INCLUSION WITHOUT MODERATION:

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIC

PARTICIPATION BY RELIGIOUS GROUPS

by

Cheryl Mariani Anthoney

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and International Relations

Spring 2018

© 2018 Cheryl Anthoney All Rights Reserved

INCLUSION WITHOUT MODERATION:

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIC

PARTICIPATION BY RELIGIOUS GROUPS

by

Cheryl Mariani Anthoney

Approved: ______David P. Redlawsk, Ph.D. Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations

Approved: ______George H. Watson, Ph.D. Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences

Approved: ______Ann L. Ardis, Ph.D. Senior Vice Provost for Graduate and Professional Education

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: ______Muqtedar Khan, Ph.D. Professor in charge of dissertation

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: ______Stuart Kaufman, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: ______Aaron Fichtelberg, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: ______Benedetta Berti, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are several people who deserve recognition for providing support throughout this journey, both personally and professionally. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Muqtedar Khan, who has been my mentor throughout graduate school and imparted his sincere enthusiasm for research and scholarship. I would also like to thank the rest of my dissertation committee: Dr. Stuart Kaufman, Dr. Aaron

Fichtelberg, and Dr. Benedetta Berti. Each committee member offered valuable insights and advice that greatly benefitted my project.

I would like to extend my appreciation to other professors at the University of

Delaware who also made themselves available to review and discuss my dissertation.

This includes Dr. Neepa Archarya for her assistance in understanding Hindu nationalism, Dr. Kassra Oskooii for his methodology assistance, and Dr. Kai Draper for reviewing my dissertation chapters while I worked as his TA. I am also grateful to the experts who agreed to be interviewed for this dissertation. They each provided regional and scholarly insights that enriched this research.

I could not have written this dissertation without the support of my family, friends, and colleagues. My parents have always encouraged me throughout my educational pursuits and provided the stable foundation I needed to explore my interests. The

iv strong value they place in both academics and service to others makes them ideal role models. I would like to thank my fellow graduate students (especially my cohort) for lending their ears, shoulders, and words of encouragement these past five years. The community we created together is truly special. Finally, I would like to thank my husband Danny for his patience and support throughout this process. When times were difficult, he ensured that I had healthy food, a comfortable space, and lots of love.

Thank you.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ...... ix ABSTRACT ...... x

Chapter

1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 1

Militancy as a Reaction to the Political Opportunity Structure ...... 3 Religion-Based Militancy ...... 6 Defining Political Violence and Behavioral Moderation ...... 8 Assessing Broader Movements ...... 10 Chapter Overview ...... 13

2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY ...... 16

Research Puzzle and Theoretical Solution ...... 18 Moderation and Political Participation ...... 21

Democratization ...... 21 Nonlinear Transitions ...... 27 Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis ...... 31 Necessary Condition for Religious Militancy (Hypothesis 1) ...... 39

Political Violence ...... 40

Terrorism ...... 40

Structural Explanations and the Strategic Logic of Terrorism ...... 43 Adding Ideational and Agentic Explanations of Terrorism ...... 49 Assessment of Terrorism Literature ...... 52

Social Movement ...... 53 Internal Conflict / Ethnic Violence ...... 59 Necessary Condition for Religious Militancy (Hypothesis 2) ...... 60

Religious Ideology as Motivation for Violence ...... 64

Are Certain Religious Ideologies More Violent? ...... 66 How Do Religious Ideologies Motivate Violence? ...... 71 Necessary Condition for Religious Militancy (Hypothesis 3) ...... 76

Framing and Myth-Making ...... 77

vi Necessary Condition for Religious Militancy (Hypothesis 4) ...... 80

Research Design ...... 82

Case Selection and Methodology ...... 82 Mapping Relationships ...... 87 Resources ...... 90

3 SHIA ISLAMISM IN LEBANON ...... 91

Shias in Lebanon ...... 92 The Lebanese Civil War and the Emergence of Hezbollah...... 99 Hypothesis 1 ...... 107

Hezbollah Enters the Political System ...... 108 Hezbollah’s Outcome Goals ...... 114

Hypothesis 2 ...... 123

The Impact of Militancy on Hezbollah’s Resistance Goals ...... 128 The Impact of Militancy on Hezbollah’s Public Support ...... 135 The Impact of Militancy on Hezbollah’s Foreign Support ...... 141

Hypothesis 3 ...... 146

Is Hezbollah’s militant action obligatory according to its religious ideology? ...... 155

Hypothesis 4 ...... 164 Conclusion ...... 179

4 HINDU NATIONALISM IN INDIA ...... 182

Hypothesis 1 ...... 198

Hindu Nationalist Objectives ...... 198 Banning Cow Slaughter ...... 205 Pakistan ...... 218 Jammu and Kashmir ...... 230 Uniform Civil Code ...... 235

Hypothesis 2 ...... 241

Militancy in the BJP’s Road to Political Power ...... 243 Violent Mobilization ...... 252

vii Hypothesis 3 ...... 258 Hypothesis 4 ...... 265 Conclusion ...... 275

5 BUDDHIST NATIONALISM IN SRI LANKA ...... 277

History of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka ...... 278 Hypothesis 1 ...... 288

Sinhala language policy ...... 289 Promotion of the Buddhist religion ...... 293 Removal of minority advantages ...... 298 Territorial integrity and dominance over the entire island of Sri Lanka. . 302

Hypothesis 2 ...... 306

Militant and Radical Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Organizations...... 307 The Impact of Militancy on Electoral Performance for Buddhist Nationalists ...... 313 The Impact of Militancy on the Ideological Spectrum ...... 331

Hypothesis 3 ...... 339 Hypothesis 4 ...... 343 Conclusion ...... 350

6 CONCLUSION ...... 354

A Modified Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis ...... 368 Religion as Theology v. Religion as Identity ...... 373 Towards a Theory of Religious Militancy in Democracies ...... 375

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 378

viii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Grievance and Structure-Based Model of Religious Militancy ...... 63

Figure 2 Case Selection in Theory-Building Process Tracing ...... 84

Figure 3 Shia Islamism in Lebanon ...... 88

Figure 4 Hindutva in India ...... 88

Figure 5 Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka ...... 89

Figure 6 Modi’s Vision for India ...... 202

Figure 7 Buddhist Nationalist Violence vs. Electoral Results since Independence ...... 314

Figure 8 SLFP Parliamentary Results Following Buddhist Nationalist Violence ...... 328

Figure 9 SLFP Parliamentary Results and Overall Buddhist Nationalist Violence ...... 329

Figure 10 Results of Hypotheses ...... 354

ix ABSTRACT

The central goal of this dissertation is to explain the continued use of political violence by religious groups after their associated political parties obtain inclusion in the political system. According to the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis, militant political actors moderate their behavior as a result of inclusion in democratic political processes. The transition from violence to peaceful politics is often conceptualized as linear and unidirectional. However, this does not explain the behavior of movements that practice militant activity simultaneously with political participation. I examine this phenomenon by studying three cases of religious militancy that coincide with democratic participation. These cases are Shia Islamism in Lebanon, Hindu nationalism in India, and Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka. In each case, this research tests four hypothesized necessary conditions for political violence derived from the literatures on democratic moderation, terrorism, religious ideology, and ethnic conflict. It finds that perceived religious obligation is not a necessary condition for religious militancy. Additionally, blocked legal avenues and the tactical effectiveness of violence are not necessary conditions for religious militancy in the absence of movement consolidation. The only necessary condition which is supported in each case is the framing of narratives that evoke fear and hostility towards outgroups. This research proposes important modifications of the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis regarding the ability and incentives of movements to moderate their behavior. Additionally, it reveals an important distinction between

“religion as theology,” and “religion as identity,” with the latter behaving similarly to ethnic or national identities which motivate violence when combined with prejudice and fear.

x Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Religious extremism is nothing new, but trends of democratization and the mixture of this militancy with democratic politics has produced surprising results. What happens when ideological militants are given the opportunity to participate in peaceful political processes? Do they moderate their goals or their methods to compete for votes? U.S. policymakers typically believe democracy has a moderating effect. In September 2004, President George W. Bush told the United Nations General Assembly that peaceful nations must support the “advance of democracy,” because “no other system of government has done more to… channel human energy to the pursuits of peace.”1 Three years later, President Bush responded to a question about instability in Iraq with the assertion that, “A young democracy will provide the stability we look for.”2 President Obama continued the policy of promoting democratic transitions in the Middle East based on the belief that democracies foster

1 “President Speaks to the United Nations General Assembly.” George W. Bush White House Archives. September 21, 2004. https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040921-3.html.

2 Schorn, Daniel. “Transcript: Bush Interview.” CBS News. January 14, 2007. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-bush-interview.

1 peace.3 Indeed, the Arab Spring has demonstrated a widespread desire for democracy in this region, but questions remain about whether democratization can be counted on to provide internal peace, stability, and moderation of religious extremists. The track record of democratization is mixed. The Irish Republican Movement is often viewed as a model of the power of democratic moderation as the political participation of Sinn Fein incentivized the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to end its armed struggle. Similarly, the African National Congress (ANC) in South

Africa is another example of an organization that ended militancy and embraced peaceful political participation in the transition from apartheid to democracy. Another former militant group which transitioned to peaceful political participation was Al- Gama'a al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic Group”) in Egypt. However, as I argued previously, this group’s renunciation of violence is better attributed to a government enforced crackdown that left them thoroughly defeated rather than moderation brought about by democratic participation.4 While these groups eventually moderated their violent methods, plenty of militant groups tell a different story about the relationship between political violence and democracy. In many cases today, non-state militancy continues and even thrives despite democratic participation. For example, Hamas is a political party which has not renounced militancy despite democratic participation in Palestinian government. This

3 “Key Quotes from Obama’s Middle East Speech.” Reuters. May 19, 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-mideast-quotes/key-quotes-from-obamas- middle-east-speech-idUSTRE74I63A20110519.

4 Mariani, Cheryl. “From Radicalism to Democratic Politics: Lessons from Al- Gama'a al-Islamiyya for ISIS and other Jihadis,” Turkey Agenda, May 03, 2015.

2 is also true for Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. Ethno-religious nationalist movements like Hindu nationalism in India and Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka also contain militant elements that resort to communal violence despite democratic representation. All of these groups exist in countries that are republics and at least partially democratic, yet they continue to pursue their objectives through militancy. Examination of this phenomenon will benefit literatures on political violence (including terrorism and ethnic conflict), as well as the literature on moderation and democratization by clarifying the motivations for militancy within democratic structures. The continuation of militancy in these situations poses a challenge to commonly accepted ideas about terrorist motivations and democratic moderation.

Militancy as a Reaction to the Political Opportunity Structure

What do a terrorist, a government official, and a voter have in common? These actors have all been labelled at some point as strategic decision-makers by various literatures. Existing within a single political system, they may all use the tools at their disposal to achieve their objectives, whether these tools are violent intimidation, policymaking, or the vote, respectively. When these goals are radical, such as the overthrow of political or economic systems or the implementation of theocratic rule, it is tempting to categorize the entire endeavor as irrational. However, this perspective masks the “thin” rationality displayed by groups in pursuit of their preferences, however radical those may be. While a religious or emotional motivation may not conform to most models of rational preferences, the means that these actors

3 use are a rational response to the political opportunity structure. This type of rationality is compatible with a Constructivist approach. Nicholas Onuf notes that there are two models of rational action. The first model, “emphasizes the goals, tastes or preferences that rational agents are equipped with,” while the other emphasizes the rules and institutions, “within which agents act on their preferences.”5 Onuf was most interested in this second model which does not regard preferences as fixed or stable, but examines how actors behave within contexts of socially constructed rules.

So then, if the tools used by these groups are a reflection of the incentive structure in which they exist, it makes sense to question which type of structure disincentivizes political violence. For many scholars and policymakers, democracy has been viewed as the solution to internal and external conflict. Democratic Peace theory focuses on regime type as a predictor of war between states, asserting that democracies do not fight each other.6 While this focuses on the external peacefulness of democracies, scholars have also viewed democracy as an antidote to internal political violence.7 Peacebuilding efforts often prioritize organizing states around

5 Onuf, Nicholas. “Chapter 8: Rules in Practice.” In On Rules, Politics and Knowledge: Friedrich Kratochwil, International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Ed. Oliver Kessler, Rodney Bruce Hall, Cecelia Lynch, and Nicholas Onuf. Palgrave Macmillan. 2010. 125.

6 Doyle, Michael 1983 “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12(3). And Layne, Christopher 1994 “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19(2).

7 Chellaney, Brahma. 2001. “Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History,” International Security 26(3): 116.

4 liberal-democratic principles in an effort to make them more peaceful and stable.8 It is important here to differentiate between existing democracies and processes of democratization. While a mature democracy may provide stability, processes of democratization may be volatile and create the opportunity for more polarization and violence as elites compete for popular support. Fragile institutions lend themselves to subversion by militant groups.9 For this reason, it is important not to view democratization as a silver bullet against violence and instability.

The idea that participation in democratic processes incentivizes ideological and behavioral moderation is referred to as the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis. This idea emerged in the years after the Cold War as scholars perceived a wave of democratic transitions.10 It was assumed that militant groups would moderate their behavior to participate democratically under shared rules. This belief has influenced scholarly views of transitions from terrorism to peaceful politics. Most scholars today assume that there is a linear, unidirectional relationship between terrorism and political legitimacy. Basically, they believe groups begin from a position of complete commitment to armed struggle, take certain steps towards legitimacy, and then finally reject violence completely in favor of peaceful democratic participation.11 This

8 Barnett, Michael. 2006. “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after war,” International Security 30(4): 88.

9 Walter, Barbara. 1999. “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace,” International Security 24(1): 129.

10 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 165.

11 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.

5 transition is typically perceived to only move forward towards peaceful politics, never backwards to renewed armed struggle. Additionally, it assumes that groups do not simply practice both militancy and democratic politics simultaneously without fully transitioning or committing solely to either course of action. From empirical observations of militant groups with political wings today, this assumption is shown to be unwarranted. Therefore, it is clear that democratic participation alone does not ensure movements will abandon the militant option. If militants are strategic actors, it follows that militancy continues in certain cases despite democratic participation because violent means are still effective. The main puzzle this research seeks to address is: Why do religious militant groups continue to practice political violence after their associated political parties obtain inclusion in the political system? The following sections break down this question to explain its parts, including the focus on religious militancy, definitions of political violence and behavioral moderation, and the perspective of analyzing movements holistically.

Religion-Based Militancy

There are many types of ideologically-motivated violence. For example, militancy can be based on political, economic, or religious ideologies. These ideologies often overlap, such as Islamist movements that are both religious in nature and advocate for a political system based on that religion. Similarly, Marxists may espouse beliefs that are both economic and involve overthrow of existing political systems. Drawing on Bard O’Neill’s insurgency typology, Dorle Hellmuth offers a

6 conceptualization of possible terrorist political objectives that could be helpful in this analysis of political violence.12 These objectives are conceptualized along four dimensions including their opposition towards 1) political systems, 2) political communities, 3) political authorities, and 4) public policies. The political system refers to the values, norms, and institutions that constitute the rules of the game for decision- making. Groups opposed to the political system either aim to replace it with a different system or none at all.13 Examples include Marxist-Leninists, Anarchists, and

Islamists. The political community refers to the composition of a society on which a state is often based. Groups who do not view the political community as legitimate reject being a member of the state in which they are incorporated. They are often termed secessionists or separatists. Finally, groups which target ruling authorities or policies have less ambitious objectives than toppling the political system or separating from the state. These less radical objectives have a greater possibility of being achieved within democratic systems.

The religious militancy examined in this research falls into the first category because it typically involves efforts to restructure the political system according to the movement’s religious ideology. It could also be viewed in terms of the “political community” category based on the presence of ethno-religious conflict, but the groups examined in this research are not secessionists or separatists. As movements with a good deal of democratic political power and representation, their goals extend to remaking the state rather than leaving it. This is often displayed by ideologies of

12 Hellmuth, Dorle. “Of Terrorism Types and Countermeasures: No One Size Fits All.” Annual Northeast Political Science Conference (2015).

13 Ibid. 5.

7 religious nationalism that view a particular religion as fundamentally intertwined with national identity. This research narrows its focus to religious militancy in an effort to gain precision and better scrutinize this phenomenon. While the movements examined here may include ethnic and nationalist elements, they are all characterized by promotion of a particular religious ideology. Along with analyzing the rationality of continuing militancy despite democratic participation, this research also examines the ideological or emotional motivations for violence. Religious ideology has been studied as a key explanation for terrorism, especially in cases of suicide attacks which challenge notions of rationality.14 If political violence is counterproductive or simply unnecessary in a democratic system, why do groups continue to practice it? One goal of this dissertation is to pit religious motivation against strategic motivation in contexts where they may be opposed. Is use of political violence by members of democratically-included religious movements motivated primarily by feelings of religious obligation, strategic calculation, or both?

Defining Political Violence and Behavioral Moderation

In this research, the term “political violence” is used to encompass all militant activity which is conducted for political purposes. Traditionally, this refers to violence which is outside of state control, whether it is one-sided or two-sided. For

14 Moghadam, Assaf. 2008. “Motives for Martyrdom.” International Security, 33(3), 58.

8 this reason, political violence includes subsections such as ethnic conflict, terrorism, and insurgency. Political violence is viewed by some scholars as part of “contentious politics,” which includes a continuum of activities from violent revolution to peaceful protest that comprise collective political struggle.15 Since this dissertation is examining the behavior of movements that are part of democratic systems and act in the name of particular religious ideologies, most of the political violence conducted on behalf of these movements is performed by individuals or non-state militant groups.

A notable exception would be if the movement is powerful enough to make use of state police or military apparatuses. Generally, most of the violent activity explored in this research could be considered terrorism or communal violence. In the examination of democratic moderation (or lack thereof), this research focuses explicitly on behavioral moderation rather than ideological moderation as the dependent variable. This means that it is primarily concerned with the continuation of violent activity as a tool in the service of ideological objectives. While some models of democratic moderation claim that democratic participation influences an ideological shift towards moderation, the model that is central to this research concerns moderation of methods and behavior.16 In this research, I distinguish between extremists and radicals, with the former referring to those who advocate violent means and the latter referring to those with far-reaching transformative goals.17 What makes

15 O’Neil, Patrick H. “Chapter 7: Political Violence.” Essentials of Comparative Politics. W.W. Norton & Company. 2015.

16 Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." World Politics 63(2): 352.

17 Distinction suggested by Stuart Kaufman (unpublished)

9 beliefs “radical” is highly dependent on the political climate, since a proponent of democracy would be considered a radical under a dictatorship, while a fascist would be a radical in a democracy. For the purposes of this dissertation, “extremism” always refers to the decision to resort to violent activity. A follower of a particular religious ideology with radical objectives may choose to pursue these objectives through peaceful democratic processes or through extreme violent measures. This research is focused on why they would maintain extremist methods when democratic avenues are available. For the purposes of this dissertation, the dependent variable of continued political violence by religious militant groups will often be shorted to the phrase “religious militancy.”

Assessing Broader Movements

Now that we’ve discussed the dependent variable being assessed, it should be helpful to explain our perspective on the nature of the overall movements being examined. The analysis in this dissertation is somewhat unique because it approaches religion-based ideological movements in a holistic way, rather than narrowing the lens to particular groups. The main reason for this perspective is that political and military branches may have separate organizational structures yet act in support of the same overall movement. In India, for example, both political parties and militant groups are included under the umbrella of the “Sangh Parivar,” a network of Hindu nationalist organizations. While the groups contained within this movement use different methods, they often overlap in leadership and pursue similar goals. In his chapter on “Hindu nationalism and the Discourse of Modernity,” anthropologist Peter van der

10 Veer lists several prominent figures who held leadership roles in multiple Hindutva organizations, even including leaders who held these different roles simultaneously between major organizations such as the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) political wing, RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and the VHP (Vishva Hindu Parishad), which is home to the militant Bajrang Dal youth wing.18 For this reason, the interests of even the overtly militant groups can be considered as democratically represented by the movement’s political party. In this sense, the religious militant groups are “politically included.” Even Hezbollah, which is more centrally organized, is a subject of contentious debate when it comes to how closely linked its political and military branches are. The European Union, for example, distinguishes between these wings as separate organizations, choosing only to place Hezbollah’s military wing on its terrorism blacklist.19 Viewing Hezbollah’s political and military wings as two distinct groups allows European foreign ministers to maintain contact with Hezbollah political officials, but the distinction has been criticized by the United States and Israel.20 In November 2017, Israeli and U.S. officials published a joint statement calling on

18 Van Der Veer, Peter. “Chapter 23: Hindu Nationalism and the Discourse of Modernity: The Vishva Hindu Parishad.” Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements. Ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. The University of Chicago Press. 1994. P.663.

19 Pawlak, Justyna and Adrian Croft. “EU adds Hezbollah’s military wing to terrorism list.” Reuters. July 22, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-hezbollah/eu-adds- hezbollahs-military-wing-to-terrorism-list-idUSBRE96K0DA20130722.

20 Black, Ian. “EU resists Hezbollah ban but lists armed wing as terrorist groups.” The Guardian. July 22, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/eu-ban- hezbollah-terrorist-wing.

11 European countries to reject what they referred to as a “false distinction” between Hezbollah’s political and military arms.21 The United States designates all of Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.22 Considering the group’s large role in Lebanese government, this complicates U.S.-Lebanon relations. Political wings in democracies often have an incentive to downplay their association with militant branches. Meanwhile, they may find ways to coordinate in pursuit of similar goals. For this reason, I think it makes sense to evaluate the behavior of entire movements, rather than basing analysis on segmentations that may be at least partially superficial. Each movement examined in this dissertation will have varying levels of leadership integration, which will be explored on a case by case basis. The choice to focus on broader movements also has implications for how “political inclusion” is operationalized. In this research, a group is considered “politically included,” if a political party sharing its religious ideology contests elections and holds a position in government. It is possible that these militant groups may have objectives which are more radical than their associated political parties, even if they share the same religious ideology. This possibility will be examined as part of my evaluation of how effective democratic participation has proven for adherents of the religious ideology being studied. Even if a political party shares all the same goals as militants in the country, a lack of progress achieving these goals

21 “Israel, US call on EU to declare Hezbollah a terrorist organization.” Middle East Monitor. November 1, 2017. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171101-israel-us- call-on-eu-to-declare-hezbollah-a-terrorist-organisation.

22 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed January 23, 2018. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

12 through peaceful processes would have the same end result as not pursuing them at all. I will aim to uncover whether religious militant groups may view themselves as adequately represented and whether this democratic representation has proven effective at achieving major goals.

Chapter Overview

This dissertation will first delve deeper into literatures related to the research question before explaining its methodology and exploring the three case studies. Chapter 2 reviews several literatures on political violence and moderation, focusing on the theme of competition between theories that emphasize the political opportunity structure or ideational characteristics of groups as key motivating factors for violence. After exploring the puzzle posed by politically-included militant groups, it derives four hypotheses about the continuation of religious militant activity. Chapter 3 examines the interesting case of Lebanese Hezbollah, in which democratic political power and religious militancy are most closely integrated. As a representative of Shia Islamism, Hezbollah’s political wing participates in Lebanese political processes, but the country’s religious diversity means the group does not have the political strength to implement its vision domestically. The high level of geographic interconnectedness between diverse religious groups also makes a repeat of the Lebanese civil war unfeasible, according to regional experts.23 Instead, Hezbollah asserts its vision through regional military action. In terms of motivations for violence, this chapter

23 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

13 finds that religious justifications for current military actions in Syria do not correspond to the group’s religious ideology. The ethnic framing of narratives included in celebrations such as Ashura are perhaps a more potent motivator for Hezbollah’s sectarian militancy. Chapter 4 considers the case of Hindu nationalist (or “Hindutva”) militancy in India. It finds that Hindutva proponents have not had much success pursuing their aims through the BJP. Additionally, communal violence only seems to gain electoral support for the party. This is contrary to models of democratic moderation that assume movements must commit to nonviolence in order to play by the democratic “rules of the game.”24 This chapter also finds that communal violence is motivated more by hostile myths (such as the Ram Temple myth) than a sense of Hindu religious obligation. Chapter 5 examines the case of Buddhist nationalist militancy in Sri Lanka. Unlike the other movements studied, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have achieved major objectives through democratic participation. Additionally, Buddhist nationalist militancy does not display the same symbiotic relationship with electoral victory present in the Hindutva case. This presents an interesting conundrum concerning the strategic decisions of Buddhist militants. The waters are also muddied by the power of

Buddhist nationalists to use Sri Lankan democratic processes to order government military action (as in the case of Sri Lanka’s civil war) against out-groups like the predominantly Hindu Tamils. This means political violence against ethnic-religious rivals can be practiced through democratic avenues. This is also the case in which

24 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 165.

14 violent action is most at odds with the militants’ religious ideology, to the extent that militant monks have been accused of directly violating their vows.25 Like the two other cases, much of the violent activity on behalf of this religious ideology appears to be motivated by hostile framings of ethno-religious narratives, particularly those found within the ancient records of the Mahavamsa.26 The Conclusion draws comparisons between these case studies and considers what trends may be generalizable for explaining occurrences of religious militancy alongside democratic participation in other countries. It assesses the impact of these results on the commonly-accepted Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis and current theories of political violence. Finally, it points to the construction of a possible theory to explain this phenomenon, rooted in strategic perspectives and the framing of sacred histories.

25 The Buddhist Monastic Code 1, Chapter 4: Parajika. Thanissaro Bhikkhu. 1994. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/bmc1.pdf.

26 The Mahavamsa. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://mahavamsa.org/mahavamsa/original-version.

15 Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I establish the theoretical basis of my research, develop my hypotheses, describe my research design, and identify my cases. I begin by explaining my research puzzle and demonstrating why current theories are inadequate to explain religious militancy by members of politically-included movements. By reviewing several sets of literature that offer explanations for political violence and moderation, I will derive hypotheses based on necessary conditions that should apply to these cases of religious militancy. First, I will explore debates about moderation and political participation. This includes research about the effects of democratization on violence, as well as patterns of transitions of terrorist groups, and the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis. Then, I will examine the literature on political violence, including contributions from scholars of terrorism, social movements, and internal conflict. These scholars provide several motivations and factors to explain the existence of political violence. The factors they reference can be divided into structural and ideational categories. While ideology can be considered a structural factor, I analyze it separately as a characteristic of movements, while acknowledging that it also plays a role in shaping the overall political opportunity structure. This distinction allows me to compare explanations that view violence as a rational reaction to incentive structures to other explanations that suggest movement ideologies and emotions provoke violent activities that may be perceived as “irrational” within these structures. This can boil down to questions about whether a particular religious militant group

16 pursues militancy because of its nature as a religious group or because of structural conditions that make violence effective. For this reason, my research is focused mainly on ideational properties of movements (as an agentic characteristic) while recognizing that these ideas are also structural. After reviewing the literature on political violence, I examine literature on the relationship between religious ideology and militant activity. I also consider works from the literature on ethnic conflict which focus on the power of “hostile myths” within a group ideology.27 These works argue that commonly believed myths can create fear and instigate hostility against rival groups. Overall, these literatures offer explanations for violence based on structural factors such as levels of political opportunity and the effectiveness of militancy, as well as ideational properties of movements, including ideological aspects used to justify violent action. After reviewing the literature and deriving four hypotheses, I will test these hypotheses using three case studies that were selected as “deviant” cases because violence continues despite democratic openings (contrary to the Inclusion- Moderation hypothesis). The literature examined in this chapter serves as a guide to explain the continuation of militancy in cases which do not conform to dominant theories of moderation. This research aims to uncover trends among these deviant cases which may point towards a possible theory of religious militancy within democratically-included movements. In the section on Research Design, I will outline my methods for case selection, explain how I will test the hypotheses, and describe the objectives of this research.

27 Kaufman, Stuart J. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence.” International Security. 30(4): 47.

17

Research Puzzle and Theoretical Solution

The key puzzle my research aims to address is why religious militant groups continue to practice violence after their associated political parties obtain inclusion in the political system. As discussed in the Introduction chapter, this is a puzzle because most scholars view political violence as a reaction to lack of opportunity to pursue goals through peaceful political participation. While many of the literatures examined include several explanatory variables, almost all emphasize the political opportunity structure as a key explanation for political violence. Namely, when groups lack political opportunity, they will respond by working outside the system and using violent means. For example, the literature on terrorism emphasizes the existence of grievances that cannot be pursued within the political system. According to the strategic terrorism literature, groups that lack political power use terrorism because it is an effective tool to coerce governments. This logic suggests that political participation can lessen terrorist activity if a group benefits more from political power within the system than from military power, and the group’s violent actions are constrained by the rules it must follow to enter legitimate politics. Social Movement theory similarly stresses that government repression (or at least perceived repression) is essential for groups to frame their struggle as legitimate and garner support.

The continuation of militancy despite democratic inclusion is especially problematic for scholars of democracy and moderation. Scholars such a Brahma

18 Chellaney prescribed democracy as the “antidote” to terrorism.28 It is often assumed that a militant group’s development of a political wing is a step towards disarmament and peaceful politics. This idea is represented by the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, which states that inclusion in democratic politics causes groups to become more moderate due to factors such as rational cost-benefit calculations or socialization. However, this logic becomes problematic when faced with the empirical reality of movements that simultaneously practice militancy and democratic participation, especially if the movement wields considerable political power within the democratic system. If political violence is a response to being blocked from legitimate political participation, why does it continue (or even worsen) in many cases when movements obtain democratic power? Researching this puzzle is essential to informing efforts to mitigate political violence. If political participation alone does not lead to disarmament, we must understand the factors that contribute to retention of violence within democratic systems. Are there structural elements that incentivize violent activity within democracies, or are there ideational factors that continue to compel movements to retain militancy despite democratic openings? This research focuses on religious militant groups as opposed to groups motivated by other types of ideologies to determine whether elements of religious ideologies or religious identity motivate continued violence. As Nukhet Ahu Sandal demonstrates, a religious ideology or “public theology” represents the interaction of religion with dimensions such as

28 Chellaney, Brahma. 2001 “Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History,” International Security 26(3): 116.

19 political policy and geography.29 Rather than identifying causal elements within broad religions, this research examines particular religious ideologies (often mixed with local political concerns) and the identities they interact with. This research aims to contribute to developing a theory of the retention of political violence by religious militant groups after their associated political parties obtain democratic political power. A theoretical solution could comprise insights offered by the literatures on political violence, religious ideology, and moderation. Firstly, it will examine structural factors that may incentivize militancy within democratic systems. Then, it will examine ideational factors that may compel groups to retain militancy. By using these literatures to create hypotheses and test them on case studies, this research will identify patterns and suggest elements of a larger theory. Each of the hypotheses refers to an explanatory variable for political violence offered by scholars in varying literatures. If any of these conditions are not present in the cases, it would challenge the applicability of the theoretical framework they were derived from. The first two hypotheses address structural variables, while the second two refer to ideational causes. To analyze theories based on the political opportunity structure, we will begin with the literature on moderation and political participation.

29 Sandal, Nukhet Ahu. 2012. “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(1): 67.

20 Moderation and Political Participation

Democratization

The democratic nature of a political system (or lack thereof) is often presented as a key structural explanation for political violence. Notably, Democratic Peace Theorists argue regime type plays a key role in making democracies less war prone towards other democratic states. Kant referred to this zone of peace among liberal democracies as a “pacific union.”30 While the causes and significance of this phenomenon are debated31, scholars continue to examine the effect of democracy and democratization on violence. These studies focus mostly on interstate war rather than domestic political violence. However, examinations of how the people are mobilized under democratic or semi-democratic regimes provides insight into the mobilization of militant groups under conditions of somewhat open political participation.

It is important to differentiate between a political opportunity structure that is democratic and one that is in the process of democratizing. The latter tends to be more vulnerable to internal political violence. According to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, states which are in the process of democratizing become more war prone

30 Kant, Immanuel Perpetual Peace.

31 Doyle, Michael 1983 “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12(3). And Layne, Christopher 1994 “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19(2).

21 and fight wars with democratic states.32 In describing the causal mechanism that makes democratizing states more likely to fight wars, Mansfield and Snyder argue that, “threatened elites from the collapsing autocratic regime, many of whom have parochial interests in war and empire, use nationalist appeals to compete for mass allies with each other and with new elites.”33 Addressing Samuel Huntington’s argument that a key problem in political development is the “gap” that forms between high levels of political participation and weak institutions, Mansfield and Snyder note that such a disconnect exists within their four great power case studies: Victorian Britain, France under Napoleon III, Wilhelmine Germany, and Taisho Japan. They stress the importance of ideology as a tool for threatened elites to mobilize allies and gain mass support during periods of democratization. During these transitions, elites were not fully accountable to the people, so public groups, “often worked outside the electoral system, making direct demands on public authorities, since the democratic path to power was rigged against them.”34 This strategy of outside demands is presented as a reaction to the political opportunity structure. If such public groups had previously engaged in armed struggle, would their decision to work outside the system include a return to militancy? Scholars such as Anisseh Van Engeland and Rachel Rudolph tackle the problem of terrorism with a more optimistic perspective of democratization, arguing

32 Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder 1995 “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20(1).

33 Ibid 19.

34 Ibid 23.

22 that an opening in the political structure will encourage terrorist groups to participate.35 In the wake of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, Brahma Chellaney declared that “Democracy and human rights are the antidote to terrorism.”36 According to Audrey Kurth Cronin, however, there is no evidence that democratization correlates with a reduction in terrorism.37 In fact, she asserts that it can have the opposite effect, with much terrorism in the twentieth century arguably being caused by democratization.

Still, Cronin, like many other scholars, views transitions towards legitimate political participation as one way to mitigate terrorism. In her book, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Cronin identifies the ways in which almost all terrorist groups die out. This includes decapitation (arresting or killing the leader), negotiations, achieving the objective, failure, repression, and reorientation. For Cronin, the category of “negotiations” refers to transitioning towards a legitimate political process.38 Despite the insistence of many democracies that they do not negotiate with terrorists, Cronin asserts that, “virtually all democratic governments facing terrorist campaigns have been forced to

35 Engeland, Anisseh Van, and Rachael M. Rudolph. From Terrorism to Politics. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008.

36 Brahma Chellaney 2001 “Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History,” International Security 26(3): 116.

37 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline And Demise Of Terrorist Groups." International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 7-48.

38 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 35.

23 negotiate at some point, and many have even made concessions.”39 In her chapter on negotiations, Cronin aims to uncover whether negotiations end terrorist campaigns. She concludes that, while negotiations can be used to manage terrorist violence, terrorist groups decline for other reasons.40 Although a level of “democratic peace” may exist between mature democracies, processes of democratization have been shown to increase both a propensity for war and terrorism. However, scholars recognize that including militant groups in legitimate political processes may provide opportunities to negotiate concessions. Negotiations with terrorist groups can be compared to civil war negotiations aimed at ending conflict. Barbara Walter identified two camps in the debate about what make such negotiations succeed or fail.41 The first camp claims negotiations break down because combatants ultimately do not want to reach a settlement, while the second camp maintains combatants may want to reach a compromise but fail to agree on a settlement. This is echoed in debates about whether terrorist groups are simply irrationally motivated to use violence, or whether they use terrorism as a tool to achieve political settlements. The second category would include the possibility of successful negotiations. According to Walter, the key to a successful negotiated

39 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 35.

40 Ibid 71.

41 Walter, Barbara. 1999. “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace,” International Security 24(1): 130.

24 settlement is the implementation of credible guarantees.42 She argues that countries emerging from civil war face significant challenges when they attempt to democratize. Fragile institutions in democratizing countries provide temptation for exploitation and a return to violence. It follows that democratization may only lead to nonviolence when institutions are strong enough to prevent militant groups from subverting them. Despite scholarly caution about the emergence of violence in processes of democratization, policymakers continue to assume it is necessary component of creating peaceful societies. The practice of peacebuilding has been dominated by liberal norms which influence the types of institutions created to stabilize states. According to Michael Barnett, these efforts have been dominated by “liberal peacebuilding,” in which the explicit goal is to build strong rule of law, markets, and democracy.43 The implicit logic is that states must be organized around liberal- democratic principles to be legitimate, and liberal societies are more likely to provide peaceful foundations for a liberal international order. In response to this common belief, Michael Barnett and Roland Paris argue that liberalizing institutions have not been effective at providing security and stability. Using a series of case studies, Paris demonstrates that liberalization can have a destabilizing effect. This is because democracy and capitalism encourage conflict and competition.44 Instead, Paris

42 Barbara Walter 1999 “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace,” International Security 24(1): 129.

43 Barnett, Michael 2006 “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after war,” International Security 30(4): 88.

44 Paris, Roland 1997 “Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism,” International Security 22(2): 74.

25 recommends “strategic liberalization,” in which liberalizing processes occur more slowly and equitably in order to strengthen stability.45 For Barnett and Paris, international institutions involved in peacebuilding must focus on stability and small steps rather than attempting to impose liberal ideology. Like Barbara Walter, these scholars prioritize creating stability, adding that liberalizing processes must be secondary in order to prevent further violence. Despite initial optimism that democratization would create peaceful relations, recent scholars have challenged this assumption based on continued interstate conflict (especially between liberal and nonliberal states) and continued internal violence. This violence is partially because processes of democratization are unstable and can encourage competition between groups without an effective mediator. Group leaders are incentivized to make ideological appeals to gain supporters and work outside the fragile system. Cronin and Walter consider that negotiations with militant groups can lead to lowered violence under certain conditions such as situations when the combatants want to reach a settlement and institutions are strong enough to make credible guarantees. It is clear that not all democratic states have the ability to make credible guarantees (or threats for that matter) to incentivize religious militant groups to disarm. My research will question whether continued religious militancy results from groups’ inability to achieve their goals through democratic participation (which is related to lacking credible guarantees). Additionally, it will address a lack of credible threats against use of militancy to determine whether militant activity

45 Paris, Roland 1997 “Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism,” International Security 22(2): 82.

26 continues to be an effective method of achieving group objectives within a democratic system.

Nonlinear Transitions

The literature on terrorist transitions is also heavily dependent on the political opportunity structure to explain why certain groups abandon violence. However, like the literature on democratization, it is often too optimistic regarding the prospects for political participation to create lasting peace. As Benedetta Berti argued in her 2013 book, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration, the way most scholars study terrorist groups assumes a linear, unidirectional relationship from terrorism to political legitimacy.46 However, the existence of hybrid groups demonstrates that the categories of “political party” and “terrorist group” are not mutually exclusive. Examining how armed groups decide to form political wings, Berti differentiates between “tactical change” which simply involves the addition of a political wing, and “strategic change” which completely transforms the structure of the organization to focus solely on peaceful politics. Berti envisions a cyclical model, in which organizations travel between armed struggle, hybrid political-military strategies, unarmed political participation, and back to hybrid strategies.47 She argues that the creation of a political wing requires four

46 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.

47 Ibid 26.

27 necessary conditions. These are an internal commitment to change, institutional pressure to expand, strain on the availability of mobilization resources, and an “opening” in the political opportunity system.48 For Berti, “strategic” change is most influenced by a group’s internal commitment to change. As long as institutional logics of politics and military complement each other, they will both be practiced. However, if these logics are at odds, strategic change is most likely. My research builds on this work by investigating more factors that may prohibit strategic change for democratically-included religious militant groups. Cynthia Irvin also addresses the relationship between peaceful politics and armed struggle in one movement. In her assessment of the IRA’s transition to peace, Irvin references classic guerilla theory which posits that political mobilization and armed struggle should be complementary and pursued jointly to defeat an incumbent regime. However, Irvin argues, “reconciling the conflicting demands of a strategy of armed struggle and one of political outreach and mobilization has often proved more contentious in practice than in theory.”49 To mitigate this contention, the IRA maintained separate political and military organizations, which were distinct but allied. However, even with this structural combination, the political and military aspects of the IRA became at odds. The decision to pursue either violence or nonviolence is presented as a reaction to incentives within the political opportunity structure.

48 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. 3.

49 Irvin, Cynthia. Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 5.

28 Through examination of the IRA and ETA, Irvin suggests three structural factors that played a central role in the groups’ cost-benefit calculations for continuing their violent campaigns. These are the level of regime responsiveness, the political competitiveness of the groups’ political wings (Sinn Fein and Herri Batasuna), and the level of resources available.50 The first two factors could be broadly understood as the groups’ ability to pursue their objectives through legal avenues. In both cases, expressions of interest by state governments in search for a negotiated settlement resulted in the groups at least weighing the pros and cons of continued violence. In the case of the IRA, Irvin credits permanent cessation of violence to the commitment of the Irish and British governments to the peace process.51 Political competiveness also played a role, as Irvin argues increased levels of electoral support for Sinn Fein and Herri Batasuna facilitated cessations of violence by increasing the relative weight of political struggle within their movements. Finally, resources in the form of physical materials (such as weapons) and human capital willing to support the war effort were important factors for continued violence.52 While these factors refer to structural elements, such as political context and resource availability, they also recognize the internal struggle within movements to determine political or militant strategy. While Berti and Irvin explore the factors that cause militant groups to form political wings and choose peaceful politics over violence, some scholars reverse the

50 Irvin, Cynthia. “Negotiating End Game: A Comparative Analysis of the IRA and ETA,” Reconcilable Differences: Turning Points in Ethnopolitical Conflict. Kumarian Press. 2000. 201.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid. 203

29 question. The literature on disarmament and political participation suggests a few possible causes for a political organization to resort to violence after previously solely practicing peaceful democratic participation. Firstly, structural literature argues military activities such as civil war or external occupation can cause political parties to turn to terror.53 In addition, the political opportunity structure has been emphasized by scholars who view armed struggle as a response to lack of political opportunity. This would suggest political organizations in less open political systems may be more likely to form an armed wing due to a lack of political options. In his article, “Political Parties: When do they turn to terror?” Orlandrew Danzell also considered the effect of ideology on the political structure. According to Danzell, opposition groups are more likely to turn to terror when right-wing governments are in power. He argues that, when right-wing political parties gain political power, political freedoms and access to government tend to be curtailed.54 Because ideology of the ruling party affects the amount of political opportunity available, this theory uses a logic similar to those who argue the importance of democracy. Essentially, if an organization is blocked from political participation, it will use violence as an alternate tool. This type of research into patterns of transitions of terrorist groups adopts a strategic understanding of decision-making in which terrorists are rational actors who perform cost-benefit analyses. Generally, it is assumed that groups will employ terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net

53 Danzell, Orlandrew. "Political Parties: When Do They Turn to Terror?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 1 (2011): 85-105.

54 Ibid. 93.

30 expected benefits of alternate means of protest.55 Still, such an understanding leaves room for varied preferences based on diverse values or ideologies. In his article, “Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities,” Leonard Weinberg suggests political parties may be more likely to form terrorist groups if their goals are grandiose or their doctrine emphasizes the illegitimacy of the prevailing political order.56 The posited mechanism is similar to the one mentioned previously: political organizations may choose to use violence as an alternate means of achieving goals they cannot fulfill politically.

Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis

The Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis is the idea that “political groups and individuals may become more moderate as a result of their inclusion in pluralist political processes.”57 This implies that structural factors influence and potentially transform agentic factors (including ideational characteristics of groups). Debates within the inclusion-moderation literature center on two points of disagreement concerning what is being explained and which mechanisms lead to moderation. In terms of the first point, authors differ in whether they emphasize changes in behavior

55 Danzell, Orlandrew. "Political Parties: When Do They Turn to Terror?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 1 (2011): 85-105.

56 Weinberg, Leonard. "Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities." Comparative Politics 23, no. 4 (1991): 423-38.

57 Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." World Politics 63(2): 348.

31 or changes in ideology. Additionally, they may focus on groups, individuals, or both.58 These distinct analytical lenses have produced different explanations of the conditions that lead to moderation. My research is most interested in changes in behavior (such as disarmament versus continued militancy) and focuses on the group level. Samuel Huntington’s 1993 book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, includes an early incarnation of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis.59 In this book, Huntington examines the causes and significance of what he perceives as a wave of democratic transitions throughout the developing world. He explores the “participation/moderation tradeoff,” in which behavior and ideology are brought in line with the government’s “rules of the game.”60 However, he treats this concept as self-explanatory so he does go not into depth about what this means or how it can be proven. According to Huntington, a central compromise in most cases of democratization was “the democratic bargain.”61 This refers to negotiating processes leading to democratization, in which Huntington argues “the scope of participation was broadened and more political figures and groups gained the opportunity to compete for power and to win power on the implicit or explicit understanding that

58 Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." World Politics 63(2): 348.

59 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

60 Ibid. 165.

61 Ibid. 169.

32 they would be moderate in their tactics and policies.”62 According to Huntington, this cooperation provides incentives for radicals to moderate their goals and tactics. In the literature on moderation, there is typically a sharp distinction between radicals and moderates. Studies of political transitions typically view actors who support an elite-led transition as moderates, while those who put forth revolutionary demands are deemed radicals. In his article, “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties,” Stathis N. Kalyvas uses this dichotomous perspective of radicals versus moderates.63 Recognizing that rational challengers in emerging democracies have an incentive to signal to incumbents that they will behave moderately once in power, Kalyvas identifies a “commitment problem” in which the challengers struggle to send credible signals about their moderate intentions.64 His goal is to determine how religious parties either succeed or fail to overcome this commitment problem. Using the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria and the Catholic Party in Belgium as case studies, Kalyvas differentiated

“radicals” and “moderates” within the two parties and studied the competition among these groups for party control. He concluded that the centralized, hierarchical organization of Catholicism allowed moderate Catholics in Belgium to solve their commitment problem, while, “the absence of a comparable structure in Algeria contributed to the inability of the moderate FIS leadership credibly to signal its future

62 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 169.

63 Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2000. “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties.” Comparative Politics. 379-393.

64 Ibid 380.

33 intentions.”65 While such studies place “radicals” and moderates” in sharp contrast, subsequent scholars have suggested the differentiation is not so clear cut. The term “moderate” becomes problematic when it is assumed to represent democratic values (like in the Kalyvas article), yet the term becomes most often used to describe those who “don’t rock the boat.”66 In an authoritarian country, moderation may hinder the emergence of democracy. Indeed, the real democratizers may be the groups labelled “radical” due to their demands for systemic change and their opposition to status quo power configurations. For this reason, scholars should pay careful attention to normative uses of these terms. There is also disagreement among scholars about whether the terms moderate and radical should be used to reference objectives or tactics. Objectives refer to the acceptance or rejection of existing institutions and power relations, while tactics refer to the method of achieving those objectives. These differentiations regarding democratic implications and the focus of study not only make it important for scholars to define their terms, but may suggest a rethinking of how moderation and radicalism are understood. In this research, I define “extremists” as those who advocate violent means and “radicals” as those who advocate far-reaching change.67 The work of scholars, such as Kalyvas, who studied Christian and socialist groups that formed political parties in the early twentieth century has been used as a

65 Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2000. “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties.” Comparative Politics. 390.

66 Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." World Politics 63(2): 350.

67 Distinction suggested by Stuart Kaufman (unpublished)

34 foundation for much of the recent literature on inclusion of Islamist groups. Mona El- Ghobashy presents a typical model of this inclusion. In her 2005 article, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” El-Ghobashy examines the way the Muslim Brotherhood has changed in recent decades.68 She finds that “[t]he Ikwan [Brotherhood] have come to experience organizational and ideological transformations endemic to any party or social movement: splits along generational lines, intense internal debates about strategy, and a shift in their ideological plank from politics as a sacred mission to politics as the public contest between rival interests.”69 Her logic follows the model of strategic moderation, in which the participation of the Brotherhood in elections diminished the influence of radical member Sayyid Qutb. In their study of Islamist women’s activism, Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler criticize studies of democratic transitions for focusing attention on internal party divisions along a single moderate-hardliner continuum.70 Citing a spectrum of issues which may produce complex divisions, Clark and Schwedler note that actors who may be in agreement on one issue cannot be assumed to be in accord on others. They argue the moderate/hardliner vocabulary is problematic because it labels entire blocs under these terms rather than focusing on specific policy positions.71 Clark and Schwedler advocate ceasing use of moderate and radical as categories describing

68 El-Ghobashy, Mona. 2005. “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37(3): 368– 79.

69 Ibid 374.

70 Clark, Janine Astrid and Jillian Schwedler 2003. “Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties” Comparative Politics. 35(3):295.

71 Ibid 295.

35 political actors and instead suggest using distinctions specific to individual issues. For example, this may mean distinguishing between legalists and contextualists when the salient issue is interpretation of religious texts. Similarly, if the issue at hand relates to participation in state processes, a distinction between accommodationists and nonaccommodationists may be apt. When individual issues are placed on a moderate- radical continuum, analysis is more precise than attempting to label an actor itself as “moderate” or “radical.” Since the cases studied in this dissertation encompass broad movements, it is important to consider that objectives may vary even among adherents of the religious ideology being studied. If certain members have different objectives, they may not feel represented by their associated political party. This would suggest that continued violence could be a result of inability to achieve their true objectives through legal avenues. Jillian Schwedler identifies three models that have been used to determine when moderation has taken place and to identify the mechanisms involved in producing that change. The first model, “The Behavioral Moderation of Groups,” encompasses the majority of the literature on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis.72 These are followed by Model 2 “The Ideological Moderation of Groups,” and Model 3: “The Ideological Moderation of Individuals.” The first model focuses on tactical moderation, while the others consider moderation of objectives and ideas. Model 1 emphasizes the ways institutions and political opportunities provide incentives for groups to enter the system and abandon their radical tactics. It is assumed that groups will “play by the rules” and adhere to constraints imposed on members competing

72 Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." World Politics 63(2): 352.

36 within the system. The second two models go further, positing that strategic behavioral modification affects ideological orientations. To understand how behavioral change can produce ideological moderation, Schwedler does a comparative study of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) and Yemen’s Islah party in the 1990s. While the former became relatively more moderate through its participation in pluralist political processes, the latter did not.73 She finds that processes of engaging in debates about ideological commitments produce ideological moderation, defined as “movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives.”74 While the IAF had serious debates about Islamic justification for political participation, the Islah Party did not. This is because the Islah Party chose not to adapt its positions to accommodate more liberal supporters, even after its alliance with Yemen’s General Popular Congress party began to deteriorate in 1994. Contrasting the decision-making practices of the two parties, Schwedler asserts that Islah’s leaders remained the same people for fifteen years, and they have been willing to contradict each other and the party line. Meanwhile, the IAF experiences more frequent turnover and leaders remain true to the party line, creating a model of democratic activity within the party and encouraging internal debates.75 This may explain why ideological moderation

73Schwedler, Jillian. 2011. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." World Politics 63(2): 359.

74 Ibid. 352.

75 Schwedler, Jillian. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 195.

37 occurred only in the former case. While Model 1 can be understood mostly as a group reacting to political structure, Models 2 and 3 transform the identities of actors. Nadav Shelef also recognizes shifting radical and moderate elements within movements. In his book, Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Identity, and Religion in Israel, 1925-2005, Shelef examines the evolution of the idea of Israel as a nation-state within Zionist and Israeli discourses. Studying the mechanisms of ideological change more broadly, Shelef finds that nationalist movements change the foundations of their ideological beliefs in both moderating and radicalizing directions. While most scholars generally assume that ideological changes are the result of rational adaptation or elite manipulation, Shelef demonstrates that changes can occur in an unguided manner resembling evolution.76 According to the evolutionary logic, ideological change should occur when a new ideological variant arises that is more successful and eventually replaces the old one. Rather than treating groups as unitary, Shelef recognizes the competing variations that occur within them. Such competing variations should be present in the movements studied by the research, especially since they contain multiple branches or organizations. Using a strategic understanding of terrorist goals and methods, the inclusion- moderation hypothesis makes sense as a cost/benefit calculation. In order to gain the benefit of political power, groups may be willing to forego violence. However, many studies of moderation distinguish too sharply between radicals and moderates. They also do not adequately consider the ways moderate political groups may benefit from the violent activities of separate factions, even while arguing that the groups are not

76 Shelef, Nadav G. Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Identity, and Religion in Israel, 1925-2005. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.

38 associated with each other. As Berti shows in the previous section, political inclusion may occur simultaneously with terrorist activity. Still, processes of inclusion which impose significant constraints on group activity may diminish violence in the long run.

Necessary Condition for Religious Militancy (Hypothesis 1)

The literature on moderation and political participation suggests that the key structural element creating the necessary conditions for militancy is lack of access to legal avenues for achieving group objectives. Applying this logic to the continuation of militancy in democratic systems yields the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if their goals cannot be achieved through legal avenues.

If proven, this hypothesis supports the literature on political opportunity and partially supports the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis. While the cases examined in this research demonstrate that violence can continue despite participation in democratic governance, it is possible the extent of violent activity relates to the movement’s success (or lack thereof) in pursuing their objectives politically. A lack of ability to pursue goals through legal avenues could be because the group’s goals are

“illegitimate” (incompatible with democratic principles) or because of limited political opportunity. An example of an illegitimate goal could be discrimination against members of a rival sect. Since this could be difficult to implement democratically, groups may choose to intimidate their targets through force. Limited political

39 opportunity could manifest as a political system that is only marginally democratic due to issues such as corruption or other barriers. Additionally, limited political opportunity can exist within a democracy when popular opinion is opposed to the movement’s goals. This hypothesis could be disproven if a movement has a legal avenue to pursue their goals, as well as popular support, yet violent action continues. If this hypothesis is disproven, it could suggest two possibilities. The first is that incorporating militant acts is simply more effective than a sole focus on democratic processes, which is why groups choose militancy alongside or instead of available legal avenues. The second possibility is that a group’s ideology of violence is primary. If a group values violence above peaceful action, it may choose violent methods even when peaceful ones are available. The following section on political violence also emphasizes structural conditions as a cause of militancy. While ideational elements are sometimes included as explanations of perceived “irrationality” at the individual level, the dominant perspective is that terrorists and other militants operate according to a strategic logic. This means that their choice to use violent means is a strategic reaction to incentive structures that make it the best available option.

Political Violence

Terrorism The literature on terrorism provides theoretical groundwork to understand political violence more generally. Audrey Kurth Cronin isolated four fundamental

40 aspects of terrorist violence.77 The first is that terrorism always has a political nature, meaning that it aims to achieve political ends (even if these ends are not necessarily negotiable). Terrorism is also perpetrated by nonstate actors and targets innocent civilians. Finally, terrorists do not abide by international norms or conventions. The unpredictable quality of their attacks increases the psychological impact.78 Terrorism forms a subset of political violence, which is understood to be violence that is outside of state control and includes a political aim. Due to the normative quality of the term

“terrorism” and its resulting definitional difficulties, this research aims foremost to understand group use of political violence, without aiming to distinguish which acts may be considered terroristic. Nevertheless, this research draws on a strong terrorism literature that provides context for understanding violent motivations. Motives for terrorism can be divided into structural and ideational categories. Structural explanations may attribute terrorism to the type of political system or other aspects of the political culture which tolerate violent activity. On the other hand, ideational explanations may attribute violence to ideas motivating the movements, such as their goals and religious identity. In the literature on terrorism (and political violence in general), most authors acknowledge the presence of other explanatory factors but choose to focus on either structural or ideational elements.

77 Cronin, Audrey Kurth 2002/03. “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International Security 27(3).

78 Ibid 33.

41 Structural explanations coincide best with strategic perspectives on terrorism supported by scholars such as Robert Pape, Mia Bloom, and Martha Crenshaw.79 This perspective assumes that groups employ terrorism as part of a rational pursuit of group objectives. Viewing terrorist activity as a strategic endeavor means that it is most likely to be practiced in a political context where it will be effective. Meanwhile, social perspectives on terrorism, promoted by scholars like Max Abrahams, consider the influence of other factors such as ideology and social solidarity that may cause groups to act against their stated interests.80 Still, many authors, like Gordon McCormick and Colin Beck, stress the importance of both categories in explaining terrorist activity.81 This literature review will show that the strongest explanations of terrorism view it as a strategic endeavor employed within structures that incentivize its use as a method for pursuing tactical objectives, while acknowledging the limits of its effectiveness in achieving broader political objectives. Additionally, they make allowances for ideational motivations and varying goals at the individual level.

79 See: Pape, Robert 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Political Science Review. 97(3):343-361; Bloom, Mia. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005; and Crenshaw, Martha 1981. “The causes of terrorism,” Comparative Politics. 6(2): 379-399.

80 Abrahms, Max. 2008. “What Terrorists Really Want.” International Security 32(4): 78-105.

81 McCormick, Gordon H. “Terrorist Decision Making.” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 473-507. And Beck, Colin J. 2008. “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism.” Sociology Compass. 2(5): 1566.

42 Structural Explanations and the Strategic Logic of Terrorism The strategic terrorism literature contributes to our understanding of political violence by analyzing it as a rational response to certain opportunity structures. While certain types of political violence (such as suicide terrorism) have traditionally been viewed as irrational, many scholars now view it as a strategic response to structural constraints and opportunities. According to Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, terrorist groups are rational enough to be successfully deterred.82 They reference scholars such as Martha Crenshaw and Robert Pape to argue that groups engage in terrorist activities in order to achieve a hierarchically ordered set of goals. These authors succeed in demonstrating the strategic logic of employing terrorism, but they must be careful not to overstate its effectiveness. As Audrey Kurth Cronin argues, the trauma of 9/11 has influenced American perceptions of terrorism to make the tactic appear more dangerous and successful than it actually is.83 In reality, most terrorist groups struggle to survive, with the average terrorist group lasting only eight years.84

In order to gauge the effectiveness of terrorism, we must differentiate tactical goals (such as recruitment, rivalries between groups, and satisfying external donors) from outcome goals, which may encompass larger political, economic, or religious objectives. The latter goals are very rarely achieved through terrorism. In her review of the MIPT (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) database,

82 Trager, Robert and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva 2005/06. “Deterring Terrorism: It can be done,” International Security 30(3): 93.

83 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton University Press. 2011. 73.

84 Ibid 75.

43 Cronin found that less than 5 percent of the more than four hundred terrorist groups she analyzed had succeeded by their own standards in achieving their aims.85 While there are certainly more effective forms of political violence, even terrorism can be understood strategically. In 2003, Robert Pape introduced a strategic model for understanding suicide terrorism. He combats the wave of psychological explanations for suicide terrorism, arguing that psychological profiles of suicide terrorists have been mostly inaccurate, characterizing them as uneducated, unemployed, isolated single young men. In reality, terrorists come from a broad cross section of lifestyles, including married, educated people of all ages.86 Pape concedes that individual motivations may be irrational, but argues organizational leadership is not. Seeking to explain the sharp escalation of suicide terrorism since the 1990s, Pape’s central explanation is “because terrorists have learned that it pays.”87 He argues suicide terrorism has proven itself as an effective tactic for coercing governments to change policy, mobilizing recruits, or gaining financial support. Pape supports his argument by examining terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001 and exploring how terrorist organizations have assessed the effectiveness of these attacks. He finds that recent suicide terrorist campaigns are associated with gains for the terrorists’ political cause in about fifty percent of cases.88

85 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton University Press. 2011. 81.

86 Pape, Robert 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Political Science Review. 97(3): 344.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid 351.

44 In his 2005 book, Dying to Win, Pape expanded this study to up to the year 2003, noting the occurrence of two more terrorist campaigns, one of which correlated with significant gains for the terrorist group.89 Bringing the total to seven successful terrorist campaigns out of the thirteen that occurred from 1980 to 2003, Pape maintains his conclusion that terrorism is effective. Since suicide terrorists do not have the means to coerce through denial, he argues they must coerce through punishment. In this case, the punishment is mounting civilian causalities. The terrorists’ willingness to die also magnifies the impact of suicide terrorism by providing a costly signal that the attackers cannot be deterred and are willing to violate the norms of violence.90 While this strategic model explains the logic of employing terrorist tactics, Pape’s empirical evidence has been criticized for overstating the role of suicide terrorism in the cases he analyses.91 In his review of Pape’s 2005 book, Arie Perliger notes that certain “successes” of suicide terrorism should be interpreted differently, such as Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities in 1994-1995, which was undertaken largely as part of agreements that had been signed between the Palestinian Authority and Israel despite suicide attacks. Additionally, while Israel withdrew from Lebanon following suicide terrorism, Perliger points out that over 140 suicide attacks from

89 Pape, Robert. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House Publishing Group, 2005. 64.

90 Pape, Robert 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Political Science Review. 97(3): 347.

91 Perliger, Arie. 2006. “A Review of: ‘Robert. A. Pape: Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.’” Democracy and Security. 2(2).

