The Politics of Control and Defection in State Sponsorship of Rebel

CEU eTD Collection I n partialn fu FRAGILE PROXIES: PROXIES: FRAGILE Doctoral School ofPolitical Science, Public Policy International and D EFECTION lfillment ofthe requirements for the Degree Doctorof ofPhilosophy Submitted Centralto European University Supervisor:

ORGANIZATIONS STATE SPONSORS STATE THE THE Budapest, 2014 Milos Popovic

Dr. Matteo Fumagalli Relations POLITICS By

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October 14,2014 Milo s Popovic

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CEU eTD Collection defection.Finally, existence sponsors ofmultiple the with associated are support transnational of existence the and rebels weak ties, ethnic shared that demonstrates model the Likewise sponsors. their against defect to likely are organizations 1989 militants, Kashmiri of sponsorship Pakistan’s of study case the and (SOR), Rebels of Sponsorship on dataset novel between to response in policies their change rapidly to commit credibly cannot sponsors, their to accountable less are pun or monitor defection. organizations principal conditions what Under sponsors. their against than costly less is organizations rebel of sponsorship State adversaries. rebel their to against organizations support providing by conflicts armed in intervene frequently governments Foreign

irect military intervention, but rebels often often rebels but intervention, military irect - the top and lower echelons. My argument is tested through the statistical analysis of a a of analysis statistical the through tested is argument My echelons. lower and top the gn ad raiainl theories organizational and agent

N on shifts

increases the length of delegation chain from sponsors to rebels, leading to to leading rebels, to sponsors from chain delegation of length the increases - i sh its its sh centralized organizations have weak central leadership central weak have organizations centralized

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CEU eTD Collection Analyzing Defection Rebel Across Armed Conflicts, 1968 CHAPTER 3 Theory Rebel of Defection CHAPTER 2 Principals, Agents and The Limits Sponsor’s of Control CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Acknowledgements List of Tables List Figuresof Table Contentsof Abstract Declaration Robustness Checks Results of the CoxProportional Hazard Models Results of the Multilevel Logistic Model Method Control Variables Independent Variables Data Blaming Principal? the Fragmentation Sponsors of Organization Counterinsurgency, Inter The (dis)Advantages of Organizational Structure Three Types Rebelof Organizational Structure The Problem Many of Delegation Hands: Chain from Sponsors to Rebels Leaders, Followers and Sponsors: Theory Rebel of Defection Summary Potential Explanations for DefectionRebel The Weakening Sponsor’s of Control and Rebel Defection Principals and Agents, Sponsors andRebels: Delegation of Usethe Force of in C Defining Rebels, States and State Sponsorship Rebels of Dissertation Roadmap Research Design Theory Defection: of Delegation Chain and Rebel Organization Why Understanding Sponsorship of Rebels and Defection is Importan Credible Commitments Accountability Control

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CEU eTD Collection References APPENDIX B APPENDIX A CONCLUSION AND POLICYIMPLICATIONS Refining the Theories CHAPTER 5 A Story Pakistan of and Militants in Kashmir, 1988 CHAPTER 4 Implications for Policy Implications for Conflict Studies Findings The Portability of Theories across Wars Periods and Mechanisms Trajectories of Militant Behavior in Kashmir: Assessing Arguments the A Monster that Never Was: The Loyalty Lashkar of ISI’s Goes Favorite Rogue: How Jaish Defiance of Harkatul Ansar B. PAKISTAN AND FOREIGN MILITANTS IN KASHMIR Mass Desertions: A Short Story The Rise Fall and of Hizbul Mujahideen, 1991 Defiance and Desertion of Ja A. PAKISTAN ANDINDIGENOUS MILITANTS IN KASHMIR (1987 The Kashmir Rebellion: Background Armed of Conflict in Kashmir Summary Organizational Theory

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CEU eTD Collection f Kumar Vinod topic. Iow anonymous, militaryremain Prav d great a learned have I people. important with intouch umbrellaputting and me institutional an Delhi, providing me for atadviser University of my as acted who Behera, Chadha Navnita to debt in forever am I experience. India my shaped Raanan. Oded and Ilic Vujo Kumar, Sashi Haenni, Miriam Schmidt, Roland Kirvas, Anna Sata, Roby s each in comments invaluable offered who colleagues brilliant with surrounded be to fortunate been thought and comments insightful with me provided who Roe Paul m stimulating always empirics, and argument concepts, my discussing to hours countless dedicated Erin studies. conflict to me exposing for gratitude deep her owe I interests; academic my shaped profoundly has She Jenne. never have would project This day. this to research my of stages early the from patience and support immense encouragement, professional his for Matteo vir gratefulto guidance.Iandam I motivation whenneeded Matteo to of I turned excellence.academic paragon the mentor, true a been has Matteo Fumagalli. Matteo supervisor my with work to opportunity the had have to lucky feel I them. of each from received I that advice re dissertation and enjoyable this writing of process the made who people great of number a to thankful am I een Swami who openly shared his contacts. Although my contacts from the intelligence and and intelligence the from contacts my Although contacts. his shared openly who Swami een tage of my thesis writing. I am thankful to my Consec crew: Natalia Peral, Artak Galyan, Galyan, Artak Peral, Natalia crew: Consec my to thankful am I writing. thesis my of tage During my stay in Delhi where I conducted interviews, a number of a of number a interviews, conducted I where Delhi in stay my During

warding. The completion of this project is due to the inspiration, support and and support inspiration, the to due is project this of completion The warding. rom the IDSA has been a true friend and a lovely host. I thank him for for him thank I host. lovely a and friend true a been has IDSA the rom e to ask big questions. I benefited greatly from interactions with interactions from greatly benefited I questions. big ask to e e my gratitude to gratitude my e Acknowledgements a aot h amd ofit n Kashmir in conflict armed the about eal

their willingness to talk about such a sensitive sensitive a such about talk to willingnesstheir

been initiated, were it not for Erin for not it were initiated, been - provoking questions. I have have I questions. provoking mazing individuals individuals mazing tue and and tue

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CEU eTD Collection myunderstanding of andAleksandar friendship brother Popovic Vladan father, my and Popovic, Milunka mother, my to grateful deeply am I written. been never behindstood I me throughgood times; and bad Toni be. should friend a what of essence the is She heart. and mind my in carved remain always will her with spent hours infinite times; difficult in lighthouse my being for Vanja to thankful and David Cunningham. Szekely Ora Toft, Duffy Monica Huth, Paul Valeriano, Brandon Moore, Will Mitchell, us providing and the approach my in challenging For work framework. conceptual my my improve situate and literature me helping for Salehyan Idean thank I dissertation. my on imprint me. Pushpender Chaudhary always friend.will be dear my to sister a like is she city; the through me guided Vidhuri Payal enjoyable. and smooth capital Indian the in stay my made have hospitality and support kindness, whose Chaudhary Sunder with friendship my of proud am I Delhi. in accommodation find me helping for Deka Tusharika thank I scholars. several to me introducing for and library impressive IDSA’s to me inviting eful feedback on my argument and/or empirics I am much obliged to Steven Saideman, Sara Sara Saideman, Steven to obliged much am I empirics and/or argument my on feedback eful have would dissertation this family my of encouragement and support love, the Without bei human lovely two of friendship the with blessed been have I b has work My ,

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enefited from interactions with several scholars whose suggestions left an an left suggestions whose scholars several with interactions from enefited al support, patience and sound advice. The love, love, The advice. sound and patience support, al am proud tocallmy him am friend. have

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CEU eTD Collection 1 Some Taleban. the with align not do and Kashmir profile their lower they provided organizations their rename to allowedandreleased soon were leaders The them. officiallybanned accountsand their milit major of leaders the detained government Musharraf the 2002, January In militants. Kashmiri jihad and Al struggle action Jaish’s Parakram. Operation as known mobilization military massive a launched India war. of brink the on countries two the placed and negotiations India. with conflictescalate to Musharraf Pervez However, 1990s. late the since government who militants Jaish five dead to shot policebelonged The policemen. six killing guards on fire opened and

Who Will Strike First? StrikeFirst? Will Who n otis uh s Lashkar as such outfits ant On December On by providing by - Qaeda. Pakistan was cornered by the US and India to crack down on Jaish and other andother onJaish India down tocrack US and cornered by the wasQaeda. Pakistan was - e The Economist, Economist, The -

Mohammad, a Kashmiri militant militant Kashmiri a Mohammad, 13, India wit India unaware of this operation and outraged by the attack as he was reluctant was he as attack the by outraged and operation this of unaware

2001 several gunmen infiltrated the Indian Parliament in New Delhi Delhi New in Parliament Indian the infiltrated gunmen several 2001 are my creator, but I am your am master I but creator, my are you. to hateful be will day of light the that miserable, wretched so you yourself make can I but believe you power; have I that Remember condescension. Slave,

The Parliament attack event attack Parliament The h the argument that the that argument the h - e 22 December 2001. 22 -

ab, Harkat Taiba, I before reasoned with you, but you have proved yo youproved have you,but with reasoned before I I NTRODUCTION

it turned out that then then that out turned it - ul

organizations - uaien n J and Mujahideen – re is no difference between difference no is re

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CEU eTD Collection Alliances Terminating Alliances. 4 3 Press, 2 renege by commitments ontheir p reneging.likely decreasing of durable likelihood tobe the security alliance abandonment” of the unlikelihood enemy, common a have allies “when Jaish. for no gains obvious promised and high tremendously were Pakistan angering by enemy another acquiring of did. Lashkar as profile their lower to as suchdisposal its at strategies other had Jaish and costlypolicy most the was Musharraf President support material abundant received and jihadists” “good labeled been traditionally have dead President control its p The Moh motorcade. Musharraf’s intercepted bombers suicide second a assass escaped he later week a than More it. crossed had convoy his before minute a just exploded Rawalpindi in bridge a under planted bomb a when death escaped nearly Musharraf creators others while demands, Musharraf’s with

Glen H. Snyder. 1997. 1997. Snyder. GlenH. Stephen Tankel. Stephen ae D. James am

pp. nto atmt o fr rm h big wee h frt tak curd Ti tm two time This occurred. attack first the where bridge the from far not attempt ination Evidently, the abovementioned events show tha show events abovementioned the Evidently, second the On ma

to – 122 American Journal of Political Science Political of Journal American

the Pakistani state. Morrow. that d and Harkat battle - 123.

ultimately turned against its master. Interestingly, those who wanted the Pakistani the wanted who Interestingly, those master. its against turned ultimately 2011. Storming the World Stage World the Storming 2011.

India.

: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements? Agreements? Abrogate States Do : Why 1991. Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of of Model Aggregation Capability the to Alternative An Asymmetry: and Alliances 1991. AlliancePolitics 2

niesr of anniversary ul W

h dd Jaish did Why - hat Jihad

3 conditions . Some statistical analyses suggest that asymmetrical alliances arealliances asymmetrical that analysessuggest statistical Some . - al ursuing such a defiantandselfursuing such . Ithaca: Cornel Universit CornelIthaca: . - Islami.

the Given the simultaneous fighting a fighting simultaneous the Given refused to do so do to refused

un against turn 35(4): contribu : The Story of Lashkar of Story The :

nin alaet tak Pksa’ rlr Pervez ruler Pakistan’s attack, Parliament Indian

pp.

ted to such a disastrous result? disastrous a such to ted 903 Journal Politics of Journal - Pakistan 944; Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Burcu Savun. 2007. 2007. Savun. Burcu and Ashley, Brett Leeds, 944; yPress, t Pakistan had nurtured the entity beyond beyond entity the nurtured had Pakistan t

and eventually turned against their very very their against turned eventuallyand 4

What factors then encouraged then to factors What Jaish -

pp. e Cmo kolde od that holds knowledge Common ? - Taiba. New York: Columbia University University Columbia York: New Taiba. -

defeating behavior? behavior? defeating 317. otr blne t Jaish to belonged lotters iem i sfee b the by softened is dilemma

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CEU eTD Collection 7 Press. University 6 131 pp. Press, 5 have why so, If when? and avoidable defection Is benefactors? their against turn even or desert organization confrontation armed of short organizations Isponsors and rebels, ontheir draw logicconstructmy concept. to co nati the to opposed explicitly organizations join individuals whereby process “a denote to defection” dictate. central the against violence s his of focus the defection, objectives”. broader group’s the of expense the at as defection understands the toward echelons lower of behavior welfare. sponsor’s factional or interests, sponsor’s their d ties, these break non and

efection as efection Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. 2007. Weinstein. Jeremy Stathis Kalyvas. 2008. Ethnic Defection in Civil War. War. Ethnic Civil Defection in 2008. Kalyvas. Stathis Jacob N. Shapiro. 2013. Shapiro. N. Jacob - ethnics” onal aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify and end up fighting against their fighting up against theyend and which identify groupthe ethnicwith of aspirations onal pno’ gas Dfcin a b collective be can Defection goals. sponsor’s ie that Given underpinninggeneral problem more a to refers question This - state armed actors. The main aim of this project is to explain when rebels damage or or damage rebels when explain to is project this of aim main The actors. armed state 7 . . s desert their sponsors their desert s actions

hl tee ocps r nt osrce t dnt te eainhp between relationship the denote to constructed not are concepts these While

ever turn against their sponsors? sponsors? their against turn ever .. ne wa cniin rbl dfc aant hi sponsors. their against defect rebels conditions what under i.e. Previous definitions Previous some by The Terrorist’s Dilemma: M Dilemma: Terrorist’s The Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence Insurgent of Politics The Rebellion: Inside

rebel combatants rebel

“actions individual combatants take that maximize their personal gains personal their maximize that take combatants individual “actions ee atos a b self be can actions rebel

uy s lo n h poest o mltn fcin t cry out carry to factions militant of propensity the on also is tudy ,

ht ey h odr o ter pnos Ad hn o the do when And sponsors? their of orders the defy that –

? Why ? whenever a faction of members behaves detrimental to to detrimental behaves members of faction a whenever 6

have used have n h ohr hand, other the On ir

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p Jrm Wisen fr example, for Weinstein, Jeremy ip. in civil war to war civil in ing tti Kalyvas Stathis

their benefits at the expense of expense the at benefits their s

raiain pru policies, pursue organizations only defy orders, while other other while orders, defy only . New York: Camb York: New .

the the 41 (8): 1043 41 illicit ties between states betweenstates ties illicit

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. State Sponsorship Rebel of Organizations: Examples Some Defectionof and Loyalty organization separatist group Mohhamed, a Tamil Tamil Tigers Party (KKE) The Taliban her as largely theRENAMO militants had sponsor. remainedloyal its to Communist The Kashmiri Renamo Jaish (LTTE) Rebels Greek

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1995/96 Period

1980 1999 1946 1983 other f other 1994 2003 1948 1991

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orms of defection. Some infamous militant militant infamous Some defection. of orms organization Mozambique Afghanistan Sri LankaSri Target Greece India

remain obedient to their external masters? masters? external their to obedient remain Collective Collective Collective Defection Factional No

Indian forces Sriin Lanka; killed involved a in failed assassination ained from such a behavior? behavior? a such from ained In 2002and2003, groupthe was cooperate In clashed 1991,LTTE with the between USSR andYugoslavi agreement was reached leading In decided KKE 1948,the to former Prime Rajiv Minister Pakistan’s T withside Stalin in a dispute to immediatelyto release attempt against Pakistan’s controlled until the peace he group was successfully captured Russian pilots Attacked Herat against President Musharraf. to its demobilizationto

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CEU eTD Collection Press. University Conflicts. Intrastate Saideman of Duration the and Interventions Empowerment Minority of Paradox 1820 Duration, 11 Strate Afghanistan and Iraq for Lessons Conflict: Regional of Escalation the and Insurgencies Organizations. Rebel to War Terrorism. Sponsored Politics World 10 in Insurgencies Press. University Transnational Borders: Carolina Without North Rebels of University C Manuscript, Power. Bargaining Science 213 9 Un 8 conflicts. civil in intervention external of consequences and causes the understanding to devoted scholarship when actors armed governments external militants, to resources providing government. target the on pressure exerting and rebellion the controlling in interest an powerbargaining.of forma groupsis rebel support external that and agenda political own their have interveners external recognizethat to begin Scholars picture. simplified this beyond goes groups rebel of sponsorship state on studies be balance the shifting third usually are interventions that holds wisdom conventional Similarly, met. not are goals these game sum

Groups. Terrorist Transnational with Bargaining State 2006. Bapat. Navin on Patrick Regan. 2000. 2000. Regan. Patrick For example: Dylan Balch example:Dylan For Daniel Byman and Sarah E. E. Sarah and Byman Daniel iversity of Michigan Press, pp. pp. Press, ofMichigan iversity - nections: States that that States nections: 2 - gic Studies Institute, Institute, gicStudies 29; Navin Bapat. 2007a. The Internationalization of of Internationalization The 2007a. Bapat. Navin 29; party military and/or economic incursions into internal affairs of foreign countries aimed at aimed countries foreign of affairs internal into incursions economic and/or military party 4 4: 265 (4): 24 zero a are conflicts armed in interventions external that assume mostly scholars Conflict . 2001. 2001. – -

1992. hy a ete sced hn nevnr accompli interveners when succeed either can they

11 h Te Ta Dvd: tnc oiis Frin oiy ad nentoa Conflict International and Policy, Foreign Politics, Ethnic Divide: That Ties The

Existing research Existing -

2 International Studies Quarterly Studies International nentoa Suis Perspectives Studies International 80; Navin Bapat. 2007b. The Strategy of the Weak: State Support for Terrorism and and Terrorism for Support State Weak: the of Strategy The 2007b. Bapat. Navin 80; the ii Wr ad oeg Pwr: usd I Outside Powers: Foreign and Wars Civil S PA ponsor ponsor tween the the tween - direct Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterlin J. Andrew and Lindsay Journal of Conflict Resolution Resolution Conflict of Journal

: Carlisle Kreps. 2010. Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal Applying Destruction? of Agents 2010. Kreps. 10. T

errorism. errorism. military intervention military Ithaca .

government and rebel organization rebel and government

finds that external involvement, particularly external support external particularly involvement, external that finds

( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Idean Salehyan. 2009. 2009. Salehyan. Idean Press; University Cambridge UK: Cambridge, N.Y. ) 9 : Cornell University Press; Press; University Cornell :

Most governments intervene in armedconflict intervene governmentsin Most

44(4): 615 44(4):

Journal of Conflict Resolution Resolution Conflict of Journal 11: 1 11(1): Terrorist Campaigns. Campaigns. Terrorist 54(1): 4 54(1): e. 2000. Killing Time: The World Politics of Civ of Politics World The KillingTime: 2000. e.

is too costly. too is - 642; Erin K. Jenne. 2007. 2007. Jenne. K. Erin 642; - – 18; Idean Salehyan. 2010a. The Delegation of of Delegation The 2010a. Salehyan. Idean 18; Chapel Hill; Daniel Byman. 2007. 2007. Byman. Daniel Hill; Chapel treto i Itatt Conflict Intrastate in ntervention delegate 93 - 515; Idean Salehyan. 2010b. 2010b. Salehyan. Idean 515; Ihc (N Ithaca . International Studies Quarterly Quarterly Studies International

There is a significant body of of body significant a is There sh certain goals or fail when when fail or goals certain sh h ue f force of use the arc Regan. Patrick ofit aaeet n Peace and Management Conflict (s). 8

. R Y . U.S. Army War College, College, War Army U.S. . - ecent proliferation of proliferation ecent . Agent Analysis to State to Analysis Agent ) and London: Cornell Cornell London: and ) 6 55 46: Ethnic Bargaining: The Bargaining: Ethnic

2002. Third Party Party Third 2002. – 73;

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Byman and Kreps, Kreps, and Byman 2011. Cunningham. E. David (2002) Regan Weinstein, Weinstein, da Slha, rsin kee ldtc ad ai Cunningham. David and Gleditsch Skrede Kristian Salehyan, Idean - sponsored arrangements topeace. illicit contribute can

Studying state sponsorship of rebels and particularly conditions under which these illicit these which under conditions particularly and rebels of sponsorship state Studying and governments between relationship the and intervention external of issues the While consequences detrimental such Despite ofit resolution. conflict c onfrontational policies onfrontational p cit op.

break their commitments to external governments. We governments. external to commitments their break International Organization International ., op. cit. op. Idean Salehyan, David Siroky and Reed M. Wood. 2014. 2014. Wood. M. Reed and Siroky David Salehyan, Idean -

Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities. Atrocities. ofWartime Analysis Agent sometimes

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Salehyan Processes. in Problems SpoilerPeace 1997. Stedman. Stephen Weinstein For example: Bethany Lacina. 2006. Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars. Wars. Civil of Severity the Explaining 2006. Lacina. Bethany example: For Fatah the and strip Gazae K.M. de Silva, K and S.W.R. Samarasinghe, (eds). 1993. 1993. (eds). Samarasinghe, S.W.R. and K Silva, de K.M. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf. 1970. 1970. Wolf. Charles and Leites Nathan uain hn te opsto groups. opposition other than pulation - 289.

Second, we need to understand conditions under which rebels defect against their their against defect rebels which under conditions understand to need we Second, Markham Publish Markham

( 20 , 2009 op. cit. op. , and infinitely block block infinitely and , 17 14.

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scholars esfr agreement ceasefire , Hamas has accepted a reconciliation accord with Fatah that Fatah with accord reconciliation a accepted has Hamas , ec poes Atog etra spot a nt be not may support external Although process. peace 18 eelo ad uhrt: n nltc sa o Isret Conflicts Insurgent on Essay Analytic An Authority: and Rebellion

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the insurgency the Journal of Conflict Resolution Conflict of Journal s novd n hlig Israeli shelling in involved as organizations organizations

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main supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (ISIS) Syria and Iraq of State Islamic the of supporters main Third, the sponsorship of rebels can cause conflict spillovers to neighboring countries. neighboring to spillovers conflict cause can rebels of sponsorship the Third, - of

may become the target of their own creations. For instance, Saudi Arabia has been one one been has Arabia Saudi instance, For creations. own their of target the become may - - the Qaeda. If the Pakistani state had fallen into anarchy, the consequences for neighbors neighbors for consequences the anarchy, into fallen had state Pakistani the If Qaeda. - countr s

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CEU eTD Collection Behavior Organizational 26 policies organizational in say no almost have levels lower the while top, the at individuals few procedures” making decision formal and mechanisms, reporting these hav organizations Centralizedhierarchy. robust and leadership clearcentrala with rebelorganization a delegatedto s may theirendagent to field upbeing ancommanders and commanders. tothe chief regiments local the configuration, rebel the on Depending regiments. local their of principals fie their to principals become organization principal further to extend may chain control and command the organization, rebel the Within units. local and commanders field its to principal the becomes leadership rebel the Consecutively, length. chains delegation create tactics. and strategies goals, over cooperation their for return in support DefectionTheory of theshortboth in andlong strategies, management conflict better to window a provide can delegations of termination the to contribute that factors understanding consideration, into reasons the all Taking borders. over pons

Walter W. W. Walter

rs aaeet of management or’s raiain epue cer eatetl onais cer ie o atoiy detailed authority, of lines clear boundaries, departmental “clear espouse organizations h lnt o dlgto cha delegation of length The material with along rebels to violence delegate sponsors that argue I dissertation this In This authority is delegated to the rebel leadership who becomes an agent to its sponsor. sponsor. its to agent an becomes who leadership rebel the to delegated is authority This Powell. 1990. Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, Organization, of Forms Network Hierarchy: nor Market Neither 1990. Powell. commanders e : Delegation Chain and Rebel: Delegation and Chain Organization 12:

295

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run

from their secret services to the rebel movement movement rebel the to services secret their from – ees a rn mohy hn h atoiy n rsucs are resources and authority the when smoothly run may rebels 336, at pp. 303 pp. at 336, .

h are who - gn rltosis Te he cmadr i te rebel the in commanders chief The relationships. agent in depends on the rebel organizational structure. The The structure. organizational rebel the on depends in .

ld commanders, while the field commanders turn into into turn commanders field the while commanders, ld iety epnil t te leadership. the to responsible directly

26 chief commanders in charge of charge in commanders chief . K .

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CEU eTD Collection 28 Press, 27 th allows obedience This center. the from resources of loss the for compensate to way no has it because rank the result, a As organization. and Such resources. these of rank the since effective be deprived to likely are sanctions be may leadership central the of dictate the to conform these of much how and when They resources. what, get unit and commander principal. proximate which its decides to exclusively only responsible is chain the in unit every that levels lower the from information receives and orders issues which node supreme support. regular the to attached rewards argument, thefirst is comprehensive this ofsponsor study defection. structureto organizational defection. i.e. sponsors, toward behavior rebel of that into control sponsor’s of problem the transforming by proposition Sinno’s resources. for supporters external on depend heavily thus, and, communities local non to Contrary because backers foreign their by control to easier the to back central beanycan held leadershipand actio responsible for report levels lower The decisions. these of implementation of charge in are and

Ibid bukdr H. Abdulkader

ie s nbe o trc alternativ attract to unable is file , pp. , pp. pp. pp. The central leadeThe central Abdulkader from starts argument My 7 e leadership to accept any change in sponsor’s policies. Therefore, the command and command the Therefore, policies. sponsor’s in change any accept to leadership e 14 8 - 80 .

Sinno. 2008. 2008. Sinno. - exercise centralized organizations, Sinno argues, centralized argues, Sinno organizations, centralized rship is likely to be accountable to its sponsor sponsor its accountable belikely to to rship is

effective control over the organization. Th organization. the over control effective raiain a Wr n fhnsa ad Beyond and Afghanistan in War at Organizations

I n doing so, I spell out particular causal mechanisms, connecting mechanisms, causal particular out spell I so, doing n

and

While Sinno draws on a number of narratives to support his support to narratives of number a on drawsSinno While

file of centralized organizations is likely to be obedient obedient be to likely is organizations centralized of file Acting as a p a as Acting etra spot eas i hs ite oe i the in power little has it because support external e

in’ pooiin ht etaie rbl are rebels centralized that proposition Sinno’s

rebel leaders can discipline the rank the discipline can leaders rebel and roximate principal, the rebel leadership is a is leadership rebel the principal, roximate

file has weak local ties. Likewise the rank the Likewise ties. local weak has file - rebel relations. n.

ose commanders who do not do who commanders ose rebels lack solid ties to their to ties solid lack rebels Ihc, Y Corn NY: Ithaca, . because it receives private private receives it because

o leadership Top , and assures and , 28 ell University University ell -

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CEU eTD Collection 30 Press University Cornell Ithaca: 29 o autonomy financial significant enjoys often it because rank The interests. their against be to it find they if implementation their veto also but orders central change only not they that in autonomous are factions These the challenge openly or organinew aformally organizationnor collectivelythe establish not exit do from leadershipbut independently operate organization the within parts certain centralconsequently,to defection leadership,and,prone their more sponsors. against of control the to amenable less organization decentralized makes This sponsor. and organization w communities, respective their of leadership. its against and monitoringa and mismatchbetw sanctioning isfragileand thereis internal tactics, over preferences diverging have followers and leaders militant when argues, le large, and by are, commandersare becausetheirsponsors their to accountable organizations decentralized counterparts, centralized their Unlike allocatio the over say final the has commander each where which resources, rank non of leadership awithout clear from indication asponsor. order any alter not will agents their that ensures organizations centralized of structure control

Shapiro, Shapiro, Alexander Cooley. 2005. 2005. Cooley. Alexander - - ie s iey o nae n nacind ilne dfc t te oenet r vn turn even or government the to defect violence, unsanctioned in engage to likely is file and Fa be may mechanism this However, - op. cit op. ie s omnes ae togr oa te, n, hrfr, n ces o alternative to access an therefore, and, ties, local stronger have commanders as file ctiona ., pp. ., 56 pp. lized lized w - etaie organization centralized eakens - 30 61. organizations

With strong With Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States and Military Occupations Military and States Empires, of Organization The Hierarchy: of Logics

their allegiance to the center. the to allegiance their

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parochial interests, commanders are bound to the protection the to bound are commanders interests, parochial r te ot ntbe om f non of form unstable most the are

ant use cannot nesbe n non in unfeasible runs against runs

wing to its ties to the local level, other other level, local the to ties its to wing 29 the

This more general interests of their parent their of interests general more more autonomous more

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CEU eTD Collection Process. 32 Rule. 31 the T course. new a with comply to agent survival. very its or gains territorial in shift a such fact, In movements. rebel focused narrow by shared not are sponsors of concerns national because rebels and sponsor the between t and divisions to lead gradually to likely are policies reconciliatory of forms these All cease support government, targetthe against operations offensive include to support their cease to parties third by pressured are sponsors Often support. of policy sponsor’s in change the by triggered is and chain delegation mec first The shocks. external to vulnerable less be to likely defect. to organization lead that condition antecedent as serve shocks external mechanisms, these flow of recruits rebel other in membership factionalized claim factions and commanders their Most as control and command sponsor. fluctuating the to detrimental operations out carry parall a out carve simply infighting protracted from suffer often organizations These governments. external even and actors political or militants

Adria Lawrence. 2010. Triggeri 2010. Lawrence. Adria Wendy Pearlman. 2008. 2008. Pearlman. Wendy sponsor International Security International organizations. This creates This organizations.

In Defection of non of Defection sanctions or or sanctions ternational Security Security ternational . But if the rebels give in, this may create discontent among the commanders and and commanders the among discontent create may this in, give rebels the if But . ,

let alone issueare thedirectionsgivenlet alone a that sponsor. by a threat o threat

Given their aforementioned characteristics, c characteristics, aforementioned their Given 35(2): 88 35(2): piig nie n Out: and Inside Spoiling -

el organization within the parent organization, parent the within organization el centralized organizations centralized 33(3): 79 33(3): s

where many actors compete for the leadership. the for compete actors many where ng Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings against Colonial against Uprisings in Conflict and Competition Violence: Nationalist ng

f force. A sponsor may cave in and in cave may sponsor A force. f – 122, at pp. at 90 122, pp.

a –

109. serious problem for the leadership to monitor and control the control and monitor to leadership the for problem serious

In the In he rebels may resist, by raising voice or their arms against against arms their or voice raising by resist, may rebels he

– mechanism second 91.

Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Peace East Middle the and Contestation Political Internal

driven by three causal mechanisms. In a In mechanisms. causal three by driven the rebels. These international pressures international These rebels. pno’ plc my hetn rebel threaten may policy sponsor’s ,

hanism comes directly from the the from directly comes hanism the sponsor attempts to force its its force to attempts sponsor the - fire, peace talks and proposals. and talks peace fire, advocate restraint in executing in restraint advocate entralized organizations are organizations entralized 32

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CEU eTD Collection Review Science Political 35 August 29 Boston, in APSA Conference theat 2002 presentation for prepared paper StudyMethods, 34 Research Qualitative 33 small of use the with associated problem furt spurious results stemmingaemploym separate from that is design research separately. used when methods two the of limitations the avoid helps methods statistical and study case of combination the because approach method” “mixed sponsor their toward behavior rebel of process pose. we that question research of type Research Design buyinggreedy offcommanders, offeringor promising amnesty polit by hopes these stir can government target the conditions, such Under life. civilian to attracted rank affected the grows, attrition and prolongs, conflict the As cause. factions and commanders betwee ties the weaken skirmishes the among fear and disorder resentment, encourages rivals and government target the of hands the at file triggered agai both turn may who factions,

Andrew Bennett. 2002. Where the Model Frequently Me Frequently Model the Where 2002. Bennett. Andrew vn . ibra. 2005 Lieberman. S. Evan Garry King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. 1994. Verba. Sidney and Keohane O. Robert King, Garry e tse truh mr in more a through tested her In particular, the statistical part allows me to narrow down a set of hypotheses that can be be can that hypotheses of set a down narrow to me allows part statistical the particular, In the on dependent is method of appropriateness the suggests, wisdom conventional As by

omnes n fo slir. niiain, t Intimidations, soldiers. foot and commanders counterinsurgency (COIN) and inter and (COIN) counterinsurgency . Princeton: Princeton University Press. University Princeton Princeton: .

99: 435 99: allows one to identify general trends and avoid bias and better organize organize better and bias avoid and trends general identify to one allows .

etd nlss s Mixed a as Analysis Nested

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ehd taey o Cmaaie Researc Comparative for Strategy Method ets the Road: Combining Statistical, Formal, and Case Case and Formal, Statistical, Combining Road: the ets ent ofsmall analyze the outcome and process, and outcome the analyze einn Sca Iqiy Sinii Ifrne in Inference Scientific Inquiry: Social Designing ,

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CEU eTD Collection Journal Management Challenges. and Opportunities Cases: from Building Theory 2007. Graebner. E. Melissa and Eisenhardt 38 pp. Theory and Scope Science: Political Science. Political of Handbook 37 at 144, 36 producearefindingscase. the that idiosyncratictoasingle multiple than interpretation arbitrary researcher’s to vulnerable multiple than accurate and generalizable, them” to attached a as regarded theory is study this of aim regarding mechanisms and processes causal over the period. observation value in change that variables explanatory of effects the assess to me allows model survival the selec the mitigates which year, observed last the after not or occurs defection rebel whether assesses modeling this First, method. this using from benefits methodological two are There sponsor. its of realization a reaches it until factor, a Imodeling withthe nature fitthe method ofthe data. touch between relationship the in interested am I Since level). group and (individual levels two at vary predictors that assumes which modeling, non be randomly or

James Mahoney. 2007. Qualitative 2007. Mahoney. James K. R. Yin. 1994. Yin. R. K. . csen 17. ae td ad hoy n oiia Science Political in Theory and Study Case 1975. Eckstein. H. 80. tion bias from the omission of sponsorships that never experienced rebel defection. rebel experienced never that sponsorships of omission the from bias tion es

pp. pp. On the other hand, I use process trac process use I hand, other the On IIn proportional whichestimatesof addition, time hazard usemodel, thesurvival theCox

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rvds cnrl atr o te aue n bhvo of behavior and nature the for factor control a provides –

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CEU eTD Collection analysisasand the actors muchinformation squeeze about as outand possible. processes of efficiency the maximize to tried have I sources these and interviews the between triangulating establishments political andsecurity the to close arewho Pakistan and India both from authors the by books and articles and magazines weekly archives, news on i state. the in resides them of handful a only and exile, in or dead either is leaders militant Kashmiri Pakistani the about that my asreason,IFor this topichighlyinformation was themost depicted sensitive. found have from the interviews. o decade first the about information The events. and trends general the about information insightful provided have elites the while actors, and dynamics local out mapping in helpful particularly been have knowledgeable journalists Delhi and Kashmiri The picture. highly nuanced all are more a These build me helped which perspectives, diverse from analysts.conflict the viewed who interviewees policy journalists, Kashmiri and Indian off of Indi number comprising a excluding subjects, 15 interviewed I sources. secondary c) evidence; archival b) interviews; a) data: the collecting in techniques following the on relied compr a develop to field the in research term nformation on Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir. For this reason, I was compelled to also rely also to compelled was I reason, this For Kashmir. in involvement Pakistan’s on nformation

of scarcity the realized I data, necessary the collect to determination my Through given reasons security for Pakistan and Kashmir to travel to able not was I Regrettably, single the fordata The n eeas h sre i Ksmr uig h isrec, nelgne chiefs, intelligence insurgency, the during Kashmir in served who generals an

view from the news archives and magazines. Also the majority of key key of majority the Also magazines. and archives news the from view - case study was obtained from several sources and entailed a short a entailed and severalsources from obtained was studycase ehensive analysis of each insurgent organization. I organization. insurgent each of analysis ehensive of the respective countries. By By countries.respective the of f insurgency mainly comes comes mainly insurgency f - ie discussions, side

16 -

CEU eTD Collection all with dealing of problem the is movement rebel a managing of problem The followers. and leaders of coalitions are rebels actors, coherent relatively are sponsors while that assumes theory ethnicity/ideology, alternative resourcesrebelcapabilities. and shared defection: rebel of explanations alternative three suggest I studies conflict with literature sponsor their of interests the to detrimental or opposite are and opportunism hazard, that agendas out moral carry to resources granted the using are particularly, rebels whereby dilemma” “Maddison’s and problems, agency of terms in defection violence delegates government foreign a which Secon sponsorship. state understand to how and is rebellion what conflict, armed of context the in rebel chapter, this In framework. checked inawithin a through my of validity external the approach: method mixed a employ I research this of purposes the For sponsor. their to loyal stay or against defect rebels the d provided project. I a such addition, out carrying In of relevance sponsors. policy state and theoretical their regarding rebels of behavior the explaining Dissertation Roadmap elegation chain, and particularly the structure of rebel command and control control and command rebel of structure the particularly and chain, elegation , peet y nesadn o sae pnosi a a principal a as sponsorship state of understanding my present I d, hpe 2 eeos n raiainl hoy f re of theory organizational an develops 2 Chapter addr 1, Chapter chapter, next The introd this In

n eun for return in novel dataset on rebel behavior toward state sponsors, while the internal validity is validity internal the while sponsors, state toward behavior rebel on dataset novel - case study toseven outfits. case ofPakistan’sKashmiri militant support cin hv age t mv cnlc suis oad nesadn and understanding toward studies conflict move to argued have I uction

oprto oe gas srtge ad atc. hr, I Third, tactics. and strategies goals, over cooperation I discuss I a number of topics. First, I define what it means to be a a be to means it what define I First, topics. of number a esses the definitional issues and provides a conceptual a provides and issues definitional the esses some

uhrt to authority

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and alternative and suggest I - agent relationship in in relationship agent

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argument rary to the interests of their sponsors. The change in sponsor’s policy toward the armed armed the toward policy sponsor’s in change The sponsors. their of interests the to rary

Jaish In Chapter 5 I first discuss the causal mechanisms of the most significant factors drawing drawing factors significant most the of mechanisms causal the discuss first I 5 Chapter In processes and mechanisms particular uncover to try I 4, Chapter In of validity external The :

JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaaz Force and Ikhwanul Muslimeen. In the the In Muslimeen. Ikhwanul and Force Janbaaz Muslim Mujahideen, Hizbul JKLF, - e

- and alternati and Mohammad and Lashkar and Mohammad - , centralized outfits centralized

I run some postestimation analyses to examine how different factors produce produce factors different how examine to analyses postestimation some run I t I xmn fu idgnu mvmns n ter eainhp with relationship their and movements indigenous four examine I st, ve theorie anization. When the rebels espouse a centralized and hierarchical and centralized a espouse rebels the When anization. my argument my

or their constituent parts s could travel across time and types of warfare. I divide the divide I warfare. of types and time across travel could s - e - Taiba.

and alternative explanations is tested in Chapter 3. Chapter in tested is explanations alternative and o check for the robustness of theo checkresults. robustness for of the

in the 1990s the in .

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CEU eTD Collection groups militant various of sponsorship its to owing Kashmir and Jammu power the Despite aggression. Rebels, State States RebelsDefining and Sponsorship of measures theanalysis quantitative for 3. inChapter principal the to reference with defined is Defection defection”. “rebel variable, dependent my operationalize interve external from rebels” of “sponsorship term the delineate me help which groups rebel to given support possible answer challenges to attempt I contested. be can definition every that aware am I so, doing In for guide a provide to is aim my questions, these answering outfit that know we do How intervention? and sponsorship between mean we do important raises topic The before discussed be to need defection. that issues definitional rebel of forms and sponsorship state both to related Smlry wa sig what Similarly, ? States often empower rebel movements to fight their adversaries instead of pursuin of adversariesinstead fighttheir to movements rebel empower often States of types and “state” “rebels”, as terms discuss I First, follows. as proceeds chapter This issues conceptual clarifies and groups rebel of sponsorship describes first chapter This

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CEU eTD Collection 44 Press. Carolina Politics World in Insurgencies Transnational Borders: North Without Rebels of terro sponsor that University States connections: Manuscript, Power. Bargaining Science 213 43 PA.Carlisle, Institute, StrategicStudies Afghanistan and Iraq for Lessons Conflict: Regional of Escalation the and Insurgencies Organizations. Rebel to War Terrorism. Sponsored 42 41 129 116 40 1999). 39 ci of duration the or onset rebels, to conflict delegate governments why as: such issues phenomenon and e heavily manyrely insurgents on government. foreign a by supported conflicts rebel warring their to supplies and money, arms, troops, provide governments which in actors state Democratic the in conflicts Armed Repu sponsor. their of behalf on civilians and forces Israeli alt dispute interstate insurgent of sponsorship the cross extensive waged had Eritrea and Ethiopia Sudan, territory. disputed

Salehyan and Salehyan,Gleditsch Navin Bapat. 2006. State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups. Groups. Terrorist Transnational with Bargaining State 2006. Bapat. Navin For instance: Thomas Turner. 2007. 2007. Turner. Thomas instance: For Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps. 2010. Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal Applying Destruction? of Agents 2010. Kreps. E. Sarah and Byman Daniel e eg Grr Puir 20. ee Mvmns n Poy afr: gna Sdn n te Cong the and Sudan Uganda, Warfare: Proxy and Movements Rebel 2004. Prunier. Gerard e.g. See – – – 29; Navin Bapat. 2007a. The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns. Campaigns. Terrorist of Internationalization The 2007a. Bapat. Navin 29; 141, 2002. (ed.). Clark F. John 130;

blic of Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda involve complex interactions complex involve Rwanda and Uganda, Congo, of blic African Affairs African age A recent proliferation of studies on externally backed insurgencies raises some important some raises insurgencies backed externally on studies of proliferation recent A 44: 265 24(4):

pp. ,

nts. showing that more than one hundred and fifty insurgencies around the world have been been have world the around fifty insurgencies and hundred one than more showingthat et al., op. cit. op. al., et

155 40 –

159. 159. eet tde hglgt hs evsvns o etra te in ties external of pervasiveness this highlight studies Recent – 280; Navin Bapat. 2007b. The Strategy of the Weak: State Support for Terrorism and and Terrorism for Support State Weak: the of Strategy The 2007b. Bapat. Navin 280; 103(412): 359 103(412): nentoa Suis Perspectives Studies International

hough Tehran hough

Cunningham, Journal of Conflict Resolution Resolution Conflict of Journal

vil and international wars, internationaland vil groups.

– 383. The African Stakes of the Congo War Congo the of Stakes African The rism. rism.

The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality and Myth, Conflict, Wars: Congo The op. cit op. -

sponsored militants such militants sponsored 41 39

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Idean Salehyan. 2009. 2009. Salehyan. Idean Press; University Cambridge UK: Cambridge, The sponsorship of rebels is, therefore, a fairly widespread fairly a therefore, is, rebels of sponsorship The

. Iran and Israel do not have a single recorded militarized recorded single a have not do Israel and Iran

1() 1 11(1): , 54(1): 493 54(1): xternal governments for theirxternal governments fighting. for 43

why rebels accept foreignassistance, accept rebels why – - 18; Chapel Hill; Daniel Byman. 2007. 2007. Byman. Daniel Hill; Chapel . Ithaca (NY) and London: Cornell University University Cornell London: and (NY) Ithaca . –

515; Idean Salehyan. 2010b. 2010b. Salehyan. Idean 515; of Delegation The 2010a. Salehyan. Idean 42 as Hezbollah and Hamas and Hezbollah as

how this state strategy affects the affects strategy state this how . New York: Palgrave MacMil Palgrave York: New . International Studies Quarterly Quarterly Studies International ofit Mana Conflict . New York: Zed Books, Books, Zed York: New . between . U.S. Army War War Army U.S. . - - Agent Analysis to State to Analysis Agent border wars through wars border eet n Peace and gement

state and non and state

international Transnational Transnational attack (1986 o

College, College, lan, lan, Deadly Deadly 44 50(2): 50(2):

and the the pp. pp. pp. 21 – - -

CEU eTD Collection e: CP co Dtst 2.1 Dataset Actor Burma. and in Ireland Conflicts UCDP 47 http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/63/63658_UCDP_Actor_Dataset_Codebook_2011.pdf. See: 46 Organization 45 authority. of relations the and membership by restrained are who commi any without interaction social in other each engage who individuals more or two of comprised is group a Importantly, difference asrathergroup.are The aniscrucial: understood a organization they than g target a against force armed using individuals encompassing andgroups terrorist militant alike. means radical most the using groups the for to stand “militants” opposition and “terrorists” organized terms while an authority, denote “rebels” language, colloquial In insurgency. or conflict have associated often are and terms meanings different these science, political In groups. “terrorist” or “militant” of sponsorship state exclusively analyze Bapat Navin and Byman Daniel like authors other “rebels”, label the diff subsume Salehyan Idean like authors some While recipients. support external of definitions precise Lately, more proposed groups. insurgent of classification descriptive for used mainly rebels. conditions what under

Kenneth A. Schultz. 2010. The Enfor The 2010. Schultz. A. Kenneth This definition corresponds with the one in Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) dataset on non on dataset (UCDP) Program’s Data Conflict Uppsala in one the with corresponds definition This Paul Kenny. 2010. Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from Protracted Protracted from Evidence Organizations: Insurgent in Cohesion and Integrity Structural 2010. Kenny. Paul

45 Rbl” r dfnd s nmd non named a as defined are “Rebels” and coherence conceptual lacked rebels of sponsorship however, recently, Until f confr of

64:

281 ontation – 312. tments, whereas an organization is a mutually oriented activity of individuals individuals of activity oriented mutually a is organization an whereas tments,

can can Ti poet ps o tr “ees bcue t s oe inclusive more is it because “rebels” term for opts project This .

Internat states use coercion to compel other states to cease their support to support their cease to states other compel to coercion use states

cement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Civil Wars. Wars. Civil Interstate Bargaining: Coercive in Problem cement ional Studies Review Review Studies ional ih vrey f hnmn sc a rvlto, ethnic revolution, as such phenomena of variety a with - 00 Uppsal 2010,

- vrmn t ahee eti pltcl goals. political certain achieve to overnment oenetl political governmental 12(4): 533 12(4): But . -

55. a Conflict Data Program, Program, Data Conflict a hs dfntos ifr n em of terms in differ definitions these

erent opposition groups under groups opposition erent 47

- eiig ees as rebels Defining military collective of of collective military

some authors have have authors International International - state actors. actors. state it was it an 22 46 ,

CEU eTD Collection (ed.), Chesterman Simon 48 t as such organizations separatist some example, For approachsuch u an because choose I disputed. internationally is statehood whose entities all excludes sponsor of definition rebellion over control exert to dia regime the is Government Council. Security UN the of members permanent two least at by recognized territory certain becauseexcluded nottry do tocontroldo. and territory they populationasrebels by Fi driven violence. always is objective their and organization political distinct a lack ultimately they but base rear a control may and forces regular state’s the of supplements the are Paramilitaries irregula These India. in Rifles Assamese the or Janjaweeds Sudanese the Bosnia, and Croatia in Tigers Arkan’s the Iraq, as in Army such Popular groups, paramilitary from rebels distinguish goals and means Such territory. of mobilization political tactics of range a includes insurgency or Rebellion forces. armed and organizations political illegal of use the through territory certain a over authority political It interests.factions.rebel multiple as alsodisplays entities with actors power on light more shed may organization

Marie sporas, companies and refugees, and companies sporas, - The “state” in state sponsorship of rebel groups refers to a sovereign government over government sovereign a to refers groups rebel of sponsorship state in “state” The protracted a as here viewed is which “insurgency”, or “rebellion” in engaged are Rebels Joelle Zahar. 2001. 2001. Zahar. Joelle - iiay tuge gis a oenet ie a waeig n/r elcn it replacing and/or weakening at aimed government a against struggle military al, rmnl rus eteit oiia pris n mltn rlgos et are sects religious militant and parties political extremist groups, criminal nally, Civilians in War in Civilians –

directed toward the establishment of a of establishment the toward directed

Proteges that nrecognized entities are quite similar tostate nrecognized entities are quite similar

. These actors These .

controls the capital city. The non The city. capital the controls Cins Cno Fde: Civil Fodder: Cannon Clients, , , Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Riener Lynne Colo.: Boulder, ,

are excluded from this definit this from excluded are frain ae “flip a are formations r

are often coerced often are - relations between the leadership, commanders an commanders leadership, the between relations he

- ieain ies f ai Eelam Tamil of Tigers Liberation , pp. pp. , Militia Relations in Internal Conflicts. In In Conflicts. Internal in Relations Militia in – lternative government on a piece piece a on government lternative

to assist to guerilla warfare, terrorism, and and terrorism, warfare, guerilla 43 - ion because ion state forms of support of forms state – - ie o rbl movements. rebel of side” 65.

- ing like rebel organizations. rebel organizations. like

rebels. Similarly, my my Similarly, rebels. none of them of none

, such as as such

seek 23

48 d a s s

CEU eTD Collection David and Salehyan Idean Gleditsch, S. Kristian compiledby post the covers also project (201 Themnér and Pettersson 50 Press University Cornell (N.Y.): 49 intervention for substitute howev note, links, empirical and analytical their Despite againstexiles Idi regime military as Amin’s of a prototype support. 19 become the forces Consider conflict. armed ongoing an in own embroiled sponsor’s the as interventions military term the to corresponds non and (troops) military into divided is assistance the its between conflict ongoing the in sponsor of involvement services. military/intelligence to access and training material/logistics, but spurious. patterns and causes underlying the and heterogeneous extremely cases of universe the make also non Including that organizations rebel other exclude to reason legitimate no be would there then Abkhazia, or Authority National Palestinian from units, sovereign recognized internationally administration. state modern resemble closely that system bank even and educational security, health, including governance sophisticated developed had (LTTE)

This variable is coded according to the UPCD External Support in Armed Conflict dataset compiled by Högbladh, Högbladh, by compiled dataset Conflict Armedin Support External UPCD the accordingto coded is variable This Zachariah Cherian Mampi Cherian Zachariah in this project support refers to the provision of troops, sanctuary, weapons, finance, finance, weapons, sanctuary, troops, of provision the to refers support project this in such a such The provision of troops is a nod in which sponsorship and direct intervention overlap. intervention direct and sponsorship which in nod a is troops of provision The groups, opposition embattled to support of types different provide governments External

status - recognized states recognized . If my definition of sponsor would encompass no encompass would sponsor of definition my If . - World War 2 period, the remaining observations will be coded using coded will be observations the remaining period, 2 War World lly. 2011 lly.

1) which covers the above types of external assistance for the 1975 the for assistance external of types above the covers which 1) ,

vice versa vice

. have woul Rebel Rulers: Rulers: Rebel

d not only overstretch my definition of sponsor but would but sponsor of definition my overstretch only not d dge o pltcl oto oe a hn o territory. of chunk a over control political of degree a . First, direct intervention assumes that the intervening intervening the that assumes intervention direct First, . ln wt al rvlgs n olgtos ht stem that obligations and privileges all with along nugn oenneadCvla iedrn War. during Life Civilian and Governance Insurgent

Cunningham as well as supplementary sources. supplementary as well Cunninghamas 9 on ivso o Tnai ad Ugandan and Tanzania of invasion joint 79 er, that sponsorship is not a conceptual a not is sponsorship that er, - military (the rest). Military support support Military rest). (the military protégé 49

Yet, these movements these Yet,

n - and recognized entities recognized 50

the target government, target the ae o te ee of level the on Based EACD v2.3 EACD - 2009. Since my Since 2009. like the like are

dataset dataset Ithaca Ithaca

not 24

CEU eTD Collection 270. 54 53 Pat Conflicts, Intrastate Press. Michigan of University Arbor: Ann 828 68(4): and Findley Michael 2433; Paper Working Research Policy Bank World Wars. Civil of Duration the and Interventions External 1820 52 29 2(3): 51 and conflict a ending toward aimed act benevolent a as intervention consider sometimes scholars or groups, rebel Palestinian end completely or co external intervention, of view static somewhat a with rebel of expense the at often loyalty, and compliance spons a relationship, this In Chad. pan a create to aimed Legion Islamic The directed and financed established, activities). and strategies goals, (e.g. agenda rebels’ over control exercising and shaping in role vital a play governments foreign that over control little and insurgency to peripheral is who party external an condemnation. entails international intervention direct and Second, loss physical avoid to it undertakes sponsor a and overt, inte its to damage and casualties including conflict, for responsibility takes and party, a with sides openly state

Salehyan, Delegation of Conflict, ofConflict, Salehyan,Delegation Yaacov Bar Siman Bar Yaacov Chris Loveman. 2002. Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention. Intervention. Proxy of Phenomenon the Assessing 2002. Loveman. Chris ya Balch Dylan

– 1992. 1992.

– U 48 at 48 – nlike intervention, nlike 837; Patrick Regan. 2000. 2000. Regan. Patrick 837; nentoa Suis Quarterly Studies International Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. Rethinking Third Rethinking 2006. Teo. Kwang Tze ntrol pp. pp. - ida, n Ade Etrie 20. iln Tm: h Wrd Polit World The Time: Killing 2000. Enterline. Andrew and Lindsay, 33. – Journal of Conflict Resolution Conflict of Journal

- the a Tov. 1984. The Strategy of War by Pr by War of Strategy The 1984. Tov. rnational reputation. In contrast, sponsorship can be unknown, secretive or or secretive unknown, be can sponsorship contrast, In reputation. rnational

– rebel movement. rebel

s etfe i Sras pnosi o te Fatah the of sponsorship Syria’s in testified as sponsor’s grip over rebellion may increase, decrease, weaken, then resume resume then weaken, decrease, increase, may rebellion over grip sponsor’s

sponsorship is sponsorship n h cs of case the in

pp. pp. or provides resources to a rebel movement in exchange for for exchange in movement rebel a to resources provides or Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict Intrastate in Intervention Outside Powers: Foreign and Wars Civil 501; 501; 53 52

Sinno, 44: 615 44(4):

For instance, instance, For On the other hand, the concept of sponsorship presumes sponsorship of concept the hand, other the On ik ea. 02 Third 2002. Regan. rick

46(1): 55 46(1): op. cit op.

a complex relati complex a ita’ cnrl vr h Khmer the over control Vietnam’s - Party Interventions into Civil Wars. Wars. Civil into Interventions Party – the 642; Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis 2000. 2000. Sambanis Nicholas and Elbadawi A. Ibrahim 642; .,

pp. pp. – 73. sponsorship also assumes a varying level of of level varying a assumes also sponsorship oxy. for 79.

s’ Cooperation and Conflict and Cooperation

mer Libyan leader leader Libyan mer

raiainl autonomy. organizational onship between sponsors and sponsors between onship - Party Interventions and the Duration of of Duration the and Interventions Party ofit Scrt ad Development and Security Conflict, ( 1964 c o Cvl a Duration, War Civil of ics Muammar el Muammar - , The Journal of Politics of Journal The - Arab entity against against entity Arab 1970 19( Rouge. Finally, Finally, Rouge. 4): ) 54

263 n various and

In contrast In - 273, - Qaddafi rebels. rebels.

at with

pp. 25 51 . ,

CEU eTD Collection 56 in Conflicts Ethnic Interventions Foreign 55 etc. Emirates Arab United o sponsorship Pakistan’s e.g. groups, Qatar, multiple backs sponsor a Sometimes Arabia, Saudi from training possibly and arms money, receives and Turkey in sanctuary a enjoys Army Syrian Free the where war civil Syrian ongoing dyad my is conflict. This ofanalysis. per unit group. the over control agenda an maintaining govern recognized internationally an against fighting is which non and define I parts, constitutive abovementioned the expect Al of sponsors active not were governments these as with, sup to chosedeliberately the U the in operatives had even and Malaysia in sanctuary private a ran Saudis, rich 9/ of eve the on assistance. material of provision the to themselves to need Governments sponsorship. a constitute not does it itself by but outfits, case African South sponsorshipofRenamo. ofthe to order in organization rebel a support violence establishingpeace.

Bym o eape Raa (00 ad egn 20) Fr xetos e fr ntne Rbr Nladv 2009. Nalbandov. Robert instance: for see exceptions For (2002). Reagan and (2000) Reagan example: For

inaction an, an, aual, hr ae ay ofit fauig utpe pnos Oe f hs is these of One sponsors. multiple featuring conflicts many are there Naturally, p The

- Deadly Connections Deadly may not necessarily be t be necessarily not may aeil eore b a etra gvrmn t a eintd rebel designated a to government external an by resources material organization

rovi f these of 11: this 11: in of sion 55

ponsorship

organization raise organization government port the port to comply with the policies of their alleged masters. alleged their of policies the with comply to

, aeil sitne s a is assistance material pp. pp.

219 . organization s are not necessarily driven by such principals such by drivennecessarily arenot s

. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. Publishing Ashgate VT: Burlington, . he goal of sp of goal he s

may have been important, none of these governments governments these of none important, been have may d money in Germany, enjoyed financial aid from many many from aid financial enjoyedGermany, in money d economically weaken the weaken economically state sponsorship as an active provision of material of provision active an as sponsorship state ’s activities. Since there was no relationship to start start to relationship no was thereSince activities. ’s

onsors. onsors.

At the heart of sponsorship is a sponsor a is sponsorship of heart the At n

Consider the notorious example of Al of example notorious the Consider motn sget f st of segment important For instance For - Qaeda, it would be unreasonable to to unreasonable be would it Qaeda, ment

, external governments external , agt government target –

aimed at establishing and establishing at aimed

f Kashmiri rebels and and rebels Kashmiri f t spot o rebel to support ate

. Summing T actively organization he cessation of cessation he S . 56

Although as in the the in as commit - up the up Qaeda - rebel may the

26 –

CEU eTD Collection 2001, 57 Ethiopia eastern in Liberation an for Front (WSLF)independent Somali state Front whofought and (SALF)Western sece opponents. their than weaker much are they when militants to violence delegate may territory contesting Rivals regimes. unfriendly war proxy superpowers the out War, carried Cold the During agenda. political own its fulfill to is sponsor any of Principals Agents and describe I sponsor section following the In option. reasonable more a as seems approach dyadic the particular a at aimed but way, certain a in act groups rebel that suggest claims monadic and Poliyadic party. other the to behavior this relate always party a of behavior about This approaches. monadic and polyadic than precise more nevertheless is it imperfect, dyadicis the approach While groups. armed other of strategies with intertwined is assu this allies. their of sponsor every each Ideally, toward way specific a in act may rebels and sponsors both that implies of quality ties, ethnic or ideological as such criteria certain to according allies their between distinguish rationally can movements rebel (2004 Chad in war proxy Sudan’s

Zeev Maoz and Belgin San Belgin and Maoz Zeev soit for ssionists International Studies Quarterly Studies International No matter how noble the goal of assisting aggrieved groups may sound, the ultimate aim ultimate the sound, may groups aggrieved assisting of goal the noble how matter No - rebel dyad mption can be contested in multiparty civil wars where rebel behavior toward a sponsor a toward behavior rebel where wars civil multiparty in contested be can mption

ertra gis Fr xml, Soma example, For gains. territorial

using the using in the 1970s and 1980s. Alternatively, sponsors may be interested i interested be may sponsors Alternatively, 1980s. and 1970s the in

sponsor. Since sponsor. - , Sponsors and Rebels, Sponsors rebel dyad rebel s

- Akca. 2012. Rivalry and State Support of Non of Support State and Rivalry 2012. Akca. n Afric in

principal

56(4): 720 56(4): - a, Asia and Latin America to topple down ideologically ideologically down topple to America Latin and Asia a, should constitute should 2009). Regardless of the scenario I assume that sponsors and sponsors that assume I scenario the of Regardless 2009).

I am interested in rebel behavior toward their state sponsors, sponsors, state their toward behavior rebel in interested am I 57 - agent agent

n on s, hy a trw ul upr bhn the behind support full throw may they so, doing In – evc rvso, aaiiis rsmtiges. This else. something or capabilities, provision, service 734. terminology

Delegation theUse Force of of Wars Civil in

a distinct unit of analysis. I am aware that aware am I analysis. of unit distinct a lia .

pnoe the sponsored it is unclear is it - State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946 (NAGs), Groups Armed State

whether is because dyadic claims dyadic because is

oai b Liberation Abo Somali

their behavior is behavior their n making n

27 –

CEU eTD Collection 60 59 58 Iransome states like they that optfor be can ideology suggest, Kreps and Byman As logic. rationalist commitments symbolic of basis ties. such without those than governments foreign from support military receive to likely more are ties ethnic transnational nei troops and heavy mechanization. where swamps) inhospita in advantageous especially is This have break Afghan from withdraw to troops Soviet the forced mujahedeen the US, US the 1980s the in government Afghanistan over Union Soviet the with war conventional disastrous losses material and human atrocities orembarrassing other acts. plausible the preserves sponsor a way, Either East. Such territory disputed a acquire to seeking necessarily without cuts” thousand from “bleed rival their

Byman, Byman, Cunningham and Salehyan,Gleditsch Salehyan ghboring states as this may be may this as states ghboring

the the u o a ula war. nuclear a of out a strategy a iial, tts r mr lkl t spot hi kn aig n re srgl in struggle armed an waging kin their support to likely more are states Similarly, delegate frequently governments external importantly, More op. cit., op. expertise,

( 2010

funneled covert support to seven mujahedeen outfits. At a relatively low cost for the the for cost low relatively a At outfits. mujahedeen seven to support covert funneled a).

pp. pp. is limited limited

often 90 knowledge of local terrain, language and links to the indigenous population. indigenous the to links and language terrain, local of knowledge - 94 .

navigation and communication may severely hamper the deployment of of deployment the hamper severely may communication and navigation attributed to attributed

f pn iiay confrontation military open of iial, eeain a b a efcet ehns we rebels when mechanism efficient an be may delegation Similarly, 59

At other times, external governments external times, other At – ,

seen as seen op. cit op. such as shared identity and ideology and identity shared as such

a butnormatively lesscapable congruent agent. Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir, Punjab and the North the and Punjab Kashmir, in involvement Pakistan’s ., at pp. 727. pp. at .,

a popular move. Recent research finds that rebels with rebels that finds research Recent move. popular a ble areas (e.g. jungles, deserts, mountains and and mountains deserts, jungles, (e.g. areas ble

eiblt i cs their case in deniability . o isac, i instance, For such a such

violence choose their clients on the on clients their choose –

powerful motivator for for motivator powerful

istan that sed f fighti of nstead

to rebels to avoid to rebels to , and averted the the averted and , tend to trump the the trump to tend agents 60

commit commit ng a a ng 28 58 - .

