what I think may be the likeliest October surprise at this point — some unforeseen thing relative to the coronavirus numbers, which are outside the hands of both campaigns. Also interesting to think about what it does to Trump’s chances if he catches the virus himself — which wouldn’t necessarily be the game-ender you might think. He could get over the virus, and then trumpet that ad nauseam. See? I’m fine, you’ll be fine, everybody quit complaining! On a related note, let’s talk about White House health advisor Dr. Anthony Fauci for a moment. What if Fauci, who also serves as the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, felt the Trump administration was no longer sufficiently addressing the coronavirus situation and decided to resign in the face of a continuously worsening public health crisis? Or if he endorsed Joe Biden — or even did something so small as contributing a check to the Biden campaign? The Twitter question is also an intriguing one. The president has increasingly pushed the bounds of what the social network is comfortable with, as we’ve noted already, and it’s possible the service could take action leading up to … expulsion? Maybe? I wouldn’t be surprised if Trump threw a rhetorical hand grenade-via-tweet close to the election, just to see if Twitter would give him the boot. Playing the aggrieved party sometimes works well for him. Meanwhile, here’s another interesting scenario: The US Senate is currently in Republican hands, and Kentucky Republican Senator and Majority Leader Mitch McConnell wants to keep it that way. A source recently told Politico that this is where the president and his strongest backers might eventually part ways. “At the end of the day, the Senate majority leader wants to be the Senate majority leader,” one former senior White House official said. “He cares about the Senate, he cares about maintaining that majority, so if that means walking away from Trump at some point, he absolutely will.” How about a Supreme Court justice retiring sometime between now and the election? There are few things that bring Republicans together, even to the point of overlooking Trump’s weaknesses as a candidate, than the opportunity to ensure that a justice of your political persuasion replaces a high court vacancy. “I couldn’t even fathom the chaos a (Supreme Court) vacancy could bring to this race,” a GOP operative close to the Trump campaign told Politico. “McConnell’s going to go forward, the president’s going to go forward and the left is going to go crazy.” So much potential chaos and uncertainty, that at this point one of the few things we can say for sure is that the coronavirus pandemic will have a profound impact on whoever is chosen. The latest numbers out of Johns Hopkins University show that there have now been more than 3 million confirmed coronavirus cases in the US, along with more than 132,000 deaths.

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Trump blocks the 2020 election Atkins 20 [David Atkins, contributor to the Washington Monthly and is the president of the Pollux Group, a research and political consulting firm, 7-18-2020, "Trump May Use DHS Stormtroopers To Stop People from Voting," Washington Monthly, https://washingtonmonthly.com/2020/07/18/expect-trump-to-use-dhs-stormtroopers-to-stop-people-from- voting-and-plan-accordingly/]/Triumph Debate

Last night I wrote about Trump’s use of ICE and Border Patrol stormtroopers under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security to detain and intimidate peaceful protesters. In that piece I speculated that Trump was not only testing the waters of creating his own personal paramilitary domestic security force and attempting to please the most sadistic elements of his base, but also that he was taking the natural actions an executive might take if he actually believed the dystopian propaganda about America’s cities being promulgated every day on Fox News. But there is another deeply alarming possibility to consider. This November will be the first since the expiration of a 1982 consent decree in which the Republican National Committee will be freed to conduct voter suppression and intimidation en masse. As Andy Kroll recently explained at Rolling Stone: The result of the suit was a 1982 consent decree between the Democratic and Republican parties. Even though the RNC refused to admit wrong-doing in New Jersey, the group agreed to stop harassing and intimidating voters of color, including by deputizing off-duty law-enforcement officers and equipping those officers with guns or badges. Over the next three decades, Democrats marshaled enough evidence of ongoing Republican voter suppression to maintain the consent decree until 2018, when a federal judge lifted the order. The 2020 presidential election will be the first in nearly 40 years when the RNC isn’t bound by the terms of the 1982 decree. Clark, the Trump campaign lawyer, told the group of Republicans at the private meeting last November that the end of the consent decree was “a huge, huge, huge, huge deal,” freeing the RNC to directly coordinate with campaigns and political committees on so-called Election Day operations. The RNC is sending millions of dollars to state Republican parties to vastly expand these measures, which include recruiting 50,000 poll observers to deploy in key precincts. So consider the following facts: 1) The Republican National Committee under Trump is set to deploy tens of thousands of likely armed, unbadged goons to try to intimidate voters of color from exercising their right of suffrage; 2) Both Border Patrol and ICE are functioning as largely unaccountable enforcers of the president’s personal whims and interpretations of law, detaining citizens for hours without explanation or formal charges, and operating in direct conflict with local mayors and governors; 3) Border Patrol and ICE both have stridently bigoted, conservative organizational cultures hostile to most people of color and more liberal, urban areas generally–and they are well aware that their powers will likely be curtailed under a possible future Democratic administration; 4) Trump continues to ramp up rhetoric against nonexistent “voter fraud” in liberal areas. His focus has primarily been on vote-by-mail as a result of the COVID pandemic, but imaginary in- person voter impersonation fraud among communities of color in Democratic-leaning cities has long been a Republican obsession. A senior legal adviser to the Trump campaign recently declared that Trump would win even California if voting were “fair,” showing just how deeply the conspiratorial thinking around this issue runs in top GOP circles. 5) Acting Department of Homeland Security chief Chad Wolf appears to have no constraints on his behavior or his overheated rhetoric, and that the Trump Administration is planning to scale up the use of border patrol agents as a conservative paramilitary nationwide. 6) Donald Trump and his campaign team know by now that absent some explosive scandal around Biden or other unpredictable event to change the fundamentals of the race, the president’s only path to victory lies not in persuading a majority of voters but in choosing his own electorate by suppressing the votes of the majority of Americans who despise him. Put all of this together, and it opens the possibility of a terrifying abuse of power. We could end up seeing armed private contractors hired by the RNC and affiliated conservative organizations to intimidate Democratic-leaning voters, bolstered by camouflage-wearing taxpayer-funded rifle-toting border patrol agents aggressively checking papers of every voter in line in the guise of “securing against voter fraud” on the president’s orders. This would be happening during the most tense presidential election in our lifetimes during a raging pandemic, often in lines in which voters must wait 8 to 10 hours to vote due to restricted polling places in minority communities–also a blatant suppression attempt enabled by the Supreme Court’s voiding of many of the protections of the Voting Rights Act. The likelihood that these actions would be met with immediate enraged protest would be very high. Election Day violence unheard of since the Civil Rights era could ensue, which would give Trump an excuse to instigate further crackdowns across the country as election day continues. Federal agents could forseeably be sent in to attempt to stop the counting of mail-in ballots in the days following the election on presidential orders. No need for a Brooks Brothers Riot if you can just send in an armed federal paramilitary, instead. Absent some form of preventive action by states, municipalities, the Democratic Party and left-affiliated organizations, there is very little to stop Trump, Attorney General Bill Barr and Acting DHS Secretary Wolf from attempting any or all of this. And unlike in normal political circumstances where a party that loses an election can hope and expect to retool and win elections in the future, Republicans know that if they get wiped out in 2020, demographic realities mean it could be the last hurrah for this version of the GOP at a federal level. If Democrats were to follow up a landslide victory with efforts to secure a voting bill of rights, an elimination of gerrymandering and the filibuster, and a rebalancing of the Senate, the courts and the electoral college, the Republican Party would not be able to regain serious federal power in its current form without a realignment. Donald Trump himself would literally be in danger of going to jail. The Republican incentive in November would be to pull out all the stops to prevent this from happening, especially in a census year. Perhaps these fears are paranoid. But when left organizers warned that ICE and Border Patrol were being converted into an 73 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

authoritarian paramilitary security force and demanded that they be disbanded and abolished, self-proclaimed serious people in politics tended to dismiss their concerns as so much overheated partisanship. One of the most important lessons of the Trump administration has been that whatever you fear they might do, expect them to do worse if they can get away with it. Far better to be prepared for such eventualities and be ready to fight back with all available legal means on Election Day, than to be caught surprised by the next unthinkable transgression. If Trump and his cronies can create authoritarian chaos on Election Day to intimidate Democratic voters, they likely will. Portland was just the first step.

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Dejoy is the worst mailman – millions of ballots won’t be delivered or returned due to him deliberately undermining the post office Johnson 8-12 [Jake Johnson, staff writer for Common Dreams, 8-12-2020, "'A Conspiracy to Steal the Election, Folks': Alarms Sound After Postal Worker Reports Removal of Sorting Machines," Common Dreams, https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/08/12/conspiracy-steal-election-folks-alarms-sound-after-postal-worker- reports-removal]/Triumph Debate

The head of the Iowa Postal Workers Union alleged Tuesday that mail sorting machines are "being removed" from Post Offices in her state due to new policies imposed by Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, a major GOP donor to President Donald Trump whose operational changes have resulted in dramatic mail slowdowns across the nation. Asked by NPR's Noel King whether she has felt the impact of DeJoy's changes, Iowa Postal Workers Union President Kimberly Karol—a 30-year Postal Service veteran—answered in the affirmative, saying "mail is beginning to pile up in our offices, and we're seeing equipment being removed." Karol went on to specify that "equipment that we use to process mail for delivery"—including sorting machines—is being removed from Postal Service facilities in Iowa as DeJoy rushes ahead with policies that, according to critics, are sabotaging the Postal Service's day-to-day operations less than 90 days before an election that could hinge on mail-in ballots. "In Iowa, we are losing machines. And they already in Waterloo were losing one of those machines. So that also hinders our ability to process mail in the way that we had in the past," added Karol, who said she is "not a fan" of the postmaster general. Washington state election officials have also raised concerns about the removal of mail sorting machines. "I grew up in a culture of service, where every piece was to be delivered every day. And his policies, although they've only been in place for a few weeks, are now affecting the way that we do business and not allowing us to deliver every piece every day, as we've done in the past," said Karol. "I don't see this as cost-saving measures. I see this as a way to undermine the public confidence in the mail service. It's not saving costs. We're spending more time trying to implement these policy changes. And it's, in our offices, costing more over time." Observers reacted with alarm to Karol's comments, viewing them as further confirmation that DeJoy is deliberately attempting to damage the Postal Service with the goal of helping Trump win reelection in November. "It's a conspiracy to steal the election, folks," tweeted The Week's political columnist Ryan Cooper. Freelance journalist Erin Biba said there's "absolutely no way to see" the removal of mail sorting machines from Post Offices as anything other than "sabotage" of the most popular government institution in the U.S. "It's so blatant," added Biba. Karol's remarks come as members of Congress and hundreds of thousands of ordinary Americans are demanding DeJoy's immediate resignation or removal in the wake of his displacement of nearly two dozen top Postal Service officials late last week—a major leadership overhaul that critics dubbed a "Friday Night Massacre." According to internal Postal Service memos obtained by Reuters, DeJoy—a former logistics executive with tens of millions invested in USPS competitors—was aware his operational changes would lead to mail delays. As Reuters reported: The reorganization, introduced in July, has resulted in thousands of delayed letters in southern Maine, as delivery drivers follow a new directive to leave on time, even if the mail has not been loaded. Delays have also been reported in at least 18 other states, according to media reports. "One aspect of these changes that may be difficult for employees is that—temporarily— we may see mail left behind or mail on the workroom floor or docks," says one memo, dated July 10. The plan hopes to eliminate 64 million working hours nationally to reduce personnel costs, according to another memo. In a statement over the weekend, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.) warned that Dejoy's "nefarious collective efforts will suppress millions of mail-in ballots and threaten the voting rights of millions of Americans, setting the stage for breach of our Constitution." "It is imperative that we remove him from his post," said DeFazio, "and immediately replace him with an experienced leader who is committed to sustaining a critical service for all Americans."