45 2000-2004 did not result in a withdrawal from Judea and Samaria.92 Despite the limited effectiveness of terrorism at achieving political ends, groups may still strategically assess its effectiveness at gaining short-term tactical goals such as signaling resolve. In her book, Dying to kill: the allure of suicide terror, Mia Bloom also provides strategic explanations for suicide terrorism. She argues terrorist groups use suicide bombing under two conditions: when other tactics fail, and when they are competing with other terrorist groups.93 These both refer to terrorism’s tactical effectiveness. Bloom argues there is nothing inherent in Islam which predisposes people towards violence, but groups emulate each other’s’ tactics. This is why suicide terrorists often appear to be Muslim. Through an examination of early suicide terror, such as kamikazes, Bloom demonstrates continuity in the terrorists’ desire for publicity, indoctrination of young children, and targeting of foreign occupiers and collaborators.94 According to Bloom, suicide terrorists often try to portray themselves as “fanatical, and irrational, because they want their potential victims to believe that there is nothing that can be done against such an adversary.”95 This supports Pape’s claim that suicide terrorism can be used for cost signaling to demonstrate resolve.

92 Perliger, Arie. 2006. “A Review of: ‘Robert. A. Pape: Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.’” Democracy and Security. 2(2).

93 Bloom, Mia. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. P.1.

94 Ibid 17.

95 Ibid 89.

46 Pape draws on the work of Martha Crenshaw, who previously argued that terrorism is best understood in terms of its strategic function. In evaluating the causes of terrorism, Crenshaw distinguishes between preconditions, factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, and precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism.96 According to Crenshaw, terrorist groups depend on “permissive” factors (which are considered a type of precondition) to create the opportunity for operations. Modernization provides a few permissive causes of terrorism, since sophisticated networks of transportation and communication provide terrorists with mobility and the means of publicity.97 Another permissive factor is social “facilitation,” which Crenshaw describes as “social habits and historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and even dictating an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism.”98 In this way, a positive public opinion towards the use of terrorism is required for terrorist groups to emerge. Finally, Crenshaw argues the most salient political factor in the category of “permissive” causes is a government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism.99 While this analysis acknowledges ideational elements (such as the social beliefs that provide justification for violence), Crenshaw provides a mostly structural explanation that focuses on infrastructure, public opinion, and governmental characteristics as elements of the

96 Crenshaw, Martha 1981. “The causes of terrorism,” Comparative Politics. 6(2):381.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid 382.

99 Ibid 381.

47 overall political environment that create the conditions for political violence to emerge. Crenshaw also considers more direct causes of terrorism. The first condition is “the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority.”100 A social movement then develops to redress these grievances, and an extremist faction may begin using terrorism. According to Crenshaw, a lack of opportunity for political participation is a second condition that creates motivations for terrorism. In this case, grievances are primarily political, and paths to legal expression are blocked. The accessibility of such legitimate pathways is another key structural explanation. Finally, Crenshaw considers “precipitants,” that immediately precede outbreaks of terrorism. Such events could be, “government use of unexpected and unusual force in response to protest or reform attempts.”101 According to Crenshaw, terrorist campaigns depend on rational political choice. She argues that, “terrorism is the result of an organization’s decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government.”102 The strategic usefulness of terrorism depends on elements of the overall opportunity structure. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Crenshaw, Pape, and Bloom may help explain why certain movements retain militancy despite democratic participation. Their understanding of the strategic motivations of political

100 Crenshaw, Martha 1981. “The causes of terrorism,” Comparative Politics. 6(2): 383.

101 Ibid. 384.

102 Ibid. 385.

48 violence suggests that these groups must practice militancy as a rational response to the political opportunity structure.

Adding Ideational and Agentic Explanations of Terrorism Much of the literature uses some combination of structural and agentic factors to explain political violence. In his 2003 article, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Gordon

McCormick combined multiple theories about terrorist decision-making by arguing that terrorists have a duality of aims.103 These can be strategic, organizational, or psychological. According to strategic theories, terrorists operate rationally and employ violence instrumentally to achieve political change. In organizational theories, the internal dynamics of terrorist groups bring about violence, and psychological theories explain terrorist activities using individual psychology. While strategic theories view political violence as a response to structural factors, organizational and psychological theories present agentic explanations. According to McCormick, terrorists can be viewed as rational agents using terrorism as a means to an end, while simultaneously affected by internal logic (such as organizational and psychological factors) that can run counter to external objectives. Viewing terrorism solely through the lens of the strategic model, without consideration for possible irrationality, would provide an incomplete understanding. Colin Beck urged such nuance in the study of terrorism by arguing that, “the contentious politics approach sees tactics, movements, and actors arrayed along a

103 McCormick, Gordon H. “Terrorist Decision Making.” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 473-507.

49 spectrum of related phenomenon rather than boxed in by formal, discrete categories.”104 This middle-ground perspective provides a more complete picture of how movements operate and allows scholars to account for certain “irrational” activities. I incorporate McCormick’s insights about multiple aims by considering not only the factors that make retention of militancy strategically effective, but also the characteristics of movements that may influence their aims and attitudes towards use of force, such as religious beliefs or ethnic hostility.

In 2008, Max Abrahms took a more extreme stance by rejecting the strategic model of terrorism completely.105 Examining the strategic model and the natural systems model, Abrahms argues that terrorist groups can be best understood using the latter. He argues terrorist groups do not conform to the strategic model because terrorism is not often effective at achieving political goals.106 He presents several empirical tendencies of terrorist groups that do not conform to the strategic model, including inability of terrorist groups to achieve their aims, changing political platforms, and anonymous attacks.107 Instead, Abrahms argues the natural systems model is a better fit. According to the natural systems model, people participate in organizations not to achieve their official goals, but to experience social solidarity with other members. This is a key agentic explanation. Abrahms derives two testable

104 Beck, Colin J. 2008. “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism.” Sociology Compass. 2(5): 1566.

105 Abrahms, Max. 2008. “What Terrorists Really Want.” International Security 32(4): 78-105.

106Ibid. 81.

107 Ibid 82.

50 hypotheses from this theory: (1) people are mainly attracted to terrorist organizations not to achieve their political platforms, but to develop strong affective ties with other terrorist members and (2) at the organizational level, terrorist groups consistently engage in actions to preserve the social unit, even at the cost of official political agendas. Abrahms concludes that terrorism must be motivated by social solidarity. In her 2009 article, “What Makes Terrorists Tick,” Erica Chenoweth criticized Abrahms for overreaching in his flat rejection of strategic models of terrorism.108

While the individual behavior of terrorists can be explained by the natural systems model, Chenoweth argued aspects of the organization as a whole remain aligned with the strategic model. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter also separated the goals of individuals with the goals of the organization, arguing that volunteers can have a variety of motives such as promises of reward in the afterlife, providing financially for family, or revenge.109 Even though she studies terrorism as a “rational political choice,” Crenshaw also demonstrates that individual motivations vary.110 Rather than relegating ideational or social factors to the realm of individual motivations, my research will examine the motivation of groups as a while. While they may operate according to a strategic logic, the reasons why they operate should not be ignored or be assumed as fixed preferences.

108 Chenoweth, Kristin. 2009. “What Makes Terrorists Tick.” International Security 33 (4): 180-202.

109 Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. 2006. “The strategies of terrorism.” International Security, 31(1), 49-80.

110 Crenshaw, Martha 1981. “The causes of terrorism,” Comparative Politics. 6(2):389.

51 Assessment of Terrorism Literature The literature has provided numerous structural and ideational explanations for terrorism and political violence more generally. While ideational explanations could refer to both structural and agentic factors, they are typically included with agentic explanations that refer to group characteristics such as organizational, ideological and psychological factors. These could cause groups to act contrary to their outward objectives. Scholars present several direct and indirect causes of political violence.

As Crenshaw shows, elements such as Modern infrastructure, a supportive populace, and an ineffective government provide the background conditions that allow a terrorist group to emerge. She argues the emergence of these groups is motivated by grievances that cannot be pursued within the political system. These groups turn to terrorism as a strategic choice, usually when they have no other effective options. Scholars assert that terrorism can be used tactically in attempts to coerce governments by demonstrating resolve and signaling high levels of cost (especially suicide terrorism). Additionally, it can be a recruitment tool when competing against other groups for popular support and resources. Since a key factor in the emergence of terrorist groups is a response to being blocked from legitimate political participation, is it possible inclusion into the political system will end terrorism? This consideration of political opportunity as a structural condition for violence relates to the first hypothesis. Overall, the literature on terrorism provides key insights for developing a theory of retention of militancy by politically-included religious movements. Namely, the strategic logic of terrorism suggests that these movements must only retain the military option if it is at least marginally tactically effective. The movements examined in this research may employ more effective forms of political violence as

52 they grow stronger and gain control over territory or government apparatuses. Additionally, scholars such as Abrahms, McCormick, Chenoweth, Kydd and Walter demonstrate that particular characteristics of organizations and individuals can cause groups to make decisions that may seem “irrational.” While Abrahms completely rejects the strategic model of terrorism, the others demonstrate how various motivations may coexist at different levels. Any theory explaining the retention of militancy should account for the possibility of factors that could cause movements to act contrary to the strategic model.

Social Movement

Social Movement Theory can also be used to understand the conditions that allow religious militant groups to emerge. In his article, “The Contribution of Social

Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism,” Colin Beck asserts that Social Movement Theory has centered on a three-fold framework for the emergence of social movements.111 These aspects include mobilizing resources (including both materials and supporters), political opportunities, and framing.112 This framework suggests that, while grievances are necessary, they are not sufficient to explain why terrorist groups emerge. Crenshaw notes that scholars question whether al Qaeda is genuinely motivated by conflicts in Palestine and Iraq, or if these conflicts provide an

111 Beck, Colin J. 2008. “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism.” Sociology Compass. 2(5): 1565-1581.

112 Ibid 1567.

53 opportunity to express grievances.113 Similarly, al Qaeda’s position that Islam is on the defensive appeared to be vindicated by the war in Iraq, inadvertently reviving the movement.114 The resource mobilization perspective highlights the problem of marshalling resources. While terrorism is often less expensive than other types of militant activity, Beck describes it as a “high-cost enterprise” compared to participatory collective action.115 This is especially true if the group employs suicide bombing, which demands a steady influx of deeply devoted participants. Framing, which is the third approach in this framework, also explains the emergence of terrorist groups. In order to mobilize support, these groups must ensure that the meanings ascribed to their actions resonate with the public. As Thomas Perry Thornton posited, terrorism is largely symbolic and terrorist acts are meant to convey broader meanings.116 Framing is essential to understanding the ways ideational factors are used to stir group violence. Thornton argued that terror is a weapon of political agitation.117 The strategic model posits that terrorism is adopted when the expected political return is greater than other alternatives. As such, insurgents may use terror either when incumbents do

113 Crenshaw, Martha. 2007 “Terrorism and global security.” Leashing the dogs of war: Conflict management in a divided world. P.68

114 Ibid.

115 Beck, Colin J. 2008. “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism.” Sociology Compass. 2(5): 1568.

116 Thornton, Thomas Perry. "Terror as a weapon of political agitation." Terrorism- Critical Concepts in Political Science 3 (1964): 41-64.

117 Ibid 41.

54 not make constitutional provision to transfer power or when the insurgents lack political strength to use the provisions that are in place. In the second case, the insurgents will strive to give the impression that the incumbents are repressive. Therefore, terrorism is not exclusively used when repression is evident, but terrorists attempt to establish legitimacy for the extranormal means used through claims that the normal channels of their political system are unresponsive. This means that the actual oppressiveness of a political system may not always be as important as its perceived oppressiveness in determining factors for political violence. Influencing perceptions of the oppressiveness of a regime is a key element of a movement’s framing. Social movement theory has also been applied to the study of Islamic activism, encompassing a wide range of Islamic organizations, from prayer groups to terrorists to political parties.118 In 2003, Quintan Wiktorowicz edited the volume, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, which uses social movement theory to explain mobilization of contention in support of Muslim causes.119 In his introduction, Wiktorowicz argues,

Whereas the majority of studies on Islamic activism tend to assume that a particular set of grievances, translated into religious idioms and symbols, engenders mobilization, various generations of social movement theory and concomitant debates have demonstrated that other factors are inextricably

118 Wiktorowicz, Quintan. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University Press, 2003. P.4-5

119 Ibid.

55 linked to mobilization processes, including resource availability, framing resonance, and shifts in opportunity structures.120 These are the same elements of the three-fold framework for the emergence of social movements that Colin Beck applied to understanding terrorism.121 In their chapter, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement,” Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz view violence as one method of contention, among a repertoire that includes religious instruction, social welfare services, publications, and general proselytizing activities.122

Tackling the question of why groups turn to violence when other options are available, Hafez and Wiktorowicz argue, “Islamists engage in a rational calculus about tactical efficacy and choose modes of contention they believe will facilitate objectives or protect their organization and political gains.”123 In their view, violent Islamic contention is a result of repressive state policy that leaves few alternatives. Therefore, their discussion of violent contention focuses on the element of “political opportunity” as the key factor explaining the development of the 1992 Islamic insurgency.124

According to Hafez and Wiktorowicz, the deliberalization of the Egyptian political

120 Wiktorowicz, Quintan. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University Press, 2003. P.4

121 Beck, Colin J. 2008. “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism.” Sociology Compass. 2(5): 1565-1581.

122 Hafez, Mohammed M. and Quintan Wiktorowicz. “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement,” Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University Press, 2003. P.61

123 Ibid 62.

124 Ibid 71.

56 system in the 1990s narrowed the peaceful options for contention, and the reactive (rather than preemptive) nature of state oppression against militant Islamists meant that these groups had already attained the necessary organizational means to fight back. Finally, the indiscriminate nature of state repression supported the “injustice frames” promoted by insurgents to gain broader support. In this way, Hafez and Wiktorowicz apply the social movement theory factors of political opportunity, mobilization resources, and framing to explain Islamic insurgency in Egypt.

Understanding religious militant groups as a type of social movement highlights the importance of collective identities as a source of mobilization. Being a member of the Islamic “ummah” is one example of a possible collective identity that would influence movement decision-making. In his book, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma, Peter G. Mandaville suggests that the passing of the Prophet created the “Muslim political community” as a space of negotiation.125 The concept of the ummah was first invoked to describe the original group that accompanied Muhammad on the hijra in 622.126 In Medina, the ummah was conceived as a “defense pact” whereby the city’s clans pledged to protect Muhammad and his followers. Today, this community extends transnationally, unifying Muslims across the world into one political space. Muslim transnationalism includes globalizing Muslim social and political movements, as well as a “global Muslim

125 Mandaville, Peter G. Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma. London: Routledge, 2001.

126 Ibid 71.

57 public sphere,” in which Islamic identity and norms are debated and consumed.127 Such collective identities are essential for mobilizing support and framing contention. This literature is relevant for the study of religious militant groups because it suggests retention of militancy may depend not only on the continued existence of grievances, but on the availability of personnel and material resources, opportunity structures, and framing. Like the literature on terrorism, the key contributions of social movement theory mix elements of the overall political structure and the groups themselves. Regarding the opportunity structure, my study focuses on groups which already have access to democratic political power. This poses a puzzle for why they continue using violent contention. However, their actions may be partially explained by the other two factors. Resource mobilization includes both material and ideational factors since personnel must be persuaded to join the movement. As Hafez and Wiktorowicz argue, the availability of such resources depends on the nature of a regime’s repressiveness. If the regime practices repression preemptively (before a movement coalesces), the movement may not be able to organize. In contrast, reactive repression may not be effective because members have already gained organizational momentum and formed bonds.128 In my analysis of religious militant groups that participate in legitimate political processes, each movement would have already mobilized resources in the past. This means they would only need to maintain them,

127 Mandaville, Peter G. 2009. “Muslim Transnational Identity and State Responses in Europe and the UK after 9/11: Political Community, Ideology and Authority.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 35(3): 495.

128 Hafez, Mohammed M. and Quintan Wiktorowicz. “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement,” Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University Press, 2003. P.68

58 and, as Hafez and Wiktorowicz have shown, that should be less difficult than organizing resources in the first place. Additionally, my analysis includes movements participating in democratic governance that would presumably be less repressive. However, democratic states also have an interest in suppressing violent dissent. The third factor, framing, is crucial for maintaining and attracting new supporters. This element will be considered in my exploration of ideological and symbolic motivations for retention of militancy.

Internal Conflict / Ethnic Violence

The literature on insurgency and internal conflicts also identifies structural explanations for political violence. In their article “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, James Fearon and David Laitin argue that the post-Cold War presence of internal wars is not a result of ethnic or religious antagonisms. Instead, they assert, “the factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency.”129 These conditions relate to a state’s weakness, demonstrated by poverty levels, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations. These factors make it difficult for states to control their peripheries and conduct counterinsurgency efforts. David Lake and Donald Rothchild agree that weak states provide the conditions for ethnic conflict.

According to Lake and Rothchild, ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective

129 Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” The American Political Science Review 97(1): 75.

59 fears of the future. These fears arise when the state is weak, meaning it loses its ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups.130 In his study of Afghanistan’s insurgency, Seth Jones takes a similar perspective, arguing that a precondition for the onset of the insurgency was the collapse of governance after the Taliban was overthrown.131 Many scholars of internal conflict agree that a weak government is an important structural precondition for violence. While the opportunity for violence

(created by weak governance) is a necessary condition for political violence to occur, it is not sufficient in the absence of grievances. Collective fears that arise in the absence of strong governance are rooted in group identity. Aspects of group identity that support violence or hostility towards other groups may exist whether or not the state is weak. State weakness amplifies fears and provides an opportunity to act on them. While weak governance creates a gap for militant organizations to fill, acts of political violence still require motivations.

Necessary Condition for Religious Militancy (Hypothesis 2)

From this review, it is clear that a dominant theme in the literatures of democratic moderation and political violence is that militant groups act according to

130 Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild. 1996. “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” International Security 21(2): 43.

131 Jones, Seth. 2008. “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.” International Security 32(4): 8.

60 strategic logic (even if there may be irrationality at the level of the individual). Both of these sets of literature consider a model in which movements express grievances and decide whether to resort to militancy based on structural factors. The first hypothesis considered the inability of movements to achieve their goals legally as a necessary condition for militancy, based on the democratic moderation literature. Other necessary conditions present in these literatures are based on the idea of militant groups as strategic actors who will only choose violence if it is the most effective option available. This means that we can add another hypothesis expressing a necessary structural condition for religious militancy:

Hypothesis 2: A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if this violent activity is at least tactically effective at furthering the movement’s objectives.

Like the first hypothesis, this applies a strategic understanding of political violence. It implies that violence will be used if certain elements of the political structure make it effective. For this hypothesis, I will first need to determine the movement’s objectives. According to Pape, some objectives may be coercing governments to change policy, mobilizing recruits, or gaining financial support.132 In terms of the first objective, this can be fulfilled in the case studies by successfully passing legislation or gaining political power as demonstrated by electoral victory or public opinion polling. Drawing from Crenshaw, a structural element that may cause

132 Pape, Robert 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Political Science Review. 97(3): 344.

61 violence to increase political power would be a general population that sanctions the use of violence against the government, considering it morally and politically justifiable.133 Of course, the general population may not be the intended audience of militant acts. Pape’s second objective of “mobilizing recruits” suggests that a movement may undertake militant acts to solidify its base of support. According to the literature on terrorist motivations, such militant action may be most likely when an organization is competing against other groups for community support. In her book, Dying to Kill, Bloom refers to this tactic as “outbidding.” She argues, “In the war for public support, when the bombings resonate positively with the population that insurgent groups purport to represent, they help the organization mobilize support.”134 Finally, the group may use violence to pursue an objective of financial support. In terms of structural explanations, this incorporates the geopolitical context of surrounding entities which may be sympathetic to the movement and act as financiers.

If proven, this hypothesis supports “thin rationality” and strategic understandings of terrorist groups. Whether or not an organization’s ultimate goals reflect rational self-interest, this hypothesis suggests that groups at least pursue rational methods of achieving them. If this hypothesis is disproven, then the movement is not employing violence strategically. This could be due to ideational

133 Crenshaw, Martha 1981. “The causes of terrorism,” Comparative Politics. 6(2): 382.

134 Bloom, Mia. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 78.

62 characteristics of the movement, such as an ideology that values and promotes violent action.

The following is an illustration of how commonly-accepted structural conditions discussed in this review would lead to religious militancy, according to the literatures on democratic moderation and political violence. This model is based on key structural conditions that make political violence a logical option for pursuing objectives.

Figure 1 Grievance and Structure-Based Model of Religious Militancy

Step 1 (Grievances blocked) and Step 2 (Strategic choice to use militancy) represent the first and second hypotheses, respectively. They assume a strategic logic in which

63 grievances interact with the opportunity structure to create the conditions for militancy. When grievances (in this case, religious political ends), are unable to be successfully pursued due to a lack of political opportunity, movements must make a strategic choice. If permissive structural conditions make militancy the most effective option, then the strategic choice will be in favor of militancy. Empirical evidence of the continuation of militancy despite democratic participation suggests that this model must be flawed if there is no “Repression/ Lack of Political Opportunity” present. The first hypothesis addresses this puzzle to determine whether the religious militants in democracies truly lack political opportunity. Step 3 (Mobilization), is suggested by the social movement literature and is dependent on how movements frame conflicts in order to marshal support. In this model, how issues are framed depends on the interaction between grievances and the political opportunity structure. However, this model lacks an explanation of how grievances are formed and what ideational or emotional factors may make framing effective. If violence is continuing despite political opportunity, perhaps militants are being mobilized by other factors? The following two sections on Religious Ideology and Myth-Making explore possible ideational explanations. These could be applied at the level of grievance formation and framing as alternative explanatory variables for militant mobilization.

Religious Ideology as Motivation for Violence

Religious ideology is a key ideational factor that scholars have used to explain political violence, especially terrorism. When violence is religious in nature, some

64 scholars argue it can be even more brutal and difficult to resolve.135 In contrast to Realist scholars who view states as “black boxes” differentiated only by capability, many scholars recognize that a state’s identity (including religious identity) influences its behavior. In his book, Jihad for Jerusalem: Identity and Strategy in International Relations, Muqtedar Khan recognizes how a state’s identity interacts with its level of causal powers to explain its actions.136 For example, despite its weak causal powers, Iran is motivated by its strong identity as an “Islamic state.”137 According to Khan, this motivation gives Iran a tendency to “make symbolic choices when core identity issues are at stake even at very high material costs.”138 Monica Toft argues Abrahamic religions contain elements that are “uncompromising” and “encourage followers to discount their physical survival,” and that these elements make bargaining and deterrence less effective.139 According to Toft, “when religion hinders the ability of the state to bargain, the combatants may go on killing each other long after there is any political, economic, or social utility in doing so.”140 Similarly, Michael Horowitz

135See: Bruce Newsome’s recent large-n analysis of religious and secular terrorism in Newsome, Bruce Oliver, W. James Stewart, Aarafah Mosavi. Countering New(est) Terrorism: Hostage-Taking, Kidnapping, and Active Violence - Assessing, Negotiating, and Assaulting. CRC Press. 2018.

136 Khan, Muqtedar Jihad for Jerusalem: Identity and Strategy in International Relations. Praeger. 2004.

137 Ibid 147.

138 Ibid 147.

139 Toft, Monica 2007 “Getting Religion? The Puzzling case of Islam and Civil War,” International Security 31(4): 100.

140 Ibid 101.

65 argues religious motivation can prolong wars despite material costs.141 Using the Catholic Crusading movement as a case study, Horowitz finds that “given the costs and failures of the Crusades, purely material factors cannot explain their persistence.”142 He uses this examination to shed light on the contemporary Salafi jihadi movement.143 These same religious elements that influence the use of violence by states may also be present at the level of religious militant groups.

Are Certain Religious Ideologies More Violent?

Most recent examinations of religious violence focus on Islamic militancy due to its representation in current conflicts. In particular, suicide terrorism as a mode of attack has been linked strongly to Islamic militants. Like political violence in general, suicide terrorism has been explained in theories that focus on ideational factors, structural factors, and a mixture of these variables. In contrast to scholars such as Pape, who dismiss religion or ideology as important variables, Assaf Moghadam argues that ideological factors are important for explaining the proliferation of suicide missions. According to Moghadam’s analysis, “of the 788 suicide attacks from December 1981 to March 2008 in which the identity of the group could be identified,

141 Horowitz, Michael C. 2009 “Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading,” International Security 34(2).

142 Ibid 174.

143 Ibid 173.

66 Salafi jihadist groups carried out 37.7 percent – more than any other group.”144 This suggests that certain ideological affiliations (such as Salafi jihadist) make it more likely a group will implement suicide terrorism. Moghadam argues the main reasons for the global spread of suicide missions are al-Qaida’s status as a global actor and the spread of Salafi jihad.145 Advocacy of suicide bombing as a tactic spread from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden and other Salafi jihadist groups.146 With its elevation of the importance of violent jihad and admiration of martyrdom, Salafi jihad as an ideology is presented as a key factor in the spread of suicide terrorism. Does this mean that elements of Salafi theology itself explain the prevalence of suicide attacks, or are there other factors that create this association? It should be noted that Hezbollah, a Shia organization, is considered the first group to practice modern suicide terrorism (after World War II).147 After Hezbollah’s suicide attacks of the early 1980s, the tactic spread to Palestinian groups. While Hezbollah inspired the modern age of suicide terrorism, it was al-Qaida that spread the popularity of the tactic on global scale along with the ideology of Salafi jihad. If certain religious ideologies, such as the Salafi movement within Sunni Islam, are more heavily represented in the use of terrorist tactics, does this mean religious ideology is a

144 Moghadam, Assaf. 2008. “Motives for Martyrdom.” International Security, 33(3), 64.

145 Ibid. 58.

146 Ibid. 60.

147 Overton, Iain and Henry Dodd. “A short history of suicide bombing,” Action on Armed Violence. August 23, 3013. https://aoav.org.uk/2013/a-short-history-of-suicide- bombings.

67 determinant of terrorism with some theologies motivating violence more than others? Studies of this phenomenon suggest that contextual factors contribute to the overrepresentation of certain religions in terrorist activities. For example, scholars have offered several explanations for the association of Islam with recent wars and suicide terrorism. According to Monica Duffy Toft, Islam in general is disproportionately represented in civil wars. She notes that, “In 42 religious civil wars from 1940 to

2000, incumbent governments and rebels who identified with Islam were involved in 34 (81 percent), far more than those identifying with other religions, such as Christianity (21, or 50 percent) or Hinduism (7, or 16 percent).”148 Of the fourteen Islamic states which experienced religious civil war during this time period, eight were Sunni-dominated, three were Shia-dominated, and three were mixed. This shows that the disproportionate representation of Islam includes both Sunni and Shia adherents. In addition, Toft demonstrates that, “civil wars in which key actors identify as

Islamic are more likely to escalate into religious civil wars than civil wars in which key actors identify with other religions”149 Toft argues that Islam’s higher representation in religious civil wars is due to a combination of historical, geographical, and structural factors, as well as religious outbidding.150 Historically, the Thirty Years War led Europeans to generally no longer have states governed by

148 Toft, Monica 2007 “Getting Religion? The Puzzling case of Islam and Civil War,” International Security 31(4): 97.

149 Ibid 97.

150 Ibid 112.

68 God, while the Islamic World maintained the fusion of religion and state.151 Geographically, the co-location of holy Islamic sites and petroleum reserves led to negative interactions with Western states, and hence a growing sense of Arab and Islamic unity. Finally, Toft argues that the concept of jihad is a key structural factor leading to Islam’s disproportionate role in civil wars.152 This means Islam includes a very strong component obligating followers to defend the religion. These factors combine to increase the utility of religious bidding for Islamic elites.153 Invoking religion to justify violence is more likely to be successful when the religion contains elements that support defensive action and political authority is fused with religious authority. Discussing the interaction of religion and politics in the Middle East, John Esposito and Muqtedar Khan argue that power and religion seem to be “inseparable.”154 This means religious ideology may be a more potent explanatory variable for militancy in political contexts where religion is fused with authority and when source texts include calls for defense of the religion.

In their examination of Islamic suicide terrorism, Bradley Thayer and Valerie Hudson recognize many similar social science explanations for participation in this

151 Toft, Monica 2007 “Getting Religion? The Puzzling case of Islam and Civil War,” International Security 31(4): 108.

152 Ibid 110.

153 Ibid 104.

154 Esposito, John and Muqtedar Khan “Chapter 11: Religion and Politics in the Middle East,” in Understanding the Contemporary Middle East, ed. Deborah J. Gerner, (Lynne Rienner Pub, 2000).

69 activity, including radical Islamic belief systems.155 Adding the possibility of evolutionary motivations based on Life Sciences, Thayer and Hudson argue that factors such as gender differentiation, religious support for polygyny, and obstructed marriage markets motivate Muslim men to participate in suicide terrorism.156 Even such evolutionary explanations rely on the ideological/religious structure of society to create the conditions in which men face high pressure to assert their masculinity and dwindling prospects for marriage. Additionally, these motivations are solely at the level of the individual. While they may explain factors motivating men to become suicide terrorists (like Abrahms’ natural systems model), they do not explain tactical decisions by larger movements. The phenomenon of increasing Muslim foreign fighters has also been explained based on religious identity. According to Thomas Hegghammer, this phenomenon can be explained by pan-Islamism’s emphasis on Muslim solidarity.157 Such religious obligations can contribute to a movement’s ability to mobilize resources (drawing from the social movement literature). Whether due to Islam’s theological structure or aspects of Muslim cultural identity, this religion has been examined by several scholars to explain its overrepresentation in violent conflict.

155 Thayer, Bradley and Valerie Hudson 2010 “Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Science on Islamic Suicide Terrorism,” International Security 34(4): 41.

156 Ibid 61.

157 Hegghammer, Thomas 2010 “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security 35(3): 89.

70 How Do Religious Ideologies Motivate Violence?

Islam is only one of many religions that has been used to explain political violence. In the early 1990s, a multi-year study termed “The Fundamentalism Project” was launched to study world fundamentalisms. While the project created controversy by using the term “fundamentalist,” which does not clearly translate from Christianity to other religions158, it produced a comprehensive examination of radical religious ideologies. Directed by Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, the project incorporated hundreds of experts on religion and culture. Of the five encyclopedic volumes which resulted from this project, one addressed militancy arising from fundamentalism. Titled Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance, this volume addresses how various fundamentalisms lead to political activism and violence, including cases within the traditions of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sikhism.159

Part Three of this volume, “Remaking the world through militancy,” includes six case studies by different authors. Three of the articles are devoted to Islamic groups and movements, while the rest address Jewish, Buddhist, and Christian cases.160 In his introduction to the section, David C. Rapoport asserts that the aggressiveness of fundamentalist groups is defensive, “springing largely from fears

158 Bernard Lewis. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

159 Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott. Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance. University of Chicago Press, 1996.

160Ibid. 429.

71 that secularization will destroy the authority of the sacred, that traditional religious establishments lack confidence in the truth or viability of divine principles, and that time is running out.”161 In his chapter on Hezbollah, Martin Kramer argues that the violence of religious groups often has a sacred dimension, which is derived from the precedents, symbols, and rites of their parent religious communities. While the other authors in this section do not refer directly to “sacred violence,” the information they provide can be distinguished between religious justifications, occasions, objects, and methods. These latter three (occasions, objects, and methods) suggest religious prescriptions for how or when to enact violence, but the former category (justifications) is most relevant to this research because it concerns religious motivations for violence. According to Rapoport, two principle religious sources are used to justify violence. These are the “founding myth” and millenarian or messianic expectations.162 The first source refers to the idea that a community can be revitalized by returning to its origins, while the second source refers to divine promise for the future. In his chapter on Buddhism, Stanley J. Tambiah demonstrates the importance of the “founding myth” for Theraveda Buddhists. According to Tambiah, their founding myth describes the settlement of Sri Lanka as a refuge for Buddhists and the following

161 Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott. Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance. University of Chicago Press, 1996. 430.

162 Ibid 447.

72 struggles against Hindus wishing to destroy Buddhism.163 This myth has been invoked periodically to mobilize Buddhist masses. According to Ehud Sprinzak, Jewish fundamentalists are inspired by messianism.164 He argues many Jewish fundamentalists believe they must protect the boundaries of the “righteous remnant” because the survival of that community is a precondition for fulfillment of the messianic promise. Overall, the authors of this volume provide insight into how elements of religious doctrine can be used as an impetus for violence.

Focusing on religion as an explanatory variable often places scholars in the sensitive position of interpreting exactly what religious texts mean or how a religion should be practiced. Nukhet Ahu Sandal offers a useful “public theology” framework which focuses on the public manifestations of religious belief instead of the religion itself. According to Sandal, public theology, “can be defined as the systematic ways people relate their faith to public issues under the guidance of religious authorities.”165 This includes substantive dimensions (concepts such as human rights, foreign policy, and governance) that interact with spiritual, spatial, and temporal dimensions to

163 Tambiah, Stanley J. “Buddhism, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka.” In Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance. University of Chicago Press, 1996.

164 Sprinzak, Ehud. “Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel.” In Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance. University of Chicago Press, 1996.

165 Sandal, Nukhet Ahu. 2012. “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(1): 67.

73 produce manifestations of the religion in the public sphere.166 For example, Sandal argues that Shia public theologies of governance differ greatly between Iraq and Iran due to differences in political culture and history.167 Additionally, more than one public theology of an issue area may exist in the same country. According to Sandal, India includes, “two main Hindu public theologies in regard to the issue of citizenship and identity. One is a traditional, pacifist, ‘broad and generous’ Gandhian understanding; the other is a more aggressive, exclusive, cultural nationalist Hindutva, represented by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).”168 Rather than using broad religions (such as Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism) as causal variables for retention of militancy, my research takes a similar perspective by focusing on specific manifestations of these religions within particular movements. The term used in this research is “religious ideology,” referring to a set of views about the material world that are tied to religious belief. It can be compared with other types of ideologies that have been studied as causes for violence, such as political or economic ideologies. Like public theology, a religious ideology is not synonymous with the religion itself. Rather, it comprises the specific interpretations and practices used by a religious movement. Sandal notes that the types of public theologies which inspire violent organizations are the ones which contain, “the internal space for binary

166 Sandal, Nukhet Ahu. 2012. “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(1): 72.

167 Ibid 75

168 Ibid 76

74 othering.”169 Religious ideologies underlying organizations that retain militancy despite democratic inclusion should display such exclusionary characteristics. Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars have advocated for prioritizing identity-based explanations (such as religious ideology) to explain rising militancy. It is conceivable that the same aspects of religious ideologies that promote use of force may explain continued militancy after achieving democratic power. According to the literature on religious ideology, elements such as an obligation to defend the religion,170 concepts of solidarity across borders,171 and exclusion of rival groups172 may be used to justify continued violence. These elements will be studied to determine whether militants believe they are acting according to religious instructions when they carry out violence in the name of democratically-included movements. If they are acting against religious instruction (within their own religious ideology, not the religion as a whole), then some other explanatory variable must be primary. This research will contribute to the literature on religious ideology by continuing to

169 Sandal, Nukhet Ahu. 2012. “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(1): 78.

170 Toft, Monica 2007 “Getting Religion? The Puzzling case of Islam and Civil War,” International Security 31(4): 110.

171 Hegghammer, Thomas 2010 “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security 35(3): 89.

172 Sandal, Nukhet Ahu. 2012. “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(1): 78.

75 investigate its importance as a causal variable for political violence, especially when democratic avenues are available.

Necessary Condition for Religious Militancy (Hypothesis 3)

While several aspects of religious ideology may provide motivation for political violence (such as religious obligation, solidarity, and exclusion of others), the necessary condition derived from this literature will be limited to the first aspect. The other two aspects play a role in the narrative framing and myth-making which will be examined in the final section. These aspects of religious ideology show how religion functions both as a theology and an identity. While the former provides rules for action, the latter creates emotional attachment to a community. Drawing from the literature that considers religious obligation a necessary condition for religious militancy, the first hypothesis states:

Hypothesis 3: A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if they perceive it to be religiously obligatory.

If the primary explanation for militant activity is ideological, the groups studied should act according to religious beliefs about use of violence. This would mean that certain ideologies have a greater tendency towards violence than others. According to Moghadam, one of the reasons Salahi jihadists use suicide bombing more than other groups is the ideology’s elevation of the importance of violent jihad

76 and admiration of martyrdom.173 Additionally, scholars taking part in The Fundamentalism Project offer numerous ways in which religious beliefs provide justifications, occasions, objects, and methods for use of violence.174 This hypothesis must be proven if religious obligation is a motivation for violence. The perception among perpetrators that their violence is religiously obligatory is a minimum requirement for religion to be important as an explanatory variable. This also means leaders use religious language to justify violent activity, whether or not it corresponds with more mainstream interpretations of the religion. If this hypothesis is disproven, then religious militancy must be motivated by something else, such as strategic logic or the framing of narratives that evoke fear and hostility.

Framing and Myth-Making

The literatures on internal conflict and ethnic violence recognize the importance of group myths. While much of the internal conflict literature emphasizes the role of the state in arbitrating between groups to prevent violence, social- psychological theories consider characteristics of the groups themselves, such as concerns with perceived status or group myths.175 In his book, Ethnic Groups in

173 Moghadam, Assaf. 2008. “Motives for Martyrdom.” International Security, 33(3), 59.

174 Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott. Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance. University of Chicago Press, 1996.

175 Kaufman, Stuart J. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence.” International Security. 30(4): 47.

77 Conflict, Horowitz argues that tension between ethnic groups is caused by group comparison. Power may be sought not only to ensure group survival, but to confirm group worth.176 The importance of emotions is further highlighted by Roger Peterson, who applies models of “fear, hatred, and resentment” to understand the motivations of perpetrators of ethnic violence.177 Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine address the role of nationalist myths in promoting nationalist and ethnic conflict.178 They challenge liberal conventional wisdom based on John Stuart Mill’s argument that conditions of “perfect competition” in the marketplace of ideas will discredit false nationalist myths.179 Conversely, Snyder and Ballentine argue the promotion of unconditional freedom of public debate in democratizing societies may exacerbate the problem. For the purpose of their research, “myths,” are defined as “assertions that would lose credibility if their claim to a basis in fact or logic were exposed to rigorous, disinterested public evaluation.”180 These myths may either be falsifiable statements or normative claims which cannot be scrutinized objectively. With this understanding, Snyder and Ballentine define nationalist mythmaking as “the attempt to use dubious arguments to mobilize support

176 Horowitz. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1985.

177 Peterson, Roger D. Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press. 2002.

178 Snyder, Jack and Karen Ballentine 1996 “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 21(2).

179 Ibid 12.

180 Ibid 10.

78 for nationalist doctrines or to discredit opponents.”181 While proponents of unfettered free speech view government media monopolies as the perpetrators of nationalist myths, Snyder and Ballentine argue that many instigators of ethnic conflict are actually members of civil society.182 In democratizing states, the marketplace of ideas may include partial monopolies of supply, segmented demand, and weak regulatory industries which can be exploited by both governmental and nongovernmental elites.183 This could allow nationalist myths to flourish and instigate ethnic conflict.

In Stuart Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory, the critical causes of ethnic violence are hostile group myths and the fears they produce.184 According to Kaufman, people generally make emotionally-charged choices by responding to evocative symbols. These symbols are powerful because they can reference group myths to, “[frame] a conflict of interest as a struggle against hostile, evil, or subhuman forces.”185 Invoking fear can cause people to prioritize security over values. Myths that stir fears of group extinction facilitate mass hostility. In his book, Nationalist

Passions, Kaufman also emphasizes the importance of prejudice which combines with

181 Snyder, Jack and Karen Ballentine 1996 “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 21(2):10.

182 Ibid 8.

183 Ibid 25.

184 Kaufman, Stuart J. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence.” International Security. 30(4): 47.

185 Ibid 52.

79 emotion to create situations in which people both, “dislike and fear each other.”186 Kaufman argues prejudice makes people quicker to see others as a threat. According to Omar McDoom, explanations of ethnic war that focus on threats can be divided into “rationalist” and “affective” camps.187 Symbolic politics theory combines emotional and materialist factors. This is because ethnic warfare requires not only hostile myths and ethnic fears, but opportunity to mobilize. Similarly, McDoom distinguishes group polarization from group violence arguing, “emotions drive polarization, but it is opportunity that mediates whether these emotions are expressed as violence.”188 He argues there are four psychological effects of threat that lead to group polarization: boundary activation, outgroup negativity, outgroup homogenization, and ingroup solidarity.189 As in the literature on religious ideology, ideological myths that create fear or hostility towards other groups are considered key ideational explanations for outbreaks of violent activity.

Necessary Condition for Religious Militancy (Hypothesis 4)

Drawing from the literature on social movements, religious ideology, and ethnic conflict, a dominant theme seems to be the importance of framing narratives to

186 Kaufman, Stuart J. and Michael C. Grillo. “Introduction: Ethnic Relations and Symbolic Politics,” Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015. P. 3.

187 McDoom, Omar Shahabudin 2012 “The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict,” International Security 37(2): 124.

188 Ibid 127.

189 Ibid 142-150.

80 encourage militant mobilization. These narratives, which are part of a group’s history or theology, should be most effective in provoking militancy when they stir emotion of hostility and fear towards outgroups. This yields the fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if framing of myths or sacred histories contained within the group’s religious ideologies evoke hostility towards other groups and fear of extinction.

Framing is a key contribution of the social movement literature, especially since political violence is often itself a symbolic action. In order to frame violent action as necessary, groups draw on symbols that refer to sacred histories or myths. I include “sacred histories” alongside myths because even true historical events can be framed to invoke hostility. The literatures on religious ideology and ethnic conflict include the importance of myths and ideology for stirring group emotions, especially fear. According to Rapoport, “founding myths” in religious ideologies may provide justifications for violence against groups viewed as perpetual enemies.190 Similarly, the literature on symbolic politics emphasizes the importance of myths that not only create hostility towards other groups but stir fears for group survival.191 This hypothesis will be proven if these movements perpetuate myths or draw on historical

190 Rapoport, David C. “Remaking the world through militancy: Comparing militant fundamentalist movements and groups.” In Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance. University of Chicago Press, 1996. 447.

191 Kaufman, Stuart J. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence.” International Security. 30(4): 47.

81 symbols about their origins or relations with rivals that create hostility among members. These could include ideas about divine rights of the in-group or previous injustices inflicted by the out-group which are used to justify violent activity. Like religion, these hostile myths are another aspect of movement ideologies which may motivate violence independently of strategic considerations. As Bennett and Checkel argue, possible answers to my research questions may include a mix of structural and ideational factors.192 Therefore, it is possible multiple hypotheses will be proven in the search for why religious militant groups engage in violence despite political representation. If the first hypothesis is proven, certain conclusions of the inclusion/moderation literature could be maintained because it could be argued that the groups were not fully included in political processes. However, if the hypothesis is disproven, it will present a stronger challenge to theories of democratic moderation. Testing the other hypotheses will reveal the extent to which these groups act strategically or according to ideational factors.

Research Design

Case Selection and Methodology

The primary research method for this project will be comparative case studies.

The dependent variable is continuation of political violence by religious militant

192 Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel. Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge University Press. 2014. 23.

82 groups in pursuit of a particular ideological objective. This challenges the Inclusion- Moderation hypothesis as well as the strict differentiation between radicals and moderates. While previous scholars have examined moderation on the organizational level, this study takes a more holistic approach by examining broader ideological currents within a geographic region. These ideological currents can be compared to Sandal’s concept of “public theologies,” which represent public manifestations of religious belief in a specific political context, such as Buddhist nationalism in Sri

Lanka. Beach and Pederson provide prescriptions for case selection in process tracing research designs.193 My research falls under their category of “theory-building” because the purpose is to build a theory that explains continued implementation of the “military option” by religious militant groups despite democratic political participation. Numerous scholars have demonstrated factors leading to political violence, and these factors will be considered in my research. However, my key questions differ because they concern overall political violence conducted in the name of an ideology (rather than being limited one organization), and they are specific to circumstances in which representatives of the ideology are participants in a democratic system. This is a study of “deviant” cases because their outcomes challenge the

Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis. Therefore, my case selection process subscribes to Beach and Pederson’s “second situation,” in which the outcome (Y) is known, but we remain unsure what causes it to happen. Case selection in this situation resembles a

193 Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. Process-tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. University of Michigan, 2013. 155.

83 deviant case selection strategy, in which the outcome is considered “surprising” in relation to existing knowledge. Candidates for case selection in this research design will be those in quadrant IV of Figure 1. This figure is based on Beach and Pederson’s model of case selection in theory-building process tracing. Cases in quadrant IV are “deviant” cases because their choice to implement the military option cannot be explained by a lack of access to democratic processes.

Figure 2 Case Selection in Theory-Building Process Tracing

84 Using this model, three ideological currents were selected to demonstrate how extremist elements persist within movements and are even tolerated by moderate political wings. As Douglas Dion wrote in his chapter on conducting comparative case studies, when considering necessary conditions it makes sense to select cases in which the dependent variable is present. This is because, in cases where the dependent variable is not present, satisfying a necessary condition would say nothing about whether the dependent variable would occur, only that it would be possible.194

In their book, “Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool,” Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel recommend considering both agent-based and structural explanations.195 Structural explanations may attribute continued violence to the level of democracy in the countries where these groups operate, or other aspects of the political culture which tolerate violent activity. On the other hand, agentic explanations may attribute continued violence to properties of the movements themselves, such as their goals and religious identity. The cases vary in the extent to which they use or tolerate religious militancy. Additionally, there are within-case variances in use of violence over time. This research will examine the potential causes of such variance. The cases selected for examination vary in both religious/ideological identity and the nature of their respective political systems. The religious ideologies selected

194 Dion, Douglas. “Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study.” In Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications. Ed. Gary Goertz and Harvey Starr. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2003. 97.

195 Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel. Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge University Press. 2014. 23.

85 for study are: Shia Islamism in Lebanon, Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) in India, and Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka. Each of these ideologies are represented by several key organizations whose relationship will be studied. Typically, they include ideological leadership, a political branch, and militant elements. The key militant organizations that will be studied for each ideology are Hezbollah’s military wing in Lebanon, the Bajrang Dal (a militant Hindu nationalist organization in India), and the Bodu Bala Sena (a militant Buddhist nationalist organization in Sri Lanka), respectively. Violence related to these movements may not be confined solely to these organizations, such as in situations of communal violence or allied militant groups. Several types of actors may engage in militancy as part of the same movement within a given country. This research examines the broad networks of associated political and militant groups. Compared to other ideological movements, these are religion-based (unlike other political or economic ideologies). While religion is sometimes used as a proxy for ethnic identity, these cases can be distinguished from groups such as the IRA and ETA because, instead of separatism, their radical religious beliefs lead them to challenge the nature of their political systems from within. They aim for transformation rather than inclusion or separation. This corresponds with the

“political systems” dimension of Bard O’Neill’s insurgency typology because these religious groups reject the secular character of their governments.196 Additionally, these cases are mostly state-based (despite some regional interests). Therefore, their goals are limited to transforming their own governments rather than more universal

196 O’Neill, Bard. Insurgency & Terrorism, 2nd ed., rev. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.

86 objectives held by groups such as ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). With these distinctions, the type of research conducted should be representative of what I term “state-based religious militant groups.” Each of these cases has achieved political legitimacy at some point through their political branches: Hezbollah’s political party in Lebanon, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in Sri Lanka. Yet, in each case, the achievement of political power does not seem to have led to a decrease in militant extremist activities. Why is this so? By testing the four previously- outlined hypotheses in each of these cases, I aim to better understand this puzzle.

Mapping Relationships

Figures 2-4 show the relationships between the major organizations selected to represent military and political leadership for Shia Islamism in Lebanon, Hindutva in India, and Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka.

87 Figure 3 Shia Islamism in Lebanon

Shia Islamism

Hezbollah Secretary General and Shura Council

Political Party: Armed Group: Hezbollah political wing Hezbollah military wing (Sometimes partnered with Amal and other allies)

Figure 4 Hindutva in India

Hindutva

Sangh Parivar (Family of Organizations)

Armed Group: Political Party: Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Bajrang Dal

88 Figure 5 Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka

Buddhist Nationalism

Armed Group: Political Parties: Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)

As figures 3-5 show, each of these cases include affiliated segments that conduct military activities (such as the Hezbollah’s military branch, the Bajrang Dal and Bodu Bala Sena). Each of the ideological leadership structures have varying control over their associated military organizations, with Hezbollah having the most coordinated power structure of the three. The cases also include political parties (such as Hezbollah’s political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party, and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party). The separation of this structure provides room for politicians and government officials to deny their participation in violent activity while it continues to occur in support of the overall movement. I believe researching these movements will bring light to the ways democratic political parties tolerate extremism and examine why political participation is not enough to reduce violence.

89 Resources

I have relied primarily on archives and local media to find evidence for my hypotheses. This includes making use of academic publications and news sources from Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and India. I was also fortunate to conduct interviews with local experts to better understand the political environment in these countries. Since I conducted comparative case studies with recent timeframes, much of my research is derived from local news sources. Additionally, I made use of primary sources such as statements and other movement information posted by the RSS self-maintained archive197 and the Al Marshiq archive of Hezbollah documents.198 I used these documents to compare violent activity with the statements and actions of the political parties included in this analysis. In this way, I was able to construct accounts of how violence and peaceful politics interact within ideological currents. I believe this research will shed light on the ways moderate political parties tolerate extremism and demonstrate that political participation alone is not enough to reduce violence. I have tested structural and ideational explanations from the literatures on political violence, religious ideology, and moderation to determine whether they apply to politically-included religious groups and their associated militant elements. The findings from my case studies will be explored in the following chapters.

197 Archives of RSS. Accessed May 06, 2016. http://www.archivesofrss.org/Default.aspx.

198 "Hizbullah - the Party of God." Al Marshiq. Accessed May 06, 2016. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/.

90 Chapter 3

SHIA ISLAMISM IN LEBANON

Shia Islamism in Lebanon is an important case study for the continuation of religious militancy because Hezbollah, the most powerful organization representing this religious ideology in Lebanon, has maintained its armed status since its creation in the early 1980s during the Lebanese civil war, despite participating in democratic elections since 1992.199 In the aftermath of the civil war, Lebanese leaders were eager to hold elections quickly because, according to Elizabeth Picard, “the election process constituted both a symbolic and actual transition from the logic of war to the logic of politics.”200 This aligns with the assumptions of the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis that a transition to peaceful politics prevents continuation of hostilities. However, in the case of Hezbollah, both continue to be practiced as the organization participates in Lebanese government while simultaneously carrying out militant activities.

Compared to the other cases, this provides an opportunity to test the four hypotheses in conditions where the religious movement being examined is 1) highly consolidated within a hierarchical organization, 2) religiously affiliated with Islam (unlike the others which are associated with Hinduism and Buddhism), and 3) representative of a religious minority. Additionally, this case includes conditions which allow for heavy influence from foreign actors. This chapter will test whether

199 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. P. 101.

200 Picard, Elizabeth (1999). “The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias,” Prospects for Lebanon. P. 42

91 Shia Islamism in Lebanon conforms to the four hypotheses offered in Chapter Two. It includes information derived from archives of Hezbollah statements, Lebanese scholarship, Lebanese news sources, and historical research. It also includes interviews with Lebanese scholars who offered their perspectives on Hezbollah’s activities and motivations. The first scholar is Joseph Alagha, an expert researcher of Hezbollah and professor of Political Science at Haigazian University, Beirut. The second is Antonios Abou Kasm, a Lebanese professor and attorney assigned to the

Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Each hypothesis will be tested to uncover which hypothesized necessary conditions are present and which explanations best illuminate Hezbollah’s situation.

Shias in Lebanon

Hezbollah represents the manifestation of political and military power for the population of Shias in Lebanon who have long been marginalized and passive. Understanding Hezbollah requires examining the history of Lebanese Shias as a minority with strong regional ties and how they finally began to mobilize in the 1960s.201 Shias in Lebanon trace their presence back to the ninth century in Jabal

Amil, a mountainous region in the South, as well as the Biqa’ Valley in the East.202 In

201 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 53-55.

202 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 19.

92 the sixteenth century, when the Safavids assumed power in Iran and adopted Shi’ism as the official state religion, the ulama (religious scholars) of Jabal Amil worked to convert the majority of Iranians from Sunnism to Shi’ism. Since then, the Shi’ite communities in Lebanon and Iran have held strong historical ties.203 Under rule by the Sunni-dominated Ottoman Empire, Shias in Lebanon depended on their feudal leaders to maintain good relations with the Ottoman Turks.204 They practiced taqiyya, which means concealing their faith as a precautionary measure. This practice had been authorized by Shia imams and jurists as a defense against Sunni persecution.205 According to Lebanese Shi’ite scholar, Fouad Ajami, the Shias in Lebanon were a “politically quiescent” population who he referred to as, “bearers of a tradition of lament and submission.”206 After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Ottoman rule was replaced with French rule over Lebanon. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement allocated control of Lebanon to France, which extended the border of “Greater Lebanon” to include the Shia regions of Jabal Amil and the Biqa’ Valley.207 This French Mandate was meant to have France act as a trustee until Lebanon was prepared for

203 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 20.

204 Ibid.

205 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 28.

206 Ibid. 22.

207 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 21.

93 independence. In 1926, the French High Commissioner in Beirut put Lebanon’s constitution into effect, establishing a democratic republic with a parliamentary system of government.208 The constitution also called for Lebanon’s government to be structured according to what is now called “confessionalism,” which is a system of government that allocates political power proportionately among religious or ethnic communities according to their percentage of the population.209 The new proportional representation of religious minorities provided an opportunity for Lebanese Shias, yet their feudal leaders still did see much chance to play a prominent political role and chose instead to maintain the calmness of their constituencies.210 This confessional balance was solidified when Lebanon gained independence from France with the 1943 National Pact. The National Pact was an unwritten understanding between the dominant political communities (Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians) that created a political system based on formalized sectarian communities, or confessions. The system of government was implemented in response to Lebanon’s varied religious composition. It is the only country in the Arab world that contains 18 different religious sects and includes by far the largest proportion of Christians of any Arab country. Allocation of political power under the

208 “Lebanon: Constitutional Law and the Political Rights of Religious Communities.” Library of Congress. Accessed February 13, 2018. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/lebanon-constitutional-law.php.

209 Harb, Imad. “Lebanon’s Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects. United States Institute of Peace. Published March 30, 2006. https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/03/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and- prospects.

210 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 21.

94 National Pact was based in a census conducted in 1932. Due to the practice of taqiyya and the French government’s preferential treatment of Christians, Lebanese Shias were undercounted in this 1932 census. For example, Shias who lived in predominantly Christian areas were counted as Christians.211 As a result, the Maronite Christians were declared to be the majority, followed by the Sunnis as the second largest group and the Shias as the third largest group. Therefore, the National Pact called for the President to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni

Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim. Additionally, the ratios for parliament and political posts were set at six Christians for every five Muslims.212 While the balance was adjusted following the Lebanese Civil War, this system still causes tension due to shifting demographics. In fact, due to the political implications of demographic changes and the desire of leading groups to maintain power, no official census has been conducted in Lebanon since 1932.213 This means that Lebanese Shias remain underrepresented.214

211 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 22.

212Ibid. 23.

213 Ekmekji, ArdaArsenian. "Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon." Aspen Institute.

214 Some estimates put Shia at 40 percent of the Lebanese population. Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012.

95 At the time of independence, Shia politics in Lebanon was primarily based on clans.215 The primary leader of the Lebanese Shias in the 1940s and 1950s was Ahmad Bey, followed by his son Kamel Bey in the 1960s.216 Ajami tells the common story of such feudal leaders travelling to Parliament routinely only to make a timid demand on behalf of the Shia community before returning to their constituents and embellishing the heroism of their request. Inevitably, Ajami writes, these demands would be ignored.217 While the ulama were respected among the Shia community, it was the beys (aka tribal chiefs) who had economic power and who the Shia community looked to for aid. After the creation of the independent Lebanese state, Shia feudal leaders began to lose power among Shia communities largely as a result of the growth of state bureaucracy that provided the goods and services they had traditionally been responsible for.218 Beginning in the 1950s, much of the Shia youth became dissatisfied with the old politics of clans and became interested in “ideological” parties that aimed for political change, such as the Communists, the Baath, the Syrian Socialist

Nationalist Part and the Arab Nationalist Movement.219

215 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 43.

216 Ibid. 36.

217 Ibid. 35-36.

218 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 23.

219 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 44.

96 The new ideological political currents among the Shia community offered hope for change and a sense of self-respect. The Shias were gradually becoming less quiescent and less accepting of their unequal position in Lebanon. According to an economic study ordered in the year 1959 and conducted by the French government’s “Institut International de Recherche et de Formation Education Developpement” (IRFED), just two percent of the Lebanese population owned eighty percent of the means of production and distribution.220 Now that the Shias were beginning to see the possibility of improvement, the time was ripe for the emergence of an ideological political leader. This is the political atmosphere which Musa al Sadr encountered upon his arrival in Lebanon in 1959.221 During the 1960s and 1970s, Lebanese Shias became more politically active under the leadership of Musa al Sadr, an Iranian from a long line of clerics who traced their ancestry back to Jabal Amil.222 During this time period, many other Iranians also came to Lebanon to serve the mobilization and organization of the Shia community.223

Compared to Iran, the Shia religious institutions in Lebanon were more fluid, allowing Musa al Sadr to quickly rise to prominence.224 As a newcomer in Lebanon, Musa al

220 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 24.

221 Ibid. 26.

222 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 3.

223 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 28.

224 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 18.

97 Sadr initially had to demonstrate his fidelity to state institutions by working through establishment politics during his first decade in the country. Still, he was primarily a reformer. His goals included the creation of vocational schools and clinics, higher representation of Shias among government officials, and more economic equality for the neglected Shia towns of the South.225 In contrast to the Shia clerics who had remained politically passive to maintain their purity, Musa al Sadr believed that religion should address modern needs.226

In order to break free of Sunni control and represent their own interests, the Lebanese Shias formed the Higher Shia Council in 1969, with Musa al Sadr as chairman.227 The following year, Musa al Sadr called for a general strike expressing “solidarity with the South.”228 He issued a manifesto in which he declared that, “For over a year and a half…we have been asking, in the name of the Higher Shia Council, in the name of the violated rights of the South, for justice for the South, for attention to its problems, for serious effort to provide for its fortification.”229 This is a strong sectarian demand for improved conditions in the Shia-dominated South. Musa al Sadr was so adored by Lebanese Shias that they called him “Imam,” referring to the twelve

225 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 58.

226 Ibid. 68.

227 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 25.

228 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 95.

229 Ibid. 96.

98 infallible Imams beginning with Imam Ali.230 When the 1975 Lebanese Civil War began, the Shias in Lebanon were a politically organized community led by Musa al Sadr.

The Lebanese Civil War and the Emergence of Hezbollah

The Lebanese Civil War lasted from 1975 to 1990 and resulted in more than 100,000 fatalities.231 It also led to the development of Shia militancy and the creation of Hezbollah. Five years before the outbreak of Lebanon’s Civil War, PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) guerillas had flooded into Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan.232 They set up their headquarters in Beirut and increasingly conducted raids into Israel from southern Lebanon. In April 1975, a series of clashes between PLO guerillas and members of the Phalange (a Christian militia) in Beirut culminated in a

Phalangist attack on a PLO bus. This attack sparked the beginning of a civil war between Christian Maronites and Muslims.233 The war included several complex factions. The side seeking to maintain the status quo was called the Lebanese Front, which primarily included Maronite militias

230 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 92.

231 Krayem, Hassan. "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement." American University of Beirut. http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.

232 Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford University Press. Third Edition, 2001. xvii.

233 Ibid.

99 (such as the Phalange, led by Pierre Gemeyel).234 The side fighting for change was known as the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) led by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt. This movement decried religious discrimination in Lebanon’s sectarian system. The backbone of the LNM was Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which Jumblatt had organized into an armed force.235 It also included a variety of leftist militias and fighters from non-PLO Palestinian organizations. The PLO and Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) were finally brought into the battle in 1976, when the right-wing Lebanese Front besieged the Palestinian camp of Tall Zatar and leveled the Karantina Muslim quarter in East Beirut. In March of that year, Syria was invited by Lebanese President Franjieh to intervene in the conflict.236 Syrian forces began conducting operations against Palestinian and leftist militias. From the beginning of the civil war, Musa al Sadr preached nonviolence. His initial reaction to the PLO-Phalangist clashes in Beirut was to take sanctuary in a mosque and begin a fast as protest against the violence.237 During his fast, he delivered a sermon declaring, “Nonviolence is our way and our answer. Let anyone who comes to us with arms depart from us. I will not wield a sword. Our weapons are the words of

234 Krayem, Hassan. "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement." American University of Beirut. http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.

235 Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford University Press. Third Edition, 2001. 76.

236 Ibid. xvii.

237 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 137.

