Volume XIII, Issue 20 u October 2, 2015

IN THIS ISSUE: BRIEFS ...... 1 TEHRIK-E- EVOLVES UNDER PRESSURE By Farhan Zahid ...... 3

THE ISLAMIC STATE’S BALKAN ‘STRONGHOLDS’ A Bosnian house flying By Ebi Spahiu ...... 5 the flag of the Islamic State. The jihadist group has focused significantly SAUDI ARABIA’S YEMEN INTERVENTION: A HIGH RISK GAMBLE? on the Balkans recently. By James Brandon and Nicholas A. Heras ...... 8

Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. BERLIN KNIFE ATTACK, WAVE OF ARRESTS UNDERLINES GERMAN The Terrorism Monitor is RADICALIZATION THREAT designed to be read by policy- makers and other specialists James Brandon yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed A known radical Islamist stabbed and wounded a policewoman in Berlin on September within are solely those of the 17, and was subsequently shot dead (DW, September 17). The attacker, a 41-year-old authors and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jamestown ethnic Kurdish Iraqi man called Rafik Mohamad Yousef, had previously been convicted Foundation. by a German court in 2008 of being a member of Ansar al-Islam, a jihadist group comprised mainly of Iraqi Kurds, and for plotting to kill the Iraqi prime minister on Unauthorized reproduction a visit to Berlin; he was released in 2011 (Berlin Morgenpost, September 17; Rudaw, or redistribution of this or any September 18). The precise motives for the attack, and Yousef’s most recent affiliations, Jamestown publication is strictly are not yet known. prohibited by law.

A few days after the stabbing attack, on September 22, police carried out eight counter- terrorism raids, focusing mainly on suspects in the Berlin area (DW, September 22). Among those arrested was a 51-year-old Moroccan man suspected of inciting others to join the Islamic State. Although the police said that the raids were not related to the earlier knife attack, the developments indicate the increasing threat to Germany from jihadists and the authorities’ increasing efforts to monitor radical Islamist circles and to For comments or questions about disrupt groups actively involved in supporting jihadist groups abroad or plotting attacks our publications, please send an at home. email to [email protected], or contact us at: Underlining this trend, also on September 22, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz—BfV), Germany’s internal security 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 organization, said that the number of radical Salafists had increased to 7,900, up from Washington, DC • 20036 an estimated 7,500 in June. In addition, BfV President Hans-Georg Maassen stated: Tel: (202) 483-8888 Fax: (202) 483-8337 We are very concerned that Islamists in Germany are trying, under the cover of humanitarian assistance, to exploit the situation of the refugees for their own ends Copyright ©2015

TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015 and to proselytize and recruit among asylum-seekers VICTORY OVER BOKO HARAM CONTINUES TO (The Local, September 22). ELUDE NIGERIA

In addition, Maassen provided updated figures on the James Brandon number of German foreign fighters abroad, saying that an estimated 740 people had left Germany to join jihadists in Nigeria’s conflict with the Boko Haram Islamist militant Syria and Iraq; around one-third of these individuals have group continues to be marked by a mix of successes and returned to Germany, and about 120 have been killed. The setbacks, with the group continuing to prove itself an government has also begun prosecuting those who have adaptable and wily adversary. For instance, in the last few returned from Syria, particularly those involved with the weeks, the government has scored a number of considerable Islamic State. For instance, also in September, the authorities localized victories against the group. On September 23, the charged a 25-year-old German individual, known legally government announced that its troops had continued to as “Nils D,” for traveling to Syria to join the Islamic State advance against Boko Haram in parts of Borno State, the in October 2013, and subsequently receiving firearms longstanding heartland of the group’s Islamist insurgency. and explosives training (Berlin Kurier, September 9). He The government claimed to have captured the group’s returned to Germany in November 2014, and was arrested “kingpin” in the area, Bulama Modu, arrested 43 suspected two months later (DW, January 10). militants, freed 241 women and children being held prisoner by the militants and seized arms and ammunition (Premium Meanwhile, in the Middle East itself, Germany has continued Times [Abuja], September 23). Separately, across the border to provide some of the most significant European support in northern Cameroon on the same day, Cameroonian for forces fighting against the Islamic State (particularly the forces said they had killed 17 suspected militants in a series Kurds), most recently training Iraqi peshmerga forces on of operations (Punch [Lagos], September 23). mitigating chemical weapon attacks (Rudaw, September 18). This came after the government confirmed instances Simultaneously, the Nigerian government has continued to of the Islamic State using mustard gas against Kurdish give the impression that the defeat of the group is imminent. fighters. Adding urgency to both the German government’s A senior presidential advisor, on September 23, tweeted a efforts in Iraq and its actions against the growing number of message ascribed to the country’s president, Muhammadu Islamist radicals at home is the flow of migrants and refugees Buhari, that: “Boko Haram’s reign of terror in parts of the expected into Germany in the coming months and years country will be finally over very soon as the ongoing military from mainly Muslim parts of the Middle East; an estimated onslaught against the terrorist sect will continue relentlessly 800,000 people will arrive this year (Der Spiegel, August until total victory is achieved” (Twitter, September 23; Punch 31). To date, Germany has generally been more successful [Lagos], September 23). Similar rhetoric has come from the in integrating Muslim immigrants than other European ministry of defence. Colonel Rabe Abubakar, the ministry countries. However, this is partly because up until now the spokesperson, in response to an apparent audio message vast majority of German Muslims have generally originated released by Boko Haram leader Abubakr Shekau, said in relatively more developed countries with a long history that: “Our candid advice to Shekau or his ghost, cohorts or of secularism, such as Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan and a range impersonators is to toe the line of their fellow comrades and of Balkan states; the flow of new migrants from Iraq, Syria surrender now as there is no more hiding place for him or and elsewhere, including states without a similarly strong his criminal gang to operate freely,” adding that the “era of secular tradition, will undoubtedly pose new challenges to cheap propaganda is over and in no distance time Nigerians the German government, including in the sphere of political and the whole world will know who is saying the truth” radicalization. (Premium Times [Abuja], September 22).

