Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan
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PAKISTAN: THE WORSENING CONFLICT IN BALOCHISTAN Asia Report N°119 – 14 September 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. CENTRALISED RULE AND BALOCH RESISTANCE ............................................ 2 A. A TROUBLED HISTORY .........................................................................................................3 B. RETAINING THE MILITARY OPTION .......................................................................................4 C. A DEMOCRATIC INTERLUDE..................................................................................................6 III. BACK TO THE BEGINNING ...................................................................................... 7 A. CENTRALISED POWER ...........................................................................................................7 B. OUTBREAK AND DIRECTIONS OF CONFLICT...........................................................................8 C. POLITICAL ACTORS...............................................................................................................9 D. BALOCH MILITANTS ...........................................................................................................12 IV. BALOCH GRIEVANCES AND DEMANDS ............................................................ 13 A. POLITICAL AUTONOMY .......................................................................................................13 B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONCERNS.............................................................................................14 1. Gwadar.....................................................................................................................14 2. Energy resources......................................................................................................16 3. Distribution of resources..........................................................................................17 C. SECURITY ...........................................................................................................................18 V. ISLAMABAD’S RESPONSE ...................................................................................... 19 A. MOVING ON TWO TRACKS ..................................................................................................19 1. One step forward......................................................................................................19 2. Divide and rule ........................................................................................................21 B. MILITARY RESPONSE ..........................................................................................................22 1. Blaming the sardars .................................................................................................22 2. Military operations...................................................................................................24 VI. GEOPOLITICS ............................................................................................................ 25 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 26 APPENDICES A. MAP OF BALOCHISTAN .......................................................................................................28 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................29 C. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ....................................30 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................33 Asia Report N°119 14 September 2006 PAKISTAN: THE WORSENING CONFLICT IN BALOCHISTAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS President Pervez Musharraf and the military are responsible While Baloch alienation is widespread, crossing tribal, for the worsening of the conflict in Balochistan. Tensions regional and class lines, the military government insists between the government and its Baloch opposition have that a few sardars (tribal leaders) are challenging the grown because of Islamabad’s heavy-handed armed centre’s writ, concerned that their power base would be response to Baloch militancy and its refusal to negotiate eroded by Islamabad’s plans to develop Balochistan; the demands for political and economic autonomy. The killing state therefore has little option but to meet the challenge of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in August 2006 head on. This failure to accept the legitimacy of grievances sparked riots and will likely lead to more confrontation. lies at the heart of an increasingly intractable conflict, as The conflict could escalate if the government insists on does Islamabad’s reliance on coercion and indiscriminate seeking a military solution to what is a political problem force to silence dissent. and the international community, especially the U.S., fails to recognise the price that is involved for security The military government should recognise that it faces in neighbouring Afghanistan. conflict not with a handful of sardars but with a broad- based movement for political, economic and social Tensions with the central government are not new to empowerment. The only one way out is to end all military Balochistan, given the uneven distribution of power, which action, release political prisoners and respect constitutionally favors the federation at the cost of the federal units. The guaranteed political freedoms. Baloch have long demanded a restructured relationship that would transfer powers from what is seen as an exploitative As a preliminary confidence-building measure, Islamabad central government to the provinces. But Musharraf’s should implement recommendations of the Parliamentary authoritarian rule has deprived them of participatory, Committee on Balochistan, which have local support. But representative avenues to articulate demands and to voice a sustainable solution requires implementation, in spirit grievances. Politically and economically marginalised, and substance, of constitutional provisions for political, many Baloch see the insurgency as a defensive response administrative and economic autonomy. The federation to the perceived colonisation of their province by the would also be strengthened if the national parliament Punjabi-dominated military. were to amend the constitution, to shift powers from an overbearing centre to the provinces. However, centralised Although regional parties still seek provincial autonomy rule is the hallmark of authoritarianism. Like its within a federal parliamentary democratic framework, predecessors, this military government is averse to and there is, as yet, little support for secession, militant democratic engagement and powersharing, preferring sentiments could grow if Islamabad does not reverse ill- to retain and consolidate power through patron-client advised policies that include: relations and divide-and-rule strategies. exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources Reliance on the Pashtun religious parties to counter its without giving the province its due share; Baloch opposition has strengthened Pashtun Islamist construction of further military garrisons to forces at the cost of the moderate Baloch. With their chief strengthen an already extensive network of military Pakistani patron, Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam bases; and running the Balochistan government in alliance with Musharraf’s Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam), a centrally driven and controlled economic projects, reinvigorated Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are attacking such as the Gwadar deep sea port, that do not benefit international forces and the Kabul government across locals but raise fears that the resulting influx of Balochistan’s border with Afghanistan. But the international economic migrants could make the Baloch a minority community, particularly the U.S. and its Western allies, in their homeland. seem to ignore the domestic and regional implications of the Balochistan conflict, instead placing their faith in Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°119, 14 September 2006 Page ii a military government that is targeting the anti-Taliban (e) allowing all political parties to function Baloch and Pashtuns and rewarding pro-Taliban Pashtun freely, respecting the constitutionally parties. guaranteed rights of speech and expression, assembly, association and movement; and With the federal government refusing to compromise with its Baloch opponents, intent on a military solution to a (f) respecting the constitutional obligation to political problem and ignoring local stakeholders in framing preserve and promote distinct language and political and economic policies, the directions of the conflict culture. are clear. The military can retain control over Balochistan’s 3. Entrust the Baloch with more responsibility for territory through sheer force, but it cannot defeat an their own security by: insurgency that has local support. (a) accepting provincial jurisdiction over law Still, the conflict could be resolved easily. Free and fair and order and policing; elections in 2007 would restore participatory representative (b) retaining Balochistan Levies, re-establishing institutions, reducing tensions between the centre and the those that have been disbanded, reforming province,