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Caught in the Crosshairs of Militancy by Jawad Falak, Zeeshan Muneer, Hassan Riaz and Ousama Khurshid Khan

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Caught in the Crosshairs of Militancy by Jawad Falak, Zeeshan Muneer, Hassan Riaz and Ousama Khurshid Khan Quetta: Caught in the crosshairs of Militancy by Jawad Falak, Zeeshan Muneer, Hassan Riaz and Ousama Khurshid Khan Research Brief www.cscr.pk QUETTA BLAST: THE LOSS OF A GENERATION Pakistan's military with the backing of civilian government and the entire nation has clamped down on terrorist hideouts and networks across the country. The large scale military operation Zarb-e-Azb, which gained momentum after the massacre of school children in APS Peshawar by TTP terrorists, has restored the writ of the government in FATA and has largely reduced the capabilities of terrorists in Pakistan. However, the terrorists leadership survived the wrath of Pakistan Army by retreating to safe havens in Afghanistan. The terrorists having been unable to capture and control territory as they used to, are now resorting to suicide attacks against soft targets to make their presence felt. One such attack was conducted on August 8, 2016. The well planned and coordinated attack resulted in the deaths of at least 93 people, lawyers being half of them. On the morning of August 8, President Baluchistan Bar Association, Advocate Bilal Anwar Kasi, was murdered near Mengal Chowk on Manno Jan Road by assailants on motor bike. Distance between target killing of Kasi and Civil Hospital The body was taken to Government Hospital where senior lawyers and members of Baluchistan Bar Association gathered to pay respect. In a well conceived plan, the terrorists dispatched suicide bomber to the same hospital where they correctly predicted the arrival of large number of lawyers, media persons and social activists. The suicide bomber blew himself in the middle of the gathering killing and injuring a large number of people. The victims included the senior lawyers, members of Bar and barristers which practically wiped out much of the senior tier of lawyers in Quetta. Investigating agencies and senior security officials have stated that the attack targeted the lawyers community. According to them, attackers killed President Baluchistan Bar and attracted maximum number of lawyers away from the security of the district courts to the hospital where the suicide bomber blew himself. The attack has been condemned by international community which expressed grief on the huge loss of life. Prime Minister, the Army Chief and leaders of various political parties visited Quetta to express solidarity with the families of victims. The attack has been claimed by Jammat ul Ahrar and Islamic State. Baluchistan is a province which is already marred by sectarian violence, insurgency and terrorist activities conducted by BLA, BLF, Lashkare Jhangvi among others. The arrival of IS and Jammat ul Ahrar in Baluchistan has exacerbated the problems for security agencies which are already over stretched in the province. The ideology of all these groups is different but their aim is similar which is to destabilize Baluchistan and hamper Pakistan's ambition of developing CPEC. These groups are targeting security forces, government installations, foreigners, doctors, professors and now lawyers in a concerted effort to fail the government machinery. The attack on lawyers is not a random attack with the only aim of inflicting huge casualties. Rather, it is an attack on the judicial system of the province. An entire generation of top lawyers in the province was eliminated. The junior lawyers in Quetta have now climbed to the senior tier of legal practitioners in the province. The attack on legal experts, intellectuals and scholars in Baluchistan is part of well thought plan to deprive it of an educated class which is essential for the development of any society. 2 www.cscr.pk Total Number of Attacks: Date Detail Group Responsible 3rd September Meezan Chowk in Quetta, killed 50 wounded 50 plus LeJ 2010 September 2011 Twin suicide attack in Quetta, 25 people killed several wounded LeJ June 2012 Hazarganji area, killed 14 injured 30 people LeJ suspected January 10th Attack on a Snooker club in Quetta claimed 92 lives LeJ, United Baloch Army 2013 February 16th Target Shia Hazara community claimed 89 people in Suburbs of Quetta LeJ 2013 200 injured April 2013 Attack on FC post Quetta killed six people and wounded 40 others LeJ June 2013, An attack in Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University killed 25 people LeJ including DC Quetta August 9, 2013 The target was a police officer but other 38 people were also killed Unknown with several wounded 21st January A plotted bomb exploded in a bus targeting Shia pilgrimages killed 24 LeJ 2014 people January 13th, A suicide attack on Polio Vaccination center killed 15 people TTP 2016 GROUPS BEHIND ATTACKS The following groups have claimed responsibility for the brutal and horrendous attack of 8 August 2016 • Jamaat-ul-Ahraar • Daesh (IS Vilayet-e-Khorasan) While local government officials such as the Balochistan Chief Minister Sanaullah Zehri, have asserted that Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Afghanistan's