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USPS will disenfranchise millions and ensure post-election controversies Cox et al. 20 [Erin Cox, Washington Post reporter covering politics with a BS in journalism from the University of Colorado, Elise Viebeck, Washington Post enterprise and investigations reporter with a BS in government from Claremont McKenna College, Jacob Bogage, Washington Post business and technology reporter with a BA in journalism from University of Missouri, Christopher Ingraham, Washington Post data reporter and graduate from Cornell, 8-14- 2020, “Postal Service warns 46 states their voters could be disenfranchised by delayed mail-in ballots,” The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/usps-states-delayed-mail-in-ballots/2020/08/14/64bf3c3c- dcc7-11ea-8051-d5f887d73381_story.html]/Triumph Debate

Anticipating an avalanche of absentee ballots, the U.S. Postal Service recently sent detailed letters to 46 states and D.C. warning that it cannot guarantee all ballots cast by mail for the November election will arrive in time to be counted — adding another layer of uncertainty ahead of the high-stakes presidential contest. The letters sketch a grim possibility for the tens of millions of Americans eligible for a mail-in ballot this fall: Even if people follow all of their state’s election rules, the pace of Postal Service delivery may disqualify their votes. The Postal Service’s warnings of potential disenfranchisement came as the agency undergoes a sweeping organizational and policy overhaul amid dire financial conditions. Cost-cutting moves have already delayed mail delivery by as much as a week in some places, and a new decision to decommission 10 percent of the Postal Service’s sorting machines sparked widespread concern the slowdowns will only worsen. Rank-and-file postal workers say the move is ill-timed and could sharply diminish the speedy processing of flat mail, including letters and ballots. The ballot warnings, issued at the end of July from Thomas J. Marshall, general counsel and executive vice president of the Postal Service, and obtained through a records request by The Washington Post, were planned before the appointment of Louis DeJoy, a former logistics executive and ally of President Trump, as postmaster general in early summer. They go beyond the traditional coordination between the Postal Service and election officials, drafted as fears surrounding the coronavirus pandemic triggered an unprecedented and sudden shift to mail-in voting. Some states anticipate 10 times the normal volume of election mail. Six states and D.C. received warnings that ballots could be delayed for a narrow set of voters. But the Postal Service gave 40 others — including the key battleground states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Florida — more-serious warnings that their long-standing deadlines for requesting, returning or counting ballots were “incongruous” with mail service and that voters who send ballots in close to those deadlines may become disenfranchised. “The Postal Service is asking election officials and voters to realistically consider how the mail works,” Martha Johnson, a spokeswoman for the USPS, said in a statement. In response to the Postal Service’s warnings, a few states have quickly moved deadlines — forcing voters to request or cast ballots earlier, or deciding to delay tabulating results while waiting for more ballots to arrive. Pennsylvania election officials cited its letter late Thursday in asking the state’s Supreme Court for permission to count ballots delivered three days after Election Day. But deadlines in many other states have not been or cannot be adjusted with just weeks remaining before the first absentee ballots hit the mail stream. More than 60 lawsuits in at least two dozen states over the mechanics of mail-in voting are wending their way through the courts. Trump has repeatedly claimed, without evidence, that mail ballots lead to widespread voter fraud and in the process politicized the USPS. This week, he said he opposes emergency funding for the agency — which has repeatedly requested more resources — because of Democratic efforts to expand mail voting. The Postal Service’s structural upheaval alone has led experts and lawmakers from both parties to worry about timely delivery of prescription medications and Social Security checks, as well as ballots. “The slowdown is another tool in the toolbox of voter suppression,” said Celina Stewart, senior director of advocacy and litigation with the nonpartisan League of Women Voters. “That’s no secret. We do think this is a voter-suppression tactic.” Vanita Gupta, a Justice Department official in the Obama administration and now president and chief executive of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, said she viewed the situation as “the weaponization of the U.S. Postal Service for the president’s electoral purposes.” “It’s completely outrageous that the U.S. Postal Service is in this position,” Gupta said. DeJoy, in service changes last month, has drastically reduced overtime and banned extra trips to ensure on-time mail delivery. His wholesale reorganizations ousted several agency veterans in key operational roles. And the USPS is currently decommissioning 10 percent of its costly and bulky mail- sorting machines, which workers say could hinder processing of election mail, according to a grievance filed by the American Postal Workers Union and obtained by The Washington Post. Those 671 machines, scattered across the country but concentrated in high-population areas, have the capacity to sort 21.4 million pieces of paper mail per hour. The machine reductions, together with existing mail delays and a surge of packages — a boon to the Postal Service’s finances but a headache for an organization designed to handle paper rather than boxes — also risk hamstringing the agency as the election approaches and have led lawmakers to hike pressure on DeJoy to rescind his directives. DeJoy wrote in a letter to USPS workers Thursday that temporary delivery slowdowns were “unintended consequences” of his efficiency moves but that the “discipline” he was bringing to the agency “will increase our performance for the election and upcoming peak season and maintain the high level of public trust we have earned for dedication and commitment to our customers throughout our history.” DeJoy declined to be interviewed, but in a statement the USPS described the machine reductions as a matter of“routinely” moving equipment to accommodate the mix of packages and letters in the mail stream. Doing so “will ensure more efficient, cost effective operations and better service for our customers,” the statement said. Even without the emergency funding Trump vowed to 76 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

block, postal workers can handle the country’s mail-in ballots with proper planning, the head of their union said. “Piece of cake for postal workers,” said Mark Dimondstein, president of the American Postal Workers Union. Johnson, the USPS spokeswoman, also said the agency “is well prepared and has ample capacity to deliver America’s election mail.” The letters to states detailing concerns for November followed ramped-up vote-by-mail primaries marred by serious delivery problems. It “presented a need to ensure the Postal Service’s recommendations were reemphasized to elections officials,” Johnson said. In New York City, for example, a 17-fold increase in mail-in ballots left results of a June congressional primary race in doubt for six weeks. During court wrangling over it, USPS workers said elections officials had dropped off 34,000 blank absentee ballots at a Brooklyn processing center on the day before the election, leaving postal workers scrambling in an attempt to deliver them overnight. Some voters received ballots after the election, and tens of thousands of voted ballots were initially thrown out because of delayed receipt. The letters warning about November caution many states that their deadlines for voters to request an absentee ballot are too close to Election Day and that “the Postal Service cannot adjust its delivery standards to accommodate the requirements of state election law.” The letters put the onus on election officials to adjust deadlines or educate voters to act well before them. Mail carriers, meanwhile, have warned that new cost- cutting measures at the USPS are slowing the delivery of mail ballots in key states. Recent contests have offered a preview of the potential consequences, with voters — particularly in urban areas such as Detroit and the Bronx — complaining that their absentee ballots did not arrive until the last minute or at all. The problems predate the cost-cutting measures — a late returned ballot was the chief reason absentee or mail ballots were disqualified during the 2016 election, according to U.S. Election Assistance Commission data submitted to Congress. But the onslaught of vote-by-mail ballots, driven by directives to stay at home and practice social distancing during the pandemic, has increased the volume of delays this year. In D.C.’s early-June primary, elections officials drove around town hand-delivering ballots because the mail service was not quick enough. In Florida, 18,500 mailed ballots arrived too late to be counted during the March primary. Tens of thousands of late ballots in Pennsylvania were counted only after courts intervened. Eighteen states and D.C. have eased or expanded access to mail ballots during the pandemic, allowing concerned voters to avoid potential exposure to the virus at polling places. These policy shifts have brought the number of Americans who are eligible to cast mail or absentee ballots in the general election to a historic high of nearly 180 million, roughly 97 million of whom will automatically receive an absentee ballot or an absentee ballot request form in the mail, according to a tally by The Washington Post. An analysis of the USPS letters to states reveals that the threat of ballot rejection because of missed delivery deadlines may be highest for voters in 40 states that received serious warnings. About 159.5 million registered voters live in those states. According to the letters, the risk of disenfranchisement is greatest for voters who wait until close to Election Day to request or cast a ballot. The letters advised 31 states that regardless of their deadlines, voters should mail ballots no later than Oct. 27 — a week before Election Day — if they want to guarantee they are counted. Elections officials across the country are also installing drop boxes for completed ballots and encouraging voters to use them in lieu of the Postal Service. The USPS did not offer serious warnings to the five states that have long conducted universal vote- by-mail elections — Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah and Washington. For Nevada, which Trump accused in May of trying to “cheat” in elections after it announced plans to conduct a statewide primary by mail, the USPS delivered a clean bill of health. The state plans to mail ballots to all active voters for the general election. “Under our reading of Nevada’s election laws, it appears that your voters should have sufficient time to receive, complete, and return their ballots by the state’s deadlines,” the letter stated. Trump tweeted Wednesday: “Nevada has ZERO infrastructure for Mail-In Voting. It will be a corrupt disaster if not ended by the Courts. It will take months, or years, to figure out.” Postal workers, meanwhile, are concerned over the ongoing removal of mail sorting machines in areas that project to be hotly contested in the presidential race. The machines — Automated Facer-Canceler Systems, Delivery Bar Code Sorters, Automated Flat Sorting Machines and Flat Sequencing Systems — can label and sort tens of thousands of paper mail items, such as letters, bills and ballots, each hour. Purchased when letters and not packages made up a greater share of postal work, the bulky and aging machines can be expensive to maintain and take up floor space postal leaders say would be better devoted to boxes. Removing underused machines would make the overall system more efficient, postal leaders say. The USPS has cut back on mail-sorting equipment for years since mail volume began to decline in the 2000s. The machines, however, fundamentally changed the job of some postal workers, allowing them to spend more time on the street delivering mail, rather than in post offices organizing it.

