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Home , Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Bruce Riedel, David Headley, Hafiz Saeed, Haqqani network, Hizbul Mujahideen

New America Foundation

Militancy in and Impacts on U.S. Foreign Policy

Saba Imtiaz, International Security Program Carnegie Fellow August 2014

“What is happening now, seems almost a writing strikes – including the legality of the program and on the wall and God help us if we do not stop the issue of civilian casualties– have these ignorant people from cutting each other’s overshadowed the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and throat and thus bringing comfort and cheer to discussions on counter-. our enemies.”i However, the fact that Pakistan is still a training Executive Summary and recruitment ground for who would seek to attack the , and that The state of internal security in Pakistan is a transnational terrorism plots have been traced potentially disruptive factor for the U.S.-Pakistan back to Pakistan, is a key concern. Additionally, relationship. Even if there is no threat posed to this is a concern because of the intensive growth the U.S. and/or American interests by Pakistan- of networks in urban Pakistan. This based militant groups, the United States is concerns the United States because these factors concerned by the rise of religious militancy in together enable a network for anti-American Pakistan and the risks it poses to the state, to its militancy in addition to the existing threat from ability to govern effectively, and the toll it is insurgent groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas. taking on the civilian population. This was underscored by the failed bombing attempt on Times Square in New York in 2010 The focus of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in that combined both homegrown radicalization recent years has been on the , and the supporting apparatus of Pakistani and to a lesser extent, the Tehrik-e- militant networks based in the tribal areas. Pakistan, which are based in Pakistan’s tribal areas. These groups have been the target of the The main purpose of this paper is to examine the controversial C.I.A.-run drone program, which is current U.S. assessment of the threat posed by largely the prism through which the U.S.- homegrown militancy in Pakistan’s urban centers Pakistan relationship is seen. Homegrown to American interests in , as well as to militancy in Pakistan’s urban areas has not been the American homeland. It will also comment on a major issue in the bilateral relationship, though the reported resurgence of groups such as Jaish-e- it has been a source of contention. But drone Mohammad, which for several years went

dormant but today appears to be rebuilding a 1. Introduction public profile; implications for the future of homegrown militancy groups are also assessed. It A. Militancy in Pakistan will also look at the role Pakistan-based, homegrown militant groups could play in Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, religious destabilizing South Asia, as seen by American intolerance and violence has plagued the country. analysts and experts on the region. It will also The division of the Indian subcontinent that saw briefly analyze the growing transnational the creation of Pakistan was marred by one of the ambitions of groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, largest population displacements in the world which has signaled that it could take its campaign and religious violence amongst , of attacking Shi’ites elsewhere in the region. Muslims, and Sikhs. Since 1958, Pakistan has seen protracted periods of military rule. Its first There is also the potent question of Pakistan’s elected Prime Minister , the complicity in allowing militant groups to operate leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), was within the country. The long-standing view in executed under the military regime of General Pakistan is that anti- militant groups pose Zia-ul-Haq on charges that he had abetted a no imminent or internal threat to Pakistan – yet conspiracy to murder a political rival. After a could be a useful proxy force in India and decade of military rule, Pakistan returned to – is still ingrained in its military being a “democratic” country with the election of establishment and political sphere. There is little the late Bhutto’s daughter, , as belief amongst U.S. experts in Pakistan and prime minister. Her fractious coalition and former and current policymakers that this policy allegations of corruption led to her dismissal by has changed. However, many do see a growing President Ghulam Ishaq Khan two years later. realization in Pakistan that there is a problem Her rival – the conservative politician Nawaz with homegrown militancy, yet no understanding Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League –was voted of how to resolve it.ii into power in 1990 until he too was removed from office. For the purpose of this paper, I am studying the threats posed specifically by two strains of One more term followed for Bhutto (1993-1996) homegrown militancy in urban areas. The first is and Sharif (1997-1999) respectively until General the ‘traditional’ anti-India groups that have or overthrew Sharif’s government could potentially morph into anti-state groups. in a military coup on October 12, 1999. The second is the sectarian groups that have yet to express any aims of attacking the U.S. but The identity of Pakistan – whether it was meant contribute to militancy in Pakistan. to be a secular or – has long been debated by scholars and is closely linked to the idea of militancy in Pakistan.iii Militant groups’ goal to establish a “true” Islamic state in the country takes root from this identity.iv It also remains a rallying cry for right-wing groups– with leaders of conservative parties like the Jamaat-e-

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Islami criticizing secularismv – even though the country’s “Islamic” credentials were strengthened In the 1970s, the anti-Ahmadi campaign resurged by the passage of the Objectives Resolution in and the Ahmadi sect was legally excommunicated 1949. The Objectives Resolution is part of the from Islam through an amendment to the Pakistani Constitution and states that all laws Pakistani constitution.x Prime Minister Zulfikar must be in line with Islamic principles.vi A Ali Bhutto’s government also sought to appease Council of Islamic Ideology exists to advise right-wing groups by imposing a ban on the sale Parliament on legislation; however, it has no of alcohol to Muslims.xi binding authority but remains an influence on lawmakers and politicians. In 1977, the , led by General Zia- ul-Haq, launched a coup and overthrew the Successive military and democratic regimes have government. Two years later, Bhutto was tried used religion for political gain as well as exploited and executed after being convicted on charges of religious fault lines in the country that had abetting a conspiracy to murder a political rival. existed since its creation. These fault lines were General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime strengthened the not just about different religions. Intra-Muslim role of hardline in Pakistan. Measures conflicts began to emerge as early as 1951, when included legal ordinances that equated rape with the first reports of violence against Shi’ites began adultery, thus placing the onus on the victim, to emerge. While many Muslim groups changing the law of evidence to reduce the had not supported the idea of Pakistan’s creation, standing of female witnesses, and rewriting they began to take charge of Pakistan’s shift to a school textbooks to place more importance on Deobandi state through rhetoric and riots. Of .xii The Zia regime also further exploited note is the Majlis-e-Ahrar’s anti-Ahmadi sectarianism in the country, allowing groups like movement in the 1950s, as well as protests by the anti-Shi’ite Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba (later smaller religious groups like the Islam League, renamed to the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan) to “demanding the amelioration of suffering [during flourish. The regime feared the influence of a a food crisis] and a greater Islamization of post-revolution Iran and its support to Shi’ite government.”vii activist groups in Pakistan, and sought to counter it with groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba In the 1950s, right-wing groups launched a Pakistan.xiii massive campaign against the Ahmadi sect of Islam, calling for its followers – who they B. Pakistan: Fighting by Proxy considered apostates – to be excommunicated from Islam in the constitution.viii Pakistan had long used the idea of militias as a proxy of sorts in its constant war with India over These riots laid the groundwork for what was to the disputed territory of , enlisting the become the intensely influential role played by support of tribes as well as battalions from the clergy and right-wing politicians in Pakistani religious and political parties.xiv It also replicated society and governance. This has also inspired this strategy in 1971 during the war with India and provided a precedent for the militant groups that led to the split of Pakistan and the creation of that exist in Pakistan today.ix .