CEU eTD Collection Analysis Policy the of Impact The Need: in Friend A 66 Revolution 65 Structure, Ownership Governance. EU in Relations Fiduciary 64 and Agency Delegation: Politics ofUnion European Logics Two 2001. Majone. Giandomenici 2009. Community. European the in Setting Agenda and Agency, Reform. Environmental Bank World Delegatio 2000. Strøm. 63 K. Press; Democracies, University Cambridge Cambridge: 1999. Appropriat the and 62 61 sponsorship ofrebel movements. organizations followers and leaders rebel between relationship agent. the to includ principal the for service some perform (formalcontract “principal” a “agent” orinformal) authority to according toan towhich transfers and Organization decision parties. political and bureaucracies, on emphasis an with science political and studies legal in Principal models by captured re This group. rebel the of cooperation minimal for return in resources provides

Byman and K and Byman 1982. RussellHardin. For example: Roderick Kiewiet, and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. 1991. McCubbins. Mathew and Kiewiet, Roderick example: For Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and and Theory Agency Organizations: International to Delegation 2003. Tierney. Michael and Nielson, L. Daniel Michael Jensen, and William Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Behavior, Managerial Firm: the of Theory 1976. Meckling. William and Jensen, Michael Scott Gates. 2002. Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion. Rebellion. of Microfoundations The Allegiance: and Recruitment 2002. Gates. Scott opoieain hog Delegation Through Nonproliferation eeaig oes A rnato Cs Pltc Apoc t Plc Mkn udr eaae Powers Separate under Making Policy to Approach Politics Cost Transaction A Powers: Delegating ihr a, pnosi i a olcie action collective a is sponsorship way, Either found - -

aig rm ebr tts o utltrl ois such bodies multilateral to states member from making 46(1): 111 agent theories have proven a powerful tool in analyzing various delegation affili delegation various analyzing in tool powerful a proven have theories agent European Journal of Political Research Research Political of Journal European agency (or pr (or agency , forthcoming. , 64 reps, reps, .

66 in both the both in

n ofit tde, principal studies, conflict In os Process. ions olwn tee eet tde, aot h faeok o nesad state understand to framework the adopt I studies, recent these Following

op. cit op. – Journal of Financial Economics Financial of Journal various 130; Shapiro, 130; CollectiveAction

2(1): 103 2(1): .; Salehyan, Delegation of War; War; of Delegation Salehyan, .;

writings incipal U agencies. EU Chicago: University of Chicago Press; David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran. O’Halloran. Sharyn and Epstein, David Press; Chicago of University Chicago: –

122. op. cit op.

Internation Syrian Civil War on Syria’s Clients Syria’s on War Civil Syrian

agent) theories agent)

. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. Univ. Hopkins Johns MD: Baltimore, . of Max Webber and the “new institutionalism” in economics. in institutionalism” “new the and Webber Max of .

62 PD israin Uiest o Calif of University dissertation, PhD .

nentoa rltos coas xmn dlgto of delegation examine scholars relations International 63 al Organization Organization al

n nthl, gny hoy sue ta tee s a is there that assumes theory agency nutshell, a In - 3 37: 261 ing the transfer of some decision some of transfer the ing gn tere hv be ue t udrtn the understand to used been have theories agent :

305 . These theories These . , 65 International Organization Organization International Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, Wood, and Siroky Salehyan, -

360, at 360, and – 289. 57 (2): 241 (2): 57

the ties between state sponsors and rebel and sponsors state between ties the

The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties Parties Congressional Delegation: of Logic The 61 pp. pp.

n hc te xenl government external the which in 308. n and Accountability in Parliamentary Parliamentary in Accountability and n

(A Principal (A eiltv bodies, legislative

276; Mark Pollack. 1997. Delegation, Delegation, 1997. Pollack. Mark 276; are a set of general governance general of set a are

ornia: San Diego, La Jolla; Jolla; La Diego, San ornia: 51 (1): 99 (1): 51 – s h Wrd Trade World the as op. cit. op. Agent Approach Agent - making Journal of Conflict Conflict of Journal ; Ora Szekely. 2014. 2014. Szekely. ; Ora lationship is best is lationship Agency Costs, and and Costs, Agency - 134; R. L. Brown. Brown. L. R. 134; governments, governments, authority ). ). Foreign Foreign ations ations 29 .

CEU eTD Collection Horizons 68 from 67 that in intervention direct of costs the offset delegation of benefits the conditions, comp will and sponsor their trust rebels the aligned, are beliefs and preferences their Because flawlessly. works delegation the government, target a fighting its as information regime.of the sponsor’s political their expect sponsors minimum, m a and arrangement, incomplete to relationship favor They whole. a as membership the of cooperation passive a and governments the over control of compliance large) at seek sponsors non them goal. accomplish main their enough with rebels provides rebel a that is idea principal delegates government

oetSemn 98 taei Sple eeto:Udrtnig Long Understanding Selection: Supplier Strategic 1988. Spekman. Robert (20 Salehyan -

the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 10, September to Invasion Soviet the collision between collision

over goals, organization, strategies and tactics. Cooperation implies that at least there is is there least at that implies Cooperation tactics. and strategies organization, goals, over hn rbl uft ges ih sosr bu is oe n cnlc, a th has conflict, a in role its about sponsor a with agrees outfit rebel a When rebel a usually is agent the sponsorship, of context the In

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not to use the granted resources to threaten the survival survival the threaten to resources granted the use to not fight against the target government, but not enough to enough not but government, target the against fight

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CEU eTD Collection Wikileaks Cables.Minawi: Erdimi Rejects Khartoum's Push for Renewed Offensive. March 3, 2008. 2008. 3, March Offensive. Renewed for Push Khartoum's Rejects Erdimi http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08KHARTOUM311/?q=erdimi%20sudan Cables.Minawi: Wikileaks 2008http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08KHARTOUM397/?q=erdimi%20sudan 75 the against 2000 in India with cease aHizbulcommanders Mujahideenstruckthe Forexample, target the government. with alliance an making without fighting the of out drops or government target the with settlement resources. Congo’s of management and control the over Rwanda, sponsor, another with clashed Kampala when Uganda, backers, its of one deserted (RCD) Movement Resistance f Congolese Similarly, Libyan the demanded (GUNT), Council Transitional rebel Chadian (1978 Chad in war civil the of conclusion the in instance, For assistance. sponsor’s discards deliberately is by contract openlyMilosevic, didso. President Yugoslav sponsor, their though even group Contact the by proposals peace accept to BosnianSerbs and Krajina of refusal the is example notorious most The sponsor. their backedby cease sign to refuse or over negotiations Chadian opposition. leaders a him denied Khartoum because demand Ghosh’s Ndjamena. refused Erdemi take to failed they after Deby Idriss President Chad’s against offensive renewed

Wikileaks Cables. Chad: RFC's Erdimi Plans Land Grab While Other Rebels Move to Topple Deby. March 17, 17, March Deby. Topple to Move Rebels Other While Grab Land Plans Erdimi RFC's Chad: Cables. Wikileaks desertion eee defectio Severe rebel when is defiance of indicator third The Desertion the organization the - weey rbl oeet r t fcin hetn t lae t sponso its leave to threatens faction its or movement rebel a whereby , 1987) Qaddafi had to pull back his forces from the country after its its after country the from forces his back pull to had Qaddafi 1987) Reportedly,

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ed a bulk of Kashmiri militants militants Kashmiri of bulk a ed population (e.g. bombing) or against the officials of the sponsor country (e.g. (e.g. country armed clashesbetween rebel militias sponsor the of officials the assassination and attempts) against or bombing) (e.g. population one sporadic any act sponsor’sgovern spoken denyingability itspop the to as well as order, constitutional or regime sponsor’s the of overthrow an for calls verbal a where situation a sides, switching is defection severe of type second The s -

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CEU eTD Collection Illinois of 2012. University Dissertation, PhD Unpublished Asia. South 78 Dissertation. PhD Unpublished University: Princeton AfricanInsurgencies. in Fragmentation 77 Civilians. against Violence Sets. Fuzzy Press University Resolution 76 of distribution unequal the involves typically sponsorship state while relations, symmetric strateg groups splits. organizational of toward combatants of behavior the about theories developed civilians. against violence use actors armed state rebelof b studies existing non between interactions Potential for Explanations suicide bombings Pakistani officials against orstirring sectarian violence. Jaish ocassion sov Pakistan’s of Hizb like respectful organizations remained them of all not grew, organizations and Kashmir in Inter Pakistani

Christia, ct Gts 2002. Gates. Scott For instance: Kenny, Kenny, instance: For - Alliances between Militant Groups. Groups. Militant Alliancesbetween e ic alliances between rebels offers plausible arguments, but the but arguments, plausible offers rebels between alliances ic - that However, this literature provides no explanations explanations no provides literature this However, strategic of theories lack we rapidly, expanded has wars civil on literature the Although Mohammad and HarkatMohammad and aly op. cit. op. 46(1): 46(1): Political Research Quarterly Quarterly Research Political

draws on draws arig u voec aant nin forces. Indian against violence out carrying ; - ; Christina Furtado. 2007. Inter 2007. Furtado. Christina ; Services Intelligence (ISI), these these (ISI), Intelligence Services lie . eeis 08 Te osqecs f Ri of Consequences The 2008. Metelits M. Claire 111

eevd re riig n waos A tm pse ad h Kashmiri the and passed time As weapons. and training free received Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion. Rebellion. of Microfoundations The Allegiance: and Recruitment - 130; Stathis Kalyvas. 2006. 2006. Kalyvas. Stathis 130;

propositions from dominant propositions IR theories. p cit. op. Journal of Peace Research Research Peace of Journal ul 77

- ehavior contribute to our understanding of conditions under which non whichunder conditions of understandingour to ehaviorcontribute

state and external interveners in the context of armed conflicts. The The conflicts. armed of context the in interveners external and state M ial, hr i a ugoig ieaue n line bten rebel between alliances on literature burgeoning a is there Finally, Rebel u Mi ;

aienad Lashkar and jahideen ul

chael H. Woldemariam. 2011. Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and and Factionalism Collide: Rebels Why 2011. Woldemariam. H. chael Ansar, have turned into Frankenstein’s monsters byconducting Frankenstein’s into turned have Ansar, Defection British Journal of Science of Political Journal British 24: 673 62(4): - Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competitio or Cooperation Dynamics: Group Rebel -

47(5): 684; Reed M. Wood. 2010. Rebel Capability and Strategic Strategic and Capability Rebel 2010. Wood. M. Reed 684; oi o Voec i Cvl War Civil in Violence of Logic outfits

601 - e 76 - -

Taiba still follow Islamabad’s agenda by agenda Islamabad’s follow still Taiba 614.

were allowed to recruit militants to fight to militants recruit to allowed were tdns f ofit tde hv also have studies conflict of Students - Champaign; Navin Bapat and Kanisha Bond. Bond. Kanisha and Bapat Navin Champaign; for The

valry: Explaining Insurgent Violence Using Using Violence Insurgent Explaining valry:

78 rebel defection. The scholarship on scholarship The defection. rebel rebel leadership and the likelihood the and leadership rebel

aoiy f other of majority

3: 3: 1 - se 32.

explanations are based on on based are explanations

. Cambridge: Cambridge Cambridge Cambridge: . h Junl f Conflict of Journal The

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CEU eTD Collection 80 Press, 79 resources and capabilities. id be can explanations such three speaking, Broadly disobedience. agent’s of explanations several principal. the against resources of use the and opportunism thei of interests and goals the against behave often agents that recognize models agency before, mentioned As defection. of them. to back report and rebels monitor stric mechanisms, selection use can Sponsors rebels. i.e. agents, their discipline and oversee to sponsors, i.e. principals, of ability the involves authority principal into incorpor is asymmetry power that is reason first The reasons. several for chosen is theory theoriesthe power shouldallowfor disparity between parties. relative the bringdisobedient blockade,to endure to resources necessary Finall fighting. all need rebels whereas support, of extent the manipulating by commitments their break or alter to afford can governments external group.Moreover, rebel a cause.Because mutual the to committed less governments external default, by makes, sponsorship of asymmetry power the agreements, mutual on renege to parties all for opportunities equal produces alliances the Whereas governments. external of favor in capabilities and resources

Susan Shapiro. 2005. Agency Theory. AgencyTheory. 2005. SusanShapiro. entified in the principal the in entified Roderick D. Kiewiet, and Mathew McCubbins. 199 McCubbins. Mathew and Kiewiet, D. Roderick pp. pp. I formulate formulate I 27 - 34.

power -

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aiy mn pris eeal peet sc a behavior. a such prevents generally parties among parity oeta explanations potential

agent literature: preference convergence, the availability of alternative of availability the convergence, preference literature: agent picpl. hs eair nlds hrig hdn information, hiding shirking, includes behavior This principals. r

agents shrouded i shrouded Annual Review of Sociology of Review Annual into line with their own preferences.Ininter own their with line into 79

Second, principal Second, n secrecy n h bss f principal of basis the on 1. The Logic of Delegation of Logic The ,

sponsors can always deny that they support support deny always can thatthey sponsors

(31): 263 (31): - sntos r ie third hire or sanctions t agent theories relate to the problem the to relate theories agent

ial, gny oes suggest models agency Finally, - 284, at 284, . Chicago: University of Chicago Chicago of University Chicago: . - gn faeok Agency framework. agent pp. pp. 279.

aiy f inter of parity

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CEU eTD Collection Together. Go to Tend ‘Pork’ and Politics Ethnic Why 1999. Fearon. University. Stanford Mimeo, D. James Press; Westview CO: Boulder, in Africa, 86 85 136 84 Review 83 14. 62 6(1): Studies, Security Can’t. Other the and Done be Can One Why Wars: Civil Ideological and Ethnic in Intervention 1996a. Kaufmann. 82 81 principal rebel a over solidifies control and monitoring sponsor’s ethnicity facilitates origin ethnic shared common Consequently, authority, of criteria clear up the has ruler legitimacy claim can sponsors ties, these to Owing ties. authority and social p the with line in closer behavior in efficient more a to preferences common to lead arguably can ethnicity action, and identities. embody ethnic their to protect claiming organizations to loyal be to tend groups and individuals conflicts, ethnic all of premise basic bewill mot preferences to as long As principal.

Fearon and Laitin, and Fearon Tierney, Nielsonand David Horowitz. 1985. 1985. Horowitz. David Chaim D. Kaufmann. 1996b. Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars. Wars. Civil Ethnic to Solutions Impossible and Possible 1996b. Kaufmann. D. Chaim James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 1996. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. Cooperation. Interethnic Explaining 1996. Laitin. D. David and Fearon D. James Robert H. Bates. 1983. Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Contemporary in Politics of Rationality the and Competition, Ethnic Modernization, 1983. Bates. H. Robert

be compliant. be – 75.

4: 715 4: 83

The most common proxy for shared preferences in civil war studies is ethnicity. The The ethnicity. is studies war civil in preferences shared for proxy common most The likely more be may defection First,

State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas Policy African Claims: Ethnic versus State and to be sticky and evident, and more restricting more evident, and and sticky and tobe ivated by its – widens 35. right

81 op. cit. op.

to issue orders and rebels have an have rebels and orders issue to Agency problems arise when the distance between the sponsors’ and rebels’ and sponsors’ the between distance the when arise problems Agency . The greater the gap between the two, the more likely a rebel a likely more the two, the between gap the greater The . op. cit op. these - Ethnic Groups in Conflict in Groups Ethnic 100; Stephen Biddle. 2006. Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon. Saigon. Thinking Baghdad, Seeing 2006. Biddle. Stephen 100; ; Salehyan (2010a), pp. pp. ; Salehyan(2010a),

narrow often interests,

based explanations is that in times of crisis, particularlyamids crisis, of times in that is explanations based ar preferences

82 organizational cohesion through a variety of mechanisms, from from mechanisms, of variety a through cohesion organizational

hrd tnct i togt o iiae rbes f collective of problems mitigate to thought is ethnicity Shared references of its sponsor as ethnic groups cherish primordial primordial cherish groups ethnic as sponsor its of references e aligned with those of the sponsor, the rebels the sponsor, the of those with aligned e - 506 . Berk . group monitoring. group when rebels’ preferences differ from those of the the of those from differ preferences rebels’ when .

at the expense at the eley: University of California Press, Press, California of University eley: obligation , ed. Donald ed. , than other ideological forces. ideological other than

of 85

Common norms may bring rebel bring may norms Common to comply with them. By settin By them. with comply to the

Rothchild and Victor A. Olunsorola. Olunsorola. A. Victor and Rothchild

sponsor’s agenda. sponsor’s American Political Science Science Political American - gn relationships. agent International Secur International F oreign Affairs oreign – at pp. pp. at

a belief that the that belief a organization 349; Chaim D. D. Chaim 349;

are likely are 84 t armed t

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arvard University Press. University arvard Byman and Kreps, Kreps, and Byman See: Stathis Kalyvas. 2008. 2008. Kalyvas. Stathis See: This line of argumentation draws on Mancur Olson’s in that the homogeneity of the org the of homogeneity the that in Olson’s Mancur on draws argumentation of line This

redfollowingempirical preferences, therefore,offer the propositions: not a sufficient condition for loyalty. They cite the example of Iran’s sponsorship of of sponsorship Iran’s of example the cite They loyalty. for condition sufficient a not Overall, the ethnicity the Overall, H1b: shareexternal sponsor. ethnicity withtheir H1a: Kreps Sarah and Byman Daniel ideology. shared of favor in made is argument similar A 87

hrdehiiymycnrbt o intra to contribute may ethnicity Shared Shared defec thechance ideology decreases of Rebel op. cit. op. s are less prone to defection when their leaders or the majority of membership membership of majority the or leaders their when defection to prone less are s

, pp.

op. cit. op. 12 - The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Groups. of Theory the and Goods Public Action: Collective of Logic The based argument seems convincing and there is certainly some logic some certainly is there and convincing seems argument based -

13. xy force. xy ; - State Paramilitaries. MS MIT. MS Paramilitaries. State Paul Staniland. 2010. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Fratricide, Insurgent Place: Hard a and Rock a Between 2010. Staniland. Paul

pre 88

with co

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CEU eTD Collection 92 621 59(4): 91 Karabakh. Nagorno and Croatia Bosnia, 90 in points various At Syria. and Arabia Saudi Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, as such countries different with principal”). (“collective contract single a or principals”) (“multiple principals distinct with the compliant. more be will rebels the and leverage greater non are alternatives When leverage. less have will sponsor the available, is support alternative stra If orders. its over follow to willing monopoly less rebels the sponsor’s making resources a break sources alternative following: the is here logic indiscipline opportunism, corroborated inChapter tests by 3. thestatistical to prey fall can actors aligned ethnically even combatants on pressure tremendous put wars Because defection. rebel fuel may Pakistan then the kill to attempted as joined and Pakistan from kinsmen their abandoned agreeme peace brokered externally accept to Belgrade in kinsmen their from calls rejected fiercely had Bosnia and Croatia in organizations Serb major two instance, For defection. rebel to ultimately divisi to policy. leads hardline a progressively of expense the at government target the with compromise choose

Nielson and Tierney, Nielsonand Nina Caspersen. 2007. Belgrade, Pale, Knin: Kin Knin: Pale, Belgrade, 2007. Caspersen. Nina Nina the multiple sponsors anmultiple

apre. 08 Bten upt ad needn Atr: Kin Actors: Independent and Puppets Between 2008. Caspersen. R Pakistani nts. – ebels sometimes have two or more sponsors. These sponsorships are either agreements agreements either are sponsorships These sponsors. more or two have sometimes ebels The second explanation second The 641. 91

Some Kashmiri Kashmiri Some - tfe ognztos Jaish organizations stuffed op. cit. op. 92 d thetransnational ties

Throughout its history of armed struggle armed of history its Throughout

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Ethnopolitics

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President Musharraf. President ewe te sponsor the between s such as Ikhwan ul Ikhwan as - . 7(4): 357 7(4): . State Control over Rebelli over Control State - e argument.

is oamd n Hrau Jhd Islam Jehadi Harkatul and Mohammad

access to alternative sources of support. The support. of sources alternative to access

the – 372, at 372,

Indian security forces, while others while forces, security Indian There are two streams of this argument: this of streams two are There - These examples indicate that indicate examples These Muslimeen and Muslim Jambaz Force Jambaz Muslim and Muslimeen

and pp. pp.

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Szekely, Salehyan2010, Julia Adams. 1996. Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay of Colonial Control in the the in Control Colonial of Decay The Men: Company and Colonialists Agents, and Principals 1996. Adams. Julia Edward Banfield. 1975. Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization. Organization. Governmental of Feature a as Corruption 1975. Banfield. Edward - 94 Making. ational support, rebels may not be in dire need of need dire in be not may rebels support, ational –

lentv sources Alternative P 605, at 605, This structur This rincipal op. cit. op. 96

- tt actors state

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Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Organization and Law,Economics, of Journal pp. pp.

at American Sociological Review Review Sociological American -

pp. pp. agent theories expect agent expect theories 595; Thomas Hammond and Jack Knott. 1996. Who Who 1996. Knott. Jack and Hammond Thomas 595; 509 e is inherently unstable as principals tend to impose their own preferences own their impose to tend principals as unstable inherently is e .

the hs nlds h spot usd ntoa bres bsd n tnc or ethnic on based borders, national outside support the includes This

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agents eceived financial and military support from Syria and and Syria from support military and financial eceived 61(Feb):12

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Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Presidential Bureaucracy?: the Controls 95

f h aet s aware is agent the If

to Journal of Law and Economics Economics and Law of Journal have a greater ahave leeway in

eev spot from support receive If a sponsor threatens threatens sponsor a If 93

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CEU eTD Collection the into invest sponsors resources more The leadership. strong multiple the of expectation the to Contrary rebels. over control increase may sponsors multiple hand, other the On behavior. and,make as therebelssuggested, more resilient should support transnational as sides, switching or desertion imply not does This unavoidable. is agent its and sponsor the between confrontation open an blackmail, such rejects regime the the that believing t regime the pressureon the orincrease electorateelites will the from support defiance, choose may rebels the compromise, a seeking of Instead them. r goals such If goals. their can around country sponsor they the from electorate that and elites mobilize believing successfully policies radical more pursue rebels mechanism, this In opposition. rec Bosnia and in Croatia rebels Serb the instance, For This argument. country.ties ethnic sponsor the to the opposition in of stands mechanism majority ethnic from comes support transnational the when Another them. abandons sponsor the if even this In support alternative on draw still could ideology.they as orders defy to expected are or rebels the mechanism, goals their against go that orders execute to need they defiant when more especially rebels the make may This backing. vocal beyond goes n gis sosrs ainl neet, h rbl my e se t mdf o abandon or modify to asked be may rebels the interests, national sponsor’s against un h atraie support alternative The decreasesof desertion/switching sides thelikelihood H2b: H2a:

Rebels multiple with state sponsorsare The presence of of presence The eived support from both the Milosevic government and Serbian Serbian and government Milosevic the both from support eived - principal hypothesis, principals may gain leverage by investing into investing by gainleverage may principals hypothesis, principal

rnntoa support transnational xlnto ofr a oefl n eeat con o rebel of account elegant and powerful a offers explanation

mechanism linking transnational ties and defiance is is defiance and ties transnational linking mechanism

radical their in demands. more more

nrae te hne f def of chance the increases prone todefection. .

rebel

of sponsor’s policies policies sponsor’s of edrhp the leadership, o back down. Whendown. back o

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CEU eTD Collection Commission. Trade Federal the by PolicyMaking 44: 98 University, Stanford Dissertation. 97 highly activities, their curtail to threaten credibly and costly more becomes sanctioning stronger, grow rebels as mechanism, this In capabilities. military strong agents tocounterinsurgency. whoare exposed material or operational logistical, necessary the provide to unable be might they borders, across operate to capacity lack sponsors such Because sides. desertion/switching s defiance states weak run to expected be should rebels instances round identify, and areas, rural to army and police deploy territory, their on camps rebel locate to intelligence use can infrastructure of capacity coercive punishm for word key The them. punish to threaten credibly can who disobedience. instr key a be to considered is sanctions subsequent of use The defection. rebel determine capabilities making themmore t buttressed had Salvador El and Africa South in insurgents the to be will disciplined

ar Wigs. 94 h Congressional The 1984. Weingast. Barry ihli . io. 01 Voet re: ee Orga Rebel Order: Violent 2011. Lidow. H. Nicholai

147 ument in the control of principals over bureaucracies because it can presumably discourage discourage presumably can it because bureaucracies over principals of control the in ument – By the same token, the ability to punish rebels should be reduced when they possess possess they when reduced be should rebels punish to ability the token, same the By sanctioning inadequate otherwise or lacking that suggests explanation third The 92; Barry Weingast and M. Moran. 1983. Bur 1983. Moran. M. and Weingast Barry 92; hould be more likely more be hould 98

As long as rebels act rationally, they will be reluctant to defect against defect to reluctant be will they rationally, act rebels as long As ,

hy ak orie aaiy n wliges o ofot ee defection rebel confront to willingness and capacity coercive lack they sponsors are less able to credibly threaten them. Because sponsors cannot cannot sponsors Because them. threaten credibly to able less are sponsors

the rank and file. and rank the obedient anddisciplined. obedient

sponsor. Those governments with coherent regimes and effective policing effective and regimes coherent with governments Those sponsor.

pp. pp.

124 .

Likewise weak sponsors are likely to be associated with rebel rebel with associated be to likely are sponsors weak Likewise - 125. 97

- For instance, the abundant support from the socialist block socialist the from support abundant the instance, For ueurtc ytm A Principal A System: Bureaucratic be obedient be

up and punish the ringleaders for misbehavior. In such In misbehavior. for ringleaders the punish and up Journal of Political Economy Economy ofPolitical Journal

eaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?: Regulatory Regulatory Control?: Congressional or Discretion eaucratic -

nization and Liberia’s Civil War. Unpublished PhD PhD Unpublished War. Civil Liberia’s and nization equipped groups will be more autonomous in autonomous more be will groups equipped to their external sponsors. But when sponsors sponsors when But sponsors. external their to 91:765 - Agent Perspective. Perspective. Agent he r epcie leaderships, respective ir ent in this context is the is context this in ent – 800.

upr t their to support Public Choice Choice Public

sponsors so , 42

CEU eTD Collection 102 101 100 99 little have may capabilities while outcome, the defection, after only comes sanctioning If slack. future avert to aim agent, disobedient a with faced who defected k we how as such questions, further begs some factions orcommandersthe group. toeventually leave survival. ens to sides switch mayto choose it outfit, rival stronger much bya attack under is movement casualties serious because sponsors their abandon to likely more be should rebels Weak sides. desertion/switching in work government. target the toward policies conciliatory more for support” allied for need less have will power “rising the because sponsors their with ties terminating or severing risk can spons defy to able better demands, rebels make capabilities Enhanced policies. their pursuing

Byman and Kreps, Kreps, and Byman

Staniland (2010). (2010). Staniland Processes. ProblemsSpoiler Peace in 1997. Stedman. StephenJ. 1997. StephenWalt. The capabi The desertion/switching sides H3b: H3a: Hence explanation capabilities suggests the following the hypotheses.

102 lack they against 99 then the explanatory power of capabilities is suspicious. Other factors may be driving be may factors Other suspicious. is capabilities of power explanatory the then

and independently negotiate with the target government. Moreover, stronger rebels stronger Moreover, government. target the with negotiate independently and lhuh uh oeet my dp hit adopt may movements such Although

Weaker sponsors areWeaker likely sponsors togr ees r poe o def to prone are rebels Stronger

their sponsors. Sanctioning is usually an an usually is Sanctioning sponsors. their

op. cit, cit, op. lities argument offers a commonsensical a offers argument lities capabilitie on Why Alliances Endure or Collapse. Collapse. or WhyAlliancesEndure

h rbl, leading rebels, the 100 pp.

. Finally, rebels can use their cap their use can rebels Finally, . 8 .

s to endure a protracted a endure to s

to suffer defection. to suffer now that sanctioning does not come after rebels have have rebels after come not does sanctioning that now e mmes o bno fgtn. n addition, In fighting. abandon to members key

analytical Survival ac, hl wae rbl ae rn to prone are rebels weaker while iance, fighting - and International Security International

39(1): 15 39(1): ex post ex

abilities against the sponsor if it opts it if sponsor the against abilities

explanation for defection. But it also it But defection. for explanation u tcis iatvt my stimulate may inactivity tactics, run ucae Smlry te capabilities the Similarly, purchase. . The target government can inflict can government target The . 101 6

– principals, by used mechanism h opst mcaim s at is mechanism opposite The 179 at 179 pp. pp.

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- 53.

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CEU eTD Collection www.lexisnexis.co 103 of powerdistribution betweenand theleaderscadres. on based structure rebel the endogenousto be variableto needs This context. sharedpolitical behavior organizational differing determines that variable conditioning a be must outcomes. varying of force driving a as not and constraint structural broad a as only but extent, some to matter factors these All defection. to exposed less or more rebels make not do alone capabilities and resources outco varying explain cannot alone context political that suggests it Rather defection. explaining in role no play explanations three the that suggest not their groups sponsorsas ofPalestinian violence Marxist J toward move. this against clearly was government, US the sponsor, erstwhile its though even 1992 in government Angolan the with cease the breaking mind not did Savimbi leader UNITA’s superpower. a even disobey dare Rebels practice. in case the rarely is which power, by encouraged or deterred automatically be to capabilities of level the would why capThe defection? determine measures precise had one if even Finally, defection. fine of lack chronologi a in capabilities in change the measure to difficult is it wars civil of context the in Particularly variation. explain to static and broad too are capabilities as acute becomes problem This around? capab way that other the know not and we defection do how endogeneity: of problem the upon hits argument

h Nw ok ie. ieped tak b Uia ees n noa r Rpre. coe 3, 1992. 31, October Reported. Are Angola in Rebels Unita by Attacks Widespread Times. York New The Table in presented is arguments key of summary The - rie ifrain ae oe kpia ta cpblte ae asly ro to prior causally are capabilities that skeptical one makes information grained m.

If, for instance, sanctioning plays certain role in rebel behavior, then there then behavior, rebel in role certain plays sanctioning instance, for If,

abilities argument places rebels in a rather passive, responsive role, role, responsive passive, rather a in rebels places argument abilities

103

Even those groups with low capabilities are often undeterred by undeterred often are capabilities low with groups those Even cal and sequential fashion. Consequently, the the Consequently, fashion. sequential and cal

mes as shared preferences, alternative preferences, shared as mes 2 . The aforementioned vignettes do vignettes aforementioned The . ordan implies.

reflecting the reflecting lte affect ilities - fire fire 44

CEU eTD Collection ties and sponsors (multiple support of sources alternative ethnicity/ideology, shared are princ The defection). (factional faction a by or defection) (group whole a as movement rebel the by committed is It sponsor. the with confrontation armed and desertion to orders of defiance from ranges Defection defection. their against work might agents rebel Some cause. their to loyal always not are agents sponsors, for Unfortunately tactics. and goals policies, organization, r dyadic a is Sponsorship sponsorship. form movements rebel to support material offer who actively governments The sponsors. be to considered are states recognized internationally Only org rebel A defection. and Summary elationship in which a rebel outfit receives resources in exchange for sponsor’s control over its its over control sponsor’s for exchange in resources receives outfit rebel a which in elationship ) andcapabilities. coercive In this chapter I have introduced the concepts of rebel organization, sponsor, sponsorship sponsor, organization, rebel of concepts the introduced have I chapter this In Alternative Support Shared Preferences

Capabilities Theory

Table

anization is distinguished from paramilitary forces and criminal gangs. criminal and forces paramilitary from distinguished is anization

2 . Alternative Explanations Rebelfor Defection

ipal - agent literature offers three explanations of defection. These These defection. of explanations three offers literature agent Weak rebels Strong rebels →def desertion/switching sides) sponsors Weak Transnational ties desertion/switching sides) defection sponsors→ Multiple desertion/switching sides) non → ideology Shared desertion/ non → ethnicity Shared

switching sides) →

desertion/switching sides

→ def defection → iance Prediction iance - -

defection defection sponsor’s interests, which I call call I which interests, sponsor’s

bt dfac and defiance (both bt dfac and defiance (both

bt dfac and defiance (both and defiance (both

transnational transnational

CEU eTD Collection chapter.my thenext in rebel theory defection of present I course, this Following sponsor. the to loyalty its affects file and rank its and leadership particularly dynamics, organizational intra ignore all They defection. factional and group both for account to unable are they but defection, group of terms in power explanatory some possess approaches these that is argument bv I ae one ot h srnts n wanse o weaknesses and strengths the out pointed have I Above o te hne n h rltosi bten rebel between relationship the in change the how

tee xlntos My explanations. these f - rebel 46

CEU eTD Collection University. 2010. Balcells. Conﬂict. Internal Angstrom Shaped Jan War and Cold Duyvesteyn the Review of End Science the Political How American Rebellion: of Technologies and System International 104 In areas. remote in located when particularly superiors, its to loyal stay to pressure considerable T outfits. militant rival or government conventional in valid be also Iconflicts. assess should asymmetric thevalidity ofmy inChapter argument beyond conflicts 3and 5. theory my of parameters the 4, Chapter in Kashmir) war. than stronger are or parity arme in sponsors state more or one government’s policies. sponsor their obey theorizing to rebels on constraints the shape shocks external how and rebels control to sponsors of ability the on length its of impact the rebels, to sponsors from whyandr when on based explanations

For the distinction between asymmetric and conventional civil wars see: Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells. 2010. 2010. Balcells. Laia and Kalyvas Stathis see: wars civil conventional and asymmetric between distinction the For 104

y ruet niin a otx i wih a which in context a envisions argument My My discussed I chapter previous the In vn huh ts te asl ehnss n h cs o a aymti cnlc (i.e. conflict asymmetric an of case the in mechanisms causal the test I though Even

the organizational structure of rebel movements and their response to sponsor’s and and sponsor’s to response their and movements rebel of structure organizational the hoy ple to applies theory Behind the Frontlines: Identity, Competition, and Violence i Violence and Competition, Identity, Frontlines: the Behind ebels defect against their sponsors. The goal defectTheebels against thedelegation their tounderstand sponsors. is chain principal “T

rust is good, but control is better”. (Vladimir Ilyich Lenin) Ilyich (Vladimir isbetter”. but control good, rust is

the

(eds.), (eds.),

non target

0: 415 104: - Theory Rebelof Defection agent framework. In this chapter this In framework. agent ehnig h Ntr o War of Nature the Rethinking - state armed organizations that receive military support from from support military receive that organizations armed state d conflict d

government he rank and file of file and rank he – CHAPTER 2 429; Stathis Kalyvas. Kalyvas. Stathis 429; .

First, I consider militant outfits that have the same the have that outfits militant consider I First, three as well as those that are fighting an asymmetric asymmetric an fighting are that those as well as

ye o rbl eeto ad the and defection rebel of types

such an organization an such . Abingdton: Frank Cass, Cass, Frank Abingdton: . rebel 2005. n Civil Wars Civil n

afr i Cvl Wars, Civil in Warfare , organization

I develop a theory to explain to theory a develop I

. Ph.D. Dissertation: Yale Yale Dissertation: Ph.D. .

is placed under a a under placed is face . hs requires This s. pp. pp. s

a i n: Isabelle Isabelle n: - 108 possible possible c apable ; Laia 47

CEU eTD Collection alternative lo allies, building ties totheir stronger and finding from factions and commanders monitor powerful prevent cannot Sponsors movement. a to sanction ability sponsor’s on strain considerable a puts complexity organizational in in to worse, or, coup internal to lead may others of expense the at interests some accommodate to failure The accommodated. be must the between relationship the affects and leadership factions and commanders of number in increase The movement. a within players important of number the affecting organizations these of file and decentralize to centralized from structure organizational their shift to forced frequently are rebels rivalries, and COIN responseto organizations. other of actions organization rebel because is This support. foreign of benefits rivals numerous and government wars civil multiparty in fighting movements those For them. against defect autonomy may may rebels side, flip a On support. their channel to prefer a Sinno as which, through leadership central the buttress this may support All material matters. operational and organizational in subordination) (or cooperation for return sophisticated wea outfits these missions, increaselethalityof and prowessdiscipline, solidify To internal movement. throughoutawildfire da a is together organization an keeping case, this In essence, the essence, In

force the rank and file, in that there are more preferences more are there that in file, and rank the pons, money,pons,

the rebelsthe accept to

sponsored sponsored r dpnet n their on dependent are

an d, and d, T e agt government target he – rebels have two options: to remain loyal to their spon their to loyal remain to options: two have rebels access to safe territory,access safe to

staying loyal may be more costly than defecting despite the the despite defecting than costly more be may loyal staying - group fighting and split and fighting group vice versa vice most

sponsor’s conditions

foreign sponsors. sponsors. foreign cal communities or making deals with the target target cal the ormaking communities with deals . Such shifts may empower or weaken the rank rank the weaken or empower may shifts Such . unting task and factionalism may spread may factionalism and task unting s usually is and - up. At the same t same the At up. logistical or intelligence support in intelligencelogistical or supportin oe hi autonomy their lose l eair s odtoe by conditioned is behavior al h s The .

h ms pwru atr In actor. powerful most the –

some even radical even some ponsors may offer more more offer may ponsors ime, this increase increase this ime, –

ge, sponsors rgues, faced with the the with faced . h ls of loss The sors or sors – like

that 48

CEU eTD Collection 2003. Salancik. Perspective Gerald and Pfeffer Jeffrey 105 are activities Organizational absent. are advantages these when leave and gained, be to benefit ideological structure. authority Followers Leaders, Rebel Theory and of Sponsors: Defection religiouslyanti motivated rebellions, against o discriminate goals not different does theory my Finally, warfare. asymmetric in involved are they extend argument my contrast, In obligations. their on renege the from defect to powe threaten the sponsorships, credibly In agreement. can party each which in relationships inter symmetrical hand, other the On outfits. rebel of autonomy the mili the into integrated better are Paramilitaries alliances. inter as well as paramilitaries, and governments between relationship the understand to study this in proposed than dynamics other by driven and non and sponsors foreign does Nor peacetime. in movements movements prone todefection. are rebels and unstable highly is chain delegation the circumstances, such Under government.

Richard M. Richard Rebels coalitions are of T e xlntr pwr f y theory my of power explanatory he . Stanford, CA: Stanford, . .

Cyert It d It

anandaddfndb acaiin fmmesadfcin woivs their invest who factions and members of coalition a by defined and maintained oes , James G. James , f rebel movements; it applies to secessionist, ethnically, ideologically and and ideologically ethnically, secessionist, to applies it movements; rebel f

105 not

Stanford University Press, pp. pp. Press, University Stanford

niiul ad rus on hm hn hr i sm mtra or material some is there when them join groups and Individuals aim to aim

violent movements. Both phenomena are situated in different contex different in situated are phenomena Both movements. violent March. 1992. 1992. March.

individuals and groups linked by common goals, groups by common and and linked membership individuals explain the relationship between foreign governments and armed and governments foreign between relationship the explain - government insurgenciesgovernmentanti and Behavioral Theory of the Firm the of Theory Behavioral h theory the h Etra Cnrl f raiain: Resource A Organizations: of Control External The aymty evs a leaves asymmetry r 24

is restricted to armed conflicts and violent violent and conflicts armed to restricted is ; ae lis bu te eainhp between relationship the about claims make Kenny, tary hierarchy of their sponsors lacking sponsors their of hierarchy tary . op. cit., cit., op. In addition In - rebel alliances entail more or less less or more entail alliances rebel s

much to terrorist movements given that given movements terrorist to . Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Publishers, Blackwell Oxford: .

pp. pp. 535.

mle sae o ees to rebels to space smaller ,

- this theory may not be fit fit be not may theory this

colonial uprisings.colonial - D ependence ependence pp. pp. -

rebel 32; 32; 49 ts

CEU eTD Collection 471 9: Population. and Efficiency, Dependence, Resource Organizations: in Perspectives 108 107 106 contradiction inherent an on betweencontrol and autonomy. built coalitions are organizations of rebel sources Therefore, independent largely financing. prefer they leadership; the by decisions the veto or modify th which in formats organizational those favor operatives and commanders Ultimately, leadership. the from autonomy their maximizing in interested are hand, other the on operatives, (mone resources echelons. lower decision share not need they which in organizations prefer leaders power their preserve to is leaders decision whi in organization. necessarily the of not those are with that congruence goals own its has echelons these of Each power. of distribution d This echelons. lower to belong operatives and commanders while upper, to belong usually Leaders operatives. and commanders leaders, of composed are organizations rebel speaking, Roughly echelons. lower the interests members. ofthe coalition combat. in part take and capabilities

Kenneth J. Arrow. 1964. Arrow. 1964. KennethJ. James Herbert Simon. 1961. 1961. Simon. Herbert ch helps achieving themin goals. their - 481. raiain ae rns f tuge o pwr Power, power. for struggle of arenas are Organizations po as such organizations, other to Akin March and Herbert Simon. 1958. 1958. Simon. Herbert and March - making,

Also y, guns, lucrative materials etc.). The lower echelons, i.e. commanders and and commanders i.e. echelons, lower The etc.). materials lucrative guns, y,

s rtcl o h efcie oenne f organization. of governance effective the to critical is Administrative behavior. behavior. Administrative they favor those organizations where they can tightly control the flow of of flow the control tightly can they where organizations those favor they Control in Large Organizations. Organizations. in Large Control istinction denotes a typical organic composition rather than the actual actual the than rather composition organic typical a denotes istinction

and Organizations 106

prevent By virtue of this contribution organizations operate for operate organizations contribution this of virtue By

New York: Macmillan; David Ulrich and Jay B. Barney. 1984. 1984. Barney. B. Jay and Ulrich David Macmillan; York: New 107 litical parties and the military there are upper and and upper are there military the and parties litical

. New . Wiley. York: ah ceo hs t on ru o supporters of group own its has echelon Each the Management Science Management ascendance

f hlegr. t maximum, a At challengers. of

understood as the control of of control the as understood

10(3): 397 10(3): Academy of Management Review Management of Academy - aig au making 108 – 408, at 408, h mi ga of goal main The thority with the the with thority pp. pp. 398. ey can can ey

50 ,

CEU eTD Collection 111 Leone. Sierra and Liberia from Evidence 110 109 threa Qatar and Turkey after Opposition Syrian the and Forces Revolutionary for Coalition National the into transformed (SNC) Council National Syrian fragmented the 2012 November outfit whole the of performance the for leaders rebel accountable hold can they because structures formalized c for incentives create and cooperation. factions other off fend to leaders to resources material providing argues Johnston Patrick instance, balanceamong of themembers rebel organization. power temporary of sort some arises interdependence and exchange this of out and bargaining members coalition Therefore, exist. to cease or fragment activities, its of scope the change can organization rebel the turmoil, this of result a As leadership. the seize to attempt an in status political of deprived those with align saved. be not may organization the where point the to leading file and rank the of dissatisfaction the increase would leadership the satisfy leadershi quo file and rank and leaders the between nrl s fe atce with attached often is ontrol Ibid Sinno, Sinno, Patrick Johnston. 2008. 2008. Johnston. Patrick . At other times, times, other At . , pp Can sponsors affect the nature of rebel structure? Some authors Some structure? rebel of nature the affect sponsors Can a contradiction this With op. cit. op. . p. In such a setting, preserving the balance the preserving setting, a such In p. 27.

. 110 111 , pp. 34 and pp. pp. and 34 pp. 79. ,

ln tee ie, Sinno lines, these Along R ecent reports from the Syrian civil war support this argument. this support war civil Syrian the from reports ecent the rank and file and rank the The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars: Wars: Civil for Consequences its and Organization Insurgent of Geography The

oeg support foreign pa, re play, t that state sponsors are key to preserving the power the preserving to key are sponsors state that Security Studies Security

. Sometimes, leaders tilt the balance in the favor of of favor the in balance the tilt leaders Sometimes, .

succeeds in succeeds and groups are continuously involved in process of of process in involved continuously are groups and

bel organizations serve as a platform for bargaining bargaining for platform a as serve organizations bel ugss that suggests 109

oefcin myot out opt may factions Some , 17: 107 , and centralized more favor sponsors that and ,

secur

of power of – 137. ing h dmn fr ntr cmad and command unitary for demand the

greater autonomy or or autonomy greater

is a precarious business. What may What business. precarious a is

believe that they can. For can.they that believe

from the coalition or coalition the from

taking Reportedly, in Reportedly, - balance by by balance

over the the over status status tened tened 51 -

CEU eTD Collection 115 50 pp. Press, University 114 Solutions and CNAAnalysis 113 08/05/2014). on (accessed a0304028233 http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Report%3A+Turkey+and+Qatar+cut+arms+supply+until+divided+factions+unite. 112 co similar to a point also dissertation this from examples empirical Some support. sponsor’s to endogenous be not may centralization that suggests finding This hierarchy. and roots social their of robustness on depend to likely is Staniland militant sponsored whether But splits. instigate can sponsors Asia, that shows Southeast and South in militancy of fragmentation the Analyzing structure. spl fragile force may sponsors support, leadership. unitary their a under unite of to organizations level the manipulating By play. at also are b structure organizational other each off factions different playing by them undermine or outfits cohesive less of unification the advance may sponsors that argues Staniland their decisionwhom lost of most 1980s, and 1970s in Syria in based were that organizations Palestinian various among fact pitting by or factions or members disgruntled of cooptation leaders, of rotation the through organization the onto agenda sponsors. on leadership rebel of dependence 2012. late in council military unified decision military its centralize to (FSA) Army Syrian Free the rebels. the to supplies arms their cut to

Ibid Turkey, Qatar Cut Arms Supply Until Until Supply Arms Cut Qatar Turkey, Paul Staniland. 2014. 2014. Staniland. Paul Afshon Ostovar and Will McCants. The Rebel The McCants. Will and Ostovar Afshon t, n, oe motnl, hy ant s ter upr t cue sit n organizational in shift a cause to support their use cannot they importantly, more and, its,

On the other hand, Paul Staniland offers a offers Staniland Paul hand, other the On - 51. Networks of Rebellion: Rebellion: of Networks

, , 2013. March -

making tothe Syrian regime. ecause other forces, such as local rivalries, petty interests and COIN, and interests petty rivalries, local as such forces, other ecause ions off against each other. Such examples have been encountered encountered been have examples Such other. each against off ions

Divided Syrian Factions Unite, Unite, Factions Syrian Divided nclusion. For instance, the case study of Kashmir in Chapter Chapter in Kashmir of study case the instance, For nclusion. 113 112

Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse and Cohesion Insurgent Explaining Similarly, after Saudi Arabia and Qatar put pressure on pressure put Qatar and Arabia Saudi after Similarly, T

Alliance e rvso o provision he

Sponsors :

115 more nuanced answer to the above question. above the to answer nuanced more Why Syria’s Armed Opposition Has Failed to Unify. Unify. to Failed Has Opposition Armed Syria’s Why . 114

oee, pnos ant rvn future prevent cannot sponsors However,

can u sosr cno fx r un every ruin or fix cannot sponsors But resources f

use these resources to impose their their impose to resources these use Today’s Zaman Today’s - making, the rebels established a established rebels the making,

a sapy increase sharply may s preserve their cohesion cohesion their preserve s , October 1, 2012, source: source: 2012, 1, October , . Ithaca, NY: Cornell Cornell NY: Ithaca, .

the - 52

CEU eTD Collection local their to ties 116 solid lack rebels centralized argues, Sinno organizations, file. andcentralized rank the discipline can leaders rebel because backers foreign leaders. decision more hold factions and commanders various organizations, its over control direct exercises who leader central in concentrated in authority this organizations, centralized In echelons. lower decision how i.e. structure, who leadership rebel the with cooperate primarily services secret The outfit. rebel a supervise and select to services secret ProblemThe Hand Many of orders. its complywith not do they conditions what under and demands sponsor’s to respond do and can organizations when becomes then question obvious The others. with relations downgrade to and maintai to compelled be may organizations rebel existence in stay to In order file. and rank the offend may sponsor their favoring leaders rebel Unwillingly, others. of detriment the to interests some appease must they demand; possible every filter cannot the unsynchronized onslaughtIndian Mujahideen. the by Hizbul militaryand rather was it (JKLF); Front Liberation Kashmir and Jammu the of end the cause not did Pakistan splits, instigated and support of cut a despite Similarly, groups. jihadi of favor in it sidelining by Mujahideen Hizbul of structure organizational the change not could Pakistan that suggests 3

Sinno,

h dlgto can trs from starts chain delegation The because agents their controlling difficulties face often Sponsors

op. cit., op. bukdr Sinno Abdulkader

pp. pp. 78 - 80 .

eoe ter agent. their becomes

- suggests making authority is distributed between the rebel leadership and and leadership rebel the between distributed is authority making

s: Delegation Chain from toRebels Sponsors ht etaie rbl wl be will rebels centralized that he commanders. chief

sosr government sponsor a

But rebel organizations vary in terms of their their of terms in vary organizations rebel But

n cordial relations with some actors some with relations cordial n In decentralized and factionalized factionalized and decentralized In

who - making authority than their their than authority making

better controlled by their their by controlled better delegates authority to its its to authority delegates 116

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CEU eTD Collection Aid Foreign of Economics Institutional 117 the prtobability ofdefection. the chains longer in increases; the as Therefore, sponsor. the of those from different much are chain the of bottom the at those of preferences of likelihood the increases, chain delegation sponsors because contrast, spons because structure organizational chain delegation of length that connects structure organizational todefection I structure, towa behavior advance I sponsors. their to loyal more be to likely are organizations centralized Therefore, resources. rebels centralized reason, this For communities.

Paul Seabright Paul causal this to According

Sinno’s proposition by transforming the problem of sponsor’s control into that of rebel of that into control sponsor’s of problem the transforming by proposition Sinno’s decentralized and factional and decentralized Organizational contribute to Sinno’s proposition by developing it it developingby proposition Sinno’s to contribute structure r da wt a arw ru o leaders of group narrow a with deal ors , d pnos ie dfcin Atog w bt da o rbl organizational rebel on draw both we Although defection. i.e. sponsors, rd

Conflicts of Conflicts

organizational structure becomes less becomes structure organizational act as act Figure Figure

principals to principals C O 1 nrlzd organizations entralized . bjectives and and bjectives

The Causal Mechanism of Organizational Theory

rm pnos o rebels to sponsors from

potential for rebel preference misalignment preference rebel for potential , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 34 Press, University Cambridge:Cambridge ,

ehns peetd in presented mechanism delegation chain i Length of z both the leadership and lower echelons. As the As echelons. lower and leadership the both ed organizations organizations ed T ask A llocation in in llocation

are heavily dependent on external supporters for for supporters external on dependent heavily are defection

are likely to shorten shorten to likely are A ce are likely to lengthen delegation chains delegation lengthen to likely are

, which, in turn, is affected by the the by affected is turn, in which, , id id h hv te oooy f power of monopoly the have who ntralized

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46.

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chain chain

. In In . The the the 117 54

CEU eTD Collection 119 System 118 ISI. and Rabbani leader his with consultation prior a without command Soviet the with truce M Nevertheless, grounds their hold to managed rebels called population. the support” popular on directly depended militias his and (…) miners, lapis and emerald on taxes levied and valley Panjshir the in committees discipline to outfits mujahideen whose Massoud other use to seldom had ISI sponsor, its with relationship leadership political Jamiaat’s While Jamiaat controlling problem similar hidden action a consequence, widens.a chain As long defection. leads delegation rebel to re for room the clients, its control and resources transport efficiently to unable is sponsor the If financing. of sources own its develop to able often is file and rank the since leadership also scenario a leadership.Such deter to ability sponsor’s curtails This rebels’ apparatus. coercive control over a sponsorlacks the rebelagents movement, a within supplyingmonitoringInand rebel resources activity. particular of costs the higher the rebels, and sponsor the between distance the longer The rebels. the and

Coll, Coll, Barnett Rubin. Rubin. Barnett , New Haven, CT: Yale University Yale CT: New , Haven, “Panjshir offensive”) in the Panjshir valley. The offensive was not a major success as the the as success major a not was offensive The valley. Panjshir the in offensive”) “Panjshir op. cit op. During the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet occupation, Pakistan’s ISI faced a a faced ISI Pakistan’s occupation, Soviet the against insurgency Afghan the During sponsor a between increasedistance theythe that is chains delegationlong with issue The ., pp. 118. pp. .,

In early 1980s, the Soviet arm Soviet the 1980s, early In 2002. assoud received no reinforcements or supplies from Pakistan and had to sign a sign to had and Pakistan from supplies or reinforcements no received assoud army

h Fragmentation The was based across the border. the across based was

diminishes the manipulative potential of private rewards to rebel rebel to rewards private of potential manipulative the diminishes

Press, pp. pp. Press, - rebel e

- f fhnsa: State Afghanistan: of sais he fed omne, ha Sha Ahmad commander, field chief Islami’s –

while

which was based in Pakistan Pakistan in based was which misbehavior by credibly threatening to punish punish to threatening credibly by misbehavior 220.

y initiated a series of military operations ( operations military of series a initiated y

119 the Soviets suffered casualties and defections. defections. and casualties suffered Soviets the . His army received crops and livestock from livestock and crops received army His . 118

“Massoud ran local ran “Massoud

Formation , in chains with many , inchains with autonomous

n Clas i the in Collapse and

police and civil affairs civil and police –

a a excellent an had Massoud. h International

the so the bel its 55 -

CEU eTD Collection 121 120 interests. business by driven be may networking the bonds, such of absence the In connections. these of formation the facilitate may bonds ideological or ethnic Common militants some lead may capital sponsor’s to proximity the However, agents. their punish and monitor to sponsors allows also It size. in to access The borders. sponsor’s to vulnerable more ranks. be therefore, targeted counterinsurgency. should, the reach sponsor’s among outside discouragement located and Organizations fear resentment, inciting adversaries, t vulnerability of perception the strengthens also distance circumstances, such Under offensive. well receive to able be not would tim same the At minimal. be would loss this trade illicit and taxation from earnings his given but supplies, weapons, losing and money risk would Massoud interests. sponsor’s his against ran even that activities cou Pakistan Pakistan’s If avoid misbehavior. to for ability sanctions of perception his reinforced location Massoud’s turn, In army. Soviet the with confrontation a risking without Afghanistan to patrol disciplinary a dispatch In borders. Pakistan’s within operated had he if than autonomy greater enjoyed he where Afghanistan in located was Massoud chain. delegation the lengthen disobedie to support the cut Massoud. to decided ISI while betrayed”, “felt Rabbani Reportedly,

William Reno. 2007. Patronage Politics and the Behavior of ArmedGroup of the and Behavior PatronagePolitics 2007. WilliamReno. Ibid , pp. , 121. pp. h preto o vleaiiy s bet hn rbl uft i outfit rebel a when absent is vulnerability of perception The also may distance physicalfeatures, organizational from apart suggeststhat example This 120

e, the separation from his leadership and sponsor meant that Massoud that meant sponsor and leadership his from separation the e,

the - timed assistance from Pakistan in case of a major Soviet Soviet major a of case in Pakistan from assistance timed sponsor’s territory allows rebels to avoid attrition and grow and attrition avoid to rebels allows territory sponsor’s

oetbihcnetoswt lclpltcl groups. political local with connections establish to d o pns Msod te h cud conduct could he then Massoud, punish not ld s. Civil Wars Civil

sec, aitn ol not could Pakistan essence,

9(4): 324 9(4): lctd ihn its within located s 121

These ties may ties These - 342.

56 nt nt o

CEU eTD Collection a file, and rank to leadership rebel to government anyabout the loyalty ofleadership, iseasily replaced. doubtit t monitorssponsor the Inturn, centralleadership. the The soldiers. to feedback a is foot there and seniors their by monitored to carefully is echelons lower of performance way the all officers, district to commanders chief from commanders, top a through runs smoothly directions these interests stimulate execute should structure organizational an Such sponsors. to loyalty encourage in change the how considering requires organizatio defection Explaining sponsors. their against defect rebels when predict cannot location geographic structure, organizational the in variation physic such, As static. also is it behavior, rebel on constraints places geography While opportunity. of perception the reinforce therefore, may, borders sponsor’s within Located her. or him against guns turn even or orders beco sponsor the If agent. militant its anger may approach cease for calling mechanism operations, militants’ in triggering restrain The conflict. this advocating i.e. struggle, into armed the toward policy sponsor’s in change drawn a be should confrontation be may militants the odds, at are connections local and sponsor their Once sponsor. the against them pit eventually may state ra militants help Apparently, this ideal implies a straightforward and short delegation chain from a sponsor a sponsor from chain shortdelegation aApparently, and straightforward implies ideal this should structure organizational when consider first I relationship, this explain To all are nal structure pursue createsrebels to forcertain incentives behavior.

the the recognized and broad directions how to meet them are given. The implementation of implementation Theare given.them meet to how directionsbroad and recognized ise more funds for their cause. But meddling into domestic politics of sponsor of politics domestic into meddling But cause. their for funds more ise sponsor’s orders irrespective of the level of its material support. Sponsor’s Sponsor’s support. material its of level the of irrespective orders sponsor’s l itne fes ata epaain o dfcin Wtot a Without defection. for explanation partial offers distance al - on hne, rm eir lea senior from channel, down nd back. Straightforward implies that the flow the that implies Straightforward back. nd - ie r ec da. hs U This deal. peace or fire he organization and its leadership; if thereis if leadership; itsorganizationand he mes weak, the militants may defy defy may militants the weak, mes

- turn in sponsor’s sponsor’s in turn

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rebels

for 57 to

CEU eTD Collection 122 the from feedback receive and orders issue hierarchy to leadership central of ability the as understood organizational of levels upper the at authority and cal I what is organization RebelThree Structure of Organizational Types identify affect threetypes that the structure length oforganizational ofdelegation chain. complex. more becomes organizations rebel in control and command the as long authority a within rebel decision of distribution the Thus, benefits. its than higher become defection of costs the transgression,caseof in it crediblyand punish information hidden leadershipreveal the make sanctioning and monitoring employ effectively more can sponsors leadership, rebel the with rests accountability the Because sponsor. one to accountable is agent one and leadership), (rebel agent one only to violence delegates sponsor single a stage orders, from receive soforth. a the lower feedback levelsand of transgression the sanction file, and rank the of actions monitor system, incentive effective opera and commanders capable select to authority an with individuals of team a or executive chief a be must there sense, this In organization. rebel the within control hierarchical as act sponsors that assumed already have I As actor. unitary a as regarded be can movement rebel top runs resources and information of

Simon, Simon, unitary h dsrbto o decision of distribution The quite be can rebels to sponsors from chain delegation of length the however, practice, In the circumstances, these Under op. cit. op.

actor

, h mi cniin o a tagtowr ad hr dlgto can s a is chain delegation short and straightforward a for condition main the s, organization infavor rebeldeter of should organization the rebel leadership defection.

l the level of level the l

- aig ewe te edrhp n rn ad ie f rebel of file and rank and leadership the between making - down, and the short size of delegation chain implies that a that implies chain delegation of size short the and down,

centralization delegation chain is configured in such a way that a that way a such in configured is chain delegation

. Centralization denotes Centralization . mechanisms. As the sponsor can easily can sponsor the As mechanisms.

. 122

uhrt ad oe are power and Authority the extent of power power of extent the

In particular In tives, run an an run tives,

- making t each t rank rank , I , 58

CEU eTD Collection support. regular the to attached centra T 3, includeLashkar Fatah, Hezbollah, examples, presentedinTable leadership. Other subordination oftothepolitical themilitary corps d clearly its for known organization militant the (LTTE), Eelam Tamil of Tigers Liberation The organization military 2, Figure in depicted As action. any for responsible held be can and leadership central the to back report levels lower The level. top the of directions the at decisions these of implementation of charge in are and policies almost have levels lower the while top, the at individuals few a by and leadership file. and efined leadership, complex bureaucratic structure, functional differentiation and the the and differentiation functional structure, bureaucratic complex leadership, efined ogether with private rewards private with ogether l leadership is likely to be accountable to its sponsor its to accountable be to likely is leadership l C C nrlzd raiain hv a im oto o rsucs rvdd y sponsors. by provided resources of control firm a have organizations entralized Centralized do not experience not do –

organizations central control prevails over autonomy. over prevails control central Figure Figure the de , t , 2 cision hese resources are channeled to and through rebel leaders. rebel through and to channeled are resources hese . Private rewards Private

any challenge to its central command central its to challenge any Centralized Organization as a Pyramid -

e - have commanders commanders have - making authority is vertically distributed and distributed vertically is authority making Taiba and UNITA.andTaiba also motivate rebel leaders to keep or change change or keep to leaders rebel motivate

ht are that because it receives private rewards rewards private receives it because An example of this form was the the was form this of example An iety epnil t the to responsible directly

. K . no say in organizational organizational in say no

ey decisions are taken taken are decisions ey –

akin to a a to akin

The The 59

CEU eTD Collection Militancy, and Crime, Terror, of Future The 2001 Ronfeldt. D. and Arquilla John other”. witheach coordinate and communicate to node the in reign 123 to ability sponsor’s a without echelons lower among squandered are resources non of leadership 3). Figure (See power of levels lower the bystrategies organizational and local movement. but commanders, autonomous directives. centralized organizations are and central autonomy horizontallyfavor over control. structured leadership disregard or transform to authority the assume can to commanders space the circumstances, more such Under gives policies. preferable which their for group, push to a commanders or individuals more or two between divided is itself leadersh the Often commanders. i.e. levels, lower of participation high the with implemented awithout clear from indication asponsor. centralizedorganizationsensurestha structureof control and to leadership the course. of change the about concerns serious voice to unlikely therefore, organization. rank to arelikely sanctions Such who those to denied and file and rank obedient to delivered are its to only responsible is chain the in unit every that assures leadership rebel demands. sponsor’s with line in policies organizational their

This organization is a set of actors “tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node or actor, and must go through that that through go mustand actor, or node hierarchical) not (but central a to “tied actors of set a is organization This

and n sc tp o non of type such One non In

ie s nbe o trc alternative attract to unable is file

h dcnrlzto o decision of decentralization The This way, rebel leaders make sure that the rank and file is dependent on them a them on dependent is file and rank the that sure make leaders rebel way, This - centralized organizations, on the other hand, most decisions are made and and made are decisions most hand, other the on organizations, centralized smoothly implement smoothly - etaie or centralized

be effective since the rank the effectivesince be

it - etaie ognzto i a eetaie oti, which outfit, decentralized a is organization centralized does not does aiain lcs oto oe lcl oiis n external and policies local over control lacks ganizations RAND Corporation, at RANDCorporation,

any change in sponsor’s policies. Therefore, the command command the Therefore, policies. sponsor’s in change any

compete with the centra the with compete - making entails more control over the creation of of creation the over control more entails making s pot eas i hs ite oe i the in power little has it because upport - and pp. pp. - file has weak local ties. weaklocal has file 7. t their agents will not alter anyalternot will order agentstheir t Acting

may l leadership over the control of of control the over leadership l as a p a as

oppose the central dictate. central the oppose roximate principal, the principal, roximate This obedience allows allows obedience This . superior Networks and Netwars: Netwars: and Networks 123 paety non Apparently,

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has nd, nd, the the he 60 ip -

CEU eTD Collection 125 295 124 moreagainst prone their sponsors. todefection leaders its against turn consequently, and, leadership, central of even control the to amenable less organization decentralized or government the to defect violence, rank the tactics, and goals between mismatch a is have them. prevent to do could leadership central the that little is there government, target the with compromise to decide commanders leadershi distant the to loyalty the between sandwiched are commanders the as widens interests these of discrepancy the casualties, incur units local the when counterinsurgency, of face the In sponsor. and organization parent interests Such communities. respective their is oftendiluted andorganizational followers goals. may to be opposed intended” had government employer the than more enemy “ power personal their maximize to seek battle controlling problems serious face to likely are leaders rebel against runs usuallywhichrespective protectiontheircommunities, the of to bound commandersareinterests, cen the from independent more is file and rank the leadership, central a is there though Even organization.