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Biden wins now but the plan’s large-scale turnout in favor of democrats is enough to force Trump to back off and leave office Freedland 20 [Jonathan Freedland, Guardian columnist with a degree from Wadham university in Philosophy, Politics and Economics 7-17-2020, "Trump will cling to power. To get him out, Biden will have to win big," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/17/trump-biden-win-democrat-landslide]/Triumph Debate

Were we not thoroughly spooked by what happened in 2016, we’d find it easier to say out loud that all signs point to the defeat and removal of Donald Trump on 3 November. Superstition and a desire not to tempt fate hold us back, but the signs are plentiful. The most obvious is the polls, which show not only that Joe Biden is ahead of Trump by double-digit margins, but also that 72% of Americans believe their country is on the wrong track – a number that spells ruin for any incumbent. Of course, we learned four years ago that national polls don’t matter – after all, Hillary Clinton led in those – and what really counts are the contests in the battleground states: the likes of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan. Biden is handily ahead in all of those, too. Could those polls be wrong? One expert reckons Biden is so far in front that even if the polls are as wrong now as they were in 2016 he will still win. More important, these numbers reflect something solid. Naturally, liberals have been appalled by Trump’s behaviour since day one, but mere outrage and scandal have proved insufficient to sink his presidency. Now, though, he is associated with genuine catastrophe. More than 130,000 Americans are dead from coronavirus, with caseloads rising in 41 of 50 states. Trump’s handling of this disaster has so obviously made it worse – whether playing down the threat, urging premature easing of lockdown or calling on Americans to inject themselves with bleach – that he has made the case for his own removal more powerfully than any rival. His one hope was a healthy economy, but that too now lies in ruins (though, troublingly, Trump still leads Biden by 12 points on economic competence). His racial dogwhistling is also costing him: surveys suggest that, outside his base, Americans recoil at Trump’s widening of the country’s most enduring divide. It means Trump’s unpopularity is not ephemeral – the kind of thing that might be fixed by sacking a campaign manager, as the president did this week – but rather anchored in facts that will be hard to shift. Given all that, surely the rational response is to look forward to Trump’s imminent departure from office? To which the right answer is: not so fast. To remove Trump, it will not be enough for Biden to win. He has to win big. By that, I don’t mean that thanks to voter suppression – fewer polling places in majority-black neighbourhoods and the like – Democrats have to be several points ahead merely to draw level, though that is true. Nor do I mean that Biden can only overturn Trumpism by riding a wave so big that Democrats take back the Senate and therefore avoid being thwarted by Mitch McConnell for four gridlocked years, though that is also true. Or that Biden needs a wide enough margin to withstand the foreign hacking and disruption efforts in Trump’s favour that most monitors expect, having concluded that when Russian agents poked around voter registration databases in 2016, they were merely “casing the joint” for a more sustained offensive in 2020 – though that too is true. No, what I have in mind is a threat more fundamental. The danger is that Trump will lose – and refuse to go. He’s already laid out his rationale. “Rigged 2020 election,” he tweeted last month. “Millions of mail-in ballots will be printed by foreign countries, and others. It will be the scandal of our times!” Here’s the scenario Trump is planning for. On the evening of 3 November, he loses the popular vote by a margin even greater than the 3 million votes by which Hillary beat him in 2016 – but the count of votes cast on the day puts him narrowly ahead in one or two key states. He promptly declares victory, claiming that the millions of votes that were cast as absentee ballots – by voters anxious to avoid polling stations because of Covid-19 – should be disqualified as fraudulent. He has a motive to do that, since mail-in votes often skew Democratic. And he has a precedent for it: in a tight senate race in Florida in 2018, Trump urged the state to stop counting the votes and go with the election night results, which favoured Republicans. Let’s say he makes that same move in the three midwestern battlegrounds in November. Republicans are in charge of the state legislatures in all three. Now here’s where it gets nerdily arcane, but bear with me. Those Republican legislatures could refuse both to certify their state results and to send a slate of representatives to the electoral college, which has to meet by 14 December. Biden’s lawyers would plead his case all the way to the supreme court, but that court likes to stay out of elections. It could plausibly instruct the electoral college to meet on 14 December, with or without the disputed states. If it meets without them, and neither Trump nor Biden can reach the 270 electoral college votes required to win, then the constitution throws the question to the House of Representatives. Democrats control that body, but here’s the thing. Under the rules, the house would make its decision state-by-state, with one vote per state – so that tiny Republican Wyoming would have as much say as populous, Democratic California. By that count, Republican states would outvote Democratic ones by 26 to 24 – and Trump would remain president. There are variations on that theme. Some imagine a standoff in which, say, Pennsylvania’s Democratic governor certifies the state’s vote for Biden, while the state’s Republican assembly certifies it for Trump: the result is deadlock. Former senator Tim Wirth can picture Trump’s pliant attorney general ordering a bogus investigation, on grounds of national security, into foreign meddling, thereby giving Republicans an excuse not to ratify a Biden victory in their state. But it’s just as easy to imagine a situation where, with next to no legal or technical justification, Trump simply stays put and refuses to leave – and Republicans stand by him. After all, they’ve tolerated his every other assault on the republic: why would they change now? Granted, these are nightmare scenarios, but if these past four years have taught us anything, it’s

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that nightmares can come true. There’s only one guaranteed defence against such a possibility, and that is for Biden to win a blowout victory. Which is why efforts such as those by the Lincoln Project and Republican Voters Against Trump could be significant: they make it legitimate for conservatives, independents and, yes, lifelong Republicans to lend their vote to the Democratic candidate, just this once. It’s also how Biden’s weaknesses can become a strength: he is sufficiently inoffensive that millions of non-Democrats can back him, in a way they could not bring themselves to do for Hillary Clinton. It goes without saying that Democrats, whether of the left or centre, also have to turn out in colossal numbers, if not to elect Biden then to remove Trump. Every vote will count this time because of the unique nature of this president. Make no mistake, it will take a landslide to get Trump out.

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Biden wins now – polling and the economy Riotta 8-1 [Chris Riotta, Independet reporter for politics and Master’s candidate in Journalism at Columbia 8-1-2020, "New election map predicts resounding victory for Biden against Trump," Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/2020-election-map-biden-trump-victory-electoral- college-swing-states-arizona-a9659951.html]/Triumph Debate

With months to go until one of the most unprecedented elections in American history, anything can happen — but at least one new prediction has forecasted a resounding victory for Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee. The first 2020 battleground electoral map by NBC News was released on Friday, showing the former vice president with a lead of 334 electoral votes. President Donald Trump was trailing behind Mr Biden in the new forecasting with just 125 electoral votes. At least 270 votes in the Electoral College are required to secure a victory in the presidential elections. While Mr Trump won with 306 electoral votes in 2016, the latest national polling has him losing to Mr Biden in key battleground states like Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. Mr Biden seemed to be gaining ground in other states like Florida, North Carolina and Arizona, all of which have favoured Republican presidential nominees in past years but have appeared to shift somewhat following the 2016 election. Meanwhile, states that have remained reliably Democratic did not appear to be shifting towards Mr Trump, making those battleground regions all the more crucial come November. The former vice president has consistently polled higher than Hillary Clinton when she was the Democratic nominee in 2016, who held a 7.5-point lead over Mr Trump in some national polls taken just after the Democratic National Convention in early August that year. His average level of national support has also remained higher than the former secretary of state’s ever did while she ran for the White House. Still, questions remain as to whether the president can manage an economic rebound ahead of the election — a move that could better position him in the polls by November — as well as what will happen with the coronavirus pandemic. Many states across the country and countless businesses have been forced to reinstate restrictions and lockdowns amid a reemergence of the novel virus. The latest jobs report released on Friday showed a sharp slowdown in hiring, with payrolls rising by just 1.7 million compared to 4.7 million the month prior. The nation’s unemployment rate remained at a historic double-digit figure of 10.2 percent — a less than one percent drop from June.

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Coercion

Voting isn’t a moral obligation, but state enforcement of it is paternalistic coercion and violates the rights of the individual Kouba and Mysicka 19 [Karel Kouba, assistant professor of political science at the University of Hradec Kralove and Stanislav Mysicka, assistant professor of political science at the University of Hradec Kralove, January -March 2019, “Should and Does Compulsory Voting Reduce Inequality?,” Sage Pub, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244018817141]/Triumph Debate

