Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses www.rsis.edu.sg ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 13, Issue 1 January 2021 A PUBLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH (ICPVTR) ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT Global Threat Landscape Southeast Asia Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Singapore South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan China Xinjiang Province The Middle East: Between COVID-19, Conflicts, Jihadist Threat and Public Discontent The Islamic State (IS): Maintaining Resilience in a Post-Caliphate, Pandemic Environment Religious Extremism: Challenging Extremist and Jihadist Propaganda Persistence Of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism In The West Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 1 Building a Global Network for Security ADVISORY BOARD Dr. Jolene Jerard Dr. Stephen Sloan Adjunct Senior Fellow, Professor Emeritus, International Centre for Political The University of Oklahoma Violence and Terrorism Research, Lawrence J. Chastang, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Distinguished Professor ,Terrorism Studies, The University of Central Florida Dr. Rohan Gunaratna Professor of Security Studies, Dr. Fernando Reinares S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Director, Program on Global Terrorism, Elcano Royal Institute Professor of Security Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna Studies Universidad Rey Juan Carlos Associate Dean (Policy Studies), Dr. John Harrison Head of International Centre for Political Associate Editor, WViolence and Terrorism Research, and Journal of Transportation Security Research Adviser to National Security Studies Programme Dr. Hamoon Khelghat-Doost S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Science University of Malaysia Dr. Marcin Styszyński Assistant Professor, Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies Adam Mickiewicz University EDITORIAL BOARD Senior Editorial Advisor Noorita Mohd Noor Editor Amresh Gunasingham Associate Editor Abdul Basit Assistant Editor Kalicharan Veera Singam Copy Editor Remy Mahzam Design and Layout Okkie Tanupradja The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and not of ICPVTR, RSIS, NTU or the organisations to which the authors are affiliated. Articles may not be reproduced without prior permission. Please contact the editors for more information at [email protected]. The editorial team also welcomes any feedback or comments. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 1 The Global Threat Landscape In 2020 THE GLOBAL THREAT LANDSCAPE IN 2020 In 2020, despite its territorial losses, the more than 75 million cases and over 1.7 Islamic State (IS) proved resilient, million deaths worldwide, the struggle against capitalising on the COVID-19 pandemic to COVID-19 is, as has been said in some increase its online propaganda and execute quarters, likely to be the defining struggle of attacks in Iraq and Syria, while its affiliates this generation.1 Unsurprisingly, the impact of did the same elsewhere. Ideologically, the the COVID-19 pandemic was felt across the pandemic was exploited by IS and Al-Qaeda, board, including within the domain of with narrative propagated being that the countering and preventing transnational pandemic was God’s punishment on infidels. terrorism and violent extremism, in various Globally, the violent Islamist threat was ways. That said, strategic trends evident in characterised by the continued salience of recent years remained robust into 2020, lone actor attacks against civilian and certainly as far as the violent Islamist terrorist government targets; the involvement of threat – still the most potent terrorist threat to women, youth and family networks, at times global peace and stability - was concerned.2 in combatant roles; the rehabilitation and Despite the military demise of its so-called reintegration challenge posed by returning territorial caliphate carved out of Iraq and foreign fighters and their families; the role of Syria last year, the Islamic State (IS) diasporas and ideological ecosystems managed to remain resilient and active, not sustaining extremist narratives and the just on the ground in the Middle East – where diversity of terrorist financing mechanisms. it launched notable attacks on civilian sites, Furthermore, the close nexus between broad oil fields and security forces3 - but also in the Extreme Right social movements and Far- cyber domain. Right political entities was noted in the Buddhist, Hindu and White Nationalist cases, In fact, IS has re-envisioned the caliphate as along with striking ideological similarities an overarching global state rather than one amongst the latter. Finally, the importance of that is confined to Iraq and Syria, and has nuanced state responses incorporating sought to make opportunistic virtue out of a judicious and customised mixes of “hard” and strategic necessity. Its spokesperson, Abu “soft” approaches, to deal both with the Hamzah Al-Qurasyi, in January 2020, physical terrorist threat as well as the reframed the inclement strategic situation IS underlying conditions sustaining it, was faced in 2020 as a “protracted resistance” underscored. strategy that had to be waged stoically and with resilience, taking supposedly temporary Introduction - The Violent Islamist Threat military setbacks in stride. Al-Qurasyi called Remains the Key Global Concern on IS supporters and cells worldwide to intensify “clandestine” activity to “spread The year 2020 was dominated by the COVID- influence” throughout the anti-IS Coalition.4 19 pandemic. As of December 18, 2020, with Subsequently IS propaganda online – put out 1 "COVID-19 CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC," Institute for Economics & Peace, November 2020), Worldometer, p. 3. https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/. 3 See the essay by Amin Saikal, “The Middle East: 2 While there has been an increase in attacks in the Between Covid-19, Conflicts, Jihadist Threat and West by violent “far right”, White nationalist Public Discontent” in this volume. extremists in recent years, such incidents have 4 “Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector been less lethal than Islamist terrorism in the West. General Report to the United States Congress,” The Also “the absolute number of far-right attacks US department of Defense, January 1- March 31, remains low when compared to other forms of 2020, pp. 22-23, terrorism”. See Global Terrorism Index 2020: https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/lig_oir_q2_ma Measuring the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney: r2020_gold_508_0513.pdf. 1 The Global Threat Landscape In 2020 by both the weakened central network in Iraq attacks”.8 Rather than tight strategic control, and Syria as well as its affiliates around the both IS and Al-Qaeda have sought through world, produced content in various languages social media to provide a broad strategic - reiterating the rallying call of baqiyah wa narrative to guide the actions of a widely tatamaddad (remaining and expanding). This scattered global network of affiliates and narrative was reinforced by more aggressive cells.9 This violent Islamist global strategic campaigns such as the “Battle of Attrition” narrative remained centred on three core series first begun in June 2019 and repeated themes, as in previous years, but adapted to in May and July 2020. Such ramped-up diverse local contexts across the world: online propaganda efforts were not without armed jihad to establish the khilāfa effect, apparently helping spark violence by (caliphate); hatred of the non-Muslim Other, IS affiliates in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Somalia, and the End Times and the coming of the West Africa and the Philippines.5 Mahdi.10 As far as the estranged ideological cousin of Six Major Trends IS, Al-Qaeda was concerned, the year in some ways proved particularly traumatic. The Across the regions surveyed in this volume, deaths of Abu Muhsin al-Masri (Husam Abd- the evolving global violent Islamist threat al-Rauf) in Afghanistan, Abu Muhammad al- could be deconstructed by way of six major Masri (Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah) in Iran and trends. the reported demise of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri have undoubtedly The Continuing Salience of Lone Actor impacted the network seriously. It does seem Attacks against Civilian and Government that “the core organisation is no longer able Targets. While attacks by organised cells and to project its power and force in the same networks remained a real threat, what way” and that “a continuing disintegration will seemed striking was the continuing salience take place as the various groups using the of the threat of lone actor attacks by self- name around the world continue to focus radicalised individuals inspired if not their attention on local conflicts rather than necessarily directed by IS, Al-Qaeda or their the global clash the core group was affiliates online. In 2020, for example, in advancing”.6 Some observers argue that IS Indonesia, “stabbings were the most by contrast appears relatively more astute in preferred tactic, followed by shootings and “connecting and inspiring this new bombings” by not just “pro-IS groups” but generation”, albeit there is “very little also “individuals in Indonesia, which reflects evidence usually of cases having specific a continued preference to execute attacks direction and planning organised by the that require little training, planning or group”.7 In essence, what can be asserted is funds”.11 This was partly