On the ground, however, evidence of solid Nigerian gains against Boko Haram are harder to find. On September 20, the group carried out one of its most significant attacks in months, killing around 85 people in the northeast city of Maiduguri, in Borno State (Vanguard [Lagos], September 21). The attacks mainly targeted a mosque and people watching a football game on television. In further evidence that the group remains strong in Borno State, the government banned the use of cars, public transportation, donkeys and 2 TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015 camels in the state over the Eid al-Adha Islamic holiday Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Evolves in order to reduce the potential for militant attacks (BBC, September 24). Moreover, in addition, between July and Under Pressure August, the Nigerian authorities arrested 20 suspected Boko Haram leaders in southern parts of the country, suggesting Farhan Zahid that the group may be planning to extend its operations to these regions, including the economically critical city of The recent attack by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on Lagos, which have largely been unaffected by the conflict a (PAF) camp at Badaber, located 10 so far. A Department of State Service (DSS) spokesman miles from , fully displayed the jihadist group’s said that “the sudden influx of Boko Haram members into professional, yet highly violent, nature. Dressed in uniforms Lagos State points to the determination of the sect to extend of the Frontier Constabulary (a paramilitary force), 14 its nefarious terrorist activities to the state and in fact, militants breached the security parameter of the PAF camp other parts of the country” (This Day Live [Lagos], August and then entered from two different points in the early hours 31). In a further indication that the government’s offensive of September 18. The resulting battle went on for two hours is not going entirely as well as advertised, the government and left at least 28 military personnel and all 14 attackers has also floated the idea of negotiating with the group, or dead (News International, September 18). Later, five of the potentially releasing some prisoners, in return for the release dead militants were identified; two of whom were from the of the schoolgirls who were kidnapped from Chibok in May Swat district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province while three 2014 (Punch [Lagos], September 16; The Nation [Lagos], came from the tribal areas where the camp was located September 22). (Dawn, September 19).

The attack is the first time an air force camp (as opposed to an airbase) has been targeted by militants. However, PAF airbases have long been repeatedly targeted by TTP and associated groups, and long before the government launched its Operation Zarb-e-Azb anti-militant campaign in June 2014. For instance, PAF Base Kamra, in Punjab province, was targeted by Islamist militants in 2007 (Dawn, December 11, 2007). A likely reason for the TTP’s attacks on PAF facilities is the air force’s role in military campaigns against the TTP in the country’s tribal areas. The rugged terrain of the tribal areas, the epicenter of the Islamist insurgency, provides formidable cover for TTP militants, and as a result, PAF bombardments are often the only way for the military to progress in its operations, often causing considerable collateral damage in the process. Of the 11 active flying bases of Pakistan Air Force, five have been attacked in last ten years, whereas another three airports (Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta) have also been targeted.