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of anti-India militant groups in Kashmir. “There The Pakistani military and intelligence services was a strong inclination inside the counter- had provided training and funneled support to terrorism community, including the State Afghan insurgent groups during the Soviet Department and the Bush Sr. White House, to invasion of Afghanistan and duplicated this put Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of strategy to the disputed territory of Kashmir in terrorism,” said analyst Bruce Riedel.xviii The the 1990s. There is considerable evidence that the move was scuttled because it was being mulled Pakistani military and intelligence services during the transition period between the recruited, trained and supported the anti-India outgoing Bush Sr. administration and the militias. However, these charges are routinely incoming Clinton administration.xix denied by the military.xv These include groups like the Hizbul , Lashkar-e-Taiba, The threat resurfaced in 1993 as President Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- Clinton’s administration also considered placing Islami.xvi Their use was part of a strategy to Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of subvert India through proxy groups while terrorism.xx Administration officials, including claiming plausible deniability, and came with a Secretary of State Warren Christopher, warned “supreme confidence” that Pakistan could control Pakistan that if circumstances did not change in them in the long run.xvii its support for militant groups, it would be forced to take action against the country. Only a decade later, however, these proxy groups became sworn enemies of their former trainers None of these warnings manifested into action and paymasters, almost stoking war between and they never led to any checks and balances on India and Pakistan and embarking on a campaign Pakistan’s support and use of militias, even when of attacks against Pakistani civilians and military they began to develop transnational aims and officials. targeted foreign citizens. They began plotting attacks against foreign citizens in India, C. Homegrown Militancy and the U.S.-Pakistan including kidnapping foreign tourists in Relationship Kashmir, in the 1990s.xxi

The issue of homegrown militancy in Pakistan This pattern – from being one of many groups has long been a policy concern in the United fighting in Kashmir to developing transnational States. This precedes the events of September 11, aims and then carrying out large-scale attacks – 2001 and the ensuing Operation Enduring would see itself repeat throughout the . Freedom mounted by NATO and U.S. coalition While the U.S. government’s moves to censure forces in Afghanistan that drew the world’s Pakistan for its use of militant groups were attention to Pakistan. scuttled, there was also little leverage that the United States had with Pakistan. During the American policymakers and analysts feared that 1990s, engagement between the two countries the violence would destabilize a volatile region. was at a low, though the Bush Sr. By 1992, there was a push to designate Pakistan Aadministration had attempted to forge a as a global sponsor of terrorism because of its use working relationship with Benazir Bhutto during

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her first term in government (1988-1990). In By 1999, the Sharif government had begun to 1990, sanctions were enforced against Pakistan take on the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The police for embarking on a nuclear weapons program.xxii launched a campaign against sectarian militants, Among other sticking issues was the sale of F-16 killing up to thirty-six in extrajudicial killings that fighter jets to Pakistan. Nuclear tests by Pakistan year.xxvi in May 1998, a tit-for-tat response to tests carried out by India, led to a further derailment of ties as But their short stints in power did not allow for the United States placed sanctions on Pakistan. any long-term counter-terrorism strategy to deal with these groups. Pakistan faced a number of While the idea that militant groups in Kashmir other security challenges that consumed the were under the state’s control existed, efforts of the civilian governments, including homegrown militancy in other forms began to ethnic and political conflict in and a manifest in Pakistan. The rise of the Sipah-e- constant, pervasive fear of the government being Sahaba Pakistan led to a spike in sectarian overthrown. But the 1998 nuclear tests and a war killings throughout the 1990s, including that of with India in 1999 overshadowed many of these the head of the Iranian Cultural Centre in , developments taking place in the heart of Sadiq Ganji, as well as Shi’ite professionals.xxiii Pakistan. In 1999, an embattled Prime Minister The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan attempted to evolve sought U.S. President Bill Clinton’s into a mainstream political party, often publicly support while Clinton pressed him to withdraw disavowing links to the murders of Shi’ites. It troops from Kargil.xxvii also enjoyed electoral success, winning seats in the lower house of parliament. But Sharif lost his job just four months after meeting President Clinton, and General Pervez The militant offshoot of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Musharraf’s government was only forced to Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, formed in 1996 address the issue under intense U.S. pressure in and came into its own with a firebrand leadership 2001. In December 1999, India was forced to free that sought to enlarge its scope of attacks on Pakistani militants, (who would go Shi’ites.xxiv Among its plots included a failed on to found the Jaish-e-Mohammad), Ahmed assassination attempt against Prime Minister Omar Saeed Shaikh, and Mushtaq Ahmed Nawaz Sharif in January 1999. Zargar, while negotiating the release of a hijacked Indian Airlines plane that had been forced to land While Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as in Kandahar. prime ministers and heads of the most popular political parties in Pakistan, did not seek to In the days after the September 11, 2001 attacks, abolish the military’s role in the , Pakistan – as has been well documented– agreed they did realize that Pakistan faced an internal to work as a coalition partner with the United security threat. Benazir Bhutto was concerned States in the ‘’ and support the U.S. about the rise of and presence in Afghanistan.xxviii While the United admitted this to American interlocutors.xxv States was concerned with eliminating the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan and required Pakistan’s support for everything from sharing

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intelligence about suspects to renditions and act against these facilitating networks or the anti- interrogations, Pakistan was able to sign on India militias until December 2001. without promising the United States it would do anything to dismantle homegrown militant On December 13, 2001, militants launched an networks or to end its policy of using proxy attack on the Indian parliament in New . groups in Afghanistan and India. India blamed Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e- Taiba for the attack, and reports of an armed While Pakistan may have acceded to the United escalation between both countries began to States’ demand to help with al Qaeda in surface.xxxiv This was the first indicator of how Afghanistan, then-military ruler General Pervez Pakistan’s support of anti-India groups could Musharraf did not agree to work on tackling the potentially stoke war between two nuclear-armed homegrown threat. “When I went to talk to countries, and that Pakistan’s use of proxies no Musharraf on September 13 (2001)xxix and then on longer gave it any plausible deniability. A million September 15 (2001), he agreed to help us troops amassed on the border and there were unstintingly with al Qaeda in Afghanistan reports that nuclear missiles had been because they attacked us. But he did not agree to unsheathed in India, while Pakistan would not help us go after Pakistani groups inside Pakistan. rule out the possibility of a first strike. The What he said was that was his responsibility, not United States– fearful of a nuclear war between ours,” said Wendy J. Chamberlin, who served as the two countries – intervened, with Secretary U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from September Colin Powell playing a key role in negotiating 2001 to May 2002.xxx with Pakistan.xxxv The United States then asked General Musharraf to not just make a statement Chamberlin recalled that the U.S. concern about against anti-India groups, but that he begin to homegrown militancy in Pakistan predated the rein them in.xxxvi events of September 11, 2001. American diplomats regularly sent Pakistani officials démarches on General Musharraf made a key policy speech the issue. “When I arrived our policy was clearly against militancy and said that while Pakistan that these homegrown groups – Lashkar-e-Taiba, supported the Kashmiri cause, it would not allow Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, all of those – were very, very organizations to “carry out terrorism under the dangerous and we saw connections between the pretext of Kashmir.”xxxvii The government Pakistani government using them as proxies, subsequently placed bans on a number of groups: particularly across the border with India. And we Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e- were opposed to it.”xxxi Sahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, Tehrik- e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi and the Tehreek- Even though several suspects – including alleged e-Islami.xxxviii However, the Jamaat-e-Islami al Qaeda leaders and self-confessed 9/11 plotter remained a key ally of General Musharraf, as part Khalid Sheikh Mohammad – were detained from of a six-party coalition called the Muttahida the houses of supporters of mainstream political Majlis-e-Amal. parties like the Jamaat-e-Islamixxxii or safe houses run by the Lashkar-e-Taibaxxxiii, Pakistan did not While the bans caused militant groups to curtail their activity in the immediate short-term, each

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group resurged in the months to follow. Many, to the military and the civilian government. like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e- However, as attacks against U.S. troops in Taiba, changed names and continued to operate. Afghanistan intensified and began to be linked The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi back to the Haqqani network – which the United would go on to cause a surge in militancy in the States accuses Pakistan of sheltering – the Swat and Malakand districts of the Khyber relationship worsened.xliii Pakhtunkhwa province, resulting in a military operation in 2009.xxxix “This sanctuary, it became very real. It wasn’t just simply people who were destabilizing There was also a concern from Pakistan that the Afghanistan – they were people who were directly anti-India groups – the key threat at that point in responsible for our guys getting killed,” said time – could disband and ‘freelance’ with other Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department militant networks. The United States noted that official, describing the mood in Washington as while training camps for these groups were being reports emerged on the links between insurgent moved away from the Pakistan-India border, they groups operating out of Pakistan and attacks on were moving into the west and north center of U.S. forces.xliv the country.xl “The big change here goes back a number of The red lines began to shift in Pakistan with the years, which I think is a strategic change in terms evolution of militant groups. Despite the bans, of Pakistani calculations,” said scholar Stephen P. sectarian attacks continued throughout General Cohen.xlv “In the early 2000s, when American Musharraf’s tenure, particularly in Karachi.xli troops were in Afghanistan, they realized very Moreover, militant groups began to launch an quickly that they were being shot at by guys who insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal were being supported by Pakistan. I had a lot of Areas as well as in the Swat and Malakand contact with American military which was fresh districts of the North West Frontier Province back from Afghanistan saying ‘Professor, why is (now known as ). our ally Pakistan supporting people trying to kill me because I’m going back for another tour?’ So Many of the groups involved in stoking the they lost their traditional alliance among the violence in Pakistan were those that the state had American conservatives. Soldiers told the Bush once supported.xlii That Pakistani militant groups administration this. Congress – especially were able to resurge and operate is an example of [Senator] John McCain – was very angry with how Pakistan has been unable to ever crack down Pakistan.” Cohen noted that American on militancy. Moreover, because bans on the conservatives – traditionally supportive of groups came as a result of U.S. pressure and the Pakistan’s military – were now worried about it. stand-off with India as opposed to any real “I tell Pakistani officials here, ‘Your lobby is gone, domestic opposition to them, there was little buy- it’s completely wiped out. It’s not something the in for the policy measure or its implementation. Indians did. It’s something you did.”

