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Pakistan Security Situation European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation August 2017 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation August 2017 Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00800 numbers or these calls may be billed. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Print: ISBN 978-92-9494-616-4 doi: 10.2847/433337 BZ-04-17-693-EN-C PDF: ISBN 978-92-9494-615-7 doi: 10.2847/502130 BZ-04-17-693-EN-C © European Asylum Support Office 2017 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © PPI-Images, by Getty Images from iStock, photo ID 598170484 Karachi, Pakistan - September 01, 2016: Activists of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) are protesting against Sindh Government and demanding to refer the murder case of Dr. Khalid Soomro to military court, during demonstration at M.A Jinnah Road in Karachi Rashid Khalid Mahmood Soomro, the successor of Dr. Khalid Soomro led the demonstration. Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 3 Acknowledgements EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum and migration department as the author of this report: Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Cedoca (Centre for Documentation and Research) The following departments reviewed the contents of this report, together with EASO: The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo; Asylum Research Consultancy – a consulting group that provides case-specific, country specific and thematic COI research, publishes commentaries on COI reports, and undertakes research consultancy, project management and training for the asylum and human rights sector both in the UK and internationally. It must be noted that the review carried out by the departments, experts or organisations mentioned does not necessarily lead to an endorsement or approval of the content of the report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. The review is a contribution to the quality of the report. 4 — EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 5 Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 3 Contents .................................................................................................................................... 5 Disclaimer .................................................................................................................................. 6 Glossary and Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 8 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 11 Map .......................................................................................................................................... 13 1. General description of the security situation in Pakistan ................................................... 14 1.1. Overview of recent conflicts in Pakistan ...................................................................... 14 1.1.1. Political violence ................................................................................................... 14 1.1.2. Ethnic and sectarian violence ............................................................................... 17 1.1.3. International disputes ........................................................................................... 18 1.2. Actors in the conflict .................................................................................................... 18 1.2.1. State armed forces ................................................................................................ 18 1.2.2. Armed Groups ....................................................................................................... 21 1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations ...................................................... 30 1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes ................................................................ 31 1.3.2. Terrorist attacks .................................................................................................... 33 1.3.3. Sectarian related violence .................................................................................... 35 1.3.4. Ethnic and political violence ................................................................................. 35 1.3.5. Border attacks ....................................................................................................... 36 1.3.6. Drone strikes ......................................................................................................... 37 1.4. Impact of the violence on the civilian population ....................................................... 37 1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities ................................................................................... 37 1.4.2. Socio-economic life ............................................................................................... 43 1.4.3. Children ................................................................................................................. 43 1.4.4. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees ................................................ 44 1.5. State ability to secure law and order ........................................................................... 45 1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice ........................................................ 45 1.5.2. Anti-Terrorism Acts ............................................................................................... 47 1.5.3. Detention and death penalty ................................................................................ 49 2. Security situation per region ............................................................................................... 51 2.1. Geographical overview of the violence 2016 – May 2017 ........................................... 51 2.1.1. Trends in regional violence ................................................................................... 51 2.1.2. Regional comparison of violence related fatalities .............................................. 52 2.2. Security trends per geographic subdivision ................................................................. 54 2.2.1. Punjab ................................................................................................................... 55 2.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ............................................................................................ 58 2.2.3. Balochistan ............................................................................................................ 62 2.2.4. Sindh ..................................................................................................................... 66 2.2.5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas ..................................................................... 70 2.2.6. Islamabad Capital Territory .................................................................................. 79 2.2.7. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan ......................................................................... 80 Annex 1: Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 82 Public sources ...................................................................................................................... 82 Anonymous and non-public sources ................................................................................. 110 Annex 2: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................ 111 6 — EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION Disclaimer This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012) (1). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. As much as possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has been cross-checked. The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that such person or organisation does not exist. Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position. ‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not as legally defined in the EU Aslum Acquis and the 1951 Refugee Convention. Neither EASO nor any person acting on its
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