100 God.”238 Despite Musa al Sadr’s stated aversion to armed violence, a Shia militia formed around him. This militia was called Afwaj Al-Muqawama Al-Lubnaniyya (“The Brigades of the Lebanese Resistance”), primarily referred to by its acronym AMAL.239 Musa al Sadr did not acknowledge the existence of this militia until he was forced to do so after a catastrophic accident occurred at a military training camp in the Biqa Valley in July of 1975.240 Amal was established with the goal of protecting Lebanon, particularly the South, from possible aggression from Israel.241 It is possible that, without this threat of Israeli invasion, Musa al Sadr may have maintained nonviolent leadership of Lebanon’s Shia community. Israeli invasion began soon after the formation of Amal. The Syrians, who occupied much of Lebanon, had extended their control as far south as Nabatiya, which caused unease among Israelis who saw this outpost (located only six miles from the nearest point on the Israeli frontier) as a serious military threat.242 In February 1977, Israel succeed in convincing Syria to evacuate the area, leaving the Israelis free to deal more harshly with the Palestinian guerillas who had been firing rockets towards Israeli

238 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 138.

239 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 29.

240 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 140.

241 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 30.

242 Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford University Press. Third Edition, 2001. 105.

101 settlements.243 In March of 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon in response to a massacre of Israeli civilians by PLO guerillas. The invasion was termed “Operation Litani.”244 While the Palestinian forces retreated to avoid direct confrontation, it was the Shia population in the South who bore the brunt of the conflict. Their town of Nabatiya was almost completely destroyed.245 This invasion and its disastrous aftermath made it easier for Musa al Sadr to speak candidly about the Palestinian presence and what he believed should be done to protect Lebanon and the Shia. According to Musa al Sadr, the land in the south, “could not be rescued by the Palestinians, for Israel would be sure to claim that the presence of ‘non-Lebanese” in the south gave it the right to intervene there.’”246 Therefore, Musa al Sadr concluded that, “only the people of south could defend their land.”247 In August 1978, Musa al Sadr mysteriously disappeared during a trip to Libya, and the Lebanese Shias began to look for new leadership.248 They found inspiration in the Iranian Revolution. The success of the Iranian Revolution made it more acceptable to be Persian (a label Musa al Sadr had struggled with) in the Lebanese Shia

243 Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford University Press. Third Edition, 2001. 105.

244 Ibid. 126.

245 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 151.

246 Ibid. 152.

247 Ibid.

248 Ibid. 153.

102 community. Additionally, it summoned the Shia to arms.249 Musa al Sadr’s religious authority among the Shia community passed to Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. Fadlallah’s 1976 book, Al Islam wa Mantaq al Quwa (“Islam and the Logic of Force”) foreshadowed the rise of militant Shiism in Lebanon.250 This book represents the transition from Shia doctrines of withdrawal and quietism to rebellious confrontation. While Fadlallah later denied any organizational ties to Hezbollah, he has informally provided spiritual leadership and was highly respected by the group.251 Politically,

Lebanese Shias were inspired by Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology. Indeed, Lebanon was the only Arab country to welcome the Iranian Revolution with massive supporting demonstrations.252 While Musa al Sadr was initially opposed to violence and believed in working inside the Lebanese system, the revolution in Iran and civil war in Lebanon produced ideological shifts among the Lebanese Shias. They became more receptive to revolutionary political ideology and use of militancy. Israel’s 1982 invasion and subsequent occupation of Southern Lebanon provided the conditions for Hezbollah’s formation. Termed “Operation Peace for Galilee,” this invasion was launched in response to attacks from the PLO operating in

249 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 163.

250 Ibid. 186.

251 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 36.

252 Ibid. 31.

103 southern Lebanon.253 The invasion transformed into an occupation that lasted until June 1985. Israel’s occupation had uprooted Palestinian domination of the South, an action that was initially met with Shia gratitude. In early 1982, Amal had broken with the PLO due to the misery generated by the Palestinian presence, and the Shias actually welcomed Israeli forces with showers of rice.254 However, it became apparent for the Shia that Palestinian domination was to be replaced with domination by Christian proxies.255 In September of 1982, three months after the invasion began,

Lebanese Christian militias massacred almost 800 Palestinian civilians residing in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. The Israeli Army was criticized for willfully facilitating the massacre.256 Not only did they fail to stop the violence, but the Israeli military had allowed these Christian militias into the camps, even lighting their way.257 A 1983 Israeli investigative commission found that former defense minister Ariel Sharon bore “personal responsibility” for failing to prevent the massacre.258 While they had initially been glad to be rid of Palestinian domination in the South, the

253 Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford University Press. Third Edition, 2001. 201.

254 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 32.

255 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 173.

256 Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford University Press. Third Edition, 2001. 4.

257 Anziska, Seth. “A Preventable Massacre.” The New York Times. September 16, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/opinion/a-preventable-massacre.html.

258 Ibid.

104 Shias came to resent overly-zealous Christian militias and doubted Israel’s assurances that its presence would be temporary.259 It was in the context of this occupation that Amal suffered a schism between moderates and radical Islamists. In June 1982, the Lebanese president Elias Sarkis formed the National Salvation Committee to deal with Israel’s occupation and besiegement of Beirut.260 Amal’s leader, Nabih Berri, chose to cooperate with the government and join this committee. However, Amal members who had been inspired by Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrines found this unacceptable.261 In protest, these members defected to the new radical religious party of Hezbollah. Berri, who is the current leader of Amal and Speaker of the Lebanese parliament, has repeatedly stated that Amal was the “womb” of Hezbollah.262 Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, who is Secretary General of Hezbollah, formerly served as an Amal official.263 Hezbollah welcomed members of the Shia community who rejected compromise and preferred mobilization and revolution.

Hezbollah’s emergence and religious ideology is strongly linked to Iran. Unlike rival sects in Lebanon, the Shia had lacked a foreign patron until Iran helped

259 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 172.

260 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 32.

261 Ibid.

262 Ibid.

263 Ibid.

105 create Hezbollah.264 While Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 sparked the establishment of Hezbollah, anthropologist Augustus Richard Norton argues that “young would-be revolutionaries among the Shi’a” were already on the path to pursuing their own Islamic revolution and that Israel’s occupation of Lebanon provided the context for such a movement to grow.265 The group’s radical religious ideology can be traced to the 1978 arrival of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi (who was Nasrallah’s teacher) as well as the simultaneous arrival of dissident Iranian clergy and military personnel who established both religious and military training centers with the backing of Khomeini.266 One of the goals of the Iranian Revolution was to establish contacts with external Shia communities. It supported Iraqi members of the Da’wa (“The Islamic Call”) Party in Lebanon and encouraged them to infiltrate Amal to spread their revolutionary message.267 Before he joined Amal, Nasrallah was an official in the al-Da’wa party.268 Israel’s 1982 invasion prompted Khomeini to send his Pasdaran (Republican

Guards) to provide Hezbollah with military and financial support.269 The Israeli occupation motivated violent resistance, while Iranian support made it possible for

264 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 177.

265Ibid. 177.

266 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 33.

267 Ibid. 31.

268 Ibid. 32.

269 Ibid. 34.

106 Hezbollah to function as an effective military force and provided radical ideological leadership. From its origins as a passive minority, the Lebanese Shias developed a radical religious ideology and a logic of militancy that was manifested in Hezbollah. When Hezbollah eventually decided to participate in democratic politics after the conclusion of the civil war, why did it maintain its militancy? In contrast to Hindu nationalist militants in India and Buddhist nationalist militants in Sri Lanka, Hezbollah’s militancy has been primarily oriented outwards across national borders.

As this chapter will demonstrate, this reflects a strategic decision to maintain domestic legitimacy while pursuing violent geopolitical regional goals. The following hypotheses test several necessary conditions for the continuation of violence in this context.

Hypothesis 1

A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if their goals cannot be achieved through legal avenues.

According to the literature on moderation and the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis, political groups become more moderate as a result of democratic political participation. This is used to explain moderation of both means and objectives. Since Hezbollah has not moderated its means, it is possible that the political opportunity structure is still limited in such a way that it cannot achieve its goals though legal avenues. To test this hypothesis, we must first determine Hezbollah’s objectives. Such examination requires distinguishing between the group’s tactical goals and outcome

107 goals, as explained Chapter Two.270 While Hezbollah’s tactical goals include objectives such as recruitment and maintaining support from Iran, its outcome goals are larger political objectives derived from its radical religious ideology. If Hezbollah is unable to achieve its political objectives (ie. outcome goals), through legal avenues, it could be argued that the group is not politically included enough to incentivize behavioral moderation. My research suggests that, while Hezbollah did make an ideological shift to accept participation in the Lebanese political system, the group maintains its original goal of creating an Islamic state based on Iranian revolutionary ideology. The minority status and underrepresentation of Hezbollah’s Shia constituents means that the group cannot gain the democratic power it would require to achieve this vision alone. Therefore, it continues to use militancy as a tactical tool outside of Lebanon’s borders, while behaving moderately within Lebanon and attempting to attract domestic allies.

Hezbollah Enters the Political System

Hezbollah’s ideology was initially opposed to participation in Lebanon’s political system, as evidenced by its members’ opposition to Amal leader, Nabih Berri, cooperating with the government.271 According to Alagha, members of Hezbollah

270 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton University Press. 2011. 81.

271 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 32.

108 distanced themselves from the teachings of Musa al Sadr, who had believed “Shias should be empowered under the umbrella of the state. Not to compete with the state or have more political power or military power than the state.”272 In the years following the end of the civil war, Hezbollah began to accept the idea of political participation but maintained its own political and military authority. Critically, the end of the civil war and Hezbollah’s entrance into politics did not result in the group’s disarmament. When the civil war ended, all the militias involved, except Hezbollah, agreed to disband in accordance with the 1989 Taif accord. Hezbollah justified maintaining its armed forces by arguing that they were not actually militias, but “Islamic resistance” groups committed to ending Israel’s occupation. According to Hezbollah, these forces were necessary to defend Lebanon from Israel.273 The first post-civil war elections were held in 1992. Hezbollah’s decision to participate in the elections signaled a departure from its previous rejection of Lebanon’s political system. In the 1980s, the idea that Hezbollah would participate in elections had been rejected outright by the leadership.274 This change in position reflected a shift within the organization towards those voices which advocated electoral participation. As Nadav Shelef argues, movements contain both radical and moderate elements, and ideological shifts between these positions can occur through

272 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

273 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 83.

274 Ibid. 98.

109 competition between ideas.275 The first voice within Hezbollah to argue in support of forming a political wing was Musawi, who later became the organization’s second secretary-general.276 Those opposed to entering politics were led by Subhi al-Tufayli, the first secretary-general of Hezbollah.277 Fadlallah, the most influential Shi’i cleric in Lebanon, had held a pro-election stance for years before Hezbollah’s entrance into politics. Fadlallah’s argument was that, due to the impossibility of Islamic rule in Lebanese society, gradual reformation was the best course of action.278 As important figures within Hezbollah became oriented towards political participation, Secretary- General Tufayli withdrew his candidacy for reelection in protest. This aided the rise of pro-participation Musawi in 1991.279 According to Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah’s establishment of a political wing was a strategic decision to remain relevant after the civil war.280 With increasing popular disapproval of Amal, Hezbollah sensed an opportunity to incorporate new

275 Shelef, Nadav G. Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Identity, and Religion in Israel, 1925-2005. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.

276 Qassem, Naim. Hizballah: The story from within. Saqi, 2010. P .124

277 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P. 51.

278 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. P. 99.

279 Qassem, Naim. Hizballah: The story from within. Saqi, 2010. P .124

280 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P. 45.

110 Shia supporters.281 The idea of entering Lebanese politics was popular among the Shia community, who looked forward to gaining representation after suffering disenfranchisement. It was also seen as an opportunity for the community to gain jobs, contracts, and other political benefits.282 In the 1992 elections, Hezbollah and its allies gained twelve seats in the Lebanese parliament. This included eight seats for its Shia party members.283 The other four seats went to Hezbollah’s allies: two Sunni, one Maronite, and one Greek Catholic.284

Berti argues that several changes occurred in Lebanon’s political environment after the civil war to create an opening in the political structure, which provided the opportunity for Hezbollah to enter politics. The first of these changes was the ratification of the Taif Agreement (also known as the Document of National Accord).285 This agreement allowed the return of elections and reduced political volatility by introducing a large Syrian military and political presence. The Syrian presence in Lebanon ensured that Hezbollah would be permitted to participate

281 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P. 45.

282 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 101.

283 Ibid. 101.

284 El Khazen, Farid. “Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary Election, 1992: An Imposed Choice” Al Marshiq. Accessed February, 13, 2018. http://almashriq.hiof.no/ddc/projects/pspa/elections92-part2.html.

285 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P. 48.

111 politically without being forced to disarm.286 Syria pressured the Lebanese government to endorse Hezbollah’s right to fight the Israeli occupation and to avoid interfering with the organization’s activities. The Taif Agreement also made the political system more accessible to Hezbollah by restructuring the confessional electoral system.287 The Taif Agreement maintained the confessional system in Lebanon, but it amended the system in ways which opened political participation to Shias. While parliamentary representation had been set at a ratio of 6:5 favoring Christians under the 1943 National Pact, the Taif Agreement equalized the number of seats allotted to Muslim and Christian representatives.288 It also raised the number of deputies to 128 (compared to previous 95) and distributed the Muslim seats evenly between Sunni and Shia candidates.289 These reforms encouraged the political participation of Lebanon’s Shia community. Since Hezbollah entered politics, it has increased its political power within the Lebanese government. The organization formed an alliance with Amal called “the

Resistance and Development Bloc.” In the 2000 elections, this alliance won all twenty-three available seats in southern Lebanon and more than a quarter of all seats

286 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P. 49.

287 Ibid.

288 Harb, Imad. “Lebanon’s Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects.” United States Institute of Peace. Published March 30, 2006. http://www.usip.org/publications/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and-prospects.

289 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P. 49.

112 in parliament.290 The 2005 assassination of Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and the resulting backlash created two competing factions in Lebanon: the March 8 movement (which includes Hezbollah) and the March 14 movement (also called the Cedar revolutionaries). The May 2005 election included three distinct blocs of voters: The Cedar Revolution (led by Saad al-Din al-Hariri), the Amal/Hezbollah alliance and pro-Syrian Christians (led by Michel Aoun). In this election, Amal and Hezbollah won 35 seats.291 In the 2009 elections, the March 8 coalition won 57 seats (compared to the March 14 movement’s 68 seats). Additionally, Hezbollah and its allies gained control of eleven out of thirty cabinet seats. Because the Lebanese government cannot be ruled by a simple majority, this decision effectively granted Hezbollah veto power and the ability to collapse the government.292 In the cabinet, this is referred to as a “blocking third.” Hezbollah used this power to collapse the Lebanese government in January 2011.293 Hezbollah has also been successful in municipal elections. Unlike the national elections, municipal elections in Lebanon do not use quotas to distribute offices according to religious affiliation. In 1998, Lebanon held municipal elections for the

290 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 102.

291 Ibid. 130.

292 Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah).” Council on Foreign Relations. September 13, 2008.

293 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 179.

113 first time in 35 years.294 These were the first local elections in which Hezbollah participated. In this election, Hezbollah was victorious in the poor quarters of Southern Beirut, where it serves the population through its networks of health clinics and schools. Rather than using ideology to win votes, Hezbollah’s candidates appealed to voters on a more pragmatic level.295 They emphasized economic, social, and developmental aspects, promoting their efforts to improve social welfare. Since 1998, municipal elections have been held every six years. In the Spring of 2004,

Hezbollah won control of 21 percent of Lebanon’s municipalities. It did especially well in southern Lebanon, where it gained control of 60 percent of the municipalities. While Hezbollah has gained increasing power within Lebanon’s government, it remains a minority which depends on gaining allies and building coalitions to exercise power at the national level. This does not provide Hezbollah the level of control it would require to achieve its radical goal of making Lebanon an Islamic State.

Hezbollah’s Outcome Goals

Throughout its existence, Hezbollah has been the primary force representing the most politically radical Lebanese Shias. It was created with the goal of emulating

294 Al-Amine, Firass. “Hezbollah Pulls Off Surprise Local Election Win.” Inter Press Service. http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/05/politics-lebanon-hezbollah-pulls-off- surprise-local-election-win/.

295 "Hezbollah: Between Ideology and Political Pragmatism." Official Website of the Lebanese Army. January 1, 2008. Accessed February 13, 2018. http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/news/?18041#.VGj-Tcl5UuI.

114 Iran’s Islamic revolution.296 The name “Hezbollah” is translated “party of God.” When Hezbollah emerged in 1982, it was not yet a coherent organization. It consisted of young revolutionaries like Nasrallah (who was twenty-two years old at the time) and was sponsored by Iran and Syria. According to Norton, “For Iran, the creation of Hezbollah was a realization of the revolutionary state’s zealous campaign to spread the message of the self-styled “Islamic revolution.”297 This founding characteristic of Hezbollah includes the radical domestic goal of creating an Islamic state within

Lebanon, an objective which runs counter to Lebanon’s democratic political system. In interviews, Lebanese experts Joseph Alagha and Antonios Abou Kasm both insisted that Hezbollah maintains this goal of creating an Islamic state as its overarching objective.298 On February 16, 1985, Hezbollah published its “Open Letter,” a manifesto that stated the organization’s primary goals. In the letter’s first paragraph, Hezbollah praises Iran’s Islamic revolution, writing that Iran, “succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world.”299 In the following sentence, they pledge their obedience to Ayatollah Khomeini, who they refer to as their “tutor and faqih (jurist).” The organization lists its objectives as follows:

296 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 33.

297 Ibid 34.

298 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018. And Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018.

299 “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah- program/p30967.

115

(a) to expel the Americans. the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land; (b) to submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians; (c) to permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country.300 In this letter, Hezbollah’s main objectives reflect their desire to remove Western influence, defend Muslims, and create an Islamic government in Lebanon. The evacuation of French and American forces in the 1980s, and Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon were major fulfillments of this first objective.301 Additionally, throughout the 1980s, the role of the Phalange deteriorated after the assassination of Bashir Gemeyel and the death of his father, Pierre.302 When a Greek Catholic was named head of the party, many Maronite members defected. This leaves the third goal,

Islamic government, as the only objective which has not already been fulfilled in some way. While Hezbollah expresses that it is opposed to Lebanon’s political system, the letter states that they “don’t want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force as is the case

300 “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah- program/p30967.

301 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse University Press, 2004. 84.

302 “Phalange Party.” Country Studies/Area Handbook Series sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Army. Accessed February 13, 2018. http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/85.htm.

116 with the Maronites today.”303 Their desire is that the people will freely choose Islamic governance. According to the letter, Hezbollah’s opposition to Lebanon’s political system is due to two factors, “(1) the present regime is the product of an arrogance so unjust that no reform or modification can remedy it. It should be changed radically, and (2) World Imperialism which is hostile to Islam.”304 This means that Hezbollah’s original position viewed attempts at reform through political participation as pointless or even harmful. The letter states, “all opposition in Lebanon voiced in the name of reform can only profit, ultimately, the present system.”305 It also includes a religious argument that “Allah has also made it intolerable for Muslims to participate in an unjust regime… in a regime not predicated upon the prescriptions (ahkam) of religion and upon the basis of the Law (the Shari’a) as laid down by Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets.”306 Hezbollah found the Lebanese political system “unjust” not only because it was not Islamic (as the previous quote states), but due to the confessional system that placed non-Christians at a disadvantage. Hezbollah’s Open Letter charged that Lebanon’s Christian-dominated government was based on, “confessional

303 “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah- program/p30967.

304 Ibid.

305 Ibid.

306 Ibid.

117 privileges and on the alliance with colonialism.”307 Indeed, the confessional system created by France privileged Lebanon’s Christians by dividing Muslims into Sunnis and Shias (thereby preventing them from counting as the majority), and the undercounting of Shias in the 1932 census.308 According to Hezbollah’s manifesto, radical change required opposition from outside the limits of Lebanon’s political system. Hezbollah’s formation of a political wing was a pragmatic step based on a careful assessment of the advantages it could provide, such as conferring legitimacy and giving Hezbollah a voice in legislative processes.309 Because Hezbollah’s Shia constituents are a minority in Lebanon, the party recognized that it would need to search for allies and create coalitions. This created an ideological shift, in which members became more inclusive of domestic groups. However, this pragmatism does not mean the group has abandoned its revolutionary goals. As it became a major political player, Hezbollah’s political branch evolved into an “ordinary” political party by allying with other parties and shifting its focus from

“Islamization” to “Lebanonization,” meaning that it became willing to accept non- Islamist groups and participate in the Lebanese electoral process.310 Hezbollah also responded to the emergence of a pluralist public sphere in Lebanon by changing its

307 “The Hizbullah Program, An Open Letter,” International Institute for Counter- Terrorism. https://www.ict.org.il/.

308 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 22.

309 Ibid. 152-153.

310 Alagha, Joseph, “A Tug of War: Hizbullah, Participation, and Contestation in the Lebanese Public Sphere,” in Publics, Politics, and Participation, ed. Seteney Shami (Social Science Research Council, 2009), 458.

118 discourse from marginalization to integration, employing the term infitāh (opening up).311 Infitah is a “policy of open dialogue in a pluralistic setting through interaction and cooperation with all the sects and communities that comprise the Lebanese polity in order to solve political and social problems, foster national unity, and build a stronger and united Lebanon on shared common ground.”312 Muting its original Islamist goals, Hezbollah began to accept man-made laws, arguing that the sharia is actually flexible and can account for modern complexities.313 This developing perspective allowed Hezbollah to accept the legitimacy of the Lebanese system and become a participant. In comparison to Hezbollah’s initial refusal to accommodate what they considered a corrupt political system, by the 1990s, “their fervor began to give way to a more realistic sense of the possible.”314 Hezbollah became a representative of the Shia community in Lebanon and proved responsive to the attitudes of this constituency, which included a large share of the expanding Shia middle class that had become skeptical of corruption in the Amal movement and viewed Hezbollah as possessing greater integrity. This constituency led Hezbollah to moderate its official goals, “as the new Shi’i middle class does not yearn to live in an Islamic Republic,

311Alagha, Joseph, “A Tug of War: Hizbullah, Participation, and Contestation in the Lebanese Public Sphere,” in Publics, Politics, and Participation, ed. Seteney Shami (Social Science Research Council, 2009), 457.

312 Ibid 461.

313 Ibid 463.

314 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 45.

119 least of all the Islamic Republic of Lebanon.”315 While the Open Letter originally called for an Islamic government in Lebanon, Norton asserts that, “there have been periodic hints from leading Hezbollah officials, including Nasrallah and Deputy Secretary-General Naʿim Qassem, that the 1985 open letter is obsolete and no longer an authoritative guide to the party’s positions.”316 In its 1998 Statement of Purpose, Hezbollah made clear that they, “don't seek the application of Islam by force or violence but by peaceful political action, which gives the opportunity for the majority in any society to adopt or reject it.”317 The statement seems to take a nonchalant perspective towards the possibility of Islamic governance, declaring, “If Islam becomes the choice of the majority then we will apply it, if not, we will continue to coexist and discuss till we reach correct beliefs.”318 In order to attract the support of the Shia middle class, Hezbollah had to moderate its official political platform. Still, there are competing perspectives about how much Hezbollah has truly moderated its Islamic vision for Lebanon. While scholars such as Mona Harb and

Lara Deeb examine the way Hezbollah aims to gradually shape Lebanese Islamic culture, Hilal Khashan goes further by arguing that Hezbollah has not abandoned its goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon. In their 2011 article, Harb and Deeb explore the production of the Islamic milieu in Lebanon with a focus on Hezbollah’s

315 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. P. 45

316 Ibid.

317 “Statement of Purpose.” Hizbullah Press Office, March 30, 1998. Al Mashriq. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/statement01.html.

318 Ibid.

120 efforts to organize its culture.319 They investigate two sites in the south of Lebanon: the Khian detention center and the Mleeta resistance memorial. These sites highlight the importance of history and specific narratives to the party’s understandings of thaqafa (culture). According to Harb and Deeb, this cultural production (incorporating nature and history into the landscape), is one way in which Hezbollah influences the Islamic milieu in Lebanon.320 These efforts could be seen as a battle for the hearts and minds of supporters.

In his 2013 article, Khashan argues Hezbollah has not abandoned its goal of creating an Islamic state of Lebanon.321 He traces Hezbollah’s history through discussion of a series of goals the party has pursued, such as controlling Shiites, monopolizing the fight against Israel, finding a non-ideological Maronite partner, and marginalizing Sunnis. He argues that Hezbollah is a “totalitarian political party,” which means that it cannot survive without a military component and it will not accept anything less than full control of the Lebanese political system. According to

Khashan, Hezbollah is “incapable of transforming into a genuine domestic political force that accepts the rules of accommodation due largely to its strict adherence to the Iranian political-theological worldview.”322 Khashan is not alone in this view. When I

319 Harb, Mona and Lara Deeb (2011). “Culture as History and Landscape: Hizballah’s Efforts to Shape an Islamic Milieu in Lebanon.” The Arab Studies Journal. 19(1): 10-41.

320 Ibid. 13.

321 Khashan, Hilal (2013). “Hezbollah’s Plans for Lebanon,” Middle East Quarterly. 20(2):81-86. (http://www.meforum.org/3534/hezbollah-lebanon).

322 Ibid.

121 asked Abou Kasm whether Hezbollah would cease to exist without militancy, he replied, “Of course.”323 He went on to clarify that Hezbollah could not exist as a resistance movement without militancy, claiming that “You will not see Hezbollah without weapons before the liberation of Jerusalem.”324 This suggests that Hezbollah would need to undergo a fundamental change in identity and purpose before abandoning militancy, to the point that it would be unrecognizable. While resistance against Israel and the West comprised one of Hezbollah’s original goals during the time Lebanon was occupied, I argue that promoting its resistance image has become more of a tactical goal for Hezbollah now in order to provide legitimacy for maintaining arms. This will be discussed in the following section about the tactical effectiveness of militancy. Despite its policy of infitah and overtures to rival Lebanese groups, Hezbollah’s end goal of Islamic revolution requires complete control of the political system. As a minority, this is not a goal that Hezbollah supporters can achieve through legal avenues. Alagha and Abou Kasm agree that the Lebanese Shia are underrepresented by the Taif Accords, which do not provide an appropriate proportion of Shia seats in Parliament.325 Ajami asserts that Lebanese Shias make up approximately 40 percent of the country’s population.326 This is far greater than the

323 Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018.

324 Ibid.

325 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018. And Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018.

326Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 160.

122 19.6 percent figure from the 1932 census that has been used to assign political power.327 For Hezbollah, participation in Lebanon’s government has been successful in making the Shias a component of Lebanese society, so that their rural populations cannot be isolated like they have been historically. Additionally, it provides the group with a sense of legitimacy.328 While these represent tactical accomplishments, Hezbollah’s outcome goal of Islamic governance requires total control of the political system, which it cannot achieve due to the Shias’ minority status. Therefore,

Hezbollah has been unable to achieve its goal of creating an Islamic state through legal avenues, supporting Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if this violent activity is at least tactically effective at furthering the movement’s objectives.

Unable to achieve its Islamic revolutionary goals through participation in Lebanon’s political system, Hezbollah acts outside of this system to achieve tactical goals such as building popular support and maintaining powerful Shia allies, including sponsorship from Iran. These are all steps aimed towards increasing Hezbollah’s power, until one day it is able to exert control domestically. Alagha refers to this balance between domestic and regional activity in his “parallel track theory,” which

327 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 22. 328 Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018.

123 suggests that Hezbollah uses its participation in Lebanon’s government to gain legitimacy, leaving the group free to pursue its regional agenda.329 He notes that Hezbollah is so practical and dovish in their domestic politics that they are willing to work with Lebanese president Michel Aoun, who had bombed them in the 1980s.330 Despite leading a Christian militia during the civil war, Michel Aoun is now one of Hezbollah’s closest allies.331 The domestic restrictions of compromise and coalition- building incentivize Hezbollah to focus on regional goals, which they have more leeway to pursue through extreme measures. These goals include strengthening foreign alliances and promoting its status as a protector of Lebanese constituents. Both of these goals are achieved through militant activity. Hezbollah’s history of political activity exhibits a decision to prioritize its regional agenda over domestic objectives. In the 1996 elections, Hezbollah’s platform still demonstrated a balance between foreign and domestic concerns. Calling out the corruption of the Lebanese state, Hezbollah’s electoral program called for domestic reforms such as achieving equality of opportunities, adopting economic policies to promote human development, education reform, improving public health, social welfare, and safeguarding public freedoms.332 Still, the first priority listed in

329 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

330 Ibid.

331 Shebaya, Halim. “Where do Lebanon's Christians stand on Hezbollah?” Al Jazeera. November 30, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/lebanon-christians- stand-hezbollah-171128102446572.html.

332 “The Electoral Program of Hizbullah, 1996,” Al Mashriq. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-platform.html.

124 Hezbollah’s program was resisting the occupation. Their foreign policy objectives included maintaining Lebanese-Syrian relations, standing against American interference, and communicating with Lebanese expatriate communities. Finally, the program emphasized, “building normal and balanced relations with the Arab and Islamic countries and all the countries of the world on the basis of independence and strengthening the ties that assist in confronting the plots of the American arrogance and allow for honorable and constructive cooperation.”333 The summer after the 2000

Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah faced a serious internal debate about whether to focus on Lebanese politics or maintain its position as leader of the resistance against Israel and the West. These discussions concluded that the latter strategy was superior and Nasrallah received Ayatollah Khameini’s blessing to continue the resistance.334 Hezbollah uses its image as a resistance leader to justify its continued armed status. So far, Hezbollah has not been forced to choose between pursuing its objectives through militant activity or democratic political participation. The organization managed to maintain its armed wing despite entering Lebanese politics and contradicting several agreements including the Taif Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1559, and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 which ended the 2006 war. While the 1989 Taif Agreement called for all militias to disband after the civil war, Hezbollah justified remaining armed by arguing that its forces were necessary for resistance against Israel. The strong Syrian presence in Lebanon after the Taif

333 “The Electoral Program of Hizbullah, 1996,” Al Mashriq. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-platform.html.

334 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 90.

125 Agreement ensured that Hezbollah would not be required to disarm like the other militias in Lebanon.335 Sharing common anti-Israel motives and strategic concerns, Iran and Syria encouraged and supported Hezbollah’s armed jihad.336 In September 2004, the United Nations called on Lebanon to establish sovereignty over its land, including the cessation of Syrian intervention in Lebanese politics.337 This resolution also called for the disbanding of all militias (including Hezbollah’s military wing). After Syria withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005,

Hezbollah argued that its “armed wing was needed more than ever as the only credible force available to defend the country against an Israeli invasion.”338 The next year, without a Syrian presence to offer support, Hezbollah attempted to bolster its credibility through war with Israel. Israel’s Prime Minister Olmert “emphasized his determination to see to the elimination of Hezbollah as a military force and to the dismantling of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1559.”339 The 2006 war was ended with UN Security Council

335 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P. 49.

336 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse University Press, 2004. P. 81.

337 “Security Council Declares Support for Free, Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There.” United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. Published September 2, 2004. http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8181.doc.htm.

338 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 132.

339 Ibid. 139.

126 Resolution 1701. This resolution called for Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and the deployment of Lebanese soldiers along with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL) to keep peace in the South.340 In a televised address after the ceasefire was declared, Nasrallah suggested he was willing to consider disarmament, but argued that he did not believe Lebanese troops were capable of defending the country. Nasrallah stated, “Some people say that disarming the resistance is an essential condition to building a strong government, and

I say the opposite.”341 Hezbollah formally declared its agreement with Resolution 1701, creating a “don’t ask, don’t tell policy” for its armed members. The resolution aimed to enhance UNIFIL enough to disarm Hezbollah. However, in practice, UNIFIL was prohibited from taking any action to disarm Hezbollah without Lebanese government approval.342 Once again, Hezbollah managed to avoid complying with directions to disarm without hindering its ability to participate in Lebanese government. This militant status allows Hezbollah to act outside the confines of the

Lebanese political system. As Alagha says, “They have a foot in the river and a foot on dry land.”343 This means Hezbollah makes use of all the tools available and pragmatically adapts to the situation at hand. “It’s not hypocrisy,” Algha argues, “It’s

340 “Lebanon: UN peacekeepers lay out rules of engagement, including use of force,” UN News Centre. October 3, 2006

341“Lebanon truce holds despite clashes.” CNN.com, Published August 15, 2006. https://web.archive.org/web/20080613073546/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/me ast/08/14/mideast.main/index.html.

342 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 141.

343 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

127 the dictate of reason that they go with the flow.” With militant forces that are stronger than the Lebanese Army, Hezbollah has found militancy tactically effective.344 Hezbollah’s use of militancy is a rational endeavor that has yielded tactical advantages in terms of achieving its resistance goals, maintaining public support and benefitting from powerful alliances.

The Impact of Militancy on Hezbollah’s Resistance Goals

Using its armed wing, Hezbollah achieved strategic successes in its resistance against Israel and the West. From 1982 to 1990, Hezbollah’s militancy was “primarily aimed at liquidating the foreign presence in Lebanon and building an Islamic order in its areas of control.”345 Hezbollah employed a wide variety of techniques, including martyrdom operations, hostage taking, guerilla warfare, and seizure of power by force.

The aim of Hezbollah’s martyrdom operations was to rid Lebanon of foreign forces (namely Western and Israeli forces), and it achieved success in this area. Attacks by Hezbollah and its affiliates were carried out against Western targets, such as France and the United States. In 1982, French, Italian and American troops were deployed in

344 Blanford, Nicholas. “Israel: Hezbollah is now stronger than any Arab army.” Published June 9, 2014. The Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0609/Israel-Hezbollah-is-now- stronger-than-any-Arab-army.

345 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse University Press, 2004. 81.

128 Lebanon as part of a multinational force (MNF).346 This force was tasked with peacekeeping and assisting in the evacuation of the PLO and Syrian forces from Lebanon. After an Israeli blockade of PLO-controlled West Beirut, the PLO had agreed to evacuate if an international force deployed to protect Palestinian civilians.347 In September 1982, two weeks after the PLO completed its withdrawal, Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, and these Western troops remained in Lebanon with goals such as rebuilding the Lebanese Army and working towards the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon (including Syrian and Palestinian fighters). In April 1983, the Hezbollah-linked Islamic Jihad bombed the U.S. Embassy in Ras-Beirut.348 This resulted in the deaths of eighty embassy personnel and visitors. In October 1983, two suicide commanders simultaneously attacked the compounds of the U.S. Marines and French troops.349 Two hundred forty-one U.S. Marines and eighty French paratroopers were killed in these attacks. In February 1984, American and French troops were evacuated from Lebanon.350 This could be

346 "The Reagan Administration and Lebanon, 1981–1984". U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/lebanon.

347 Ibid.

348 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse University Press, 2004. 83.

349 Friedman, Thomas L. “Beirut Death Toll at 161 Americans; French Casualties Rise in Bombings; Reagan Insists Marines Will Remain.” The New York Times. Published October 24, 1983.

350 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse University Press, 2004. 84.

129 viewed as an effective use of militant activity by Hezbollah to achieve its resistance objectives. Hezbollah’s attacks also contributed to the Israeli withdrawal from Beirut and Mount Lebanon into a “security zone” in South Lebanon, and later Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon completely (with the disputed exception of Shebaa farms).351 This ended Israel’s 22-year military presence in Lebanon since the beginning of the civil war in 1982.352 Initially, many believed that Israel would only withdraw from Lebanon if it reached an agreement with Syria. However, in July 1999, Ehud Barak became prime minister of Israel and promised to unilaterally withdraw. In January 2000, Hezbollah assassinated Colonel Aql Hashem, commander of the South Lebanon Army (SLA)’s Western Brigade. The SLA was a Lebanese Christian militia which was Israel’s primary ally in the 1985-2000 South Lebanon conflict against Hezbollah. Colonel Hashem was the second most senior officer in the SLA and was about to become first in command due to the SLA’s commander’s imminent departure.353 His assassination weakened the SLA’s morale and led to doubts about the group’s leadership. After Israel’s withdrawal, the SLA collapsed, leading to a rapid takeover of the area by Hezbollah forces. Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon was widely considered a victory for Hezbollah and bolstered public

351 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse University Press, 2004. 84.

352 “First Lebanon War: Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon.” Jewish Virtual Library. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-of-first- lebanon-war-2.

353 “Hezbollah bomb kills colonel.” BBC News. Published January 30, 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/624332.stm.

130 support for the organization. In the parliamentary elections held in August/September of 2000, the Resistance and Development Bloc (An Amal-Hezbollah alliance) won all twenty-three available seats in southern Lebanon and more than a quarter of all seats in parliament.354 This represented a political success for Hezbollah and its allies. Hezbollah’s completion of military objectives is intertwined with the tactical goal of gaining public support. The success of Hezbollah’s armed wing continued after Israel’s departure from

Lebanon. The tentative peace resulting from Israel’s withdrawal did not last long. In October 2000, Hezbollah conducted a cross-border raid in which militants captured three IDF soldiers.355 By capturing these soldiers, Hezbollah gained bargaining chips that led to a 2004 prisoner exchange brokered by Germany. In this exchange, Hezbollah returned the bodies of the three captured soldiers and released Elhanan Tannenbaum, an Israeli businessman and army reserve colonel. In exchange, Israel freed 423 prisoners, 23 of whom were Lebanese. The rest were Palestinians. While many Israelis were somber and felt that the deal was lopsided, the freed prisoners in Lebanon were met with great fanfare.356 After disembarking, the former prisoners were met by Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in a “red carpet welcome” with a band playing patriotic music.357 This

354 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 102.

355 “Israel, Hezbollah swap prisoners.” CNN.com, Published January 29, 2004. http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/01/29/prisoner.exchange/.

356 Ibid.

357 Ibid.

131 triumphant prisoner exchange paid off a few months later when Hezbollah was victorious in the 2004 municipal elections.358 Once again, militant tactics (in this case, hostage-taking) led to both strategic and political success. Two years later, support for Hezbollah was again bolstered by the 2006 war with Israel. This conflict lasted from 12 July 2006 to 14 August 2006. The precipitating event that led to the conflict was the Zar’it-Shtula incident, which was a cross-border attack carried out by Hezbollah militants on an Israeli military patrol.

Hezbollah launched diversionary rocket attacks onto Israeli military positions while a separate Hezbollah group crossed into Israel and ambushed two Israeli army vehicles. They killed three Israeli soldiers and seized two others.359 Hezbollah used these hostages to demand the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel. Israel refused to negotiate another prisoner exchange. Instead, Israel launched a large-scale military campaign across Lebanon. The following month-long conflict resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,300 Lebanese people (mostly civilians),360 119 Israeli soldiers, and

40 Israeli civilians.361 After the Lebanese Government, Hezbollah, and the Israeli

358 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 116.

359 Abrams, Dennis. Ehud Olmert. Infobase Publishing, 2008. P. 101.

360 Fisk, Robert. “Lebanon’s pain grows by the hour as death toll hits 1,300.” Independent. Published August 16, 2006. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-lebanons-pain- grows-by-the-hour-as-death-toll-hits-1300-412170.html.

361 Knickmeyer, Ellen. “2006 War Called a ‘Failure’ for Israel.” Washington Post Foreign Service. Published January 31, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html.

132 government accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1701, a ceasefire finally took effect on August 14, 2006.362 While both sides initially claimed victory, the 2006 war has been called a “failure” for Israel.363 By the time the ceasefire was put into place, the United States and Israel had been forced to “dramatically scale back their demands and expectations for the war’s outcome.”364 The night the ceasefire was declared, Nasrallah gave a televised address followed by celebratory gunfire and fireworks.365 The Israeli government appointed the Winograd Commission to examine the country’s conduct of the 2006 war.366 According to Eliyahu Winograd, the retired judge who led the commission, the panel concluded that the war “was a big and serious failure.”367 The report stated,

362 “Lebanon truce holds despite clashes.” CNN.com, Published August 15, 2006. https://web.archive.org/web/20080613073546/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/me ast/08/14/mideast.main/index.html.

363 Knickmeyer, Ellen. “2006 War Called a ‘Failure’ for Israel.” Washington Post Foreign Service. Published January 31, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html.

364 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 141.

365 “Lebanon truce holds despite clashes.” CNN.com, Published August 15, 2006. https://web.archive.org/web/20080613073546/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/me ast/08/14/mideast.main/index.html.

366 “Winograd Commission Final Report.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/israel/winograd-commission-final-report/p15385.

367 Knickmeyer, Ellen. “2006 War Called a ‘Failure’ for Israel.” Washington Post Foreign Service. Published January 31, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html.

133

Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi- military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East…The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it…After a long period of using only standoff fire power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive, very close to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed.368 After the commission’s findings were released, it led to the resignations of Israel’s defense minister Amir Peretz and the chief of Israel’s military, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz.369 Additionally, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s popularity dropped. Israel failed to achieve its goals of securing the release of the two captured soldiers or destroying Hezbollah’s military wing. In response to Nasrallah’s claims of victory, President Bush declared, “How can you claim victory when you were a state within a state in southern Lebanon, and now you're going to be replaced by an international force?”370

As discussed previously, this international force was never given the necessary tools to disarm Hezbollah. Instead, Hezbollah claimed victory and continued to use militancy to achieve its tactical goals.

368 “Winograd Commission Final Report.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/israel/winograd-commission-final-report/p15385.

369 Knickmeyer, Ellen. “2006 War Called a ‘Failure’ for Israel.” Washington Post Foreign Service. Published January 31, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html.

370 “Lebanon truce holds despite clashes.” CNN.com, Published August 15, 2006. https://web.archive.org/web/20080613073546/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/me ast/08/14/mideast.main/index.html.

134 The Impact of Militancy on Hezbollah’s Public Support

As the previous section has shown, Hezbollah’s militant resistance activities bolstered its popularity. Public support is a crucial tactical goal for the group to gain democratic power in Lebanon and possibly achieve Islamic governance in the future. So how have Hezbollah’s more recent militant activities affected this public support? While support among Sunnis in the Arab world has diminished based on Hezbollah’s sectarian warfare in Syria, the group’s levels of popular support among their constituencies remains mostly constant. This is due to the loyalty of its Shia constituents and the protection Hezbollah provides against ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham). Since early 2013, Hezbollah fighters have been operating openly across the border alongside Syrian and Iraqi counterparts.371 This is the first time Hezbollah fighters have waged war outside the borders of Lebanon, fought alongside a formal army, or initiated broad offensives for the purposes of seizing territory.372 Their involvement has strengthened the Assad regime and helped it gain control of rebel- held areas. This shift from resisting Western forces to pursuing sectarian goals and fighting fellow Muslims in Syria has caused public backlash against Hezbollah,

371 Sullivan, Marisa. "Hezbollah in Syria." Institute for the Study of War. http://www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria.

372 Hubbard, Ben. “Syrian Fighting Gives Hezbollah New but Diffuse Purpose.” The New York Times. May 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/world/middleeast/syrian-fighting-gives- hezbollah-new-but-diffuse-purpose.html?_r=1.

135 including international ostracism.373 Hezbollah’s participation in Syria’s civil war on the side of Assad has threatened its credibility as a resistance movement.374 Sheikh Qaradawi, an Egyptian Sunni theologian who previously supported Hezbollah, referred to it as the “party of Satan” in a June 2013 interview.375 He lamented, “Those, whom I defended, went and killed their brothers in Syria. We thought that they were our brothers, but apparently they are not.”376 This is a critique leveled at Hezbollah for fighting fellow Muslims. Despite their insistence that Syrian rebels are

“takfiris” (extremists), and that their actions are legitimate, Hezbollah is facing public outrage. Once viewed as a regional leader of resistance against Israel and the West, Hezbollah is now faring poorly in public opinion polls throughout the Arab world. According to a Pew public opinion survey, in the Spring of 2007, the percentage of Palestinians, Jordanians, and Egyptians who viewed Hezbollah favorably were 76 percent, 54 percent, and 56 percent respectively. By the Spring of 2013, those figures had dropped to 43 percent, 25 percent, and 19 percent.377 According to an Al-Monitor interview of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the decrease in popularity is mostly due to

373 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 201.

374 Masters, Jonathan, and Zachary Laub. "Backgrounders: Hezbollah." Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/.

375 "Sheikh Qaradawi makes U-turn, says Hezbollah is ‘party of Satan’." Al Arabiya News. http://english.alarabiya.net/.

376 Ibid

377 "Hezbollah Topline and Survey Methods." Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project RSS. June 7, 2013. http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/07/hezbollah-topline- and-survey-methods/.

136 the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict. Masuud Halawa, a 44-year-old pharmacist from Gaza, argued that Nasrallah’s decision to join the battle in Syria was purely sectarian and told Al-Monitor that Hezbollah, “showed themselves as a group of assassins and committed awful crimes chiefly targeting Sunni Muslims in Qusair.”378 Still, this should not be interpreted to mean that Hezbollah has lost support among its constituency. In Lebanon, public opinion of Syria is divided according to sect. According to a Pew Research survey conducted in March and April of 2013, about 94 percent of Sunnis regard Hezbollah unfavorably, while 89 percent of Shia Muslims in Lebanon view Hezbollah favorably.379 This sectarian divide is consistent with Hezbollah’s representation of Lebanese Shias. A Pew poll in the following year showed little change among these groups as Hezbollah’s Syria operations intensified. In Spring of 2014, only 88 percent of Lebanese Sunnis held an unfavorable opinion of Hezbollah, while 86 percent of Lebanese Shias held a favorable view.380 Among the Lebanese population in general, Hezbollah’s favorability ratings have improved slightly, from 64 percent unfavorable in 2007 to 59 percent unfavorable in 2014.381

378 “Poll Shows Hezbollah Losing Support Among Palestinians.” Al Monitor. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/poll-hezbollah-losing-support- palestinians.html.

379 Drake, Bruce. "As It Fights in Syria, Hezbollah Seen Unfavorably in Region." Pew Research Center RSS. June 7, 2013. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact- tank/2013/06/07/as-it-fights-in-syria-hezbollah-seen-unfavorably-in-region/.

380 “Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East: Views of Hezbollah.” Pew Research Center. June 30, 2014. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise- in-middle-east/pg-2014-07-01-islamic-extremism-06.

381 “Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East: Unfavorable Views of Hezbollah on the Rise in Middle East; Steady in Lebanon.” Pew Research

137 According to Abou Kasm, Lebanese Shias are fiercely loyal to Nasrallah.382 Additionally, he argues the influx of Sunni refugees boosts Shia support for Hezbollah to maintain the “equilibre,” or balance of power between the sects.383 Heavy casualties in the Syrian conflict are taking a toll on supporters, with an estimated 1048 Hezbollah fighters killed in combat from September 30, 2012 to April 10, 2017.384 This number is treated as a minimum since Hezbollah leadership has an incentive to downplay losses. Still, Alagha argues these supporters remain loyal because Hezbollah rewards them for their sacrifice. According to Alagha, Hezbollah soothes the doubts of its supporters by, “showering them with economic benefits.”385 As will be explored in the evaluation of the next tactical goal, Iran’s patronage allows Hezbollah to provide these perks to boost morale. In addition to the loyalty of Hezbollah’s Shia supporters, other groups in Lebanon have also bolstered Hezbollah’s public support due to the group’s ability to provide defense against ISIS. The 2014 Pew opinion poll showed high concern about

Islamic extremism in Lebanon. While 81 percent of Lebanese citizens marked that they were “very/somewhat” concerned about Islamic extremism in 2013, this

Center. June 30, 2014. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic- extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/pg-2014-07-01-islamic-extremism-07.

382 Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018

383 Ibid.

384 Alfoneh, Ali. “Hezbollah Battlefield Deaths Defending Assad Mount Up.” Newsweek. April 21, 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/hezbollah-battlefield-deaths- defending-assad-mount-586320.

385 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

138 percentage rose to 92 percent the following year.386 This was the highest percentage among the Middle Eastern countries surveyed (including Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey). According to both Alagha and Abou Kasm, Hezbollah’s protection of Lebanon against ISIS has yielded widespread support among different sects.387 The Pew surveys of public opinion towards Hezbollah were conducted before ISIS’ offensive in Iraq, but it is likely that support has risen among the Lebanese as Hezbollah demonstrates its ability to defend against ISIS extremists.

Combined efforts, including operations by Russia, the United States, the Kurdish Peshmerga and others, have drastically reduced ISIS’ territory. In August 2017, Hezbollah declared “mission accomplished” against ISIS in Lebanon after it successfully pushed around 600 ISIS fighters back into Syria.388 Alagha noted that Hezbollah’s base of support has shifted to the eastern section of the Biq’a, where these fights against ISIS had been occurring. “Now,” Alagha said, “Hezbollah protects. Hezbollah offers guns. Hezbollah defends them from ISIS. It did the same with a few

Christian villages in Syria. So, this gives it some kind of popularity among the minorities.”389 In a stronger state, the people would not need to rely on Hezbollah to

386 “Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East.” Pew Research Center. June 30, 2014. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic- extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/pg-2014-07-01-islamic-extremism-01/

387 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018. And Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018.

388 Saifi, Zeena and Sarah El Sirgany. “Hezbollah: "Mission accomplished" against ISIS in Lebanon.” CNN. August 21, 2017. https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/29/middleeast/hezbollah-isis/index.html.

389 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

139 protect them. In this way, the weak Lebanese state provides the conditions for Hezbollah to act as a provider of security. While Hezbollah once acted as a protector of Lebanon against Israel and the West, now it plays this role against ISIS. As discussed in the second chapter, many scholars of political violence subscribe to the theory that the conditions which create internal wars relate to a state’s weakness. According to David Lake and Donald Rothchild, ethnic fears (which lead to conflict), arise when the state is too weak to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups.390 Since Hezbollah is able to provide credible guarantees, it obtains popular support for its military wing. State weakness creates a need for Hezbollah’s military services among the population. In Lebanon, certain territories are controlled exclusively by Hezbollah. These are referred to as closed military zones (CMZs).391 Hezbollah also provides local policing within the Shia communities where it operates. In these communities, Hezbollah members act as a silent police. Like typical security forces, they drive around and investigate any signs of commotion.392 In such communities, Hezbollah

390 Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild (1996). “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” International Security 21(2): 43.

391 “Behind the Headlines: The Second Lebanon War-Three Years Later." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. July 12, 2009. http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Hizbullah/Pages/The-Second- Lebanon-War-Three-years-later-12-Jul-2009.aspx.

392 Tavernise, Sabrina. "Charity Wins Deep Loyalty For Hezbollah." The New York Times. August 5, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/06/world/middleeast/06tyre.html?pagewanted=all.

140 even provides social services.393 The organization is considered an even more effective welfare provider than the government of Lebanon.394 Hezbollah’s role as a security provider among certain populations is a main factor in Waleed Hazbun’s argument that Lebanon should not be considered a “weak state,” but rather a system of “hybrid security.”395 Much of the public support for Hezbollah is due to their ability to act as a government, providing security and social services to constituents. In this way, a weak central government in Lebanon allows Hezbollah to effectively use militant activity to gain support and achieve its objectives. While the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict has diminished Hezbollah’s popularity regionally, it maintains the support of its Shia constituents and those it protects from ISIS.

The Impact of Militancy on Hezbollah’s Foreign Support

Maintaining foreign sponsorship is another tactical goal that Hezbollah achieves through its militant activity. Led by Iran, Hezbollah is part of the “axis of

393 For more on Hezbollah’s provision of social services: Harik, Judith (1994) “The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias” Papers on Lebanon p.1-54.

394 Cammet, Melani. "Habitat for Hezbollah." Foreign Policy. August 17, 2006. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/08/16/habitat_for_hezbollah.

395 Hazbun, Waleed (2016). “Assembling security in a ‘weak state:’ the contentious politics of plural governance in Lebanon since 2005.” Third World Quarterly. 37(6):1053-1070.

141 resistance” against Israel, which includes Syria as a key ally.396 If the Assad regime were to collapse, it could be replaced by a moderate regime that reflects the Sunni majority in Syria. This would “tear out the geo-strategic heart” of the axis of resistance.397 Hezbollah views Syria as an indispensable conduit for Iranian supplies and personnel movement.398 Although the conflict continues, Hezbollah has achieved some strategic victories and prevented the opposition from succeeding. After regime forces regained control of the city of Aleppo in December 2016, Nasrallah declared that this was, “a major victory for the axis of resistance,” and that this victory, “decisively foiled all attempts to topple the Syrian government.”399 By joining the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah secured its stream of support from Iran. The discussion of Hezbollah’s emergence at the beginning of this chapter displays how intertwined the group is with Iranian ideology, funding, and military training. Its very creation was sponsored by Iran and Syria.400 Additionally, Hezbollah

396 Atrache, Sahar. "How Hezbollah Is Changing the War in Syria - and Vice Versa." The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sahar-atrache/hezbollah-war- syria_b_5455850.html.

397 "Hezbollah role in Syria grows more evident." The Daily Star Newspaper. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-12/191121-hezbollah-role-in- syria-grows-more-evident.ashx#axzz33ndxoVwg.

398 Khashan, Hilal, and Ibrahim Mousawi. "Hizbullah’s Jihad Concept." Journal of Religion and Society 9 (2007): 15.

399 Haidar, Marwa. “Sayyed Nasrallah: Aleppo Victory Decisively Foiled All Attempts to Topple Syrian Regime.” December 23, 2016. http://english.almanar.com.lb/144307.

400 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 34.

142 fighters received training in guerilla warfare from Iranian instructors.401 After the civil war, it was Syria’s presence in Lebanon that allowed Hezbollah to maintain its armed status.402 According to Alagha, “without Iranian support, there would be no violent Hezbollah.”403 Hezbollah depends on Iran for weapons and training. In June 2016, while scoffing at U.S. sanctions, Nasrallah revealed that all of Hezbollah’s funding comes from Iran. In a publicly broadcasted speech, he declared, “We are open about the fact that Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”404 Before this confirmation, it was strongly suspected that Iran was supplying all of Hezbollah’s financial needs. For example, directly after the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Hezbollah appeared to be a major beneficiary of the new sanctions reliefs.405 The previous section shows the importance of these funds not only to enable military activity, but to provide social welfare and benefits that preserve support among constituents.

401 Picard, Elizabeth (1999). “The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias,” Prospects for Lebanon. P. 19.

402 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P. 49.

403 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

404 Rafizadeh, Majid. “In first, Hezbollah confirms all financial support comes from Iran.” Al Arabiya. June 25, 2016. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/2016/06/25/In-first- Hezbollah-s-Nasrallah-confirms-all-financial-support-comes-from-Iran.html.

405 Ibid.

143 According to Alagha, if Hezbollah were starved of this support, the group would, “cease to exist.”406 Considering this level of dependence on Iranian support, could Hezbollah’s activities be explained simply as a result of being an Iranian proxy? The relationship does not appear to be that simple. When I asked Abou Kasm whether the main reason Hezbollah participated in the Syrian conflict was because of Iran’s request, he replied, “Of course.”407 Still, this does not explain Hezbollah’s initial hesitation. According to

Alagha, Hezbollah withstood Iranian pressure for two years before directly entering the Syrian conflict. He said that Hezbollah’s Shura Council was split on the issue of intervention: four votes to four votes.408 Indeed, a pattern of Iranian involvement in Syria’s civil war is present since the initial uprising in 2011, while Hezbollah did not commit to intervention until early 2013.409 In May 2011, The Guardian reported that Iran had sent riot equipment and personnel from the IRGC (Iranian Republican Guard) to help crush the uprising.410 In a 2012 meeting with Syrian President Assad, the

Chairman of Iran's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Alaeddin

406 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018

407 Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018

408 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018

409 Sullivan, Marisa. "Hezbollah in Syria." Institute for the Study of War. http://www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria.

410 Tisdall, Simon. “Iran helping Syrian regime crack down on protesters, say diplomats.” The Guardian. May 8, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/08/iran-helping-syrian-regime- protesters.

144 Boroujerdi, affirmed that, “the security of Syria is Iran's security.”411 By Spring 2012, Iranian-backed Shiite militias were activity engaged in Syria, while Hezbollah maintained indirect participation and provided training in Lebanon.412 Hezbollah’s decision to join the Syrian conflict was based on rational calculations, and the group waited to intervene until it seemed unavoidable. For example, it became clear that Shias in border villages required protection.413 Additionally, the protection of the “axis of resistance” is in Hezbollah’s interest in order to keep Iranian support possible.

In May 2013, Hezbollah’s Al-Manar media center published an article explaining why the group chose to intervene directly in Syria.414 This article mainly references the geopolitical consequences of the conflict. It raises the concern that the “axis of resistance,” and, therefore, Hezbollah itself, was being made a “target,” by foreign powers.415 It refers to the need for self-defense and honors the Hezbollah, “martyrs who fought off military operations that targeted their villages and properties

411 “Assad: Damascus Firm in Resistance Path, Boroujerdi: Syria’s Security Is Iran’s.” Al Manar. August 26, 2012. http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=66340.

412 Knights, Michael. “Iran's Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria.” The Washington Institute. June 27, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-foreign-legion-the- role-of-iraqi-shiite-militias-in-syria.

413 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

414 Al-Fass, Israa. “Why Hezbollah ’Is Fighting’ in Syria?” Al Manar. May 9, 2013. http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=92809

415 Ibid.

145 on the borderline.”416 It is difficult to determine to what extent Hezbollah acts as a proxy of Iran, but its militant activities are rationally directed towards tactical goals. Hezbollah has an interest in maintaining public support and backing from Iran in order to protect and expand its base of power. So far, the group’s militant activities have been successful in achieving these tactical objectives. This supports the second hypothesis. While Hezbollah’s use of militancy certainly does not seem to be tactically irrational, the following hypotheses test whether religious and emotional factors also motivate this militancy.

Hypothesis 3 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if they perceive it to be religiously obligatory.

While Hezbollah’s goal of Islamic governance is certainly religious in nature, does the group’s use of violence reflect religious obligation? For Hezbollah, the set of rules that determine the religious use of violence is based on the concept of jihad. Jihad parallels both Western concepts of just war and Christian concepts of the holy war because, for Muslim jurists, “any authentic instance of jihad was both holy and just.”417 In general, jihad represents the struggle of Muslims to act according to their

416 Al-Fass, Israa. “Why Hezbollah ’Is Fighting’ in Syria?” Al Manar. May 9, 2013. http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=92809.

417 Bonner, Michael David. Jihad in Islamic history: doctrines and practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 5.

146 faith, defend Islam, and lead good lives that contribute to the flourishing of a just Islamic society.418 Scholars who focus on the military aspects of this definition emphasize its call to defend the religion (which may be undertaken through violent means), while others argue that the peaceful and spiritual elements are more prominent. Throughout the history of Islamic jurisprudence, Muslims recognized two types of jihad: the lesser jihad (al-jihad al-saghir) and the greater jihad (al-jihad al- akbar).419 Lesser jihad concerns military struggle in the name of Islam, while greater jihad refers to inner spiritual struggles. For this discussion, the military aspects of jihad are most relevant to Hezbollah’s justification of violent activity. Manuals of classical Islamic law typically included a section called ‘Book of Jihad.’420 These sections would include law governing the conduct of war. They would address issues such as treatment of nonbelligerents and division of spoils among the victors. Additionally, classical Islamic scholars included discussions of how jihad derives from the Quran and the Sunnah (Example of the Prophet). Jihad arose in the context of the Prophet’s life in Medina. Medina was a collection of small villages, divided among Jewish and pagan Arab tribes. Converting the tribesmen and

418 Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 5.

419 Bukay, David. From Muhammad to Bin Laden: religious and ideological sources of the homicide bombers phenomenon. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2008. 46.

420 Bonner, Michael David. Jihad in Islamic history: doctrines and practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 3.

147 fighting campaigns to gain adherents comprised much of the community’s activity.421 As such, the Quran addresses many issues relating to the conduct of jihad. Asma Afsaruddin argues that jihad is a dynamic, discursive term.422 Because jihad (as an Islamic principle) plays a major role in gaining political legitimacy, this concept has evolved and been distorted over time for political purposes. As a Shia Islamic organization, Hezbollah is subject to Shia interpretations of jihad. The Shia concept of jihad is connected to historical suffering, notably the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala.423 According to Yann Richard, Hussein “has become the prototype of every struggle for justice, every suffering.”424 Most Shia thinkers believe that no expansionary jihad should be fought until the Twelfth Imam returns (this does not include defensive jihad, which is permitted).425 Expansionary (or “offensive”) jihad is a collective duty in which a group of Muslims fight on behalf of an entire community to expand the territory of Islam. According to Shias, this type of jihad is only possible when the ummah is united by a legitimate ruler. In contrast, defensive jihad is an individual duty for every Muslim to protect the community from

421 Cook, David. “Quran and Conquest,” Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

422 Afsaruddin, Asma. Striving in the Path of God: Jihād and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 1.

423 Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi’i Perception of Jihad." The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2003): 2.

424 Richard, Yann. Shi´ite Islam: Polity, Ideology, and Creed. Oxford, UK & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995. 29.

425 Moghadam, Assaf. 2007. “Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom: The Shi’a Conception of Jihad.” Terrorism and Political Violence. 19(1): 132.