The normative defense of compulsory voting stands on the idea that participation in elections is a moral (civic) duty. Nonvoting, on the contrary, presents a breach of moral duty and nonvoting citizens are kind of free riders, that is, they reap the benefits of the public good of democratic political decision making without contributing. Thus, nonvoting is like not paying taxes and using various public goods without sharing the burdens. But apart from a superficial resemblance between these two cases, are they analogical? If we do not pay taxes or refuse to contribute to national social insurance, the result may be the collapse of the distribution of some public goods made possible only by individual contributions. In this sense, it is not clear whether nonvoting is a significant threat to personal liberties or democratic decision making as such, because the danger that no one would vote seems negligible. What is more important is that Lijphart’s defense of compulsory voting presupposes that the primary contribution to building a more democratic and equal society is to go voting. But that is manifestly untrue, because it is perfectly possible that many citizens work for the society’s common good in a different way than just through taking part in elections (we are following the general argument of Brennan & Hill, 2014, Chap. 2). Some people take credit for generating a large part of their country’s GDP (gross domestic product), others take part in social services, education, or health care and still others care about politics and go vote (with various overlaps between these groups of citizens). Why should, for example, my contribution to democratic society as a university lecturer (who does not vote) count as less important than somebody else’s contribution by voting? In the same vein, we know that a strong civil society is good for the quality of a democracy, but we do not compel people to establish nonprofit organizations, volunteer for providing care of the elderly, provide education for children from poor families in their free time, and so on. Furthermore, it is very hard to make a coherent picture regarding the claim that people who do not vote are generally those socially and politically marginalized and at the same time selfish and immoral because they reap the benefits of the system upheld by more disciplined people who attend elections regularly. It seems that the necessary component of the concept of free riding is that the free riders unjustly gain some substantive benefits of a certain general good without contributing to sustain the conditions generating this or that general good. But it would be really strange for proponents of compulsory voting to say that socially and politically disadvantaged nonvoters gain unfair benefits from a democratic political system relative to those who do vote regularly. It is precisely those disadvantaged and marginalized groups that vote the least and have low sociopolitical status at the same time. We find compulsory voting unjustifiably paternalistic. Unlike the myriad of occasions when we are justifiably made to perform certain actions (paying taxes, stopping at red lights, driving on the assigned side of the road, etc.), in case of the duty to vote, there is no comparable justification for such regulation of individual actions. Paternalism could be roughly defined as “the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced” (Dworkin, 1972, p. 65). Defenders of compulsory voting claim that the coercion involved is negligible or absent, because nobody is actually forced to vote, only to attend the elections. Therefore, the charge of paternalism in the case of compulsory voting is misguided (Lacroix, 2007; see Engelen, 2009). Contrary to claims of proponents of compulsory voting in systems practicing it, there is criminal liability attached to nonvoting, which puts a significant amount of pressure on nonvoters and nonvoting may result in prison sentences, problems at work or reduced access to social services (see Lever, 2009). Even though in many states that practice compulsory voting this duty is rarely enforced and many exemptions are granted, it is precisely this fact of a quite opaque and normatively suspect system of who and when will be exempted from the duty to turn out at the elections that should lead us to reject the idea of compulsory voting. Exemptions from legally binding duties are always controversial, because they usually present significant obstacles to the legal equality of citizens. Therefore, compulsory voting still amounts to coercion and making people vote should be rightfully seen as an example of unjustified paternalism. Paternalism is of course not always bad and there are many cases of paternalistic policies, which the majority of society would find rational and justified (e.g., laws against dueling, compulsory use of seatbelts, regulations for handling hazardous materials, etc.). Using one influential defense of paternalism by Gerald Dworkin (1972), we may claim that “paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in question.” From this point of view compulsory voting is not justified, because there are many other (yet less effective) ways of increasing voter turnout that are not coercive. And Lijphart and others cannot tell us why we should

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not try to attract more people to vote by alternative ways rather than compelling them by using the coercive nature of the state. We agree here with Dworkin (1972) that in all cases of paternalistic intervention there must be a heavy and clear burden of proof placed on the authorities to demonstrate the exact nature of the harmful effects (or beneficial consequences) to be avoided (or achieved) and the probability of their occurrence. (p. 83) Furthermore, we cannot simply assume that every act of voting is in the self-interest of this or that particular voter, because he or she could have many reasons to feel that a particular act of voting is detrimental to his or her ideological, social, or economic interests. Therefore, making the vote legally mandatory does not sufficiently respect people’s voluntary decision not to vote. Proponents of compulsory voting claim that the right not to vote is either nonexistent, superficial, or trivial. We do not agree with this statement, because having not only the right not to vote, but also completely ignore the whole electoral process has its important place in democratic politics. As Lever (2010) points out, Rights to abstain, to withhold assent, to refrain from making a statement or from participating may not be very glamorous, but can be nonetheless important for all that. Rights to abstain, no less than rights of anonymous participation, enable the weak, timid and unpopular to protest in ways that feel safe, and that require little coordination and few resources. (p. 911) However, the problem with compulsory voting runs deeper. Compulsory voting infringes on individual rights in an inappropriate way, because it builds upon a restrictively perfectionist version of liberalism, which could not be reasonably justified to all citizens in democratic states. Perfectionism rejects the standard liberal claim that a person is autonomous only if outside values and norms (or duties) governing her or his deliberation are accepted by him or her upon critical reflection (see Rawls, 1996). Perfectionists challenge that view because there are some completely objective values that should govern one’s actions even against the wishes and voluntary decisions of individuals or groups (see Hurka, 1993). Perfectionist liberals target the prevalent liberal idea that the liberal state’s policies should be neutral and respect individual autonomy. Take the Lacroix account, for example, where she claims that compulsory voting strengthens individual autonomy (see Lacroix, 2007). She claims that people should be compelled to vote because otherwise governments would not be appropriately controlled by the majority of citizens and that would mean a loss to everyone’s autonomy. Thus, her defense of compulsory voting is founded on an idea that the act of voting (or tuning out at the elections to be more precise) has to take preference over some other goals individuals might have at the time. The problem here is that by establishing a duty to vote, we claim that a certain action (voting in this case) is necessary for citizens to fully realize their fundamental purposes. Defenders of compulsory voting say that other actual desires than voting are not rational and they make people less free. That may be true in the case of constitutional fundamentals as individual liberties, protection of minorities, freedom of speech and religion, existence of competitive elections and rule of law, and so on, but not in the case of voting. If there are alternative ways to solve at least partially the problem of low turnout without restricting individual liberties, we should take such a course (see Dworkin, 1972). Many of those compelled to vote will not vote due to a greater interest in politics or societal issues, but simply because of the fact of compulsion being in place. Lijphart understands anything beyond mandatory presence at the voting booth is a breach of fundamental personal liberties, most likely the freedom of conscience (Lijphart, 1997). Therefore, in all probability compulsory voting does not translate to the desired goal of upholding the duty to vote, because proponents of compulsory voting themselves stated in many books and articles that a duty to vote will not be legally compulsory. It is a very well-known empirical fact that turnout falls sharply after compulsion is removed, as happened in the Netherlands, for example. We should thus assume that many voters do not vote because compulsory voting made them appreciate fulfilling their duty to vote, but they have voted only because the presence of a legally enforceable compulsion. To sum up, if the goal is to undermine sources of political domination in democratic society (e.g., the effect of class status on voter turnout) and achieve higher levels of social, economic, and political equality, we should probably be concerned with ensuring that more people vote conscientiously, in a more informed way and, crucially, try to mitigate the problem of significant structural inequalities within liberal democracies. Focusing too much on compulsory voting could lead to a situation in which we focus too much on inequality in turnout but fail to tackle much more severe and significant inequalities. Proponents of compulsory voting presuppose that higher turnout will lead to changes in the policy-making process, because politicians will be forced to reflect more the needs of people from lower social strata, who otherwise do not vote in significant numbers. However, there are no a priori reasons why this should be case. From these reasons, we conclude that, normatively speaking, compulsory voting brings unjustified limits to individual liberties that are not consistent with the tradition of democratic governance and that its impact on policy outcomes is speculative and overly optimistic.

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Because of the unfairness in the electoral process, voting supports and unjust system and boosts its legitimacy Hanna 09 [Nathan Hanna, Associate professor of philosophy at Drexel University, 10-2009, “An Argument for Voting Abstention,” Public Affairs Quarterly, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40441535.pdf]/Triumph Debate

All this suggests some broad criteria for identifying conditions that might be reasons to abstain: illegitimacy and unfairness. The illegitimacy of an electoral process that purports to be democratic can be a reason to abstain. One reason why is that voting in such a process can help confer an appearance of legitimacy upon it. Observers who see significant electoral participation often take this as evidence that an electoral process is legitimate (even when they should not).2 Given this, voting can hinder attempts at reform and can therefore perpetuate the illegitimacy, at least relative to other options. I will come back and touch on these points in more detail when discussing objections. One way an electoral process can be illegitimate is by being unfair. If an act is unfair, that is a prima facie reason to refrain from it. If an act perpetuates unfairness, that is also a prima facie reason to refrain. So if voting would be unfair or if it would perpetuate unfairness, there is a prima facie reason to abstain (cf. Brennan forthcoming; Brennan and Lomasky 2000, p. 76). An act of voting can be unfair because of the unfairness of the electoral process. If the unfairness is to one's advantage, one arguably takes unfair advantage of others by voting. This is a prima facie reason to abstain. If the unfairness is not to one's advantage, one may nevertheless have a prima facie reason to abstain if voting helps confer an appearance of legitimacy on a process that takes unfair advantage of people (including perhaps oneself).3 Whether and when these prima facie reasons might be decisive is something I will explore in the rest of the paper.

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CV laws imply that not all citizens are of equal worth-- non-voters are seen as valueless parasites who must be coerced into doing the right thing. Rovensky 08 [Jan Rovensky, Doctoral Student of Political Theory, 2008, “Voting: A Citizen’s Right, or Duty? The Case against Compulsory Voting,” Luiss Guido Carli, https://eprints.luiss.it/40/1/rovensky-20080728.pdf]/Triumph Debate

Now let us look at the situation in the fifth point. We find a completely different depiction of the non-voter: he is no longer the weak individual society ought to protect from the interests of the strong but a selfish exploiter of the public good without any moral conscience – he is a democratic parasite. His actions undermine the electoral system because not only he but also all other citizens and the democratic electoral system itself suffers as a result from his non-voting. It is thus obvious that we must teach such individuals how to behave ‘properly’. We are well aware that one of the motivations for the institution of compulsory voting is equality, however, by the very nature of its legislation CV seems to imply that there are in fact two classes of citizens. Proponents of compulsory voting must take for granted the duty to vote (the right to vote is not really relevant), and it is because the duty to vote supplants the right to vote that an imbalance in the concept of equality occurs – people are no longer regarded as equal in the traditional sense of each having the right to vote but in terms who participates and who does not. This hidden categorization implies that true citizens take an active interest in politics which benefits the society (this is from a minimalistic point of view characterised by voting), whereas the non-voters need to be coerced into taking the active stance by laws which make turnout obligatory. In this respect compulsory voting seems to imply that there are citizens who are valuable to a society (voters) and those who are not (non-voters). By trying to make the non-voters see the strength of their argument, proponents of compulsion put down their claim as a moral dilemma in terms of good and evil thus indivertibly forcing the non-voter into a corner due to the fact that it has already been decided that voting is good. Active participation is stressed as something desirable and good for democracy, whereas non-voting is portrayed as something parasitical and bad and people (not citizens, because being a citizen also means voting) who do not participate are accused of consciously taking advantage of the efforts of the well- behaved citizens. The problem for me with this picture is that it is too black and white and the good and bad sides are a priori defined, thus allowing no room for further argument. By supposing that something is the correct way of behaviour does not make it so, as I have already pointed out. This argument is, once more, linked to the fact that advocates of compulsion take too many things for granted – that low turnout is bad, that non-voters are worthless free-riders, that compulsory voting is like any other law, etc – and to me such presuppositions are typical of apologies of compulsory voting. The justification in this case stems from the selfish nature of the nonvoters who free ride on the electoral system; they must be made to contribute, even against their wishes and regardless of the quality of the vote, because it is for the greater good of society. In this chapter I wish to dispute such a claim. In my eyes, the non- voter is an integral part of the democratic system, much like the right not to vote is an integral part of the right to vote. To be sure, to claim that non-voters are free riders is another simplification made by CV supporters.