In 2008 the United States was willing to work For many in the United States, the breaking point with a democratic government, offering support was when Admiral Mike Mullen testified in the

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Senate that the Haqqani network was a “veritable attack, a move that was scuttled by the Pakistani arm of the ISI, ”Pakistan’s intelligence service. xlvi military.xlviii On the Hill, sanctions for Pakistan went under consideration again – almost two decades after After the November 2008 attacks, the United they had first been considered by the Bush Sr. Nations proscribed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa under administration. UN Resolution 1267, a sanctions regime against Al Qaeda and associated groups and individuals. D. Pakistan’s Relationship with Militant Groups Pakistan detained Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief Saeed under the Maintenance of Public Order act While the current relationship between groups and held five Lashkar-e-Taiba activists, including like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani , under the Anti-Terrorism government, and security establishment remain Act. Saeed was freed after the unclear, there is a historical relationship between ordered his release in June 2009 because the these groups and the state. The linkages from the government could provide no evidence for his 1980s and 1990s, as a result of the state’s support detention to be extended further.xlix The trial of and creation of the groups, are unlikely to ever the latter five suspects is still ongoing in a special break completely. There is also a well-established court designated for terrorism cases in Lahore, connection between Lashkar-e-Taiba and the and has been marred by extensive delays, security government of the Punjab province (which has risks to legal staff, including the presiding judge, been controlled by the Pakistan Muslim League- and criticism from India.l Nawaz party from 2008 to date). In its implementation of the designation of Despite the evidence from the trial Jamaat-ud-Dawa under UN Resolution 1267, that linked the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Pakistan blocked the organization’s bank agency’s officers to the November 2008 attack, accounts.li However, the Zardari-led federal U.S. officials and experts are still divided on the government believed the provincial Punjab full extent of culpability by the Pakistani state in government had tipped off the group about the the November 2008 attacks in India.xlvii As a assets freeze; as a result, the bank accounts were result, there is a reluctance to blame the Pakistani nearly empty.lii government for the attacks. Pakistan’s case, on the other hand, has been bolstered by the However, U.S. officials believe that even if plausible deniability since Lashkar-e-Taiba is not Pakistan does not support or completely control an official government organization. While there the Lashkar-e-Taiba, they have a working is suspicion still at the role of the Pakistani relationship and a set of red lines the group military, it is widely acknowledged that at least cannot cross. the civilian government was completely unaware of an attack being planned, given its willingness “You hear two arguments from the Pakistani to work with India on investigating the case. military,” Cohen said. “One is that ‘We have to President , for example, offered to stay close to them to control them.’ The other is send then-director general of the ISI Lt. Gen ‘Well, there are some people beyond our reach, to India in the days after the we are as surprised as you are.’ And I think from

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the American point of view, since American lives whether it continues to date – were laid bare by are at stake, we have to be much tougher on the November 2008 terror attacks in India and Pakistan.” the subsequent investigation. Investigations and legal proceedings by the United States and India “The first response is ‘where’s the proof,’” Riedel – and a subsequent underway judicial trial in said, when asked what Pakistani officials say Pakistan – have found that the Lashkar-e-Taiba when confronted with accusations of supporting was responsible for the attacks in India and militant networks such as Lashkar-e-Taiba.liii received support from individuals associated with “Which gets pretty thin and you do have the the ISIS agency.lv The trial of Tasawwur Hussain confessions of Mr. Headley and a mass of other Rana in a U.S. federal court– particularly witness evidence. Secondly, and in a more subtle way, you David Headley’s testimony and evidence – get the answer ‘Well we’re keeping them under provided deep insight into the operational control.’ I’ve heard this described as ‘We have the activities of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and how the problem corralled… We know it’s a dangerous India attacks were planned. organization, we have influence over it and we’re going to keep it within certain boundaries.’ It’s a According to newspaper, “‘These very revealing answer because it implies that ‘If groups operated under the umbrella of ISI … they we want we can remove the restraints.’ I don’t, as coordinated with ISI,’ Headley testified under an outside observer on the other side of the questioning.lvi He said that he had received planet; don’t see a lot of corralling going on. weapons and leadership training with Lashkar-e- Maybe I’m missing it. But that’s the more subtle Taiba since 2000 and it was his understanding response. And it’s usually given off the record.” that the group and the ISI helped each other. ‘They coordinated with each other and ISI “It strikes me that militancy writ large in Pakistan provided assistance to Lashkar,’ said Headley.” has gained in strength in terms of its political “David Headley’s testimony, the detail that he influence and its ability to shape the media provided about the hands-on involvement of his message and to impact foreign relations and ISI handlers, the training provided and the domestic relations,” said Shamila Chaudhary, support that… the public description of the depths former Pakistan director on the National Security of that relationship confirmed what some have Council.liv “In the past we’ve looked at Pakistan long stated about the nature of the relationship,” and said ‘there’s a state within a state’, that is the Tricia Bacon, a former State Department official, military and the civilians. I actually think there is said.lvii “One of the things that Headley provided a third pillar now of who is running the country. was that this relationship remains intact. That third group is a huge security threat for the Arguably, if the Haqqanis are an arm [of the ISI], state. It’s not as if they’re just planning attacks then LeT is a gland or the legs or something.” and killing Shias or attacking India. They’re collaborating with al Qaeda, and this is not just In January 2013, Headley was sentenced for his based on ideological connections.” role in plotting the November 2008 terror attacks in India.lviii Rana was sentenced for providing The ramifications of Pakistan’s policy of material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba and the plot supporting anti-India militant groups – and to attack a Danish cartoonist.lix

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how these are being calibrated by observers and More so than the attacks of December 2001, the analysts in the United States. scale of the 2008 attacks – which saw direct attacks on foreign citizens, including , A. Lashkar-e-Taiba as well as key Indian officials and buildings – was a sign that Pakistan had ‘crossed a line’. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is considered to be amongst the most important homegrown It also served to put LeT firmly on the U.S. radar. militant groups operating out of Pakistan. This is largely based on the threat it poses to Pakistan 2. Pakistan’s Militant Networks and the and the region.lx There is significant interest in Risk to the United States the counter-terrorism community about the growth and threat perception of LeT, which has Since 2001, the risk posed by militancy has been bolstered further since the attacks in India largely been seen through the prism of al Qaeda. in 2008. In the United States, there has been a push to not lump all militant networks in the al Qaeda While the top priority of the United States bracket, but this comes at the cost of ignoring the remains al Qaeda and the Haqqani network, the mingling and cross-pollination of groups based in LeT is of concern because it is believed to have Pakistan. There is a realization in counter- links with al Qaeda. It has proven its ability to terrorism and policy circles of the latter, but this stage large-scale transnational attacks in India, complicates the domestic narrative in the United destabilize Pakistan-India relations, and target States on Afghanistan, because it undercuts the foreign citizens. objectives behind which the United States went to war in Afghanistan in the first place. Moreover, The key concern for many observers is how the the threat posed by groups such as the LeT is Lashkar-e-Taiba – believed to be operating under often seen as secondary, with analysts saying that the guise of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is led by the real threat to the U.S. is still posed by groups and works as a pressure group – has like the Haqqani network. been allowed to expand rapidly.lxi The Jamaat-ud- Dawa currently has an extensive presence in the However, there is now a concerted effort in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab U.S. intelligence community to study and provinces through a network of seminaries, understand the threat posed by Pakistan-based schools and offices. It is also embarking on an militant groups and to analyze potential scenarios expansion in the Balochistan province.lxii The that could arise as a result of a major attack on Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s philanthropic wing, the Falah- the United States, its interests, or in South Asia e-Insaniat Foundation, has played a key role in that links back to Pakistan. There has been relief and rehabilitation efforts during natural planning by the U.S. government to parse out disasters and humanitarian crises in urban and what potential scenarios could arise from such an rural Pakistan. attack. I have attempted to outline which groups pose a risk to U.S. national security interests and The threat is also crystallized by the nature and expansion of the group. According to scholar

