january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents The Facade of Allegiance:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Facade of Allegiance: Bin Ladin’s Bin Ladin’s Dubious Pledge to Dubious Pledge to Mullah Omar By Vahid Brown Mullah Omar By Vahid Brown Reports 6 Assessing the Al-Qa`ida Threat to the United States By Martha Crenshaw 9 The Pakistan Military’s Adaptation to Counterinsurgency in 2009 By Sameer Lalwani 13 Karachi Becoming a Taliban Safe Haven? By Imtiaz Ali 16 Uighur Dissent and Militancy in China’s Xinjiang Province By Chris Zambelis 19 Ninawa Province: Al-Qa`ida’s Remaining Stronghold By Andrea Plebani 22 The French Approach to Counterterrorism By Charles Rault Usama bin Ladin explains why he declared jihad against the United States. - Photo by CNN via Getty Images he relationship between al- the fear that if the Taliban were to regain 26 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity Qa`ida and the Afghan Taliban control of Afghanistan, it would renew 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts is of critical concern to the the close relationship that it had with al-

U.S. foreign policy community. Qa`ida prior to 9/11 and thus increase al- TIt has repeatedly been cited by the Qa`ida’s capacity to threaten the United current administration as the central States. justification for U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan.1 Yet the precise nature Yet a historical account by an insider of this relationship remains a matter of who worked for both organizations debate among specialists.2 While some in the 1990s challenges one of the key argue that al-Qa`ida and the Afghan assumptions underlying this fear—that About the CTC Sentinel Taliban have effectively merged, others Usama bin Ladin had personally sworn The Combating Terrorism Center is an point to signs that their respective global allegiance (bay`a) to Mullah Omar— independent educational and research and nationalist goals have increasingly revealing that al-Qa`ida’s early relations institution based in the Department of Social put them at odds.3 Behind this debate is with the Taliban regime were much Sciences at the United States Military Academy, rockier than is commonly assumed. This West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses remarkable first-person account opens a the Center’s global network of scholars and 1 In the words of U.S. General Stanley A. McChrystal, unique window on a critical moment in practitioners to understand and confront commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, “Roll- the early history of al-Qa`ida’s relations contemporary threats posed by terrorism and ing back the Taliban is a pre-requisite to the ultimate de- with the Taliban, depicting these relations other forms of political violence. feat of al-Qaeda.” For more, see his statement to the U.S. as deeply contentious and threatened by House Armed Services Committee on December 8, 2009. mutual distrust and divergent ambitions. 2 For a sense of the spectrum of opinion on this issue, see The views expressed in this report are those of “The al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus,” Council on Foreign Rela- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, tions, November 25, 2009. October 19, 2009 and Vahid Brown, “Al-Qa’ida and the the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 3 On these respective positions, see Peter Bergen, “The Afghan Taliban: Diametrically Opposed?” Jihadica.com, Front: The Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger,” The New Republic, October 21, 2009.

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Indeed, it alleges that al-Qa`ida’s enduring religious and fraternal bonds Although Abu’l-Walid has only recently purported endorsement of the Taliban suggested by al-Qa`ida’s propaganda. made his writings available to the online regime was an “outright deception,” a These significant differences represent jihadist community, his work has long calculated political move that provided key vulnerabilities and invite a closer been known to historians of al-Qa`ida. cover for activities that threatened the examination on the part of policymakers U.S. troops sent into Afghanistan after Taliban’s very existence. and the counterterrorism community. 9/11 recovered thousands of pages of documents authored by Abu’l-Walid The revelation of Bin Ladin’s dubious The Significance of Abu’l-Walid al-Masri at al-Qa`ida compounds and training oath does not prove that al-Qa`ida and The account of Bin Ladin’s dubious the Afghan Taliban can be decisively pledge of allegiance to Mullah Omar split, but it is emblematic of the appears in a document written by the “The ambiguity of Bin tensions that have long complicated Egyptian jihadist Mustafa Hamid, better Ladin’s bay`a challenges their often volatile relationship. It also known as Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, entitled suggests that the “allegiance” to the The Story of the Arabs’ Pledge to the Commander the notion that al-Qa`ida Afghan Taliban professed today by al- of the Faithful Mullah Muhammad Omar.7 The is, or ever was, subservient Qa`ida and its Pakistan-based allies— author’s long career in international including the Haqqani network and jihadist activism has intersected with to the aims and methods of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—is almost every militant Islamist group the Afghan Taliban.” more a strategy of expediency than a currently active in Afghanistan and sign of real harmony. To be sure, there the tribal areas of Pakistan, including is currently a significant alignment al-Qa`ida, the Haqqani network and of interest between these groups and the Afghan Taliban.8 After the fall of camps, and the Combating Terrorism Mullah Omar’s Taliban movement, the Taliban in 2001, Abu’l-Walid fled Center’s Harmony studies made as they share a common enemy in the Afghanistan for Iran and worked briefly extensive use of these materials to Afghan government and its NATO as a journalist under the pseudonym chronicle al-Qa`ida’s history.11 Abu’l- supporters. Yet at the same time, al- Hashim al-Makki. His publications Walid’s memoirs, historical sketches, Qa`ida and its militant allies in North abruptly ended in 2002 for reasons that strategic analyses and letters to other Waziristan are bent on waging a much remain unclear.9 In 2007, however, Abu’l- al-Qa`ida leaders shed considerable wider conflict, the pursuit of which Walid began posting electronic editions of light on the inner workings of the Mullah Omar has repeatedly denounced his memoirs, and in 2009 renewed his organization and are unique in their as a direct threat to his movement’s relationship with the Taliban’s media candid and often highly critical tone.12 goals in Afghanistan.4 Mullah Omar has wing. He is now a regular contributor to While his pre-9/11 writings are often characterized the Afghan Taliban as a the Afghan Taliban’s Arabic-language corroborated by multiple other primary “nationalist movement,” an ideological monthly al-Sumud, presumably from his 10 position that al-Qa`ida has labeled “house arrest” in Iran. “Abu’l-Walid is Back…with the Taliban (and not al- 5 “Satanic.” Al-Qa`ida’s pursuit of global Qa’ida),” Jihadica.com. Abu’l-Walid’s re-emergence has jihad, aside from having caused the 7 Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya li-amir al- also been discussed at length by Australian counterter- downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, mu’minin Mullah Muhammad ‘Umar, undated, posted on rorism expert Leah Farrall on her blog at www.allthing- lies in direct opposition to the stated various jihadist web forums on July 19-20, 2007. Thanks sct.wordpress.com, where she first drew attention to the aims of the Afghan Taliban today, which to Muhammad al-Obaidi for his translation assistance. document discussed in this article and posted a fascinat- declares the intent to pursue friendly 8 During the 1980s and early 1990s, Abu’l-Walid forged ing recent exchange of correspondence with Abu’l-Walid 6 relations with neighboring countries. a close friendship with Jalaluddin Haqqani and worked himself. as a propagandist and military strategist for what would 11 The CTC’s Harmony reports, along with copies of the It is critical, therefore, not to mistake come to be known as the Haqqani network—helping original documents, are available online at www.ctc. the calculated political interactions to edit Haqqani’s monthly magazine, Manba’ al-Jihad. usma.edu. between the two movements for the Throughout the 1980s, Abu’l-Walid developed close 12 Participants on jihadist forums have occasionally ex- ties to future leaders of al-Qa`ida, including Abu Hafs pressed outrage at some of Abu’l-Walid’s criticisms of 4 Mazhar Tufail, “Mullah Omar Orders Halt to Attacks al-Masri, and beginning in 1990 Abu’l-Walid worked al-Qa`ida and its senior leaders, although none of the lat- on Pak Troops,” The News, February 24, 2009; Ahmed for al-Qa`ida as a trainer at its camps in Afghanistan. ter have ever publicly contradicted any of the assertions Rashid, “Slide into Anarchy,” Globe and Mail, February When the al-Qa`ida leadership moved back to Afghani- contained in Abu’l-Walid’s writings. Fazul Abdullah 28, 2009. stan from Sudan in 1996, Abu’l-Walid’s loyalties became Muhammad, an al-Qa`ida member since the 1990s and 5 On the Taliban’s “nationalism,” see Mullah Omar’s increasingly divided between his old employers and the a current leader of its operations in the Horn of Africa, message of September 19, 2009, available online at www. newly-risen Taliban. By 2000, he was working directly wrote an autobiography in early 2009 where he specifi- jihadica.com. Al-Qa`ida has consistently maintained its for the Taliban as a co-editor, along with famous jihadist cally mentions reading Abu’l-Walid’s memoirs, and he position against nationalism since it was formed; al- strategist Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, of the Taliban’s Arabic- cites no inaccuracies. On the contrary, Fazul contends Zawahiri called it “Satanic” in his September 28, 2009 language magazine al-Imarah (The Emirate). For an in- that Abu’l-Walid was the “architect of the strategy” of eulogy for Baitullah Mehsud, an English translation of depth account of Abu’l-Walid’s career, see the author’s al-Qa`ida in 1991 and that while Bin Ladin is given most which is available online at www.nefafoundation.org. profile of him at www.ctc.usma.edu. of the credit for this, “it is actually Shaykh Abu’l-Walid 6 See Mullah Omar’s September 19, 2009 message, and 9 It is possible that the Iranian government imposed al-Masri whose great merit it was to have convinced the the open letter of the Taliban leadership addressed to the greater restrictions on his freedom of movement at that al-Qa`ida leadership to confront the United States of Shanghai Cooperation Conference on October 14, 2009, time. America.” For details, see Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, available online at www.jihadica.com. 10 On these recent developments, see Vahid Brown, Harb ala’l-Islam 1 (2009): pp. 145f.

2 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 sources, he should also not be taken as a These details are not reported in any announced the creation of the “World “disinterested” observer. He is a Taliban other source, nor has the specific Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews loyalist, and has devoted much of his timing or nature of Bin Ladin’s bay`a to and Crusaders” in February, calling life to writing jihadist propaganda. His the “Commander of the Faithful” ever on Muslims worldwide to “kill the claims must therefore be treated with been known.16 Much more than a minor Americans wherever you find them.”18 caution, as they could be advanced historical detail, this information casts in To further publicize this declaration in support of a Taliban (or personal) an entirely new light al-Qa`ida’s senior of hostilities, he gave a series of high- agenda. Yet even if his allegations are leaders’ frequent claims of recognition profile interviews and press conferences tendentious, this would perhaps be no of Mullah Omar’s leadership. in May to international journalists at less illustrative of Taliban/al-Qa`ida his Zhawar Kili camp complex in Khost, rifts than if they are accurate, given that The Story of the Arabs’ Pledge to Mullah Afghanistan.19 Abu’l-Walid’s writings are regularly Omar published in an official organ of the Abu’l-Walid’s narrative of Bin Ladin’s On August 7, 1998, near-simultaneous Afghan Taliban. oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar bombings of two U.S. embassies in begins in the autumn of 1998. He writes Africa were carried out by al-Qa`ida Abu’l-Walid’s account sheds new light that relations between the Taliban operatives, some of whom had trained on the debates about the Taliban’s and the Arab jihadists in Afghanistan in camps in Afghanistan. The U.S. legitimacy that raged within the Arab had become more contentious during responded with cruise missile strikes jihadist community in Afghanistan that year, primarily on account of on the jihadist training camps around during the late 1990s.13 According to the escalation of al-Qa`ida’s media Zhawar Kili. According to Abu’l-Walid, Abu’l-Walid, in the late 1990s the groups and operational campaign against the the embassy bombings and retaliatory most opposed to the Taliban and the United States. From the outset, the U.S. strikes led to an immediate influx of idea of pledging allegiance to its leader Taliban’s provision of hospitality for new Arab volunteers into Afghanistan, were Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian the al-Qa`ida leadership was limited exacerbating the fractious tendencies of Islamic Jihad (EIJ) organization and by two conditions: Bin Ladin was not the various Arab jihadist groups that the jihadist groups from North Africa.14 to communicate with the media without had established bases in the country.20 Today, al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership the consent of the Taliban regime, Long-running doctrinal disputes took is almost entirely composed of former nor was he to directly antagonize on new urgency as the foreign jihadist members of these very groups, including the United States.17 Although he had groups competed for a share of the al-Zawahiri, Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid violated these conditions on a number freshly-mobilized human resources, and and Abu Yahya al-Libi. Of the people of occasions during 1996 and 1997, he new training camps were built in various identified by Abu’l-Walid as initially significantly increased his provocative parts of the country.21 “A number of the open to considering a formal oath to media stunts during the spring and Arab jihadist leaders rose in opposition Mullah Omar, only Bin Ladin survives summer of 1998. Joined by Ayman al- to Bin Ladin at this time,” writes today, and his profile is much lower in Zawahiri’s EIJ organization, Bin Ladin Abu’l-Walid, “all of them affirming the al-Qa`ida’s public messaging than it primacy of the domestic fronts against was 10 years ago. com/749972/mustafa-hamed-taliban-and-al-qaeda. the Arab regimes, convinced that a 16 According to Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower shift to a ‘global confrontation’ against 22 The document’s most novel disclosure (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2006), p. 288, Bin Ladin the United States was ill conceived.” is its account of how Bin Ladin reneged “made a pledge of personal fealty” to Mullah Omar after Those opposing Bin Ladin and his on an initial agreement to give Mullah being summoned by the Taliban leader in the wake of the “global jihad” had patrons within Omar his oath of allegiance, and finally Africa embassy bombings. However, Wright’s source for the Taliban movement and sought to deputized Abu’l-Walid to perform the this assertion—Robert Fisk’s summary of Ahmad Zay- sideline al-Qa`ida and undermine Bin bay`a on Bin Ladin’s behalf, although dan’s Arabic biography of Bin Ladin, published in the Ladin’s unique status among the Arab Abu’l-Walid was not even a formal Independent, on October 23, 2002—does not make this jihadists, leading to the emergence of 15 member of the al-Qa`ida organization. claim, nor does Zaydan’s book. The 9/11 Commission Re- pro- and anti-al-Qa`ida factions within 23 port (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), relates that the Taliban leadership. 13 On these debates, see Vahid Brown, Cracks in the Foun- Khalid Shaykh Muhammad said under interrogation that dation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida 1989-2006 (West “Bin Ladin had sworn bayat to Omar upon first moving 18 “Al-Qaeda’s Fatwa,” PBS NewsHour, undated. Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007), pp. 13- to Afghanistan, following the Shura Council’s advice,” 19 On these interviews, see Peter Bergen, The Osama bin 18; Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al- an assertion which is flatly contradicted by a number of Laden I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 194ff. Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia other sources in addition to the account presented here. For Mullah Omar’s irate response to these developments, University Press, 2008), pp. 241ff; Alan Cullison, “Inside 17 Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya, p. 15. See also see Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story (Washington, Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” The Atlantic, September 2004. Brown, Cracks in the Foundation, p. 17. Bin Ladin referred D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008), p. 129. 14 These included the “Fighting Groups” (al-jama’a al- to the restrictions himself in an interview with al-Jazira’s 20 For details on these organizations, see Abu Mus`ab islamiyya al-muqatila) of Libya and Morocco and the anti- Ahmad Zaydan in September 1998: “There is an opinion al-Suri, Da’wa al-muqawwama al-islamiyya al-‘alamiyya, regime jihadist organizations from Tunisia and Algeria, among the Taliban that we should not move from within undated, pp. 727ff., portions of which are translated in the last of which re-branded itself in January 2007 as al- Afghanistan against any other state. This was the deci- Lia, pp. 247ff. Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). sion of the Commander of the Faithful, as is known.” For 21 Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya, p. 5. 15 Although he worked closely with al-Qa`ida for many details, see Bruce Lawrence ed., Messages to the World: 22 Ibid., p. 6. years, Abu’l-Walid claims that he never gave Bin Ladin The Statements of Osama bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005), 23 Ibid. According to Vahid Mozhdeh, a former official a formal bay`a. For details, see www.mafa.maktoobblog. p. 86. within the Taliban government, the Taliban’s Foreign