Shapiro, Shapiro, Kenneth W. Grundy. 1968. 1968. Grundy. W. Kenneth - 310, at 310,

diverging preferences over tactics, internal monitoring and sanctioning is fragile and there and fragile is sanctioning and monitoring internal tactics, over preferences diverging because is This pp. pp. op. cit op.

297. more general interests of their parent organization and sponsor. and organization parent their of interests general more rl omn a i hs togr is o h lcl levels. local the to ties stronger has it as command tral .,

56 - 61.

omnes sal hv lclzd inte localized have usually commanders

On Machiavelli and the Mercenaries. Mercenaries. the and Machiavelli On

p and the social ties to their soldiers and the population. If the If population. the and soldiers their to ties social the and p

As ihr y orig hi epoe o b cecn the coercing by or employer their coercing by either Shapiro Shapiro

sal cah ih m with clash usually

- rus we mltn laes n followers and leaders militant when argues, and - file is likely to engage in unsanctioned unsanctioned in engage to likely is file The Journal of Modern African Studies African Modern of Journal The 124 .

Consequently, the agenda the Consequently, et sc as such rests ore general interests of their their of interests general ore - adnd omnes who commanders hardened

ih strong With hip. S h protection the 125 ponsors and the the and ponsors

hs makes This

parochial - setting

6(3): 6(3): of of 61

CEU eTD Collection 127 leadership. existing the to disobedience its despite infrastructure institutional and resources recruits, organization’s on draws still faction a establishing toward actions their coordinate jointly and organization the leave to members of decision collective a is which fragmentation, from 126 segmented is leadership the where stars of constellation a like look organizations organization. new a establish formally nor organization ope or from independently operate non of form unstable most the group infightings. protracted or more one experienced have they thefactexcept that for see fit. they as directions central the alter and decision own their its make to autonomy operational more has design: organizational each similar Instead, controlled. centrally not aare they but leadership central share a to tied are commanders movements these all context, different the Hizb

For a similara distinct For Fr actionalized organizations are a stage in the development of command and control and should be distinguished distinguished be should and control and command of development the in stage a are organizations actionalized - e

- Factionalized examp The Islami), Frolinat and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) (see Table 3). Despite Despite 3). Table (see (JKLF) Front Liberation Kashmir and Jammu and FrolinatIslami),

les of this type are Hamas, the Afghan mujahideen (except for Hekmatyar’s for (except mujahideen Afghan the Hamas, are type this of les ion between rebel factionalization and fragmentation see: fragmentation and factionalization rebel ionbetween Figure Figure organizations

new entity. In contrast, fractionalization is endogenous to the organization because a a because organization the to endogenous is fractionalization contrast, In entity. new 3 .

Decentralized Organization as a Solar System - etaiain hr cran atos ihn h organization the within factions certain where centralization nly challenge the leadership but do not collectively exit the exit collectively not do but leadership the challenge nly

nal h sm tat as traits same the entail 127

As depicted in Figure 4, factionalized 4, Figure in depicted As the ir Woldemariam, Woldemariam,

decentralized decentralized

op. cit., op. – counterparts

with many with

126 pp. pp.

This is 35 - 38. 62

CEU eTD Collection 130 129 Militancy, 2001. (eds.). Ronfeldt D. and Arquilla J. in Opponents, L. SPIN. shortly or network” 128 rebel other in membership claim factions and commanders their as control and command govern external even to owing autonomy financial sponsor. the to detrimental operations out carry to use can para a out carve simply factions leadership. the for compete actors many where infighting protracted from suffer interests. their against be to it find they if implementation its veto also o not they that in autonomous are factions and commanders These commandersfactions. and act

Pearlman Lawrence, Organizations that are neither centralized nor decentralized Gerlach calls “segmentary, polycentric and integrated integrated and polycentric “segmentary, calls Gerlach decentralized nor centralized neither are that Organizations r vig o authority for vying ors pp. pp. , op. cit op. op. cit. op. 289 - 310, RANDCorporation. 310, .

, at pp. 90 pp. at , Figure Figure et. u t tee is ot f most ties these to Due ments.

– 128 91. elc. h Struc The Gerlach.

–

their

Factionalized Organization as a Constellation and networked networked and ll raiainwti h aet organization, parent the within organization llel ties to the local level, other militants or political actors a actors political or militants other level, local the to ties

ue f oil oeet: niomna Atvs ad its and Activism Environmental Movements: Social of ture Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and and Crime, Terror, of Future The Netwars: and Networks –

having loose connections between various various between connections loose having cinlzd rus ae fluctuating have groups actionalized Some factions often wield often factions Some nly change leader’s orders but orders leader’s change nly

These organizations often organizations These

130 129

they which Sometimes significant

nd nd 63

CEU eTD Collection East. Middle the in Organizations 131 for thecommonpropensity causefor and violence. except peers their with common in much have not did who governments and organizations other commande autonomous had all They MDD. and ADF SLM/A, RCD, FAP, others, among includes, type This infightings. frequent and control central no with fragile toCOINcommandexposed and control or is inter the when particularly splits to prone are organizations factionalized circumstances, such Under recruitsgiven directions let aloneby issuethat the are a sponsor. co and monitor to leadership the for problem serious creates This organizations.

Victor

n rcie fatoaie ognztos ae nmnl edr bt hi heacy is hierarchy their but leader, nominal a have organizations fractionalized practice, In

Asal , Mitchell Brown and Angela Dalton. 2012. Dalton. Angela and Brown Mitchell , Table

Fractionalized Decentralize 3 Centralized .

Some Examples Rebelof Organizational Structure Journal of Conflict Resolution Conflict of Journal Type

- Why Split? Organizatio Split? Why

reb

el fighting. 56(1): 94 56(1): FMLN JKLF Frolinat Jamaat Hamas UNITA Lashkar Hezbollah Fatah LTTE MDD ADF SLM/A RCD FAP

- –

- 117. e - Islami (Afghanistan)

131 Taiba

Rebels rs and factions with ties to ties with factions and rs nal Splits among Ethnopolitical Ethnopolitical among Splits nal

ntrol the flow of flow the ntrol

CEU eTD Collection Press, 134 Salancik, 133 132 The wider likely the theless zone, defe isrebel orders. out carry to ready not is people of group a or individual an which beyond point critical a is acceptance of Zone acceptance”. of “zones non their of their sizes different on than built is expectation defection to prone less be to organizations Control rebel defection. wra the for supplies and income stable trade would individuals of group rational No defection. deter to sanction strong sufficiently a is cadres to resources off Cutting orders. undesired out carry to others induce can rare. is resource a when important more even is and power of source key a is organization rebel the into flowing resources external of control The organization. an within resources of members” distribution the by constrained is followers organization of behavior of behavior the prescribe and constrain “simultaneously to tends power of distribution the because outcomes organizational and centralization the between d and competitive in even rebels on constraints defection strengthens control and command of centralization higher that is argument My expected. be can outcomes organizational of kind what consequently, and, (dis)AdvantagesThe of

Richard H. Hall. 1982. 1982. Hall. H. Richard Simon, Simon, There are many potential forms of control such as possession, access to resource or use of resource. Pfeffer and and Pfeffer resource. of use or resource to access possession, as such control of forms potential many are There pp. pp. f h aoeetoe lgc od, n wud xet ihy etaie rebel centralized highly expect would one holds, logic aforementioned the If decision of centralization The

op. cit., op. 169. op. cit., cit., op.

pp. pp.

pp. pp. angerous environments. It may be reasonably argued that there is a connection a is there that argued reasonably be may It environments. angerous 49 10; Chester I. Barnard. 1938. 1938. Barnard. I. Chester 10; - 50. Organizations: Structure and Pr and Structure Organizations:

th of their benefactors. Thus, the level of centralization may be related to to related be may centralization of level the Thus, benefactors. their of th

Organizational StructureOrganizational

- making The F The 133

ction. ction. indicates how power is distributed among actors actors among distributed is power how indicates

Those who Those unctions of the Executive the of unctions ocess

, 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice NJ: Cliffs, ed.Englewood 3rd , decide on the allocation of resources of allocation the on decide - etaie counte centralized .

Cambridge: Harvard University University Harvard Cambridge: prs This rparts. - Hall. 132 .

The 134 65

CEU eTD Collection 137 136 135 such commandersare andBy large, a theleadership. against can trumpcard which as they alluse c the to troops, the allegianceamong resources these of allocation the over say their final the has faction or commander decreases which resources, alternative to an therefore, access and, ties, local stronger have commanders as capacity manipulative this lacks non of leadership The autonomous. more them making levels lower sponsor’s agents their that ensures organizations centralized of structure control and the for compensate to way no is there because acceptance of zone wide a have to likely very is organizations centralized of file and rank the result, a As organization. the in power little has it because support external alternative ties. local weak has file and rank the since effective be to likely are sanctions Such resources. these of deprived be may leadership central effective c have They resources. these of much how and when what, get unit and commander principal.proximateonly responsible its is chainto the receiv and which issues orders contract” employment “ empowered is it and instructions, and resources principal” “proximate a as acts leadership central strong instances, such In leadership. central the by controlled is resources to nrl vr h ognzto. hs cmadr wo o o cnom o h dcae f the of dictate the to conform not do who commanders Those organization. the over ontrol

Cooley, Cooley, Sinno, Martens n otat non contrast, In non in than wider is zone this organizations centralized In op. cit op.

op. cit op. et al. op. cit., op. al. et order. ., . pp. pp.

14.

pp. pp. 135 - 47; etaie ognztos lo fr h dseso o rsucs o the to resources of dispersion the for allow organizations centralized .

Acting as a p a as Acting Nielson and Tierney, Nielsonand

es information from the lower levels, and assures that every in unit assuresthat levels,and thelower from information es –

t s piay channel primary a is it loss of resources from the center. Therefore, the command command the Therefore, center. the fromresources of loss roximate principal, the rebel leadership is a supreme nodesupreme a is leadership rebel the principal, roximate 136 op. cit. op.

ieie h rn ad fil and rank the Likewise

to hire, fire, or otherwise alter the agent’s agent’s the alter otherwise or fire, hire, to

Top leadershipexclusively Top which decides hog wih sosr itr its filters sponsor a which through - centralized because the access access the because centralized - etaie organization centralized i ual t attract to unable is e do enter. o atr any alter not 137

Each 66

CEU eTD Collection 141 140 139 Terrorism on Perspectives 138 approval). (e.g. incentives social and survival) physical (e.g. material both through motivated are echelons payments in interested is leadership of preservation the and enrichment personal for used are which money), (e.g. rewards private it offers sponsor the because sponsor the to accountable activitie organizational for accountable directly second is the and members of behavior the regulating of capable is leadership the because counterparts accountability. Accountability cadres more the orless sponsor toward defective. its and leadership of behavior makes centralization of level the resources, to access the widening empowering further agendas, opposing leadership. enga to likely is file and rank the tactics, and goals between mismatch a is there and fragile is sanctioning and monitoring internal tactics, over preferences diverging have followers and leaders militant when punis of face the in even orders disobey to likely

Lidow, Sino, Shapiro, J.K. Zawodny, Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations, in Lawrenc in Organizations, Terrorist of Infrastructures Zawodny, J.K. o Firm control is one of advantages of centralized organizations. Their second advantage i advantage second Their organizations. centralized of advantages of one is control Firm p. cit. p. op. cit. op. op. cit. op. 141 139

, Sponsor’s clout over the leadership is reinforced when it provides exclusive support exclusive provides it when reinforced leadershipis the over clout Sponsor’s

pp. pp. e n nacind ilne dfc t te oenet r vn un gis its against turn even or government the to defect violence, unsanctioned in ge ial, non Finally, ,

pp. pp. are organizations rebel Centralized , pp. , 56 pp. 79. 25.

– 64. pp. Delaware, Wilmington, . 61.

- etaie gop cn lo trc mlil sosr, fe with often sponsors, multiple attract also can groups centralized

and the promise of future rewards, whereas the lower lower the whereas rewards, future of promise the and the

faction

hment. air o oto ta ter non their than control to easier s

vr edrhp Tu, y narrowing by Thus, leadership. over tts quo status 138

In addition, as Jacob Shapiro argues, Shapiro Jacob as addition, In e Z. Freedman and Alexander Yonah. 1983. 1983. Yonah. Alexander and Freedman Z. e s.

ihn h organization. the within 140

h cnrl edrhp is leadership central The - centralized - Top tier tier

or or 67 s

CEU eTD Collection Sinno, 145 99 26(1): 144 143 142 top andlowerwhich one echelons, findinnon can decision over monopoly center centrali an uncertain outcome. intra in embroiled become may sponsor a Even forth. so and prestige non followers, their superiors” its of independently file echelons. lower its with together compartments hierarchical may faction or commander constitu implementation. in difference and conflict for groups and individuals More units. disobedient communic effective establish and with sponsor’s fileintoline preferences. the to

Lawrence, Ibid Sun Sinno suggests that specialized branches within centralized rebel organization may undermine its coherence. coherence. its undermine may organization rebel centralized within branches specialized that suggests Sinno

“can sometimes take orders from the rogue cell without being aware that the cell is acting is cell the that aware being without cell rogue the from orders take sometimes “can op. cit. op. , - centralized organization. centralized Ki Chai. 1993. An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence. Violence. Antigovernment of Theory Economics Organizational An 1993. Chai. Ki pp. pp. ae e dcsos tee s es ofit n dset mn lwr echelons. lower among dissent and conflict less is there decisions, key make sponsors. for choice safer much a are they and counterparts, zed hs cnrlzd raiain ae oe conal t sosr ta ter non their than sponsors to accountable more are organizations centralized Thus, non contrast, In – ent factions of such organizations frequently act independently of their leadership. their of independently act frequently organizations such of factions ent 110, at 110, 14. , op. cit op.

pp . pp. pp. 80 ., pp. ., – 102. 81. - centralized organizations eas organizations centralized

- – centralized organizations are more complex hampering leader’s ability to ability leader’shampering complex more are organizations centralized - 91;

making and force inhibits force and making Pearlman, Pearlman, e facto de

ation with the rank and file, monitor their behavior and punish punish and behavior their monitor file, and rank the with ation 144 142 .

Consequently, the central leadership is eager to bring the rank the bring to eager is leadership central the Consequently, Lacking a central command to limit ambitious individuals and individuals ambitious limit to command central a Lacking op. cit op.

poe t spros y salsig uooos mini autonomous establishing by superiors its oppose .

involved in decision in involved As some authors note, rebel commanders and and commanders rebel note, authors some As ily turn into battlegrounds for power, resources, resources, power, forbattlegrounds into turn ily -

centralized organizations. frequent and destructive quarr destructive and frequent Under such conditions such Under - making open up more space space more up open making - rebel power rebel Since few people at the the at people few Since 145 Comparative Politics Comparative

els between the between els - struggles with struggles , the rank and rank the , 143 The

68 A - -

CEU eTD Collection ofViolence. theCharacter 146 throug control his maintained and capital Ethiopia’s in headquarters rebels’ the organized Mengistu authority, his challenging from leadership SNM the prevent to order In 1980s. the in Mariam Haile Mengistu ruler Ethiopian the of proxy a became organi centralized a (SNM), Movement National Somali the with case the example, commitments Rebel Organization Counterinsurgency setting shrinksleavingfertile for a soil defection. domina a objective. subjugate and dilute to tends goals of multiplicity a because strategy, of change non A process. the efficient innon than concerns ofcourse,centralaboutendanger letalonetheleadership. the change divi disempowered, The interests. and structure organizational its jeopardizing without demands sponsor’s in changes to response central that wonder No individuals Credible Commitments

Lindsay Heger, Danielle Jung and Wendy Wong. 2012. Organizing for Success: How Group Structure Impacts Impacts Structure Group How Success: for Organizing 2012. Wong. Wendy and Jung Danielle Heger, Lindsay The constellation a Such fewer With execution. prompt is organizations centralized of advantage third The 146

in charge of charge in abovementioned advantages of centralization centralization of advantages abovementioned

s aiu rbl lts n cmadr ps fr hi gas sosrs agenda sponsor’s goals, their for push commanders and elites rebel various As –

allow sponsors to exercise their control without much difficulty. much without control their exercise to sponsors allow - centralized organization cannot afford unity, much less blindly follow a rapid rapid a follow blindly less much unity, afford cannot organization centralized - , Inter

centraliz Terrorism and Political Violence Violence Political and Terrorism

decision

edrhp a ceil cmi t rpdy hne t srtge in strategies its change rapidly to commit credibly can leadership - Rebel Fighting and Sponsor’sFighting Defection: and External and Rebel Shocks makes t makes ed structures in which many local power holders must participatein must holders manyed local which structures power in

- making, centralized organi centralized making, ded and dependent rank and file is unlikely to voice serious voice to unlikely is file and rank dependent and ded he communication and decision and communication he

24: 743 24: – 768, at 768, – te eetv sdlnn o some of sidelining selective the h

zations tend to speak and act as one. one. as act and speak to tend zations control, accountability and credible and accountability control, pp. 7 pp. 47 - making process much more much process making – 748.

This was, for for was, This zation that zation 69 nt -

CEU eTD Collection 147 narrow the by concern nationalbecause rebels the and sponsor betweenthe tensions and divisions to lead gradually to likely are policies reconciliatory of forms these All survival. cease support or government, target the against operations may offensive sponsor executing a in restraint instance, advocate For clients. their of goals and interests the to opposed directly are rebe the to support of policy its change to need may sponsor pressured the result, a As regime. political endangeringcountry its sponsor the within discontent civil involvement serious to lead may theirweariness war with combined pressure terminate international to sponsors pressure often parties third force, of use or threat or sanctions economic condemnation, Through conflicts. armed in policies client rebel its against interna force of use the and policies reconciliatory sponsor’s and targetgovernment’s policies other. the of goalsand prompt often shocks from stemming shocks external the group immediately isunable declinesas tocomp it a have accordingly and organization leaders or leader its over clout significant centralized the over control exclusive hold to tends those to payments and members

William Reno. 2011. 2011. WilliamReno. - fire, fire, tional system, sponsors are exposed to external pressures regarding their interventionist interventionist their regarding pressures external to exposed are sponsors system, tional The However, peace talks and proposals, all of which may threaten rebel territorial gains or its very very its or gains territorial rebel threaten may which of all proposals, and talks peace first shock is shock first - focused rebel movements. The sponsor may force its client to comply with a new new a with comply to client its force may sponsor The movements. rebel focused ee organizations rebel Warfare in Independent Africa WarfareIndependent in both Thus, to explain how organizational structure leads to structureleads organizational how explain to Thus,

sponsors and rebels to change their policies at the expense of interests interests of expense the at policies their change to rebels and sponsors the change of sponsor’s policy toward armed struggle, including the the including struggle, armed toward policy sponsor’s of change the

h aaci ntr o cvl as n insurgenci and wars civil of nature anarchic the h wud et ev Mnit’ interests. Mengistu’s serve best would who

o o oeae n vcu. They vacuum. a in operate not do . If the patron withdraws guns, money or a safe heaven, safe a or money guns, withdraws patron the If .

ls, usually by making concessions to other states that states other to concessions making by usually ls, as for incentives rebels. . New York: Cambridge University Press, University New Cambridge York: ensate for support. the of loss

s of sponsors are not shared arenot sponsors of s .

s ebr o the of members As are n cnlc. Such conflict. a in defection

147 often

pp.

uh patron a Such

154 es

xoe to exposed

External . I consid I – 155.

70 er

CEU eTD Collection 149 148 preferences Their rivals. and target sponsor, the of preferences the about perceptions on based policy sponsor’s in change the to control words other In flux. into control and command rebel put shocks External structure. organizational rebel the through particularly, and, chain, these greedy hopes bybuyingoff commanders, amnesty offering orpromising political offices. stir can government target the conditions, such Under life. civilian to attracted more becomes and rank affected the grows, attrition and prolongs, conflict the As cause. the to loyalty their reconsider to factions and commanders prompting file and rank and leadership rebel the between Intimidations soldiers. foot and commanders the among fear and disorder resentment, encourages rivals and government target rebels. sponsored of killings targeted in branches. local their or strongholds rebel attack sponsors. reach. sponsor’s outside are they when rivalries and COIN to vulnerable more be should rebels general, comm wheresome and factionalism, to may lead This sponsor. the loyaltyto the over internallydivided become may organization centralized a Even discontent. the in reign to attempt may leadership T facilities. arresting by course,

Staniland, Staniland, Weinstein, anders may theirleadershipfactions andguns and turnagainst both sponsor.

The How do these shocks trigger defection? defection? trigger shocks these do How from stems shock second The Capable target governments can use the police, military and intelligence to locate and and locate to intelligence and military police, the use can governments target Capable

Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Hard a Rockand a Between he rebels may resist, by r by resist, may rebels he op. cit op. attrition from COIN and rivalries is likely to push the push to likely is rivalries and COIN from attrition ., pp. pp.

ee laes fezn o cnictn rbl eore ad lsn rebel closing and resources rebel confiscating or freezing leaders, rebel 14 –

15.

t , argeted killings, kidnappings and skirmishes weaken the ties ties the weaken skirmishes and kidnappings killings, argeted aising voice or their arms against the patron, or t or patron, the against arms their or voice aising

149

counterinsu ,

The decimation of the rank and file at the hands of theof hands the at file and rank the of decimation The and

to the to 148 ,

The defection is a reaction of rebel command and and command rebel of reaction a is defection

Similarly, rgency ir

conflict with other actors. other with conflict

mat s filtere is impact

CI) n inter and (COIN)

rival rebel movements can engage can movements rebel rival

exposed d through the delegation the through d

rebels away from the the from away rebels - ee rivalries. rebel

This reaction is is reaction This

he rebel he file file

71 In

CEU eTD Collection SPONSOR’S Therearefour possibl perceptions. these on sponsor the toward actions their base file andrank and rebelleadership The vulnerability. of perception and opportunity of perception autonomy, of perception restriction, The file. and rank and leadership rebel the of perceptions defection decline thereisa incentralization. when struc Organizational time. over changes structure organizational the which in setting a as serves It sponsors. their against defect rebels in the organizational structure. s of expectation on perceptions their base file and rank and theirperception have file and rank and leaders rebel the Both acts. physical or verbal from deduced are WITHIN REACH

In Table 4 I combine the organizational structure and location to present the dominant the present to location and structure organizational the combine I 4 Table In

s of other actors other s of

Yes No ponsor’s coercive reach. These perceptions are primarily driv primarily are perceptions These reach. coercive ponsor’s

rank andfile e actions: staye actions: desertand loyal, defyswitch sides. orders,

The organization is

leaders tightly controlled, Centralized Perception of . These perceptions are not necessarilycongruent. The. These are rebel leadership perceptions Restriction Table : stay: The The

: : stay loyal 4 coercive reachcoercive . loyal Rebel Behavior toward Sponsors ORGANIZATION

ture is the key variable of my theory, and we should see see should we and theory, my of variable key the is ture

rank and file Decentralized Uncertainty about Rebel Rebel factions meddl hi pwr ihn n raiain ad their and organization, an within power their leaders Vulnerability Perception of

commitment is constant and does not predict is constantandand doeswhen why not

sponsor’s

AL STRUCTURE Perception of Opportunity : desert:

rank andfile : : desert re are four perceptions: perception of of perception perceptions: four are re

leaders

: stay: loyal e into domestic politics, : : switch sides

sponsors’ interests rank andfile Factionalized Local Local ties trump Perception of lead Autonomy

ers en by the variation variation the by en

: defy:

: : defy

CEU eTD Collection Security International 2012. Price. C. Targeting Leadership of Effectiveness Polit and Terrorism 150 entail features these Because types? organizational other than agents loyal more organization centralized make highly into transformed usually bureaucratizati arethe do why But relationships. formalized and bureaucratized leaders of performance and messages presence, The ma downfall. or stagnation their to leading decapitation, particularly and counterinsurgency, to vulnerable more are leadership charismatic on based organizations shoul organizations their demise. to leads it if even directions sponsor’s follow blindly to expected are both they Thus, ties. local Ne interests. their with line in organization can Sponsors leaders. its on depends file and rank beyond whole a d from refrain as organization centralized organization a would Why the location. its of of regardless loyalty the reinforce should restriction of perception The alone sides, let switch orders, defy to file and rank or leadership the of ability the restricted status a Such regime. Mengistu the by monitored tightly was and sponsor its on depended leadership SNM the counte from insulated was It sponsor. its of reach coercive the under and organization centralized a was SNM The restriction. of perception

Michael Freeman. Freeman. Michael y be an important feature, it tends be routinized and formalized in centralized organizations. centralized in formalized and routinized be tends it feature, important an be y The abovementioned example of Ethiopia’s sponsorship of the SNM should reinforce the the reinforce should SNM the of sponsorship Ethiopia’s of example abovementioned The its its sponsor’s reach? First, because the leadership depends on external support, and support, external on depends leadership the because First, reach? sponsor’s

even in the face of Ethiopia’s radical shift in its policy toward the armed struggle. struggle. armed the toward policy its in shift radical Ethiopia’s of face the in even

clear rules on decision on rules clear eod gvn hi bracaie ad omlzd tutr centralized structure formalized and bureaucratized their given Second, agtn Tp errss Hw Leade How Terrorists: Top Targeting ical Violence ical

36( The Headless Horseman: A Theoretical and Strategic Assessment of Leadership Leadership of Assessment Strategic and Theoretical A Horseman: Headless The b mr rslet o ON Te ovninl idm od that holds wisdom conventional The COIN. to resilient more be d 4 ) 9 ) -

46. , f ,

orthcoming; Patrick B. Johnston 2012. 2012. Johnston B. Patrick orthcoming;

in Counterinsurgency Campaigns. Counterinsurgency in - making and succession, allowing succession, and making rinsurgency, preventing desertions. Simultaneously, desertions. preventing rinsurgency, te rbl edr nr oe ehln hv strong have echelons lower nor leaders rebel ither rship Decapitation Contributes to to Contributes Decapitation rship deliver

private rewards to leaders to keep the the keep to leaders to rewards private

International Security International Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the the Assessing Work? Decapitation Does 150

While charismatic leadershipcharismatic While centralized organizations centralized on and formalization and on

36 efection if it is it if efection Counterterrorism. ( 4 ): 47 ): - Targeting. 79; Bryan 79; the the 73

CEU eTD Collection Strikes 151 t result, a As reach. are outside and leaders thantheir becauseare stronger theyautonomy perception of sponsor their alone let leaders, rebel the strategic narrower a have factions and commanders result, a As reach. sponsor’s of ignore reasonably can factions and commanders Likewise privileges. the to access the endanger or limit that centraldecision those fortolerance low have they andbenefits, preservingthese interestedin inter vested has it is, that incentives, is file and rank The honor. and respect as such non of source a also arecommunities These communities. respective their of also organization factionalized and ties. vulnerability, of perception the organizat develop to likely are organizations decentralized reach, sponsor’s their outside located when hand, other the On territory. sponsor’s defection loyalty over irrespective defection location. oftheir dissatisfie are they when even government target the to out reaching from defectors potential deterring effective, intra the makes rules and administration eliminati of case in replacement a find to

Jenna Jordan. 2014. 2014. Jordan. Jenna T . e eeain hi fo sosr t te ees s tand y h fc that fact the by strained is rebels the to sponsors from chain delegation he International Security International the the n otat dcnrlzd n fcinlzd raiain ae oe nlnd towards inclined more are organizations factionalized and decentralized contrast, In . The perception of oppo of perception The . ions sponsor’s orders without incurring too high costs for their actions because they are out are because they actions their for costshigh incurringtoo without orders sponsor’s –

perception of autonomy. The perception of autonomy is reinforced due to local to due reinforced is autonomy of perception The autonomy. of perception draw wt te eta dcae I sm cnrlzd raiain sol prefer should organizations centralized sum, In dictate. central the with d takn te edr Msig h Mark: the Missing Leader, the Attacking s e ak n fl i ms lkl t defy to likely most is file and rank he

on popular support and resources, obtained through ta through obtained resources, and support popular on

38(4): 7 38(4):

- 38, rtunity is dominant among both types when they have access to accessthey have types when amongboth dominant rtunityis

at pp. at 1 pp. ests at the local level. Commanders and factions are mainly mainly are factions and Commanders level. local the at ests on . 2

- omnes and Commanders - 15

organizational monitoring and sanctioning highly highly sanctioning and monitoring organizational of a leader or key commanders key or leader a of .

particularly

h Troit rus Survive Groups Terrorist Why motivated by both material and social and material both by motivated

factions are likely to develop the the develop to likely are factions

the

pno’ sit toward shift sponsor’s

. - 151 material incentives, incentives, material xation or extortion extortion or xation

The existence of existence The

the the

picture than picture

Decapitation Decapitation sponsor’s sponsor’s h rebel the 74

CEU eTD Collection for shockssoil argued the delegationchain desertion. above,destabilize external As these likely be will sponsor’s organizations within reach other factionalized perceptionOn the hand, vulnerability. of their given desert to prone more be will reach sponsor’s beyond organizations Decentralized a defiance, to Similar government. target the joining necessarily without sponsor the against guns turning is sides Switching government. target the joining or fighting of abandonment approval, explicit cease accepting involves armed struggle. b to likely is defiance costly entail not would move a play,perceptionatthis autonomy. of With reinforceconditionsperception two the The sanctions. such reach her or his outside are they that Given sponsor. outbiddin the enter to them encourage local should politics organization, the the within power of of decline monopoly the to lack lead already leaders and Since factions, leadership. radical more bolster may demand public the address a support their over factions other with compete they and communities respective their in embedded are leaders Rebel standing. public its to damaging more be may request sponsor’s every satisfying factions, some by advocated policies the of favor in be not constituencies. their of loyalty the or predation or taxation through acquired privileges status, social losing risk they because interests local their affecting decisions ce as such policies, reconciliatory Naturally, exogenous pressures such as COIN and insurgent fratricide provide a fertile fertile a provide fratricide insurgent and COIN as such pressures exogenous Naturally, Desertion sides. switching and desertion are defection rebel of forms severe most The non

o un hi gn aant h sosr u t te ecpin f opportunity. of perception the to due sponsor the against guns their turn to -

etaie raiainl str organizational centralized e triggered in response to response in triggered e

- ie r ec tls ih h tre gvrmn w government target the with talks peace or fire

ase - ie gemns peace agreements, fire

ucture the

sponsor’s reconciliatory policies toward the the toward policies reconciliatory sponsor’s is the main condi main the is g even at if it means the collision with the with collision the means it if at even g - treaties or other operational operational other or treaties

While rebel leadership may leadership rebel While tion for severe defection. severe for tion nd loyalty. Failing to to Failing loyalty. nd tot sponsor’s a ithout

and the and the 75

CEU eTD Collection 152 internat the across supplies and equipment Moving outfit. the hammered the if assist to even willingness and information attrition has sponsor or decapitation survive to support external on count cannot likewise it file and rank the border, international the across usually the about clue second no his virtually of has problems and chain delegation the of top the at sits who sponsor the organizati echelons) territorialto remote the separationhampers flow units. ofsupplies lower and upper (between the ground, the on situation the about knowledge broad has leadership the if Even consolidation. vertical and echelons) lower the (among horizontal in invested effort no or little with outfits, local into assimilated randomly are and type inflow, the about information less much and troops, its of interests and needs the about information scarce has leadership rebel the file, and rank its from Detached constrained. seriously is cadre military lea rebel of ability the leadership, central the to and another one to links organizational solid lack and communities respective their with associated and control. chain, and command delegation rebel of of configuration length the sponsors. cause: proximate their a and on combat depends desert to decision rebel the shape that chain delegation make or fighting government the target abandon the to with compromise prone are echelons lower losses, manpower generates a Because movement. rebel a within control and command

For For a similar argument see: Weinstein, Weinstein, see: similara argument If the rebel leadership suffers from the information asymmetry and poor logistic poor andasymmetry information the suffersfrom leadership rebel the If desertionorganizationleading the to extentfactorsoverwhelm whatthese to and Whether number of recruits that are joining the local branches. As a result, recruits result, a As branches. local the joining are that recruits of number -

tier agents. Situated outside the reach of sponsor’s policing patrols, patrols, policing sponsor’s of reach the outside Situated agents. tier ional border, even a porous one, is not just costly in material terms, material in costly just not is one, porous a even border, ional

op. cit., op.

pp. pp. Tee r te ot motn fact important most the are These . 131. 152

hn omnes n fcin ae mainly are factions and commanders When es o nlec te eair f their of behavior the influence to ders may avoid wraith of its state patron. But patron. state its of wraith avoid may tiin nerps upy ie and lines supply interrupts ttrition

more precisely, the the precisely, more ors outside the the outside ors

s, so does so s, onal 76

CEU eTD Collection 1. chapter 1990. Brynen. Rex squabbles. political 153 the with confronted become easily sponsor may group the government, sponsor the to opposition toleranc greater acquire This factions these however, so, doing In decision the influence to and leaders nominal their over leverage a gain to opportunity the file, and rank the among opportunity of perception the support. social and economic spo political, additional the for government within factions even or groups religious parties, political individuals, powerful commanders different leadership, rebel from themselves distinguish to Striving of tendency the factionalized to related is sides switching chain, delegation in government f ordesert to file and rank its or whole a as organization the either expect should we result, a As fighting. from organization decentralized discourage should perception rivals, retaliate. credibly can government target the if particularly exposure, of risk a run would they that expect unreaso is it conflict, the in involvement their conceal to support provide sponsors most As guards. border the by caught are officers its lest reputation sponsor’s harm also may it but

Rex Brynen warns that such internal alliances can backfire against the rebels by drawing them into domestic domestic into them drawing by rebels the against backfire can alliances internal such that warns Brynen Rex creates alternative sources of material support and exerts political pressure on the sponsor to thesponsor politicalexerts pressure on and material support alternativecreates sources of

de Whereas desertion stems from the weakness of sponsors to protect the lowermost agents agents lowermost the protect to sponsors of weakness the from stems desertion Whereas .

etaie ognztos r lkl to likely are organizations centralized D e rvd f upr fo their from support of prived

organization ighting o ad upr fr ee activities. rebel for support and of e

s to exploit ties to various domestic actors within the sponsor country. country. sponsor the within actors domestic various to ties exploit to s

when operating outside sponsor’swhen purview. operatingoutside Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon in PLO The Survival: and Sanctuary

are meddling into the into meddling sponsors

develo

- amid a counterinsurgency or pressure from from pressure or counterinsurgency a amid making pro making te ecpin f unrblt. This vulnerability. of perception the p

internal 153 seek an agreement with the target target the with agreement an seek cess within the sponsor country. sponsor the within cess

u w But

These connections reinforce reinforce connections These

affairs oh eetaie and decentralized both e tee lis r in are allies these hen

Boulder: Boulder:

of the sponsor state. sponsor the of il pel to appeal will Westview Press Westview nable to nable nsor 77 ,

CEU eTD Collection pp. 1956. Coser. Lewis group. former their of followers the 155 154 semi Many Pakistan. violence within sectarian stir to used groups these which support material its to ideology extremist Jaish contemporary in Harkat as such outfits Kashmiri concerns militant fractionalized some where greatest Pakistan the of one been has this Incidentally, agendas. extreme in also This own. their of life a on take to tend they central the recognizing while funding leadership. separate secure and name different a under actions way third shambles. in group the the Expelling allowed. is dictate central the opposing that message a conveys and sits leadership the which on branch the can elements. expel the ignoretroublesome disobedience However,ignoring or the cutting means goals detrim the sponsor’s to leads goals adopting against some about assumption be may rapprochement a such as business risky a is this But strategies. their endorsing by back them win to try may Leaders commands. central grou and individuals those pose problems greatest The interests. their pursue and define to space organizational broad a enjoy they because commanders and elites in reign splinter

Pearlman Pearlman

Those who break away from the parent group are dangerous foes because they continue to vie for the loyalty of of loyalty the for vie to continue they because foes dangerous are group parent the from away break who Those 71. -

e - However, once semi once However, “semi to birth give groups fractionalized when is sponsors for danger greatest The Mohammad were simult were Mohammad groups” –

op. cit. op.

allowing the creation of a semi a of creation the allowing 154 , pp. pp. . As noted above, the leadership of non of leadership the above, noted As . 16 – 155 17.

troublemakers is costly as they might pull the others with them leaving leaving them with others the pull might they as costly is troublemakers

If ignoring is risky and expelling is costly, the leadership can seek a seek can leadership the costly, is expelling and risky is ignoring If - splinter groups are allowed to attract alternative sources of support support of sources alternative attract to allowed are groups splinter -

pitr rus ikd o Harkat to linked groups splinter aneously supported by supported aneously - splinter group. This will allow the group t group the allow will This group. splinter The Functions of Social Confl Social of Functions The cludes alignments with external allies with allies external with alignments cludes

the

ent of other. Alternatively, leadership Alternatively, other. of ent ISI and Al and ISI - centralized organizations is weak to weak is organizations centralized ul

and Jaish have used suicide suicide used have Jaish and - Qaeda. Al Qaeda. ict . Illinois: The Free Press, Free The Illinois: . ps who openly shun shun openly who ps - ul – - Mujahideen and Mujahideen -

Qaeda attached attached Qaeda remember the the remember o carry its its carry o 78 -

CEU eTD Collection 157 Pakistan. to Threat Jihadist The 2003. 156 be with may conflicts there and that disagreements accept I services. intelligence and army the through usually clients rebel their toward entity coherent a as act governments external that implies This actors. unitary as ana of unit main the as regarded is which dyad, In this options. self utility are rebels and sponsors both that assume I wars, civil in Principal?Blaming the Fragmentation Sponsors of September. Black as known infamously 1970, September in groups leftist Palestinian fractionalized the with s Jordan’s the of Think war. civil into countries their drag ultimately may challenge governments unresolved and weak For respond. l of activities the viewing authority, state shun may flocks indoctrinated than more nothing are who rebels the If sponsors. extremist and stronger fa united ideologically small, a of motivation semi the organization, same parent the the on as drawing facilities and Although followers friends. powerful with actor serious a into grown already semi a with affiliation denyand support its off cutmight organization fractionalized a leadershipof the situation, In this a bombings

Leites and Wolf, Wolf, Leites and esc Sen 20. aitns ia Culture. Jihad Pakistan’s 2000. Stern. Jessica - interest. In Chapter 1, I defined rebel defection as a rational action. Following past work on actors actors on work past Following action. rational a as defection rebel Idefined 1, Chapter In

nd assassinations to get rid of their rivals and the leadership of their parent groups. parent their of leadership the and rivals their of rid get to assassinations nd 157 ocal security forces as aimed to destroy their armed struggle and will violently violently will and struggle armed their destroy to aimed as forces security ocal

They both make decisions based on the expected costs and benefits of available of benefits and costs expected the on based decisions make both They op. cit. op. ;

- Kalyvas, Kalyvas, pitrd ru. y ht ie however, time, that By group. splintered

op. cit. op. The Washington Quarterly Washington The in the government, between the military/intelligence and the the and military/intelligence the between government, the in ; Weinstein, sponsor decides to punish such punish to decides sponsor oeg Affairs Foreign ction, which can call upon the resources of its much much its of resources the upon call can which ction, op. cit op. –

. h sfe fo crnc instability chronic from suffer who

, 7 - , November/December; Stephen Philip Cohen. Cohen. Philip Stephen November/December; , 25, at 25, pp. pp. lysis, sponsors are conceptualized are sponsors lysis, - pitr niy a atie the attained has entity splinter - 10. maximizing actors led by their their by led actors maximizing

h semi the

behavior, fractionalized behavior, - splinter will have have will splinter howdown howdown –

this 156 79

CEU eTD Collection Terrorism: rather the over control minimal authors, Other has agency. authority civilian the that claim Nawaz Shuja and Pakistan, in operative CIA former 160 Institute, StrategicStudies India. 159 158 is or forging the Pakistani the government. informationsponsored to from insurgents anti rogue, a be India. northeastern and Kashmir in operations militant in invested purview a intelligence main Pakistan’s JeM. and LeT groups militant banned officially the by attacks Mumbai 2008 the in officers its of involvement the being examples clearest the of one Kashmir, toward policies government’s bec of contradiction ISI 1990s. since outfits militant Kashmiri various and Taliban state” the within “state Inter powerfulPakistan’s is example notorious government. the consulting without own their on act often services security that is criticism only activel government Lebanese the of parts example, For government. of fragment a only constitutes sponsor a practice in that is how externa my However, rebels. the manage affectseriously not do interests of spheres bureaucratic and agendasembattled that is assumption to how on services security the within and government

no easy no I thank Ora Szekely for thisfor comment. Szekely thank Ora I Rian Clarke. 2010. Lashkar 2010. Clarke. Rian oiy xet ae iie oe te su o gvrmn cnrl vr S. oe uhr lk Bue idl a Riedel, Bruce like authors Some ISI. over control government of issue the over divided are experts Policy

a handful of ministers support ministers of handful a than Both arguments pose a thoughtful challenge to the unitary the to challenge thoughtful a pose arguments Both unitary for argument of line One unproblematic. not is assumption This . Its alleged links to drug trade and other illegal financial transactions are supposedly supposedly are transactions financial illegal other and trade drug to links alleged Its .

Behind the or

l governments treatl governments their rebel clients.

whole instant solution, I suggest two ways to ways two suggest I solution, instant

- the s tate agency, tate

ISI

Accusations. such as William Milam and and Milam William as such

sometimes

– - i

- US Army War College, no. 35 no. College, US ArmyWar hc hs aae te fhn uaei i te 90, n the and 1980s, the in mujahedin Afghan the managed has which Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in in Terrorism Islamist of Future the and Proxies Subservient of Fallacy The Taiba: 160

y backed the PLO in 1971, while others actively opposed it. opposed actively others while 1971, in PLO the backed y

Council

it is certainly an autonomous actor capable of hiding, distracting hiding, of capable actor autonomous an certainly is it

rogue.

rebels, can we still call it a state sponsorship? The second The sponsorship? state a it call still we can rebels, on

For Forei

the Marvin gn

discussion

- Relations Services Intelligence (ISI) Services ec otn prts usd te government’s the outside operates often gency

Weinbaum, address , pp. pp. , .

see: http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/#5. 41. 41.

this issue. The first is to account for for account to is first The issue. this

Kaplan,

disagree - 159 actor assumption. While there While assumption. actor

and While ISI does not seem to seem not does ISI While

and m well ame

suggest – Bajoria.

often referred to as a a as to referredoften -

actor skepticism actor that

- 2008. nw fr its for known

certain

The

officers

ISI

158

and

80 A If

CEU eTD Collection I causal outline that Before analyzed. is Pakistan toward groups militant Kashmiri several of behavior the where emba I not. do others while sponsor the to ties ideological and/or ethnic have rebels some where and support; for sponsor on depend and base, rural own their establish to weak are who rebels the governments; target and sponsor capable of context the in my and chain, delegation downplay analyzenot to capacity. isaim isto intention explanatoryRathersponsorsh their my the affect also may chapter previous the in suggested have I that wh in context wider the of 4 wherebetween militants is analyzed.relationshipKashmiri Pakistan the and mechan causal specific the analyze to way second The apparatus. security their control to governments of ability the for accounts partly it but politics, bureaucratic the in nuances the capture fully not alternative the of one by s fragmented be to expected are states weak suggested 1, Chapter in explanations As capacity. coercive and administrative sponsor’s T he conditions I propose, rebel organization and external shocks, are simply one segment segment one simply are shocks, external and organization rebel propose, I conditions he

mechanisms leading ofdefection.mechanisms tothe twoforms ich sponsors and their clients cooperate. The alternative explanations explanations alternative The cooperate. clients their and sponsors ich isms behind a sponsorship. This step is undertaken in Chapter Chapter in undertaken is step This sponsorship. a behind isms

rked on this goal in Chapter 4 Chapter in goal this on rked relax this relax ponsors. This proxy does does proxy This ponsors.

assumption is to is assumption ips ips 81

CEU eTD Collection I section, final the In cases. summarize themain findings ofthe statistical analyses. and periods time some omitting by findings statistical the of robustness the analyze I Then time. in defection rebel of risk the assess to order in model hazard models the of adequacy check to diagnostics of number a run subsequently I dataset, novel a is this As argument. hierar the as known for measurements (also model the logistic multilevel the of present use the justify I I Third, variables. control and part, independent second the In provided. also are variable dependent so and analysis of unit cases, of universe the (SOR) and theonset to2012. ofrebel defection from 1968 explanations using alternative tested are 1 the Chapter in surveyed with along hypothesis, This the decreases, increases. centralization defection rebel of of likelihood level the as hypothesis: core a produced has section relationshi their on entities rebel within control and command of effect the analyzing for framework organizational an presented and defection, and obedience The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the properties of the dataset including including dataset the of properties the Idiscuss First, follows. as organized is chapterThe principal the discussed I chapters, two previous the In Analyzing Rebel Defection chical method). The following section shows the results, which support my my support which results, the shows section following The method). chical Atr hs tss I nlz te ape sn te o propor Cox the using sample the analyze I tests, these After . CHAPTER 3 a novel, cross novel, a A cross Armed Confl me methodological issues. The indicators for the the for indicators The issues. methodological me

national dataset on sponsorship of rebels of sponsorship on dataset national

p with sponsors. The theoretical theoretical The sponsors. with p - icts gn apoce to approaches agent , 1968 - 2012

for the the for

tional rebel 82

CEU eTD Collection 163 162 March. Data. New Presenting 161 conflict. of inclusion the for deaths related battle 25 of rule UCDP the respecting added were observations new The year. per dyad rebel sponsor for observations new added I 1975 into continues and 1968 in begins conflict a Where hav which dynamics intervention external of understanding our in Sudanese thesegap and andcivil wars Chad.a cases civilDropping war, inCambodia creates the war civil major of number a are there though even 1975 after conflicts only covers dataset UCDP featuringexternal support. the is dataset this in analysis of unit for conflicts 169 of total a is main there and conflict/year The support. verbal include not does UCDP that troops” of short support, military and logistics arms, assistance, financial “sanctuary, that conflict” armed ongoing an in it assist to given is that party primary suppo External dataset,this Conflict Uppsala the cross (UCDP) Program’s from Department selected was analysis quantitative the for cases of universe The Data

Ibid Ibid Stina Högbladh, Therése Pettersson, and Lotta Themnér Lotta and Pettersson, Therése Högbladh, Stina ta hv ter einns n h sxis nml te Israeli the namely sixties, the in beginnings their have that s

sosr s edn top t spot h rbl, hl non while rebels, the support to troops sending is sponsor a

hs aae ws iageae it sponsor into disaggregated was dataset This a of government the is one least state, results in at least at 25battle which of parties, two between force armed of use the where territory and/or government concerns that incompatibility contested a which iscommonly us rt or sponsorship of rebels is understood as “warring or non or “warring as understood is rebels of sponsorship or rt ae peae fr h 21 IA nul ovnin n otel Quebec Montreal, in convention annual ISA 2011 the for prepared Paper

ed among political scientists, - related related deaths. - national database of external support in armed conflict. armed in support external of database national I identified the name of sponsor using the using sponsor of name the identified I . 2011. External Support in Armed Conflict 1975 Conflict Armed in Support External 2011. . 161

the time period 1975 period time the

- rebel dyads per year. Furthermore, the the Furthermore, year. per dyads rebel c onflict defined is as - aetna cnlc, h first the conflict, Palestinian - 162 arn sup warring ocre pir o 1975. to prior occurred e . Warring support implies support Warring . - 2009 with 118 conflict 118 with 2009 - warring support to a to support warring ot osss of consists port Cnd 16 Canada ,

Expanded 163 Note . - 2009 - 19 83 In - - -

CEU eTD Collection 164 ended.sponsorship is A another. one toward behavior sponsor their develop to time some need alliance every in parties tw least at for support the provided sponsor a if and government, the against fighting by deaths related battle five twenty reaches if only data the enters movement a rules, coding UCDP Following alternative and my of focus 1968 years the for observations with year, per dyad rebel intervention. external experienced that conflicts those only are sponsor unjustified toexpect rebelloyalty where may therelationship exist. noteven acknow or explicit was sponsorship the where cases only considered I Finally, outcome. the in change observe to method survival the for period short a sponsor the all removed ILikewise, Taiba. Harkat Mujahideen, battle the met they when (2003 UFDD Sudan, by supported organizations militant five and India, from support military received that war civil th in missing been have that organizations rebel certain added have I Next, books. and articles engines, searching dataset (EACD) v2.3 Data Conflict Armed

See Appendix A for the complete list of sponsorships. list of Athefor complete Appendix See - 200 The - - o consecutive years. Those sponsorships that last that sponsorships Those years. consecutive o ee da i osre utl h cnlc i triae, h mvmn per movement the terminated, is conflict the until observed is dyad rebel dy rebel ) Te ahii nugns ee iageae it priua rbl organizations rebel particular into disaggregated were insurgents Kashmiri The 9).

oiid aae, hc I ae Sae pnosi o Rebels of Sponsorship State named I which dataset, modified - , F (F) FR, U ad PD drn te Sudan the during MPRD, and FUC FPRN, (UFR), RFC F, ads nested within 108 conflicts. 108 within nested ads e UCDP dataset after 1975. These are TELO and EROS from the Sri Lankan Sri the from EROS and TELO are These 1975. after dataset UCDP e - ul

- na, ibl uaien Jaish Mujahideen, Hizbul Ansar,

- related deaths threshold. I included Al Barq, Al Jihad Force, Al Umar Umar Al Force, Jihad Al Barq, Al included I threshold. deaths related

rmwrs s n ee bhvo twr a atclr sponsor. particular a toward behavior rebel on is frameworks - rebel dyads that have lasted for one year because it is it year because one for lasted have that dyads rebel Te ye f upr ws oae uig h online the using located was support of type The .

164

Since the fo the Since - - ed e 2012. -

oamd JL ad Las and JKLF Mohammad, egd eas i ws analytically was it because ledged for one year are excluded because excluded are year one for

The unit of analysis is a sponsor a is analysis of unit The cus is on sponsorship, considered sponsorship, on is cus

The data is data The

dyadic -

Chad proxy war war proxy Chad (SOR)

se o the or ishes because the the because hs 188 has , hkar - 84 e - - -

CEU eTD Collection Outcome. Durationand ofCivil War 166 at 2011. Montreal presented manuscript Unpublished data. new presenting rebel some dataset UCDP 165 the In organizations. rebel particular to refers design research each for codebook code personally to had I reason, this For support. of types for scheme coding different a provides and basis year a on cases code not does dataset which are ofthisstudy. purview outsidethe of all violence, communal and political protests, of sponsorship excludes it because important resulting combat in engage state, a of government beingthe them of oneparties, where two cases onlythose includes UCDP The conflicts. armed of context the in groups armed and sponsors between relationship coi dataset the Finally, basis. year a on support) of type unknown and support, of forms other intelligence, funding, training, logistics, weapons, infrastructure, military/intelligence to access territory, to access (troops, support of types ten and spo particular between distinguishes data UCDP the particular, In sponsorships. the about fine provides dataset the Second, agenda. political own its fulfill to actor a government a defines as It sponsor sponsorship. of definition my with compatible is data UCDP the First, reasons. three for research this with fit reasonably to seems dataset UCDP the Overall, dataset. UCDP s those SOR into incorporate not do I that Note 1975 Conflict, Armed in Support External on dataset (UCDP) Program Data Conflict

David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis Analysis Dyadic A Two: Takes It 2009. Salehyan. Idean and Gleditsch, Skrede Kristian Cunningham, E. David Stina Högbladh, Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér. 2011. External Support in Armed Conflict 1975 Conflict Armed in Support External 2011. Themnér. Lotta and Pettersson Therése Högbladh, Stina t total, In For additional cases I draw on the on draw I cases additional For

ee r 18 are here ofit ht a icue in included was that conflict in minimally 25 battle 25 minimally in

or other entity that provides a material support to a non a to support material a provides that entity other or 8

Journal of Conflict Resolution Conflict of Journal sponsorships Ex -

related deaths in a calendar year. This distinction is distinction This year. calendar a in deaths related Fr h uies o css da o te Uppsala the on draw I cases of universe the For . panded Armed Conflict Data v2.3 (EACD) v2.3 Data Conflict Armed panded ncides with my scope conditions conditions scope my with ncides

ponsorships that are coded as “alleged” in the the in “alleged” as coded are that ponsorships these parameters in accordance with the UCDP the with accordance in parameters these

the the International Studies Association Convention in in Convention Association Studies International the SOR. SOR.

53(4): 570 olwn the Following - 597 .

- grained information information grained EACD –

analyzing the analyzing

- dataset, state armed state - . 2010. 166 - nsors nsors

2009 This

my my 165 85 -

CEU eTD Collection he after Uganda and Rwanda against turned Kabila Lawrence example, For sponsor. a against defection ended had sponsorship the after sponsor its against defected movement rebel a If sponsorship. ongoing an of context the in acts on therelationship between sta is, reader The light some sheds which globe. undertaking, imperfect an as the dataset this approach to across advised therefore, files intelligence in somewhere buried are that defection i here Presented secrecy. in shrouded are movements rebel and governments foreign between relations the because and scarce is information the because Itcivil wars andtoidentify wasrebel hard insurgencies. very using thesesources defections open repo and articles books, various and abstracts, book online Google WikiLeaks, ProQuest, not. or defection rebel is there whether denoting since 1968 of total a are There organizations. rebel p only includes dataset SOR the “rebels”, as organizations various together lumping pos avoid To organizations. across support capabilities, external in and resources variation potential a ignores coding This organization. rebel a as designated Kashmiris, e.g. group, ethnic whole the finds one Likewise, organizations. specific with along coded Afghanistanare Alliancein Northern or Rhodesia in (PF) Front Patriotic as alliances,such In coding defection I defection coding In d main My vrhe Mobutu overthrew

in the SOR ependent variable is rebel defection. D defection. rebel is variable ependent .

. Similarly, Khmer Rouge began purging its cadres from the the from cadres its purging began Rouge Khmer Similarly, . followed t followed te sponsors and rebel organizations. te sponsors and rebel or the conflict had been terminated been had conflict the or hree

8 criteria

rebel organizations that received external support external received that organizations rebel . First, I only considered the aforementioned aforementioned the considered only I First, . co I efection is a binary dependent variable dependent binary a is efection ded ded s but a fraction of numerous cases of of cases numerous of fraction a but s hs variable this

sible pitfalls associated with associated pitfalls sible , then it was it then ,

sn Lexis using

not coded as coded not articular articular Nexis, Nexis, rts on rts 86

CEU eTD Collection 168 CLIO 167 factions or leadership the by contract of termination the is defection, severe labeled defection, def mild of definition the to conform that occurrences 54 identified I r rebels when coded is defection mild particular, In contract. of termination the without orders sponsor’s of disobedience the is defection, organizational or mild code I which type, first The rebel of leadership the when agent. its into resources considerable invests often who sponsor a for cost material a presents it because movement a of desertion the about care faction. or movement of desertion outright open include it unless defection as coded not was incidence such agent its of behavior the about government sponsor a coding Before interests. between rathergovernments a sponsor two than advisors Vietnamese efuse to:

For detailed narrative of defections see Appendix B. Appendix see narrativeofdefections detailed For Mich    .

denunciation of the sponsor, the of denunciation

a sign explicitly a agreementis peace that backed bythe sponsor. accept cease fire conduct military operations defection. of occurrences 100 identified I rules, these Following was defection Second, e l Haas. 1991. 1991. Haas. l

regarding eoie y rx: abda Pw o a uepwr Chessboard Superpower a on Pawn Cambodian Proxy: by Genocide fe i cpue te capital the captured it after

or peace talksevenexplicitlya though sponsor supported it

at s eeto, frt erhd o a for searched first I defection, as act n mo

co the behavior of its agent. When When agent. its of behavior the vement nsidered only if it was it if only nsidered

an armed attack against its military, citizens or property or citizens military, its against attack armed an

or any of its factions engages in two types of behavior. behavior. of types two in engages factions its of any or ,

E e aoe faction, a alone let ven though it may be argued that a sponsor may not not may sponsor a that argued be may it though ven

- rebel re rebel

n 1975. in lationship. lationship.

aimed against a sponsor and its explicit its and sponsor a against aimed 167

oh ae dpc a depict cases Both the sponsor the found I

dissatisf ection.

h cdn appropriate coding the 168

government

The second type of type second The eeto i coded is Defection ied

tones . Westport: ABC ABC Westport: . , or relationship

rm the from is

silent d an d

87 or

CEU eTD Collection cent a are there dataset this of validity the rank the does competencies, other or rank operational the to orders issue to able is leadership a is there whether indicating examples for searched d information. partial offers data existing the because Variables Independent seventeen these Of whole. a as incidents, three movement the by committed are rest the while defection, group both be can s of incidents 46 found I characteristics, these Following is defection severe Specifically, measuredas: sponsor. the against guns turning by or desertion through srbto o decision of istribution    

ral control, and to what extent what to and control, ral For targeting government. thearmedcivilians and/or sponsor forces of joining the targetor government, abandoning fighting, approval,explicit accepting

y e variable, key my

the first two indicators two first the incidents

cease - led and factional. Out of 100 reported incidents, seventeen denote factional factional denote seventeen incidents, reported 100 of Out factional. and led

two dummy variables to variables dummy two -

ie or fire -

fall aig ewe te edrhp n rank and leadership the between making

und

the pe er and mild, fourteen belong tosevere defection.

tutr o rbl organization rebel of structure c tls ih h tre gvrmn wtot sponsor’s a without government target the with talks ace .

If there were any misunderstandings in the findings, I also I findings, the in misunderstandings any were there If , I draw on on draw I ,

depict rebel structure: whether an organization has organization an whether structure: rebel depict - - and and the

- - In Chapter 2, I define rebel structure as a a as structure rebel define I 2, Chapter In file compete for the leadership. the for compete file EACD rank the whether file,

eta laesi, o ht xet the extent what to leadership, central evere defection. evere

dataset ,

mil ue oe sources open used mainly I

- as a reference category. In category. reference a as and

ie Cneunl, I Consequently, file. As defined, defection defined, As - an d

- file has only only has file To inspect To 88

CEU eTD Collection oeok eso 920 online: 9/2008 Version http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp Codebook 170 http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/. Maryland. of University by edited Profiles. Organization 169 fine offers it that is coding my of advantage The decades. across even sometimes and years, across constant be to majority the from differs approach an Such centralized. to factionalized from or decentralized, to centralized from change can centralization centr of level This leadership. central the by issued orders any follow not do frequently operational and to issues politics alliance to organizational from issues of range broad a on decide can organizati Factionalized areas. geographic distinct in operate who commanders field by modified are that orders or statements organizations ta centralization of level This year. given a in leadership the over competition no experiences and issues operational to related competencies has which file, rank the from feedback receives and orders issues who helm the at council or person strong decentralized and strongruling council/strong leader. single leadership central to according organization rebel classifies dataset This useful. classification MAROB t the For project, START consulted

Victor Asal, Amy Pate and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2008. Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior Data and and Data Behavior Organizational Risk at Minorities 2008. Wilkenfeld. Jonathan and Pate Amy Asal, Victor ainl osrim o te td O Troim n Rsoss o errs (TR) 21. Terr 2013. (START). Terrorism to Responses and Terrorism OF Study the for Consortium National alization is coded is alization 1. This variable is time is variable This and sources these on Drawing hird indicator I mainly relied on the open sources, while for the fourth I consulted the consulted I fourth the for while sources, open the on relied mainly I indicator hird

dataset. , which take the value of 2, of value the take which , - 170 grained information about the evolution of rebel structure allowing for a more more a for allowing structure rebel of evolution the about information grained .

