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SR & G SHIPPING REGULATIONS & GUIDANCE

Lifeboat Release and Retrieval Systems (LRRS) September 2016

Summary

Accidents involving survival and rescue craft are a continuing source of concern within the maritime industry. Various regulatory amendments have been made in recent years, many of which have addressed on-load release mechanisms in an attempt to prevent further occurrences. However, recent accidents on board the ‘Harmony of the Seas’ in September 2016 (one dead, four injured) and on board the ‘Norwegian Breakaway’ in July (one dead, three injured) show that fatal accidents are continuing to occur, commonly during training and drills. Accidents have involved not just the hooks themselves, but also the entire lifeboat release and retrieval system (LRRS), including the wires, as well as unsound procedures followed by those involved.

The main causes of such accidents include: • Lack of adequate training and knowledge • Unfamiliarity with equipment • Inadequate risk assessment and planning • Systems not yet modified in accordance with SOLAS regulation III/1.5 • Incorrectly or poorly maintained systems.

Quite often these accidents involve qualified and experienced seafarers, and it is essential therefore that the safety lessons

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance learned from accidents involving lifeboat systems are passed on. An awareness of the current regulatory requirements and the available guidance concerning the use of lifeboats is important, as it ensures that appropriate on board procedures and training are then applied and followed. Accidents

Accidents involving survival craft are one of the main causes of injuries and fatalities at sea. A 2001 study by the UK Government found that, in the preceding ten-year period, 16% of all lives lost on merchant were attributable to lifeboat systems and that 87 people had been injured working with lifeboats. In 2014, the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch, in its annual report, stated that the single largest location where death and injury occur on board is the deck (23 casualties out of 142 for the year). Listed below are some of the more serious examples of survival craft accidents from the last 20 years at sea.

‘Iolcos Grace’

9 November 1998

Release hook opens while lowering lifeboat – 1 dead, several injured.

During a lifeboat drill on the ‘Iolcos Grace’, while lowering the lifeboat, the forward hook released with the operating lever still in its stowed position.

The boat then swung vertical and the aft hook also released, causing the boat to fall into the water and resulting in a fatality and several injuries.

‘European Highway’

1 December 2000

Four crew injured as lifeboat falls from Ro-Ro ferry

The ‘European Highway’ was berthed in Zeebrugge, where her port lifeboat had been swung out and lowered slightly with three men on board. The weight of the lifeboat was being taken on ‘hanging-off’ pendants.

The operating lever of the suspension hook release mechanism was activated, resulting in the lifeboat falling into the water. Two crew were trapped underneath the lifeboat, with a third falling into the water alongside. The Second Officer was subsequently injured from the rapid rotation of the FRC davit’s hand-winding lever.

‘Gulser Ana’

17 October 2001

Release hook opens, suspending lifeboat and throwing crew into the water – 1 serious injury

The Turkish bulk carrier ‘Gulser Ana’ underwent a Port State Control inspection by MCA surveyors on 16 October 2001. 37 deficiencies were found, resulting in the vessel being detained. On the morning of 17 October 2001, two crew were tasked with freeing up and greasing the releasing hooks on the starboard lifeboat while it was in the water, as these had been found seized during the inspection the day before. Having freed and greased the forward hook, the crew discovering that the aft hook operating rod had sheared and they used a lashing to secure the hook in the closed position to allow the lifeboat to be hoisted.

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance The Chief Engineer and the Chief Officer were then called to inspect the operation of the hooks. The Bosun raised the lifeboat to the embarkation deck with the two crew on board. Here, the Chief Officer joined the crew in the lifeboat to inspect the work, shortly after which the forward hook released without warning. The forward end of the boat dropped, leaving it suspended vertically from the aft fall.

The two crew and the Chief Officer were thrown into the water. The two crew pulled the unconscious Chief Officer to the surface and kept him afloat until they were all picked up by a pilot .

‘Galateia’

26 January 2002

Lifeboat fell 19 m – 3 crew injured with 1 serious head injury

A class surveyor had boarded the ‘Galateia’ to carry out an ISM safety audit. When the surveyor required a lifeboat drill to be carried out, the Master, accompanied by the Chief Officer and four crew, boarded the port lifeboat.

The lifeboat was lowered to the water and taken for a run to test the engine. The lifeboat was returned to the falls and was reconnected. When the lifeboat had been returned to the embarkation deck, two of the crew disembarked, leaving the others to stow the lifeboat in the davits.