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There is no justification for coercion – it is unlike any other legitimate law Rovensky 08 [Jan Rovensky, Doctoral Student of Political Theory, 2008, “Voting: A Citizen’s Right, or Duty? The Case against Compulsory Voting,” Luiss Guido Carli, https://eprints.luiss.it/40/1/rovensky-20080728.pdf]/Triumph Debate

In any case, returning back why I do not think that compulsory voting is comparable to other laws, I grant that it is quite true that voting once every four or five years requires less effort than sitting on a jury, however, I still feel that there is something wrong in comparing the two. Lever (2007: 36) maintains that it is difficult to compare compulsion with the duty to sit on a jury, serve in the army, send children to school or pay taxes; it is equally difficult to compare compulsory voting to these concepts as each one is justified differently and their moral and political significance is lost when treated as ‘examples of justified coercion in response to collective action problems’– taxation is tied to the concept of proportionality and redistribution (the element of compulsion is necessary here because otherwise the state would cease to function), jury duty to political notions of justice, fairness and equality (compulsion is necessary to ensure a free and fair trial not a biased jury), sending children to school goes with a basic idea of equality of chances (compulsion is necessary to force parents to send their offspring to school), etc. To generalise and claim that CV is just like any other coercive law is to misinterpret the different natures of these forms of compulsion (taxation, jury duty, mandatory elementary education etc.) which have ‘an evident and agreed point to them, whereas whether or not it is desirable to raise and equalize voting, or to use legal compulsion to do so, has still to be established’. Indeed, in this light it is important to bear in mind that CV does not have such urgency to it the other concepts cited above do.110

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It undermines the principle of free and fair elections by violating the right not to vote Rovensky 08 [Jan Rovensky, Doctoral Student of Political Theory, 2008, “Voting: A Citizen’s Right, or Duty? The Case against Compulsory Voting,” Luiss Guido Carli, https://eprints.luiss.it/40/1/rovensky-20080728.pdf]/Triumph Debate

Coming back to the two cases for compulsion presented above, I maintain that both examples – Lijphart’s and Keaney and Rogers’ – infringe on the right not to vote not only because of the fact that there is not much room for abstention in both cases but also because both accounts work with the assertion that the citizen must explain his actions to the state authorities if he fails to behave in the way dictated by law (regardless whether it is simply to turn out or cast a valid ballot). In my view, such a provision violates the right not to vote precisely because of this required explanation and the possible penalties which follow if one ignores this duty. It is interesting to put this into perspective with the right to vote – whereas no one sane would, within the democratic context, question a citizen’s candidate or party of choice or make him state why had he voted in such and such a way, proponents of compulsory voting seem to have no difficulty in making the non-voter explain why he did not vote. To me this further demonstrates the absurd nature of CV because the freedom associated with the right to vote and the freedom associated with the right not to vote go hand in hand and are inseparable within the democratic context. The freedom to abstain from the electoral process altogether (not to vote) should be unconditional and independent of further clarification much as the right to vote is. Furthermore, it is important to realise that abstaining from the electoral process is also a form of voting (though passive, but voting nonetheless) – admittedly, it may not please many people that citizens decide not to vote in elections (myself included) but this is something one should learn to appreciate, to examine and, if needs be, address the true causes behind abstention (which can be even in some cases beneficial to a democracy as I will discuss in the next chapter). This is why I cannot regard neither version of compulsory voting (weak or strong) as justifiable in fulfilling the right not to vote which I believe is not satisfied simply by having a ‘none of the above’ option, by the possibility to spoil one’s ballot or by signing one’s name off the register. In effect, in their attempt to imprint the duty to vote on the society (by stressing the importance of universal turnout or near universal turnout as the next logical step following universal suffrage) by institutionalising CV, supporters of compulsion in actual fact do away with the right not to vote which they seem to regard as something unnecessary for a democracy. This, however, is false because in such a case we are left only with the duty to vote which gives elections a rather nasty authoritarian tinge as citizens must vote, provide explanation when not voting (only some of which are accepted), and if practicing the ‘right not to vote’ (not usually the case as this would be a waste of time) their protests are not seriously taken into account. If one of the principles of democracy is having free and fair elections, part of this freedom must be the right not to vote understood as the right to abstain from the electoral process altogether. The right to vote without the right not to vote loses its meaning and the duty to vote does not presuppose the right not to vote, and in fact neither the right to vote – the duty to vote supersedes the right to vote, rendering it trivial and obsolete.

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And Covid-19 means compulsory voting is forced endangerment Orr 20 [Graeme Orr, current Professor of political law at the University of Queensland in Australia, 4-14-2020, “The Demos in a Pandemic: Staging Elections in a Health Emergency,” AusPubLaw, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3575265] /Triumph Debate

What of disenfranchisement? Calling off a poll would be, in a sense, the ultimate disenfranchisement. But holding one in an ongoing pandemic will affect turnout. It may be practically or psychologically harder for certain groups – the elderly, the afflicted, those in quarantine and those stuck overseas – to poll. Cynics might say that elections are already skewed by higher turnout amongst older citizens. But that will not mollify the concerns of individuals who miss out. How would an all-postal vote pan out, for instance? Will everyone feel safe venturing out to find their nearest red postal portal? Are younger people, stuck at home and relying on online shopping, growing more familiar with the postal service?

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Compulsory voting spurs resentment through forced participation thereby lowering perceived legitimacy Singh 16 [Shane P. Singh, professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia with a PhD in political science from MSU, 2016, “Compulsory Voting and Dissatisfaction with Democracy,” Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/compulsory-voting-and- dissatisfaction-with-democracy/610E2AEC2611B3092CFEB46EA12A21CC] /Triumph Debate COERCION AND PUNISHMENT, COMPULSORY VOTING AND DISSATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY Individuals prefer to feel that their actions are a result of their own accord;13 when one is coerced into a behavior, intrinsic motivation to engage in that behavior declines.14 External coercion is associated with less cognitive engagement with one’s environment, a decreased interest in one’s assigned tasks, and a decreased belief in the legitimacy of the coercer and its authorities.15 Sidman16 explains that the attitudinal and behavioral effects of acting against one’s will are most pronounced among those who are negatively oriented towards the coercer. This suggests that, if the coercion present in compulsory systems sours beliefs about the legitimacy of the democratic system, this effect should be most pronounced among those who are negatively predisposed towards democracy and thereby likely to prefer abstention. Further, coercion will be most strongly felt where penalties for abstention are routinely enforced, as one will more likely feel obliged to act when he or she suspects that abstention will garner a penalty. Depending on the nature of the compulsory rule, abstainers may also receive a penalty for non- participation. Penalties, like coercion, will intensify the consequences of negative orientations towards the democratic system, especially when the punishments are strong and thereby likely to meaningfully afflict the abstainer. In addition, as with coercion, the emotional effects of punishment are most pronounced when individuals have negative orientations towards the punisher or society in general.17 With regard to democratic governance, such orientations are reflected by individuals’ attitudes about the principles of democracy. Many individuals support some such principles while rejecting others.18 I refer to attitudes that run counter to democratic principles as anti-democratic, and I expect that individuals with anti-democratic attitudes are less likely to believe in the legitimacy of the democratic system, and therefore to express satisfaction with democracy. Of course, as extant research establishes that anti- democratic attitudes relate negatively to democratic satisfaction,19 this expectation is not especially novel. Yet the coercion and punishment present under compulsory voting will exacerbate the consequences of negative orientations towards the democratic system, which will strengthen the link between anti-democratic attitudes and dissatisfaction with democracy. Those with anti-democratic attitudes will further question the legitimacy of democratic authorities, institutions and processes where their participation in the system is mandatory, intensifying gaps in satisfaction between anti-democrats and those who are more positively oriented towards democracy. As discussed above, these patterns should be most prominent where voting is not just legally required, but where significant penalties for abstention are likely to be applied. A straightforward, observable implication results from this reasoning: HYPOTHESIS 2: Where voting is compulsory, anti-democrats will be particularly dissatisfied with democracy, especially where compulsory voting laws are routinely enforced and penalties for abstention are substantial. DATA AND MEASUREMENT

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Voters will be more disinformed with compulsory voting because of its coercive nature – that decreases the representativeness of their vote and causes political extremism Singh and Roy 18 [Shane P. Singh, professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia with a PhD in political science from MSU, and Jason Roy, associate professor of Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University with a PhD in political science from McGill University, January-March 2018, “Compulsory voting and voter information seeking,” Research and Politics, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168017751993]/Triumph Debate

When individuals are forced into a behavior, their motivation for engagement lessens (Deci, 1975), and coercion and punishment are linked to defiance, lower levels of cognitive engagement, and less interest in one’s tasks (e.g., Sherman, 1993; Tyler, 2006). Forced voting, in particular, has been found to magnify and entrench resentment of the democratic system (Henn and Oldfield, 2016; Singh, 2016b). The fact that compulsory voting increases invalid voting (e.g., Katz and Levin, forthcoming; Power and Garand, 2007; Singh, 2017) reinforces the notion that those who are compelled to participate in elections are less motivated to formulate a meaningful vote. This leads to our first hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: Relative to voluntary voters, those who feel compelled to vote are less likely to seek out political information. Individuals who vote because of external coercion are more likely to be politically unsophisticated (Dassonneville et al., 2017; Gallego, 2015; Hoffman et al., 2017; Hooghe and Pelleriaux, 1998; Irwin, 1974; Singh, 2015), and politically unsophisticated individuals are less likely to engage with politically relevant information (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006). This suggests that at least part of compulsory voting’s effect on information seeking is driven by political sophistication. However, compulsory voting’s production of defiance toward, and resentment of, the democratic system likely lessens political information seeking in the voting population independent of sophistication. That is, those who are negatively oriented toward the democratic system, even if politically sophisticated, are unlikely to engage with campaign information. Moreover, compulsory voting brings to the voting booth individuals who prefer fringe, outsider, or antisystem parties or candidates (Bélanger, 2004; Carreras, 2012; Jensen and Spoon, 2011). While supporters of such non- mainstream options are not necessarily less politically sophisticated, they will have little desire to learn about the competitors to their preferred parties or candidates. Thus, while one’s level of political sophistication likely drives some of the hypothesized negative link between voter compulsion and information seeking, voter compulsion should also have an effect independent of sophistication. This leads to our second hypothesis: Hypothesis 2: The effects of feeling compelled to vote on information seeking are partially driven by political sophistication.

