Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: PAK34010 Country: Date: 17 November 2008

Keywords: Pakistan – Lashkar-i-Islam – Khyber Agency – Bagh – Armed forces – ISI

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions

1. Please provide information on the presence of Laskar-i-Islam and leader Mangal Bagh in Bara in the Khyber Agency. 2. Please provide information on the relations between the Pakistan authorities and Mangal Bagh and Laskar-i-Islam.

RESPONSE

Note: information provided in this response is split into several sections. In Question 1, information on Lashkar-i-Islam and Mangal Bagh is provided from previous RRT Research Responses, from government and NGO reports, and from recent media reports. In Question 2, information on the relations between the Pakistan authorities and Mangal Bagh and Lashkar- i-Islam is provided in two sections, the first focusing on recent reports involving relations between the government and Lashkar-i-Islam, and the second providing more general information about the relationship between the authorities in Pakistan and militant groups in the North West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

1. Please provide information on the presence of Laskar-i-Islam and leader Mangal Bagh in Bara in the Khyber Agency.

Previous research responses

Two previous research responses provide information on the Khyber Agency, and on Lashkar-i-Islam.

RRT Research Response PAK30614, of 11 October 2006, provides general background on the location and administration of the Khyber Agency, including a district map of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response PAK30614, 11 October – Attachment 1; for the map of the FATA and NWFP, see: ‘District Map of NWFP & FATA’ 2004, Khyber gateway website http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/nwfpmap01.gif – Accessed 4 October 2006 – Attachment 2; for a detailed map of the Khyber Agency showing the location of Bara, see: ‘Map of Khyber Agency’ (undated), Khyber Agency Official website http://www.khyber.gov.pk/images/Maps/Khyber-Map1.jpg – Accessed 12 November 2008 – Attachment 3).

Question 1 of PAK30614 provides information on the following aspects of the Khyber Agency: location and terrain; tribal groups; administration; governance; and a situation update as of October 2006. The following reports quoted in the response may be of interest:

A June 2006 report from the Indian government funded Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) provides information on the formation of Lashkar-i-Islam in the Bara tehsil (district) of Khyber Agency. It states that Mufti Shakir “formed a militant outfit called Lashkar-i-Islam to impose a Taliban style religious code in the area” of Bara in 2005, and that “Mangal Bagh, who claimed to be the amir of Lashkar-i-Islam, set upon himself the task of realising the dreams of his mentor by force”. This involved a battle with a rival group, the Amar Bilmaroof Wanahi Anilmunkar (ABWA), and the imposition of strict religious rules, as Bagh “urged men in the area to pray five times a day, grow beards and refrain from collaborating with the political authorities”. The report claims that “[t]he efforts of the administration and the jirga to bring moderation into Mangal Bagh do not seem to have had any effect”, and that “Mangal continues to remain defiant”:

The entire area stretching from the Khyber Pass till Chaman in the south across Waziristan and eastward up to in Pakistan has remained immune to change, both because of lack of will on the part of the government to extend its writ to these areas and the unwillingness of the local people to abandon their tribal mode of existence.

While the Taliban have hit the headlines, certain other groups posing as counterfoils to the Taliban have received scant attention. In fact, the Deobandi-Barelvi dimension in the tribal belt has been comparatively understudied. The traditional intra-sectarian fault-lines among a variety of Islam-pasand groups in the Tribal Areas have erupted in recent years and are posing serious internal security challenges for . The year-long clashes between two rival Mullah groups in Bara in the Khyber agency of Pakistan best illustrates this development.

For much of 2004 and 2005 groups like Amar Bilmaroof Wanahi Anilmunkar (ABWA) – which literally means promotion of virtue and prevention of vice – fought against the Barelvi- Pirano groups in the Khyber agency. These rival groups run their own FM radio stations and mobilise popular support through active propaganda.

…The most recent case involves a tussle between Mufti Shakir and Pir Saifur Rahman at Bara, a few kilometres from Peshawar in Khyber agency. In 2004, the two Maulanas had established separate FM stations and their sermons began to progressively assume intense sectarian contours. By September 2005, the verbal duel between the Maulanas over the FM radio transmissions had crossed the limits of civility.

…Mufti Shakir claimed that the Pir had been promoting a perverted version of Islam and in the true tradition of the religion such vice had to be prevented. After preaching continuously against the Pir, he asked the latter to leave Bara by December 25, 2005. The Mufti even formed a militant outfit called Lashkar-i-Islam to impose a Taliban style religious code in the area. His principal follower, Mangal Bagh, who claimed to be the amir of Lashkar-i-Islam, set upon himself the task of realising the dreams of his mentor by force and issued warnings to the Pir to move out of Bara. But the Pir refused to oblige. To prevent the situation from spiralling out of control, Pakistani authorities had to send in more than 1,000 troops from Bajaur Scouts, Rifles, Mehsud Scouts and Khyber Rifles to maintain order.

…On January 31, 2006, the Khyber administration organised a jirga of sub-tribes to discuss the matter. The jirga decided to expel the Maulanas as they were not locals and had aggravated the security situation in Bara. The Pir obeyed the verdict and left Bara on February 1, reportedly for Lahore. Mufti Shakir, however, interpreted the Pir’s exit as a grand victory and refused to leave Bara for quite some days. Finally, upon pressure from the administration, he too left towards the end of February reportedly for Tirah valley, where the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry is peaking now. Subsequently, the jirga entrusted the task of maintaining security of the area to a tribal peacekeeping force, Tanzeem-e-Ittehad Ulema.

But the sectarian temperature in the area refused to subside even after this. The Tanzeem faced serious attacks from Lashkar-i-Islami in early March 2006. On March 25, Lashkar followers led by Mangal destroyed the house of one of the Pir’s followers. And on March 28, they attacked the house of the Pir’s principal follower, Badshah Khan, and killed 19 supporters of the Pir, 16 of whom were Afghan nationals, and carried away women and children as hostage.

The administration’s response was quick. After one shot from the Frontier Corps aimed at the Mufti’s headquarters in Nullah Khajori, which destroyed the antenna of the FM station on March 30, Mangal reportedly fled to Gugrini area on the hills near Jamrud to hide in the caves there. He re-launched his radio station and started spewing venom against the Barelvi-Pirano group. In true Taliban tradition, he urged men in the area to pray five times a day, grow beards and refrain from collaborating with the political authorities. He also imposed a ban on the interest-based loan system, declaring it un-Islamic.

The efforts of the administration and the jirga to bring moderation into Mangal Bagh do not seem to have had any effect. By early May 2006, he was threatening the local administration that all routes to Tirah would be blocked, if his supporters, apprehended in April, were not released. He even persuaded the elders of the Zakhakhels – the largest sub-tribe among the – not to participate in the jirga in May. At the beginning of June, Mangal’s men kidnapped a local Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam leader from a mosque for allegedly cooperating with the administration. The Lashkar took control of the Bara bazaar on June 10. The administration responded on June 12 by blowing up of a four-storey shopping plaza owned by Mangal. The Khasadar force and Mehsood Scouts have since taken up the Bara bazaar under their control. But Mangal continues to remain defiant (Behuria, A.K. 2006, ‘Million Mutinies in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses website, 27 June http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/AshokBehuria270606.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006 – Attachment 4).

In other media reports from PAK30614:

• A September 2006 article from the Baluchistan Times states that no cease-fire agreement has been reached between the feuding Islamist groups Lashkar-i-Islam and Ansar-ul-Islam (‘Ansar Ul Islam Rejects Truce With Lashkar-E-Islami In Tirah Valley’ 2006, Baluchistan Times, 19 September – Attachment 5).

• An August 2006 report from BBC Monitoring Newsfile states that “[a]t least seven more people were killed and three others injured in clashes between armed supporters of Lashkar-i-Islam and Ansarul Islam in Bara and Tirah areas on Sunday [13 August]” (‘Seven dead as rival religious groups clash in Pakistan tribal area’ 2006, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, source: Dawn website (14 August 2006), 14 August – Attachment 6).

• A July 2006 report sourced from The News states that “[t]he Khyber Agency has the tradition of being ruled by different religious groups on different occasions” (‘Pakistan takes action to prevent tribes from supporting Islamist groups’ 2006, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: The News website (6 July 2006), 7 July – Attachment 7).

• A June 2006 article from BBC Monitoring South Asia, sourced from Pakistan AVT Khyber TV predicts that the “situation will further worsen” and that “[t]he political agent, which is a government representative and was considered to be a very powerful figure, has also lost its power”:

It seems that situation will further worsen and ordinary people will be more affected and the local tribal Taleban, tribesmen and soldiers will also be harmed. A number of people have already lost their lives and situation has worsened to a greater extent. The local malik [local elder of an area] system has also been weakened by this situation and no one accepts what a local malik says. The political agent, which is a government representative and was considered to be a very powerful figure, has also lost its power now. The media is also weak and you can’t find a journalist in the region. Journalism seems to have wound up and journalists have left the area (‘Commentator views “deteriorating” situation in Pakistan’s tribal areas’ 2006, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Pakistan AVT Khyber TV (11 June 2006), 14 June – Attachment 8).

RRT Research Response PAK31546, of 23 March 2007, provides information on the Khyber Agency, general information on governance and authority in the FATA, and information on clashes between Lashkar-i-Islam and rival groups (RRT Country Research 2007, RRT Research Response PAK31546, 23 March – Attachment 9).