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Tricia Bacon: “As the U.S. draws out of security apparatus in the U.S. post-2001. However, Afghanistan, the LeT is one of the few groups the LeT has proven that it can recruit foreign that I would say remains virtually entirely individuals to carry out terrorism plots, which make it a risk. unscathed by the counter-terrorism efforts of the last ten years. Most of the groups operating in the  Attacking U.S. interests in South Asia: The LeT region have at least experienced some pressure could also potentially attack the United States via and some losses over the course of the counter- embassies or consulates elsewhere in South Asia. terrorism campaign. LeT stands as a very clear There have been various reports and statements contrast to that as a group that’s led by its since 2008 that indicate LeT is planning an attack founding leaders, still has a fairly overt presence on the United States, including a plot to attack the in Pakistan, and has a transnational network that U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh.lxv is still operating.”lxiii

It is also interesting to look at why there has not  Al Qaeda: Analysts and former officials believe the LeT has close links to al Qaeda, and can serve as a been an attack since 2008 by LeT. There are “host” to the remnants of the group in Pakistan. several theories: one, that the group was damaged Reports of communication between Jamaat-ud- by the investigation and extensive details that Dawa leader Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Osama emerged, and would make a stronger effort to bin Laden have strengthened this perception.lxvi hide its involvement in another attack. Another is Moreover, the groups have enjoyed a relationship that there are stronger counter-terrorism efforts in the past when the LeT gave refuge to al Qaeda against the group, not just by India but also by members. However, al Qaeda in Pakistan has been the British and American intelligence agencies. A weakened extensively by an aggressive drone third is that the Pakistani government has campaign and reports indicate it may be refocusing warned the group against another attack because on countries such as Syria.lxvii it is directly detrimental to the state.lxiv

 Afghanistan: Reported increased LeT activity in The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has also evolved into an Afghanistan could lead to an attack on American influential pressure group on channeling anti- interests – consulates, troops or officials – India and anti-U.S. sentiment, particularly emanating from Afghanistan.lxviii through its role in the multi-party Defense of Pakistan Council. While the Jamaat-ud-Dawa denies that it is linked to the LeT, the United  State support: The LeT, or its public face as States believes the latter is used as a cover for the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, is widely believed to have strong former’s activities. links to the state. Pakistan has consistently denied it was responsible for the November 2008 attacks.

But there is considerable suspicion of the Pakistani Why is the Lashkar-e-Taiba a threat to the United States state’s or Pakistani officials’ involvement with the and U.S. interests? group. The David Headley testimony at the Tasawwur Hussain Rana trial has strengthened  Attack on the U.S. homeland: An attack on the this perception, because it detailed the links and U.S. homeland is highly unlikely and would be far training provided by serving officers of Pakistan’s more difficult to execute given the evolution of the ISI agency to LeT.lxix Several experts and former

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officials in the United States and Pakistan believe incendiary speech by Azhar.lxxvi It remains that elements in the Pakistani state have close unclear to most observers in Pakistan why Jaish- connections with the group, though they may not e-Mohammad and Azhar have resurfaced. The have the same relationship as they did in the group has largely been overshadowed by the 1990s. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s leadership, in its Jamaat-ud-Dawa as far as being a leading voice on public statements and rallies, is careful to not anti-India and the sectarian organizations. criticize the military establishment in Pakistanlxx

Why is the Jaish-e-Mohammad a threat to the United  Political influence: The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has, States and U.S. interests? since 2008, become a highly effective pressure group in Pakistani politics and society. Through its  Jaish-e-Mohammad is not seen as a major threat to effective use of protests on political and security the United States, largely because it has shown no lxxi developments – from the Raymond Davis case to transnational aims as a group. However, its lxxii drone strikes and the NATO airstrike that killed potential to cause instability in Pakistan and in 24 Pakistani soldiers in Salala – it has managed to India has put it on the U.S. radar. Indian observers become a leading voice to channel anti-Indian and fear that Jaish-e-Mohammad could stir up violence anti-U.S. sentiment. It has also been a driving force in Indian-held Kashmir again, even though there is behind the Defense of Pakistan coalition of over 30 little appetite in Kashmir for the kind of militancy political and religious groups, which have that plagued it in the late 1980s and early organized massive countrywide protests and sit- 1990s.lxxvii ins since its inception in 2011. By his own admission, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed sees the C. Sectarian Groups Jamaat-ud-Dawa as a “political party,” albeit one lxxiii that does not contest elections. Sectarianism in Pakistan is a concern for the United States, but it is not a high-ranking one by

any means. Sectarian groups have not attempted B. Jaish-e-Mohammad to attack the United States or its interests in the

region or directly targeted American citizens. Jaish-e-Mohammad has been under the radar for They have yet to display transnational aims in the several years. Its activities and recruitment in same manner as the anti-India groups. The most Punjab have continued despite founder Masood prominent sectarian group is the Lashkar-e- Azhar curtailing his public profile.lxxiv Jaish-e- Jhangvi, which has carried out a significant Mohammad publications detail the group’s number of attacks against Pakistani Shi’ites. recruitment drives in urban cities such as Karachi and reported deaths of its fighters in the disputed Kashmir territory.lxxv Why are sectarian groups a threat to the United States and U.S. interests? A massive rally organized by Jaish-e-Mohammad in January 2014 has prompted fears of  Transnational aims: There is sufficient evidence of sectarian groups moving in this direction. ‘resurgence by the group’. The rally, which took Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is believed to have been place in Pakistan-held Kashmir – once used as a responsible for an attack on a visiting Sri Lankan conduit for sending fighters to the disputed Kashmir territory – featured a recorded,

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cricket team in Lahore in 2009 and an attack on A. Investigation Shi’ites in in 2011.lxxviii The first step would be to establish a link between the attack and the Pakistani state. This is  Relationship with Al Qaeda: The Lashkar-e- inherently problematic because Pakistan has and Jhangvi has long been believed to have links with al can continue to claim plausible deniability. The Qaeda, and many analysts now say that because of United States, as one source said, could justify the evolution of the militant networks in Pakistan, any measures against Pakistan on the grounds there is far more cross-pollination between groups that it had not acted against Lashkar-e-Taiba or like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and al Qaeda.lxxix Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, for example. Moreover, this may not be a viable option for Pakistan given the  Political influence: The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, via its American footprint in Pakistan, as well as what political network – the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan one can assume is fairly extensive surveillance of (now known as the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat) – has Pakistani militant groups. “For those in Pakistan considerable political influence in southern Punjab, who think that they are hiding a relationship where it is based. This provides the group with the between these groups and officialdom is possible, legitimacy many other militant networks do not I think they should really rethink that, because have, and allow it to have a platform to preach the last decade has allowed the coalition and the sectarianism. U.S. to work inside Pakistan in a way which is unprecedented. So very little is protected. 3. Policy Options for the United States Everything really revolves around the extent to which you can establish a link,” said the Atlantic lxxx Experts and officials interviewed for this paper Council’s Shuja Nawaz. were asked to surmise what a potential response to an attack by a Pakistani militant group in the There is also the issue of how long it would take United States, against the U.S. interests, or to establish such a link. It is likely that by the against India would look like after 2014 and the time any Pakistani official complicity is revealed – diminished presence of U.S. troops in as it did months later in the November 2008 Afghanistan. Respondents could only offer their attacks in – there is little political will in best hypotheses using past precedents and the United States to proceed against another attempting gauge the variables involved. Others state. noted that another cause for concern for the U.S. would be an attack by militants on Pakistan’s There are several other options to consider in nuclear facilities. The reason for this exercise was terms of the nature of the attack. to try and understand what potential American policy towards Pakistan could be in the wake of  Attack against the U.S. homeland: In the event of any of the attack(s) described above. an attack on American soil, the American response would be similar to the one after September 11, 2001. However, the possibilities of such an attack are still considered to be highly unlikely by U.S. officials and analysts.

