The ISIL's Theft of WMD Components in Iraq
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Islamist Politics in South Asia After the Arab Spring: Parties and Their Proxies Working With—And Against—The State
RETHINKING POLITICAL ISLAM SERIES August 2015 Islamist politics in South Asia after the Arab Spring: Parties and their proxies working with—and against—the state WORKING PAPER Matthew J. Nelson, SOAS, University of London SUMMARY: Mainstream Islamist parties in Pakistan such as the Jama’at-e Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam have demonstrated a tendency to combine the gradualism of Brotherhood-style electoral politics with dawa (missionary) activities and, at times, support for proxy militancy. As a result, Pakistani Islamists wield significant ideological influence in Pakistan, even as their electoral success remains limited. About this Series: The Rethinking Political Islam series is an innovative effort to understand how the developments following the Arab uprisings have shaped—and in some cases altered—the strategies, agendas, and self-conceptions of Islamist movements throughout the Muslim world. The project engages scholars of political Islam through in-depth research and dialogue to provide a systematic, cross-country comparison of the trajectory of political Islam in 12 key countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Pakistan, as well as Malaysia and Indonesia. This is accomplished through three stages: A working paper for each country, produced by an author who has conducted on-the-ground research and engaged with the relevant Islamist actors. A reaction essay in which authors reflect on and respond to the other country cases. A final draft incorporating the insights gleaned from the months of dialogue and discussion. The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. -
Extremism and Terrorism
Pakistan: Extremism and Terrorism On April 21, 2021, a car bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Serena Hotel in Quetta, killing at least five and wounding 11. Chinese ambassador to Pakistan Nong Rong was staying in the hotel but was not present during the attack. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. “It was a suicide attack in which our suicide bomber used his explosives-filled car in the hotel,” the TTP said in a text message to Reuters. (Sources: Reuters, Associated Press) On April 12, 2021, police in Lahore arrested Saad Rizvi, leader of the outlawed Islamist political party Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP). The arrest was reportedly to deter TLP supporters from further demanding the expulsion of France’s ambassador over the publication in France of cartoons featuring Islam’s Prophet Muhammad. Rizvi had claimed the government had reached an agreement with his party to expel the ambassador by April 20, while government officials claimed they agreed only to discuss the issue in parliament. In response to Rizvi’s arrest, TLP supporters blocked highways and clash with police across the country over the course of two days, killing at least four people and wounding dozens of others, including at least 60 police officers. On April 18, TLP supporters attacked a police station in Lahore while rallying in the city against Rizvi’s arrest. The protesters took hostage 11 officers. The protesters released the hostages the following day after negotiations with the government. Photos released of the hostages during the negotiations showed they had been tortured. (Sources: Voice of America, Associated Press) Overview Since its independence from British colonial rule in 1947, Pakistan has been divided along ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines, a condition which has been exploited by internal and external organizations to foster extremism and terrorism. -
EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation
European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation October 2018 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation October 2018 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9476-319-8 doi: 10.2847/639900 © European Asylum Support Office 2018 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: FATA Faces FATA Voices, © FATA Reforms, url, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO COI REPORT PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 3 Acknowledgements EASO would like to acknowledge the Belgian Center for Documentation and Research (Cedoca) in the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, as the drafter of this report. Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed by reviewing the report: The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis Hungary, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Office Documentation Centre Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation Sweden, Migration Agency, Lifos -
Special Report No