Question 1 of PAK31546 quotes an article from the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor which makes the following claims about the rule of law in the FATA:

On political and social issues, it is the jirga (assembly of tribal elders) that define laws, regulations and policies. Pakistani courts and law enforcement have almost no jurisdiction over the area. Unelected jirga leaders from the region, however, were invited to become full members of the successive elected National Assemblies of Pakistan until 1997 to represent FATA. Due to their allegiance to the Pakistani establishment, they would always vote in favour of the ruling party on critical issues, but in reality the state’s writ is only on paper (Abbas, Hassan 2006, ‘Profiles of Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. IV, Iss.20, 19 October, The Jamestown Foundation, p.2 http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM_004_020.pdf – Accessed 22 October 2007 – Attachment 10).

Question 3 of PAK31546 quotes several reports on violence involving Lashkar-i-Islam, one of which took place in the “Bara sub-division of Khyber Agency”:

More than 1,000 paramilitary troops were sent to Bara sub-division of Khyber Agency Thursday [22 December] to help the political administration in maintaining law and order, as two rival religious groups are bent upon expelling each other from the area.

Sources in the political administration and intelligence agencies confirmed that more than 1,000 troops of Bajaur Scouts, Mohmand Rifles, Mehsud Scouts and Khyber Rifles have been rushed to Bara ahead of the 25 December deadline given by Mufti Munir Shakir’s group to Pir Saifur Rehman to leave the area before the expiry of the deadline or face the consequences.

Pir Safiur Rehman is an Afghan national from Samangan Province and has settled down in area of the agency inhabited by the Sipah sub-tribe of Afridis, while his rival groups headed by Mufti Munir Shakir is using the territory of Malikdin sub-tribe of Afridis.

Mufti Munir Shakir is and has migrated from Karak district of NWFP [North West Frontier Province] to Sadda tehsil of Kurram agency and then made Bara his abode after he was expelled from Kurram agency by the political authorities for his alleged involvement in Sunni-Shi’i sectarian violence.

Both sides, local tribesmen said, have made preparations and brought in hundreds of armed men and heavy weaponry to be used against each other in case any side insisted on the forced eviction of the rival group.

…Mufti Shakir has announced through his FM radio that, in case of his death, arrest or inability to reach them through the private transmitter, his supporters should block the main -Mattani road and bring traffic to a standstill in the entire Khyber agency to force the pir to leave the area (‘Pakistan troops sent to tribal area to avert armed clash’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 23 December, sourced from report by Behroz Khan on Pakistani The News website, 23 December 2005 – Attachment 11).

Government and NGO reports

Recent government and NGO reports indicate that Mangal Bagh and Lashkar-i-Islam (LI) are still active in the Bara tehsil of Khyber Agency. The US Department of State’s 2008 International Religious Freedom Report for Pakistan states that the kidnapping of “25 to 32 Christian men and boys in Peshawar” was attributed to “militants affiliated with Lashkar-e- Islam”. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan’s State of Human Rights in 2007 report claims that LI “activists” reportedly executed three people accused of adultery in the Khyber Agency. A September 2007 report from the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor provides information on the battle between LI and Ansar-ul-Islam, and a December 2006 International Crisis Group report states that LI enforce “a parallel justice system” in Khyber Agency, and that the LI base is in Bara [here transliterated as “Baza”] (US Department of State 2008, International Religious Freedom Report 2008 – Pakistan, 19 September – Attachment 12; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2008, State of Human Rights in 2007, April, Section 1.2, pp. 38-39 – Attachment 13; Abbas, H. 2007, ‘Increasing Talibanisation in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 18, Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373679 – Accessed 12 November 2008 – Attachment 16; International Crisis Group 2006, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, 11 December – Attachment 17).

The US Department of State’s 2008 International Religious Freedom Report for Pakistan does not make specific mention of Bara tehsil, but states that Lashkar-i-Islam has been active in Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, and Sarband, near Peshawar, just across the provincial border from Bara:

On June 21, 2008, unidentified militants kidnapped during prayer 25 to32 Christian men and boys in Peshawar and released them on June 22. One Muslim also kidnapped with the group was still missing. The Muslim man had rented a building, which was formerly a madrassah, to the Christians. According to press reports, the militants were affiliated with Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), a militant group with ties to terrorist organisations. The Muslim man was later released after he promised to pray five times a day, grow a beard, and never commit an un-Islamic act.

On May 3, 2008, LI militants killed a man, Mukarram, for not offering Asr prayers and standing outside a mosque in the Sarband Police Station jurisdiction in the NWFP. When Mukarram told the militants that it was his personal matter, the LI men shot him.

…On June 20, 2008, LI activists visited a shrine in Peshawar and warned persons to avoid taking part in religious ceremonies there (US Department of State 2008, International Religious Freedom Report 2008 – Pakistan, 19 September – Attachment 12).

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan’s State of Human Rights in 2007 report claims that LI “activists” were involved in the execution of three people “accused of adultery” in the Khyber Agency:

Two men and a woman, accused of adultery, were stoned and then shot dead in public in Khyber Agency, adjacent to Peshawar. The executioners were masked activists reportedly belonging to a militant group calling itself Lashkar-e-Islam. The Political Agent invited criticism for his failure to intervene, particularly in view of the fact that the victims were detained for two days by the vigilante squad before they were killed and this was known to the people living in the area (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2008, State of Human Rights in 2007, April, Section 1.2, pp. 38-39 – Attachment 13).

Reporters Without Borders’ 2008 annual report for Pakistan states that Bagh made an on-air “death threat against [a] journalist on the illegal FM radio that he runs” and that the journalist’s home was later the target of a grenade attack:

The home of Nasrullah Afridi, correspondent in the tribal areas for the Urdu-language daily Mashriq Khyber , was targeted in a grenade attack in May. Five days earlier, the head of the Jihadist group Lashkar-i-islam, Mangal Bagh, made a death threat against the journalist on the illegal FM radio that he runs. The journalist, who had already moved home because of similar threats, told Reporters Without Borders that “I am in fear for my life” and I will have to “leave the town” (Reporters Without Borders 2008, Pakistan – Annual report 2008 , 11 February http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25678&Valider=OK – Accessed 15 September 2008 – Attachment 14).

A South Asia Terrorism Portal report from 2008 states that on April 23 2008, “[s]ix people were killed and 12 others sustained injuries when Lashkar-i-Islam activists and SFs exchanged fire at Bara in the Khyber Agency of FATA” (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2008, ‘Major incidents of Terrorism-related violence in Pakistan, 1988-2008’, (undated) http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents.htm – Accessed 29 January 2008 – Attachment 15).

A September 2007 Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor report on the FATA states that “many men are seen wearing traditional caps in the [Khyber] agency because of fear, as a local religious outfit sympathetic to the Taliban, Lashkar-i-Islam (Army of Islam), has declared it binding on all men of the agency to wear caps”:

Khyber Agency is the main artery connecting Peshawar to via the Khyber Pass. Today, many men are seen wearing traditional caps in the agency because of fear, as a local religious outfit sympathetic to the Taliban, Lashkar-i-Islam (Army of Islam), has declared it binding on all men of the agency to wear caps. The leader of the group, Mangle Bagh, in his radio address last week issued this edict and announced that violators’ heads will be shaved and they will face a monetary fine (Statesman, September 22). It is pertinent to point out that there is a serious battle going on in the agency between Ansar-ul-Islam—led by Pir Saif ur Rahman—and Lashkar-i-Islam—led by Gul Maiden and Mufti Munir Shakir—since 2005-06 (Daily Times, November 17, 2006, April 1, 2006, December 3, 2006). Both factions have built their militias over the last few years and have entrenched themselves in castle-like strongholds. In essence, this is an intra-Sunni (Deobandi vs. Barelvi) war (Daily Times, March 30, 2006).

After banning music in the tribal areas, the local Taliban in Khyber Agency have also started fining taxi drivers and citizens Rs 500 (about $8) for listening to music cassettes in their cars (Daily Times, March 1). Also recently, militants started distributing pamphlets in Bara Bazaar in Khyber Agency saying that the “Taliban have finally reached Bara,” while warning that “if anyone tries to hinder our movement and activities, we will launch a holy war against them” (Mashriq, September 3).

In comparison to other tribal agencies, Khyber Agency (because of its proximity to Peshawar, the capital of the North-West Frontier Province) is more accessible to Pakistani government functionaries and some development work has been done in the area. For instance, in 2005, Stephen Hadley, the then adviser on national security to President Bush, inaugurated a primary school building project in Surkamar town of Khyber Agency that was financed by the U.S. and Japanese governments in collaboration with the FATA Secretariat (Daily Times, September 28, 2005). Conditions have changed for the worse since then. The extent of the writ of the state can be ascertained from the fact that around a dozen people were killed in June this year when the Taliban attacked the house of the Khyber Agency political agent, Syed Ameeruddin Shah (Daily Jang, June 1) (Abbas, H. 2007, ‘Increasing Talibanisation in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 18, Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373679 – Accessed 12 November 2008 – Attachment 16).

An International Crisis Group report from 2006, titled Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, states that the LI “enforced a parallel justice system” in Khyber Agency:

In Khyber Agency, adjoining Peshawar, Mufti Munir Shakir, a JUI-F-linked Deobandi cleric, enforced a parallel justice system through his militia, the Lashkar-e-Islami (Army of Islam), policing the area and airing hard-line religious and sectarian teachings through his FM radio station. Armed clashes between his supporters and those of a rival Barelvi leader, Pir Saifur Rehman, in the Bara tehsil have killed scores of people since February 2006. The administration belatedly evicted the rival leaders but Lashkar-e-Islami has established its new base in Baza sub-tehsil, where it has imposed a ban on money-lending as un-Islamic. The new Lashkar head has also issued warnings to those who do not pray five times a day over his FM station from his hideout in Tirah valley.