148 attack. Ultimately, Assaf Moghadam argues, the difference between Sunni and Shia concepts of jihad is one of ‘emotion.’426 Because of shared historical grievances, Shias emphasize aspects of jihad related to maintaining dignity, glorifying martyrdom, and resisting tyrannical rule. Accordingly, these Shia thinkers are concerned with topics such as the dignity of those engaged in jihad, as well as provisions for jihad against rulers deemed oppressive. This Shia interpretation of jihad demonstrates the effect of sociopolitical contexts, whereby Shia minorities have been subject to oppression and injustice. In addition to the emotional connection to sacrifice and countering oppression, Shia concepts of jihad align with mainstream interpretations of acting in defense and abstaining from fighting fellow Muslims.427 The Shiite manual on jihad and martyrdom, Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin (“Jihad and the Martyrs’ Traits”), lists nine contexts in which defensive jihad is considered a duty.428 The first two contexts refer to a situation in which the enemies of Islam attack a Muslim country to terminate Islam or control and colonize it. The third context is when a Muslim country is attacked by another Muslim country, in which case the aggressor must be brought to justice. Cases four through six refer to an onslaught against the public wealth of Muslim countries, the worshipping of God, or

426 Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi’i Perception of Jihad." The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2003): 6.

427 Moghadam, Assaf. 2007. “Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom: The Shi’a Conception of Jihad.” Terrorism and Political Violence. 19(1): 140.

428 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 84-85.

149 the life, property, and dignity of Muslims.429 The seventh case refers to the defense of Islamic culture, and the eighth case calls for the defense of the oppressed. Finally, the last case calls on Muslims to fight to prevent the propagation of materialism and atheism.430 These cases generally obligate Shia Muslims to engage in jihad to defend themselves, their countries, and their faith. There have been three main exponents of the Shia perception of jihad. These are Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani, and Ayatollah Murtaza

Mutahhari. Born in 1933, Shariati was a key figure in the Iranian Revolution. Educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, Shariati was influenced by Islamic as well as Western thought.431 He simultaneously drew inspiration from Marxist sociology, Muslim theology, Third World theorists, and the early Shia martyrs.432 In his speech, “Jihad and Shahadat,” Shariati drew a distinction between these two concepts. He described a shahid as someone who “negates his whole existence” in pursuit of a sacred goal or ideal.433 The term “shahid” can mean either witness or martyr, with the latter definition appearing outside of Quran. According to Shariati, Hussein is the ideal embodiment of this notion of shahid. Shariati argues that, through his act of

429 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 85.

430 Ibid.

431 Abrahamian, Ervand. "Ali Shari'ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution." MERIP Reports No. 102. Islam and Politics 1 (1982): 24.

432 Ibid.

433 Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi’i Perception of Jihad." The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2003): 3.

150 sacrificing himself at the battle of Karbala, Hussein became sacredness himself. Because he chose to negate himself in pursuit of the truth by refusing to swear allegiance to Yazid before the governor of Medina, Hussein became the ideal shahid. The emphasis on shahadat reveals the value that Shariati places on pursuing justice. For him, the struggle to reveal truth is sacred. Shariati argues that a shahid, through his death, “condemns the oppressor and provides commitment for the oppressed.”434 According to Shariati, justice has sacredness, and it is noble for someone to negate their own existence to pursue this ideal for the sake of everyone. A second Shia thinker who has influenced conceptions of jihad is Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani. An Iranian theologian, humanist, and senior Shia cleric, Taleqani was a leader of Iran’s Shia resistance movement against the secularist, pro- Western Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. His greatest area of influence is considered to be his teaching of Quranic exegesis.435 According to Taleqani, jihad must not be based solely on anger. Rather, it should performed to improve human society for the sake of God. While Shariati distinguishes between jihad and shahadat, Taleqani similarly presents a dichotomy between jihad and taghut.436 If people are not guided by God in their jihad, he argues, they will be considered a selfish person, or “taghut.” In Arabic, “taghut” refers to one who rebels or oversteps boundaries. While Taleqani

434 Shariati, Ali. "Jihad and Shahadat." Iran Chamber Society. Accessed January 2015. http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/works/jihad_shahadat.php.

435 Bakhash, Shaul. The reign of the ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic revolution. New York: Basic Books, 1984. 168.

436 Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi’i Perception of Jihad." The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2003): 4.

151 argues that human instinct makes warfare inevitable, he is concerned about what causes make war legitimate. He argues, “war is natural and instinctive and man cannot do without it…Only a religion [Islam] which recognizes the geometry of human instincts and makes a plan according to it can govern the world.”437 As opposed to taghut, jihad is performed for the larger purposes of bettering the world and bringing truth to it. Taleqani identifies four types of jihad. The first is jihad against foreigners to

“remove those obstacles which are placed before those who cannot see the truth.”438 This can be categorized as offensive jihad. The second is jihad to protect one’s own rights (defensive jihad), and the third is jihad against protected minorities (dhimmi). This jihad is undertaken if the minorities become hostile and rebel against Muslim law. Finally, the fourth type of jihad is against unjust rulers, or despots.439 According to Taleqani, “jihad cannot be for the sake of strengthening the government of a tyrant, sultan, or imam. But it is recommended for us to fight alongside a just sultan and to defend him.”440 Therefore, Taleqani argues both leaders and the mujahed must be pure in order to engage in jihad.

437 Ṭāliqānī, Maḥmūd, Murtaz̤ á Muṭahharī, ʻAlī Sharīʻatī, Ṃehdi Abedi, and Gary Legenhausen. Jihād and shahādat: struggle and martyrdom in Islam. Houston, Tex., U.S.A.: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986. 53.

438 Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi’i Perception of Jihad." The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2003): 4.

439 Zimmerman, John C. "Jihad, Theory and Practice: A Review Essay." Terrorism and Political Violence 19.2 (2007): 285.

440 Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi’i Perception of Jihad." The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2003): 4.

152 Finally, a third prominent Shia commentator on the concept of jihad is Ayatollah Murtaza Muthhari. Born in 1920, Muthhari has influenced many Shias, particularly Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.441 Unlike Taleqani, he categorizes all types of jihad as defensive. For him, the liberation of mankind is considered defensive, despite that this is usually defined as offensive jihad.442 This different classification is based on Muthhari’s understanding of oppression. For Muthhari, oppression can be either against Muslims or non-Muslims. Oppression occurs against non-Muslims when their rulers forbid them from hearing the message of Islam.443 Even though these non-Muslims may not have their lives or property threatened, Muthhari argues that they must be liberated. Like Shariati and Taleqani, Muthhari stresses that the purpose of jihad distinguishes it from other types of warfare. Jihad cannot be purely aggressive and greedy. It must be undertaken in defense of one’s property or values.444 For Muthhari, the most superior type of jihad is in defense of humanity and human rights.

Shariati, Taleqani, and Muthhari all exhibit the particularly Shia call for justice. While Sunnis view injustice as preferable to rebellion, Shia scholars promote the opposite. This is evident in Shariati’s emphasis on shahadat, Taleqani’s belief that

441 Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi’i Perception of Jihad." The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2003): 4.

442 Zimmerman, John C. "Jihad, Theory and Practice: A Review Essay." Terrorism and Political Violence 19.2 (2007): 285.

443 Ibid

444 Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi’i Perception of Jihad." The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2003): 4.

153 jihad must improve society rather than strengthen unjust rulers, and Muthhari’s insistence on combatting oppression. This Shia interpretation of jihad demonstrates the effect of sociopolitical contexts, whereby Shia minorities have been subject to oppression and injustice. The theme of self-sacrifice for the purpose of countering oppression was also present in the religious ideology of Ruhollah Khomeini, which inspired Hezbollah. Khomeini extolled the virtues of martyrdom and selflessness in defense of

Islam. In a March 1979 speech, he declared martyrdom the secret of the Islamic revolution’s success before remarking, “People who are materialists or materialistically inclined never long for martyrdom, but our young men regard it as a blessing, a source of tranquility.”445 Khomeini was the first faqih (Islamic jurist) to sanction the use of suicide attacks for both men and women, arguing that they constitute the highest level of religious self-sacrifice.446 In his book, A Clarification of Questions, Khomeini provides authoritative answers to several topics of concern, including questions about jihad.447 He repeats the interpretation that only defensive jihad can be undertaken without the permission of the religious leader. In cases of

445 Hamid Algar, “A Speech Given to a Delegation of Customs Officials.” Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Islamic Publications International, 2001.

446 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 92.

447 Khomeini, Ruhollah. A Clarification of Questions: An Unabridged Translation of Resaleh Towzih Al-Masael. Westview Press. 1984. 379.

154 defensive jihad, such as when an enemy invades Muslim borders, it is the duty of all Muslims to defend, “by any means possible, forsaking life and belongings.”448 Following in Khomeini’s footsteps, Hezbollah’s religious ideology emphasizes that jihad is based on self-sacrifice. For Hezbollah, jihad is “a means of defense to preclude the enemy from accomplishing its goals,” even though this may lead to, “sacrifices and pains.”449 Additionally, the group’s stated policy is to defer to the faqih to diagnose whether specific instances constitute legitimate defensive jihad.450

Hezbollah’s religious ideology, based on Shia interpretations of jihad, means that militancy is considered a religious obligation in cases of defense. This obligation carries a strong reverence for self-sacrifice and fighting oppression. In addition, most interpretations explicitly prohibit offensive jihad, fighting fellow Muslims, or engaging in any type of jihad without the permission of the faqih.

Is Hezbollah’s militant action obligatory according to its religious ideology?

Based on this analysis of Shia religious ideology concerning jihad, for Hezbollah’s violent actions to be perceived as religiously obligatory, it should define its militancy in defensive terms. At the very least, its militancy should not be

448 Khomeini, Ruhollah. A Clarification of Questions: An Unabridged Translation of Resaleh Towzih Al-Masael. Westview Press. 1984. 379.

449 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 102.

450 Ibid. 103.

155 considered “offensive,” waged against fellow Muslims, or performed without the permission of the faqih. While the element of defensiveness determines whether jihad is an obligation, these other factors determine whether it is even permissible according to Hezbollah’s religious ideology. Proving this hypothesis would mean determining that Hezbollah’s militant activities are obligatory within its own Shia ideology, meaning that they satisfy the Shia criteria for defensive jihad. In terms of perceived obligation, it is important to distinguish between the level of the individual and the group. When asked about religious motivations for violence, both Alagha and Abou Kasm expressed the belief that individual fighters have been convinced that their militancy is a religious duty.451 According to Alagha, these fighters have been “ideologically brainwashed.”452 Through indoctrination since childhood, they are convinced that martyrdom is a religious duty that will be rewarded by entering heaven. It was reported that during the operations against Israel in Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s Secretary General would meet with every prospective martyr to raise their morale. He would emphasize that they were going to Heaven and tell them, “Give my regards to the Prophet Mohammed.”453 Abou Kasm also stresses that Hezbollah fighters believe they are embarking on a “holy mission,” and that martyrdom is a “grace from God.”454 Since Shia religious ideology of jihad focuses

451 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018. And Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018.

452 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

453 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 106.

454 Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018.

156 strongly on martyrdom and sacrifice, these attitudes make sense among the fighters. However, this perspective does not address the choice to conduct certain wars in the first place. Even if martyrdom is religiously honored within war, it is necessary to examine whether Hezbollah’s choice to engage in the war itself reflects religious obligation. As this section has shown, the factors that make a war obligatory for Shia Muslims generally boil down to defense. The language of individual duty in

Hezbollah’s 1985 “Open Letter” corresponds to defensive jihad: “Each of us is a fighting soldier. And when it becomes necessary to carry out the Holy War, each of us takes up his assignment in the fight in accordance with the injunctions of the Law.”455 Countering the “imperialist infiltration,” Hezbollah declares its objective, “to expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land.” The removal of foreign forces is portrayed as a defensive act. In its 1998 Statement of Purpose, Hezbollah emphasizes that its Islamic faith corresponds with self-defense. Describing the type of Islam it intends to promote, the statement declares:

The Islam we mean is the religion that recommends communication among civilizations and rejects divisive collision between those civilizations. An Islam that believes in cultural communication among nations and refuses setting up barriers and embargos and sees that it is our right to remove those barriers by diplomatic means. However, when others intend to launch wars against it, Hezbollah finds it a natural right to defend itself.456

455 Masters, Jonathan, and Zachary Laub. "Backgrounders: Hezbollah." Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org.

456 “Statement of Purpose.” Hizbullah Press Office, March 30, 1998. Al Mashriq. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/statement01.html.

157 The statement also clarifies the types of violence that are not religiously justified, proclaiming, “We hereby affirm that our Islam rejects violence as a method to gain Power, and this should be the formula for the nonislamists as well.”457 Hezbollah’s language of resistance and fighting oppression presents a defensive vision of jihad, combined with the embedded Shia sense of persecution.458 Hezbollah’s recent involvement in the Syrian civil war has made the group’s defensive justifications murkier. As discussed previously, Hezbollah fighters have been operating openly across the border alongside Syrian and Iraqi counterparts since early 2013.459 This war does not correspond to any of the nine situations obligating defensive jihad that are presented in the Shiite manual on jihad and martyrdom.460 Syria was not attacked by any external “enemies of Islam,” aiming to persecute Muslims or destroy the faith. In reality, the Syrian opposition consists of Muslims fighting against a repressive regime.461 While the regime is Alawi (Shia) and the opposition is largely Sunni, both groups are Muslims. Therefore, it is difficult to

457 “Statement of Purpose.” Hizbullah Press Office, March 30, 1998. Al Mashriq. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/statement01.html.

458 Khashan, Hilal, and Ibrahim Mousawi. "Hizbullah’s Jihad Concept." Journal of Religion and Society 9 (2007): 5.

459 Sullivan, Marisa. "Hezbollah in Syria." Institute for the Study of War. http://www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria.

460 Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam University Press. 2006. 84-85.

461 “Syria: Al-Asad's Decade in Power Marked by Repression.” Human Rights Watch. July 16, 2010. https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/16/syria-al-asads-decade-power- marked-repression.

158 perceive either side as a defender or enemy of Islam. In fact, the Shia call to counter oppression makes fighting on the side of the Assad regime even more opposed to Hezbollah’s religious ideology. In order to conform to Taleqani’s understanding of jihad, the Shia militant groups would need to view Assad as a ‘just sultan.’ However, Assad’s rule has been marked by human rights violations such as torture, curtailing freedom of expression, poor treatment of the Kurdish minority, and forced disappearances.462 As a historical and current minority in the Middle East, Shias place a high value on fighting unjust rulers and upending oppression. In the case of the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah’s militancy is not obligatory according to its religious ideology because it is neither defensive nor aimed against oppression. The group appears to be acting against its own vision of defensive jihad presented in its 1985 Open Letter. Not only does Hezbollah’s activity in Syria lack religious obligation according to Shia ideologies of jihad, it is not even permitted due to most interpretations that prohibit fighting fellow Muslims. Hezbollah’s image as a leader of the Islamic resistance means that breaking this rule has led to public outrage throughout the Muslim world. Public opinion shifts demonstrate that many former Sunni supporters do not view Hezbollah’s operations as legitimate jihad because they seem to be motivated by sectarianism rather than defense of Islam, they target fellow Muslims,

462 “A Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power.” Human Rights Watch. July 16, 2010. https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/07/16/wasted-decade/human-rights-syria-during- bashar-al-asads-first-ten-years-power.

159 and they support an unjust regime.463 When I asked Alagha whether Hezbollah’s current military operations are a result of religious obligation or if Hezbollah was simply trying to find a way to justify these actions religiously, he replied, “The latter thing… If you look at their ideology, it doesn’t fit.”464 According to Alagha, these actions are religiously problematic because, “It boils down to killing Muslims, whatever you do.”465 Killing Muslims is explicitly prohibited in the Quran which states, “He who slays a believer willfully his reward is Hell, where he will abide.

Allah's wrath is against him and He has cast His curse upon him, and has prepared for him a great chastisement.”466 According to Hezbollah’s own religion, the punishment for killing fellow Muslims is Hell, which means the group’s operations against Muslims in Syria have been strongly criticized as contrary to Islam. This has led Hezbollah to attempt to find religious justification for its activities in Syria. For example, despite crossing national borders from Lebanon to Syria, Hezbollah continues to view its jihad as defensive because, as an Islamic country,

Syria falls within the dar al-Islam. A major disconnect, however, lies in the target and purposes of the group’s fighting. It is evident from this chapter’s discussion of jihad that it is not meant to be waged against fellow Muslims. Therefore, Hezbollah must offer a reinterpretation in order to persuade the public. Hezbollah accomplishes this by

463 “Poll Shows Hezbollah Losing Support Among Palestinians.” Al Monitor. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/poll-hezbollah-losing-support- palestinians.html.

464 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

465 Ibid.

466 Quran 4(93).

160 labelling the Muslim rebels in Syria as ‘takfiris,’ extremists who pose a threat to the whole region. According to Hezbollah leaders, the anti-Assad uprising is really a plot to undermine enemies of Israel.467 Comparing Israel to the anti-Assad forces, Nasrallah asserted that, “The takfiri threat is also a threat against the whole region.”468 This new focus gives threats by Sunni extremists similar gravity to threats from Israel.469 In a December 2016 speech to university students in Beirut, Nasrallah portrayed opposition forces as a threat to Islam and a cause of defamation of the religion. Stating that, “Takfiris’ atrocities are real massacres on the humanitarian and cultural levels,” Nasrallah called on all Muslims to condemn them.470 Through defining their enemies as “takfiris,” Hezbollah argues that it is not fighting true Muslims and that they are on the side of justice. However, much of the public views these military operations as simple sectarian fighting, with Hezbollah distorting jihad to provide justification. Many Shias look to their religious leaders to determine whether it is permissible engage in jihad. When a follower asked him whether it is legitimate to travel to Syria to fight, Grand Ayatollah al-Haeri (leader of the Shia community in

467 Hubbard, Ben. “Syrian Fighting Gives Hezbollah New but Diffuse Purpose.” The New York Times. May 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/world/middleeast/syrian-fighting-gives- hezbollah-new-but-diffuse-purpose.html?_r=1.

468 Ibid.

469 Ibid.

470 Haidar, Marwa. “Sayyed Nasrallah: Aleppo Victory Decisively Foiled All Attempts to Topple Syrian Regime.” Al Manar. December 23, 2016. http://english.almanar.com.lb/144307.

161 Iraq) responded, “The battle in Syria is not for the defense of the shrine of Sayida Zeinab but it is a battle of infidels against Islam and Islam should be defended.”471 The statement that the battle is not about the shrine of Sayida Zeinab refers to accusations of sectarianism, in which Hezbollah is accused of fighting to protect Shia shrines. Al-Haeri claims that the fighting is not about such sectarian concerns, but rather a battle to defend Islam from infidels. In this way, the definition of ‘defensive’ jihad stretches across national borders to defend all ‘true’ Muslims, with al-Haeri viewing combat against Sunni Muslims in Syria as defense of true Islam. Therefore, al-Haeri provided a fatwa in favor of travelling to Syria to fight.472 As mentioned, Hezbollah has stated that it requires the permission of a faqih to wage jihad. The group subscribes to the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist” (Wilayat al-Faqih), in which an Islamic jurist (faqih) is given guardianship over the people. Khomeini advanced this concept in 1970 and was considered the Guardian Jurist. This title was passed to Ayatollah Khameini. At the time this dissertation was written, Khameini had not made public any direct fatwas about the Syrian conflict, but there have been reports of him issuing religious orders to Shia groups including Hezbollah.473

471 Abdul-Zahra, Qassim. “Shiite Cleric Issues Fatwa In Support Of Fighting In Syria War: Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri Supports Assad.” The Huffington Post. December 19, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/19/shiite-cleric-fatwa- syria-war_n_4475628.html.

472 Mamouri, Ali. “Shiite Seminaries Divided on Fatwas for Syrian Jihad.” Al Monitor. July 29, 2013. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/syria-- jihad-fatwas-shiite-clergy-iran-iraq.html.

473 Smith, Phillip. The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2015. 16.

162 Interestingly, the concepts which are used by Hezbollah and Shia religious leaders to justify fighting fellow Muslims appear to derive from the same radical Sunni ideological lineages followed by those Muslims whom they have labelled “takfiri.” For example, Ibn Taymiyya was a medieval Sunni theologian whose ideas influenced Salafism. His controversial fatwa which allowed jihad against other Muslims has been referenced by jihadi groups such as Al-Qaeda.474 He is frequently referenced when violent action is taken against fellow Muslims because his interpretation of jihad allows jihadists to effectively excommunicate fellow Muslims as apostates, allowing them to be attacked.475 Ibn Taymiyya recognized the possibility of a jihad against `heretical` and `deviant` Muslims within the dar al-Islam.476 He considered as heretical anyone who propagated innovations (bidʿa) contrary to the Quran and Sunna. Therefore, he, “legitimated jihad against anyone who refused to abide by Islamic law or revolted against the true Muslim authorities.”477 According to this interpretation, when the goal of jihad is to defend “true” Islam, violent action against heretics is perceived as both necessary and right.478 This is the justification used by Hezbollah when it labels the Syrian rebels as “takfiris.” Hezbollah’s

474 Springer, Devin R. James L. Regens and David N. Edger. Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Georgetown University Press. 2009. 54.

475 Ibid.

476 Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam from revival and reform to global Jihad. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 250.

477 Ibid.

478 Springer, Devin R. James L. Regens and David N. Edger. Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Georgetown University Press. 2009. 54.

163 intervention into the Syrian conflict and its’ killing of Sunni Muslims has resulted in a “fitna,” which is essentially a schism between Shias and Sunnis.479 Regarding the factors that make jihad obligatory, evaluation of this hypothesis has shown that Hezbollah’s action in Syria is not required under any Shia contexts of defensive jihad. It does not exhibit the Shia call to counter oppression. Rather, Hezbollah’s support of Assad places it on the side of a repressive regime. Hezbollah does seem to have the backing of Shia religious leaders, although Khameini has not made a fatwa on the issue public. However, the practice of killing fellow Muslims is a strong deviation from Islamic teachings. Overall, according to Hezbollah’s Shia religious ideology, militant action in Syria is neither obligatory nor permissible (despite the group’s attempted justifications). Therefore, it can be concluded that Hezbollah’s militant activity is not the result of perceived religious obligation, and the third hypothesis can be rejected.

Hypothesis 4 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if framing of myths or sacred histories contained within the group’s religious ideologies evoke hostility towards other groups and fear of extinction.

This hypothesis is based on the literatures about religious extremism and ethnic conflict. Both of these fields assert the importance of myths, either as part of a religious ideology or group history, which may motivate violence. In Stuart

479 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

164 Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory, the critical causes of ethnic violence are hostile group myths.480 These myths stir fears of group extinction and provide justifications for hostility. If this theory explains Hezbollah’s continued militancy, then hostile myths should be present in its discourse. For the purpose of this study, whether or not a myth is factually accurate is less important than the emotion it produces. It can be defined as a traditional or legendary story concerning the history of a people and their relationships with outside groups. In the case of Hezbollah, this hypothesis can best be proven by exploring the group’s celebration of Ashura. For Shia Muslims, Ashura represents a narrative tied to religious and ethnic identity. Based on a historical event in which early Sunnis were the enemy, the story of Ashura is imbued with emotion and religious importance. It contains dramatic symbolism that has been invoked by Hezbollah and its supporters. While this narrative has been used for both peaceful and violent mobilization of Shias, it serves the role of empowering Shias while enforcing ethnic identity. In interviews, both Alagha and Abou Kasm answered that celebrations of Ashura have been used to motivate Hezbollah’s violent activity.481 The symbolic predispositions about outgroups (especially Sunnis) which are produced in such narratives make Shias more likely to perceive these rival ethnic groups as a threat.482

480 Kaufman, Stuart J. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence.” International Security. 30(4): 47.

481 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018. And Abou Kasm, Antonios. Personal Interview. February 2, 2018.

482 Kaufman, Stuart J. Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015. P.11.

165 Ashura means “Day of Remembrance,” and is one of the most sacred events in Islam. Occurring on the tenth day of Muharram in the Islamic calendar, the Day of Ashura marks the death of Hussain ibn Ali. Hussain was a 7th century revolutionary leader and the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad.483 He fought against the rule of Yazid and was killed in the Battle of Karbala along with 72 followers and family members.484 In April 680 (less than fifty years after the death of Muhammad) Yazid of the Ummayad dynasty had succeeded his father Muawiyah as the new caliph.

However, many viewed his rule as corrupt and contrary to the teachings of Islam. Yazid instructed Hussain to pledge his allegiance (bay’ah), but he refused to do so.485 When Hussain received letters from the people of Kufa (a city in Iraq) urging him to join them in fighting the Ummayyads, he sent his cousin, Muslim ibn Aqeel to investigate the situation. Muslim was initially successful in gaining the support of the people of Kufa, and Hussain began to travel to the city, only to discover along the way that Muslim had been killed. As he approached Kufa, Hussein encountered the army of Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad which forced him to divert his route and stop at Karbala.

483 “The Day of Ashura.” ‘Who is Hussain’ International Organization. https://whoishussain.org/who-is-hussain/the-day-of-ashura/.

484 Constable, Pamela and Julie Vitkovskaya. “Dramatic photos show how Shiite Muslims mark Ashura, one of the most emotional events in Islam.” The Washington Post. October 16, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/12/dramatic-photos- show-how-shiite-muslims-mark-ashura-one-of-the-most-emotional-events-in-islam.

485 “The Day of Ashura.” ‘Who is Hussain’ International Organization. https://whoishussain.org/who-is-hussain/the-day-of-ashura/.

166 Hussain and his 72 companions had been stopped in the desert for three days without water when the battle of Karbala began.486 In the fighting, all of Hussain’s supporters were killed. Then, Hussain was surrounded and beheaded by a man named Shimr. This battle is commemorated and sometimes reenacted by Shia Muslims on Ashura. It marks the beginning of the Islamic schism in which Muslims divided into two main sects: Sunnis and Shias. The Shias (known as the “party of Ali”) had supported Hussain’s father, Imam Ali, who was Muhammad’s son-in-law and the fourth caplih. When Ali was murdered in 661 AD, his opponent Muawiya (father of Yazid) became caliph.487 The deaths of Ali and his son Hussain created a cult of martyrdom and emotional struggle against oppression within Shia Islam. Today, Shias make up about fifteen percent of the total Muslim population.488 While many Sunnis fast on Ashura and remember other events (including Moses’ journey from Egypt and the story of Noah’s Ark), Shia Muslims mark the death of Hussain with mourning rituals and dramatic events.

Shias have several customary ways of marking the Day of Ashura. Ashura is a public holiday in many countries with large Shiite populations, such as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.489 Some pilgrims visit the shrine of Hussain in Karbala.

486 “The Day of Ashura.” ‘Who is Hussain’ International Organization. https://whoishussain.org/who-is-hussain/the-day-of-ashura/.

487 “What is Ashura?” BBC News. December 6, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16047713.

488 Ibid.

489 Constable, Pamela and Julie Vitkovskaya. “Dramatic photos show how Shiite Muslims mark Ashura, one of the most emotional events in Islam.” The Washington Post. October 16, 2016.

167 Others recite poems in memory of Hussain or perform acts of charity.490 There are public gatherings and demonstrations with, “huge banners hung from poles, black- draped archways erected across roadways, vivid posters depicting the life and death of Hussein, and martial dirges blaring from loudspeakers in hypnotic, pounding rhythms.”491 Ashura also includes a controversial ritual in which men and boys flagellate themselves with small knives and chains, while others continually beat their chests. The Day of Ashura is full of mourning and strong emotion.

According to Ali J. Hussain, the mourning rituals of Ashura have undergone several evolutionary phases within the Shia community.492 The Umayyad period was the earliest phase, in which people began gathering at the grave of Hussain to mourn and read poetry. The same sources which describe these commemorations also depict women expressing their grief by beating their chests and wailing.493 These rituals were later combined into today’s rhythmic chest beating, set in time to the meter of

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/12/dramatic-photos- show-how-shiite-muslims-mark-ashura-one-of-the-most-emotional-events-in-islam.

490 “The Day of Ashura.” ‘Who is Hussain’ International Organization. https://whoishussain.org/who-is-hussain/the-day-of-ashura/.

491 Constable, Pamela and Julie Vitkovskaya. “Dramatic photos show how Shiite Muslims mark Ashura, one of the most emotional events in Islam.” The Washington Post. October 16, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/12/dramatic-photos- show-how-shiite-muslims-mark-ashura-one-of-the-most-emotional-events-in-islam.

492 Hussain, Ali J (2005). “The Mourning of History and the History of Mourning: The Evolution of Ritual Commemoration of the Battle of Karbala.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 25(1): 78.

493 Ibid. 81.

168 poetry being recited. In the second phase of the ritual’s development, public rituals became more prominent. This was due to the Abbasids’ promotion of Karbala and the martyrdom of Hussain as part of their political rhetoric during and after their revolution against the Umayyad dynasty (746-750 CE).494 This is early historical evidence of the Ashura myth being used to incite violence. More recently, ritual commemorations of Ashura began to include dramatic re-creations of the Battle of Karbala and bloodshedding rituals (such as striking one’s skull with a sword or striking oneself with swinging chains). These rituals became popular and useful for propagating a new Shia identity. The depiction and practice of violent activity as part of the Ashura commemorations makes it even more useful as a vehicle for promoting community solidarity (and militancy) against a perceived oppressor, represented in the Ashura story by Yazid. The emotions of Ashura have been channeled to great effect in Iran as well as Lebanon. In 1963, Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi issued a series of reforms that were denounced by clerics. During Ashura (June 3, 1963), Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini delivered a sermon in which he compared the Shah to Yazid and called him a “wretched, miserable man.”495 Khomeini’s subsequent arrest sparked demonstrations that created the 15 Khordad Movement. This movement laid the

494 Hussain, Ali J (2005). “The Mourning of History and the History of Mourning: The Evolution of Ritual Commemoration of the Battle of Karbala.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 25(1): 82.

495 Sahimi, Muhammad. “Ashura 101.” PBS Frontline. December 24, 2009. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/12/december-18-marked- the-beginning.html.

169 groundwork for the 1979 Revolution.496 Khomeini used the occasion of Ashura for political purposes again in 1978, when the Revolution had gained momentum. A few weeks before Ashura, Khomeini issued a declaration titled, “Moharram: the triumph of blood over the sword.”497 This declaration began:

With the approach of Moharram, we are about to begin the epic month of heroism and self-sacrifice, the month in which blood triumphed over the sword, the month in which truth condemned falsehood for all eternity and branded the mark of disgrace upon the forehead of all oppressors and satanic governments, the month that has taught successive generations throughout history the path of victory over the dagger [or knife].498 Khomeni targeted Ashura and Tasua (The day before the Battle of Karbala) for public demonstrations. During the next couple months, the Shah fled Iran and Khomeini returned, toppling the monarchy and fulfilling the demonstrator’s demands. Interpretations of Hussein’s sacrifice by leading figures of Shi’ism, such as Musa al- Sadr, Ruhollah Khomeini, and ‘Ali Shariati, frame Hussein as a revolutionary example for both the toppling of the shah in Iran and the mobilization of Shias in Lebanon.499 In Lebanon, Hezbollah leaders organize celebrations of Ashura and use the holiday to promote their political activities. According to Imad Salamey, professor of political science at the Lebanese American University, Hezbollah aims to benefit

496 Sahimi, Muhammad. “Ashura 101.” PBS Frontline. December 24, 2009. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/12/december-18-marked- the-beginning.html.

497 Ibid.

498 Ibid.

499 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 50.

170 politically from Ashura. He believes the “Shia community in Dahieh [a suburb of Beirut] mobilizes behind Hezbollah, which is looking for legitimacy for its political actions.”500 Public commemorations of Ashura in Beirut began less than fifty years ago and have become viewed in the political context of fighting oppression.501 As demonstrated by Ali J. Hussain, Ashura rituals have transformed over the centuries to become more public and feature more extreme elements.502 After conducting field research in a Lebanese Shia community located in a Hezbollah-dominated suburb of

Beirut, Lara Deeb argued that, “In Lebanon, Ashura commemorations have undergone a transformation in recent decades, from a ritual focused on mourning to one highlighting Islamic activism.”503 According to Deeb, this transformation corresponded to the Lebanese Shi’i Islamic mobilization that began with Musa al-Sadr in the 1960s and was carried on by organizations and figures such as Amal, Fadlallah, and Hezbollah. Deeb argues that this movement emphasizes Ashura and its connection to contemporary political discourse. The figure of Hussain provides a

500 Lupo, Nicolas. “Hezbollah's Ashura parade links activism with religious fervor.” Middle East Eye. October 25, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hezbollahs- ashura-parade-links-activism-religious-fervor-658152535.

501 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 55.

502 Hussain, Ali J (2005). “The Mourning of History and the History of Mourning: The Evolution of Ritual Commemoration of the Battle of Karbala.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 25(1):88.

503 Deeb, Lara (2005). “Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 25(1): 123.

171 model for “sacrifice in blood” for Shia men in Lebanon.504 While Ashura may have originally focused mainly on mourning, modern commemorations in Lebanon portray the message of Ashura as resistance against oppression. Ashura was an important factor that helped Musa al Sadr mobilize Lebanese Shias in the 1960s and 1970s. He successfully used the tale of Karbala to overthrow traditional Shia quietism and withdrawal.505 While this tale once evoked just feelings or sorrow and mourning, Al Sadr framed this narrative as, “an episode of political choice and courage on the part of Imam Hussein.”506 Hussein became the prototype of political Shias who choose to battle overwhelming odds. In the tale of Ashura, Hezbollah supporters find a parallel between Hussain’s struggle against Umayyad oppression and their current resistance against Israel and the West. Even after the Israeli occupation ended, Hezbollah continued to draw inspiration from Ashura for its militant activities. According to Sheikh Nabolsi, director of a Hawza (a seminary for training Shia Muslim clerics), “The truth is that

Hezbollah, when it intervenes in Syria, or when it’s resisting the Israeli occupation, or when it’s being present in any part of this region, it’s being inspired by Karbala and by its chivalry and nobility and honour and in defence of the rights of the oppressed.”507

504 Deeb, Lara (2005). “Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 25(1): 123.

505 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 110.

506 Ibid. 114.

507 Lupo, Nicolas. “Hezbollah's Ashura parade links activism with religious fervor.” Middle East Eye. October 25, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hezbollahs- ashura-parade-links-activism-religious-fervor-658152535.

172 Sheikh Nabolsi described the way Hezbollah supporters contextualize the current conflict, saying “This enemy wants to violate our woman like the enemies of the Imam Hussain did with his woman and the people of his family.”508 In 2016, Hezbollah’s Ashura marches were dedicated to the Yemeni people, which include another Shia minority Hezbollah considers oppressed509 Nasrallah argued that, “Yemen today is like Karbala,” and declared that the marchers would chant Ashura slogans alongside slogans supporting the resistance in Yemen.510 The story of Ashura is useful for motivating militant action against any group Hezbollah supporters perceive as oppressive. Along with rival Shia group, the Amal Movement, Hezbollah coordinates logistics for commemoration of Ashura among Lebanon’s Shia community, although the two groups differ in their preferred rituals.511 While Amal supports the bleeding ritual, Hezbollah endorses a parade which does not include this type of flagellation

508 Lupo, Nicolas. “Hezbollah's Ashura parade links activism with religious fervor.” Middle East Eye. October 25, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hezbollahs- ashura-parade-links-activism-religious-fervor-658152535.

509 “Sayyed Nasrallah: Tenth of Muharram Marches Will Be in Solidarity with Yemenis.” Al Manar. October 10, 2016. http://english.almanar.com.lb/59937.

510 “Sayyed Nasrallah: Yemen Today Resembles Karbala.” Al Manar. October 14, 2016. http://english.almanar.com.lb/65327.

511 “Lebanon Shiite parties to coordinate during Ashura commemoration.” The Daily Star Lebanon. September 29, 2016. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon- News/2016/Sep-29/374327-lebanon-shiite-parties-to-coordinate-during-ashura- commemoration.ashx.

173 because the organization views it as un-Islamic.512 This may seem backwards since Hezbollah is the current powerful militant group, but Amal also has a history of militancy. Despite that Amal was forced to disarm at the end of the Lebanese civil war (unlike Hezbollah) in order to join the political order, members still supported militant action. During the 2006 war with Israel, Amal Chairman Nabih Berri declared that Amal fighters had been involved in every major battle.513 Additionally, while Amal has not officially joined the war in Syria, some activists have charged that Amal members are fighting alongside Hezbollah.514 Hezbollah’s procession (or “masirat”), displays military order and includes men and boys performing latam (ritualized striking of oneself) in such a way that no blood is shed. Deeb notes that the people watching this display perceived it as a “demonstration of the readiness of their youth to defend the community and fight against the Israeli occupation.”515 In this way, the rituals include clear militant overtones. Hezbollah’s Ashura activities include political speeches by its leaders. In

2003, Shaikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a spiritual leader of Hezbollah, gave the following sermon:

512 Lupo, Nicolas. “Hezbollah's Ashura parade links activism with religious fervor.” Middle East Eye. October 25, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hezbollahs- ashura-parade-links-activism-religious-fervor-658152535.

513 “Israeli troops suffer largest one-day loss.” CNN International. July 27, 2006. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/26/mideast.main/index.html.

514 “Amal Movement, Shiite militia, is fighting in Syria too: activists say.” Zaman Al Wasl. March 10, 2014. https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/4066.

515 Deeb, Lara (2005). “Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 25(1): 130.

174 The slogans of Karbala are the slogans of life in its entirety. . . . Living Ashura is standing against oppression. Such a stand should fill our hearts and minds each time we face the oppressors and arrogant powers, whether in Muslim countries or in the whole world. It is not living in a tragedy of tears and hitting ourselves with swords or chains . . . for swords should be raised against the enemy as we were taught by the Imam (a.s).516 Calling for swords to be “raised against the enemy,” Fadlallah used the story of Ashura to invoke militant action from supporters. In his 2015 Ashura speech, Nasrallah compared Hussain’s battle at Karbala to Hezbollah’s fight in Syria supporting the Assad regime, referring to the Syrian opposition as “takfiri.” He declared, “We will never be humiliated…We won’t be moved by Israeli or Takfiri threats. We’ll work day and night for the dignity of all our people…We’ll keep on crying blood for Imam Hussain instead of tears.”517 In his 2016 Ashura speech, Nasrallah commented about the power of Imam Hussain to continue to “awaken people,” arguing, “And that’s what happened during the Islamic revolution of Iran and the Islamic resistance [Hezbollah], as well as fighting all Takfiri groups. This logic, spirit and determination are still active and present.”518 In this way, Hezbollah uses the emotions of Ashura to build support for its militant activities. The portrayal of Hezbollah’s enemies (especially Israel) as Caliph Yazid is often overt and has led directly to violence in the past. On October 16, 1983, an

516 Deeb, Lara (2005). “Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 25(1): 130.

517 Lupo, Nicolas. “Hezbollah's Ashura parade links activism with religious fervor.” Middle East Eye. October 25, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hezbollahs- ashura-parade-links-activism-religious-fervor-658152535.

518 “Sayyed Nasrallah: Nowadays Events Prove Blood Triumphs over Sword.” Al Manar. October 3, 2016. http://english.almanar.com.lb/51280.

175 estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Shiites were gathered in the South Lebanon market town of Nabatiya.519 Israeli forces had begun to withdraw from Lebanon in September, but many remained in the southern part of the country. This decision to remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely angered Lebanese Shiites, especially when Israel chose to employ local Christian militiamen to patrol the region. During the 1983 Ashura services in Nabatiya, an Israeli convoy attempted to drive through the town. Unaware of the significance of the commemorations, the Israeli soldiers started honking their horns for the locals to get out of the way.520 The symbolism was severe, as the celebrants were performing the drama of Karbala just as the armed Israeli patrol suddenly appeared and attempted to crash through the crowds.521 For the celebrants, these Israeli soldiers slipped easily into the role of Caliph Yazid. The Shiites immediately began to pelt the Israeli convoy with stones and bottles, even overturning some of the vehicles.522 The Israeli soldiers responded by firing on the crowd, killing at least two people and wounding fifteen others. This event crystallized the Shia resistance against Israel.

519 Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1989. P. 179.

520 Swidey, Neil. “Tipping Points: How military occupations go sour.” Boston Globe. April 27, 2003. https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2003/04/27/tipping- points/OkWKMz8oZtZFBUwuewZSVM/story.html.

521 Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, 2014. 66.

522 Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1989. 180.

176 While “Calpih Yazid,” has been used as a placeholder for many enemies, he is historically a representative of early Sunnis at the time of the schism. For the Lebanese Shias who have felt oppressed by Sunni power, the tale of Karbala solidifies prejudice against Sunnis and creates a sense of empowerment against overwhelming odds. This ethnic tension has manifested in domestic Shia-Sunni violence within Lebanon. In Tripoli, tension is felt most acutely between two neighborhoods well- known for their longstanding conflict. These are the Alawite (Shia) neighborhood of

Jabal Mohsen and the Salafist neighborhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh.523 They have been rivals since the Lebanese Civil War, with periodic clashes consisting of gunfire from apartment to apartment. Their sectarian opposition to each other extends to their opposition or support of the Alawite-led Syrian government (which is being supported militarily by Hezbollah). Nearly half of the Alawites in Lebanon reside in the Jabal Mohsen neighborhood and support the Assad regime. In contrast, the majority of Bab al-

Tabbaneh's residents are Sunni and support the rebels.524 It was Musa al Sadr who had originally issued a fatwa declaring the Alawis part of Shia Islam.525 This fatwa legitimated the rule of Hafiz al Assad in Syria and created a strong sectarian bond between Lebanese Shia and the Alawite regime. Despite that Assad’s Ba’ath party

523 Kirkby, Andrew “The Lebanese Sunnis: A Community in Disarray.” Journal of Defense Studies and Resource Management, 2013.

524 "Gun Battles Renew in Lebanon's Tripoli." Aljazeera English. October 22, 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/10/gun-battles-renew-lebanon- tripoli-20131022223623809919.html.

525 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 146.

177 promotes secularism while Hezbollah is based on Islamic revolutionary ideology, the group now supports Bashar al Assad along sectarian lines against the largely Sunni opposition. For Lebanese Shia, Sunnis have long been viewed as oppressors. This is apparent in historical narratives such as the story of the late eighteenth-century Ottoman governor Ahmad Pasha al Jazzar.526 Al Jazzar is literally translated as “the butcher.” The time before Al Jazzar is described as an, “imagined age of bliss and plenty,” until his rule brought misery and dispossession.527 While the Lebanese Shia are no longer ruled by the Ottomans, they still represent a minority in Lebanon and the Middle East. Sunni-Shia sectarianism marks many current conflicts in this region, including the Houthi insurgency in Yemen, in which the rebels are primarily Shia and the Yemeni military is backed by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states.528 Narratives about the battle of Karbala are one way to emphasize struggling against oppression (notably Sunni oppression). According to Alagha, this militant interpretation made the

Lebanese Shia feel “empowered.”529 Rather than remain a downtrodden minority in Lebanon and the Middle East, they could assert themselves militarily against the Sunnis and other oppressors. The story of Ashura mobilizes Lebanese Shias towards militancy by evoking fear of oppression and hostility towards outsiders (portrayed as

526 Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. Cornell University Press, 2012. 24.

527 Ibid. 26.

528 “Yemen crisis: Who is fighting whom?” BBC News. January 30, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.

529 Alagha, Joseph. Personal interview. January 11, 2018.

178 Caliph Yazid). This corresponds to the theory of hostile myths in the literature on ethnic conflict and supports the fourth hypothesis.

Conclusion

In this case study, all of the hypothesized necessary conditions are present, except for hypothesis three (religious obligation). This means that Lebanese Shia Islamists, represented by Hezbollah, have been unable to achieve the “outcome” goal of Islamic governance through democratic participation, have managed to achieve tactical objectives through militancy, and are motivated by sectarian fears and prejudices evoked by the framing of hostile narratives. An examination of Hezbollah’s objectives uncovered that it maintains its Islamic revolutionary ideology, despite being unable to achieve this goal as a minority in Lebanon’s government. Acknowledgement of its minority position incentivizes Hezbollah to act as a moderate, pragmatic political party domestically in order to gain allies that can increase its strength. Meanwhile, it uses militancy to score tactical victories such as resistance against Israel, maintaining public support, and ensuring support from Iran. These goals are all necessary for Hezbollah to build political power and continue to exist as a military force.

This has important implications for the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis. Firstly, it could be argued that Shia Islamists are not fully included in the Lebanese democratic system because they are unable to achieve their goal of Islamic governance through Hezbollah’s political participation. Therefore, movements with radical goals that represent minority groups may not view democratic participation as an effective method of achieving their objectives. Even appearances of moderation (as in

179 Hezbollah’s case), may be tactical maneuvers only to build alliances rather than true ideological shifts. Secondly, Hezbollah never had to agree to Huntington’s “democratic bargain,” because external intervention from Syria and Iran supported the group’s continued militancy.530 Therefore, religious movements in states with weak enough governance to allow intervention from foreign powers may find effective external support that allows them to continue militant activity. This means democratic moderation cannot be expected to occur in situations where the participating religious movement has radical goals, an inability to achieve those goals democratically, and external support for continued violence. By proving the second hypothesis, this research supports arguments of “thin rationality” and strategic understandings of political violence because Hezbollah is not undertaking operations that would hinder their tactical objectives. Recently, arguments about the effectiveness of Hezbollah’s militancy have become murkier due to its unpopular involvement in Syria. However, as this chapter demonstrates,

Hezbollah’s actions to support Iran and Syria benefit the organization strategically and ensure continued access to resources. It is important to note that the other religious movements studied in this dissertation are not as consolidated as Lebanese Shia Islamism is in the organization of Hezbollah. This gives Hezbollah greater control over the practice of militancy and means that there is less likelihood of militancy occurring which would be counter to the organization’s objectives. Shia Islamist militancy in Lebanon disproved the third hypothesis because

Hezbollah’s current activity in Syria does not represent a defensive obligation

530 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 169

180 according to its own Shia ideology of jihad. While Hezbollah’s outcome goal is based on religious ideology, this does not seem to be the motivating factor behind its choice to practice militancy. The organization’s rhetoric about fighting “takfiris,” demonstrates that it is important for Hezbollah to at least appear to be acting according to accepted interpretations of jihad. However, even if its justifications made fighting permissible, the organization’s participation in the Syrian conflict was not obligatory. Therefore, it does not fulfill the requirements of the third hypothesis.

Finally, this case study supports the fourth hypothesis about the framing of hostile narratives. In the 1960s, the tale of Karbala underwent a change in framing that corresponded to the increased mobilization of Lebanese Shias. Rather than evoking passive sorrow, the new commemorations emphasized active resistance against oppressors (particularly Sunnis) who were represented by Caliph Yazid and his army. Hezbollah’s commemoration of Ashura demonstrates how historical legends can be used as analogies for modern political situations. By proving the fourth hypothesis but not the third, this case study suggests a new perspective of how religious militancy should be understood. In later chapters, I will expand on the difference between understanding religion as theology and religion as identity. While theology did not motivate militancy in this case (due to lack of religious obligation), religion as identity was present in sectarian fears and prejudices, including celebrations of Ashura. Militants were mobilized not because of Shia theology, but because of their feelings of Shia identity that led them to view Sunnis and other outgroups as threats.

181 Chapter 4

HINDU NATIONALISM IN INDIA

Hindu nationalism in India provides a beneficial case study to improve scholarly understanding of the intersection of democratic participation and violent activity within a movement. After the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist political party in India, won electoral victory in 2014 and Narendra Modi was sworn in as prime minister, levels of Hindu nationalist violence did not decrease.

In fact, this violence increased, with rights activists documenting 600 incidents of communal violence (including 43 deaths) during Modi’s first 300 days in office.531

So, why does Hindu nationalist militant activity continue despite the BJP’s inclusion in democratic political processes and its status as the dominant political party in India?

Compared to the other cases, this provides an opportunity to test the hypotheses in conditions where the religious movement being examined is 1) Not fully consolidated but represented by a family of organizations, 2) religiously affiliated with

Hinduism, and 3) part of the religious majority in the country. This chapter will begin with a brief description of the evolution of Hindu nationalism (or “Hindutva”) before testing each of the four hypotheses about retention of militancy. It includes information from Indian news sources, archives of Hindutva organizations, historical

531 Singh, Jas. 2015. “India’s Right Turn.” World Policy Journal 32(2): 93-103.

182 research, and Indian scholarship. It also includes an interview with Amir Ullah Khan, an economist whose work for the Indian government brought him into contact with

Hindutva leaders, and an interview with a source based in Delhi who prefers to remain anonymous. Each hypothesis will be tested to uncover which hypothesized necessary conditions are present and which factors best explain Hindu nationalist militancy in

India.

Hindu Nationalism in India

The term, Hindutva, first offered by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in the 1920s, equates religious and national identity.532 It defines an Indian as a Hindu, essentially placing other Indian religious communities, such as Christians and Muslims, outside of Indian national identity. Proponents of Hindutva believe that India should be ruled by Hindus as a Hindu rashtra (state). Hindu nationalism has its roots in the confrontation between colonial Europeans and Indians who wanted to develop their own national identity.533 Under British rule in the early 1900s, Hindu revivalism in organizations such as the Hindu Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj was popular, even

532 Van der Veer, Peter. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. University of California Press. 1994. P.1

533 A.T. “What Hindu nationalism means,” The Economist, May 19, 2014.

183 though it sometimes led to Hindu-Muslim riots.534 Despite Gandhi’s efforts to support a Hindu-Muslim alliance, relations between Hindus and Muslims in India deteriorated during his noncooperation campaign. According to Stuart Kaufman, this was partly because Gandhi’s use of religious language and symbols alienated

Muslims, especially since they were also used by Hindu nationalists.535 For example,

Gandhi associated the myth of a Hindu golden age (Ram Raj) with his goal of independence. This symbol became used by Hindu nationalists who attacked mosques while evoking appeals to Ram Raj (which had been depicted as a time of peace due to the vanquishing of lower castes and non-Hindus).536 The legend of Ram Raj will be explored as part of testing the fourth hypothesis about myths and sacred histories.

Hindu-Muslim relations also deteriorated due to the rise of communal violence in the 1920s. In the Malabar region of southern India, an insurgency against the

British was transformed into Hindu-Muslim fighting.537 In August 1921, Muslim

Moplahs in this region initiated a rebellion that killed both British officials and Hindu

534 Kaufman, Stuart J. and Michael C. Grillo. “Chapter 5: Gandhi’s Nonviolence, Communal Conflict, and the Salt March,” Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015. P.151

535 Ibid. 161.

536 Ibid.

537 Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. Yale University Press. 2003. P. 142

184 landlords.538 When Congress leaders lost control over the movement, Muslim clerics who had joined to protest against the British treatment of the caliph in Turkey became the principal leaders and fought based on religious motivations to revive the Turkish caliphate.539 Some Hindus responded to these attacks by aiding the British against the rebellion. In return, the Moplahs committed more atrocities that resulted in an estimated six hundred Hindus killed and 2,500 forcibly converted. Thousands of

Moplahs were later killed when the British suppressed the revolt. Arya Samaj leader,

Swami Shraddhanand, denounced the attacks on Hindus in Malabar and began arguing that it was necessary to undertake reclamation (reconversion of Islamized Hindus) in order to preserve Hinduism.540 This initiative helped bring an explicitly anti-Muslim tone to communalist organizations Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a third communalist organization, was founded in 1925 by K.B. Hedgewar. Hedgewar was mentored by V.D. Savarkar,

538Kaufman, Stuart J. and Michael C. Grillo. “Chapter 5: Gandhi’s Nonviolence, Communal Conflict, and the Salt March,” Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015. P.162.

539 Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. Yale University Press. 2003. P. 142

540 Kaufman, Stuart J. and Michael C. Grillo. “Chapter 5: Gandhi’s Nonviolence, Communal Conflict, and the Salt March,” Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015. P. 163.

185 who wrote a pamphlet in 1928 titled, “Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?”541 For Savarkar, a

Hindu is someone who regards India as both the land of their ancestors and the land in which their religion originated. Savarkar’s definition is not a religious one. Instead, it blends cultural, religious, and national identity. Dhananjay Keer, the official biographer of Savarkar, described how the RSS was envisioned at its early stages. He wrote,

Before starting the volunteer organization known as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Hedgewar had a long discussion with Savarkar over the faith, form and future of the organization. A great Hindu leader and an unbending upright nationalist, Hedgewar wanted to conserve and direct the energy of Hindu youth towards all-round uplift of the Hindu Nation. After the collapse of the Non-cooperation Movement of Gandhi and the fiasco of the Khilafat Movement, the country lay prostrate, and chaos and confusion reigned in the student world. In the wake of this confusion and in consultation with Savarkar and others, Hedgewar decided to build up an organization to supply Hindu society with power and pillars.542

Hedgewar formed the RSS with the goal of propagating these views among the younger generation.543 He aimed to disseminate his views (and those of Savarkar) on the Hindu Rashtra (or “Hindu nation”). Hindus encounter the RSS in daily life through its shakhas (branches) in which members engage in regular meetings that include

541 Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969.

542 Keer, Dhananjay. Veer Savarkar, Popular Prakashan. 1966. P.171

543 Ibid.

186 cultural activities, political discussion and physical exercises such as yoga and martial arts. As of 2016, the RSS held 56,859 shakhas at 36,867 locations throughout India.544

In 1947, the violent partition of India created Pakistan. This outraged many

Hindu nationalists. Savarkar and members of the Hindu Mahasabha accused Gandhi of appeasing the Muslims. The partition of their homeland and the expulsion of

Hindus from their ancestral homes in Pakistan stirred anger towards the Congress and

Muslims as a whole. This resulted in a boost in RSS membership from 76,000 in 1943 to 600,000 in 1948.545 Hindu nationalists were also infuriated over Gandhi’s demand that the Indian government pay 550 million rupees to Pakistan as compensation for losses related to the Partition. On January 31, 1948, Gandhi was assassinated by

Nathu Ram Godse, a member of the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha. According to

Hindutva critic Shamsul Islam, Gandhi was killed because he, “did not subscribe to the Hindutva vision.”546 Savarkar was also arrested and the RSS was temporarily banned before it was determined that they were not linked to the conspirators.

544 “Highest growth ever: RSS adds 5,000 new shakhas in last 12 months.” The Indian Express. March 16, 2016. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/rss- uniform-over-5000-new-shakhas-claims-rss/.

545 Ahmed, Ishtiaq. 2002. “The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in India and Pakistan.” Asian Ethnicity 3(1): 9-28.

546 Islam, Shamsul. “The New Right is Wrong.” The Indian Express. January 24, 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/hindutva-right-wing-bjp-alt- right-4488349.

187 In the 1960s, more avenues of Hindu nationalism appeared. The Vishwa

Hindu Parishad (VHP) was founded in 1964 by RSS leaders M.S. Golwalkar and S.S.

Apte in collaboration with the Hindu spiritual leader Chinmayananda. As a non- political organization, the VHP’s main objective is to, “to organise, consolidate the

Hindu society and to serve, protect the Hindu Dharma.”547 Its Hindu nationalist views include opposition to cow slaughter and conversions to other religions as well as the defense of Hindus around the world. In 1964, Golwalkar published his book, Bunch of

Thoughts, with the purpose of clarifying the nature of the RSS and its activities.

Considered a “Bible for RSS cadres,”548 the book begins by celebrating India and

Hinduism, before demonizing those Indians not born into the Hindu faith.

Golwalkar’s chapter titled, “Internal Threats,” is about Muslims, Christians, and

Communists. This chapter calls into question the patriotism of these groups and warns about their, “future aggressive designs on our country.”549 Golwalkar also asserted that, “hostile elements within the country pose a far greater menace to national security than aggressors from outside.”550 According to Shamsul Islam, these writings

547Vishwa Hindu Parishad Homepage. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://vhp.org/swagatam.

548 Islam, Shamsul. Undoing India the RSS Way, Media House, 2002. P. 32.

549 Guha, Ramachandra. “The Guru of Hate.” The Hindu. March 26, 2012 http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundaymagazine/the-guru-of- hate/article3232784.ece.

550 Ibid.

188 were used by the VHP to justify the killing of Muslims during the 2002 Gujarat riots.551 Golwalker was the second Saranghchalak (supreme leader) of the RSS after

Hedgewar, and he led the organization until his death in 1973.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was officially formed in 1980, under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and L.K. Advani, as the new political wing of the

RSS.552 Translated as the “Indian People's Party,” it adheres to cultural nationalism and is the most significant member of a family of organizations known as the “Sangh

Parivar.” “Sangh Parivar” refers to the network of Hindu nationalist organizations which have been inspired by the RSS. The BJP was the successor of the Bharatiya

Jana Sangh (BJS), which was founded by Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookherjee in 1951.

The goal of the BJS was to stem the growing political power of the Indian National

Congress (INC), “which was said to have initiated a number of compromises in the questions of political and cultural integrity and unity of India, such as appeasement policy for Muslims.”553 In the 1977 elections, the BJS merged with three other political organizations to form the Janata Party. When this party collapsed in 1979

551 Islam, Shamsul. Undoing India the RSS Way, Media House, 2002. P. 33.

552 “Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),” Elections.in. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.elections.in/political-parties-in-india/bharatiya-janata-party.html.

553 Ibid.

189 due to internal fractionalism and political chaos, the BJP was formed. At its founding, the BJP consisted primarily of members of these former parties.554

In addition to cultural and political activities, there are also Hindu groups in

India which practice militant religious nationalism. Shiv Sena is one such organization, although its brand of Hindu nationalism differs from that of the Sangh

Parivar. Shiv Sena can best be understood as part of a trend of “subnationalism” in

South Asia. According to Prerna Singh, subnations are defined as political units that do not seek sovereign statehood but aspire for political autonomy within a sovereign state.555 Taking a constructivist view of identity, Singh argues that subnationalism is created by elites who compete for political power through use of cultural symbols.

Subnationalism becomes entrenched in the broader population through socio-political movements and institutionalization.556 Like nationalism, subnationalism emphasizes language as an important element of homogeneity. According to anthropologist

Clifford Geertz, this “linguism” has “been particularly intense in the Indian subcontinent.”557 It has been a key factor in the Tamil nationalist movement in Sri

554 “Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),” Elections.in. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.elections.in/political-parties-in-india/bharatiya-janata-party.html.

555 Singh, Prerna. 2015. “Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States.” World Politics. 67(3): 507-508.

556 Ibid. 508.

557 Geertz, Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures. Basic Books. 1973. P.262

190 Lanka, the successful nationalist movement in Bangladesh (literally “the homeland of the Bengali speakers”), and several linguistic movements in Pakistan.558 Shiv Sena’s subnationalist ideology emerged from linguistic struggles in India after independence in which the Marathi-speaking people led a popular struggle to align state borders along linguistic boundaries.559 In 1960, this resulted in the division between Gujarat and Maharashtra, the state inhabited by the Marathi people.

Shiv Sena (translated “Army of Shivaji”) was formed in 1966 as a pro-Marathi political party, but it gradually transitioned to a broader Hindu nationalist agenda, aligning with the BJP. From the beginning, Shiv Sena gained a reputation for violence.

Its early militant activity included an attack on the Communist Party office in 1967, the murder of Communist MLA Krishna Desai, assaults on South Indian restaurants and street hawkers, and its involvement in the 1971 Bhiwandi riots and the Belgaum border clashes.560 In the 1990s, Shiv Sena supporters began shouting at rallies, “Say with pride, that we are Hindu,” in Hindi rather than Marathi.561 This chant was indicative of a shift towards Hindu nationalism. Shiv Sena, which had become

558 Singh, Prerna. 2015. “Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States.” World Politics. 67(3): 508.

559 Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod, Uday Singh Mehta, and Usha Thakkar. 1997. “The Rebirth of Shiv Sena: The Symbiosis of Discursive and Organizational Power.” The Journal of Asian Studies. 56(2): 373.

560 Ibid. 374.

561 Ibid. 371.

191 politically stagnant and unable to hold more than a limited role in Bombay (now

“Mumbai”) city politics, decided to shift its ideological emphasis, “from a

Maharashtrian ethnic appeal to a pan-Hindu religious appeal – linking the party to the already expanding discourse of Hindutva.”562 This resulted in electoral success for

Shiv Sena. Meanwhile, the BJP benefits from this alliance because of Shiv Sena’s organizational strength and capacity to lead local activities. This alliance has been fraught with tension, including years in which the alliance broke down.563 However, this symbiotic relationship managed to last for three decades.

This relationship with the BJP has been maintained despite Shiv Sena’s continued violent activities. For example, in 2003 Shiv Sena activists attempted to stop a cricket match between India and Pakistan by damaging the stadium. They

“entered the stadium with cans filled with mobil oil in a bid to set the pitch on fire so that it could not be prepared again on time for the match.”564 In 2009, after IBN TV

562 Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod, Uday Singh Mehta, and Usha Thakkar. 1997. “The Rebirth of Shiv Sena: The Symbiosis of Discursive and Organizational Power.” The Journal of Asian Studies. 56(2): 387.