SPECIAL REPORT NO. 494 | MAY 2021 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan By Amira Jadoon Contents Introduction ...................................3 The Rise and Decline of the TTP, 2007–18 .....................4 Signs of a Resurgent TPP, 2019–Early 2021 ............... 12 Regional Alliances and Rivalries ................................ 15 Conclusion: Keeping the TTP at Bay ............................. 19 A Pakistani soldier surveys what used to be the headquarters of Baitullah Mehsud, the TTP leader who was killed in March 2010. (Photo by Pir Zubair Shah/New York Times) Summary • Established in 2007, the Tehrik-i- attempts to intimidate local pop- regional affiliates of al-Qaeda and Taliban Pakistan (TTP) became ulations, and mergers with prior the Islamic State. one of Pakistan’s deadliest militant splinter groups suggest that the • Thwarting the chances of the TTP’s organizations, notorious for its bru- TTP is attempting to revive itself. revival requires a multidimensional tal attacks against civilians and the • Multiple factors may facilitate this approach that goes beyond kinetic Pakistani state. By 2015, a US drone ambition. These include the Afghan operations and renders the group’s campaign and Pakistani military Taliban’s potential political ascend- message irrelevant. Efforts need to operations had destroyed much of ency in a post–peace agreement prioritize investment in countering the TTP’s organizational coherence Afghanistan, which may enable violent extremism programs, en- and capacity. the TTP to redeploy its resources hancing the rule of law and access • While the TTP’s lethality remains within Pakistan, and the potential to essential public goods, and cre- low, a recent uptick in the number for TTP to deepen its links with ating mechanisms to address legiti- of its attacks, propaganda releases, other militant groups such as the mate grievances peacefully. -
Tackling Terrorism Within, by Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch
scholar warrior Pakistan’s Future Wars: Tackling Terrorism Within DHRUV C KATOCH Pakistan faces multiple internal and external challenges, each of which has a bearing on the security situation within the country. For the most part, these challenges have been aggravated by Pakistan’s economic, governance and policy- delivery deficits, which have been a constraint on strategic resource-allocation and decision-making.1 Writing on the issue, Sherry Rehman, Chair of the Jinnah Institute and Vice President of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), has categorised Pakistan’s challenges as deficits in governance and service delivery, which, in turn, have affected the state’s ability to execute policy change. Pakistan’s demographic profile is also a cause for serious concern. With a burgeoning population, and a median age of just 23 years, the state lacks the capacity to absorb the increasing workforce in meaningful labour. Unemployment levels, which stood at 5 percent in 2007-08, increased to 6 percent in 2012-13 and are set to spiral further. With 1.7 million entrants yearly to the workforce, lack of employment opportunities have the potential to further fuel unrest in the country.2 Pakistan also faces challenges on the economic front, compounded by a persistently low tax to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio, increased debt servicing, untargeted subsidies and financing of bleeding Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs).3 Natural disasters, which have visited Pakistan in the last decade have worsened the economic situation as have the ongoing military operations in various parts of the country, and rehabilitation of internally displaced persons. Urbanisation too is taking its toll. -
Pakistan: Country Report the Situa�On in Pakistan
Asylum Research Centre Pakistan: Country Report /shutterstock.com The situa�on in Pakistan Lukasz Stefanski June 2015 (COI up to 20 February 2015) Cover photo © 20 February 2015 (published June 2015) Pakistan Country Report Explanatory Note Sources and databases consulted List of Acronyms CONTENTS 1. Background Information 1.1. Status of tribal areas 1.1.1. Map of Pakistan 1.1.2. Status in law of the FATA and governance arrangements under the Pakistani Constitution 1.1.3. Status in law of the PATA and governance arrangements under the Pakistani Constitution 1.2. General overview of ethnic and linguistic groups 1.3. Overview of the present government structures 1.3.1. Government structures and political system 1.3.2. Overview of main political parties 1.3.3. The judicial system, including the use of tribal justice mechanisms and the application of Islamic law 1.3.4. Characteristics of the government and state institutions 1.3.4.1. Corruption 1.3.4.2. Professionalism of civil service 1.3.5. Role of the military in governance 1.4. Overview of current socio-economic issues 1.4.1. Rising food prices and food security 1.4.2. Petrol crisis and electricity shortages 1.4.3. Unemployment 2. Main Political Developments (since June 2013) 2.1. Current political landscape 2.2. Overview of major political developments since June 2013, including: 2.2.1. May 2013: General elections 2.2.2. August-December 2014: Opposition protests organised by Pakistan Tekreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) 2.2.3. Former Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf 2.3. -