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Alarmed at these developments, Abu’l- the Taliban from interfering in our hands and then returned to Walid submitted a proposal to Bin their freedom to carry out foreign sit on a low wall. Mullah Jalil Ladin, Abu Hafs al-Masri and other al- operations.26 was on his right while I sat on his Qa`ida leaders in an attempt to address left. For several minutes the amir the growing disunity. Arguing that Abu’l-Walid writes that relations asked Mullah Jalil about various it was counterproductive to have so between Mullah Omar and Bin Ladin matters, including the condition of many Arab groups in Afghanistan, each were worsening by the day, with Bin the Arab guests…Finally, the amir with their own amir (leader), he urged Ladin continuing to “disobey commands stood up, declared the meeting the Arabs to form one bloc, somewhat in a free-wheeling manner,” while was over, then shook my hand like an Afghan tribe, and pledge their debate over the issue of the bay`a raged and Mullah Jalil’s. Mullah Jalil collective allegiance to Mullah Omar within the Arab jihadist community. then walked me out to the gate. as amir al-mu’minin, the Commander of Two poles emerged within al-Qa`ida on Surprised, I looked at Mullah Jalil the Faithful. The suggestion was met the question, with Bin Ladin and some and said, “but I did not yet give with ridicule, and the al-Qa`ida leaders of his senior aides leaning in favor of bay`a to the amir!” He corrected objected that Mullah Omar was only considering an oath of allegiance, and me, saying “his handshake with the amir al-mu’minin for Afghans and that the Egyptians from al-Zawahiri’s EIJ you was the bay`a.” “But I wasn’t only Afghans could give him the bay`a. organization firmly opposed to it.27 paying attention,” I said, “so I Surprised at this objection, Abu’l-Walid need to shake his hand again.” asked Mullah Omar’s deputy, Mullah In frequent trips to Kandahar from his Mullah Jalil laughed and returned Jalil, about the possibility of non- home in Kabul, Abu’l-Walid continued to speak with the amir. The latter Afghans giving oaths of allegiance to to press the issue throughout the fall rose from his place and shook the Taliban leader. Mullah Jalil asserted of 1998, only to learn in late October my hand again. This bay`a was that anyone within Afghanistan could that the al-Qa`ida leaders had returned as simple as a handshake, yet give bay`a to Mullah Omar.24 Abu’l- to their earlier position that bay`a to profound in significance. Walid brought this clarification to Bin Mullah Omar was only permissible for Ladin, but Bin Ladin and his senior Afghans. To break the impasse, Abu’l- Thinking that he had made a aides asked for “more time to think Walid offered to make a “test run” breakthrough in improving the Taliban- about the issue.”25 and pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar Arab jihadist relationship, Abu’l-Walid himself. Accompanied by Muhammad went immediately to “Arabkhayl,” the After several weeks, Abu’l-Walid was Tahir Yuldashev, the late leader of the settlement of foreign jihadists on the finally told that Bin Ladin had asked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, whom outskirts of Kandahar, to share his for a consultation on the matter with Mullah Omar “greatly respected and good news. The guards at the al-Qa`ida a delegation of Pakistani religious loved,” Abu’l-Walid called on Mullah compound welcomed him excitedly, scholars, and that it would take some Jalil in Kandahar on November 2, 1998. “and some cried ‘Allahu Akbar’ and time before they had an answer. Abu’l- Mullah Jalil contacted Mullah Omar by embraced me as if I had just carried Walid believed this was just another radio and arranged for the two to meet out a successful suicide mission and pretext to avoid the issue: at Taliban headquarters. Abu’l-Walid returned from it safely!”28 He met an describes the scene: entirely different response, however, It was only when it was too late when he told Bin Ladin, Abu Hafs and that I realized the real reasons for Mullah Muhammad Omar, tall, al-Zawahiri about his successful bay`a. their procrastination; the whole thin and with his distinguished Abu’l-Walid felt that he had immediately time they simply wanted to keep bearing, was sitting alone…in plummeted in their esteem, and the a courtyard of the governor of reception was hostile. The al-Qa`ida Affairs Ministry was almost uniformly opposed to the ex- Kandahar’s residence…The amir leaders again insisted that they would tension of hospitality to Bin Ladin and frequently lobbied stood to welcome us. He shook need to consult further with Pakistani Mullah Omar to place him under greater restrictions, to religious scholars. Abu’l-Walid set an such an extent that Bin Ladin was said to have claimed, 26 Ibid., p. 8. Here and below the author translates appointment with Bin Ladin for later “Two entities are against our jihad. One is the US, and the Abu’l-Walid’s al-imarat as “the Taliban,” as that is how in November, hoping that by then the other is the Taliban’s own Foreign Affairs Ministry.” See the regime is best known in English. matter would be resolved. Vahid Mozhdeh, Afghanistan va panj sal-i sultah-i Taliban 27 The Egyptian Jama`a al-Islamiyya remained aloof (Tehran, 2003), unpublished English translation, p. 53. from the debate, with Abu’l-Walid claiming that they Finally, on a visit to the al-Qa`ida Thanks to Roy Gutman for sharing this translation. were “waiting for fatwas to arrive from who knows guesthouse in late November, Bin Ladin 24 Mullah Jalil also stated that the issue of bay`a being where, with nobody really knowing when or whether walked Abu’l-Walid to the door and given by those outside of Afghanistan was still under such fatwas would even arrive at all…The last thing took him aside. debate, about which Abu’l-Walid writes: “I later learned you would expect from them was a clear stance about that this concerned the Pakistani tribes that were seek- anything.” As for the jihadist organizations from North [Bin Ladin] said in a low voice that ing to give their allegiance to Mullah Omar, something Africa, “the most tolerant of them saw the Taliban as in- he had agreed to give bay`a to the which the Taliban was being pressured against by the fidels…Their stance was the most easily comprehensible, Commander of the Faithful and Pakistani government, which had issued a number of simple and contrarian; it began with excommunicating asked me to arrange an appointment warnings in this regard.” Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at (takfir) the Taliban and ended with excommunicating for this purpose…I told him that I al-‘arabiya, p. 7. everyone in their vicinity, from Arabs to the residents of 25 Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya, p. 7. Afghanistan.” Ibid., pp. 8f. 28 Ibid., p. 11.

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would not accompany him, as his I asked myself why Abu Abdullah his “troublemaking with the Taliban.”33 meeting with the amir would have insisted on having me perform In July, Abu Mus`ab al-Suri wrote an a greater impact if they were alone the bay`a to Mullah Omar on his angry e-mail to Bin Ladin on behalf of the and would thus go further toward behalf. Why not do it directly? I Taliban for continuing to flout Mullah removing the awkwardness and think he did it this way in order Omar’s directives and urging Bin Ladin to tensions between the two men. He to leave himself plenty of room make a personal apology.34 According to acquiesced, though he said he’d for maneuver, in the event that Abu’l-Walid, Bin Ladin did eventually prefer it if I attend the meeting he be pressed on whether or not make a personal call on Mullah Omar with him. I told him that I would he indeed pledged allegiance to early in 2000—“on the advice of one of return the next day to learn the the Commander of the Faithful. If the Arabs,” a probable reference to al- details of this historic event.29 circumstances require him to deny Suri’s e-mail—and relations between it, he can honestly say that he did them “were relatively improved.”35 Abu’l-Walid stayed the night as a guest not, as he did not swear allegiance with the Uzbek leader Tahir Yuldashev, personally. And if circumstances But it appears that Abu Abdullah and returned to the al-Qa`ida guesthouse require him to confirm the bay`a, was already at an advanced stage the next day. he can say he did, and this will of preparation for the attack of likewise be the truth, as the bay`a September 2001, about which Abu Abdullah [Bin Ladin] arrived was made—if only on his behalf.31 no one knew any details save for at mid-morning. He lacked his three individuals, one of which usual smile, so I began to get a bad In concluding his account, Abu’l-Walid was Abu Abdullah himself36… feeling…I immediately asked Abu observes that Bin Ladin’s bay`a by proxy Nobody outside the first or second Abdullah about yesterday’s news had little immediate effect on relations inner circle had any idea of what and how things went with Mullah between the two leaders. “In general,” was going on. Of course, Mullah Omar. He said he didn’t go! I was writes Abu’l-Walid, Omar topped the list of those kept thunderstruck, and asked in shock, in the dark, though it was on his “How? Why?” He briefly replied Abu Abdullah…continued to head that all of the catastrophic that he felt he needed further time disobey the basic instructions of consequences of that strike would to think the matter over.30 the Commander of the Faithful, fall, as his regime collapsed along which could be summarized under with the Twin Towers of New York. In dismay, Abu’l-Walid told Bin Ladin two headings. First was to halt Naturally, I was also on that list how poorly his no-show would reflect all interviews, for either print of the un-informed. Had I known, upon the Arabs, and how it would only or television media. Second was I would never have pushed with confirm the impression of arrogance the prohibition on any military all my strength to bring about the and self-importance that Mullah Omar strike against the United States, bay`a of Abu Abdullah to Mullah already had of him. Finally convinced as Pakistan had threatened to Omar, since it turned out to have of the seriousness of the situation, Bin intervene directly against the been an outright deception of Ladin agreed to meet again later in the Taliban in the event of such a the Commander of the Faithful, day to discuss it further. That evening, strike. The Taliban could not bear diverting his attention from a Bin Ladin told Abu’l-Walid that he had up under such an intervention dangerous act, plotted behind decided to go ahead with the bay`a, but so long as it remained unable to his back, that undermined his that he wanted Abu’l-Walid to give the control the remaining territory fundamental prerogatives as ruler bay`a on Bin Ladin’s behalf. Abu’l-Walid held by the northern resistance.32 of the country and threatened the stressed that he felt it was imperative for lives and fates of all Afghans.37 Bin Ladin to perform the oath himself Other sources confirm that relations to clear the air with Mullah Omar, but remained tense throughout 1999. The Conclusion Bin Ladin insisted and Abu’l-Walid Taliban ordered several of the Arab The ambiguity of Bin Ladin’s bay`a ultimately agreed. He writes: jihadists’ training camps closed, and challenges the notion that al-Qa`ida is, there was increased pressure on Bin or ever was, subservient to the aims and I was very embarrassed while Ladin from other foreign militants to end methods of the Afghan Taliban. On the setting the new appointment to contrary, this purported subservience make the bay`a on behalf of Abu 31 Ibid., pp. 14-16. While it could be objected that Bin is a useful illusion that obscures al- Abdullah. I performed the bay`a Ladin may have given a personal bay`a to Mullah Omar Qa`ida’s fundamental conflicts with the on Abu Abdullah’s behalf and then after the events described by Abu’l-Walid, there is no ev- rushed out, as if a great weight had idence to suggest this. Bin Ladin began publicizing his al- 33 Cullison; Brown, Cracks in the Foundation, p. 17. just been lifted off of me, or as if legiance to Mullah Omar in April of 2001 (see Lawrence, 34 Cullison. I feared that Mullah Omar would p. 98), when Abu’l-Walid would still have been in a posi- 35 Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya, p. 15. draw back and refuse to accept tion to know if a second bay`a had been given. 36 Fazul Abdullah Muhammad also states in his mem- this proxy pledge of allegiance… 32 Ibid., p. 15. Abu’l-Walid notes that after the second oirs that only three people knew the details of the 9/11 Later, when it was already too late, intifada in Palestine (September 2000) the Taliban were plot before the fact, identifying them as Bin Ladin, Abu not opposed to strikes against Israel being carried out Hafs al-Masri and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. See Fazul 29 Ibid., p. 13. from their territory and were “willing to face the conse- Abdullah Muhammad, p. 392. 30 Ibid. quences [of such an attack] alongside the Arabs.” 37 Abu’l-Walid, Qissat al-bay’at al-‘arabiya, p. 15.

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Afghan Taliban’s agenda. Today, al- Assessing the Al-Qa`ida This article examines the three levels Qa`ida continues to drape itself in the that constitute al-Qa`ida’s overall Taliban flag and proclaims allegiance to Threat to the United structure and then assesses the terrorist Mullah Omar. Yet as it did in the 1990s, States group’s intentions going forward. it is simultaneously pursuing strategic objectives that directly threaten those By Martha Crenshaw The Organization of Mullah Omar. In many ways, the Al-Qa`ida has always depended as Afghan Taliban remain as dependent This article is based on testimony before the much on local initiative as on top-down on support from Pakistan as they were Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information direction, and in the aftermath of 9/11 prior to 9/11. Yet it is against this very Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, it has dispersed even more. Its complex patron, and under a Taliban banner, that Committee on Homeland Security, United organizational structure is somewhere al-Qa`ida and its coalition of Pakistani States House of Representatives, Hearing on between a centralized hierarchy and jihadists are waging a bloody campaign Reassessing the Evolving al-Qa`ida Threat a decentralized flat network. It is a of suicide terrorism. Mullah Omar has to the Homeland, November 19, 2009, flexible and adaptable organization flatly condemned this campaign, telling Washington, D.C. The author adapted her that has survived well beyond the his purported “followers” in Pakistan’s testimony for use in the CTC Sentinel. lifespan of most other terrorist groups. tribal areas that they are “bringing a bad It is a web of overlapping conspiracies, name” to the Taliban and “harming the although al-qa`ida is substantially often piggy-backing on local conflicts war against the US and NATO forces in weaker than it was on the eve of the 9/11 and grievances. In many ways it is a Afghanistan.”38 attacks, it still poses an active threat transnational secret society. Clandestine to the United States and its allies.1 cells are the norm, not the mobilization The “Commander of the Faithful,” Transnational reach is central to al- of mass support. however, has proven unable to command Qa`ida’s identity, and it is organized to these particular faithful, and the carry out this mission. The expanded The structure of the organization can be violence in Pakistan’s cities rages on. U.S. military presence in Afghanistan analyzed on three levels: al-Qa`ida central This says less about the limits of Mullah and continued strikes against the core in Pakistan; the second tier leadership; Omar’s authority than it does about leadership in Pakistan may cause the cells (or micro-cells) and individuals. the expedient nature of the allegiances remaining al-Qa`ida operatives to grow that al-Qa`ida and its partners profess. more desperate to activate supporters Al-Qa`ida Central To achieve its objectives in the region, in the West. Local militants may be The key policy issue is leadership the policy community must strive for a motivated to act to avoid failure and and leadership potential. Although more nuanced understanding of these the collapse of the cause. Al-Qa`ida’s the leadership does not control the allegiances, the purposes they serve, and leaders have likely given up the idea of worldwide organization, it provides the underlying tensions they conceal. a repetition of 9/11 and would settle for ideological direction and guidance less spectacular but lethal attacks on as well as some resources (mainly Vahid Brown is a Research Fellow with civilian targets. assistance with training and funding). the Combating Terrorism Center, as well Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri as a senior instructor for the Center’s FBI are compelling motivational figures. program. Locally, al-Qa`ida is a disruptive player in Pakistani politics. 1 A sampling of many works on jihadist attacks and plots in the West would include: Petter Nesser, “Chronology of The leadership is reduced in number and Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Pre- many key operational personnel have pared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks,” Studies in Con- been captured or killed. There can be no flict and Terrorism 31:10 (2008): pp. 924-46; Edwin Bak- doubt that their loss is a serious blow ker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe,” Netherlands Institute to the organization. It is demoralizing of International Relations, December 2006; “Radicalisa- as well as debilitating. In addition, tion and Recruitment to Terror Networks,” Forsvarets communication is impeded. Under Forskningsinstitutt (FFI) Seminar, Oslo, Norway, 2006, pressure it is harder to communicate along with many other FFI Reports from the Norwegian both within the leadership group and Defence Research Establishment; Lorenzo Vidino, Al to supporters outside, although it is Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Ji- clearly not impossible since al-Qa`ida’s had (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2006); Jeffrey M. Bale, media outlet still operates. “Jihadist Cells and ‘I.E.D.’ Capabilities in Europe: Assess- ing the Present and Future Threat to the West,” unpub- There are a number of key questions lished paper, Monterey Institute of International Studies, concerning al-Qa`ida’s central 2009; Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism leadership. Can the removed leaders in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenom- be replaced? If there is no effective enon?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32:1 (2009): pp. succession, can the core leadership 38 These quotes are drawn from a letter addressed to 1-17; Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization continue to function under pressure? leaders of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in February 2009. in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” New York City Can it maintain communication with For details, see Tufail. Police Department Intelligence Division, 2007. the rest of the organization and with

6 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 the world, which is essential to survival U.S. policy in Afghanistan affect the real threats to political stability in as the vanguard of jihad? Is the top Pakistani government’s willingness Yemen and Somalia. leadership essential to mounting terrorist and ability to confront al-Qa`ida? attacks against and in the West? Apparently, al-Qa`ida has a closer The second mid-level interface is relationship with the Pakistani Taliban composed of local leaders in Western Could the al-Qa`ida leadership than with the Afghan Taliban, and it is countries, often Muslim clerics (for survive without a base in Pakistan or the Pakistani Taliban that committed example, at the Finsbury Park Mosque Afghanistan? Could it be transplanted the spectacular acts of terrorism that in London, which drew adherents from to another conflict zone such as Somalia provoked a military offensive from across Europe) but including other or Yemen? Al-Qa`ida has been rooted the Pakistani government (in terms of activists as well. They are public figures, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater for a threat to the homeland, recall that not covert operatives. It is difficult almost 30 years. Rebuilding a base in a the Pakistani Taliban has exhibited new location would be problematic and a capacity for organizing terrorism perhaps impossible. outside of the region, such as the 2008 “Even if a faction of the Barcelona plot). Perhaps the United Taliban did take power, it Moreover, does al-Qa`ida need a States should leave the eradication of territorial location at all? One reason for al-Qa`ida to the Pakistani military and might not be sympathetic a base may be to maintain training camps intelligence services. On the other hand, to al-Qa`ida and in fact rather than ensure the functioning of Pakistan may not be willing or able to the core leadership. Although experts do the job, especially considering the might be hostile. After disagree, the author’s judgment is that high levels of anti-Americanism among all, it was al-Qa`ida’s hands-on training is important to the the country’s public. Uncertainty about tactical success of terrorist attacks. U.S. intentions after the summer of recklessness that led to the Expertise in handling explosives, 2011—which is the start of withdrawal Taliban’s defeat in 2001.” tradecraft, and operational security are date for U.S. forces in Afghanistan— learned through experience, not through will lead to equivocation. the internet or training manuals. The Second-Tier Leadership to trace their direct connections to al- Another question is the relationship It is a mistake to think of al-Qa`ida as Qa`ida central, but clearly they have between al-Qa`ida central and diverse composed solely of a core leadership adopted its principles. They provide Taliban factions in Afghanistan and at the top and self-generated or self- more than just inspiration by calling Pakistan. One scenario is that if the radicalized volunteers who respond for jihad against the West. They United States and NATO withdraw independently to the call for jihad at also organize young men in summer forces, the Taliban will regain control in the bottom. The intermediate level of camps, sports clubs, and other venues Afghanistan, and al-Qa`ida will return leadership is equally important. for socialization, indoctrination, and to its pre-9/11 home and pose the same recruitment. In the years since 9/11 and deadly threat as before. Pakistan would The first type of interface consists of particularly since the London bombings then be likely to make an accommodation affiliated or merged local organizations in July 2005, Western governments have with both the Taliban and al-Qa`ida. with their own interests in specific arrested or deported radical clerics and This assumption appears to be the conflict zones, such as Lashkar-i- closed down mosques (or assisted in a logic behind the current strategy of the Tayyiba, al-Qa`ida in the Islamic transfer of control). Barack Obama administration. On the Maghreb (AQIM), the Moroccan Islamic other hand, there may be no coherent Combatant Group, the revived al-Qa`ida Recruits and Volunteers “Taliban” but a mix of local interests. in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) A major concern is transnational Such a weak coalition is not likely to operating in Yemen, or al-Shabab in recruitment in the West or among secure control of the country, and even Somalia. They are either branches of individuals who move easily to and if a faction of the Taliban did take power the central organization or associates from the West. From what little is it might not be sympathetic to al-Qa`ida that have adopted the al-Qa`ida brand known, recruitment processes at the and in fact might be hostile. After all, or label. In return, al-Qa`ida central individual level vary. Typically, it it was al-Qa`ida’s recklessness that led acquires transnational reach as well is difficult to establish a connection to the Taliban’s defeat in 2001. In fact, as the all important image of a force between a local militant and al-Qa`ida some proponents of the new Afghanistan that mobilizes Muslims around the or to determine who took the initiative strategy hope that pragmatic elements world. Some of these alliances are in making contact. As seen in the 9/11 of the Taliban will be willing to fragile, as local affiliates discover the conspiracy, the process combines both compromise, which assumes that the high price of joining. An important volunteering and active recruiting by Taliban is not monolithic and suggests part of the al-Qa`ida brand is suicide activists or organizers—it is bottom-up that its disparate elements would not be attacks on civilian targets, including on and top-down at the same time. Some able to control Afghanistan. Muslim civilians. This requirement has individuals in the West initially travel apparently provoked dissension among abroad to fight, but when they arrive al- Another consideration is that al-Qa`ida supporters. Nevertheless, a number of Qa`ida leaders persuade them to return may not need Afghanistan as long as attacks and plots in the West can be home to attack their own societies. it has a base in Pakistan. How will linked to these groups. They also pose

