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El Viaje De La Muerte”1

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El Viaje De La Muerte”1 Informe de la ONG británica Reprieve que sacó del anonimato muchas historias de presos de Guantánamo y cómo EEUU los compró “El viaje de la muerte”1 Más de 700 prisioneros fueron enviados ilegalmente a Guantánamo con la ayuda de Portugal Reprieve, 28 de enero de 2008 Traducido del inglés para Rebelión por Germán Leyens La organización británica Reprieve muestra de modo concluyente que territorio y espacio aéreo portugueses han sido utilizados para transferir a más de 700 prisioneros para ser torturados y encarcelados ilegalmente en Guantánamo. Mediante la comparación de registros de vuelo obtenidos de las autoridades portuguesas,2información del Departamento de Defensa de EE.UU. mostrando fechas de llegada de prisioneros a Guantánamo, y testimonios no confidenciales de los propios prisioneros, 3 Reprieve puede identificar por primera vez a 728 prisioneros enviados a Guantánamo pasando por la jurisdicción portuguesa. La investigación también muestra que Portugal ha jugado un papel sustancial de apoyo en el programa general de entregas [‘extraordinarias’]. Por lo menos nueve prisioneros transportados pasando por la jurisdicción portuguesa fueron severamente torturados en prisiones secretas en todo el mundo antes de su llegada a Guantánamo.4 Vuelos de entregas de prisioneros a Guantánamo pasando por jurisdicción 1 Definición de Adil Zamil, prisionero transportado en el Vuelo RCH108Y que pasó por jurisdicción portuguesa hacia Guantánamo: “Llamo el viaje a Guantánamo ‘El viaje de la muerte.’ Discretamente estuve deseando que el avión se cayera para terminar con el dolor que sentía.” Fuente: “Kuwaiti Gitmo Detainees Speak Out about Abuse” [Detenidos en Guantánamo hablan del abuso], de Rania El Gamal, Kuwait Times, 1 de diciembre de 2006 2 Registros de vuelo obtenidos por Ana Gomes, miembro del Parlamento Europeo, en 2006 revelan que aviones cruzaron en por lo menos 94 ocasiones el espacio aéreo portugués en camino a, o desde, Guantánamo entre 2002 y 2006. En por lo menos 6 ocasiones los aviones de entregas volaron directamente desde Lajes en las Azores a Guantánamo. Vea el apéndice para copias completas de los registros. 3 El Departamento de Defensa de EE.UU. ha publicado registros “ingresados al proceso” de reclusos en Guantánamo, detallando cuando los prisioneros fueron pesados y medidos por primera vez al ingresar a la prisión. Es posible confirmar las identidades de prisioneros transportados a Guantánamo a través de jurisdicción portuguesa comparando las fechas “ingresados al proceso” de prisioneros en particular retenidos en Guantánamo con vuelos contenidos en los registros de vuelo portugueses. Esta investigación revela que de 774 registrados como habiendo sido pesados en Guantánamo, 728 fueron transportados en avión pasando por jurisdicción portuguesa en por lo menos 28 vuelos. Vea registros del Departamento de Defensa de EE.UU. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/measurements/index.html 4 Por ejemplo, el cliente de Reprieve Binyam Mohamed, quien había sido previamente sometido a 18 meses de tortura en un sitio clandestino marroquí, que incluyeron repetidos cortes en su pene con navajas de afeitar y amenazas de violación, electrocución y muerte, y Hassan Bin Attash, un niño que fue transferido a Guantánamo, quien había sido retenido en Jordania durante dos años donde sufrió horribles torturas, incluyendo que lo colgaron cabeza abajo y lo golpearon repetidamente en las plantas de sus pies. 1 portuguesa Los registros de vuelo revelan por lo menos 48 vuelos de los militares de EE.UU. y de la CIA que pasaron por jurisdicción portuguesa en camino a Guantánamo, en la lista detallada más adelante.5 Para listas completas de prisioneros a bordo de esos aviones, vea más adelante. 111/1/2002 RCH7502 de la Base Aérea Morón (España) 214/1/2002 RCH076y de Incirlik (Turquía) 316/1/2002 RCH077y de Incirlik (Turquía) 417/1/2002 RCH178y de Incirlik (Turquía) 520/1/2002 RCH317y de Incirlik (Turquía) 621/1/2002 RCH180y de Incirlik (Turquía) 77/2/2002 RCH071y de Incirlik (Turquía) 89/2/2002 RCH074y de Incirlik (Turquía) 911/2/2002 RCH481y de Incirlik (Turquía) 1013/2/2002 RCH485y Incirlik (Turquía) 1115/2/2002 RCH486y Sin código ICAO para el aeropuerto 1226/3/2002, ELD5110 (Electra Airlines), de Santa Maria (Azores) 131/5/2002 RCH705y de Incirlik (Turquía) 143/5/2002 RCH108y de Incirlik (Turquía) 155/5/2002 RCH711y de Incirlik (Turquía) 168/6/2002 RCH781y de Incirlik (Turquía) 1710/6/2002 RCH784y de Incirlik (Turquía) 1812/6/2002 RCH787y de Incirlik (Turquía) 1914/6/2002 RCH790y de Incirlik (Turquía) 2016/06/2002 RCH793y de Incirlik (Turquía) 2118/6/2002 RCH796y de Incirlik (Turquía) 225/8/2002 RCH233y de Incirlik (Turquía) 2328/10/2002 RCH184y de Incirlik (Turquía) 2428/10/2002 RCH319y de la Base Aérea Rota Nava (España) 2524/12/2002 PAT65 de Lajes (Azores) 267/2/2003 RCH191y de Incirlik (Turquía) 2723/3/2003 RCH191y de Incirlik (Turquía) 289/5/2003 RCH594y de Incirlik (Turquía) 2918/7/2003 RCH918y de Incirlik (Turquía) 3023/9/2003 N313P (Premier Executive Transport Services) de Rabat (Marruecos) 3122/11/2003 N313P (Premier Executive Transport Services) de Rabat (Marruecos) 3223/11/2003 RCH901y de Incirlik (Turquía) 333/12/2003 N379P (Premier Executive Transport Services, Inc.) de Rabat (Marruecos) 348/3/2004 RRR6868 (UK Royal Air Force) de Brize Norton (Inglaterra) 35 12/3/2004 N8068V (Premier Executive Transport Services) de Rabat (Marruecos) 3626/7/2004 FAF4050 (French Air Force) de Evreux (Francia) 3731/7/2004 N85VM (Richmor Aviation Assembly Point AV) de Santa Maria (Azores) - LPAZ 38 8/9/2004 N8068V (Premier Executive Transport Services) de Mitiga, Libia 39 19/9/2004 RCH948y de Incirlik (Turquía) 4020/9/2004 RCH947 de Lajes (Azores) 4114/3/2005 RCH914y de Lajes (Azores) 5 La mayoría de estos vuelos tenían indicativos RCH que indicaban que pertenecían al Comando de Movilidad Aérea, un importante comando (MAJCOM) de la Fuerza Aérea de EE.UU., con su central en la Base Aérea Scott, en Illinois. Vea el Apéndice con los registros originales de vuelo. 2 4220/4/2005 RCH950y de la Base Aérea Rota Nava (España) 4322/7/2005 RCH925 de Lajes (Azores) 4422/8/2005 RCH924 de Lajes (Azores) 458/9/2005 N248AB (Prime Jet LLC) de Santa Maria (Azores) 468/11/2005 RCH985 de la Base Aérea Morón (España 4710/2/2006 RCH919 de Rabat (Marruecos) 487/5/2006 RCH957 de Lajes (Azores) Casos analizados – prisioneros entregados a Guantánamo con ayuda del gobierno portugués a. Sami Muhideen AlHaj, ISN 345, nacional Sudanés transportado a bordo del vuelo RCH790y el 14 de junio de 2002 de Incirlik, Turquía, cruzando