…As the militants consolidate their hold in the tribal areas, Talibanisation has also crept into the settled districts. Local clerics inspired by, and with links to, local militants and the Taliban try to emulate Taliban-style rule. “The [Pakistani] Taliban’s sphere of influence has expanded to Dera Ismail Khan, Tank and the Khyber Agency, where clerics of the area have started to join them”, admitted Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan (International Crisis Group 2006, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, 11 December, pp. 23-24 – Attachment 17).

A September 2008 report from the Shirkat Gah Women’s Resource Centre’s Newsheet may be of interest as it provides information on the closure of girls’ schools in the NWFP and the FATA, including Khyber Agency (it should be noted that the report locates in Khyber Agency, whereas the map of the FATA provided as Attachment 2 locates it in Agency to the south):

In Darra in Khyber Agency, local residents had set up a private school for girls were 600 students were enrolled. This, along with most other schools in the town, has been padlocked. Parents who could afford to do so have shifted to neighbouring Peshawar or other settled areas for their daughters’ future drivers who take pupils to schools. At times, threatening pamphlets are also dropped at the homes of students or school heads. Teachers are also terrorised.

These tactics have ensured that there is minimum loss of life while a school is bombed or torched. “They have never attacked any of these schools when pupils are around,” says an education official. Clearly, the aim of the militants is to create a general scare besides forcing people to stay away from sending their daughters to schools.

In most cases, in fact, militants turn up at night for their raids. They tie up the watchman, collect all Islamic literature and the copies of the Holy Quran from the school and leave after torching or bombing the building.

But this is not to say that they are not willing to take lives to get their message across. In October last year, unknown militants killed a female teacher in Mohamand Agency for not heeding the warning that she should be covered from head to toe. Soon after that, all the girls’ schools in the agency were closed. Indeed so effective has been the drive that scores of teachers have given up their profession and others have handed over the threatening letters to the authorities to explain why they cannot continue teaching.

Officials say Parachinar in Kurram Agency is the only area in all the seven tribal agencies – North and South Waziristan, Khyber, Kurram, Mohamand, Bajaur and Orakzai – where the situation is little better.

…instead of confronting the Taliban’s anti-education campaign, the authorities have been living in denial. For instance, in the face of threats from militants last year the local administration in Darra Adamkhel directed female teachers and girl students of government schools to wear a burqa while going to and coming back from schools (Shirkat Gah Women’s Resource Centre 2008, Newsheet, Vol. 20, No. 3, September, pp. 15-16 http://www.shirkatgah.org/Newsheet%20Vol%2020%20No-3%20Sept%202008%20pdf.pdf – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 20).

Recent media reports on Mangal Bagh and Lashkar-i-Islam

Recent media reports indicate that Mangal Bagh and the LI are still active in Bara tehsil, despite a June-July 2008 operation against them undertaken by the Pakistani military. A November 2008 article from the Pakistan Daily Times relates the rescue of a kidnapped child by LI “activists”, and states that Bagh announced his own punishments for the kidnappers, and “asked the government to lift the ban on the LI, so the outfit could help the government curb crime”. An October 2008 report from USA Today claims that despite apparent attempts by the Pakistani military to impose order in Bara, “[t]he local militant group – Lashkar-e- Islam, led by former bus driver Mangal Bagh…is back in charge now”. The report states “that Lashkar gunmen are walking the streets”, imposing “a rigid Muslim code of behaviour” in Bara. A September 2008 report from the Daily Times, titled ‘Mangal Bagh still rules Khyber’, claims that “[n]o one dares to speak up against Mr. Bagh”, and that “[w]hen the state was winning against him, Mr Bagh was laughing on TV”. An August 2008 report from the Group claims that Bagh “said that Lashkar-i-Islam would not permit the observance of any un-Islamic practices in any part of Khyber Agency and would wage a jihad against the violators”, and that LI “would establish centres [in] every tehsil of Khyber Agency”. An April 2008 interview with Mangal Bagh from The News quotes Bagh claiming that the LI has “no problem” with Pakistan’s security forces in Khyber Agency, and that “Lashkar-i-Islam was now able to enforce its code of conduct in almost the whole of Khyber Agency”. In another April 2008 interview with Bagh in the Pakistan Times, the reporter claims that “[t]he Pakistani state seems to have withdrawn from Bara and much of Khyber agency and it has taken no recent action to rein in Mr Bagh” and that “Lashkar-i-Islam have become the de facto police”. This report also claims that “while he has Bara and its surrounding area, his command elsewhere is less certain” (‘LI claims recovering kidnapped child’ 2008, Daily Times, 5 November http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C11%5C05%5Cstory_5-11- 2008_pg7_18 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 18; Wiseman, P. & Sheikh, Z. 2008, ‘Militants flourish in Pakistan’s tribal area’, USA Today, 1 October http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10-01-tribes_N.htm – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 19; ‘Mangal Bagh still rules Khyber’ 2008, Daily Times, 1 September http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C09%5C01%5Cstory_1-9- 2008_pg3_1 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 22; ‘Militant group takes over two mosques in Pakistan tribal area’ 2008, Dawn News Group, 28 August – Attachment 23; ‘Mangal Bagh claims he refused to join Taliban’ 2008, The News, 21 April http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=108035 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 25; Masood, A. 2008, ‘Who is Mangal Bagh Now Commanding Khyber’, Pakistan Times, 29 April http://www.pak-times.com/2008/04/29/who-is-mangal-bagh-now- commanding-khyber/ – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 26).

A November 2008 article in the Pakistan Daily Times reports that the “Bara-based…LI claimed recovering a kidnapped child”, and that Bagh “said the kidnappers would be fined Rs 1 million and their houses would be razed”. The report also states that “Bagh asked the government to lift the ban on the LI, so the outfit could help the government curb crime”:

BARA: The Bara-based Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) claimed recovering a kidnapped child on Tuesday after an exchange of fire with the kidnappers that left one kidnapper dead.

…LI chief Mangal Bagh told reporters LI activists raided the house of Bhora Khan in Mamaray after receiving a tip-off. The occupants of the house opened fire on the LI activists and kidnapper Jan Akbar was killed in the retaliatory fire. He said four kidnappers – Ismail Akakhel, Zar Mohammad, Baghicha Gul and Mohabat Khan – were captured.

Bagh said the LI also took into custody former councillor Mubarak Shah and his accomplice in another raid.

The LI chief said the kidnappers would be fined Rs 1 million and their houses would be razed. He said the dead kidnapper would be buried without funeral prayers. He also announced a Rs 500,000 fine for anyone who offered prayers for him.

Bagh asked the government to lift the ban on the LI, so the outfit could help the government curb crime (‘LI claims recovering kidnapped child’ 2008, Daily Times, 5 November http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C11%5C05%5Cstory_5-11- 2008_pg7_18 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 18).

A 1 October 2008 report from USA Today states that “militants with bushy beards, shoulder- length hair and Kalashnikov rifles have taken over Bara and surrounding areas”. The report notes that “Pakistani troops swept through Bara as recently as June. The local militant group – Lashkar-e-Islam, led by former bus driver Mangal Bagh – melted away, then returned as soon as the army pulled out. It is back in charge now”. According to this report, the LI enforces a “rigid Muslim code of behaviour” in Bara, but quotes a local resident who claims that “Bara is safer now that Lashkar gunmen are walking the streets”:

The marketplace enforcer and the gunmen aren’t police; they’re militants who have become the law in this market town in northwest Pakistan’s tribal region. Their ability to impose a rigid Muslim code of behaviour here highlights what is an increasingly grave threat to the security of the United States and its allies in the region.

Whenever there’s bad news in the region lately, it seems to have its origins in these rugged mountains, where the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other militant groups operate with near impunity.

…The rugged, mountainous area hardly seems part of Pakistan. The central government is invisible. Instead, militants with bushy beards, shoulder-length hair and Kalashnikov rifles have taken over Bara and surrounding areas in the shadow of the legendary Khyber Pass. They can be seen with their signature black flags hanging from their trucks.

…Pakistan has sent tens of thousands of troops to the area. But after four years of periodic offensives – and ill-fated truces – the Pakistani army has failed to seal the border or stop militant attacks within its own borders.

…Pakistani troops swept through Bara as recently as June. The local militant group – Lashkar-e-Islam, led by former bus driver Mangal Bagh – melted away, then returned as soon as the army pulled out.

It is back in charge now.

Lashkar militants regularly search pedestrians for CDs and other contraband. They also have banished weapons from the marketplace, unusual in an area where most men regard their rifle as a lifesaving necessity.

…As evening fell on Bara recently, clerical worker Ilyas Khan, 47, hurried home in drizzling rain, trying not to attract any attention from the religious enforcers.

“I don’t want to be stopped in the bazaar,” he says. “They stop everyone at prayer time” to make sure they’re headed to the mosque. “I am happy to pray on my own. But I don’t want to pray with these guys.”

The Lashkar militiamen do a roll call every evening at prayers. Anyone absent better have a good explanation — or face a 500-rupee ($7.15) fine, which can be more than a week’s pay for tribal people. Khan keeps a prayer cap in his pocket in case the Lashkar enforcers stop him. Anyone caught without a prayer cap must pay 100 to 200 rupees ($1.31 to $2.62).

Khan is annoyed by the intrusion into his life, but he says Bara is safer now that Lashkar gunmen are walking the streets.

“Before at night, in the dark, no one would leave home without a weapon,” he says. “We would gladly pay (the fines) to make sure our homes, our wives, our kids are safe. We don’t want these Lashkar people to go” (Wiseman, P. & Sheikh, Z. 2008, ‘Militants flourish in Pakistan’s tribal area’, USA Today, 1 October http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10- 01-tribes_N.htm – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 19).