563 “Shiv-Sena and BJP Alliance Breaks, Maharashtra Polls Wide Open.” The Citizen Bureau. September 25, 2014. http://www.thecitizen.in/. And Sawant, Sanjay. “Shiv Sena decides to end alliance with BJP for 2019 LS, Maharashtra polls: Move likely to benefit Congress, NCP.” First Post. January 24, 2018. http://www.firstpost.com/politics/.

564 “Shiv Sena activists damage cricket pitch.” Silicon India. December 18, 2003. https://www.siliconindia.com/shownews/Shiv_Sena_activists_damage_cricket_pitch- nid-22229-cid-Top.html.

192 news channels criticized party leader Bal Thackeray, a mob of Shiv Sena activists attacked and vandalized their offices.565 In another act of anti-Pakistan violence, Shiv

Sena activists attacked the headquarters of the Board of Control for Cricket in India

(BCCI) in 2015 attempting to prevent a meeting between the BCCI chief and his

Pakistan counterpart, Shaharyar Khan.566 Shouting anti-Pakistan slogans and holding posters that read “Shahryar Khan go back,” Shiv Sena protestors crashed through the gates of the office. Still, Shiv Sena works with the BJP as a proponent of Hindu nationalism.

The Bajrang Dal is another group which practices militant Hindu nationalism.

As the youth wing of the VHP, it is a member of the Sangh Parivar family of organizations. Founded in 1984 in Uttar Pradesh, the Bajrang Dal runs about 2,500 akhadas (similar to RSS shakhas) and claims to have over a million members. The

VHP’s website describes the BJP as a “security ring of Hindu society,” stating

Whenever there is an attack on Hindu Society, Faith and Religion, the workers of Bajrang Dal come forward for their rescue. Hindu Society and its faith are being kicked and insulted by various forces for the last fourteen hundred years. Demolitions of more than 3,000 temples, fraudulent or forceful conversion of

565 “In the name of their Boss, Sena goons attack IBN TV channels.” The Indian Express. November 21, 2009. http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/time-for-cnn-ibn- to-introspect/544428/.

566 “Shiv Sena activists storm BCCI HQ over Shaharyar-Manohar meeting.” Dawn News. October 19, 2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1214126.

193 crores of Hindus were the main tactics of these forces. Bajrang Dal endeavors to put up resistance by democratic means against these forces.567 While the Bajrang Dal officially claims not to condone violence, it has nevertheless participated in violent activity for the issues central to Hindu nationalism. Bajrang Dal organizes firearms training in its camps and schools, which it claims are for the purpose of “self-defense.”568 The main goals of the Bajrang Dal include building a

Ram temple in Ayodhya, preventing cow slaughter, and protecting India’s “Hindu” identity. In 2016, the Bajrang Dal controversially held one of its firearms training camps in Ayodhya.569 The Bajrang Dal has been involved in numerous instances of

Hindu nationalist violence, including the Babri mosque demolition and the 2002

Gujarat violence.570 Its other violent activities have included mosque bombings,571 the

567 “Bajrang Dal.” Vishva Hindu Parishad Official Website. Accessed March 7, 2018. http://vhp.org/vhp-glance/youth/dim1-bajrang-dal/.

568 “Bajrang Dal organises firearms training, UP Governor Ram Naik defends action.” The Economic Times. May 24, 2016. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/bajrang-dal-organises- firearms-training-up-governor-ram-naik-defends-action/articleshow/52420249.cms.

569 Ibid.

570 “Bajrang Dal leader held for carnage in Gujarat.” The Hindu. May 29, 2002. http://www.thehindu.com/2002/05/29/stories/2002052903501100.htm.

571 Swami, Praveen and Anupama Katakam. “Malegaon: the road to perdition.” The Hindu. March 22, 2012. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/malegaon- the-road-to-perdition/article3072855.ece.

194 1999 burning of an Australian Christian missionary and his children,572 and attacks against suspected beef transporters.573

A third militant Hindu nationalist organization is Hindu Yuva Vahini (HYV).

Founded in 2002, this group is a Hindu youth militia that was created by BJP legislator Yogi Adityanath.574 A member of parliament for the Gorakhpur constituency since 1998, Yogi Adityanath adheres to an aggressive Hindutva agenda that includes participation in communal violence. In a 2009 interview, he boasted about the loyalty of his followers, “When I ask them to rise and protect our Hindu culture, they obey. If I ask for blood, they will give me blood.”575 He further pledged,

“I will not stop till I turn UP [Uttar Pradesh] and India into a Hindu rashtra.”576 The

HYV’s violent activities have included actions such as inciting the 2005 Mau riots

572 “Attacks Across the Country.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed March 7, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/indiachr/christians8-05.htm.

573 Singh, Santosh. “BJP, Bajrang Dal in Bihar beef attack: ‘Our govt now’” The Indian Express. August 5, 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/bjp-bajrang- dal-in-bihar-beef-attack-our-government-now-4783104/.

574 Graff, Violette and Juliette Galonnier. “Hindu-Muslim Communal Riots in India II (1986-2011).” Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence. SciencesPo. August 20, 2013. P.30

575 Mohan, Rohini. 2009. “‘When I Ask Them To Rise And Protect Our Hindu Culture, They Obey Me’” Tehelka Magazine. Volume 6, Issue 6.

576 Ibid.

195 against the alleged murderer of BJP member Mukhtar Ansari.577 Nine deaths were officially recorded from this riot.578 Additionally, in January 2007, Adityanath and

130 others were arrested for burning mosques, homes, buses and trains in Gorakhpur as retaliation for an alleged attack on the Gorakhpur temple.579

Together, these organizations form a sort of pyramid with the RSS at the top, followed by the BJP and other more radical / militant organizations such as the VHP,

Bajrang Dal, and HYV. While Shiv Sena did not originate from the Sangh Parivar, its alliance with the BJP and shared ideology make it a fellow Hindutva organization.

The overlapping membership and shared Hindutva agenda among the Sangh Parivar organizations means that Hindutva must be conceptually understood as a single movement in India. When I asked Amir Khan whether he believed Hindutva should be understood as one movement, he replied, “Absolutely. All fringe elements view Modi as God and seek legitimacy from all that he does.”580 BJP member and Prime Minister

Narendra Modi is a prime example of the overlapping membership between Sangh

577 “Mukhtar Ansari appears in court in Mau riots case.” The Hindu. March 22, 2012. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-otherstates/mukhtar-ansari- appears-in-court-in-mau-riots-case/article3119044.ece.

578 Graff, Violette and Juliette Galonnier. “Hindu-Muslim Communal Riots in India II (1986-2011).” Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence. SciencesPo. August 20, 2013. P. 30.

579 Mohan, Rohini. 2009. “‘When I Ask Them To Rise And Protect Our Hindu Culture, They Obey Me’” Tehelka Magazine. Volume 6, Issue 6.

580 Khan, Amir Ullah. Personal Interview. February 3, 2018.

196 Parivar organizations. His roots are in the RSS, which he joined at 17 years old before rising through the ranks to become an RSS pracharak (preacher).581

My anonymous source from Delhi confirmed this assessment about the movement, stating, “all Sangh Parivar constituents adhere (put faith in) to the broader strategic goal of Hindu Rashtra.”582 This source went on to accuse BJP leaders of collusion with militant groups, referencing Modi’s involvement in the 2002 Gujarat riots and arguing, “There are instances around the country where BJP’s political leaders are seen colluding with Hindu militant outfits. At the same time national level leaders maintained a disposition of tacit agreement to the politics of Hindutva militancy.”583 Consolidation of this movement is not as hierarchical as the case of

Hezbollah and Shia Islamism in Lebanon. However, even though leaders in the BJP do not have direct control over militant elements (like the Secretary-General has over

Hezbollah), these organizations often align their strategies in pursuit of the same goals. The first hypothesis will test how successful the BJP has been pursing such

Hindu nationalist goals through legal avenues.

581 “Narendra Modi: Pracharak to PM.” The Times of India. May 17, 2014. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/Narendra-Modi-Pracharak-to- PM/articleshow/35235189.cms.

582 Anonymous. Personal interview. February 16, 2018.

583 Ibid.

197 Hypothesis 1 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if their goals cannot be achieved through legal avenues.

In order to test this hypothesis, I will first examine the goals of Hindu nationalist groups in India, such as the BJP and the RSS. Then, I will determine to what extent the BJP, as the major political party representing Hindu nationalism, has successfully pursued these goals through legal avenues.

Hindu Nationalist Objectives

While the BJP today includes several areas of interest (as noted in its “India

Development Plan”584), it continues to be distinguished by its Hindu nationalist policy goals. On its website, the BJP declares that, like the RSS, the party is, “wedded to

India’s unity and integrity, its intrinsic identity and the social strength, individual character and cultural uniqueness that have been the hallmark of this great country and its people for millennia.”585 The emphasis on India’s “unity and integrity,” is reminiscent of nationalist appeals against Partition and opposition to “minority

584 “Development Plan.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/core-issues/development-plan.

585 “About the Party.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/about-the-party.

198 safeguards” that Hindu nationalists view as dangerous for national cohesion.586 Is this what the BJP meant to signal with its word choice? Indeed, Savarkar and the RSS bitterly opposed the partition of India.587 Redefining secularism, BJP members assert that all Indians should be “culturally” Hindu, even if they are not religiously subscribed to Hinduism. The BJP websites continues, “Hindu identity and culture

[are] the mainstay of the Indian nation and of Indian society. This identity and this culture informs all Indians, irrespective of religious or denominational faith.”588

Scholars such as Ranbir Singh, Karamvir Singh, and Naidu Ashok argue that secularism faces difficulty in India due to the rise of Hindutva and attempts to shift the definition of secularism.589

Despite attempts to portray Hindutva goals as aligning with certain interpretations of secularism, the objective of making India a “Hindu Rashtra” in which everyone is “culturally” Hindu faces roadblocks of constitutionality and culture.

586 Bajpai, Rochana. “Chapter 3: Nationalist Discourse and Group Rights: A Conceptual Approach.” Debating Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India. Oxford University. 2011.

587 Chitkara, M.G. Hindutva Parivar. A.P.H. Publishing Corporation. 2003. P.12

588 “About the Party.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/about-the-party.

589 Singh, Ranbir and Karamvir Singh (2008). “Secularism in India: Challenges and Its Future.” The Indian Journal of Political Science, 69(3): 597-607. And Ashok, Naidu (2007). “Secularism Re-Examined.” The Indian Journal of Political Science, 68(3):607-614.

199 India’s constitution enshrines religious freedom and prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.590 In 1976, the 42nd amendment added the term “secular” to the preamble, declaring India a “Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic.”591

This can be contrasted with the case of Shia Islamism in Lebanon, in which government is explicitly divided according to confession, or to Sri Lanka where

Buddhist nationalists succeeded in granting special importance to Buddhism in their constitution. Hindu nationalists may aspire to match the success of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists who managed to declare Buddhism the state religion.592 According to the

2011 census, about 80 percent of Indians are Hindus, 14 percent Muslim, 2 percent

Christian, and 2 percent Sikh.593 India’s religious diversity and secular values pose a challenge for proponents of Hindutva who aim to impose Hindu culture.

To evaluate the BJP’s success in achieving its Hindu nationalist goals, it is important to separate its more generic political goals from those which are characteristic of Hindu nationalism. As the current dominant political party in India,

590 The Constitution of India. Part III Fundamental Rights: Right to Freedom of Religion. http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-4March2016.pdf.

591 The Constitution of India. Preamble. http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi- english/coi-4March2016.pdf.

592 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.41.

593 Religion Census 2011. Census Organization of India. https://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php.

200 the BJP’s platform contains objectives which sweep across multiple issue areas and are meant to appeal to the broader Indian population. On its website, the BJP outlines its eight point “Development Plan.” The eight focus areas are, “Strengthening the federal structure, agriculture reforms, urban development and infrastructure, healthcare, children and women's empowerment, inflation control, anti-corruption measures and education and job opportunities for youth.”594 Due to the BJP’s domination of Indian government, the majority of these goals reflect general aims for good governance and development in India. Modi has even coined a phrase for inclusive development, “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas” (Together with all, Development for all).

Still, within these general development goals, the influence of Hindu nationalism is present. This is apparent in Modi’s “Vision” for India. This vision includes seven key themes, listed as “India's Culture, Agriculture, Women, Natural

Resources, Youth power, Democracy and Knowledge.”595 A BJP publication places the first theme, “India’s rich cultural heritage,” in the position of highest importance

(See Fig.6).

594 “Development Plan.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/core-issues/development-plan.

595 “Vision of Modi.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://fb.bjp.org/en/core-issues/vision-of-modi.

201 Figure 6 Modi’s Vision for India

(Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. http://www.bjp.org/core-issues/vision-of-modi?u=rainbow-of-

india.)

In the “Rainbow of India,” that describes Modi’s seven key focus areas, the theme of culture is depicted in the highest and largest graphical representation. This theme is described as, “the multicultural identity of India and its family values and

202 traditions.”596 This political language is an example of the difficulty the BJP faces in simultaneously demonstrating public respect for other cultures within India, while maintaining that all Indians should be culturally Hindu.597 The Hindu nationalist aspect of this theme is its focus on the “family values and traditions” of India. It signals that India’s cultural identity is Modi’s highest concern.

These cultural considerations drive BJP policy and Hindu nationalist objectives. The main Hindu nationalist goals examined in this chapter pertain to 1) prevention of cow slaughter, 2) anti-Pakistan foreign policy, 3) protection of Hindus in

Jammu and Kashmir and integration of this state within India, and 4) the pursuit of a uniform civil code. The BJP’s ability (or lack thereof) to pursue these goals through legal channels will determine the strength of the first hypothesis. India’s democratic political system and the political power of the BJP provide Hindu nationalists ample opportunity to influence public policy. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit,

India’s 2016 Democracy Index was 7.81.598 This places it within the category

“Flawed democracy” (the same category in which the United States currently resides).

India’s highest score (9.58) pertained to “Electoral process and pluralism,” while its

596 “Rainbow of India.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/core-issues/vision-of-modi?u=rainbow-of-india.

597 “About the Party.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/about-the-party.

598 “Democracy Index 2016.” The Economist Intelligence Unit. https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index.

203 lowest score (5.63) was ascribed to “Political culture.” The Indian government contains legitimate avenues for policy-making. Parliament comprises two Houses: the

Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of the People).599 The

Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950, and the first elected

Parliament was formed two years later. India has a history of coalition governments.

In fact, from 1989-2014, no single party held a majority.600 This changed when the sixteenth Lok Sabha was elected in May 2014. Now, the BJP holds a majority, with

281 seats out of 545.601 The BJP’s National Democratic Alliance holds more seats in the Rajya Sabha than any other political bloc.

Still, the BJP’s political successes mainly consist of issues that are not necessarily influenced by Hindu nationalism. For example, listed among the BJP’s greatest accomplishments are the creation of organizations such as the Bharatiya

Janata Yuva Morcha (BJYM), which battles corruption and unemployment, and the development of a BJP wing to address women’s issues.602 BJP member Rajnath

599 “Indian Parliament.” India.gov.in National Portal of India. Accessed October 31, 2017. https://india.gov.in/my-government/indian-parliament.

600 “India gets 10th coalition govt in 20 yrs.” NDTV Elections. May 19, 2009. https://www.ndtv.com/elections-news/india-gets-10th-coalition-govt-in-20-yrs- 394540.

601 “Parliament of India.” Lok Sabha Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://loksabha.nic.in.

602 “Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),” Elections.in. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.elections.in/political-parties-in-india/bharatiya-janata-party.html.

204 Singh has been heralded for passing the Anti-Copying Act (which targeted cheating during examinations) when he was Education minister in 1992.603 Even though this legislation was contentious (facing repeal a year later before being reinstated in 1998), it is not a particularly Hindu nationalist success. The BJP-led NDA government also undertook major infrastructural development projects like the Golden Quadrilateral network of National highways as well as the North South East West Corridor.604

Again, the BJP’s successes regarding development in India do not necessarily translate to fulfillment of the cultural objectives of India’s Hindu nationalists such as cow slaughter, Pakistan policy, Jammu and Kashmir, and a uniform civil code.

Banning Cow Slaughter

Banning cow slaughter has long been an objective of the RSS. The Akhil

Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (ABPS) is the highest body for policy formulation and decision making in the RSS. At its 1952 annual meeting, this organization declared:

The issue of cow protection is not merely an economic question for our country; it is a point of cultural sanctity and a symbol of our national oneness…This Sabha wishes to remind the rulers once again through an organized expression of nation-wide public protest, of their sacred duty to protect the bovine species. The Sabha calls upon the Swayamsevaks to

603 “Shri Rajnath Singh.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/leadership/shri-rajnath-singh?u=biography.

604 “Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),” Elections.in. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.elections.in/political-parties-in-india/bharatiya-janata-party.html.

205 organise meetings, processions and such other programmes with a view to giving a powerful expression to the feelings of millions all over the country and thus make it obligatory upon our democratic Government to bow to the will of the people and impose a total ban on the slaughter of cow and her species.605

Over the years, the RSS continued to release statements against cow slaughter, even calling for a “Constitutional Amendment for Cow protection” in 1960.606

Still, cow slaughter is one area in which the BJP’s power is notably limited.

This is because legislation regarding this issue must occur at the state level.

Therefore, there are several states where Hindu nationalists cannot successfully ban cow slaughter, despite the rise of the BJP elsewhere. States in India have varying regulations on cattle slaughter, including complete bans (in the majority of states), allowance of certain types of cattle slaughter with a certificate, and some states in which there is no ban at all.607 The states in which cow slaughter is legal are: Kerala,

West Bengal, and some smaller states (Arunachal, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Nagaland,

605 “A.B.P.S. 1952: Ban On Cow Slaughter.” Archives of RSS. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions/1950%20-%201960/966657.htm.

606 “A.B.K.M. 1960 : Constitutional Amendment for Cow protection.” Archives of RSS. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions/1950%20-%201960/966390.htm.

607 “States Where Cow Slaughter is Banned So Far, and States Where it Isn’t.” News18.com, May 26, 2017. http://www.news18.com/news/india/states-where-cow- slaughter-is-banned-so-far-and-states-where-it-isnt-1413425.html.

206 Tripura, and Sikkim).608 Most of these states are in India’s North Eastern Region, which has a lower concentration of Hindus than other regions. These are all states in which Hindu nationalists and the BJP do not have effective political power to implement their cow protection agenda. In the Kerala legislature, the BJP’s coalition,

National Democratic Alliance (NDA), holds only one seat out of 140.609 In the West

Bengal legislature, the BJP hold only 3 seats out of 294.610 The BJP also holds only

11 out of 60 seats in Arunachal and two out of 59 seats in Nagaland. In Mizoram,

Meghalaya, Tripora, and Sikkim, the BJP does not hold any seats in the legislative assembly. In these states, Hindu nationalists are unable to wield democratic political power.

In May 2017, the BJP government attempted to impose wide-reaching restrictions on cow slaughter. This included banning the sale of cows for slaughter at

“animal markets” and requiring those who wish to buy or sell cows for other purposes to undergo a certification process. The sellers must state that the animals have not been “brought to the market for sale for slaughter,” and buyers must “verify they are agriculturalists and declare that they will not sell the animal/s for a period of six

608 “The states where cow slaughter is legal in India.” The Indian Express. October 8, 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-no-beef-nation.

609 “Kerala.” Mathrubhumi. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.mathrubhumi.com/result/election2016/en/index.html.

610 “West Bengal (WB) Elections Results 2016.” Elections.in. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.elections.in/west-bengal.

207 months from the date of purchase.”611 According to BJP leader Nalin Kohli, “the state governments can decide on the cow slaughter ban keeping in view the local food habits.”612 This effort to regulate cow slaughter on a national level is meeting resistance in four Northeastern states which are set to hold assembly elections in 2018

(Meghalaya, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Tripora).613 Meghalaya, Nagaland and

Mizoram all have a majority Christian population. According to data released by the

National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) three years ago, “all eight North- eastern states except Tripura were among the top 10 most frequent consumers of beef or buffalo in the country.”614 Leaders in these states criticized the BJP’s legislation, with some declaring they will not implement it. Even in Tripora, where only 4 percent of the population consumes beef or buffalo meat, members of government have said

611 “New restrictions on cattle slaughter.” The Hindu. May 26, 2017. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/government-bans-sale-purchase-of-cattle- from-animal-markets-for-slaughter/article18585018.ece.

612 “Cow slaughter ban has to be decided by states, not centre: BJP.” The Indian Express. July 14, 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/cow-slaughter-ban-has- to-be-decided-by-states-not-centre-bjp-4683216.

613 Parashar, Utpal. “Cattle slaughter ban: BJP risks losing allies, party leaders in Northeast over cow rule.” Hindustan Times. May 31, 2017. http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/.

614 Ibid.

208 they will not put the new cattle rules into effect.615 The Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis would suggest that Hindu nationalists in these states would be more likely to engage in violence due to political exclusion. However, it is also important to consider that violent mobilization requires social networks and institutions which are stronger in Hindutva-dominated states.

Many Hindu nationalists resort to militancy in the name of cow protection throughout India. Even in states with cow protection regulations in place, suspicions and lack of faith in the judicial system breed mob violence. Mob killings of Muslims and Dalits (members of India’s lowest caste), suspected of killing cows or eating beef have been increasingly frequent.616 In September 2015, a Hindu mob attacked a 50- year-old Muslim man on suspicion of eating beef. He was dragged from his home and beaten to death.617 This attack occurred over a year after Modi and the BJP assumed power. In fact, incidents of cow protection violence increased under Modi.618 In

August 2016, four Dalits accused of killing a cow were brutally beaten by a crowd of

615 Parashar, Utpal. “Cattle slaughter ban: BJP risks losing allies, party leaders in Northeast over cow rule.” Hindustan Times. May 31, 2017. http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/.

616 “Vigilante Justice in India.” The New York Times. May 28, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/opinion/vigilante-justice-in-india.html.

617 Miller, Michael E. “A mob in India just dragged a man from his home and beat him to death — for eating beef.” The Washington Post. September 30, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/.

618 Ibid.

209 Hindu cow vigilantes. While Prime Minister Modi spoke out against this attack, he has remained silent since then, despite increasing mob violence. In May 2017, the

New York Times placed partial blame on the BJP for, “encouraging Hindu furor over the slaughter of cows.”619

Often, groups of Hindu cow vigilantes intercept trucks carrying cattle which they believe are headed for slaughter. In June 2017, these vigilantes attacked five trucks carrying 80 head of cattle in the western state of Rajasthan.620 The cows were being taken for a BJP flagship cattle breeding program, but the vigilantes refused to accept that the transporters had permits. They attacked the transporters and attempted to set fire to one of the trucks.621 In India, organized Hindu “cattle patrols” lie in wait for smugglers’ trucks carrying cows.622 Vijendra Singh, a member of one of dozens of cow protection squads operating across India, declared “Either we die or they die.

But we won’t let anyone eat beef here.”623 The chief of the cow protection quad in

Ramgarh town in Rajasthan noted that their work is easier under a BJP government

619 “Vigilante Justice in India.” The New York Times. May 28, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/opinion/vigilante-justice-in-india.html.

620 Singh, Harsha Kumari. “Rajasthan Vigilantes Try To Burn Truck Of Cows Meant For Central Scheme.” NDTV. June 12, 2017. http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/.

621 Ibid.

622Lakshmi, Rama. “Hindu ‘cattle patrols’ in India seek to protect cows from beef eaters.” The Washington Post. October 28, 2015.

623 Ibid.

210 because the police take their complaints about cow smuggling seriously.624 Still, the patchwork beef laws across India and the prevalence of cow smuggling cause Hindu cow protectors to turn to militancy.

According to an IndiaSpend content analysis of the English media, 97% of the cow-related violence over the past seven years occurred since Modi’s government came to power in May 2014.625 Additionally, about half of the cases occurred in states governed by the BJP.626 This signals that Hindu cow protectors are turning to violence not only in states where the BJP lacks government representation. Even in states the BJP controls, these cow protectors do not have faith that the law will be adequately enforced. During the period of the study, the only incident reported in the northeast was the murder of two men in Assam on 30 April, 2017.627 Despite its location in the Northeast, Assam is currently dominated by the BJP.628 Lower levels of cow-related violence in the northeast could also be attributed to smaller Hindu

624 Lakshmi, Rama. “Hindu ‘cattle patrols’ in India seek to protect cows from beef eaters.” The Washington Post. October 28, 2015.

625 Abraham, Delna and Ojaswi Rao. “97% cow-related attacks after PM Modi came to power in 2014.” Business Standard. June 29, 2017. http://www.business- standard.com/article/current-affairs/.

626 Ibid.

627 Ibid.

628 “Hate Crime: Cow-related Violence in India.” IndiaSpend. Accessed March 3, 2018. http://data.indiaspend.com/hate-crime.

211 populations in these states. The study also noted that the year 2017 was the worst year since 2010 for cow-related violence.629

Cow-related violence may also be prevalent in states controlled by the BJP because collective violence requires organizations to mobilize people and signals of impunity from leadership.630 While Hindu nationalists cannot wield political power in the Northeastern states (which could motivate violence due to lack of legal avenues), they also have less organizational power to mobilize people in these states. The

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCR), a think tank based in New Delhi, released a chronology of communal riots in India from 1947-2003.631 While the

IndiaSpend analysis includes information on all cow-related violence since 2010, this chronology provides historical information on communal riots (which would require greater organization than solitary acts of violence). This broader chronology noted four instances of communal riots that were cow-related. Two occurred in Maharashtra

629 Saldanha, Alison. “2017 Deadliest Year For Cow-Related Hate Crime Since 2010, 86% Of Those Killed Muslim.” IndiaSpend. December 8, 2017. http://www.indiaspend.com/cover-story/2017-deadliest-year-for-cow-related-hate- crime-since-2010-86-of-those-killed-muslim-12662.

630 Horowitz, Donald. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. University of California Press. 2001. P.326.

631 Rajeshwari, B. “Communal Riots in India: A Chronology (1947-2003).” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCR). March 2004.

212 (1968 and 1983), one occurred in Assam (1968), and one in Haryana (2002).632 While the BJP and its predecessors were not yet in control of these states during their riots,

Hindutva organizations were starting to take hold. Today, they are all BJP-controlled.

Additionally, Shiv Sena was founded in Maharashtra two years before its 1968 riots, and the Janata Party (which later merged in the BJP) led the state’s opposition in

1983.633 Maharashtra first banned the slaughter of cows in 1976 with the Maharashtra

Animal Preservation Act.634 The Assam Cattle Preservation Act of 1950 banned slaughter of cattle without a “fit-for-slaughter” certificate.635 In Haryana, cow slaughter had been banned by the 1955 Punjab Prohibition of Cow Slaughter (which extended to the state of Haryana).636 After the RSS called for a government ban on

632 Rajeshwari, B. “Communal Riots in India: A Chronology (1947-2003).” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCR). March 2004.

633 “Maharashtra Assembly Election Results.” Elections.in Accessed March 7, 2018.

634 Shaikh, Zeeshan. “Maharashtra bans beef, 5 years jail, Rs 10,000 fine for possession or sale.” The Indian Express. January 27, 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/beef-banned-in-maharashtra-5-yrs- jail-rs10000-fine-for-possession-or-sale/.

635 “Chapter IV: Legislation.” Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying, and Fisheries. Government of India. Accessed March 7, 2018. http://dahd.nic.in/hi/related- links/chapter-iv.

636 “The Punjab Prohibition of Cow Slaughter, 1955.” Laws of India: A Project of PRS Legislative Research. http://www.lawsofindia.org/pdf/haryana/1956/1956HR15.pdf.

213 cow slaughter in 1952, a wave of state level legislation occurred throughout the 1950s-

60s.637

These attempts to restrict cattle sales could encourage vigilante violence if they are seen as a signal that authorities are on the side of Hindu nationalists. Limited info on cow-related violence (except in the context of communal riots) before 2010 means that our best bet is to examine the recent cow-related violence reported by IndiaSpend to determine whether it was affected by the BJP’s new national restrictions on cow slaughter that were enacted May 23, 2017.638 The data for 2017 includes 36 recorded incidents of cow-related violence. While most of the violence occurred after the May notification of the new regulations, the violence began ramping up before the regulations and seems to mostly follow a trend of increased violence in the warmer months. The number of incidents recorded in each month are as follows: none from

January-February, one in March, seven in April, six in May (three before the notification and three after), seven in June, five in July, six in August, two in

September, one in October, one in November, and none in December.639

637 “Chapter IV: Legislation.” Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying, and Fisheries. Government of India. Accessed March 7, 2018. http://dahd.nic.in/hi/related- links/chapter-iv.

638 “New restrictions on cattle slaughter.” The Hindu. May 26, 2017. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/government-bans-sale-purchase-of-cattle- from-animal-markets-for-slaughter/article18585018.ece.

639 “Hate Crime: Cow-related Violence in India.” IndiaSpend. Accessed March 3, 2018. http://data.indiaspend.com/hate-crime.

214 The week following the notification included three recorded incidents of cow- related violence. On May 23, a group of more than twenty cow vigilantes assaulted a railway station and four others for alleged cattle smuggling in Odisha.640 Odisha’s government is ruled by the Biju Janata Dal (which was allied with the BJP until 2009).

On May 25, at least seven cow vigilantes attacked three Muslim youths for possessing beef in BJP-controlled Maharashtra.641 Finally, on May 29, a PhD scholar was attacked in a college canteen for eating beef in Tamil Nadu, which is controlled by the

All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), a centrist Dravidian party.642 While this surge of cow-related violence in the last week of May reflects an atmosphere in which the BJP seems to be condoning the goals (if not the methods) of cow vigilantes, the May 23rd notification seems to have had little effect on the overall trend of cow-related violence throughout the year. The incidents also are not confined to Hindu nationalist controlled states. However, the small numbers involved in each

640 “Cow vigilantism crops up in Odisha, Railway, dairy farm staff assaulted.” The New Indian Express. May 25, 2017. http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/odisha/2017/may/25/cow-vigilantism-crops- up-in-odisha-railway-dairy-farm-staff-assaulted-1608799.html.

641 “Maharashtra: Cow vigilantes thrash 3 youth for possessing ‘beef’, 7 arrested.” Hindustan Times. June 14, 2017. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india- news/maharashtra-cow-vigilantes-thrash-3-youths-for-possessing-beef-7- arrested/story-zNBQa0D34q2aL80u3xwBjP.html.

642 Manuel, Thomas. “Standing Up For Justice For Sooraj and Other Victims of Cow Nationalism.” The Wire. February 6, 2017. https://thewire.in/142687/cow- nationalism-modi-bjp/.

215 instance do not require as much organization as large-scale riots. The clearest sign of increase is still IndiaSpend’s previously-referenced assessment that 97% of the cow- related violence over the past seven years occurred since Modi’s government came to power in May 2014.643 While the May 23rd regulation on cow slaughter does not seem to have produced much of a spike in violence, it is clear that cow vigilantes are encouraged by Modi’s leadership, which is marked by efforts to end cow slaughter and a pattern of silence on cow vigilante attacks.644

Cow vigilantes may be encouraged not only by tacit signs of government approval, but by the direct participation of BJP members. In August 2017, a truck was blocked and three men allegedly beaten on suspicion of transporting beef in Bihar.645

This interception was orchestrated by BJP and Bajrang Dal workers who said their goal was to “produce proof,” of illegal trading.646 BJP state executive committee member Bhuwar Ojha declared, “We had been telling police for some time about an

643 Abraham, Delna and Ojaswi Rao. “97% cow-related attacks after PM Modi came to power in 2014.” Business Standard. June 29, 2017. http://www.business- standard.com/article/current-affairs/97-cow-related-attacks-after-pm-modi-came-to- power-in-2014-117062800204_1.html.

644 Manuel, Thomas. “Standing Up For Justice For Sooraj and Other Victims of Cow Nationalism.” The Wire. February 6, 2017. https://thewire.in/142687/cow-nationalism- modi-bjp/.

645 Singh, Santosh. “BJP, Bajrang Dal in Bihar beef attack: ‘Our govt now’” The Indian Express. August 5, 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/bjp-bajrang- dal-in-bihar-beef-attack-our-government-now-4783104/.

646 Ibid.

216 illegal slaughterhouse in the Ranisagar area of Shahpur but they would not listen to us.

Now that the BJP is part of the state government, our morale has been boosted.”647

Growing BJP political power in this state has been interpreted by Hindu nationalist militants as a green light for cow vigilantism. The incident was planned using

WhatsApp, where information about the truck was initially posted in a group called

“Bhojpur news,” which is run by Chandan Pandey, the BJP’s Shahpur town general secretary. This group also includes the officer in charge of the local police station as a member, which may serve as a signal that violent activity would not be punished.648

Pandey posted the location of the truck late at night, and immediately a group of fifteen BJP and Bajrang Dal workers met to intercept it. This is a clear case of BJP authority encouraging cow-related violence and Hindutva organizations (including the

BJP and Bajrang Dal) working together to mobilize this violence.

While the BJP has worked towards the goal of cow protection, legislation of cow slaughter remains the jurisdiction of the states, leading the new ban to be ineffective especially in North Eastern states where a majority of people consume beef. Additionally, the BJP’s recent attempt to restrict the sale of cattle on a national

647 Singh, Santosh. “BJP, Bajrang Dal in Bihar beef attack: ‘Our govt now’” The Indian Express. August 5, 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/bjp-bajrang- dal-in-bihar-beef-attack-our-government-now-4783104/.

648 Ibid.

217 level has spurred cow vigilante groups to become increasing assertive.649 Overall,

Hindu cow protectors turn to violence because the BJP lacks the political power

(including enforcement ability) to end all cow slaughter. Despite this shortfall, gains by the BJP embolden Hindu cow protectors to use militancy because they face less repression. For these vigilantes, militancy fills in the gap where the BJP lacks political ability. BJP governance and cow-related militancy work side by side in the goal of cow protection.

Pakistan

Another Hindu nationalist objective pursued by the RSS and BJP is anti-

Pakistan foreign policy. In 1960, the RSS published a statement condemning

“appeasement” in India-Pakistan agreements. The statement warned,

Our relation with Pakistan in all spheres should be determined on a realistic basis, keeping in mind the historical perspective of the demand for and formation of Pakistan and also the mentality and ambitions of her rulers…As a consequence of this policy of repeated appeasement, serious doubts about the Government's ability to protect national interests are bound to arise in people's mind and severely affect their morale and self-confidence.650

649 Chauhan, Chetan. “Centre bans sale of cows for slaughter at animal markets, restricts cattle trade.” Hindustan Times. July 19, 2017.

650 “A.B.K.M. 1960 : Bharat-Pak Agreement.” Archives of RSS. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions/1950%20-%201960/966383.htm.

218 The RSS’s propagation of Hindu culture seems opposed to the character of Pakistan, which was born as a Muslim homeland formed through partition from India. Hindu nationalist objectives towards Pakistan are primarily concerned with the welfare of

Hindus within and outside of India. In 2013, the RSS released a statement to “address the concerns of the persecuted Hindus of Bangladesh and Pakistan.”651 It included the assertion that, “The Hindus and other minorities have been facing the brunt of Islamic fury for no fault of theirs time and again.”652 Hindutva attitudes towards Pakistan are largely based on communalism and Pakistan’s Islamic character.

The BJP addresses Pakistan largely as a security issue, drawing parallels between Pakistan, terrorism, and Muslims. According to Indian journalist and political scientist, Harish Khare, the BJP manages to rally Hindus to solidarity by conveying “anti-Muslim sentiment” that is, “served up with an anti-Pakistani dressing.”653 The BJP is able to stir anti-Muslim feelings by referencing issues such as Pakistan or terrorism, which serve as a proxy for Muslims and Islam. According to

Khare, Modi made a connection between Muslims and Pakistan by using the acronym

651 “ABPS 2013: Address the concerns of the persecuted Hindus of Bangladesh and Pakistan.” Archives of RSS. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions.aspx.

652 Ibid.

653 Khare, Harish. “How The BJP Used UP's Muslim Population To Capture Hindu Votes.” The Huffington Post: India Edition. March 14, 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.in/harish-khare-/how-the-bjp-used-ups-muslim-population- to-capture-hindu-votes_a_21886467.

219 “KASAB,” which stands for the BJP’s rival parties (KA for Congress, SA for

Samajwadi Party and B for BSP).654 The acronym is also meant to reference Ajmal

Kasab, a Pakistani militant and member of the Lashkar-e-Taiba Islamist group who took part in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Through such language, Pakistan,

Muslims, and rival parties become lumped together as dangerous enemies. In 2014,

Senior BJP leader Giriraj Singh implied that holding pro-Pakistan attitudes makes someone not only a political rival, but an enemy of India. He asserted, “Those opposing Narendra Modi are looking at Pakistan, and such people will have place in

Pakistan and not in India.”655 Rather than moderating his tone, Singh later confirmed,

“I meant to say that those opposing Narendra Modi are doing so at the behest of

Pakistan. They are pro-Pakistan people and need not stay in India."656 For Hindu nationalists, foreign policy objectives towards Pakistan are driven by communalism that equates Pakistan with Muslims and political rivals.

654 “UP elections 2017: After 'SCAM', BJP coins 'KASAB' acronym for Congress, SP and BSP.” The Economic Times. February 22, 2017. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/up-elections-2017- after-scam-bjp-coins-kasab-acronym-for-congress-sp-and- bsp/articleshow/57296718.cms.

655 Ahmadi, Faizan. “Those opposed to Narendra Modi should go to Pakistan, BJP leader Giriraj Singh says.” The Times of India. April 20, 2014. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/Those-opposed-to-Narendra-Modi-should- go-to-Pakistan-BJP-leader-Giriraj-Singh-says/articleshow/33971544.cms.

656 Ibid.

220 Use of anti-Pakistan language as a rhetorical proxy for Indian Muslims has been practiced by Hindu nationalists since at least 2002. During the 2002 riots in

Ahmedabad, for example, localities were segregated into “Muslim” and “Hindu” areas. The dividing line between these populations was popularly termed “the border,” and the Muslim side was called “Pakistan.”657 Additionally, during the 2002 elections in Gujarat, Modi made a point of calling Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, “Miyan

Musharraf,” using a prefix that emphasizes his Muslim faith.658 The BJP also published advertisements asking people to choose between “Modi and Musharraf,” signaling that any opposition to the BJP (especially among Gujarat’s Muslim population) was on the side of Pakistan.659 Survey data confirms this atmosphere of prejudice in which Muslims are not regarded as truly Indian. In 1993, 481 Hindus in the city of Bombay (now “Mumbai”) were interviewed by India’s Marketing And

657 Mehta, Nalin. “Is Pakistan ‘code-word’ for Muslims, Mr Shah?” The Times of India. October 30, 2015. https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/academic- interest/is-pakistan-code-word-for-muslims-mr-shah/.

658 Desai, Darshan. “Modi is back at it — name-calling.” The Hindu. October 18, 2016. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Modi-is-back-at-it-%E2%80%94- name-calling/article12434596.ece.

659 Mehta, Nalin. “Is Pakistan ‘code-word’ for Muslims, Mr Shah?” The Times of India. October 30, 2015. https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/academic- interest/is-pakistan-code-word-for-muslims-mr-shah/.

221 Research Group (MARG).660 In this survey, 64% of respondents agreed with the statement “Indian Muslims consider themselves Muslims first and Indians later.”

Additionally, 53% agreed with the statement, “Muslims believe that all non-Muslims are their enemies.”661 These predispositions towards Muslims as outsiders and enemies provides the conditions for hostility and violent outbreaks. Yet, this prejudice stoked by the BJP in discourse that equates the “threat” of Pakistan with India’s

Muslim population.

In the case of Pakistan foreign policy, BJP political power does not just face shortfalls in the eyes of Hindu nationalists. In some cases, BJP policy outright contradicts the goals of Hindu nationalism. As Prime Minister of India, BJP leader

Atal Bihari Vajpayee worked for peaceful relations with Pakistan. In February 1999,

Vajpayee brought his message of peace to Pakistan during a bus journey to Lahore.662

He specifically visited Minar-e-Pakistan, a public monument honoring the 1940

Lahore Resolution that was the first official call for an independent Muslim homeland

660 Bancroft, Ella. “Poll Examines Hindu Views of Muslims.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. July/August 1994. P. 44. https://www.wrmea.org/1994-july- august/public-opinion-poll-examines-hindu-views-of-muslims.html.

661 Anderson, John Ward. “India’s Muslims Fear New Physical Threat.” The Washington Post. March 12, 1994. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/.

662 Chopra, Divya. “What is the Vajpayee doctrine on Kashmir that Mehbooba Mufti wants PM Narendra Modi to follow?” India Today. April 24, 2017. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-modi-mebooba-mufti-wants-modi-to-follow- vajpayee-doctrine/1/936826.html.

222 separate from British India. Vajpayee made a point to re-affirm India’s commitment to the existence of Pakistan.663 Speaking at the Governor’s house in Lahore, Vajpayee spoke so eloquently about friendship and mutual trust against collective struggles that

Prime Minister Sharif was prompted to comment, “Mr. Vajpayee, now you can win elections even in Pakistan.”664 During this trip, Vajpayee also signed the Lahore

Declaration with Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan.665 This declaration reflected a mutual understanding about nonproliferation and regulation of nuclear weapons. It was the second nuclear control treaty signed by both countries.

Two years later, Vajpayee initiated an India-Pakistan summit and invited

Pervez Musharraf, leader of the Pakistan military at the time. Despite the failure of the summit, Vajpayee made repeated efforts to improve relations with Pakistan.

Vajpayee even launched the Delhi-Lahore Bus Service Sada-e-Sarhad (Call of the

Frontier) with the goal of promoting friendly relations with Pakistan.666 Hindu

663 Chopra, Divya. “What is the Vajpayee doctrine on Kashmir that Mehbooba Mufti wants PM Narendra Modi to follow?” India Today. April 24, 2017. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-modi-mebooba-mufti-wants-modi-to-follow- vajpayee-doctrine/1/936826.html.

664 Ibid.

665 “Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),” Elections.in. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.elections.in/political-parties-in-india/bharatiya-janata-party.html.

666 Chopra, Divya. “What is the Vajpayee doctrine on Kashmir that Mehbooba Mufti wants PM Narendra Modi to follow?” India Today. April 24, 2017. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-modi-mebooba-mufti-wants-modi-to-follow- vajpayee-doctrine/1/936826.html.

223 nationalists, including the RSS (who were ardent supporters of the bomb), largely viewed these overtures as a waste of time.667

Vajpayee’s moderation on the Pakistan issue was largely the result of political necessity. As mentioned, India has a history of coalition governments and a political culture that favors secularism. Vajpayee was first sworn in as Prime Minister in 1996, but his term only lasted 13 days due to his failure to garner a majority. His second term, beginning in 1998, was also hampered by a weak majority, resulting in government dissolution after 13 months when the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra

Kazhagam (AIADMK) withdrew its support.668 In order to form a strong coalition,

Vajpayee had to win the backing of secular groups, which meant tempering the party’s

Hindu nationalism. Vajpayee’s third term (from 1999-2004) was built on a governing coalition of 24 parties that included secular groups such as the Janata Dal United

(JDU), All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), and the Biju Janata Dal (BJD).669

Sensing a general public opinion in favor of improving the Pakistan relationship, and worried about the growing anti-Vajpayee image in India, the RSS

667 Malik, Priyanjali. India’s Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb. Routledge. 2010. P.248.

668 “Atal Behari Vajpayee.” BBC News. January 7, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1746861.stm.

669 Suellentrop, Chris. “Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.” Slate. June 10, 2002. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2002/06/indian_prime_m inister_atal_bihari_vajpayee.html.

224 chose not to make waves at the time.670 Instead, the RSS conveyed its message through Sangh Parivar organization Bharatiya Yuva Kranti Dal (BYKD). In a memorandum to the prime minister, the BYKD implored him to remember that

Pakistan was created on the basis of, “hatred and communalism.”671 The letter reminded Vajpayee of the thousands massacred during the partition, the spread of terrorism from Pakistan, and Pakistan’s illegal occupation of Indian territory. The memorandum notes, “In the light of these facts, if you are still willing to extend a hand of friendship with Pakistan, then please don't forget the sanskrit saying shathe shathyam samacharet (tit for tat).”672 Despite the Sangh Parivar’s attempt to avoid controversy, some members chose not to contain their rhetoric about Pakistan. At the eighth dharma sansad (religious parliament) in February 1999, VHP leader Acharya

Dharmendra openly ridiculed Vajpayee and called for an offensive against Pakistan.

He declared, “Go to Pakistan if you must, but not on a bus. Go there on tanks and take

670 Joshi, Rajesh. “A Proxy War of Words: The sangh parivar gets a new spokesbody.” Outlook India. March 01, 1999. https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/a-proxy-war-of-words/207060.

671 Ibid.

672 Ibid.

225 the Pokhran bombs along.”673 While other leaders denounced this rhetoric, it is clear that many Hindu nationalists felt Vajpayee was acting against their interest.

Modi’s foreign policy towards Pakistan has wavered alternately between rapprochement and a hardline stance throughout his term. Having run on a platform of economic development, Modi welcomed foreign investment and showed initial indications that he intended to improve relations with India’s neighbors.674 In a dramatic diplomatic gesture, Modi invited all leaders of SAARC (the South Asian

Association for Regional Cooperation) to his swearing-in.675 This included Pakistan

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who risked his reputation with Pakistan’s army to attend. However, this relationship between Modi and Sharif cooled over the next few weeks as Modi had already begun preparing for November elections in Maharashtra and Jammu and Kashmir, which meant the BJP could not be viewed as soft on

Pakistan.676 While he recognized the economic and security benefits of reconciliation

673 Joshi, Rajesh. “A Proxy War of Words: The sangh parivar gets a new spokesbody.” Outlook India. March 01, 1999. https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/a-proxy-war-of-words/207060.

674 Mazumdar, Arijit. “Narendra Modi’s Pakistan Policy: A Case of Old Wine in Old Bottles.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. 106 (1): 38.

675 Singh, KC. “Auditing Modi’s Pak policy.” The Tribune. January 4, 2018. http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/auditing-modi-s-pak- policy/523158.html.

676 Ibid.

226 with Pakistan, continued influence of Pakistan’s army over the country’s foreign affairs as well as electoral considerations ensured that Modi would periodically return to a hardline stance.

Modi has also continually drawn redlines that are easy to cross, meaning that lower level fighters in Pakistan’s army are able to initiate attacks (with or without approval from higher-ups) that would be sure to invite massive retaliation.677

Intermittent border skirmishes have led to deteriorating relations between the two countries. Additionally, the dialog process has been fraught with difficulties. This has been partially caused by Pakistan’s insistence upon the ‘indirect’ participation of the

All Parties Hurriyat Conference (a collection of more than two dozen Kashmiri separatist organizations) in any India–Pakistan dialog, as well as the stalled 2008

Mumbai terror attacks trial in Pakistan.678 Modi also adopted a hardline approach that made talks contingent on “Pakistan’s demonstrated sincerity in wanting to end cross- border terrorism against India.”679 This has led to pushback and multiple talks cancelled at the last minute. The opposition Congress party criticized what it called the

677 Singh, KC. “Auditing Modi’s Pak policy.” The Tribune. January 4, 2018. http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/auditing-modi-s-pak- policy/523158.html.

678 Mazumdar, Arijit. “Narendra Modi’s Pakistan Policy: A Case of Old Wine in Old Bottles.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. 106 (1): 38.

679 Ibid.

227 regime’s “blow-hot blow-cold” diplomacy, calling Modi’s Pakistan policy,

“incohesive and inconsistent.”680

Modi’s attempts at rapprochement have also evoked criticism from the opposition. In December 2015, following terrorist attacks at Gurdaspur and Udhampur by Pakistani militants, Modi made an unplanned visit to Pakistan to attend the wedding of Nawaz Sharif’s granddaughter.681 Referring to this surprise trip among other elements of Modi’s Pakistan policy, Congress spokesperson Randeep Surjewala told reporters “The entire country knows who loves Pakistan and who has been giving protection to the separatists.”682 He also criticized Modi’s government for releasing

Pakistan-based terrorist Maulana Masood Azhar and working with the ISI (Inter-

Services Intelligence) Pakistani spy agency.

Meanwhile, government military action has not been effective at reducing cross-border terrorism.683 Under Modi, the Indian military has been conducting

680 “PM Narendra Modi government ‘incohesive and inconsistent’ in its Pakistan policy: Congress.” The Economic Times. August 22, 2015. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/.

681 “PM Modi's claim of party leaders meeting Pak envoy baseless: Congress.” DNA India. December 10, 2017. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-pm-modi-s-claim- of-party-leaders-meeting-pak-envoy-baseless-congress-2566601.

682 Ibid.

683 Mishra, Vivek. “Does India Have Options in Tackling Pakistan?” Journal of International Affairs. School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. January 17, 2017. https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/does-india- have-options-tackling-pakistan.

228 “surgical strikes” on military launch pads across the Line of Control (LoC). This tactic was meant to disrupt the normal routine of low-intensity terror attacks that had often gone without retaliation, backed by Pakistan’s tacit threat of using nuclear weapons.684 In response to perceived support from Pakistan’s state institutions for cross-border terrorism, Modi’s government lowered the threshold for India’s stated policy of “strategic restraint.” Pakistan has maintained a policy of not acknowledging these strikes on launch pads because to do so would admit its complicity with terrorist groups. Still, these strikes have not acted as an effective deterrent. They have been followed by “irresolute and heavy” firing from the Pakistani side against primarily civilian targets along the border.685 This is not a satisfactory result for Hindu nationalists or Indians in general who may be targets of these attacks. Amir Khan described Modi’s overall Pakistan policy as “wishy washy,” pointing out that “surgical strikes seem to have convinced very few people.”686

684 Mishra, Vivek. “Does India Have Options in Tackling Pakistan?” Journal of International Affairs. School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. January 17, 2017. https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/does-india- have-options-tackling-pakistan.

685 Ibid.

686 Khan, Amir Ullah. Personal Interview. February 3, 2018.

229 Modi’s electoral promises included taking a tough stance against Pakistan, especially regarding attacks on Indian soil by Pakistani-based militants.687 However, the task has proven more difficult, and Modi has attempted to use both diplomacy and military action to little effect. According to Arijit Mazumdar, the main stumbling block is the Pakistan army’s influence over national security and policy matters.688 As noted, the issue of Pakistan is often conflated with India’s Muslim population in

Hindu nationalist rhetoric. By promising results and raising expectations of victory against Pakistani terrorists, the BJP not only exacerbates the possibility of war between nuclear powers but stokes communal hostilities within India. Vajpayee,

Modi, and the BJP have not fulfilled Hindutva objectives regarding Pakistan.

Jammu and Kashmir

The integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India and protection of Hindus in this state is another key Hindu nationalist goal for the RSS and BJP. In a 1964

Resolution titled “Bharat(India)’s Kashmir Policy,” The RSS declared,

687 “India’s Modi promises tough stance against Pakistan.” Dawn News. September 29, 2013. https://www.dawn.com/news/1046274.

688 Mazumdar, Arijit. “Narendra Modi’s Pakistan Policy: A Case of Old Wine in Old Bottles.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. 106 (1): 41.

230 Kashmir is an inseparable part of Bharat. Its political accession to Bharat became final with the signing of the Instrument of Accession by the late Maharaja Harisingh, the then ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State. Pakistan had committed aggression against Bharat by attacking Kashmir and when India fought the Pakistani forces it only discharged its primary obligation of defending her territory.689

The issue of Jammu and Kashmir is combined with the Hindu nationalist opposition to

Pakistan. For the BJP, Pakistan is equated with terrorism that poses a threat to the state. In August 2016, Modi spoke at an All Party Meeting on Jammu and Kashmir.

He presented a list of six main policy concerns, the first of which was countering terrorism.690 In his speech, Modi made clear that he viewed Pakistan as the source of this terrorism. He declared, “The fundamental reason of disturbances in Kashmir

Valley is cross-border terrorism promoted by our neighboring country…Now the time has come that Pakistan shall have to answer to the world for the atrocities committed by it against the people in Baluchistan and PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir).”691

According to Modi, India has a duty to protect Jammu and Kashmir, which is considered the “crown of India.” Speaking about India’s special connection to Jammu and Kashmir, Modi asserted, “Jammu & Kashmir is not only a matter of our territorial

689 “A.B.P.S. 1964 : Bharat's Kashmir Policy.” Archives of RSS. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.archivesofrss.org/Resolutions/.

690 “PM’s concluding remarks at All Party Meeting on Jammu & Kashmir.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/en/shri-narendra-modi-feed/pm-s-concluding-remarks-at-all-party- meeting-on-jammu-kashmir-15-08-2016.

691 Ibid.

231 integrity but also defines our nationality.”692 This is a strong statement about the

BJP’s views on Jammu and Kashmir as part of the “Hindu nation” of India.

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) hold a special status in terms of governance and autonomy according to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.693 This “temporary provision” grants special autonomous status to J&K under Part XXI of the

Constitution of India, which deals with "Temporary, Transitional and Special provisions.” This means the Constitutional provisions which apply to other states do not apply to J&K. It also specifies that Parliament requires the concurrence of J&K to apply any laws not related to defense, foreign affairs, finance, and communications.694

Sheikh Abdullah, former prime minister of J&K, drafted this provision in 1947 and argued against making it temporary. Despite his insistence on “iron clad autonomy,”

692 “PM’s concluding remarks at All Party Meeting on Jammu & Kashmir.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/en/shri-narendra-modi-feed/pm-s-concluding-remarks-at-all-party- meeting-on-jammu-kashmir-15-08-2016.

693 “What is Article 370? Three key points.” The Times of India. May 28, 2014. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/What-is-Article-370Article- 370/articleshow/35678708.cms.

694 Ibid.

232 Article 370 was placed under temporary provisions. The BJP blames this provision for creating a “separatist psyche” and wants to remove it.695

On the subject of Jammu and Kashmir, the BJP falls short of meeting Hindu nationalist political goals. Vajpayee’s approach to J&K was referred to as the

“Vajpayee Doctrine,” and it included improving relations with Pakistan. The

Vajpayee doctrine on Kashmir, “called for peace, progress and prosperity in the

Valley by imbibing the spirit of Insaniyat (Humanity), Jamhuriyat (Democracy) and

Kashmiriyat (Identity of the people of Kashmir).”696 His aim was to resolve all issues with Pakistan (including the J&K issue) through peaceful bilateral dialogue without intervention from third parties. Despite setbacks such as the Kargil conflict (an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that occurred in the Kargil district of J&K from

May-July 1999), the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Kandhar and a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, Vajpayee maintained faith in a peaceful bilateral approach.

695 “Time to remove Articles 370, 35A from Constitution: BJP.” The Hindu. August 11, 2017. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-otherstates/time-to- remove-articles-370-35a-from-constitution-bjp/article19468953.ece.

696 Chopra, Divya. “What is the Vajpayee doctrine on Kashmir that Mehbooba Mufti wants PM Narendra Modi to follow?” India Today. April 24, 2017. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-modi-mebooba-mufti-wants-modi-to-follow- vajpayee-doctrine/1/936826.html.

233 Modi’s sharp anti-Pakistan rhetoric stands in contrast to Vajpayee’s doctrine.697 Still, continuing terror attacks have led NDA partners and hardline

Hindutva organizations to issue public criticism of Modi’s Kashmir policy.698 In July

2017, two Indian soldiers were killed while fighting terrorists in the Keran sector of

Kupwara in Jammu and Kashmir. This occurred days after the terror attack at

Amarnath yatra that resulted in the death of seven devotees.699 In response to these attacks, the VHP’s international working president, Praveen Togadia, openly demanded the resignation of Mehbooba Muft as chief minister of Jammu and

Kashmir. This is a public criticism of Modi because it is well-known that Mufti’s

Peoples Development Party (PDP) and the BJP are alliance partners in the state.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), eighty-eight security personnel were killed in terrorist attacks in 2016. This is the highest number since

2008. As of 20 August 2017, forty-six security personnel had already died since the beginning of the year, alongside 43 civilian fatalities. This is already the highest

697 Anand, Geeta. “Tough Stand by India’s Modi on Militants Raises Risks with Pakistan.” The New York Times. October 23, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/world/asia/tough-stand-by-indias-modi-on- militants-raises-risks-with-pakistan.html.

698 Singh, Sanjeev and Narad Muni. “Hindu hardliners target Narendra Modi’s Kashmir policy after Amarnath yatra terror attack.” Times of India. July 13, 2017. http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sanjeev-singh-blog/hindu-hardliners-target- narendra-modis-kashmir-policy-after-amarnath-yatra-terror-attack.

699 Ibid.

234 number of civilian fatalities since 2009.700 Modi’s policies have failed to yield results in terms of integration or security in Jammu and Kashmir that would satisfy Hindu nationalists.

Uniform Civil Code

The final Hindu nationalist goal which will be examined in this section is the pursuit of a uniform civil code. A uniform civil code would mean replacing the personal laws specific to each of India’s major religious communities with a common set of laws applicable to every citizen. Hindu nationalists are most opposed to the

Muslim Personal Law (MPL), which is based partially on the Sharia law and permits unilateral divorce and polygamy for Muslims in India. In its 2014 election manifesto, the BJP promised to work towards a uniform civil code, stating that the group believes, “there cannot be gender equality till such time India adopts a Uniform Civil

Code, which protects the rights of all women, and the BJP reiterates its stand to draft a

Uniform Civil Code, drawing upon the best traditions and harmonizing them with the modern times.”701 The RSS has also promoted the implementation of a uniform civil

700 “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence: 1988-2017.” South Asia Terrorism Portal. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualti es.htm.

701 “BJP Election Manifesto 2014.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. P. 41 http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf.

235 code. In December 2016, RSS leader Arun Kumar said that such a code is essential to make India stronger and more “integrated, progressive, and developed.”702 He argued, “To ensure freedom, equality and justice, about which our Constitution professes, uniform civil code should be ensured. But unfortunately, every time when this topic comes up for discussion, it becomes an issue of identity politics.”703

According to Kumar, issues of religious minorities (such as Muslims) are distractions from integrating India and making it more progressive.

For Hindu nationalists, a uniform civil code is about more than progress and gender equality. It is also another way to subsume India’s religious minorities under a

Hindu-majority cultural system. In the 1994 MARG survey of Hindus in Bombay, 78 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, “Until a uniform civil code is established, there will never be national integration.”704 As noted, Hindutva goals such as cow protection and creating a Hindu rashtra are not fully achievable democratically due to India’s religious diversity and secular values. Hindu nationalists view a uniform civil code as an instrument for altering the cultural landscape in favor of Hinduism.

702 “RSS Urges to Implement Uniform Civil Code for Stronger, Integrated India.” News18.com. December 1, 2016. http://www.news18.com/news/india/rss-urges-to- implement-uniform-civil-code-for-stronger-integrated-india-1318007.html.

703 Ibid.

704 Bancroft, Ella. “Poll Examines Hindu Views of Muslims.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. July/August 1994. P. 44. https://www.wrmea.org/1994-july- august/public-opinion-poll-examines-hindu-views-of-muslims.html.

236 However, it is not clear that a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) would achieve this. In fact, this opposition to Muslim Personal Law could consolidate Muslim identity in defiance.

The UCC is another Hindu nationalist goal that the BJP has yet to fulfill.

Hindu nationalists have been working to determine what an ideal Uniform Civil Code would look like. The India Policy Foundation (IPF) headed by RSS ideologue Rakesh

Sinha has been holding consultations on this issue since 2012.705 Their work has yielded at least three drafts of a potential UCC. The three major issues they aim to address which are non-uniform in personal laws are marriage, divorce, and inheritance.706

While no UCC has been enacted yet, the BJP received a political victory in

August 2017 when the Supreme Court issued a ruling banning triple talaq.707 Triple talaq, also known as “instant divorce,” is a practice in which a Muslim man can

705 Hebbar, Nistula. “RSS-affiliated think tank readies Uniform Civil Code drafts.” The Hindu. December 23, 2016. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/RSS- affiliated-think-tank-readies-Uniform-Civil-Code-drafts/article16927151.ece.

706 Ibid.

707 Nair, Harish V. “Triple talaq verdict to speed up Uniform Civil Code report.” India Today. August 27, 2017. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/uniform-civil-code-triple- talaq-law-commission/1/1034728.html.

237 divorce his wife simply by uttering “talaq” three times.708 While other Muslim schools of thought prefer a slower process of divorce, triple talaq is prevalent among

India’s Muslim community, the majority of whom subscribe to the Hanafi Islamic school of law.709 In its judgement, the Supreme Court termed the practice,

“discriminatory and unconstitutional.”710 The Law Commission, which is in the process of compiling opinion on the UCC, will use this judgement as a main reference text.