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 Economic assistance: The United States could  Attack against U.S. interests: An attack against limit, delay or entirely cut down aid to the U.S. interests – whether on troops, citizens, or Pakistani military or to the executive branch. military or diplomatic facilities – that links back to However, Pakistan’s other allies – such as the Gulf Pakistan-based militant groups would not be countries or Russia – could step up to fill the gap. equated with an attack on U.S. soil. It would The United States could also use its leverage with certainly damage U.S.-Pakistan relations, and international donors such as the International depending on the scale of the attack, would lead to Monetary Fund or the World Bank to limit repercussions for Pakistan in the short term. assistance. However, the past precedent associated with attacks by the Haqqani network on U.S. diplomatic facilities and troops in Afghanistan has led to the  Diplomatic ties: The United States could delay or perception that the United States has limited cancel scheduled visits by Pakistani and U.S. options in such cases. officials, as well as postpone any high-level dialogues.

 Attack against India: An attack against India – akin to the November 2008 attacks – would likely  Sanctions: Pakistani officials could be placed on a lead to the U.S. acting as an intermediary between list of sanctions. However, there is great skepticism India and Pakistan. The United States would step in amongst foreign policymakers that this would be to defuse tension between India and Pakistan, and ineffective because of the United States’ experience would ensure there is no build-up of troops on the with sanctions against Pakistan in the 1990s. border or threats of nuclear war. The U.S. would be Sanctions are already in place against militant lxxxii acknowledged as having a peacemaker role in this groups and their leaders, including Hafiz Saeed. regard and it would act to ensure that the region Any efforts to sanction Pakistan through the United remains stable. Nations could also be inevitably blocked by China or Russia. Pakistan could be designated as a Country of Particular Concern under the B. Policy Options International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, which could involve sanctions against Pakistan by the United States.lxxxiii The increasing violence  Military options: Any policy option that the against religious communities in Pakistan, United States would have is undeniably including Christians and Ahmadis, has served to constrained by two factors. The first is that highlight the role that militant networks are Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. This makes the playing in Pakistan. Pakistan would be forced to possibility of a military option, akin to President confront its policy vis-à-vis militancy; however, Clinton ordering airstrikes in Afghanistan and such a move is contingent on U.S.-Pakistan policy Sudan after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in after 2014 where the U.S. could enact such a 1998, difficult.lxxxi Secondly, the United States measure without stoking the expected backlash would be highly unlikely to bomb Pakistani from Pakistan that could harm the U.S. military military installations or hideouts of militant groups presence in Afghanistan. “My hope is that our that are based in urban Pakistan because of the involvement in Afghanistan lessens and our inevitable civilian casualties. reliance on supply routes through Pakistan as well as Uzbekistan – which is one of the worst places in the world for religious freedom – will give us more

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flexibility to push on human rights agenda,” said coffers. This has been my point for a long time Knox Thames at the United States Commission on that assistance to Pakistan doesn’t get us results, lxxxiv International Religious Freedom. it gets us access and it doesn’t get us the best access. But if we didn’t do that, we would

4. Militancy in Pakistan – The Risk to basically be in the dark.” South Asia Pakistan, observers say, does realize that it risks

regional security because of the militant groups Pakistani militant networks also pose a risk to that are using the country as a base. However, security in the South Asia region. All four of its Pakistan prioritizes these issues depending on its neighbors – India, China, Iran and Afghanistan – relationship with other countries: if China is the have blamed Pakistani militant networks for top of the list, Afghanistan is possibly the last carrying out terrorist attacks. This situation because of the difficult relationship between the causes more foreign policy concerns for the U.S. countries. vis-à-vis Pakistan. India, China and Afghanistan have all pressed the United States to get Pakistan China has been pressing Pakistan to take action to do more to control militant groups, while against Uighur militants that it believes are Iran’s Foreign Minister wrote to the United carrying out attacks in China.lxxxvi There have also Nations after Iranian soldiers were kidnapped by been a string of attacks against Chinese workers a group reportedly operating out of Pakistan.lxxxv in Pakistan. Pakistan – which considers China to But the United States can only do so much in be a strong ally – has reportedly acted several terms of passing these concerns on to its times to allay China’s concerns. China has also Pakistani counterparts, and it only has a limited been pressing the United States to get Pakistan to amount of influence on Pakistan. act against homegrown militancy that poses a risk

to China, but the United States has indicated that “How it happens is that any one of these China should probably play a stronger role in countries – with the exception of Iran – will go to Pakistan given that it enjoys a far better the U.S. and say ‘Put pressure on them’,” relationship with the government than the United Chaudhary explained. “We can because we have a States does. Moreover, Pakistan has managed to strong role right now, but we’re not going to have effectively portray to its neighbors that it is as at that in the future. The leverage that we have is risk from militancy as the region is. This going away and the leverage we will have is perception of being weak has sympathy in China. through the security assistance to the Pakistani As Vanda Felbab-Brown explained,lxxxvii based on military. As long as we give them money, we can a recent dialogue with Chinese officials on convey messages to the military on behalf of Afghanistan and Pakistan: “The Chinese also had China, India or Afghanistan. But if we don’t give something on the same lines. I asked them how them that much money, what are we going to be they find this narrative and it was quite able to do? Nothing, actually. In some ways – it’s interesting that they were quite sympathetic. ‘We really messed up – but it actually does help are concerned about Pakistan stability or Pakistan’s interests because having these instability; we are concerned about militants in problematic groups in the country keeps the U.S. Xinjiang,’ for example. ‘You cannot assume we engaged and money coming into the military’s

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can push Pakistan too much. We have to be very These concerns have been relayed to the United careful. ’ They used this phrase that ‘It’s like States and then to Pakistan several times over the holding an egg shell… you squeeze too much on past six years. either end and it’ll break.’ It’s also a cop out. But it also reflects some reality, or some reality of A repeat of a November 2008-style attack in India their thinking, that they have bought into the could destabilize South Asia. India is unlikely to fragility narrative.” react mildly to another attack, and there remains a risk of repeating 2001 with an escalation of The Afghan government has long blamed troops and/or threats of nuclear strikes. While Pakistan for violence in the country and for there are several factors to take into account – for aiding the Haqqani Network. This indicates a example, the targets and nature of the attack, the larger problem – whether the Pakistani state – in stability of Pakistan and India at that time, and particular the military – still uses proxy groups the governments in power in both countries– the such as the Haqqani network or the LeT to ability of Pakistan to claim plausible deniability of influence India or Afghanistan, and if it still such an attack would be far reduced, given the wields control over militant groups that it may rapid expansion of Jamaat-ud-Dawa since 2008. have supported in the past. There would be inherently stronger pressure on the U.S. and India to respond to an attack by a The idea of influencing or destabilizing group operating out of Pakistan. Afghanistan via proxy groups has been disavowed over the years by many Pakistani officials, However, Indian and U.S. policy towards including the military. But this claim is backed by Pakistan will be more complicated by the election little action. of the right-wing leader Narendra Modi as Indian prime minister.lxxxix “Many Pakistani officials and academics disavow Prime Minister Modi brought up security issues it but then they’ll turn around and say with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in ‘Afghanistan cannot be controlled by an India- their first meeting after Modi’s inauguration,xc friendly government,’” Felbab-Brown noted. “The but it is hard to predict what the Modi-led notion of strategic depth in the sense of using government’s policy towards Pakistan will be . actual physical territory might not be there… but Many analysts believe Modi as prime minister that’s quite different from saying Pakistan does would not be as accommodating of Pakistan as not have a very strong interest in Afghanistan and his predecessor, , was. U.S. arguably an interest that is not consistent with observers are also assessing what Modi’s policy Afghanistan’s sovereignty.”lxxxviii towards the United States will be, given the countries’ fairly rocky relationship in the past few India’s main concern stems from the anti-India months.xci groups such as LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad and their ability to recruit and work openly in India is also concerned that a Pakistani military Pakistan. It has pressed for Pakistan to move operation in North against the Tehrik- forward with the trial of suspects arrested for e-Taliban Pakistan could drive fighters into India. their alleged role in the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. However, with an operation in North Waziristan