An October 2008 report from Newstrack India states that “[t]wo Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) men were killed in a clash with security forces in Khyber Agency on Wednesday, when they were stopped at the BC-1 checkpoint while on their way from Jamrud to Bara tehsil” (‘15 Pak FC soldiers found dead in Swat’ 2008, Newstrack India (source: ANI), 23 October http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/30549 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 21).

A September 2008 report from the Pakistan Daily Times, titled ‘Mangal Bagh still rules Khyber’, suggests that the “‘successful’ operation in Khyber Agency” only meant that Bagh and the LI temporarily relocated to Landi Kotal, also in Khyber Agency, and imposed their rule there. According to this report, “[n]o one dares to speak up against Mr. Bagh. But everyone is ready to speak against the state and ask it not to come to their help. This is because the state has gone in and then left the job unfinished. When the state was winning against him, Mr Bagh was laughing on TV”:

There is no need to say what happened after a “successful” operation in Khyber Agency. Warlord Mangal Bagh was put to flight and is under a deadline to leave the agency. The latest news is that his gang Lashkar-e-Islam has asked the people of Landi Kotal to obey his orders, or else. Mr Bagh has asked the people to voluntarily hoist his army’s black flags on their rooftops or face punitive action. He has asked men to keep beards, cover their heads with caps, and keep their ankles visible to avoid thrashings. A large number of people have bought caps to avoid being killed. Since he is using the FM radio, the sales of radio sets have shot up. People don’t want to miss out on his fresh orders and suffer. Every prayer-leader will have to follow the timetable for five prayers set by Mr Bagh’s army.

It is the same as in Swat and Bajaur. No one dares to speak up against Mr Bagh. But everyone is ready to speak against the state and ask it not to come to their help. This is because the state has gone in and then left the job unfinished. When the state was winning against him, Mr Bagh was laughing on TV. He still owns houses in Peshawar and orders people around in , but the state is not there in Khyber (‘Mangal Bagh still rules Khyber’ 2008, Daily Times, 1 September http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C09%5C01%5Cstory_1-9- 2008_pg3_1 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 22).

An August 2008 report from the Dawn News Group claims that Bagh “said that Lashkar-i- Islam would not permit the observance of any un-Islamic practices in any part of Khyber Agency and would wage a jihad against the violators”, and that LI “would establish centres [in] every tehsil of Khyber Agency”:

Speaking on his FM radio, Mangal Bagh asked the local people to hoist black flags atop their houses both as a protest against government failure to control the law and order situation in tribal areas and also as a token of allegiance to his organisation.

He said that Lashkar-i-Islam would not permit the observance of any un-Islamic practices in any part of Khyber Agency and would wage a jihad against the violators. He said that they would establish centres [in] every tehsil of Khyber Agency (‘Militant group takes over two mosques in Pakistan tribal area’ 2008, Dawn News Group, 28 August – Attachment 23).

A June 2008 article from Newstrack India, sourced from TNI, states that “a militant named Mangal Bagh…holds sway in the Khyber agency and is so flush with men and money that he is fighting another Islamic group in the Tirah valley, law enforcement officials said” (‘Fall of Peshawar to militants eminent: NYT, other dailies’ 2008, Newstrack India (source: TNI) 28 June http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/4246 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 24).

An April 2008 interview with Mangal Bagh from The News quotes Bagh claiming that: the LI has “no problem” with Pakistan’s security forces in Khyber Agency; that LI is “a reformist organisation trying to promote virtue and prevent vice”; that “Lashkar-i-Islam was now able to enforce its code of conduct in almost the whole of Khyber Agency”; and that LI has “120,000 men under arms who at a short notice would be able to assemble in case of need”:

In an interview with The News at his base in a remote part of Bara in Khyber Agency, he said that he has never fought Pakistan’s security forces and had no intention of doing so in future. “There is a Pakistan Army camp in Bara area and we also have Frontier Corps troops and Khasadars operating here. We have had no problem with the presence of these forces in our area,” he argued.

Mangal Bagh, a slightly-built man aged 35, hogged media limelight recently when he tried to force his way along with hundreds of his fighters into Jamrud area in a bid to extend his control in Khyber Agency. The fighting so close to Peshawar’s suburban Hayatabad town created scare in the city. Ceasefire between Lashkar-i-Islam and Afridi tribesmen from Kukikhel sub-tribe residing in Jamrud ended the fighting and restored calm in and around Peshawar.

However, Mangal Bagh assured residents of Peshawar not to worry, as he wasn’t going to cause them any harm. “I am not about to attack Hayatabad or any other part of Peshawar,” he remarked. “Ours is a reformist organisation trying to promote virtue and prevent vice. We have rid Bara of drug-traffickers, gamblers, kidnappers, car-snatchers and other criminals and we want to cleanse Jamrud as well of those selling drugs and liquor and running gambling dens. That was the reason for us to send our mujahideen to Jamrud to accomplish the job,” he stressed.

Mangal Bagh claimed Lashkar-i-Islam was now able to enforce its code of conduct in almost the whole of Khyber Agency except parts of Jamrud inhabited by Kukikhels and a two- kilometre stretch of territory in Maidan area of Tirah valley. “We have 120,000 men under arms who at a short notice would be able to assemble in case of need. All I have to do is to make an announcement on our FM radio channel and my mujahideen volunteers would be ready to fight for the Lashkar-i-Islam,” he maintained. He added that about 70 vehicles, almost all double-door pickups, had been donated by pious and wealthy tribesmen for use by Lashkar-i-Islam volunteers (‘Mangal Bagh claims he refused to join Taliban’ 2008, The News, 21 April http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=108035 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 25).

In another April 2008 interview with Bagh in the Pakistan Times, the reporter claims that “[t]he Pakistani state seems to have withdrawn from Bara and much of Khyber agency and it has taken no recent action to rein in Mr Bagh” and that “Lashkar-i-Islam have become the de facto police”. According to this report, Bagh claims that “people’s frustration with the failure of the state to deliver law and order brought them flocking to him”, and that “his writ ran over almost the whole of Khyber”, while “[o]thers suggested that while he has Bara and its surrounding area, his command elsewhere is less certain”:

The Khyber agency, which is part of Pakistan’s tribal belt and is now largely in Mr Bagh’s control…

Mangal Bagh’s stronghold, the market town of Bara, is just a half hour drive from the city centre of the provincial capital, Peshawar. An escort of his heavily armed followers is needed to reach his fortified compound in the countryside nearby. “I’m not the ruler of Khyber, I’m the servant,” said Mr Bagh, with an unexpectedly gentle manner, as he relaxed with his Kalashnikov-toting men, drinking tea. “My aim is to finish all social evils.”

…Lashkar-i-Islam forbids kidnapping and suicide bombings. Mr Bagh’s message is more an austere one, that “vices” must end, not the international jihad of the Taleban and Al-Qaeda.

The Pakistani state seems to have withdrawn from Bara and much of Khyber agency and it has taken no recent action to rein in Mr Bagh. In Bara town, the local government office was padlocked and no army or police were visible on the streets. Lashkar-i-Islam have become the de facto police, driving around in four-wheel-drive vehicles that even have a blue flashing light.

A local politician, who declined to be identified, said: “If we finish Mangal Bagh, the Taleban will come in. He’s a better alternative. At least he will never pick up his gun against Pakistan.” In Bara, there were no women walking around. The Lashkar-i-Islam’s harsh strictures, delivered through a pirate radio station, appear to have driven them indoors. In the market, local people praised Mr Bagh for cracking down on rampant crime – though it would be a brave man to openly criticise him. Praying five times a day at the mosque is now mandatory.

Mangal Bagh, known as the “Emir”, said that he had over 10,000 men under his command and could call on up to 120,000 – which would be greater than the Pakistan army soldiers stationed in the region…He said that people’s frustration with the failure of the state to deliver law and order brought them flocking to him. “I just preached, praised Islam, it was not difficult for me to organise these people. They are not my followers, they are followers of the Koran.”

Mr Bagh belongs to the Afridi tribe, the biggest clan in the 2,500 sq km Khyber agency, with a population of about 550,000 and seen as the most developed part of FATA. He said his writ ran over almost the whole of Khyber. Others suggested that while he has Bara and its surrounding area, his command elsewhere is less certain (Masood, A. 2008, ‘Who is Mangal Bagh Now Commanding Khyber’, Pakistan Times, 29 April http://www.pak- times.com/2008/04/29/who-is-mangal-bagh-now-commanding-khyber/ – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 26).

An April 2008 report in The News states that “Bagh said he had ordered closure of the political administration headquarters forthwith…which he claimed, tried to stop his drive against anti-social elements in the tribal agency”. According to this report, Bagh claimed that “the role of the authorities is no more acceptable to us”:

BARA: After forcing his opponents to surrender in Jamrud area of the Khyber Agency, head of the militant organisation Lashkar-e-Islam turned his guns towards the political administration (PA) compelling it to close down its Bara headquarters. Announcing the development at his illegal FM radio station, the defiant LI head said he exercised maximum restraints in taking action against the political administration, which he claimed, tried to stop his drive against anti-social elements in the tribal agency. “But following Wednesday’s incident, when Khasadar force impeded our efforts to stop immoral, illegal and un-Islamic activities in Jamrud, the role of the authorities is no more acceptable to us,” he declared.

Mangal Bagh said he had ordered closure of the political administration headquarters forthwith which was later locked out. He announced, “I will no longer protect security forces from anti-social elements in the tribal territory which I have been doing since the launch of the Lashkar-e-Islam”.

The LI chief in his address warned personnel of Khasadar force of Bara tehsil against performance of their duties, failing which, their houses would be razed to the ground besides imposition of a fine of rupees one million (‘Closure of PA Bara headquarters demanded’ 2008, The News, 18 April http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=107445 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 27).