7 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1

Key factors in recruitment include divert potential extremists away from for attacking the West be altered as family and social ties in the local the path to terrorism. Hizb al-Tahrir circumstances change? What is the setting as well as to a country of origin, (also known as Hizb-ut-Tahrir), which implication of the surge in Afghanistan, access to training camps, and collective seeks the establishment of an Islamic coinciding with a drawdown in Iraq? encouragement as well as contacts in caliphate and is estimated to have a institutions such as mosques, sports million members worldwide, is a case in The narrative promoted by the top centers, or prisons. Social network point. Western governments have taken leadership—reflected in statements by theory is often used to map out different positions on this issue, some Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, the jihadist these relationships (usually through banning these organizations and others strategist Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, and friendship and kinship networks). not (usually on grounds of freedom of others—is that violent jihad is an The internet also contributes to speech and association). obligatory response to encroachments radicalization and recruitment, but on Muslim lands by the “Crusaders operational control probably requires These associations may not be effective and Jews.” Jihad is considered substitutes for violence because fundamentally defensive and thus “The radicalization committed extremists are impatient essential as long as Islam is in danger. process can apparently with endless philosophical discussion It is also an obligation at the level of and are eager for action. They are not the individual, as authorized by al- occur quickly. Individuals attracted to moderate Islamism and do Qa`ida. The framing of terrorism as a not find its representatives persuasive defense against aggression toward the can rapidly move from a or credible. This rejection is an umma (the Muslim community, not al- secular lifestyle to extreme impediment to a policy that tries to end Qa`ida itself) and as an individual duty terrorism by encouraging moderates is coupled with another justification. religiosity and then to the within the same general community of Al-Qa`ida explains terrorism as a way endorsement of violence. It belief to take a stand against violent of making citizens of the West suffer extremism. It is important to remember, as Muslims have suffered—to establish is difficult to predict who however, that those who use violence equivalence by bringing the war will take this path.” are a tiny minority. home. Communications emphasize the suffering of civilians at the hands of the Al-Qa`ida’s Intentions United States and its allies fighting in Considering the diversity of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Palestinian face-to-face contact. A recruiter may be perspectives within the organization, victims of Israel are also cited as in touch with an individual who then it is unsurprising that al-Qa`ida’s evidence of the enemy’s perfidy. reaches out to other individuals to form motivations are not necessarily a conspiracy, or a recruiter may enlist consistent or uniform. There are many These messages constitute powerful an already-formed group that appears currents of jihadist thought.2 It is and urgent emotional appeals to defend promising. Recruits have included first also logical that the goals of the top one’s community and one’s faith and generation, second generation, and even leadership would be couched in vague to take revenge on their persecutors. third generation immigrants as well as terms, reflecting their conception of a Martyrdom is the highest expression converts. Some are citizens, but others minimum common denominator. The of commitment (since the war in Iraq, are illegal residents. Some appear well- author’s interest is in the beliefs and it has become an al-Qa`ida trademark, assimilated, well-educated, upwardly objectives that drive attacks on the although suicide attacks began in the mobile, and prosperous, while others United States, especially attacks on or early 1980s and were initially conducted are rootless and marginal. Some have within the homeland, and on allies of by secular or Shi`a groups). There is criminal backgrounds, some do not. the United States. Will the rationale no indication of a change in the view Most participants in these conspiracies expressed by al-Qa`ida theoretician are male, and in Western Europe most Abu Mus`ab al-Suri in 2005: the lesson 2 For a small selection of recent works on ideology and were initially recruited in their country of history is that terrorism is the most organization, see Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, of residence. useful political method to compel an and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad opponent to surrender to one’s will.3 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009); The radicalization process can Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice apparently occur quickly. Individuals Demonstrating that Muslims in the West (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Raymond can rapidly move from a secular lifestyle can be mobilized in the service of these Ibrahim ed. and trans., The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: to extreme religiosity and then to the collective aims is a legitimizing device Broadway Books, 2007); Gilles Kepel et al., Al-Qaida dans endorsement of violence. It is difficult for al-Qa`ida. Sponsoring terrorist le Texte (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005); to predict who will take this path. attacks in the West is an ideological Bruce Lawrence ed., Messages to the World: The Statements imperative, essential to al-Qa`ida’s of Osama Bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005); Mark E. Stout An important policy question, and yet identity and image. Promoting terrorism et al., The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Op- another point of dispute among experts, erational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements (An- is whether or not non-violent Islamist- napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008); Brynjar Lia, 3 See “The Strategy of Deterring with Terrorism,” in “The oriented organizations serve as conveyer Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Global Islamic Resistance Call,” (2005) excerpts translat- belts for recruitment into underground Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, ed as an appendix to Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, cells or instead as safety valves that 2008). pp. 413-19. Al-Suri was captured in Pakistan in 2005.

8 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 in the West is all the more important to there has not been a successful attack The Pakistan Military’s their reputation because challenging against a target in the West since 2005. the United States in the Middle East Criticism of their passivity presents a Adaptation to has failed so far, although al-Zawahiri challenge for al-Qa`ida loyalists. Counterinsurgency in 2009 boasts that al-Qa`ida has won in every conflict. The al-Qa`ida challenge to Is there Muslim opposition to the al- By Sameer Lalwani Saudi Arabia also collapsed, and Egypt Qa`ida worldview? Some prominent is a lost cause. The outcomes of the Muslim clerics have taken a strong faced with a rising and emboldened conflicts in Yemen and Somalia remain stand against al-Qa`ida’s doctrine insurgency in its tribal belt, Pakistan’s to be determined. (particularly in Saudi Arabia and military has come under fire in recent Egypt), but their critiques are unlikely years for failure to adapt its military Decentralization is also a practical to moderate the views of major al-Qa`ida doctrine, which is based around response to pressure. Following the logic leaders. Delegitimizing the jihadist conventional warfare, to tackle that most terrorism is local, instigating message might discourage potential the internal threats of insurgency local cells to attack the enemy at home recruits who have not yet moved to and terrorism.1 Not adapting to is the most effective way of reaching violence, but it is almost impossible unconventional warfare has been used Western territory. Mounting an attack to know. Al-Qa`ida and the Taliban to explain Pakistan’s failures to quell from abroad is logistically difficult. typically deflect internal criticism of insurgency in the tribal areas, high Al-Suri explicitly acknowledged that bomb attacks that kill Muslim civilians civilian and soldier casualties, rising dispersion into small units is the by evoking conspiracy theories: the true levels of resentment and militancy, most effective way of maintaining perpetrators are invariably the Central three major operational failures in the organization and continuing the Intelligence Agency, the Mossad, South Waziristan, and its overall poor struggle in the face of the effectiveness Pakistani intelligence, or other shadowy battlefield performance.2 Underscoring of post-9/11 counterterrorism. agents of the enemy. this concern is the mounting evidence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) rapid It is instructive to look at al-Qa`ida’s Conclusion learning and adaptation that poses a and its sympathizers’ reactions to Al-Qa`ida is declining, but it is serious threat to the state of Pakistan.3 President Barack Obama’s speech still a dangerous organization. It is in Cairo in June 2009 calling for a not a mass popular movement, but The Pakistan military’s failure new beginning as expressed in online rather a complex, transnational, and has been attributed to a number of forums. In general, the initiative was multilayered organization with both poor tactical choices since 2002, interpreted as a threat. Al-Zawahiri clandestine and above-ground elements. including: 1) excessive focus on enemy was scornful of Muslims who were It has proved durable and persistent. targeting and “high-value targets”; 2) deceived into welcoming a dialogue or The determination of its leaders to attack overdependence on large-scale multi- partnership with the West. Al-Zawahiri the United States is undiminished and unit forces (mostly brigade level) rather appealed to nationalism in both Egypt might strengthen as the organization is than smaller units dispersed among the and Pakistan (interestingly, speaking threatened, but another attack on the population; 3) frequent deployment of in English to a Pakistani audience and scale of 9/11 is unlikely. forces to static garrisons or defensive referring frequently to the honor of the positions inhibiting proactive actions; military). Jihadist online circles also Dr. Martha Crenshaw is a Senior Fellow at 4) inadequate resources for flexible seemed alarmed by Muslims’ positive the Center for International Security and responses to contingencies such as reception of the Obama message. One Cooperation (CISAC) and the Freeman Spogli quick reaction forces; 5) over-reliance theme of jihadist discourse is that Institute for International Studies, as well as on kinetic “direct-action” operations Obama’s deceptive “sweet-talk” and Professor of Political Science, by courtesy, at and heavy firepower; and finally 6) an cajoling cannot be permitted to weaken Stanford University. She is also Professor of Muslim hatred for the United States. Government Emerita at Wesleyan University, 1 This critique has been advanced by a number of promi- Another is that U.S. policy will not where she taught from 1974 to 2007. She is a nent security analysts and includes: David Kilcullen, change—the new approach renouncing lead investigator with the National Center for “Terrain, Tribes, and Terrorists: Pakistan, 2006-2008,” the war on terrorism is mere rhetoric, the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Brookings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Se- and the United States will continue to Terrorism (NC-START) at the University of ries, No. 3, September 10, 2009; Ahmed Rashid, “Paki- kill Muslims and support Israel. These Maryland. Dr. Crenshaw is a former President of stan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency views will be reinforced by the new the International Society of Political Psychology Strategy,” CTC Sentinel 2:3 (2009); Seth G. Jones, “Paki- strategy in Afghanistan; no matter how (ISPP) and was a Guggenheim Fellow in stan’s Dangerous Game,” Survival 49:1 (2007). careful U.S. forces try to be, civilian 2005-2006. Her current research focuses on 2 One anonymous Western analyst quoted by the Econo- casualties are inevitable. why the United States is a target of terrorism mist estimated that Pakistan had lost 70% of its battles and the effectiveness of countermeasures with the Taliban. See “Pakistan and the Taliban: A Real A common view in these discussions is against terrorism. She recently edited The Offensive or a Phony War?” Economist, April 30, 2009. that jihadists must act because of the Consequences of Counterterrorism, 3 Some examples of analysts underscoring the role of ad- cowardice of leaders in Muslim countries forthcoming from the Russell Sage Foundation. aptation by both insurgent and counterinsurgent parties (Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular), includes Ejaz Haider, “Agency to GHQ,” Indian Express, including the ulama or clergy. Online October 13, 2009; Shaukat Qadir, “The Taliban Diaries,” comments also remind audiences that Daily Times, June 20, 2009.

9 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 underuse of local forces’ capacity and Bajaur: Operation Sherdil (Lion Heart) previous Pakistani military forays in knowledge.4 These choices generally After a series of tactical and strategic the tribal region. defy counterinsurgency doctrine—now disasters in the tribal areas,7 the military ascendant in U.S. and Western political achieved a reversal in fortunes through The patient, methodical clearing of discourse—which calls for political over tactical shifts in Bajaur Agency. The the Taliban from Bajaur strayed from military solutions, population security objective of Operation Sherdil, which conventional operations and made over enemy targeting, ground forces occurred from August 2008 through significant use of new tactics and human over airpower, and small rather than February 2009, was more ambitious intelligence.10 Militants in Bajaur large force deployments for missions than previous punitive efforts, seeking to were deeply entrenched, requiring the (such as patrols, intelligence gathering, target and dismantle the nerve center of military to move out the remaining and development assistance). In the TTP’s northern operations. General villagers to utilize airpower and heavy essence, these practices expose troops Tariq Khan, the former commander artillery for combined arms maneuvers to greater vulnerability to achieve more of the 14th Infantry Division who took that drew militants out of their discriminatory use of force.5 command of the North-West Frontier positions.11 Airstrikes and artillery fire Province Frontier Corps (FC), stated, were quickly followed by ground forces While the characterization of Pakistan’s that took advantage of suppressive fire to doctrinal focus on conventional warfare If we dismantle the training better target militants, and used mobile is correct—an unsurprising feature camps here, the headquarters, forces and helicopters for transport given the country’s high external the communication centres, the and intimate air support.12 By the same threat environment6—and unlikely to roots which come in, stop the token, the more discriminate use of change, the past year has witnessed interagency movement and destroy force that reduced civilian casualties substantial improvement in the conduct the leadership…we feel that about increased troop vulnerability resulting 65 per cent or so of militancy [in in higher Pakistani military casualties.13 “Rather than replicating the five northern Agencies] will Despite criticisms of their capabilities have been controlled.8 and loyalties,14 the FC evolved into a the mistakes of past more competent and useful localized assaults that had simply After months of failed brute suppression force spearheading the gradual erosion and coercive assaults, the field reports of of insurgent power over many months displaced the Taliban to many junior officers led General Khan to along the central arterial roadways of neighboring districts, the shift tactics to a more population-centric the tribal agency.15 approach by early 2009, making greater military combined assets use of patrols, lashkars (militias), and Only toward the conclusion of successful from the army and air tribal councils.9 This within-operation operations and the establishment of adaptation that utilized battlefield credible force in March 2009 did the force in joint operations to reports and substantial junior officer military negotiate with the Mamood ‘corner, choke, contain.’” input proved a unique “lessons learned” tribe to dismantle and surrender Taliban process and signaled a departure from militants.16 By negotiating from a position of strength and employing local 7 The Pakistani military exhibited a series of disastrous forces to carry out demobilization, the and outcomes of Pakistani military operations from 2004-2007 that resulted in cycles of military was able to establish a system operations. The sustainability of recent offensives, defeats, and three sets of negotiations and of local security that neither appeased gains remains contingent on future concessions with the Taliban (in 2004, 2005 and 2006), militants nor galvanized resistance to a political choices, civilian capacity, and providing the insurgency strength and legitimacy. This military occupation. successive operational phases. This stemmed from underestimating the enemy, a firepower article, however, contends that the intensive approach, and overreliance on the Frontier Although militant activity in Bajaur Pakistan military’s efforts in Bajaur Corps, which at the time was under-equipped and Agency is reported to have flared up Agency, the Swat Valley, and South under-trained. The capstone of this humiliation was an in November 2009, with an FC convoy Waziristan Agency have already ambush in which more than 200 Pakistani soldiers were showcased a diligent institutional captured without a fight. One Western analyst estimated learning process that has produced that the military had lost 70% of its battles with the Tali- 10 Personal interview, General (Ret.) Mahmud Durrani, significant tactical adaptations yielding ban. For details on the ambush, see BBC News, October former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, De- increasing tactical success. 9, 2007. For the battle estimate, see Economist, April 30, cember 17, 2009. 2009. For more details on prior campaign failures, see 11 Witness: Pakistan’s War: On the Front Line, al-Jazira, Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War With- January 4, 2009. in,” Survival 51:6 (2009): p. 168. 12 Durrani. 4 Kilcullen. 8 Brian Cloughley, “Insurrection, Terrorism, and the 13 Cloughley, p. 17. 5 Stephen Biddle, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Pakistan Army,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief, 14 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and December 10, 2009, p. 17. Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Af- Political Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics 6:2 (2008). 9 Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Helping Pakistan Defeat ghanistan Frontier,” International Security 32:4 (2008): p. 6 Sameer Lalwani, Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterin- the Taliban: A Joint Action Agenda for the United States 76. surgency Campaign: A Net Assessment (Washington, D.C.: & Pakistan,” Institute for Social Policy and Understand- 15 Witness: Pakistan’s War: On the Front Line. New America Foundation, 2009). ing, August 2009, p. 19. 16 Cloughley.

10 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 being ambushed,17 this is due in large the military combined assets from the military relations,28 cycles of political part to strained resources being utilized army and air force in joint operations instability,29 and calcified, regressive for the South Waziristan campaign that to “corner, choke, contain”—making economic institutions.30 will test the enduring nature of tactical greater efforts to block escape routes innovations. and drive the Taliban out of mountain South Waziristan: hideouts.21 Pakistan’s Special Service Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation) Swat Valley: Operation Rah-e-Rast (Path to Group (SSG)—basically Pakistan’s After suffering three humiliating Righteousness) special forces—was also deployed to defeats in South Waziristan since Building on successes in Bajaur, the secure areas for helicopter assaults 2004, the military approached its latest military turned its attention to a north of Swat’s largest city, Mingora.22 operation in the agency better equipped deteriorating situation in the Swat Moreover, rather than moving on to and with an estimated 30,000-60,000 Valley and its surroundings from the the next target after clearing areas, the troops.31 Although officially launched end of April to mid-June 2009. Aside military retained an enduring presence on October 17, 2009, preliminary efforts from properly resourcing the Swat with small bases and detachments to shape the operation began as early as operation with much higher levels of troops to conduct local patrols, the spring of 2009, preparing the way of troops (roughly 52,000) along enforce curfews, and prevent TTP re- for the ground assault. Intelligence with intelligence and air assets,18 infiltration.23 assets embedded in the area enabled interception of TTP communications32 In contrast to strategic assessments and assisted with targeting TTP ground “While the military discounting Pakistani military establishments for Pakistani airstrikes has demonstrated its innovation,24 the Swat operation and the highly controversial U.S. drone revealed a surprising degree of junior attacks.33 The military established a increasing proficiency officer creativity on the battlefield blockade around the target area for two in phase one ‘clear’ including the combined use of human, months prior to the ground assault to signal, and imagery intelligence as well cut-off movement and supply routes operations, the ‘hold’ phase as conventional weaponry employed while airstrikes and shelling softened will test Pakistani adaptive in unconventional ways.25 More enemy targets.34 After the military importantly, these lessons learned recognized the value of blocking forces capabilities as well as the were quickly shared and disseminated in Bajaur and Swat, they were heavily sustainability of its divide- to inculcate the practice of bottom-up emphasized and utilized during the innovation.26 South Waziristan assault,35 although and-rule approach as it their efficacy has been disputed by seeks to rebuild dilapidated Consolidating the military’s tactical outside assessments.36 tribal structures to restore success in Swat depends upon subsequent phases. The reincorporation 28 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of stability.” of two million IDPs will prove Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defense (Cambridge: Cam- challenging alongside maintaining bridge University Press, 1990); Ayesha Siddiqa, Military security and rebuilding decaying Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto economic and governance institutions Press, 2007). 27 the distinguishing innovation of the that had allowed for Taliban takeover. 29 Paul Staniland, “The Poisoned Chalice: Military Cul- operation was the deliberate mass Further constraints will be posed by ture, Contentious Politics, and Cycles of Regime Change evacuation of the population to better limited resources and systemic problems in Pakistan,” MIT working paper, 2009. target insurgents and reduce collateral including historically poor civil- 30 Omar Noman, Economic and Social Progress in Asia: 19 damage. After clearing out militants, Why Pakistan Did Not Become a Tiger (Oxford: Oxford the military merged with some civilian University Press, 1997); John R. Schmidt, “The Unravel- efforts to shift to a more population- 21 Mullick, p. 21. ing of Pakistan,” Survival 51:3 (2009). centric approach by working to resettle 22 “Pakistan Raids Taleban Stronghold,” BBC, May 12, 31 This included at least two regular infantry divisions. the internally displaced persons (IDPs), 2009; Cloughley, p. 14. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Assessing the Progress of re-establish the writ of governance, and 23 Mullick, p. 21. Pakistan’s South Waziristan Offensive,” CTC Sentinel rebuild the local economy, although 24 Daniel Byman, “Friends Like These,” International Se- 2:12 (2009). this process is ongoing and remains in curity 31:2 (2006). 32 Bukhari. 20 the balance. 25 Mullick described how commanders bucked field 33 Haider. For more on the drone strikes, see Jane May- manuals by using soldiers to help refugees escape before er, “The Predator War,” New Yorker, October 26, 2009. Rather than replicating the mistakes of the use of heavy artillery, combining intelligence sources 34 Haider; Cloughley; Frederick Kagan, Reza Jan and past assaults that had simply displaced to improve targeting, and deploying tanks in urban areas Charlie Szrom, “The War in Waziristan: Operation Rah- the Taliban to neighboring districts, to target snipers. See Mullick, p. 22. e-Nijat - Phase 1 Analysis,” www.criticalthreats.org, No- 26 Ibid. vember 18, 2009. 17 Ibid. 27 Due to a severe economic crunch, reconstruction 35 Personal interview, Shuja Nawaz, December 2009. 18 Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan’s Summer of Chaos,” Foreign has not yet begun in Swat. See Syed Adnan Ali Shah Also see Durrani. Policy, June 18, 2009. Bukhari, “New Strategies in Pakistan’s Counter-Insur- 36 Imtiaz Ali, “Military Victory in South Waziristan or 19 Durrani. gency Operation in South Waziristan,” Terrorism Moni- the Beginning of a Long War?” Terrorism Monitor 7:38 20 Ibid. tor 7:37 (2009). (2009). Also see Yusufzai.