Although it Although

n u, t sum, In

169 -

sensitive which codes for the level of centralization of some militant outfits. militant some of centralization of level the for codes which

ons have competing leadership and commanders or factions that factions or commanders and leadership competing have ons

covers only armed actors in the Middle East, I find I East, Middle the in actors armed only covers ee r mvmns with movements are here .

meaning that for each year of existence the level of rebel rebel of level the existence of year each for that meaning indicators have a have of other datasets where rebel structure is considered is structure rebel where datasets other of , I coded centralized organizations as entaili as organizations centralized coded I , person/council as a leader who issues political political issues who leader a as person/council

kes the value of value the kes factionalized/competing leaders, leaders, factionalized/competing h srnt o its of strength the 3 . Decentralized . MAROB’s -

and orist orist ng 89 -

CEU eTD Collection 176. Institutions. Political of Database The Economy: Political Comparative 174 173 http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/11796. 172 e stat more or two 171 has group a Whether sources. several on draw I defection and support of non to afterwards. it change only support external attract to program political certain proclaim may group rebel a that is operationalization this of weakness main The otherwise. 0 and ideology, shared for 1 coded ideo ruling the to corresponds organization rebel a of program assess To government. sponsor a the of used I ideology dominant sponsor’s party ruling of ideology the with organization rebel project. START the in movements rebel about information not are EPR EGIP the variablefrom the online sources and I on relied bonds, ethnic have determine thetwo if To otherwise. 0 and ethnicity, share government sponsor of majority the and leadership rebel defection cent), while fractionalized ob 359 accountfor organizations decentralizedThe data. the in organization centralized with observations of percent 56.98 or 698 of total a There organizations. centralized a precise - Taiba have been centralized for over a decade, and MDD was fractionalized for over five years. five over for MDD and fractionalized was decade, a over for havecentralized been Taiba

S There are still some organizations that do not change much over time. For instance, both Hezbollah and Lashkar and Hezbollah both instance, For time. over much change not do that organizations some still are There hrtn ek Gog Cak, let Gof Pii Kee, a Keefer, Philip Groff, Alberto Clarke, George Beck, Thorsten

TART(2013) - Lar ideological. - ETH data s . For th For hypotheses alternative first the test To - Erik Cederman, Brian Min, and Andreas Wimmer. 2009. Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. Dataset. Relations Power Ethnic 2009. Wimmer. Andreas and Min, Brian Cederman, Erik h scn vral i shared is variable second The ayi o is mat n defection. on impact its of nalysis –

I develop two binary variables. Th variables. binary two develop I e second alternative hypotheses alternative second e

set.

172

Overall, there are There are a tot a are There

organizations

al of al 35 sponsorships based oncommon ethnicity, and35 sponsorships 153that

Database of Political Institutions 2012. Institutions Political of Database are in168observation encountered

ideology 76 ideologically 76

171 that – e first is first e

the relationship between shared preferences and preferences shared between relationship the

h feuny f itiuin s n ao of favor in is distribution of frequency The

. To code ideological links I first used the the used first I links ideological code To . establish the link between alternative sources alternative between link the establish shared ethnicity shared - 173 based sponsorships, and 112 that are that 112 and sponsorships, based d arc Wlh 20. e Tos in Tools New 2001. Walsh. Patrick nd World Bank Economic Review Review Economic Bank World

Then I compared the ideolo the compared I Then oyo pno oenet I government sponsor a of logy , which is coded 1 if the the if 1 coded is which , s servations (29.31 per per (29.31servations

or 13.71 percent 174

If the If 15(1): 165 15(1):

political gy of a of gy .

90 e - -

CEU eTD Collection 175 troops, whereas theaverageand thestron years. and values missing for update as coded are sponso strongest the and 2,717 US$ of average the 239, US$ of capita per GDP a has data my in sponsor weakest The strength. state denote to used measure Data. GDP and Trade Expanded dataset sponsor of capacity transnational appears support (39.76percent) in487observations inthe data. l the while percent), (60.24 observations 738 among encountered is support Transnational rebextpart pre the signifying the from variables two merging by constructed is defection. rebel encourage may support a racial Marxist), and (Islamist ideological non percent) (37.88 observations 464 support provided sponsor single whereas percent), (62.12 observations and UCDP the from received is variable labeled and variable binary a as coded is sponsors

Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2002. Expanded Trade and GDP Data. GDP and ExpandedTrade 2002. Gleditsch. S. Kristian - iiay sitne rm rnntoa non transnational from assistance military Finally, the third alternative hypotheses suggest that capabilities cause defection. For the the For defection. cause capabilities that suggest hypotheses alternative third the Finally, dntn te rsne f iiay sitne rm rnntoa non transnational from assistance military of presence the denoting , thousands ec o non of sence

government I use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita capita per GDP of logarithm natural the use I government

of troops and logged. I borrow the figures from the from figures the borrow I logged. and troops of

iiay upr fo tasainl non transnational from support military Apart from state support, rebel groups can receive military or military receive can groups rebel support, state from Apart

n h SR te eks sosrd oeet a 100 has movement sponsored weakest the SOR, the In Transnational gest have 175 EACD nd ethnic/diaspora movements. The existence of such of existence The movements. ethnic/diaspora nd

lhuh mefc, D pr aia s standard a is capita per GDP imperfect, Although

datasets.

- 6,870 and 115,000 troops, respectively.6,870 and 115,000troops, state actors as militant outfits, religious, religious, outfits, militant as actors state EACD

multiple sponsors multiple Journal of Conflict Resolution Conflict of Journal support

Multiple sponsors are present in 761 in present are sponsors Multiple

aae: ) variable 1) dataset: r

– is coded as a binary variable and and variable binary a as coded is

US$ 27,342. 27,342. US$ . The information on this on information The .

to a rebel movement in movement rebel a to - tt atr; n 2) and actors; state

EACD

Rebel capabilities Rebel 46: 712 46: from Gleditsch’s from transconstsupp - tt actors state

- dataset and and dataset 24.

ack of of ack 91 . ,

CEU eTD Collection 178 177 Sage, Hills: Beverly 1820 War, Power Major and Uncertainty, Distribution, 176 otherwi 0 and fighting, for troops rebel prepares sponsor a when 1 of value the taking variable dummy conflict the in advisors/trainees foreign of group a by co is variable This sponsor. their from COIN. to resilient more it making movement, rebel a of discipline and cohesiveness the increase may the of behavior the mi monitor provide and file and rank to the indoctrinate ideologically leadership, group rebel a in trainees and advisors install can sponsors personalmillion under com its year. average the soldiers, 3,000 per has data my soldiersin government active of thousands signifies personal, military the of power counterinsurgent the for code that given demands sponsor’s of defiant more be to rebels acounter Ontheweaker other their may desert sponsors. hand, and senior arrest to able are they because movements sup to relating those Control V

Weinstein, Weinstein, Salehya ainl iiay aaiiis v Capabilities Military National port - ieadbha t laesi edn o the to leading leadership its behead and file 178 Features of the sponsorship may also affect rebel behavior. rebel affect also may sponsorship the of Features . used I variables, control of choice the suggest to research previous little is there Since se. n,

iiaiy aal tre government target capable Militarily If this holds, rebels should prefer should rebels holds, this If ariables Embedded advisors are present in 62 rebel movements, and absent in 46 in the data the in 46 in absent and movements, rebel 62 in present are advisors Embedded op. cit. op. op. cit. op.

pp. pp.

e hrceitc o te agt government target the of characteristics he 19 - 48.

. mand. 3.02, 3.02,

David

ded, following UCDP, as the provision of military training training military of provision the as UCDP, following ded,

J. J. status quo status igr Sur Bre Stuart Singer, agt oenet I ey n h CW aa on data COW the on rely I government, target - s 1965.

hud rsn a eiu calne o rebel for challenge serious a present should

defeat of insurgency. of defeat rebel ”

n rc Rset (ed) Russett Bruce in h rebels the over defection when they receive training receive they when defection over -

ridden country or abroad. or country ridden – members, inflict casualties to the rank the to casualties inflict members,

19 e, n Jh Suky 17. “ 1972. Stuckey. John and mer, 2,000 and the strongest has over a a over has strongest the and 2,000

cnlc cnet n external and context conflict , face no serious challenger. To To challenger. serious no face - Idean Salehyan argues that that argues Salehyan Idean insurgent may allow rebelsinsurgent may litary training. litary 176

Under such Under ec, a, n Numbers and War, Peace,

h waet target weakest The Training Training 177 c onditions, onditions,

Training Capability Capability is a a is 92 - . ,

CEU eTD Collection Forces Armed 1974. Berman. Paul Winthrop; Tactics and Control, Social Mobilization, Resource Movements: Social of Dynamics The 180 179 data. the in percent) (47.96 observations 465 in present is conflict minor while percent), (62.04 observations 760 ba pe dyad the in intensity of level services. security of hands the f violence, state by Discouraged intensity non 60 and territorial 48 of total a are There non for 0 and territorial, for 1 coded is It Dataset. Conflict Armed UCDP government. or territory a over fought is it whether f control I and defection, yearsand thelongestover spanned5.5 and 23respectively. externa of end the until beginning the from years in length the observing by sponsorship of duration while sanctuary, external enjoyed movements rebel 70 total, Sanctuary permission. its with and control sponsor’s under territory the on bases rebel of establishment the UCDP, Following desertion. of risk the decrease should sanctuary time, same reb and sponsor a between conflict of likelihood the increases sanctuary external to access that found research previous Next, dataset. UCDP the from also is coding This

ttle deaths) ttle G. T. Marx. 1979. External efforts to damage or facilitate social movements, in M. Zald& J. D. McCarthy (Eds.), (Eds.), McCarthy D. J. Zald& movements,M. in social facilitate or damage Externalto efforts 1979. Marx. T. G. Brynen, l support to a movement. The shortest sponsorship lasted for 2 years, while the average average the while years, 2 for lasted sponsorship shortest The movement. a to support l hrceitc o te ofit niomn my lo nlec te ne o rebel of onset the influence also may environment conflict the of Characteristics

places constraints on the ability of rebel group rebel of ability the on constraints places op. cit op.

is coded 1 if a sponsor provides sponsor a if 1 coded is . Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Lexington MA: Lexington, . , . and

2 for 2

ial, cnrl o mliat cvl wars. civil multiparty for control I Finally, factors. important three or civil eouinr Ognzto: Institution Organization: Revolutionary

war (1,000 or more or (1,000 war 180 ollowers prefer desertion to harassment, arrest or elimination at elimination or arrest harassment, to desertion prefer ollowers clna ya. t s oe 1 coded is It year. calendar r

This variable is from UCDP Dyadic data set and records the records and set data Dyadic UCDP from is variable This

access to its territory to a group, and 0 otherwise. 0 and group, a to territory its to access - territorial conflicts in the data. data. the in conflicts territorial

battle First, I find the measure for for measure the find I s

I control for control I related deaths related to honor to

38 did not. did 38 - Building within the People’s Liberation Liberation People’s the within Building

for for

their h peec o ohr rebel other of presence The low

the the ).

- Finally, I control for the the for control I Finally, contract with a sponsor. sponsor. a with contract

level el movement. el identity Civil wars account for account wars Civil , 94 incompatibility Second - ter –

125. Cambridge, MA: MA: Cambridge, 125. sanctuary conflicts conflicts ioil conflicts. ritorial

of conflict, of , high 179

(26

denotes denotes conflict

At the At in the the in – 999 i.e. i.e.

93 In

CEU eTD Collection 181 a of variance the that suggests 1.5 of VIF a while factors, among multicollinearity no is there indi 1 of VIF A collinearity. of degree the indicates tolerance whereas error, standard the of problem. a is multicollinearity whether assess to (VIF) factor independentcontrol variables andTable are presented in multiparty are data conflict the in movements them. on dependence rebel decreasing least at or sponsors external for need the decreasing alliances annihilation. over inter that argues inter to leading them between rivalry encourage may movements

Staniland (2010) Staniland

Multiparty eoe unn t ta tes that to turning Before Intensity Incompatibility D Sanctuary Training Target power Spo Rebel strength Transnational Multi sponsors Ideology Ethnic ties Structure Defection Multiparty

- uration ee cahs ed o wthn sds s ekr ee gop cos survival choose groups rebel weaker as sides switching to lead clashes rebel

181 nsor GDP

s dmy aibe niaig h peec o asne f te rebel other of absence or presence the indicating variable dummy a is (78), while the rest are not (3 not are rest the while (78),

Simultaneously, the the Simultaneously,

and is borrowed from the UCDP data. data. UCDP the from borrowedis and

(p.c.)

, oee, Table however, t, Table 192.18 Mean

13.07 5 0.68 1 0. 5.56 0.46 0.35 1.92 0.6 0.62 0.47 0.16 2.4 0.08 . . 62 41 Descriptive Statistics 0 0 rsne f utpe ees a ecuae rebel encourage may rebels multiple of presence

Std. Dev. 0). 322.38 14.32 0.46 0. 0.4 4.21 0. 0.47 1.32 0.4 0.48 0.50 0.3 0.7 0.27

6 The descriptive statistics for the dependent, the for statistics descriptive The 48 50

9 8 7 1 rsns h vle fr aine inflation variance for values the presents

VIF denotes the extent of inflation of extent the denotes VIF

Min 239 0.1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 The majority of conflicts in the the in conflicts of majority The

rebel clashes. rebel 27342 1325 Max 115 23 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1

Paul Staniland Staniland Paul cates 94

CEU eTD Collection Routledge, 182 to order in multilevel as data the treats that method a employ I reason, this For level. (group) sub the both upon touch theories my states, of policies interventionist levels. both at variables independent with level), group and (individual levels two at sampling assumes Method predictors. control the among Table in results the to According than larger degree of matter the is multicollinearity general, In factors. other with correlated no was factor that if be would it than higher percent 50 is variable

Joop J. Hox and J. Kyle Roberts. 2011. 2011. Roberts. Kyle J. and Hox J. Joop 182 I first apply the multilevel logistic modeling to the problem. Multilevel modeling modeling Multilevel problem. the to modeling logistic multilevel the apply first I

pp. pp. eas I td hw eair f non of behavior how study I Because

0 n tlrne aus qa lwr hn 0.4 than lower equal values tolerance and 10 7.

Table variables, particularly incompatibility, but it is much lower among the main main the among lower much is it but incompatibility, particularly variables,

6 . Variance Inflation Factor andTolerance Test of Collinearity

Mean Mean VIF Multiparty Intensity Incompatibility Duration Sanctuary Training Target power Sponsor GDP Rebel strength Transnational Multi sponsors Ideology Ethnic ties Structure

, multicollinearity is not a problem. The highest inflation is inflation highest The problem. a not is multicollinearity ,

adok f Advanced of Handbook

1 1.47 1.18 1.33 1. 1.25 1.92 1.17 1.28 1.19 1.63 1.27 1.46 1.16 1.24 VIF - and the unwritten rule is that VIF equal to or to equal VIF that is rule unwritten the and tt amd cos s netie wt the with intertwined is actors armed state .16 30

utlvl Analysis Multilevel

Tolerance niae xrm multicollinearity. extreme indicate 0.86 0.68 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.52 0.85 0.78 0.83 0.61 0.78 0.68 0.85 0.80

- state (individual) and state and (individual) state

. New York and London: London: and York New .

CEU eTD Collection Press, CambridgeUniversity 185 Sage. 184 Structures. Data Multilevel Modeling Science 2002. Jones. S. Bradford and Steenbergen 183 defects it whether information But A. to obedient remain to “failure” (“survives” loyal stays same the in operate once years. year. it happened. sponsor its against Cox defecting the organization contrast, In period. time a in pro defection suffer that sponsorships of proportion the estimates model logistic multilevel The rebeldefection. incidenceof the in covariates various that donotvarygroup the over level. effects, fixed and model, a in covariates of outcomes random denoting coefficients mixed country rebel (the fashion hierarchical a in data the structure to me allows avoid

accounts for right for accounts P.D. Allison. 1984. Allison. 1984. P.D. Janet M. Box M. Janet Douglas A. Luke. 2004. 2004. Luke. A. Douglas otoa hzr cluae te rbblt o a eet occurring event an of probability the calculates hazard portional

185

defects

- drawing i drawing

X and Y are parties to the same conflict. same the to parties are Y and X 46(1): 46(1): 218 fet poeue A mixed A procedure. effects

As a supplement, I use I supplement, a As - For example, suppose that sponsor A has A sponsor that suppose example, For er) ad o oe rcsl cmue h efc o idpnet variables independent of effect the compute precisely more to and years), 184

The Cox proportional hazard proportional Cox The against - Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones. 2004. 2004. Jones. S. Bradford and Steffensmeier – nferences nferences 237. Event History Analysis: Regression for Longitudinal Event Data Event Longitudinal for Regression Analysis: History Event -

censoring, i.e. whether rebel defection occurs or not after the last observed observed last the after not or occurs defection rebel whether i.e. censoring, place and place , n Y ty obedient stays Y and A, . is X ). Multilevel Modeling. Modeling. Multilevel pp. pp.

about 16 –

19.

eadd as regarded

period

the Cox proportional hazard model to assess the significance of of significance the assess to model hazard proportional Cox the groups gis A against

fet mdl iutnosy aclts adm effects, random calculates simultaneously model effects , the two the , from

is Y

is London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, Publications, Sage Delhi: New and London

fe te bevd eid T period. observed the after uncensored —

important individuals, and individuals, t priua tm, ie ta i hs o yet not has it that given time, particular a at

Wit o A to cases are different: X defects (“fails”), while Y while (“fails”), defects X different: are cases considered

Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Social for Guide A Modeling: History Event hin been . hl they While

t five years of years five o my research question and question myresearch o

because we have information about its its about information have we because providing

right vice versa vice -

censored because there is no no is there because censored both

- support to X and Y for five for Y and X to support sponsor dyads nested within within nested dyads sponsor

this American American

share A’s resources and and resources A’s share

. Newbury Park, CA: .Park, Newbury . — 183 sponsorship e tnad regression standard he in my case, a rebel rebel a case, my in

Multilevel modeling Multilevel J ou pp. pp. nl f Political of rnal

data becausedata 5 , – parameters

suppose 6; 6; sn the using Sci Marco R. R. Marco

entists, entists, 96 X

CEU eTD Collection 186 different a in but wars, civil to context. common is defection ethnic that find did work Previous b to sponsors their to ties ethnic with movements rebel expected theory hand, other the on ties, Ethnic whi are insignificant. models. successive the in robust less is finding this although defection Territ it. increases movements rebel other separately models subsequent counter weak a face they when sponsors their towards defiant more significant and negative is characte in factors macro examining by analysis mybegin R selection bias estimates. deflated or inflated create model esults of theMultilevel Modelesults of Logistic

E.g. Kalyvas (2008); Staniland (2010). Staniland (2008); Kalyvas E.g. e otoln fr h cnet Ielg dmntae a isgiiat fet n defection. on effect insignificant an demonstrates Ideology context. the for controlling le do s ideology, and ethnicity shared factors, preferences common the included I 2, Model In Table 186 ristics of the environment help explain rebel defection. The coefficient for target power power target for coefficient The defection. rebel explain help environment the of ristics . As expected, training decreases the probability of defection, while the presence of of presence the while defection, of probability the decreases training expected, As .

What could explain this finding? Apotential couldexplainWhat finding? may this explanation be associated with o dis not 7 resulting from the omission of sponsorships theresulting omission from that never experience

reports the results of the regression with rebel defection as a dependent variable. I ofthea theresults regression dependentreports withrebeldefection as variable.

criminate I check whether this holds when mild and severe and mild when holds this whether check I

across the models. It confirms the expectation that rebels should be be should rebels that expectation the confirms It models. the across

ewe ucnoe ad right and uncensored between hw srrsnl pstv ascain ih defection. with association positive surprisingly a show

Th e

o model Cox ra conflict orial

base model, base drse ti ise n hls e avoid me helps and issue this addresses is

lo on t b ascae with associated be to found also Model 1 Model esrd observations. censored - ins

, urgent force. However, force. urgent defections are defections

to determine whether the the determinewhether to

Other control variables variables control Other e more reliable agents. agents. reliable more e d rebel defection.

considered hs may This the The The 97 in in

CEU eTD Collection unwavering an expect and brethren ethnic its to support material and vocal give to willing more ethnic shares population the When state. sponsor the within insurgents for support popular of existence p Note: arentheses, clustered o clustered arentheses,

Dyads Observations LL Prob > chi2 Wald chi2 Constant Multiparty Intensity Incompatibility Duration(log) Sanctuary Training Target power(log) Sponsor GDP(log) Rebel strength(log) Transnational Multi sponsors Ideology Ethnic ties Structure Variables ties with the rebels, it is more sympathetic toward their armed struggl armed their toward sympathetic more is it rebels, the with ties

Multilevel logistic regression of rebel defection. defection. rebel of regression logistic Multilevel

ndyad. Table - - - - 1 0. 32 2.44 0. 0.26** (0. (0.3 (0.1 (0.29) (0.13) (0.22) (0.25) (0.1 3 - 1225

0.00 . 0.1 0.12 L 188 0. M 2. 32 5 58 6 L is 5 9**

11 28 7 1 .8 6) 2 ** 8 1 0 ** ** .

) ) )

Onset of Rebel

log

likelihood. likelihood. - - - 0.74** 319.41 1 0.27 2. 0.65 (0.22 (0.3 (0.57 (0.3 (0.18 (0.32) (0.13) (0.22) (0.2 (0.1 37 - - 1225 0.00 . 0.25 0.13 0.0 188 0.00 0.0 M 1 36* . 4**

94 2 3 2 3 5 0 ** 5 **

) ) ) ) ) ) )

Defection, 1968 - - - -

1. p<0.05, * p<0.05, 0.24 324 2.5 0.64 (0.24 (0.24 (0. (0.3 (0.19 (0.29 (0.13) (0.22) (0.2 (0.1 0.47* 35 0.49 - - 1225 0.00 0.10 0.1 188 0.12 0.20 M 2 . 7 58 rsne ae ofiins with coefficients are Presented

1** 97 3 . ** 5 2 5 0 ** 96 ** *

) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

p<0.10. - - - 1 - - 0.2 3 0.5 (0. (0.08) (1.02 (0.3 (0.19 (0.30) (0.14) (0.2 (0.2 (0.10) 35 0.52 - - 1225 0.15 1. 0.00 . 0.19 0.06 188 0.04 25 0.0 M 1 76 .9 9** 0

9 9 – 4 . 9 3 3 5

** 09 3 ** 2012 8 *

* *

) ) ) ) ) )

- - - 1 0.6 - 0.2 0.7 3 (0.14) (0.61 (0.3 (0.19 (0.29 (0.13) (0.22) (0.25 (0.10 5 - - 1225 0.4 0.00 .1 0. 0.2 18 13 0.9 0. M 8 . 3 1 1

2* 3 15 49 5 8 . 3* 2 ** ** 7 1 ** 42 4 e. The population is population The e.

) ) ) ) ) )

tnad ros in errors standard - - - - 0.92 0.84 0.25* 0.79 30 0.57* (0.10) (0.09 (0.26 ( (0.23) (0.33) (0.15) (1.08 (0.3 (0.20 (0.33 (0.15) (0.24) (0.26 (0.10 67 - - - - 1225 0. 0.25) 0.02 0.00 0. 0.17 0.23 0.00 188 0.12 0. 0.00 0.11 M 6 3 . 29 0 53 6 . 6 * 4 ** 6 ** 68

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) *

* *

CEU eTD Collection 188 187 fa of measurement directionsignificance andits its indicating noticeabletraining retains Itis that strength. sponsor’s the of inadequacy the to due be may result This insignificant. but negative more only supportwith likely than movements state toreceive ties. local be to found are ties transnational with movements armed that given ironic seems result a Such non that indicate 3 Model in result the factors, all of inclusion the to robust not are ties transnational though Even defection. of onset the with associated positively and significant is it expectation: con support transnational contrast, In research. future for leave I tentative holds interpretation this Whether agents. their of sanctioning and monitoring synchronize successfully un are rebels that is finding this of reading possible One anticipated. I as negative is coefficient the though even test, this from support no receive sponsors Multiple 3. Model in controls, with along support, may rebeldefiance. fuel ties sharedethnic conditions Undersuch stop. never would support the that believing sponsor the Ri actions. assume may rebels The issues. economic or political other from attention its divert and agenda nationalist the ma regime authoritarian most the even interest, rebels. the to backing government vorable

Salehyan, Brynen, - state support is a far greater danger for danger greater far a is support state Model 4 tests the effect on capabi on effectthe tests 4 Model e the test I support, alternative to regard With

op. cit. op. ding the wave of nationalist fervor, they may become bolder in their behavior toward toward behavior their in bolder become may they fervor, nationalist of wave the ding effect on rebel coherence and discipline irrespective of of irrespective discipline and coherence rebel on effect Gleditsch and Cunningham, and Gleditsch that such a popular support implies unconditional support from the sponsor for their their for sponsor the from support unconditional implies support popular a such that

able or unwilling to defect against ideologically coherent sponsors who can can who sponsors coherent ideologically against defect to unwilling or able

187 op. cit. op.

Even though governments frequently do not work in public in work not do frequently governments though Even

lities in a sponsorship on defection. Sponsor’s wealth is wealth Sponsor’s defection. on sponsorship a in lities

sponsors than the presence of other state sponsors. state other of presence the than sponsors y use the support to rally the population around population the rally to support the use y ffect of multiple sponsors and transnational and sponsors multiple of ffect 188 sponsor’s sponsor’s

capcity. firms the the firms The The 99

CEU eTD Collection wit associated rebelstructureis that suggestfindingsdefection. The to linkingties ethnicparticular mechanisms out tease to research future requires and loyalty, increases ethnicity shared that expectations consider is defection severe where 7 Model too, wars, in significant only becomes it but civil positive is ties ethnic for coefficient Multiparty The defection. encourage sponsors. their disobey to organizations rebel to freedom more ta weak expected, As defiance. and ties positive transnational between association a show results The defiance. of predictor significant a is structure rebel that reveals Table transnationalsignificant showaeffect after ties other ondefection predictors. the of inclusion is explanations alternative the to pertaining factors identified previously the of none However, 2. Model from direction and significance its preserves also ties ethnic for term The factors. other of inclusion than inall preceding models. model’s base from improvement significant a demonstrates decr centralization rebel i structure rebel the for term the theory, organizational comes todefiance. tested be to needs it However, desertion. of mechanism the with line in is This defection. to prone more are rebels weaker that shows capabilities rebel for coefficient

8 nme o epaain ofr priua mcaim fr h tps f defection. of types the for mechanisms particular offers explanations of number A in presented As In

use mild and severe defection as dependent variables and run the full model. Model 7 Model model. full the run and variables dependent as defection severe and mild use oe 5 I nld ol rbl tutr wie epn te otos Wt rgr to regard With controls. the keeping while structure rebel only include I 5, Model h severe defection, as my theory posits. Among the control variables, the the variables, control the Among posits. theory my as defection, severe h significant anymore.significant

full model, full eases

eeto bcms oe likely. more becomes defection

Model 6, the coefficient for rebel st rebel for coefficient the 6, Model Despite having the same direction, neither rebel strength nor nor strength rebelneither direction, same the havingDespite ed as outcome. outcome. as ed s consistent with my hypothesis: my with consistent s - 326.85, and it is also much better much also is it and 326.85,

This finding runs against the the against runs finding This h lg ieiod of likelihood log The

if the sign changes when it it when changes sign the if ructure is robust to the the to robust is ructure rget government leaves government rget -

313.42 as the the as

100 In

CEU eTD Collection mostly buttheyretain their allsignificant direction cease Model in 7. tobe no is it actor. capable when sponsor a with contract their terminate This rebels sign. that hypothesis significant the and confirms negative anticipated the takes capacity sponsor’s for coefficient

The estimates for transnational ties, target government power and multiparty wars wars multiparty and power government target ties, transnational for estimates The errors in parentheses, clustered in parentheses, errors Note: Multilevel logistic regression of rebel defection. Presented Presented defection. rebel of regression logistic Multilevel Table Dyad Observations LL Prob > chi2 Wald chi2 Constant Multiparty Intensity In Duration(log) Sanctuary Training Target power(log) Sponsor GDP(log) Rebel strength(l Transnational Multi sponsors Ideology Ethnic ties Structure Variabl compatibility

. es

Onset of Mild and Severe Defection

on dyad. LL is log likelihood. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. ** p<0.05, loglikelihood. dyad. on LL is

og)

- - 3 1. 1.39** - 0.40** 197.10 (0. (0.4 (0.21) (1.47) (0.50 (0.2 (0.48 (0.19) (0 (0.3 (0.14 (0. (0. (0. (0.36 36.32 - - - 1225 0. Mild 0.23 0. 0 0.00 .3 0. 0 0.18 0. 188 0. 0. 0. M7 10** . . .33 28 31 12 74 7** 04 00 26 13 13 43 54 01 06 8 8 4)

* ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

- - 1 Severe - 1 1 (0. ( (0.20 (1.60) (0.4 (0.28 (0.45 (0.21) (0.34 (0.42 (0.14 (0.15 (0.13 (1.36 (0.36 5 ------1225 0. . 0.00 2 0 0 0.25 0.46 188 0. 0. . 67.03 0 0. 0.6 0. 0. 0 M8 16 0. 04 . . . .2 26 . 10 51 28 35 1 1 21 22 07 55 21 * 6) 7 5 ** 7 0

) ) * ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

r ofiins with coefficients are

standard standard 101 a t

Predicted probability of defection

CEU eTD Collection controls year,fourth sponsor’ their to access or advisors embedded have not do rebels the addition, In 2,697. US$ of capita per GDP a has profile sponsor the and soldiers 6,870 from and sponsors state other from support receives movement the movement, rebel and sponsor a between ties ideological median and continuous values different at defection constant factors other holding while compute I models, logistic In fac of effect the interpret directly to difficult is it Since

86,000 terms of the core hypotheses, this implies that there are no common ethnic or or ethnic common no are there that implies this hypotheses, core the of terms

and

fractionalized .1 .2 .3 .4 Figure 0 troops. the rebels the

.21 5 . Predicted Probability of Defection byLevels of Rebel Structure

predictors at their mean values (basedpredictors at values their mean onTable Presented here Presented

are fightinginamultip

predicted

of the rebel structure while holding all binary variables at their their at variables binary all holding while structure rebel the of transnational constituencies, the size of size the constituencies, transnational .

In particular In

rbblte a vros ees of levels various at probabilities is the probability the is

Rebel structure Rebel

decentralized arty , Figure ,

.09

civil war

of 5 defection

territory, s graphs the predicted probability of of probability predicted the graphs

to topple down a government a down that to topple tors based on the estimates from estimates the on based tors

in each dyad year. dyad each in 7

h pnosi i n its in is sponsorship the , Model 6). , h ee force rebel the my

aibe f interest of variable

centralized

.05

Figure 5 Figure s e to set is

102

Predicted probability of defection

CEU eTD Collection time. across ties ethnic by defection values. median or mean their to In values. constant their more centralized counterparts. their than sponsors state their against defect to likely more are organizations rebel centralized f to decentralized from moves organizatio the as doubled than more is defection of probability The twice. nearly defection c from change that shows vary along with the rebel structure and duration of s of duration and structure rebel the with along vary Figure Figure The above analysis assumes a rather artificial setup, in which many factors are held at at held are factors many which in setup, artificial rather a assumes analysis above The

6 the probability of defection defection of probability the

.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .

0 The

.07 entralized to decentralized organizational organizational decentralized to entralized

.16

.03

E ffect

1.5

of the subsequent figures I allow I figures subsequent the

2.5

noethnic ties R ebel

n Figure In

4.5

.22

.05

.10 actionalized. S

Duration of sponsorship years) (in sponsorship of Duration tructure

7.5 Sponsorsh tncte have ties Ethnic nrae a te ee o cnrlzto decreases centralization of level the as increases 6

, I present the marginal effects of rebel structure on on structure rebel of effects marginal the present I ,

12 on the Probability Defectionof hs test This

fractionalized decentralized centralized ip Durationip

.07

.29

.14

.32

.16

.09

a substantial effect on the probability of of probability the on effect substantial a ponsorship. three significant variables from Model 6 Model from variables significant three

1.5 support

om nrae te ieiod of likelihood the increases form

2.5

ethnicties m hypothesi my s

4.5 All other variables are set at set are variables other All

.41

.22

.12

7.5 by E thnic

12 that s Ti

.29

.17

.50 es andes weakl

The The 103 n y

Predicted probability of defection

CEU eTD Collection nearly more threetimes likelytodefect multiparty in thanintwo are who organizations centralized among encountered is influence strongest The centralization. thelev movementsof irrespective facing norival sponsor that those a likely against todefect figure. previous the in sponsorship of years per conflict those withoutethnicties. than sponsors their against defect to likely more times three are organizations centralized with dramatic more is organizations centralized on effect The sponsor. its to ties ethnic without organization decentralized/factionalized a than defection, in engage to likely more times ti through defection Figure Figure Figure

.1 .2 .3 7 0 . The Effect of Rebel Structure on the 7

.07

.01

.03 rsns h cmie efcs of effects combined the presents me. A decentralized or factionalized organization with ethnic ties is two two is ties ethnic with organization factionalized or decentralized A me.

1.5 On average, rebels that fight in a multiparty conflict are 2.5 times more more times 2.5 are conflict multiparty a in fight that rebels average, On

two-partyconflict

2.5 Belligerents

4.5

.10

.02

.04

Duration of sponsorship years) (in sponsorship of Duration

the probability of defection. probabilityof the

and Sponsorship Duration

fractionalized decentralized centralized

.03

.14

.06

Probability Defectionof by

.16

.07

.03

1 tutr and structure

1.5

multi-partyconflict

2.5 -

T party conflicts. party he effects are effects he

number of belligerents in a a in belligerents of number

4.5

.22

.10

.05

7 the Number of

a s paramount as paramount s

.07

.28

.14 : coethnics coethnics :

el of el of 104

Predicted probability of defection

CEU eTD Collection counterinsurgency. m defection resulting fractured and the that indicating decentralized power target’s in variation contrast, the by affected In profoundly not are organizations soldiers). (1,000 incumbent weak a fighting are fo a they whenface obedient be likelyto more most the soldiers. of thousands in shown and distribution of defection. of probability the on Figure Figure I n Figure n

8 infcn f significant .

.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 The Effect of Rebel Structure on the Probability Defectionof by Target Government 0

(10%)

.13

.43

.23

1 8 ,

ay be more due to their non their to due more be ay

display the joint effect of effect joint the display

or centralized structures. Centralized organizations are almost two times times two almost are organizations Centralized structures. centralized

Target's military size (in thousands of size soldiers) military of (in thousands Target's

(25%)

The target’s counterinsurgent potency is presente is potency counterinsurgent target’s The

2 Power rmidable opponent (18,000 troops) than when they they when than troops) (18,000 opponent rmidable

(50%)

rebel structure rebel

.09 -

.33

.16

fractionalized decentralized centralized centralized composition than the pressure from pressure the than composition centralized

The effect of effect The and the target government power power government target the and

(75%) the target government power government target the

(90%)

(95%)

14 d in percentiles in d

(99%)

.07

.29

.13

105 is

CEU eTD Collection ratios and a theirerrors sponsor robust standard clustered around percent imply55 a o ratio hazard a contrast, In high). as times two as defectionare of odds the words,other (in yearsponsorship of every defectionfor of risk the in vari ties ethnic shared the on 2 of ratio hazard a instance, value constant their at variables independent other holding while variable independent ratios. interpretat their so nonlinear, value.of defection was maximum settoits occurrence/non the to leading time denote to used is which sponsorship, of Duration to set were variables binary the turne were dyads 188 that means method. likelymost The tooccur. is defection rebel the which in periods time distinguish to relevant equally is it variables various of effects the from Apart event. an to leading period time the about little tell they but findings, i analysis, of levels different at covariates of effects the computing the using theCoxResults Proportional of H iia t lgsi rgeso, t regression, logistic to Similar the of requirements the fit to data the modified I analyses, the out carrying Before re I method, logistic multilevel the complement To azard ratio is a number that increases the odds of defection for a one unit increase in an an in increase unit one a for defection of odds the increases that number a is ratio azard T

he unit of analysis,of sponsor unit he o pootoa hzr rgeso. Multilevel regression. hazard proportional Cox their maximum value maximum their

decrease in the risk of defection. In interpreting the results, I report the hazardI the In report defection.results, of interpretingthe risk the in decrease , including the dependent variables (defection, mild and severe defection), severe and mild (defection, variables dependent the including ,

Cox regressionCox end. this fitto modelis ion is not straightforward. To ease To straightforward. not is ion s d into 188 observations, i.e. one observation for each dyad. each for observation one i.e. observations, 188 into d

, while the continuous variables were set to their mean values. mean their to set were variables continuous the while , Hazard Models - rebel dyad per year, was aggregated to the dyadThis level.the to year,aggregated perwas dyad rebel he standard coefficients from the Cox regression are are regression Cox the from coefficients standard he

f 0.45 on the provided tra provided the on 0.45 f

able would mean a 100 percent 100 a mean would able - estimated

logistic

- interpretation, I estimate hazard hazard estimate I interpretation, rebel dyad. ncreasing one’s confidence in confidence one’s ncreasing

M oes r ueu for useful are models odel ining variable would variable ining

from - occurrence

Table increase increase s. For For s. All 106 7 ,

CEU eTD Collection results, estimates for the rebel organizational structure the of interpretation the to mild Moving defection, defection. interest: severe of and outcomes defection, three the of each turn, in including, models Cox the ag findings the general, In Table 9 . parentheses. Note: Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Defectionfor and its Forms Intensity Incompatibility Sanctuary Training Target power(log) Sponsor GDP(log) Rebe Transnational Multi sponsors Ideology Ethnic ties Structure Failures Observations LL Prob > chi2 Wald chi2 Multiparty Variables

Reported are hazard ratios withratios hazard are Reported ree with those of the of those with ree l l strength(log)

is logpseudo is

Defection - - 2. 0.4 110 0.63 0.6 0.7 likelihood. likelihood. 310 (0. (0. (0.0 (0.42 (0.2 (0.43 (0.14 (0.14 (0.06 (0.0 (0.09) (0. (0.20

0. 0 0.00 1. 0. 1. 0.8 1.2 0.6 remain significantremain across tests. the 18 M9 4 81 . 69 logistic 2 95 74 1** 2 32 8 3 6 2 35

. 8 . 0) 8 ** 53 2 2 2 * * 6 ** 5 1 4

88 *

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) * *

robust robust

** p ≤ 0.05, * 0.10. ≤ 0.05, **≤ p p

- models. Table models. 0.40 0 0.80* 3 17 (0. ( (0.1 (1.76 ( (0.5 (0.27 (0. (0.1 (0.0 (0.16 (1 (0.40 2.24 60 2.89* Mild M10 0.85 0.00 1.22 1 0.9 0.69 .71 0.7 . 0 0.92 0.56 standard errors inerrors standard 1 2 50 . .7 . 88 8 . 11 8 24 19 7 27 . ** 7 ** 9 ** 9 5 9) 1 8 4)

82 *

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) * ) )

- 3 0.42 0.47 0.65 0.63 Severe 15 (0. (1.41 (0.1 (0.34) (0.2 (0.85 (0.1 (0.18 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.23 62.66 0.49 M1 0.9 . 0.00 0.8 0.70 1 0 0. 0.57 188 34 41 . .86 7 8 6 3 .82 9 2 ** ** 7 1 ** ** ** 5 0) 0 8 5 1

) ) ) ) ) ) )

of estimates the reports

find I

ht the that 107

CEU eTD Collection rebels orfractionalized decentralized organizational have structure. Figure sponsorship. of survival of probability the that indicates line the rank allowingfile toact and onthecontr from independently sponsor, themtorenege its hypothesis, 6 by drops disobedience of probability the centralized more becomes control and command rebel percent 58 paribus Ceteris Survival percent 0 9 Figure . ad h p the and , the weaker command and control within rebel organizations increases the ability of of ability the increases organizations rebel within control and command weaker the .2 .4 .6 .8 the As similar. are results the severe, and mild into defection disaggregate I When

0 1 for ,

shows the survivor function for rebel organizational structure. The descending The structure. organizational rebel for function survivor the shows

2 each oaiiy f wthn sds by sides switching of robability 9

displays that over time the probabili the time over that displays increase in the level of cen of level the in increase Figure Figure

3 9 . Survival Rate Structure Rebel for

duration of sponsorship years) (in sponsorship of duration

fractionalized centralized

4 –

defection not occurring occurring not defection

5 tralization the risk of defection decreases by decreases defection of risk the tralization 8 ecn. s xetd y y core my by expected As percent. 58 ty of defection increases when the the when increases defection of ty

decentralized

–

decreases for each year each for decreases

act. 108

CEU eTD Collection r the increases movements rebel other of presence The percent. 34 by decreases defection models. previous the from direction and likely todisobey lesscapable sponsors, alsodesert but to them. are rebels addition, in defection; suffer to likely more are rebels weaker hypothesis, capabilities t the is from model logistic difference major The times. three than more disobedience movement’s of risk the increasing defection mild with associated be to found again is support transnational of presence multi from support material to access that find I common that claim benefactors. external morepreferences loyaltheir to rebels make the for support no offer variables Both significance. statistical of short defection, the on effect negative a indicating one than less is variable ideology the percent. 334 by sides desertion/switching of risk the dramatically, models origin. ethnic common no have that those almost are sponsors their with bonds ethnic forms the of either consider I when corroborated to seems ideology Shared models. the across defection of ratio hazard the on effect significant and positive a preserves organization rebel autonomous rank thanwhen and file central they aleadership. have strong survival of probability the that passes time as widens form fractionalized and centralized the between gap The

Regarding a between ties ethnic shared the variables, preferences common the Among niaig tha indicating the he significance of sponsor’s capacity in all three models. In line with the the with line In models. three all in capacity sponsor’s of significance he t ethnic ties increase the risk of defiance by 224 percent, and, more more and, percent, 224 by defiance of risk the increase ties ethnic t control variables, target’s power and training preserve their significance their preserve training and power target’s variables, control –

o eeto occurring defection no

o eey nrae in increase every For The results for shared ethnicity are robust across the the across robust are ethnicity shared for results The de 2.5 crease the risk of defection but this finding is not is finding this but defection of risk the crease ple state sponsors does not trigger defection. The The defection. trigger not does sponsors state ple

times more likely to defect against them than them against defect to likely more times f eeto. ee ognztos ht share that organizations Rebel defection. of –

is lower when rebels have a more more a have rebels when lower is

Similarly the the In contrast, the hazard ratio of ratio hazard the contrast, In target’s power the risk of of risk the power target’s

to the logistic models

by, indicating by, sponsor and sponsor

but it falls it but isk of of isk 109 ,

CEU eTD Collection Likewise, versa. vice and fragmented to decentralized to centralized from moving time, across vary to organization rebel of type the allows data my issue a as regarded still be fact in may faction the organization parent its with and split a proclaiming While parent. erstwhile etc.) its of recruits grounds training (offices, infrastructure support), foreign (including resources the spl the longer) even(sometimes month, a within that assume to reasonable is It defection. commits month) a (within immediately and off breaks faction In a if sponsor. only coded the to related as behavior its of aspect construct any code to reason no is there then goes, argument the sponsor, erstwhile than its from support receive not does more group a such If group. nothing be may defection factional fragmentation, by a process which specifically, More defection. of types Inresults. there are particular, twoissues. dedicate I space, and time across sponsors their and organizations rebel of number the in heterogeneity significant a to due and observations of and organization defection. individual rebel of fragmentation the of endogeneity the about concern important an Checks Robustness sanctuaryless likelyspon are their todesert 53percent external to access have who Rebels 11. Model and 10 Model in only but significant, becomes sanctuary model, logistic the Unlike defection. severe regarding significant not is it but defiance, First, some may argue that the organizational and factional defection are two different two are defection factional and organizational the that argue may some First, is there argument, my for support quantitative strong provide analyses above the While ing SOR I paid attention to this potential pitfall. An instance of factional defection is defection factional of instance An pitfall. potential this to attention paid I SOR ing

Because

of the relatively small number of defections relative to the number number the to relative defections of number small relatively the of a group disgruntledaoff members own breakstoestablishits of (disgruntled) member of the group. To partially address this this address partially To group. the of member (disgruntled)

particular attention to the robustness of of robustness the to attention particular sors or them. turngunsagainst

in Table Table in 10

I estimate Model 12 using using 12 Model estimate I inter group still claims groupstill inter

110 the the

CEU eTD Collection variable independent the results for rebel structure one

year lagged defection as a dependent a as defection lagged year The second issue is that I am walking a thin line between one of my variations on the the on variations my of one between line thin a walking am I that is issue second The in parentheses, clustered on dyad. LL is log likelihood. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. ** p<0.05, likelihood. LL is log dyad. on clustered inparentheses, Note: Constant Multiparty Intensity Incompatibility Duration(log) Sanctuary Training Target power(log) Sponsor GDP(log) Rebel strength(log) Transnational Multi spon Ideology Ethnic ties Structure Dyads Observations LL Prob > chi2 Wald chi2 Variables

Multilevel logistic regression. regression. logistic Multilevel –

atoaim a factionalism,

sors

remains significant

Table

Defection d h otoe n y eedn variable dependent my on outcome the nd - - Lagged 10 1 0.62 273 (0.27 (0.27 (0.25 (0.37 (0.1 (1 (0.3 (0.28 (0.36 (0.15 (0.25 (0. (0.1 (0.1 (0. 0.77 3 M12 ------1

0.01 0.21 0.00 . 0. 0 188 0.05 0 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.30 0. 9 02 variable. 037 . .22 .18 . . 03 27 10 45 03 0 33 14 10 Robustness Checks 19 . 6 7 ** 1 1 ** 41 7 * Pr

: : ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

esented are coefficients with coefficients are esented

- - Lagged Severe - While many variables lost their significance, their lost variables many While 0.70 158 (0.36 (0.38 (0.35) (0.4 (0.20) (1.73 ( (0.37 (0.48 (0.27 (0.36 (0.43 (0.15 (0.16 (0.13) 3 0. M13 ------1 0.61 0.7 0.00 0. 0 0.6 0 0.50 188 0.1 0. 0. 0. 0.6 0.21 0.1 7 037 83 .14 .0 . 49 16 20 0 00 . 3 1 8 9 4 ** 03 0 3 9 *

* :

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

factional Without - - 1.33 - - 0.61 12 (0. (0. (0.42 (0.5 (0.2 (1.79 (0.57 (0.22 (0.28 (0.25 (0. (0.48 (0.17 (0.17) (0.15

2 M14 - - - - - 1 0.7 0.8 0.33 0. 0.01 0 0 0 0 175 0. 0. 0.3 0.16 0. 6 1 . . .1 .04 9 4 4 02 . 9 67 41 19 14 39 23 90 1* . 1 2) 4 5 ** 3 0 1 ** 65 6

* : ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

standard errors errors standard - - - 0. 0.83 2 0. (0.30 (0.31 (0.2 ( (0.1 (1.2 (0.3 (0.24 (0.40 (0.1 (0.2 (0.29 (0.1 (0.11 (0.12 1975 4 M15 ------2009 1 0.0 0.00 0. 0.00 1.2 0. 0.46 169 0.1 0. 2 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 8 54 067 36** 9 74 . 60 15 02 39 40 28 1 35 . 6 2 ** 8 8 5) 8 9 9 3 8 ** 85 8

: -

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

–

factional 111

CEU eTD Collection P 193 Analysis Survival and 192 Var withDependent Binary a Analysis 191 190 fromthe analysis. wereremoved dyads rebel 189 data. my of dependence time for account to analysis the in duration) for term cubed and (squared duration of polynomials include percentiles 90 and 75 50, 25, 10, at model) (full 6 considerablystructure Table the from modelsin variabledidnot deviate 1 Figure listed not In variable. dependent a are but 2010 and 1975 between occurred that cases those all I dropped asexclusion, this to addition defection lagged used I model this For 2010. before terminate in listed not are that cases exclude I estimates. of direction and significance the affected have may cause defection. sponsor. a against defection of year the in fragmentation internal suffered have may that outfit any exclude va dependent performed have I issue, this for account To different. are phenomena two these how wonder may reader The defection. olitical Analysis Analysis olitical

Thirteen sponsor Thirteen David B. Carter, and Curt S. Signorino. S. Curt and Carter, B. David Eleven out of one hundred and seven rebel movements or twenty out of one hundred and eighty seven s seven eighty and hundred one of out twenty or movements rebel seven and hundred one of out Eleven F.E. F.E. el ek Jnta N Kt, n Rcad ukr 19. aig ie eiul: Time Seriously: Time Taking 1998. Tucker. Richard and Katz, N. Jonathan Beck, Neal Harrell. 2001. 2001. Harrell. B In 6 eyond the models in Table in models the eyond

O . addition, in Model 15 Model in addition, 189 n h UD dataset. UCDP the in

eal te ie drcin ad infcne f h cefcet o organizational on coefficients the of significance and direction, size, the verall, riable using restricted cubic splines of duration of sponsorship of duration of splines cubic restricted using oh oes fe a upr t m agmn ta non that argument my to support a offer models Both 18(3): 271 18(3): -

rebel dyads were dropped from the analysis. weredropped dyads rebel . New York: Springer. New . York:

Regression Modeling Strategies: With Applications to Linear Models, Logistic Regression, Regression, Logistic Models, Linear to Applications With Strategies: Modeling Regression n oe 13 Model in – two tests two 92.

the UCDP d UCDP the

iable. iable.

190 193 . I test whether the inclusion of cases outside the UCDP dataset dataset UCDP the outside cases of inclusion the whether test I .

First,

Then

h results The 10 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependency in Binary Data. Data. Binary in Dependency Time Modeling Future: the to “Back 2010. tests both In

American Journal of Political Science Science Political of Journal American of duration’s marginal distribution marginal duration’s of , I account for temporal dependence. I re I dependence. temporal forI account , I re I ataset is, I First, - ran the full model with lagged severe defection as a a as defection severe lagged with model full the ran ,

that is, those conflicts that take place take that conflicts those is, that f h Cx rprinl hazard proportional Cox the of rebel structure rebel eoe te ee ognztoa srcue to structure organizational rebel the recoded

remains 42(4): 42(4): 1260 - . etaie o centralized 191

8 .

from 192 . statistically significant statistically

I generated five knots five generated I

Alternatively, I also I Alternatively,

this analysi this - – eis Cross Series - 88. estimated Model estimated

r rpre in reported are

rganizations

1975 and and 1975 s those those s - ponsor Section Section 112 - .

CEU eTD Collection cit. op. in Problems Spoiler 1997. Stedman. Stephen 194 out particular mechanisms. defection. ties ethnic that rebeldisobedience. fuel to arelikely which support of sources transnational their of capacity irrespective sponsors defect to tend rebels Interestingly, group. rebel a a between and discipline sponsor than rather conflict of source a be can ties ethnic that show results the av should sponsors that suggesting tests statistical the throughout significant factoris This increases.defection of risk the formalized, and importanceis ofoutmost for t bloodier. and longer wars civil makes intervention external against gr rebel which under conditions into inquiries It groups. rebel and Summary may increas significantly findings These

Bethany Lacina. 2006. Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars. Wars. Civil of Severity the Explaining 2006. Lacina. Bethany

not pose a seriousnot poseissue. , pp. pp. The findings indicate that as the rebel organizational structure becomes less centralized less becomes structure organizational rebel the as that indicate findings The sponsors state between relationship the toward wars civil of study the chaptermoves This sponsors. Studying these illicit ties is important because conflict scholars have found that found have scholars conflict because important is ties illicit theseStudying sponsors. . Finally, alternative support plays no role in explaining defection except for the the for except defection explaining in role no plays support alternative Finally, . 24.

In the subsequent chapter I use the case of Pakistan’s involvement n Kashmir to draw to Kashmir n involvement Pakistan’s of case the use I chapter subsequent the In

ly n motn role important an play

hird

- party countries.party e our confidence in the argument suggesting argument the in confidence our e

Peace Processes. Processes. Peace oid supporting fractionalized organizations. In addition, In organizations. fractionalized supporting oid –

ln wt ognztoa str organizational with along

International Security International ora o Cnlc Resolution Conflict of Journal 194

Weakening or breaking these ties these breaking or Weakening oups and their factions defect factions their and oups

2(2): 5 2(2): ucture

Further tests indicate indicate Furthertests - 53; 53;

that endogeneity that –

Leites and Wolf, Wolf, and Leites

50(2): 276 50(2): n predicting in - 289; 113

CEU eTD Collection from operated outfits foreign The paramilitary. and army Indian the by destruction and killings s therefore, and, IJK the in located were groups indigenous The ideology. and ethnicity common had militants foreign the while that), even share not did (JKLF sponsor t Lashkar and(JEM) major three on is focus The sanctuaries. A or Pakistani of are members whose organizations those analyzes B, section part, second The examples. illustrative as serve and briefly examined are latter The Pakistan. toward behavior and pressures exogenous dynamics, organizational their is focus main The (MM). Mujahideen Muslim and (MJF) Force Janbaaz Muslim (HM) Mujahideen Hizbul outfits major two including groups militant and composition ethnic their Kashmir controlled Pakistan (in location to respect with Pakistani, foreign, are them of three whereas confli Kashmir in both organizations, the in role important an had heir geographic location. location. geographic heir h dsicin ewe te w gop i bsd n hi aflain ih aitn and Pakistan with affiliation their on based is groups two the between distinction The Iexplaining defectionIn eight or obedience rebel focus of chapter this on A S tory - e - Taiba (LET).Taiba terms of their recruits and location (in Indian Jammu and Kashmir and Jammu Indian (in location and recruits their of terms

P – T “[…] no true victory is possible with a possible victoryis “[…]trueno akistan

e nieos rus hrd ny dooy ih hi Pakistani their with ideology only shared groups indigenous he (Niccolo Machiavelli, (Niccolo and three smaller groups such as Ikhwanul Muslimeen (IUM), (IUM), Muslimeen Ikhwanul as such groups smaller three and

and and CHAPTER 4 –

outfit PCK). The first part, section A, deals with indi with deals A, section part, first The PCK). M –

ilitants in Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and (JKLF) Front Liberation Kashmir and Jammu The Prince The : aktl na (U) Jaish (HUA), Ansar Harkatul s:

t Fv o te ae indigenous are them of Five ct. fghan origin, operating from their Pakistani Pakistani their from operating origin, fghan

pp. K lien arms”. lien ashmir 83 – 84)

, 1988 uffered the brunt of the the of brunt the uffered - 2004 movements - e on the former, former, the on -

Mohammad Mohammad

Kashmiri genous –

IJK),

that 114

CEU eTD Collection most the are They groups. foreign the with reversed is picture The sponsors. their against defect to expected not are support given HM) excludes one (if present commonbonds. shared the for case organizations indigenous the As organiza counterinsurgency. the puts the counterinsurgency to to exposure exposed less them making Pakistan in sanctuaries their At the same time same the At Table outfits Muslim Janbaaz Force,

Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Jammu andKashmir Muslim Mujahideen may be termed least termed be may Hizbul Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish ORGANIZATION Li Lashkar Harkatul Ansar beration Front, 11

1998 1991 - a b casfe a te most the as classified be may 1988 preferences, that is, one should expect their defection due to absent or partly partly or absent to due defection their expect should one is, that preferences, e . - Mohammad Rebel Organization, - - -

2002 1998 e -

94 , this is the least the is this , - Taiba -

likely case for the capabilities and alternative support because support alternative and capabilities the for case likely

that rebel outfits lacking military prowess and other sources of of sources other and prowess military lacking outfits rebel that

- likely. likely.             

External Shocks - Decentralized, COIN andrivalries High exposure to Centralized Fractionalized Pakistan’s crackdo Fractionalized COIN andrivalries Low Exposure to Decentralized COIN andrivalries High exposure to Decentralized C High exposure to Centralized COIN andrivalries High exposure to fractionalized org. likely case for the capabilities and alternative support alternative and capabilities the for case likely In contrast In OIN andrivalries CONDITIONS - tional structure under a heavy pressure, the the pressure, heavy a under structure tional likely case for my theory, while the foreign foreign the while theory, my for case likely

, the indigenous groups are the most the are groups indigenous the ,

and Predictions

PREDICTION (Desertion) (Desertion) (Desertion) Status Quo Status Quo (defiance) Defection Defection De Defection Defection (Assault)

in Kashmirin fection

- likely likely all of of all 1 15

CEU eTD Collection 195 Nehru’ and Pakistan decision. a make not could Kashmir of Maharaja the only map. partition who outlined a underCyril Radcliffe commissions Sir boundary states states successor two into Empire Indian in valley. Jamaat degree, less Sheik maharaja Singh, indirect or directly were that states princely of hundreds among one was Kashmir and Jammu period. colonial the in originate region the over Pakistan andIndia between divisions political the rulers, and invasions numerous nineties. the in conflict of Armed KashmirBackground in Conflict presented inTable h theory my If Pakistan. with ideology and ethnicity least the are groups foreign the hand, other the On sources. alternative to access and capabilities higher had outfits foreign the

M.J. Akbar. 2002. Akbar. 2002. M.J. the next the next

h Mohammad Abdullah in late 1930s late in Abdullah Mohammad h

ee se to asked were

a Hindu maharaja Hindu a These political organizations would be the most important actor important most the be would organizations political These In Delhi in interviewee one As ’s the summer of summer the couple of decades. despot ism Kashmir 1 - e 1 dmcay n India in democracy s - . , join join Islami, have used Islam as the driving force of political mobilization in the in mobilization political of force driving the as Islam used have Islami,

the Kashmiri nationalists theKashmiri ned w Indeed,

- ,

Behind the Vale. the Behind 1947, the British the 1947, who ruled who one

y diitrd y h British. the by administered ly

f h scesr states successor the of - likely case for the shared preferences given that they all shared all they that given preferences shared the for case likely hile the history of Kashmir of history the hile told over a predominantly Muslim population. Muslim predominantly a over

Roli Books: New Delhi, pp. 97. pp. Delhi, Books:Roli New

me, the history in Kashmir does not start with the armed armed the with start not does Kashmir historyin the me, –

h otd o procrastination.” for opted he , India and Pakistan and India to and, Conference Muslim the time, same the At .

colonial government colonial

established the National Conference (NC) led by Conferenceby Nationalestablishedled the (NC) . ls oe hud xet h otoe as outcomes the expect should one olds,

n uut 97 te rts st p two up set British the 1947, August In . “ h pic o Ksmr was Kashmir of prince The

rgtnd by Frightened More spans over over spans

proposed the partition of their of partition the proposed

than five hundred princely princely hundred five than s in Jammu and Kashmir Kashmir and Jammu in s 195 centuries, witnessing witnessing centuries,

Jinnah’ Of all the princes all the Of y ht time that By

In opposition to opposition In Islam s

the , Hari 116 in a ,

CEU eTD Collection 36 pp. Press, University 198 197 196 of head the became Abdullah Sheikh region, of areas cease of months Following setbacks flo immediately Abdullah maharaja the Kashmir, and Jammu of capital alone let resistance, firm ranks their joined Kashmir 1947. October in valley the T force. by Kashmir and route to Jammu Radcliffe India. Minister Prime Indian valley’s

Alastair Lamb. 1991. Lamb. Alastair Navnita Sumantra Bose. 2003. 2003. Bose. Sumantra - 196 fire,

Since no appeal no Since the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh and Valley Kashmir the

. ot popular most Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad, along with Gilgit and Gilgit with along Muzaffarabad, and Mirpur, Poonch,

’s plan ’s

f h militia the of h sau o Jmu n Ksmr ae o h fot ih h anucmn of announcement the with front the to came Kashmir and Jammu of status The Chadha Behera. 2006 Behera. Chadha to join his join to As the As

Jammu and Kashmir was partitioned between the two countries. two the between partitioned was Kashmir and Jammu

w in mid in . invading n

Faced with the invasion and uprising, the maharaja the uprising, and invasion the with Faced

n o eue h Siaa arot n dfa te militia. the defeat and airport Srinagar the secure to in

Kashmir that allowed holder the its phys 37. military Pakistani he Kashm government stalemate - Pakistan ,

political leader, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, had become close to the the to close become had Abdullah, Mohammad Sheikh leader, political

August to Radcliffe’s decision Radcliffe’s to ahi: ot o Cnlc, ah t Peace to Paths Conflict, of Roots Kashmir: Jawaharlal

expel the irregular army. army. irregular the expel ir: A Disputed Legacy 1947 Legacy Disputed A ir: militia militia . Demystifying Kashmir Demystifying

hs ol b the be would This . ,

Pakistan was Pakistan India and Pakistan signed a ceas a signed Pakistan and India ,

and signed and directly swiftly swiftly

Nehru Jammu and Kashmir and Jammu

organized a group of armed tribesmen armed of group a organized nee te war the entered advanced advanced Algdy Adla epesd hi expressed Abdullah Allegedly, . ere awarded to awarded ere documents shocked invited his longstanding political op political longstanding his invited

. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Institution Brookings D.C.: Washington . was allowed, was - 1990.

is Pksai oet cin in action covert Pakistani first With hog am n Kashmir and Jammu through

to find that Radcliffe awarded India a RadcliffeIndia that awardedfind to

Karachi: Karachi:

acceding the ’s

India gis India against

ical

a enemy at the gates of Srinagar, the Srinagar, of gates the at enemy Pakistan chose to chose Pakistan dministration until dministration Oxford University Press University Oxford

. Cambridge, Massachusets: Harvard Harvard Massachusets: Cambridge, . . control 198 e

- to India to fire in 1949. in fire

The maharaja abdicated and abdicated maharaja The

Baltistan ’ s army could not put up a up put not could army s over over

n h srn o 1948 of spring the in .