2. Please provide information on the relations between the Pakistan authorities and Mangal Bagh and Laskar-i-Islam.

Relations between Pakistan authorities and Lashkar-i-Islam

An October 2008 report from the International Herald Tribune provides an overview of present federal government attitudes, suggesting that recent parliamentary debates “showed that Pakistani politicians had little stomach for battling the militants”. A July 2008 report from the Pakistani newspaper The News claims that the recent operation against LI and other militant groups in Khyber Agency was “hogwash” designed to give the appearance of firm action against militant groups in the FATA, and that “the government’s real writ does not extend beyond the last settled area police picket at the Peshawar-Bara sub-division border”. Another July 2008 report, from Pakistani magazine Newsline quotes Mangal Bagh stating that “he would not fight the Pakistan Army or the government, and would instead focus on reforming society and ridding it of vice” but also refers to “recent reports that Mangal Bagh had secretly joined hands with the TTP and Baitullah Mehsud and promised to disrupt fuel, food and other supplies from Pakistan to the US-led coalition forces in via the Khyber Pass”. A July 2008 report from Inter Press Service claims that “[t]he local police and paramilitary forces are no match for the Islamic fighters”, and quotes “a researcher on the Taliban at the University of Peshawar”, who claims that “‘[t]he federal government, which directly controls FATA, has shown no serious efforts to contain insurgency there’”. A July 2008 article from the Daily Times states that Bagh “signed a peace deal with the government last week” after the military operation in Khyber Agency, but also quotes a former army general who describes “the offensive around Peshawar as a ‘very limited, psychological operation’”. A June 2008 report, sourced from TNI and located on the Thaindian News website, claims that LI “had before-hand information about yesterdays combing operation launched by Pakistan’s paramilitary forces, and had escaped to the remote Tirah Valley much in advance along with his fellow militants”. This report states that “[f]lags of Lashkar-i-Islam were seen flying above houses and school buildings in Bara, and local people were quoted as saying that the operation was just an eyewash and Mangal Bagh was being supported by the district administration” (Perlez, J. 2008, ‘Deep ambivalence among Pakistani lawmakers over fighting militants’, International Herald Tribune, 21 October http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=17133602 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 28; Malick, M. 2008, ‘The Bara Operation is a lie, plain and simple’, The News, 1 July http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=15673 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 29; , R. 2008, ‘The Price of Peace’, Newsline, July http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJuly2008/cover2july2008.htm – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 30; Yusufzai, A. 2008, ‘Taliban Move In On Peshawar?’, Inter Press Service (IPS), 21 July – Attachment 32; ‘Fear choking Peshawar despite deal with militants’, Daily Times, 14 July http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C07%5C14%5Cstory_14-7- 2008_pg7_27 – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 31; ‘Militants had escaped before Pak strike in tribal areas’ 2008, Thaindian News (source: TNI), 30 June http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/health/militants-had-escaped-before-pak-strike-in- tribal-areas_10066030.html – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 33).

An October 2008 report from the International Herald Tribune provides an overview of present federal government attitudes, suggesting that recent parliamentary debates “showed that Pakistani politicians had little stomach for battling the militants”. The report claims that parliamentary sessions have been “dominated by calls for dialogue with the Taliban and peppered with opposition to what lawmakers condemned as a war foisted on Pakistan by the United States, according to participants”. The report goes on to quote Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali, a senior member of the governing Pakistan People’s Party and a former foreign minister, who claims that “[t]he speeches in Parliament expressed so much opposition to fighting the militants that it was doubtful that the governing Pakistan People’s Party could engineer an ‘appropriate resolution’”:

In one of his first initiatives as president, Asif Ali Zardari called the session in an effort to mobilise Pakistan’s political parties and its public to support the fight against the militants, which he has now called Pakistan’s war.

But instead, the nearly two weeks of closed sessions have been dominated by calls for dialogue with the Taliban and peppered with opposition to what lawmakers condemned as a war foisted on Pakistan by the United States, according to participants.

The tenor of the debate has highlighted the difficulties facing both Zardari and Washington as they urgently try to focus Pakistan’s full attention on the militant threat at a time when the Pakistani military is locked in heavy fighting in the tribal areas.

…But the Parliamentary proceedings, which included criticism of a lengthy military briefing by a senior general on the conduct of the war, showed that Pakistani politicians had little stomach for battling the militants.

In one sign, Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-N, sent a letter on Monday to the prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, calling for dialogue with the militants.

The letter suggested a halt in military operations while negotiations were given a chance, according to Ahsan Iqbal, an aide to Sharif.

In an interview last week, Sharif said, “What is wrong with talking?”

He said a distinction had to be made between the Taliban, whose members could be talked to, and Al Qaeda, whose adherents could not. A national committee should be formed to decide whom Pakistan should negotiate with, Sharif said.

Differentiating between the two groups was one of the themes of the debate, according to participants, on the grounds that Qaeda members are outsiders to Pakistan and the Taliban are mostly living in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

…The speeches in Parliament expressed so much opposition to fighting the militants that it was doubtful that the governing Pakistan People’s Party could engineer an “appropriate resolution,” said Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali, a senior member of the party and a former foreign minister.

…In their speeches, the politicians emphasised the need for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, said Jehangir , the leader of a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League.

“The sense of the house is that there is no military solution to this,” Tareen said. “This is not a war we want to be part of. There is a sentiment that we are being pushed to do all this by the United States. We want this war to end” (Perlez, J. 2008, ‘Deep ambivalence among Pakistani lawmakers over fighting militants’, International Herald Tribune, 21 October http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=17133602 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 28).

A July 2008 opinion piece from the Pakistan newspaper The News suggests that the operation against LI and Bagh in Khyber Agency is “all hogwash”, “a drama being staged to placate a nervous public, please the cooperative militias by giving them sufficient advance warning, and confuse the Americans who of late have been displaying the audacity to ask for verifiable deliverables against all the money they have been pumping in for the last eight years”. This report claims that “within minutes of the security forces moving out after blowing out the abandoned and vacated structures, the Lashkar-e-Islami militants could be seem [sic] calmly raising their black flags over the damaged structures and casually inspecting the damaged goods”:

PESHAWAR: The so-called grand operation to “protect” Peshawar from the marauding troops of the Lashkar-e-Islami of militant leader Haji Mangal Bagh and others entered its third day today. The government has already claimed victory to the extent of ridding the Khyber Agency of the so -called criminal extremists who ostensibly have been sent scurrying to the farther valley of Tirah.

…And now the truth: It’s all hogwash. It’s a drama being staged to placate a nervous public, please the cooperative militias by giving them sufficient advance warning, and confuse the Americans who of late have been displaying the audacity to ask for verifiable deliverables against all the money they have been pumping in for the last eight years. A desperate appeasement attempt for the visiting Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, if you may.

But we’ll come to the causes later. First the happenings on the ground. The government can go blue in the face claiming otherwise but the fact is that the government’s real writ does not extend beyond the last settled area police picket at the Peshawar-Bara sub-division border. And in some cases where it may appear to be present in any diluted form a little farther down the road, there too it is only a negotiated concession from the local militias and not the consequence of any so-called restored the government writ.

…Now to Mangal Bagh’s people. While Mangal himself had left for Tirah, where incidentally he is engaged in a bitter sectarian feud, his followers were not found lacking in numbers or visibility. The truth is that within minutes of the security forces moving out after blowing out the abandoned and vacated structures, the Lashkar-e-Islami militants could be seem [sic] calmly raising their black flags over the damaged structures and casually inspecting the damaged goods. The interesting part is that not a single militant of any group ever seems in a hurry to get away from the scene, or the area, and at least on three occasions I personally saw militant loaded vehicles drive by Levis and others with no reaction from the paramilitary forces. One amazing operation cleanup isn’t it? (Malick, M. 2008, ‘The Bara Operation is a lie, plain and simple’, The News, 1 July http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=15673 – Accessed 13 November 2008 – Attachment 29).

A July 2008 report from the Pakistani magazine Newsline quotes Mangal Bagh stating that “he would not fight the Pakistan Army or the government, and would instead focus on reforming society and ridding it of vice”. Nonetheless, the article also refers to “recent reports that Mangal Bagh had secretly joined hands with the TTP and Baitullah Mehsud and promised to disrupt fuel, food and other supplies from Pakistan to the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan via the Khyber Pass”. The Newsline report also states that “700 FC soldiers were initially sent to Bara to secure the town and to beef up the defences of Peshawar following unsubstantiated and rather mysterious reports that Mangal Bagh and other militant commanders were planning to attack the city”. The article claims that residents of Peshawar “were getting impatient that not much had been done to secure Peshawar’s defences” against LI:

…the military operation was confined to the Khyber Agency, a strategically important tribal area close to Peshawar that provides the major land route to Afghanistan…the three militant groups that were the apparent target of the assault by the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) in Khyber Agency’s Bara area, were not directly linked to the Pakistani Taliban. This led critics to accuse the military of avoiding action against the Pakistani Taliban, who are now in de facto control of some of the tribal borderlands and are challenging the government’s writ in several places elsewhere in the NWFP.

…For his part, Maulvi Omar said the Pakistani Taliban would come to the aid of the militant tribal commander Mangal Bagh, who operates out of Bara and was previously not aligned to the TTP and Mehsud. In fact, Mangal Bagh had earlier refused to join the TTP by arguing that he would not fight the Pakistan Army or the government, and would instead focus on reforming society and ridding it of vice. He had also refused to send his fighters to Afghanistan or to Waziristan and Swat to fight alongside the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. However, there were recent reports that Mangal Bagh had secretly joined hands with the TTP and Baitullah Mehsud and promised to disrupt fuel, food and other supplies from Pakistan to the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan via the Khyber Pass. There have been growing attacks on oil tankers and containers taking supplies through the Khyber Agency to Afghanistan.