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During the operation, significant Second, the military experimented and the expansion of operations against airpower was combined with rapid with psychological operations, soft targets beyond their conventional follow-on ground assaults.37 For the distributing leaflets supposedly from theater in recent months—all suggest first time, the Pakistani military religious authorities and local tribes that the Pakistani Taliban have not been purportedly received operational that warned youth of “false jihad” and dismantled but remain organizationally intelligence support from U.S. drones blamed foreign militants for ushering intact.49 to assist with navigation and targeting destruction into the tribal areas.44 Third, in mountainous terrain.38 Learning the military waited for a proximate Conclusion from the 2004 South Waziristan and cause—the insurgent assault on the Leading Pakistani national security the 2008 Bajaur operations, regular army’s headquarters in October—to experts have themselves been divided forces advanced from multiple axes rally popular support and ensure the over the pace of learning and adaptation and seized the high ground to encircle operation was perceived as Pakistan’s within the military. While the military and control valleys. SSG forces were own offensive, not one at the behest of the leadership has expressed confidence in integrated into the operation to mop United States.45 The focus on conducting its capacities and training facilities,50 up insurgents as the army advanced psychological and information and analysts have praised the military’s and to secure the heights and key nodal operations, amassing popular support, swift adaptation and remarkable learning points.39 The military also responded and dividing insurgents to limit the curve under logistical independence,51 to insurgent innovation and tactical scope of operations all factored into the others, such as former Chief Secretary diffusion from Afghanistan that had moderately successful outcome. of the NWFP Khalid Aziz and former introduced anti-aircraft weapons and Inspector General of the Frontier improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to While acknowledging the tactical Corps Major-General Mohammad Alam the Pakistani battlefield.40 Precision- success of the operation, former Khattak, have expressed a significant targeting by Pakistani jets was able to generals have publicly expressed need for Pakistan to adapt faster to the neutralize anti-aircraft weapons, which skepticism over the sustainability of the demands of counterinsurgency.52 could disrupt close air support, and Pakistan military’s gains, predicting effective route clearance limited damage that dispersed militants will regroup A close examination of the 2009 from IEDs.41 and resume hit-and-run operations operations in Bajaur, Swat, and South against the Pakistani Army within Waziristan testify to the Pakistan Politically innovative tactics also months46 (a development that appears military’s learning from previous effectively shaped the environment prior to have already begun47). The military’s tactical blunders of indiscriminate to the operation. The first new tactic was expected presence for three to four violence that produced tremendous narrowing the scope of the mission to months in the region could become a collateral damage and only enflamed target the Mehsud tribe while securing target for resistance and attacks, but an the insurgency.53 The cost of innovation, the neutrality of other powerful tribal early departure could quickly unravel however, has been high casualty rates groups led by Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz the hard-fought gains.48 Moreover, and the creation of new challenges, Gul Bahadur, whose participation in the despite being dislodged from their particularly the hundreds of thousands insurgency had foiled previous regional strongholds, a number of factors— of IDPs created in the 2009 operations. operations.42 Even after they renounced the escape of the TTP leadership, the While the military has demonstrated their neutrality when operations began, relatively few numbers of militants its increasing proficiency in phase one there seems to be little evidence that killed (600 out of an estimated 10,000), “clear” operations, the “hold” phase will fighters from their tribes actually fought test Pakistani adaptive capabilities as with the militants in the Mehsud camp 44 Ibid., p. 20. well as the sustainability of its divide- or attacked Pakistani forces, suggesting 45 Ali. and-rule approach as it seeks to rebuild this was more of a face-saving political 46 Retired General Talat Masood is quoted as saying, dilapidated tribal structures to restore 54 gesture rather than a defection from “The militants have the capacity to regroup and come stability. As this process moves from their original agreement with the back…South Waziristan has been a tactical success of 43 military. sorts, but by no means is it a victory.” See Alex Rodriguez, 49 Ali; Yusufzai. Based on off-the-record conversations, “Pakistan Taliban Regrouping Outside Waziristan,” Los this appears to be corroborated by Pakistani military as- 37 Bukhari. One analyst in close contact with Pakistani Angeles Times, November 26, 2009. Retired General Jav- sessments as well. military headquarters estimated there were initially ed Hussein is quoted as stating, “Three or four months 50 This is evidenced by General Kayani’s rejection of more than 140 targets slated for airstrikes. from now, they (the Taliban) are going to bounce back. counterinsurgency training. See “Counter-Insurgency 38 Julian E. Barnes and Greg Miller, “U.S. Aiding Paki- When the army is deployed to hold the area, the gueril- Training Facilities Developed: Kayani,” Daily Times, May stani Military Offensive,” Los Angeles Times, October 23, las will start their hit-and-run attacks against the army’s 17, 2009. 2009; Bukhari. lines of communication, and all over the tribal area.” See 51 Mullick; Shaukat Qadir, “Guerilla Warfare,” Daily 39 Haider; Frederick Kagan, Reza Jan and Charlie Sz- Saeed Shah, “Big Pakistan Offensive has Failed to Nab Times, September 26, 2009. rom, “The War in Waziristan: Week 1 Analysis of Op- Any Taliban Leaders,” McClatchy Newspapers, Novem- 52 Khalid Aziz, “Need for a Counterinsurgency Strat- eration Rah-e-Nijat,” www.criticalthreats.org, October ber 24, 2009. egy,” The News International, June 15, 2008. On Khattack, 26, 2009. 47 Yusufzai. see Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “Analyzing Domestic 40 Johnson and Mason, p. 67. 48 Kagan et al. indicate that the military will continue to Terrorism as a Threat to Pakistan’s Security and the 41 Kagan et al., October 26, 2009. stay for a period of time, but Johnson and Mason predict Policy Response,” IPRI Journal 9:2 (2009): p. 61. 42 Durrani; Cloughley, p. 19. fierce resistance by Pashtun tribal groups toward any 53 Johnson and Mason, p. 74. 43 Cloughley, p. 19. centralizing efforts. 54 Yusufzai. Durrani confirmed the military and stra-

12 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 tactical to strategic shifts, greater October and early November 2009, resistance will be encountered. Karachi Becoming a Karachi police arrested more than Taliban Safe Haven? 450 illegal foreign residents, mostly The Pakistan military’s learning and Afghan and Uzbek citizens suspected of adaptation has been characterized by By Imtiaz Ali having ties to militants.6 Moreover, 70 many analysts inside and outside of militants with access to suicide jackets, Pakistan as a cumulative “learning karachi is the backbone of Pakistan’s rocket launchers and other explosives by doing” process,55 suggesting that economy and the country’s largest city were arrested in the closing months of there will be gradual adjustments of 18 million people.1 The city has a 2009.7 over time within Pakistan’s approach history of ethnic and sectarian violence, to counterinsurgency rather than a yet in the last few years it has managed This article will provide background on dramatic doctrinal shift56 or wholesale to maintain relative peace. Since 2009, the city of Karachi, including how it is adoption of Western militaries’ “best however, there has been an uptick in home to jihadist and sectarian groups, as practices” by way of U.S. Army Field violent activity in Karachi, culminating well as explaining why Taliban fighters Manual 3-24. This seemingly languid pace with the December 28, 2009 bombing are increasingly moving to the city. of Pakistani adaptation will continue to of a Shi`a Ashura religious procession be the result of finite and overstretched that left more than 30 people dead.2 Brief Demography of Karachi resources,57 the inherently difficult The attack was not only followed by Karachi is Pakistan’s financial hub pace of organizational adaptation,58 and an unprecedented level of looting, but and its most populated city. It was the the divergence of Pakistani strategic it plunged Karachi into a fresh wave of country’s first capital after it achieved interests in the region from the United targeted killings.3 independence in 1947, until it was States and NATO.59 moved to Rawalpindi in 1958 and then These developments are alarming Islamabad in 1960. Karachi is located Sameer Lalwani is a Ph.D. student in the because the destabilization of Karachi in a strategic geographic position. It is Department of Political Science at the would have profound effects on on the shores of the Indian Ocean and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Pakistan. Karachi houses Pakistan’s is a major Pakistani port. It is a primary He is an affiliate of the MIT Security central bank and its largest stock entryway for supplies to U.S. and NATO Studies Program and a Research Fellow exchange, and generates 68% of the troops in neighboring Afghanistan. at the New America Foundation studying government’s revenue and 25% of the Its population has grown to more than civil-military relations, civil-conflict, country’s gross domestic product.4 18 million, and it is home to several and national security decision-making different ethnicities and religions.8 with a focus on Middle East and South It is clear that fighters from multiple Although 96% of the city is Muslim, it Asian geopolitics. He recently published Taliban factions are increasingly is estimated that 30% of that number a net assessment on Pakistani military moving to the city. Militants continue ascribes to the minority Shi`a faith; this capabilities for counterinsurgency. to flee U.S. drone strikes and Pakistani has resulted in sectarian violence over military operations in the country’s the years between minority Shi`a and northwest tribal regions. In fact, two majority Sunni Muslims.9 Karachi is months ago news reports speculated home to a sprawling network of madrasas that Taliban supreme leader Mullah (religious schools) and jihadist militant Omar himself shifted his base from groups. 5 tegic leadership was coming to terms with this insight, Quetta to Karachi. Between late made by outside observers including Johnson and Ma- The city is home to the world’s largest son, p. 73. 1 Pamela Constable, “Bombing and Fire Disrupt a Frag- number of Pashtuns. In Karachi, the 10 55 Durrani; Stephen P. Cohen and Shuja Nawaz, “Mas- ile Peace in Karachi, Pakistan,” Washington Post, January more than 3.5 million Pashtuns are tering Counterinsurgency: A Workshop Report,” Brook- 4, 2010. second only to the Urdu-speaking 11 ings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, July 2 A faction of the Pakistani Taliban initially took credit Muhajir, who are the biggest ethnic 7, 2009. for the attack, but the government blamed Lashkar-i- 56 Mullick argues this indicates a doctrinal shift (p. 23) Jhangvi. See “Suicide Bombing in Karachi Kills 30,” CBS Karachi,” Newsweek, November 28, 2009. but conversations with other analysts including Shuja News, December 28, 2009; “Taliban Claim Karachi Sui- 6 Farhan Sharif and Naween Mangi, “Karachi Police Nawaz and Moeed Yusuf imply otherwise—that this cide Attack Responsibility,” The Nation, December 30, Hunt Terror Cells as Taliban Flee Army,” Bloomberg, is a more graduated adaptation and that doctrinal shift 2009; Geo TV, December 28, 2009; Amir Wasim, “Ma- November 6, 2009. will not occur without a serious investment in retraining lik Blames LJ for Karachi Ashura Blast,” Dawn, January 7 Ibid. through the establishment of a staff college or local coun- 15, 2010. 8 Aziz and Birsel. terinsurgency training school. 3 Salis bin Perwaiz, “Political Violence Continues on 9 This is according to Pakistan’s 1998 census. For de- 57 Durrani; Lalwani. Fourth Day,” The News, January 11, 2010. tails, see www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/ 58 Austin Long, “Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The 4 Faisal Aziz and Robert Birsel, “Pakistan’s Karachi the pdfs/Karachi.pdf. U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960- Taliban Revenue Engine – Mayor,” Reuters, December 2, 10 “Editorial: Prospects of a ‘Quick Finish’ in Swat,” 1970 and 2003-2006,” RAND Counterinsurgency 2009. Daily Times, May 13, 2009. Study, No. 6, 2008. 5 “Mullah Omar in Karachi: Report,” The Nation, No- 11 Muhajir, politically organized into the Muttahida 59 Moeed Yusuf, “Rational Institutional Design, Per- vember 20, 2009; Eli Lake, Sara A. Carter and Barbara Qaumi Movement (MQM), are the descendents of Urdu- verse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan Partnership in Slavin, “Taliban Chief Hides in Karachi,” Washington speaking Indians who migrated from India after the post-9/11,” Defence Against Terrorism Review 2:1 (2009). Times, November 20, 2009; Ron Moreau, “Sheltered in creation of Pakistan in 1947. They are the biggest com-

13 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 community in Karachi, dominate the 2007—were serious and hundreds of al-Qa`ida leaders in Afghanistan, city’s administration, are constantly at people were killed. Conflicts in Karachi including Mullah Omar and Usama odds with the Pashtuns, and are ardently generally erupt over ethnic issues and bin Ladin.17 The Binori madrasa is also anti-Taliban. Karachi’s demography has the struggle for power and resources in accused of fanning anti-Shi`a and anti- been changing rapidly, attracting people the city. Muhajir, Pashtuns and Sindhis Barelvi violence. Four leading scholars due to its vast business opportunities have been at the center of the clashes. of the madrasa were killed in retaliation and educational facilities—both secular During the last 15 years, however, by other sects.18 The Binori madrasa is and religious. The city suffers from the nature of the violence in Karachi known for helping to sustain a number high ethnic tensions and cultural and has shifted toward sectarianism and of jihadist outfits, including HuM, JM religious divisions. Karachi’s police jihadism. The Afghan jihad of the 1980s and SSP.19 estimate that there are more than 5,000 left a deep impact on the city. Karachi armed militants from various jihadist attracted not only thousands of Afghan Jamiatul Rasheed Ehsanabad, Jamia groups located in the city, which has refugees, but it was overrun with Ashraful Madaris, Jamia Ehsanul further disrupted the complex fabric of weapons and jihadist outfits as well Uloom, Jamia Anwarul Quran, Madrasa society.12 Once known as the “Paris of as sectarian militant groups. Since the Khalid Bin Walid, and Darul Uloom Asia” or the “City of Lights,” Karachi mid-1990s, Sunni and Shi`a sectarian Rehmania are some of the prominent is unfortunately quickly turning into a groups have fought each other in bloody madrasas in Karachi that are suspected lawless city where banks are looted and battles. Even groups within the Sunni of having links to sectarian and businessmen kidnapped for ransom. sect have engaged one another. jihadist groups.20 These madrasas have

Home to Jihadist and Sectarian Groups Almost all of the sectarian and jihadist Since the early 1990s, Karachi has outfits in Karachi trace their background “Taliban fighters and been a safe haven for leaders of several to the city’s leading madrasas where other militant groups have militant groups such as Harkat-ul- they received ideological and financial Mujahidin (HuM), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi support during the anti-Soviet jihad long considered Karachi (LJ), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI), and in the post-jihad era. These madrasas a safe location because it Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Jaysh- may be playing a similar role today. i-Muhammad (JM), Lashkar-i-Tayyiba is unlikely the city would (LT) and lately Tehrik-i-Taliban Madrasa Networks ever face a major military Pakistan (TTP). Al-Qa`ida operatives During General Zia-ul-Haq’s 11-year rule, have also been found in the city, seen Karachi experienced the tremendous operation or drone attacks. through the arrest of Ramzi bin al- growth of madrasa networks. According Such a development could Shibh on September 11, 2002. U.S. to government estimates, out of a total journalist Daniel Pearl was abducted of 1,248 madrasas in Sindh Province, at cause huge political and and beheaded in Karachi in 2002. least 869 of these exist in Karachi.14 economic fallout and the Moreover, when leading politician The Madrasa Federation of Deobandi Benazir Bhutto’s convoy was traveling Wafaq al-Madaris, however, claims to ultimate destabilization of through Karachi in 2007, she narrowly have 1,872 madrasas in Karachi.15 It also Pakistan.” escaped an assassination attempt in puts the number of Deobandi madrasas at which more than 100 people were killed. 1,500, Barelvi madrasas at 300 and Shi`a Karachi was also used as a launching and Ahl-e-Hadith at 36 each. point for the LT militants who attacked attracted thousands of foreign students. India’s financial hub of Mumbai in Deobandi madrasas have played a leading According to government reports in 2008; moreover, the Mumbai militants role in violence.16 The Binori town 2003, 10,905 foreign students were reportedly coordinated their assault madrasa in Karachi has always been at in Karachi studying at madrasas.21 via cellular telephone with a contact in the forefront of jihad. Jihadist leaders Due to strict government policies in Karachi.13 from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and recent years, their numbers have been some from Arab countries, frequently significantly reduced, but the exact Karachi has also witnessed several visited Binori for religious and spiritual number of foreign students in Pakistani bloody conflicts in recent decades. Three guidance during the 1980s and 1990s. madrasas today is not known. As Taliban of these conflicts—in 1986, 1994 and The leader of the Binori town madrasa, fighters move to Karachi, it is likely Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai (who was that they will find support from within munity in Karachi and dominate the city’s administra- killed in Karachi in 2004) enjoyed the madrasa network. tion. During the 1990s, the MQM was involved in bloody close relations with the Taliban and factional clashes. Now, however, they are part of the 17 Zarar Khan, “Senior Sunni Muslim Cleric Gunned coalition government in Pakistan’s parliament. They are 14 “Karachi: 11,000 Foreigners in Sindh Madaris,” Dawn, Down in Karachi, Sparking Unrest,” Associated Press, anti-Taliban. January 16, 2003. May 30, 2004. 12 Huma Yusuf, “The Karachi Question: Ethnicity or Ex- 15 “Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extrem- 18 “Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extrem- tremism?” Dawn, April 30, 2009. ism,” International Crisis Group, March 29, 2007. ism.” 13 Huma Yusuf, “Launch Point for Mumbai Attacks, Ka- 16 For a background report on Deobandi Islam, see Luv 19 Ibid. rachi Faces Rising Militancy,” Christian Science Monitor, Puri, “The Past and Future of Deobandi Islam,” CTC Sen- 20 Ibid. January 14, 2009. tinel 2:11 (2009). 21 “Karachi: 11,000 Foreigners in Sindh Madaris.”