Militant attacks on the air force, although not seriously disrupting government operations, have nonetheless imposed a considerable toll on air force personnel and finances. For instance, an attack on PAF Base Mushaf in Sarghoda district killed 11 officers in 2007 (Dawn, November 2, 2007). A Pakistan Navy airbase (PNS Mehran) in Karachi was also targeted by TTP in 2011, resulting in the destruction of three PC-3 Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft and the killing of 18 Pakistan Navy personnel (Express Tribune, May 23, 2011). In another spectacular attack by TTP militants, at PAF Base Kamra in 2012, the attackers destroyed one Saab 2000 Erieye aircraft fitted with an Airborne Early Warning & 3 TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015

Control System (AEW&C) and severely damaged the other ul-Ahrar, issued a statement confirming the merging of TTP one (News International, February 9, 2013). In addition, the factions: TTP launched its most well-coordinated attack to date in 2014, simultaneously attacking two PAF bases (PAF Base We congratulate the Ummat-e-Muslima [the Muslim Khalid and PAF Base Samungli), killing 12 people (Dawn, community] in common and especially the mujahideen August 15, 2014). of Pakistan for the coalition of strong jihadist groups, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat ul-Ahrar, Tehrik-e- TTP Bounces Back Lashkar-e-Islam and Tehrik-e-Taliban on one name Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan against the taghooti [satanic], ​​ Due to the government’s on-going Operation Zarb-e-Azb infidel, democratic, unIslamic system and the Na-Pak military operation in North Waziristan, the TTP recently Murtad [a Muslim who rejects Islam] Army. [3] appeared to have lost its momentum due to scores of Islamist militants being killed or arrested by the government. In addition, Lashkar-e-Islam’s amir, Afridi, [1] The spectacular nature of the attack on Badaber PAF merged his organization with the TTP in March, and pledged Camp, however, showed that the TTP remains capable allegiance to Fazlullah. This was partly in the response to the and has caused the public to question the success of the government’s I, which was directed against ongoing military operation. Indeed, it can be argued that, his strongholds of Tirah Valley and Bara in . in some senses, the government’s military operations have The TTP’s spokesperson, Ehsanullah Ehsan, endorsed the strengthened the region’s fractious jihadist organizations by alliance as creating what he termed the “mujahideen of forcing them to put aside their differences and work together. Pakistan” (Dawn, March 13).

The TTP has never been monolithic. It comprises more than Conclusion 42 Islamist-tribal groups and some groups from mainland Pakistan, such as the Punjabi Taliban. [2] The broadness of While the military operations Khyber I (concluded) and the TTP’s coalition also presents challenges, however, and has Zarb-e-Azb (on-going) have achieved many successes, threatened the group’s cohesion. For instance, after the death such as killing a large number of militants and putting such of its former amir Hakimullah Mehsud in a U.S. groups on the back foot, there have also been unexpected in November 2013, the jihadist leaders of several key TTP disadvantages of the operations. For instance, in response factions failed to reach a consensus over who should head the to the government’s military pressure, Islamist militants are group. The resulting decision to eventually select Fazlullah now resolving their differences and forming alliances, and are (a.k.a. Fazal Hayat) as the new amir of TTP annoyed many also committing attacks on high-profile targets, such as the as he was not from the tribal areas, hailing instead from the school in Peshawar and on Badaber PAF camp, in an effort Buner district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Despite to prove their continued abilities. In particular, the merger