…The FC’s military operations targeted the assets of three militant tribal commanders in the Bara area. The foremost target was Mangal Bagh, head of the Lashkar-i-Islam group and the most powerful of the three. He inherited the leadership of Lashkar-e-Islam from a hardline Islamic cleric, Mufti Munir Shakir, who was expelled from the Khyber Agency as part of a solution proposed by a government-backed jirga to prevent further polarisation and fighting between his men and those of rival clergyman, Pir Saifur Rahman. Mangal Bagh was the one sending armed men to Peshawar city and adjoining villages located near the boundary with Khyber Agency to abduct people and threaten those who were allegedly running brothels, gambling dens and music shops. He also had about 20 Christians abducted from Peshawar’s Academy Town for allegedly indulging in vices and occupying a property that was once part of a madrassah. The abductees were subsequently freed in Bara, but not before the ANP-led coalition government in the NWFP suspended several senior police officials for negligence in protecting the Christians. The ruling coalition, which also includes the PPP as a junior coalition partner, claimed the abductions were part of a conspiracy to bring down the provincial government.

…the Lashkar-i-Islam and Mangal Bagh have been grabbing the attention of the government and the media and are growing in strength. Bara’s proximity to Peshawar has also made Mangal Bagh and his group critical to the security, or insecurity to be precise, of the capital of NWFP.

As the FC’s military operation progressed, its officials claimed they had killed several armed men resisting their deployment in Bara and destroyed Mangal Bagh’s headquarters. The FC shelled the positions of militants amid reports that Mangal Bagh had shifted to the remote Tirah valley near the border of Afghanistan. About 700 FC soldiers were initially sent to Bara to secure the town and to beef up the defences of Peshawar following unsubstantiated and rather mysterious reports that Mangal Bagh and other militant commanders were planning to attack the city. Mangal Bagh, in earlier interviews, had refuted the reports that he was drawing plans to assault Peshawar.

…It soon became apparent that the military operation in Bara was primarily aimed at pushing the armed tribal militants back so that they no longer threatened Peshawar and kept the Khyber Pass, linking Peshawar with Landikotal and Torkham and beyond with and Kabul, open to traffic, including the huge oil tankers and containers, to serve as a lifeline of all kinds of supplies to the NATO forces operating in Afghanistan.

…The existence of the militant threat to Peshawar appears to have been exaggerated. The military claimed it had neutralised the threat after deploying troops in Bara, where Khyber Agency’s political administration had lost its writ to the militants loyal to Mangal Bagh. However, some residents of Peshawar felt their city was never at risk from the militants, who are a divided lot and lack the arms and manpower to take the city and hold on to it. They were definitely concerned by the forays that Mangal Bagh’s men were making into Peshawar to abduct people and, allegedly, to extort money. Peshawarites expected the government, the armed forces and the law enforcement agencies, which have a strong presence in Peshawar, as it is the headquarters of the Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Police, to protect the city and were getting impatient that not much had been done to secure Peshawar’s defences (Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The Price of Peace’, Newsline, July http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJuly2008/cover2july2008.htm – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 30).

A July 2008 report from Inter Press Service claims that “[t]he local police and paramilitary forces are no match for the Islamic fighters”, and that “[t]he situation has worsened because of lack of coordination between the federal and the provincial governments”. The report quotes “a researcher on the Taliban at the University of Peshawar”, who states that “[t]he federal government, which directly controls FATA, has shown no serious efforts to contain insurgency there”:

…The local police and paramilitary forces are no match for the Islamic fighters. Some 500 policemen have died in militancy-related incidents over the past year. Not one of Peshawar’s 30 police stations stays open after 8 p.m. Police in rural Peshawar have stopped night patrols after a patrol was blown up in a grenade attack on May 29.

The situation has worsened because of lack of coordination between the federal and the provincial governments. “The operation against Mangal Bagh was handled exclusively by the federal government. The NWFP was not part of it,” says Mian Iftikhar Hussain, provincial information minister. “The situation is bad and we are trying to end militancy through talks,” he insists.

“The federal government should take the NWFP along as far as talks with the Taliban are concerned. The situation in NWFP is linked with the situation in FATA,” he adds. He confirms that 20 suspected Taliban who were arrested, are being investigated.

…“The federal government, which directly controls FATA, has shown no serious efforts to contain insurgency there. In the process, the Taliban and militants have established permanent sanctuaries in the NWFP,” says Ashraf Ali, a researcher on the Taliban at the University of Peshawar (Yusufzai, A. 2008, ‘Taliban Move In On Peshawar?’, Inter Press Service (IPS), 21 July – Attachment 32).

A 14 July 2008 article from the Daily Times states that Bagh “signed a peace deal with the government last week” after the military operation against “hard-line organisations” in Khyber Agency. Nonetheless, the report quotes a former army general who describes “the offensive around Peshawar as a ‘very limited, psychological operation’”, and a Peshawar video store owner whose store was bombed, who claims that “‘[t]his operation was just cosmetic. The government is going against the wrong people because it wants to look tough’”:

…Peshawar has seen months of incursions by Mangal Bagh’s self-styled ‘moral brigade’ and other militants seeking to impose their version of Shariah law in the style of Afghanistan’s 1996-2001 Taliban regime.

The Frontier Corps finally launched a weeklong operation in Khyber on June 28, with troops demolishing buildings belonging to Bagh and two other hard-line organisations. Bagh, a former bus driver, signed a peace deal with the government last week. But many residents question just how safe Peshawar is now.

Wrong people: Bagh is not even a member of Pakistan’s main organisation of Taliban rebels, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). “This operation was just cosmetic. The government is going against the wrong people because it wants to look tough,” said Zar Ali Khan, 46, whose video shop was hit by a bomb planted in the city’s Nishtarabad market last year.

…A spokesman for Mangal Bagh said Lashkar-e-Islam was not trying to challenge the government’s control of Peshawar. “Our aim is to finish crime here, the same as the government,” Lashkar-e-Islam Commander Haji Abdul Karim told reporters by telephone, adding, “We want peace here and across the country and will accept the rule of the security forces.”

Meanwhile, Taliban who are loyal to Baitullah Mehsud – the chief of the TTP and the man accused by authorities of masterminding the killing of former premier Benazir Bhutto – have gone untouched in other areas around Peshawar.

…However, defence analyst Talat Masood, a former army general, described the offensive around Peshawar as a “very limited, psychological operation”. “It is a very serious business around Peshawar,” he said, adding, “The government has to apply itself with greater resolve” (‘Fear choking Peshawar despite deal with militants’, Daily Times, 14 July http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C07%5C14%5Cstory_14-7- 2008_pg7_27 – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 31).

A June 2008 report, sourced from TNI and located on the Thaindian News website, claims that LI “had before-hand information about yesterdays combing operation launched by Pakistan’s paramilitary forces, and had escaped to the remote Tirah Valley much in advance along with his fellow militants”. This report states that “[f]lags of Lashkar-i-Islam were seen flying above houses and school buildings in Bara, and local people were quoted as saying that the operation was just an eyewash and Mangal Bagh was being supported by the district administration”:

Lashkar-e-Islam chief Mangal Bagh who is spearheading the militancy campaign against the Pakistan government in tribal areas, had before-hand information about yesterdays combing operation launched by Pakistan’s paramilitary forces, and had escaped to the remote Tirah Valley much in advance along with his fellow militants.

During the operation, security forces destroyed several hideouts and an FM radio station in the Bara tehsil of the Khyber tribal region, reported the Dawn. However, there are indications that the militants had moved out of the area before the offensive was launched, it added.

Paramilitary forces are reported to have destroyed four hideouts of Lashkar-i-Islam and Ansarul Islam on Sunday without encountering any resistance. Flags of Lashkar-i-Islam were seen flying above houses and school buildings in Bara, and local people were quoted as saying that the operation was just an eyewash and Mangal Bagh was being supported by the district administration.

According to them, Mangal Bagh had used radio broadcasts to order his supporters not to attack security forces or hinder their movement. He asked his supporters to let them (troops) go wherever they wanted, an unidentified man said. Khan Mohammad, who was guarding one of the destroyed Lashkar-i-Islams centre in Bara, said: The Amir knew about the operation and had asked his supporters to move out of the area and take shelter in the Tirah Valley before it started. People will do as they are told and that is why there is no resistance.

…Lashkar sources in Bara claimed that most of their activists were engaged in fighting the Ansar group in Tirah valley. The week-long fighting has so far claimed the lives of 40 people from both sides. Mangal Bagh continued his propaganda broadcasts from the Tirah Valley , telling his supporters not to put up any resistance to the security forces and urged them to remain calm. He said, the Army operation will not help the government achieve its objectives or stop him from purging the Bara of all anti-social elements and providing justice to the poor (‘Militants had escaped before Pak strike in tribal areas’ 2008, Thaindian News (source: TNI), 30 June http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/health/militants-had-escaped-before-pak- strike-in-tribal-areas_10066030.html – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 33).