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Growing Taliban Activity in Karachi generators for the Taliban. There are Muhajir, have led to shutdowns of the U.S. drone attacks are proving to be also a rising number of incidences of super highway. one of the biggest challenges al-Qa`ida Taliban militants threatening music and operatives and Taliban leaders have ever CD shop owners. In Pashtun-dominated It has not been easy for the police to faced. Multiple al-Qa`ida and Taliban areas such as Sohrab Goth and Baldia arrest Taliban suspects in Karachi. leaders have been killed by the drones, Town, walls and bridges carry graffiti Approximately 200,000 displaced including the former head of the TTP, such as “Long Live the Taliban” and refugees from the conflict zones in the Baitullah Mehsud. The U.S. government “Welcome to the Taliban.”23 The Pashtun North-West Frontier Province and the has clearly increased its intelligence community denounces the Taliban and Federally Administered Tribal Areas assets in the tribal region, evidenced by claims that the MQM is exaggerating have migrated to Karachi in the last the rising number of successful strikes. the level of Taliban activity in Karachi year due to ongoing military operations. As a result, al-Qa`ida and especially for political reasons. This makes it difficult for the police to Taliban operatives find the only way identify militants. to avoid such strikes is to limit their When Taliban militants from the tribal militant activities or shift to safer areas come to Karachi, they reportedly Conclusion locations such as in Quetta and Karachi. have taken refuge in the city’s kacha Karachi is a vital city for Pakistan According to local police officials in abadi (slums) such as Quid Abad, Sohrab as well as for its allies. The city has a Karachi, TTP militants are heading to Goth and Kiamaree, and in the hills of complex demography suffering from the city to seek shelter and rest, as well Manghopir and Orangi town and other ethnic tension and sectarian clashes. low-income areas. Taliban militants Both the MQM and jihadist groups have such as Hasan Mahmood, a senior aide a large cache of arms and ammunition in “Karachi’s police estimate in the TTP, was reportedly arrested in Karachi.27 It is home to various militant that there are more than Karachi.24 Karachi police have arrested and sectarian groups, and violence many militants associated with the TTP, between them could easily flare. 5,000 armed militants from including one militant identified as the Approximately 70% of supplies for various jihadist groups TTP’s Karachi chief, Bahadar Khan U.S. and NATO forces in neighboring (known as Sadiq), from the crowded Afghanistan depend on this port city.28 located in the city.” Sohrab Goth area of the city.25 Hundreds of thousands of displaced Pakistanis Despite these important concerns, the and Afghan refugees are based in these Taliban are not close to overtaking the slums. city. Karachi has a powerful and liberal as funding. One Taliban source told civil society and progressive political reporters last year that Karachi is one An increase in instability in Karachi parties. It is a modern, Westernized of their main destinations for rest and could put supplies to Afghanistan at city with a large education base that to receive medical treatment. According risk. The major slums are located on the should repulse trends of Talibanization. to the source, every month a group of outskirts of Karachi on the main eastern Nevertheless, if left unchecked, the 20-25 militants arrive in Karachi where and western entry points into the city. growing influence of the Taliban in they rest for a month while a fresh group Sohrab Goth, for example, is next to the Karachi could spark violent clashes of militants replaces them in the region super highway that is used for U.S. and and eventual destabilization, which to fight.22 NATO supply convoys that travel from would have powerful ramifications for Karachi to the Torkham border crossing Pakistan. Taliban fighters and other militant into Afghanistan. In the past two years, groups have long considered Karachi a these supplies have been occasionally Imtiaz Ali is a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow safe location because it is unlikely the disrupted in Karachi, allegedly by at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington city would ever face a major military members of the TTP and other militant D.C. where he is pursuing research on the operation or drone attacks. Such a groups; insurgents have threatened Pakistani Taliban and its connection with the development could cause huge political supply drivers against carrying fuel Afghan Taliban and other terrorist networks. and economic fallout and the ultimate supplies to U.S. and NATO forces in Mr. Ali has worked for the Washington Post, destabilization of Pakistan. Afghanistan.26 These disruptions, along BBC, London’s Telegraph and Pakistan’s with ethnic violence between Sindhi premier English dailies The News and Dawn. Karachi’s municipal government, and Muhajir, and between Pashtun and He was a Knight Journalism Fellow at the John which is run by the Muttahida Qaumi S. Knight Journalism Fellowship Program at Movement (MQM), has warned about 23 Naween A. Mangi and Farhan Sharif, “Taliban Hole Stanford University during 2006-07, a Yale the possibility of the Taliban taking Up in Karachi as Pakistan Weeds Out Swat Valley,” World fellow 2008 at Yale University. Mr. Ali control of Karachi. There has been an Bloomberg, June 19, 2009. is also a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy alarming increase in bank robberies 24 Samir Quraishe, “CID Report Reveals Taliban Pres- and Understanding (ISPU) in Michigan. and kidnapping-for-ransom, both of ence in Karachi,” Daily Times, February 28, 2009. which are considered major revenue 25 “Three More TTP Militants Arrested,” Daily Times, 27 A large amount of arms and ammunition is available November 2, 2009. in Karachi because of the city’s large size, and its role in 22 “Fear of Taliban Influx Looms in Karachi,”Dawn , May 26 “Taliban Warn Truckers to Stop Supplying Fuel to ethnic and sectarian violence during past decades. 17, 2009; Ashraf Khan and Nahal Toosi, “Taliban Find- NATO Forces in Afghanistan,” Asian News Internation- 28 Imtiaz Gul, “US-NATO in the Eye of Taliban Storm,” ing Safety in Karachi,” Associated Press, May 17, 2009. al, June 21, 2008. Weekly Pulse [Islamabad], December 18, 2008.

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Uighur Dissent and long regarded popular expressions of in Xinjiang is estimated to range social and political dissent and the between 8-10 million, representing Militancy in China’s vocalization of grievances by Uighurs roughly half of Xinjiang’s total Xinjiang Province as a threat to domestic stability. China population of approximately 21 million.6 also perceives the history of Uighur Many observers often mistakenly By Chris Zambelis separatist sentiments and activities, lump the Uighurs in Xinjiang together to include two short-lived periods of with other Chinese Muslims such as in july 2009, communal rioting unsettled independence in the 20th century4 the Hui Muslims7—a Chinese Muslim the provincial capital Urumqi in and incidences of terrorist violence group constituting the largest Muslim China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region and persistent political activism, as community in China—or smaller ethnic (XAR). The rioting, between Uighurs—a a threat to its territorial sovereignty. Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, or Tajik largely Sunni Muslim and ethnic Frequently downplaying the veracity Muslim communities, exaggerating Turkic minority group—and Han of Uighur grievances, China instead Chinese, highlighted the contentious equates Uighur aspirations with those “The 9/11 attacks, in position of ethnic Uighurs in China promulgated by radical Islamists. China and the underlying tensions between links Uighur militants to al-Qa`ida and essence, provided Beijing Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang the Taliban and the specter of radical with an opportunity to in particular. The worst spate of ethno- Islam in Central and South Asia. sectarian strife in China in decades was Public statements by al-Qa`ida that frame its campaign against sparked by a confrontation between called attention to the Uighur question Uighur separatism and Uighur migrant workers and Han following the July 2009 riots raised Chinese at a toy factory in Guangdong another set of questions regarding al- other forms of activism— Province in southeastern China that left Qa`ida’s possible intentions toward both peaceful and violent— two Uighurs dead. Subsequent public China. demonstrations by Uighurs in Xinjiang in the context of the U.S. protesting the government’s handling While there is evidence of a fringe war against al-Qa`ida.” of the incident spiraled into violence.1 extremist current within the larger Approximately 192 people were killed— Uighur nationalist movement that frames two-thirds of whom were Han—and Uighur aspirations in a radical Islamist thousands more injured on both sides context and is involved in transnational their actual numbers in the process. The in the ensuing chaos that captured radical Islamist movements, the Uighur distinction between Uighurs and Hui international attention.2 question never figured prominently in al- Muslims is significant in the context Qa`ida discourse prior to the July 2009 of Chinese ethnic politics. Although Xinjiang’s Uighurs consider themselves violence. This article will examine some the Hui are regarded as essentially the targets of a systematic campaign of the key political and cultural aspects Chinese culturally, the Uighurs, in of state discrimination and repression of the Uighur question in China, shed spite of their status as an officially aimed at destroying Uighur identity light on the regional and global nature recognized minority, are largely viewed and culture and undermining Uighur and implications of Uighur activism as foreigners. Ethnic Uighur minorities rights in Xinjiang. Uighur nationalists and simmering ethno-sectarian unrest are also found in the neighboring refer to Xinjiang as East Turkistan in Xinjiang, and highlight some of the Central Asian republics8 and Uighurs or Uighuristan, and it is a region they reasons why the Uighurs are attracting likewise share close linguistic, cultural, consider their ancestral homeland. increased attention among radical and religious ties with the other Turkic For Uighurs, Beijing’s decision to raze Islamist groups such as al-Qa`ida. Muslim peoples of Central Asia. While the Old City in Kashgar, the Uighur the Uighurs are exempt from China’s cultural capital and a key stop on the Demographics and Geography one-child policy due to their official Silk Route, and to build new structures Understanding the demography and in its place is emblematic of China’s geography of Xinjiang is central to effort to diminish their perceived presence or influence 3 hostility toward them. China has comprehending the geopolitics of the in Chinese society. Uighur question. Demographic data 6 Matthew Teague, “The Other Tibet,” National Geo- 1 Andrew Jacobs, “At a Factory, the Spark for China’s on the number of Uighurs in China graphic, December 2009; Joe Havely, “Q & A: China’s Violence,” New York Times, July 15, 2009. and other parts of the region are often Restive Uighurs,” al-Jazira, July 9, 2009. 5 2 Given the generally favorable opinion of China in the politicized. The total Uighur population 7 For more background on the history of China’s Hui Middle East and greater Islamic world, China was sen- Muslims, see Matthew Dillon, China’s Muslim Hui Com- sitive to international Muslim public opinion during the 4 Two separate albeit short-lived independent Uighur- munity: Migration, Settlement and Sects (Richmond, VA: crisis. For more details about the effect of the violence in led “East Turkistan Republics” existed between 1933- Curzon Press, 1999). Xinjiang on Muslim perceptions of China, see Chris Zam- 1934 and 1944-1949. 8 With a community of approximately 300,000, Ka- belis, “Xinjiang Crackdown and Changing Perceptions of 5 Uighur or international Muslim activists concerned zakhstan is home to the largest Uighur population China in the Islamic World?” China Brief 9:16 (2009). with the plight of Uighurs may have an interest in inflat- outside of China. Kyrgyzstan is home to an estimated 3 Michael Wines, “To Protect an Ancient City, China ing the actual numbers of Uighurs in China. Similarly, 60,000 Uighurs, and approximately 6,000 Uighurs re- Moves to Raze It,” New York Times, May 27, 2009. China fearing the specter of emboldening Uighur secessionist side in Tajikistan. Smaller Uighur communities are also justified the action on the ancient city’s vulnerability to or identity activism, China may have an interest in down- found in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Paki- earthquakes. playing the number of Uighurs in Xinjiang in a possible stan, and Turkey.

16 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 minority status, China’s aggressive Congress (WUC) led by Rebia Kadeer, a radical Islamist movements outside efforts to encourage the migration of native of Xinjiang living in self-exile in of China, many observers attribute Han Chinese to Xinjiang under the the United States.13 Beijing is concerned acts of Uighur militancy to nationalist auspices of its “Go West” campaign to that foreign powers such as the United resistance or civil unrest.19 Uighurs have offset the Uighur population reflects States will use the Uighur issue as a traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan the true nature of Beijing’s concerns political lever over China.14 Beijing’s and joined the Taliban and other radical about the demographic composition of opposition to the WUC is such that it Islamist militant groups operating in the province.9 accused the group of masterminding Central and South Asia in the 1990s.20 the July 2009 violence.15 Despite a Yet, many Uighur nationalists fled the Representing its largest political lack of evidence, China considers the province for Afghanistan (as well as region, China’s Xinjiang Province is WUC to be a terrorist organization, an Pakistan and other countries) to evade located in the northwestern part of accusation likely meant to tarnish the Chinese authorities; others may have the country and shares frontiers with group’s reputation globally. intended to travel westward to gain Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, political asylum.21 Overall, the radical Mongolia, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Since the 1990s, Beijing has implicated Islamist strain of Uighur militancy Afghanistan. China’s concerns about a number of Uighur organizations constitutes a fringe among Uighur instability in Xinjiang stemming from in terrorism, including bombings, militants, not the dominant trend Uighur nationalism are compounded arson attacks, assassinations, and claimed by Beijing. due to the region’s vital strategic abductions in Xinjiang and other parts significance: Xinjiang is rich in of China.16 The ideological impetus for China’s accusations regarding the East natural resources, boasting the highest Uighur militancy, however, is a point Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM),22 concentrations of natural gas and oil of contention. China often ascribes all an obscure Uighur organization linked reserves in China,10 as well as extensive manifestations of Uighur militancy to violence and terrorism, provide coal, mineral, and water resources. to violent Islamism. The 9/11 attacks, insight into its approach to the larger Pipelines originating in neighboring in essence, provided Beijing with an Uighur question. Beijing accuses the Central Asian republics also traverse opportunity to frame its campaign ETIM of executing more than 200 Xinjiang transporting natural gas to against Uighur separatism and other terrorist attacks over the years.23 Chinese consumers. Since Xinjiang forms of activism—both peaceful and Beijing also accuses the ETIM of having shares a border with Afghanistan and violent—in the context of the U.S. war received financial and material support Pakistan, Beijing worries about the against al-Qa`ida.17 This approach from al-Qa`ida and the Taliban24 and spread of al-Qa`ida- and Taliban-style afforded China a greater license to crack of maintaining links with the Islamic influence in the province, especially down on all forms of Uighur dissent. Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),25 an amid the war in Afghanistan and al-Qa`ida-linked group with a presence mounting instability in Pakistan. Other In reality, Uighur militancy does not in Afghanistan, Pakistan and across threats, such as opium and heroin comprise a monolith—let alone a radical Central Asia.26 ETIM is also implicated trafficking, already a serious problem Islamist monolith—characterized by in plots against Chinese interests and in the region, are also a major concern Beijing.18 While acknowledging evidence other targets outside of China, such as for Beijing.11 of individual Uighur participation in an alleged plot to attack embassies—

Political Activism and Militancy 19 Sean R. Roberts, Ph.D., testimony before the U.S. Uighur rights advocates in the diaspora 13 For more details about the World Uighur Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee who engage in peaceful political (WUC) and its numerous affiliates, see the official web- on International Organizations, Human Rights, and opposition to what they often describe site of the WUC at www.uyghurcongress.org. Oversight, June 16, 2009. Also see Dru Gladney, Ph.D., as the “Chinese occupation of East 14 “‘East Turkistan’ Forces Seriously Disrupt Xinjiang’s testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Turkistan” are politically savvy, Development Progress: White Paper,” Xinhua News Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, organized, and can often count on allies in Agency, September 21, 2009. Also see “White Paper on Human Rights, and Oversight, June 16, 2009. diplomatic, human rights, and religious Development and Progress in Xinjiang,” Information Of- 20 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Cen- 12 circles. One such group, run by exiled fice of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, tral Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), Uighur activists, is the World Uighur September 21, 2009. p. 204; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale 15 “Anti-Terror Expert: World Uyghur Congress behind University Press, 2001), p. 128. 9 Henryk Szadziewski, “How the West was Won: Chi- Xinjiang Violence,” Xinhua News Agency, July 7, 2009. 21 Roberts, June 16, 2009. na’s Expansion into Central Asia,” Caucasian Review of 16 James Millward, “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A 22 The East Turkistan Islamic Movement is also often International Affairs 3:2 (2009): pp. 210-218. Critical Assessment,” East-West Center, Policy Studies referred to as the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP). 10 “Xinjiang’s Oil and Gas Equivalent Ranks First in 6, 2004. 23 Millward. China,” People’s Daily Online, July 11, 2008. 17 Sean Roberts, “Ethnic Clashes in China: Uighurs vs. 24 “Uighur Group ‘Linked to al-Qaeda,’” al-Jazira, March 11 Lei Xiaoxun and Zhu Zhe, “Xinjiang Targets Drug Han Chinese,” Washington Post, July 8, 2009. Also see 9, 2007. Trafficking,”China Daily, March 10, 2009. Yitzhak Shichor, “Fact and Fiction: A Chinese Documen- 25 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, in an effort to 12 Much to China’s chagrin, the Dalai Lama also sup- tary on Eastern Turkestan Terrorism,” China and Eurasia showcase its wider, regional focus, now refers to itself as ports Uighur rights and maintains ties to the WUC, often Forum Quarterly 4:2 (2006): pp. 89-108. the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT). likening the Uighur question to the situation in Tibet. See 18 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic 26 Bahukutumbi Raman, “Strange Bedfellows: China’s Laura MacInnis, “Uighur Unrest Shows China’s Failures Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” Asia-Pacific Center for Problems in Xinjiang are Forcing it to Reach out to India. – Dalai Lama,” Reuters, August 6, 2009. Security Studies, 2008. But Does India Care?” Foreign Policy, August 31, 2009.