The

Pakistan the region. After

while

seize According to the to According Indian army w army Indian s

he was deposed was he who penetrated who Press, pp. 27 pp. Press, ponent Sheikh ponent desire , pp. 101 pp. , ,

nme of number a many

am and Jammu Jammu and Jammu the Jammu Jammu the gained the the gained 197

o join to

117. locals locals

- land land 28. 117

as as

CEU eTD Collection 200 ch.4. Routledge, 2004. 199 intelligence Pakistani the time, same decid Haq opposition. armed Afghan Afghanistan ho future prevent not did agreement Pakistan and Indian the 1972 in Agreement Simla the signed Pakistan new covert warfare discovered administration. Indian the against support local garner would it another Pakist to land Kashmiri valley Kashmir Indian the into irregulars Gibraltar, Operation to opportunity officials appointed and arrested

Arif Jamal. 2009. 2009. ArifJamal. For a detailed study of Pakistan’s involvement in in involvement Pakistan’s of study detailed a For

oet a i Jmu n Ksmr ee delayed were Kashmir and Jammu in war covert ni, aitn n te ert ia: h Cvr Wr n ahi, 1947 Kashmir, in War Covert The Jihad: Secret the and Pakistan India, joined the invasion force. invasion the joined Following n 1962, In militant organization, symbolically named Al named symbolically organization, militant ed to ed , 199

, leading the US to turn Pakistan into the main supplier of its military aid to the the to aid military its of supplier main the into Pakistan turn to US the leading , in

leading to the arrest of arrest the to leading

1953. ae h Indian the take save some portion of the Afghan aid for aid Afghan the of portion some save Sha

China Pakistan’s defeat in the in defeat Pakistan’s by the Delhi government.by the dow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir Jihad of Story Untold The dow War:

From 1953 until 1975, the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by KashmirruledIndian was and stateby 1975,theof Jammu From 1953until h second the

an, but an,

defeated -

otold Kashmir controlled Exploiting its new regional role, the Pakistani military leader Zia leader military Pakistani the role, regional new its Exploiting

- held Jammu and Kashmir by force. In 1965, Pakistan initiated initiated Pakistan 1965, In force. by Kashmir and Jammu held

the operation the

The subsequent The covert

. India

This operation failed operation This

tlte i Kashmir. in stilities Al services

a fr Kashmir for war - in a brief brief a in

Fatah’s Third Indo Third

the the

. failed to meet Pakistan’s goal. Pakistan’s meet to failed

made contacts with potential partners across partners potential with contacts made The treaty established a established treaty The creation and functioning of Al of functioning and creation defined as Line of Control (LOC). But this this But (LOC). Control of Line as defined

Tashkent Declaration Tashkent key members key border border - Pakistani war in 1971, in war Pakistani - Fatah (“ Fatah .

bec a new covert war in Kashmir. in war covert new a and India war, the of aftermath the In ulahn a ope f huad of thousands of couple a unleashing ,

war. n 99 te oit no invaded Union Soviet the 1979, In . New York: Melville House Melville York: New . a u conquest s

and another failure of Pakistan’s of failure another and e

However, the organizatio the However, Pakistan no

political organization in the in organization political – 2004

allocated ” in Arabic), hoping that hoping Arabic), in ” de facto de - Fatah see: Praveen Swami. Swami. Praveen see: Fatah . London and New York: York: New and London . a ti even this saw potential plans for plans potential

Pakistan

some additional some border border , pp. 109 pp. , 200 launched between between t

At the At n was n s an as - 110.

- 118 the the ul a

CEU eTD Collection 205 pp. Taurus, I.B. 204 203 202 201 The Pakistan. from (LOC), Control of Line the across weapons procure to easy was it and flux an be fashionableto was it then, Backteam. cricket a of size the sometimes outfit, an to birth gave town and village every interviewee, one o plethora a rebellion, 1989 In policies. counterinsurgent changing India’s and interests The Pakistanembracedoutfits. youth thedisappointedweapons and provided them and with training. militant of leaders became and suit followed Salahuddin, Syed or Malik Yasin as such elections, where deliver will bullet “the the that conclusion the to came leaders MUF Many Conference. National the and government seats. six seventy ir serious by marked were elections the However, development” “ to opposition in of was there son, Abdullah’s by led Conference National the from Apart government. 1980s. LOC

Behera, Behera, Ibid Bose, Ibid V anti ictoria ictoria Kashmir Groups Its Rebellion: ContextMilitant and , who agr who , , pp. , 48. pp. , 114 pp. -

establishment The rebellion in Kashmir offers a story of manifold militant militant manifold of story a offers Kashmir in rebellion The In op. cit., op. op. cit op.

S 198 chofield. 2003. chofield.

- 137 115. 202

eed to start a jihad in Jammu and Kashmir and Jammu in jihad a start to eed 7 pp. 47. pp. ., pp. 47. pp. ., eetos ee raie i Jmu n Ksmr o a tt asml and assembly state a for Kashmir and Jammu in organized were elections , . -

138.

h caiin emd o trc smah ad upr ars te valley. the across support and sympathy attract to seemed coalition The 204

bulh’ aiy ue gvrmn cruto ad ak f economic of lack and corruption government rule, family Abdullahs’

political parties labeled Muslim Unite Muslim labeled parties political

f h algtos xcrae te decade the exacerbated allegations The

organizations Kashmir in Kashmir

h blo hd failed” had ballot the

Conflict

made a bid for bid a made : India, Pakistan and the Unending War Unending the and Pakistan India, ti - Indian and to carryAK anIndian to and regularities, and MUF secured only four out of of out four only secured MUF and regularities,

the leadership of the struggle. the of leadership the 205 . Sm o te U cniae i the in candidates MUF the of Some . 201 d Front (MUF) Front d

The opportunity appea opportunity The

- l futain ih h Delhi the with frustration old - 1991, at the outset of the the of outset the at 1991, outfit - 47. s, Pakistan’s complex complex Pakistan’s s, . MUF built its image image its built MUF . . London and New York: New and London .

T he sit he red in the late the in red uation was inwas uation

an umbrella umbrella an I n words of of words n 119 203 :

CEU eTD Collection 208 207 206 pla GOI the elections the Through 2002. and 1996 in elections state Kashmir organizing by rebellion the uncontrollable. and ineffective I comrades. former their Pakistan’s against attitude and fighting by disappointed those turn to often but organizations their decimate offices. and assets territory, int turned frequently itself agency intelligence whose Pakistan, by remedied or prevented be not could ensued subsequently that defections and splits factionalism, Massive commanders. local and leadership the between relationship loose a with organizations those particularly exacerbating organization militants’ on effect profound a had shock exogenous leadingto 1991/1992 onwardIndian thearmy andother outfits. steppeddamageHizbul toJKLF, incausing from sponsors, theirby Pakistani and run a militants bystanders show border beingguard in mere the with compromise a make and While (GOI). own India of its government of life a on take could organization Kashmiri various of fall Indian otherwise, with of Pakistan” bring themerger Kashmir outfit “any to training and intelligence sanctuary, arms, Inter its and (GOP) Pakistan of government

Aut 2007. Devadas. David Joshi. 1999. Manoj hor’s interview, retd. Indian Army General, name withheld name ArmyGeneral, Indian retd. hor’sinterview, government The massive, determined response determined massive, The the though even Kashmir claim to intervened directly never Pakistan time, same the At yed on rebels’ hardships and offered amnesty and a potential place in Kashmir’s politics politics Kashmir’s in place potential a and amnesty offered and hardships rebels’ on yed an

increase in and intensification of internecine rivalries between multiple internecinebetween rivalriesof intensification and in increase organizations Lost Rebellion:

was on its knees in this period. this in knees its on was In Search of a Future: The Story of of Kashmir Story The Future: a of In Search

otn itn te aant ah te faig ht dominant a that fearing other each against them pitting often ,

The The 208

Kashmir

A parallel, less costly GOI strategy included the pacification ofpacification the included strategy GOI costly less parallel, A O ue ti cnuin mn te iiat nt ny to only not militants the among confusion this used GOI the

in the Nineties the in O ws ntal caugh initially was GOI n the long run, however, these renegades proved to be to proved renegades these however, run, long the n

from the Indian army raised the costs of the militancy the of costs the raised armyIndian the from - evcs nelgne gny II hd provided had (ISI) agency Intelligence Services . New Delhi: Penguin Books New Penguin Delhi: . 207 206

Instead, Pakistan superv Pakistan Instead, .

. Delhi: Penguin Books, Books, Penguin Delhi: . that was able to, by force of arms or or arms of force by to, able was that of ur wt is oie and police its with guard off t o an arbiter in turf wars over over wars turf in arbiter an o , pp. pp. pp. pp. 50. ised the rise and rise the ised 176.

outfits

.This 120 ,

CEU eTD Collection from Pakistan. support (reduced) the despite 1994 in politics enter and struggle armed up give to commanders f army. Indian the to and Mujahideen, Hizbul darling, new Pakistan’s of designs hegemonic splits. ultimately, and, crises leadership Amanu Chairman overthrow to attempted unsuccessfully the support), As Kashmir. prorefusalget ridof to 1988 years, early JKLF’s the mark would structure This (PCK). Kashmir which decision in autonomous make organization”) to able than were (IJK) idea Kashmir and Jammu an Indian the “more in located or commanders “loose” a as it to referring interviewees Kashmiri organizations. particularto turn us Let best. at results mixed have approachesalternative that and well performs Table in outcomes and predictions of summary The rivals. and faced groups militant of structure the in centralization of level rebelwith awell were faced outfits and similarities their despite Therefore, outfits. the smaller other and JKLF, in defection of plant the seed helped strategies These fighting. up gave who everyone to cinlzd tutr exac structure actionalized h JKLF, The the in variation of result a as emerged defection in variation the conditions such Under , oiy r vn eo ietos f t pltcl edrhp n h Pksa controlled Pakistan the in leadership political its of directions veto even or modify s, the

uft nee a f a entered outfit GOP gradually distanced itself from the JKLF in 1991 (but it did not cease the cease not did it (but 1991 in JKLF the from itself distanced gradually GOP the frontrunner of the rebellion, surfaced as a decentralized group (many (many group decentralized a as surfaced rebellion, the of frontrunner the - independence ideology and for its open challenge for to open and its independence ideology

erbated by these exogenous shocks ultimately led JKLF senior senior JKLF led ultimately shocks exogenous these by erbated - actionalized phase: senior commanders from the valley valley the from commanders senior phase: actionalized organized, capable andorganized, GOI capable decisive Simultaneously, the JKLF cadres had fallen prey to the the to prey fallen had cadres JKLF the Simultaneously,

llah Khan in 1993 and 1994 leading to leading 1994 and 1993 in Khan llah ih h oneisret state counterinsurgent the with 1 2

niae ta m theory my that indicates

. differences all Kashmiri all differences

Pakistan’s control of 1990, known for its its for known 1990,

The 121

CEU eTD Collection Mujahideen/Harkatul Jammu andKashmir Muslim Mujahideen Mu Hizbul Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen, Hi Jaish step had politicalits weakened militants’ thevalley. base the in th at party the of victimization tremendous by caused HM, from disengagement JI’s the was change first a into HM transform would that occurred changes fundamental the of pressures increasing the 1991 in defection HM of instances no found I 1997/1998. until profile centralized a Jama and ranks, highest the its filled members of patronage the to owing organization centralized Liberation Front, Lashkar zbul Mujahideen, Janbaaz Force, slimeen, Muslim 2002 1998 1991 - Ikhwanul Harkatul 1988 e - Ansar Mohammad On the other hand, the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) entered the Kashmir arena in 1991 as a as 1991 in arena Kashmir the entered (HM) Mujahideen Hizbul the hand, other the On * - - - -

2004 2002 1998 e - Bold Cells are Correct Predictions 94 - e hands of the Indian paramilitary. Because JI was a political front for HM activities, HM for front political a was JI Because paramilitary. Indian the of hands e Taiba

(Alternative Prefer Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo Theory I) Defection Defection Defection Defection Defection Shared Table

ences

Indian army and its paramilitary forces. However, in 1997 two 1997 in However, forces. paramilitary its and army Indian

. (Alternative Capabilities Pred Theory II) Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo Defection Defection Defection Defection Defection the the ictions and Reality Kashmir*in

ISI. Despite the several splits HM managed to preserve preserve to managed HM splits several the Despite ISI.

(Alternative Theory III) Alternative Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo Defection Defection Defection Support

Organizational decentr (My (My theory) at Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo Defection Defection Defection Defection Defection - Theory e - Islami (JI) party, whose whose party, (JI) Islami

alized organization. The The organization. alized

- 1997 despite 1997 Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo Defection Defection Defection Defecti Defection Outcome

on 122

CEU eTD Collection was fighting continued bond, andimpossible desertions consequently ensued. that Without parties. their to bond remaining the lose would arrested bullied, were commanders if commanders; particular to loyalty T rivalries. internecine or counterinsurgency mounting centralized of lack the to struct Due leadership. central the from alienated and localities their to tolerate could structure leaders. of behest the at commanders discipline and monitor would who HM, in like entrepreneurs, political action of course the on decide autonomously could echelons lower quite h all theyAlthough leadership.central the from autonomous were commanders local their because desertion to prone were outfits These to desertion. leads breakdown organizational an how indicates (MM), Mujahideen Muslim and (MJF) arrest Pakistan from in wherepolitical statements. he occasionally issues house a under nowadays is Salahuddin Syed leader its strength; former its of cost the at status re HM the 2002, After 2002. in killed was he before fighting renounce to ready party political own his established even Dar, Majid Abdul them, of One talks. peace central the cease of the proclaiming Pakistan dictate and leadership the defied commanders HM some meantime, the In 2002. in factions until organization the within ensue and erupt would dissatisfactions t in status their ure, the ure, The story of three smaller outfits, Ikhwanul Muslimeen (IUM), Muslimeen Ikhwanul outfits, smaller three of story The with commanders powerful some of dissatisfaction brewing the was change second The ah f these of Each

rank and file and rank e M Ulk sm peiu qarl wih eutd n pis these splits, in resulted which quarrels previous some Unlike HM. he ,

leading to the creation of semi of creation the to leading

organi of these organizations these of ain acpe mr rcut ta ter acn command nascent their than recruits more accepted zations - fire with GOI and engaged themselves in further in themselves engaged and GOI with fire

was tempted to desert fighting in the face of of face the in fighting desert to tempted was - independent branches that were attached were that branches independent i i bcue ot odes ow soldiers foot because is his ad a ad

nominal . These movements lacked movements These . the ISI separated the warring the separatedISI

Muslim Janbaaz Force Janbaaz Muslim central

r ild te soldiers the killed, or and t centralized its gained command ed their their ed , their their

123 the the

CEU eTD Collection Jamat ally preferable more ideologically An available. not were allies alternative because JKLF and ISI Pakistani the between convenience of marriage a Pec inception. its since ever it crush to trying been had governments both as India and Pakistan of enemy an into movement the turned Kashmir sovereign for struggle JKLF’s TheBirmingham. in independence Kashmiri Pakistan. and India both from Kashmir and Jammu of Defiance and A. centralized structure. Lashkar capabilities, and support of wake the in pressure some put Jaish when Pakistan against them pitted eventually and Mujahideen Harkatul with case the leadership loose inherited also they However, f factionalism for propensity a and links commander warriors. holy these for question of out hardened that agree interviewees most were in based be PAKISTAN AND more resilient to desertion, than to defiance and assault. Their leadership and commanders and leadership Their assault. and defiance to than desertion, to resilient more uliarly, the JKLF became the first Kashmiri outfit sponsored by Islamabad in 1986. This was This 1986. in Islamabad by sponsored outfit Kashmiri first the became JKLF the uliarly, The JKLF The oth the On owing to their involvement in theAfghanInspired in civil war.owing totheir involvement desertion by jihadism, was

the Desertion Jammu of KashmirFront Liberation and (JKLF)

PCK decreasing the PCK er hand, the Pakistani militants Pakistani the hand, er wa

s an indigenous an s

I NDIGENOUS since 1977 when it was founded by founded was it when 1977 since h Pksai organizations Pakistani the - e 9/11. Despite having a similar ethnic composition, alternative composition, ethnic similar a having Despite 9/11. - Taiba remained loyal to Pakistan largely owing to its neatly its to owing largely Pakistan to loyal remained Taiba , ir

secular and nationalist organization seeking organization nationalist and secular

exposure to exposure ILITANTS IN ILITANTS the the

who GOP shifted its policy of support after the US the after support of policy its shifted GOP -

the e rom their Afghan brothers in arms. This was This arms. in brothers Afghan their rom - Mohammad whose factional infightings infightings factional whose Mohammad

are analyzed in the second part, proved to proved part, second the in analyzed are It had been at the core of a movement for for movement a of core the at been had It

devastating counterinsurgency.Likewise,

K ASHMIR

- Amanullah Khan Amanullah ee oe d more were e - sai (he Islami (1987 efe, I, n Islamist an JI), reafter, i cpie ad battle and sciplined - 2000)

and

Maqbool Bhat Maqbool

independence 124 - -

CEU eTD Collection 214 213 212 els this for argument thesupport 211 210 209 the from heavens safe their operated leaders JKLF’s PCK The Muzaffar. Raja and Haider In IJK. Conference. National the or Islami Jamaat as such parties political J&K main the to ties without movement urban predominantly camp in JKLF the of leader each providing by movement the controlled ISI the However, IJK. also leadership JKLF demands. Pakistan’s with line in file and who founder) the with mistaken be to (not Khan Amanullah cooperative the replace to managed supposedly LOC. the across back them direct and training provide would ISI where PCK the into LOC the across the separatistmove its from program adecade rebellion. of force driving the be to had JKLF the that and province the in popular less wereIslamists the that realized soon resistance. armed in involved become to reluctant was valley, the from party

Author’s interview, journalist (name withheld), Delhi November 2, 2012. 2, Delhi November withheld), (name journalist Author’sinterview, Joshi, Jamal, Joshi, Jamal, David Devadas claims that Pakistan agreed to back JKLF’s struggle for independent J&K, but I have not found found not have I but J&K, independent for struggle JKLF’s back to agreed Pakistan that claims Devadas David IJK. 212 raiainly ee sne t rvvl h JL ws dcnrlzd popul decentralized, a was JKLF the revival its since ever Organizationally, In op. cit., op. cit., op. the 211

op. cit., op. cit., op. PCK. PCK. t first, At late 1986, the ISI and the JKLF agreed to accelerate their preparation for a rebellion in rebellion a for preparation their accelerate to agreed JKLF the and ISI the 1986, late

According to the deal, the JKLF’s task wa task JKLF’s the deal, the to According PCK, the JKLF was led by Chairman Amanullah Khan, V Khan, Amanullah Chairman by led was JKLF the PCK,

pp. pp. pp.

pp. pp. pp. 19. 17. 125 123. h JL’ cnrl leadership central JKLF’s the

126; Joshi,126; demanded free hand in deciding upon the strategy for armed struggle in struggle armed for strategy the upon deciding in hand free demanded

210 ewhere. Devadas, Devadas, ewhere.

Likewise,

op. cit., op. 214

It had the leadership based in based leadership the had It more a with Qureshi, Hashim chairman opponent, main pp. pp. the JKLF leaders desperately needed foreign support to support foreign needed desperately leaders JKLF the 18. op. cit., cit., op. - 213 long deadlock. long

uig meig ih n S senio ISI an with meeting a During pp. pp.

opposed 158. 158. s to recruit and smuggle young Kashmiris young smuggle and recruit to s

h dvso o labor of division the

the

ice Chairman Dr. Farooq Farooq Dr. Chairman ice PCK and commanders incommanders and PCK

then

brought the rank rank the brought 209

bt h ISI the but , lo te ISI the Also, ofcr the officer, r

a separate separate a ar and and ar 125 - e -

CEU eTD Collection 24 217 Left Extremism & and Northeast the Kashmir, Jammu Turmoil: 216 215 into poured had militants trained newly these of swarms 1988, of end the Until police. in camps JKLF in accommodated were youngsters Kashmiri of thousands Initially, LOC. the across back sent and sanctuary. crossing were people young more turn, In valley. the in youth Muslim of arrests massive to led attacks The authority. Indian the against war” of “declaration a as them succe would havegroup’s toward themajoron Pakistan. impact behavior in one acto exogenous by repression to exposed more was JKLF the of branch This forces. security Indian the by killed or jailed either were leaders these of all 1992, By Malik. Yasin and nam the from accountIndian withthe Analyses ofworking and Research intelligence Wing service. (RAW) suppor this to Owing dependedAmanullah on heavily Khan membership, buoying its control to Unable auspices. its under operatives the keep would that valley the from recruits for checkpoint training a as officers. security ISI of supervision the under area Rawalpindi

– Joshi, Joshi, Zahid Hussain. 2007. 2007. Hussain. Zahid Despite this reliance on ISI, Kh ISI, on reliance this Despite 25. ssful bomb attacks. attacks. bomb ssful

s frrne, h JL tigrd h isrec o Jl 3, 98 ih t with 1988 31, July on insurgency the triggered JKLF the forerunner, a As so the by led was JKLF the LOC, the of side other the On the op. cit., op. 217

C. ope wt te non the with Coupled PCK.

Under the patronage of ISI they were trained in handling weapons only to be armedbe onlyto weapons handling in trained were ISIthey of patronage the Under es of its four senior commanders: Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Wani, Javed Ahmad Mir Ahmad Javed Wani, Ashfaq Sheikh, Hamid commanders: senior four its of es

pp. pp. 46. the the

Frontline Pakistan: the Struggle with Militant Islam Militant with Struggle the Pakistan: Frontline , hn a al t ete sdln o epl miiu mmes n the on members ambitious expel or sideline either to able was Khan t, PCK, the only condition only the PCK,

The

an was also in favor of J&K independence. See: Ved Marwah. 2009. 2009. Marwah. Ved See: independence. J&K of favor in also was an JKLF’s Khan immediately took credit for the attacks referring to referring attacks the for credit took immediately Khan JKLF’s

the -

etaie caatr f h JL, hs to factors two these JKLF, the of character centralized ISI for the provision of facilities, arms and armssupplies. facilities, ISIthe provision of for

for support being the readiness to fight the Indian the fight to readiness the being support for failing to develop a solid organizational base base organizational solid a develop to failing . New Delhi: Rupa Co., Co., Rupa Delhi: New . 215 . London & New Yor New & London .

The PCK JKLF mainly served mainly JKLF PCK The - called HAJY group derived derived group HAJY called

the the pp. pp. LOC 64.

for training and training for k: I.B. Tauris, Tauris, I.B. k: rs than the the than rs

the India in in India

hree IJK 126

pp. pp. 216

CEU eTD Collection 221 220 theRecord, Indian the of auspices 219 the under 218 dialogue offered GOI 1990 late in When high. riding mill. its through pass militant other which through channel core the likewise was It towns. valley major of streets the to people arme popular most youth of the mobilization of “the made uprising” vanguard theJKLF crackdown, Indian by Spurred J&K. Indian in group militant strongest the been has JKLF 1992) Islamicof militants. meetings. organizational group’s allow to refused JKLF when 1990s early in came straw last The demands. pro a adopt to JKLF the on pressure increasing was ISI 1989, of As JKLF. the with patience lost had for call its tolerated and JKLF the to support uprising. offered pragmatically Zia Kashmir religious, deeply the being Despite of mastermind the and insurgency Afghan the of supporter main the in exploded generals Pakistan’s more ul Zia Gen. Presidentcarrying Pakistani plane the 1988, InAugust JKLF.the with activists woul forces. security Indian the on attacks 142 carried and

Joshi, Joshi, Bose, Joshi, Amanullah Khan complained that GOP “left [the JKLF] on the streets of Pakistan”. Quoted in: Zulfiqar Ali, For For Ali, Zulfiqar in: Quoted Pakistan”. of streets the on JKLF] [the “left GOP that complained Khan Amanullah - aitn otr ad eone needne u is edrhp a unmoved was leadership its but independence renounce and posture Pakistan

Why JKLF defied ISI’s demands? B demands? ISI’s defied JKLF Why for set was stage the success, initial this Amid op. cit., op. op. cit., op. cit., op. an outfits The Herald (Pakistan) Herald The

independent J&K. With his death, the new Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Bhutto Benazir Minister Prime new the death, his With J&K. independent d soonsetthevalley aflame.

pp. pp. pp. 26. pp. pp.

entered the valley. In the words of Manoj Joshi, all other militan other all Joshi, Manoj of words the In valley. the entered 117. 27. d group in Kashmir in group d

221

At this stage, being the strongest and the most popular outfit JKLF was JKLF outfit popular most the and strongest the being stage, this At

, July 2005, July , 2005,

219

After this defiance, the ISI would sideline the JKLF in favor in JKLF the sideline would ISI the defiance, this After

the air not far from Bahawalpur, Pakistan. General Zia was was Zia General Pakistan. Bahawalpur, from far not air the pp. pp. .

A 56. t that time that t

ecause for the first three years of insurgency (1989 insurgency of years three first the for ecause

, the JKLF was JKLF the , 218 a

The symbolic attack by a gang of JKLF of gang a by attack symbolic The major change in Pakistan’s relationship Pakistan’s in change major 220

able to take over a million a over take to able . Thethe byfar JKLFwas the ISI to attend the attend to ISI t groups had to had groups t - Haq and eight eight and Haq

y these by the 127 ISI -

CEU eTD Collection 226 Analyses Studies and Defence for Institute NewDelhi: 225 224 Delhi.2012, October 18 officer, Indianintelligence withformersenior a interview 223 222 commander. zonal a Lone, Ahmad Riaz and Masjid Jama Hanifa the of Imam Mir, Mohammed Ghulam Maulvi Guru, Dr leaders political 1993 in Only murder. and falle had cadres JKLF of decimation the approved and closing theone private down already were there 1990 (by insurgency strategy, this to According terrorism. warned government US the after 1990 party. pro and much Islamist diverting by JKLF the sideline to started ISI the 1991, early By JKLF. the tolls heavy for not considering desertion. storage cold in lying was which issue decades” Kashmir to rebirth given has “1990 that was t refused flatly JKLF the J&K, in group any to constitution

Joshi, Joshi, Devadas, Sahni, The support was not completely removed, but drastically decreased in favor of Hizbul and other outfits. Author’s Author’s outfits. other and Hizbul of favor in decreased drastically but removed, completely not was support The K. Santhanam, Sreedhar, Sudhir Saxena and Manish. 2003. 2003. Manish. and Saxena Sudhir Sreedhar, Santhanam, K. 223 n hs taey te KF a t b mriaie i fvr of favor in marginalized be to was JKLF the strategy, this In However, op. cit., cit., op.

op. cit. op. 222 This was part of a larger strategy launched by the Bhutto government and ISI in early in ISI and government Bhutto the by launched strategy larger a of part was This o . Thus, given its mounting capabilities, Pakistan’s and popular support the JKLF was JKLF the support popular and Pakistan’s capabilities, mounting its given Thus, . on its leadership and members and leadership its on p. cit., p. , pp. 44. pp. , pp. pp. -

pp. pp. Pakistan groups, such as Hizbul Mujahideen, a militant subsidiary of the the of subsidiary militant a Mujahideen, Hizbul as such groups, Pakistan 425. JKLF’s obedience would falter as soon as exogenous pressures started taking started pressures exogenous as soon as falter would obedience JKLF’s 206

n prey to HM to prey n - 207.

the i JL lose JKLF did

JKLF ranks at the hands of H of hands the at ranks JKLF s. 224 ’s systematic campaign of disarming, kidnap disarming, of campaign systematic ’s

the the dozens . First, the ISI unleashed its ideological proxies against proxies ideological its unleashed ISI the First, .

oe f t ms poiet iue t H sc as such HM to figures prominent most its of some 226 O o sanctions of GOP S wud etaie t cnrl vr h chaotic the over control its centralize would ISI ,

pp. pp.

Amanullah Khan claims t claims Khan Amanullah of outfits) by taking over all the training camps training the all over taking by outfits) of 171. Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery Portrait A Kashmir: and Jammu in Jihadis

he proposal. The official justification official The proposal. he M . if it it if 225

Particularly in 1991 in Particularly

did

not hat HM limit HM . The

, arrest, torture torture arrest, ,

killed more of more killed t spot to support its

ISI tacitly tacitly ISI upr to support - 1993 top 1993 128 JI .

CEU eTD Collection Delhi. 231 230 229 228 Jamal, had.” 227 Haider Chairman Vice the including opponents his expelled Khan In turn, theorganization. from him overwhelminglyexpelled Committee Centralmeeting,the the attend to refused Khan When decision. his explain to summoned was Khan Committee. Central were Haider, Farooq Dr Chairman Vice including seniors, party the of none But image. international organization’s g a prevent to was created but Pakistan stunned only not that move “a Kashmir, of Government Provisional a declared suddenly Khan Amanullah 1990, June of splinter groups. outfits. own their up set and JKLF the from break sections. similar and when 1992 in accelerated dissipation JKLF’s The leadership. central the from autonomously operated (SLF), Front Liberation Student the 1992 to Prior dissipate. in senior killed commanderswere more three and Butt Ahmad Farooq commander Regimental Mohammad, Jan Commander Area who Malik Yasin and Mir Javed except groups HAJY the of leaders senior the all killed they 1992, By echelons. commanding JKLF’s the to blows army Indian the than file and rank its

Sahni, Joshi, 2012 November withheld), (name journalist Author’sinterview, 1999. Sati Sahni. According to Amanullah Khan, “H Khan, Amanullah to According

Caught op. cit., cit., op. op. cit., op. op. cit., op.

pp. pp.

pp. pp. ewe a ok n hr place, hard and rock a between Kashmir Underground. Kashmir

48 pp. pp. 43; Author’s interview with a former senior Indian intelligence officer, October 18, 2012, New New 2012, 18, October officer, Indianintelligence senior former witha Author’s43; interview roup of Kashmiri exiled parties to do the same, as well as to boost his and the and his boost to as well as same, the do to parties exiled Kashmiri of roup At the same time At the – 50. 156. The priori a ,

the

ISI provided money, arms and training to individual commanders to commanders individual to training and arms money, provided ISI JKLF was a “loose organization” “loose a was JKLF

osle, hc tigrd tuh epne rm the from response tough a triggered which consulted, izbul Mujahideen eliminated more JKLF officials than Indian military agents agents military Indian than officials JKLF more eliminated Mujahideen izbul

the , ther

New Delhi:

Budgam district. 227 e were major turbulences within the JKLF leadership. In theJKLF turbulenceswere within major e leadership. . Second, the Indian security forces dealt some heavy some dealt forces security Indian the Second, . confusion the ISI began to en to began ISI the Har 230 - AnandPublications, the

By 1992 By

228 in were detained in 1991. In 1993 In 1991. in detained were KFs iiay raiain start organization military JKLF’s ,New Delhi.

the

JKLF as well” as JKLF 229 ,

JKLF would give birth to dozens to birth give would JKLF ,

in which some sections, such assuch sections, some which in courage

whom he castigated as castigated he whom

pp. pp. 48.

defection 231 . Khan’s intention Khan’s . s

of , the ,

the JKLF’s JKLF’s

an JKLF ed to to ed SLF SLF

129 ISI

CEU eTD Collection Joshi, withthe authorities”. in working tandem 234 Kashmiri. speak 233 170. pp. 232 May in prison from released was Malik Yasin When politics. to militancy the Jamaat of leadership the All called parties separatist of umbrella an 1993, In option. only the not was gun the that convinced becoming were commanders valley willing ororganization tosee unseating any person him. Khan fold. Malik’s JKLF. S supported the Mir Javed from even Initially, Sidiqui Shahbir expel to decided former the when turn new a Khan. took Amanullah conflict to allegiance his pledge to valley the in commander o bulk the by supported was Malik While power open an into off spiraled turmoil The commanders. c Khan’s against ISI. the ja voice then with back was relations who Malik, his close Yasin proclaimed preserve to raised failure his Mir, and funds Javed of misappropriation commanders, valley JKLF remaining fractionalize further would leadership JKLF 1992. in Khan rejoined group Haider the until years two almost for on dragged conflict The agent. u dd o succeed. not did oup

It appears that Mir had even a backing from a couple of Pakistani of couple a from backing a even had Mir that appears It “It seemed apparent in Srinagar that by 1994, whatever was left was whatever 1994, by that Srinagar in apparent seemed “It Amanullah Khan had weak stature among the valley JKLF because he is from Gilgit in PCK and he does not not does he and PCK in Gilgit from is he because JKLF valley the among stature weak had Khan Amanullah

Weakened by foes and internal feuds, internal and foes by Weakened been had damage the But

who considered himself as as himself considered who

e I - ol wdnd h gl bten h PK edrhp n IJK and leadership PCK the between gulf the widened only t Islami’s

done

chief Shabir Ahmed Shah Gilani with an aim to subordinate to aim an with Gilani Shah Ahmed Shabir chief iddiqui. However, he later switched sides and returned to returned and sides switched later he However, iddiqui. op. cit., cit., op.

- n, oehr ih h ISI the with together and, Hurriyat Party Conference (AHPC) was created under under created was (AHPC) Conference Party Hurriyat

234 te ar, Shabbir cadre, the f pp. 425. pp. in 1993 and 1994. In August 1993, one of the the of one 1993, August In 1994. and 1993 in

iled in Delhi, Chairman of the JKLF. But this this But JKLF. the of Chairman Delhi, in iled lacking ful lacking the

KFs re edr ws i ay ae not case, any in was, leader, true JKLF’s

- of the armed section of the JKL the of section armed the of based JKLF seniors. seniors. JKLF based l support from Pakistan, the JKLF’s the Pakistan, from support l - struggle between Malik and Khan. Khan. and Malik between struggle - instrumented defections, the the defections, instrumented Siddiqui Santhanam Santhanam 233

a JL’ only JKLF’s was 1994 h Malik The F was actually actually was F decided he , et al., op. cit., op. al., et 232 - Khan

Mir 130

CEU eTD Collection 236 victimization. 235 Hizb by cadres JKLF of targeting relentless the by fueled further were that feuds internal by caused was faction Malik the of desertionSecond, 1991. in Mir Javed p ISI’s of defiance JKLF’s First, pressures. exogenous the and organization the of politics internal the with rests fact in of causes main the means no by were they strategies issuing andorganizing political of statements a ralliesinstate elections. participation short to confined remain would JKLF the Thereafter, well. as JKLF’s was desertion Malik’s Pakistan. m receive not did definitely it and movement militant a more no was JKLF 1994, After client. its and ISI between relationship the for watershed a was 1994 commanders, Khan, remains although in Amanullah based Amanullah than rather JKLF the of leader legitimate the as Malik Yasin recognized Pakistan of fr released was who Siddiqi, Ahmed Shabir organization. the from Khan Armanullah expelled Malik Yasin whereas JKLF, the of presidency the from Malik Yasin ce us,” unilateral informing a of offer Malik’s Yasin was difference basic Our groups. two into divided practically is organisation our “Unfortunately Khan. Amanullah with split definite a to “partly GOI to negotiations political offered Malik struggle. armed the renounce and AHPC the join to

Cited in Cited Bose 1995 - ul , vn huh dooy n cpblte hd so had capabilities and ideology though Even valley JKLF other and Malik with contact maintains still Pakistan though Even - , temporarily took over took temporarily , op. cit., op. Mujahideen, byIndian and securityforces. the

Schoefield preserve what remained of the JKLF’s cadre” JKLF’s the of remained what preserve

236 pp. pp.

opand mnla Ka. t h ed of end the At Khan. Amanullah complained , 130. Most interviewees agree that Malik’s primary motive was to spare JKLF from further further from JKLF spare to was motive primary Malik’s that agree interviewees Most 130.

op. cit op. .,

pp. pp. olicies came as a result of the internal divisions between Khan and and Khan between divisions internal the of result a as came olicies 175.

the

leadership of Amanullah’s faction. Tensions prevailed after after prevailed Tensions faction. Amanullah’s of leadership

Pakistan. the

235 e tutrl mat on impact structural me JKLF’s defective behavior. The reason reason The behavior. defective JKLF’s . But his non his But . the the 1995 ISI om prison in the second half second the in prison om - sponsored groups, such groups, sponsored Aaulh hn ousted Khan Amanullah , - violent approach caused approach violent ilitary support from support ilitary asefire, without without asefire,

the

JKLF’s

131 the the

as as

CEU eTD Collection control Jamal, the organization.” over total nearly meant patron the appoint to power the result, a As patron. the of counsel the under commander 238 Joshi, training.” good boys receive Hizb could the which through Afghanistan, 237 instructor JI a as was who Dar, Ahsan Master patron, as served elections, 1987 the in candidate Front United (Muslim MUF’s was emir. who leader), an and commander supreme a medieval Muslim great a after Salahuddin Syed himself patron, renamed (later Shah Yusuf Mohammad a of offices the comprising triumvirate h which twenty a on based formation militant centraliz political through commanders fieldadministrators as andan overground served mouthpiece. HM’s supervised JI the orders, operational issued and rec intelligence and training provided money, and arms channeled ISI While ISI. Jamaat party political Islamist Pakistani a by directed and supported formed, on struggle its builds JKLF secular to contrary which, group, militant Islamist, an is HM suggests, name outfit indigenous 1990 late the From handlers. Pakistani its for imperative an became thus organization the of marginalization The support. ISI of detriment the to PCK over authority Pakistan’s challenged openly had JKLF the above,shown Kas Azad i.e. PCK, on hold its jeopardizing mean would so doing Fall Hizbul RiseThe and of

Te arn a t nmnt te mr f h ognzto, (…), organization, the of amir the nominate to was patron “The “Jama The JI took over took JI The tolerate not could Pakistan t lo rvdd h Hzu Mjhde wt lns o fhn rus uh s h Hizb the as such groups Afghan to links with Mujahideen Hizbul the provided also at d edrhp rm co from leadership ed eld

the ideology of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of Pakistan. The group was was group The Pakistan. of part integral an as Kashmir and Jammu of ideology the h eeuie oe oe te ak n fl. h ra pwr a vse i vested was power real The file. and rank the over power executive the –

Hizbul Mujahideen (“The Party of Holy Warriors”; hereafter HM). As it it As HM). hereafter Warriors”; Holy of Party (“The Mujahideen Hizbul HM in 1990 by installing loyal members in key positions and creating a creating and positions key in members loyal installing by 1990 in HM

op. cit., op. ,

Mujahideen, 1991 ISI h ISI

- pp. pp. opt 144. ad decreased support to the group in favor of a pro a of favor in group the to support decreased ad d nelcul. t first, At intellectuals. ed the - member council and a five a and council member

JKLF’s cry for independent J&K for too long because because long too for J&K independent for cry JKLF’s - 2004 –

caiin f ahii Ilms p Islamist Kashmirir of coalition a

237

while the amir was to nominate the chief chief the nominate to was amir the while HM operated as an autonomous autonomous an as operated HM - member decision member op. cit., op. hmir and Gilgit Baltistan. As As Baltistan. Gilgit and hmir

pp. pp. 48.

- e - Islami (JI) and and (JI) Islami - making body, making onnaissance, onnaissance, - e - - Pakistan Pakistan lslami of of lslami arties) arties) a n 132 238

CEU eTD Collection http://www.jammu 243 242 241 240 short be Tribune to proved outfit this But Mujahideen help. Muslim named ISI’s group with a floated he time some For 1992. in followers Salahuddin’s by kidnapped even 239 the into members own its of nomination the through HM the over control its majoritygroup loyalties ofhis shifted counter and joined the con the from disengaged completely and J&K over sovereignty Indian accepted Azad Nabi Ghulam by headed other the while end, the to fighting continue would Sidiqi Ahmad Bilal lack the and helm MM’s to heir credible no With HM. the by killed was he 1994, in prison the from released “directionless” was MM Indians, and HM the by pounded being cadres by arrested was Dar Finally, comrades. erstwhile In1992, pressures. exogenous serious suffered he Likewise integrate to space less even organization, MM’s develop to time no had Dar scratch, the from Starting MM. for badly go would things However, police. Indian and HM the both target to ordered was MM and power growing HM’s check to of support the with and, o Salahuddin ISI, and JI the marginalized Ahmed MircrowningHM. himselfthe “supreme commander” of of backing the With emir. HM’s as acted Mir Ahmed Hilal and HM of commander supreme the became schools, party its of one in

Sahni, Joshi, New Delhi. 2012, November withheld), (name journalist Author’sinterview, Muzamil Jaleel, Jaleel, Muzamil After being accused of corruption and the misap the and corruption of accused being After , 22 January 1993; Santhanam Santhanam January22 1993; , This first split did not shake HM’s foundations because by 1993 the JI the 1993 by because foundations HM’s shake not did split first This forces his gathered Dar HM. in rupture first the initiated Dar Ahsan of dethronement The op. cit., op. op. cit., op. of control over district commanders, the MM gave birth to two factions. One led by led One factions. two to birth gave MM the commanders, district over control of

pp. pp. pp. pp. - kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20030522d.html (05/14/2012). kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20030522d.html Spawning Militan Spawning 87. 157.

241

fe Drs ees, i oti bcm te agt f Ms reprisals. HM’s of target the became outfit his release, Dar’s After the

ISI, formed his own outfit, Muslim Mujahedin Muslim outfit, own his formed ISI,

the Indian police in 1993. With Ahsan Dar imprisoned and its its and imprisoned Dar Ahsan With 1993. in police Indian the cy: The Rise of Hizbul, Hizbul, of Rise The cy: et al et , op. cit., op.

- pp. pp. ie ad nfetv. e Nxs f Mi of Nexus New ineffective. and lived propriation of HM funds, Ahsan Dar was dethroned and later later and dethroned was Dar Ahsan funds, HM of propriation 126

the – 127. 127.

ar The Indian Express Indian The riving commanders into his nascent outfit. nascent his into commanders riving

Dar - insurge

was temporary kidnapped by his by kidnapped temporary was

ncy force.ncy , 22 May 2003, available online: online: available 2003, May 22 242 usted Ahsan Dar and and Dar Ahsan usted . After Dar had been had Dar After . (MM). ISI’s aim was aim ISI’s (MM). ” litant Bodies in J&K, J&K, in Bodies litant 239

243 had

organizational

consolidated flict. “A “A flict. 133 240

CEU eTD Collection 248 Sadhu Major George, Major AmirGill. 2004. Mir. Major and Majors, three included dead The injured. were hundred five around and died soldiers Indian the of heart the at Highway Jammu Srinagar on vehicles 350 of motorcade army an for ambush an up set operatives 247 246 245 244 the and operations counterinsurgency Indian the of effectiveness in increase the witnessed t soldiers nature.bureaucratized and formalized support desertion major any experience not did organization outfits. militant other by respected and foes its by feared develop HM helped cadre JIand organisational with cooperation political The shelter. and recruits s in valley the across tentacles its spread rapidly to network JI’s exploited skillfully Indian the against attacks launched they which from bases rear established cadres HM the areas, rural up. set were cells underground where district Srinagar the and Pulwama, Doda, Sopore, Valley the across leaders largeupper a and militants 6,000 over of network vast a with outfit, Pakistani the among After ISI. and JI both by managed organization field. the in commanders the monitored also who leaders JI by stuffed were HM the of departments district and administrative The hierarchy.

Jaleel, Jaleel, Devadas, Jaleel, Jamal, n 91 h H crid o carried HM the 1991 In - otold &. eotdy twenty Reportedly, J&K. controlled

However, b However, e troops. op., op. op. cit. op. d centralized organizations such as HM are less vulnerable to COIN given their their given COIN to vulnerable less are HM as such organizations centralized d o the Indian army and paramilitary forces. The years of 1994 of years The forces. paramilitary and army Indian the o op. cit. op.

cit. cit.

247

pp. pp. hs cnrr t JL’ lc o sld oiia base, political solid of lack JKLF’s to contrary Thus, y 1997 HM had lost a considerable number of district commanders and foot and commanders district of number considerable a lost had HM 1997 y 258. - sponsored rebel sponsored

ut one of the deadliest attacks on Indian army during the Kashmir insurgency. Its Its insurgency. Kashmir the during army Indian on attacks deadliest the of one ut based structure at its disposal” its at structure based ”. The True Face Jehadis of Face True The 245

The organization spread into into spread organization The - ie roe cr w cars armored five outfits

. “By 1993, the Hizbul was the only Kashmir only the was Hizbul the 1993, “By . 244

its

. Lahore: Mashal Books, Mashal. Books, Lahore: hs te M ae o en a a centralized a as being to came HM the Thus,

conso 248 ere destroyed, more than two two than more destroyed, ere . s y hoy xet, externally expects, theory my As s. lidation,

. Despite HM’s exposure to COIN, the the COIN, to exposure HM’s Despite As a result, t result, a As h tws f the of towns the

HM rose as the most the as rose HM - level base of Jamat of base level pp. pp. 444. - he organization became organization he 1996 have particularly have 1996

the M leadership HM IJK, “ ude Indian hundred well a

- dominant dominant including earch for for earch

e - Islami - - 246

wide wide knit knit 134

In -

CEU eTD Collection the on bleeding were comrades his and he while movement the in s formerIndian Interview, battlefield. corruption widespread and life luxurious 251 http://www.expressindia.com/news/ie/daily/20000728/ina28084.html. Jamaat 250 2000 besides Jaleel, that suggests 1 Jaleel of half activists, Muzamil http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/apr/07inter.htm. online: Kashmir solve to attempt serious any support will issue. We Joseph. Josy rebellion. the of outbreak the since members 249 Regiment Panjal HM the of parts constituent Two founding. HM’s the since rift major a position. Tehreek his merged Dar when Namely, HM. in status his with dissatisfaction Dar’s reflected conflict The 1997. October Abd valley, the in commander chief HM’s mid in policies ISI of defiance open first its to lead ultimately would problems internal These JI. patron, its with links of weakening the and for theorganization and functioning ofthe movement. the and Dar Ahsan of split and ouster the with him pledging commanders other with leader undisputed HM’s as stood Salahuddin Syed pressures. exogenous the despite virulent seemed organization file. and rank the over control its weakening basis organizational HM’s as Naseeb such and commanders, Khan Ahmed district Manzoor and Kirmani, senior other and Dar Ashraf of killing the with cash the (…) forces, security HM. the against “renegades” the of brutality

J Arun Sharma, Sharma, Arun In a 2001 interview, then chief commander of HM, Abdul Majid Dar, claimed that his outfit lost thousands of of thousands lost outfit his that claimed Dar, Majid Abdul HM, of commander chief then interview, 2001 a In amal, The Rediff Interview/ Rediff The op. cit op. However, from the end of 1997 HM would experience some fissures some experience would HM 1997 of end the from However, op. cit., op. 251 .

As he was he As

Hizbul's ceasefire call was just waiting to happen, Express Indian, July 27, 2000, available online: online: available 2000, 27, July Indian, Express happen, to waiting just was call ceasefire Hizbul's 1 pp. pp. 000 insurgents that were killed by the GOI in GOI the by killed were that insurgents 000 165. One interviewee suggests that Dar may have been likewise dissatisfied with Salahuddin’s Salahuddin’s with dissatisfied likewise been have may Dar that suggests interviewee One 165. –

a sdd ih a ad h cnlc so sild no h sres of streets the into spilled soon conflict the and Dar with sided had A Dar the promotion, the denied repeatedly bdul Majid Dar, Chief Commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen, April 7, 2001, available 2001, 7, April Mujahideen, Hizbul the of Commander Chief Dar, Majid bdul

- i - Jihad - starved HM leaders were unable to woo many youths.” many woo to unable were leaders HM starved

enior intelligence official (name withheld), October 18, 2012, New 2012, 18, Delhi. October withheld), (name official intelligence enior - i - Islami into HM in early 1990s, he was promised a senior senior a promised was he 1990s, early in HM into Islami ul Majid Dar challenged Salahuddin’s leadership in leadership Salahuddin’s challenged Dar Majid ul - 2000. As a first sign of weakening internal control, control, internal weakening of sign first a As 2000. 249 - split ud

“While many HM militants were kille were militants HM many “While - i Ghazi, Din

of General Abdullah had minor implications implications minor had Abdullah General of

the first decade of insurgency belonged to Hizbul. Hizbul. to belonged insurgency of decade first the

oat. rvos ublne, s that as turbulences, Previous loyalty.

l tee blo these all - Salahuddin conflict brewed intobrewed conflict Salahuddin

– On the surface, HM’s HM’s surface, the On

s ol sae the shake would ws Al Badr and the Pir Pir the and Badr Al in its organization its in 250

Together d by the by d Firdaus

135

CEU eTD Collection 256 255 Mir, ISI. Pakistan’s infuriated that(also) 254 http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/02hizb.htm. 253 252 forc security the by decimated mid the in toll heavy a took also JI HM, groups.” two the of assets subsequently the from HMin separate the divided which ISI, the of Cell Kashmir civilians. dozen a about of lives afte and militias, two the disengage to in moved army the when end an to came battle The weeks. several for battle in locked remained militias rival two “The PCK. faction Sarfraz’s and failed action this But force. his and Sarfraz disarm to tried men armed hundreds of couple a with accompanied Turabi Rashid Allama JI’s 2000, October In Sarfraz. discipline to to support its shifted ISI the him, against resurfaced allegations financial some when but ISI, of backing the had Sarfraz first, At fight” the the of some run had (he) and movement, jihadi the in role central a battle formidable, lightlya led Sarfraz only Not action. Salahuddin’s take not would Safraz HM. from Panjal Pir Sarfraz’s Masood and Badr Al expelling Eventually, Darand managed tonedown totemporarily their Salahuddin differences. Muza

Zaffar Abbas. The Militant Brigade. Militant Brigade. The Abbas. Zaffar Jamal, Ibid Mir speculates that ISI might have sup have might ISI that speculates Mir ffarabad Sati ,

pp. pp. Another change occurred in the HM relationship relationship HM the in occurred changeAnother allies Dar’s against turned Salahuddin turbulences, future prevent to move a in then, But turned guns on JI. To ISI’s despair, the initial turf war spilled into towns and villages of villages and towns into spilled war turf initial the despair, ISI’s To JI. on guns turned op. cit., op.

252 167. . In April 1998 Sarfraz and Salahuddin brought their rivalry to the streets of PCK. of streets the to rivalry their brought Salahuddin and Sarfraz 1998 April In . Sahni. Slaves have no Eid... Eid... no have Slaves Sahni.

Pakistan, ,

pp. 167. pp.

hr te w sds a ter ae under bases their had sides two the where

es and Ikhwans. JI’s political control over HM, as well as its its as well as HM, over control political JI’s Ikhwans. and es The Herald The op. cit., op. Salahuddin. ported Sarfraz to Salahuddin for disassociating the outfit from JI, “an act act “an JI, from outfit the disassociating for Salahuddin to Sarfraz ported The

opposition t opposition

final resolution to the conflict was negotiated by the the by negotiated was conflict the to resolution final pp. pp. - . February 2004, pp. 59. pp. 2004, February . 1990s, its senior members and lower echelons being echelons lower and members senior its 1990s, 107. 254

JI also backed Salahuddin even using coercion using even Salahuddin backed also JI o theceasefirein Octoberwith GOI 2000. Rediff with regard to its its to regard with , August, 2000, available online: online: available 2000, August, , -

hardened unit, but he also “played also he but unit, hardened r the fighting had taken the the taken had fighting the r most important missions of missions important most

political wing political the 255

ISI supervision. supervision. ISI

afa would Sarfraz

, JI. L JI. , 256 136 ike ike 253

CEU eTD Collection 261 State Muj 260 Mir, objective”. achieve their meansto the and ofperception and HM 1997 by that and cosmetic not was split this that agree Sahni Sati and AmirMir Delhi. New withheld), (name journalist New Interview, 2012, Delhi; 23, October Swami, Praveen 259 1990). 258 257 the between talks be would there subsequently and it, to respond favorably would Hizbul Mujahedin ceasefire, for call a give would insurgency, the of mouthpiece political a as (APHC) cause” their for support international increase and efforts negotiating Pakistani “help would move a such that expected establishment and Jamaat of leaders mid in Pakistan against to perceptionand of vulnerability,lead ofexposedcommanders. todesertion reinforce would it reach, Pakistan’s outside were commanders HM that Given decentralized. into wit ties HM’s of weakening the and leadership outfit disowning statements of publiclydisasso forces” Indian the by killings illegal and with battles cos militants. the harm likewise would front political the striking by that army Indian the convinced has support moral and financial

Jamal, Interview,jou Yoginder Sikand Yoginder Interview, former Indian senior int senior Indian former Interview, uata oe JL ad KM Jmu n Ksmr ieain rn ad am ad ahi Hizb Kashmir and Jammu and Front Liberation Kashmir and Jammu JKHM: and JKLF Bose. Sumantra t the JI heavily, losing hundreds, if not thousands, of its leaders, cadres, and sympathizers in sympathizers and cadres, leaders, its of thousands, not if hundreds, losing heavily, JI the t ahideen, in: Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John Tirman (eds.). 2007. 2007. (eds.). Tirman John and O’Leary, Brendan Heiberg, Marianne in: ahideen,

, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 229 Press, ofPennsylvania University Philadelphia: , inform them that they are ready to negotiate a cease a negotiate to ready are they that them inform Modern Asia Asia Studies Modern was The internal fissure has not be not has fissure internal The op. cit., op.

raig l te wt JI. with ties all breaking rnalist (name withheld), November 20, 2012, New 2012, Delhi. 20, November withheld), (name rnalist

pp. pp. ciate from each other to avoid to eachother from ciate . - 2002. The 2002. e 210. - Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen would secretly contact the Indian intelligence intelligence Indian the contact secretly would Mujahideen Hizbul and Islami

, 36(3): 705 36(3): , - 2000.

HM.

Emergence 260

In early 2000 early In

elligence officer (name withheld), October 18, 2012, New Delhi. Interview, Interview, Delhi. New 2012, 18, October withheld), (name officer elligence – In November 1997 Salahuddin also publicly announced that his that announced publicly also Salahuddin 1997 November In 751, at pp. 751. pp. at 751, 257

and and 261

en closed when it led to the first major defection of Hizbul of defection major first the to led it when closed en By the late 1990s “participation in the armed struggle has struggle armed the in “participation 1990s late the By . It was suggested that the Al the that suggested was It . h goig istsato o cmadr wt the with commanders of dissatisfaction growing The Development the JI

h JI would transform the centralized organization centralized the transform would JI h ’s annihilation. ’s – ISI came up with up came ISI 256, at pp. 245. pp. at 256, op. cit., op.

of the Jama'ati Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s Kashmir and Jammu of Islami Jama'ati the of 258

106; Sati Sahni. ‘Slaves have no Eid’.no have ‘Slaves Sahni. Sati 106; - Cneunl, I n H tid to tried HM and JI Consequently, . JI leaders “had already developed difference difference developed already “had leaders JI fire. The ISI and Pakistan’s military Pakistan’s and ISI The fire.

259

B the following the y1997 late l - Party Hurriyat Conference Hurriyat Party Terror, Insurgency, and the and Insurgency, Terror,

JI issued a ser aJI issued

plan: the senior the plan:

137 ies - ul ul –

CEU eTD Collection http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/01hizb.htm 266 265 264 speculations. these dismissed later Dar Nevertheless, negotiations. 263 262 the lose to want not did and impatient, “was Dar impatient. grew Dar elections, the delaying elections the until wait to Dar advised Gilani S.A.S. head its but cease supported Lone Ghani Abdul and Bhat Ghani Abdul as such cadres senior JI of some cease a announcing before valley the in leaders JI inform to cease a support to decided army. Indian the ca hundred six than more had 2000. untill 1990 from fighters thousands five around lost HM services, commander senior the desired valley, the in commanders HM powerful most the of two Zargar, Ahmad Khurshid and Tantrey mind. his the greatest plan. ofthis opponent beappeared firstto at Dar Majid CommanderChiefAbdul HM andconcerns theirvoiced seniors to supposed were talks. peace future in Pakistan of cease on deal the reaching for conditions three present then p active the with HM the and officials Indian

Jaleel Swami, Devadas, There are some are There ai an. “ Sahni. Sati

, However, after However, a op. cit. op.

India 263 ceasefire. op. cit. op.

pn adn i Siaa i Arl 00 Dr a srrsd o id ht Masood that find to surprised was Dar 2000, April in Srinagar in landing Upon , Pakistan and the Secret Jihad the Secret and Pakistan ,

We We

speculations that the Indian RAW used Dar’s second wife, who lived in Dubai, to woo Dar into into Dar woo to Dubai, in lived who wife, second Dar’s used RAW Indian the that speculations , 266 pp. pp.

H break down adding the appearance of Pakistan’s benevolence. The JI and HM HM and JI The benevolence. Pakistan’s of appearance the adding down break 264 ave ave

329. n ie ih y hoeia epcain, a ad i flo commanders fellow his and Dar expectations, theoretical my with line In

It appears that appears It twr te ecpin f vulnerability of perception the toward s departing N

o - E fire even at the expense of damaging ties with Pakistan. with ties damaging of expense the at even fire nmity nmity sualties, including forty district commanders, in its encounters with encounters its in commanders, district forty including sualties,

from PCK to Srinagar to PCK from 262 T owards the the owards

Since GOI would never accept such a condition, the talks the condition, a such accept never would GOI Since

the , pp. pp.

. acc

189. umulated losses of HM cadres in J&K had moved had J&K in cadres HM of losses umulated P articipation of the APHC. The negotiators would negotiators The APHC. the of articipation ol of eople

I ndia via . ”. - fire, one of them being the inclusion inclusion the being them of one fire, Du - fire offer to the GOI. Reportedly, Reportedly, GOI. the to offer fire h Rdf Special Rediff The bai, it appears that Dar that appears it bai,

. in

According to Indian security security Indian to According JI

took place. As Gilani was was Gilani As place. took 265

In 1993 alone, HM alone, 1993 In , July, 2000, source: source: 2000, July, , Dar decided decided Dar

changed changed - fire, fire, 138

CEU eTD Collection 271 online: available http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume6/Fault6 Portal, 270 Thakur, discussions.” no will be he that argues Qureshi negotiator HM’s out hand, pointed clearly other the On talks. the to preconditions any attach not did HM that agree interviewees My preconditions”. without dialogue a through amicably, issue the resolve to be should exercise 269 http://www.re 268 267 dictated” had they conditions the modified had he for ceasefire, the presented had Majid way the at “furious scenari a such and GOI, with the negotiations Hizb’s the in role a of out left itself find would Pakistan that mean would turn, in That, leverage. of source last its lose would Pakistan began, dialogue political before priori to failed and instructions Gilani’s ignored Dar guard. off ISI took announcement the First, meeting, was their demand orthat mutedbyme thesubsequent first this during preconditions any out lay not did either negotiators HM that appears It level. operational the on ceasefire the of modalities the out flesh to Army the with committee a up woul commanders HM The ceasefire. the break or militants on fire not would Army the that IndianPandey, government, waschief it between agreedQureshi theof negotiator Kamal and long a Qureshi, w ceasefire unilateral the announcement. the postpone indeed had ISI and GOP the Meanwhile minds.” their change could border the across masters political his that fearing opportunity,

Devadas, Devadas, Ibid. When he announced the ceasefire on 24 July, Dar reportedly said: “Let them talk to anybody; the aim the anybody; to talk them “Let said: reportedly Dar July, 24 on ceasefire the announced he When rve Swami, Praveen Salah

inform The announcement and substance of talks angered the Pakistani military establishment. military Pakistani the angered talks of substance and announcement The - ud op. cit., op. - i wne Dr o otoe ib esfr offer, ceasefire Hizb postpone to Dar wanted Din diff.com/news/2000/aug/03jk4.htm. 271 the - . Following the first day of formal talks, an ISI officer rang Qureshi accusing the accusing Qureshi rang officer ISI an talks, formal of day first the Following . to his Indian counterpart that “we cannot ignore Pakistan, it is equally a party, without that there there that without party, a equally is it Pakistan, ignore cannot “we that counterpart Indian his to time separ time

ilge ih h Hz Lgt n h Tunnel the in Light Hizb the with Dialogue pp. pp. ISI the“ timingabout ofhisoffer. 331.

tot oslig aaudn or Salahuddin consulting ithout atist activist and a moderate, the main negotiator. In the first meeting first the In negotiator. main the moderate, a and activist atist op. cit., op. 268

o was unacceptable to GOP.” to unacceptable was o

But Dar disobeyed the order. On July 24 July On order. the disobeyed Dar But

pp. pp. 104.

hne ter id ad aaudn se Dr to Dar asked Salahuddin and minds their changed If a c a If

u i i Dw o Sne? Suh sa Terro Asia South Sunset?, or Dawn it is But easefire was successfully implemented implemented successfully was easefire Rediff

the 270 dia coverage.