Volume Xiv, Issue 18
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION SEPTEMBER 16, 2016 VOLUME XIV, ISSUE 18 p.1 p.3 p.5 p.7 Alexander Sehmer James Pothecary Zana K. Gulmohamad Animesh Roul BRIEFS Syria’s Conflict: Man- Pakistan’s Jamaat-ul- Nigeria Expands Its aging Turkey’s Inter- Ahrar: A Violent Do- ‘War on Terrorism’ to vention mestic Threat the Niger Delta INDONESIA: LONE-WOLF ATTACKS SHOW NEED in Raqqa, Syria (Jakarta Post, September 8). Naim, who FOR GREATER DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS was arrested in 2010 and spent time in jail for the illegal possession of ammunition, has been accused of mas- Alexander Sehmer terminding a deadly attack in the capital Jakarta on Jan- uary 14 (Al Jazeera, January 15). More recently he has On August 28, an 18-year-old Indonesian man attempt- also been implicated in a failed suicide bombing at a ed to stab a Roman Catholic priest during a church ser- police station in Solo, in Central Java, carried out on vice in Medan, in Indonesia’s North Sumatra province, July 5. Naim allegedly taught the attacker, the only ca- an attack reminiscent of one carried out by Islamic State sualty in the blast, how to build a bomb (Straits Times, (IS) sympathizers in France in July in which an 84-year- July 5). old priest had his throat slit. Many of Naim’s recruits have been drawn from Solo, In the failed Medan attack, however, the priest was only from local mosques and an anti-vice campaign group lightly injured. A homemade bomb, which the assailant known as Team Hisbah, which functioned as kind of vigi- reportedly carried in his backpack, failed to explode, lante militia attacking brothels and breaking up drinking and the man was detained by worshipers and later ar- parties. -
Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan
OEA Team Threat Report OEA TEAM TRISA Title Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)Date US Army TRADOC G2 TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) – Threats South Waziristan commander Wali ur Rehman (R) and TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud (L) Publication Date: 16 March 2012 US Army TRADOC G2 Information Cut-Off Date: 08 March 2012 TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) – Threats 1 U.S. UNCLASSIFIEDU.S. UNCLASSIFIED OEA Team Threat Report Purpose To inform deploying units, trainers, and scenario writers regarding the terrorist group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Student Movement of Pakistan), commonly referred to as the TTP To identify the TTP’s area of operations To discuss the TTP’s ideology and goals To identify the TTP’s leadership To highlight significant TTP attacks against U.S. targets To discuss the TTP’s funding sources and media operations Product Caveat: This presentation has been developed from multiple unclassified sources and is primarily intended for use as a training product for the Department of Army. This briefing should not be considered a finished intelligence product, nor used in such a manner. 2 U.S. UNCLASSIFIED OEA Team Threat Report Executive Summary Explains the origin, goals, ideology, and area of operations of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Identifies the leadership of the TTP. Provides examples of TTP attacks on U.S. targets. Discusses the relationship between al-Qaeda and the TTP. Discusses TTP funding and media. Covers recent developments within the TTP. 3 U.S. UNCLASSIFIED OEA Team Threat Report Map shows the areas of all Taliban groups’ influence or presence. The TTP primarily operates in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan. -
Pakistani Taliban January 2013
Issues Paper The Pakistani Taliban January 2013 Contents 1. TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................ 2 2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW .............................................................................................. 2 3. GROUPS ............................................................................................................................... 4 3.1 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ..................................................................................... 4 3.1.1 Organisation .................................................................................................................. 4 3.1.2 Tribes and Tribal Infighting .......................................................................................... 6 3.1.3 Recruitment ................................................................................................................... 7 3.1.4 Area of Influence .......................................................................................................... 8 3.1.5 Aims .............................................................................................................................. 9 3.1.6 Connections................................................................................................................. 13 3.2 Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (MTT).................................................................................. 14 3.2.1 The Mullah Nazir Group ............................................................................................ -