17 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 including the U.S. Embassy27—and separatist agenda, many observers argue using the tactics that have never been other targets in the Kyrgyz capital that China exaggerates the perceived employed.”39 What sets TIP apart from Bishkek,28 as well as another plot to threat of ETIM by conflating all acts of other Uighur militant groups is its abduct Chinese diplomats in Pakistan violence that may occur spontaneously radical Islamist discourse reminiscent of in 2006.29 The United States designated or by the hands of other Uighur groups al-Qa`ida-inspired extremists.40 Little the ETIM a terrorist organization in to ETIM to justify further repression of is known about the TIP. Despite a lack 2002, a controversial move in light of Uighur political dissent in Xinjiang.34 of concrete evidence, TIP is sometimes reports that the U.S. decision was based Since Mahsum’s death in 2003, the referred to as an affiliate or offshoot of solely on Chinese information.30 The very existence of ETIM has also come ETIM or even ETIM operating under a group’s late leader, Hasan Mahsum, into question due to the lack of credible different label, while others believe that who was killed by Pakistani forces at information about the group that it is tied to other Central Asia-based does not originate from Beijing.35 The militants who are themselves tied to controversy surrounding the Uighurs al-Qa`ida, including the IMU. Uighur “The July 2009 violence held at Guantanamo Bay who China activists have charged that Beijing may in Xinjiang, however, accuses of membership in ETIM also be behind the creation of the TIP in an raises questions about China’s previous effort to justify further crackdowns prompted al-Qa`ida to claims about the group.36 The men, against Uighur activists in Xinjiang.41 issue its first direct threat who resided in a camp in Afghanistan for Uighur nationalists who had fled Al-Qa`ida Singles Out China against China.” Xinjiang, were detained by U.S. forces as A key feature of al-Qa`ida’s platform enemy combatants. In spite of Chinese is its determination to speak on behalf protests, the men were exonerated by of besieged Muslims across the globe. U.S. authorities, with a number of them Compared to al-Qa`ida’s emphasis on a suspected al-Qa`ida hideout in South subsequently resettled in Albania, the suffering of the Palestinians and Waziristan in 2003,31 denied that ETIM Bermuda, and Palau due to U.S. fears the overall negative impact on Muslims maintained any links to al-Qa`ida or that they would be mistreated in China. of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle the Taliban and said that the group had Seven Uighurs remain in custody at East, the plight of Uighurs in China no intention of targeting the United Guantanamo Bay.37 has received only scant attention over States.32 Details surrounding Mahsum’s presence in Pakistan are unclear. In Separate from the ETIM, in July 2008 spite of his denials of ETIM links to al- China was threatened by another obscure “It is also unclear if al- Qa`ida or the Taliban, it is conceivable Uighur militant group, the Turkistan Qa`ida has the resources that Mahsum may have eventually Islamic Party (TIP). The group released joined ranks with militants. a videotaped statement titled “Our required, namely capable Blessed Jihad in Yunnan” in the Uighur networks operating on The veracity of China’s claims tying language by “Commander Seyfullah.” ETIM to al-Qa`ida has come under The statement claimed responsibility for Chinese soil, to strike scrutiny. Although China claims a series of terrorist attacks, including inside China.” the ETIM has extensive reach and a string of bus bombings in Xinjiang, capabilities, little is actually known the southern province of Yunnan, about the group. Moreover, ETIM may Shanghai, and elsewhere.38 The video be comprised of Uighur nationalists also contained a threat to stage attacks the years. The July 2009 violence in who fled Xinjiang for Afghanistan in during the summer 2008 Olympics in Xinjiang, however, prompted al-Qa`ida the 1990s to plot against China and not, Beijing: “The Turkistan Islamic Party to issue its first direct threat against as Beijing asserts, to join forces with warns China one more time…Our aim China. Al-Qa`ida’s Algerian-based al-Qa`ida.33 While acknowledging its is to target the most critical points North African affiliate, al-Qa`ida in the related to the Olympics. We will try to Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reportedly 27 Philip P. Pan, “U.S. Warns of Plot by Group in W. attack Chinese central cities severely announced their intent to exact revenge China,” Washington Post, August 29, 2002. against China and Chinese interests, 28 Millward. 34 In addition to ETIM, China implicates a host of ob- including the approximately 50,000 29 “Editorial: Uighur Terrorist in Pakistan,” Daily Times, scure Uighur nationalist groups in violence, including June 27, 2006. the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), 39 Charles. 30 Shaun Tandon, “US Lawmakers Seek Review of Ui- United Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan (URFET), 40 One interesting aspect of TIP is its presence on the ghur ‘Terror’ Label,” Agence France-Presse, June 16, and the Uighur Liberation Organization (ULO). internet, namely its release of Arabic-language publi- 2009. 35 Roberts, June 16, 2009. cations typical of al-Qa`ida and its affiliates. For more 31 “Military Confirms Killing Chinese ‘Terrorist,’”Dawn , 36 Tandon. details, see Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Journal of the December 24, 2003. 37 “Guantanamo Uighurs Sent to Palau,” BBC, October Turkistan Islamic Party Urges Jihad in China,” Terror- 32 Mahsum’s denial of links to al-Qa`ida or the Tali- 31, 2009. ism Monitor 7:9 (2009). In a related point, since the July ban is significant considering that allies or affiliates of 38 Tania Branigan, “China Plays Down Terror Link 2009 riots, the Uighur question tends to receive more at- al-Qa`ida typically boast of their associations with the as Bus Explodes,” Guardian, July 28, 2008; Deborah tention on Arabic-language radical Islamist websites and group. See Roberts, June 16, 2009. Charles, “Group Threatens Olympics Attack, Claims chat room forums. 33 Ibid. Bombed Buses,” Reuters, July 26, 2008. 41 Roberts, June 16, 2009.

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Chinese living and working in Algeria, Chinese in particular following the July Ninawa Province: days after the riots in Urumqi.42 2009 riots may lead to further attacks Additionally, in a videotaped statement against Chinese interests in the region. Al-Qa`ida’s Remaining that featured senior al-Qa`ida leader It is also unclear if al-Qa`ida has the Stronghold Abu Yahya al-Libi that appeared online resources required, namely capable on October 7, 2009, Abu Yahya called networks operating on Chinese soil, to By Andrea Plebani on Muslims to direct their attention to strike inside China. At the same time, the plight of the Uighurs. Regarding al-Qa`ida’s decision to exploit the July since the death of Abu Mus`ab al- the violence in Xinjiang, Abu Yahya 2009 riots demonstrates its ability to Zarqawi in June 2006, al-Qa`ida in Iraq declared: harness current events dominating (AQI) has been seriously weakened as the news cycle to further validate its a terrorist and insurgent organization. This massacre is not being carried narrative as a vanguard of Islamic The group was unable to achieve its main out by criminal Crusaders or evil resistance. In this case, al-Qa`ida saw objective of creating a “genuine” Islamic Jews who have committed crimes an opportunity to speak in defense state in the heart of the Muslim world. against our nation…Today, a of what it sees as a besieged Muslim Nevertheless, AQI continues to retain new massacre is being carried minority suffering under an oppressive sufficient support and capabilities to out by Buddhist nationalists and regime as most of the world—Muslims prevent the complete normalization of communists against the Muslim and non-Muslims alike—stand by in the Iraqi system, to wage a prolonged population in eastern Turkestan… silence. low-intensity conflict (focused on several It is a duty for Muslims today strategic provinces1), and to implement to stand by their wounded and Conclusion high-profile coordinated attacks such oppressed brothers in East The nature and scope of the violence in as the operations targeting Baghdad on Turkestan...and support them Urumqi in July 2009 and the increasing August 19, October 25 and December with all they can.43 international interest among Muslims 8, 2009.2 While Baghdad continues to and non-Muslims alike in the Uighur remain AQI’s major operational center Al-Qa`ida’s decision to single out question will impact the future of the of gravity, its presence in the capital China is noteworthy on a number of region. By all accounts, China will is limited due to the strong pressure levels. Given al-Qa`ida’s unshaken continue to treat the Uighur question exerted by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) focus on targeting the United States as a vital security matter. In doing so, and U.S. forces. In this framework, and U.S. interests abroad, it is unclear it will go to great lengths to root out all several elements indicate that Ninawa if the group is capable of or interested forms of dissent, peaceful or violent, Province is the movement’s main in expending resources to target China. under the guise of counterterrorism. stronghold and financial hub.3 In this regard, al-Qa`ida may not be Meanwhile, al-Qa`ida’s foray into the interested in opening up another front politics of Xinjiang should remain This article will show how the death in its campaign that would entail taking cause for further observation. Yet it is of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in June on China directly; this would likely unlikely that the group will set their 2006 marked the gradual weakening encourage the United States and China sights on China in the near future when of AQI, identify the factors that have to cooperate more closely in destroying there are far more pressing issues at made Ninawa Province the group’s the organization. Rather, al-Qa`ida hand, such as striking their primary main remaining stronghold, and assess may be content with providing moral targets: the U.S. homeland and U.S. whether AQI has moved toward a more support to others who may choose to interests abroad. traditional terrorism campaign and strike China and Chinese interests in away from the “mini-state” model. other countries independently. Chris Zambelis is a researcher with Helios Global, Inc., a risk management consultancy AQIM, for instance, claimed based in the Washington, D.C. area. He responsibility for an attack on June 17, advises clients in the public, private, and 2009 against an Algerian paramilitary non-profit sectors on a range of social, 1 Some 79% of the attacks waged from July to September police convoy escorting Chinese political, security, and economic issues 2009 took place in four provinces: Baghdad, Ninawa, construction workers; 19 paramilitary affecting the Middle East and other regions. Diyala and Salah al-Din. See “Measuring Stability and police and one Chinese worker were He is a regular contributor to a number of Security in Iraq,” U.S. Department of Defense, report to 44 reportedly killed in the incident. AQIM publications, where he writes on Middle the U.S. Congress, September 2009. has a history of targeting foreigners in East politics, political Islam, international 2 The August 19 bombings hit the Foreign and Finance Algeria, including foreign workers, and security, and related issues. He has lived and ministries and killed at least 100 people. On October 25, the group’s apparent intent to target worked in the Middle East, East Europe and attacks targeted the Justice Ministry and the Baghdad the former Yugoslavia, and Latin America. governorate headquarters, killing at least 150 people. The 42 Liam Stack, “China Warns Citizens in Algeria of Al Mr. Zambelis is a graduate of New York December 8 attacks targeted a courthouse, two colleges, Qaeda Threat,” Christian Science Monitor, July 15, 2009. University and holds an M.S. in Foreign a mosque and a bank, killing at least 120 people. For de- 43 “China: Al-Qaeda Urges Holy War to Defend Mus- Service from Georgetown University. tails, see Steven Lee Myers and Marc Santora, “Election lims,” Adnkronos International, October 7, 2009. Date Set in Iraq as Bombs Kill Scores,” New York Times, 44 Christian Lowe and Lamine Chikhi, “Insurgents Am- December 8, 2009. bush Algerian Police Convoy, Kill 19,” Reuters, June 18, 3 Eric Hamilton, “The Fight for Mosul,” Institute for the 2009. Study of War, April 2008.

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The Post-Zarqawi Phase In a few months, and in large part due and to count on a flow of fighters, funds Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi’s death in June to the strengthening of the Awakening and materials that the local security 2006 dealt a serious blow to AQI. Since movements9 and the new strategic forces have proved unable to halt. its birth, AQI was organized around posture adopted by U.S. troops and ISF Moreover, the population involved in the al-Zarqawi, who offered charismatic, units in the wake of the “surge,” the smuggling activities can benefit from the albeit controversial,4 leadership. ISI’s power waned and the movement increased traffic and related money flow. The group was primarily guided by lost much of its ground. Caught As stated by Matthew Levitt, smuggling foreign fighters, with Iraqi militants between two fires that threatened to put is “a lucrative business, and the foreign substantially underrepresented in the an end to its battle in the “land of the fighters pipeline in Syria is believed to upper echelons of the organization.5 two rivers,” AQI gradually abandoned have benefitted the local populations on After his assassination, the movement several of its traditional strongholds in both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border in had to reorganize and overcome a crisis central-western Iraq and sought shelter of legitimacy as it was increasingly in areas that remained supportive of its “Ninawa’s geographic marginalized from its Sunni Arab cause. It also restructured its logistic supporters in Iraq. and financial networks, strengthened position has made it the cooperation with the remnants of the perfect nexus between To stem losses of local support, the new insurgency and crafted a new strategy AQI leadership6 tried to strengthen its favoring the continuation of its AQI’s needs and the links to Iraqi society. In October 2006, struggle. traditional smuggling AQI was involved in the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), an umbrella Ninawa Province: AQI’s Main Stronghold routes controlled by tribes organization of Iraqi insurgent groups Ninawa Province is characterized and communities living on led by Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi. AQI’s by a series of intertwined elements interest in creating the ISI can be seen that have made it the perfect base either side of the Iraq-Syria as an attempt to limit the deepening for AQI’s revival. It is situated in an border.” divisions that were weakening the ideal geographic position, it suffers movement. Yet it did not move fast from a strong insurgency not courted enough to prevent its near complete by Iraqi government reconciliation marginalization from Iraqi society. A initiatives, and has a sociopolitical the form of jobs, increased cash flow into growing number of Sunni Arab tribal fabric fragmented along ethno-sectarian the local economy, purchase of supplies, elders—whose economic interests as lines that is deeply affected by mistrust staples, and rents.”11 Smuggling routes well as authority had become seriously toward the central government. Select are extremely significant for local compromised by AQI7—began to view the local communities are ready to consider communities since they represent one group as a more dangerous enemy than insurgent groups as the only actors of the main sources of income in areas U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi government capable of restoring the old social order which—due to the instability of the forces. As a result, a growing number to the area. recent years and the existing Arab- of Sunni Arab tribal leaders began to Kurdish standoff—have been neglected cooperate with the new Iraqi regime The Geopolitical Factor by the central government and are and U.S.-led forces.8 Ninawa’s geographic position has made traditionally devoid of suitable and it the perfect nexus between AQI’s needs attractive economic alternatives. and the traditional smuggling routes controlled by tribes and communities Smuggling routes are not the only living on either side of the Iraq-Syria element that has made Ninawa relevant border. The relations between these for AQI. The economic importance of 4 For an in-depth analysis of AQI’s status after al- tribes and AQI were built on solid and Ninawa’s capital Mosul, for example, Zarqawi’s death, see Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: shared interests; these interests make is a major factor helping to transform The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” Washing- it less likely that the relationship will the province into AQI’s main logistical 12 ton Quarterly 29:4 (2006): pp. 19-32. backfire as it did with the Sunni Arab and support center. Beginning with 5 Personal interview, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, secretary- tribes in Anbar Province. As a result, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from general of the al-Wasat Front and the former Iraqi na- AQI has been able to rely on safe the area in 2004, the city became the tional security adviser, Como, Italy, December 6, 2009. channels, allowing it to take advantage most important financial hub for AQI, 6 AQI is now under the command of “Abu Hamza al- of the supply lines offered by the capable of providing up to 80% of its 10 Muhajir,” who is presumably the Egyptian militant Abu “facilitation networks” based in Syria, Ayyub al-Masri. 7 Another important source of hatred against AQI was 9 On this issue, see John McCary, “The Anbar Awaken- thew Levitt, “Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Im- the movement’s disregard of traditions, as described in ing: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly 32:1 pact: A Case Study of Syria and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),” David Kilcullen, “Field Notes on Iraq’s Tribal Revolt (2009): pp. 43-59; Michael Eisenstadt, “Tribal Engage- Perspectives on Terrorism 3:3 (2009); Ryan Mauro, “Has Against Al-Qa`ida,” CTC Sentinel 1:11 (2008). ment: Lessons Learned,” Military Review, September- Damascus Stopped Supporting Terrorists?” Middle 8 For an in-depth analysis of the causes of AQI’s de- October 2007; Kimberly Kagan, “Anbar Awakening: East Quarterly 16:3 (2009); Safa A. Hussain, “Enough is cline, see Brian Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Displacing Al-Qaeda From Its Stronghold in Western Enough,” www.bitterlemons.org, September 10, 2009. Learned from Inside al-Qa’ida in Iraq (New York: Combat- Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, April 5, 2007. 11 Levitt, p. 18. ing Terrorism Center, 2009). 10 For more information about these networks, see Mat- 12 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.”