On the issue of triple talaq, the BJP has allies even among the Muslim community, who view this practice as a problem for gender equality. While the All

India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), a non-governmental organization that promotes Islamic laws, has opposed the move to ban triple talaq, a large segment of the Muslim community supports the ban.711 In the past two years, the Indian Muslim

Women’s Movement or BMMA (Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan), launched a campaign to ban triple talaq. Zakia Soman, one of the cofounders of BMMA, told Al

708 Khalid, Saif. “What is 'triple talaq' or instant divorce?” Aljazeera. August 22, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/tripple-talaq-triple-divorce- 170511160557346.html.

709 Ibid.

710 Nair, Harish V. “Triple talaq verdict to speed up Uniform Civil Code report.” India Today. August 27, 2017.

711 Khalid, Saif. “What is 'triple talaq' or instant divorce?” Aljazeera. August 22, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/tripple-talaq-triple-divorce- 170511160557346.html.

238 Jazeera, “In the course of our work, we have regularly been approached by our sisters, complaining about mistreatment and misuse of the oral talaq system. In most cases, men go scot-free and believe their action is approved by the Quran.”712 A BMMA study found that more than 90 percent of 4,710 women interviewed supported banning unilateral divorce.713

While this issue includes supporters motivated by human rights and gender equality, Hindu nationalists have displayed some Islamophobic motivations for supporting a UCC and banning Islamic practices such as triple talaq. In April 2017,

BJP member and Uttar Pradesh cabinet minister Swami Prasad Maurya charged that

Muslim men use triple talaq to satisfy their “lust.” He declared, “These talaqs have no basis.... if someone only for satisfying his lust keeps changing his wives and forces his own wife and children on the streets to beg... no one will call this as right.”714 Flavia

Agnes, a prominent women’s rights lawyer, questioned the BJP’s motivations for singling out triple talaq when, in her opinion, there are more pressing issues for

712 Khalid, Saif. “What is 'triple talaq' or instant divorce?” Aljazeera. August 22, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/tripple-talaq-triple-divorce- 170511160557346.html.

713 Ibid.

714 Agarwal, Nikhil. “Triple talaq row: Changing wives meant to satisfy lust, says UP minister Swami Prasad Maurya.” India Today. April 29, 2017. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/triple-talaq-changing-wives-satisfy-lust-uttar- pradesh-minister-swami-prasad-maurya/1/941502.html.

239 women in India.715 During a speech at Aliah University in the eastern city of Kolkata,

Agnes claimed that illiteracy and lack of awareness were bigger problems for women’s rights. She argued, “Talaq does not extinguish her economic rights, [the ban] is not a magic wand that will solve all her problems. We have created an image that Muslim women have no rights because husbands can pronounce triple talaq.”716

She went on to assert that the Muslim Women’s Act of 1986 has a provision for “fair and reasonable settlement after divorce,” and charged that “the whole debate is skewed and political, catering to the ruling government's Muslim bashing agenda.”717

Despite the anti-Muslim sentiment present in Hindu nationalist motivations for a

UCC, the alignment with human rights advocates and segments of the Muslim community makes this a goal that is more likely to be achieved due to broader support.

Still, the Uniform Civil Code is a BJP promise that has not yet been delivered.

Overall, the BJP’s promotion of Hindu nationalist goals through legal avenues has produced limited gains. This is due to political opposition within India’s government as well as the moderation of certain goals by leaders like Vajpayee.

Prohibiting cow slaughter throughout India is currently outside the BJP’s political

715 Khalid, Saif. “What is 'triple talaq' or instant divorce?” Aljazeera. August 22, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/tripple-talaq-triple-divorce- 170511160557346.html.

716 Ibid.

717 Ibid.

240 power, with many Hindu nationalists opting to take the law into their own hands, encouraged by signals of impunity from BJP governments. While Vajpayee made overtures to Pakistan that unsettled Hindu nationalists, Modi has used harsher rhetoric towards Pakistan. Still, Hindu nationalist goals of integration of J&K and protection of Hindus remain unfulfilled, with attacks worsening. Of the goals explored, the pursuit of a UCC seems to have made the most progress, due to alignment with human rights advocates. Still, it remains unfulfilled. These limited gains demonstrate that political inclusion of Hindu nationalists through the BJP has not provided sufficient political opportunity for them to achieve their goals.

Hypothesis 2 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if this violent activity is at least tactically effective at furthering the movement’s objectives.

For the BJP, communal violence has not threatened their political power. In fact, it has bolstered support for the party, showing that militancy and legitimate politics can be mutually reinforcing. According to a Yale study, the BJP gains in polls after every riot.718 In their May 2016 paper, “Do parties matter for ethnic violence?

718 Bhattacharya, DP. “BJP gains in polls after every riot, says Yale study.” The Economic Times. December 05, 2014.

241 Evidence from India,” Gareth Nellis, Michael Weaver, and Steven C. Rosenzweig study the importance of the partisan identity of elected officials as a determinant for ethnic conflict.719 While their primary finding was that the election of members of

India’s Congress party reduces the probability of a riot breaking out prior to the next election, the authors reported a secondary finding that riots reduce subsequent

Congress vote shares.720 According to the authors this, “raises the possibility of a feedback loop or multiplier effect, whereby the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim violence causes Congress to lose votes and seats, which in turn leads to more riots, and so on in a vicious cycle.”721

They argue that this relationship between riots and electoral results occurs because, “such violence produces ethnic polarization that weakens the electoral performance of multiethnic parties while benefiting their ethnic counterparts.”722

Occurrences of Hindu-Muslim violence in India increase the “salience” of ethnic identities, thereby strengthening ethno-religious parties like the BJP. The study also

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/bjp-gains-in-polls- after-every-riot-says-yale-study/articleshow/45378840.cms.

719Nellis, Gareth; Weaver, Michael; and Steven C. Rosenzweig. “Do parties matter for ethnic violence? Evidence from India.” Yale University. May 1, 2016. http://www.garethnellis.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/QJPS_ms_v3_NWR.pdf.

720 Ibid. 28.

721 Ibid. 28.

722 Ibid. 22.

242 reveals that, “the BJS/BJP saw a 0.8 percentage point average increase in their vote share following a riot in the year prior to an election.”723 Amir Khan provided a similar assessment, stating that “communal violence has traditionally helped the

BJP.”724 Echoing the results of the Yale study, he attributed this to the effects of

“polarization” which bolsters the BJP’s electoral performance. Contrary to parties like

Sinn Fein which suffered politically as a result of IRA violence725, the BJP benefits from outbreaks of communal violence in India. This removes incentives for behavioral moderation because, for the most part, militancy does not hinder the movement’s political objectives.

Militancy in the BJP’s Road to Political Power

As Benedetta Berti argued, when the institutional logics of politics and military continue to complement each other, they will both be practiced until such a time as these logics prove to be at odds.726 For a movement to adhere to “thin rationality” and

723 Nellis, Gareth; Weaver, Michael; and Steven C. Rosenzweig. “Do parties matter for ethnic violence? Evidence from India.” Yale University. May 1, 2016. 22. http://www.garethnellis.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/QJPS_ms_v3_NWR.pdf.

724 Khan, Amir Ullah. Personal Interview. February 3, 2018.

725 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. 160.

726 Ibid.

243 strategic understandings of militancy, the violence it employs should further its goals

(or at least not hinder them). The history of the BJP reveals a pattern in which more militant activity and rhetoric is rewarded with political gains. This reinforces the possibility of a “feedback loop,” which was suggested by Nellis, Weaver, and

Rosenzweig.727 After its formation in 1980, the BJP initially attempted to moderate its Hindu nationalist stance to gain wider political appeal.728 However, this was unsuccessful, and the party won only two Lok Sabha seats in the 1984 elections.

As the party expressed its more radical Hindu Nationalist positions, it began to gain supporters. In the election of 1989, the BJP won 86 Lok Sabha seats after supporting the Ram temple movement, which advocates construction of a temple dedicated to the Hindu deity Rama at the site of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya. L.K.

Advani, who was president of the BJP at the time, took over the leadership of the Ram

Janmabhomi (RJB) movement.729 During the build-up to the 1989 elections, the movement began preparations and mobilization to demolish the mosque and build a

Ram temple with consecrated bricks. The 1989 elections, “witnessed the worst ever

727 Nellis, Gareth; Weaver, Michael; and Steven C. Rosenzweig. “Do parties matter for ethnic violence? Evidence from India.” Yale University. May 1, 2016. 28. http://www.garethnellis.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/QJPS_ms_v3_NWR.pdf.

728 Guha, Ramachandra. India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy. Pan Macmillan. February 10, 2011. P. 538-540.

729 Bhardwaj, Ankur. “Is Ram temple no longer a core issue for BJP?.” Business Standard. May 28, 2015. http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/is-ram- temple-no-longer-a-core-issue-for-bjp-115052701020_1.html.

244 communal violence in independent India's electoral history and took a massive toll of

800 lives in the Hindi belt.”730 The heaviest casualties occurred in Bihar, where the

Muslim population of the town of Bhagalpur was, “almost wiped out.”731 The BJP’s hardline Hindu nationalism attracted more political supporters than its initial attempt at moderation.

The BJP continued its political rise bolstered by the drama of the Ram Temple movement. On 25 September 1990, Advani began his provocative rath yatra, which led to riots against Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. A yatra is a Hindu pilgrimage to a holy site, and “rath” refers to a chariot used to travel. Planning to educate people about the

Ram Temple movement, Advani set out from Somnath in Gujarat and made his way to

Ayodhya (the location of the Babri mosque) in a Toyota redesigned as a chariot.732

The yatra was accompanied by militants of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), who flanked the van. Throughout the journey, Advani made speeches which, according to

Indian historian Guha, “accused the government of ‘appeasing’ the Muslim minority and of practicing a ‘pseudo-secularism’ which denied the legitimate interests and

730 Udayakumar, S.P. “The ‘Ram Temple’ drama.” The Hindu. September 30, 2010. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/The-Ram-temple- drama/article16052939.ece.

731 Van der Veer, Peter. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. University of California Press. 1994. P. 4.

732 “1990-L.K. Advani's rath yatra: Chariot of fire.” India Today. December 24, 2009. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/1990- L.K.+Advanis+rath+yatra:+Chariot+of+fire/1/76389.html.

245 aspirations of the Hindu majority.”733 For Advani, the building of a Ram temple in

Ayodhya would be a fulfillment of these aspirations. A week before the yatra was to reach its final destination, Advani was placed under preventative detention by Bihar chief minister Lalu Prasad Yadav.734 Advani’s kar sevaks (volunteers) continued to

Ayodhya, but many of them were also detained. After Advani and his cohorts were arrested on 23 October, the BJP withdrew its support for the government.735 The ministry of V.P. Singh fell on November 9, 1990. In the parliamentary elections of

1991, the BJP won 120 seats (up from 86 seats in the previous election).736 It also won the assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh (the state where Ayodhya is located).

This meant the BJP was in power in four states in northern India (Madya Pradesh,

Rajastan, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh). The BJP was rewarded politically for stoking communalist passions.

In the election of 1996, the BJP won 161 seats. This made it the largest party in Parliament. Once again, the BJP’s political victory followed communal

733 Guha, Ramachandra. “Chapter 27: Riots.” India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy. Pan Macmillan. February 10, 2011.

734 Ibid.

735 Udayakumar, S.P. “The ‘Ram Temple’ drama.” The Hindu. September 30, 2010. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/The-Ram-temple- drama/article16052939.ece.

736 Ghosh, Shubham. “Looking back at past general elections: 1952-2004.” One India. October 28, 2013. https://www.oneindia.com/feature/looking-back-at-past-lok-sabha- elections-1952-2004-1331872.html.

246 polarization. On December 6, 1992, the Babri mosque was demolished by Hindu activists.737 Hundreds of kar sevaks tore down the mosque and erected a makeshift temple in its place.738 This led to widespread riots in which more than 2,000 people died. Pogroms in Bombay were led by the Shiv Sena, which had been banned but, according to reports in the English news media, was actively supported by the

Bombay police force.739 Responding to the arrest of BJP leaders in the wake of the demolition, Advani retorted,

[When] an old structure which ceased to be a mosque over 50 years back is pulled down by a group of people exasperated by the tardiness of the judicial process, and the obtuseness and myopia of the executive, they are reviled by the President, the Vice-President and political parties as betrayers of the nation, destroyers of the Constitution and what not! ...I wish to caution the Government against this approach... Their pronouncements against kar sevaks are only strengthening the movement.740

Advani viewed this radical opposition as politically empowering. According to a 2009 report authored by Justice Manmohan Singh Liberhan, most of the 68 people

737 “Leading BJP figures to face trial in Babri mosque case.” Aljazeera. April 19, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/leading-bjp-figures-face-trial-babri- mosque-case-170419063408261.html.

738 Van der Veer, Peter. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. University of California Press. 1994. xi.

739 Ibid. 7.

740 Udayakumar, S.P. “The ‘Ram Temple’ drama.” The Hindu. September 30, 2010. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/The-Ram-temple- drama/article16052939.ece.

247 responsible for the demolition were leaders from the BJP, including Vajpayee,

Advani, and Murli Manohar Joshi. The report stated, “[They] could have at least attempted to stem the tide of communalism and the rape of democracy. But they chose to remain deaf, dumb and blind throughout … The demolition was carried out with great painstaking preparation and preplanning.”741 In April 2017, twenty-five years after the incident, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that L.K. Advani and other BJP leaders be tried for criminal conspiracy in the demolition of the mosque.742

After the elections in 1996, Vajpayee (one of the BJP leaders named in the report) was sworn in as prime minister but was unable to attain a majority in the Lok

Sabha. This forced the government to resign after thirteen days.743 Considered a moderate within the BJP, Vajpayee had attempted to expand the BJP’s support in

Parliament by softening the party’s reputation for hardline Hindu nationalism and religious intolerance. The failure of this attempt led the BJP to reevaluate its strategy.

One major question the party faced was whether it should continue Vajpayee’s path of moderation and work within the political mainstream, or whether a stronger Hindu

741 “Uproar over India mosque report.” Aljazeera. November 24, 2009. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/11/2009112454918803725.html.

742 “Leading BJP figures to face trial in Babri mosque case.” Aljazeera. April 19, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/leading-bjp-figures-face-trial-babri- mosque-case-170419063408261.html.

743 Cooper, Kenneth J. “Indian Government Falls After 13 Days in Power.” The Washington Post. May 29, 1996. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/.

248 nationalism is the key to obtaining a parliamentary majority.744 The BJP’s history suggests that the latter strategy was more effective than moderation.

In the 1998 mid-term poll, the BJP led a coalition called the National

Democratic Alliance (NDA). In this election, the BJP won 182 seats, increasing its domination in Parliament.745 Again, Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister.

However, the government only lasted thirteen months before the All India Anna

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) withdrew its support to the government.

On April 17, 1999, the government lost a vote of confidence motion in the Lok Sabha by a single vote.746 However, the BJP and its allies dramatically returned to power in the following election, bolstered by the Kargil War that took place during the summer of 1999 in Kashmir. This war was caused by the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and

Kashmiri militants into the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC). The Indian military recaptured a majority of the positions in Operation Vijay.747 By August

744 Cooper, Kenneth J. “Indian Government Falls After 13 Days in Power.” The Washington Post. May 29, 1996. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/.

745 “General (12th Lok Sabha) Election Results India.” Elections.in. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.elections.in/parliamentary-constituencies/1998-election- results.html.

746 “BJP’s one-vote defeat in 1999 was narrowest in history.” The Times of India. July 22, 2008. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/BJPs-one-vote-defeat-in-1999-was- narrowest-in-history/articleshow/3261721.cms.

747 “Nation celebrates Vijay Diwas: This is how the 1999 Kargil War was won.” Hindustan Times. July 26, 2017. http://www.hindustantimes.com/.

249 1999, the BJP was surging in opinion polls in what India Today referred to as “The

Vajpayee Wave.”748 This wave of popularity was, “backed by the euphoria of a victorious encounter in Kargil.”749 This association with national security and the threat of militants from majority-Muslim Pakistan and Kargil increased the salience of the BJP’s Hindu nationalist stance in a way comparable to communal violence. In the election of 1999, the NDA won 298 seats, giving the coalition an outright majority.750

The BJP increased its tally to 183 seats.

As Hindu nationalist violence in India continued into the new millennium, the

BJP maintained political power in the Lok Sabha (albeit reducing to 138 and then 116 seats in the 2004 and 2009 elections) before finally achieving an outright parliamentary majority in 2014. Out of many major instances of communal violence that occurred during this time period, perhaps the most notable were the 2002 Gujarat riots. On February 28, 2002, an anti-Muslim pogrom began in the Western Indian state of Gujarat and lasted for three days.751 This outbreak of violence was instigated

748 Dasgupta, Swapan. “The Vajpayee Wave.” India Today. August 23, 1999. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/bjp-led-alliance-headed-for-decisive-victory- vajpayee-gets-high-rating-opinion-poll/1/255643.html.

749 Ibid.

750 “General (13th Lok Sabha) Election Results India.” Elections.in. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.elections.in/parliamentary-constituencies/1999-election- results.html.

751 Ghassem-Fachandi, Parvis. Pogrom in Gujarat: Hindu Nationalism and Anti- Muslim Violence in India. Princeton University Press. 2012. P.1.

250 by the burning of a train in Godhra, which resulted in the deaths of 58 Hindu pilgrims returning from Ayodhya. During the initial riots, and in the months that followed, mass killings were followed by other acts of violence, including the desecration and destruction of Muslim homes and religious structures. In the end, 150,000 individuals were displaced from their homes and more than 1,000 people were killed, the majority of whom were Muslims.752

At the time, Narendra Modi was serving as the Chief Minister of Gujarat. He was indicted by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) for complicity in the violence, including allegations that he gave explicit orders to state officials that Hindus should be allowed to vent their anger.753 Modi was controversially cleared of these charges in

2012, two years before he became Prime Minister of India. In 2013, Modi attempted to absolve himself of responsibility using an analogy which was perceived by many to be offensive. “Another thing,” Modi stated in a Reuters interview, “any person if we are driving a car, we are a driver, and someone else is driving a car and we're sitting behind, even then if a puppy comes under the wheel, will be painful or not? Of course, it is.”754 The INC and other parties criticized Modi for this language that compared

752 Ghassem-Fachandi, Parvis. Pogrom in Gujarat: Hindu Nationalism and Anti- Muslim Violence in India. Princeton University Press. 2012. P.1.

753 Ibid. 282.

754 “2002 riots: Modi's 'puppy' remark kicks up political storm.” The Times of India. July 12, 2013. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/2002-riots-Modis-puppy- remark-kicks-up-political-storm/articleshow/21040114.cms.

251 slain Muslims to dogs. Modi had also been banned from travel to the United States for his involvement in the Gujarat riots, but this ban was lifted once he became prime minister.755 Militant activity has not hindered the BJP’s electoral support. In fact, it helped bolster the BJP’s rise to power.

Violent Mobilization

Because communal violence benefits the tactical goal of increasing political power for the BJP, it is rational for Hindu nationalist leadership to instigate such riots and convey signals of impunity that encourage participants. The importance of organizational leadership was previously examined to explain the proliferation of cow- related violence in areas of BJP control. When asked why Hindu nationalist militancy occurs despite the BJP’s political power, Amir Khan responded that this militancy,

“needs political power to work.”756 For example, the 1992 Babri mosque demolition and resulting riots required large scale organization. As noted, BJP leaders including

755 Howard, Thomas Albert. “The Dangers of Hindu Nationalism.” First Things. The Institute on Religion and Public Life. March 2016. https://www.firstthings.com/article/2016/03/the-dangers-of-hindu-nationalism.

756 Khan, Amir Ullah. Personal Interview. February 3, 2018.

252 Advani were held responsible for this violence.757 Modi’s role in the 2002 Gujarat riots is another example of leadership instigating militancy.758 My anonymous source based in Delhi argued that “localized communal riots are triggered by the BJP to divert the attention of people” away from “failures of the ruling BJP government.”759

According to the IPCR chronology of communal riots in India, “the BJP and its sister organizations have been active in instigating communal riots” since the 1990s.760 This research paper also asserts that communal violence in recent decades is, “a result of the manipulation of the religious sentiments of people by the Hindu right-wing organizations for political gains.”761

The geographic dispersion of communal riots shows that the states with the greatest number of violent outbreaks are controlled by the BJP and other Hindutva organizations. This is important because large-scale riots require an organization to mobilize people. It also challenges the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis, because these are the states in which Hindu nationalists have the most political power. To analyze

757 “Uproar over India mosque report.” Aljazeera. November 24, 2009. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/11/2009112454918803725.html.

758 Ghassem-Fachandi, Parvis. Pogrom in Gujarat: Hindu Nationalism and Anti- Muslim Violence in India. Princeton University Press. 2012. P. 282.

759 Anonymous. Personal interview. February 16, 2018.

760 Rajeshwari, B. “Communal Riots in India: A Chronology (1947-2003).” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCR). March 2004. P.2

761 Ibid.

253 the dispersion of communal riots, I used information on the number of riots in each state from Ashutosh Varshney and Steven Wilkinson’s dataset on Hindu-Muslim violence in India from 1950 to 1995.762 Then, I added information on the current ruling political party of each state.763 I chose to use current BJP domination of a state’s government to indicate the presence of strong Hindutva organizations. This simplification was chosen due to the large number of cases and lacking historical information for each riot. It makes sense that the states with strong Hindu nationalist presence today would generally correlate with those states that had more Hindu nationalist presence in the past. I found that three states far surpassed the rest in overall number of riots during this time period. These states are Gujarat (with 243 riots), Maharashtra (with 201 riots), and Uttar Pradesh (with 200 riots). The next highest number of riots was a tie between Bihar and Karnataka (with 75 each).764

762 Varshney, Ashutosh and Steven Wilkinson. “Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, 1950-1995, Version 2.” Inter-University Consortium For Political and Social Research (ICPSR). October 8, 2004.

763 “Indian States’ Elections.” Elections.in. Accessed March 7, 2018. http://www.elections.in/state-elections.html.

764 Varshney, Ashutosh and Steven Wilkinson. “Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, 1950-1995, Version 2.” Inter-University Consortium For Political and Social Research (ICPSR). October 8, 2004.

254 Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh are all heavily BJP-dominated and have been discussed in this chapter as centers of Hindu nationalist power.765

While the BJP is currently dominant throughout much of India, the political makeup of the states with the least communal riots is telling. In Varshney and

Wilkinson’s study, there were nineteen states that experienced twenty or fewer riots.766 Of these states, ten are currently dominated by a party other than the BJP.767

This means a slim majority of states with the smallest number of riots do not have a strong presence of Hindutva organizations. Additionally, Varshney and Wilkinson found that the average riot during this time period was not small scale. The mean number of people killed in each riot was 9.8, the mean number of people injured was

29.6, and the mean riot duration was 1.9 days.768 While these averages may be driven up by major violent outbreaks, it is clear that this level of destruction requires more

765 “Indian States’ Elections.” Elections.in. Accessed March 7, 2018. http://www.elections.in/state-elections.html.

766 Varshney, Ashutosh and Steven Wilkinson. “Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, 1950-1995, Version 2.” Inter-University Consortium For Political and Social Research (ICPSR). October 8, 2004.

767 “Indian States’ Elections.” Elections.in. Accessed March 7, 2018. http://www.elections.in/state-elections.html.

768 Varshney, Ashutosh and Steven Wilkinson. “Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, 1950-1995, Version 2.” Inter-University Consortium For Political and Social Research (ICPSR). October 8, 2004.

255 than a few participants, and these participants require organizational leadership to mobilize.

In addition to the historical events mentioned here (such as the Babri mosque demolition and the 2002 Gujarat riots), there are also recent examples of RSS and BJP leaders instigating communal violence. In January 2018, a major Hindu-Muslim riot broke out in the Muslim-dominated town of Kasganj in Uttar Pradesh during Republic

Day celebrations.769 This resulted in the death of a 22-year-old student and widespread property destruction. A preliminary probe found that the clashes were sparked by a “Tricolor bike rally” arranged by RSS-affiliate Akhil Bharatiya

Vidhyarthi Parishad (ABVP), a Hindu nationalist student organization.770 According to some reports, these members brought clubs and other weapons. They also recited slogans such as “Pakistan Murdabad” (Death to Pakistan), and “Katve Bhago

Pakistan” (Muslims go to Pakistan).771 Senior Uttar Pradesh (UP) bureaucrat,

Raghvendra Vikkram Singh seemed to criticize the BJP (which is currently in power

769 Chauhani, Arvind. “Fresh violence keeps Kasganj on edge; vehicles, shops set ablaze.” The Times of India. January 28, 2018. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/agra/kasganj-still-on-boil-buses-shops-set-on- fire-place-of-worship-vandalised-by-mob/articleshow/62675883.cms.

770 Srivastava, Kanchan. “Pressure on Indian official after he calls out Muslim- baiting.” Asia Times. January 31, 2018. http://www.atimes.com/article/pressure- indian-official-calls-muslim-baiting/.

771 Puniyani, Ram. “Kasganj Violence: Unveiling the Anatomy of a Riot.” National Herald. February 11, 2018. https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/bjp-wants- to-benefit-electorally-from-kasganj-riots-protect-abuse-of-our-tricolour-by-bjp.

256 in UP), when he remarked that the riots revealed a “strange trend.” In what many perceive as a veiled accusation against Hindutva organizations inciting communal violence, Singh wrote, “To visit Muslim areas and raise slogans against Pakistan.

Why? Are the Muslims Pakistanis?”772

Amid recent controversy over the Indian film Padmaavat, which is about a legendary Rajput queen, BJP leaders have issued threats against those involved in production. In January 2017, BJP member Akhilesh Khandelwal, chairman of

Hosangabad municipal corporation in Madhya Pradesh, announced a reward of Rs

10,000 for slapping filmmaker Sanjay Leela Bhansali with a shoe.773 Additionally, in

November 2017, The Haryana BJP's media chief Suraj Pal Amu announced a bounty on the heads of Bhansali and actress Deepika Padukone.774 Bhansali had already been assaulted by the members of the Karni Sena, a Rajput caste organization.775 For Hindu

772 Srivastava, Kanchan. “Pressure on Indian official after he calls out Muslim- baiting.” Asia Times. January 31, 2018. http://www.atimes.com/article/pressure- indian-official-calls-muslim-baiting/.

773 Choudhury, Rabindra Nath. “BJP leader announces Rs 10K reward to slap Sanjay Leela Bhansali.” Deccan Chronicle. January 30, 2017. http://www.deccanchronicle.com/entertainment/bollywood/300117/reward-to-slap- sanjay-leela-bhansali.html.

774 “Padmavati row: Now, Haryana BJP’s media chief announces Rs 10 crore bounty on heads of Bhansali and Deepika Padukone.” The Indian Express. November 19, 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/padmavati-row-now-haryana-bjps-media- chief-announces-rs-10-crore-bounty-on-heads-of-bhansali-and-deepika-padukone/.

775 “Sanjay Leela Bhansali assault: ‘Padmavati’ actors Deepika Padukone, Ranveer Singh and Shahid Kapoor break their silence.” Times of India. January 29, 2017. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/entertainment/hindi/bollywood/news/sanjay-leela-

257 nationalists, militancy fulfills the tactical goal of electoral success for the BJP, providing evidence for the second hypothesis. This positive effect incentivizes the BJP and other Hindutva leaders to instigate and mobilize communal violence on behalf of the movement.

Hypothesis 3 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if they perceive it to be religiously obligatory.

While proof of the structural hypotheses suggests that strategic theories of political violence may explain the retention of militancy in the case of Hindu nationalism in India, it is still worth examining the role of ideational factors. This section will test whether continued militancy is perceived as religiously obligatory within Hindu nationalism as a religious ideology. Drawing from Sandal’s public theology approach outlined in Chapter Two, I focus on the cultural nationalist interpretation of Hinduism represented by Hindutva groups in India.776

bhansali-assault-padmavati-deepika-padukone-breaks-her- silence/articleshow/56832864.cms.

776 Sandal, Nukhet Ahu. 2012. “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(1): 76.

258 Within Hinduism, the closest equivalent to the Islamic concept of “jihad” and other doctrines governing war is the concept of dharmayuddha. This concept is emphasized in the Vedic and Epic literature and is roughly translated as “just war.”777

It refers to war that is carried out based on the principles of dharma (which represent goodness and support for the cosmic order). The purpose of dharmayuddha is to establish this cosmic order in the world. Based on this concept, just wars are to be waged only in response to unlawful or unjust actions. Additionally, war is to be conducted in a fair and open manner, prohibiting excessive force or mistreatment of persons in conquered territories. The goal is to prohibit inequality in fighting and protect the “helpless,” in order to make war more humane.778

Dharmayuddha represents one of the two main schools of war produced by ancient Indian thinkers. The other school is kutayuddha (devious warfare).779 While dharmayuddha is a just and righteous war, kutayuddha was unjust, lacked the approval of society, and was often carried out in secret. At the level of rhetoric, dharmayudda,

777 Roy, Kaushik 2007, Just and Unjust War in Hindu Philosophy, Journal of Military Ethics 6(3): 232-245.

778 Subedi, Surya P. 2003. “The Concept in Hinduism of ‘Just War,’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 8(2):339-361.

779 Deshingkar, Giri. “Strategic Thinking in Ancient India and China: Kautilya and Sunzi.” In Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for Understanding China. Ed. Tan Chung. Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts. 1998.

259 “always reigned supreme.”780 The purpose of qualifying a war as a dharmayuddha is to distinguish it from forms of violence that are not sanctioned in Hinduism. For example, violence motivated by greed is arthayuddha, and violence motivated by personal pleasure is kamayuddha.781 These types of violence are contrary to just war in Hinduism.

The Vedas (canonical sacred texts of Hinduism) establish the “ksatriyas” as the class which carries out dharmayudda. The Purusa Sukta hymn in the Rigveda (one of the four Vedas) provides a metaphorical description of the origin of humankind.782

According to the hymn, the cosmic Person (Purusha) was divided up and, “from his mouth came the brahmans (priest-teachers), from his arms the ksatriyas (warrior- kings), from his thighs the vaisyas (trader-craftsmen) and from his feet the sudras

(manual labourers).”783 The ksatriyas are the physical protectors of the community and the defenders of the cosmic order (dharma). The Bhagavadgita, which takes place

780 Deshingkar, Giri. “Strategic Thinking in Ancient India and China: Kautilya and Sunzi.” In Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for Understanding China. Ed. Tan Chung. Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts. 1998.

781 Rambachan, Anantanand. “The Co-Existence of Violence and Non-Violence in Hinduism.” The Ecumenical Review. 55(2): 116.

782 Ibid. 115.

783 Rambachan, Anantanand. “The Co-Existence of Violence and Non-Violence in Hinduism.” The Ecumenical Review. 55(2): 116.

260 on a battlefield, advocates that participating in war may be viewed as a personal duty for a ksatriya.784

In Chapter 2 of the Bhagavadgita, Lord Krishna addresses Arjuna (a ksatriya) and presents a lecture about the nature of a dharmayuddha. He tells Arjuna,

“Considering your duty as a warrior, you should not waver. Indeed, for a warrior, there is no better engagement than fighting for upholding of righteousness.”785

Krishna empathizes that warriors who defend righteousness will find, “the stairway to the celestial abodes.”786 After this offer of reward, he gives Arjuna a warning about shirking his duty. Krishna says, “If, however, you refuse to fight this righteous war, abandoning your social duty and reputation, you will certainly incur sin.”787 Krishna reassures Arjuna that it is never a sin to kill evildoers, those who are followers of adharma (lawlessness).788 For Hindu nationalists to be justified in their militancy according to this interpretation, they must view their opponents as evildoers who threaten the cosmic order. According to my anonymous source based in Delhi, “‘Just

784 Rambachan, Anantanand. “The Co-Existence of Violence and Non-Violence in Hinduism.” The Ecumenical Review. 55(2): 116.

785 Bhagavadgita 2.31

786 Bhagavadgita 2.32

787 Bhagavadgita 2.33

788 Kumar, Vijay. “Bhagavad Gita Chapter 2 Verse 31.” Bhagadvad Gita Live. http://bhagavadgitalive.com/gita-chapter-2/bhagavad-gita-chapter-2-verse-31/.

261 war’ is something to be conceived as a cry for justice to bring order in a situation dominated by external forces. Since Hindutva is hegemonic in fertile majoritarian environment, there is no external domination to be defeated.”789 Essentially, since

Hindu nationalists control the order in India, this source concluded that they could not be waging a “just war.” Dharmayuddha is meant be conducted in an open, righteous manner for the purpose of restoring justice and order.

Considering that religious texts may have different interpretations, do Hindu nationalists in India draw on concepts of dharmayuddha to justify attacks on non-

Hindus (despite that this distinction may not be present in the larger religious traditions)? After conducting a search for the terms “dharmayuddha,”790 “holy war,” and “just war,” on the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Official Website,791 the

BJP Official Website,792 and a collection of RSS resolutions from 1950-2007,793 there were only three occurrences of these terms discovered. The first was a blog post from

789 Anonymous. Personal interview. February 16, 2018.

790 This search included spelling variations of “dharmayudha,” “dharma yudha,” and “dharma yuddha.”

791 Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh Homepage. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://rss.org.

792 Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. Accessed October 31, 2017. http://www.bjp.org/core-issues/development-plan.

793 Chandra, Barthwal Harish. R.S.S. Resolves: 1950-2007. Suruchi Prakashan. Kindle Edition.

262 L.K. Advani which refers to historical raids in India as a Muslim “holy war.”794 The second was an RSS resolution from 1962 condemning Chinese aggression which called for a “holy war” to protect India from China and communism.795 Finally, the third occurrence was within a 1963 RSS resolution that also condemned Chinese aggression. The resolution states, “Bharat [India]’s fight against Communist China is a struggle to defend her integrity and freedom and preserve her age-old values of life.

The R.S.S. calls upon the people to join in this DharmaYuddha with all their resources.”796 Used in a resolution that does not otherwise mention religion, this term carries a connotation closer to defense of the nation rather than defense of the religion, although the two are closely related for Hindu nationalists.

This is not to say that Hindu nationalists in India never call on the concept of dharmayuddha to justify militant action in defense of Hinduism. On December, 6

1992 the Sangh Parivar called for a dharmayuddha regarding the demolition of the

Babri Mosque in Ayodhya and construction of the Ram Temple in its place.797 The

VHP placed advertisements in the newspapers appealing people to ready themselves

794 Advani, L.K. “No Full Stops in BJP.” Bharatiya Janata Party Official Website. October 08, 2013. http://www.bjp.org/core-issues/development-plan.

795 Chandra, Barthwal Harish. R.S.S. Resolves: 1950-2007. Suruchi Prakashan. Kindle Edition. Location 596.

796 Ibid. Locations 636-638.

797 Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace. India’s 2004 Elections: Grass-Roots and National Perspectives. Sage Publications. 2007. P. 157.

263 for a “holy war,” and intense communal riots followed the mosque’s demolition. Still, this concept does not rise to the strong compulsion for defense of the religion present in concepts of “crusade” and “jihad.” It is even used by political opponents within

India to refer to competitions which are not themselves religious in nature. For example, in January 2017, Arvind Kejriwal, chief of the Aam Aadmi Party (with a platform of democratic socialism and anti-corruption) called elections in Goa and

Punjab a “dharmayuddha,” between the AAP and all other parties competing with them.798 Among the opposing parties was the Hindu nationalist BJP. The lack of a clear concept calling for defense of the religion within Hinduism and Hindu nationalist discourse challenges the third hypothesis that religious militant groups may continue to use violence alongside political inclusion only if they perceive it to be a religious obligation. This suggests that Hindu nationalist militancy is motivated by something other than religious obligation.

798 Biswas, Indroneil B. “AAP Chief Arvind Kejriwal Terms Goa, Punjab Elections As 'Dharma-Yuddha’” NDTV. January 07, 2017. https://www.ndtv.com/india- news/aap-chief-arvind-kejriwal-terms-goa-punjab-elections-as-dharma-yuddha- 1646280.

264 Hypothesis 4 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if framing of myths or sacred histories contained within the group’s religious ideologies evoke hostility towards other groups and fear of extinction.

As opposed to theories of religious obligation, theories of framing and symbolic politics bear more fruit in understanding the ideational motivations for

Hindu nationalist militancy. Testing the fourth hypothesis yields strong evidence of narratives that evoke hostility and fear of extinction. One such potent narrative is the history and myths surrounding the Ram Temple in Ayodhya. In this story, Hindu nationalist groups claim that when the Babri Masjid (Mosque) was constructed, it replaced an existing Ram temple, for which there is no tangible evidence.799 Ayodhya is considered a holy place for both Hindus and Muslims. Muslims believe that Shea, the grandson of Adam, is buried in the cemetery by the Saryu river in Ayodhya, while

Hindus believe it is the birthplace of Rama.800 According to the myth, a temple commemorating the birthplace of Rama existed at this location since the eleventh century A.D.801 The myth states that a general of Babar, founder of the Mughal

799 Udayakumar, S.P. “The ‘Ram Temple’ Drama. The Hindu. September 30, 2010.

800 Ibid.

801Van der Veer, Peter. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. University of California Press. 1994 P.2.

265 dynasty, destroyed the temple and built his mosque using carved pillars from the temple ruins.

The story of Rama is written in the Ramayana, one of the two major Sanskrit epics. The other is the Mahabharat, which includes the Bhagavadgita. The Ramayana details Prince Rama’s quest to save his wife from the villain Ravana, King of Lanka

(referring to the island of Sri Lanka).802 As prince of Ayodhya, Rama was exiled for

14 years along with his wife Sita and brother Laksmana due to his stepmother’s plotting. During their exile in the forest, Sita was abducted by Ravana. In response,

Rama attacked Lanka, killed Ravana and rescued his wife with the help of an army of monkeys and bears. After this ordeal, the couple returned victoriously to Ayodhya, and Rama began his righteous rule (Ram Raj), which is described as a Golden Age.803

As mentioned previously, the legend of Ram Raj has been used to incite attacks against mosques.804 This story can be compared to the Mahavamsa for Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka. Both describe a battle between kings in which one is a

802 “Quick Guide to the Ramayana.” The British Library. March 7, 2018. http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/whatson/exhibitions/ramayana/guide.html

803 Ibid.

804 Kaufman, Stuart J. and Michael C. Grillo. “Chapter 5: Gandhi’s Nonviolence, Communal Conflict, and the Salt March,” Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015. P.161.

266 religious figure fighting in defense of righteousness and the other is a foreign threat.805

In the Ramayana, Rama is described as an incarnation of the God Vishnu.806 His rule is glorified in Hindu mythology as a time of justice and prosperity. However, this rule included the suppression of non-Hindu minorities and lower castes.807

The legend of Rama has been used by communal parties as a symbol of Hindu revivalism, much to the concern of India’s religious minorities and lower caste

Hindus.808 Like the Mahavamsa, which identifies Sinhalese Buddhists with the island of Sri Lanka, the Ramayana sets Ayodhya as the center of the Hindu nation.809 The

Ramayana provides Hindu nationalists with a shared “Golden Age” myth that they can aim to “reestablish” through politics or militancy. Additionally, the nature of Ram Raj

(which required suppression of non-upper caste Hindus), implies that these religious minorities and lower caste Hindus in India are a threat to the ideal Hindu nation. The

805 “Chapter 25: The Victory of Duttha Gamani,” in the Mahavamsa. http://mahavamsa.org/mahavamsa/original-version/25-victory-duttha-gamani.

806 “Quick Guide to the Ramayana.” The British Library. March 7, 2018. http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/whatson/exhibitions/ramayana/guide.html

807 Ahmed, Akbar S. Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin, Routledge. 1997. P. 101.

808 Ibid. 102.

809 Dubashi, Jay. The Road to Ayodhya. New Delhi: Voice of India, 1992. 57.

267 construction of a Ram Temple in Ayodhya is viewed as a symbolic fulfillment of a new Ram Raj.810

For Hindu nationalists, the symbolic connection to Ayodhya is strong. In his book, The Road To Ayodhya, Hindu nationalist and BJP-associated economist Jay

Dubashi wrote, “Ayodhya is the centre of our Hindu nationhood, and Lord Rama our national leader. Without Ayodhya, this nation cannot be a nation in the fullest sense of the word, just as there can be no Christendom, which is what Europe is, without the

Vatican.”811 In this narrative, Ayodhya is set not only as a symbol of the Hindu nation, but as a place that is threatened by the “other,” namely Muslims in India who are perceived to have “destroyed” the original temple. As anthropologist Peter van der

Veer argues, nationalist ideologies such as Hindu nationalism have, “a very urgent and contradictory need to show, in a historical account, that the nation has always existed, a need that emerges clearly in the attempt to ‘rebuild’ the temple in Ayodhya.”812 In this way, Hindu nationalists simultaneously construct an ahistorical community and identify the perceived threats against it.

810 Parashar, Brajendra. “There will be Ram Rajya by 2022, says UP CM Yogi Adityanath.” Hindustan Times. November 11, 2017. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/will-establish-ram-rajya-by-2022-says- up-cm-yogi-adityanath/story-YRDszm84Vk8pNs15LwhiZN.html.

811 Dubashi, Jay. The Road to Ayodhya. New Delhi: Voice of India, 1992. 57.

812 Van der Veer, Peter. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. University of California Press. 1994 P.xii-xiii.

268 This feeling of being threatened is essential to Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory, in which the critical causes of ethnic violence are hostile group myths and the fears they produce.813 According to Kaufman, people generally make emotionally- charged choices by responding to evocative symbols. These symbols are powerful because they can reference group myths to, “[frame] a conflict of interest as a struggle against hostile, evil, or subhuman forces.”814 Fear can cause people to prioritize security over values, and myths that stir fears of group extinction facilitate mass hostility. The emotions evoked by the Ram temple narrative sparked a long-lasting movement to demolish the Babri Masjid and build a Ram temple in its place. This symbolic struggle led to riots and bloodshed as Hindu nationalists battled Muslims defending the mosque. In 1886, a plea for permission to construct a Ram temple was turned down and subsequent appeals dismissed. In the wake of this legal defeat, tensions mounted and a battle broke out between Muslims guarding a fortified Babri

Masjid and Hindu counterparts. This fighting left 75 Muslims dead as Hindus temporarily took control of the mosque.815 The symbolism of the Ram temple continued to spark unrest a century later, as the BJP’s support for the Ram temple movement proved effective at stirring communal passions and bolstering the party’s

813 Kaufman, Stuart J. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence.” International Security. 30(4): 47.

814 Ibid. 52.

815 Udayakumar, S.P. “The ‘Ram Temple’ Drama. The Hindu. September 30, 2010.

269 electoral performance (as outlined in discussion of the second hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of this militancy). The framing of the Ram temple mythology as a struggle against Muslim conquest of the place considered the heart of Hindu nationhood proved a strong impetus for communal violence by Hindu nationalist militants.

The Ram temple narrative is not the only story which provokes hostility among

Hindu nationalists. Narratives about the Mughal Empire are used to symbolize modern Hindu-Muslim relations in India. Stories about Hindu resistance to Muslim rule, such as the story of Shivaji Maharaj (a seventeenth-century Hindu king who raised a successful Hindi revolt against Muslim rule in 1659)816, and the story of the

Hindu Sanyasi Rebellion (a late eighteenth century rebellion against Muslim leaders in

North Bengal) are framed in such a way to evoke hostility against Muslims in India.

The latter story is narrated by Bankimchandra Chatterjee in his book Anandamath, which appeared around 1882-85.817 This was the first book outlining the concept of the Hindu Rashtra (or “Hindu nation”). Shamsul Islam asserted that the 2002 Gujarat riots were a reenacting of this story, stating that, “In fact, the re-enactment of this scene of Anandamath is one of the games which are played in the shakhas [Hindu

816 Kaufman, Stuart J. and Michael C. Grillo. “Chapter 5: Gandhi’s Nonviolence, Communal Conflict, and the Salt March,” Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015.

817 Islam, Shamsul. Undoing India the RSS Way, Media House, 2002. 27.

270 theological schools].”818 These resistance narratives can be viewed as a model for outbreaks of Hindu nationalist violence.

The Moghul Empire was established in 1526 in the Indian subcontinent and ruled by a Muslim dynasty.819 It began to break-up in the mid-eighteenth century and the last remnants were formally taken over when the British Crown assumed direct control over India in 1858. Indian historian, Tapan Raychaudhuri lectured that, contrary to the myths propagated by Hindutva proponents, this period should not be perceived as a time of Muslim rule because Muslims as a class never ruled India.820

Arguing that political power was not in the hands of Muslims as a group,

Raychaudhuri asserted that Sharia was never imposed by Muslim rulers in India, and taxes like the jizya (meant to be paid by non-Muslims) were only imposed in limited areas around the capital. Levels of tolerance for non-Muslims in India varied between emperors. The Mughal emperors Akbar and Jahangir enjoyed meetings with Hindu ascetics, although they were averse to certain Hindu customs, such as sati, the burning

818 Islam, Shamsul. Undoing India the RSS Way, Media House, 2002. 29.

819 Schimmel, Annemarie. The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art, and Culture. The University of Chicago Press. 2004. P.24.

820 “Demolishing Hindutva Myths.” The Times of India. January 29, 2003. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/Demolishing-Hindutva- myths/articleshow/35791901.cms.

271 of widows.821 Jahangir ordered that no Hindu temples should be destroyed, other than in times of war, but no new temples should be constructed either. This marked a trend of Mughal rulers engaging with other religious cultures, such as taking part in festivals of non-Muslim groups, while still maintaining the superiority of Islamic practices.822

Certain narratives from this period of history are selected and repeated to evoke hostility and model violent resistance against Muslims in India.

Narratives about the Mughal Empire instill a deep sense of injustice among

Hindu nationalists.823 This empire is viewed as a cruel foreign force that oppressed

Indian identity and culture. A propaganda pamphlet distributed from the BJP headquarters in New Delhi declares that, “the barbaric methods of destruction of

[Hindu] temples and converting Hindus to Islam” are “facts of history…If temples were proved to have been destroyed for construction of the mosques then they would agree that the mosque could be removed and the temple should be re-built to redress the injustice.”824 This pamphlet also expresses concern that the population of

Muslims and Christians is growing faster than the Hindu population in India.

821 Schimmel, Annemarie. The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art, and Culture. The University of Chicago Press. 2004. P. 113.

822 Ibid. 114.

823 Howard, Thomas Albert. “The Dangers of Hindu Nationalism.” First Things. The Institute on Religion and Public Life. March 2016. https://www.firstthings.com/article/2016/03/the-dangers-of-hindu-nationalism.

824 Ibid.

272 Concerns about historical injustices and the growth of non-Hindu populations evoke fear among Hindu nationalists for their future. Speaking about the demolition of the

Babri mosque, Hindu activist Sadhvi Rithambara argued, “the Hindu is not fighting for a temple of brick and stone. He is fighting for the preservation of a civilization of his Indianness, for national consciousness, for the recognition of his true nature.” For

Hindu nationalists, the Mughal Empire and narratives about temple destruction symbolize current threats on their “Hindu Rashtra” by non-Hindus.

Worries about perceived threats to Hindu culture are manifested in the current issue of “Love Jihad.” This term was first mentioned around 2007 and refers to unsubstantiated claims that women are being coerced into converting to Islam through marriage as part of a calculated Muslim campaign.825 The specter of “Love Jihad” was widely invoked by the BJP in elections in northern Uttar Pradesh.826 In September

2013, slogans against both “Love Jihad” and cow slaughter stoked communal clashes in Uttar Pradesh that resulted in at least 37 deaths.827 Hindu nationalist militants are motivated by feelings that they must protect cows and women from Muslims.

825 Khalid, Saif. “The Hadiya case and the myth of 'Love Jihad' in India.” Al Jazeera. August 24, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/hadiya-case- myth-love-jihad-india-170823181612279.html

826 Ibid.

827 Pandey, Manish Chandra and Vikas Pathak. “Muzaffarnagar: 'Love jihad', beef bogey sparked riot flames.” Hindustan Times. September 12, 2013. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/muzaffarnagar-love-jihad-beef-bogey-sparked- riot-flames/story-C4zF5w9K1FoS5Sffu0DU2L.html.

273 Therefore, a growing Muslim population is perceived as threatening. When asked if the framing of narratives to evoke hostility or fear motivates Hindu nationalist violence, Amir Khan replied, “Indeed it does.”828 He continued, “The specter of the

Muslim gaining a majority and ruling over the country is what Modi exploited in

Gujarat. The hostility also comes from the regular reminder of a vicious Muslim rules during Mughal times who raped and destroyed India.”829 Narratives of Muslim oppression stoke prejudice against Muslims that make Hindu nationalists more likely to view the activities of Indian Muslims as threatening.

In this way, such narratives serve as symbols that evoke collective fears and frame current conflicts as a struggle of the in-group against hostile forces. Today, these hostile forces are represented especially by images of Muslims as criminals or terrorists aligned with Pakistan. According to anthropologist Parvis Ghassem-

Fachandi, “Once Hindu is invoked as essence, pregnant emotionally but emptied of much content, the figure of the Muslim may arouse a phantasmagoria of fear, anger, visceral abhorrence, and particularly disgust.”830 Examination of the Ram temple narrative provides an example of a particularly potent symbol that has been invoked as a catalyst for numerous instances of Hindu nationalist militancy and communal

828 Khan, Amir Ullah. Personal Interview. February 3, 2018.

829 Ibid.

830 Ghassem-Fachandi, Parvis. Pogrom in Gujarat: Hindu Nationalism and Anti- Muslim Violence in India. Princeton University Press. 2012. P. 13.

274 violence. This supports the fourth hypothesis that, “framing of myths or sacred histories contained within the group’s religious ideologies evoke hostility towards other groups and stir collective fears.”

Conclusion

This research suggests that Hindu nationalist militants are using violence strategically, while simultaneously shedding light on their ideational motivations.

Since all but the third hypothesis are supported in this study, we can conclude that

Hindu nationalists in India have had limited success achieving their goals through legal avenues (Hypothesis 1), while violence has proven effective in mobilizing support for the movement (Hypothesis 2). These militants are also motivated more by hostile myths and ethnic fears (Hypothesis 4) than religious obligation (Hypothesis 3).

The puzzle of continued militancy despite democratic participation is solved because, in this case, the democratic power of the Hindu nationalist political wing still has not yielded the successes desired by Hindu nationalists, especially in the realms of banning cow slaughter, Pakistan policy, and Jammu and Kashmir. Additionally, militant activity does not generally hinder the BJP’s political support, often bolstering its electoral victories. Therefore, there is no logical conundrum for pursuing democratic politics and militancy simultaneously. Still, the ideational hypotheses shed light on the motivations for continued militancy. Narratives present in Hindu

275 nationalist discourse, such as the Ram temple myth, support Kaufman’s theory of symbolic politics, in which ethnic violence is sparked by hostile group myths and the fears they produce.831

831 Kaufman, Stuart J. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence.” International Security. 30(4): 47.

276 Chapter 5

BUDDHIST NATIONALISM IN SRI LANKA

Buddhist nationalist violence in Sri Lanka presents a compelling case study about religious militancy occurring despite democratic inclusion. This religious ideology emerged and developed under British colonization and became tied to Sinhalese ethnic identity. While this research is concerned primarily with religious movements, these movements also have ethnic aspects, such as the identification of Sinhalese identity with the religion of Buddhism. When religion is emphasized as an identity rather than a theological code, it becomes a way of defining in-groups and out-groups. This use of religion as identity is often intertwined with ethnicity, as in the case of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists. To ignore this ethnic factor would make it difficult to understand the formation of Buddhist nationalist identity in Sri Lanka. As the country gained independence and began to engage in democratic practices, political parties representing Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism came to the forefront and implemented their agenda as leaders of government. Still, communal violence and riots continued, exploding into Sri Lanka’s 26-year civil war between the majority Sinhala Buddhist government and the LTTE (aka Tamil Tigers) representing the minority Tamils. Communal violence continued after the war’s 2009 conclusion, including the formation of the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist militant group. So why does ethno-religious violence continue despite government representation? Compared to the other cases, this provides an opportunity to test the hypotheses in conditions where the religious movement being examined is 1) Not

277 consolidated but represented by several organizations, 2) religiously affiliated with Buddhism, and 3) part of the religious majority in the country. This chapter will test the four hypotheses to uncover the causes of continued militancy in the name of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. It includes information derived from Sri Lankan news sources, Sri Lankan government online archives, historical research, and Sri Lankan scholarship. It also includes an interview with Sri Lankan native A.R.M. Imtiyaz, who has written about symbolic politics in Sri Lanka and is currently a professor at Temple

University. Each hypothesis will be tested to uncover which hypothesized necessary conditions are present and which explanations are applicable to Buddhist nationalist militancy in Sri Lanka.

History of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka, the emergence of Buddhist nationalism and even the revival of Buddhism itself are intertwined with the state’s colonial past. Buddhism was first established on the island that is now known as Sri Lanka in 246 BC by Mahinda (or “Mahendra”), who was the son of Indian Mauryan emperor Ashoka.832 It was reignited in the 1880s by American Henry Olcott. Olcott shaped Buddhism in Sri

Lanka by founding the Buddhist Theosophical Society (BTS) and Buddhist schools

832 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 11.

278 based on Christian models.833 Despite being a recent convert, Olcott declared that the Buddhism practiced by the Sinhalese was “false,” and he advocated a return to an ancient and pure form of the religion based on Buddhist scriptures. Anagarika Dharmapala, who was a disciple of Olcott, culminated this Buddhist revival and gave it a distinctive political nature, replete with xenophobia and exclusivity.834 Dharmapala used the sixth-century Mahavamsa chronicle to identify the Sinhalese with their Buddhism and inspire anti-colonialist sentiment.

The Sinhalese are the ethnic majority group in Sri Lanka, consisting of about seventy-five percent of the population.835 They are primarily Sinhala-speaking and religiously Buddhist. Tamils are a minority group, divided into Sri Lanka Tamils (approximately 11% of the population) and Indian Tamils (approximately 4 % of the population).836 Sri Lankan Moors and Malays make up almost 10 percent of the population and are predominantly Muslim.837 Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils

833 Silva, Neluka. 1999. “Politics and Theatre: A Comparative Study of the Construction of Nation and Gender in the Contemporary Sinhalese and Bengali Theatres.” Regional Centre for Strategic Studies.

834 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 21.

835 “Population by Ethnic Group.” Sri Lankan Information Service, Department of Census and Statistics. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://sis.statistics.gov.lk/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=144&tblId=DT_POP_SER_267 &conn_path=I2.

836 Ibid.

837 “Table A3: Population by district, ethnic group and sex.” Census of Population and Housing – 2012 Sri Lanka. Department of Census and Statistics. Table A3 P. 4. http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.php?fileName=FinalPopulati on&gp=Activities&tpl=3.

279 predominantly practice Hinduism and speak Tamil, although historically many had also learned English from American missionaries. This gave them a linguistic advantage over other groups during British rule.838 Approximately ninety percent of Indian Tamils and eighty percent of Sri Lankan Tamils are Hindus.839 The rest are mainly Christians. In the northern district of Jaffna, which is almost entirely Sri Lankan Tamil, 83 percent of the population is Hindu and 16 percent is Christian (mostly Roman Catholic).840 The combined populations of Muslims and Buddhists in this district are less than one percent. Sinhalese nationalist ideology claims that the Sinhalese were the first settlers on the island.841 It also asserts that the Sinhalese are descendants of Aryan immigrants from North India. According to Sinhalese folklore, these settlers encountered demons (called the Yakshas) which they needed to destroy. It is possible that these mythic demons refer to the previous inhabitants of the island who were dehumanized.842 In

838 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 19.

839 Ross, Russell R. and Andrea Matles Savada “Sri Lanka: A Country Study.” In Sri Lanka: Current Issues and Historical Background. Ed. Walter Nubin. Nova Science Publishers. 2002. P.146.

840 “Table A4: Population by district, religion and sex.” Census of Population and Housing – 2012 Sri Lanka. Department of Census and Statistics. Table A3 P. 8. http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.php?fileName=FinalPopulati on&gp=Activities&tpl=3.

841 Stokke, Kristian. 1998. “Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism as post-colonial political projects from ‘above’, 1948-1983.” Political Geography. 17(1): 86.

842Siddiqui, Habib. “Letter from America: Why Buddhism Declined?” Chinese Buddhist Encyclopedia.

280 his newspapers, Dharmapala exalted the purity of the Sinhalese race while expressing contempt for other nationalities. He wrote, “This bright, beautiful island was made into a Paradise by the Aryan Sinhalese before its destruction was brought about by the barbaric vandals [The British].”843 By 1905, Dharmapala renounced his former mentor Olcott and declared himself a bodhisattva, working in the path of Buddha. The year 1915 marked widespread anti-Muslim riots in Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon).844 They were sparked by resentment towards police ordinances restricting Buddhist processions from playing music while passing mosques. In response, Sinhalese mobs attacked Muslim traders, burned houses, and desecrated mosques. These riots resulted in the deaths of over two dozen people and a British declaration of martial law. Tamil and Sinhalese nationalisms both evolved and solidified in the context of Ceylon’s independence from Britain. During British rule, colonial authorities set the stage for communal power blocs through their institution of a legislative council, which acted as an advisory body to the governor.845 This council included one representative each from the European, Sinhalese, Tamil, and Burgher communities. The term “Burgher” describes the descendants of European men (primarily Portuguese, Dutch, and British) and native Sri Lankan women. While this system promoted a seamless transition of power after the departure of the British, it also

http://www.chinabuddhismencyclopedia.com/en/index.php/Letter_from_America:_W hy_Buddhism_Declined%3F.

843 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 23.

844 Ibid. 24.

845 Ibid.

281 aligned politics based on communal identities, which would become more potent after independence. Additionally, independence meant that minorities such as the Tamils would no longer have equal representation and instead be dominated by the Sinhalese majority. A nationalist political party called the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) was formed in December 1919 and played an instrumental role in attaining independence. This party was a predecessor of the United National Party (UNP), which is the current ruling party in Sri Lanka. Participation in the CNC also jumpstarted the careers of political leaders, including Sinhala Buddhist nationalist, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike.846 After serving as Secretary of the CNC and holding elected office on several councils, in 1936 Bandaranaike organized the Sinhala Maha Sabha, a political party for the promotion of Sinhalese culture and interests that would later back the UNP until 1951.847 In 1927, the British began to ease Ceylon into self-rule by establishing a commission to overhaul the constitution. The commission recommended universal suffrage and a constitution modeled on British parliamentary democracy.

Ceylon officially gained independence from Britain in 1948, and a schism between the Tamils and Sinhalese began to form shortly afterwards.848 According to human geographer Kristian Stokke, “Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism represent post- colonial political projects where nationalist material and discursive practices have been initiated by segments of the dominant class for the purpose of mobilization

846 Holt, John Clifford. Buddhist Extremists and Muslim Minorities: Religious Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka. Oxford University Press. 2016. P. 35.

847 Ibid. 35.

848 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 25.

282 within political alliances.”849 This use of ethnic nationalism as a tool for political mobilization has been studied by scholars of democratic transitions. For example, as discussed in the literature review on moderation, Mansfield and Snyder warn that democratizing states may be more likely to fight wars as elites use nationalist appeals to compete for popular support.850 Their research focuses mainly on interstate wars (also including wars between democratizing states and nonstate actors). However, their analysis of elite mobilization during democratic transitions also has implications for internal conflict. The described mobilization process is present in the development of Tamil and Sinhalese nationalisms, which are tied to religious identities, especially in the latter case. Ceylon’s history of ethnic representation under British rule, along with the absence of ideology-based political parties and the introduction of fierce political competition made ethnic identity a salient political rallying point.851 In 1951, Bandaranaike and his Sinhala Maha Sabha party left the UNP.852 Instead, he formed a new nationalist party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which gave a strong voice to Sinhala Buddhist nationalists. He mobilized the panca bala vegaya (five great forces), which consisted of Buddhist monks, vernacular

849 Stokke, Kristian. 1998. “Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism as post-colonial political projects from ‘above’, 1948-1983.” Political Geography. 17(1): 84.

850 Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder. 1995. “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20(1): 19.

851 Stokke, Kristian. 1998. “Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism as post-colonial political projects from ‘above’, 1948-1983.” Political Geography. 17(1): 93.

852 Holt, John Clifford. Buddhist Extremists and Muslim Minorities: Religious Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka. Oxford University Press. 2016. P. 35.