Just as the Chief Officer moved the release gear operating handle into the stow position, both the hooks opened and the lifeboat fell 19 metres, striking the deck as it went. It landed in a partially capsized position with one of the entrance doors underwater. The Chief Officer and one of the ABs suffered bruising, while the other AB had a serious head injury and was unconscious underwater for a time.

The cause of the accident was the crew’s lack of knowledge of the lifeboat system and failing to engage a locking pin.

‘Lowlands Grace’

7 October 2004

Lifeboat hooks released – 2 dead, 3 injured

The ‘Lowlands Grace’ arrived at an anchorage off Port Hedland in Western Australia on 6 October 2004. At 15:00 LT on 7 October, the ’s crew mustered at the port lifeboat station for a lifeboat drill. The port lifeboat was lowered to the boat deck and four of the crew were selected to act as the lifeboat crew under the command of the third mate.

After the crew had entered the lifeboat and were seated with their seat belts fastened, the third mate operated the remote descent cable from inside the lifeboat. When the boat had descended 2 to 3 metres, he released the cable, bringing the boat to a stop with a jerk. At this point, the crew on deck heard a bang and then saw the lifeboat’s stern start to fall, now detached from its fall.

The boat continued to swing forward and rotate around the forward hook until it had described an arc of between 200 to 220°. The forward hook then released and the lifeboat fell upside down into the sea some 16 metres below. All five of the boat crew were injured in the fall, with two dying from their injuries.

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance ‘Sea Urchin’

22 May 2006

Release hook opens during lifeboat recovery – 1 dead, 4 injured

While at anchor in the Bay of Sept-Îles, an abandon ship drill was carried out on board the bulk carrier ‘Sea Urchin’. During recovery of the starboard lifeboat, the aft hook release gear mechanism opened. The forward mechanism, unable to take the full load, also opened. The lifeboat then fell 11 metres, stern first, into the sea, killing one crew member and injuring the other four.

‘Valparaiso Star’

28 August 2007

Release hooks failed – 2 dead

The Bahamas-registered ‘Valparaiso Star’ was docked at Setubal, Portugal where an abandon ship drill was ordered. It began at 07.45. By 08.15, five crew members were on board the lifeboat. The Coxswain started lowering from inside the lifeboat. Like many seafarers, he didn’t entirely trust the system so he had a crewmember on deck controlling the brake.

Two minutes later, the lifeboat davits reached the outboard rest position. There was a loud bang and the stern of the lifeboat dropped as its on-load release hook failed. The boat fell stern first towards the water, causing the forward hook fixings to be ripped away. The lifeboat now lay upside down, with 2 of her crew dead, and was not reached for a further 15 minutes.

MV ‘Louise Russ’

3 January 2011

Accidental release – 1 serious injury

During a routine drill, the vessel’s freefall lifeboat was accidentally released. It was found that the incident occurred when one of the lifting hooks of the winch caught the lower side of the lifeboat stern. This device lifted the lifeboat over its davit locking mechanism and the boat released. An AB was seriously injured as a result of falling from height, off the stern of the boat onto the poop deck.

It was determined that a lack of safe on-board procedures and a failure to perform the drill in the correct sequence led to the incident occurring.

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance ‘CMA CGM Christophe Colomb’

15 April 2011

Missing pin – 2 dead, 1 injured

The container ship ‘CMA CGM Christophe Colomb’ was alongside in the Chinese port of Yantian. A test of the starboard lifeboat was carried out with three persons on board (an officer, a cadet and AB). During the recovery phase of hoisting, the forward pulley block contacted the davit and the swivel broke away from the linking devices to the quick release hook. The lifeboat fell 24 metres landing upside down. The officer on board died instantly, the cadet shortly after and the AB received serious injuries.

The causal factor of the incident was found to be a missing pin from the swivel screw nut, which had allowed it to disconnect from the release hook. This had gone unnoticed since the construction of the vessel. The weakness of the securing structure was found to be an aggravating factor.

‘Anna Maersk’

27 March 2012

Damaged split pin – 1 dead, 1 injured

The container ship ‘Anna Maersk’ was alongside in the Japanese port of Kobe. The vessel carried out a routine rescue boat drill. Two crewmembers entered the boat at the embarkation level for lowering down. The jaw end of the swivel connected to the hook then failed, due to a damaged split pin. The boat fell 18 metres to the sea. One crew member was killed instantly and the other sustained severe injuries.

‘Thomson Majesty’

10 February 2013

Failure of lifeboat wire – 5 dead, 3 injured

The ‘Thomson Majesty’ was moored in Las Palmas and carried out a general emergency and lifeboat drill. Three lifeboats were lowered and run into the water.