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Unenthusiastic voters will see through the smoke and mirrors – that only furthers resentment Tuccille 3-2 [Jerome Tuccille, former managing editor of Reason and current contributing editor, 3-2-2020, "Mandatory Voting Will Build Resentment, Not Democracy," Reason, https://reason.com/2020/03/02/mandatory- voting-will-build-resentment-not-democracy/]/Triumph Debate

American democracy—or, at least, the California simulation of it—requires that even disinterested and actively hostile non-voters mark a ballot so government officials can gin up participation numbers, says Assemblyman Marc Levine (D-San Rafael). Levine has introduced a bill that would make voting compulsory, with civil penalties for the non-compliant. It's a proposal that seems guaranteed to make disaffected nonvoters become even less impressed with a sketchy political process. If passed, the measure would "require a person who qualifies and is registered to vote to cast a ballot, marked or unmarked in whole or in part, at every election held within the territory within which the person resides and the election is held. The bill would require the Secretary of State to enforce this requirement," according to the summary. In defending the bill, Levine points to the 20-plus supposedly healthier democracies around the world that have some sort of compulsory ballot- marking on their law books. The number is a bit vague, since several countries have experimented with mandatory voting, then dropped it, while others implement it only regionally, and still others have it on the books but don't bother with enforcement. "Can a country be considered to practice compulsory voting if the mandatory voting laws are ignored and irrelevant to the voting habits of the electorate?" asks the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. "Is a country practicing compulsory voting if there are no penalties for not voting? What if there are penalties for failing to vote but they are never or are scarcely enforced? Or if the penalty is negligible?" Belgium and Singapore, for example, threaten to punish non-voters by, ummm, not letting them vote in subsequent elections. Apparently, that all sounds awesome to Assemblyman Levine. "Democracy is not a spectator sport – it requires the active participation of all its citizens," huffed Levine in a press release. "California is a national leader on expanding voting rights to its citizens. Those rights come with a responsibility by registered voters to cast their ballot and make sure that their voice is heard by their government." "Heard by their government?" But doesn't refusing to vote say something loud and clear in and of itself? As a form of speech, refusing to cast a ballot would seem to be an expression of disinterest in or opposition to the political system—certainly clearer than scribbling on a ballot just so you don't have to pay a fine. That actually happens a lot in Australia, the one country fans of mandatory voting keep citing because it's a more-or-less functioning democracy with consistently high (over 90 percent) voter turnout and enforced financial penalties for scofflaws. Voter guides in Australia instruct people on the right way to express their disgust and disinterest on their ballots. "If you leave the ballot paper blank, or fill it out incorrectly, or draw a dick and balls on the page instead of numbering the boxes, then that's an informal vote. It doesn't count," advises the Australian radio current affairs program Hack. "If you number each box in the order that the candidates appear, that's a donkey vote— and it definitely counts in the overall tally." That guide advises grudging voters on the proper way to cast a thoughtless, low-effort donkey vote because Australia offers something that California doesn't: ranked voting among numerous competing parties and candidates. If your first choice doesn't make the cut-off, your vote passes to your second choice, and so on, down the line. California, by contrast, has a top-two primary system, which often results in a general election ballot featuring "rival" candidates from the same party—usually Democrats, given the state's current political tilt. "Millions of California voters saw same-party races on November's ballot and left the space blank," the Los Angeles Times reported in 2018. Among those races was the U.S. Senate contest between Democrat Dianne Feinstein and Democrat Kevin De Leon. "This is the system that helped Levine keep his seat in 2018: He defeated another Democrat, Dan Monte," Scott Shackford pointed out last month. These kinds of contests, The New York Times insightfully notes, raise "a high school civics class question: should voters have a choice of two different philosophies?" Nah, says Assemblyman Levine. Make 'em vote, because … because … Why? "The bigger the voter pool, the stronger the contract is between citizens and leaders," insisted economist Dambisa Moyo in an October 2019 New York Times op-ed calling for mandatory voting. Are we really supposed to believe that the social contract is strengthened by threatening people with fines unless they mail in a sheet of paper with "a dick and balls on the page"? Levine's bill says you're off the hook if you "cast a ballot, marked or unmarked in whole or in part." He seems content so long as he can to point to a stack of envelopes and crow, "That's participation! Ain't democracy grand?" Rather than reinforce some mythical contract between voters and politicians, mandatory voting would seem more likely to further erode connections and build resentment. "Participate in our bogus process or else" seems designed to sour people on voting and politics, not build enthusiasm.

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AT: Coercion

Compulsory voting doesn’t violate individual freedoms like the right to not vote because of it being a duty right – people are obliged to do so Hill 16 [Lisa Hill, professor of Politics at the University of Adelaide with a Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford, 6-20- 2016, "Does compulsory voting violate a right not to vote?," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10361146.2014.990418?journalCode=cajp20 ]/Triumph Debate

The assumption that all rights can be waived is problematic and this has been shown repeatedly in landmark cases. In Australia, for example, the High Court considered whether the ‘right’ to trial by jury can be waived should the accused wish to do so.13 The majority judgement of the court was that the right to trial by jury, as protected by Section 80, could not be waived ‘because jury trials were held to be a fundamental institution within criminal justice’ that existed ‘for the benefit of the community as a whole as well as for the benefit of the individual’ (Gray 2012: 602–03). Similarly, in the USA it has been found that there is no right to waive the rights to workplace safety, to a minimum wage, to equal employment opportunities and the right of a criminal defendant to be tried only when competent. Some cases have also confirmed that an individual's ability to waive constitutional rights in exchange for government benefits is limited. For example, the court in Perry v Sinderman (1972) found that ‘government employees may not waive their right to free speech as a condition of employment’, while Sherbert v Verner (1963) held that ‘a state cannot condition the availability of unemployment benefits on a beneficiary's waiving her right to the free exercise of religion’ (HLR 2007). Some rights (such as the right to bear arms) can be waived, but this does not mean that all rights can be. Neither does it prove the ‘general existence of inverse rights’. The US Supreme Court observed this in Singer v United States (1965), in which it upheld a federal rule that requires government consent in order for criminal defendants to waive their rights to a jury trial. According to the court, ‘[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right’.14 Apart from conceiving rights as ‘invertible’ and waivable, right-not-to-vote advocates also seem to take for granted that rights are individuated and divisible, existing only to serve personal ends. The right to vote, however, is also a social right intended to serve the social condition of democracy. As a right, it is only possible due to the existence of organised political communities, and individual possession of this right depends on their membership of a particular community (Jones 1994: 89). Significantly, in Holmdahl v Australian Electoral Commission, the court emphasised that if there is a right to vote, it is not a personal right.15 According to Justice Gray: ‘[t]he Commonwealth Constitution does not vest a personal right in the defendant or any elector to vote in a federal election. The rights conferred by § 7 and 24 are given to the “people of the State” or the “people of the Commonwealth”’.16 In echoing Chief Justice French's words in Rowe v Electoral Commissioner 2010,17 Gray drew attention to the fact that rights do not exist to protect individual liberty alone: individual rights often serve public as well as private interests. For example, the right to a trial by jury protects individuals from the state, but it also performs an important collective function by ensuring the ‘accuracy and legitimacy’ of criminal trials (Kreimer 1984: 1387). Similarly, the right not to be murdered for another's amusement even where the victim has explicitly consented, exists not only to protect individuals, but to preserve the decent, secure society: a collective interest.18 In cases where a particular right defines the structure of government, or even the structure of a decent society, any individual's desire to waive becomes immaterial. Rights instruments that proscribe slavery (e.g., the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 4, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the US Bill of Rights, 13th Amendment) do so not only to protect individual liberty, but also to eradicate a practice that profoundly undermines the ideals of a free society (Kreimer 1984: 1387–88). Should citizens wish to assent to a life of slavery, the state would not recognise their attempt to waive the right to equal protection because that state (and all the people it represents) has an interest in maintaining a society free from slavery. Our freedoms are limited: they do not extend to the derogation or annihilation of the freedoms themselves because this defeats the purpose of having them in the first place. As Mill (1991: 114) famously wrote: ‘The principle of freedom cannot require that [a person] should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate [one's] freedom.’ Rights usually have conditions that often prevent their holders from acting in a certain way. The right to be free from the murderous intentions of others also requires that people refrain from consenting to be the victims of sadistic murder. The right to be free from slavery requires that we refrain from willingly selling ourselves into servitude. These rights are so fundamental that they carry with them a strict condition of inalienability, even where an individual is strongly inclined to waive that right and where their consent seems to be freely given. This holds true even when the 91 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