283 teachers, native doctors, farmers, and workers.853 Since its founding, the SLFP has been monopolized by the Bandaranaike family, in competition with the Senanayake family which dominated first the CNC and later the UNP.854 Sri Lanka is currently a two-party system, with the SLFP and UNP as the dominant parties, although they practice coalition politics to build parliamentary majorities. While both parties represent the majority Sinhalese community, the UNP is focused more on economic liberalism and has supported religious minority groups, much to the consternation of the Buddhist nationalists who departed to form the SLFP. Despite its representation in political parties like the SLFP and other smaller parties, Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka maintains a legacy of militancy. This militancy occurs in the context of communal tensions in Sri Lanka which boiled over in a devastating civil war that lasted from 1983 to 2009.855 The civil war was sparked by “Black July,” an anti-Tamil pogrom that occurred in July 1983. These riots began as a response to an ambush on 23 July 1983 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(aka the LTTE or “Tamil Tigers”) that left 13 Sri Lankan soldiers dead. Starting in the capital Colombo, mobs of mostly Sinhalese attacked Tamil targets, engaging in arson, looting, and murder of Tamils. The death toll is estimated to be between 2,000 and

853 Holt, John Clifford. Buddhist Extremists and Muslim Minorities: Religious Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka. Oxford University Press. 2016. P. 35.

854 Stokke, Kristian. 1998. “Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism as post-colonial political projects from ‘above’, 1948-1983.” Political Geography. 17(1): 93.

855 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 49.

284 3,000.856 During this massacre, mob leaders carried voter registration lists (a detail that is viewed as a sign of government complicity).857 This can be compared to India’s 2002 anti-Muslim Gujarat riots in which more than 1,000 people were killed and the government was accused of complicity (including an indictment against Narendra Modi).858 In both cases, large scale violence was carried out against a minority group, seemingly with the support of the government. The Black July pogrom resulted in a flood of recruits to the LTTE and the expansion of the global Sri

Lankan diaspora that began to fund them.859 The LTTE responded by launching an insurgency against the government. Their goal was to create an independent Tamil state in the north and east of the island, which was referred to as “Tamil Eelam.” During the fighting, the Sri Lankan government forces were accused of human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions and forced disappearances.860 A ceasefire in December 2001 provided temporary hope for a negotiated settlement, but renewed tension led to escalation and major government offensives in July 2006, which drove the LTTE out of the entire

856 Rajah, A.R. Sriskanda. Government and Politics in Sri Lanka: Biopolitics and Security. Taylor & Francis. 2017. P. 64.

857 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 47.

858 Ghassem-Fachandi, Parvis. Pogrom in Gujarat: Hindu Nationalism and Anti- Muslim Violence in India. Princeton University Press. 2012. 282.

859 Ibid. Preface.

860 “International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Submission of the Universal Periodic Review of Sri Lanka.” United Nations Human Rights Council, 14th Session of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. April 2012.

285 Eastern province of the island. In his book, The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers, Gordon Weiss recounts the horrific scenes that occurred during these government offensives at the end of the civil war.861 In 2009, when the remaining Tamil Tigers were, “caged on a small sand spit [a small sandy point of land] the size of New York City’s Central Park,” he notes that the conditions were ripe for a “bloodbath.”862 The LTTE finally admitted defeat on 17 May 2009. By the beginning of the civil war, the Sri Lankan military was almost entirely

Sinhalese. Due to British policies, at the time of independence minorities (including Tamils) were actually overrepresented in the officer corps.863 However, as Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism began to permeate the highest levels of government in the 1950s, there was increasing strain between civil and military authorities, manifesting in a conspiracy to commit a coup d’état in 1962 by high-ranking Christian military officers. The government’s programs to privilege Sinhalese Buddhists in recruitment produced a gradual change in ethnic composition of the military. By 1983, Tamils accounted for less than 5 percent of all military personnel. As the civil war began, this number dropped even further due to ethnic tensions and deployment against the Tamil

861 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012.

862 Ibid. P.8.

863 “Sri Lanka: Ethnic Composition of the Armed Forces.” Country Studies Series. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. http://www.country- data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13282.html.

286 population that discouraged young Tamil men from joining. By 1985, almost all enlisted personnel in the Sri Lankan military were Sinhalese.864 The civil war was won by the Sri Lankan military with the help of state- supported Sinhalese militias. In 1986, in response to Tamil attacks against Sinhalese settlers who were perceived to have infringed on traditional Tamil land, the Sri Lankan government authorized the formation of small militias for local self- defense.865 These all-volunteer militias were called the Sri Lanka Civil Security

Service, or “Home Guards.”866 Falling under the authority of the police, they enjoyed certain police powers and numbered around 40,000 personnel during the war.867 These personnel were primarily poorly educated male Sinhalese villagers. During the war, the government expanded recruitment to women as well as Muslims in affected Muslim villages.868 These militias often exceeded their mandate of self-defense by “avenging terrorist attacks with indiscriminate killings of Tamil civilians.”869 For

864 “Sri Lanka: Ethnic Composition of the Armed Forces.” Country Studies Series. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. http://www.country- data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13282.html.

865 “Sri Lanka: The Home Guard.” Country Studies Series. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13290.html.

866 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.148

867 Ibid.

868 Tudor Silva, Kalinga. 2010. “Home Guards in Syria: Guardians of Peace or Threat to Human Security?” Economic and Political Weekly. 45(36): 33.

869 “Sri Lanka: The Home Guard.” Country Studies Series. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13290.html.

287 example, in February 1998, police and home guards massacred eight Tamil civilians, apparently in retaliation for the LTTE bombing of the Buddhist Temple of the Tooth.870 In 2006, the Home Guards were renamed the “Civil Defence Force,” and placed under the authority of the newly-established Department of Civil Security.871 Part of the decision not to demobilize these militias was based on the possible effects of increased unemployment and implications for unrest and political radicalism. 872 While the civil war provided democratic mechanisms for use of state-sponsored military force in pursuit of a unified Sri Lanka, communal violence in the name of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism continued during and after the conflict. Does this violence persist because Buddhist nationalists cannot achieve their goals through legitimate avenues? The results of testing the first hypothesis will address this question.

Hypothesis 1 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if their goals cannot be achieved through legal avenues.

870 Tudor Silva, Kalinga. 2010. “Home Guards in Syria: Guardians of Peace or Threat to Human Security?” Economic and Political Weekly. 45(36): 33.

871 Civil Security Department of Sri Lanka. http://www.csd.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=11&Itemid=1 01&lang=en&limitstart=9.

872 Tudor Silva, Kalinga. 2010. “Home Guards in Syria: Guardians of Peace or Threat to Human Security?” Economic and Political Weekly. 45(36): 33.

288 As with the other case studies, evaluation of this hypothesis will depend on identifying the goals of Buddhist nationalism and determining the extent to which they have been fulfilled politically, through representative parties such as the SLFP. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalists have a long history of wielding political power since achieving independence. According to Imtiyaz, Buddhist nationalists achieve their goals in Sri Lanka by backing Sinhalese politicians from whom they demand concessions once these politicians win power.873 To test whether they have been successful at this strategy, I will examine results of the following Buddhist nationalist objectives: 1) Sinhala as the dominant language, 2) Promotion of Buddhist religion, 3) Removal of minority advantages in fields such as education, and 4) Territorial integrity and dominance over the entire island of Sri Lanka.

Sinhala language policy

Making Sinhala the official language of Sri Lanka was an early goal of Buddhist nationalists after achieving independence from Britain. In the 1830s, the British had imposed English as a medium of instruction and encouraged its use in official capacities.874 The Buddhist revival of the nineteenth century gave way to a

873 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. Personal Interview. February 13, 2018.

874 Thirumalai, M.S. 2002. “Sri Lanka’s Language Policy: A Brief Introduction.” Language in India. (1):9.

289 cultural movement for the dominance of the Sinhalese language over English.875 The Sinhala nationalist ideology that motivated this movement and its “Sinhala linguistic nationalism,” are present in documents such as The Revolt in the Temple (1953).876 This book, published soon after independence, defines Sinhala nationalism in terms of race, religion, and territory.877 The Revolt in the Temple was written by Don Charles Wijewardena, the son of Helena Wijewardena (who renovated the Buddhist temple at Kelaniya) and whose family had been part of the colonial elite.878 D.C.

Wijewardena’s book appropriated a 2500 year history for his family’s temple and the “Sinhalese race.”879 It promotes the idea that the Sinhalese Buddhists have been ordained from ancient times to govern the island.880 From this ideology, a movement for Sinhala as the official language arose and gained strength. The Kelaniya High

875 Mohan, Rohini. “Sri Lanka’s Violent Buddhists.” The New York Times. January 2, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/03/opinion/sri-lankas-violent-buddhists.html.

876 Michael Roberts. 1997. “For Humanity. For the Sinhalese. Dharmapala as Crusading Bosat.” The Journal of Asian Studies. 56(4): 1006-1032.

877 Grant, Patrick. Buddhism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. SUNY Press. 2009. P.59

878 Hoole, Rajan, “Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Identity.” University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna). Accessed January 4, 2018. http://www.uthr.org/Book/CHA01.htm.

879 Ibid.

880 Grant, Patrick. Buddhism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. SUNY Press. 2009. P. 60.

290 Priest Buddharakkhita, who was close to Wijewardene’s widow, helped bring S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike to power three years later on the 'Sinhala Only' cry.881 J.R. Jayewardene, nephew of D.C. Wijewardena, first attempted to promote the Sinhala language during British rule. In 1943-1944, J.R. Jayewardene introduced a resolution in the State Council that Sinhala should replace English as the official language.882 However, this resulted in a compromise between Sinhalese and Tamil parties in which English was replaced with both Sinhala and Tamil as the nation’s official languages. In 1951, the Governor-General of Ceylon appointed a three member Language Commission to look into the steps that had been taken to introduce Sinhalese and Tamil as the official languages. During the submission of the final report, the chairman of the commission stated that, “in my opinion the replacement of English by Swabhasha [mother tongue – referring to Sinhala and Tamil] would have been very much easier if, instead of two Swabhasha languages as official language, one alone had been accepted in terms of the motion introduced by Mr. J. R.

Jayewardene in the State Council on June 22, 1943.”883 This development in favor of Sinhala over Tamil added fuel to the fire of communal divides and linguistic nationalism.

881 Hoole, Rajan, “Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Identity.” University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna). Accessed January 4, 2018. http://www.uthr.org/Book/CHA01.htm.

882 Thirumalai, M.S. 2002. “Sri Lanka’s Language Policy: A Brief Introduction.” Language in India. (1):9.

883 Ibid.

291 The year 1956 saw the passage of the Sinhala Only Act. This year marked the 2,500th anniversary of the death of Buddha and arrival of Prince Vijaya (founder of the Sinhalese nation) on the shores of Ceylon with his 700 men.884 While the UNP was making overtures to minorities, Bandaranaike and the SLFP rode the rising tide of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. Bandaranaike remarked, “I have never found anything to excite the people quite the way this language issue does.”885 At an election rally, he declared, “Sinhala in twenty-four hours!”886 The UNP quickly tried to jump on the bandwagon, offering an even more chauvinist language policy. When Bandaranaike was elected prime minister in 1956, he was put in charge of managing this nationalist fervor and implementing a language policy that would satisfy Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists. He oversaw passage of the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956 (Also known as The Sinhala Only Act) declaring Sinhala to be the only official language.887 This Act led to mob violence that killed hundreds of Tamils in 1956 and 1958 and fanned the flames of Tamil nationalism.888 Eventually, due to rising resistance to the language policy, the Ceylon Parliament passed the Tamil Language (Special

884 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 31.

885 Ibid. 32.

886 Ibid.

887 Thirumalai, M.S. 2002. “Sri Lanka’s Language Policy: A Brief Introduction.” Language in India. (1):9.

888 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 32.

292 Provisions) Act of 1958.889 This allowed Tamil to be used in an official capacity alongside Sinhala in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The 1978 constitution (which is the current and most recent constitution) reiterated that Sinhala shall be the official language of Sri Lanka, without taking the explicit position of the 1956 Act which had declared it the one official language. It also declared that Tamil would be one of the national languages of Sri Lanka. In 1988, the 16th amendment to the constitution declared that Sinhala would be the language of administration in all provinces other than the Northern and Eastern provinces where Tamil would be used.890 While the Sri Lankan government has made small concessions to Tamils regarding language policy, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists had early success imposing the Sinhala language as the nation’s official language. The successful passage of the Sinhala Only policy represents a Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist goal that was achieved through democratic legal avenues.

Promotion of the Buddhist religion

Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism ties religion and ethnicity together as essential aspects of national identity in Sri Lanka. Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists scored a victory with the drafting of the 1972 constitution that declared Ceylon a republic with

889 Thirumalai, M.S. 2002. “Sri Lanka’s Language Policy: A Brief Introduction.” Language in India. (1):9.

890 Ibid.

293 Sinhala as the official language and Buddhism as the state religion.891 Additionally, this constitution included symbolic victories, such as rebranding Ceylon to “Sri Lanka,” and inserting Bo leaves, a Buddhist symbol, into the flag. The 1972 constitution was drafted while the SLFP was in power and it faced criticism from the UNP, which was the opposition party. It was drafted following the 1970 General Election, which the SLFP’s United Front Alliance won with a two-thirds majority. The SLFP held 91 seats in parliament (out of 151) and was headed by Prime Minister

Sirimavo Bandaranaike (wife of the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike). The two parties with the next highest share of seats were the Lanka Sama Samaja Party with 19 seats, and the UNP with just 17 seats.892 The Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) is a Trotskyist political party that was at the height of its power during this time and was part of the SLFP’s United Front Alliance893. This party breakdown means that the SLFP was strongly in power when the 1972 constitution was drafted. The process of drafting the 1972 constitution was dominated by the SLFP. The

SLFP-controlled parliament was transformed in a Constituent Assembly tasked with formulating the new constitution.894 Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike convened

891 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 41.

892 “Parliament Election (1970).” Kusaka Research Institute. Accessed February 24, 2018. http://www.jpp.co.jp/lanka/gov/govd/govde/gov37e.htm.

893 Udagama, Deepika. “The Fragmented Republic: Reflections on the 1972 Constitution of Sri Lanka.” Groundviews: Journalism for Citizens. May 01, 2014. http://groundviews.org/2014/05/01/the-fragmented-republic-reflections-on-the-1972- constitution-of-sri-lanka/.

894 Jayawickrama, Nihal “Reflections on the Making and Content of the 1972 Constitution: An Insider’s Perspective.” In The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections

294 several committees to draft the document. The Steering and Subjects committee, which formulated a series of resolutions outlining the basic principles of the constitution, had 17 members out of whom only 3 represented the opposition.895 Additionally, all the draft resolutions had to be vetted by a group of senior SLFP ministers. On May 22, 1972, the draft constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly by 119 votes to 16. The UNP voted against it.896 Some of the UNP’s main criticisms concerned the socialist economic policies included in the constitution, as well as a lack of suitable protection for fundamental rights. Additionally, the UNP complained that the committees tasked with drafting the constitution were overwhelmingly populated by members of the SLFP’s United Front coalition. This meant that the process was non-inclusive and non-representative, giving the SLFP-led government the political opportunity to frame the law of the land based on its ideological image.897 According to UNP leader Dudley Senanayake, the government had chosen to ignore, “all and every one of the amendments presented” by the UNP.898

on Constitutional History, Theory and Practice. Ed. Asanga Welikala. Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives. 2012. P. 19.

895 Ibid. 26.

896 Ibid. 41.

897 Udagama, Deepika. “The Fragmented Republic: Reflections on the 1972 Constitution of Sri Lanka.” Groundviews: Journalism for Citizens. May 01, 2014. http://groundviews.org/2014/05/01/the-fragmented-republic-reflections-on-the-1972- constitution-of-sri-lanka.

898 Jayawickrama, Nihal “Reflections on the Making and Content of the 1972 Constitution: An Insider’s Perspective.” In The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections

295 The drafting of the 1972 constitution provided a legal mechanism for Buddhist nationalists to have their interests represented and codified solely through representation by the SLFP and its allies. In some ways, the 1972 constitution was drafted as an assertion of nationalism from a state whose original constitution (the Soulbury Constitution) had not been based on any nationalist struggles, like those that had surrounded the drafting of the Indian constitution.899 Additionally, the Soulbury Constitution had maintained the

English Queen as nominal head of state. In her July 1970 communication to the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike stated, “It is your unchallengeable right to set up a Constituent Assembly of our own, chosen by us and set up by us as a free, sovereign, and independent people who have finally and forever shaken off the shackles of colonial subjection.”900 The privilege accorded to Buddhism in the 1972 constitution represented a shift away from colonial ideals and an assertion of the new nation’s identity.

The Constitution contains a chapter dedicated to Buddhism. The chapter states, “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism while

on Constitutional History, Theory and Practice. Ed. Asanga Welikala. Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives. 2012. P. 41.

899 Coomaraswamy, Radhika. “The 1972 Republican Constitution in the Postcolonial Constitutional Evolution of Sri Lanka.” P.126

900 Ibid.

296 assuring to all religions the rights granted by section 18(1)(d).”901 The rights to which this chapters refers are freedom of thought, conscience, and the freedom to practice the religion of one’s choice. This constitution effectively privileged Buddhism as the state religion, while allowing minority religions to continue to be practiced. It also repealed the protection offered to minorities in the 1946 constitution including provisions against religious discrimination.902 While the 1972 constitution called for Sri Lanka to be a Republic, based on the principles of secular democracy, it was crafted to grant importance to Buddhism. This represents a success for Buddhist nationalists who view Buddhism as an inextricable part of the nation’s identity. In fact, certain provisions of the 1972 constitution (such as the repeal of protections against religious discrimination) favored Sinhalese Buddhists so strongly that the drafting of this document helped instigate calls for an autonomous Tamil homeland.903 Frustrated by the government’s dismissal of demands made by the Federal Party (which represents Tamils), Tamils boycotted the deliberations of the

Constituent Assembly and created the Tamil United Front (TUF) to consolidate the

901 “The Constitution of Sri Lanka (Ceylon).” Parliament of Sri Lanka. May 22, 1972. https://www.parliament.lk/.

902 Legislative Powers and Procedure 29 (2). “Sri Lanka’s Laws: Ceylon Constitution Order in Council 1946.” Tamilnation.org. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://tamilnation.co/srilankalaws/46constitution.htm#LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

903 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 41.

297 main Tamil political organizations.904 The TUF presented six demands, including, “(i) A defined place for Tamil language, (ii) Sri Lanka should be a secular state, (iii) fundamental rights of the ethnic minorities should be embodies [sic] in the constitution and made enforceable by law, (iv) Citizenship to all who applied for it, (v) Decentralization of the administration; and (vi) Abolition of the caste system.”905 The failure of the Sri Lankan government to respond to these demands led to the 1976 formation of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which aimed to create an independent Tamil state.906 In the formation of the 1972 constitution, Buddhist nationalists succeeded in privileging Buddhism and Sinhalese Buddhists at the expense of Sri Lanka’s minority groups.

Removal of minority advantages

Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists resented the successes of minority groups such as the Tamils, who had benefitted from their knowledge of the English language

904 “Constitutional / Legal Provisions and Tamil Grievances.” Ilankai Tamil Sangam: Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA. Accessed February 24, 2018. http://www.sangam.org/FB_PHOTORAW/2.htm.

905 Ghosh, P.A. Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Role of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). A.P.H. Publishing Corporation. 1999. P. 37.

906 “Constitutional / Legal Provisions and Tamil Grievances.” Ilankai Tamil Sangam: Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA. Accessed February 24, 2018. http://www.sangam.org/FB_PHOTORAW/2.htm.

298 through missionary schools and held positions of power during British rule.907 Tamils had also benefitted from the system of communal representation until independence in 1948. Since the beginning of Western education in Sri Lanka, only the privileged classes had access to a good English education. This meant that the majority of Sinhalese Buddhists (as well as those Tamils who did not speak English) had been excluded from University education and public service employment due to their lack of English language skills.908 After democratization, the Tamils and Christians were targeted as the groups receiving the most advantage from government policy on language and religion. Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists decried social disparities in higher education and public service employment, in which Tamils and Christians were viewed to have an advantage. The 1950s proposal for parity of status for Tamil language was met with rejection by Sinhalese Buddhist spokespersons who called it, “an attempt to preserve a position of advantage and secure an unwarranted place for the Tamil minority relative to the Sinhala majority.”909 The 1956 Sinhala Only Act was one step taken to counter this perceived advantage. Still, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists continued to hold grievances about the status of Tamils in Sri Lankan universities and professions.

907 Menon, Shivshankar. Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution Press. 2016. P. 83.

908 Lakshman, W.D. and Clement Allan Tisdell. Sri Lanka’s Development Since Independence: Socio-economic Perspectives and Analyses. Nova Publishers. 2000. P.117

909 Ibid.

299 Over-representation of Tamils in higher education, professions, and government administration was due to a few factors. Firstly, Tamils were strongly represented in universities due to well-funded American missionary schools that provided access to English language and pre-university education. Additionally, oversaturation of land-based occupations in Tamil-dominated areas motivated many Tamils to pursue employment through higher education.910 By the time of independence, Tamils accounted for over 30 percent of government services positions, despite never totaling more than 25 percent of the general population.911 By 1956, the year the Sinhala Only Act was passed, it is estimated that Tamils made up, “50% of the clerical personnel of the railway, postal and customs services, 60% of all doctors, engineers and lawyers, and 40% of other labor forces.”912 Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists sought to curb this Tamil presence. In the 1970s, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists succeeded in implementing a preferential university admissions system called the “policy of standardization.”913

This policy, introduced by Bandaranaike, discriminated against Tamils in job recruitment and university admissions decisions, effectively institutionalizing ethnic discrimination. When it was first adopted in 1971, the standardization policy required that the number of students qualifying for university entrance from each language was

910 Perera, Sasanka. “The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline.” The World Bank. February 2001. P.11

911 Ibid.

912 Ibid.

913Menon, Shivshankar. Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution Press. 2016. P.84.

300 proportionate to the number of students who took the university entrance exam in that language.914 This meant that Tamil speakers would need to compete against each other and score much higher than Sinhalese speakers in order to gain admission. The next year, a district quota system was introduced with the intention of benefitting those who did not have adequate access to educational facilities in their district. These changes had a dramatic impact on demographics of universities. From 1970 to 1975, Tamil representation in science-based disciplines fell from

35 percent to 19 percent.915 Meanwhile, Sinhalese representation in all disciplines skyrocketed. For Tamils, this policy was viewed as test of their equal rights as Sri Lankan citizens.916 While they had once held about 30 percent of administrative positions in the year 1956, that figure dropped to just 5 percent within twenty years.917 The language-based admission policy was abolished in 1977 and other adjustments have been made to the standardization policy since that time to tweak the acceptance formula, yet Tamil youth continue to feel that they face discrimination in the university acceptance process. This policy represents a success for Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists who wanted to strip the Tamils and other minorities of their advantages in education and employment.

914 Perera, Sasanka. “The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline.” The World Bank. February 2001. P. 12.

915 Ibid.

916 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.43.

917 Ibid.

301 Territorial integrity and dominance over the entire island of Sri Lanka.

While the first three Buddhist nationalist goals were achieved through legislation and political documents such as the Sinhala Only Act, the 1972 constitution, and the policy of standardization, the final objective examined in this section yielded more violent strategies. The struggle for territory and dominance created the conditions for the Sri Lankan civil war. Five days after the beginning of the Black July mass violence, President Jayewardene addressed the nation, not with a message of condemnation against the violence or sympathy for the Tamils, but with warnings against Tamil secession.918 He declared, “The government has now decided that the time has come to accede to the clamour and the request, the natural request, of the Sinhala people that we do not allow the movement for division to grow anymore.”919 Jayewardene, a supporter of Sinhala Buddhist cultural nationalism, steered the government towards action to maintain Sinhalese dominance over the island.920 During this time, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists wielded political power through Jayewardene’s presidency despite the more moderate leanings of his party (the UNP), which held a parliamentary majority. Jayewardene was much more aligned with the goals of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism than the UNP was in general.

918 Rajah, A.R. Sriskanda. Government and Politics in Sri Lanka: Biopolitics and Security. Taylor & Francis. 2017. P.64.

919 Ibid.

920 Grant, Patrick. Buddhism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. SUNY Press. 2009. Page xiv.

302 Additionally, he managed to obtain unprecedented powers during his presidency. After being sworn in as prime minister in 1977, Jayewardene amended the constitution to make the presidency an executive post. As the incumbent prime minister, the provisions of this amendment automatically made him president. In 1978, a new constitution reflecting Jayewardene’s vision of an “Executive presidency” was ratified. This constitution centralized power, making the president both the Head of State and Head of Government, and devalued the position of prime minister.921 In this way, Jayewardene became Sri Lanka’s first “Executive president.” When Tamils began making secessionist demands, Jayewardene responded with the full weight of the Sri Lankan government. A few weeks after the Black July violence, the Jayewardene regime enacted new legislation in the form of the Sixth Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution, which amended Article 157 of the 1978 constitution. This amendment criminalized secessionist demands, even if they were advocated by political parties through non- violent means.922 Additionally, it allowed the state to remove the civic rights of convicted secessionists for a period of up to seven years and confiscate their property. The aftermath of Black July also saw the state take control of all property that was destroyed or damaged in the attacks. Jayewardene’s regime claimed, “[w]recked homes and factories would remain state property until it decides what to do with them

921 Ranjith, H. and A.G.T.S. Somarathna. 2013. “Sri Lanka’s Executive Presidency: A Critical Analysis of Its Powers and Functions Under the Constitutions of 1978 and Subsequent Constitutional Amendments.” Social Science and Humanities Review. 01(01): 75-96.

922 Rajah, A.R. Sriskanda. Government and Politics in Sri Lanka: Biopolitics and Security. Taylor & Francis. 2017. P.64

303 under a rehabilitation programme.”923 Even though the Black July violence was primarily targeted against Tamils, Jayewardene’s government harnessed the widespread fears of lawlessness to enact policy that punished Tamils and criminalized the rising Tamil calls for secession. In this case, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists were represented politically by documents and policy that addressed Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and the objective of maintaining Sinhalese dominance over the island. However, these political actions were ineffective. The 27-year civil war that began in the aftermath of Black July was a battle over the issue of Tamil secession. While violent means were used to combat Tamil secessionist demands, they were orchestrated through Sri Lanka’s democratic government, which directed the state military. This differs from violence by non-state militant groups because governments are considered to have a monopoly on use of force. As members of a majority group, similar to Hindu nationalists in India, Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka have influence over government military force. In

India, government police units such as the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) in Uttar Pradesh have been accused of partaking in sectarian violence. The PAC, which is often sent to quell communal riots, has been accused of joining Hindu mobs and targeting the Muslim minority.924 The composition of the force is also highly sectarian, with Hindus making up the vast majority and Muslims only representing

923 Rajah, A.R. Sriskanda. Government and Politics in Sri Lanka: Biopolitics and Security. Taylor & Francis. 2017. P.64

924 Chawla, Prabhu. “Provincial Armed Constabulary of Uttar Pradesh becomes focus of controversy.” India Today. January 6, 2014. https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/special-report/story/19801015-provincial-armed- constabulary-of-uttar-pradesh-becomes-focus-of-controversy-821491-2014-01-06.

304 five percent (despite constituting over 17 percent of Uttar Pradesh’s population).925 In cases of religious militancy in which the movement being examined is part of the majority religion in a democratic country, participation in government provides access to military resources. For almost half of the duration of the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist SLFP was in power.926 Therefore, this Sinhalese Buddhist objective could be ultimately considered a success due to representation by the government and military of Sri Lanka, but not as a success of “peaceful politics.”

Overall, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have successfully completed several major objectives as part of their participation in Sri Lankan democracy. Through legislation, they helped make Sinhala the official language of Sri Lanka, instituted Buddhism as the state religion, and removed minority advantages in education and employment. Therefore, the first hypothesis is not supported because Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have managed to achieve their goals through legal avenues. As Imtiyaz asserted in his interview, “the strategy of using ruling political forces to win political concessions has been pretty successful in Sri Lanka for Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists.”927 All of these reforms occurred in the time between independence and the onset of the civil war that lasted until 2009. With the power to implement

925 Chawla, Prabhu. “Provincial Armed Constabulary of Uttar Pradesh becomes focus of controversy.” India Today. January 6, 2014. https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/special-report/story/19801015-provincial-armed- constabulary-of-uttar-pradesh-becomes-focus-of-controversy-821491-2014-01-06.

926 “Sri Lanka, Parliamentary Chamber: Parliament, Elections Held in 1994.” Inter- Parliamentary Union. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2295_94.htm.

927 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. Personal Interview. February 13, 2018.

305 Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist policy democratically and with the backing of the Sri Lankan military to maintain territorial integrity, why would Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists resort to militancy on their own? The next hypothesis tests the effectiveness of practicing political violence alongside democratic governance.

Hypothesis 2

A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if this violent activity is at least tactically effective at furthering the movement’s objectives.

Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka has maintained political power throughout its history of riots, war, and militancy. Still, has militancy been effective at influencing democratic decision-making or bolstering the parties which have achieved Buddhist nationalist successes? To test this hypothesis, I will explore the more militant and radical elements associated with this religious ideology to determine whether violent activity is tactically effective. This includes examining how outbreaks of communal violence impact the success of political parties representing Buddhist nationalism as well as the impact of this violence on the ideological spectrum. Does violence in the name of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism help or hinder pursuit of their goals?

306 Militant and Radical Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Organizations

Aside from the SLFP, the two main parties that currently advocate for Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism are the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). Both of these parties are smaller and more radical than the SLFP. The JVP is a communist and Marxist-Leninist party that initially embraced cross-communalism until they decided to remove their multiethnic platform in

1982.928 The JHU (or “National Heritage Party”) is composed primarily of ultranationalist Buddhist monks. It was the JHU that led to the creation of Sri Lanka’s primary Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist militant group, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS).929 According to Imtiyaz, “These groups share common goals: to uphold Buddhism and establish a link between state and religion, and to advocate a violent solution to the Tamil question and oppose all form of devolution to the minorities, particularly the Tamils.”930 The support of these groups for violent strategies helped bolster their political success and lent a perception of legitimacy to the Sri Lankan government’s military offensives. Due to its economic ideology, the JVP initially welcomed minorities in its struggle for a socialist revolution, until this stance began to hurt them politically. Founded in 1965, the group supported a violent strategy from the beginning. It

928 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 51.

929 Mohan, Rohini. “Sri Lanka’s Violent Buddhists.” The New York Times. January 2, 2015.

930 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. “The politicization of Buddhism and electoral politics in Sri Lanka.” In Religion and Politics in South Asia. Routledge. 2010. P. 150.

307 launched two armed uprisings against the Sri Lankan government. The first uprising occurred in 1971 when the SLFP was in power, and the second was in 1987-89 against the ruling UNP government. Both of these uprisings ended in brutal government crackdowns. The first was primarily a Marxist youth rebellion, in which the JVP claimed that approximately 20,000 Sinhala youth lost their lives, while government reports place the figure at less than 2,000.931 After this failed rebellion, the JVP was banned by the government and it became an underground organization until it was gradually allowed to emerge as a political party. In 1982, the JVP contested the District Development Council (DDC) elections and the presidential elections. JVP founder Rohana Wijeweera (who had spent six years in prison after the 1971 uprising) was the party’s presidential candidate.932 In a major shock, Wijeweera received only 279,000 votes, a number so embarrassingly low that he stayed in bed for three days and rethought the JVP’s policy of cross- communalism. Wijeweera became convinced that his “secular multiethnic political platform had led to his electoral defeat,” and he decided to discontinue his party’s support for Tamil self-determination.933 This disappointing step into democratic politics set a new, more nationalist tone to the JVP which already had experience with militancy. When the JVP fully entered Sri Lanka’s democratic political system in

931 “Memoirs of Sirima R.D.Bandaranaike: Insurgency April 1971.” Sunday Observer. Published May 5, 2005. https://web.archive.org/web/20090214021804/http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2005/05/ 08/fea01.html.

932 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P. 51.

933 Ibid.

308 1994, it held an official stance against neoliberal economic policies, but prioritized the, “need to safeguard the unitary nation-state from the ‘threat of Tamil separatism.’”934 Now, in order to win Sinhala-Buddhist votes, the JVP resorts to messages of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, a strategy that has aided it in mobilizing underprivileged Sinhalese.935 Unlike the JVP which had its origins in secular socialist militancy and became more nationalist to further its political objectives, the JHU has always been a distinctly

Sinhalese and Buddhist nationalist organization, which saw some of its members branch into militancy through the creation of BBS as an organizational offshoot. Launched in February 2004 by the lay-based secular Sinhala nationalist party Sihala Urumaya, the JHU has a history of addressing religious and ethnic political concerns. The party’s main objectives are to promote the interests of Sinhala-Buddhists, seek governance based on the principles of Buddhism, and to forcefully end Tamil violence.936 It engaged in its first parliamentary elections in April 2004, where it garnered 6.0% of the popular vote and nine out of 225 seats.937 The JHU fulfilled its goal of destroying the LTTE by military force by teaming up with the JVP to pressure the government to heighten military operations in the Tamil regions and threatening to

934 Lal Fernando, Jude. “Chapter 32: Towards a convergence of resistance in Sri Lanka?” The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South. Ed. Francois Polet. Zed Books Ltd. 2013.

935 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. “The politicization of Buddhism and electoral politics in Sri Lanka.” In Religion and Politics in South Asia. Routledge. 2010. P. 150.

936 Ibid. 151.

937 “About Us.” Jathika Hela Urumaya Official Website. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://www.jhu.lk/about-us.

309 withdraw their support for the government if any concessions were given to the Tamils.938 The JHU, “shuns non-violence as a means to seek political alternatives for the Tamil national question, and has been urging young Sinhala-Buddhists to sign up for the army.”939 The violence advocated by the JHU is state-based, as opposed to the BBS’ non-state militancy. The JHU is also known for introducing anti-conversion bills to combat Christian proselytization in Sri Lanka.940 While the Supreme Court found their original anti-conversion bill opposed to international law concerning religious freedom in 2004, the JHU has continued to propose similar legislation. The JHU’s legislation calls for, “seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to Sri Lankan rupees 500,000 (US$4,425) for converting a person from one religion to another by using ‘force, fraud or allurement’.”941 Most Sri Lankan Buddhists support this bill.942 When the bill was before parliament again in 2009, a young university student commented, “this law is as necessary as the government’s destruction of the LTTE. We must rid ourselves of

938 Lal Fernando, Jude. “Chapter 32: Towards a convergence of resistance in Sri Lanka?” The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South. Ed. Francois Polet. Zed Books Ltd. 2013.

939 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. “The politicization of Buddhism and electoral politics in Sri Lanka.” In Religion and Politics in South Asia. Routledge. 2010. P.151.

940 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. “Anti-conversion Bill paving the way to ‘theocracy,’” The Sunday Times. February, 22, 2009. http://www.sundaytimes.lk/090222/Plus/sundaytimesplus_08.html.

941 Ibid.

942 Perera, Melani Manel. “Anti-conversion bill: minorities fear restrictions on religious freedom.” AsiaNews.it. January 30, 2009. http://www.asianews.it/news- en/Anti-conversion-bill:-minorities-fear-restrictions-on-religious-freedom-14360.html.

310 all those who convert (others), priests and pastors who destroy our Buddhist-Sinhalese culture. Christians are living in this land peacefully because of the great Buddhism. . . . Otherwise they would have washed out long ago.”943 While the JHU continues to combat conversions through legislation, its militant offshoot (the BBS) echoes this grievance against conversions and attempts to stifle the growth of other religions through more violent activity.944 The BBS (In English, “The Army of Buddhist Power”) is a Sinhalese Buddhist militant organization and political party that was formed when two monks (Kirama Wimalajothi and Galagoda Aththe Gnanasaara) broke away from the JHU in 2012.945 This was three years after the end of the civil war and victory over the LTTE. At its first national convention in 2012, the BBS passed five resolutions. These resolutions demanded the fulfillment of the state’s constitutional obligation to protect Buddhism, legislation to preserve cultural and ancient religious heritage, preferential treatment in university admissions for students who attended Buddhism classes, efforts to increase

Sinhala population growth (including the closing of all family planning units in the

943 Perera, Melani Manel. “Anti-conversion bill: minorities fear restrictions on religious freedom.” AsiaNews.it. January 30, 2009. http://www.asianews.it/news- en/Anti-conversion-bill:-minorities-fear-restrictions-on-religious-freedom-14360.html.

944 Sarvananthan, Muttukrishna. “Are Religious Conversions Taking Place in Sri Lanka?” Colombo Telegraph. November 4, 2016. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/are-religious-conversions-taking-place- in-sri-lanka.

945 Mohan, Rohini. “Sri Lanka’s Violent Buddhists.” The New York Times. January 2, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/03/opinion/sri-lankas-violent-buddhists.html.

311 country), and reformation of the legal system to apply evenly to all Sri Lankans.946 Unlike the JHU, the BBS goes to forceful extralegal lengths to pursue its goals through violence and intimidation. For example, on 14 October 2012, the BBS stormed the house of a Christian pastor named Dinesh who was believed to be trying to convert Sinhalese Buddhists to Christianity.947 They abducted him along with several members of the Christian fundamentalist group and claimed that they admitted to “unethical” conversions before being released.948

In a comparison that the Indian BJP and RSS would find unflattering, BBS leaders claim to have been inspired by these Hindutva organizations.949 Dilantha Withanage, chief executive of Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), told The Indian Express he had wanted to launch, “a party modelled on these Indian ventures to protect Buddhist culture in Sri Lanka,” and that the BBS “admire” Modi as a leader.950 Withanage revealed his perspective on the role of the BBS and its comparison to Hindutva

946 Deegalle, Mahinda. “The ‘Army of Buddhist Power’ in Sri Lankan Politics.” In Buddhism and the Political Process. Ed. Hiroko Kawanami. Springer. 2016. P.124- 126.

947 Fernando, J.A. “Police arrests fundamental conversion group attempted to convert Buddhists.” Asian Tribune. October 14, 2012. https://web.archive.org/web/20121016134055/http://www.asiantribune.com/news/201 2/10/13/police-arrests-fundamental-conversion-group-attempted-convert-buddhists.

948 Ibid.

949 Janardhanan, Arun. “Hardline Lanka Buddhists to launch party, say inspired by BJP, RSS.” Indian Express. January 20, 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/hardline-lanka-buddhists-to-launch- party-say-inspired-by-bjp-rss.

950 Ibid.

312 counterparts stating, “There are lots of similarities between India and Sri Lanka. Both of us face threats from Muslims and minorities who are actively engaged in conversions. When Sinhalese families have a child or two, minorities have half a dozen or more….So Modi and his party is a great inspiration for us.”951 Based on the actions of the BBS, these militant Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists may view Hindutva organizations in India not only as a model of ethnic and cultural nationalism, but as a blueprint for communal violence alongside democratic participation. As shown in the previous chapter, communal violence bolstered the BJP’s electoral performance. Is the same relationship present in Sri Lanka? This section will explore the timeline of violence conducted by the BBS and other Buddhist nationalists along with the resulting electoral performance for Sinhalese Buddhist political parties.

The Impact of Militancy on Electoral Performance for Buddhist Nationalists

This section seeks to address the impact of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist violence on the electoral performance of political parties representing Sinhalese Buddhists. As discussed, the main party representing Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka is the SLFP, although the smaller and more radical JVP and JHU will also be examined. In order to discover the impact of this violence, I take a similar approach to the authors of the Yale study, “Do parties matter for ethnic violence? Evidence from

951 Janardhanan, Arun. “Hardline Lanka Buddhists to launch party, say inspired by BJP, RSS.” Indian Express. January 20, 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/hardline-lanka-buddhists-to-launch- party-say-inspired-by-bjp-rss.

313 India,” which was referenced in the chapter on Hindutva.952 These authors discovered that ethnicity-based political parties in India performed better in elections that followed riots. If ethnic violence benefits ethno-religious parties like the BJP, does it also benefit Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist parties in Sri Lanka? To answer this question, I have compiled a timeline of ethnic riots and BBS violence and compared it to election results in the years following violent outbreaks. The timeline is displayed in Figure 6 below.953 Instances of ethnic violence are in italics. Presidential and parliamentary elections occurring in the year following a riot are in bold.

Figure 7 Buddhist Nationalist Violence vs. Electoral Results since Independence

Date Activity Results

24-30 May 1952 Parliamentary SLFP lost. Earned 9 seats total Elections

05-10 April 1956 Parliamentary SLFP won. Gained 42 seats. Elections

952 Nellis, Gareth; Weaver, Michael; and Steven C. Rosenzweig. “Do parties matter for ethnic violence? Evidence from India.” Yale University. May 1, 2016. http://www.garethnellis.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/QJPS_ms_v3_NWR.pdf.

953 References for tables include: “Dates of Elections.” Parliament of Sri Lanka. Accessed January 4, 2018. https://www.parliament.lk/dates-of-elections; and “Elections Results.” Election Commission of Sri Lanka. Accessed January 4, 2018. https://www.slelections.gov.lk/web/index.php/en/elections-results.

314 11 June 1956 Gal Oya riots (or First ethnic riots that targeted “Ceylonese riots”).954 Tamils. Resulted in approximately 150 deaths.955

24-27 May 1958 1958 Riots Resulted in approx. 300 deaths.956

19 March 1960 Parliamentary SLFP lost. Dropped 5 seats. Elections

20 July 1960 Parliamentary SLFP won. Gained 29 seats.

Elections

22 March 1965 Parliamentary SLFP lost. Dropped 34 seats. Elections

27 May 1970 Parliamentary SLFP won. Gained 50 seats. Elections

21 July 1977 Parliamentary SLFP lost. Dropped 83 seats. Elections

12 August 1977 1977 Anti-Tamil First major outbreak of communal Pogrom violence since the 1958 riots. Resulted in approx. 300 deaths.957

954 Mohan, Anupama. Utopia and the Village in South Asian Literatures. Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. P. 209.

955 “An evolving army and its role through time.” Sunday Times. October 16, 2005. http://www.sundaytimes.lk/051016/plus/4.html.

956 Ibid.

957 Kearney, Robert N. (1985). “Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka.” Asian Survey. 25(9): 907.

315 31 May – 2 June Burning of the Jaffna Resulted in the deaths of four Tamils 1981 Library and large-scale property destruction.958

June-September 1981 Riots959 Sporadic communal violence, 1981 including looting, arson, and rape.

20 October 1982 Presidential Election SLFP candidate Kobbekaduwa lost.

JVP candidate Wijeweera 4.19%

July 1983 Black July Death toll is estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000.960

19 December 1988 Presidential Election SLFP candidate Bandaranaike lost.

15 February 1989 Parliamentary SLFP lost. Gained 59 seats. Elections

16 August 1994 Parliamentary SLFP won. Gained 38 seats.

Elections JVP entered, gained one seat.

09 November Presidential Election SLFP candidate Kumaratunga won. 1994

958 “Over two decades after the burning down of the Jaffna library in Sri Lanka.” The Independent, Sri Lanka. Accessed January 4, 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20070927204835/http://www.independentsl.com/cgi- bin/newsscript1.cgi?record=1034.

959 “Sri Lanka: The Riots of 1981.” Country-data.com. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13161.html.

960 Rajah, A.R. Sriskanda. Government and Politics in Sri Lanka: Biopolitics and Security. Taylor & Francis. 2017. P.64.

316 12 December 1997 Kalutara Prison Riots Resulted in the deaths of three Tamil detainees.961

21 December 1999 Presidential Election SLFP candidate Kumaratunga won. JVP candidate Gunathilake 4.08%

10 October 2000 Parliamentary SLFP won. Gained 2 seats. Elections JVP gained 9 seats.

25 October 2000 Bandarawela Riots962 Resulted in deaths of 25 Tamil

detainees by a Sinhalese mob.963

April 2001 Mawanella Riots Attacks on Sri Lankan Muslims. Resulted in two deaths.964

05 December Parliamentary SLFP lost. Dropped 30 seats. 2001 Elections JVP gained 6 seats.

02 April 2004 Parliamentary SLFP won. Gained 28 seats.

Elections JVP gained 23 seats. JHU entered, gained 9 seats

961 “Sri Lanka: Killing of Political Prisoners in Kalutara Prison.” Asian Human Rights Commission. December 22, 1997. http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent- appeals/UA971223/?searchterm.

962 Mehta, Raj K. Lost Victory: The Rise & Fall of LTTE Supremo, V. Prabhakaran. Pentagon Press. 2010. P.46.

963 “Sri Lanka: Ethnic Violence Escalates.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed January 4, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2000/11/01/slanka617_txt.htm.

964 “For a place in the sun.” The Hindu. July 15, 2001. http://www.thehindu.com/2001/07/15/stories/05151346.htm.

317 17 November Presidential Election SLFP candidate Rajapaksa won. 2005

26 January 2010 Presidential Election SLFP candidate Rajapaksa won.

08-20 April 2010 Parliamentary SLFP won. Gained 39 seats. Elections JVP lost 35 seats. JHU contested as part of UPFA (SLFP alliance). Alliance won 144

seats.

October- Newly-formed BBS Some protests turn violent, including November 2012 holds series of protests stone-throwing.965

January 2013 The BBS storms a Sri Lanka Law College forced to college and hotel investigate BBS allegations of distorted exam results966, and two hotel managers arrested for

“sacrilege.”967

965 “Tense situation outside Bangladesh High Commission.” Adaderana: Sri Lanka Premier 24x7 News Portal. October 4, 2012. http://www.adaderana.lk/news.php?nid=19931

966 De Mel, Kithsiri. “Law College registration postponed.” Daily Mirror. January 8, 2013. http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/24833-law-college-registration-postponed.html.

967 “The Slow Spread of Discord.” The Sunday Leader. February 3, 2013. http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2013/02/03/the-slow-spread-of-discord/.

318 June 2014 Anti-Muslim Riots led Resulted in at least four deaths and by BBS 10,000 displaced persons.968

08 January 2015 Presidential Election SLFP candidate Rajapaksa lost.

17 August 2015 Parliamentary SLFP joined coalition government Elections led by UNP. Dropped 49 seats. JVP gained 2 seats. JHU defected to UNFGG (UNP

alliance). Alliance won 106 seats.

As this timeline demonstrates, throughout Sri Lanka’s history since independence, there have been a total of four national elections held in a year following Buddhist nationalist communal violence. All of these elections resulted in losses for the SLFP. The small gains of the more radical JVP suggest that this party may have benefitted from the violence, or at least that it was more shielded from the consequences of violent outbreaks. The JHU managed to stay on the winning side by changing alliances from the SLFP’s United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) to the UNP’s United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG). As the main ethnicity- based political party in Sri Lanka’s two-party system, the SLFP’s consistent losses after outbreaks of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist violence present evidence against the hypothesis that continuing violence is effective at furthering the movement’s political

968 Cronin-Furman, Kate. “Sri Lanka’s surprise political transition.” The Washington Post. January 12, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- cage/wp/2015/01/11/sri-lankas-surprise-political- transition/?utm_term=.8dbb011b9244.

319 objectives, unless these objectives are focused on the success of the smaller, more radical parties or shifting the entire political spectrum (examined later). The October 1982 presidential election was the first instance of a national Sri Lankan election occurring in a year following communal violence. The year 1981 saw the burning of the Jaffna Public Library and the beginning of riots sparked by extremist Tamil separatists.969 This violence occurred in the context of Tamil attempts to gain greater representation on District Development Councils despite setbacks such as repression and intimidation from law enforcement during the 1981 local elections in Jaffna.970 On 31 May 1981, the major Tamil political party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) held a rally which turned violent, resulting in the shooting of three Sinhalese police officers. The Sinhalese law enforcement responded with a three-day pogrom against the Tamil community.971 During this pogrom, eyewitnesses saw “uniformed police and Sinhalese gang members set fire to the Jaffna Public Library.”972 Tamils reacted with grief to the loss of this library, and many became convinced that the Sinhalese truly aimed for the extinction of the Tamil culture and

969 “Sri Lanka: The Riots of 1981.” Country-data.com. Accessed January 4, 2018 http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13161.html.

970Knuth, Rebecca. Burning Books and Leveling Libraries: Extremist Violence and Cultural Destruction. Greenwood Publishing Group. 2006. P. 84.

971 Ibid.

972 Ibid.

320 race from the island. A faction of Tamils within the separatist movement embraced extremism and started to oppose working within the existing political framework.973 Shortly before the 1981 local elections, the leading UNP candidate was assassinated while departing a political rally, sparking sporadic communal violence that would persist for the next few months. The local elections resulted in the nation’s first election scandal, with charges of voting irregularities and mishandled ballots.974 Nevertheless, the TULF received an overwhelming electoral victory.975 The following year, voters at a national level were faced with their first presidential election. In this election, J.R. Jayewardene of the UNP garnered 53 percent of the vote and defeated Hector Kobbekaduwa of the SLFP. While this was a defeat for the SLFP, both of these candidates could be considered representatives of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, considering the incumbent Jayewardene’s personal ideology. Government-controlled media and a lack of opinion polls made indications of public opinion difficult.976 Still, when Jayewardene called for a December referendum to extend the life of parliament by six years (the first and only national referendum in Sri Lanka), the passage of this referendum signaled that the people not only supported

973 “Sri Lanka: The Riots of 1981.” Country-data.com. Accessed January 4, 2018 http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13161.html.

974 Ibid.

975 Sivathasan. S. “Jaffna Development Council Election.” Colombo Telegraph. May 4, 2013. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/jaffna-development-council- election-1981.

976 Kannangara, Arjuna. (1983) “The Sri Lankan presidential election: Politics of the pendulum.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. 72(285): 64-70.

321 Jayewardene but the UNP as a whole.977 As mentioned previously, the JVP also participated in this presidential election with candidate Wijeweera, although his poor performance convinced them to adopt a more nationalist tone. The 1981 Buddhist nationalist violence did not bring victory to Sinhalese Buddhist parties at the local or national levels. The second instance of a national Sri Lankan election occurring in a year following communal violence was the 2001 parliamentary elections, which took place after the Bandarawela Riots and the Mawanella Riots. On 25 October 2000, a Sinhalese mob massacred 25 Tamils who were being held in a detention facility in Bandarawela.978 Members of the local Sinhala community assaulted these inmates (many of whom had been detained on suspicion of links to the LTTE) with clubs and knives. Local police were allegedly complicit in this attack.979 This incident led to a sharp increase in communal tensions and ethnic clashes in Sri Lanka. According to Human Rights Watch, some Sri Lankans described the situation as, “worse than any time in the last twenty years.”980 On 30 April 2001, a group of criminals assaulted a

977 Hoole, Rajan. “The 1982 Referendum and July 1983.” Colombo Telegraph. January 7, 2017. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/the-1982-referendum- july-1983.

978 “Sri Lanka: Ethnic Violence Escalates.” Human Rights Watch. January 1, 2000. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2000/11/01/slanka617_txt.htm.

979 Mehta, Raj K. Lost Victory: The Rise & Fall of LTTE Supremo, V. Prabhakaran. Pentagon Press. 2010. P.46.

980 “Sri Lanka: Ethnic Violence Escalates.” Human Rights Watch. January 1, 2000. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2000/11/01/slanka617_txt.htm.

322 Muslim hotel owner in the town of Mawanella.981 When police did not seem willing to take action against those responsible, hundreds of Muslims took to the streets in protest. After the police promised to bring the criminals to justice, the crowd began to disperse but it was met by a Sinhala mob. The resulting clashes and police intervention left two people dead, several people injured, and widespread property destruction.982 An SLFP minister was accused of playing a prominent role in these riots.983

Parliamentary elections were held on 05 December 2001. The main issue of the electoral campaign was the continuing civil war, in addition to the suffering economy.984 The UNP promised to pursue peace talks with the LTTE, while the SLFP’s People’s Alliance (PA) kept a hardline stance against meeting LTTE demands.985 The week leading up to the election was marked by violent activity with

981 Silva, K.T., N.T.M. Saif Deen, and A.M.A.S. Gunasekera (2001) “The May 2001 Riots in Mawanella: A Sociological Account.” Proceedings of the Annual Research Sessions, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. Volume 6.

982 “For a place in the sun.” The Hindu. July 15, 2001. http://www.thehindu.com/2001/07/15/stories/05151346.htm.

983 Ibid.

984 “Sri Lanka Parliamentary Chamber: Parliament, Elections Held in 2001.” Inter- Parliamentary Union. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2295_01.htm.

985 Dugger, Celia W. “Urging Peace Talks, Sri Lankan Opposition Defeats President’s Coalition.” New York Times. December 8, 2001. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/08/world/urging-peace-talks-sri-lankan-opposition- defeats-president-s-coalition.html.

323 reports of between 14 to 25 deaths due to pre-election violence.986 In the end, the UNP won with 45.62 percent of the vote and 109 seats, while the SLFP-led PA won only 37.19 percent of the vote and 77 seats.987 This meant a loss of 30 seats for the SLFP and their removal from power. Interestingly, the JVP gained six seats in this election, signaling that its more radical base may be more receptive to communal violence than supporters of the SLFP. Still, despite recent communal violence and ethnic hatreds, voters chose the party that was willing to negotiate.

Finally, the last two instances of national elections in the wake of communal violence were the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. These were the first national elections after the formation of the BBS, and much of the communal violence leading up to the voting was instigated by this group. Most notably, the BBS led widespread anti-Muslim riots in June 2014. The riots began in the town of Aluthgama after the BBS held a demonstration against the Muslim community for an alleged assault on a Buddhist monk.988 The resulting riots led to the deaths of four people and the displacement of 10,000 more.989 Local Sinhala Buddhist families marked their

986 “Sri Lanka Parliamentary Chamber: Parliament, Elections Held in 2001.” Inter- Parliamentary Union. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2295_01.htm.

987 Ibid.

988 Colombage, Dinouk. “In Pictures: Sri Lanka hit by religious riots.” Al Jazeera. June 18, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2014/06/pictures-sri- lanka-hit-religio-2014617112053394816.html.

989 Cronin-Furman, Kate. “Sri Lanka’s surprise political transition.” The Washington Post. January 12, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- cage/wp/2015/01/11/sri-lankas-surprise-political- transition/?utm_term=.8dbb011b9244.

324 homes with the Buddhist flag in an attempt to avoid the attacks.990 The response of the ruling SLFP regime was to impose a media blackout and accuse journalists who wrote about the violence of creating “disharmony.”991 Division grew in the government with the Sinhalese Buddhist parties (including the SLFP and JHU) on one side and the rest of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) on the other. While leaders of Muslim and leftist parties within the alliance condemned the BBS and called for justice, the SLFP and JHU blamed the violence on Muslim extremists. Minister Champika Ranawaka, leading member of the JHU stated that the United States helped create the Aluthgama incident by, “nurturing and fostering militant Muslim groups against a democratically elected government.”992 President Rajapaksa, member of the SLFP, responded to accusations against the BBS by asserting that there was blame, “from all sides.”993 At the June

990 Colombage, Dinouk. “In Pictures: Sri Lanka hit by religious riots.” Al Jazeera. June 18, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2014/06/pictures-sri- lanka-hit-religio-2014617112053394816.html.

991 Cronin-Furman, Kate. “Sri Lanka’s surprise political transition.” The Washington Post. January 12, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- cage/wp/2015/01/11/sri-lankas-surprise-political- transition/?utm_term=.8dbb011b9244

992 “US Creating a Taliban in Sri Lanka: Champika.” Daily Mirror. June 20, 2014. http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/48702-us-creating-a-taliban-in-sri-lanka- champika.html.

993 “Verbal battle in Cabinet over southwest violence.” The Sunday Times. June 22, 2014. http://www.sundaytimes.lk/140622/columns/104559-104559.html.

325 2014 meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR), the Sri Lankan government placed the blame for the riots squarely on the Muslim community.994 The presidential election in January 2015 resulted in a startling upset when Rajapaksa lost to the UNP candidate (the first time in Sri Lanka’s history that an incumbent president was voted out of office).995 Rajapaksa’s campaign had focused heavily on his 2009 defeat of the LTTE. He faced a major split when health minister Maithripala Sirisena defected to the UNP-led opposition and announced his own candidacy. Despite that Sirisena emerged from the same Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist background as Rajapaksa, he garnered the support of Muslim and Tamil parties who were anxious to oust Rajapaksa. In contrast, Rajapaksa was supported by the BBS. Sirisena won the election with 51.28 percent of the vote.996 The SLFP also performed poorly in the August 2015 parliamentary elections. Again, the SLFP was split between supporters of Sirisena and those loyal to Rajapaksa. The UNP won with 106 seats, while the SLFP-led UPFA secured only 95 (a decline of 49 seats).997 The

994 Balachandran, PK. “Sri Lankan Government Accuses Muslims, President Orders Probe.” New Indian Express. June 22, 2014. http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2014/jun/22/Sri-Lankan-Government- Accuses-Muslims-President-Orders-Probe-627271.html.

995 Cronin-Furman, Kate. “Sri Lanka’s surprise political transition.” The Washington Post. January 12, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- cage/wp/2015/01/11/sri-lankas-surprise-political- transition/?utm_term=.8dbb011b9244

996 Ibid.

997 “General Election 2015: Results.” Parliament of Sri Lanka. August 21, 2015. https://www.parliament.lk/en/election-2015.

326 JVP gained six seats in the election (representing an increase of two seats for the party). Overall, outbreaks of communal violence in Sri Lanka have been followed by electoral losses for the SLFP. In the year following the 1981 riots, voters supported the UNP over the SLFP in the presidential election and referendum. In the 2001 parliamentary elections (which followed the Bandarawela Riots and the Mawanella Riots), the SLFP suffered another loss. Finally, the BBS-led anti-Muslim riots in June

2014 helped sow division within the UPFA that led to the ousting of Rajapaksa and the SLFP’s loss in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Interestingly, the performance of the JVP does not exhibit the same pattern of losses. It is possible that ethnic violence benefits (or at least does not hinder) the JVP more than the SLFP because this party is small and contains a base of more radical supporters. While national elections immediately following outbreaks of Buddhist nationalist violence have resulted in losses for the SLFP, an analysis of overall levels of this violence (not just during the previous year) shows a much weaker relationship. In an analysis of all Sri Lankan parliamentary elections since 1960, I set the dependent variable as the net seats earned by the SLFP. This number was negative when the party lost seats and positive when they gained. I then measured the amount of time that had passed since a major outbreak of Buddhist nationalist violence in days before each election examined. These variables are represented in Figure 7.

327 Figure 8 SLFP Parliamentary Results Following Buddhist Nationalist Violence

80

60

40

20

0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 -20

-40 SLFP Net Seats SLFP Net Seats Earned

-60

-80

-100 Days since last major outbreak of Buddhist nationalist violence

This scatterplot suggests there is no strong relationship between periods of time lacking Buddhist nationalist violence and the SLFP’s electoral performance. If this violence has a negative impact on electoral results for the SLFP, Figure 6 should show an upward trend in net seats earned as the days since the last violent outbreak increases. The inverse should be true if recent violent outbreaks have a positive effect on the SLFP. However, neither direction is clearly shown. In case the severity of this violence plays a role, I also measured the death toll of the most recent outbreak of Buddhist nationalist violence for each election. Using this data, I created a “Buddhist nationalist violence ratio” represented by the death toll of the most recent outbreak over days since the outbreak occurred. A higher ratio represents a higher level of

328 overall Buddhist nationalist violence, both in terms of severity and proximity. The relationship between this ratio and the SLFP’s electoral performance is presented in Figure 8 below.

Figure 9 SLFP Parliamentary Results and Overall Buddhist Nationalist Violence

80

60

40

20

0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 -20

-40 SLFP Net Seats SLFP Net Seats Earned -60

-80

-100 Buddhist Nationalist Violence Ratio (Death toll of most recent violence / Days since violence)

If anything, the slight upward trend in this graph would suggest a positive relationship between Buddhist nationalist violence and the SLFP’s performance in parliamentary elections. However, comparing this data to the SLFP’s losses in election years immediately following violent outbreaks suggests the relationship is weak at best. If voters have short memories, then it is possible that only violence occurring since the previous year is relevant. While this is population data, the small historical

329 number of parliamentary elections means that a weak relationship is difficult to detect. If the impact of Buddhist nationalist violence on SLFP electoral results is weak or unclear, then militants may also be unaware of whether this violence is tactically effective at increasing the political power of Buddhist nationalist parties. Therefore, they may not be acting irrationally in the sense that militant activity is knowingly hurting the political power of the SLFP. However, this militancy also has not demonstrated tactical effectiveness at supporting the SLFP either.

It is possible that Buddhist nationalist militants have shifted their support from the SLFP to smaller parties like the JVP and JHU. These groups began participating in national elections more recently, which means there is less data on how their performance is affected by Buddhist nationalist violence. However, the JVP gained seats in the 2001 and 2015 elections following violent outbreaks. The Buddhist nationalist successes described in this chapter (such as the Sinhala Only Act, constitutional promotion of Buddhist religion, and the “policy of standardization” that affected university admissions) were all achieved before the civil war. After the civil war fulfilled another important objective (territorial integrity), many Buddhist nationalists may feel that the major parties no longer represent them. According to Sri Lankan political geographer Shantha Hennayake, one of the reasons for the emergence of the JHU was a feeling that Sinhalese Buddhists were not adequately represented.998 He accuses the main political parties, including the SLFP and UNP, of only paying “lip service” to Sinhalese Buddhist culture and decries what he believes to be a,

“deliberate attempt by the two parties when in power, to deny any effective

998 Hennayake, Shantha K. “Sri Lankan politics, 2004 election and JHU.” The Island. May 18, 2004. http://www.island.lk/2004/05/18/featur01.html.