The June 2006 report from the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses website claims that the “episode in Bara epitomises Pakistan’s policy towards the local Taliban”, as “[t]he process of engendering sectarian hatred has been left untouched and the state has exhibited a sense of reluctance to rein in the Deobandi-Taliban elements”. According to this report, “[s]ome analysts in Pakistan would argue that this is mainly because the administration is traditionally known for its sympathies towards such a puritanical viewpoint”, and “have allowed the Deobandi strain to dominate the terrain, hoping to quarantine its influence in the tribal belt and buy peace in the bargain”:

The efforts of the administration and the jirga to bring moderation into Mangal Bagh do not seem to have had any effect. By early May 2006, he was threatening the local administration that all routes to Tirah would be blocked, if his supporters, apprehended in April, were not released. He even persuaded the elders of the Zakhakhels – the largest sub-tribe among the Afridis – not to participate in the jirga in May. At the beginning of June, Mangal’s men kidnapped a local Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam leader from a mosque for allegedly cooperating with the administration. The Lashkar took control of the Bara bazaar on June 10. The administration responded on June 12 by blowing up of a four-storey shopping plaza owned by Mangal. The Khasadar force and Mehsood Scouts have since taken up the Bara bazaar under their control. But Mangal continues to remain defiant.

This episode in Bara epitomises Pakistan’s policy towards the local Taliban. The process of engendering sectarian hatred has been left untouched and the state has exhibited a sense of reluctance to rein in the Deobandi-Taliban elements, unless they become violent and challenge the writ of the state. Some analysts in Pakistan would argue that this is mainly because the administration is traditionally known for its sympathies towards such a puritanical viewpoint. The Barelvi viewpoint, which could perhaps provide a counter-force, stands marginalised. The authorities have also not tapped the new generation of local leadership, which wishes to get out of the tribal mould and mainstream itself. Instead, they have allowed the Deobandi strain to dominate the terrain, hoping to quarantine its influence in the tribal belt and buy peace in the bargain. However, the administration has ignored the inability of such groups to remain quiet and non-coercive. These groups have moreover repeatedly challenged the might of the state. In the absence of an imaginative plan to counter such an assertive ideology at the grassroots level, Pakistan will continue to labour under a million mutinies, which will increasingly weaken the capacity of the state in the days to come (Behuria, A.K. 2006, ‘Million Mutinies in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses website, 27 June http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/AshokBehuria270606.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006 – Attachment 4).

The Pakistani government, Inter-Services Intelligence, and militant groups in FATA

A July 2008 article in Ideas, “The Newsletter of Pashtun Peace Forum, Canada”, describes the “visible and predictable pattern” of “the way militant movements have grown and been handled in Pashtun areas in the past seven years”. This report describes the establishment and growth of a militant organisation resembling LI, and the impingement of the rights of the public enforced by such organisations, and claims that “a mysterious inaction/silence on the part of the official administration prevails that is only broken when the public outcry over the impingement on their rights is widely reported in the national, regional and international media”. Military action is then taken, “in which much collateral damage occurs but the core of militant leadership escapes”, and then “a new order emerges in which the official administration of the state and parallel administration of the militants co-exist and engage with each other in many ways from their respective domains”:

As for the common Pashtun masses are concerned, they also view the anti-militancy measures with scepticism. And their suspicion is not misplaced looking at the way militant movements have grown and been handled in Pashtun areas in the past seven years, phenomena which hitherto have followed a visible and predictable pattern. Even a common Pashtun can summarise the broad outline of this process.

To begin with, the birth of a brand new militant movement usually begins with the emergence of an individual, from obscurity, who starts preaching his ideology from a popular platform like a mosque or seminary and via a popular medium like an FM radio station. After enough number of adherents has been won, the foundations of a “proto-khilafath” are laid down through the establishment of a “department of vice and virtue”. Soon a hardcore militant cadre is raised that embarks on enforcing the proclamations of the supreme leader of the movement and extending the geographical domain of the newly established spiritual order.

Although this process takes a long time, a mysterious inaction/silence on the part of the official administration prevails that is only broken when the public outcry over the impingement on their rights is widely reported in the national, regional and international media. Awakened to the situation, the administration takes action by bombarding militant bases indiscriminately in which much collateral damage occurs but the core of militant leadership escapes. After some “partial success” has been achieved, a new order emerges in which the official administration of the state and parallel administration of the militants co- exist and engage with each other in many ways from their respective domains.

Public, however, is subjected to immense difficulties in the whole process both at the hands of the militants and the official administration. Disruption of the social and economic life due to insecurity, displacement, and a constant fear of the breaking out of a new wave of violence make the life of ordinary Pashtun people miserable. This is how the things happened in Swat valley (known as the Switzerland of Asia). And if past is any indicator, this is what likely to happen in Khyber Agency of FATA. There is already news that Mangal Bagh had fled from his base in Sipah to Tirah along with his men one day before the operation started (Khan, N. 2008, ‘Countering Militancy in Pakistan-Afghanistan: A Pashtun Perspective’, IDEAS, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 1, pp. 5-7 http://www.khyberwatch.com/IDEAS-Newsletter1July08.pdf – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 34).

A September 2008 report from Reuters Alertnet claims that recent US ground strikes inside Pakistan “reflected fears that Islamic militants are winning the war against U.S.-led forces”, and “followed long frustration that the Islamabad government was doing too little to combat Islamist militants”. The report also quotes “analysts” who claim that “[t]he Pakistani government had also been unable to sever ties between the military intelligence service, ISI, with the militants”:

A U.S. decision to mount a ground strike inside Pakistan last week reflected fears that Islamic militants are winning the war against U.S.-led forces and followed political pressures in a U.S. election year.

…The raid was preceded by a series of U.S. aerial strikes inside Pakistan’s tribal areas this year that followed long frustration that the Islamabad government was doing too little to combat Islamist militants.

The Bush administration has treated Pakistan as an anti-terrorism ally since former President Pervez Musharraf promised to cooperate after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. But Washington also prodded Pakistan with little effect to shut down the militants’ border haven.

…The Pakistani government had also been unable to sever ties between the military intelligence service, ISI, with the militants, analysts said. A diplomat in Washington, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said personnel changes taking place in Pakistan’s intelligence service would satisfy Washington (Mikkelsen, R. 2008, ‘Fear of losing drove US ground raid in Pakistan’, Reuters Alertnet, 11 September http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N11511353.htm – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 35).

A June 2008 report from the Council on Foreign Relations analyses the relationship between the Pakistani military, the paramilitary Frontier Corps deployed in tribal areas, and militant groups. Despite the presence of thousands of Pakistani troops in the FATA and NWFP, “experts say it has made no significant victories against the Taliban and other groups that have been traditionally supported by the military and the intelligence services”. This report claims that “Pakistan’s armed forces have proven ineffective in the tribal areas, in part because the regular military has not been deployed in these semi-autonomous areas in decades”, instead relying on the paramilitary Frontier Corps, among whom “there have been numerous defections, and refusals to fight and follow orders”. The report quotes “a South Asian military affairs analyst”, who claims that “[t]he Frontier Corps…is under strain because its members are all Pushtun and there are extreme pressures placed upon them in regard to combating fellow Muslim tribesmen”:

Former Pakistani president and army chief Pervez Musharraf promised “unstinted cooperation” to the United States in the fight against global terrorism. But while Musharraf cracked down on terrorist groups, he did so selectively, experts say. Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes that Musharraf tightened pressure on groups whose objectives were out of sync with the military’s perception of Pakistan’s national interest. Pakistan’s new president, Asif Ali Zardari, widower of Bhutto, is seen as being pro-American and has pledged to combat terrorism. But the army remains the key player and most analysts express concern that the civilian leadership in Pakistan may not have much say in the matter. “The main challenge for the civilian government is to gradually assert their predominance over the military,” says South Asia expert Frederic Grare. However, he warns it must do so without humiliating the military and while avoiding direct confrontation.

Today, more than eighty-five thousand Pakistani troops remain deployed along the Afghan border. While the military has captured over seven hundred al-Qaeda operatives within its borders, experts say it has made no significant victories against the Taliban and other groups that have been traditionally supported by the military and the intelligence services. But Pakistan points to the death of nearly a thousand soldiers in its fight against militancy to deny these charges.

Pakistan’s armed forces have proven ineffective in the tribal areas, in part because the regular military has not been deployed in these semi-autonomous areas in decades. Thus, Islamabad has turned to its Frontier Corps—a Pakistani paramilitary organization that operates in the autonomous tribal areas—to target insurgents. Local language skills and familiarity with the local terrain have given the corps an advantage. But this strategy, too, has been plagued with problems; there have been numerous defections, and refusals to fight and follow orders. RAND Corporation expert C. Christine Fair, in January 2008 testimony to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, said the Frontier Corps is “inadequately trained and equipped and has been ill-prepared for counter-insurgency operations in FATA.” Fair, along with other experts, also questions the soldiers’ willingness to fight. She says the corps “was used to train the Taliban in the 1990s and many are suspected of having ties to that organisation.”

Hassan Abbas, a former Pakistani government official who is now a research fellow at Harvard University, notes that Washington has funded a program to transform Pakistan’s Frontier Corps into an effective counterbalance against terrorist elements. Training of the corps—part of a broader $400-million effort to improve security in the region—was expected to start in late 2008. But an errant U.S. air strike in June 2008 that Pakistan says killed eleven Frontier Corps soldiers has infuriated the Pakistani military and jeopardised the training effort (NYT). Brian Cloughley, a South Asian military affairs analyst, says the program faces an uphill climb even if it does get off the ground. “The Frontier Corps…is under strain because its members are all Pushtun and there are extreme pressures placed upon them in regard to combating fellow Muslim tribesmen,” Cloughley writes in a January 2008 research brief.

Another approach taken by past and present Pakistani governments in the tribal areas is to sign peace agreements with tribal leaders. So far, most of them have failed. Critics, including many in Washington and the U.S. military, say such agreements only end up strengthening the militants (Bruno, G. & Bajoria, J. 2008, ‘Backgrounder: U.S-Pakistan Military Cooperation’, Council on Foreign Relations, June 26 http://www.cfr.org/publication/16644/uspakistan_military_cooperation.html – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 36).