of having led an Islamist insurgency in Swat and adjoining Lashkar-e-Islam into the TTP and the reconciliation between districts in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province in 2008-2009, two major factions of TTP are two major recent developments he was not unanimously accepted as new amir, leading to that threaten to empower the group further. In addition, further fragmentation of the TTP. However, ironically, the the government’s various operations have only been able to government’s commencement of the Zarb-e-Azb operation restrict the space for Islamist militants to operation in rather in North Waziristan district, and supplementary operations than deny it complete; there is also the fact that no senior in other districts of tribal areas, served to soften the TTP’s militant leaders have yet been killed or arrested, making it differences over the leadership and to bind these groups is easier for these groups to bounce back once government together against a common enemy. pressure is removed. The latest attack on a highly secured PAF camp displays the militants’ reinvigorated abilities and In addition, Fazlullah carrying out the December 16, 2014 their continuing resolve to target the state, sending a clear attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, in which message that the TTP is a still a force to be reckoned with. 141 people (a large number of them children) were killed, outclassed all other competing jihadist groups, and Fazlullah Farhan Zahid writes on counter-terrorism, al-Qaeda, thereby proved his mettle to rule TTP. Other groups, most Pakistani al-Qaeda-linked groups, Islamist violent non-state importantly the Jamaat ul-Ahrar group, led by actors in Pakistan, militant landscapes in Pakistan and the Khorasani, led then sued for reconciliation, leading to Afghan Taliban. Khorasani pledging allegiance to Fazlullah. As a result, in March 2015, Ehsanullah Ehsan, the spokesperson of Jamaat 4 TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015 Notes The Islamic State’s Balkan 1. According to official figures released by the Pakistani ‘Strongholds’ military’s press and media department, Inter-Services Public Relations, between June 2014 and June 2015, 2,763 Ebi Spahiu terrorists have been killed, 837 hideouts of terrorists destroyed, 253 tons of explosives captured and 18,087 To the Islamic State militant group, foreign fighters from weapons recovered. 347 officers and soldiers of Pakistan the Balkans have particular importance due to their Army were also killed during the operation. For details historical ties to Islam, their homelands’ proximity to other please see, “2,763 terrorists killed in Operation Zarb-e-Azb”, Western Europe and because ethnic disputes in the region , June 14, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/ remain close to the surface. A video released in June 2015 story/903282/2763-terrorists-killed-in-operation-zarb-e- by the organization’s al-Hayat media center, for instance, azb/. emphasizes the strategic importance of the Balkan Peninsula 2. Other notable groups in the TTP include Lashkar-e- to the Islamic State by lengthily analyzing the historical Jhangvi (LeJ), Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), Harkat ul significance Balkan Muslims purportedly had in defying ul Islami (HuJI) and Jaysh-e-Mohammad (JeM). “European crusaders” during the Ottoman Empire, as well 3. “A Profile of Omar Khalid Khurasani: Emir of Jamaatal as enduring hardships during Enver Hoxha’s and Josip Ahrar,” FATA Research Centre, July 2015, http://frc.com.pk/ Broz Tito’s Communist regimes in Albania and Yugoslavia wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Omar-Khalid1-2.pdf. respectively. [1] In the last issue of Dabiq, the Islamic State’s English language magazine, the jihadist organization again continued to refer to the importance of the Balkans and also calls for its followers in the region to conduct lone wolf attacks. [2]