, August 3, 2000, 2000, 3, August , Second, ISI, and appointed Fazal Haq Haq Fazal appointed and ISI, ,

he suddenly announcedsuddenly he the the 269 - Swami GOP and ISI were ISI and GOP

vial online available - F.htm#_ftn1.

of the the of d set set d 139 rist rist 267

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CEU eTD Collection 275 http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/jul/31jk1.htm. 274 273 272 h of orders the before bow to decided helm Council Jihad United the from Salahuddin removing by ceasefire the with dissatisfaction its demonstrated ISI he because simply ceasefire Dar’s endorsed reluctantly chief religious were across killed minorities, August on culminating Kashmir derailing when 31 cease the down put and valley negotiations. ongoing the derail to outfits re openlyto position no in was government ISI’s That Pakistan. without talks concern inthesubsequent light founded account: seemed tobe ofQureshi’s the with proceed to eager is Dar that concerned was ISI entir

Mir, Mir, This Ibid Lashkar e HM chain of command for failure to insist on Pakistan’s involvement in the negotiations. negotiations. the in involvement Pakistan’s on insist to failure for command of chain HM e ,

op. cit. op. claim pp. pp. Likewise, debacle Kargil 1999 Pakistan’s Following theyas knew fate the of those who dared in goto against the country’s wishes. leader no because was This Pakistan ofindependentsolution a wants he that declareopenly can limited.Kashmir been have could influence Pakistan’s Valley, long a on agreement mutual a governmentthewas talkswanted secret me)and had really (Dar come with to to we what

LeT HM’s ceasefire offer. ceasefire HM’s 105. - e

- is corroborated by a series of interviews, October ofinterviews, series a by iscorroborated , ob Sy Atc i Rsos t Pae ak. R Talks. Peace to Response in Attack Says Toiba pp. pp.

launched 101; Abbas, Abbas, 101; the the – ISI arm ISI

an attack on the Rashtriya Rifles garrison in northern IJK, with IJK, northern in garrison Rifles Rashtriya the on attack an n mrla raiain f iait bsd n Pakistan in based jihadists of organization umbrella an

op. cit., cit., op. -

- twisted twisted fire at all costs. all at fire 274 pp. pp. 1 when more than one hundred civilians, mostly members of of members mostly civilians, hundred one than more when 1

Subsequently, LeT undertook a series of massacres in South in massacres of series a undertook LeT Subsequently, - 56. atn pae oml. ne ec ws etrd n the in restored was peace Once formula. peace lasting Syed Salahuddin into submission. At the outset, the HM HM the outset, the At submission. into Salahuddin Syed is masters. He swiftly turned against Dar denouncing his his denouncing Dar against turned swiftly He masters. is the

Both IJK. ject 273

JeM and LeT were ordered to wrack havoc in the the in havoc wrack to ordered were LeT and JeM the ceasefire. Instead ceasefire. the

The first The

ntefut Indo fourth the in - December 2012, New Delhi. 2012, December blow to D to blow ediff

was left left was , July 31, 2000, available online: online: available 2000, 31, July , ar’s initiative came on July on came initiative ar’s Pakistan - Pakistani war Pakistani with with

no choice. no 272

– relied on relied

especially – , its military its ,

Salahuddin Salahuddin 275 an aim at aim an its

jihadi 140 the

CEU eTD Collection http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/08kash1.htm. 278 277 ofnegotiations. notwas aware that Salahuddin argue mysomeofinterviewees Jamal, See: announcement. its of timing the about consulted not was he but GOI, with 276 to talks further” want we and hope of ray a showed It (…) deliberation. were conditions the talks why the understand to not attached did he said Dar chief, his and ISI the to defiance In resume. would talks that hope the expressing supremo his contradicted Dar Majid Abdul day S August.refused GOIdemand, his the When 8 for set was deadline The talks. future in Pakistan include to agree not did GOI the unless offer ceasefire the withdraw would HM that 1 August on announced Salahuddin ISI, the by Pressured announcementcease of surprise” by “taken seemingly were officers whose ISI by backed South Deputy and Khan. Shamsher J&K commander North the by Regiment supported was anathema Panjal Salahuddin’s Pir and Dar Rasool Ghulam and Jehangir Particu 1997/1998. in quarrel last their since schism major a into escalate to threatened Dar and Salahuddin between triggering Dar, ceasefire inthe talks. the GOI Pakistan by Augustunless 8included treachery. as move

Intervi Authors like Arif Jamal and Pradeep Thakur suggest that Sa that suggest Thakur Pradeep and Jamal Arif like Authors Hizb Commander Wants Talks to Continue, Continue, to Talks Wants Commander Hizb Before Dar was expelled along with his supporters, he had committe had he supporters, his with along expelled was Before Dar withdrawa and denouncement Salahuddin’s 278 ews, October ews, Poedn wt tls fetvl mat ht a de nt nit n h ky ISI key the on insist not does Dar that meant effectively talks with Proceeding .

tension - larly when Dar received backing from North IJK Division commander Majid Majid commander Division IJK North from backing received Dar when larly 276 J&K Division commander Abdul Ghani. Most importantly, Salahuddin was Salahuddin importantly, Most Ghani. Abdul commander Division J&K November 2012, New 2012, Delhi November

Even worse, Even after they had been initiated. “We took this decision after months of of months after decision this took “We initiated. been had they after s - fire. fire.

between the leader and his chief commander. The emerging animosity animosity emerging The commander. chief his and leader the between

Salahuddin .

alahuddin carried out his promise. Yet carried promise. alahuddin outhis

threatened to disassociate himself and HM from HM and himself disassociate to threatened l of support for the for support of l Rediff lahuddin tacitly supported Dar’s secret negotiations negotiations secret Dar’s supported tacitly lahuddin Ags 8 20, vial online: available 2000, 8, August , Division Division

277

chief Abdul Rashid Hajam Hajam Rashid Abdul chief proceed

following Dar’s unilateral Dar’s following

ceasefire offer infuriated infuriated offer ceasefire op. cit. op. d another defiant act. act. anotherdefiant d

; Thakur, Thakur, ; (emphasis added) added) (emphasis ,

on the same on thesame op. cit. op.

Yet, Yet, 141

CEU eTD Collection 281 280 http://freepresskashmir.com/kashmirs 279 problem” alone gun “the that arguing GOI with dialogue a endorsed publicly Zargar Salahuddin’s criticized publicly Zargar, Ahmed Khurshid commander associate, mid in changed abruptly this But HM. within lull a been council supreme GOI. the with dialogue a revive th about worry only not did Salahuddin that appears It valley. the from supporters his and Dar recall to council supreme the summoned Salahuddin ISI, the from instructions under acting 2000, November In authority. that theythe unilateralgrew factionalismof ceasefire. intointense following declaration and divisions previous bridged not has HM that clear became it August by Thus, accept. never Pakistan unless talks any rejecting again”. start will authorities Indian the and Mujahideen cease new a “that contradict that statements issuing had ceasefire the from HM was them infavorat even of the cost ofGOP’s exclusion. condit

Hizbul Commanders in Jammu & Kashmir Recalled to PoK Camp, PoK to Recalled & Jammu Kashmir in Commanders Hizbul NewDelhi 2012, Interviews,November Kashmir’s Hibul Hopes for Truce Renewal Soon, Soon, Renewal Truce for Hopes Hibul Kashmir’s exposed ion h slt eae nvtbe s Salahuddi as inevitable became split The from Pressured 281 –

. In late November, Salahuddin issued another call to Dar and others to immediately to others and Dar to call another issued Salahuddin November, late In . the inclusion of GOP. Thus, despite ISI and Salahuddin undermining the talks, Dar talks, the undermining Salahuddin and ISI despite Thus, GOP. of inclusion the

power , Salahuddin Salahuddin , - fire will take place in the next two months” and that “the talks between Hizbul Hizbul between talks “the that and months” two next the in place take will fire - struggle between the HM leader and his chief commander. The two began two The commander. chief his and leader HM the between struggle

the offer on 8 August. 8 on offer

ps tasrsin, u h as bcm aamd y a’ efrs to efforts Dar’s by alarmed became also he but transgressions, past e ISI and ISI replaced them with them replaced

- 280 hizbul ed

As Dar and a couple of his loyalists his of couple a and Dar As the .

each other. On August 22, Dar announced that he believe he that announced Dar 22, August On other. each - hopes

s included in them in included s jihadists, Salahuddin decided to disassociate himself and and himself disassociate to decided Salahuddin jihadists, - Salahuddin’s for - truce re rs Kashmir Press Free

new commanders. For eleven months there ha there months eleven For commanders. new - n came to see Dar as a major threat to his his to threat major a as Dar see to came n renewal

withdrawal of withdrawal 279

soon/. soon/. The Daily Excelsior Daily The –

- On the other hand, Salahuddin kept Salahuddin hand, other the On

November 2001 when Dar’s close close Dar’s when 2001 November the

, August 22, 2000, available online: online: available 2000, 22, August , condition he knew GOI would GOI knew he condition

avoided the session of the of session the avoided support for support , November 24, 2001. 24, November , is no solution to the to solution no is hardline

the cease the

policy. -

fire fire 142 d s

CEU eTD Collection 285 284 http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1911/19110190.htm. 283 online: available Same, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume11/Article3.htm. the of More 9/11 After J&K Swami, Praveen valley. the to o Pakistan from series transfers money a by pressed also was camp Dar’s 282 Dar Majid that argued Saifullah, Khalid commander division south former and “Khan Shamsher comman regiment Panjal Pir leaders, Hizbul other Two meeting. council command the of out walked angrily Dar, Rasool Ghulam and Jehangir Majid commander division north Hizbul’s south deputy a and divisio Hajam Rashid Abdul chief, division north Former verdict. the of favor agent. RAW covert the with charged was Dar members. its longer no were followers his of number a and Fatah Abdul Zafar commander Bhat ofideas, kinds contain these to just was infuriated.” “Salahuddin elections. a State J&K the before collect groups secessionist of coalition to Vajpayee Minister Prime Indian by efforts with line in be to seemed move This p Bhat, Ahmad Abdul RAW. Indian the from funds received theylikewise but faction, own their up set only not associateshad with Dar. sided who IJK in commanders other of number a by ignored was too this but Pakistan to return

Ibid Ibid Since the eruption of conflict with Salahuddin in late 2001, Dar’s faction received fewer funds from the ISI. ISI. the from funds fewer received faction Dar’s 2001, late in Salahuddin with conflict of eruption the Since Praveen Swami, The Hizbul Meltdown, Meltdown, Hizbul The Swami, Praveen

282 cmadr bu Gai to bhn ter he’ algtos To others Two allegations. chief’s their behind stood Ghani Abdul commander n The next day, HM announced that Majid Dar, commander Zargar, central division division central Zargar, commander Dar, Majid that announced HM day, next The valley’s the within voices Dissenting

n a 1 a rngr al pitd tx by text a printed daily Srinagar a 1, May On

285 defiance of leadership’s orders to return to Pakistan and castigated as a a as castigated and Pakistan to return to orders leadership’s of defiance oiig o es al iiay prtos f ni iiitd dialogue. a initiated India if operations military all cease to romising

pr rm S from Apart

f the Indian Intelligence Bureau operations which intercepted illegal illegal intercepted which operations Bureau Intelligence Indian the f yed Frontline Salahuddin only two members members two only Salahuddin HM intensified intensified HM

(Chennai), May 25 25 May (Chennai), 284 h H’ dpt commander deputy HM’s the

2002. It appears that Dar and his his and Dar that appears It 2002. -

June 7, 2002, available online: online: available 2002, 7, June of ,

the Hizbul were in were Hizbul the who had appoi had who - in - - chief

nted der der 143 the 283

CEU eTD Collection 291 290 289 288 237. 287 286 j some of activities curb to urged was government Musharraf the Armitage, Richard State of Secretary Deputy US then of visit the following 2003, June In JeM. and LeT as such Salahuddin’s firmgrip. ISI’ the of because primarily group. Dar’s to ISI the they and other each investigation to money pay to parties thorough two the ordered a After HM. in crisis succession the resolving permanently revived. were sides two the between clashes street house inSopore 2003. inMarch his of front in dead him shot hitman unidentified an Movement, Salvation Kashmir and Jammu electi Assembly State IJK upcoming the in part take and violence renounce to decided already had supporters his and Dar time, that By support. its pledged and 2003 January in outfit militant separate a as faction Dar’s organized temporarily skirmishes The assets. other and camps training over rights members. disgruntled Pakistan.” to return and orders Despite these HMwascalls, reconciliatory in thesplit a fact mid by Salahuddin’s per as act to time more given be to needed

Ibid Jamal, Marwah, Ibid. Ibid There were reportedly some senior HM commanders who defected to Dar after t after Dar to defected who commanders HM senior some reportedly were There

pp. pp. But after these incid these after But In Pakistan. in cadre Hizbul the within shock a provoked assassination Dar’s from far however, was, split The op. cit., op. 66. op. cit op.

pp. pp. ., pp. 79. pp. ., 290 237

aaudn uvvd n rmie frl i cnrl f h organizati the of control in firmly remained and survived Salahuddin – 287 238.

This led to a turf war turf a to led This

ents

support. s 289 HM

was mostly sidelined by the ISI in favor of Pakistani Pakistani of favor in ISI the by sidelined mostly was ons. As Dar As ons. settled 291

M a aan eoe etaie oti under outfit centralized become again had HM

as long as Dar’s faction was able to attract HM’s attract to able was faction Dar’s as long as in

the The was preparing to promote his new party, new his promote to preparing was

PCK where the two camps claimed their claimed camps two the where PCK ISI

also completely ceased the support the ceased completely also gain

stepped in with an interest in interest an with in stepped - 20 02. he breakup. Jamal, Jamal, breakup. he

ceased only after only ceased

i hadi groups, hadi early 2003 early op. cit., op. the the outfits outfits

144 the the ISI pp. pp. 288 286 on

CEU eTD Collection Jamal, 294 Mir, 2003.” during encounters 293 292 were members their of kidnappedintimidated, orexecuted across thevalley. hundreds punished: ruthlessly were (MJF), Force Janbaaz Muslim with merged willingly organizations Some necessary. deemed Pakistan other of incorporation the undertook HM 1990s, other. the against off group each pitting by ultimately, and, support material of manipulation the through maintained be would control its whereby insurgency fractured a preferred ISI The insurgents. seri could insurgency Kashmiri on HM of monopoly the outfit, single a through channeled be to have would support all As Kashmir. Mass Desertions:A StoryIkhwa Short of militant strongest the of one organizations remains HM policy. Kashmir Pakistan’s about complaining Her ISI. the of surveillance the under home his to confined bodyguards. personal his his to of promptly some arresting reacted by ISI defiance The pressures. despite jihad continue to threatened and 2003, which India, with rapprochement of policy Pakistan’s denounced publicly Salahuddin action, this to protest In cars. his of some surrender to and Islamabad his in residence leave to forced immediately was Salahuddin and suit followed GOP The HM. including

Mubashir Zaidi. The Himalayan Implosion, Implosion, Himalayan The Zaidi. Mubashir “Only in January 2004, the Hizbul had claimed killing 7 killing claimed had Hizbul the 2004, January in “Only “ According to a Hizbul Mujahideen commander, the organization eliminated some 7,000 political rivals political 7,000 some eliminated organization the commander, Mujahideen Hizbul a to According op. cit., op. Despite its investment in HM, in investment its Despite

en te togs oti i the in outfit strongest the Being

pp. pp. , 293 155. Amanullah Khan, Khan, Amanullah 155.

but ever since the 2002 state election in IJK,but ever since inactivitieselection its have the2002state been waning. M Toe h rfsd icuig h JL, kwnl ulme or Muslimeen Ikhwanul JKLF, the including refused, who Those HM.

op. cit., op.

pp. pp. 68. the PCK JKLF chairman argues that around 500 of its cadres were wiped were cadres its of 500 around that argues chairman JKLF PCK the

the The Herald The ously weaken weaken ously

such ISI grew w grew ISI nul Muslimeennul Force Muslim and Janbaaz valley

s Al as , June 2003, 2003, June , 70 Indian s Indian 70

HM had a hegemonic agenda. In the early early the In agenda. hegemonic a had HM 294 ary of creating a dominant militant party in in party militant dominant a creating of ary - ar Hzulh r al or Hizbullah Badr, the the

ISI’s bargaining position position bargaining ISI’s - 292 pp. pp. sponsored movements by any means means any by movements sponsored oldiers oldiers

ad hr h ise a statement a issues he there and e 58 ic te, aaudn a been has Salahuddin then, Since – 59. and losing 232 of it’s fighters in 314 314 in fighters it’s of 232 losing and

- was accelerated in in accelerated was mr Mu Umar vis - à jahideen

- vis . (…) (…) .

145 the the

CEU eTD Collection Security 296 295 86 2004. confis Rana. Amir Muhammad HM. by out members HM of examples numerous were There valley. the in cadres todevelopand MJF aperception of vulnerability, leading themto attrition. of face the in desertion of chance the increased only corps commander divided a and command major other a of and case Beg Hilal the little was there In units local ground. the against the violence fratricidal on or counterinsurgency situation the control to ability its reduced which one to links another. organizational solid lacked and communities, respective their with associated Anantnag,Kupwara. Pulwama and such districts in activists political and commanders the with and ISI, in up set was body central group’s the Formally, principal. its as Ikhwan 1992, splitting after (JKSLF) Front Liberation Student Kashmir and Jammu the as central the from autonomous M Ikhwanul leadership. quite were strongmen or commanders local which in outfits were desertion to prone most The pressure. intense most the under were that lines organizational

– Joshi, Joshi, Paul Staniland. 2012. 2012. Staniland. Paul 87.

leaders could do to influence the behavior of their lower echelons. Such a Such echelons. lower their of behavior the influence to do could leaders the 37(1): 37(1): ul Muslimeen indicating that the group adopted Islamist ideology and endorsed Pakistan Pakistan endorsed and ideology Islamist adopted group the that indicating Muslimeen ul hs cnro tre t urvl n 92 we H luce attacks launched HM when 1992, in unravel to started scenario This chiefly were Kashmir south and north in commanders local IUM’s however, practice, In victim the consequence, a As op. cit. op. 296

y hoy xet dcnrlzd raiain otie sponsor’s outside organizations decentralized expects theory My JKSLF was divided into two whereby the new outfit led by Hilal Beg was renamed was Beg Hilal by led outfit new the whereby two into divided was JKSLF

n un IUM turn, In 142 , pp. pp. – 177, at 177, 80.

Organizing Insurgency Organizing

pp. pp. uslimeen (IUM) was one such group. The group was established in 1991 1991 in established was group The group. such one was (IUM) uslimeen

’s 170.

eta laesi ws n hre f n tmzd omne corps commander atomized an of charge in was leadership central

295 A to Z to A

s of HM’s campaign started to fracture along those those along fracture to started campaign HM’s of s :

Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia South in Rebellion and Resources, Networks, of of Jehadi Organizations Organizations Jehadi

in in

the Pakistan favor

PCK to coordinate with the with coordinate to PCK desert . Lahore: Mashal Books Mashal Lahore: . s rngr Baramula, Srinagar, as

ec sc a IUM as such reach ion from against .

decentralized the JKLF. In JKLF. the aig guns, cating

International International

h IUM the , 146 pp. pp.

CEU eTD Collection 303 302 301 300 299 298 297 a and solid receiving troops asas 300 militarily having manyIUM, was stronger, contrast MJF to In Srinagar. and districts northern from coming recruits the of most with Kashmiris, comprised Sha Shabir of auspices the under 1988 Kashmir. pro Parrey’s joined Majid Usman and my with along terminated gang” be would I HM, the fighting stopped I day the knew “I it, put he Indian the to unit entire his with deserted he after, Soon Delhi. to men his with HM in Beig Hilal gu his turned Hizbul the of militants the Mujahideen.” with deal to had I other the on and forces, security the fighting to According reprisals. Hizb harsh of target a became Parrey Kukka singer folk local a by led IUM of section a Kashmir north In Kashmir. across place took it against attacks of wave new a by1993 and attacks its resumed HM late in HM with hatchet the burying tried IUM out, work not did this when But Mujahideen. Umar Al and JKLF as such victims other with aligning by power combatants. IUM killing or kidnapping

Praveen Swami. A beleaguered force. force. A Swami. beleaguered Praveen Thakur Thakur, Devadas, Thakur. Pradeep Ibid Joshi, ’s

, 302 attacks. pp. pp. Another op. . Other . op. cit op. 303 op. cit., op. 248.

op. cit., op. cit.

ns on the Hizb” the on ns , 299

the 301 ., pp. pp. pp. pp.

pp. pp. segments organization

Militant Monologue: Echoes from the Kashmir Valley Kashmir the from Echoes Monologue: Militant After

pp. pp. When Kukka refused to obey, he and his company were disarmed and disarmed were company his and he obey, to refused Kukka When 105. PCK only added fuel to the fire. Beg demanded Parrey not to retaliate to not Parrey demanded Beg fire. the to fuel added only PCK 50. 50 286.

– 51. several

of the IUM faced similar similar faced IUM the of

300 with a similar faith was Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF) founded in in founded (MJF) Force Janbaaz Muslim was faith similar a with

skirmishes between Parrey between skirmishes . Instead of supporting his commander, the central leadership of leadership central the commander, his supporting of Instead . Frontline Frontline Parrey, “I was encircled from all sides: on one front I was was I front one on sides: all from encircled was “I Parrey, - India camp, expanding the wave of desertions into south into desertions of wave the expanding camp, India 297

(Chennai), February 12, 1999. 12, February (Chennai), With ISI’s blessing, Hilal Beg sought to check HM’s check to sought Beg Hilal blessing, ISI’s With ’ Pol’ Lau Pry P) Lk IM MJF IUM, Like (PL). Party League People’s h’s fate . The The .

and HM in 1993 and 1994, “Kuka had “Kuka 1994, and 1993 in HM and 1992. . New Delhi: Parity Paperbacks, Paperbacks, New Parity . Delhi: IUM sections of Liaqat Ali Khan Ali Liaqat of sections IUM 298

Unfortunately for IUM the IUM for Unfortunately side

because, as because, pp. pp.

against he fled he 47. 147

CEU eTD Collection 308 307 306 305 304 size!). actual its of third H from came shock exogenous second The apprehended. was Badar Babar J&K in commander yearMJF’s same the arrest” Shah’s Shabir after aimless become “had followers Beheaded police. Indian 1991 In actions. police IJK the from came organization the to shock exogenous first The cadre. top its targeted army Indian the once an into unwieldy outfit”. growing slowly was what into them assimilate to but choice no had Babar returned, MJF” the of ranks the in were there boys many Salar becameBadar Babar When (…) Pakistan to across going was who know not did hierarchy MJF “the Badar, Babar commander chief MJF’s of biography her in out points Sinha Aditya As J&K. across how and where what, their over control commanders. meaningful a establish could were leadership branches central district the than MJF’s faster that spawning was problem main The soldiers. foot and commanders on paper. only file and rank the over control had which body central a had it IUM, to Similar organization. supp ISI of amount

Jamal, Ibid Ibid Ibid 2000. Sinha. Aditya , , , pp. pp. pp. pp. Due to such a decentralized character, MJF would ultimately come under serious strain serious under come ultimately would MJF character, decentralized a such to Due it with links organizational build to failed leadership MJF the practice, In op. cit., op.

57. 60. 59.

304

pp. pp.

As a result, there was no feedback to the centralleadershthe feedbackto no therewasresult, a As 306 157.

Death of Dreams: a Terrorist's Tale Terrorist's a of Dreams: Death M in 1991 in M Therefore, MJF wasTherefore, MJF r. bet n atraie ore f udn, J ws state a was MJF funding, of source alternative any Absent ort.

308

In order to save the group from complete disaster, the remnants of the of remnants the disaster, complete from group the save to orderIn

- 1993. MJF suffered heavy toll losing more than 100 cadres (one cadres 100 than more losing toll heavy suffered MJF 1993. , - Shabir Shah, Shabir e - Allah (chief comma (chief Allah essentially a decentralizedessentially outfit. 305 . India: Harpercollins Publishers, Harpercollins India: . . Simultaneously, “when the trained militants trained the “when Simultaneously, .

the MJF political MJF the nder) he had absolutely no idea how how idea no absolutely had he nder) leader ip about who was doingwas who about ip

was arrested by the by arrested was pp. pp. 58.

307 . Then in Then . - s field field s reliant reliant 148

CEU eTD Collection 312 Sahni, Manhas. Khalid Raja commander Gyias Maulana th of Some police. 311 310 309 organizations two the circumstances, such Under targeting. HM’s against commanders its support to refused even IUM of leadership The support. timely a receive an leadership their from Separated to of theircommander. erstwhile follow or outfits other of ranks the filling members some with organization as exist to ceased MJF the politician, a became Badar Babar After India. with dialogue political for bid o group a by career.militant his of announcingend Delhithe bandwagonNew to with 1996 February In attacks. Indian mounting the resisting while together organization Javed India commander, the joined AJF even Shah (one Hussain fight the leave eventually and forces Indian the by casualties heavy suffer to group the leaving AJF, from split immediately He outfit. separate a as revived be file. and rank the and leadership the between links organizational poor the with leadership fractious force” Jihad the and MJF old the integrated really (AJF). Force Jihad Al form to Force Jihad into integrated MJF

He wasHe join Ibid Sinha, In 1993, a number of AJF senior commanders, advisors and leaders were arrested or eliminated by the Indian Indian the by eliminated or arrested were leaders and advisors commanders, senior AJF of number a 1993, In ON n hostile and COIN

, pp. pp. The cases of IUM and MJF demonstratethat MJF and IUM of cases The op. cit., op. In 1993 Babar Badar was released from jail deciding th deciding jail from released was Badar Babar 1993 In 157. ed by 15 senior commanders from the Jammu region. Sahni, Sahni, region. theJammu from commanders senior 15 by ed f commanders from Al Jihad, Al Umar Mujahideen and Muslim Mujahedin in his in Mujahedin Muslim and Mujahideen Umar Al Jihad, Al from commanders f -

pp. pp. - ese names include its military advisor Javed Ahmad Dar, senior leader Zubair Ahmad, chief chief Ahmad, Zubair leader senior Dar, Ahmad Javed advisor military its include names ese Din, chief commander Sheikh Abdul Aziz, acting chief Bilal Ahmad and Jammu area area Jammu and Ahmad Bilal chief acting Aziz, Abdul Sheikh commander chief Din, 92.

rival

oeet ae iey o eeo te ecpin f vulnerability. of perception the develop to likely are movements

op. cit., op. d sponsor, the rank and file of both organizations could not not could organizations both of file and rank the sponsor, d n side). n

pp. pp. 153. 311

But neither could Babar Badar hold the eroding the hold Badar Babar could neither But

310 decentralized organization decentralized Te e gop emd o obn the combine to seemed group new The . op. cit., op. 309 at MJF, with ISI’s blessing, is to to is blessing, ISI’s with MJF, at

However, “Al Jihad h Jihad “Al However,

pp. pp. developed a perception of of perception a developed 312 155

He was accompaniedwasHe – 156. s that are exposed exposed are that s

ing the steps the ing ,

he decided decided he ad never ad 149

CEU eTD Collection 314 4 313 widened, had client its and master the between gap the 1998, of As HM. and ISI the between Udhampur. 1996 of summer 313 in base time” more some recruitment for continued force by recruitment ISI’s though up, dried gradually Valley “the Kashmir result, a As murder. and rape loot, extortion, through locals corrup has AK47 the of power The valley. the in alienatedthe time had population calledculture” by that encouraged by Pakistan “Kalashnikov so the addition, In militants. of toll death highest the witnessed years these figures, government 1994 in momentum its lose to started had insurgency the P B. and t Pakistan. to obedient more be to and civilians the against violence out carry mercilessly to expected were commanders its of control survival vulnerabil –

5. Gurmeet Kanwal. 2002. 2002. Gurmeet Kanwal. i the revive To . Gurmeet Kanwal. 1999. 1999. Kanwal. Gurmeet

AKISTAN ANDAKISTAN heir toward Pakistan behavior inthe post The introduct The paramilitary, and counterinsurgency Indian the from pressure lethal growing the Amid Salahuddin in disappointed and Kashmiris, the of performance the with Dissatisfied , both organizations choseboth organizations This did not turn out to be so. I describe three movements in details in the next chapter, next the in details in threemovements Idescribe so. be to out turn not did This t ta i ms vsbe n uk Pre’ tsioy Cuh bten agtn and targeting between Caught testimony. Parrey’s Kukka in visible most is that ity 314

The aim was to destabilize thepreviouslyTheto destabilize aim was unaffected areas. .

T nsurgency he ISI opened a new front in the Jammu areas of Doda, Punch, Rajouri and Rajouri Punch, Doda, of areas Jammu the in front new a opened ISI he ion of foreign militants militants foreign of ion

F Pakistan’s Proxy War Proxy Pakistan’s Proxy War in Kashmir: Jehad or State or Jehad Kashmir: in War Proxy OREIGN

, by , ,

Pakistan began to introduce foreign militants into the valley the into militants foreign introduce to began Pakistan 2001 ISI ha ISI 2001

M to desert ILITANTS . New Delhi: Lancer Delhi: New . . d also

- mostly shifted its support to Pakistani to support its shifted mostly 2001 period. ted the militants who turned their guns against the against guns their turned who militants the ted

IN had an adverse consequence on the relationship the on consequence adverse an had

K ASHMIR - Sponsored Terrorism? Terrorism? Sponsored

Publishers & Distributors, &Distributors, Publishers

- 95 According 1995.

Strategic Analyses Strategic

pp. pp. o oe Indian some to 13. outfits

in the in

23(1): 23(1): who 150 ’s -

CEU eTD Collection 317 316 315 named being Afghani Khan Sajjad with commanders HUJI and HuM existing the by led was HuA too, IJK, In unit. PCK the of charge in was who Khan, Sadaatullah and Pakistan, of whole Khal Rahman Fazlur between divided Harkatul (HuM), Mujahedin Harkatul of merger the through 1993 late in born was Pakistan, of (HUA) Ansar Harkatul the direction” and control 1993, In outfit. active an to assigned be would they where Harkatul (HuM), Mujahedin Harkatul groups, militant capabilities. militants’ bolster Ansar Harkatul Defiance of s Pakistan’snext orders.In the they though even organiz whic locals the of harassment and killings looting, Mujahideen” of commanders as mercenaries foreign and “appoi ISI the proxies, its between wedge a draw To Army. Indian the fighting in effectiveness greater of pretext the under HM than resources and space more given militants, foreign the with helm. HM the from Salahuddin of overthrow the for support ISI’s in resulting

Sahni, Ibid Chief. Sacks Hizbul ISI , pp. pp. Foreign militants, mostly from Afghanistan, were introduced to J&K by J&K to introduced were Afghanistan, from mostly militants, Foreign mujahidee the areas, some In ation. op. cit., op. 20.

316

pp. pp. . Moreover, these foreigner outfits, known as known outfits, foreigner these Moreover, . 136. had

317 many Pakistanis in their ranks, the mujahideen were often disobedient of of disobedient often were mujahideen the ranks, their in Pakistanis many Tribune

over these militants and combined and militants these over

such - e . 31 January 1998, 1, January31 1998, .

- The ection Iection Ansar. such movement, present one Harkatul Jihad

s Lashkar as Afghan fighters were usually dispatched by the Af the by dispatched usually were fighters Afghan - Islami (HUJI) and Jamaatul Mujahedin. The leadership was was leadership The Mujahedin. Jamaatul and (HUJI) Islami l te ed f h HM wo edd h HM o the for HUM the headed who HUM, the of head the il, n also clashed with HM’s local commanders. But, But, commanders. local HM’s with clashed also n - e

- pp. 1. pp. several insurgent groups, especially the Hizbul Hizbul the especially groups, insurgent several ab ad Harkat and Taiba

dmgd Ms euain s indigenous as reputation HM’s damaged h - e - Jihad the the

them into a single front. As a result, a As front. single a into them mujahidee ISI decided “they wanted a better better a wanted “they decided ISI - Islami (HUJI), to (HUJI), Islami - ul - Ansar, was that they were were they that was Ansar, n nted Pakistani militants Pakistani nted , were also engaged in engaged also were ,

315 in 1991 in

the

The proble The

ghan PCK from from PCK

- 1992 to 1992 - based based 151 m

CEU eTD Collection 321 320 319 http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/691/currentpage/35/ 318 regiment, Srinagar a on attack frontal a through comrade his free to tried Afghani him. free to caught was Langrial brothershisof thatone out Afghani ISI’sfound When approval. Srinagarwithout in actions reckless of series a on embarked Afghani as known Khan Shadid Sajjad commander discipline their ground. the on policies Pakistan’s defy to seeking autonomy, of perception the develop should it reach, J&K. in operations leading of charge in is who over HUJI, of leader Sheikh, Mehrajuddin with differences serious developed only Ahangar outfit, nascent the consolidating of Instead HuA. of Commander Chief a as over took HuM, of misappropriation. fund of other each accusing f jihadi big other as organized org well not as “considered were HUJI and HuM predecessors, Kashmiris”. be are but unknown, Arab well. as and war Afghan Afghan the of included veterans but Kashmiris, and Pakistanis mostly militants, 300 numbered Amjad and commander chief actionalized

Ibid. Santhanam Rana, anizations”

Indeed, HuA’s factionalzied structure affected its its affected structure factionalzied HuA’s Indeed, its and HuA Both J&K. in organization centralized a achieved never had HuA The op. cit., op.

B. Raman. Harkatul Mujahideen Mujahideen Harkatul Raman. B. 318 et al et

between the HuM and HUJI. Their chiefs frequently clashed over authority authority over clashed frequently chiefs Their HUJI. and HuM the between 319 pp. pp.

., and I fc, vr ic is neto i 19, u’ laesi hd been had leadership HuA’s 1993, in inception its since ever fact, In . op. cit. op. 249.

lieved to come from sympathetic Arab countries and wealthy Pakistanis and Pakistanis wealthy and countries Arab sympathetic from come to lieved by the Indian army, he did not wait for approval from either the HuA or ISI or HuA the either from approval for wait not did he army, Indian the by

raig headache creating , pp. pp.

102. 102.

Bilal deputy chief commander. At the moment of inception, HuA inception, of moment the At commander. chief deputy Bilal

“ h suc ad mut f U’ mltr fnig are funding military HUA’s of amount and source The fr h II I mid In ISI. the for s 321

Given that HuA’s rank HuA’s that Given 320

In January 1994, Aijaz Ahmad Ahangar, c Ahangar, Ahmad Aijaz 1994, January In Default.aspx. field commanders in J&K in commanders field - aur, h mi HA valley HuA main the January,

– and file was outside ISI’s outside was file and

An Update. Update. An - in - , arms named named arms

weakening hief 152

CEU eTD Collection 324 323 322 blam to India for harder it make to Faran Al labeled organization front a form would HuA HuA time, and This Ghar. ISI Operation the out hammered Langrial, and Afghani Azhar, free to Determined government. Pakistani embass Western the after hostages the released They days. seventeen another for Britons the held crew his and Sikander refused, side Indian inmates. HuA other of number a and Langrial Afghani, Azhar, release government immediat Sikander 1994. June in Mackey, David and Housego Kim nationals, British two kidnapped Sikander commander by led HuA of branch Kashmiri Azhar and Afghani release ISI themtogether. onlythat holds being the spring the other, each from autonomously acted and divided deeply remained leaders HUJI and HuM blo major adealt commander onenumber the and leader senior the was of detention The Azhar Afghani. with together Srinagar police Indian the to by apprehended landing upon However, J&K. to 1994 February early in ISI by sent m the and Bahawalpur from cleric skillful a Azhar, Masood necessary tosend insomebody rank undisciplined m file. toreign and inthe senior Afghani’s for leadership its scolded HuA for responsible hiding into went and officer exchange. Langrial. held which

Rana, Ibid. Scott Cathy LevyAdrianand

rvkdb h Indian the by Provoked Maulana movement, the within tensions operative and organizational these up patch To op. cit op. 323

., But the Indian army would not budge. Furious, Afghani finally executed the Indian the executed finally Afghani Furious, budge. not would army Indian the But pp. pp. 264. 322

After this attempt failed, Afghani kidnapped an Indian major h major Indian an kidnapped Afghani failed, attempt this After

- Clark. 2012. 2012. Clark. – ,

leading his unit to dissipate in the wilderness. The ISI officer officer ISI The wilderness. the in dissipate to unit his leading hog kdapns Eupe ad ntutd y h II the ISI, the by instructed and Equipped kidnappings. through action The Meadow The , the HuA leadership now sough now leadership HuA the , e Pakistan for abductions. Al Faran comprised 24 24 comprised Faran Al abductions. for Pakistan e w to ISI’s attempt to consolidate HuA in the valley. valley. the in HuAconsolidate to ISI’sattempt to w . London and New Delhi: Penguin Books, Books, Penguin Delhi: LondonNew . and 324 e mutd sgiiat rsue n the on pressure significant a mounted ies

ovement’s Secretary General was was General Secretary ovement’s seair n dcdd t was it decided and isbehavior l dmne ta te Indian the that demanded ely t a more radical way to to way radical more a t

pp. pp. When 49. oping for oping

153 the the -

CEU eTD Collection 328 at: 327 326 325 Norway. from Ostrø Christian Hans and Germany; from Hasert Dirk Hutchings; Donald tourists western which HuA’s faced f problems with that meant also organization volatile In Pakistan. turn,this and Faran backto report Al whowouldthere official oversee nosenior was ascommand of chainweakened likewise the it deniabilityplausible but leadershipachieved HuA tw the to operation the Subcontracting Pakistan. in leadership group’s official were independently, off.” cut funding operate to continue could HuA meant support of means other t jihad, Kashmir the for service intelligence Pakistani the from funding received it While Pakistan. inside existed that infrastructure Deobandi wider the of “elements to connections on relied commanders (b) fac and condition; general more a as resources alternative (a) this: for dispatched nearby for J&K, to south potentialtargets. Anantnag,tofish operation the of charge in put were essence In demands. their in fold to India on pressure greater a exert reasoned, they would, this as engineers foreign Al that decided was it 1995 early In Pakistanis. mostly members

Alexander Evans. 2000. 2000. Evans. Alexander Devadas, October interviews Various http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm. tionalized Country Reports on Terrorism 2010. U.S. Department of State, 2010. Available Available 2010. State, of Department U.S. 2010. Terrorism on Reports Country In July 1995, Al Faran already diverged from the previous plan by kidnapping six six kidnapping by plan previous the from diverged already Faran Al 1995, July In t a be to out turn would HuA The op. cit., op.

structure – 328

pp. pp.

Keith Mangan and Paul Wells from the UK; two UK; the from Wells Paul and Mangan Keith

Second, Second, 206. , Al ,

Kashmiri Separatists

alternative financia alternative

n te ak f oto oe Al over control of lack the and - Faran was different from HuA but in name. in but HuA from different was Faran Dec both ember 2012, Delhi. 2012, ember

Sikander and Turk enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the from autonomy of degree high a enjoyed Turk and Sikander actionalized l aa ejyd hg dge o atnm fo ISI, from autonomy of degree high a enjoyed Faran Al – -

The Harkat ul ul Harkat The errible choice for this operation. There are two reasons two are There operation. this for choice errible oamd iadr n Adl ai Turk Hamid Abdul and Sikander Mohammad l sources outside sources l

status. Ansar,

Monter

Pakistan, - Faran commanders. First, HuA HuA First, commanders. Faran ey Institute. ey

- Ame Faran should kidnap some some kidnap should Faran 326 325

o field commanders, the the commanders, field o

and enjoyed formidable enjoyed and Two HuA commanders HuA Two ricans

n particular, in , John Childs John ,

HuA’s Childs Childs –

hese

and and and 154 327

CEU eTD Collection day. this mystery to the remains hostages the of place resting the as well as executioners of identity The literature. the by corroborated not is t militias these used GOI that argue They GOI. by supported militias local to Faran Al by over handed eventually were hostages the that 331 330 “anti wasbecoming tatters in movement the time thatthat at 329 Under exit. unclearcircumstances, hostages inDecember Al were the executed Faran’s 1995 despite safe a for return in hostages the over hand would they that known be it let They not could Faran’s Al blocked. be soon would Pakistan to roads all coming winter the With hostages. the kill to threatened Faran Al Outraged, press. the to leaked deal this But money. for hostages remaining only own advantage. its to cruelty Faran’s Al exploit would Delhi New that aware were who patrons Pakistani his by acti Turk’s that suggesteven authorsOther action. an such support not ISIdid moderation. for calls of defiance in Ostrø of decapitation facti itself Faran Al that appears It 1995. August mid in Turk by beheaded was Ostrø after Faran Al of condemnation massive a by reinforced Kashmir’s pro All and JI of leader the Gilani, S.A.S as such leaders separatist Kashmiri the from even pressure serious under came group the passed dema first whereas abductors, his escape to managed

Levy and Scott Levyand After undertaking a systematic field work, journalists Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott Cathy and Levy Adrian journalists work, field systematic a undertaking After Levy and Scott and Levy on leaning toward a compromise with India and the Turk faction, carrying out the the out carrying faction, Turk the and India with compromise a toward leaning on four By October, Al Faran moderated its stance its moderated Faran Al October, By

dd h raes o Ahr n twenty and Azhar of realease the nded ebr. n sbeun bat subsequent a In members. - - separatist parti separatist - 330 Clark, Clark, o execute the hostages on 13 December 1995 in order to put the blame on Pakistan. This finding finding This Pakistan. on blame the put to order in 1995 December 13 on hostages the execute o

afford another blunder and its leaders searched for a way out of the impasse. the of out way a for searched leaders its and blunder another afford

op op . . cit cit

. . This is also in line with a testimony by one of the militants involved, who claimed claimed who involved, militants the of one by testimony a with line in also is This .

es) and militants such ases) HMtorelease andsuch was hostages. militants pressure This

- at Hria Cneec (mrla raiain of organization (umbrella Conference Hurriyat Party l o nre, h mvmn are t rlae the release to agreed movement the nerves, of tle Ostrø was taken hostage after that incident. Al Faran Al incident. that after hostage taken was Ostrø became - , Pakistani”. Joshi, Joshi, Pakistani”.

demanding other HuA members. However, as the time time the as However, members. HuA other

fractured by that time between Sikander’s between time that by fractured 329

All of my interviewees suggest that suggest interviewees my of All

that op. cit. op.

India release release India , - pp. pp. Clark came to the conclusion conclusion the to came Clark 282 on was condemned was on .

fifteen

and later later and fold. 331 155

CEU eTD Collection Pakista by sponsored been ever have wasthis thecase. not was leadership its since organization Al of most and Pakistani, reliable a be to HuA ethnicity expect common would the one to explanation according composition: ethnic HuA the from stems shortcoming well the regarding command ISI’s defied Sikandar not and Turk why reader the convincing of short runs assumption this However, ISI. to loyal be not should particular, power predictive some may have ethnicity Common chain. command the in actors key of motives and timing the for account to fail they but orders defy a created this Consequently, instructions. ISI to ear deaf a turned apparently faction Turk The two. into fragmented also but goals operational prior the from diverged only not Faran Al ground, the on Wi Ghar. Operation in leeway a much too given been had Turki and Sikander commanders. its sanction and monitor could which organization centralized a build to leadership HuA inabilityof the with rests reason the that suggests evidence Al did Why hostages. the release to calls the and execution Norwegian’s change ISI’s FavoriteISI’s

Jaish Al by executed were hostages the Whether the fact that the group defied Pakistan’s orders, particularly in the case of the the of case the in particularly orders, Pakistan’s defied group the that fact the

backlash iadr a Ksmr, hl Tr hie fo Agaitn ugsig ht they that suggesting Afghanistan from hailed Turk while Kashmiri, was Sikandar - e - Moh Goes Rogue against Pakistan. Alternative resources broadly factor in HuA capability to to capability HuA in factor broadly resources Alternative Pakistan. against a m

mad (JeM) was one of the deadliest Kashmiri militant militant Kashmiri deadliest the of one was (JeM) mad - Faran’s operatives were also fro also were operatives Faran’s : How Jaish : How n. Formed on the ruptures of Harkatul Ansar/Mujahideen, Harkatul of ruptures the on Formed n. - e - Moham th the authority to make autonomous decisions autonomous make to authority the th - ma aa o a pro a or Faran d Turned Against Against Turned d Pakistan m Pakistan. Yet, it is obvious now thatnow obvious is it Yet, Pakistan. m regarding - being - ni prmltr de not does paramilitary India

Al Faran’s commanders.Faran’s Al - of the tourists. Another tourists. the of Fa ran defy orders? The orders? defy ran organizations

that that 156

CEU eTD Collection 335 Sharpe, E. 334 Lashkar of 333 Story The Stage: World Press, the University Columbia NewYork: Storming 2011. Tankel. Stephen foundation”. ideological weak of ownership the over skirmishes some Rana, still martyrs. are There inventory. and offices lost the for HuM to money pledging Afghanistan and Pakistan in shootouts to led This cadres. from JeM Punjab in offices its of some retake to tried operatives HuM property. over intoconflict 332 of sort any to hostile be to appeared JeM orders. sponsor’s “foreign”with pan jihadi groups m JeM make would ethnicity shared that believed ISI The corps. military Pakistan’s of core the hails which from region the Punjab, three Approximately status. preferential power. growing LeT’s S proxies. favored Pakistan’s with al trained were members JeM of hundreds Reportedly, establ leadership the theater, Afghan the in involved was JeM Since commanders. autonomous rather and HuM, organization, parent former its with membership overlapping an retained JeM fact, in prison Indian from exchang freed in 1999 was December he after Azhur Maulana by headed was JeM Nominally, organization. centralized and cohesive a establish to managed never leadership central the

Farzana Shaikh. 2009. 2009. Shaikh. Farzana Hussain, In fact, the fact, In Hassan Abbas. 2005. 2005. Abbas. Hassan se te t te aea ad Al and Taleban the to ties ished - oee, t s rcsl Pakistani precisely is it However, Al from support and nature decentralized its Despite Qaeda

pp. pp. op. cit., op.

separation from HuM and the establishment of JeM had violent repercussions. The two got embroiled embroiled got two The repercussions. violent had JeM of establishment the and HuM from separation 214. eea o Ahrs ls fml mmes okd n h Tlbn oenet and government Taleban the in worked members family close Azhar’s of several op ” 333 .

cit., pp. pp. .

66 pp. pp. Pakistan’s Drif Pakistan’s Making Sense of Pakistan of Sense Making

334 220

– h ehi cmoiin f e w JeM of composition ethnic The 2.SehnTne ntsta e ws “(… was JeM that notes Tankel Stephen 221. e for 185 passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines Flight 814. In 814. Flight Airlines Indian hijacked the of passengers 185 for e ome argue that the ISI sponsored JeM’s creation in order to check check to order in creation JeM’s sponsored ISI the that argue ome

- where HuM had bases. The fight ended when Usama bin Laden intervened intervened Laden bin Usama when ended fight The bases. had HuM where pp. pp. Islamic agendas. t into Extremism: Extremism: into t 123. ore obedient to the military’s objectives in Kashmir than than Kashmir in objectives military’s the to obedient ore

- quarters of JeM’s members were Pakistani from North North from Pakistani were members JeM’s of quarters - “ ad, hc poie JM ih aeil support. material with JeM provided which Qaeda, in camps camps in . New York, Columbia: Columbia University Press, Press, University Columbia NewColumbia: . York, outfit Allah, then Army, and America's War Terror War America's and Army, then Allah, s 335 such

Afghanistan, bringing them into con into them bringing Afghanistan, s e ta wr ms dfat f their of defiant most were that JeM as - Qaeda, s h adtoa rao fr its for reason additional the as Pakistani ) organizationally fractious, with a with fractious, organizationally ) JeM JeM quickly became on became quickly - supported negotiated negotiated supported , pp. pp. London: M. M. London: - 175. e - Taiba. Taiba. e of e

tact tact 157 332

CEU eTD Collection these Under USA. the with alliance Musharraf’s by enraged were followers JeM many Taleban Qaeda, the to links close to Due cause. their to traitor a as President the perceived U Musharraf’s disliked members the of most But attacks. the in involved were who do. could he little Pakistani governmenta “terrorist action”. as the by framed was event the 9/11, after week a than less place Taking organizations. militant shut to pressure international strong under government Musharraf the put and fighters freedom as militants portray to efforts Pakistan’s undermined attack The people. eight thirty and A Legislative the into thirty killed which Kashmir, Indian of center Srinagar, in assembly legislative Kashmir the on attack suicide 200 1, October On policies. patron’s their with dissatisfaction their demonstrate to decided hawks The file. and rank hawkish the and leadership moderate a between squabbles internal organization’s the by fueled was regime military the and conf The regime. Musharraf the with course collision a on set was JeM 2001, October By LeT. also but JeM HuM, included These them. to ties close had that organizations Mush US the of wake the in militants Kashmiri for support of policy its modified Pakistan after intensified situation This compromise. to uneager was JeM of file and rank the Pakistan. in connections Deobandi its and Afghanistan from resources material alternative muster to able and decentralized more rigidity ideological LeT’s Unlike India. with settlement arraf’s decision to align with Washington against the Taleban and Al and Taleban the against Washington with align to decision arraf’s Even though his ISI backers urged Azhar to rein in the rank and file of JeM there was was there JeM of file and rank the in rein to Azhar urged backers ISI his though Even

To avoid detention, Maulana Azhar reportedly expelled some of those activists those of some expelled reportedly Azhar Maulana detention, avoid To sml uligi Siaa, Indian Srinagar, in building ssembly - one people. A Jaish operative drove a truck armed with explosives with armed truck a drove operative Jaish A people. one

Even if Azhar re Azhar if Even

, hnfl f e oeaie crid u a out carried operatives JeM of handful a 1, f rained from undermining from rained , JeM JeM , - controlled Kashmir, killing himself killing Kashmir, controlled was less ideologically electrified, ideologically less was - Qaeda angered those angered Qaeda - led “war on terror”. terror”. on “war led

the lict between JeM JeM between lict

peace process, peace - administered

- down the down turn and and turn n Al and 158 -

CEU eTD Collection Delhi. 2012, 23, October Swami, 340 http://www.economist.com/node/917228. 339 http://www.hindu.com/2004/03/07/stories/2004030703320900.htm. 338 337 336 is this whether Regrettably, that suggests officer intelligence international criticism. belli India give would move this that knew he as consequences its by enraged and operation the who General ISI an India from in organizations rebel managed approval unilateral given was operation the that suggests attack involvement. state any denying while attack the behind Delhi. off caught was leadership central JeM’s that evidence operation. clear suicide no the sanctioned is there guilty, all them found and JeM Azhar. on pressure put ISI the personnel the Ministry of gate main 2001 December 13 On war. of brink the to Pakistan and India bring would that fashion defiant more a in act to decided members JeM of faction a circumstances,

Muhammad Amir Rana. 2001. AmirRana. 2001. Muhammad Hussain, Interview, former senior intelligence officer (name withheld), October 18, 2012, Delhi; Interview, Praveen Praveen Interview, Delhi; 2012, 18, October withheld), (name officer intelligence senior former Interview, . uaihr ed, Jais Reddy, Muralidhar B.

h Wl Srk First? Strike Will Who n dlgtmz te ahii rus e a mtclul tyn t sil from shield to trying meticulously was he groups Kashmiri the delegitimize and 337 Altho JeM

and h fre II chief ISI former The op. cit., op. shot back at backshot the

immediately

ugh Musharraf may not have not may Musharraf ugh Parliament

pp. pp. 67. 339

aes ad pnd ie s hy o ot f h vehicle. the of out got they as fire opened and labels,

Parliam claimed responsibility for the attack but removed it the next day after after day next the it removed but attack the for responsibility claimed gunmen -

ur we i hpee a te algdy et o iso t New to mission no sent allegedly they as happened it when guard a A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan in Organizations Jehadi Z of to A Bhn Primn Atc: ex Attack: Parliament Behind h

case of defiance can only be coded coded be only can defiance of case 336 ,

t General Lt. Even though Even car a in Delhi New in House ent

killing infiltrators all ofthe To The Economist, Economist, The the - controlled

h cnrr, oe nie sucs vn li ta the that claim even sources insider some contrary, the

S ws novd n t pann ad execution. and planning its in involved was ISI

directly authorized this authorized directly

ae Ashraf Javed

the Kashmir. Musharraf was supposedly unaware of unaware supposedly wasMusharraf Kashmir.

Indian authorities put on trial four members of members four trial on put authorities Indian 22 December, 2001, available online: online: available 2001, December, 22

338 -

I One journalist One ho Qazi, SI chief, chief, SI .

. Lahore: Mashal Books, Books, Lahore: Mashal . ex post ex

operation, the go the operation,

fi ee, lee ta JM is JeM that alleges wever, The Hindu, Hindu, The ve . And in this in And .

armed men armed who investigated the investigated who March March

with - The ahead by an an by ahead pp. pp.

entered respect the the respect leadership 234.

security security 7 ,

Home Home casus casus

2004,

159 the 340

CEU eTD Collection online: available 2002, May, 341 released a byorder ajust few court after arrest. months his was Azhar prohibition. official of months of couple a after only resumed was JeM to support Harkat Pasban became activities their continue to encouraged were groups in Kashmir. policy jihadi its of abandonment Pakistan’s marked seemingly which speech, subsequent wi accomplice,was its LeT,groups. togetherthree banned “No with and radicalparty more infuture organization the 2002, 12, January On India. to over him hand to refused authorities Pakistani was JeM, of leader the Azhana, Masood Maulana December. in transactions financial JeM’s all prohibited and suit followed take to regime Musharraf concrete OnOct stepsagainst JeM. the pressuring began officials US escalation, dangerous a about the since the along armies border. their mobilized countries two the and militants Kashmiri supporting stop Islamabad that demanded India attack, the after Soon Musharraf. for costly be to proved incident

ll be allowed to be identified with words like Jaish, Lashkar or Sipah,” warned Musharraf in a in Musharraf warned Sipah,” or Lashkar Jaish, like words with identified be to allowed be ll Rorry McCarthy. McCarthy. Rorry - Indeed Indo The ul India

1971 Indo 1971 -

uaien hne is ae o ait ul Jamiat to name its changed Mujahideen Peiet uhra sae tu t hs rms ad all and promise his to true stayed Musharraf President , sent - e - Dange aitn tnin a de was tension Pakistani

- Ahl ros o ahi ad ujb in Punjab and Kashmir to troops - Pakistani War. War. Pakistani rous Game of State of Game rous - e http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/25/pakistan.india. -

aih Jaish Hadith,

shortly afterwards placed under house arrest even though the the though even arrest house under placed afterwards shortly ober 12, the US governmentoberUS froze theaccounts 12, ofJeM. the As a response, Pakistan also mobilized its troops its mobilized also Pakistan response, a As - Sponsored Terror that Threatens Nuclear Conflict. Conflict. Nuclear Threatens that Terror Sponsored - e - oamd aee isl Khuddam itself labeled Mohammad - saae ol atr rsdn Pre Musharraf Pervez President after only escalated

albeit t m its - Ans

under new banners. Lashkar banners. new under s significant ost ar. The financial and intelligence intelligence and financial The ar.

f h bne militant banned the of

iiay mobilization military

- The Guardian The ul - . Islam, and and Islam, 341

- Worried e

- Taiba Taiba . 25 . 160

CEU eTD Collection Hurst&Company, 345 344 Security, International 343 the organization. of the detriment to enrichment personal and ofnepotism Azhar membersaccused Wish. Death 2003. Abbas. Azmat Azhar”. and Jabbar between conflict of source primary the was finances of distribution the that claim sources “Jaish money. over quarrels ignited 342 a convened Jabbar Abdul meetin Maulana leaders, factional the of One Afghanistan. of invasion US the of eve the on 2001 November in planned were bombings suicide the that revealed temples, Christian targeting by Pakistan throughout sectarianism up stirred Taliban the of fall the after Afghanistan from returning activists JeM officials. state targeting Bahawalpur and Taxila Murree, Karachi, leadership. group’s the of guidance the to opposition in Pakistan of government “slave” the against jihad by Backed Pakistan across attacks terrorist of series a launching byIslamabad on influence US increasing the and ban the against retaliate to decided irritat Particularly outfit his instructions. GOP with compliance of favor Pakista in shift the toward violently react and opportunity, of perception the develop should JeM Pakistan within located organization the seized, assets financial its and banned

Anatol Lieven. 2011. 2011. Lieven. Anatol Pakistan perhaps opened Pandora’s box with the seizure of JeM’s financial asse financial JeM’s of seizure the with box Pandora’s opened perhaps Pakistan ee Cak n C Crsie ar Te Re The Fair, Christine C. and Chalk Peter Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy. Roy. Olivier and Zahab Abou Mariam g at the Balakot training camp in Pakistan. The participants were gathered around a so a around gathered were participants The Pakistan. in camp training Balakot the at g From March to September 2002 the first suic first the 2002 September to March From Aft control. its beyond monster a created already had Pakistan But

s h aoiy fmmeso h e SpeeCucldmne i resignation. his demanded Council Supreme JeM the of members of majority the as 344 O

sama bin sama pp. pp. ed by Pakistan’s U Pakistan’s by ed

31. Terrorism Monitor Terrorism diplomatic missions and Shia mosques. Shia and missions diplomatic Pakistan: A Hard Country Hard A Pakistan:

- Laden, the rank and file of financially impoverished JeM pressed for a a for pressed JeM impoverished financially of file and rank the Laden,

, 17 Nov 17 , - turn was a JeM faction led by Maulana Abdul Jabbar who who Jabbar Abdul Maulana by led faction JeM a was turn 342

- against sait ewrs h Afghan The Networks Islamist the factionalism within the movement intensified. movement the within factionalism the n’s policy after 2001. after policy n’s Orientation of Kashmiri Extremism: A Threat to Regional and and Regional to Threat A Extremism: Kashmiri of Orientation ember, 2005, 2005, ember, . New York: Public Affairs, Public New . York: 343

western nationals, Christians and Christians nationals, western y 2002 y Herald ide missions were carried out in Islamabad, in out carried were missions ide 3(22): 3(22): 8 , h , owever

(Karachi), July 2003. Jabbar along with along Jabbar 2003. July (Karachi), 345 – 10, at 10,

The arrested Jaish members later members Jaish arrested The

Masood Azhar was seemingly in seemingly was Azhar Masood , pp. pp. pp. pp.

Azhar had lost support within support lost had Azhar - 225. 9. aitn Connection Pakistan ts because the lack of resources resources of lack the because ts

er JeM was officially officially was JeM er

Shia Muslims. Shia London: .

With

other other - 161 led led -

CEU eTD Collection Source: identity. ass be and organization single a as operate to continued JeM split, the Despite Jabbar. Abdul 351 350 349 348 Brigade, Militant The Abbas, terrorist”. 347 346 atta deadlier for pad Jamaat called JeM within faction late a launched Jabbar 2002, In cause. jihadi the of betrayal a as move his saw who commanders Azhar’s of bulk the personal US of targeting the stop to power On Pakistan across grounds training and offices money, authority, over parent their with compete factions. Supreme Councilhad distancedOnethemwas him. ofquoted from saying: support the lost had Azhar Masood 2002 regroup” to allowed being of instead arrested be should who terrorists sectarian no was he and M However, operations. influenceIslamabad Pakistan. within means on through militant includingsuicide bombings Lashkar Taiba, Pakistani of members were and 313” “Brigade called

Abbas, The Militant Brigade, Militant Brigade, The Abbas, 2005. Rohit Honawar. Mir, Rana, Ibid y 03 JM a slt no h Kudm ul Khuddam the into split had JeM 2003, By

n hn, aod za cvd in caved Azhar Masood hand, one , op. cit. op. pp. pp. As a result of this internal turmoil, JeM JeM turmoil, internal this of result a As his and Azhar agencies we are not ready to sacrifice jihad for the sake of funds. Unlike Kashmir. occupied the liberate to jihad of cause the from deviated he that was Azhar with difference main Our Jabbar’s stop and Jaish of file and rank the in reign Azhar Masood demanded ISI The op. cit op. 349 26. Azhar also tried to distance from Maulana Jabbar and his faction by depicting him as a “sectarian “sectarian a as him depicting by faction his and Jabbar Maulana from distance to tried also Azhar 26.

ahr hn pitn t fr ter w organizations, own their form to splitting than Rather

Honawar pp. pp. longer - e - 20. 20. Jhangvi and Harkatul and Jhangvi

k aant h Pksai government. Pakistani the against cks

Jaish , op. cit op. , responsible for their actions. Azhar wrote that “the expelled members were members expelled “the that wrote Azhar actions. their for responsible asood Azhar informed the ISI that he had nothing had he that ISI the informed Azhar asood

- e - pp. pp. Mohammed. IPCS Special Report, No. Report, Special IPCS Mohammed. . , at ,

60. pp. pp.

pp. pp. 1. 1. 60. 60.

Mujahideen. to within the group: seven out of ten members of the JeM JeM the of members ten of out seven group: the within - sa (u) ld y za ad aat ul Jamaat and Azhar by led (KuI), Islam

in Pakistan. in S pesrs n poie t d eeyhn i his in everything do to promised and pressures ISI a egle i tr war turf in engulfed was 346 atr i te aitn intelligence Pakistani the in masters

350 They decided to resist the inc the resist to decided They - pnoe ognztos s Lashkar as organizations sponsored -

ul On the other the On 351 - 4, 4, 1 Furqaan which became a launching launching a became which Furqaan

oe aitn mltr sources military Pakistani Some – 7,at 348

pp. pp. hs fcin cniud to continued factions these

2. hand

to do with this outfit this with do to , this move angered move this , ociated with its original original its with ociated - Furqan (JUF), led by by led (JUF), Furqan

347 between various various between . Allegedly, by Allegedly, reasing US reasing

162 - e - .

CEU eTD Collection 354 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm. 353 352 explo install to able were hitmen the military, is bridge the Although Pakistan. Rawalpindi, in bridge a crossed motorcade guarded highly Musharraf’s President after exploded Decem on occurred first The Musharraf. President against attempts government’s was it onlya wraith; warning issued list. watch and placed onthe to support Al “logistical fugitive movement’s the about concerned be to seemed Washington because Hizb Khudam (alias JeM Harkat banned government Musharraf the 2003, November 15 On inv harsher against thePakistani President Musharraf. f two to support logistical provided officers ISI renegade the organizations militant other from members and leaders factional JeM’s of group a with Together ISI. the of members “rogue” from factions competing to support the by exacerbated further was and Pakistan to adherence Azhar’s opposed violently that factions competing many of battleground a become had JeM faction, Jabbar’s besides that assert

Mir, Mir, Rana, Syed Shoaib Hasan. Profile: Islamabad's Red Mosque. Mosque. Red Islamabad's Profile: Hasan. Shoaib Syed - ul op. cit., op. - Less than a month after the second ban a group of militants carried militants of group a ban second the after month a than Less The ul - op. cit. op. Tehrir. Of all these groups, JeM received the harshest treatment by the security forces forces security the by treatment harshest the received JeM groups, these all Of Tehrir. - Mujahideen (alias Jamiat (alias Mujahideen olving the arrest of militant leaders, seizure of offices and freezing of bank accounts. accounts. bank of freezing and offices of seizure leaders, militant of arrest the olving - pre ad ad aia leaders” Taliban and Qaeda

pp. pp. , pp. pp. lude to these assassination attempts was marked by a second round of repression of round second a by marked was attempts assassination these to lude 47. 27.

- 353 based militant groups. While the first round was mild, the second was much much thesecondwas was roundmild, thefirst groups. While militant based

- nearby ul - Ansar),Jamaat

354 Musharraf’s Musharraf’s I cnrs, e hd m had LeT contrast, In . sives to the pylons below it. The second attack attack second The it. below pylons the to sives - ul BBC News. News. BBC - residence Furqan (sister organization o organization (sister Furqan the ailed assassination attempts against attempts assassination ailed ISI. 352

7 uy 20, vial online: available 2007, July, 27 and heavily guarded by the the by guarded heavily and ber 14, 2003, when a bomb a when 2003, 14, ber

The organizational disa organizational The ngd o sae the escape to anaged

out

two assassination two f JeM) and JeM) f - ul - Islam), rray 163

CEU eTD Collection 357 Asia. Central and Afghanistan, 356 http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2004/01/dangerous 355 Maulana said Hussain, Yousaf spokesperson, JeM As misbehavior. for organization the from expelled been had who renegades ea his repeated Masood However, organization. militant the against evidence enough was there that claimed officials GOP. leader Asvoiced byoftheassassination ainthe aftermath militant attempts: their put to eager not were organizations militant other and JeM in Many regime. Musharraf the with confrontation a into escalated has Kashmir camp thePakistani t in The attacks the in involved were military the within elements that suggesting time, given any at of which andtravelsMusharraf’s of timing androute the Taliban. the with fought also who HUJI from was other The Afghanistan. in Taliban the alongside fought who Kashmir, Azad from JeM the convoy car drove bombers suicide two when 2003, 25, December on occurred

Ibid Ahmed Rashid Ahmed investigation also revealed also investigation . Zahid Hussain, Dangerous Liasons, Liasons, Dangerous Hussain, Zahid

. The GOP immediately took action against JeM and interrogated its top circle. The The circle. top its interrogated and JeM against action took immediately GOP The quietly. friends, many so str Kashmir lost the in have relatives and Webrothers natural. is policies his and Musharraf towards anger The toward policy GOP’s in change the with Islamists of dissatisfaction growing The One discovered. soon were bombers suicide two the of identities The Both

attacks 357 . 2008. 2008. .

failed to kill tokill failed Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building Nation of Failure the and States United The Chaos: into Descent ribal area Waziristan ofSouth

le cam ht hs ivle i te sasnto atmt were attempts assassination the in involved those that claim rlier New York: Viking, pp. 230 pp. New Viking, York:

that that the President. “ the explosives used in the attacks came from an al an from came attacks the in used explosives the uggle. What was that for? We are not going to sit to going not are We for? that was What uggle. - liaisons/. liaisons/. “

Since only a minority of military officers knew knew officers military of minority a only Since - 232. esie Magazine Newsline

arms down, even if that meant war with war meant that if even down, arms ”

356

several identical cars he would be using using be would carshe identical several , 18 January, 2004, 2004, January, 18 ,

bombs into Musharraf’s Musharraf’s into bombs

was a member of of member a was

in Pakis in - Qaeda Qaeda ”

tan, tan, 355 164 the .