20 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 internal funds13 at its height as a result This tactical cooperation shows political influence in Ninawa, cemented of a mafia-style network entrenched in that the dividing line between AQI by the victory of its list in the 2005 the city.14 Despite several ISF military and former Ba`athists is thin and at elections, created resentment among operations to destroy this network, it times overlaps. Moreover, a growing Sunni Arabs.21 This resentment has not continues to provide the movement with ideological rapprochement between the been extinguished by the pro-Sunni al- a significant financial stream. two movements appears underway, as Hadbaa coalition’s victory in the 2009 demonstrated by the statement released provincial elections.22 This has fueled Tactical Cooperation with Local Insurgent on December 2, 2009 by Ba`athist leader a strong insurgency in Ninawa that the Movements Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri,18 who invited the Iraqi government has been unable to Insurgent groups, especially former Iraqi resistance and the mujahidin to tackle. members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba`ath lay down the basis for the creation of a Party, are abundant in Ninawa new Iraqi state founded on a legislative In this context, AQI has been able to Province. Their presence has helped system that considers the Qur’an as its exploit the anger of the Sunni Arab AQI regroup in the region. Learning first and main legal source.19 community and the existing local from its losses in Anbar Province, AQI divisions. AQI has adopted a strategy did not try to impose its will on the other A Fragmented Sociopolitical Fabric that targets Ninawa’s minorities to insurgent groups active in the area, but Ninawa Province’s ethno-religious prevent the stabilization of the area, to instead forged strong tactical linkages mosaic represents another valuable asset display the Iraqi government’s inability to keep the region under the grips of for AQI’s revival. While historically to provide security, and to perpetuate the insurgency.15 In this framework, dominated by a strong Sunni Arab particularly relevant is the cooperation majority, which traditionally held “This tactical cooperation between AQI and Ba`athist groups. the levers of power, Ninawa is the Several high-level Iraqi officials,16 as seat of important Kurdish, Christian, shows that the dividing line well as U.S. General Ray Odierno, deem Shabak and Yazidi communities that between AQI and former this relationship as responsible for claim ancient and strong linkages to the high-profile attacks targeting the the territory. Under Saddam’s regime, Ba`athists is thin and at country in the last year. According to the region witnessed the effects of a times overlaps.” General Odierno, prolonged Arabization campaign— aimed at limiting the relevance of the the size of al-Qaida has been Kurdish community and strengthening reduced significantly, they can Sunni Arab identity in the area—that a climate of fear that sustains the no longer conduct the attacks altered the original ethno-religious movement directly (through its mafia- independently, they can only do map, fueling the resentment of hundreds style network) and indirectly (by it with the help of others. Baathist of families obliged to abandon their strengthening the perception that it still elements are no longer capable of ancestral homes. retains powerful military capabilities). operating independently as well, so the successes we’ve had have The fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003 This strategy also underlines a deep forced them to work together.17 and the transfer of control from U.S. understanding of the local ethno- to Kurdish security forces in 2004 sectarian balance: by attacking these in Ninawa pushed many of the Sunni communities, AQI can continue its Arab families, which settled in the struggle without waging a bloody 13 Personal interview, Safa A. Hussain, former brigadier area in the wake of the government- campaign against local institutions general in the Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi national security led Arabization process, to flee their and security forces (which maintain adviser, December 2009. homes. This added hatred to hatred strong linkages with the local Sunni 14 AQI fundraising activities in Ninawa (mainly kid- toward the new Iraqi government, community and have been accused of napping, racketeering, extortion as well as oil theft and which was perceived hostile to the collaborating with insurgents) and smuggling) rely on a network of agents located on the ter- Sunni Arabs and allied with its worst peshmerga (or Kurdish militias whose ritory and are based on an alliance of interests with local enemies: the United States, Iran and the presence in the area AQI recognizes as 20 criminal gangs. For more details, see Michael Knights, Kurdish leadership. Furthermore, the instrumental in fomenting Sunni Arab “Al-Qa`ida in Iraq: Lessons from the Mosul Security Op- growing Kurdish military, economic and anger and distrust). eration,” CTC Sentinel 1:7 (2008); Lennox Samuels, “Al Qaeda Nostra,” Newsweek, May 21, 2008; Phil Williams, 18 Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri was Saddam Hussein’s former “Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in deputy chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command 21 The 2005 elections were boycotted by the Sunni Arab Iraq,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009. Council and is the leader of one of the two wings of the community. 15 Knights. “new” Iraqi Ba`ath Party. 22 The provincial elections held on January 31, 2009 16 Sammy Ketz, “Iraq Security Adviser Warns of Qaeda 19 “A statement from the leader believer Mujahid Izzat marked the victory of the al-Hadbaa National List which, Threat Ahead of Poll,” Agence France-Presse, December Ibrahim Al Duri on the occasion of the formation of the appealing to Arab identity in the province, received 29, 2009; Khalid al-Ansary, “Iraq’s Maliki Blasts Foreign Jihad, Liberation and National Salvation Front,” posted 48.4% of the votes, defeating the Kurdish coalition that Support for Bombings,” Reuters, December 9, 2009. on al-Basrah.net, November 2, 2009. has headed the region since 2005. For a deeper analysis 17 Jim Garamone, “Commanders: Iraq Progress Will 20 “On Vulnerable Ground: Violence Against Minority of the political situation in the province, see “Iraq’s New Continue in U.S. Drawdown Year,” U.S. Department of Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territo- Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa,” International Defense, January 1, 2010. ries,” Human Rights Watch, November 10, 2009. Crisis Group, September 28, 2009.

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Toward A Major Strategic Shift? History of Terrorist Violence in France AQI has exploited local conditions to The French Approach to From the mid-1970s, France and other transform Ninawa into one of its main Counterterrorism European countries faced threats from strongholds. Yet this achievement separatist or left-wing terrorists. In could represent just one element of a By Charles Rault 1985, for example, General René Audran, broader strategic shift by AQI aimed at the chief of arms sales for the French reversing the debacle it suffered during in the last five years, a number of Ministry of Defense, was assassinated the last three years. In this regard, the terrorist attacks have occurred in by the urban guerrilla group Action creation of a solid base in the province Western Europe. In March 2004, Directe.2 In 1986, the same group was and the completion of the Iraqification Islamist terrorists attacked Madrid’s blamed for the murder of Georges Besse, process of the group that started after commuter train system, killing 191 the director of the French automotive al-Zarqawi’s death has been coupled people. On July 7, 2005, Islamist company Renault.3 with a series of initiatives aimed at terrorists struck London’s public adapting the movement’s strategy transportation system, killing more From 1982 to 1987, terrorist violence to local conditions and to exploit its than 50 people. A number of other in France peaked after state-sponsored traditional strengths. plots in Western Europe have been terrorist groups from the Middle East disrupted. Since the 9/11 attacks on the targeted French interests in the context The recent terrorist attacks that hit United States, France has managed to of East-West tensions generated by Baghdad indicate that AQI is increasing escape a terrorist attack. Nevertheless, the Cold War.4 Groups such as the high-profile coordinated attacks against the threat to France remains high, and Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization Iraqi political targets and institutions, French authorities believe that it is only (ANO) and Lebanese Hizb Allah, in in addition to continuing its campaign a matter of time before their country is addition to Carlos “The Jackal,” were aimed at fostering sectarian divisions. targeted successfully, likely by militants the most active. In 1988, the ANO The decision to focus on these types of associated with al-Qa`ida in the Islamic executed four French citizens on a attacks—widely recognized as an AQI Maghreb (AQIM).1 Greek tourist boat, the City of Poros. trademark—could indicate a shift from Hizb Allah conducted a campaign of the “ISI paradigm” of transforming There are a number of reasons why 13 terrorist attacks beginning in 1985 areas under jihadist control into states France has not suffered a terrorist that culminated with an attack against or mini-states administrated according attack in more than a decade. One reason the store “Tati” at Rue de Rennes in to Shari`a.23 By concentrating on high- is due to the successes of the country’s Paris in 1986, killing seven people profile attacks, AQI could be moving experienced and well-established and wounding 66.5 Known for having toward a more traditional terrorism counterterrorism apparatus. France’s planned the attack on the headquarters campaign, aimed at reasserting AQI’s security apparatus was strengthened of the Organization of the Petroleum role in the country and limiting the huge in the last two decades in response to Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna losses experienced by the movement multiple terrorist attacks that struck in 1975, Venezuelan terrorist Carlos since 2006. the country in the 1990s—effectively “The Jackal” first joined the Palestinian foreshadowing today’s threat of cause as a member of the leftist Popular Andrea Plebani is a Ph.D. candidate at Islamist terrorism. It is useful to review Front for the Liberation of Palestine Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of France’s domestic counterterrorism (PFLP) before operating undercover for Milan and Program Manager of the Italian efforts to better understand how other East Germany’s Stasi and Romania’s think-tank Landau Network-Centro Volta governments have met this growing Securitate.6 In 1982, Carlos was (LNCV). Mr. Plebani would like to thank challenge. This article will provide Professor Riccardo Redaelli and all the background on previous terrorist attacks 2 Frederick Painton, William Dowell and William Iraqi and American friends of the LNCV targeting France, the government’s McWhirter, “Terrorism New Generation of Violence,” Iraq Group who contributed to the ideas in overall view toward counterterrorism, Time Magazine, February 11, 1985. this analysis. and finally the tactics it uses to combat 3 Action Directe denied any responsibility. In Domin- the ongoing terrorism threat. ique Lorentz’s and David Carr-Brown’s La République atomique: France-Iran le pacte nucléaire film documentary, the authors suggest that Besse might have been killed by Iranian operatives due to his previous involvement in the nuclear-related disagreements between France and Iran. 1 According to French former counterterrorism judge 4 In this context, terrorist groups also targeted U.S. and Jean-Louis Bruguière, the current threat level is four, Jewish interests. with five the highest. See “L’ancien juge Jean-Louis Bru- 5 There were a number of motives behind Hizb Allah’s 23 This strategy seems to be based on Abu Bakr Naji, guière évalue trente ans de terrorisme,” La Voix du Nord, targeting of French interests. The group demanded the an important jihadist ideologue who wrote Idarat al- November 7, 2009. As for the claim that the greatest ter- release of Lebanese militant Georges Ibrahim Abdal- Tawahhush (Management of Savagery). In his book, Naji rorist threat to France is likely from AQIM militants, see lah, which France refused to do. Moreover, France was indicates a plan to re-establish the caliphate and, accord- personal interview, former DGSE intelligence officer, targeted due to its alleged support for the Christian Ma- ing to his program, under the “management of savagery” Paris, November 6, 2009. AQIM was formerly known ronites. Iran was also not pleased with French support to stage, the mujahidin should transform the areas under as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. their control into states or semi-states which they should French sources argue that the GSPC’s connection to al- 6 John Follain, Jackal: The Complete Story of the Legendary administrate according to Shari`a law. Qa`ida is nominal, not operational. Terrorist, Carlos the Jackal (New York: Arcade Publish-

22 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 involved in supplying weapons in the during attacks against metro stations in Today, France remains a priority failed rocket attack against the French Paris.12 target for al-Qa`ida and its affiliates.16 nuclear power station Superphénix.7 In In December 2008, for example, the 1983, Carlos’ group killed four people Despite these attacks, French counterterrorist section of the French in a bombing against two TGV high- intelligence moved quickly to disrupt criminal investigation department and speed trains in France.8 Reportedly a the GIA networks, and this caused the the domestic intelligence organization, convert to Islam, Carlos once preceded terrorist group to increasingly move the Central Directorate of Interior Usama bin Ladin as the most dangerous its logistical, funding and propaganda Intelligence (DCRI), detained several global terrorist.9 In 1994, Carlos was activities to other European countries, people for questioning who had apprehended by French authorities, especially to the United Kingdom. Over suspected ties to Afghan networks.17 and is now serving a life sentence in a time, due to tensions between the GIA’s The suspects planned to attack the Paris prison for the 1975 murders of two core members on the extreme use of newly-built headquarters of the DCRI French intelligence agents and one of violence against civilians, Muslims in Levallois-Perret with a car bomb.18 their informants. included, and successful French counterterrorist efforts, the GIA’s More recently, in October 2009 Adlene Beginning in the early 1990s, Islamist operations and influence faltered. Hicheur, a 32-year-old French nuclear extremists recruited youth in the physicist of Algerian origin, discussed impoverished French suburbs and The terrorist incidents of the 1990s possible terrorist attacks targeting radicalized several of them to undertake showed France the level of sophistication terrorist operations. The Islamist that terrorist groups could achieve. “Although it was on terrorist threat grew dramatically when The GIA and other networks took the Algerian government annulled the advantage of European laws—such as a smaller scale when victory of the Islamic Salvation Front a lack of extradition agreements—to compared to today, France (FIS), the largest Algerian Islamic build extended networks. This had opposition party, in the first round of ramifications throughout North Africa nevertheless saw the Algeria’s legislative elections in 1991. and Western Europe. Although it was on 1990s as a period that The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) opted a smaller scale when compared to today, for violent tactics in 1992 and 1993 France nevertheless saw the 1990s as a foreshadowed the current in response to the annulment, and period that foreshadowed the current fight against al-Qa`ida and it began to target those suspected of fight against al-Qa`ida and related supporting the Algerian government. groups. Today’s Islamist terrorist related groups.” It also designated foreigners in Algeria groups share a similar ideology that is and French people everywhere as hostile to democracy and that rejects priority targets.10 On the pretense social and political progress.13 Moreover, that French authorities opposed the “homegrown” converts to Islam engaged French businesses and military GIA by dismantling its logistical and in jihadist actions as early as 1996 in barracks.19 He allegedly exchanged funding networks in France, the group France, when the “gang de Roubaix”14 e-mails with members of AQIM in North decided to strike France. In addition robbed banks and attempted to blow up Africa. Although he never reached the to assassinating French people in a car with gas cylinders at a G7 meeting operational stage, Hicheur is now being Algeria, the group took an Air France in Lille, France.15 The case demonstrated held under “provisional detention” with flight hostage on December 24, 1994.11 to French intelligence the danger posed no time limit. What raised concern in the In 1995, the GIA killed eight people by a few fanatic individuals and the intelligence community is that he was interaction between violent crime and working on the Large Hadron Collider ing, 1998). terrorism. Indeed, Islamist terrorism (LHC), a unique scientific project led 7 Mycle Schneider, “The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” was already international, long before by the Switzerland-based European speech to the French National Assembly, December 10, 9/11. Organization for Nuclear Research 2001. (CERN) and that uses state-of-the-art 8 “Suspected Terrorist ‘Carlos the Jackal’ to Face Trial,” nuclear-related technology. NewsMax, May 4, 2007. 12 “Attentats de 1995: le procès tant attendu,” RFI, Sep- 9 David Yallop, Tracking the Jackal: The Search for Car- tember 30, 2002. In December 2005, Rachid Ramda, los, the World’s Most Wanted Man (New York: Random accused of organizing the 1995 metro bombings, was House, 1993). extradited to France from the United Kingdom. Ramda 10 Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, Histoire du terror- was convicted in 2007 for involvement in the GIA and isme, De l’Antiquité à Al Qaida (Paris: Bayard, 2006). the metro bombings. He received a life sentence. 11 The hostage-taking on Christmas Day in 1994 of Air 13 Abdelhak Layada, one of the founders of the GIA, was France flight AF8969 and the successful neutralization quoted as saying “political pluralism is equivalent to se- 16 “Al Qaeda Threatens France for Perceived Anti-Burqa of the four Algerian GIA terrorists by the National Gen- dition.” See Jeune Afrique, January 27, 1994. Stance,” CNN, June 30, 2009. darmerie Intervention Group (GIGN) task force made the 14 The Gang de Roubaix was run by two French converts 17 “Comment on traque les terroristes,” Le Point, March French people realize the seriousness of the threat. It also to Islam, Christophe Caze and Lionel Dumont. It counted 12, 2009. gave them confidence in the government’s capacity to up to six members. 18 Ibid. address it. The terrorists’ final objective was to crash the 15 Mary Dejevsky, “Islamic Terror Link to French Siege,” 19 “Suspect Physicist Discussed Attacks on French plane into the Eiffel Tower, a tactic later used on 9/11. Independent, April 2, 1996. Army,” Associated Press, November 17, 2009.

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The French Government’s View on the French.23 Algeria eventually gained minimal and remote, in connection with Counterterrorism independence. a terrorist plot, or “enterprise.”25 This Led by judges from the counterterrorism law can be somewhat compared to the section of the public prosecutor’s office, French Counterterrorism Tactics U.S. Federal Racketeer Influenced and counterterrorism investigations— France pursues a number of Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that whether domestic or foreign—are strategies to counter terrorist groups. stipulates conducted in the same manner as a France’s intelligence agencies criminal investigation. Terrorists emphasize international cooperation, it shall be unlawful for any person are treated as any other dangerous human sources and the training of employed by or associated with criminal to delegitimize their “cause.” counterterrorist operatives. It addresses any enterprise engaged in, or From the French viewpoint, the special the psychological dimension of the the activities of which affect, jurisdiction for enemy combatants at mission by following a strict three-tier interstate or foreign commerce, to Guantanamo Bay is counterproductive approach that combines compliance, conduct or participate, directly or because it elevates terrorists to a coherence and convergence.24 This indirectly, in the conduct of such higher level of importance, bolstering means that to reach optimal efficiency, enterprise’s affairs through a their narrative. Moreover, the French counterterrorism must be inventive pattern of racketeering activity or government views the threat of terrorism collection of unlawful debt.26 differently from the United States. Although France considers Islamist “In basic terms, French Another tactic used by French law terrorism a major threat, it does not law authorizes the arrest enforcement to prevent terrorist attacks view terrorist actions as an “act of war” is to “incite” one or several suspects against France or against the West as a and prosecution of any to break the law, often through the whole.20 France defines terrorism as the individual who played a use of undercover agents. This is violent expression of extremism, which permissible in the French legal system is sometimes motivated by religion role, however minimal if the objective is to prevent a more and other times motivated by different and remote, in connection dangerous or impending offense. The factors. intelligence services employ the same with a terrorist plot, or tactics to trace a network. Such special This definition was borne out of ‘enterprise.’” clauses only apply to cases related to France’s extensive history of dealing procurement, narcotics and threats to with guerrilla and terrorist tactics. the security of the state, which includes In the Algerian War,21 for example, terrorism. Only a few magistrates France learned that military victory and flexible while remaining within control the legality of these actions, and on the ground did not guarantee an the confines of the law. Renouncing their activities are highly classified. The end to terrorist attacks. Moreover, it democratic principles to further a French penal code that was modified realized that the “hearts and minds” of counterterrorism mission will only help in 2006 allows counterterrorism a population could not be won through terrorists spread their ideology and agents to investigate cases and testify military action alone. Indeed, as it bolster their “martyr” narrative. anonymously by providing the judiciary faced growing resilience from National with their administrative registration Liberation Front (FLN)22 networks, The main tool in the French number.27 An agent’s real identity can the French military increasingly used counterterrorist arsenal is a unique only be unveiled upon the decision of harsher measures to the detriment and far-reaching law that makes “an the attorney general at the Court of of conventional military procedures. intention to commit a crime a crime Appeal in Paris. Consequently, the Although these harsher tactics itself.” By accusing an individual of law authorizes the agents to “enter,” were more successful in gathering “association with wrong-doers involved or infiltrate, networks under their intelligence, it turned a large part of the in a terrorist enterprise,” the French agency’s supervision. These agents are local Arab population in Algeria against judiciary can arrest and detain any compartmentalized from conventional suspect for any crime that could have units of their own service and their ultimately assisted terrorist activity. operations are carried out in complete 20 This is a marked difference to the former U.S. admin- In basic terms, French law authorizes secrecy. France has a long history istration of George W. Bush, which declared a “global the arrest and prosecution of any of infiltrating terrorist and criminal war on terrorism.” individual who played a role, however networks, and its intelligence and 21 The Algerian War began on November 1, 1954 and law enforcement agencies have been ended on March 19, 1962. Although the French led a suc- 23 For details on the war, see: Lt.-Col. James D. Camp- successful at this tactic for decades. cessful counterinsurgency strategy and achieved mili- bell, “French Algeria and British Northern Ireland: Le- tary victory, Algeria gained independence. The memory gitimacy and the Rule of Law in Low-Intensity Conflict,” of this conflict still hampers good relations between the Military Review, March-April 2005; David Galula, Coun- two countries. terinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Santa Barba- 25 French Penal Code, Article 421-2-2. 22 The National Liberation Front is a socialist political ra, CA: Praeger, 2006); Alistair Horne, A Savage War of 26 Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 party in Algeria. It was established on November 1, 1954 Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: NYRB, 2006). U.S.C. § 1961-1968, enacted in 1970, Section 1962, para- from a merger of smaller groups, with the objective of ob- 24 Personal interview, André Tarrat, former DST senior graph c. taining Algerian independence from France. intelligence officer, Paris, November 7, 2009. 27 French Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 706-24.