The region’s Muslim communities in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia still largely practice a moderate vision of Islam, based on Hanafi jurisprudence and Sufi traditions inherited from decades of Ottoman rule. However, Saudi-led efforts following the fall of the region’s communist regimes have attempted to make the Balkans a bastion of Salafist and Wahhabist doctrines and practice. One outcome of this process is that in the last two years, over 1,000 foreign fighters from the Western Balkans have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (Illyria Press, August 7). These recruits come from Muslim communities throughout the region, including Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro.

During the past year, the authorities in the region have conducted a series of arrests of groups and individual imams purportedly involved in inspiring and facilitating the flow of foreign fighters to the Islamic State. In Albania, for instance, the authorities undertook a series of security operations in March 2014 against an alleged network of recruiters based in two mosques on the outskirts of the capital Tirana, and arrested nine individuals on grounds of facilitating recruitment for terrorism, financing of terrorist activities. These included two imams allegedly instrumental in radicalizing the group’s followers. In addition, since August 2014, the security authorities in Kosovo have arrested and questioned over 100 individuals during investigations into the recruitment of young Albanian men and women from 5 TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015

Kosovo to the Islamic State (Gazeta Express [Prishtina], [Tirana], August 10). While religiosity was already an integral January 17). Similar operations have been conducted in component of a society that has historically promoted Macedonia, Bosnia and Serbia against individuals accused peaceful co-existence between religions, many in Kosovo of involvement in militant recruitment on behalf of the have gradually embraced Salafist and Wahhabist ideologies, Islamic State. Although most of these policing operations leading to a shift in their views and attitudes, while hundreds have proved successful in identifying and isolating the main of religious hardliners from Kosovo have also joined the lines of militant recruitment, questions remain over the Islamic State in recent years. Kacanik, a small town in Kosovo continuity of hardline religious doctrine in these areas and near the border with Macedonia, is a particular example of ways it is being utilized to establish strongholds of support where radical religious rhetoric has flourished and despite among smaller communities in the countries most affected. recent efforts to curb its influence, many radical imams in Even though most countries in the region remain keen to the area are still able to carry on giving sermons to radical join the European Union (EU), high levels of corruption, youth despite being in hiding from the authorities (Telegrafi organized crime and a weaker and less appealing EU [Prishtina], September 1, Telegraph, August 23). have created an environment where hardline ideologies can spread, especially in countries with predominantly In addition to Balkan youths’ changing approach to Muslim populations, such as Kosovo or Bosnia. The lack religion, hardliners sympathetic to the Islamic State have of preventative measures against this radical upswing may apparently also established a physical presence in the region potentially make religious radicalism one of the region’s by purchasing vacant real estate along the former lines of greatest security threats, alongside organized crime. contact between the local warring factions in the 1990s conflicts. This has been particularly visible in Bosnia, where Islamic State ‘Strongholds’ these types of properties are often in badly damaged remote areas that have been abandoned by state authorities (Avaz Weak governance and poor rule of law, and a corresponding [Sarajevo], May 28). According to another report, this one limited government presence in remote areas, is a problem on Bosnian fighters in Syria, these types of purchases are common to many Balkan countries. Communal anger over common among local Salafists, and many known Islamic high levels of unemployment and extensive government State foreign fighters from Bosnia have visited these villages corruption has been further stoked by a widespread in the past. [4] Current communities inhabiting these villages dissatisfaction with a prolonged EU integration process. do not shy from advertising their support for the Islamic These elements have accordingly become the centerpiece State, either via flying the group’s flags or through displaying of the grievance narrative that many Islamist leaders have other symbols of the group (Localno [Skopje], May 28). promoted in order to gain local support and fuel anti- Western and anti-government sentiments among their Organized Crime and Religious Radicalism followers. In addition, this dissatisfaction with the status quo also explains the gradual increase in people from Kosovo Although most regional security officials and security and Albania migrating to Western Europe in hopes of experts treat the threats posed by religious extremism and finding employment. For instance, Albanian migrants rank organized crime as separate concerns—growing out of third after Syrians and Afghans seeking asylum in Germany separate networks—there are strong possibilities that these (Panorama [Tirana], September 19). two elements may combine in future, as Islamist groups, such as the Islamic State, attempt to establish their presence As state institutions lack credibility, radical imams and in other parts of Europe. Throughout the past year, for similar groups are filling the vacuum, while additionally instance, there have been several media reports and events replacing moderate religious leaders and other societal that reflect that such combination is possible in a region actors in these communities. Several testimonies from marked by trafficking, prostitution and political links to local civil society groups based in northeastern Albania, for organized crime. instance, describe the rapid transformation of local religious life and an increased commitment towards following imams This emerging nexus between criminals and religious among youths, whose lives are increasingly shaped by radicals is particularly visible in Lazarat, a village in southern religious doctrine in the absence of a strong school system Albania infamous for its production and export of cannabis. and meaningful employment opportunities. [3] Similarly, a There have been several instances of unrest in the area, recent report found that youth in Kosovo are also becoming with authorities issuing arrest warrants for five young men increasingly conservative, while their main reference points allegedly responsible for a series of explosions near Lazarat for spiritual and intellectual guidance are also imams [Tema in March, which resulted in no reports of death or injuries 6 TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015