jurisdicción portuguesa Sami Muhyideen alHaj, periodista de Al Jazeera, originario de Sudán6, fue capturado el 15 de diciembre de 2001, mientras iba a su puesto en Afganistán. Sami fue capturado originalmente porque EE.UU. pensó que había filmado una entrevista con Bin Laden, una ‘afirmación’ que resultó ser totalmente falsa, como reconoce ahora EE.UU. Pero EE.UU. siguió reteniendo a Sami porque quería que dijera que Al Jazeera, sus empleadores, tenían vínculos con al Qaeda. Se ha negado tenazmente a hacerlo. Sami voló de Kandahar a Guantánamo. Durante el último trecho de su vuelo, los soldados no lo dejaban dormir. Lo despertaban aproximadamente cada 15 minutos. Cuando Sami llegó a Guantánamo, descubrió el motivo por el cual lo habían privado de sueño. En cuanto aterrizó lo llevaron para interrogarlo. Los soldados querían que estuviera exhausto. Un prisionero que iba a bordo del mismo vuelo que Sami al Haj describe su viaje como sigue: “Las condiciones del vuelo fueron horribles. Nuestras manos y pies iban sujetos con grilletes, teníamos tapaorejas, una máscara sobre la cara y gafas sobre los ojos, y las gafas estaban cubiertas de pintura para que no pudiésemos ver nada y nos colocaron mitones. Perdí varias veces el conocimiento por la falta de oxígeno. Y el vuelo duró 28 horas.”7 El 7 de enero de 2007, Sami al Haj comenzó una huelga de aire en protesta pacífica contra su detención sin acusación o juicio. La reacción de los militares de EE.UU. fue atarlo a una silla, introducir un tubo de plástico de 100 cm. por sus fosas nasales, y 6 “Ingresado al proceso” en Guantánamo el 14 de junio de 2002 7 Aiat Vahitov: Cageprisoners Interview, December 21, 2005 http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/theguantanamotestimonialsproject/testimonies/prisoner- testimonies/aiatvahitovcageprisonersinterview 3 bombear nutrientes líquidos. Extrajeron por completo el tubo antes de una segunda ingestión, más tarde ese mismo día. Aunque este proceso hace que la huelga de hambre sea indescriptiblemente dolorosa, la huelga de Sami sigue hasta hoy. b. Binyam Mohamed, ISN 1458, residente británico8, transportado a bordo del vuelo RCH948Y el 19 de septiembre de 2004 desde Incirlik (Turquía) cruzando jurisdicción portuguesa o a bordo del vuelo RCH947 el 20 de septiembre de 2004 desde Lajes, territorio portugués de las Azores. Binyam Mohamed nació en Etiopía, donde su familia era perseguida. A los 14 años llegó a Londres buscando asilo. Vivió en North Kensington durante cinco años. En el verano de 2001, Binyam abandonó el Reino Unido para viajar. En abril de 2002, camino a casa, fue arrestado por las autoridades de inmigración paquistaníes. En julio de 2002 fue entregado a los estadounidenses que lo metieron en un avión jet y lo llevaron a Marruecos donde sufrió 18 meses de tortura en un sitio clandestino donde su maltrato incluyó repetidos cortes en el pene con una navaja. “¿Qué clase de tortura hacen en este sitio?” pregunté a uno de los guardas” “Llegan enmascarados y te pegan. Te pegan con bastones. Te violan primero, luego toman una botella de vidrio, le quiebran el cuello y te obligan a sentarte encima.”9 Después de meses de tortura en Marruecos Binyam fue llevado en avión, en enero de 2002, a la Prisión Oscura en Afganistán donde sufrió otros 5 meses de tortura.
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