CEU eTD Collection http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp 359 358 to support provided (CIA) Agency Intelligence Central U.S. the and ISI both and Initially, pictures. cinema television, forbids that Islam Sunni of version puritanical a Pakistan, in thought Wahhabi the spread to and Union Soviet the against resistance Afghan the in participate to Iqbal Zafar and Saeed Muhammad Hafiz professors, engineering Pakistani A Monsterof Was: TheLoyalty that Never as acounts onJeM strategicasset inJ&K. GOP the state, the on attacks previous its despite Thus, cadres. “problematic” from purged been the from permission personal. thousand several and fighters active thousand two and one between have may outfit The Azhar. under leadership consolidated more a and attacks was arrested. not assasination, Musharraf’s for called publicly had who Azhar, Even leaders. militant of arrests nor 2003, in those to similar crackdowns mass no were There m life. his at whose attempts in groups involved militant other against action the However, no death. took to government sentenced Musharraf and guilty found even were some and interrogated, and than More apparatus.

Rana, Hassan Abbas, Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, Network, Taliban Punjabi the Defining Abbas, Hassan n 96 Markaz 1986 In in fallen largely has JeM 2004, of As sec the of members and militants some on down clamped eventually GOP The Pakistanin avengeto the of fall the interests US the against missions suicide out carry to adamant were dissidents The group. eventually leaders other and Jabbar Abdul Maulana of expulsions The op. cit. op. , pp. pp.

25.

ISI to resume operations against the Indian forces after the leadership has has leadership the after forces Indian the against operations resume to ISI one - content/uploads/2010/06/ -

Dawa

ude mltr ad nelgne mlye hd en apprehended been had employees intelligence and military hundred

- ul - Irshad (Center for Preaching, MDI) was founded by two two by founded was MDI) Preaching, for (Center Irshad

Taliban regime Afghanistan in

to obscurity. In 2009, it resurfaced with new suicide suicide new with resurfaced it 2009, In obscurity. to Vol2Iss4

Lashkar T Sentinel CTC - Art1.pdf. - e - Taiba

359

, April 2009, 4(2), available online: online: available 4(2), 2009, April , t per ta JM a given was JeM that appears It . 358

led to a split in our in split a to led Ahl - e - Hadith school of of school Hadith embers were were embers urity 165

CEU eTD Collection Terror 365 364 363 362 Peace, International 361 360 articles books, from information of pieces various on draw I large, and By salt. of grain a with organizations”, closelyLeTattacks together all planned leadership with its chief and commanders. Generals ISI that suggest even authors Some circle. ISI the in outfit favorable most the of status Delhi. in Fort Red the inside barrack Indian an 1990 period the in missions amongothe to initiate demands. ISI identical out carry to refused allegedly who Hizbul across Hindus of massacres its for became notorious also LeT army. and police Indian of targeting and cleansing ethnic to related orders Kashmir conflict. pol Islamabad’s in shift major a of case the in even Pakistan to obedient remain organization. parent its as leadership technically MDI’s by wing out militant carried were attacks The army. Indian the and population Hindu target to J&K to squads suicide and fighters its sending organization the on rely to continued ISI b had troops Soviet the after but MDI, the

Tankel, Tankel, was behin that ISI claim MyIndianinterviewees Rana, Rana, Amir Mir, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed: Lashkar Saeed: Mohammad Hafiz Mir, Amir Husain Haqqani. 2005. 2005. Haqqani. Husain . New Delhi: Roli Books, Books, Roli Delhi: New . ie ta “h Mra ad h Lashkar the and Markaz “the that Given e Indeed, op. cit. op. cit. op. op. cit op. fedayeen r organizations. The organization claims to have executed nearly one hundred suicide suicide hundred one nearly executed have to claims organization The organizations. r , , Lashkar , ., pp. pp. pp. 365 pp. pp. ver since its introduction to J&K in 1992 in J&K to introduction its since ver pp. pp.

337. 329. h cam I m aig eadn te nenl raiain hud e taken be should organization internal the regarding making am I claims the 61. attacks in thevalleyattacks in 290.

Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. and Mosque Between Pakistan:

- e

- Taiba (Army of the Pure, hereafter LeT), which had the identical identical the had which LeT), hereafter Pure, the of (Army Taiba pp. pp. - 2000.

66.

362

In December 2000, LeT even carried out a suicide attackonsuicide a out carriedLeT even 2000, In December With its centralized organization, the model expects LeT to LeT expects model the organization, centralized its With – - e

the specialty that made it the most respected and feared respectedfeared most the specialtyand made the it that - een ousted the CIA cut its support to the organization. the to support its cut CIA the ousted een Toiba, in Harinder Baweja (ed.). 2002. 2002. (ed.). Baweja Harinder in Toiba, d this operation. this d & i te al 20s wih itd t against it pitted which 2000s, early the in J&K 363

Such a deadly specialization deadly a Such

360 ahntn DC: ange nomn for Endowment Carnegie D.C.: Washington, - e -

ob ae extre are Toiba LeT has meticulously executed ISI executed meticulously has LeT 361

LeT was also the first outfit first the also was LeT Most Wanted: Profiles of of Profiles Wanted: Most mely secretive secretive mely

earned LeT the LeT earned icy toward the the toward icy 364

166

CEU eTD Collection 368 367 Foundation, Research 366 organizational fractionalized structure. and decentralized their to owing Pakistan against turned who decisi it makes that factor the is LeT in control and command the of centralization The 2001. September of wake the in militancy the on down cracked government the after Pakistan to loyal stayed LeT why reason of heads the through command operational LeT’s in processes the of most controls Saeed leadership, its from autonomous quite were commanders whose Harkat, and Jaish Unlike operations. militant of execution and training recruitment, for commander, commanders. districtand commanders, battalion provisional deputy, his and commander supreme a with fashion, military typical a in organized direc responsible are who associates close or kinsmen jihad. and charity; and social education welfare, affairs; religious with dealing departments into who compartmentalized Saeed is by LeT Moreover, presided forum consultative a likely most is it exists Shura famil his while organization the rules Saeed Hafiz and centralized highly is control and command the image ofthe organization. interviews with them triangulate and newspapers, and

Ibid Tankel, Wilson John. 2011. 2011. John. Wilson y members and cronies occupy key positions in the hierarchy. the in positions key occupy cronies and ymembers ,

(Council of Elders), similar to advisory council in Hizbul, but even if such a political bodypolitical aif evensuch but Hizbul, in advisory council to similar Elders), of (Council pp. pp. The LeT’s chain of command is a pyramidal and highly specialized s specialized highly and pyramidal a is command of chain LeT’s The sources the all to common is finding one information, of sea the Despite op. cit op. 142; Clarke, 142; ., pp. pp. pp. pp. 68 ey ifrn fo ohr smlr raiain, uh s as ad Harkat, and Jaish as such organizations, similar other, from different vely op. cit op. – h Clpaes odes Te Lashkar The Soldiers: Caliphate’s The 137 69. –

139. .

367

ah f hs dprmns s edd y Saeed’s by headed is departments these of Each

sections who report to him. to report who sections

with Indian security officials to construct construct to officials security Indian with - e - l t hm Te iai eatet is department jihadi The him. to tly Ta yb’ Ln War Long yyeba’s

366

There might be a a be might There ae al decisions. all makes . New Delhi: Observer Observer Delhi: New . tructure responsible responsible tructure 368

This is the mainthe is This –

Majlis the LeT LeT the 167 - e -

CEU eTD Collection Asia: South in Rekha and Suba D. Chandran, 372 371 370 Internation 369 Gulf other and this from countries. organizations private numerous and Arabia Saudi from support shelter. of provision the or training sharing, intelligence Al with links had have them of all LeT, networkweak. amongis population thelocal fighte thousand few ambulances and farms. and hospitals, institutes, research and schools facilities, other among of, comprised Muridke in complex huge a i as organization, specialized more be to seems LeT Pakistan. in based is infrastructure outfits. the militant pla from originate cadres (its composition ethnic diverse most the with movement transnational a is LeT that noticeable government. the and ISI to dedicated more Pakistani more proportionally has LeT that argue authors Some recruited. is corps military Pakistan’s of bulk the which from region the Punjab, non were fighters of majoritythe organizations

Praveen Swami, Lashkar Chief’s Release Cause of Global Concern, Global of Cause Release Chief’s Lashkar Swami, Praveen Mir, Rahul Tripathi, Madani Raised Huge Funds for Ter for Funds Huge Raised Madani Tripathi, Rahul Mir, Mir, op. cit. op. p cit. op. Finally, all the groups have relied on alternative sources of support. Jaish, Harkat and and Harkat Jaish, support. of sources alternative on relied have groups the all Finally, between have they organizations; capable very all are these Third, their because reprisals army’s Indian the from insulated are all they Second, Firs similarities. four to points Harkat and Jaish and LeT, of comparison The al Peace al 372

A Preliminary Structured Focused Comparison. Focused Preliminary Structured A .,

, pp. pp. pp. pp. , 76. pp. pp. 8 Ahe J Tli. 02 Te eae ht s Lashkar Is That Menace The 2012. Tellis. J. Ashley 78;

rs under their command. Even though they are infiltrated in J&K, their social their J&K, in infiltrated are theythough Even command. their under rs 10 - 11, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf (03/07/2013). http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf 11,

Chakravarthi, Chakravarthi, ces such as Central Asia, the Sudan, Afghanistan and Bosnia) among Bosnia) and Afghanistan Sudan, the Asia, Central as such ces

370 Lashkar

Qaed - e

369 - a usually through mutual assistance in the form of form the in assistance mutual through usually a Taiba, in Taiba, ror From Saudi Arabia, Arabia, Saudi From ror -

Kashmiris, or more precisely the Pakistanis from from Pakistanis the precisely more or Kashmiris, hl ti agmn my od re i i also is it true, hold may argument this While

fighters than any other outfit, which makes it it makes which outfit, other any than fighters

New Delhi: Pentagon Press, Press, New Pentagon Delhi: Arpita Anant (ed.). 2012. 2012. (ed.). Anant Arpita 371 The Hindu The

n diin LT eevs covert receives LeT addition, In - The Times of India of Times The e , - 13 October, 2009. October, 13 Taiba. Taiba.

a couple of hundred of couple a Carnegie Endowment for for Endowment Carnegie Non p p. p. - 253. State Armed Groups Armed State

, 07 June 2009; 2009; June 07 ,

t, in all the all in t, t operates t 168

se to to

CEU eTD Collection 375 374 Books Penguin York: Tellis, 373 to able was leadership the result, a As eye. li watchful ISI’s if under out, LOC carry the across to operations file and rank its enabled infrastructure militant LeT’s of tolerance policychange. ten between companies, small send to LeT decided 2001 in Reportedly, agency. the from permission that theoutf extent the to 9/11 of aftermath the in control and command JeM’s of dissipation the accelerated has This outfits. other join or freelancing start to file and rank the prompted JeM in leadership their to militants the confine to decision the by importantly, most and, others of relocation camps, some T of closure Pakistan’s by accelerated 2001. September after foreigners and groups religious the against attacks of series a triggered Jaish of fractioning the how Pakistan. within target civilian or military other any against nor state, Pakistani the in Parliament Indian 2001 collaboration is a with JeM bordercasefor defection). the though (even orders ISI of defiance LeT’s indicating report path. violent Jaish’s embraced never LeT defection. their to organization fractionalized Jaish’s and Harkat in control and command decentralized the how shown have I sections, previous the In Islamabad. against guns turned Jaish and orders

Hussain, Mir, See e.g.: C. Christine Fair. 2011. Lashkar 2011. Fair. Christine C. e.g.: See

and op. cit. op. op. cit., op. In contrast, LeT contrast, In A of spite In fifteen part from part op. cit. op. ; Ahmed Rashid. 2012. 2012. Rashid. Ahmed ; it evolvedit intoaconglomerate factions. ofembattled pp. pp. 374

, fig 96. 96. pp. pp.

In turn, LeTIn turn, ,

tr, cos h LC nta o lre omtos o dut o Musharraf’s to adjust to formations large of instead LOC the across hters, pp. pp. hs smlrte, e rmie lyl wie akt eid h operational the defied Harkat while loyal, remained LeT similarities, these the 53; Tankel,

53.

operational obedience, there is likewise no record of LeT attacks against attacks LeT of record no likewise is there obedience, operational accepted ISI’s demand to lower its profile in J&K and act only with the the with only act and J&K in profile its lower to demand ISI’s accepted

op. cit., op. was allowed to preserve its large training camps in PCK in largecamps trainingits preserve to allowedwas Pakistan on the Brink the on Pakistan

pp. pp. - e 127; Rana, 127; - Tayiba and the Pakistani State. State. Pakistani the and Tayiba ap. h ako oto adacutblt to accountability and control of lack The camps. : op. cit. op. The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Westthe and Afghanistan Pakistan, of Future The

, pp. pp. 57. To my knowledge, there is neither a a neither is there knowledge, my To

e rcinlzto o JM was JeM of fractionalization he

Survival

aitn establishment, Pakistani

53(4): 1 53(4): – 373 23, at 23,

contributed contributed Remember . 375 pp. pp.

GOP’s mited, . New New . 9 – 169 10;

CEU eTD Collection 378 Unit (PSRU) Research Security Pakistan Howenstein, 377 376 assistance. mil LeT’s on down clamp to refusal GOP’s in visible most was support This J&K. in struggle armed toward policy Pakistan’s in change the accepted had he after GOP and ISI of support full the received Saeed Hafiz because their for necessary resources key the controlled leadership central the as rogue turn easilynot could file and rank LeT’s that meant hierarchy organizational factionali and rallies, and andtraining therecruitment cadres. of outfits militant many India with rapprochement 2004 Pakistan’s on compliance In for return bans. of round second the sparred was LeT 2003, In outfits. other with touch in keep and top organization terrorist time. year a 2 December in arrested was Saeed Hafiz Although country. the in organizations militant other and HUJI JeM, on down clamped years”intact over the hierarchica as well as control to and “command complied its because orders LeT POK’s defections. mass avoid and organization the of cohesiveness the maintain

Zaffar Abbas, Endgame Begins, Begins, Endgame Abbas, Zaffar Network. Taliban the Punjabi Defining Abbas, ihls oesen ugss ht ae’ ale i GP lyd cuil oe n i relea his in role crucial a played GOP in allies Saeed’s that suggests Howenstein Nicholas

members, Hafiz Saeed and his close circle continued to hold meetings, plan terrorist attacks, attacks, terrorist plan meetings, hold to continued circle close his and Saeed Hafiz members, LeT did not change behavior toward GOP because it avoided intensive leadership crises crises leadership intensive avoided it because GOP toward behavior change not did LeT 2001 of hunt” “witch the avoided LeTmostly compliance, its to Owing The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir, Kashmir, and Pakistan in Groups Jihadi Sunni the to Introduction An Pakistan: in Terrain Jihadi The

377 sm

u ee when even But

that have plagued similar outfits such as Jaish and Harkat. The preservation of preservation The Harkat. and Jaish as such outfits similar plagued have that , the , 376 – .

e ws loe t fel cry n ih fund with on carry freely to allowed was LeT

organization The Herald The

Pakistan, under a significant US pressure, pressure, US significant a under Pakistan, ,

001 for his fiery speeches, the court ordered his release within within release his ordered court the speeches, fiery his for 001 5 February, 2008, 1 2008, February, 5 , February 200 February , preserved its hierarchy its preserved tn atvte, n cniud oitcl n military and logistical continued and activities, itant

378 – 4, 51 4,

41, at 41, – 62, at 62, pp. pp. activities. LeT avoided Jaish’s faith Jaish’s avoided LeT activities. 21. pp. pp. . Despite the house arrest of some some of arrest house the Despite .

61.

–

l structure has remained has structure l a - raising, holding public public holding raising, n episode that enraged enraged that episode n enlisted - 2003, when GOP when 2003, se. Nicholas Nicholas se.

e a a as LeT 170

CEU eTD Collection 2004, July, 18 splits, Dawa Jamaatud 381 Rana, Amir Naas”. Khairun name http://www.dailytimes.co online: available the adopted we so Pakistan in banned 380 http://www.rediff.com///news/2004/jul/16let.htm. 379 even alive hostages the keep to demand Pakistan’s defied Ansar Harkatul why explain to fails partly theory My sponsor. their against guns turn or defy rebels the facti inter and COIN particular, In defection. rebel cause non on pressures exogenous that suggests theory My chap this in advanceI argument Trajectories Kashmir: Behavior Militant in of theArguments Assessing J&K. sp the engineered ISI that claim LeT. the ban to US the from pressure to response in ISI the by orchestrated be to thought is and structure organizational LeT’s on impact significant violation and corruption nepotism, of Saeed accused had Khair labeled group breakaway a established and Saeed Hafiz of leadership the opposed leaders senior policies not and funds over but control, and command LeT the within struggle i Likewise, Musharraf. against attempt assassination Hashim officer, Pakistani former and member senior LeT a 2003 in instance, For splits.

Amir Mir. 2008. 2008. AmirMir. A senior KN member even stated that “Khairun Naas and Lashkar and Naas “Khairun that stated even member KN senior A ons of non of ons aha Prn Ui Jamaat Unit Parent Lashkar 381 - un In this section I assess the explanatory power of my and alternative theories. The The theories. alternative and my of power explanatory the assess I section this In brief and individual to immune not was it control, and command its preservedLeT While

yd lf te uft n jie te naos Brig infamous the joined and outfit the left Syed, - Naas (KN). Naas - centralized groups to desert, while the shift in sponsor’s policy is likely to make make to likely is policy sponsor’s in shift the while desert, to groups centralized The Fluttering Flag of Jehad of Flag TheFluttering 379

The breakaway group was made up of former LeT senior members who members senior LeT former of up made was group breakaway The

ter engenders considerable, although not full, explanatory power. explanatorypower. full, not although considerable, engenders ter lit as a warning to Saeed to tone down his speeches on jihad in jihad on speeches his down tone to Saeed to warning a as lit - ud m.pk/default.asp?page=story_18 - Dawa Splits, Splits, Dawa . Lahore: Mashal Books, Lahore: Mashal. Books,

Rediff.com n 2004 there were reports indicating a power power a indicating reports were there 2004 n 380 - - ee cnlc my ed omnes and commanders lead may conflict rebel centralized rebel movements are likely to likely are movements rebel centralized

Some close associates of the LeT leader LeT the of associates close Some - e - , 16 July, 2004, available online: online: available 2004, July, 16 , Taiba are basically the same, but the LT is is LT the but same, the basically are Taiba a pp. pp. f at gas Te pi hd no had split The goals. party of - de 313 that was involved in the the in involved was that 313 de 7 - 2004_pg7_20. 178.

huh saaa hd not had Islamabad though

. Reportedly, some some Reportedly, . Abdur Rehman Rehman Abdur 171

CEU eTD Collection militancy Kashmiri the toward policy Pakistan’s in change the how depicts accurately argument Lashkar an accommodation withGOI. of group a led 1990s late in th and Jamaat of disassociation the However, period. this in desertions any suffer not did movement the onward, 1992 in Hizbul against offensive Indian growing the mana the at Indianhands and ofthearmy Hizbul. attrition the and control, and command weak their to thanks splits additional suffered Pakistan. by Mu Muslim and Force supported Janbaaz Muslim Muslimeen,Ikhwanul or instigated being them of some splits, of plethora a and 1993, and f most the was JKLF re and COIN by decimation and decapitation faced they when fighting the desert to tended Mujahideen Muslim and Force Janbaaz Muslim Muslimeen, Ikhwanul JKLF, as such only in2000. wishes Pakistan’s against GOI with rapprochement the initiated commanders Hizbul Dar, and f became movement Mu Hizbul of timing the explain and I changed policies. its transnational support transnational ged to preserve the most centralized structure owing to its ties to Jamaat to ties its to owing structure centralized most the preserve to ged ial, h ter epan wy h to aitn otis Jaish outfits, Pakistani two the why explains theory the Finally, it because 1990s late until Pakistan to obedient remained Mujahideen Hizbul Second, outfits decentralized First, evidence. the by supported mostly are predictions of rest The - e - ab prud comp pursued Taiba

actionalized in 1997/98 following the internal ruptures between Salahuddin Salahuddin between ruptures internal the following 1997/98 in actionalized actionalized movement and it suffered two major leadership crises, in 1990 in crises, leadership major two suffered it and movement actionalized t

appears that

while disgruntled

exogenous pressures played no role. Similarly, my theory cannot theory my Similarly, role. no played pressures exogenous eey ifrn pts n hi rltosi wt Pksa. My Pakistan. with relationship their in paths different letely aiens esfr wt te nin ry Ev army. Indian the with ceasefire jahideen’s

its

defiance was a result of factionalized militant organization offactionalized militant a was result defiance

commanders, headed by chief commander Dar, to seek seek to Dar, commander chief by headed commanders, jahideen had all been splinters who splintersbeen all hadjahideen e conflict over leadership over conflict e - e - - e oamd and Mohammad - Islami. Despite Islami. bel bel n huh the though en rivals. The The rivals. 172

CEU eTD Collection account to fails it while Jaish, and Harkat as such completely policies inrelation Pakistan. different to Jais and Lashkar why explain cannot argument This state. the against turned others while loyal, remained some threats, such from insulated were outfits Pakistani the though Even ceasefire. Ramzan the over negotiations cas the in worked approach This politics. normal to return the and amnesty them promising by desertion into outfits some lure to opportunity this use could GOI The sight. in resolution conflict no was there and passed years the as strain increasing the indigenous un be to seemed the Pakistan to loyalty the Because valley, the in homes fighting. and families their had the militants abandon to decision their in figure broadly to seems Kash other any than cause Pakistan’s to loyal more be to proved Mujahideen, Hizbul ideology, Islamist moderate a with movement Kashmiri predominantly A sponsor. their abandoned eventually Mujahideen, Kashmir’s for suc Pakistan, fought with integration who movements similar ideologically other However, case. JKLF’s in visible most is ideologies and identities different from arising discrepancy The movements. rela varying the explain partly preferences shared the establishment. a 2001 in nd centralized Lashkar to tone down its cross its down tone to Lashkar centralized nd eod te lentv rsucs ep epan h bhvo o sm Pksai outfits, Pakistani some of behavior the explain helps resources alternative the Second, supportfrom theevidence.mixed First,On the otherthealternative receive hand, theories –

ushered in by the US administration US the by in ushered

ii iiat uft I trs f nieos oeet, hrd ethnicity shared movements, indigenous of terms In outfit. militant miri h as Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Muslim Janbaaz Force and Muslim Muslim and Force Janbaaz Muslim Muslimeen, Ikhwanul as h h, the two groups with predominantly Pakistani stuff, pursued pursued stuff, Pakistani predominantly with groups two the h, - border activities and synchronize its moves with moves its synchronize and activities border –

tionship between Pakistan and purely Kashmiri Kashmiri purely and Pakistan between tionship led the fractious Jaish to turn against the state state the against turn to Jaish fractious the led

for Lashkar’s loyalty. The Kashmiri outfits outfits Kashmiri The loyalty. Lashkar’s for e of JKLF, and, allegedly, in Hizbul’s Hizbul’s in allegedly, and, JKLF, of e der der 173

CEU eTD Collection loyal remained mostly have Hizbul, throughout the insurgencyinflating theexplanatorycapabili ofpower the and Lashkar organizations, strongest organization. the militant of However, erosion overall the to lead pressures exogenous the that argument complementary be to appears combat the deserting rebels weaker The the sides. about switching argument and defiance in engaged Jaish, and Harkat strongest, the while desert, the that defections. their explain fails to argument this support,and of alternative any received source have major not Third, the capabilities also offer an incomplete picture of the Kashmir insurgency. I find find I insurgency. Kashmir the of picture incomplete an offer also capabilities the Third,

weakest outfits, Ikhwanul, Muslim Janbaaz Force and Muslim Mujahideen, tended to to tended Mujahideen, Muslim and Force Janbaaz Muslim Ikhwanul, outfits, weakest

ties argument.

to my my to 174

CEU eTD Collection against their sponsors. non than defect results the Surprisingly, sponsors multiple ties, ethnic/ideological including arguments alternative the test to sought also have I theories, agent movemen sponsored a is likely more the control, and command the of centralization have the lower findings the indeed, argument: The my confirmed defection. for propensity their and structure organization rebel between analysis different and types of periods of theory In approaches. alternative and my for implications draw and capabilities Pakistan, support. with of sources alternative ties of nature structure, organizational different with units within solid a provided have organizations six The 4. Chapter in Pakistan I Subsequently, 3. Chapter sponsor on rebel

movements should The particular focus of my investigation in Chapter 3 was to demonstr to was 3 Chapter in investigation my of focus particular The some conditions what under and why examine to aimed have I chapters previous the In - ee r rebel

be -

tnc pnosis i addition, in sponsorships; ethnic

narrowed or narrowed defect against their state sponsors, while others do not. Using a novel dataset dataset novel a Using not. do others while sponsors, state their against defect ltos I elations

tasainl support /transnational

have indicated that shared ethnic ties may more often prompt rebels to rebels prompt often more may ties ethnic shared that indicated have explored statistically

enhanced In this chapter, this In R

in efining t dfc against defect to t - depth CHAPTER 5

warfare beyond asymmetric conflicts asymmetric beyond nlzd oe hn n hnrd ee mvmns in movements rebel hundred one than more analyzed

the behavior of six rebel outfits in Kashmir toward Kashmir in outfits rebel six of behavior the n te iiay tegh f pnos n rebels. and sponsors of strength military the and the

I use the findings from the previous chapters to chapters previous the from findings the use I .

T rnntoa te ecuae rebels encouraged ties transnational heories

addition, t sponsor its

I ask whether the scope of my my of scope the whether ask I B daig n principal on drawing By .

by considering statistical considering by - case compa case ate an association association an ate rison of of rison o turn to 175 -

CEU eTD Collection of types and support, or, iftheybe it, receive le t and War differentperforms periods. in is dissertation in future support. transnational and ties ethnic structure, organizational are these and tests, the across robust proved have that separately. theory each discussing analysis, this organize organization Jaish Mujahideen, J unlike Pakistan, to loyal Lahskar and Mujahideen Hizbul of organization centralized the how indicated I particular, In leadership. their of independently act to chang factions and commanders a to led players other and sponsor a with interactions how and behavior, their affected movements these of structure organizational Lashkar combat deserted Muslimeeen) Ikhwanul and Force Janbaaz Muslim (e.g. others while orders, defied particular, In defection. Adtoal, h hs Jaish has why Additionally, . To check whether the development of development the whether check To chapter this In I 4, Chapter In - - e depth studies. depth - Taiba remained loyal? I started off by demonstrating how the difference in in difference the how demonstrating by off started I loyal? remained Taiba he

eventually warfare

post

applicable - od War Cold - , the next section uses the uses section next the , e

, -

In this In Mohammad and Harkatul Ansar whose decentralized/fragmented decentralized/fragmented whose Ansar Harkatul and Mohammad have I use these findings to refine my and alterna and my refine to findings these use I

led to led After that, I statistically check whether check statistically I that, After asked I

n te contexts. other in trace

discussion I tease out particular mechanisms that can be probed in probed be can that mechanisms particular out tease I discussion Perhaps the theory I advance here cannot account advance cannot I here Perhaps theory the their Muslim Muslimeen, Ikhwanul Force, Janbaaz Muslim KLF, periods d why have some movements (e.g. Harkatul Ansar and JKLF) JKLF) and Ansar Harkatul (e.g. movements some have why

ss dependent ontheir sponso the patterns from C from patterns the fallout Pakistan. with .

- n hs wr, rebels wars, these In e - oamd turned Mohammad

e in the command and control enabling some some enabling control and command the in e

SOR

n particular In movement’s organization is portable across time time across portable is organization movement’s

dataset hapter 3 and link and 3 hapter

Discussed

, and

I ask ask I rs. its guns against Pakistan, while while Pakistan, against guns its a hv ls ne fr external for need less have may the

the argument I develop in this this in develop I argument the - tive arguments. I thematically arguments. tive e

- multilevel logistic model logistic multilevel Taiba rendered them more more them rendered Taiba o ognztoa theo organizational how here ed

them to defection/non to them are only those factors factors those only are

both for the Cold theCold both for ing 176 r y -

CEU eTD Collection triggering in propositions defection. t cases, 4. Chapter in findings the using proposition individual each analyze under perform propositions theoretical mechani the how understanding for useful is approach this time, same the in the lacks and conflicts civil is approach 3. Chapter in study case the to evidence supplementary as regarded be should but support, case comprehensive a offering than rather wars at aimed is assessment this so, doing applicability to identifying study case the to and findings statistical the I section, this In defection. mechanisms causal particular develop outfits Pakistani illu to Kashmir and Jammu in insurgency of case the Iused Likewise, movements. rebel of range broad Mechanisms 1989 versus sponsorshipsafterand versusconflicts. asymmetric symmetric 1989, non and War/Post Cold the in factors of significance the for test to strate aspects of the framework the of aspects strate he mechanisms should not be seen as isol as seen be not should mechanisms he T I chapters previous the In - ass te relevance the assess o territorial conflicts. territorial

a much weaker alternative to case to alternative weaker much a

other cases other

lk. vn huh h cs study case the though Even alike. . consider

I split the population into two paired samples: sponsorships 1968 sponsorships samples: paired two into population the split I - depth evidence to rigorously test the underlying mechanisms underlying the test rigorously to evidence depth

f hs agmns I lo rw n ae byn Ksmr In Kashmir. beyond cases on draw also I arguments, these of

statistic the theories by focusing on each proposition, going proposition, each on focusing by theories the

illustrating common traits of sponsorships in different civil different in sponsorships of traits common illustrating by examining the defection/non the examining by aat rm y theory, my from apart , varying varying ally - studies given studies nlzd principal analyzed ated circumstances. - study.

partly

pathways. They might be linked to other to linked be might They pathways. -

Cold Wa Cold The additional cases provide some some provide cases additional The h mcaim and mechanisms the

that uprs h faeok I i not did I framework, the supports

it ignores it

n h sbeun scin, I sections, subsequent the In that link the propositions to to propositions the link that r period and among territorial territorial among and period r - agent framework against a a against framework agent

Drawing on supplementary on Drawing - defection of Kashmiri and and Kashmiri of defection sms stemming fromstemming sms

the complex nature of of nature complex the

assessing their their assessing

back to back This . At .

177 the -

CEU eTD Collection Pakistan’s orders organizational relatingto ando JKLF Kashmiri the addition, In corps. Kashmiri the over wings. Kashmiri and Pakistani between split was leadership o the On interests. and instructions Pakistan’s against clearly was this that shows evidenceThe rest. the killed possibly and tourists captured the of one operatives beheaded actions Both tourists. foreign of group a kidnapped then and base, Indianarmy an attacked first Harkatul cadres. loyal most the were they could commanders Harkatul the Kashmir, behavior. egregious in engage to commanders JKLF out ofsponsor’s reach. actions their for costs high too incurring without orders sponsor’s ignore reasonably Therefo resources, and support popular leadership non of file and rank the mechanism,target In the country.thethis latterand in sponsor the formerresidingin the with chain. delegation defection. severe drive two latter the while defection, Organizational Theory . The separation of of separation The . hs ehns i ms cery n ipa i the in display on clearly most is mechanism This are There e te pc fr idn cin rmtcly ies and widens dramatically action hidden for space the re, ee xctd ihu Pksa’ epii apoa. n o o ta, h Harkatul the that, of top On approval. explicit Pakistan’s without executed were

eas i i nt el oioe ad otold I te ak n fl also file and rank the If controlled. and monitored well not is it because F three irst , when a rebel leadership and lower echelons are echelonslower and leadership rebel a when , -

central

ehnss ht em o rdc defection produce to seem that mechanisms Harkatul’s zd raiain can organizations ized

t a as avoid also can it After one of their leaders was captured, the rank and file of of file and rank the captured, was leaders their of one After

edrhp n rn ad ie has file and rank and leadership not communicate with their leaders in Pakistan even if even Pakistan in leaders their with communicate not

perational issues. Located in the inaccessible mountain peaks of of peaks mountain inaccessible the in Located

h css of costs the twist the initial orders from the central central the from orders initial the twist All of them of All ae o Hrau Ansar Harkatul of cases The Pakistani wing had little control control little had wing Pakistani The used its popular support to defy defy to support popular its used

commanders and factions can can factions and commanders

acin fr misbehavior for sanctions are related to the length of of length the to related are

te is lead first the : geographically ie mr sae o the to space more given ther side, the JKLF the side, ther

n partly and

separated, separated, s draw

they are are they o mild to s

178 on .

CEU eTD Collection System 385 384 383 382 echelons) lower and on situation the about upper knowledge broad has leadership the if (between Even consolidation. organizational vertical and echelons) lower the (among horizontal in invested effort no or little with outfits, local into assimilated randomly are recruits result, a less much inflow the about information and troops, its of interests and needs the about information scarce has leadership leadership. its from separated territorially is that observers t said Hizb centralized Afg from departure Soviet ISI. alone let leadership, its from clearance a without commanders other with clash government the against a attacks out carry often As would commanders The disobedient. communities. their of protection were they the consequence, for responsible were money” commanders sometimes Afghan and shelter food, reinforcements, received he which from (…) smart living, bridge to difficult that notes Yousaf Mohammad comma to money and arms supplied and directions issued who Soviet

Ibid Ibid Adkin.1992. Mark and Yousaf Mohammad Barnett Rubin. 2002. 2002. Rubin. Barnett . Oxford University Press, pp. 251. pp. University Press, Oxford . , pp. , 65 pp. , 66 pp. - sponsored regime in Kabul in the 1980s. They all They 1980s. the in Kabul in regime sponsored In the second the In the against fought who Mujahideen Afghan the among present also is mechanism This

cars and well and cars he commanders‘on strike’ were ) “showed increasing resistance to ISI attempts to direct them militarily; some some militarily; them direct to attempts ISI to resistance increasing “showed )

(because)

mechanism there is COIN or inter or COIN is there mechanism The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International International the in Collapse and Formation State Afghanistan. of Fragmentation The

- oe autonomous more furnished villas furnished

, type and number of recruits that are joining the local branches. As As branches. local the joining are that recruits of number and type , aitn n 98 l Mjhde pris ecp Hekmatyar (except parties Mujahideen all 1988 in hanistan h l the

“ h gp ewe toe h fgt n toe h d nt was not do who those and fight who those between gap the aes ee h sbet of subject the were eaders

The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story Untold Afghanistan’s Bear Trap: The ” 382 . vi .”

In addition, each commander had “ had commander each addition, In s 385 - à

- eahd rm t rn ad ie te rebel the file, and rank its from Detached

vis

- hi laes and leaders, their re had bel clashes aimed at the rank and file file and rank the at aimed clashes bel

uh rtcs (…) criticism much political dr wo ogt n h field the in fought who nders leaders based in Pakistan in based leaders , London, pp. 59. , London,pp.

consequently for their soft soft their for his own base own his 384

posts and posts After the After 383

more The 179 ’s ’s .

CEU eTD Collection UAE (ELF) Front Liberation Eritrean the (EPLF), People Eritrean by dealt defeats of series a after instance, For movements. Lashkar radical as Pakistan usedsuch central more outfits leadershipandthe directions the Pakistan. from cease a made Dar, Majid them, of One leadership. political from autonomously behave to commanders influential and dissatisfied more leaving movement a within control the weakened has Islami, Jamiaat wing, political its from en the 1990s, early the in desertion prevented that Whereas organization centralized highly attacks. a developed HizbulHizbul and movement the in splits encouraged who defection, Pakistan’s i.e. leaders, remaining the forcing and section Kashmiri the eradicating Hizbul and military Indian the both Pakistan their as l faction Ikhwanul An imprisoned. or killed were leaders their after deserted massively cadres Mujahideen Muslim and MJF The Mujahideen. Hizbul and military Indian the from fire heavy under were commanders the pol hardships, from their isolated While Mujahideen. Muslim and Muslimeen Ikhwanul MJF, agreement thetarget government with fate. fightingtoavoidill ordesert non sponsors and leaders their from both support units. remote to supplies of flow the hampers separation territorial the ground, the d of the decade produced a shift in its organizational structure. The withdrawal of support support of withdrawal The structure. organizational its in shift a produced decade the of d – ill This

- Infighting e ea dsnertn i Ags 17. eotdy b Nvme hnrd o ELF of hundreds November by Reportedly, 1979. August in disintegrating began - Taiba andTaiba Jaish Yasin fate has struck a number of decentralized movements in Kashmir such as JKLF, as such Kashmir in movements decentralized of number a struck has fate - based leadership did nothing to deter Hizbul attacks. The JKLF was targeted by by targeted was JKLF The attacks. Hizbul deter to nothing did leadership based

and non and Mali , to k, - e - - centralized organization have caused desertions in a number of rebel rebel of number a in desertions caused have organization centralized Mohammad to eet n 94 However, 1994. in desert

derail thecease derail –

s ponsored by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the the and Syria Arabia, Saudi Iraq, by ponsored - centralized org centralized ed by Parrey joined the Indian military military Indian the joined Parrey by ed the - - fire. fire with the Indian military against against military Indian the with fire JKLF defection was preceded by by preceded was defection JKLF

anizations are likely to seek an an seek to likely are anizations

itical leadership was was leadership itical

’ the Pakistan the s Liberation Front Front Liberation s D vi of evoid - based based 180

CEU eTD Collection http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week 387 2014). Julyon 30, (accessed 2010.pdf 158 pp. Gregoriana, Phi 386 directly are segments its or organization sponsor the within commanders s Israeli tohis thesituation explain contacts. “ and Israel the to was According move this Lagu, Joseph Accords. commander and leader Anyanya Ababa Addis the as known agreement the accepted leadership Anyanya the year, that autonomy cultural and religious pea offered Khartoum reconsider When government. to forced were rebels The Kenya. in refueling and Ethiopia over flying planes by Sudan southern into airdrop expensive an being other the Sudan South to arms running for route main the as Uganda of use the to end an came this With clos Libya, and Egypt by pressed Amin, Idi weapons The Sudan. Israel Anyanya. the of desertion the is example Another Ethiopia. with relations diplomatic established cease pursue Demoraliz Army. Ethiopian the to or EPLF rival the to deserted or Sudan neighboring to fled either have fighters and commanders osrs reach. ponsor’s

ipns: 1965 lippines): William Larousse. 2001. A Local Church Living for Dialogue: Muslim Dialogue: for Living Church Local A 2001. Larousse. William Dann had had n h fnl ehns, a mechanism, final the In a Harman. Harman. a pro sal a s was Israel - appeal to powerful individuals, political parties, religious groups or even factions factions even or groups religious parties, political individuals, powerful to appeal vided weapons and training to the movement and also sent three advisors to South South to advisors three sent also and movement the to training and weapons vided ie ih h Mnit regime. Mengistu the with fire - 2000. Interreligious and Intercultural Investigations. Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Università Pontificia Editrice Rome: Investigations. Intercultural and Interreligious 2000. tiig o itnus tesle from themselves distinguish to Striving - state 5, vial oln: http://www.n49intelligence.com/N49 online: available 159, had been had Leaving Leaving

for additional political, economic and soci and economic political, additional for

mwa ust y h pae deal peace the by upset omewhat

supplied through Uganda. However, in 1972, Ugandan President President Ugandan 1972, in However, Uganda. through supplied itterness itterness - s -

end/leaving ed, cornered, and fragmented the ELF leadership decided to to decided leadership ELF the fragmented and cornered, ed, non - etaie organizations centralized B

edig no h pltc o te pno sae This state. sponsor the of politics the into meddling ehind. - ed Israel’ ed bitterness 386

Haaretz yi imdaey esd t spot and support its ceased immediately Syria - behind s embassy there and expelled all I all expelled and there embassy s Jnay 8 21, vial online: available 2011, 28, January , - 387 1.339712 hi central their

” made Lg ee fe t Nioi to Nairobi to flew even Lagu . - Christian Relations in Mindanao in Relations Christian

al support. support. al as a whole is located within within located is whole a as ce talks with the Sudanese Sudanese the with talks ce

(accessed on July 30, 2014). Julyon 30, (accessed without without - Somali

leadership, different different leadership, a consultation with with consultation a In this case a rebel rebel a case this In - Region - Update sraelis. sraelis. -

- July Sulu Sulu 181 - -

CEU eTD Collection Ethnic and Transnational ties interwovendefection. inproducing co of sponsorship Yugoslav actors. transnational and ethnic with have ties structure. organizational on effect an the Throughout suppor and ties the by stimulated are sponsor disintegration to leading organization the on unleashed is power coercive this sponsors, their deserting When coerc state target of shadow the in operates organization rebel each that assumes project this in develop I theory the example, For organization. the of outside incentives some be chapters previous the shocks. external for account cannot alone theory organizational movement, rebel fine with faced when considered be respective sponsors. their against actions such in engaged have Tigers, Tamil the with along movements, Palestinian instability chronic against guns their turn a own. their of life a on support material of sources alternative creates

sponsor decides to punish such a behavior, fractionalized rebels may shun may rebels fractionalized behavior, a such punish to decides sponsor While organizational theory offers a solid ac solid a offers theoryorganizational While

indicated the ability of Harkatul of ability the indicated of

non –

- and the above narratives, for rebels to defect to rebels for narratives, above the and centralized entities. Similarly, defying orders or turning guns against the the against guns turning or orders defying Similarly, entities. centralized this challenge may ultimately drag their countries into civil war. The The war. civil into countries their drag ultimately may challenge this When the sponsor the

chapters, ethnic ties and transnational support, have demonstrated such such demonstrated have support, transnational and ties ethnic chapters, -

ethnics in Croatia and Bosnia and Croatia in ethnics c

oerced by its central leadership they are likely to disobey orders. orders. disobey likelyto are theyleadership central its by oerced

. For weak and unresolved governments unresolved and weak For . -

rie information. grained In the case of Kashmir, of case the In n h floig uscin I subsection, following the In

Ansar t

allowing radical commanders and factions to take take to factions and commanders radical allowing that

to defy orders, and the danger of Jaish’s ties Jaish’s of danger the and orders, defy to

count of rebel defection, other factors should should factors other defection, rebel of count the rank and file develops with other actors. actors. other with develops file and rank the

to show how t how show to

Focused on the inner workings of a a of workings inner the on Focused shared ethnicity and transnational and ethnicity shared

against sponsor there need to to need there sponsor against rel revisit briefly hese two hese –

it who suffer from suffer who s authority, and and authority, s ive capabilities. capabilities. ive

As indicated in indicated As factors

the cases of of cases the

may be be may 182 If

CEU eTD Collection 2003. August 1, prosecution 389 Serbia.”). on financiallydependent and completelyeconomically 388 war.” make to able been have not would 1994: May suppor FRY’s of military.The theBosnian Serb into importance integrated were JNA the and services security the where RS, in created was structure military Army the theremnantsof services governmentsecurityMilosevic and thestate used salar 1 Since (RS). Republic Serb the statelet its christened Karadzic Radovan under SDS Bosnian the Bosnia, In (RSK). Krajina Serb of Republic the proclaimed Babic Milan under (SDS) Party Democratic 1990s. the during of Republic Federal its demonstrate that cases other dissatisfaction withsponsor’sdefection. policy sponsor’s or organizations. nationalist other and parties political church, transnational – confirmed. also was defection defection. and ties ethnic shared between

who are located outside sponsor’s territorial control control territorial sponsor’s outside located are who Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 19, 2002, pp. 2002, 19, November Transcript, Trial Babic, Milan of Testimony Te seby f eulk Spk, 1992 Srpska, Republika of Assembly “The ies

( JNA

Although the first mechanism is not ondispla isnot Althoughfirst mechanism the association surprising a revealed study case the partly and findings statistical The 9/92 oh S ad S a rcie mltr support military received had RS and RSK both 991/1992 n advisors and ) wtot eba ohn wud ae apnd w dnt ae h rsucs and resources the have don’t we happened, have would nothing Serbia “without

to train, organize and issue commands to local fighters in the RSK. the in fighters local to commands issue and organize train, to aeil upr fo ter co their from support material

Following

Yugoslavia

–

rm h Mlsvc eie n Belgrade in regime Milosevic the from

There the outbreak of war in Croatia, the leadership of the Serbian Serbian the of leadership the Croatia, in war of outbreak the

partial

(FRY) is at least one least at is

- ap 95: Highlights and Excerpts, Dr. Robert J. Donia,” submitted by by submitted Donia,” J. Robert Dr. Excerpts, and Highlights 95:

The positive association between transn between association positive The n Sr rbl organization rebel Serb and plicability. One such scenario scenario such One plicability. 389 -

et h te cif omne o R am, General army, RS of commander chief then The nc i te pno sae uh s h business, the as such state sponsor the in hnics

mechanism y numberthe Kashmirare a of case, there in

–

defy orders because they can draw on draw can they because orders defy

This may be triggered by the rebels’ rebels’ the by triggered be may This

12970

at play. In play. at t was summed up by Karadzic in Karadzic upby summed t was - 71, (“SAO Krajina and RSK were RSK and Krajina (“SAO 71, . According to Babic, the the Babic, to According . s –

n rai ad Bosnia and Croatia in oty epn, fuel weapons, mostly unraveled between unraveled this mechanism this

Yugoslav NatYugoslav 388 ational ties and and ties ational

The identicalThe , rebels , ional ional

183 the the ,

CEU eTD Collection the Contact Groupcalling Plan conflic for the rejected Martic 1994, In Milosevic. defied also Martic minister. support, FRY’s police on dependent RSK Although the Martic, Milan backed and him on turned Milosevic waned, status and Belgrade’s with down toppled soon was Babic protection. a without him leave would it refused Babic plan, the accepted Croatia from paramilitaries and army FRY the of withdrawal the after Areas envisio plan This widened. RSK and Milosevic between to ready was and elites. unacceptableRSK RS tothe trade. illicit social provided taxes, levied they which through structures governance wartime. during created privileges economic and autonomy Bosnia goals its moderate to pressure international The history. monetary Croati and Bosnia in Milosevic. to obedient consumption. f accounted support FRY’s that admitted Mladic, Ratko

involvement, and replaced by Goran Hadzic, a strongman fro strongman a Hadzic, Goran by replaced and involvement, . In1991, Yet h mi polm was problem main The

cet ih eti mdfctos Floig h 19 Vance 1993 the Following modifications. certain with accept ,

even this stark dependence on dependence stark this even

ccept anything short of independence of short anything ccept RSK’s Babic refused the Contact Group’s CarringtonGroup’s Contact the Babicrefused RSK’s

a accepting By 1993, FRY had suffered harsh economic sanctions for its involvement involvement its for sanctions economic harsh suffered had FRY 1993, By ,

leading

some sort of sort some

h Yugoslav the o t convince to how ,

fearing that the withdrawal of the army and paramilitaries and army the of withdrawal the that fearing Yugoslav

t resolution. resolution. t

political autonomy political

cease support to the rebels, had rebels, the to support cease cnm t sfe te os hprnlto in hyperinflation worst the suffer to economy

h rbl edr t gv u ter political their up give to leaders rebel the resources did not make not did resources

would compromise these privileges these compromise would ned the establishment of establishment the ned In turn, r lot 0 e cn o is military its of cent per 90 almost or

Both RSK and RS RS and RSK Both Belgrade for the statelets the for m Knin. As Hadzic’s political Hadzic’s As Knin. m

plan

services and conducted conducted and services , which Milosevic was Milosevic which , - imposed Owen plan, the rift rift the plan, Owen the . While Mil While .

led Milosevic to to Milosevic led co

in Cro in UN Protected Protected UN - had

ethnics more more ethnics sanctions on installed blessing atia and atia osevic .

This 184

CEU eTD Collection Serbia's Milosevic Tightens Pressure On Bosnian390 Serbs http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0510/10012.html Vuk by led Movement Renewal Serbian the like Others support. vocal only provided Djindjic Milosevic with clashed intransigent the behind support its threw materially wa ethnics they polici defiant adopt to able were Martic and Babic both Simultaneously,implemented. fe Serbian from support the and regime, partiesopposition prevented the regime Karadzic change. the to opposition of absence the power, medic and food government FRY severe including the when However, RS. the against moves punishment unpopular from himself restrained Milosevic elections, upcoming opposition political Serbian majority. Serb a with them of three and cantons Owen presented planwas Sarajevo Karadzic regimeMilosevic the ared

Jonathan S. Landa JonathanS. S. Finally, RSK.

could rely on their co their on rely could losing security and political privileges if any of the proposed plans were signed and and signed were plans proposed the of any if privileges political and security losing RSK’s defianc RSK’s cohere more was regime SDS the Bosnia, In . , but also dependent on Serbian support despite facing despite support Serbian on dependent also but ,

This did not prevent Karadzic from defying Milosevic’s dictate. Milosevic’s defying from Karadzic prevent not did This s popular with the elites and electorate, the Serbian political opposition vocally or or vocally opposition political Serbian the electorate, and elites the with popular s ines s y, Special to The Christian Science Monitor Christian Science The to y,Special i tood aside tood aside when the Croatian army initiated initiated army Croatian the when ntroduced . 390 e partly came as a response to Milosevic’s reconciliatory policies. Itselites policies. reconciliatoryMilosevic’s to response a as came partly e

Unlike the fragmented RSK where different strongmen vied for political for vied strongmen different where RSK fragmented the Unlike Sm opsto pris uh s h Dmcai Pry e b Zoran by led Party Democratic the as such parties opposition Some .

to the warring Bosnia of theplanproposed division parties; the into - ethnics in FRY for some military support. support. military some for FRY in ethnics , Karadzic Karadzic ,

while

tmoay lcae n h Drina the on blockade temporary a

its agentits inAugust perished 1995 rejected the plan to Milosevic to plan the rejected

RS assembly RS norgd y h spot rm h entire the from support the by Encouraged nt under the political leadership of Radovan of leadership political the under nt rebel leaders rebel a ,

M counter ay

10, 1993 10,

refused the 1994 Contact Plan Contact 1994 the refused

- a weak a offensive against the RSK, the the RSK, the against offensive , especially when they when especially ,

utn out cutting ’s .

Given that Given

disappointment er

central government in in government central

In 1993, the Vance the 1993, In

a ll . back

goods ing the co the ing es because because es .

With

openly ex cept cept

185 ten the the - -

CEU eTD Collection of case The survive. to are they if sponsors their to stick to need they and government target probed Theories PortabilityThe of even Milosevic’s whenthreatened political survival. they to adhering stubbornly lines” “red Belgrade’s overestimated RSK and RS the both How punishment. Milosevic’s of risk the minimizing while agenda his further to support sought Karadzic Serbia, in sentiment nationalist the on Playing elections. the a Karadzic allowed it material, than vocal more was support this though Even opposition. Serbian the from had support therefore, SDS, Bosnian The Plan. Group Contact the rejected latter the when Karadzic sup unstable the Despite Milosevic. the to ties with party Kos Vojislav with cooperated Karadzic. to support his offered Seselj plan, Milosevic. to ally alternative an as himself to maintain RSK in party Moreover, in1993. withMilosevic fallout disobedienceafter the Vance in battlefront the Radical Serbian the and Draskovic -

Owen plan (his party was in coalition with Milosevic at that time), he encouraged RSK’s encouraged he time), that at Milosevic with coalition in was party (his plan Owen The mechanisms for the organizational theory organizational the for mechanisms The Seselj too, Bosnia, In in the context of asymmetric wars. asymmetric of context the in

uncompromisingran when positions they against Mil –

had Croatia and Bosnia. and Croatia nd his allies to mobilize elites and public opinion against Milosevic during Milosevic against opinion public and elites mobilize to allies his nd

presented himself as himself presented

Serbian Orthodox Church. Orthodox Serbian across tu salse te eb aia Pry rnh n 93 posi 1993 in branch Party Radical Serb the established nica who led the led who nica

Party Wars and Periods and Wars

Although Seselj refused to support Babic’s rejection of the the of rejection Babic’s support to refused Seselj Although ot rm h Dmcai Pry Didi as backed also Djindjic Party, Democratic the from port

an led by Vojislav Seselj, had sent their paramilitaries to paramilitaries their sent had Seselj, Vojislav by led

In these conflicts, these In alternative all alternative When the RS leadership rejected the Vance the rejected leadership RS the When I

adto to addition n

Democratic Party of Serbia, a small nationalist nationalist small a Serbia, of Party Democratic Kostunica always sided with sided always Kostunica that I outlined above, outlined I that

- Serb leader Serb

rebels are much weaker than the the than weaker much are rebels Seselj’s

osevic’ Seselj

– allowing RSK leadership RSK allowing s demands. Radicals, Radicals,

who ran a branch of his of a ran branch who have have Karadzic Karadzic

public use to hitherto their policies policies their

against tio - Owen Owen

ever, been been n also in 186 g

CEU eTD Collection 391 Republ Democratic and Liberia to Bosnia and Tajikistan from warfare of character the in shift a to leading states collapsing or weak very against rise to rebels revolutionary) than (rather opportunistic perish. or strategies consequence their transform to left and support of deprived were movements Cold the SPLM/A RENAMO, Rouge). Khmer FMLN, (e.g. government Fatah, the unseat others helped and [1980s]), (e.g. movements some of lifetime the prolonged significantly (1979 the answered a adopt would movement attract To support. foreign needed desperately against launched etc. ambushes of test ifthese expl split theory thi but Mujahideen, Afghan o is 3 Chapter in Kashmir

Balcells and Kalyvas (2010) Kalyvas and Balcells combatants fighting against a much stronger government using hit using government stronger much a against fighting combatants superpowers ting - 1992), Angola (1975 Angola 1992),

performs During the Cold War, civil conflicts were conflicts civil War, Cold the During

h regime the my datasetinto

in the countryside, in the by one of the superpowers the of one by War , the loss of massive foreign support to both governments and rebels andgovernments both to support foreign massive of loss the ,

Poorly equipped Poorly

anations can time, travelacross

n te emnto of termination the and in other wars and periods. and wars other in r hi allies their or . But asymmetric and symmetric warfare using Kalyvas’ classification. warfareasymmetric symmetric Kalyvas’ using and

n iiat uft wr mc wae ta te government, the than weaker much were outfits militant ne such conflict. In this Chapter, I briefly analyzed the case of the the of case the analyzed briefly I Chapter, this In conflict. such ne

- anti 2002), Mozambique (1979 Mozambique 2002), from cnlc ws lo asymmetric also was conflict s

- and mostly ideologically mostly and le rvdd mltr spot to support military a provided where they woul where they ftist or ftist . At that time, t time, that At anti superpower

nti scin I section, this In - rightist ideology and hope that its call w call its that hope and ideology rightist

s dominated by irregular warfa irregular by dominated ing as War theCold a threshold. sproe o rgoa hegemon regional or superpower a d draw onpopular support here asymmetric - - 1992), to name few. few. name to 1992), sponsored sponsored - ic of Congo, foreign support foreign Congo, of ic were a were driven S fr I ae o tested not have I far, So .

first , these movements w movements these ,

ee movements rebel plenty of cases where where cases of plenty o ovninl wars. conventional to proxy warfare many rebel rebel many warfare proxy ran regression analysis aft analysis regression ran - and - run tactics, sabotages, tactics, run

T to he re re start a revolution start arevolution W – has encouraged encouraged has foreign

Afghanistan : a ith the end the ith

small group small ere , a rebel rebel a , and has been has 391 either of of either o my how

ould support usually usually

Then

From As they they 187

be of of er er a I

CEU eTD Collection to sponsors capable more expect states neighboring or hegemons regional by sponsors as replaced largely been have superpowers the Additionally, sponsors. their against important more be should and factions. particular the to but itself sponsor leadership factions and commanders conflicts parties belligerent wars of case the is which hasWar usheredin shou we non sponsors may networking transnational of relevance t longer much survive to rebels by characterized are which wars, it but present, - statewithout actors i my e rvn y dfeet ehns. Due mechanism. different a by driven be may it , explanations? alternative and my for shift this of consequences the are What In addition, rebels may be more capable to resist their sponsor’s their resist capablemoreto be In mayrebelsaddition, ld expect ld . hip Potential Potential . Any defection coming out from such a change may not be directed toward the the toward directed be not may change a such from out coming defection Any .

given that weapons and equipment c equipment and weapons that given played

rebels to be less committed to their sponsors given that the end o end the that given sponsors their to committed less be to rebels more symmetricmore conflicts. changes in the command and control and command the in changes orga rebel asymmetric asymmetric

minor strings attached.

h ae istsid ih hi sau o te aaeet f their of management the or status their with dissatisfied are who n ovninl wars conventional in

nization role warfare.

be more effective in effective more be a bfr ee wtot frin pno. h growing The sponsor. foreign a without even before han opportunities/grievances

h blne f power of balance the than during the Cold War Cold the during than

a suffer may While my theory may hold in the context of context the in hold may theory my While

h a who

My theo My have e es aal states capable less re , and stronger rebels are expected to defect defect to expected are rebels stronger and , ould

ee organizational fewer also

ry perform

deter be delivered or purchased from militant from purchased or delivered be

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nst their external benefactors could have devastating consequences for their armed their for consequences devastating have could benefactors external their nst CONCLUSION

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AND POLICY IM

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pressures may be severe including sanctions or threat of force. A sponsor may cave may sponsor A force. of threator sanctions including severe maybe pressures argeted killings, kidnappings and skirmishes weaken the ties between the rebel rebel the between ties the weaken skirmishes and kidnappings killings, argeted ponsors. ponsors. doae etan i eeuig fesv oeain aant h target the against operations offensive executing in restraint advocate

file prompting commanders and factions to reconsider their loyalty to to loyalty their reconsider to factions and commanders prompting file - fire, fire,

peace talks and proposals. All these forms of reconciliatory reconciliatory of forms these All proposals. and talks peace d ie t h hns f h tre gvrmn ad rivals and government target the of hands the at file nd ebels give in, this may create discontent among discontent createmay this in, give ebels - etaie ognztos r mr poe to prone more are organizations centralized s to cease cease to s - focused rebel movements. In movements. rebel focused hi spot o the to support their

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nd time, and retains statistical significance even when significance even statistical retains and time, nd such inhp ewe mlil sosr ad rebel and sponsors multiple between tionship another variable, another s aetn ad ahi ae xldd The excluded. are Kashmir and Palestine as tnc n ielgcl non ideological and ethnic .

osr ae iey o ufr l tps of types all suffer to likely are ponsors Particularly The Sponsor’s capacity becomes significant significant becomes capacity Sponsor’s

transnational support has indicated a a indicated has support transnational are more likely to disobey orders. orders. disobey to likely more are transnational transnational

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Chapter 4 Chapter finding is that is finding multiple rebel organizations seems to be detrimental to the discipline of sponsored sponsored of discipline the to detrimental be to seems organizations rebel multiple , using the case study of Kashmir, I analyzed how the change in Pakistan’s in change the how analyzed I Kashmir, of study case the using , ovision of training to a rebel organization decreases the risk of defection, defection, of risk the decreases organization rebel a to training of ovision rebel movements tend to defect against sponsors when they face w face theywhen sponsors against defect to tend movements rebel

outfits against its members. Weakened by the machinations machinations the by Weakened members. its against outfits militant outfits. militant - rebel violence which are not suited for statistical for suited not are which violence rebel

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sing given existing principal existing given sing ndian COIN, mutual clashes and fragile command and and command fragile and clashes mutual COIN, ndian

r raiainl tutr dcnrlzd n 1998 in decentralized structure organizational ir - e - Mohammad in the aftermath of 9/11 9/11 of aftermath the in Mohammad ralized militant outfits, Hizb outfits, militant ralized - agent explanations. One of One explanations. agent inst Pakistan. Both outfits Both Pakistan. inst connection that made that connection - fire with fire 20 0 .