(BalkanWeb, May 23). Facebook profiles in the name of the Conclusion five men showed that they were vocal supporters of the Islamic State, but also led glamorous lives, involving expensive cars Convergences between organized crime groups and and Mediterranean trips, despite outstanding domestic and traditional terrorist organizations are nothing new. Frequent international arrest warrants. Arbion Aliko, one of the main evidence of direct linkages is seen between terrorist individuals involved, was apprehended in June, following a organizations and criminal networks who seek to capitalize shootout between the young men and police, on charges of upon each others’ skills and assets, despite divergences in carrying out acts for terrorist purposes and over the killing ideologies and objectives. For instance, the U.S. National of Ibrahim Basha, a special forces officer on duty in Lazarat. Security Council has said that “today’s criminal networks According to a Facebook profile in Aliko’s name, which was are fluid, striking new allegiances with other networks later taken down, he expressed his admiration for Lavdrim around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit Muhaxheri (an infamous Albanian-Kosovar jihadist with activities, including cybercrime and providing support for the Islamic State), and other known Albanian jihadists terrorism.” [6] Although details of direct links between the reportedly fighting for the jihadist organization. Aliko had Islamic State and organized groups in Albania, especially also repeatedly called for action to take back Lazarat from since the recent events in Lazarat, are not confirmed, the state control. [5] rampant corruption in all sectors of society, including the judiciary, and allegations of prostitution and drug links to Although direct links between organized criminal groups the political establishment mean that Albania and the rest and IS supporters in Albania were denied by the authorities, of the Balkan region are particularly vulnerable to extremist these events exposed the potential for organized crime to groups looking to establish their presence in Europe. In converge with religious radicalism and violent extremism addition, according to several unofficial sources, in Albania in Albania (BalkanWeb, June 29). The events in Lazarat in particular, political polarization and electoral fraud shocked public opinion in Albania, but they also suggest the have led religious leaders to support particular political possible emergence of other nexuses between radicals and agendas in exchange for delivering votes, thus leading to the active criminal groups elsewhere in the country. Albania willingness of authorities and politicians to overlook illicit has a long history of being a transit and destination country activities that these individuals may be involved in. This for cannabis, heroin and cocaine, and also has long been underlines that high levels of corruption at administrative considered a source country for cannabis going to EU and political levels in affected Balkan countries can create countries. The Albanian government has sought to tackle this additional vacuums in which religious radicalism can take problem; for instance, in 2014, Albanian police undertook a hold, potentially increasing threats not only in the region massive raid on Lazarat that was intended to end the village’s itself but also further afield. production and export of cannabis to Western Europe. However, although Albania’s interior minister, Saimir Ebi Spahiu is a researcher on Central Asian and Western Tahiri, has recently claimed that almost all marijuana plants Balkan Affairs, focusing on gender and religious extremism. in northern and southern parts of the country, which are particularly known for their high production of cannabis, Notes were destroyed as a result of police operations, questions remain over who managed these areas and profited from 1. See: http://jihadology.net/2015/06/04/al- their lucrative revenues (Fax [Tirana], August 16). On the %E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video- other hand, for hundreds of local residents, drug production message-from-the-islamic-state-honor-is-in-jihad-a- is a valuable source of income in the absence of other message-to-the-people-of-the-balkans/. employment opportunities, and the destruction of these 2. “An Opportunity for Noble Deeds,” Dabiq (August), pg. plantations poses an economic threat to them due to the 54. lack of alternatives. These areas are particularly vulnerable to 3. Author’s own discussions with civil society the influence of radical religious leaders, as well as criminal representatives based in different regions in Albania, groups that still maintain their own influence, in absence of September 2015. police control and weak institutions. This situation illustrates 4. “The Lure of the Syrian War,” The Atlantic Initiative that efforts to tackle the drugs trade also risk boosting http://atlanticinitiative.org/images/THE_LURE_OF_THE_ radicalization. SYRIAN_WAR_THE_FOREIGN_FIGHTERS_BOSNIAN_ CONTINGENT/The_Lure_of_the_Syrian_War_-_The_ Foreign_Fighters_Bosnian_Contingent.pdf. 5. Arbion Aliko Lazarat, Facebook profile https://www. 7 TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015 facebook.com/ar.al.18?fref=ts. Saudi Arabia’s Yemen Intervention: 6. “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” U.S. National Security Council, https://www.whitehouse. A High Risk Gamble? gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/strategy. James Brandon and Nicholas A. Heras

Saudi Arabia’s ongoing armed intervention in Yemen, which began overtly in March with airstrikes in support of Yemen’s internationally-recognized president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, has since become a coalition effort, although the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as Saudi Arabia’s major military partner in the intervention. On balance, the coalition campaign to oust the predominately Zaydi Shi’a Ansar Allah (Partisans of God—a.k.a. the Houthis) movement and their allies, which include forces loyal to Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, has made strong progress. Saudi Arabia’s daily air strikes on the Houthis and their allies in the country’s capital of Sana’a and in other Houthi-dominated areas in Yemen’s western highland region are degrading the Houthi alliance’s conventional military forces (al-Arabiya, September 28; al-Arabiya, September 5).

Concurrently, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait have landed troops in the southern city of Aden, the former capital of South Yemen, and are using the city to assist local, southern tribal militias organized under the broad network of al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya (Popular Resistance Committees). This has succeeded first in pushing the Houthis and their allies back from the city and pressuring Houthi-held areas around the city of Taiz in the country’s southwest and in the mainly desert region of Mareb, to the west of Sana’a (The National, September 7; YouTube, July 3; YouTube, June 17; YouTube, June 8; YouTube, June 5; YouTube, May 31; Khabar News Agency [Taiz], April 21; YouTube, April 21; al-Arabiya, March 26).