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currently underway, there is little evidence to from Balochistan indicating rocket attacks by Iran support this argument. There is also a concern into the province.xcvii While Iran is not going to that after the withdrawal of active combat troops ask the United States to tell Pakistan to control from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, LeT and militant groups, it will be interesting to gauge in associated groups will refocus their attention on the future how Pakistan will work with Iran in India and the insurgency in Kashmir, which, the event that relations between Iran and the unlike Afghanistan, is still a heavily contested United States improve. issue.xcii It is highly unlikely that the civilian government in Pakistan would support such a 5. Pakistan – Complicit or Stuck shift. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is a Between a Rock and a Hard Place? strong proponent of building a relationship with India and is hoping to sign a trade agreement Despite the anger at Pakistan, there is a degree of with a new Indian government. According to one sympathy in the United States for the degree to observer, Pakistan would consider the return of which violence has pervaded the country. Many Pakistani militant groups to Kashmir a acknowledge – whether in the U.S. government disaster.xciii or outside – that the Pakistani government and military now understand that they face an Iran’s key concern is Sunni militant groups that internal threat from various militant groups, allegedly operate out of Pakistan’s Balochistan including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose province, including Jundullah.xciv A 2009 attack goal is an Islamic state that follows the dictates of on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps led to law, and the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ – believed to intense pressure on Pakistan to act against the be a network of smaller militant groups that have group. There have been reports of Pakistan’s also declared war against the state. The key threat intelligence services cooperating with Iran over is widely considered to be from the Tehrik-e- Jundullah. However, indications that Pakistan is Taliban Pakistan, largely because of its modus currently tilting towards stronger ties with Saudi operandi of attacking the state and the military. Arabia over Iran bode badly for Pakistan-Iran The group has been the focus of military relations and any cooperation on militancy. operations. Prime Minister Sharif visited Iran in May, when Iranian leaders expressed their concerns about Attacks against the Pakistani state have also come security issues.xcv from its former proxy groups, highlighting the repercussions of Pakistan’s strategy in the 1990s. Moreover, a recent attack on the Iranian The leadership of the Red Mosque that launched Consulate in Peshawar led by Mast Gul – a an insurgency in against the state had former commander – been supported by General Zia-ul-Haq’s indicate how the Pakistani state’s former proxy regime.xcviii Among those responsible for stoking groups have evolved into having transnational violence in Pakistan included of aims beyond India and Kashmir.xcvi the 313 Brigade, a unit of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- Islami. Kashmiri and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- Iran has also threatened to take military action in Islami had once been part of the coterie of Pakistan and there have been numerous reports militias that Pakistan unleashed on India.

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Kashmiri instead turned on the state, attempting internal threat as the groups that the military is to assassinate General Musharraf. He was looking at.”cii released from jail in 2003 because of a lack of evidence against him and has since been What can Pakistan do? When it comes to the TTP implicated in attacks on Pakistani military bases it has chosen to launch a military operation, as it as well as the November 2008 attacks in India.xcix has done in the past. But with the groups that are Kashmiri relocated to the tribal areas and worked based out of key metropolitan cities and major on a terrorism plot in . Rumors of his urban centers – groups such as the Lashkar-e- death in a drone strike have circulated since 2011.c Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi – the options are fairly limited. Militant The Pakistani government launched an operation groups have largely ignored the Punjab province against militant groups – including foreign in recent years, where the Pakistani military and militants affiliated with the Islamic Movement of current ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League Uzbekistan – in June 2014 in the North Nawaz, are based, and given that these groups are Waziristan area, a region where the United States not directly attacking the state, they have been had long pressed the Pakistani government to act pushed down on the priority list. However, a against militants. However, with no independent recent series of attacks in Islamabad may shift reporting from the warzone and the operation this relationship and emphasize the need to act still underway, it is hard to determine what the against militancy. scale of the operation against the militant groups will be and to what extent it will decimate these Pakistan also believes that keeping the groups groups.ci together is far better than having them fractured and splintered as a result of an aggressive “I think there is an acknowledgement that there counter-terrorism campaign or actual law is an internal militant threat to the Pakistani state enforcement measures being taken against them. and the military recognizes that in the form of the Right now, the Pakistani state can wield influence Pakistani Taliban, and some of the groups that or control over groups that are still cohesive and were once thought as proxies which have retain a central leadership. fractured – groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and Jaish-e-Mohammad,” Bacon said. “There are “One of the points to make is that division elements within those groups – like the Ilyas [between militant groups] no longer holds and the Kashmiri story. He kind of captured that [as] a state’s problem now is a very interesting paradox militant who was wedded to the state who very where the easiest way to deal with non-state viciously turned against it. There is that cadre of actors is to keep them coherent,” said Moeed militants that I think the military does see as a Yusuf of the United States Institute of Peace. “As threat. I think to some degree there is recognition soon as they become desperate in terms of how that sectarianism is related to that although they operate, it becomes much tougher. On the maybe not as much as we would all like. I think other hand, if you want to keep them together Lashkar-e-Taiba stands as a very clear exception to you’ve got to keep them weak, because as soon as that because the group still eschews violence in you go in and try to take them out they’re going to Pakistan. So it doesn’t present the same kind of splinter and splinters are tougher to deal with. I

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don’t think the Pakistani state has figured out solution for Pakistan, but in the long run this is where that sequencing lies in terms of targeting inherently dangerous for Pakistan, the region and these groups and where that balancing lies the United States. There could be several between saying, ‘Okay, let’s not let everyone implications of this strategy: even without any splinter but these ones we have to take on.’ I also state action, a militant group could fracture in any want to be clear that ‘taking on’ doesn’t mean case as a result of internal divisions or frustration taking military action. There are a number of with its leadership for not carrying out its goals.civ other longer-term things you have to do. But this Moreover, even maintaining relationships with is why this will-versus-capacity debate is never individuals who may be influential with militants resolved. Is the Pakistani state not touching has largely been ineffective.cv Lashkar-e-Taiba because it’s an asset against India…? Or has it decided to get rid of all groups The problem, is that Pakistan does not know but because the other groups are out there and what to do about militancy without suffering a targeting the state, this is not the time to go after violent backlash. “I think some of the security Lashkar-e-Taiba. What do you want to do? You establishment does see it as a problem, they want to give them some space so that they don’t acknowledge it, and they understand that they come after you. There’s no winning this debate.” can’t control or influence them 100 percent,” Chaudhary said. “They may have realized that in “In so many ways when you talk about the the past as well, and they have been comfortable internal security problem in Pakistan and how dealing with the costs of that. But the costs have that has become a greater concern, it’s probably gotten too high now given the landscape of what very difficult to persuade a country to cause a new is happening in the region, because of the war in threat which acting against Lashkar-e-Taiba could Afghanistan, because there is a heightened potentially do,” Bacon said. “It’s very hard to get a international focus on Pakistan and what it is county to act directly against what it perceives as doing with India. Enduring the costs of this have its own interest, even if over the long term this become harder and harder for the Pakistani could be an incredible liability.”ciii government. I don’t think they know what they can do here. They know what they have to do and The flip side is that while the groups remain yet to actually do it, they can’t deal with the ‘cohesive’, they are also still operating and repercussions.” expanding, and could potentially be planning attacks against the United States. While analysts 6. Future U.S.-Pakistan Foreign Policy hold that the fact that Lashkar-e-Taiba has not been able to carry out a plot since 2008 is While Pakistan and the United States are likely to because of aggressive counter-terrorism maintain a working relationship, it is evident that operations and revelations about the group, there there exists little appetite for supporting Pakistan is an understanding that it continues to produce and great skepticism for its promises to clamp people who could attack the United States. That is down on militancy at home. However, there have the inherent risk that Pakistan’s current strategy been some indications that the United States and holds, and it is a risk that concerns the United Pakistan are working together on counter- States. In the short-term, this may be a viable terrorism: notably, that the drone program halted