CTC Sentinel 7:5 (2014), P
JULY 2014 . VOL 7 . ISSUE 7 Contents The ISIL’s Theft of WMD FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The ISIL’s Theft of WMD Components Components in Iraq in Iraq By Stephen Hummel By Stephen Hummel REPORTS 4 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Role in Attacks in Pakistan By Anne Stenersen 8 Swiss Foreign Fighters Active in Syria By Daniel Glaus and Lorenzo Vidino 11 Dutch Foreign Fighters Continue to Travel to Syria By Samar Batrawi and Ilona Chmoun 15 Boko Haram, the Chibok Abductions and Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy By J.N.C. Hill 18 Contrasting the Leadership of Mullah Fazlullah and Khan Said Sajna in Pakistan By Daud Khattak 20 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Rebels from the Islamic Front, Syria’s largest rebel coalition, clash with the ISIL near Aleppo on July 13, 2014. - Ahmed Deeb/AFP/Getty he control of radioactive al-Muthanna project site located 60 materials and chemical weapons miles north of Baghdad near the town has long been safely in the hands of Samarra where the “remnants of T 1 of state actors. Recent world events, the former [Iraqi] chemical weapons however, illustrate a contemporary program were kept.”4 environment where non-state actors, specifically terrorist organizations, The al-Muthanna site is a 100-square- have acquired such materials. In June kilometer complex that has been the About the CTC Sentinel 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and the center of Iraq’s chemical weapons The Combating Terrorism Center is an Levant (ISIL)2 reportedly seized control program since the 1970s. -
A Who's Who of the Insurgency In
VOLUME VII, ISSUE 4 u MARCH 3, 2009 IN THIS ISSUE: A WHO’S WHO OF THE INSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN’S NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE: PART TWO – FATA EXCLUDING NORTH AND SOUTH WAZIRISTAN By Rahimullah Yusufzai................................................................................1 ASSESSING THE ROLE OF HEZBOLLAH IN THE GAZA WAR AND ITS REGIONAL IMPACT By Benedetta Berti.......................................................................................4 Maulana Fazlullah THE RETURN OF SHARI’A LAW TO PAKISTAN’S SWAT REGION By Mukhtar A. Khan......................................................................................6 Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. INDIA’S HOME-GROWN JIHADI THREAT: A PROFILE OF THE INDIAN The Terrorism Monitor is MUJAHIDEEN designed to be read by policy- By Animesh Roul...........................................................................................9 makers and other specialists yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s authors and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jamestown North-West Frontier Province: Part Two – FATA Foundation. excluding North and South Waziristan Unauthorized reproduction or By Rahimullah Yusufzai redistribution of this or any Jamestown publication is strictly he Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is the largest organization of Pakistani prohibited by law. militants operating in the country’s North-West Frontier Province T(NWFP), which includes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Launched in a secret meeting on December 13, 2007, it is active in most of the 24 districts, seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions in the province. The militants’ strongholds are in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, and Darra Adamkhel tribal regions and in the settled districts of Swat, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan, Charsadda, and Kohat. -
Pakistan 16-17 October 2017 Rome
European Asylum Support Office EASO COI Meeting Report Pakistan 16-17 October 2017 Rome February 2018 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO COI Meeting Report Pakistan 16-17 October 2017 Rome Pakistan Practical Cooperation Conference 16-17 October 2017 Rome e Report February 2018 Pakistan © European Asylum Support Office 2018 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © iStock by Getty images / gaborbasch Lahore, Pakistan - May 5, 2013: Muslim women participating at a public event wearing colorful headscarves, duppattas and hijabs Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO COI MEETING REPORT PAKISTAN — 3 Acknowledgements EASO would like to thank the following experts and organisations for their participation at the conference and the presentations they gave: Anna Giustiniani, Project manager, IOM Italy Cyril Almeida, Assistant editor and journalist, Dawn newspaper, Pakistan Luisa Inversini, President of the Territorial Commission for International Protection, Milan Matthew Nelson, Reader in Politics, PhD, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) Nathalie Boschman, COI Expert, Cedoca, Belgium Shehryar Fazli, Senior Analyst