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aitn Lskr a nvr sd t srnt ad oil oncin t bly h Pakistani the bully to connections social and strength its used never has Lashkar Pakistan, The findings from the quantitative and qualitative section of this dissertation indicate that indicate dissertation this of section qualitative and quantitative the from findings The the between discriminate not did defection for propensity the that is finding final The

nvr und gis is pno dsie h U the despite sponsor its against turned never s –

ae rvd ilyl o hi sosr n dfce a so as defected and sponsor their to disloyal proved have n the organization of rebel movements in conflict, and the impact the and conflict, in movements rebel of organization the n e ak n fl fo te eta cmad ht e t their to led that command central the from file and rank he e oe, mn te aitn otis dsie hi similar their despite outfits, Pakistani the among token, me ly a game between a sponsor and a rebel a and sponsor a between game a ly - un n aitns prah to approach Pakistan’s in turn – ecially those from Kashmir, from those ecially

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defect against their state sponsors, there are implications for broader broader for implications are there sponsors, state their against defect

lizes domestic rebels exacerbating the conflict intensity and and intensityconflict the exacerbating rebels domestic lizes

dlgto o voec fo gvrmns o rebel to governments from violence of delegation a h rsne i ti dsetto udrtns foreign understands dissertation this in presented ch

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interveners use a combination of incentives acoercioninterveners use tocontrol andmaterial but detrimental sponsor. toits

e not omnipotent omnipotent not e

sponsorships of rebels more durable or fragile, how fragile, or durable more rebels of sponsorships - ee te, hn ee cins eet gis their against defect clients rebel when ties, rebel oal, coas ae h aiiy f foreign of ability the take scholars ionally,

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- e - Taiba, while seeking to check their power by backing backing by power their check to seeking while Taiba, - ie vns mltr itretos n civil in interventions military events, time r militant agents. Some sponsors prefer throwing prefer sponsors Some agents. militant r icts. This dissertation has focused on the rebel the on focused has dissertation This icts.

further lationship with external players. Without Without players. external with lationship research. The first area is how external how is area first research.The

conflicts conflicts ither by ither 204

CEU eTD Collection IHowever,am end. an bringingto conflictain partiesare interested who third those dedicatedto w Implications Policy for andgovernments target therebels. and implicatio some suggest I section, next the In conflicts. armed to responses designing in interested policymakers for implications direct has framework presented against ci large out carrying from agents their prevent to institutions and affect advisors/trainers) foreign (e.g. rebels and norm ideational of combination the how explore could research future note, related a On Islamism). vs. Marxism (e.g. ideologies particular of influence the distinguishing or brethren, their toward states kin of commitment the emphasizing could agenda an Such victory. of odds and civilians against violence for propensity longevity,their andcohesion militant affectties ideational extent what to whetherand b rebel on focusing by ties common of influence the bracket I conflict. armed in behavior insurgent shapes ideology or ethnicity shared how theorize not Idid But defection. exacerbate rebels and sponsors t of finding The behavior. rebel to relate religion and ethnicity, ideology shared ofhow understanding underdeveloped its is of thisproject limits key the of One survival. and behavior organization, rebel affects agents their and sponsors r big erbe consequences. terrible bring ars Leaving aside the question of the legitimacy of armed conflicts and interventions, civil interventions, and conflicts armed of legitimacy the of question the aside Leaving the studies, conflict to dissertation this of contribution theoretical the from Apart nature the how examine to is research further for area second The vilians? ehavior toward their sponsors. Beyond this framework, future research could address could research future framework, this Beyond sponsors. their toward ehavior

T he policy implications that I draw draw I that implications policy he

i dsetto idcts ht tnc is between ties ethnic that indicates dissertation his s

s and specific institutional ties between sponsors sponsors between ties institutional specific and s rebel discipline. discipline. rebel ns for the third parties, sponsor parties, third the for ns Could sponsors use such norms such use sponsors Could - cl idsrmnt violence indiscriminate scale u i ti scin are section this in out

include arguments arguments include f is between ties of 205

CEU eTD Collection brawl their After sanctions. its against sanctions protégé economic introduced Milosevic and refused, leadership Serb Bosnian d newly a accept to leadership Serb Bosnian the demanded Milosevic Yugoslavia mounting on was thepressure policies. As line preserve hard its to decided and sanctions of effects the from suffered not Bosniahad in client ethnic its However, to solution peaceful asearch to regime the Milosevic the prompting economy,Yugoslav devastated particularly have Belgrade against sanctions economic The conflict. Bosnian of promises and Yugoslavia against threats credible used has party, third major the USA, the case this In support of number small a and of termination their support isseen as a softsolution. for return in sponsors to support military and financial giving whereas sta “stick sponsors. a on based state solutions proposed far with so have recommendations deal to how is implication s organizations interventionist. powers, purpos warmongering for (mis)used be also may implications policy these bottle, the from released been has genie the once that aware te sponsors. Economic sanctions and use of force are usually advised as a hard response, response, hard a as advised usually are force of use and sanctions Economic sponsors. te These policies have been successfuli been have policiesThese advances dissertation This oig ht y eeig h te wt hs let te S wud ae t economic its ease would USA the clients his with ties the severing by that hoping my

oiy conclusion policy aeil netvs o rai t ioae hm rm hi rsetv cins n the in clients respective their from them isolate to Croatia to incentives material

eig o ein epne t sae pnos n ter ee clients. rebel their and sponsors state to responses design to eeking with Milosevic, the Bosnian Serbs lost their only ally, which led to to led which ally, only their lost Serbs Bosnian the Milosevic, with - s dependent rebel outfits, such as, for example, Former Yugoslavia.example,Former foras, such rebeloutfits, dependent

r nt nedd o rmt ay oiia ve, seily not especially view, political any promote to intended not are

two es. Although preventing such a scenario is beyond my my beyond is scenario a such preventing Although es.

mlctos o gvrmns n international and governments for implications n cases of armed conflicts featuring a single sponsor singlesponsor a featuring conflicts armed casesof n rafted peace proposal by the Contact group. The The group. Contact the by proposal peace rafted

n em o sosr, ot policy most sponsors, of terms In - and - carrot” policy toward toward policy carrot”

the conflict.the

The first first The 206

CEU eTD Collection as such government target and sponsor sponsor attempts torenege agreementany stage. onthe at sanc with threaten should party third A shown. has bans future avoid to names their changing militants Pakistani of case the temporaryasand symbolic maybe rebelmovement a with disassociation the processbecause sho sponsor A outfit. important most the to least the from support of removal the negotiating by sponsorship of termination to approach incremental an adopt should party third The rebels. to support its cease sponsor the make to coercion using should it sponsor, the to assurance intelligence can and military party political, full third provide a Unless fragmented. and numerous are rebels the when especially country, eth support totheir approachthis rebelsdesert since more are combat. such likelyto particu In political the supportingwhile sponsor, the to incentives material offering approach: mixed a require would so doing conflicts, armed be ties the severe to ways for look should parties third reason, this For will. political a is there when even outfits militant multiple with ties the breaking of difficulty the reveals insurgency Kashmir in involvement Pakistan’s clients. peace conference. US a in participate to consent their to ultimately and battlefield the in losses their Such an approach may be effective where there is a non a is there where effective be may approach an Such the terminate to sponsors pressuring when careful be should parties third However, supp multiple involve often wars civil and rare are cases these However, lar, ethnic sponsorships of decentralized movements may be the most suitable type for for type suitable most the be may movements decentralized of sponsorships ethnic lar,

nic brethren as this may create a backlash and ignite violence within a sponsor awithin sponsor and igniteviolence a backlash create as may nic brethrenthis tions or use of force against a sponsor or a rebel organization if the if organization rebel a or sponsor a against force of use or tions - military efforts of target government against the militants.against the government targetof efforts military

h Sudan the tween a sponsor and most powerful outfits. In some some In outfits. powerful most and sponsor a tween - Chad proxy war. In these instances, third third instances, these In war. proxy Chad uld not be rewarded for each step in this this in step each for rewarded be not uld

territorial contention between a a between contention territorial orters and rebel and orters refrain from from refrain - sponsored 207

CEU eTD Collection Regional membership. to candidates and state member among government democratic fostering OSCE and EU The term. long in help may organizations Regional military. the from policy security and foreign over control gain to leadership elected of attempts as well as sponsors similar other and Pakistan in transition democratic comprehensive therefore, should, parties Third alliances. their and outfits militant many backs still and India towards hostile seems military the Pakistan, In against. is government the when even milita the with dealing armed cooperation. confrontation with replace can rivals bitter two even that gesture political significant a is it concession; economic an t more is 2012 of end the by India to status Nation Favored Most grant to decision Pakistan’s dialogue. composite 2004 the of initiation the with direction this in steps important but small occasion and steps small the Despite border. the across good and individuals their of movement the liberalize of and relations overall state the on focus to countries the for beneficial more even be may educat It opportunities. and health infrastructure, of level the is what down practical, more to territory controls materialsponsorship with incentives alone when rootcause mor ofconflict is the state tackle to parties third for impossible almost is it circumstances, these Under combined. Pakistan, is sponsorship and the India Israel, and Iran Eritrea, and Ethiopia between rivalries enduring Unfortunately, ceased. if support financial promise and mediation in step to advised are parties This dissertation has demonstrated that terminating sponsorship takes time and carefully and time takes sponsorship terminating that demonstrated has dissertation This non from agenda the redirect to important is it context, this In mn ohr, r aot tnct, ertr, dooy r oe f hs factors these of some or ideology territory, ethnicity, about are others, among ry and intelligence circles of sponsors who may be in favor of militancy militancy of favor in be may who sponsors of circles intelligence and ry al violation of cease of violation al

- to - at ise, nldn hw ertr i governed, is territory how including issues, earth - fire agreement, India and Pakistan have made made have Pakistan and India agreement, fire o, oil evcs n employment and services social ion,

ae lyd sgiiat oe in role significant a played have - negotiable issues as who who as issues negotiable e complicated. support a a support han han 208

CEU eTD Collection career. political or life luxurious amnesty, them promising by commanders, off buy to be would or decentralized tackling of strategy Another organizations. such punish or monitor effectively to unable are Sponsors chains. delegation longer generate JKLF like organizations oper its continue While organizations. toward a agreement. peace statelet Ukrainian eastern Ukraine. eastern in resolution conflict to shortcut a is Moscow, sponsor. a with on depend heavily organizations be must Counterinsurgency demise. their to lead o centralized dissertation this in shown As governments. to menace become sponsors foreign of help the with and manpower, and capabilities their increase to able are organizations centralized of Leaders non organizations such within followers how understanding BySyria. Iraqand in attacks out make that organization violent a ISISis The conflicts. armed in actors key standard mechanisms. conflict prevention could that programs design also should Unity African of Organizational or ASEAN as such areas, geographical other in organizations - tt atr operate. actors state n h ohr ad laesi treig il e oe fetv aant decentralized against effective more be will targeting leadership hand, other the On the are Organizations insurgents. with deal to how is policy for relevant area second The rganizations tend to be obedient and disciplined. Use of force against them will not will them against force of Use disciplined. and obedient be to tend rganizations

ations, the headless JKLF had to surrender to save its remnants. Decentralized Decentralized remnants. its save to surrender to had JKLF headless the ations, eoitn te em o triaig upr t pro to support terminating of terms the Negotiating eaiae Lashkar decapitated

Counterinsurg

il e oe unrbe to vulnerable more be will external support external ,

policy makers will be will makers policy ency should be adjusted to the nature of insurgents. insurgents. of nature the to adjusted be should ency

- upr smlr long similar support e - Taiba would most likely spawn a new leader and and leader new a spawn likely most would Taiba

, replaced with diplomacy. with replaced conflict resolution requires resolution conflict power is distributed between distributed is power counterinsurgency, and more inclined inclined more and counterinsurgency,

able to analyze why and how violent how and why analyze to able - term developments apart from from apart developments term Without - s strategies and carries carries and strategies s usa saee with statelet Russian Russia’s backing Russia’s

Because centralized Because

a rapprochement a

the

leaders and and leaders ganizations ,

209 the ,

CEU eTD Collection how their toward behavior rebel to respond structures analyzing organizational from how start should sponsors Understanding relationship. their in control and organization ot than sponsors their against commanders divide and approachtodisgruntled conquer the elites. nego of combination a is orders. disobey to tend organizations factionalized counterinsurgency since reach sponsor’s the d battlefield. the in losses suffered organization the after work only may however, strategy, This emoralized

militants’ internal evolvesmilitants’ over politics time.

the defect to prone more are groups armed some why understand to seeks project This crack to difficult most the are organizations Factionalized

factions factions rankfile be will more and likelytof . Negotiating with sponsors with Negotiating . . Killing . a ke fgtn ee i te t the if even fighting keep can tiations with the sponsor, the use of force against particular factions or or factions particular against force of use the sponsor, the with tiations the hers. Foreign sponsors and rebels constantly deal with issues of of issues with deal constantly rebels and sponsors Foreign hers. leaders

of factionalized organizations factionalized of over the termination of support is support of termination the over all prey togreed.

Counterinsurgency can succeed only if there there if only succeed can Counterinsurgency arget government invests heavily into into heavily invests government arget

when they are located within located are they when

will not end the conflict conflict the end not will warpressures

fruitless because because fruitless , and and , 210 A

CEU eTD Collection

United States United States United States United States Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Sponsor Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan China China China Egypt China

Jabha Jabha Jabha Jamiaat Jamiaat Jamiaat Jamiaat Ittehad Ittehad Inqilab Inqilab Inqilab Inqilab Hezb Hezb Hezb Hezb Hezb Hezb Hezb Hezb Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Hekmatyar Hekmatyar Hekmatyar Hekmatyar H Harakat Harakat Harakat Harakat Table ekmatyar Rebels Khalis Khalis Khalis - - - Mili Mili Mili Mili e e e ------i i i i i i i i ------e Islami e Islami e

i i i i Najat Najat Najat i i i i Islami Islami Islami Islami Islami Islami Islami Islami ------13 Islami Islami Islami Islami Islami Islami Islami Islami - - - -

i i i i . - - - -

State Sponsorships Included in Datasetthe

- - -

e e e - - -

APPENDIX A Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanist Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan A Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afg Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan fghanistan Target hanistan

Start Year End Year End Start Year 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1979 1979 1979 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 Sponsorship PeriodSponsorship

1991 1991 1991 1994 1981 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1982 1982 1982 1988 1988 1988 1991 1991

211

CEU eTD Collection

United States United States United States Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia South AfricaSouth Yugoslavia Uzbekistan Morocco Armenia Pakistan Pakistan Croatia France Congo China Zaire Togo Zaire India Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran

Defense Council Jabha Junbish Junbish Hizb Sazman Mahaz Mahaz Mahaz Mahaz Samiti/Shanti Samiti/Shanti Jana Samhati Jana Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanis Afghanistan Republic of Republic of Harakat Karabakh Nagorno Islami yaIslami yeIslami yeIslami yeIslami yeIslami Pasdaran yi yiIslami Croatian UNITA UNITA UNITA UNITA UNITA UNITA UNITA Serbian Taliban Taliban Sepah Bahini FNLA - -

Mili Mili Islami e i Wahdat ------Najat - i i i i i Milli i Milli - - - - i Na Milli Milli Milli Milli Milli - - tan i

- sr

e - -

(Chittagong Hill Herzegovina Herzegovina Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Bangladesh Bosnia and Bosnia and Azerbaijan Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola Angola Tracts)

1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1992 1993 1975 1991 1975 1986 1993 1975 1977 1976 1993 1975 1995 1995 1994 1993 1989 1980

1988 1992 1989 1989 1989 1989 1988 1995 1994 1 1994 1995 1992 2000 1988 1999 1978 1995 1979 1998 2010 1995 1995 1994 1992 977

212

CEU eTD Collection

United States United States Yugoslavia Venezuela Thailand Thailand Rwanda Rwanda Liberia Liberia Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Egypt China China China Libya Libya Libya Libya

Democratization Liberation Front Liberation Front Liberation Front Movement for Khmer Rouge Khmer Rouge Khmer Rouge Development Herzegovina FROLINAT FROLINAT RFC (UFR) Republic of The Khmer The Khmer The Khmer Bosnia and UFDD National Peoples’ National Peoples’ National Peoples’ MPIGO Serbian Krajina MPRD GUNT FUCD CNDP FARC FPRN RCD FAN FAN FAN FUC FAP MJP and -

Ivory Coast Republic of Republic of Ivory Coast Democratic Democratic Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Columbia Croatia Congo Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad Chad

2002 1983 1980 1981 1980 1979 1968 1998 2006 1991 1999 2006 2005 2006 2007 2006 1983 2005 1981 1979 1977 1977 1991 1968 1969 2002

2003 1991 1988 1990 1994 1991 1973 1999 2008 1995 2012 2009 2006 2009 2009 2009 1986 2006 1986 1982 1982 1982 2002 1969 1977 2003

213

CEU eTD Collection

Saudi Arabia United Arab United Arab Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh Emirates Emirates Pakis Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Somali Somalia Uganda Uganda Uganda Zambia Bhutan Eritrea Russia Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Syria Iraq Iraq tan

Harkat Al Jihad ForceAl Jihad Mujahideen Mujahideen NSCN NSCN Republic of Muslimoon EIJM Ikhwan Abkhazia Al Umar Al Barq Hizbul Hizbul NDFB WSLF ONLF AFDL AFDL NLFT SALF TPLF EPLF EPLF EPLF PWG MLC RCD PLA OLF ELF ELF ELF ELF ELF - ul - - -

AS Ansar

Republic of Republic of Re Republic of Democratic Democratic Democratic Democratic Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Georgia Eritrea Congo Congo Congo Congo Congo public of India India India India India India India In India India India dia

1978 1978 1976 1975 1976 1996 1996 1998 1998 1992 1989 1993 1989 1991 1990 1998 1992 1992 2001 1996 1992 1997 1978 1976 1999 1977 1976 1977 1976 1978

1979 1980 1978 1977 1980 1997 1997 2001 2001 1994 2004 1999 1994 1998 1998 2000 1993 1996 2004 2004 1993 2003 2010 1983 2008 1980 1988 1979 1991 1979

214

CEU eTD Collection

BurkinaFaso United States BurkinaFaso Soviet Union Soviet South AfricaSouth Afghanistan Republic Ivory Coast Democratic Rhodesia Lebanon Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Uganda Algeria Guinea Jordan Congo Jordan Jordan China Egypt Egypt Egypt Libya Libya Libya Cuba Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria Iran Iran Ir Iran Iraq Iran Iran aq

Lashkar Liberation Front Baluch People's PartyBurma of Mujahadeene POLISARIO POLISARIO Mohammad Communist Communist RE RENAMO Hezbollah Hezbollah PFLP Jaish PDFLP PDFLP PALIR Hamas Hamas FMLN MNLF MNLF SCIRI LURD FSLN NPFL NPFL NPFL Khalq PFLP PFLP JKLF Fatah Fatah Fatah Fatah Fatah FDN RUF NAMO FPR PIJ PIJ - e - -

GC - e

Taiba

Burma/Myanmar The Philippines The Philippines Mozambique Mozambique SierraLeone El Salvador Nicaragua Nicaragua Morocco Morocco Pakistan Rwanda Rwanda Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia Israel Is Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel India India India Israel Israel Iraq Iran rael

1993 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968 1982 1986 1996 1988 2000 1989 1980 1990 1998 1975 1979 1975 1978 1982 1980 1977 1968 1975 1975 1989 1989 198 1990 1990 1993 2000 2007 1995 9

2012 1974 1970 1970 1970 1970 1988 1972 1970 1976 1976 1996 2001 2004 1994 2003 1990 1991 1994 2001 1988 1988 1977 1979 1990 1992 1980 1979 1983 1989 1991 1990 1990 2006 2006 2012 2003 2012 2007

215

CEU eTD Collection

Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Tanzania Vietnam Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiop Uganda Uganda Zambia Zambia Angola Angola Liberia Greece Eritrea Eritrea Eritrea Eritrea Sudan Sudan Sudan China China Libya Libya Libya Libya Israel Zaire Syria Chad Chad Cuba India India India Laos Iran

Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist ARS/UIC SPLM/A SPLM/A SPLM/A SPLM/A Anyanya Anyanya Thailand Thailand Thailand SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO Party of Party of Party of SLM/A SLM/A SLM/A WNBF EROS TELO LTTE SSDF SNM ANC ANC ANC ANC LRA ADF ADF PKK PKK PKK RUF RUF JEM JEM IRA

United Kingdom South AfricaSouth AfricaSouth AfricaSouth AfricaSouth AfricaSouth AfricaSouth AfricSouth AfricaSouth AfricaSouth SierraLeone SierraLeone Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Thailand Thailand Thailand Somalia Somalia Somalia Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Turkey Turkey Turkey Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan

1969 1978 1975 1975 1978 1976 1981 1981 1981 1981 1983 1985 1983 1982 1983 2006 1998 1997 1985 1995 1994 1997 1996 1993 1986 1984 1976 1976 1973 1995 1989 1983 1983 2004 2004 2004 2003 2004 1969

1972 1979 1978 1976 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1986 1988 1987 1984 1988 2008 1999 2000 1991 1997 2001 1998 1998 1999 1999 1998 1978 1978 1979 2002 1999 1984 1999 2005 2005 2008 2004 2009 1972

216

CEU eTD Collection

Mozambique Afghanistan Tanzania Zambia

ZANU ZANU ZANU IMU

Uzbekistan Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimba bwe

1974 1974 1974 1999

1976 1976 1976 2001

217

CEU eTD Collection

Year 1982 1983 1991 1989

China USA, Pakistan, Sponsor Arabia Saudi Saudi Syria Syria

Table Fatah Islami Jamiaat Fatah (Hekmaty Hizb Rebels Islami ar) 14

e . - - i

Enlisted Instances Rebel of Defection in the Dataset - reopen its office Damascus.in Ho with Fatahthe and allowed organizationthe to defiance Valley of eastern Lebanon. helping mutineers fighting in the Syria after he accused Syrian troops of Arafat faction of Fatahthe was expelled from allegedly backed split a within the Fatah. The Strip. As a consequence, the Assad regime over the fate of the West Bank andGaza non role for the PLO and called for Jordan and toward the Reagan plan, which provided no Arafat refused to follow its rejectionist stance Beirut. Deprived of Syria's aid Lebanon,in Le ceasefire with the Israeli troops invading toward Israel 1982,in when they agreed a to defiance without consulting Jamiaat's leader Rabbani. Massoud signed a truce with Soviet troops pressure from the both USSR andHekmatyar, compliance. However, in 1983, to easy the Hekmatyar's relations with the group, ISI had use often to Massoud. Although Pakistan hadexcellent with autonomythe Jamiaat's of commander desertion siding with USthe thein Gulf War 1991. of defiance Defection Type/Narrative banon and left PLOthe to their fate in - PLO Palestinians negotiateto with APPENDIX B

- - -

- denounced Saudi Arabia for their Syrians had changed policy their In 1988, April Syria reconciled

Rubin writes about ISI problems forces to coerce Massoud to

Bekaa wever, in

Israel

Barnett Rubin. 2002. Press C System International Collapse in the State formation and Afghanistan.of The Fragmentation Barnett Rubin. 2002. Source raids against Israel". "Arafat orders en The Guardian. www.lexisnexis.com 1986. friends?"of July 9 "Has PLOthe outrun The Times (London). www.le 1983. PLO".the July 6, and lost his hold on Arafat miscalculated Monitor. "How Christian Science www.lexisnexis.com; 1983. Expulsion". 27, June Comment onArafat's Broadcasts. "Syrian Summary World of Sources: BBC Pre YaleCT: University System International Collapse in the S Afghanistan.of The Fragmentation tate formation and T: Yale UniversityT:

ss, .

220. , New Haven, , New Haven,

xisnexis.com

d to 218

CEU eTD Collection

1969 1970 1969 -

Lebanon Syria

Fatah Fatah

fire against IDFthe andentered peace talks November 1989Arafat unilaterally ceased combat bases in the Bint Jbayl district in late accordthe by "setting upat half least adozen authorities." jurisdiction of military personnel, and submit the to internal discipline, provide a census of its supply. In returnthe PLO would maintain communications, medical evacuation, and matters including deployment, and designated liaison officers, on military coordinate with PLO,the by way PASC the of eArqub, and pledged that the army would Israel through specific corridors in the accepted the right of guerrillasthe "to attack institutions. LebaneseThe government also established alongside the Lebanese working through popular commi legal right to right manage to camps, the The Cairo agreement provided the Fatah the neighbors give to the Fatah sanctuary 1969. in defiance from Syrian the army". civilianin areas without prior permission uniformedor guerrillas and military vehicles activity andbanning the movement armed of Golanon the front by prohibi responded a to sharp rise in guerrilla attacks government. A source indicates that "Asad against the instructions of the Syrian up guerilla activities in the "Golan sector" Assad intensified 1969,in the Fatah stepped Syrianthe power struggle between J "Golan sector" bordering Israel. However, as reconnaissance and supply missions thein active military operations, reached with the authorities not conductto Fata defiance up propaganda activities against the Fatah. Syria and the rejectionist front who stepped with US.the Such move opposed by was h

generally adhered to the understanding

- -

For the Lebanon was coerced by its Arab

However, the Fatah s Lebanese civil and military first year after 1967,June

restricting itself to ting combat ttees ttees oon violated adid and

Studies, Insti Washington D.C., Searchthe for State Armed Struggle and Yezid Sayigh. 1997. www.lexisnexis.com Policy". Undermine Arafat's "Attempts to The Jerusalem Post. www.lexisnexis.com; November 25,1988. Studies, Insti Washington D.C., Searchthe for State Armed Struggle and Yezid Sayigh. 1997. tute tute for Palestine 187 192 for Palestine

- 193

219 , ,

CEU eTD Collection

1970

Jordan

PDFLP PFLP; Fatah;

with with helpthe sympatheticof Lebanese 1969 and early 1970,evading army controls overthrow of governmentthe was issued. September to join the fray andthe call for the Fatah revolutionary council decided on 8 After further clashes with the government, the guerrillas had been arrested various in areas. 160 wounded by Palestinian count, and 6 September, 33 persons had killedbeen and assassination attempt. By evening the 2 of what the authorities described as a deliberate convoy came firenear under the airport in inten refugee camps Amman. in Theviolence August, when the Jordanian army shelled sporadic clashes soured into insurgency on31 Arabthe ceasefire with Israel. Three days of strategy, the in view of the PFLP, was to end u offensive with all guerrilla and militia forces by splitting army the andlaunchingageneral leadership should assault the throne directly, PFLPthe argued that the Palestinian government building Amman. in In August by Total casualties were estimated 800at station andFatah rocketed the royal palace. also attempted seizeto the government radio dozens of foreign guests hostage. PFLP The two hotels in thecore of Amman taking PFL Jordanian armed forces and Fatah the and assault offi nder nder its command. key The a such to

12 June. In12 June. July PDFLP the raided a cers and soldiers". P in On10 June. June the PFLP seized sified next the day, after king

The armedThe clashes between the

Hussain’s - 1,000 0

256, 259 Studies, Ins Washington D.C., Searchthe for State Armed Stru Yezid Sayigh. 1997. titute for Palestinetitute 252, 255

ggle and - 220 ,

CEU eTD Collection

1971 1974 1970 1972 1970 -

Lebanon Egypt Egypt Syria

PDFLP PFLP; PLO Fatah/ PLO Fatah/ PFLP

Hussein accepted a ceasefire Israel with along defiance tighter restrictions. bases in the border r PFLP Following their Syria'swith longstanding rival Iraq. Golan sector PFLPthe limited disengagement forces of from the accept a final ce desertion protests organized by PFLP the andPDFLP. policy shift in July 1970without joining the buplan defiance attacks onLebanese airbases. Fatah re and infantry attacks onthe refugee camps. curtail the Palestinian guerilla through decided abrogateto Cairothe agreement and raids in return the government Beirutin Lebanon. But as Lebanon suffered Israeli instigateto According this to plan, the PLO was supposed became part of the Egypt HQ from Jordan Lebanon,to the organization assault Leftists. from andcutting its remaining with ties the expulsion 140 of PFLP and PDFLP supporters photograph onit. Nasir retaliated with the members Nasirof came from PFLP the andPDFLP public vilification. The harshest Left immediately launched a campaign of cautious in their criticism, the but Palestinian Arafat, as PLO chairman, and was dis Suezthe Canal. The Palestinian movement - GC membersGC were arrested and guerilla

united on its stand towards Nasir. t t Fatahthe reportedly criticized this -

sponded by carrying rocket out

After After the defeated PLO relocated its - - who paraded a donkey his with

- On 22 NasirJuly, and King Egypt and Jordan accepted Rogers

clashes with Israel southernin following Syrian decision to unholy asefire with Israel and a

egion were placed under -

GC decided alignto alliance, a number of - Syrian war Syrian design.

Fatah denunciation

were armor

Armed Struggle and Yezid Sayigh. 1997. Studies, Inst Washington D.C., Searchthe for State Armed Struggle and Yezid Sayigh. 1997. Studies, Inst Washington D.C., Searchthe for State Armed Struggle and Yezid Sayigh. 1997. www.lexisnexis.com July 29,1970. NEW YORK TIMES. Studies, Insti Washington D.C., Searchthe for State i itute foritute Palestine tute for Palestine tute for Palestine

253 340 314

- 315

221 , , ,

CEU eTD Collection

1988 1976 1975

Pakistan Syria Syria

PLO Fatah/ Inqilab Harakat Islami, Jamiaat Islami, Ittehad (Khalis), Islami Hezb Guinea PLO Fatah/ an Afghanist Islami ye Milli Mahaz an, Afghanist e Mili the Jabha e Islami,

Najat

- e

- - - - i - e i - - i - i - - organized massive a protest i defiance the commandersthe were 'on strike'." directto them m "showed increasing resistance ISI to attempts Mujahideen parties (except Hekmatyar) Soviet departure from Afghanistan 1988in all defiance Guéckédou Guinea. in destruction much of of t LURD forces in late 2000, leading to the broke between out the Guinean army and assault intervention. Lebanon after Syria decided to increase its Sidon, Tyre and other smaller towns across disarming withclashes the Syrian army by assault non members confiscated and both military and government detained hundreds of PLO representative Cairoin indicated that Syrian refugee camps. Soonafter this, the Lebanon and shellingthe of Palestinian denouncing Syrian the intervention in - military supplies.

- -

The ICGThe notes Report that a fighting On 5, June PLOthe entered armed - -

its paramilitaryits Rubin indicates that afterin the In 1975, April the PLO andLNM

ilitarily; someilitarily; said observers

he town of outposts in T n Beirut preemptively

Fatah ripoli,

The Key Ending to ICG Liberia: Report. Studies, Insti Washington D.C., Searchthe for State Armed Struggle and Yezid Sayigh. 1997. Studies, Insti Washington D.C., Searchthe for State Armed Struggle and Yezid Sayigh. 1997. University Press, System International Collapse thein Formation and Afghanistan. State The Fragmentation of Barnett Rubin. 2002. gional%20Instability to%20Ending%20Re %20The%20Key%20 africa/liberia/Liberia rica/west p.org/~/media/Files/af http://www.crisisgrou Ap Regional Instability. ril, 24,2002,ril, tute for Palestine tute for Palestine . Oxford 393 389 -

251 222 , ,

CEU eTD Collection

1998 1996 1995 1988

Pakistan Pakistan Arabia Saudi Saudi Iran

e Harakat Taliban Taliban Taliban an Afghanist ya - Islami

- party formedIran by 1989. in In retaliation, defian actions by the Taliban. the freeze in relations to certain unspecified extraditionthe of BinLaden, attributing “ Taliban official declared in October 1998. September 1998. At least this is what a Laden, Saudisthe ceased their support by repeteadly refused to hand over Usama bin the Taliban from July 1996. Since the Taliban defiance occassions. ISI demanded this from them onseveral Afghanthe rebel leader Dostum even defiance ISI.the captured Russian crew against ordersthe from decided prolongueto detentionthe aof defiance occurred Augustin when the Taliban operation without ISI approval. Another act of The Taliban has carried out that military spring 1995,which of was opposed by ISI. the defiance was defiance Tehran expelled HIA fromits territory. Saudi Arabia d ce

- - - -

The The Taliban refused to ally with One o Refused to enter Shia the unity Sau

the the initial attack onHerat in the di Arabia provided money to enied asking Taliban the for f thef examples of Taliban's ”

though

the the Taliban,” Rashid, Press New York University and the Taliban. NY: Reborn? Afghanistan Fundamentalism 1998. William Maley (ed.). Military Force, in: Taliban Became a Davis, How the 103 Palgrave Macmillan, Afghanistan Taliban in 2002. Neamatollah Nojumi. 1998. Presse Agence France Laden’s extradition,” asking bin for “Saudi Arabia denies October 6,1998 France Laden,”bin committee discussto Afghan “Taliban suggest University Press, & Beyond Warat Afghanistan in 2008. Abdulkader Sinno. Press, 82 New York University and the Taliban Reborn? Afghanistan Fundamentalism Maley (ed.). 1998. Taliban, in: William Pakistan and the Ahmed Rashid.

, 59,71;

The Rise of the Organizations , October 14, - -

Press “Pakistan and Saudi Saudi

. Cornell . NY: Agence , 84. - . NY:

233. 223

CEU eTD Collection

1992 1993

Yu Unit States goslavi a

of Srpskaof Republic UNITA (RS)

Milosevic bowed Westernto pressures to defiance party lost generalthe elections against the MPLA government as soon as his brokered cease defiance Bosnian Serbs. preserve communication with the army of military arms Yugo and Belgrade would continue to provide RS an embargo Furious of their rejection, Milosevic imposed notdid guarantee its merger with Yugoslavia. wouldplan decrease its territorial gains and UNof embargo. RS The Milosevic sought RS's ascuiscence getto rid wrecking havoc onYugoslav economy and Byplan. 1993western sanctions were the leaderhip of Bosnian Serbs acceptto the delivered a speech theto RS assembly urging issue to the Ass remained unmoved promissed and to take the Karadzic acceptto plan,the RS but President accept the Vance

- -

Savimbi not did adhere to the US In 1993Yugoslav President

against against RS.the However, -

embly. InMay,Milosevic fire and resumedfire fighting the - Owen plan. He demanded slav army would

objected because the

- tml om/1993/0510/10012.h http://www.csmonitor.c Bosnian Serbs Tightens Pressure On Serbia's Milosevic 1993 Monitor Christian Science Special to The Jonathan S.Landay, www.lexisnexis.com October 31,1992. BreaksPeace Down. Several Killed as Attacked With Dozens of Towns Luanda Airport, the Move Angola; in Opposition Troops on The Washington Post. www.lexisnexis.com; 1992. Report Rebels Angola in Are Attacks by Unita Times. Widespread The New York .

ed. October 31,

MAY MAY 10, 224

CEU eTD Collection

1981 1982 1984 -

S. Africa Thailand China;

(MNR) Renamo KPNLF

government signed the Nkomati accord (non de Cambodia. failure to attack the Vietnam in troops arms delivery to the KPNLF annoyed with its Another source reports that China withheld military to aid the KPNLF onMarch 12. leader Khieu Samphan, Beijing stopped its Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Khme resistance tripartite summit Peking in with attempts to foil proposedthe Khmer 1982, angered by SonSann's Rouge they but each time refused to doso. In leadership of KPNLF to ally the with Khmer less extent Thailand) put defiance to support but(...) rather the failure Pretoriaof majorany withdrawal material of or logistical report indicates, the cause for conflict "is not Maputo”.of The hostility Renamo. of As a and of “being the in league with the Marxists accused apartheidthe r Reportedly, in October a Renamo spokesman Pretoria's commitment to their cause. 1984, Renamo became concerned about aggression pact) with Mozambique March in fiance fiance fully support the MNR's political demands"

- -

After After the South African Throughout 1981 China (and to egime “betrayal” of pressure on the continuous r Rouger

www.lexisnexis.com 1985. Interests. January 23, Threat to SAfrica's MNR Activities a World Broadcasts. BBC Summary of Uppsala. Universi Africanof Stud Scandinavian Institute 73. nr. The Implications. Report Effects and A Critical Analysis of Post Mozambique in the Strategy Towards South African Robert Davies. 1985. www.lexisnexis.com 12, 1982. Cambodia. October Attack Vietnamese in Rebels Reportedly Noncommunist The Washington Post. www.lexisnexis.com 16, 1982. SonSann.to March Chinese military aid Suspension of Indochina; ReportsOther on World Broadcasts. BBC Summary of latest spate of talks Khmer leaders in outside support elude 1981 Thursday Unity, (Canada) Ma The Globe and Mail - Nkomati Period: ty of 5 - 62, at 33. 62, at rch 19, ies, 225

CEU eTD Collection

1995, 1976 1999 1988

China Libya Libya

PEC FUNCI MDD AT FROLIN

N dissappointed with Sihanouk's to decision desertion to changeto sides and join the government. struggle led the dissapointed unit from Wadai desertion Etkatou, emerged." was disowned, and a new leader, Guel described as an "act of betrayal." Medellah government 1999, in an act which the MDD exile to sign apeace accord with the fighting 1998, in Medellah returned fr 1995. Following abrief period of intense agreements with the Deby government in whole of the MDD, signed cease fire theseof factions, claiming represent the Medellah's dominant faction. In several fact, Unityfor andDevelopment the Western Armed Forces (FAO), the Action Chadianthe National Armed Forces (FANT), National Union for Democracy andSocialism, factions in these years: Youssou Sougoudi's The group was comprised of roughly five divides within organizatithe Medellah's leadership 1995,in though many desertion desert rather than defiance. patron's consensus I it code an as attempt to willingness to "exit the conflict" without involves Since this compromise forbid peace through negotiations would fail. backed regime Phnom in Penhand hoped his unilaterally negotiate with the Vietnam

negotiations with the enemy andthe

- - -

"The "The MDD reunited under In 1988Beijing grew The growing internal power

- seeking attitude

(AFUD), and on still existed. om - -

id=4136 anizatio ons/tops/terrorist_org edu/start/data_collecti http://www.start.umd. www.lexisnexis.com August 11,1988. support Sihanouk.for withholds usual International. China United Press www.lexi 1988. talks. February 12, unhappy over peace Sihanouk says China International. United Press 111 Publishers,Wiener Princeton Road toDisaster Darfur: TheLong Robert Collins. 2008. MillardJ. Burr and - 112. n_profile.asp?

: snexis.com;

Markus . 226

CEU eTD Collection

1976

Libya

FAN

sponsor unravelled when Qadhaffi annexed assault imprisoned. killed, seven wounded, and sixteen attacked by Habre's FAN. Libya Three Omchi, asmall oasis in the Aozou Strip, was force attempting raise to the Libyan flag at continued to deteriorate. Inlate July aLibyan rendezvous. Relations between them However, Habredid not show upat the meeting May in to resolve the c Libyan emissaries proposed aHabre demands, while Goukouni accepted. The FAN. Habrerefused caveto Libyan in heldbeen captive for over a year by Habre's Fransoise Claustre, a French official, who had Qadhaffi demanded the FAN t "chiefs" Aoziat village in the Aozou Strip. 1975, he organized gathering a the of rebel awedgedrew between the two men.In March supported the Libyans. Qadhaffi masterfully could not hide his jealousy toward Habre, opposed the occupation Gou while fractured after the Libyan move. Habre Aouzuthe strip in 1975.In fact, FAN further

Habre's his conflict with erstwhile

o release the onflict. kouni, who - Qadhaffi Qadhaffi ns were 108 Publishers,Wiener Princeton Road toDisaster Darfur: TheLong Robert Collins. 2008. MillardJ. Burr and - 110.

: : Markus . 227

CEU eTD Collection

1981

Libya

FAP

warlords gathered desertion from whom those hepersonally despised. reward for which was a demand withdraw to loss aof great deal of expensive materiel, the troops had suffered heavy casualties and the by petty the chi these conflicting statements andambiguities Qaddafi, not surprisingly, was infuriated with demanding immediate their withdrawal. decision of GUNTthe council ministersof around Ndjamena, in contradiction to the continuedthe declared publicly his unequivocal support for Ahmat Acyl, GUNT the foreign minister, would rearm GUNT the and deploy troops. that France, Qaddafi's archenemy Chad, in council and subsequentin interviews implied Goukouni must leave Chadby 31December 1981. wasJalloud informed that all Libyan troops prefectures. Libyan Ndjamena and Charithe evacuation of all Libyan forces from had unanimously demanded the immediate

- confirmed the decision of his

GUNT (a (a GUNT fragile group of

presence of Libyan troops eftains of GUNT. His Libyan around commander - Baguirmi

Goukouni's FAN)

in NDjamena,in

153. PublisheWiener Princeton: Markus Road toDisaster Darfur: Th Robert Collins. 2008. MillardJ. Burr and

e Long rs, . 228

CEU eTD Collection

1986

Libya

FAP

manipulations by the rebel leaders for the assault Oueddei, under house arrest in Tripoli. 135 Libyan troops to exchange Gouko for Aozou capture to huge a amount arms of and covered by Sukhoi jets between Faya and Libyan convoy guarded by T During its retreat the FAP destroyed large a Erdi into their sanctuaries in the Tibesti. plane but now outgunned, they retired FAP succeeded shootingin down oneLibyan command anembarrassing of defeat. The Acheikh who had just arrived to take air his force strafeto the Toubou to save Libyan expeditionary forces Chad, in ordered overrun, Colonel Khalifa, comma When CDRthe defenders were about beto launched a devastating on assault 5October. Acheikh's troops refused, the Toubou demanded that CDRthe surrender, but when regrouped, and encircled Erdi. They casualties onboth one another with enthusiasm. heavy After Arabsthe of the CDR Acheikh of slaughtered a tribal dispute, the Toubou Goukouni of and refused to intervene whatin they regarded as matched, andwhen the Islamic Legion (FAP). The two oppo disarm Goukouni's Popular Armed Forces placed under house arrest". The CDR tried to Acheikh Ibn Oumar's government,' hewas to Tripoli. When hedeclined 'recognize to Qaddafi. He was summarily arrested and sent orders protested his demotion and refused to follow control GUNT,of Goukouni publicly

from L the -

"During the convoluted ibyan military command or sides, the PAP withdrew, nents were about evenly - 62 tanks and nder of the of nder from

uni uni 153. Publishers,Wiener Princeton: Markus Road toDisaster Darfur: TheLong Robert Collins. 2008. MillardJ. Burr and

. 229

CEU eTD Collection

2004

Venezuel a

FARC

September 2004 a skirmish between assault 2004. operatives and financial blockade throughout group through detention the FARC of his regime increased the repression of the rapprochement Colombia. with In doing so, sought to improve external security through a strongman. Politically vulnerable, Chavez an abortive against coup Venezuela's Chavezthe regime the and rebels rest with abreakdown cooperationin between 1999.in The reasons for this attack probably Understanding signed between the two parties soldiers since the Mutual Pact of attack by FARCguerillas on Venezuelan group's Front. Tenth wasThis t attack from ambush wascarried out by the Venezuelan government found out that the FARC initially denied the involvement but the next to Sararethe River in the state Apure. of and the Venezuelan border guards occurred

According this to source, in he first such following

FARC IISS. 113 Reyes''Raul Secret Archive of Ecuador and the Venezuela,Files: 2011. Strategicfor Studies. International Institute The FARC - 114. . London:

230

CEU eTD Collection

1998

Rwanda

RCD

with differentwith backgrounds who wereunited desertion against against wishthe of its sponsor, Rwanda. organization attempted to exit the conflict desertion because the leader of the resources to the group. Coding this event as aafter petty quarrel over the distribution of he was toppled by Rwanda and oth grind their teeth in frustration". In early 1999, Kabila, "causing Rwandan commanders to called for a cease were blazing across the country, Wamba the first days of the rebellion, RCD as soldiers he had little influence over others.the From an academic, wasa nominal rebel leader, but different elements RCD. of Wamba Wamba, made during intense squabbles between clear leadership and all the decisions were A anti peasants and academics, and Mobutists and Composed socialists of and capitalists, Kabila and assume powerin Kinshasa. only by aim their to topple down President ccording the to source, it notdid have the - Mobutists wasMobutists it a diverse movement.

RCDwas acollection of - fire and fire and negotiations with er er leaders leaders

249 York: Public Affairs, War Africa.of New Congo Great and the Collapseofthe the Glory Monsters: of Sterns. Dancin Source: Jason K. - 250.

g in the 231

CEU eTD Collection

1994 1995 1996 1999 -

Pakistan Pakistan Rwanda

RCD Al Barq Ansar Harkat

- ul

- strategic town Lisala, the birthplace of desertion Pakistani government. caused considerable embarrassment to the ISI approve not did of these abductions as it members. The available sources indicate that aim trading of them f commenced series a of abductions with an defiance desertion. sponsor was against this policy and code it as involvement the in rebellion, I that the infer offer exit to the conflict amidst Pakistan's government. Since this move involves an advance the "dialogue process' the with Indian Forumthe Permanent for Resolution (FPR other rebel organizations formed member Bilal Lodi along members with of moneythe allocation, a faction led by asenior desertion Ugandan army. conflict, while Wamba joined the hostile officials fled their sponsor: Ngoma the left sponsor, Rwanda, because two RCD's or top code this Goma Ugandan for dia Wamba wholeft Rwandanthe controlled France, and the RCD leader Ernest Wamba Ngoma, senior RCD a officialwho fled to from Rwandan camp by Z'Ahidi Arthur latter. was This preceded by major desertions fighting alongside Ugandan troops chose the rebellion. Reportedly, most the of troops stay with Uganda andhelp buildit anew Kisangani and work the with Rwandans, or gave them achoice James Kazini, assembled the RCD troops and Mobutu, the Ugandan commander, General

- instance desertionas RCD's of

- - During 1994

In the 1999,after capture of After asplit in March 1996 over

— - controlled Kisangani. I or theiror detained senior either they will return to

- 1995, HuA

) to)

www.lexisnexis.com Camp. April Dissent In Rebel Moves Base Amid Kinshasa; Wamba Africa News. Congo www.lexisnexis.com 28, 1999. In Rebels Split, Wamba Uganda; Congo Africa News. 266. York: Public Affairs, War Africa.of New Co Collapsethe of the Glory Monsters: of Sterns. Dancing in the Source: Jason K. Jihadis Jammuin and Saxena Manish. 2003. Sreedhar and Sudhir SanthanamK. 371 Pe Nineties Kashmir in the The Lost Rebellion: Manoj Joshi. 1999. 105 SAGE Publications, Gallery Kashmir: APortrait Jihadis Jammuin and Saxena Manish. 2003. S SanthanamK. reedhar and Sudhir

nguin Books, 370 Kampala. January ngo Great andthe .

. New Delhi: . New Delhi: 9, 1999. 232 -

CEU eTD Collection

2000 1995

Pakistan Pakistan

en Mujahide Hizbul en Mujahide Hizbul

in earlyin 2002. Kashmiri political scene before he was killed comple establishing owngroup. his Darhad aimed to separation of the two sides Darwith faction and the loyalists ISI agreed has the After aseries clashesof between the Dar Dar's expulsion from Hizbul the 2001. in c has talks without having Pakistan onboard. This his followers were ready to continue further party chief Salahuddin. Even Dar worse, and India despite oppositionthe fromISI andhis announced a ceasefire with governmentthe of local commande senior commander of Hizbulthe supported by desertion tofile Indian security forces throughout 1995. reports massive surenders of Hizb rank and consequence of this fratricide, source a retreat from Indian the controlled J&K. As a challenged Hizb combatants and forced a Indiato after Hizb haddeci (MM) and Nawaz Azad who (MM), deserted those of Kuka Parrey (IUM), Shirir Khan Different counter the target of these same in 1994 outfits other Kashmiri militant groups, Hizb became desertion reated tensions in the group andled to tely leave the fighting and the join - -

Once a ruthles In July 2000,Abdul Dar,Majid a

rs fromrs Jammu andKashmir - insurgencygroups like s executioner of mated their ranks, - 1995.

129. SAGE Publications, Gallery Kashmir: APortrait Jihadis Jammuin and Saxena Manish. 2003. Sreedh SanthanamK. 105 SAGE Publications, Gallery Kashmir: APortrait k4.htm m/news/2000/aug/03j http://www.rediff.co available online August 3,2000, ceasefire offer, Dar to postpone Hizb Salah

- ud ar ar and Sudhir

. New Delhi: . New Delhi: - Din wanted Rediff : 233 ,

CEU eTD Collection

2003 2002 2001 1994

Pakis Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan tan

ul Ikhwan ad (JM) Mohamm Jaish ad (JM) Mohamm Jaish ad (JM) Mohamm Jaish n (IUM) Muslimee - - - - e e e - - -

desertion assault assault defiance

–

See Chapter 4

Paperbooks. India: Parity Valley thefrom Kashmir Monologues: Echoes 2003. Pradeep.Thakur, 426 India: Penguin, 425 Nineties Kashmir in the The Lost Rebellion: Manoj Joshi. 1999. India: Penguin. Kashmir Future: The Story of SearchIn of a David Devadas. 2007. See Chapter 4 See Chapter 4 See Chapter 4 Militant . New Delhi, . New . New Delhi,

Delhi, 234 -

CEU eTD Collection

1979 1994 1989

Pakistan Pakistan Iraq

and Jammu Eritrean (JKLF) Front Liberation Kashmir and Jammu (JKLF) Front Liberation Kashmir (ELF) Front Liberation

between the ISI and defiance redirect ELF'sit to factions. decided cutto off its support ELF for and Iran, wasdisappointed with this move and for financial aid. Iraq, long a desertion "Gandhian approach". renounced violencethe and adopted a pressures and in 1994 Yasinthe Malik faction JKLF's fragile organization succumbed to the counterinsurgency of across J&K. Coupled with the increasinf disarmament andkillings of cadresJKLF embarked onkidnappings, torture, Hizbul Mujahideen whose members decreased its support to the JKLF favorin of his removal. At the same time, Pakistan Amanullahthe Khan leadership demandi members commanders and openly challenged fractionalized group, when some senior serious internal crisis, turning a into desertion were rejected by the JKLF leadership. Committee as an observer. Both demands representative sit to on in the CentralJKLF also instead focus on "self stop calling for "sovereignty'' Kashmir for and its public message. The ISIdemanded JKLF ISIthe attempted to force the toJKLF change second half of 1989. Arif Jamal argues that

requested the appointment anISI of

- - There hadThere been significant tensions

In 1992/93 JKLF experienced In March 1979 E

JKLF leadersJKLF during the - the Indian army, the determination." ISIThe

- LF turned Iranto time rival of rival time

ng See Chapter 4 House, 146 York: Melville Kashmirin Untold Story of Jihad Shadow War. Arif Jamal. 2009. www.lexisnexis.com 18, 1979. Iraqi support. Augus rebel group loses (Canada). Eritrean The Globe and Mail . New .

The 235 t

CEU eTD Collection

2004 1980

Eritrea Syria

Liberation Eritrean (ONLF) Front Liberation National Ogaden (ELF) Front

Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), desertion threatening to cut the support otherwise. leadership continueto its struggle and talks or acease source indicates that Eritrea against is any ONLF leadership." Apparently, another Col Yusuf is the cau doing. Themeeting between Usman Mr and "without each knowing whatthe other is Ethiopian embassies Londonin andNairobi, holding separate talks with officials from the secretary chairman, Mu ONLF,the with the ONLF Ethiopia movethe divided has the upper echelons of government. The report also points out that chairman London in and the Ethiopian had organized talks between ONLF's the an ONLF President Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf defiance relations with Ethiopia. its suppor Mengistu regime. Syria immediately ceased decided pursueto cease cornered, and fragmented the ELF leadership EPLF to or the Ethiopian Army. Demoralized, neighboring Sudanor deserted theto rival commander Reportedly, by November hundreds of ELF ELF began disintegrating in August 1979. - - t and established diplomatic general, Muhammad Dolal Sirad

- an unconfirmed notes report that

s and s and fighters have either fled to after a series of defeats dealt by hammad Usman Umar the and - fire pressingfire ONLF the se ofse the rift between the

- fire with fire with the - based based

Ethiopian ONLF World Broa BBC Sumary of www.lexisnexis.com 5, 1980. collapse. November guerrilla arm near (Canada). Eritrean The Globe and Mail www.lexisnexis.com 2004. disbanded. June 2, vergethe being of rebel movement "on dcasts. 236

CEU eTD Collection

1992 1978 2010

Yugoslavi Eritrea Libya a

Liberation Oromo (MNLF) Front Liberation National Moro (OLF) Front of of Krajina Republic Serbian

Brigadier General Kamal Galchuu attempted desertion Hadzic, Milošević a loyalist. replaced President as of the RSKby Goran 26 February 1992,Babić wasdeposed and though hewas overruled by assembly. the On RSK,of strongly opposed the Plan for cease arms, fuelandmoney, accepted the Vance President Milosevic, RSK's key of supplier defiance 1978. governmentthe of Philippinesthe in March while Abuthe Khair faction surrendered to MNLF Leadership, was coopted by Egypt, The Salamat faction, also known as Newthe t Abu Khair Alonto, one of the few top leaders election and expelled Salamat Hashim and Supported by Libya, Misuari rejected the ideological decadency and corruption. chairman, NurMisuari, of authoritarianism, newly elected leadership accused the previous factionalism andsplits within the group. The Hashim MNLF's as Shairman triggered congress in Mecca, electionthe Salamatof desertion failed.bid and the Ethiopian government when Kamal’s and some even defected to other movements cadres “southernin Oromia” quit the party Daawud admitted that anumber OLF of not Daawud’s leadership. Apparently Eritrea did committee and central committee confitrmed Toward autumn,the OLF'sexecutive unsuccessfully claimed the leadership. from Ethiopian the army 2006, in Chairman Daawud. Kamal, who deserted wrestto control of the p o remain in Philippines,the from the MNLF. back general Galchuu's Chairman bid.

- - In February 1992, Yugoslav

In December 1977at the party's In summer the 2012 of former - fire. Milan Babic,fire. the President arty leadership from

Plan even William Larousse. leaders/ s news/or horn http://ayyaantuu.com/ Update Somali gence.com/N49 http://www.n49intelli Gregoriana, 158 Università Editrice Pontificia Investigations. Rome: and Intercultural 2000 Philippines): 1965 Mindanao Relations in Muslim Living for Dialogue: 2001. - takes - . Interreligious of A Local Church - - - - - on

Region omia/wikileak Ju africa Christian - ly - olf Sulu - 2010.pdf - - - - - 159; 159; - 237

CEU eTD Collection

1981 1990

Nicaragua Cuba; Vietnam; Union; Soviet Rwanda

Patriotic Rwandan (FMLN) Front Liberation National Marti Faribundo (RPF) Front

rebels defiance make any attacks. assignments, and that RNthe faction thein LaUnion area refused carry to its out central command that the found ERP faction For instance, afollow FMLN's factions sinchronizeto their attacks. disasterthe stemed from failure the of town. The source reports thatthe reason for failure as the guerillas did not capture a single countries. The operation turned out to be a ofhelp Nicaragua, Cuba and other socialist down government the El of Salvador with the so defiance Museveni sanctioned the invasion. although it still remains unclear whether consultation’ had launched the invasion ‘ knowledge however, claiming that the Habya position in future refugee negotiations with Uganda andthe possibility astrengthened of interfering, including stability western in Museveni had several motives not for notdid explicitly support it. Museven Gerard Prunier argues that Uganda's President involvement was immediately speculated. border from Uganda Rwanda. into Uganda's national army their left posts crossed and the dressed thein uniforms the of Ugandan - called "Final called

rimana. Museveni himself denies any followed by onehundred combatants i was aware of the RPF's plans, but - -

On 1October 1990, fifty RPF In FMLN 1981,the launched the . caseThis is coded as defiance Offensive" aimed at toppling

- up report byup report FMLN the witho “ Apparently, ut prior ”

failed to

RPF Co. Publishers, 93 London: C.Hurst & aGenocideof 1959 The Rwanda Crisis, Gérard Prunier. CT: Praeger,CT: 19. Guerrillas Salvadoran FMLN ofTactics the 1995. David E.Spencer. Bracamonte and AngelJose Moroni – 1994: History Strategy and . Westport, .

1995.

- 238 98.

CEU eTD Collection

1982 2008

Eritrea Ethiopia

for for the Alliance (SSDF) Front Salvation Somali C) (ARS/UI Courts Islamic Union of Somalia/ of liberation Re

into into two factions: one based Djibouti in and desertion SSDF's leadership. eventually resulted thein destruction of the Ethiopian claim, causing a power struggle that Ethiopian army. SSDF The disputed the Ethiopia t Addis Ababa maintained werepart of remained Balumbalein and Goldogob, which ceased. However, Ethiopian/SSDFthe units support Somalia,to the Ethiopian attacks United States provided emergencymilitary Goldogob, onthe Somali side. occupied villagesthe of Balumbale and SSDF expelled the enemy forces and Ogaden Liberation Front. The Ethiopians and byheld Somalia's army andits proxy (SNA) southern border with Somalia which were offensive at several points along Ethiopia's together with SSDF combatants l defiance and Ethiopia under Eritrea's patronage. fighting Somali the Transition Government fighting, while Amsarathe faction co transitional government andlargely stopped faction signed a peace deal with Somalithe otherthe in Asmara, Eritrea. The Djibouti - hat had been liberated by the

– On 30, 1982,June Ethiopian army,

“ In 2008ARS/UIC fragmented ”

“ After the aunched an ntinued ”

malia1978b.htm m/aced/data/sierra/so http://www.onwar.co Database Armed Conflicts Uppsala University

239

CEU eTD Collection

2008 2009 1986

Sudan Sudan India

Ee Tamil (UFR) RFC ntal Fundame UFDD (TELO) ion Organizat Liberation lam

launched an offensive against TELO camps in desertion confession Chadian opposition. Sudan was by Erdemi's denied him aleadership role a in u refused Ghosh's demand because Khartoum weeks. The source indicates Erdemi that Chad's Idriss President Deby within two that they launch arenewed offensive against other Chadian rebel leaders anddemanded with the leader RFCof Ti director General Salah Ghosh reportedly met Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) defiance Khartoum not did approve their of action. Fundamental formations. Apparently, were from Adouma Hassaballah's UFDD from Sudanon3September. The ex former Chad rebels crossed back into Chad desertion possible. keeping many as groups Tamil afloat as group seem civilian life. The end of TELO armed as desertion of members who went back to its annihilation sources report "massive" could reanimate organization.the Following over the reins of the TELO Madras,in but he With t killed LTTE'sin onslaught on May 6,1986. TELO's Sri leader, Sabarattinam, was also northeast,the killing over 150TELO fighters. he decapitation of TELO, Selvam took

- -

On February 28,National "not happy" about his decision.

s to gos to against India's of interest Reportedly, as many 1,50 as On April 29,1986 LTTE the man Erd e nited mi and - rebels rebels 0 -

Wikileaks Cables. www.lexisnexis.com May 7,1986, rivals. Tigers claim of defeat Hawksley H. Tamil www.lexisnexis.com 2, 1986, The Guardian. rival TELO faction. reports victory over Lankan group rebel Hawksley, H. Sri sudan sudan M311/?q=erdimi%20 cable/08KHARTOU http://dazzlepod.com/ March 3,2008. Renewed Offensive. Khartoum's Push for Erdimi Rejects Cables.Minawi: Wikileaks %20sudan OUM397/?q=erdimi com/cable/08KHART 2008http://dazzlepod. Deby. March 17, Move to Topple While Other Rebels LandPlans Grab RFC'sChad: Erdimi Wikileaks Cables. D%20sudan MENA381/?q=UFD .com/cable/09NDJA 2009.http://dazzlepod SeptemberRebel. 4, Defection Confirms Massive SRSG Angelo

The Guardian.

From

May 240

CEU eTD Collection

2009 2006

Sudan Sudan

FU FPRN C

support and an alleged payment $5.5 of desertion case case defianceof FPRN of toward Sudan. other Chadian armed groups. This is aclear year, Yakoub defied orders mergeto with mines. Another source reports that i activities south El of Geneina including laying Sudan's demand were and conducting militant Adoum Yakoub's FPRN refused caveto in decision, other movments, specifically Mahamat Nouri's UFDD complied with the some proxiessuch as ImanErdimi Mahamat reportedly complained that while foreign minister of the Sudan, Moussa Faki Sudan JEM. Khartoum restricted the access to response Ndjamena'sto "pacification" of curb the activities of its C defiance clear that Su desertion because sourcesthe donot make it failed "suicidal" attack. This is coded as As result, a his ranks were annihilated in a reinforcement or the consequences of failure. no regard adequacyto supply of lines, traveled secondary rounded uphis fighters in the East and attack onN'djamena was a disaster. Nour with options".few Apparently FUC's April which rendered Nour's party force a"spent was also prompted by asetback April in in DeTripoli peace agreement with the Deby government Chadian rebel leader Mahamat sign Nour to a Gadaffi may have combined to induce million from Libyan President Moammar - Chad border to its clients However, -

- As of 2008 the Sudan decided to

The withdrawal the of Sudanese dan supported FUC’s move. cember 24.It appears that FUC

roads to N'djamena with hadian proxies in 's UFR and n the same

an 18/?q=erdimi%20sud cable/07NDJAMENA http://dazzlepod.com/ 2007. One Less. January 9, FUC'swith Nour Deby Accord Peace Wikileaks Cables. Rapprochement.pdf Sudan Dimensions Regional 25 papers/HSBA dmin/docs/working surveysudan.org/filea http://www.smallarms dan 601/?q=UFDD%20su cable/09NDJAMENA http://dazzlepod.com/ 15, 2009. Rebels In. December "On Track," Chad Chad Wikileaks Cables.

- Local - Sudan Detente - - - and - Chad - - WP -- - - 241

CEU eTD Collection

2007 1972

Israel Chad

Anyanya t (JEM)t Movemen Equality and Justice

with weaponswith and training andalso sent three desertion subsequently assassinated by JEM. Sudanesethe government. Duda was outposts and even signed an agreement with from Al his As result, a Duda an "totalitarianism" of JEM's leader Dr. Ibrahim. Apparently, the latter were dissatisfied with senior member Abdulmajied Duda. JEM's central leadership and the followers of there was some factional infighting between desertion sponsor’s prior knowledge backing. and terminated peacethe codedis as desertion because the outfit situationthe histo Israeli contacts. This case deal". Lagu even flew Nairobito explainto "Israel was somewhat upset by peace the taken without aconsultation Israel with and commander LaguJoseph According the to Anyanya leader and known Addis the as Ababa Accords. Anyanya leadership accepted the agreement religious and cultural autonomy year, that the government. When Khartoum offered reconsider peace talks with Sudanesethe refueling in Kenya. The rebels were forced to Sudan by planes flying over Ethiopia and other being anexpensive airdrop into southern route for running arms SouthSudan to came end an theto use Uganda of the as main Kampala and Egypt andLibya, closed Israel's embassy in Ugandan President Idi Amin, pressed by supplied through Uganda. However, 1972, in advisors South to Sudan. The weapons were - -

- Israel provided movementthe Reportedl Aranga desered tribe their

expelled all Israelis. With this d a group 100 of fighters agreement without y, in February 2007, , this move was

the the

1.339712 bitterness end/leaving m/weekend/week http://www.haaretz.co January 28,2011. bitterness behind. Haaretz. Leaving ml?rsnpid=204037 ondaily.com/details.ht http://news.sudanvisi

- behind - - - s 242 -

CEU eTD Collection

2006 2008

Chad Chad

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