330 opportunity for the Sinhalese-Buddhists to raise their concerns and readdress their grievances.”999 As Imtiyaz stated, Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka achieve political successes in the form of concessions from politicians they support.1000 If they stop receiving adequate concessions, they may shift their allegiance. If Buddhist nationalist militancy is not effective at bolstering the SLFP, maybe it is being used in support of the JVP or JHU. Still, this would not explain violent outbreaks that hindered the SLFP before the civil war. An examination of electoral results shows that Buddhist nationalist militancy may hurt SLFP results in the short run, but further analysis shows a weak positive relationship overall. Additionally, the entrance of smaller, more radical parties means that Buddhist nationalists may be aiming for the success of these groups instead. Therefore, this examination does not prove that violence hurts Buddhist nationalist objectives. However, no tactical advantage has been found regarding the impact of Buddhist nationalist violence on electoral outcomes.

The Impact of Militancy on the Ideological Spectrum

As mentioned, Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka achieve their goals by supporting certain parties and expecting concessions. While the SLFP has historically

999 Hennayake, Shantha K. “Sri Lankan politics, 2004 election and JHU.” The Island. May 18, 2004. http://www.island.lk/2004/05/18/featur01.html.

1000 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. Personal Interview. February 13, 2018.

331 been their best representative, Buddhist nationalist militants may not aim to support one party specifically. Rather, some movements rely on shifting the entire ideological spectrum. This tactic disempowers moderates and ensures that the movement is represented no matter who is in power. In Sri Lanka’s two-party system, the UNP is the other major political party. If this party’s platform moves towards Buddhist nationalism after instances of violence, this could be a tactical victory for Buddhist nationalists. My research found that the UNP’s key reevaluations and platform shifts towards Buddhist nationalism occurred as a result of UNP electoral losses rather than episodes of violence. Additionally, the party has demonstrated continued resolve in its platform of reconciliation with Tamils, even amid Buddhist nationalist violence, suggesting that this violence has not been effective in shifting their platform. The UNP was formed as a coalition of interest with wide appeal.1001 It consisted of elite figures from the struggle for independence such as D.S. Senanayake, the party’s first leader. As an economically liberal party (to the right of the SLFP), the

UNP initially campaigned on a platform of dominion under the UK and anti- communism.1002 During the party’s first two terms in power, its most important

1001 Jiggins, Janice. Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976. Cambridge University Press. 1979. P.8-9.

1002 “About UNP.” Webpage of Ajith P. Perera, Chief Organiser, Bandaragama, UNP. Accessed February 24, 2018. https://bandaragama.wordpress.com/about-unp/.

332 program was food subsidies.1003 Additionally, it supported minority groups such as Catholics and was allied with the Tamil Congress.1004 The electoral upset of April 1956 (when the SLFP first came to power), provided the impetus for the UNP to reevaluate its platform. This election occurred before the June 1956 Ceylonese Riots (which were the first ethnic riots that targeted Tamils).1005 Therefore, the decisions made by the UNP during the election were not a result of ethnic violence. Rather, the wave of Buddhist nationalism during this election stoked communal hostility that created violence as a result. At this time, the UNP was led by Sir John Kotelawala, whose main goal was to create an open, westernized society.1006 The SLFP party surged to popularity through its populist policies, redistribution program, and alliances with advocates of cultural revival.1007 Its traditionalism and calls for “Sinhala Only” proved effective at garnering support.1008

1003 Jiggins, Janice. Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976. Cambridge University Press. 1979. P. 9.

1004 Richardson, John Martin. Paradise Poisoned: Learning about Conflict, Terrorism and Development from Sri Lanka’s Civil Wars. The International Centre for Ethnic Studies. 2005. P. 149 And “About UNP.” Webpage of Ajith P. Perera, Chief Organiser, Bandaragama, UNP. Accessed February 24, 2018. https://bandaragama.wordpress.com/about-unp/.

1005 “An evolving army and its role through time.” Sunday Times. October 16, 2005. http://www.sundaytimes.lk/051016/plus/4.html.

1006 Jiggins, Janice. Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976. Cambridge University Press. 1979. P. 10.

1007 Ibid. 11.

1008 Richardson, John Martin. Paradise Poisoned: Learning about Conflict, Terrorism and Development from Sri Lanka’s Civil Wars. The International Centre for Ethnic Studies. 2005. P. 146.

333 According to Imtiyaz, the SLFP came to power in 1956 by forming electoral pacts with Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists.1009 Even though the UNP had originally rejected resolutions calling for Sinhala as the official language (leading S.W.R.D. Bandarainke to resign and form the SLFP), the UNP now attempted to jump on the populist bandwagon. However, the UNP’s cynical attempt to counter the SLFP’s promise of “Sinhala in twenty-four hours” with its own “Sinhala Only” policy fell flat.1010 When the SLFP won the election, the UNP decided to reevaluate its strategy.

After the 1956 electoral defeat, the UNP formed a committee to determine why they had lost and to recommend reforms.1011 The committee determined that the party’s platform had lost touch with the people. It recommended a blueprint to transform the party from a “loose confederation of notables,” to a “more structured organization that could appeal to ordinary people and win elections.”1012 When the UNP failed to form a majority after the March 1960 election and then lost the following election in July of that year, the UNP formed another committee and took its recommendations more seriously than the first time. While Dudley Senanayake (leader of the UNP) was initially reluctant to listen to J.R. Jayewardene’s ideas, the 1960 election loss prompted the party to follow his plans for reorganization. This time,

1009 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. Personal Interview. February 13, 2018.

1010 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.32.

1011 Richardson, John Martin. Paradise Poisoned: Learning about Conflict, Terrorism and Development from Sri Lanka’s Civil Wars. The International Centre for Ethnic Studies. 2005. P.193

1012 Ibid.

334 Jayewardene was chair of the committee.1013 He urged the party to drop its elitist image and “be more welcoming to those who had been educated in Sinhalese and wore national dress.”1014 Additionally, his plan included recruiting leaders of Buddhist and Sinhalese communities, such as I.M.R.A. Iriyagolle, who was, “a man with strong ties to the powerful lay Buddhist community and an effective orator in Sinhala,” and Ranasinghe Premadasa, “a spellbinding Sinhala orator who had begun his political career with the Labour party.”1015 These electoral losses paved the way for the UNP engage more with Buddhist nationalist concerns under Jayewardene’s leadership. When Dudley Senanayake died in 1973, Jayewardene became leader of the party.1016 While much Buddhist nationalist violence occurred during his term as president (from 1978-1989), Jayewardene had already demonstrated his sympathy to Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism previously. This was apparent in 1943 when he introduced a resolution in the State Council that Sinhala should replace English as the official language.1017 Therefore, Jayewardene’s Buddhist nationalist perspective was already present and not affected by continuing violence. As Sri Lanka’s first “Executive President,” Jayewardene had sweeping powers to implement his vision.

1013 Richardson, John Martin. Paradise Poisoned: Learning about Conflict, Terrorism and Development from Sri Lanka’s Civil Wars. The International Centre for Ethnic Studies. 2005. P.193.

1014 Ibid.

1015 Ibid. 194.

1016 “About UNP.” Webpage of Ajith P. Perera, Chief Organiser, Bandaragama, UNP. Accessed February 24, 2018. https://bandaragama.wordpress.com/about-unp/.

1017 Thirumalai, M.S. 2002. “Sri Lanka’s Language Policy: A Brief Introduction.” Language in India. (1):9.

335 Under Jayewardene, the UNP government cracked down on both Tamil militants and a JVP insurrection. This crackdown against Tamil militants is discussed in the previous section about Buddhist nationalist goals of territorial integrity. While Jaywardene initially released imprisoned JVP members and allowed them to participate in mainstream politics in the 1970s, he banned the group for participating in Black July in 1983.1018 In its 1987-1989 insurrection, the JVP followed a Sinhalese nationalist agenda that was opposed to the Indian-brokered settlement to the conflict in the north, which included the presence of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF).1019 After Jayewardene’s retirement, this insurrection was finally brutally suppressed by UNP President Ranasinghe Premadasa.1020 After being out of power from 1994-2000, the UNP gained power again in 2001 and demonstrated a resolve to pursue negotiations with Tamil militants despite instances of Buddhist nationalist violence. In 2001, during the civil war and following the Bandarawela Riots and Mawanella Riots, the UNP campaigned as a party of peace, calling for negotiations with the LTTE.1021 This reflected the interests of UNP

1018 Farisz, Hafeel. “Our only coalition will be with the people.” Daily Mirror. February 6, 2014. http://www.dailymirror.lk/opinion/172-opinion/42704-our-only- coalition-will-be-with-the-people.html.

1019 Rajasingham Senanayake, Darini. “Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence and Civil-Military Relations” in Muttiah Alagappa (ed.) Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role of the Military in Asia. Stanford University Press. 2001. P.302

1020 Ibid.

1021 Perera, Jehan. “Defeating pessimism about peace in north-east.” The Island. December 12, 2001. http://www.island.lk/2001/12/12/midwee06.html.

336 supporters who viewed the war as an obstacle to economic investment and those who were generally frustrated with the SLFP’s inability to end the war.1022 In 2015, the next time the UNP came to power, the election was also preceded by major Buddhist nationalist violence in the previous year. However, the UNP maintained a policy of reconciliation with Tamils. Additionally, it took steps towards reconciliation such as lifting travel bans on Tamil-dominated areas in the North and East, strengthening civil administration in these areas, and lifting the prohibition on singing the National

Anthem in Tamil.1023 In these cases, instances of Buddhist nationalist violence did not effectively shift the UNP’s platform. Additionally, as this section has shown, UNP decisions to represent Buddhist nationalist positions were a result of calculations that the party needed to be more populist to attract votes and compete with the SLFP. This began with an abrupt shift in the UNP’s language policy during the 1956 election (before major occurrences of Buddhist nationalist violence). Therefore, Buddhist nationalist militancy has not proven tactically effective at shifting the UNP’s platform. Overall, Buddhist nationalist violence in Sri Lanka has not been shown to clearly hinder the movement’s tactical objectives, but it also has not demonstrably helped in terms of electoral outcomes or ideological spectrum shifts. This result is

1022 Venugopal, Rajesh. “The Politics of Market Reform at a Time of Ethnic Conflict: Sri Lanka in the Jayewardene Years.” In Liberal Peace in Question: Politics of State and Market Reform in Sri Lanka. Ed. Kristian Stokke and Jayadeva Uyangoda. Anthem Press. 2011. P. 78.

1023 “Towards Sustainable Peace in Sri Lanka: The Opportunities Ahead.” Presented at the US Institute of Peace on December 1, 2015. Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington DC. http://slembassyusa.org/downloads/Towards_Sustainable_Peace_in_Sri_Lanka- The_Opportunities_Ahead.pdf.

337 contrasted with the effectiveness of Hindu nationalist militancy in India, as shown by the Yale study that found ethnicity-based political parties in India performed better in elections that followed riots.1024 Religious militancy in Sri Lanka does not seem to have the same symbiotic relationship, possibly due to the ability of multiple parties to court the Buddhist nationalist vote. This leaves the key question of why such violence continues to occur. According to Imtiyaz, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism is not “systematic.”1025 The SLFP does not exercise control over militant elements such as the BBS, although it has been accused of providing tacit support (similar to allegations against the BJP). In the absence of strong data to the contrary, it is possible that militants interpret their behavior as aiding Buddhist nationalist political objectives. However, without clear tactical successes, it is likely the militants are motivated by something else. As the least consolidated movement examined in this research, it makes sense that militants may be less motivated by tactical considerations than other factors, such as religious or symbolic appeals. The effect of these factors will be tested in the next two hypotheses.

1024 Nellis, Gareth; Weaver, Michael; and Steven C. Rosenzweig. “Do parties matter for ethnic violence? Evidence from India.” Yale University. May 1, 2016. http://www.garethnellis.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/QJPS_ms_v3_NWR.pdf.

1025 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. Personal Interview. February 13, 2018.

338 Hypothesis 3 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if they perceive it to be religiously obligatory.

The case of Buddhist nationalist militancy is confounding considering Buddhism’s canonical nonviolence. Of the religions studied in this research, Buddhism is the most averse to any form of violence, focusing strongly on the principle of ahimsa (meaning “no harm”).1026 A main reason for the Buddhist detachment from material things is to prevent violence that arises from covetousness. The religion contains five precepts for all Buddhists to follow, the first of which is, “to abstain from taking the lives of living beings.”1027 This has been interpreted by many Buddhists to prohibit all forms of violence, sometimes even in cases of self-defense. In his book, What Buddhists Believe, the Venerable Dhammananda states that Buddhists who have “not renounced the worldly life” should not be blamed for fighting wars based on a duty to their country, but that ideally, “Buddhists should not be the aggressors even in protecting their religion or anything else. They must try their

1026 “Buddhism on Peace and Violence.” Georgetown University, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs. Accessed January 4, 2018. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/buddhism-on-peace-and-violence.

1027 “The Five Precepts, By His Royal Highness the late Supreme Patriarch Prince Vajirananavarorasa.” A Buddhist Library. Accessed January 4, 2018. https://www.abuddhistlibrary.com/Buddhism/B%20%20Theravada/Ethics/The%20Fiv e%20Precepts%20%20The%20Buddhist%20Golden%20Rule/five_precepts_the_budd hist_golde.htm

339 best to avoid any kind of violent act.”1028 Unlike religions such as Christianity and Islam, there is no Buddhist code for the conduct of a “just war,” since all war is considered akusala (unskillful and evil).1029 The rules governing Buddhist monks are even more firm concerning nonviolence. While monks are allowed to defend themselves, they are forbidden to kill even in self-defense. In Theravada Buddhism (the sect which is dominant in Sri Lanka) the basic code of monastic discipline is the Patimokkha.1030 The most important of these rules are the four parajikas (defeats), and breaking any of these rules means losing monkhood immediately with no possibility of gaining it back in a person’s lifetime. The third parajika states:

Should any bhikkhu [monk] intentionally deprive a human being of life, or search for an assassin for him, or praise the advantages of death, or incite him to die (saying): “My good man, what use is this evil, miserable life to you? Death would be better for you than life,” or with such an idea in mind, such a purpose in mind, should in various ways praise the advantages of death or incite him to die, he also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.1031 This rule means that monks must not intentionally cause the death of any human being. This is interpreted to include prohibitions against acts including abortion,

1028 Dhammananda, K. Sri. What Buddhists Believe. Buddhist Missionary Society Malaysia. 1964.

1029 O’Brien, Barbara. “Buddhist Views on War.” ThoughtCo.com. March 23, 2017. https://www.thoughtco.com/war-and-buddhism-449732.

1030 The Buddhist Monastic Code 1, Chapter 4: Parajika. Thanissaro Bhikkhu. 1994. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/bmc1.pdf

1031 Ibid. 74-75.

340 euthanasia, and capital punishment.1032 While most Buddhists are not bound by the monastic code, these rules are a representation of the values of Buddhism. Additionally, many Buddhist militants in Sri Lanka actually are monks, including BBS Secretary General Galagodaththe Gnanasara.1033 The violent actions of these errant monks have spurred demands for legislation to give legal effect to codes of conduct for monastic orders operating in the country. In January 2016, the Theravadi Bhikkhu Kathikawath Bill was presented in parliament.1034 The purpose of this bill was to require monks to act in compliance to the codes of their respective chapters. It was introduced by the Chief Prelates of the Asigiri and Malwatte chapters in Sri Lanka. The request for this legislation highlights the frustration of the Mahanayakes (high-ranking Buddhist monks who oversee the Buddhist clergy) and the powerlessness of moderate monks as they witness the distortion of Buddhist doctrine by the BBS.1035 Without this legislation, errant monks face no legal barrier against continuing to wear saffron robes and pose as monks. In

February 2012, a Buddhist monk in Sri Lanka was convicted of murder (related to a

1032 The Buddhist Monastic Code 1, Chapter 4: Parajika. Thanissaro Bhikkhu. 1994. P. 79. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/bmc1.pdf.

1033 Haviland, Charles. “The darker side of Buddhism.” BBC News. May 30, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32929855.

1034 “Theravadi Bhikkhu Kathikawath Bill presented in Parliament.” New.lk: The Official Government News Portal of Sri Lanka. January 13, 2016. https://www.news.lk/news/sri-lanka/item/11776-theravadi-bhikkhu-kathikawath-bill- presented-in-parliament.

1035 Bastians, Dharisha. “Bodu Bala Sena Leader Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Emerges Out of the Shadows Again.” January 28, 2016. DailyFT. http://www.ft.lk/article/521570/Out-of-the-shadows.

341 dispute over an affair) and wore his robes to the sentencing.1036 Buddhist leaders in Sri Lanka do not have the authority needed to enact punishment for violations against their code of conduct. In Eastern China, where Mahayana Buddhism is practiced and the religion is more organized, three monks were famously expelled from their monastery two years ago after fighting outside the temple.1037 That same year, senior Sri Lankan monk Venerable Bellanwila Wimalaratana lamented, “Even in cases where serious offences had been committed by monks, there was no way to expel them from the monkhood.”1038 This is why they advocate for legislation to punish such infractions. Buddhism’s principles of nonviolence and the actions taken by high-ranking Sri Lankan monks to protect them illustrates that political violence by groups such as the BBS is opposed not only to general Buddhist precepts, but to local Sri Lankan interpretations as well. The third hypothesis fails in this case due to a lack of religious obligation (or even religious permissibility). Drawing from Sandal’s framework, the actions of these militants are contrary to the public theology of Buddhism in Sri

1036 Haviland, Charles. “Sri Lankan monk is condemned to death for murder.” BBC News. February 22, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17133192.

1037 Chasmar, Jessica. “Monks expelled from Chinese monastery after fight video goes viral.” The Washington Times. April 28, 2016. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/28/monks-expelled-from-chinese- monastery-after-fight-/.

1038 Seneviratne, Kalinga. “Sri Lanka: Bill to Control Monks Divides Buddhists.” The Buddhist Channel. February 20, 2016. http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=43,12691,0,0,1,0.

342 Lanka.1039 Therefore, it would not make sense to say that renegade monks and the militants who follow them are motivated by a sense of religious obligation. Rather, Buddhism may be valued more as an attribute of their Sinhalese identity than as an ideological motivator for violence. BBS calls to preserve Buddhism are generally used to foment hostility towards practitioners of other religions in Sri Lanka, such as Muslims, Hindus, and Christians. Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism is based less on religious ideology than on protecting the in-group from outside groups. This ethnic conflict approach will be tested in the final hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4 A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if framing of myths or sacred histories contained within the group’s religious ideologies evoke hostility towards other groups and fear of extinction.

Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka draw on ancient narratives of Sinhalese Buddhist rule over the island and the struggle of these rulers against “outsiders,” such as Tamils. The repetition of such narratives elicits hostility towards outgroups, which are represented in the stories as a threat. The most prominent of these ancient records is the Mahavamsa, which continues to be referenced by Buddhist nationalists as an analogy for the current state of communal relations in Sri Lanka.

1039 Sandal, Nukhet Ahu. 2012. “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(1): 76.

343 Sri Lankans’ understanding of the past derives largely from a series of histories authored by bhikkhus (monks) who lived on the island. The first record in this series was the Dipavamsa chronicle, which was written in the fourth century AD.1040 Of these bhikkhu texts, the one most central to contemporary Buddhist nationalist discourse is the Mahavamsa, which was written in the sixth century.1041 This text records the arrival of the first Sinhalese on the island, visits by Buddha, the reigns of successive rulers, and finally the battle between the island’s Sinhalese king

Duttugemenu against a neighboring Tamil king called Elara. The description of visits by Buddha and his thoughts about the role of the island are key to the Buddhist nationalist understanding of Buddhism as intertwined with the nation of Sri Lanka. According to the chronicles, Buddha appointed the island to be the heartland of Buddhism. They claim that the Sinhalese were descended from a Bengali prince named Vijaya, who supposedly arrived on the island the day of Buddha’s death.1042 The text describes Buddha’s deathbed pronouncement of support for Vijaya’s mission and his prophesy that Buddhism would thrive on the island for 5000 years.1043 This story strengthens the assumption that Buddhism in Sri Lanka must be protected by its rulers and that there is no room for minority religions in a unified Buddhism state. It

1040 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.13.

1041 Ibid.

1042 Weiberg-Salzmann. 2014. “The Radicalisation of Buddhism in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries: The Buddhist Sangha in Sri Lanka.” Politics, Religion & Ideology. 15 (2): 283-307.

1043 Ibid.

344 conflates the island with Buddhism in a way similar to the perception of Ayodhya as the center of Hindu nationhood in India.1044 By portraying the island as the center of Buddhism, any external or internal threat to the unity of Sri Lanka becomes a threat to Buddhism itself. The Mahavamsa provides a description of such a threat in its chronicle of an epic battle between Sinhalese King Duttugemenu and Tamil King Elara in the second century BC. The chronicles describe it as a personal combat in which King

Duttugemenu is triumphant against the ageing King Elara, killing him and subduing his army.1045 King Duttugemenu is portrayed as a champion of Buddhism, declaring, “Not for the joy of sovereignty is this toil of mine, my striving (has been) ever to establish the doctrine of the Sambuddha.”1046 His military campaign had included destroying many of King Elara’s outposts. The Mahavamsa emphasizes that King Duttugemenu fought to re-establish the faith and protect it from Hindu heretics (Tamils). According to Imtiyaz, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists fear the possibility of

Tamil domination, and this fear derives from the Mahavamsa in which, “Tamils were portrayed as enemies of the Sinhala race.”1047 After his victory, the story goes that King Duttugemenu retired to his terrace to reflect on the many lives he had taken. He

1044 Jay Dubashi, The Road to Ayodhya. New Delhi: Voice of India, 1992. 57.

1045 Somasundaram, Daya. Scarred Communities: Psychosocial Impact of Man-made and Natural Disasters. SAGE Publications India. 2014. P. 81

1046 “Chapter 25: The Victory of Duttha Gamani,” in the Mahavamsa. http://mahavamsa.org/mahavamsa/original-version/25-victory-duttha-gamani.

1047 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. Personal Interview. February 13, 2018.

345 is advised not to feel guilty because, “from this deed arises no hindrance in thy way to heaven,” and that the Tamils he slew were, “unbelievers and men of evil life… not more to be esteemed than beasts.”1048 In this story, Tamils are perceived simultaneously as a threat to Buddhism and as lesser people, sparking both fear and prejudice. The story of the battle between King Duttugemenu and King Elara and other stories within the Mahavamsa are familiar to everyone in Sri Lanka, including schoolchildren. It has also been repeatedly used by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists as a metaphor for their cause. Helping lead the Buddhist revival at the turn of the twentieth century, Dharmapala used the Mahavamsa to identify the Sinhalese with their Buddhism. The Mahavamsa itself had recently been revived by Englishman George Turnour, who oversaw its translation from Pali (a language which had passed out of use) to English in the year 1836.1049 It was not until the British governor commissioned a Sinhala translation in 1877 that a majority of Sinhalese learned about the Mahavamsa.1050 Dharmapala made use of this rediscovery to promote a perception of the island and Sinhalese people as inextricable from their Buddhism, and the Tamils as eternal enemies.1051 His interpretations of the Mahavamsa were used to support his

1048 “Chapter 25: The Victory of Duttha Gamani,” in the Mahavamsa. http://mahavamsa.org/mahavamsa/original-version/25-victory-duttha-gamani.

1049 “Introduction to George Turnour’s edition of the Mahavansa.” The Mahavamsa. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://mahavamsa.org/mahavamsa/original-version.

1050 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.16.

1051 Ibid. 21.

346 desire for an ethnically pure Aryan Sinhalese people. Referring to this text, he boasted, “There exists no race on this earth today that has had a more glorious, triumphant record of victory than the Sinhalese…who alone have a ‘Mahavamsa.’”1052 Dharmapala also used the chronicles as a metaphor for anticolonialism, equating British rule in Ceylon with the dominance of Hinduism over Buddhism in India. He stated, “What the Brahmans had been then the British are today.”1053 He argued that Buddhism had suffered under the dominance of Christianity asserting that,

In Ceylon where the religion has flourished for nearly 2000 years, since the British advent, we see all old traditions being wiped off by the introduction of Western abominations…Consequently, we see the noble Religion of the Tathagata [Buddha] slowly disappearing from the Island where it had so flourished. There is no way to prevent it, as long as the religion of the pagans influence the Sinhalese Buddhists, so long will Buddhism decline and not prosper.1054 Just as Hinduism was viewed to be a threat against the survival of Buddhism in the Mahavamsa, so Christianity was viewed similarly using analogy to this text.

In the mid-1960s, the JVP appropriated Dharmapala’s nationalism, using the Mahavamsa to explain economic exclusion. The Marxist version of this narrative cast elite oligarchs like Sirimavo Bandaranaike and economic imperialists as the

1052 Harris, Ian. Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth Century Asia. Bloomsbury Publishing. 2010. P. 175.

1053 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.22.

1054 Harris, Ian. Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth Century Asia. Bloomsbury Publishing. 2010. P. 175.

347 oppressor.1055 Like the Sri Lankan state, the JVP subscribed to the Mahavamsa’s notion of all-island sovereignty for Sinhala Buddhists. However, they held a very different view of how to improve conditions for this group.1056 For the JVP, a communist system of government was the best solution. Making nationalist appeals, the JVP was able to use the presence of Indian troops as justification for launching the second Marxist insurrection.1057 In its war-making endeavors, the JVP found a hero in the Mahavamsa’s King Vijayabahu. In fact, Vijayabahu was the nom de guerre of the leader of the JVP military wing.1058 The Mahavamsa describes Vijayabahu as a noble Sinhala conqueror who unified Sri Lanka. More ruthless than Duttugemenu, Vijayabahu is known for uncompromising violence against Tamils and those who challenge his authority. According to the stories, Vijayabahu “captures the heads of his opponents and burns others at the stake.”1059 In the Mahavamsa, the JVP finds not only a narrative that elicits hostility against perceived oppressors, but a model of ruthless violent action.

The stories of the Mahavamsa, especially the battle between King Duttugemenu and King Elara are central to the discourse of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. Sinhalese nationalist Ranasinghe Premadasa, who served as prime

1055 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.38.

1056 Rajah, A.R. Sriskanda. Government and Politics in Sri Lanka: Biopolitics and Security. Taylor & Francis. 2017. P. 69.

1057 Ibid.

1058 Apter, David E. The Legitimization of Violence. Springer. 2016. P.180

1059 Ibid.

348 minister under Jayewardene and later took over as president, wrote a popular novel celebrating Duttugemenu’s triumph.1060 Imtiyaz argues that when politicians use symbols in this way, they “aggravate ethno-religious identities” which leads to polarization and violence.1061 The fear evoked by this story is useful for political mobilization, but it also creates hostility. The importance of these legends for Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists also play out in contestations over symbolic landscapes. For example, the city of Anuradhapura is considered a sacred city, and an ancient center of Buddhism that is described in the Mahavamsa.1062 Dakkhina Stupa, which marks a tomb in Anuradhapura, is a symbolic cite of contention. Originally worshipped as the tomb stone of King Elara, it was popularly believed that King Duttugemenu had built this tomb for Elara after defeating him in battle. However, in the 1980s, the Cabinet controversially reclassified the site as the tomb of Duttugemenu based on the discovery of ashes which archeologists claimed were his remains.1063 The ashes were paraded with great fanfare, such that the Ceylon Daily News reported,

“The Government has made arrangements to build a monument to deposit the ashes of King Dutugemunu at Anuradhapura. The ashes were taken in a motorcade from the National Museum of Colombo to Anuradhapura via Maagama, Tissamaharamaya, the

1060 Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.53.

1061 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. Personal Interview. February 13, 2018.

1062 “Chapter 10: The Consecrating of Pandukabhaya.” The Mahavamsa. http://mahavamsa.org/mahavamsa/original-version/10-consecrating-pandukabhaya.

1063 Wickramasinghe, Nira. Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History. Oxford University Press. 2015. P.398.

349 birth place of the king.”1064 In this case, the state supported a Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist narrative of history by classifying and parading symbolic artifacts. Overall, the narratives of the Mahavamsa serve several uses in the promotion of violent Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. Firstly, they establish Sri Lanka as a unified center of Buddhism which is threatened by other religions, both internally and externally. Then, through descriptions of battles and conquerors, they create a model of violent action against aggressors. While the aggressors in the Mahavamsa are primarily Tamils, the use of analogy has allowed Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists to cast groups such as Christians or imperialists in the role of aggressor. It is significant that this text was rediscovered during the Buddhist revival of the late nineteenth century to shape the new Buddhist identity, intertwined with ethnic nationalism, and a hostility against minority groups.

Conclusion

This examination of Buddhist nationalist militancy provides strong support for only one of the hypotheses: Hypothesis 4 (framing of myths or sacred histories contained within the group’s religious ideologies evoke hostility towards other groups and fear of extinction). Rejection of Hypothesis 2 and 3 suggests that Buddhist nationalist militants are not motivated by tactical objectives or religious obligation.

The first hypothesis demonstrates that Buddhist nationalists have successfully

1064 Rutnam, James Thevathasan. Tomb of Elara at Anuradhapura. Jaffna Archeological Society. 1981. P.16.

350 achieved major goals through the democratic process. These include 1) Sinhala as the dominant language, 2) Promotion of Buddhist religion, 3) Removal of minority advantages in fields such as education, and 4) Territorial integrity and dominance over the entire island of Sri Lanka. While the fourth goal did require violent action, it took the form of state-sponsored military operations by a Sinhalese-dominated government. Therefore, it can be considered a result of legitimate democratic processes. A puzzle arises in the second hypothesis when it becomes clear that communal violence does not clearly benefit SLFP electoral results or shift the UNP’s political platform. Why would Buddhist nationalists undertake violent activity that does not seem to benefit the movement? Perhaps groups such as the BBS, who model themselves on Hindu nationalists, believe that communal violence should benefit ethno-religious parties (as it does in India). In this case, a demonstration of continued poor electoral performance could lead to a crackdown on violence within the movement (as in the case of Sinn Fein and the IRA).1065 While the SLFP does not have the power to order that militants such as the BBS cease operations, members could act to curtail communal violence by toning down their rhetoric or at least avoiding complicity in riots (such as Black July and the Mawanella Riots).1066 Another possibility is that those who engage in communal violence are more concerned with the performance of parties such as the JVP and JHU, which seem to be

1065 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. P.160.

1066 See: Weiss, Gordon. The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Bellevue Literary Press. 2012. P.47.; and “For a place in the sun.” The Hindu. July 15, 2001. http://www.thehindu.com/2001/07/15/stories/05151346.htm.

351 more shielded from backlash over communal violence. However, it is the SLFP and more prominent political figures who have typically managed to achieve victories for Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists. The Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis does not seem to fit militant behavior and the rise of the BBS in Sri Lanka. Tactical moderation may be less likely for movements such as Buddhist nationalism which are not consolidated and include several organizations with different motivations. In terms of ideological motivations, it is clear that Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists are motivated more by ethno-religious identity and perceptions of out- groups than by a sense of religious obligation. In fact, the actions of Buddhist militants (many of whom are monks) are so directly opposed to the ideology and practices of Buddhism in Sri Lanka that prominent Buddhist leaders have attempted to reign in their behavior through legislation requiring them to be held accountable for presenting themselves as monks while flouting Buddhist principles.1067 An examination of narratives such as those present in the Mahavamsa provides evidence for the fourth hypothesis and Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory, in which symbolic predispositions and perceptions of threat are reinforced.1068 In the stories repeated by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists, out-groups such as Tamils are portrayed as

1067 “Theravadi Bhikkhu Kathikawath Bill presented in Parliament.” New.lk: The Official Government News Portal of Sri Lanka. January 13, 2016. https://www.news.lk/news/sri-lanka/item/11776-theravadi-bhikkhu-kathikawath-bill- presented-in-parliament.

1068 Kaufman, Stuart J. Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015. P.11.

352 “beasts,”1069 that pose a threat to the unity of Sri Lanka, and, therefore, a threat against Buddhism itself.

1069 “Chapter 25: The Victory of Duttha Gamani.” The Mahavamsa. http://mahavamsa.org/mahavamsa/original-version/25-victory-duttha-gamani.

353 Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I tested four hypothesized necessary conditions for religious militancy in democracies. Each of the three case studies contains unique contexts and causes of this violence. However, through hypothesis testing, I am able to make inferences about which conditions are truly “necessary” for continued religious militancy. This is important for theory building because it reveals which factors are not required. While these factors may play a role in certain contexts, understanding which structural conditions may make them necessary and narrowing down necessary conditions helps create a theory that is more focused and generalizable. Figure 10 shows which hypotheses were supported or not supported in each case study.

Figure 10 Results of Hypotheses

Case Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4

(Goals cannot (Violence is (Violence is (Narrative be achieved tactically perceived as framing through legal effective) religious evokes avenues) obligation) hostility) Shia Islamism Supported Supported Not Supported Supported in Lebanon Hindu Supported Supported Not Supported Supported Nationalism in India Buddhist Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Supported Nationalism in Sri Lanka

354 From this chart, it is clear that the only hypothesis that was supported in all four case studies was Hypothesis 4. However, structural differences between the cases may have affected the results of the first two hypotheses. Buddhist nationalism in Sri

Lanka is the only case in which Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were not supported. It also represents the least consolidated movement, suggesting that a hierarchical movement structure may be necessary for adherents to employ violence effectively.

Without such a hierarchical structure, political leaders cannot reign in militants who may be acting counterproductively. Likewise, they cannot direct militants according to a coherent strategy.

The first hypothesis, “A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if their goals cannot be achieved through legal avenues” was supported in the cases of Shia Islamism in Lebanon and Hindu nationalism in India. However, it was not supported in the Buddhist nationalism case study. It is important to note that, of these cases, Shia Islamism in Lebanon is the only movement representing a religious minority. Therefore, it makes sense that legal avenues have not proven successful. Hezbollah’s “outcome goal” of creating an Islamic state based on Iranian revolutionary ideology is not possible to achieve through legal avenues while the Shia followers of this movement remain an underrepresented minority. Hezbollah’s creation of a political wing represented a pragmatic step for gaining legitimacy and a stronger political voice. However, while the group practices inclusiveness and coalition-building domestically, Hezbollah has not abandoned its radical goal of

Islamic governance. It simply made a realistic assessment of its capabilities and chose

355 to focus on tactical goals (including geopolitical strategy) until such a time as Lebanon experiences a cultural shift towards Shia Islamism. In India, Hindutva proponents have already been working to create such a cultural shift in their favor. While this movement is associated with the majority Hindu population, the presence of minority groups and India’s secular values impede Hindutva leaders from successfully creating a “Hindu Rashtra (State).”

Hindu nationalist political goals such as the creation of a Uniform Civil Code

(UCC) are part of an effort to make all Indians “culturally” Hindu. Still, the secular nature of India’s constitution and culture means that BJP politicians must find ways to redefine secularism in such a way that they can promote Hindu identity and culture while still claiming to tolerate minority religions. Hindutva objectives for the prevention of cow slaughter are limited politically by state-level legislation in states that have lower Hindu populations. However, the BJP’s position against cow slaughter has emboldened and helped organize cow vigilantes. Other Hindutva goals, such as those concerning Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir, have been difficult to accomplish not only because of the historical requirement to build coalitions with secular and moderate groups, but because neither diplomacy nor military action have proven effective at increasing India’s security or “territorial integrity.” Interestingly,

Hezbollah’s non-state militancy seems to have had more success achieving territorial goals than the BJP’s democratic use of state-based militancy and diplomacy. For example, Hezbollah successfully contributed to Israel’s 2000 withdrawal and defended

Lebanon’s border from ISIS. In response to their minority status, Lebanese Shia

356 Islamists took a pragmatic stance to balance moderation at home and militancy abroad.

Meanwhile, Hindu nationalists in India are working to produce the cultural shift that would be necessary to give them enough democratic power to achieve their vision of a

Hindu Rashtra.

Hindutva proponents may see the political successes of Buddhist nationalists in

Sri Lanka as a guidebook for themselves. Buddhist nationalists exercised enough political power to change the constitution in ways that reflect the Buddhist nature of

Sri Lanka. The 1972 constitution declared the country a republic with Sinhala as the official language and Buddhism as the state religion. This is in contrast to India’s secular constitution. Buddhist nationalists also achieved their goals of making Sinhala the official language and removing minority advantages in education and employment.

While Hindu nationalists in India operate through RSS-associated political parties like the BJP, Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka achieve their goals by offering their support to the dominant parties in exchange for concessions. They were also successful in maintaining territorial integrity and dominance over the entire island of

Sri Lanka through a 27-year civil war against Tamil succession. In all three cases, territorial integrity has been an important issue, and militancy has been part of efforts to achieve it. The case of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka was the only movement which successfully pursued this goal through the “legal avenue” of government military action. While both Hindu nationalists in India and Buddhist nationalists in Sri

Lanka have faced backlash from minority groups, it is possible that the latter were more successful due the country’s history of ethnic representation under British rule

357 that bolstered the careers of Buddhist nationalist leaders and allowed them to permeate the highest levels of government soon after Independence. However, this early success in the first few decades since Independence resulted in a dramatic backlash and long- lasting civil war.

The second hypothesis, “A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if this violent activity is at least tactically effective at furthering the movement’s objectives” was similarly supported in the cases of Shia Islamism in

Lebanon and Hindu nationalism in India, but not supported in the Buddhist nationalism case study. However, this does not mean that Buddhist nationalist militants are acting irrationally. While their violence does not seem to have measurably helped political parties representing Buddhist nationalism or shifted the ideological spectrum in their favor, it also has not clearly negatively impacted these goals. The lack of tactical effectiveness in Buddhist nationalist non-state militancy can be attributed to its less organized nature.

Representing the most hierarchical movement of the three cases, Hezbollah has used militancy effectively to achieve its resistance goals, build popular support, and maintain powerful Shia alliances. In the 1980s, Hezbollah attacks against Western targets succeeded in causing French and American troops to evacuate. Additionally,

Hezbollah achieved victories against Israel such as the 2000 withdrawal of Israeli forces and the 2006 war (which the Israeli government widely considered a failure).

These victories against Israel and the West made Hezbollah popular as a resistance leader throughout the Middle East. While its current military operations in the Syrian

358 Civil War against Sunni Muslims lowered popular support throughout this majority-

Sunni region, Hezbollah has maintained support within its home constituencies. This is due to the loyalty of its Shia constituents and the protection Hezbollah provides against ISIS.

A key structural element of this case study which is not present in the other cases is government weakness. If the Lebanese government were able to protect its citizens sufficiently, they would not view Hezbollah as a necessary security provider.

This suggests that, if the governments of India or Sri Lanka were to crumble, the armed elements of Hindu nationalist or Buddhist nationalist movements may obtain more public support for militancy from populations they choose to protect. Likewise, a strengthened Lebanese military could lessen support for Hezbollah’s militancy.

However, it should be noted that Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government, making it challenging to provide resources to one and not the other. Finally, Hezbollah has used militancy effectively to maintain its Shia alliances, including Iranian and

Syrian allies. Iranian support provides the means for Hezbollah to operate not only militarily, but socially as a provider of goods and services that preserve support among constituents. Again, stronger Lebanese institutions could negate Hezbollah’s role as a provider of social welfare. This case study suggests that an examination of the ethnic conflict literature focusing on state weakness is important for understanding the

359 preconditions for non-state militancy in countries such as Lebanon.1070 In the absence of strong Lebanese institutions, Hezbollah provides military and social protection to its constituents.

Like Hezbollah’s political wing, the BJP in India benefits in terms of public support from violent outbreaks. Unlike Hezbollah, the BJP does not have direct control over militant elements of the movement. However, these elements are linked through the Sangh Parivar family of organizations and overlapping membership within

Hindu nationalist organizations. While not as hierarchical as Hezbollah, BJP members have used their political power to incite communal violence and signal impunity for militants. The mechanism whereby the BJP benefits politically from violence is also different than the Hezbollah case. Hezbollah’s militancy bolsters its status as a security provider, which helps it gain the support of Shias and other Lebanese citizens.

Meanwhile, Hindu nationalist militancy is not carried out through strategic military operations. Instead, it manifests as communal violence that polarizes the population along ethnic lines. This polarization causes parties such as the BJP to perform better in elections. So, while Hezbollah’s constituency rewards militancy for the purposes of protection, the BJP benefits from militancy due to its ethnically polarizing effect.

1070 See: Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” The American Political Science Review 97(1).; Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild. 1996. “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” International Security 21(2).; and Jones, Seth. 2008. “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.” International Security 32(4).

360 Interestingly, the case of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka does not demonstrate any clear tactical benefits from non-state militancy. Like the first hypothesis, this is likely because it is the least consolidated movement examined here.

It is important to separate non-state militancy from government military action because the latter was employed effectively during the Sri Lankan civil war and supported the goal of territorial integrity. This dissertation is focused on the choice to use violent means outside of legal democratic institutions. Such non-state use of violence showed no measurable benefit to the movement’s political objectives. In addition to its weaker consolidation, this movement may not easily demonstrate any tactical gains from militancy because it does not have its own major political party

(such as Hezbollah’s political wing or the BJP). Therefore, while we can attempt to measure the impact of militancy on electoral results for the Sri Lanka Freedom Party

(SLFP), which is the major party most associated with Buddhist nationalists, this movement is not limited to the SLFP as its primary political organization.

While national elections immediately following outbreaks of Buddhist nationalist violence have resulted in losses for the SLFP, an analysis of overall levels of this violence shows a weak positive relationship between violent outbreaks and parliamentary electoral results in the long run. The small historical number of parliamentary elections means that a weak relationship is difficult to detect, but these contradictory preliminary results suggest that militants may be unaware of whether this violence is tactically effective at increasing the political power of Buddhist nationalist parties. Future research could benefit from the collection of data on local

361 elections and smaller instances of violence to better detect the nature of this relationship. In addition to electoral results, Buddhist nationalist militant activity has not proven tactically effective at shifting the United National Party (UNP)’s platform.

This means such violence has not demonstrably helped the movement in terms of electoral outcomes or ideological spectrum shifts. Therefore, the second hypothesis is not supported in this case. However, it is possible that if the movement became more consolidated, like the other two cases, militancy would not continue to be practiced without clear tactical benefits.

The third hypothesis, “A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if they perceive it to be religiously obligatory” is the only hypothesis to not be supported in any of the three cases. This is important because the movements examined here were chosen based on their religious nature. Each religious ideology studied is based on a different major religion, including Islam, Hinduism, and

Buddhism. However, while religious ideologies may provide the political “outcome” goals for religious movements, they do not necessarily motivate the choice to use violence in pursuit of these goals.

Shia Islamism in Lebanon provides the trickiest case for this hypothesis because much of the group’s rhetoric refers to religious justifications for violence, such as labelling the Syrian opposition “takfiris” (extremists). However, these justifications require reinterpretation of Hezbollah’s own Shia ideology of jihad, which is based on defense and countering oppression. In fact, the concepts which

Hezbollah and Shia religious leaders began using in recent years to justify fighting

362 fellow Muslims appear to derive from the same radical Sunni ideological lineages followed by those Muslims whom they have labelled “takfiri.” It is important to note that this assessment is not based on my own interpretation of Shia Islam, but rather the

“public theology” adopted by Hezbollah.1071 For most of its existence, Hezbollah’s religious ideology of defensive jihad and its statements about this type of warfare as a duty of self-sacrifice corresponded to its resistance activities. However, its recent activity in Syria seems to have required post hoc reinterpretations of this ideology.

Not only does Hezbollah’s militant activity in Syria lack religious obligation according its own defensive interpretations of jihad, it is not even permitted due to most interpretations that prohibit fighting fellow Muslims. While individual fighters may be motivated by feelings of religious obligation ingrained in them through indoctrination, this does not explain the choice to use militancy by Hezbollah or the movement as a whole.

In the case of Hindu nationalism, the concept that is most similar to jihad is dharmayuddha, roughly translated as “just war.” Like jihad, it governs the conduct of war. Rather than specifying defense of the faith, dharamayuddha is meant to return the world to a state of cosmic order and is waged in response to threats to this order from unlawful or unjust activities. The target of this righteous violence is meant to be

1071 Sandal, Nukhet Ahu. 2012. “The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(1): 72.

363 evildoers (usually understood as an external threat), and it is meant to be conducted in a fair and open manner, prohibiting excessive force. In order to perceive militancy as religiously obligatory, Hindu nationalists would need to view the targets of their violence as evildoers who have upset the cosmic order. Since Hindu nationalists are in power in India, there is no external domination to be defeated that would require restoring justice and order. Therefore, it would be difficult for Hindu nationalists to offer interpretations of dharmayuddha that would justify or obligate communal violence.

Additionally, while Hezbollah leaders appeal to the concept of jihad frequently, dharmayuddha is rarely referenced by Hindu nationalist leaders, as shown by searches of BJP and RSS resources. When it is used in political rhetoric, the term is often employed in contexts other than religious struggles. Hindu nationalists may be reluctant to invoke the term dharmayuddha in the context of communal violence either because it would alienate centrists or because the principles of this term do not translate to such militancy. Hezbollah’s military operations against Israel were easier to frame as defensive jihad, which may explain why it appealed to this concept. Now,

Hezbollah’s rhetoric about “takfiris” in Syria may be necessary to alleviate fears among fighters that they will be eternally punished for killing fellow Muslims. Hindu nationalists in general do not seem to feel the same pressure to make theological arguments about the conduct of communal violence. I argue that this is the case because such Hindu nationalist militancy is not motivated by feelings of religious

364 obligation, nor is the violence as heavily organized as Hezbollah’s military operations, negating the need for unwavering obedience among a fixed set of fighters.

The case of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka presents the least support for the third hypothesis. Not only is militancy in the name of this movement not religiously obligatory, but Buddhism is averse to all forms of violence. While jihad calls for militancy in defense of religion and its followers, and dharmayuddha calls for defense of the cosmic order, Theravada Buddhist principles are opposed to violence even for the protection of religion or anything else. Unlike Hinduism and Islam, there is no

Buddhist code for the conduct of a “just war,” since all war is considered akusala

(unskillful and evil). While some interpretations make allowances for violence in certain circumstances, such as self-defense, the rules governing Buddhist monks are stricter. In Theravada Buddhism, monks are not allowed to kill even in self-defense.

This is important to note since many Buddhist militants in Sri Lanka are errant monks, including BBS Secretary General Galagodaththe Gnanasara. While high-ranking Sri

Lankan monks have proposed legislation attempting to reign in these violent monks, so far they have lacked the power to enforce punishments for violations of their code of conduct. The efforts of these high-ranking monks demonstrate that that militancy by groups such as the BBS is opposed not only to general Buddhist precepts, but to local

Sri Lankan interpretations as well. Therefore, as in the other two cases, militancy in the name of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka is not motivated by religious obligation.

365 The fourth hypothesis, “A religious militant group will continue to use political violence only if framing of myths or sacred histories contained within the group’s religious ideologies evoke hostility towards other groups and fear of extinction” is the only hypothesis which was supported in all three cases. Therefore, the hypothesized necessary condition of fear-inducing hostile narratives is the only necessary condition in this dissertation to remain fully intact, without structural caveats. Each of the religious movements examined contain narratives about historical oppression from outgroups which are used by movement leaders to evoke hostility against current political “threats.” This hypothesis combined cognitive and emotional theories

(including differing concepts such as narrative framing and hostile myths). The myths and sacred histories contained within each of the case studies seem to be best understood in terms of the emotional theories. The literature which best explains how narratives stir emotions of fear and hostility in these cases is the literature on symbolic predispositions and threat perceptions by scholars such as Stuart Kaufman and Omar

McDoom.1072 Still, deeper discussion is required to understand exactly how such narratives motivate militancy.

In the Shia Islamism case, Ashura marks the death of Hussain ibn Ali in the

Battle of Karbala against King Yazid (representing early Sunnis). Shias in Lebanon

1072 Kaufman, Stuart J. Nationalist Passions. Cornell University Press. 2015.; And McDoom, Omar Shahabudin 2012 “The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict,” International Security 37(2).

366 commemorate this battle annually in rituals that became more dramatic during the

Shia political awakening of the 1960s and 70s. In the Hindu nationalism case, the story of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya is a potent narrative that frames Muslims as the oppressors. According to this story, when the Babri Masjid (Mosque) was constructed, it replaced an existing Ram temple, for which there is no tangible evidence. The myth states that a temple commemorating the birthplace of Rama existed at this location since the eleventh century A.D. until it was destroyed by a general of Babar, founder of the Mughal dynasty, who built a mosque in its place. This frames Muslims as a threat to Hindus and their religion. The continuing dispute over this sacred location in

Ayodhya has led to outbreaks of communal violence.

Finally, Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka draws on hostile narratives from the

Mahavamsa, especially the story of an epic battle between Sinhalese King

Duttugemenu and Tamil King Elara in the second century BC. Like Ashura which portrays Sunnis as the oppressors and the Ram Temple myth which portrays Muslims as the oppressors, this narrative casts the Tamils in the role of the villain. In each of these cases, the narratives inspired violence against the groups which were viewed as legendary oppressors. This supports Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory because, in each case, the narratives reinforce symbolic predispositions about the “oppressor” groups that make them more likely to be viewed as a threat. This dissertation supports the hypothesis that religious militancy in democracies necessitates the existence of shared myths and histories which are framed to evoke fear of rival groups.

367 To sum up the state of the hypothesized necessary conditions, the first and second hypotheses only lacked support in the Buddhist nationalism case, suggesting that they may still apply to more consolidated movements. The lack of support for the third hypothesis in all three cases suggests that the choice to use militancy is not a result of feelings of religious obligation (although theology is certainly involved in the development of political goals, rhetoric, and justifications given to fighters). Religious movements within democracies do not require theological codes obligating combat in order to choose to engage in it. Finally, strong support for the fourth hypothesis in all three cases reveals the importance of hostile narratives for exacerbating threat perceptions that lead to militancy.

A Modified Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis

One of the main goals of this dissertation has been to assess the assumption among political scientists that political inclusion leads to moderation in light of the empirical reality of continuing militancy. The continuation of Buddhist nationalist militancy in Sri Lanka despite the movement’s political successes suggests that blocked legal avenues are not a necessary condition for religious militancy. This challenges both the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis and grievance-based theories of political violence. However, the complexities of the case, including the lack of clear movement consolidation, offer several explanations for this counterintuitive outcome

368 that will be examined here. In the cases of Shia Islamism in Lebanon and Hindu nationalism in India, these movements faced obstacles to pursuing their main objectives through legal avenues. Still, they were capable of participating democratically, especially in the case of Hindu nationalism where the BJP is the ruling party. The BJP’s inability to obtain the major cultural and foreign policy goals of

Hindu nationalism is not a result of lack of political inclusion. Rather, these failures are mainly due to a lack of political domination, which far exceeds the metric of inclusion. Rather than reject the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis, I suggest modifying it based on the contributions of this research to take into account factors that affect the ability and incentive of movements to moderate their behavior.

Firstly, it is important to recognize that not all movements may have the ability to moderate. This may be due to lack of hierarchical control over extremist elements or dependence on a foreign entity for continued support. As examined in Chapter Two,

Stathis N. Kalyvas’ comparison of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria and the

Catholic Party in Belgium resulted in the conclusion that the centralized, hierarchical organization of Catholicism allowed moderate Catholics in Belgium to send credible signals about their commitment to moderation.1073 This emphasis on the importance of hierarchy for allowing movements to control their more radical followers is supported by my dissertation. However, Kalyvas assumes that rational movements in

1073 Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2000. “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties.” Comparative Politics. 379-393

369 democracies will have an incentive to behave moderately and signal these moderate intentions. My research does not make this assumption. In fact, it finds that movement leaders may have an incentive to utilize militancy or incite communal violence to achieve tactical goals. In cases where militancy is occurring, my research suggests that the level of hierarchy affects whether this violent activity is clearly oriented towards tactical objectives or not. In the case of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, the least consolidated movement studied here, militancy did not seem to produce tactical results. Even if a movement is incentivized to moderate its behavior, this may be less possible in cases that lack leadership and control over militants.

The second factor that affects a movement’s ability to moderate is reliance on a foreign entity that prioritizes violent activity. This is demonstrated in the case of Shia

Islamism in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s creation was sponsored by Iran and Syria, and the organization relies on Iran for funding and military training. In addition to sponsoring military activity, Hezbollah relies on Iran to fund social welfare programs for constituents. Without its military strength or ability to provide social welfare and benefits, Hezbollah’s very existence would be in jeopardy. While Hezbollah may be able to exercise some discretion in its military activities (as evidenced by its delay in directly joining the Syrian conflict), the organization’s dependence on Iran suggests that Hezbollah may not have the ability to moderate behaviorally without risking its existence. Of course, Hezbollah also had a tactical incentive to enter the Syrian

370 conflict in order to support the “axis of resistance” and keep supply lines open.1074

Still, these calculations reflect the reality that Hezbollah is wholly dependent on a foreign power. Such proxy relationships (which may be more prevalent in countries with weak governance) pose another obstacle to democratic moderation.

In addition to a movement’s ability to moderate, it is also important to consider competing incentives. While movements may have an incentive to participate democratically, such participation is not always negatively affected by militancy. The cases of Shia Islamism in Lebanon and Hindu nationalism in India showed how militancy can actually help movements gain public support and political power in democracies. In such cases, there is a perverse incentive to continue or encourage violent activity because of its symbiotic relationship with democratic power. This supports Martha Crenshaw’s framework, in which social facilitation of violence is a permissive condition for terrorism.1075

Additionally, when movements include objectives so grandiose that they require major political transformation, they may not settle for moderate democratic inclusion. All three movements examined here contain radical “outcome” goals that require major constitutional and cultural change. Goals such as Islamic governance or

1074 Khashan, Hilal, and Ibrahim Mousawi. "Hizbullah’s Jihad Concept." Journal of Religion and Society 9 (2007): 15.

1075 Crenshaw, Martha 1981. “The causes of terrorism,” Comparative Politics. 6(2):381.

371 a Hindu Rashtra require not only inclusion but domination of the political system.

Even after Buddhist nationalists succeeded in changing the constitution of Sri Lanka, many were unsatisfied. For example, the BBS was founded by Buddhist nationalists who demanded further legislation privileging Buddhism and the population of

Sinhalese Buddhists. Leonard Weinberg’s research is relevant to understanding this phenomenon. As discussed, Weinberg asserts that political parties may be more likely to turn to violence if their goals are grandiose or their ideology views the political order as illegitimate.1076 Additionally, movements may contain radical segments that do not feel represented by their associated political party. The literature on moderation explores how objectives may vary and evolve within movements.1077

If religious movements or their more radical followers have goals that extend beyond what can be achieved through political inclusion, they may attempt to alter the playing field by other means. In Hezbollah’s case, this means pursing regional interests and garnering support through military struggle. For extremist Hindu nationalists and Buddhist nationalists, this can mean acting as vigilantes over cultural issues such as cow protection or conversions. My research suggests that the Inclusion-

1076 Weinberg, Leonard. "Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities." Comparative Politics 23, no. 4 (1991): 423-38.

1077 See: Clark, Janine Astrid and Jillian Schwedler 2003. “Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties” Comparative Politics. 35(3):295. And Shelef, Nadav G. Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Identity, and Religion in Israel, 1925- 2005. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.

372 Moderation hypothesis should recognize caveats that hinder a movement’s ability to moderate (including lack of hierarchy and dependence on a foreign entity).

Additionally, it should consider that the benefits of behavioral moderation can be outweighed by competing incentives (such as when militancy is beneficial for gaining democratic power or goals are so grandiose they require extralegal action to alter the playing field).

Religion as Theology v. Religion as Identity

The rejection of the third hypothesis in all three cases, paired with the success of the fourth hypothesis has important implications for understanding religious ideology as a motivation for militancy. I argue that the study of religious violence must differentiate between religion as theology and religion as identity, with the latter being more prone to motivate violence. Religion as theology includes religious texts, teachings, and interpretations. It refers to the system of beliefs followed by a religious movement. The theological aspects of religion can inspire political objectives, such as

Islamic governance or cow protection. However, my research challenges the notion that religious codes of violence motivate militancy. While these codes can be used to provide justification for violent activity, this activity does not seem to be caused by or even require a sense of religious obligation. My three case studies span religious ideologies based on Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. These religions all have varying

373 codes regarding violence (with Buddhism being the most averse to any violent action).

Yet, in all cases, militancy occurred in the name of religious ideology.

I argue that religious militancy in these cases was motivated by the concept of religion as identity. When tied to identity, religion seems to have effects similar to ethnic or national identities. Religion as identity means defining in-groups and out- groups based on religious beliefs. In the cases of Hindu nationalism and Buddhist nationalism, ideas about national identity are based on religion, meaning that those who do not subscribe to the ruling religion are symbolically placed outside the nation.

Additionally, Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka consider Buddhism as an integral part of Sinhalese ethnic identity. In all three cases, narratives within the religious ideologies create a sense of shared history and community that is placed in opposition to out-groups.

For Shia Muslims in Lebanon, the story of Ashura reinforces their group identity as a historically repressed minority group. For Hindu nationalists, texts such as the Ramayana create a sense of shared history, including the perceived Golden Age of Ram Raj. It also strongly associates Hindus with Ayodhya, as the center of Hindu nationhood. Finally, for Buddhist nationalists, the Mahavamsa intertwines Buddhism with the history of the island of Sri Lanka, describing Sinhalese origins on the island and visits by Buddha. In all three cases, the narratives that evoke hostility to rival groups also reinforce a shared sense of religious identity. This focus on identity is necessary in order to frame rival groups as enemies and threats to the shared religious community. Like ethnicity or nationality, the presence of religion-based identities

374 should not be viewed as a cause for conflict on its own. Rather, it can motivate militancy when combined with prejudice and fear of out-groups.

Towards a Theory of Religious Militancy in Democracies

Based on the findings of this research, any theory explaining religious militancy in democracies should consider 1) the ability of the movement to moderate

2) the movement’s incentive to follow the “rules of the game,” and 3) hostile perceptions of outgroups. The first factor is concerned with the means for moderation, such as hierarchical organization and a lack of dependence on external entities. While many theories of political violence focus on the means to conduct violent activity, the reverse should also be considered. Does a movement have the means to end violent activity? The second factor is a combination of opportunity and grievances/motivations. Does the opportunity structure incentivize extralegal activity in pursuit of tactical objectives or outcome goals? As shown in the case studies, the democratic nature of a system does not always mean that cost/benefit analyses favor behavioral moderation.

For moderation to occur, the second factor is dependent on the first factor. It makes no difference whether violence is incentivized if movements do not have the ability to control or influence their extremist elements. This is apparent in the case of

Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, in which extremist groups like the BBS use violence without it demonstrably supporting movement objectives. However, since the

375 other two case studies were found to be achieving tactical goals through militancy, it follows that movements with the ability to moderate should do so if the cost/benefit analysis favors behavioral moderation. This means that movements must view political inclusion as more worthwhile than militancy, and militancy must negatively affect the movement’s political power. Until such structural factors favor behavioral moderation, movements may continue practicing violence and democratic politics simultaneously. Such nonlinear transitions and the balance between politics and militancy are explored by scholars such as Berti and Irvin.1078 These scholars recognize the internal struggle within movements to determine whether armed struggle is advantageous. However, it is important to understand that not all movements may have the ability to reign in extremist elements.

The third factor considers the role of emotion in motivating religious militancy. Any theory of religious militancy in democracies should draw from the literature on ethnic conflict to make sense of the role of “religion as identity” in creating the conditions for conflict. Even if the movement’s religious political goals are achieved (as in Cronin’s success scenario of ending terrorist campaigns)1079,

1078 Berti, Benedetta. Armed Political Organizations: from Conflict to Integration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. And Irvin, Cynthia. “Negotiating End Game: A Comparative Analysis of the IRA and ETA,” Reconcilable Differences: Turning Points in Ethnopolitical Conflict. Kumarian Press. 2000. 201.

1079 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

376 religious identity remains and may still be used to for violent mobilization. Narratives that are framed to reinforce prejudice and fear influence how followers understand their ultimate objectives and perceived threats. Further research should examine how well the propagation of these hostile narratives predicts occurrences of religious militancy in democracies. This would require a methodology that includes variation on the dependent variable of continued religious militancy. While this research has focused on hypothesized necessary conditions, further research could examine whether conditions such as hostile narratives are sufficient to explain religious militancy. Could the prejudice and fear they evoke outweigh tactical political considerations in consolidated religious movements?

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