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while the Pakistani government was attempting the relationship. With a reduced U.S. footprint in to engage the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in peace Afghanistan, Pakistan may still be the United talks, and resumed when the government opted States’ first call in a crisis situation. However, for a military operation in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s much-vaunted role as a broker between the Afghan Taliban and the United The drone program plays a role in how the States may have waned with the emergence of United States and Pakistan work together in the Qatar’s role in negotiating with the Afghan future. There is little political support in Pakistan Taliban. for the drone program – neither from the current Sharif administration or opposition parties. If Pakistan’s role in a stable Afghanistan is still drone strikes resume after the military operation largely contingent on how Pakistani militant in North Waziristan, it is likely to lead to a flare- groups operate in the months ahead. President up of the same concerns – civilian casualties and blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba for an the fact that drone strikes are a violation of attack on the Indian Consulate in the Afghan city Pakistan’s sovereignty – that have loomed large of Herat this May; if such attacks continue, this over the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since the will not only lead to destabilization in program began. Afghanistan but also will have a spillover effect in how Pakistan deals with countries in South Asia Moreover, drone strikes do not address the root and the United States and vice versa. In essence, causes of militancy in Pakistan; whether it is in these attacks will lead to the need to develop a the tribal areas or in the rest of the country. And policy response. the Pakistani government has shown no signs of acting against groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi or the LeT that may have transnational aims; its counter-terrorism strategy is restricted to the i Government of Pakistan, Report of the Court of tribal areas. While urban militancy has registered Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 as a concern with the Pakistani government, it is to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953, as yet unclear how it plans to deal with these 305 groups going forward, and whether it can stop the ii Interviews with experts, congressional aides and groups and their transnational aims. Moreover, it current and former U.S. officials conducted in has not registered as significantly with the United Washington DC during March – April 2014. States as yet – partly because of the focus on the iii Ayesha Siddiqa, “The Islamisationof Jinnah’s Haqqani network; and partly because of the U.S. Pakistan,” Newsline magazine, February 2014. security concerns elsewhere in the world, iv“TTP Warning: ‘Assaults to continue even after including Ukraine, Syria and . US exit’”, The Express Tribune, May 27, 2011.Zia- ur-Rehman, “A profile of Ansar-ul-Hind and It is unlikely that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship Ansar-ul-Mujahidin in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, will cease completely. This is partly to avoid a May 29, 2014. repeat of the 1980s, when the United States was vNoman Ahmed, “In conversation with Syed perceived as having pulled away from Pakistan, Munawar Hasan,” The Express Tribune, April 26, but also because Afghanistan is still a factor in 2013.

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viText of the Objectives Resolution. Also see: xii“The Islamization of Pakistan 1979-2009,” The Ayesha Siddiqa, “Islands in the Sand,” The Institute Viewpoints. Express Tribune, January 8, 2014: “How could xiiiKamran, Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in liberalism survive in a country where the liberal- Pakistan. secular elite ensured the death of this principle? xiv The Ahmadiyya sect, for example, had a The liberal Liaquat Ali Khan, who otherwise battalion in Kashmir. impressed his Western audience with his high xvHaqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and capacity to ‘hold his drink’ gave a structure to the Military, 292. principle of religious nationalism by xvi Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past incorporating religion as the formula for Operations and Future Prospects,” April 2011, governance in the Objectives Resolution 1949. New America Foundation. Subsequently, the state’s title was changed from xvii Interview with Shuja Nawaz, Atlantic Council, dominion to Islamic Republic in the country’s Washington DC, March 2014. first 1956 Constitution. The Objectives Resolution xviii Interview with Bruce Riedel, Brookings established religion as the country’s Institution, Washington DC, March 2014. grundnorm.”Also see: , Pakistan: xixIbid. Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie xx Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan is facing terrorist Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 17: listing,” , April 25, 1993. “After the Objectives Resolution there was no xxi Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, The turning back from Pakistan’s status as an Islamic Meadow: Kashmir 1995 – Where the terror began ideological state.” (Harper Collins, 2012) viiSeyyedVali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the xxiiAdrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, Deception: Islamic Revolution: the Jamaat-e-Islamiof Pakistan, the United States and the the Secret Pakistan (University of California Press, 1994), Trade in Nuclear Weapons (Walker & Company, 133. 2007) Also see: viiiNasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, xxiiiInternational Crisis Group, The State of 136. Also see: “Ahmadiya Sect and Legislative Sectarianism in Pakistan, April 18, 2005. Action,” xxiv Ibid. https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974ISL xxv Imtiaz, Saba. “Wikileaks: Militancy in Punjab, AMA06907_b.html circa 1998,” The Express Tribune, September 10, ixGovernment of Pakistan, Report of the Court of 2011. Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 xxviOwen Bennett Jones, Eye of the Storm (Yale to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953 University Press, 2003), 23. x The National Assembly of Pakistan, xxviiElias Groll, “The story of how Nawaz Sharif ‘Proceedings of the Special Committee of the pulled back from nuclear war,” Whole House Held In Camera to Consider the ForeignPolicy.com, May 13, 2013. Qadiani Issue: Committee Report.’ xxviiiSuzanne Goldenberg, “Bush threatened to xiHusain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque bomb Pakistan, says Musharraf,” The Guardian, and Military (Carnegie Endowment for September 22, 2006. International Peace, 2010), 123.

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U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Deputy xliiiElisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with General Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,” Mahmud: Actions and Support Expected of The New York Times, September 22, 2011. Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism," September xliv Interview, Marvin Weinbaum 14, 2001. xlv Interview, Stephen P. Cohen, Washington DC, xxix The date Ambassador Chamberlin presented March 2014. her credentials to General Musharraf in xlvi“Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on Islamabad. U.S. Embassy,” The New York Times. xxx Interview with Wendy Chamberlin, Middle xlviiSebastian Rotella, “David Headley, witness in East Institute, Washington DC, March 2014. terror trial, ties Pakistani spy agency to militant xxxi Ibid. group,” , May 23, 2011. xxxii “Top al Qaeda operative caught in Pakistan,” xlviiiZahid Hussain, Matthew Rosenberg and Peter CNN, March 1, 2003. Wonacott, “Pakistan’s Probe Finds Local Links to xxxiiiLASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA: Attacks on Mumbai,” The Wall Street Journal, Security Council Committee pursuant to December 31, 2008. resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) xlixWaqarGillani and SominiSengupta, “Pakistan concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals Court Orders Release of Militant Suspected of and entities Ties to Mumbai Attacks,” The New York Times, xxxiv Steve Coll, “The Stand Off”, The New Yorker, June 2, 2009. February 13, 2006. l Malik Asad, “Trial of Mumbai attacks case xxxv Ibid. suspects stalled,” Dawn, April 4, 2014. xxxviInterview, Wendy Chamberlin. li “Dawa offices in most cities and towns sealed: xxxvii “Musharraf declares war on extremism,” Hafiz Saeed, others in custody,” Dawn, BBC News, January 12, 2002. December 12, 2008. xxxviii“Proscribed/banned organizations,” Pakistan lii Saba Imtiaz, “Pakistan: WikiWreaks havoc,” Ministry of Interior, 2012. The Express Tribune, December 2, 2010. xxxixJane Perlez and PirZubair Shah, “In Pakistan, liiiInterview, Riedel. Guile Helps Taliban Gain,” The New York Times, livInterview with Shamila Chaudhry, Washington April 26, 2009. DC, March 2014 xl Interview, Marvin Weinbaum, Middle East lvSebastian Rotella, “Four Alleged Masterminds of Institute, Washington DC, March 2014. Are Indicted in ,” xliOwaisTohid, “Descent into Anarchy,” Newsline ProPublica, April 25, 2011. Rotella, “Trial magazine, June 15, 2004. Testimony Intensifies Allegations Pakistan Is xliiThe Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was implicated in Playing Double Game,” ProPublica, facilitating the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal May 23, 2011. Colin Freeze, “Accused in India reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl was massacre claims ties to Pakistani secret service,” reportedly killed by Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, The Globe and Mail, April 11, 2011. alleged to be the mastermind of the September 11, lvi Ben Quinn, “Mumbai terror trial hears claim 2001 attacks. that ISI and LeT coordinated with each other,” The Guardian, May 24, 2011.