A September 2008 report, also from the Council on Foreign Relations, assesses the relationship between the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and militant groups in Pakistan:

Constitutionally, the agency is accountable to the prime minister, says Hassan Abbas, research fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. But most officers in the ISI are from the army, so that is where their loyalties and interests lie, he says. Experts say until the end of 2007, as army chief and president, Musharraf exercised firm control over the intelligence agency. But by late 2008 it was not clear how much control the new civilian government in Pakistan had over the agency. In July 2008, the Pakistani government announced the ISI will be brought under the control of the interior ministry, but revoked its decision (BBC) within hours. Bruce Riedel, an expert on South Asia at the Brookings Institution, says the civilian leadership has “virtually no control” over the army and the ISI. In September 2008, army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani replaced the ISI chief picked by Musharraf with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha. Some experts say the move signals that Kiyani is consolidating his control over the intelligence agency by appointing his man at the top.

“I do not accept the thesis that the ISI is a rogue organisation,” Milam says. “It’s a disciplined army unit that does what it’s told, though it may push the envelope sometimes.” With a reported staff of ten thousand, ISI is hardly monolithic: “Like in any secret service, there are rogue elements,” says Frederic Grare, a South Asia expert and visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He points out that many of the ISI’s agents have ethnic and cultural ties to Afghan insurgents, and naturally sympathise with them. Marvin G. Weinbaum, an expert on Afghanistan and Pakistan at the Middle East Institute, says Pakistan has sent “retired” ISI agents on missions the government could not officially endorse. Some observers believe Pakistan’s duplicity is deliberate: “Musharraf’s been playing with us since day one,” Grare says.

…Pakistan’s tribal areas along the Afghan border have emerged as safe havens for terrorists. Experts say because of their links to the Taliban and other militant groups, the ISI has some influence in the region. But with the mushrooming of armed groups in the tribal agencies, it is hard to say which ones the agency controls. Also, there appears to be division within the ISI. While some within the intelligence agency continue to sympathise with the militant groups, Harvard’s Abbas says others realise they cannot follow a policy contradictory to that of the army, which is directly involved in counterterrorism operations in the area.

Pasha, former head of military operations in charge of offensives against militants in the tribal areas, was appointed as the ISI chief in September 2008 amid growing U.S. and international pressure on Pakistan to combat terrorism. It was not immediately clear whether his appointment would lead to policy changes in the spy agency (Kaplan, E. & Bajoria, J. 2008, ‘Backgrounder: The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 September http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/isi_and_terrorism.html – Accessed 14 November 2008 – Attachment 37).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Government Information & Reports UK Home Office http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ US Department of State http://www.state.gov/ Non-Government Organisations Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/ Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org International Crisis Group http://www.crisisgroup.org International News & Politics BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk Region Specific Links Asian Centre for Human Rights website http://www.achrweb.org/ Dawn website www.dawn.com Pakistan Times http://www.pakistantimes.net The Daily Times website http://www.dailytimes.com.pk The Nation http://www.nation.com.pk Topic Specific Links Khyber Agency official website http://www.khyber.gov.pk Khyber Gateway website http://www.khyber.org Search Engines Google http://www.google.com Silobreaker http://www.silobreaker.com/ Staggernation Google API Proximity Search http://www.staggernation.com/cgi-bin/gaps.cgi Yahoo http://search.yahoo.com/

Databases:

FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Research & Information database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response PAK30614, 11 October.

2. ‘District Map of NWFP & FATA’ 2004, Khyber gateway website http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/nwfpmap01.gif – Accessed 4 October 2006.

3. ‘Map of Khyber Agency’ (undated), Khyber Agency Official website http://www.khyber.gov.pk/images/Maps/Khyber-Map1.jpg – Accessed 12 November 2008.

4. Behuria, A.K. 2006, ‘Million Mutinies in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses website, 27 June http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/AshokBehuria270606.htm – Accessed 3 October 2006.

5. ‘Ansar Ul Islam Rejects Truce With Lashkar-E-Islami In Tirah Valley’ 2006, Baluchistan Times, 19 September. (FACTIVA) 6. ‘Seven dead as rival religious groups clash in Pakistan tribal area’ 2006, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, source: Dawn website (14 August 2006), 14 August. (FACTIVA)

7. ‘Pakistan takes action to prevent tribes from supporting Islamist groups’ 2006, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: The News website (6 July 2006), 7 July. (FACTIVA)

8. ‘Commentator views “deteriorating” situation in Pakistan’s tribal areas’ 2006, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Pakistan AVT Khyber TV (11 June 2006), 14 June.

9. RRT Country Research 2007, RRT Research Response PAK31546, 23 March.

10. Abbas, Hassan 2006, ‘Profiles of Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. IV, Iss.20, 19 October, The Jamestown Foundation, p.2 http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM_004_020.pdf – Accessed 22 October 2007.

11. ‘Pakistan troops sent to tribal area to avert armed clash’ 2005, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 23 December, sourced from report by Behroz Khan on Pakistani The News website, 23 December 2005. (FACTIVA)

12. US Department of State 2008, International Religious Freedom Report 2008 – Pakistan, 19 September.

13. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2008, State of Human Rights in 2007, April.

14. Reporters Without Borders 2008, Pakistan – Annual report 2008, 11 February http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25678&Valider=OK – Accessed 15 September 2008.

15. South Asia Terrorism Portal 2008, ‘Major incidents of Terrorism-related violence in Pakistan, 1988-2008’, (undated) http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents.htm – Accessed 29 January 2008.

16. Abbas, H. 2007, ‘Increasing Talibanisation in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 18, Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373679 – Accessed 12 November 2008.

17. International Crisis Group 2006, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, 11 December.

18. ‘LI claims recovering kidnapped child’ 2008, Daily Times, 5 November http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C11%5C05%5Cstory_5-11- 2008_pg7_18 – Accessed 13 November 2008.

19. Wiseman, P. & Sheikh, Z. 2008, ‘Militants flourish in Pakistan’s tribal area’, USA Today, 1 October http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10-01-tribes_N.htm – Accessed 13 November 2008. 20. Shirkat Gah Women’s Resource Centre 2008, Newsheet, Vol. 20, No. 3, September, pp. 15-16 http://www.shirkatgah.org/Newsheet%20Vol%2020%20No- 3%20Sept%202008%20pdf.pdf – Accessed 13 November 2008.

21. ‘15 Pak FC soldiers found dead in Swat’ 2008, Newstrack India (source: ANI), 23 October http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/30549 – Accessed 13 November 2008.

22. ‘Mangal Bagh still rules Khyber’ 2008, Daily Times, 1 September http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C09%5C01%5Cstory_1-9- 2008_pg3_1 – Accessed 13 November 2008.

23. ‘Militant group takes over two mosques in Pakistan tribal area’ 2008, Dawn News Group, 28 August. (CISNET Pakistan CX209178)

24. ‘Fall of Peshawar to militants eminent: NYT, other dailies’ 2008, Newstrack India (source: TNI) 28 June http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/4246 – Accessed 13 November 2008.

25. ‘Mangal Bagh claims he refused to join Taliban’ 2008, The News, 21 April http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=108035 – Accessed 13 November 2008.

26. Masood, A. 2008, ‘Who is Mangal Bagh Now Commanding Khyber’, Pakistan Times, 29 April http://www.pak-times.com/2008/04/29/who-is-mangal-bagh-now- commanding-khyber/ – Accessed 13 November 2008.

27. ‘Closure of PA Bara headquarters demanded’ 2008, The News, 18 April http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=107445 – Accessed 13 November 2008.

28. Perlez, J. 2008, ‘Deep ambivalence among Pakistani lawmakers over fighting militants’, International Herald Tribune, 21 October http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=17133602 – Accessed 13 November 2008.

29. Malick, M. 2008, ‘The Bara Operation is a lie, plain and simple’, The News, 1 July http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=15673 – Accessed 13 November 2008.

30. Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The Price of Peace’, Newsline, July http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJuly2008/cover2july2008.htm – Accessed 14 November 2008.

31. ‘Fear choking Peshawar despite deal with militants’, Daily Times, 14 July http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C07%5C14%5Cstory_14-7- 2008_pg7_27 – Accessed 14 November 2008.

32. Yusufzai, A. 2008, ‘Taliban Move In On Peshawar?’, Inter Press Service (IPS), 21 July. (CISNET Pakistan CX205947) 33. ‘Militants had escaped before Pak strike in tribal areas’ 2008, Thaindian News (source: TNI), 30 June http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/health/militants-had- escaped-before-pak-strike-in-tribal-areas_10066030.html – Accessed 14 November 2008.

34. Khan, N. 2008, ‘Countering Militancy in Pakistan-Afghanistan: A Pashtun Perspective’, IDEAS, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 1, pp. 5-7 http://www.khyberwatch.com/IDEAS-Newsletter1July08.pdf – Accessed 14 November 2008.

35. Mikkelsen, R. 2008, ‘Fear of losing drove US ground raid in Pakistan’, Reuters Alertnet, 11 September http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N11511353.htm – Accessed 14 November 2008.

36. Bruno, G. & Bajoria, J. 2008, ‘Backgrounder: U.S-Pakistan Military Cooperation’, Council on Foreign Relations, June 26 http://www.cfr.org/publication/16644/uspakistan_military_cooperation.html – Accessed 14 November 2008.

37. Kaplan, E. & Bajoria, J. 2008, ‘Backgrounder: The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 September http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/isi_and_terrorism.html – Accessed 14 November 2008.