alienation of a particular right appears to offer its holder some advantage. Let us take the example of the right to an eight-hour (as opposed to a 10-hour) workday. It is rational for a worker to prefer the eight-hour day, but it is also rational for individual workers to work 10 hours in particular cases to gain a market advantage over other workers. In the long run, however, this is a bad idea for both the individual worker and all other workers because those who free-ride on the abstinence of others will end up working 10 hours for a day's pay if they are not prevented from doing so. The right to an eight-hour day not only protects workers from long work hours; it also requires them to refrain from certain actions that give rise to an unwelcome and perhaps unforeseen collective-action problem. The option of an eight- hour working day is not enough: all workers need the inalienable right to an eight-hour day. The right not to work 10 hours exists for the benefit of the right-holder, but it is invoked to prevent the right-holder from acting in a certain way that might serve their personal interests in the short term but which harms the interests of all workers in the long term, including those of the individual worker (Hardin 1986: 58–59). Therefore, it is consistent for a libertarian to argue that inalienable rights are not only rights but also a denial of rights because they impose a duty on the right-holder to refrain from certain actions. Inalienable rights do not exist as individual rights because they only make sense at the group level: the benefits conferred on individuals by the right derive indirectly from its effects on the larger class of which they are members (Hardin 1986: 58–59). The right to vote is not only an individual right; it also exists for a collective purpose and benefit: to constitute and perpetuate representative democracy. There may be certain electors who perceive some benefit in alienating their right to vote, but the collective has a more compelling interest in preventing this from happening. The right to vote is fundamental: it is not only central to the perpetuation of representative democracy; it is partly constitutive of it and therefore too precious to be alienable, to be turned on and off like a tap as individuals please. Many voters in voluntary systems are perfectly entitled to continue to abstain or vote as they please, but this is not the same as having a formal entitlement to waive their right to vote: it does not represent an explicit recognition of a particular right not to vote. The right not to vote cannot be admitted because it cannot be universalised; doing so would endanger – and possibly destroy – the system for which it exists: representative democracy. So far, I have argued on the basis that voting is a right but not a legally waivable one. What if voting is not only a right but also a duty? A ‘right’ versus a ‘duty’ to vote Voting libertarians, who tend to see it as a right only, usually deny that voting might also be a duty (Brennan 2009; Lomasky and Brennan 2000; Saunders 2010). Some also believe that, even if voting were a duty, it could not operate simultaneously as both a right and a duty. Indeed, according to Holmdahl, this is impossible. As his lawyer, Kevin Borick, said: a ‘duty and right, in this situation, cannot coexist’. Holmdahl also argued that Australian law is contradictory on the question of the status of voting rights. The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 defines voting as a duty, but the Constitution defines it as a right. Because, on his view, there cannot be both a right and a duty to vote, and because the Constitution is more legally authoritative than the Electoral Act and is supposed to override any statutory law that conflicts with it, there no longer exists a duty to vote. Accordingly, Section 245(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 is unconstitutional or at least ‘invalid’. When Justice Gageler asked Borick why he perceived ‘an inconsistency between the existence of a right and the existence of a duty to exercise that right’ Borick replied that ‘a right involves a choice and you can waive that right’ whereas duties cannot be ‘waive[d]’. The court did not show any interest in testing this argument and denied Holmdahl leave to appeal with the simple pronouncement that his case had ‘no prospect of success’.19 This case raises questions about the status of voting under Australian law. On the one hand, we have seen that the High Court has found an implied right to vote in the Constitution. On the other hand, however, Section 245(1) of The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 stipulates that voting is ‘the duty of every elector … at each election’. Is voting a right or a duty? Must we choose between them, as Holmdahl insists? The answer to this question is ‘no’: there is nothing in democratic or legal theory that obviously precludes conceiving voting as both a right and a duty. Voting seems to be a ‘duty-right’. A ‘duty-right’ exists where one has both a duty to do something (because others have a claim-right that I perform it and because I have a duty to pursue certain values – see below), and a claim that protects this duty. If I have a duty to vote, I also have a claim to not be interfered with in the performance of this duty. We rarely hear about duty-rights, but they are common and people perform them all the time: judges have duty-rights to impose sentences, teachers have a duty-right to grade the work of their pupils, and police officers have both a right and a duty to arrest criminals. A duty-right exists even when we would prefer not to have it, as in the case of the duty-right to pay our debts (Rainbolt 2006: 34–36). Courts have explicitly recognised the concept of a duty- right. For example, in Albertson v Kirkingburg,20 the court found that the owners of Albertson's (a grocery store chain) had a duty-right to dismiss one of their delivery van drivers (Kirkingburg) once they discovered that his vision did not meet federally specified vision standards. They were legally and morally empowered to do so, and they had a duty to others to do so. Voting can be plausibly characterised as a duty as well as a right because: (a) as argued above, voting is one of those rights that carry with them duties to refrain from acting in certain ways (in this case, to refrain from waiving the right) and (b) because the justification for voting is only partly rights-based: there are powerful consequentialist arguments for the importance of voting rights. For example, on the ‘decision-centred’ argument, voting rights are justified because democracy – based on the expressed will of the people – is thought to be the best procedure for making decisions. Voting is central to legitimising governments (Katz 1997), and functions as a practice that promotes and protects ‘the common interests of the members of a political community’ (Weale 1999: 41–42). Voting rights have been defended in relation to utility maximisation (Downs 1957: 45–46), while voting is commonly conceived as the mechanism by which individuals are enabled to exercise their interests in self- protection, self-government and self-development. We find a key consequentialist justification for voting in the fact that suffrage is the sovereign right that protects all other rights. The US Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the right to vote is fundamental because it is the ‘preservative of all rights’ and ‘the citizen's link to his laws and government’ (Ciccone 2001–02). The European Court of Human Rights has also determined that the right to vote is a fundamental human right with universal suffrage the basic principle.21 Were people to fail persistently and ubiquitously to express the right to vote, there would be no check against the potential tyranny of those in power, especially those seeking to trespass on realms of individual autonomy. This is why courts generally treat voting as a ‘preferred’ or special right (Douglas 2008). And consequentialism Therefore, insofar as I have a duty to promote certain values or desirable ends – such as the protection of rights and the perpetuation of a system that promotes self-government and the common interest – there are powerful consequentialist grounds for a duty to vote. This is distinct from, but in addition to, my duty to meet the claim-rights of others. On this latter count, we have a duty to vote because others have a claim-right on us to vote (i.e., they have a right to have us perform the duty). The reason others have a legitimate 92 TRIUMPH DEBATE LD BRIEF – SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

claim-right here is that democracy involves work, and we must all do some of this work if the system is truly ‘of the people, for the people, by the people’. Many democrats hold that a successful democracy depends on widespread interest and participation in politics; voting is clearly central here. If we intentionally and persistently refrain from taking such an interest we are refusing our political responsibility while continuing to enjoy the benefits of democratic life, of living in a democracy instead of, say, a dictatorship or an oligarchy. By failing to vote, we are free-riding as well as passively eroding the democratic condition. As Mill (1991: 210) observed: ‘representative institutions are of little value and may be a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue, when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government to give their vote’. Participating in the mutually advantageous co-operative enterprise of democracy requires a willingness to give up some freedom, a willingness that, in the name of fairness, should be reciprocal (Hart 1967: 61) and therefore universal. I have a reciprocal obligation to all other citizens to vote so that, together, we can constitute and perpetuate the system of representative democracy and collectively enjoy the benefits of living in a properly functioning democracy. Apart from my obligation to all other members of a given demos, there is a second group of people that has a claim on me to vote: namely, other members of my social group or class. For example, the poor owe it to each other to vote so that the wealthy do not monopolise the attention of governments (which does indeed happen when low numbers of poor people turn out to vote (Hill 2013). Similarly, women should vote in order to protect their interests as a social group. Being the only woman who bothered to vote would leave me vulnerable to the domination of men: I need the cooperation of other women to prevent this from happening. We owe it to other members of our social group to cooperate and vote so that we can shape, in our favour, the terms on which we face other classes and thereby derive the liberty and equality-enhancing benefits of voting.22 To summarise, voting is best characterised as both a duty and a right. It is a ‘duty-right’ because there is a universal obligation to share equally the work of promoting the values and social condition of democracy: I have a reciprocal obligation to all other citizens to vote so that I do my fair share in the collective task of conserving and perpetuating democracy. Nevertheless, we also have an obligation to other members of our social group so that together we can meet other classes on more even terms.

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And it prevents resentment against democratic institutions and government Malkopoulou 6-8 [Anthoula Malkopoulou, Associate Professor in Political Theory at Lund University specialized in democratic theory with a PhD in Political Thought from the University of Jyväskylä 6-8-2020, "Compulsory voting and right-wing populism: mobilisation, representation and socioeconomic inequalities," Taylor & Francis, https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2020.1774507]/Triumph Debate

The solution: mandatory universal representation How does the principle of universal turnout compete with populist claims to restore representation? First of all, obliging everybody to vote diminishes the vicious cycle of abstentionism that perpetuates feelings of disempowerment. Systematic abstention exacerbates feelings of neglect and resentment towards mainstream parties. The longer and the deeper the distance between traditional parties and voters, the more opportunity for populists to protest against unjustified underrepresentation. Conversely, it is well known that voting citizens are more satisfied with their state of democracy than are non-voting citizens (Hill 2011). Electoral participation carries ‘psychological’ benefits, especially for those who feel underrepresented. Thus, it should not surprise us that citizens in compulsory voting regimes are more content with democratic performance than citizens in voluntary voting regimes (Birch 2009, 112−113). The very act of electoral participation enhances one’s perception that they live in an inclusive, responsive and representative system. Granted, a minority of voters consciously want to be left out of the voting process. Others may be willing to vote but resent being obliged by law to do it; they may even develop a dissatisfaction towards democracy because of this obligation (Singh 2018) or may grow more insistent in their propensity to abstain (Henn and Oldfield 2016). 4 However, the reception of compulsory voting as ‘repressive’ can be easily counterweighed by offering the possibility of casting a blank ballot or crossing the option ‘none of the above’. Further, dissatisfaction with abstention penalties concern only a small number of citizens: 13–22 per cent of (only) young people who self-identify as non-voters, mostly white and male (Henn and Oldfield 2016, 1274) or people who had already a negative predisposition towards democracy (Singh 2018). It should not surprise us that anti-democrats and people from affluent backgrounds are dubious about the benefits of compulsory voting; after all, this is a very egalitarian measure that brings to the polls the less affluent. Hence, these objections do not trump the overall benefits of compulsory voting compared to voluntary voting systems: that of generally increasing (rather than decreasing) perceptions of democratic legitimacy (Birch 2009). But the relation between electoral presence and political inclusion is not just a matter of perception. The presence of voters at the polls does produce parliaments and governments that are more responsive to citizens (Hill 2014). Here is how. Imagine a national election where all eligible voters, including the poor who usually abstain, show up at the polls and cast their ballots. The poor’s potential to influence election results nudge party campaigns and platforms into directions that take into account their views and interests. As a result, policies that benefit them are squarely placed on the electoral and legislative agenda. To secure election or re-election, candidates and legislators are motivated to support poverty-alleviating or redistributive policies, as party behaviour is being conditioned by a bottom-up incentive to address the poor. Thus, by amplifying and broadening voter participation, universal turnout leads to more representative political agendas.