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French authorities have also understanding of the threat. Specific the army controller general from the progressively built a robust surveillance studies programs exist, such as the Ministry of Defense. network that privileges the use of Paris-based Research Department human sources. It identifies people who on Contemporary Criminal Threats Conclusion spend time with individuals known (DRMCC), which develops relevant France has faced terrorist threats for having extremist views. Foreign theories on “early detection”31 and for decades. As a result, it has a intelligence identifies and monitors trains people from various backgrounds well-established counterterrorism specific locations where jihadists pass on the concept.32 apparatus that benefits from a number through (such as in Pakistan’s tribal of laws that do not have real parallels areas). Allied intelligence agencies The population is the last line of defense. in the United States, from being able often inform their French counterparts Since the events of the 1990s, the to detain any individual who is even of the presence of people of interest. French people have become accustomed remotely connected to a “wrong- Occasionally such individuals are to living under the terrorism threat, and doer,” to operating in a more secretive recruited for intelligence purposes. there are a number of public vigilance political environment. Moreover, the Moreover, French intelligence services programs. For two decades, the French role of counterterrorism judges greatly have identified and extracted relevant public has been encouraged to report assists the centralization of the French data from the mass of information any suspicious package or activity to security apparatus, as these judges available on the internet. the authorities. are in constant interaction with the judiciary, law enforcement and the Similar to the constantly changing Finally, the French would argue that intelligence agencies. The purpose of tactics of terrorist groups, French counterterrorism and intelligence the counterterrorism judges—such as counterterrorism authorities are agencies in the country benefit the well-known former judge Jean- constantly adapting to recent from a higher level of secrecy and Louis Bruguière—is to “connect the developments. At the end of 2009, for centralization. Contrary to the United dots.” Many of these benefits are unique example, French Interior Minister Brice States, there is no independent authority to France, as the population supports Hortefeux announced that France would in charge of controlling France’s practices that in the United States be grouping its elite police intervention intelligence agencies. Following the would be viewed as a violation of civil units into a single force to better fight reshaping of the counterterrorism law liberties. Nevertheless, it is useful for potential terrorist attacks.28 The move in 2006, however, an eight-member Western governments to study French will combine three existing units— parliamentary delegation in charge of counterterrorism practices due to their comprising a total of 500 people— intelligence affairs was established success in countering multiple terrorist under a single command, known as to monitor the general activities of plots after the violence of the 1990s. the Intervention Force of the National the country’s intelligence services. Police (FIPN).29 Nevertheless, the body has never Charles Rault is an analyst specialized in delivered a report to the public, except non-conventional threats. He is the director On a larger scale, considering that the names of the delegation’s members. of the International Security Research and counterterrorism cannot rely solely Moreover, no public testimony has Intelligence Agency (ISRIA), an information on specialized agents, the search for been given by any high-ranking French analysis and global intelligence company, operational intelligence is one of the intelligence official; in the United and a Senior Adviser with the Athens- primary missions of non-specialized States, on the other hand, this happens based Research Institute for European internal security forces. This results several times a year. Foreign intelligence and American Studies (RIEAS). He has in all agencies’ and units’ contribution conducted by the General Directorate advised various state institutions and large in the detection and upward flow of for External Security (DGSE) is placed companies in the assessment of current and intelligence for use in counterterrorism. under the direct authority of France’s future threats. For a good understanding of what is at president and prime minister. Domestic stake, the government renewed law intelligence conducted by the DCRI enforcement training programs and is monitored by the criminal justice developed continuing education models system, although disagreements are so that all units know about the social and rare. Military intelligence under the religious environment in French society Directorate of Military Intelligence so that they can better recognize and (DRM) and the Security and Protection identify indications of possible terrorist Department (DPSD) is controlled by activity.30 Moreover, information- sharing between government officials 31 “Early detection” consists of making an early diagno- and academics has fostered a better sis of a potential security threat to act precisely and de- cisively. 28 “France to Form Special Force to Fight Terrorists,” 32 Including a master-level degree in the analysis of con- Associated Press, December 1, 2009. temporary criminal threats which the author of this arti- 29 Ibid. cle attended. In French, the theory is named le décèlement 30 La France face au terrorisme, Livre blanc du Gouverne- précoce. For details on the theory, see Xavier Raufer, Les ment sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme (Paris: La Nouveaux Dangers Planétaires - Chaos Mondial, Décèlement documentation Française, 2006). Précoce (Paris: CNRS-Arès, 2009).

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Recent Highlights in however, has been increasingly strained. Shi`a district of Sadr City, killing at Al-Shabab, a major insurgent group in least eight people. Among the dead were Terrorist Activity Somalia, is linked to al-Qa`ida. – Voice of reportedly six children between the ages America, December 2 of six and 12. – al-Jazira, December 7 December 1, 2009 (UNITED STATES): U.S. President Barack Obama announced December 3, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide December 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A that 30,000 additional U.S. troops bomber killed the head of Salah al-Din suicide bomber killed 10 people outside would be deployed to Afghanistan as Province’s anti-terrorism squad in Tikrit. a courthouse in Peshawar, the capital of part of the administration’s strategy to Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmed al-Fahel the North-West Frontier Province. – AP, stabilize the country by reversing Taliban died in the blast, along with three of his December 8 “momentum.” The troops would also bodyguards. – AFP, December 3 prevent al-Qa`ida from establishing a December 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): safe haven. President Obama said that the December 3, 2009 (SOMALIA): A suicide Two suicide bombers detonated their troops would be deployed starting in early bomber struck a graduation ceremony explosives at a popular market in Lahore, 2010 “with a goal of starting to withdraw for medical students at the Shamo Hotel killing at least 50 people. – AP, December 8; forces from the country in July 2011.” – in Mogadishu, killing three cabinet The News International, December 9 CNN, December 2 ministers and at least 16 other people. The bomber was disguised as a veiled woman. December 8, 2009 (IRAQ): At least five December 1, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide No group claimed responsibility for the car bombs exploded in neighborhoods bomber killed a provincial politician, attack, although authorities blamed al- across Baghdad, killing 127 Iraqis. Three Shamsher Ali Khan, in the Swat Valley. Shabab. An al-Shabab spokesman denied of the car bombs reportedly involved Khan was a member of the Awami that the group was involved. – Los Angeles suicide bombers. The Islamic State of National Party. The bomber reportedly Times, December 4; Independent, December 4; AP, Iraq, which is directly tied to al-Qa`ida walked unchallenged into the grounds December 5 in Iraq, claimed credit for the attacks. of Khan’s house and then detonated his – St. Petersburg Times, December 9; Telegraph, explosives. – al-Jazira, December 2 December 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): December 9 Twenty-five NATO allies agreed to send December 2, 2009 (UNITED STATES): 7,000 more troops to Afghanistan in December 8, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. Homeland Security Secretary support of U.S. President Barack Obama’s suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone Janet Napolitano warned, “Individuals December 1 decision to send 30,000 more killed at least three militants in North sympathetic to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, U.S. soldiers to the country. – Reuters, Waziristan Agency of the Federally as well as those inspired by their ideology, December 4 Administered Tribal Areas. The strike are present in the U.S., and would like occurred in Spalga, 10 miles east of Miran to attack the homeland or plot overseas December 4, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Shah. – Reuters, December 7 attacks against our interests abroad.” mosque frequented by military officials in – Washington Post, December 3 Rawalpindi was targeted by two suicide December 8, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. bombers during Friday prayers. At least unmanned aerial drone killed Salah December 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide two other militants then opened fire on al-Somali in Pakistan. Al-Somali was bomber detonated his explosives at a worshippers. Approximately 36 people identified as the head of al-Qa`ida’s security checkpoint outside Pakistan’s were killed. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan operations outside of Afghanistan and naval headquarters in the heart of claimed credit for the attack. – Reuters, Pakistan. U.S. officials took credit for the Islamabad. Two naval personnel were December 4; CNN, December 7 operation, saying that al-Somali was on killed in the blast. – Bloomberg, December 2; the Central Intelligence Agency’s list of BBC, December 2; Dawn, December 4 December 6, 2009 (IRAQ): Unidentified the top 20 al-Qa`ida targets. – Wall Street gunmen killed four policemen guarding a Journal, December 12 December 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): The vegetable market in Abu Ghurayb on the mayor of Karachi said that the city is the outskirts of Baghdad. – AFP, December 6 December 8, 2009 (NORTH AFRICA): “revenue engine for the Taliban.” Mayor Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb claimed Syed Mustafa Kamal told Reuters, “People December 6, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A bomb credit for the November kidnappings of are being kidnapped here in Karachi exploded outside a mosque in Bajaur three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania, and the ransom is taken in Waziristan.” Agency of the Federally Administered and the kidnapping of French national – Reuters, December 2 Tribal Areas, killing two anti-Taliban Pierre Kamat in Mali. – Voice of America, tribal leaders. – AFP, December 6 December 8 December 2, 2009 (SOMALIA): Abdinasir Seraar, the spokesman for the leader of December 7, 2009 (IRAQ): Five gunmen December 9, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani the Ras Kamboni insurgent faction in shot dead six members of an anti-al- authorities arrested five Muslim- Somalia, said that the group now considers Qa`ida militia as they were manning a American men in Sargodha, a major city in al-Shabab to be the greatest threat to the checkpoint in Nadim village, 19 miles Punjab Province, on suspicion of having country. The Ras Kamboni faction is part north of Baghdad. – AFP, December 5 ties to Pakistani extremist groups. The of the Somali insurgent coalition Hisbul men, who are all from the Washington Islamiyya, which has previously allied December 7, 2009 (IRAQ): A bomb ripped D.C. suburbs, were allegedly on their way itself with al-Shabab. This relationship, through a school for boys in Baghdad’s to North Waziristan Agency for training

26 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 with the Taliban and al-Qa`ida. It appears played a role in forging links between authorities identified one of the dead as that the men used the internet—including the ASG and Jemaah Islamiya and al- Mohammed Saleh Mohammed Ali al- Facebook and YouTube—to connect with Qa`ida. The United States is asking for Kazemi, described as a deputy in an al- extremist groups in Pakistan. The men his extradition for the 1993 kidnapping of Qa`ida cell in Yemen. – Washington Post, were reportedly recruited on the internet an American missionary in Pangutaran, December 17; CNN, December 18 by a man identified as “Saifullah,” who Sulu Province. According to the Philippine authorities in Pakistan are trying to find. Inquirer, “Latip was arrested by Indonesian December 17, 2009 (SOMALIA): Al- – New York Times, December 10; NPR, December authorities last Nov. 21 and turned over to Shabab militants stormed three UN Mine 11; Washington Post, December 13 the Philippine Embassy in Jakarta, which Action Service compounds in Baidoa. sent him back to the Philippines.” – BBC, – AFP, December 18 December 11, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A December 16; Philippine Inquirer, December 17 suicide bomber detonated his explosives December 18, 2009 (UNITED STATES): on a busy street in Paktika Province, December 17, 2009 (GLOBAL): A wife Three suspected members of al-Qa`ida in killing three people. One of the dead was of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Omaima Hassan, the Islamic Maghreb arrived in New York a policeman. – AFP, December 11 purportedly released a message to Muslim to be charged with plotting to transport women urging them to “raise your children drugs through the Sahara desert to raise December 13, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): to obey Allah and love jihad and to defend money for terrorist attacks. The men, Approximately 70 suspected Islamic the Muslim lands.” The message further all apparently from Mali, were arrested militants broke through a concrete said, “Fighting is not easy for women by local authorities in Ghana in the past wall and then stormed into a jail in the because they need a male guardian by week and then turned over to U.S. agents. southern Philippines, freeing 31 inmates. their side…But we can place ourselves – AP, December 18 At least five of the escaped militants were in service of the mujahidin and do what members of the Moro Islamic Liberation they ask of us. We can help by supporting December 18, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Front and 12 were from the Abu Sayyaf warriors with money or information or suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked a Group. – The Scotsman, December 14 even by a martyrdom operation.” – CNN, mosque next to a police headquarters in December 17 Lower Dir District of the North-West December 14, 2009 (SPAIN): A Spanish Frontier Province. At least 11 people were court convicted 11 Islamic militants of December 17, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. killed by the explosion. – Los Angeles Times, membership in a terrorist group. The unmanned aerial drone killed two people December 19 court, however, acquitted the men of a in a vehicle in Dosali village, located in “specific” conspiracy to attack Barcelona’s North Waziristan Agency of the Federally December 18, 2009 (MAURITANIA): metro subway system in January 2008. Administered Tribal Areas. – AP, December An Italian couple was kidnapped by The judges found that the “Barcelona 17 gunmen in Mauritania. On December 27, plot” had “not advanced sufficiently” to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb claimed be considered a crime of conspiracy under December 17, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Five responsibility for the kidnapping. – AP, Spanish law. – CNN, December 14 U.S. unmanned aerial drones attacked December 19; Reuters, December 28 two compounds in the Ambarshaga December 15, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A area of North Waziristan Agency in the December 21, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide suicide bomber in a vehicle killed at least Federally Administered Tribal Areas, bomber killed a local leader and three of eight people near a hotel in the Wazir killing 15 people. Zuhaib al-Zahibi, an his guards in Tal Afar, Ninawa Province. Akbar Khan district in Kabul. – BBC, al-Qa`ida commander, was reportedly The leader, Hussein Akris, was an December 15 among the dead. – Washington Post, December independent politician who heads the Tal 18; AP, December 17 Afar governing council. – Reuters, December December 15, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A 21; AP, December 21 suicide bomber killed two British soldiers December 17, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A out on patrol in Helmand Province. Two suicide bomber detonated his explosives December 22, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Afghan army soldiers also died in the at the home of a local political leader suicide bomber detonated explosives blast. – BBC, December 15 in Bannu District of the North-West outside a press club in Peshawar, killing Frontier Province. The bomber was the three people. – AP, December 21; AP, December December 15, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A only casualty. – AFP, December 17 22 suicide bomber rammed his vehicle into the outer wall of a provincial minister’s December 17, 2009 (RUSSIA): A suicide December 23, 2009 (INDIA): Indian home in Punjab Province, killing at least bomber in a vehicle targeted a group of Home Minister P. Chidambaram said that 20 people. The lawmaker, Zulfiqar Khosa, policemen at a checkpoint in the city “twelve to 13 terror attacks [in India] were was not at home during the time of the of Nazran, located in Ingushetia. The neutralized in 2009 which could have attack. – Bloomberg, December 15 explosion wounded seven officers. – AP, been like Mumbai.” – AFP, December 23 December 17 December 16, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): December 24, 2009 (IRAQ): Two bombs Philippine authorities have arrested December 17, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemeni ripped through a busy bus station in Abdul Basir Latip, who has been identified security forces killed at least 28 suspected Hilla, Babil Province, killing 15 people. as a founding member of the Abu Sayyaf al-Qa`ida militants at a training camp – AFP, December 24 Group (ASG). Authorities allege that Latip in al-Maajala, Abyan Province. Yemeni

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December 24, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): December 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A CTC Sentinel Staff A suicide bomber driving a horse-drawn suicide bomber attacked a Shi`a religious cart loaded with explosives blew up in procession in Karachi, killing at least 40 Editor-in-Chief Kandahar, killing eight people. – New York people. – CNN, December 29 Erich Marquardt Times, December 24 Senior Editor, CTC December 28, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemeni December 24, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A authorities arrested 29 suspected al- Editorial Board suicide bomber killed five people near Qa`ida members and announced that they COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. a security checkpoint in Peshawar, foiled an attack on government targets in Department Head the capital of the North-West Frontier addition to the British Embassy. – Christian Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Province. – Washington Post, December 24 Science Monitor, December 28

COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. December 24, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A December 29, 2009 (INDIA): The Deputy Department Head suicide bomber detonated explosives U.S. government issued an alert for Department of Social Sciences (West Point) outside a Shi`a shrine on the main road Americans traveling to India, stating, from Islamabad to the international “The US government continues to receive LTC Reid Sawyer airport, killing a six-year-old girl. – AFP, information that terrorist groups may be Director, CTC December 24 planning attacks in India.” – AFP, December 29 Christopher Heffelfinger December 24, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemeni FBI Fellow, CTC aircraft killed 34 suspected al-Qa`ida December 30, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A militants in Shabwa Province. – AFP, suicide bomber killed seven CIA agents December 23 at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost Province. An officer of Jordan’s December 25, 2009 (UNITED STATES): General Intelligence Directorate was also Contact Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, killed. Multiple Taliban factions claimed Combating Terrorism Center attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines credit for the attack. – New York Daily News, U.S. Military Academy Flight 253 en route from Amsterdam to December 31; Washington Post, December 31 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Detroit, Michigan. His explosives did not West Point, NY 10996 detonate properly, allowing passengers December 30, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Phone: (845) 667-6383 to subdue him. Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Militants kidnapped two French Email: [email protected] Peninsula claimed credit for the failed journalists, their translator and driver in Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ attack. – AFP, December 26 Kapisa Province. – Reuters, December 31

* For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 December 25, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): December 30, 2009 (IRAQ): A car bomb The Taliban released a video showing and a suicide bomber exploded at a Bowe Bergdahl, a U.S. soldier captured by government building in Ramadi, killing at insurgents on June 30, 2009. According least 27 people and wounding the Anbar to the Los Angeles Times, “Bergdahl had Province governor. – Financial Times, not been heard from since July 19, nearly December 31 support three weeks after his capture.” – Los Angeles The Combating Terrorism Center would Times, December 25 December 30, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemeni like to express its gratitude to its financial authorities arrested Mohammed Abdu supporters, for without their support and December 26, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Saleh al-Haudali, who they identified shared vision of the Center products like Authorities found the beheaded body of an as “one of the most dangerous terrorists the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If anti-Taliban Salarzai tribal elder in Bajaur wanted by the security forces.” – CNN, you are interested in learning more about Agency of the Federally Administered December 31 how to support the Combating Terrorism Tribal Areas. – AFP, December 26 Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. December 31, 2009 (PAKISTAN): The edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at December 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): United Nations announced that it will West Point’s Association of Graduates at Militants blew up the home of a withdraw some of its staff from Pakistan, 845-446-1553. government official in Kurram Agency of citing increased safety concerns as a result the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, of Taliban attacks. – Reuters, December 31 killing the official and five members of his family. Sarbraz Saddiqi, his wife and four children died while sleeping when the house was destroyed with dynamite. – BBC, December 27 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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