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lviiInterview with Tricia Bacon, American lxvi , “What Pakistan Knew About Bin University, Washington DC. March 2014. Laden,” The New York Times Magazine, March lviii “David Coleman Headley Sentenced to 35 19, 2014. Years in Prison for Role in India and Denmark lxvii Eric Schmitt, “Qaeda Militants Seek Syria Terror Plots,” U.S. Department of Justice, Base, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times, January 24, 2013. March 25, 2014. lix “Tahawwur Rana Sentenced to 14 Years in lxviiiInterview with former U.S. government Prison for Supporting Pakistani Terror Group official, name withheld on request, Washington and Terror Plot in Denmark,” U.S. Department of DC, March 2014. Justice, January 17, 2013. lxix“Interrogation report of David Coleman lxInterview, Riedel. Headley,” National Investigation Agency, lxi“Amendments to the Terrorist Designations of Government of India, 4. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” U.S. Department of State, “Government’s Santiago Proffer”, United States June 25, 2014. District CourtNorthern District of IllinoisEastern K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan – U.S. Relations”, Division, United States of America v. Tahawwur Congressional Research Service, February 6, Hussain Rana, 27. Ginger Thompson, “Terror 2009, 158. Trial Witness Ties Pakistan to 2008 Attacks,” The lxiiAuthor was told this by Jamaat-ud-Dawa New York Times, May 23, 2011. spokesperson in 2012.Jamaat-ud-Dawa press lxxAuthor’s own observations of Jamaat-ud-Dawa releases detail activities in Balochistan, rallies and Hafiz Saeed speeches. In 2011, Saeed specifically setting up medical camps and relief said during a press meet that he didn’t single out work during natural disasters. the military in his criticism because lxiiiInterview, Tricia Bacon. constitutionally the military is controlled by the lxivInterviews, Stephen Cohen, Tricia Bacon. civilian government. lxvInterview, Riedel. lxxiMark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, Speech by Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the a Secret Army and a War at the Ends of the Earth Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State (Penguin Press HC, 2013), 1. Declan Walsh and Department from 2009-2012, at the Jamestown Ewan MacAskill, “American who sparked Conference in December 2009: “Lashkar e-Taiba diplomatic crisis over Lahore was CIA spy,” The has made it clear that it is willing to undertake Guardian, February 20, 2011. bold, mass-casualty operations with a target set lxxii“Pakistan outrage after ‘Nato attack kills that would please al-Qaida planners. The group’s soldiers,’ BBC, November 26, 2011. more recent thwarted conspiracy to attack the US lxxiii “Ahead of 40-party rally, JuD chief parries embassy in Bangladesh should only deepen questions on political ambitions,” The Express concern that it could evolve into a genuinely Tribune, February 1, 2012. global terrorist threat.” lxxiv Saeed Shah, “Terror group builds big base Randeep Ramesh, “Mumbai attackers had hit list under Pakistani officials' noses,” McClatchy of 320 world targets,” The Guardian, February 19, Newspapers, September 13, 2009. Mohammad 2009. Asghar, “Ban on hides collection ineffective: Banned outfits earned over Rs780 million,”

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Dawn, December 9, 2012. Ayesha Siddiqa, further actions, including economic sanctions, by “Contextualizing militancy in Punjab,” The the United States.” Express Tribune, February 27, 2013. lxxxiv Interview with Knox Thames, United States lxxvArchives of Jaish-e-Mohammad publication Al Commission on International Religious Qalam. Example: “Miracle in , Jaish-e- Freedom, Washington DC, March 2014. Mohammad’s Abdul Waheed is martyred,” Al lxxxv See - letter by Iranian Foreign Minister M. Qalam, May 22, 2014. JavadZarif to United Nations Secretary General lxxvi Tariq Naqash, “Banned group holds rally in Ban Ki-Moon, March 26, 2014: “It is extremely ,” Dawn, January 27, 2014. Also see regrettable that all available evidence indicate that - recording of Masood Azhar speech, available on these cowardly acts of terror targeting the Islamic the Jaish-e-Mohammad’swebsite. Republic of Iran and its citizens have been lxxviiShivamVij, “Feared this summer: Ferment in perpetrated by State-sponsored extremist groups, Kashmir,” Scroll.in, February 2014. with similar patterns of funding, coordination, lxxviiiOmar Waraich, “Pakistan’s Sectarian Killers support and direction. The entire international Operate with Impunity,” Time, September 23, community should be alarmed by the regional 2011. Amir Mir, “Blood flows freely in Pakistan,” and extra-regional ramifications of sectarian Asia Times, October 5, 2011. Rod Nordland, “Rare tension and extremist violence, which are being Attacks on Shiites Kill Scores in Afghanistan,” systematically organized, sponsored and The New York Times, December 6, 2011. orchestrated in various parts of our region.” lxxix Interview, Shamila Chaudhry, Washington lxxxviInterview, Shuja Nawaz. “China details DC, March 2014. Also see – Asif Farooqi, “Profile: overseas links for Xinjiang militants,” , Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” BBC, January 11, 2013. April 6, 2012. lxxxInterview, Shuja Nawaz. lxxxvii Interview with Vanda Felbab-Brown, lxxxi “Clinton defends military strikes,” BBC, , Washington DC, March August 20, 1998. 2014. lxxxii , “US adds 2 Lashkar-e-Taiba lxxxviiiIbid. leaders to list of terrorists,” The Long War lxxxix Jason Burke and IshwarRauniyar, “India Journal, September 28, 2011.“Terrorist elections: subtle foreign policy could take tougher designations of Lashkar I Jhangvi and Malik line under Modi,” The Guardian, April 11, 2014. Ishaq,” U.S. Department of State, February 6, xc “India PM NarendraModi presses Pakistan’s 2014. sharif on militants,” BBC, May 27, 2014. lxxxiii U.S. Department of State: “The designation xciFrank Jack Daniel and David Brunnstrom, by the Secretary of State (under authority “U.S. ambassador to India Nancy Powell resigns delegated by the President) of nations guilty of after diplomatic row,” Reuters, April 1, 2014. particularly severe violations of religious freedom xciiInterview, Stephen Cohen. as ‘Countries of Particular Concern’ under the xciiiInterview withMoeed Yusuf, United States International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 Institute of Peace, Washington DC, March 2014. (H.R. 2431) and its amendment of 1999 (Public xcivAbubakar Siddique, “Jundullah: Profile of a Law 106-55). Nations so designated are subject to Sunni Extremist Group,” October 20, 2009, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty.

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xcvMehrdadBalali, “Iran prods Pakistan leader on operational activities, with its membership U.S. ties, security, pipeline,” Reuters, May 12, flocking to more active leaders such as Malik 2014. Mohammad Ishaq of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. It xcvi “ at Iranian consulate in could also fracture away from the state, as has Peshawar kills two,” Dawn, February 24, 2014. been seen with the Jamaat-e-Islami, a highly Zahid Hussain, “From jihad to terrorism,” Dawn, centralized mainstream political party that has February 12, 2014. struggled with keeping its membership attracted xcviiInterview, Shuja Nawaz. Also see: “Iran may to politics in the face of recruiters for militant send forces to Pakistan to free border guards,” groups that offer more ‘attractive’ options for Reuters, February 17, 2014; Malik Siraj Akbar, acting against the state and/or establishing a “Iran’s Border Violations in Balochistan,” The more hardline Islamic state. The Jamaat-e-Islami Baloch Hal, December 12, 2013. – once considered as close to the military xcviiiSyed Shoaib Hasan, “Profile: Pakistan’s Red establishment – openly revolted against the Mosque,” BBC, July 27, 2007. military by questioning if soldiers who had died xcix David Gritten, “Obituary: Ilyas Kashmiri,” while battling militants were not martyrs in the BBC, June 4, 2011. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistani Islamic tradition, since they were fighting a war Militant Chief is Reported Dead,” The New York against their own people. Times, June 4, 2011. cv When the Pakistan Army headquarters in c Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Militant Chief is Rawalpindi were under siege by a group of Reported Dead,” The New York Times, June 4, militants in 2009, the army flew in Malik Ishaq 2011. and Ghulam Rasool Shah of the Lashkar-e- ciIsmail Khan and Declan Walsh, “Pakistani Jhangvi – who were imprisoned as various Military Wages Assault Against Militants,” The murder trials continued – to negotiate with the New York Times, June 15, 2014. attackers.See interview with Al Hurriya cii Interview, Tricia Bacon magazine, August 2011, 14. Malik Ishaq: “I sat in ciii Ibid. the General Headquarters and refused any ‘deal’ civThis has been evidenced in the case of the [for my release] and made it clear that that we will Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, where its leadership has be released via the courts. We will be released if faced a crisis as it struggles to evolve into a the courts release us and if [they] sentence us, we political party and give up its day-to-day will accept it.”

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