Border Troubles

In spite of these successes, Houthi and allied forces continue to maintain strong control over northern Yemen, including Sana’a, and Houthi forces have launched consistent attacks on several areas of southwestern Saudi Arabia that border Yemen, particularly in Najran and Jizan Provinces (YouTub e, June 9; YouTub e, May 29; YouTub e, May 5). For instance, on September 18, two Bangladeshis were killed when mortars fired from Yemen struck a hospital in Samtah, a town in the Saudi Red Sea coastal province of Jizan that is only a few miles from the Yemen border (Daily Star [Dhaka], September 19). Earlier, on September 14, Saudi Arabia announced that one soldier had been killed in an attack on a border post in Jizan, (SPA, September 14). A day earlier, four soldiers had been killed in another cross-border attack in Najran (SPA, 8 TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015

September 13). This stream of attacks, while not seriously In addition, there have previously been unverified reports— jeopardizing Saudi control of the area, is nonetheless mainly from Iranian state media sources—of local opposition almost constant, placing considerable pressure on civilian forces emerging from Najrani tribes who were deeply populations in the region, particularly through the Houthis’ dissatisfied with Saudi Arabia’s air campaign in Yemen. Most use of indiscriminate rocket attacks. strikingly, in mid-June, reports by Iranian media, and media produced by Iran’s allies in Syria, claimed that an armed A further challenge to Saudi Arabia is the latest risk of the opposition organization called Ahrar al-Najran (Free Ones conflict with the Houthis igniting long-dormant tensions of Najran) had been formed in the region by these local, in Najran and Jizan. Local politics in these provinces is anti-Saudi tribal forces (Shaam Times [Damascus], June significantly driven by sectarian and tribal loyalties that 18; Fars News [Tehran], June 15; YouTub e, June 15). Pro- uneasily coexist with the Saudi state. Najran and Jizan, Iran media also claimed that the movement had captured which have only been formally governed by the al-Saud a military base, shot down a Saudi helicopter, engaged in dynasty since 1934, retain a strong territorial identity of their numerous clashes with government forces and also set up an own, often in conscious opposition to the forcibly-imposed organization called “The Youth of Najran” (Fars News, July 2; sterner al-Saud/Wahhabist traditions of central Arabia. In Fars News, July 1). In addition, these media sources claimed addition, there are strong cross-border ties between tribes in that the Saudi Air Force was conducting air strikes against Najran and Jizan, and with the core areas of Houthi support Najrani armed opposition groups belonging to the Ahrar in northern Yemen (YouTub e, March 29; al-Akhbar [Beirut], al-Najran movement (Fars News, July 22; Tasnim News November 12, 2014). [1] Agency [Tehran], July 2). There has been no independent corroboration of any of these events, however. Moreover, Suggestive of Saudi awareness of these potential tensions, since summer, Iranian claims of domestic Saudi opposition early in the coalition’s campaign in Yemen, the Saudi forces in Najran have tailed off. This suggests either that such government deployed a strong, and highly symbolic, Saudi forces, if they existed, have become less active, or that Iran’s Arabian National Guard (SANG) force to its southwestern government decided that promoting such propaganda were provinces that border Yemen (YouTub e, April 27). Najran, no longer in its interests. which historically had a majority Ismaili Sh’ia Muslim population and also a significant Zaydi Shi’a population South Yemeni Secession Threat with historic socio-cultural ties to areas of northern Yemen presently controlled by the Houthis, has previously been the Further complicating the Saudi-led coalition’s efforts in site of significant protests against the Saudi regime, as well as Yemen is the re-emergence of an emboldened Southern inter-sectarian violence between Sunnis and the Shi’a sects Yemeni secessionist movement. This is primarily being (YouTub e, April 27; YouTub e, April 27; Okaz [Riyadh], April driven by local anti-Houthi Popular Resistance Forces, 1; al-Riyadh, April 1; AP, May 12; Okaz [Riyadh], April 1; al- stylizing themselves as the Southern Resistance; these forces Akhbar [Beirut], November 12, 2014; BBC, April 25, 2000). are more loudly seeking support for the independence of [2] Apparently concerned with demonstrating the loyalty of South Yemen, which was forcibly reunified with North the local Najrani population, Saudi media showed footage Yemen after the country’s 1994 civil war, through the of elaborate local, tribal welcoming ceremonies for SANG assistance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even if this move forces, especially from the Bani Yam, the most important runs contrary to the Saudi-led coalition’s aim to restore a Ismaili tribal confederation in the governorate (YouTub e, strong, pro-Saudi national government in Sana’a (al-Jazeera, April 27; YouTub e, April 26; YouTub e, March 28). Saudi November 29, 2014; YouTub e, December 23, 2013; YouTub e, Arabia’s Minister of the National Guard, Prince Mu’atib bin March 19, 2013). Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, the son of the recently deceased King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud and a As the Saudi and UAE-led coalition seeks to build a Houthi- powerful player within the Saudi royal family, also personally resistant, quasi-national government structure in southern travelled to Najran to participate in festivities marking the Yemen, these local calls from prominent southern Yemeni SANG’s deployment with the region’s powerful local tribes actors for secession (and a growing rejection of President (YouTub e, June 14). These efforts can be understood as an Hadi, a unitary Yemeni state or even a devolved federalism attempt to bolster local loyalties to the Saudi state, to spread structure), present a growing policy dilemma for Saudi Arabia a wider message that the area is calm and also to show SANG (Aden al-Ghad, September 16; Aden al-Ghad, September 8; forces protecting the local population against the Houthi al-Akhbar [Beirut], January 30; YouTub e, March 25, 2013). threat. As the necessary local partners for the Saudi and UAE-led coalition against the Houthis and allies forces, the Southern 9 TerrorismMonitor Volume XIII u Issue 20 u October 2, 2015

