Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs March 19, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21922 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Summary The capacity and transparency of Afghan governance are considered crucial to Afghan stability after U.S.-led NATO forces turn over the security mission to Afghan leadership by the end of 2014. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but it remains weak and rampant with governmental corruption. Even as the government has struggled to widen its writ, President Hamid Karzai has tried to concentrate authority in Kabul through his constitutional powers of appointment at all levels. Karzai has repeatedly denied that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014 expiration of his second term, but there are concerns he plans to use state election machinery to support the election of a successor. International efforts to curb fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) largely failed, but Afghan efforts to improve election oversight for the April 5, 2014 presidential and provincial elections are taking shape. Opposition parties and civil society organizations are working to try to ensure a fair election. Fears about the election process are fanned by the scant progress in reducing widespread nepotism and other forms of corruption. President Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same bodies have faltered from lack of support at senior Afghan government levels. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at least 2017, on the condition that Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption. No matter how the Afghan leadership succession process works out, there is concern among many observers that governance will founder as the United States and its partners wind down their involvement in Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders—who have always been at least as significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure—is already beginning to assert itself in anticipation of the 2014 international drawdown. Many Afghans are looking to the faction leaders, rather than to the government, to protect them from possible civil conflict with the Taliban after 2014. But, an increase in the influence of faction leaders could produce even more corruption and arbitrary administration of justice than is the case now. President Karzai is seeking to establish himself as a nationalist leader and perhaps to attract Taliban support to rejoin Afghan politics by asserting Afghan sovereignty as the United States draws down troops. Leaders of factions outside Karzai’s ethnic Pashtun base criticize Karzai as too willing to make concessions to insurgent leaders in search of a settlement. Afghan civil society activists, particularly women’s groups, assert that a full reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics—a development increasingly likely as talks between relatively moderate Taliban figures and Afghan political leaders proliferate—could further set back human and women’s rights. Broader issues of human rights often vary depending on the security environment in particular regions, although some trends prevail nationwide. Women, media professionals, and civil society groups have made substantial gains since the fall of the Taliban, but traditional attitudes contribute to the judicial and political system’s continued toleration of child marriages, imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence, judgments against converts from Islam to Christianity, and curbs on the sale of alcohol and Western-oriented programming in the Afghan media. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Contents Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics ........................................................ 1 Afghan Ethnicities, Communities, and Their Relationships...................................................... 2 Pashtuns ............................................................................................................................... 2 Tajiks ................................................................................................................................... 2 Hazaras ................................................................................................................................ 3 Uzbeks ................................................................................................................................. 4 Ethnic and Factional Cooperation in the Security Sector .................................................... 4 The Role of Political Parties ...................................................................................................... 5 Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape ............................................................................. 6 Establishment of the Formal Afghan Government Structure: Elected but Centralized Leadership .............................................................................................................................. 6 December 2001 Bonn Agreement ....................................................................................... 7 Permanent Constitution Adopted, Sets Up Presidential System ......................................... 7 National Assembly (Parliament) Formation, Powers, and Assertion of Powers ................. 8 The Judiciary and Rule of Law ......................................................................................... 10 Rivalries Within and Outside Governing Institutions .............................................................. 12 Karzai’s Presidential Leadership, His Close Advisers, and Staff ...................................... 12 The Political Opposition: The “Northern Alliance,” Dr. Abdullah, and Others ................ 17 The Informal Power Structure: Other Power Brokers, “Warlords,” and Local Faction Leaders ................................................................................................................................. 19 Traditional Decision-Making Processes Of the Informal Power Structure ....................... 24 Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and “Independent” Activists .................................... 25 Elections in 2009 and 2010 Harmed Confidence in the Electoral Process and Widened Political Schisms .................................................................................................................. 26 2009 Presidential Election ................................................................................................. 26 September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections ................................................................... 29 April 5, 2014 Presidential and Provincial Elections: Credibility Still in Doubt ................ 34 Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance .............................................................................. 37 Expanding Central Government Capacity ............................................................................... 38 The Afghan Civil Service .................................................................................................. 39 The Afghan Budget Process .............................................................................................. 39 Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance ........................................................................... 41 The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) ............................................ 42 Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils ................................................................. 42 District-Level Governance ................................................................................................ 43 Municipal and Village Level Authority ............................................................................. 44 Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption ............................................................. 44 High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism ............................................................ 45 Lower-Level Corruption.................................................................................................... 45 Administration Views and Policy on Corruption .............................................................. 46 Anti-Corruption Initiatives ................................................................................................ 46 Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties ............................................................. 50 Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption .......................................................... 52 Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society ........................................................................... 53 Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and Outside Human Rights