The were then recovered. During the hoisting of one of the lifeboats, with 8 persons on board, the forward wire rope falls parted. This caused the lifeboat to swivel on the aft hook, which in turn failed. The lifeboat fell 20 metres to the sea, turning upside down.

One crew member was ejected from the lifeboat and two managed to escape the lifeboat, despite their injuries. Five crew members died inside the lifeboat and were recovered by divers.

The safety investigation found that the wire rope fall had parted because of pre-existing corrosion and absence of lubricant. Seawater and contaminants had penetrated the inner core and corroded the strands. The wire had not been maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and the correct grease had not been applied in periodic maintenance.

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance ‘Nagato Reefer’

9 April 2014

Unintentional release of lifeboat – 1 injured

The refrigerated cargo vessel ‘Nagato Reefer’ had carried out an abandon ship drill as part of a Port State Control inspection. The life boat had been returned to the boat deck, but fell from its davit whilst being secured. One crewman was injured as result. The subsequent investigation found that the accident had occurred because the lifeboat’s forward lifting hook had opened as the boat was being secured. This was because it had not been correctly reset when lifted from the water. Some of the key safety issues cited were poor crew competence, inadequate maintenance of safety equipment, a failure to communicate and a lack of effective training in the maintenance and use of the ship’s lifesaving appliances.

‘Westport’

21 November 2014

Incorrect fall wire – 1 dead, 2 injured

The ‘Westport’ carried out a boat drill whilst at anchor in the Elbe river. The vessel’s rescue boat was lowered into the water and hoisted again several times with three crew members on board. During the final hoist, the wire rope parted. The boat fell from height into the water. Two crew members were recovered with serious injuries. One crewmember died.

The investigation concluded that an undersized, incorrect wire rope had been used. The fall wire attached to the hook had corroded over time. In addition, the limit switches had been deliberately bypassed, which placed additional forces and caused the wire to fail.

‘Thomson Celebration’

10 June 2015

Crewmember caught by hook – 1 injured

The cruise ship ‘Thomson Celebration’ was outside the port of Hvar, Croatia and was carrying out tendering operations. The accident occurred during unlashing of one of the tender boats. When the forward gripe wire was removed, the hook caught the AB and swung open, causing him to subsequently lose his finger. It was stated that the immediate cause of the accident was tension in the gripe, which was not slackened off prior to release of the pelican hook.

The accident report highlighted the need for proper training, familiarisation and supervision. Furthermore, a review of launching instructions should occurred, with a briefing before the operation.

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance IMCA Safety Flash

October 2015

Failure of lifeboat release hook mechanism

In October 2015, the IMCA reported a near miss involving failure of a lifeboat release hook mechanism. The incident occurred during post-maintenance testing of the vessel’s davit brake. It was reported that the forward release hook opened, which resulted in the lifeboat being suspended on its fall preventer devices. Had the devices not been fitted, the boat would have fallen to the sea.

The investigation found that the cable and hook had failed, probably due to its age, time in service and the inability to adequately monitor its condition. It was unclear whether the hook was incorrectly reset or had failed under load. The hook was of an old type and had not been modified or replaced in accordance with the new requirements for on-load release systems.

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance Development of regulations

The requirement for on-load release hooks

Norway’s worst offshore accident occurred in March 1980, when the ‘Alexander Kielland’ capsized in the North Sea’s Ekofisk field, killing 123 of the 212 persons on board.

A number of deaths in that accident were attributed to the fact that the lifeboats had no means of release when their weight was on the hook and falls. On-load release systems were seen as a solution to this.

July 1986 – SOLAS Amendments

Amendments to SOLAS introduced a mandatory requirement to fit on-load release hooks for lifeboats and rescue boats to remedy the inability to release a lifeboat when there is weight on the hook and lifeboat falls. This requirement brought about a situation where manufacturers developed a number of inventive release mechanisms resulting in many of the on-load and off- load release hooks being over-complicated.

June 1996 – International Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) Code

Adoption of the International LSA Code by IMO Resolution MSC.48(66) amended Chapter III of SOLAS by requiring a ‘special mechanical protection’ to be fitted to new ships, rather than the earlier ‘adequate protection’, as a preventative measure against the possibility of accidental or premature release of lifeboat hooks.

May 2002 – Number of lifeboat accidents discussed at MSC

MSC 75 considered the high number of accidents involving lifeboats in which crew were injured, sometimes fatally. While the Committee considered the problem further, MSC/Circ.1049 was issued to draw the industry’s attention to the matter.