Resistance militias and the overall southern secessionist strong pro-Saudi bastion in southern Yemen. movement, which is generally strongly anti-Houthi, and anti-Saleh, cannot easily be dismissed, and are reportedly None of these options are particularly palatable to Saudi being engaged actively at least by pragmatic policymakers Arabia, which is loath to see a de facto Houthi state on in the UAE, who understand the need to address southern its southern border, or to set a precedent of partitioning a pro-separatist sensibilities and related grievances (al-Youm fellow Arab state along quasi-sectarian lines, with all the al-Saba [Aden], September 15; Yemen Akhbar [Aden], implications this holds for Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. The September 14; Ababiil [Aden], September 3; YouTub e, most obvious alternative, however, is for the Saudi military September 23, 2014). Saudi Arabia, therefore, finds itself to plunge deeper into the Yemeni morass, and to take on the in a quandary in southern Yemen too: it needs to build up battle-hardened and highly capable Houthi guerrillas on southern forces to counter the Houthis; however, by doing their own turf, with all the risks this entails to Saudi Arabia’s this, the strength of southern separatists, whose long-term finances, to its military and to its regional and international goals run counter to its own, is increased. prestige.

Outlook James Brandon is a political and security risk analyst. Nicholas A. Heras is a Middle East researcher at the Center for a New The new Saudi monarch, King Salman, has embarked on American Security (CNAS) and an associate fellow for The a high-risk gamble in launching a military intervention to Jamestown Foundation. defeat what Saudi Arabia perceives as Iranian expansionism in Saudi Arabia’s traditional client state, and to reinstall Hadi Notes as president. Thus far, the Saudi-led coalition has succeeded in driving the Houthis out of Aden and many areas of 1. Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (New southern Yemen. It has faltered, however, in its broader York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pgs. 266-267. aims of removing the Houthis from the capital, while also 2. For more information on Ismaili Shi’a protests in Najran, being hampered by the continued Houthi pressure on Saudi and the Saudi state security forces’ harsh reaction, see: “The Arabia’s southwestern border regions and by the South Ismailis of Najran: Second-Class Saudi Citizens,” Human Yemen separatist movement’s renewed activism as a result of Rights Watch, September 3, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/sites/ the Saudi-led intervention. default/files/reports/saudiarabia0908web.pdf.

Saudi policymakers therefore find themselves at a crossroads. On one hand, they are clearly tempted to continue to press boldly, and potentially dangerously, towards Sana’a in hope of restoring Yemen as a unitary, centrally-ruled Saudi client state, with President Hadi at its helm. However, the potential unwillingness of the Southern Resistance militias to advance into northern Yemen to displace the Houthis, seems likely to severely limit these ambitions. Adding to the pressure are the Houthi cross-border attacks and the potential for a prolonged conflict to reignite long dormant tribal, regional and sectarian irredentist feeling in southwestern Saudi Arabia.

As a result, if Saudi Arabia wants to end the conflict quickly, unless the government is willing to commit large numbers of their own forces in north Yemen, or to find some other way to mobilize significant Yemeni forces against the Houthis, the Saudis may have to recognize some form of Houthi self-rule in the north, and a significantly devolved form of government in southern Yemen. Alternatively, and even more radically, they may have to acquiesce to an independent South Yemen that may be favored by some pragmatists in the UAE government, and which would at least secure them a 10