intelligence agency National Directorate of Security (NDS) were behind terror incidents in Quetta including this one. This assertion was supported by former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf. The attack seems to be a repeat of an earlier one in 15th June 2013, when after an attack on a university bus carrying female students, the hospital where the injured were being treated was attacked by gunmen and suicide bombers. That attack was carried out by the LeJ a notorious sectarian militant group responsible for not only massive attacks within Balochistan but throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan as well. There are several Baloch separatist groups as well who had previously unleashed an ethnic cleansing campaign against settlers targeting civilians of non-Baloch origins. However subsequent counter terror campaigns seem to have contained them in far flung uninhabited areas and most of them have been found out to be operating under the auspices of RAW. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar: Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (Assembly of the Free) is a splinter group from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on March, 2014; they also show allegiance to ISIS. Currently it is headed by Omar Khourasani and their spokesperson is Ahsan Ullah Ahsan. They have forsworn any allegiance with Maulana Fazlullah who is the current head of TTP. Omar Khorasani also previously headed the Ahrar-ul-Hind which also claimed several attacks not only in Pakistan but in India too. In February 2014, Ahrar-ul-Hind, headed by Maulana Umar Qasmi (former leader in the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) was formed after TTP opened peace talks with the Pakistani government. It later merged into Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a second splinter group that broke away from Tehreek-i-Taliban in Pakistan on 4 September 2014, and named Omar Khalid Khorasani as its commander. 3 www.cscr.pk Abdul Wali Khan, popularly known as Omar Khalid Khurasani, is the patron of TTP’s splinter group Jamat ul Ahrar. He was appointed as the chief of the TTP Mohmand Faction by Baitullah Mehsud but after disagreement over Fazlullah’s order to fight against the Pak Army, he separated from TTP in August 2014 and created his faction of hardline elements, called the Jamat ul Ahrar. Having received no formal education from any school or seminary, Khurasani is a ruthless militant, compared to ISIS’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He is known to have had ties with AL-Qaeda and has even claimed to give shelter to the group leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. OMAR KHALID KHURASANI Khurasani is credited with several high-profile attacks, including the failed assassination attempt at former Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the execution of 23 paramilitary soldiers in his imprisonment. A letter issued by the Mehmand faction also hinted at taking part in the deadly attack on a Peshawar church in 2013. Khurasani is also the first militant to get a suicide attack carried out by a woman in Pakistan. News of Khurasani’s injury in a clash with the Afghan forces surfaced in February, which was confirmed by his aide and ex-TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan. The JUA claims to be fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan. It is likely to have some support in Mohmand, and the other FATA agencies: Bajaur, Khyber and Aurakzai. Some media outlets recently reported the group’s allegiance to Islamic State (IS) but there is no evidence of any active involvement at present. The recent suicide attack (7th August) in Quetta claimed 70 precious lives the responsibility was taken by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as well as Jammat-ul-Ahrar. Ehsanullah Ehsan, spokesperson of TTP said that further detail will be released soon. High Profile Attacks by Jamaat-ul-Ahraar: • 2 November 2014, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan claimed responsibility for the Wagah border attack in a telephone call to Dawn from Afghanistan. "Some other groups have claimed responsibility of this attack, but these claims are baseless. We will soon release the video of this attack," he said. "This attack is revenge for the killing of innocent people in North Waziristan." • 7 November 2014, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claimed responsibility for twin bombings that killed at least six people in Mohmand Agency. The bombs targeted peace committee volunteers in Chinari village of Safi Tehsil. Ehsanullah Ehsan claimed responsibility and vowed to continue attacking tribal peace committees. • 21 November 2014, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on the membership camp of Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Orangi Town area of Karachi. Three members of the Sindh Assembly and 50 workers were injured. • 15 March 2015, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claimed responsibility for twin bombings at a Roman Catholic church and Christ Church during Sunday service at Youhanabad town of Lahore. At least 15 people were killed and seventy were wounded in the attacks.
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