May 2004 – Lifeboat emergency training

MSC 78 adopted amendments to SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 19 (Emergency training and drills) and Regulation 20 (Operational readiness, maintenance and inspections), concerning the conditions in which lifeboat emergency training and drills should be conducted and introducing changes to the operational tests to be conducted during weekly and monthly inspections, so as not to require the assigned crew to be on board in all cases (the amendments entered into force on 1 July 2006).

May 2006 – Servicing and maintenance of on-load release gear

MSC 81 approved guidelines to implement the 2004 SOLAS amendments: Guidelines for periodic servicing and maintenance of lifeboats, launching appliances and on-load release gear and Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats (MSC.1/Circ.1206; while MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1, issued in 2009, updated the guidelines).

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance December 2006 – Changes for launch provisions of free-fall lifeboats and requirement for safer on-load release mechanisms

MSC 82 amended SOLAS Regulation III/19.3.3.4 concerning provisions for the launch of free-fall lifeboats during abandon ship drills, to allow, during such drills, for the lifeboat to either be free-fall launched with only the required operating crew on board, or lowered into the water using the secondary means of launching without the operating crew on board, and then manoeuvred in the water by the operating crew. The LSA Code was also amended to require safer design of on-load release mechanisms (hooks) of lifeboats (the amendments to SOLAS and the LSA Code entered into force on 1 July 2008).

May 2008 – Requirements to be authorized as a service provider of on-load release gear

MSC 84 approved the Interim recommendation on conditions for authorization of service providers for lifeboats, launching appliances and on-load release gear (MSC.1/Circ.1277).

June 2009 – Use of fall preventer devices (FPDs)

IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee approves Guidelines for the fitting and use of fall preventer devices (FPDs) MSC.1/Circ.1327. It was emphasised that FPDs are only to be considered as an interim risk mitigation measure and are only to be used in connection with existing on-load release hooks, and that wires or chains should not be used as FPDs as they do not absorb shock loads.

February 2010 – Guidelines agreed to replace unsafe lifeboat release mechanisms

IMO’s Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE) agrees guidelines to replace unsafe lifeboat release mechanisms. These ‘Guidelines for evaluation and replacement of lifeboat on-load release mechanisms’ ensure release mechanisms for lifeboats are replaced with those complying with new, stricter safety standards. This includes a need for the hook and locking mechanism to remain fully closed under any operational conditions until it is intentionally opened by means of its operating mechanism. Such release hooks will be made mandatory, but until such time IMO recommends the use of FPDs.

May 2010 – IMO approves Guidelines for evaluation and replacement of lifeboat on-load release mechanisms

These guidelines were approved at IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee 87th session in May 2010. They cover amendments to the revised Recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances, which concern test procedures for lifeboat hooks. Also agreed were the format of: • Amendments to the International Life-Saving Appliances Code, recommendations on testing of LSAs • amendments to SOLAS that will require lifeboat release mechanisms that do not comply to be replaced by a ship’s next scheduled dry-docking following its entry into force.

May 2011 – Guidelines and amendments adopted for on-load release mechanisms

The Maritime Safety Committee met at its 89th session and the IMO Guidelines (from MSC 87) for evaluation and replacement of lifeboat on-load release mechanisms became mandatory, contained within MSC.1/Circ.1392.

The Committee adopted MSC Resolution 317(89), introducing new requirements under SOLAS regulation III/1.5 for Lifeboat Release and Retrieval Systems (LRRS). The requirements apply to on-load release mechanisms installed on all type of ships, i.e. both new and existing cargo and passenger ships.

The Committee also adopted MSC/Resolution 320(89) and 321(89). These contain amendments to the Life Saving Appliances (LSA) Code requirements and for the testing and approval of LRRS.

January 2013 – IMO regulations as now applicable

SOLAS regulation III/1.5 entered into force on 1st January 2013. It requires that, for all ships, on-load release mechanisms (LRRS) not complying with paragraphs 4.4.7.6.4 to 4.4.7.6.6 of the LSA Code, as amended by resolution MSC.320(89) (hereinafter called “the LSA Code”), be replaced or modified not later than the next scheduled dry-docking after 1 July 2014, but not later than 1 July 2019.

In accordance with MSC.1/Circ.1392, it is still strongly recommended that vessels with on-load release systems be equipped with FPDs, until either:

1. the vessel’s LRRS is on the IMO list of accepted LRRS (having passed the MSC.1/Circ.1392, published after 1st July 2013) and has a ‘Factual Statement’ from the Manufacturer to confirm that the system on board is of the same type as those in the MSC.1/Circ.1392 evaluation (see paragraph 3.4) or, 2. replaced with a new LRRS approved to Res. MSC.320(89). 3. There is therefore a period of adjustment with regard to on-load release systems meeting the new requirements, which will not be fully implemented on all vessels until 1 July 2019. In the meantime, it is critical that mariners are fully aware of their ship systems, their method of compliance with the regulations and importantly the guidance concerning safe testing, launching and recovery of lifeboats.