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Voter Ignorance

Most voters are ignorant, misinformed, irrational, and biased about political issues – it’s impossible to make them informed Somin 13 [Ilya Somin, Professor of Law at GMU with a MA in Political Science from Harvard, and JD from Yale, 10-11- 2013, “Democracy and Political Ignorance,” Cato, https://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/10/11/ilya-somin/democracy- political-ignorance] /Triumph Debate

Just as sports fans love to follow their favorite teams even if they cannot influence the outcomes of games, so there are also “political fans” who enjoy following political issues and cheering for their favorite candidates, parties, or ideologies. Unfortunately, much like sports fans, political fans tend to evaluate new information in a highly biased way. They overvalue anything that supports their preexisting views, and to undervalue or ignore new data that cuts against them, even to the extent of misinterpreting simple data that they could easily interpret correctly in other contexts. Moreover, those most interested in politics are also particularly prone to discuss it only with others who agree with their views, and to follow politics only through like-minded media. All of this makes little sense if the goal is truth-seeking. A truth-seeker should actively seek out defenders of views opposed to their own. Those are the people most likely to present you arguments and evidence of which you were previously unaware. But such bias makes perfect sense if the goal is not so much truth as enhancing the fan experience. Economist Bryan Caplan calls this approach to information “rational irrationality”: when your purpose is something other than truth-seeking, it is often rational to be highly biased in the way you evaluate new information and also in your selection of information sources. Unlike Caplan, I contend that widespread political ignorance would be a menace even if voters were always rational in their evaluation of what they know. The problems of political ignorance and irrationality are accentuated by the enormous size and scope of modern government. In the United States, government spending accounts for close to 40% of GDP, according OECD estimates.7 And that does not include numerous other government policies that function through regulation of the private sector. Even if voters followed political issues more closely than they do, and even if they were more rational in their evaluation of political information, they still could not effectively monitor more than a fraction of the activities of the modern state. Increasing Knowledge through Education

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Involuntary voting means politically unaware people vote against their own interests Selb and Lachat 09 [Peter Selb, current professor of survey research at The University of Konstanz in Germany with a doctoral degree in political science from the University of Zurich and a master's degree in political science, Romain Lachat, 7-8-2009, “The more, the better? Counterfactual evidence on the effect of compulsory voting on the consistency of party choice,” European Journal of Political Research, https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1475- 6765.2009.01834.x?casa_token=V7OLEXd-nDAAAAAA:XYtkI8plaMuI24RJhMNB6zFknAZw2Jud-Yr4tF- 6Ok7OvZsXS6XXbXQO_dCJVMoESoM9EBBQfSvs] /Triumph Debate

This article has analysed the impact of CV on the relationship between citizens’ political preferences and their voting choices. Focusing on the 1995 Belgian General Election, we observed that voters differ strongly in their willingness to turn out if CV were abolished. A large share of the electorate indicated that they would probably abstain in such a situation. This disposition towards participation in a voluntary voting system has important consequences: lower turnout propensity is linked with lower levels of both political knowledge and political interest. Citizens who participate only because they are compelled to do so by CV also tend to be less aware of the differences between the various parties on the main issue dimensions. These differences between compelled and voluntary voters have important implications for the relationship between policy preferences, party choice and election outcomes. The party choices of citizens forced to vote by CV are less consistently related to their political preferences. This individual effect is strong (it is of similar size in both linguistic regions under study) and it is robust across various specifications of our model. At the aggregate level, CV increases the likelihood that the election outcome will not accurately reflect the distribution of voter preferences. Using the estimates of our model, we predicted what the results of the 1995 Belgian Chamber election would have looked like if the linkage between individual preferences and choices had been as strong among compelled voters as among the voluntary ones. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this would have changed the outcomes, with small parties (particularly those on the far-right) gaining a larger share of the vote. However, the magnitude of the aggregate effects we found is not outstanding.

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Voluntary voting lets individuals who are aware of their lack of knowledge opt- out Rovensky 08 [Jan Rovensky, Doctoral Student of Political Theory, 2008, “Voting: A Citizen’s Right, or Duty? The Case against Compulsory Voting,” Luiss Guido Carli, https://eprints.luiss.it/40/1/rovensky-20080728.pdf] /Triumph Debate

In other words, the right to abstain acts as a convenient and discrete way for citizens who do not vote in order to show their protest to ‘slip out the back door’ without further repercussions whatever their reasons for non-voting may be. If citizens do not regard nonvoting as a passive way of staging a protest and their grounds for not showing up at the election is not laziness, there are probably other, more mundane causes. First of all, the right not to vote enables people without any real political knowledge to admit their ignorance without forcing them to make uninformed decisions which may otherwise upset the democratic system. Non-voting as much as an active process of disobedience can also be interpreted as an honest gesture of simply admitting the fact that one does not have the knowledge to make a well-considered political judgment. Poorly informed voters tend to make decisions based on irrational personal preferences that do not reflect on the given political situation thus further fuelling populist politics.

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AT: Voter Ignorance

Voters aren’t uninformed since they’re incentivized to learn with compulsory voting – sunk costs and increased access to info Córdova and Rangel 17 [Abby Córdova, associate professor of political science at the University of Kentucky with a PhD from Vanderbilt University, and Gabriela Rangel, Assistant Professor of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute with a PhD in political science from the University of Kentucky, 2017, “Addressing the Gender Gap: The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Women’s Electoral Engagement,” Comparative Political Studies, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414016655537]/Triumph Debate

***CV: compulsory voting & VV: voluntary voting

CV and the Gender Gap in Electoral Engagement Beyond Voting Even if CV laws produce higher and more equal voter turnout rates, critics of this institution suggest it might simply force individuals to cast a ballot without truly making them more engaged with the electoral process (Brennan & Hill, 2014; Briggs & Chelis, 2010). In other words, CV might result in more uninformed voters and thus in more wasted votes. In light of this concern, scholars have recently turned their attention to exploring the substantive impacts of mandatory voting (e.g., Birch, 2009; Dalton & Weldon, 2007; Jensen & Spoon, 2011; Mackerras & McAllister, 1999; Singh & Thornton, 2013). We contribute to this burgeoning literature by examining the broader impact of CV on women’s electoral engagement. We theorize that enforced CV laws make it more likely for women to receive and seek information on competing political parties, motivating them to engage with the electoral process as a whole. As a result, we should observe a narrower gender gap in electoral engagement beyond simply voting in countries where voting is mandatory. We argue that this expected effect is driven by two reinforcing mechanisms; enforced CV laws (a) reduce the cost of accessing electoral information for women by increasing the supply of political information, and (b) create a stronger sunk cost effect among women than men, motivating women in particular to seek electoral information during electoral campaigns. We elaborate on the theoretical basis for each mechanism next. First, mandatory voting laws change the information environment during electoral campaigns by increasing the salience of political discussion (Birch, 2009; Shineman, 2012). As the number of potential voters increases so does the probability of being exposed to electoral information through informal conversations, creating dense political networks (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). Consequently, although women have more limited involvement in civic groups that facilitate the flow of political information, CV laws reduce women’s cost of acquiring political information during electoral campaigns. Moreover, political parties themselves are likely to increase the supply of electoral information for women. Scholars argue that, as all citizens are equally likely to vote in enforced CV systems, mandatory laws create strong incentives for political parties competing for votes to reach out to all individuals (Lijphart, 1997). Parties should facilitate the dissemination of electoral messages to women, and in this way also contribute to reducing the high information costs that females typically face under VV. Taken together, these theorized effects have important implications for the gender gap. As women in VV systems are more likely to have limited access to information on their electoral choices than men, CV systems should make women particularly likely to acquire electoral information in comparison with men and their female counterparts in VV countries, reducing the gender gap. Second, knowing that voting is a requirement election after election and that the cost of abstaining is high, enforced CV systems create strong incentives for citizens in general to seek political information and engage with the electoral process. Engelen (2007), for example, suggests that, “having to vote anyway, citizens might well want to know what the vote is about and what the alternatives are” (p. 32). As such, CV laws create a “sunk cost effect” (Arkes & Blumer, 1985)—meaning that because individuals are aware they will incur a non- recoverable or sunk cost, they are motivated to continue on a course of action to avoid waste. In enforced CV systems, citizens are then more likely to perceive voting as an expensive sunk cost (Shineman, 2012), which they try to redeem by seeking information about their electoral choices to avoid wasting their vote. Empirical research finds support for this effect; when the cost of abstaining is high, individuals find it “rational to invest in information” during electoral campaigns (Shineman, 2009, p. 5).

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Non-voters aren’t uninformed and CV incentivizes more people to become politically informed See 7 [M See, 12-2007, “THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY VOTING IN THE UNITED STATES,” Harvard Law Review, https://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/compulsory_voting.pdf]/Triumph Debate

If compulsory voting laws brought in a pool of uninformed or under informed voters, then they could conceivably worsen political outcomes. Underlying this concern is the assumption that many or most nonvoters are either disengaged from or unaware of political events. One response to the under informed-voter objection is to observe that it actually raises larger questions about principles of “universal” suffrage. If a concern with under informed voters is the basis for opposition to compulsory voting, then this concern does not simply justify the status quo of voluntary voting. Rather, it suggests that only those who somehow demonstrate a certain minimum degree of awareness and understanding of political issues should be allowed to vote. If, instead, the United States is to remain committed to having near universal suffrage, then the problem of an under informed citizenry should be addressed head-on through educational or other measures, rather than held up as support for voluntary voting. The assumption that nonvoters are politically ignorant is also questionable. First, it is perfectly understandable for even the most politically informed citizens to refrain from voting due to the negligible probability that their vote will influence the outcome and to the non negligible private costs they incur by voting. Second, as an empirical matter, the assumption that most nonvoters are politically ignorant is inaccurate. For example, a study of the 1990 election for the U.S. Senate found that only 18% of nonvoters fit the stereotype of individuals who are “oblivious to the campaign and . . . better off staying away from the polls.” The concern with under informed voters also assumes that current nonvoters’ levels of political engagement and awareness are static. As noted in Part II, one of the potential benefits of compulsory voting s that it can make government more relevant to the lives of current nonvoters and can thus increase their levels of political engagement. [and] Compulsory voting can also force political candidates to change the way that they communicate their messages and reach out to the electorate. Thus, over time, compulsory voting may caus[ing]e current nonvoters to become more politically informed.

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