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance Recommended guidance for on-board operations

Persons involved

According to SOLAS Regulation III/10, ‘A deck officer or certificated person shall be placed in charge of each survival craft to be used’, where this person is ‘a person who holds a certificate of proficiency in survival craft issued in accordance with the requirements of the STCW Code’.

It is essential therefore that the person in command of the survival craft be duly certificated. However, it is even more important that they and the other persons involved in the operation are fully aware of the systems they are using and of the procedures involved. This includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. a thorough and competent knowledge of the type of hook system and how to safely use it by all persons involved. This may require clarification from the lifeboat manufacturer by reference to diagrams and manuals. 2. the full operational procedure to be discussed, depending on the nature of the drill and test, including the completion of each stage of the operation and the specific tasks for each person involved. 3. ensuring that only the minimum number of persons are in the craft in order to carry out the operation safely and effectively. 4. c ommunication requirements between persons involved, including the need to use only the working language of the vessel and the need for clearly stated orders. 5. additional training must be in place so that crew members are familiar with the systems on board. If needs be, ship-specific procedures should be consulted and reviewed (in compliance with the ISM Code and LSA manual on board).

Carrying out the operation

Before any operation is carried out, it is fundamental that a risk assessment is conducted and a permit to work carried put in place as appropriate (such information is contained, for example, in the UK Code of Safe Working Practices). This should include the necessary confirmation that the people involved understand how to use the equipment safely, in particular safe operation of the on-load release mechanism, before the operation commences.

Furthermore, a thorough inspection of the LRRS should take place. It should be confirmed that the equipment is well maintained and ready for operation. This should include visual inspection of the davit system, including the hook arrangement, the fall wires and the moving parts, confirming their adequate greasing, maintenance and that they are free from damage, corrosion and obstruction. Depending on the design of the vessel, it is important that the use of safety harnesses is considered for personnel carrying out external inspections. The use of fall preventers for the lifeboat itself should be ensured as confirmed in the IMO guidance. The procedures for launching and recovery should be followed in the correct order.

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance Systems should then be reset as specified. In order to prevent accidental release, it is fundamental that hook systems are correctly reset in accordance with the manufactures instructions.

MSC.1/Circ.1206 provides guidance on ‘Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats’ and should be referenced prior to the operation. Individual flag States may also have their own guidelines and requirements for lifeboats, as well as rescue boats. For example, the US Coast Guard require that all on-load release hooks used in both rescue boats and lifeboats are assessed in accordance with MSC.1/Circ.1392. The UK government has published MGN 541 and MGN 540 on ‘Life-Saving Appliances – Lifeboats and Rescue Boats’. Companies should ensure that their seafarers receive adequate onboard training regarding the dangers and safe use of equipment. Such training and procedures should be detailed within the vessel’s Safety Management System (SMS) as required under the ISM Code.

Summary

To prevent the continued occurrence of accidents involving lifeboats and rescue craft, it is fundamental for vessels to ensure regulatory compliance and possess a thorough understanding and familiarity of the systems involved. Training should focus on the correct use of the lifeboat systems prior to operations being carried out. In addition, prior to all operations, a detailed visual inspection should be undertaken, not just of the hooks, but also of the davit, wires, falls and all other equipment associated with the operation.

References

International Maritime Organization, Circulars and Resolutions as cited.

Accident Reports, for vessels as cited from respective investigation authority.

SOLAS and the LSA Code.

MGN 541, UK Government, ‘Life-Saving Appliances – Lifeboats and Rescue Boats – Evaluation and Replacement of Lifeboat Release and Retrieval Systems (LRRS)’, October 2015.

MGN 540, UK Government, ‘Life-Saving Appliances – Lifeboats and Rescue Boats – Fitting of ‘Fall Preventer Devices’ to Reduce the Danger of Accidental Hook Release, October 2015.

CG-ENG Policy Letter, US Coast Guard, Release Mechanisms, No. 01-14 March 4, 2014

On-load release hooks in lifeboats and rescue boats, Loss Prevention Material, GARD, 2016.

Safety Study 1/2001, Review of Lifeboat and Launching Systems’ Accidents, UK MAIB.

Annual Report, 2014, UK MAIB.

Harry Harris Technical Advisor Marine Compliance & Regulations

September 2016

Witherby Publishing Group - Shipping Regulations & Guidance